A VIRTUOUS CYCLE:

TRACING DEMOCRATIC QUALITY THOUGH EQUALITY

A Dissertation

by

ASHLEY DYAN ROSS

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2010

Major Subject: Political Science

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Approved by:

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ABSTRACT

A Virtuous Cycle:

Tracing Democratic Quality through Equality. (August 2010)

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This dissertation asks the question: *How do democracies improve in quality?* Building on previous scholarship, the author offers a theoretical framework that traces democratic quality through equality of outcomes. The quality of democracy may be conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the procedural aspects of democracy motivate politicians to expand equality. This broadening of substantive opportunities outcomes, in turn, deepens democracy by developing individual-level political participation. The theoretical framework is applied to the context of public services with the expectation that quality democracies with high government capacity more broadly distribute basic public services and that this pattern of provision cultivates political participation.

The first empirical analysis tests if the quality of democracy and government capacity are associated with reduced service inequalities for a sample of 75 countries. It is found that while equalities of education and sanitation services are significantly related to democratic quality, healthcare is not, nor is government capacity shown to

play a significant role. To further explore this, the Mexican states are analyzed for the years 2000 to 2004; the results show that capacity in terms of tax collection efforts is associated with lower inequalities in education services in states with high electoral competition.

The second empirical analysis turns to the local level of government - where services are delivered. Using original data from interviews and government records of four Mexican municipalities, the author examines the aspects of democracy and government capacity that are correlated with lower inequalities of public services. The findings highlight that intense electoral competition and institutionalized channels of citizen input as well as capacity in terms of sound collection of municipal taxes and innovations in municipal funding are characteristics of governments with broader distribution of basic public services.

The third empirical analysis tests if public services are related to individual-level political participation. Employing survey data from Latin America and Africa, the author finds that “good” public service evaluations are associated with greater likelihoods of voting in high quality democracies - those with intense electoral competition - but limited government capacity. This offers evidence that in a developing context, public services enable political participation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I understand democracy as something that gives

the weak the same chance as the strong.

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

The study of democracy has moved from analysis of democratization or the transition from an authoritative to democratic regime to the exploration of the causes and consequences of deepening democracy. This is largely because over 78% of the world's nations are considered democratic in one form or another (Freedom House 2009).[1] Therefore, our concentration as political scientists and policy-makers has shifted from how to become a democracy to how to deepen democracy. From regions such as Latin America where democratic practices have ebbed and flowed to cases where democracy is struggling as in most of Africa or newly emerging as in Iraq, the most important question we can ask is: *How can we improve the quality of democracy?*

This dissertation follows the style of *The Journal of Politics.*

[1] Freedom House 2009 reports: 89 of 193 countries are "free" and 62 are "partly free", totaling 78% free or partly free regimes. Freedom House also reports 119 countries are classified as "electoral democracies".

To explore pathways to improving democracy, we must begin with a good understanding of what we mean by "quality of democracy". Unfortunately, while is it clear that studying this is important, what we understand as quality of democracy is much more muddled. Scholars and citizens have varying ideas of what this term means.

There is not a scholarly consensus regarding the definition of quality of democracy. Broadly there are two perspectives: procedural and substantive. The procedural approach focuses on the most fundamental institutions and practices necessary for democratic politics, including contestation, participation, and basic political rights. The substantive perspective emphasizes the importance of incorporating outcomes into our conceptualization of democratic quality, particularly underscoring the importance of social, political, and economic equality. While both approaches agree that there is a basic set of criterion to assessing the quality of democracy, they drastically diverge on the specifics, particularly with treatment of substantive outcomes.

Scholars are not the only ones that have divergent ideas of what democracy means. Popular conceptions of democracy are just as varied. The World Values Survey (5^{th} wave: 2005-2007) reports that individuals view democracy in political, economic, social, and religious terms. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents that considered the item in question to be an "essential characteristic of democracy". Topping the list is *civil rights and liberties*, specifically equal political rights for women

as men, people choose leaders in a free election, civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression, and people can change laws in referendums. Following these characteristics, individuals identified *rule of law* and *economic characteristics* to be essential elements of democracy, including punishment of criminals as well as economic prosperity, state aid for unemployment, and taxing the rich to give to the poor. What individuals consider to be not essential characteristics of democracy is equally revealing about popular meanings of democracy. A third of respondents considered army takeover of government in the case that the government is incompetence and religious authorities' interpretation of law as unessential to democracy, showing a prioritization of rule of law as well as a value of separation of church and state.



Figure 1: Popular Ideas of Democracy

Both scholars and citizens recognize that defining the quality of democracy involves consideration of the procedures or the necessary conditions and institutions for democracy as well as the outcomes of these. We can group such items as rule of law, popular election of leaders, and the changing of laws with referendums along with political contestation and popular participation can all be considered basic aspects of democratic institutions and practices. Civil rights and liberties, women's equality, and redistributive economic practices such as state aid for unemployment and the reallocation of wealth can all be considered under the umbrella of equality. What becomes confounding is how we mesh procedural criterion with substantive outcomes, explicitly equality, in assessing democratic quality. We know that the inclusion of basic democratic rules and behaviors are required in our conceptualization of democratic quality. For example, examining the extent to which free and fair elections exist in a country is fundamental to democratic quality. What is unclear is whether or not we must also consider substantive outcomes. Is a small gap between the rich and poor, for example, absolutely necessary for a country to be a high quality democracy?

Some scholars argue that substantive outcomes are needed to fully understand and measure democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell and Iazzetta 2004); others maintain that they confuse cause and consequence (Hill 1994). I contend that both procedure and substantive may be incorporated into our conceptualization of democratic quality without losing the distinction between the two.

And I offer a basic framework tracing one to the other that is empirical testable across multiple countries and time points.

The quality of democracy may be conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the procedural aspects of democracy motivate politicians to expand equality. This broadening of substantive outcomes, in turn, improves democracy by developing opportunities for political participation. The cycle runs from quality of democratic procedures to equality and back again.

Electoral competition motivates politicians to implement reforms whose benefits are inclusive of the larger citizenry. To gain a broader support base in the face of high political competition, politicians seek to reduce inequalities in political, social, and economic areas of individuals' lives, which expand their opportunity to be active democratic citizens. Sufficient education and health are needed to participate fully in a democracy. These are obstructed by poverty, illiteracy, lack of health and education services - all of which must be addressed to improve democracy. The broadening of social welfare benefits, advancement of civil liberties, and reduction of economic inequalities expands opportunities for political participation as substantive outcomes are realized, and increased participation feeds back into the democratic process. Higher levels of political activity deepen political competition as parties and politicians vie for political support. Increased political participation incorporates sectors of society that

may have been previously marginalized into the political process, thereby enhancing the democraticness of the policy-making process.

I apply this theoretical framework to the context of public services. I test each part of the cycle with three separate but related studies drawing on data from around the globe and capitalizing on information from national, state, and local governments as well as individual citizens. In all, the findings support that a virtuous cycle exists between democratic quality and equality in public services. Electoral competition is positively related to reduced inequalities in basic services, and in turn public services motivate individual political participation.

Plan of Dissertation

The dissertation begins in Chapter II with the theoretical foundations of the virtuous cycle mentioned above. First we review the procedural and substantive components of democracy, with particular emphasis given to the debate within the scholarship as to how to incorporate the two in the analysis of democratic quality. We explore this debate, and the virtuous cycle framework is offered as a way to bridge the gap between the two approaches. The specifics of the theoretical framework are outlined, including the components of democracy adopted, the role of government capacity in mediating the relationship of democracy and public service equality, and the theoretical motivations for reducing inequalities. Because of the endogenous nature of

the virtuous cycle, several empirical implications are mentioned, then how I apply this framework to public services is detailed, namely the working hypotheses are discussed.

Chapter III tests the first part of the virtuous cycle running from democratic quality to equality in public services. Because this hypothesized association builds heavily on the findings of work studying regime type and public service spending, we first review this literature. Following this, we consider the variables used in the analysis to model public service inequalities as a result of democratic quality, government capacity, and country wealth. The data used are taken from surveys that offer subnational measures of education, healthcare, and sanitation services. An inequality measure is built from this information. We then move on to discuss the methods to estimate the model and the results of this estimation. While equalities of education and sanitation services are significantly related to democratic quality, healthcare is not, nor is government capacity shown to play a significant mediating role. To further explore the association of democracy, government capacity, and public service equality, we explore the results of time-series model using data from the 31 Mexican states for the period 2000 to 2004. These findings illustrate that high quality democracies coupled with high levels of government capacity are associated with lower inequalities in education services. To examine this relationship on the level of government where services are delivered, we move on to Chapter IV that offers analysis of public services in four Mexican municipalities.

Chapter IV unpacks the democracy-equality link by examining in-depth what specific aspects of democracy and government capacity are correlated with lower inequalities of public services. Four Mexican municipalities are analyzed - two large and two small municipalities. Using data from interviews and government records on fiscal management and public service delivery, we again see that equality in public services is linked to high quality democracies with sufficient government capacity. In particular, we find that intense electoral competition, institutionalized channels of citizen input (beyond traditional voting), and the incorporation of communities into the service delivery process are attributes of high quality democracies. High levels of technical expertise and experience, sound collection of municipal taxes and user fees, and funding innovations are characteristics of governments with high capacity. In all, we are given a more nuanced story of the virtuous cycle in Chapter IV. Specific municipal institutions and practices directly related to expanding equalities in public services are explored.

While the previous two chapters test how democracy affects equality, Chapter V tests the reverse, examining how public services deepen democracy through individual political participation. This chapter begins with a discussion of the theoretical link between public services and political participation, teasing out the different effect of basic services on individual capacities in the developing versus developed world. Using survey data from Latin America and Africa, we test how public service evaluations affect the probability of voting and protest. Modeling political participation as a result

of services as well as country-level quality of democracy-government capacity and individual characteristics ranging from political interest to levels of education, we find that “good” public service evaluations are associated with greater likelihoods of voting in high quality democracies with limited government capacity. This offers evidence that in a developing context, public services enable individuals with the capacity needed to politically participate, and this political participation enhances democracy from the bottom-up.

In all, this project is an attempt to reconcile the literature on democratic quality and move it forward by offering a theoretical framework that may be broadly applied to a myriad of substantive outcomes. I have applied it to the context of public services and believe that the following studies offer considerable evidence that a virtuous cycle indeed exists between the quality of democracy and the equality of public services. It is my hope that this study may spur additional analyses that point to democracy as a way to reduce inequalities. In this sense we may be able to achieve Ganhdi’s idea of democracy as being something that gives the weak the same chance as the strong.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORETICAL LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY

Democratic theory is highly value-laden. The concept of democracy is fundamentally linked to normative ideas. As Sartori asserted, "What democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy should be. A democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring it into being...in a democracy the tension between fact and value reaches the highest point, since no other ideal is further from the reality in which it has to operate" (1962: 4). Scholars have struggled to deal with the conflict between what democracy *is* and what it *should be*, particularly in conceptualizing and identifying paths to improving the quality of democracy.

Some scholars approach democratic quality in purely minimalist terms, choosing to conceptualize democracy as political contestation, participation, and basic political rights. Others have incorporated civil rights and liberties as well as a variety of socioeconomic outcomes into their assessment of democracy. I offer a theoretical framework that builds on this scholarship to trace the quality of democracy from its procedural roots to the substantive opportunities and outcomes it produces. Specifically, I follow the virtuous cycle link between democracy and equality and apply it to the context of equality of public services. It is my hope that this framework is a start to reconciling the divide among scholarship on what democracy is and should be.

Before outlining how scholars have treated these components of democratic quality and my theoretical framework, it is important to clarify what I mean by democracy. Following Dahl (1971), I consider democracy to be an ideal form of government. Regimes that have opened up to political contestation and participation may be thought of as "polyarchies" - to use Dahl's terminology. Polyarchies are incompletely democratized regimes "that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (Dahl 1971: 8). Conceiving of democracy in these terms allows us to conceptualize a scale of democraticness where polyarchies are situated according to their inclusiveness and political contestation - higher levels move a regime closer to the ideal point of a true democracy.

Rather than use the awkward term of polyarchy and be bound to reference of levels of democraticness to indicate how close a regime is to the ideal of democracy, I adopt the convention of using the term "quality of democracy". Quality of democracy is representative of Dahl's continuous conceptualization of polyarchies and allows us to speak of democracy in terms of liberalization. A higher quality democracy is one with higher levels of contestation and participation; a lower quality democracy is lacking in these characteristics. Moreover, using the concept quality of democracy to refer to Dahl's polyarchies maintains that democracy in its truest form is an ideal. In other words, we may use quality of democracy to speak in terms of grades with the idea that

true democracy - complete inclusion of every citizen in politics and perfect political contestation among groups - is rarely if ever attained.[2]

In adopting Dahl's conceptualization of democracy, it is evident that I consider political contestation and participation as the defining characteristics of democracy. Scholars agree with this (Hill 1994; Vanhanen 2000); however, some add political rights and civil liberties to the criteria (Gasiorowski 1996; Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002), and others incorporate substantive outcomes as a critical element of the quality of democracy (O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005).

The chapter proceeds as follows. First we review the concepts and measures that scholars have adopted in relation to democratic quality, paying particularly attention to the divide among procedural and substantive approaches. Then we move on to discuss the theoretical framework that I have constructed from this scholarship, which I refer to as the "virtuous cycle" between democracy and equality. A broad outline of this frame is presented with emphasis on its applicability to numerous areas of study. Finally, we explore the empirical implications of the virtuous cycle frame, and I sketch out the way I apply it to the context of public services.

[2] A final point: while some scholars use the term democratization to refer to quality of democracy or degrees of democracy (for example Hill 1994), I consider democratization to denote the transition of an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime.

Quality of Democracy: Concepts and Measures

In conceptualizing the quality of democracy, scholars have delineated between the institutions and procedures necessary for a democratic regime to exist and the substantive outcomes of democratic politics. Political contestation, popular participation in politics, and basic political rights comprise the components of procedural democracy. Substantive outcomes involve equality, including the fair distribution of income and the broad provision of economic and social welfare. The following section explores each component, beginning with political contestation, then moving on to political participation, political rights and civil liberties, and finally ending with a discussion of equality as the substantive outcome of democracy.

Political Contestation

Political contestation is the hallmark of a democratic regime. Contestation is the extent to which citizens are able to freely organize into competing political groups to express their policy and political preferences. Dahl (1971) asserts two requirements related to contestation for a regime to be democratic: 1.) citizens have the opportunity to formulate preferences and 2.) citizens have the opportunity to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government. Free and fair elections satisfy the second requirement while political party competition fulfills the first.

Elections are the vehicle of political contestation in a democracy. Elections are the mechanism by which citizens select their nation's leaders and signal preferred policy directions. Elections also allow citizens to recall politicians that they judge to be unsuccessful. Moreover, elections give politicians strong institutional incentives to respond to public preferences. To be "free and fair" elections at a minimum must be inclusive by permitting all adults the right to vote (Dahl 1971). In addition to this requirement, elections should be free from corruption and fraud.

While elections are a necessary requirement of democracy, scholars agree that they alone are not sufficient to categorize a regime democratic. Healthy political competition among groups is also necessary to aid citizens in formulating and aggregating their policy preferences and to offer citizens choices in political leadership. In short, political competition is needed to make elections meaningful. Political competition is most effectively channeled as political party competition because parties best aggregate and transmit political preferences (Hill 1994: 54). Parties fulfill functions and undertake political activities, such as organizing elections, recruiting candidates, and publicizing issues, that we would not want the government to undertake but that "must be carried out if we want democracy to exist to any degree" (Hill 1994: 54). Therefore, for elections to be meaningful we must have competition among political groups, namely parties.

Many scholars have conceptualized political contestation as political party competition (Hill 1994; Vanhanen 2000; Altman and Perez-Liñán2002). Hill (1994) measures democratic quality as the degree of party competition in the 50 American states' legislatures. He adopts the Ranney index of state party competition that takes into account opposition party votes won, seats held in the upper and lower legislatures, and governorship terms. Altman and Perez-Liñán (2002) also examine party competition as a proxy for quality of democracy. They focus on opposition access to power as a key component of competition, arguing that measures of democratic quality must take into account opposition access to the legislative process by punishing excessive dominance of the ruling party while not rewarding dominance of the opposition. They base their measure of the opposition's access to power on the weighted difference between the share of the seats of the government and the opposition parties in the lower chamber.

Political contestation is the most fundamental component of a democracy and varies considerably not only among countries but also across time and space. Free and fair elections and political party competition make political contestation possible and meaningful for individual citizens. A nation would be considered a high quality democracy if elections include all the adult population and are free from fraud and are conducted in a context of high political competition among political parties.

Popular Participation

While it would seem that contestation is the minimal condition for defining a democratic regime and the quality of that regime, scholars argue that consideration of participation is also necessary (Hill 1994; Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994; Vanhanen 2000; Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002). Certainly, universal suffrage is necessary to make elections truly free and fair. Beyond inclusiveness of all the adult population, the levels of mass participation are important for democratic politics and our assessment of quality of democracy because they shape politics and political responses as well as reflect the effectiveness of political institutions.

On the most basic level, "political party competition is imbued with far more policy relevance if the public is active" (Hill 1994: 132). Political competition and contestation is meaningless if popular participation is lacking. Voting and political activities signal policy preferences and shape political issues to match citizen concerns.

Mass participation also compels politicians and political leaders to respond to popular demands and concerns. "Greater participation - whether it is voluntary or encouraged by compulsory vote - makes democratic governments responsive to a larger share of the population" (Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002: 88). Electoral incentives that constrain politicians and make political behavior predictable are stronger when a large proportion of the population participates. Politicians that compete in a political

arena where most of the citizenry are active are more compelled to be responsive to voter preferences in order to secure future support for themselves or their party.

Participation is also reflective of democratic institutions. Hill contends, "…participation levels are not a product of political culture, of satisfaction with, apathy towards or alienation from the political system. The influence, instead, of political institutions and laws means that turnout rates are determined by procedural aspects of the political regime" (Hill 1994: 12). Political institutions take a variety of forms and their outcomes largely depend on their configuration. Dahl (1998) outlines eight institutions that are necessary for citizen participation in a democracy: 1.) freedom to form and join organizations; 2.) freedom of expression; 3.) right to vote; 4.) right of political leaders to compete for support (and votes); 5.) eligibility for public office; 6.) alternative sources of information; 7.) free and fair elections; and 8.) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971: 3). The manner in which these institutions are configured matters for democratic politics. For example, we can imagine a regime where individual right to vote, join organizations, and freedom of expression are strongly guaranteed and enforced alongside weak institutional incentives to make government policies depend on votes. In this scenario, it is likely that voters will be less inclined to participate politically because their expressed preferences are not transmitted into policy. We can see from this simple example that participation is a result of institutional characteristics

of the political regime. Participation, therefore, is reflective of the quality of democracy.

Political participation is a critical factor of assessing democratic quality. Mass political activity ensures that politics are relevant to popular concerns and compels politicians to be responsive. Levels of political participation are also a yardstick for the effectiveness of democratic institutional arrangements. High levels of participation are indicative of truly democratic institutions and of high quality democracies.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

In addition to political contestation and participation, political rights and civil liberties are critical components of democratic quality. Although we commonly use political rights and civil liberties interchangeably, there are distinctions among the two. Political rights "make possible vigorous political participation and competition" and include the rights to vote, form political parties, and stand for office (Diamond and Morlinio 2005: xi). Civil rights belong to every citizen and are not connected to the administration of government (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2). These rights include "personal liberty, security, and privacy; freedom of thought, expression, and information; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association, and organization", to name a few (Diamond and Morlino 2005: xi). Political rights are those individual rights necessary to be a democratic citizen; civil liberties expand the

opportunities available to democratic citizens. Citizens must have sufficient political rights to be able to meaningfully cast a vote. However, having equal social status as a minority citizen, for example, is not necessary for democratic politics to take place but does expand the political opportunities available to minority citizens and the democraticness of society as a whole. Another way to conceptualize political rights and civil liberties is that political rights are procedural - needed for democratic politics to function - and civil liberties are substantive - contributing to the development of democracy.

There are a myriad of political rights and civil liberties and varying degrees of state respect for each, which represent different points on the conceptual continuum of democratic quality. When assessing the quality of democracy, we must decide how to handle political rights and civil liberties. There are numerous options, but scholars have tended to take two approaches - procedural and substantive. The procedural approach involves treating political rights separately from or as a component of political contestation and participation and classifying civil liberties as a substantive outcome of democratic quality. The substantive approach combines political rights and civil liberties into one component of democratic quality.

Scholars that have taken the procedural approach recognize that a certain degree of political rights are entailed in political contestation and participation. Freedom to form political parties and freedom of speech and organization, for example,

must be maintained for a democracy to have high levels of both contestation and participation. Some scholars model these freedoms separately from political contestation and participation (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994; Gasiorowski 1996) while others (Dahl 1971; Hill 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 2000) opt to exclude political rights as a separate dimension of the quality of democracy with the idea that political rights necessary to democratic politics are represented in the concepts and measures of contestation and participation. This approach does not incorporate civil liberties - as defined above - in the quality of democracy.

Other scholars (Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002), however, chose to evaluate civic rights and political liberties as a joint category in addition to political contestation and participation, claiming that state guarantees for these are important components of our assessment of democratic quality. This approach involves the inclusion of substantive dimensions of democratic quality. For example, Altman and Perez - Liñán (2002) include political rights and civil liberties in their measure of democratic quality. They adopt the Freedom House rating of a nation's political rights and civil liberties, which includes several substantive components. Freedom House scores are based upon expert surveys of each nation. The political rights and civil liberties ratings assess a nation's respect for basic political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly as well as equality of adult suffrage. In addition to these fundamental political freedoms, Freedom House evaluations of a nation's political rights and civil liberties include the following substantive considerations: media independence, religious group freedoms,

electoral conduct that expands political rights, accountability of government, corruption of political officials, academic freedom, freedom of individuals from war and conflict, minority group and women's equality, freedom of foreign travel, property rights, and state control of the economy (see http://freedomhouse.org). While this approach creates a rich scale of democratic quality, it is limited in its empirical utility due to the numerous outcomes encompassed in the category of political rights and civil liberties. It is difficult - and empirically flawed - to take a democratic quality indicator based on this approach and test specific substantive outcomes of the same.

Although political rights and civil liberties are tightly associated with concepts of democracy, the empirical treatment of these varies. Some scholars assert that political rights are encompassed in political contestation and participation and that civil liberties are an outcome of democratic quality. Therefore, they model the procedural aspects separately from civil liberties, considering the former as a component of democratic quality and the latter as a result of improved democracy. Other scholars deem political rights *and* civil liberties to be a joint component of quality of democracy and include empirical measures of these in their ranking of regime type. Regardless of the empirical treatment of political rights and civil liberties, it is clear that a high quality democracy guarantees basic political rights.

Equality

Equality is a critical dimension along which the quality of democracy varies (Rueschmeyer 2004). Equality may be understood as the distribution of benefits across a population; the broader the distribution, the more equality exists. Political, social, and economic equality encompasses the breadth of substantive opportunities and outcomes that scholars consider in the evaluation of democratic quality. Political equality such as equality of minority group representation and of women's rights is encompassed under the umbrella of substantive political rights and civil liberties. Social equality refers to welfare and human development, particularly education, health, and individual well-being (Sen 1999; O'Donnell 2004). Sen (1999) terms these "social opportunities" and considers the advancement of these to enhance individual substantive freedom - freedom from restrictions of poverty and underdevelopment. Economic equality involves the leveling of individual and household incomes and economic resources (Rubinson and Quinlan 1977; Weede 1982; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1998). Scholars recognize that these substantive opportunities and outcomes have important consequences for stabilizing and furthering democratic regimes.

Citizens and governments are also deeply concerned with equality. Many democratic constitutions acknowledge and guarantee social rights including education and health care, and some are explicit about these guarantees such as the Last

Constitutional Treaty of the European Union. These constitutional guarantees reflect citizen values and policy preferences. The 2005-2007 wave of the World Values Survey reports that 49% of respondents answered "equality above freedom" when asked what they value more (WVS 5th wave; n=972). Recent events around the globe also reflect the importance of equality to average citizens. In our own country, the equity of healthcare is one of the predominant topics of political discourse. In developing regions, equality has framed presidential elections and protests. The re-elected Bolivian President Evo Morales stated in his 2009 inaugural speech that his victory was not only for Bolivians but also for all of those that seek social equality around the world. In the same year, violent protests in South Africa have erupted over the lack of adequate public services such as water, sanitation, and electricity in municipalities.

With the indisputable importance of equality for democracy, scholars have incorporated equality into their assessment of democratic quality. As mentioned above many studies focus on equality as a result of democratic quality. A recent trend of scholarship incorporates equality into the conceptualization and measure of quality of democracy. O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta (2004) attempt to do this in their book *The Quality of Democracy*. O'Donnell argues for a conceptualization of democratic quality as the distance between political institutions and substantive outcomes. For example, if every vote is counted equally but individuals are subjected to extreme poverty, O'Donnell considers this poor democratic quality because these citizens lack sufficient autonomy to formulate political preferences. This approach focuses on

human agency as a fundamental element of citizenship. Human development of individual capacities are central to the exercise of political rights in a democracy; agency "can only be exercised if the individual has basic conditions or capabilities" such as an adequate standard of living (Karl page 187). As Ippolito puts it, O'Donnell's "innovative idea is that the violation of the conditions necessary for agency to exist and its impact of the effectiveness of citizenship *define* the degree or quality of democraticness of the political regime" (page 172).

In the second part of the book, Vargas Cullell explores O'Donnell's conceptualization of democratic quality with findings from a citizen audit of democracy. The Costa Rican State of the Nation Project (Gutiérrez and Vargas Cullell 1998) was a civic forum involving citizen surveys, focus groups, legal analyses, and a panel of academic, social, and political leaders to address quality of democracy standards. The resulting democracy audit concludes that "the quality of democracy is not a general attribute of the whole democratic system but rather the accumulated effect of institutional performance and citizen interaction on multiple fronts" (Vargas Cullell page 97). For example, the audit revealed that social development, particularly on the local level, was associated with quality of democracy for citizens. While Costa Rica's universal health care system and legal recognition of social rights paves the way for social development, progress is uneven across localities. Citizens that interact with local governments in a context of poor social development and little economic growth perceive democratic quality as low while those in more progressive contexts view

democracy as of higher quality. In the context of high inequalities, democracy is lacking for citizens living in these conditions despite national social and welfare development. The point is: equality shapes what democratic quality means in substantive terms to everyday citizens.

Clearly, equality is an important component of the quality of democracy. Scholars, citizens, and governments recognize that democracy is intrinsically linked to political, social, and economic conditions and outcomes. While some scholars chose to conceptually and empirically separate equality from democratic institutions and practices (i.e. contestation and participation), others have made compelling arguments for the incorporation of equality in our theoretical framework and measurement of democratic quality.

At a Divide?

It seems that scholars are situated in two camps with regards to the study of democratic quality: procedural and substantive. The first emphasizes the most fundamental institutions and practices necessary for democratic politics, including contestation, participation, and basic political rights. The second underscores the importance of equality - political, social, and economic - for democratic quality. Both approaches are critical to fully understanding the quality of democracy and identifying

paths to building sustainable democracies, but neither truly advances our study of democratic quality.

Adhering to a truly procedural conceptualization of quality of democracy ignores the substantive aspects of democracy that are critical to defining democracy for most citizens. On the other hand, incorporating these substantive outcomes into our idea and measurement of democratic quality often ventures into murky waters. It is becomes very difficult to sort out causes and effects, means to ends. For example, while O'Donnell puts forth a compelling argument for why equality should be incorporated into our assessment of democratic quality, he fails to provide an empirical path to do so. More troubling, it is not clear how governments may improve the quality of democracy in specific terms. Furthermore, he neglects to adequately separate out the procedural aspects of the democratic quality - institutions, contestation, participation - and instead prefers to lump, as Przeworski, et al (2000) puts it, "all good things together". While we are given an innovative conceptualization of democratic quality, we have no practical way to put it to use and cannot escape problems of endogeneity.

Furthering complicating the divide scholarship has created among procedure and substance is the conflict that arises between defining and assessing quality of democracy solely in procedural terms and the recognition that equality is the means to improve the quality of democracy. Many scholars (Dahl 1971; Hill 1994; Przeworski,

Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 2000) choose to study democratic quality in terms of procedure rather than substance - and for good reasons. Procedures - contestation, participation, political rights - are more easily measured than substantive outcomes. Moreover, endogeneity problems arise, such as those discussed above with O'Donnell's argument, from incorporating substantive outcomes, namely equality, into the concepts and empirics of democratic quality. However, the choice of procedure over substance does not address the fact that many of these same scholars explicitly or implicitly acknowledge that expanding equality improves democratic quality. Dahl, the founder so to speak of procedural democratic concepts, asserts that "the procedures ensuring equal opportunity to participate are dependent on the substantive equalization of resources" (Gordon 2001: 27).[3]

Given this conflict and the state of the scholarship on democratic quality, we must ask - are we at a divide? Must we make a choice between the procedural and substantive approaches? Not necessarily. Diamond and Morlino (2005) offer us a solution. They define quality of democracy in procedural and substantive terms, making a clear distinction between the two. They offer five procedural dimensions: 1.) rule of law, 2.) participation, 3.) competition, 4.) vertical accountability, and 5.) horizontal accountability. In addition, they offer two substantive dimensions: 6.) respect for civil and political freedoms and 7.) progressive implementation of greater political (and underlying it social and economic) equality. The final dimension links democratic

[3] In reference to *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Dahl 1985).

procedure and substance: 8.) responsiveness. Government responsiveness ensures that public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences.

Diamond and Morlino give us a framework that incorporates both procedure and substance into our assessment of democratic quality without muddling one with the other. But, we still have a problem - how do we empirically trace the concepts? A series of comparative studies are offered by the editors to empirically assess their conceptual framework of democratic quality. While these cases are illustrative, they fail to provide us with clear measurements of the concepts at hand. On this Diamond and Morlino admit their shortcomings, arguing that their framework "implies a pluralist notion of democratic quality", that there are "tradeoffs and tensions among the various dimensions of democratic quality", and that "democracies will differ in the normative weights they place on the various dimensions of democratic quality (for example, freedom versus responsiveness)" (page xii). They assert: "There is no objective way of identifying a single framework for measuring democratic quality, one that would be right and true for all societies" (page xii). If we are left without a single framework for democratic quality, are we back at our divide?

I contend that we do not have to abandon an empirical exploration of democratic quality in both procedural *and* substantive terms. If we return to the basic assumptions of democratic quality - that contestation and participation are at the heart of democratic politics and that equality is a substantive outcome of and contributor to

democratic quality - then we can trace the quality of democracy through procedure and substantive outcomes. By doing so, we also have a framework that articulates what scholars agree upon - expanding equality improves democratic quality.

Conceptualizing Democratic Quality as a Virtuous Cycle

I offer a theoretical framework that bridges the divide between procedural and substantive approaches by conceptualizing democratic quality as a virtuous cycle that begins with the procedural aspects of democracy to produce substantive opportunities and outcomes. Building on past scholarship (O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005), I assert that democracy in terms of political contestation and participation results in equality. In turn, expanded equality increases individuals' capacity to politically participate, which contributes to the development of democracy. To explore this theoretical frame, I trace the quality of democracy through public service provision in three separate but related analyses.

Overview of Theoretical Framework

The quality of democracy may be conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the procedural aspects of democracy generate substantive opportunities and outcomes that in turn affect democracy. Specifically, democracy in terms of contestation and

participation affects equality, and equality feeds back into democracy, as shown in Figure 2. Democratic competition and participation compels politicians to pursue the expansion of equality; these policies are implemented effectively through sufficient government capacity. In turn, the broadening of equality improves democracy by developing opportunities for political participation.

Following Dahl (1971), Hill (1994), and Vanhanen (2000) I adopt two procedural dimensions to define democratic quality: political contestation and participation. Healthy political contestation ensures that citizens have options in choosing political leaders and policies, and healthy political participation indicates that citizens are engaged in their political system, thereby making democracy meaningful. I choose to exclude political rights as a procedural dimension and instead assume that sufficient political freedoms are encompassed in participation. Higher levels of participation indicate that most citizens have the right and opportunity to be politically active.



Figure 2: The Quality of Democracy as a Virtuous Cycle

I contend that the translation of democracy into equality is conditioned by government capacity. Democracy is limited in what it may achieve by its state's capacity (Tavares de Almeida 2004: 213). In other words, government capacity is needed for effective policy implementation. Policies are made by politicians and political leaders whom in a democracy are cued by citizens' expressed preferences. Without sufficient government capacity, policy outputs do not become the intended outcomes and citizen input is lost. On this Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1997) note, "The greater the state's capacity to implement policies effectively, the greater the degree to which citizens' mobilization and participation will translate into influences on social outcomes, certeris paribus." (1997: 328). While is it important to include government capacity in the theoretical framework, it is equally important to conceptually separate government capacity from democratic procedures. Making the mistake to include the former as a component of the later bases democratic quality on "performance criteria that often have little or nothing to do with democraticness" (Plattner 2005: 79).

In sum, the first part of the virtuous cycle links sufficient and high levels of democracy and government capacity to greater equality. In a competitive democracy with high levels of participation, policies to address inequalities, particularly those of education and basic standards of living, emerge. The quality of government capacity determines how effectively these policies are implemented and ultimately how effectively inequalities are reduced.

Why equality as the result of democracy and government capacity? Equality is a broad concept that may be applied to a myriad of specific opportunities and outcomes that are of concern to scholars and policy-makers, including economic disparities, political discrimination, and gaps in standards of living. Beyond this utility, it is clear that equality is important to government leaders and citizens. Surveys (World Values Survey) and anecdotal evidence points to the reduction of poverty, lack of education, and poor sanitation and water conditions as chief concerns of average citizens all over the world. Finally, expanding equality is a clear path to improving the quality of democracy. Diamond and Morlino (2005) note: "For those who lack effective political skills and resources - be it because of poverty, illiteracy, discrimination, or other forms of marginalization - democracy is always liable to be seen as lacking quality. Leveling such inequalities, giving a voice to the voiceless, and bringing all citizens more fully into the arenas of civic participation and political competition remain the most enduring and difficult challenges for the deepening of democracy." (2005: xi).

How democracy is translated into equality brings us back to political contestation and participation. Policies to reduce inequalities are the results of political choices that stem from citizens' expressed preferences. No government will independently reduce inequalities because these policies are redistributive and costly. Breaking from the "endogenous, self-reinforcing political process" of inequality requires: (1) the powerful to "see that it is in their interests to implement reforms whose benefits are more inclusive", or (2) "the balance of power in the political process

shifts in a manner that enhances the relative power of other groups" (Echeverri-Gent 2009: 635). While electoral competition may encourage the former, the latter generally is accomplished when the poor, lower classes or autonomous groups such as trade unions and political parties representing this social stratum - usually the left - are mobilized (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997; Diamond and Morlino 2005). Huber, Nielson, Pribble, and Stephens (2006) find that a left-leaning balance of power in the legislature is associated with lower inequality. Similarly, Beal (2009) argues that the presence of a large high skilled labor force induces welfare spending in democracies.

Reducing inequalities in political, social, and economic areas of individuals' lives expands their opportunity to be active democratic citizens. Sufficient education and health, the ability to mobilize, and the freedom from clientelistic influences[4] are all needed to participate fully in a democracy. These are obstructed by poverty, illiteracy, lack of health and education services - all of which must be addressed to deepen democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005). These obstacles pose serious challenges to political participation in developing countries. And it is particularly in this context that the reduction of inequalities has the greatest effect on expanding political participation. In the developed world, many of these obstacles have long been overcome. While

[4] Ippolito (2004) in his comment on O'Donnell's substantive framework for democratic quality notes that reducing socioeconomic inequalities are imperative for citizen autonomy from clientelistic handouts. Citizens that severely lack resources are likely to be persuaded by clientelistic goods, essentially trading their electoral support for economic benefits. Reducing socioeconomic inequalities improves the quality of democracy in this context by giving citizens the opportunity to be free from a patron's influence and freely chose political leaders based on their political beliefs, not economic necessity.

equality may be historically linked to political participation in developed cases, today it is in the developing world where the expansion of equality can affect political participation.

The broadening of social welfare benefits, advancement of civil liberties, and reduction of economic inequalities expands opportunities for political participation, and increased participation feeds back into the democratic process. Higher levels of political activity deepen political competition as parties and politicians vie for political support. Increased political participation incorporates sectors of society that may have been previously marginalized into the political process, thereby enhancing the democraticness of the policy-making process. In all, expanding equality develops political participation, which *de facto* improves the quality of democracy.

In sum, I contend that there is a virtuous cycle between democracy and equality. Democratic contestation and participation - mediated by government capacity - are translated into the expansion of social, political, and economic equality. In turn, increased equality broadens individual political opportunities that feed back into democracy through political participation. Improving the quality of democracy lies in the reduction of inequalities and hinges on political participation.

Empirical Notes Regarding the Virtuous Cycle Framework

There are several empirical caveats to clarify regarding the theoretical framework presented above. One, this framework conceptualizes democratic quality as continuous; each component may be expressed - in abstract and empirical terms - in degrees. Second, this framework should be understood as a story of improving democracy, not as a tool for assigning values of democratic quality to nation-years. The virtuous cycle is about tracing the quality of democracy through equality. Democratic quality is conceived as a process that is about the struggle to determine social and economic policies and to shape the distribution of benefits across groups (Diamond and Morlino 2005: xxvii), not as a static regime characteristic.

Three, the relationship between democracy and equality as well as government capacity and equality is assumed to be curvilinear. High and low levels of democracy are theorized to be associated with low levels of inequality. The same applies to government capacity. This is due to the nature of equality. By definition equality indicates fairness, evenness, sameness. Undemocratic governments with little capacity are likely to produce policy outcomes that are equal in nature but limited in quantity and quality. Disparities among society are small because there is little to go around. Figure 3 illustrates these curvilinear relationships.

Four, the virtuous cycle framework builds in endogeneity. Participation is endogenous to democracy and vice-versa. Democracy in procedural terms includes

participation, and the outcome of democracy is ultimately participation as a result of expanded equality. It is important to tread carefully with the empirical estimation of these relationships. One way to deal with the endogeniety is to model the cycle as a system of equations; however, this method requires a greater degree of certaintiy of the existing relationships. Because I am testing this theoretical framework for the first time, I choose to model the virtuous cycle in separate pieces and test for reciprocal causation. This method allows us to tease out the causal relationships that exist and be more confident in the empirical results.



Figure 3: The Curvilinear Relationship of Democratic Quality and Equality

Five, expanding equality as a substantive result of democracy conceptually means broadening benefits to reach more of the population. We can easily imagine benefits as a pie, and distributing the pieces equally means dividing the whole into even parts. Conceptually equality is straight-forward; empirically, equality becomes problematic. I suggest using subnational data to measure gaps between the benefits received by sectors of society as an indicator of equality. Possible data sources include state or local government reports, agency reports for regional operations, and individual-level survey data that may be aggregated to a geographical unit. Measuring equality is important because it allows us to trace the virtuous cycle in practice and empirically test its tenants. While previous scholarship has asserted the necessity of equality in our assessment of democratic quality (O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004), we were not given a clear method to empirically do so. Measuring equality as the difference of benefits distributed across geographical units gives us a way to incorporate this substantive outcome into our empirical study of democratic quality.

Tracing Quality of Democracy through Public Services

The purpose of this study is to explore how democratic quality may be improved by equality. I trace the quality of democracy specifically in terms of the equality of public services. Basic public services including education, healthcare, sanitation, and clean water are essential to building the individual capacities needed of a democratic

citizen (Sen 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005). Uneducated, unhealthy individuals are unable to fully participate in politics because they lack the political skills and resources to do so. Building on past studies that assert an association of democracy and levels of/ spending on public services (Sloan and Tedin 1987; Brown and Hunter 1999; Przeworski, et al. 2000; Kaufman and Segura 2001; Ghoborah, et al. 2004; Brown and Hunter 2004; Avelino, et al. 2005; Stasavage 2005; Huber, et al. 2008), I contend that higher quality democracies more equally distribute basic public services. In turn, I assert that these services encourage political participation.

To test how public services contribute to the quality of democracy, I explore empirical associations of democracy, government capacity and service equalities on the global level using national aggregate data. Because public services are largely the responsibility of local governments all over the world as a result of decentralization policies, I also examine the same relationships on the local government level using case studies. I hypothesize the following:

1. Higher quality democracies distribute public services more equally than do lower quality democracies.

2. Better government capacity in conjunction with quality democracy results in more equal provision of public services.

I also explore how the provision of public services affects political participation. I examine the relationship between evaluations of public services and political

participation using individual-level survey data for Latin American countries. I separately model this relationship for countries with high democracy and high capacity and those with low democracy and low capacity as well as combinations of the two. I assume that good evaluations of public services indicates that an individual has received the service, consumed the service, and benefits from the service. Poor evaluations indicated the opposite. I hypothesize:

3. Good evaluations of public services increases political participation.

These three analyses test the virtuous cycle by separating it into testable, but related parts. Approaching the study of democratic quality in this manner gives us a comprehensive picture of one way to improve the quality of democracy through the provision of basic public services. In the following chapters, we gain traction on how democracy and government capacity are linked to equalities in public service provision on both the national and local government level. In addition, we explore the individual side of the story by examining how public services are related to political participation. In all, this project is a rigorous test of the theoretical framework I have offered and demonstrates that equality is a critical component of democratic quality by tracing the outcomes of democracy on public service distribution and the consequences of public services on democratic participation.

CHAPTER III

A GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC QUALITY, GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, AND EQUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

Equality, to borrow Hill's phrasing, represents "the *promise* of democracy" - "what we hope will be the consequence of having a truly democratic government"(Hill 1994: 5). To trace how the promise of democracy is achieved, we turn to the theoretical framework offered in the previous chapter - the framework I term "the virtuous cycle" between democracy and equality. The first part of the cycle asserts a theoretical relationship between democratic quality and equality in terms of substantive outcomes. To test this association, we focus our attention on one particular type of equality - public service distribution. This chapter presents the first analysis of the relationship between democratic quality and public service equality.

To test the virtuous cycle presented in the previous chapter, we begin by examining the first link running from democracy to equality. Specifically we start with hypothesis 1 and 2 that assert higher quality democracies more equally distribute basic pubic services than lower quality democracies and that government capacity is needed for high quality democracies to achieve this end. Because the first part of the virtuous cycle builds heavily on the literature linking regime type with social welfare spending and outcomes, the first section of this chapter reviews this work. This literature

generally links democracy with spending on services. I make the case that we should consider equality of public services rather than spending. Following this, the model used to test the relationship between democratic quality and equality is outlined, including variable measurement and methods. Next the empirical results are presented of this model as well as an additional model that examines the correlation of democratic quality and public service equality over subnationally and overtime. In all, the findings support the hypotheses by showing that the quality of democracy is positively related to public service equalities and that government capacity does play a role in this association in some cases.

Regime Type and Public Services: Past Research and the Case for Inequality

Studies examining the relationship between democracy and public services have soundly linked regime type with spending on or levels of education, healthcare, and social services. Higher quality democracies tend to spend more on public services and in turn have more educated and healthy populations than lower quality democracies or non-democratic regimes. Politicians are motivated by electoral competition to broadly distribute public services in order to secure bases of support; higher quality democracies are typically more competitive, therefore we see more spending on and greater levels of education, healthcare, and social services in these regimes.

Why public services? Studies have shown that the provision of basic public services is what citizens want (Brown 1999; Grindle 2000; World Bank Report 2004), and theorists like Sen assert that it is what individuals need to be effective democratic citizens. Basic public services are critical for "effective participation" in political activies (Sen 1999). Access to and consumption of public services equips citizens with the health and skills needed to participate politically. Basic healthcare, clean water, and adequate sanitation ensures that individuals are capable to politically participate.

While studies have soundly linked regime type to spending on or levels of basic public services, they have largely neglected a more nuanced story of regime type and public services that hinges on the patterns of service distribution. If politicians in democracies are truly motivated by electoral incentives, we should see more uniform patterns (or lower inequalities) of service provision in higher quality democracies. Political candidates provide services in order to secure support; they extend service provisions to new groups to expand their support base. This service provision mobilizes (via capabilities cultivated by basic services) previously disenfranchised groups, that further demand more services. The cycle goes on and on. In high quality democracies, this cycle would have occurred numerous times over many years; therefore, we would expect to see patterns of more equal service provision in these regimes. To capture this story of regime type and services, it is necessary to consider equality of service provision. Before further discussing this measure, let's first review in more detail the past work on regime type and public services.

Past Research

Analyses of regime type and public services found evidence that democracies spend more on and have higher levels of basic welfare. These studies couch democracy largely in terms of electoral incentives, linking higher spending on public services to electoral pressures. Some conceptualize and measure democracy as dichotomous while others frame it as continuous, as in the quality of democracy.

The general logic of this body of literature asserts that elections motivate the provision of public services in democracies. Electoral incentives in the form of reelection (Mayhew 2004) or party benefits - in the case where reelection is prohibited (Solt 2004) - motivate politicians to be responsive to voters who largely want, as studies have shown, basic services like education, health care, paving roads, and repairing schoolhouses (Brown 1999; Grindle 2000; World Bank Report 2004). Elections, the argument goes, compel politicians to widely distribute public goods and services in order to broaden their electoral support, and research has shown that democracies spend more on and provide higher levels of basic services.

Lake and Baum (2001) examined a global sample of countries across the period 1975-1990 and find that democratically-elected governments are associated with higher levels of education and health. Similarly, Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2003) find that democracy leads to improvements in numerous dimensions of health and welfare, including life expectancy and nourishment of the population. Evidence from the

developing world has found robust evidence that democracies positively affect education and health.

Studies focusing on Latin America specifically support that democracies in this developing region tend to place more importance on education and health than do autocracies. Examining 17 Latin American countries across the 1945-1980 time period, Ames (1987) finds that increased electoral competition is correlated with increased social spending. However, he notes that the poor are not always the beneficiaries of these expenditures; often middle-class and regional constituencies are targeted by social spending. Similarly, Sloan and Tedin (1987) in their study of 20 Latin American countries from 1960 to 1980 analyze the relationship between regime type, regime age, and policy outputs. Their results show that democratic regimes perform better than authoritarian regimes on health and educational measures. Brown and Hunter (1999) evaluated social spending for 17 countries in Latin America between 1980 and 1992 and found that democracies are sensitive to demographic changes in (and subsequent pressures from) the electorate. Social spending increased as the population above 55 years of age grew. Most recently, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008), analyzing 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 2000, found that democracy - regardless of the ideology of the ruling party - positively influences spending on education and health. In addition to these findings from Latin America, the effect of democracy has been particularly evident in the area of education.

Many scholars have explored the link between democracy and education, concluding that "directing resources toward education is a particularly effective strategy" for broadening electoral support (Brown 1999: 24). Analyzing a global sample for the years 1960-1987, Brown (1999) finds that democracies spend more on education but the difference between democracy and authoritarianism subsides as per capita income levels increase. Once a certain level of income is achieved, countries succeed in achieving universal enrollment in primary school. Further exploring income differences, Ansell (2008) examines 113 countries for the years 1960-2000 and finds that democracies in the developing world are associated with shifts in spending from tertiary to primary education while in the developed world democracies target spending to higher levels of education. In line with this finding, Brown and Hunter (2004) provide evidence that Latin American democracies have spent more on primary education, and Stasavage (2005) found that African democracies, particularly those governments subjected to multiparty competition, invested more in primary education. Studies have also shown that this holds for state governments as well. Hecock (2006) analyzed the effects of democracy on the subnational level in Mexico, finding that greater electoral competition is linked to higher expenditures on education services.

The Case for Inequality

While research has soundly linked democracy to social program spending and increased levels of health and education, no studies have tested how distribution of public services is affected by regime type. To fully capture the distribution of services as a result of regime type and truly test if democracies generate incentives for politicians to expand their electoral base via the broad distribution of public services, I contend that we should examine public service equality rather than spending on services or levels of service areas.

Public service equality more adequately captures the distribution of benefits across the population than spending or levels of services because it takes into account subnational variation. Aggregate estimations of social welfare spending or national levels of education, for example, do not reflect the pattern of service delivery across a nation. It is imperative to that we shift our thinking from national averages to subnational patterns of delivery because public services are generally managed, financed, and distributed at lower levels of government.

To illustrate the importance of service inequality rather than service program expenditures or aggregate levels of service coverage, consider two countries that were reported to have similar expenditures on education and approximately the same average female literacy rate but divergent national inequalities - Egypt and Malawi. According to the World Bank's Development Indicators (WDI), in 2005 education

expenditures as percent of GDP totaled 4.79% in Egypt. For the same year, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) reported an average of 63% of Egypt's female population was able to read and write. However, this average masked a deep inequality in Egypt's promotion of women's education. While female literacy peaked at 78% in the urban region of Lower Egypt, only 37% of females in the rural region of Upper Egypt were reported as literate. Considering that Egypt's was rated as "not free" by Freedom House, it is not surprising to observe such large basic service inequalities. On the other hand, female literacy in Malawi was reported in 2004 to average 66% with the highest rate of 78% in the Northern region and the lowest rate of 59% in the Southern region (DHS). Malawi's average is nearly equal to Egypt's female literacy rate and its expenditures on education as percent of GDP were comparable at 4.22% (WDI), but its service coverage inequality is considerably lower. Although Malawi was rated as "partly free" by Freedom House in 2004 due to growing government corruption, its democratic institutions set it apart from Egypt at the time. On the Polity scale of democratic institutions that ranges -10 (completely authoritarian) to 10 (completely democratic) Malawi scored a 6 while Egypt was given a score of -3. This underscores that the democratic institutions, particularly contested elections, present in Malawi but absent in Egypt ensured that citizens could express preferences about alternative policies and leaders. It may be the case that as a result of this electoral connection Malawi distributed education services more equally than Egypt, indicating that service

inequality rather than expenditures or aggregate levels of service coverage best captures the distinct pattern of service distribution by democracies.

The distribution of public services rather than the amount spent more fully explains how regime type effects social policy because it captures how democracies expand collective options to more fully incorporate all citizens into the process of political participation. The quantity of social expenditures and the levels of education and health are important outcomes of democratic institutions and practices but do not inform our understanding of the manner in which social services are delivered and how these patterns may affect political participation. High quality democracies should deliver services more equally than lower quality democracies because electoral competition should be greater in former context, motivating politicians to spread benefits to a larger proportion of the population in order to gain support in the next election. This more equal provision of basic services expands opportunities of participation for those parts of the population previously marginalized. In turn, greater political participation improves the quality of democracy. Focusing our attention to inequalities of service provision rather than aggregate expenditures or levels of services best explores the linkage between democracy and public services, particularly in cases of developing democracies.

Modeling the Democracy-Equality Link: Measurement and Methods

To adequately test the link between democratic quality and public service equality, we need sound measures that do not conflate one with the other. To this end, I constructed a measure of quality of democracy based on political contestation and participation. Also, I created a measure of service inequalities for three policy areas: education, healthcare, and sanitation. The following section outlines these variables and explains the model and methods I use to estimate the effect of democratic quality on public service equality. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix A.

Democratic Quality

Following Dahl (1971), Hill (1994), and others, I focus on two aspects of quality of democracy: political contestation and political participation. I created an additive index of democracy that combines measures of political competition and political participation. Similar to Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002), the measure of political competition I use reflects the balance of power between political parties in the national legislature. To measure political participation, I use voter turnout reports. This additive index of democracy is comparable to commonly used measures of democracy, including Polity and Freedom House; the correlation between my index and these is

approximately 0.50.[5] While comparable, my measure is a better choice for this study because it has the advantage of including both political competition and participation while excluding substantive outcomes. Polity measures democracy based on institutional factors and largely neglects political participation; Freedom House includes a wide array of substantive outcomes such as gender equality and economic equality that could potentially overlap with variance of the dependent variables analyzed. Because I have chosen to focus on political competition and participation as the key aspects of democracy (as linked to public service provision), I chose to create an index of democracy from existing data.

The political competition measure is based on the Database of Political Institutions indicator of legislative margin of majority, which is the fraction of seats held by government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats. With the idea that a perfectly balanced legislature - one where the seats held by the political party of the head of state is equal to the seats held by the opposition party or parties - is most democratic and reflects a highly competitive political context, I take

[5] The additive index of democracy that I constructed is measured at two time points - the election prior to the available service inequality data and the election following the service time point. The correlation between Polity and my measure of democracy, time 1, is 0.516, time 2, 0.5408. The correlation between Freedom House and my measure of democracy, time 1, is 0.4913, and time 2, 0.5579. The low correlations are most likely due to the difference in variable components. Polity lacks a measure of political participation, which is included in my additive index, and Freedom House includes many substantive outcomes that I explicitly exclude from my measure. Regardless of these differences, I am confident that I have created a sound and simple measure grounded in democratic theory - one that can directly test my theoretical framework.

the DPI indicator of the legislative margin of majority[6] and subtract it from 0.5 to gauge the distance between the government party's fraction of the seats and a perfect balance between ruling and opposition parties. I then take the absolute value, multiply it by 2, and subtract from 1 in order to make the scale range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating a nondemocratic balance of legislative power (the ruling party holds all seats) and 1 indicating a perfect balance of power between the government's party and the opposition party or parties. (Appendix B provides the formula and a specific example of the construction of this variable.)

Political participation is measured as voter turnout for legislative elections. The data were obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Additional sources were consulted for both political contestation and voter turnout including the African Elections Database and the Psephos database.

I combine the political competition indicator (ranges 0 to 1) with political participation (ranges 0 to 1) to get a measure of democracy that ranges from 0 to 2. On this scale 0 indicates no political competition and no political participation, and 2 represents a perfect balance of political competition in addition to 100% voter turnout.

Note that both the political contestation and political participation variables reflect the state of democracy at election time. Therefore the measures of democracy vary only for election years. On off-election years, the value of democracy is the same

[6] The variable is termed "Margin of Majority" and is "the fraction of seats held by the government". It is calculated by "dividing the number of government seats (NUMGOV) by total (government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats" (DPI Codebook 2006: 14).

as the previous election. More nuanced measures of democracy would capture aspects of political contestation and participation that vary across years, such as political party legislative activity and popular attendance at political meetings and events. However, due to data limitations, my measure of democracy is restricted to election years. This is similar to the Polity dataset as well as Vanhanen's measure of democracy. See Figure 4 for the distribution of values of my democracy index.



Figure 4: Distribution of Democracy Values

Equality of Public Services

Measuring the equality of public service coverage requires multiple subnational data points in order to assess the difference between the highest and lowest level of

reported services in the country. This is problematic because this type of data is typically not reported for countries in the developing world where record keeping is generally of poorer quality than in developed countries. Considering that this project focuses on the provision of basic public services - services that developing countries struggle with providing- it is imperative to include the developing world cases to thoroughly test and apply my theory. Therefore, I use aggregated survey data to generate regional averages of education, health, and sanitation service coverage for each country available. I employ the World Values Survey to create an education service equality measure. Surveys from Demographic Health Surveys were used to generate a health service variable, and data from the World Bank was used to measure sanitation services. All measures of service inequality are based on indicators that capture policy outcome in order to fully assess the extent of coverage. Figure 5 illustrates education, health, and sanitation inequality measures across the values of democracy and government capacity.





Figure 5: Service Inequalities



Figure 5: Continued

Education Services

To measure education service equality, I use the World Values Survey question that reports the highest level of education achieved by the respondent. Overall, the level of education ranged from "no formal education" (coded 1) to "university level, with degree" (coded 8 or 9 - depending on the time period). Specifically, for the years 1998-2004, the responses of level of education ranged from 1 to 8:

(1) Incomplete primary education

(2) Complete primary education

(3) Incomplete secondary education

(4) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

(5) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type

(6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type

(7) Some university-level education, without degree

(8) University-level education, with degree

For the years 2005-2007, the responses were:

(1) No formal education

(2) Incomplete primary education

(3) Complete primary education

(4) Incomplete secondary education

(5) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

(6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type

(7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type

(8) Some university-level education, without degree

(9) University-level education, with degree

Level of education is an appropriate way to measure education services because it captures policy outcomes. The highest level of education individuals have achieved is

a definitive reflection of the importance governments place on providing education services. I also considered using primary school attendance rates taken from data reported by Demographic and Health Surveys, but chose the World Values Survey because it covered a wider range of countries from both the developed and developing world and more years, thereby offering more variation on the variables of interest.

I aggregated the individual-level education responses to city size in order to group individuals within a geographical unit. City size ranged from small municipalities with population under 2,000 to large cities with populations of 500,000 and over. The categories of city size are:

(1) Under 2,000 inhabitants

(2) 2,000- 5,000

(3) 5,000- 10,000

(4) 10,000- 20,000

(5) 20,000- 50,000

(6) 50,000-100,000

(7) 100,000-500,000

(8) 500,000 and over

While geographical regions would have been an ideal identifier by which to group respondents, city size is appropriate because public services tend to be

distributed similarly in the same-sized cities.Smaller cities generally have less revenue, more basic governance infrastructures and institutions whereas larger cities are typically endowed with more resources and, due to their size, must maintain more complex infrastructures and institutions. These differences affect the distribution of public services, making city size an excellent unit by which to aggregate education levels and estimate the inequality of service coverage.

Once the education level data were aggregated, I created the inequality of education service variable by taking the difference between the highest and lowest reported values. Country cases were excluded if less than three city units were reported. City units were excluded if less than 30 individual respondents were reported. A total of 44 country-year observations were created spanning 42 countries for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005, 2006, and 2007.

Health Services

To measure health services, I used data from Demographic and Health Surveys, an international project sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development. I selected a question that asks female respondents if they have been assisted in births by health professionals. This question captures both the availability and quality of health services. If available and easily accessed, it is reasonable to expect mothers to use health professionals. Like the education inequality variable, I created the health

service inequality measure by taking the difference between the highest and lowest reported service in each country. Again, I excluded cases with less than 30 individual responses. The Demographic and Health Surveys are disaggregated in three ways - by city, by urban and rural regions, and by geographical region (i.e. north, south, east, and west). The disaggregation varies by country, but nonetheless reports salient within-country variation. A total of 54 country-year observations were generated, covering the years 1998, 2000, and 2002-2007.

Sanitation Services

Sanitation service inequality is measured using data from the World Bank's Health, Nutrition, and Population Database that reports the percentage of the population that has access to improved sanitation facilities. According to the World Bank, proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation refers to "the percentage of the population with access to facilities that hygienically separate human excreta from human, animal and insect contact. Facilities such as sewers or septic tanks, poor-flush latrines and simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrines are assumed to be adequate, provided that they are not public."

The data are reported for both the urban and rural populations in each country for the year 2000. I took the difference between the lowest and highest reported

service coverage for each country. Cases were excluded that solely reported one population average, typically urban service coverage.

Government Capacity

Capacity can be understood as the ability to perform and produce. In the context of governments, capacity relates to the state's ability to implement policy. On the most basic level, governments must have sound rule of law to carry out policy. To engage in contracts and do business, government and contractors must respect rule of law. We can think of contracts in tangible forms such as a contract between the state and a construction company to build a road. Contracts may also be abstract such as the electoral contract between citizens and political leaders. Regardless of the conceptualization of contract, it is clear that the rules of the game must be obeyed for policy to be implemented. Governments with high regard for rule of law have greater capacity and ability to carry out public policy.

To measure government capacity I adopt the rule of law scale taken from the World Bank's Governance Indicators. The rule of law scale ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and measures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence"

(Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2008: 7).[7] Sound rule of law is essential to effective policy-making. Without respect for the rules of the game by government, business, and citizens, the government lacks the capacity to formulate and implement policy. The measure is compiled from a variety of expert surveys and international agency ratings from sources such as Global Insight, Political Risk Services, Institutional Profiles Database, and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey - to name a few. These sources offer evaluations of numerous items including tax evasion, respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration, protection of financial assets, enforcement of government contracts, popular observance of law, and judicial independence.

Estimating the Effects of Democracy and Governance on Service Inequality

The effects of democracy and government capacity on service inequalities are estimated using OLS regressions based on data comprised of an unbalanced panel of 96 countries covering the period 1998-2007.[8] Robust standard errors are calculated to correct for heteroskedasticity present in the data. Regressions are estimated for each

[7] The World Bank's Governance indicator of government effectiveness was considered as an alternate measure of government capacity, but rejected because it captures the quality of public services which introduces a measurement of the dependent variable (distribution of public services) as an independent variable. Specifically, the government effectiveness indicator measures "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2008: 7).

[8] See Appendix C for the list of country-years included in each analysis.

service area - education, health, and sanitation - in order to explore the possibility that democracy and government capacity affect policy areas in distinct manners. Education, for example, has been shown to be a particularly effective tool by which to broaden political bases of support (Brown 1999), and therefore may reflect that democracy influences this policy area differently than healthcare or sanitation.

Because democracy is expected to have a curvilinear relationship with service inequalities, as discussed in the previous chapter, the squared term of democracy is included in the model. Both low-scoring and high-scoring democracies are expected to be correlated with low service inequalities. In addition to democracy, government capacity measured as rule of law and the logged GDP are included in the model. GDP is included in order to control for the influence of wealth on service provisions. Wealthier countries simply may be able to afford to more evenly distribute public services than poorer countries. In sum, model 1 includes the terms democracy, democracy^2, rule of law, and GDP logged and tests hypothesis 1: Higher quality democracies more equally distribute services than lower quality democracies.

Also to test if government capacity has a conditioning effect on the relationship between democracy and public service inequalities, I estimate a model that interacts democracy with government capacity measured as rule of law. Again, GDP is included. In all, model 2 includes the terms democracy, democracy^2, rule of law, democracy-rule of law interaction, democracy^2-rule of law interaction, and GDP logged; hypothesis 2 is

tested: Better government capacity in conjunction with high quality democracy results in more equal provision of public services. The next section presents and discusses the results of these two models.

Empirical Results: The Robust Association of High Quality Democracy and Low Inequalities

The results of Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in Table 1. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, but support for hypothesis 2 is lacking. Democracy demonstrates a curvilinear relationship with education and sanitation service inequalities, indicating that both low and high quality democracies are associated with low inequalities. Government capacity, however, does not exhibit a statistically significant association with the dependent variable in any of the models, and capacity does not appear to mediate the effect of democracy on service inequalities. Finally, GDP has a negative, statistically-significant effect on inequalities for health and education services, indicating that more wealthy countries can afford to more widely distribute these services.[9]

[9] The same models were estimated using The World Bank's government effectiveness indicator as a measure of government capacity as well as a capacity measure based on tax revenue per capita taken from the World Bank's Development Indicators, and the results remained the same. In addition, the models were estimated using alternative measures of democracy - Polity and Freedom House. The effect of government capacity remained the same, but the correlation of democracy and service inequalities was not significant. This reflects that my measure of democracy adequately captures the procedural aspects of democracy - political contestation and participation - while Polity fails to measure participation and Freedom House problematically reflects aspects of the dependent variable, namely

Table 1: The Robust Effect of Democracy on Reducing Service Inequalities						
	Model 1			Model 2		
	Education	*Health*	*Sanitation*	*Education*	*Health*	*Sanitation*
democracy	7.82	17.41	44.93	8.78	49.18	53.75
	(2.19)**	(48.83)	(15.98)**	(3.62)*	(50.70)	(19.11)**
democracy^2	-3.10	-9.99	-16.79	-3.47	-29.18	-20.76
	(0.81)**	(22.04)	(7.35)*	(1.33)*	(25.29)	(8.35)*
rule of law	0.04	6.05	-0.92	-0.19	-7.54	-15.46
	(0.16)	(4.77)	(2.65)	(1.80)	(41.54)	(12.30)
democracy*rule of law				0.10	46.77	34.43
				(2.58)	(88.36)	(22.27)
democracy^2*rule of law				0.04	-29.48	-16.56
				(0.92)	(42.65)	(9.42)
GDP logged	-0.14	-11.48	-5.47	-0.15	-11.72	-4.95
	(0.11)	(3.13)**	(1.61)**	(0.11)	(3.29)**	(1.63)**
constant	-1.89	103.10	37.56	-2.47	94.23	30.29
	(1.77)	(30.90)**	(14.25)**	(2.50)	(31.40)**	(16.21)
n	42	52	91	42	52	91
R^2	0.29	0.23	0.26	0.29	0.26	0.29
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%						

Democracy

I expect that the quality of democracy to be negatively related to public service inequalities; that is, high quality democracies have lower inequalities in basic services. The empirical findings offer substantial support of this hypothesis. Quality of

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equality. I also estimated the models with additional controls, including rural population as a proxy for the complexity of service delivery and subnational taxes collected as a proxy for decentralization with the idea that more decentralized democracies have more equal service distributions; the results are the same.

democracy is significantly related to lower levels of education and sanitation services inequalities.



Figure 6: Quality of Democracy Decreases Service Inequalities

The effect of democracy on service inequalities is best illustrated graphically. Figure 6 shows the predicted values of education services and sanitation services across the values of democracy^2. Note that the left vertical axis corresponds to the range of education inequalities, and the right vertical axis denotes the range of sanitation service inequalities. Clearly, democracy has a profound impact on the distribution of education and sanitation services. Higher quality democracies have much lower service

inequalities than poor quality democracies, supporting the theory that healthy political competition and participation induce democratic politicians and leaders to more evenly distribute services to build electoral bases.[10]

While education and sanitation services are significantly correlated with democracy, health services are not. I conjecture that the null finding of democracy for this service area is due to measurement issues. Recall that I measured health services as births assisted by health professionals. Unfortunately, this measure is problematic in numerous ways. One, births reflect only the female sector of the population. Two, assistance by health professional in births entails cultural issues that may make this measure different than other more objective measures of health, such as number of doctors or clinics. The choice to have a health professional assist a birth is often influenced by cultural, religious, and personal factors. Three, it is clear by looking at the distribution of this measure across democracy and government capacity values that it behaves differently than education and sanitation service inequalities (see Figures 5A, 5B, and 5C). Compared to education and sanitation service inequalities there is less variation in government capacity, and smaller inequalities are frequent for mid-range

[10] Reverse causality tests were conducted to ensure that the causal arrow runs from democracy to service inequality and not vise-versa. To estimate the effect of public service inequalities on democracy, I used service inequalities as a "treatment", regressing democracy time 1 (election prior to service inequality measure) interacted with service inequality on democracy time 2 (election following service inequality measure). Each service area was examined, and public services inequalities were not significant predictors of democracy time 2. This gives us more confidence in the assertion that democracy causes service equality. On the other hand, this finding does not lend support to my overall theoretical claim that equality should increase the quality of democracy. It may be that the effect of service equalities is not visible for many electoral periods. Education equalities, for example, may an entire human generation to impact democracy. Future analyses should carefully consider this issue.

democracies. Moreover, only developing countries are sampled, which may skew the results. Further data is needed to explore if health services indeed follow a distinct pattern or if this particular measure of health services reflects an atypical distribution of public services.[11]

Government Capacity

Although democracy is robustly associated with service inequalities, government capacity is surprisingly not. I theorized that government capacity should affect the influence of democracy on service inequalities. High quality democracies, I expected, require adequate government capacity to implement policies that effectively reduce service inequalities. The results of models, however, do not support this contention. On one hand, this underscores the importance of quality of democracy in

[11] The model was estimated using an alternative measure of health services (inequalities in subnational infant mortality rates), and the results were generally the same with no statistical significance of democracy or capacity. Clearly, the health service policy area is distinct from education and sanitation services. This may be due to the complexity of the policy areas: the higher degree of complexity, the more difficult it is to clearly link the service area to electoral payoffs. Therefore, empirically we see a sound link between democracy, education and sanitation but not health services. Sanitation services are basic and generally a responsibility of local governments. Developing a waste water plant in Municipality "X" should have clear benefits for local and regional politicians who supported the project. Education services are similar - they are often a shared responsibility of national and subnational governments with local government generally taking the lead on the administration of services. It should be clear to voters that an improvement in education services is due to the better management of services by local politicians. Health services, on the other hand, require a high degree of expertise to develop and distribute, and health services are not as clearly designated as sanitation and education areas. Health clinics are often tied to both local and regional governments and are generally heavily dependent on federal funding, making the electoral connection between services and political support blurred. For these reasons, health services may not "behave" like education and sanitation services - the empirical link between democracy and this policy area may be weak. More data and analyses are needed to explore these conjectures.

explaining service inequalities. Even controlling for government capacity, democracy accounts for the distribution of basic public services. On the other hand, the results are counter-intuitive. Shouldn't government capacity matter for issues of basic policy outcomes like public services? Can politics completely account for the manner in which public services are delivered? Further empirical analyses are needed to fully answer these questions.

We must remember that the models I have presented are limited in two critical ways that may affect the relationship of government capacity and service inequalities. One, they are cross-sectional; only one point in time for each country is represented in the data. Therefore, the over-time effect of government capacity may not be fully accounted for in the model. It is probable that the effect of government capacity is not immediate; results of government capacity in one time period may take multiple time units to be realized. Two, the data employed to estimate the models are aggregated at the national level. The distribution of basic public services is largely managed at the local government level. Consequently, estimating the effect of national government capacity on service inequalities may not correctly measure the government capacity most closely related to service delivery. I expect that variation in subnational government capacity more fully explains patterns of service distribution than the capacity of the national government. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that this is not the same for democracy, which explains why democracy and not government capacity is significant in the models estimated. Policies regarding public services are

made by the national government but implemented by lower levels of government. Democracy reflects the context in which public service policies are made while local government capacity affects their implementation.

To address these limitations, I examine public service inequalities on the subnational level in Mexico for a 5-year time period to test the effect of democracy and government capacity over-time. Second, I explore public service delivery on the local government level using four case studies of four Mexican municipalities. The results of the time-series model are presented in the next section, and the case studies are analyzed in the following chapter.

Time-Series Analysis: The Equality of Education Services in Mexico, 2000-2004

Mexico is an excellent case to test the effects of democracy and state capacity on public services because there is much variation on the subnational level in terms of political party competition, government capacity, and public service outcomes while there is sufficient similarity in state institutions so that comparisons are meaningful. Mexico is a decentralized federal system with 31 states and a Federal District. The state legislatures range from 20 to 75 members. Two-thirds of the seats are elected by "first past the post" single-member districts, and the remaining one-third are elected through a proportional representation formula (Hecock 2006). In addition to the

legislature, each state has a governor who is elected for six years and cannot be reelected consecutively.

While government institutions are consistent across the Mexican states, politics vary considerably. Political party competition fluctuated substantially across the states during Mexico's transition to democracy and continues to be heterogenous (Beer 2003). The variation in political party systems is clearly demonstrated in Figure 7. The effective number of parties (ENP) - the number of parties weighted by their seat share in the state legislature - is an indicator of party competition and political party system stability. Lower ENP indicates that there is less political party competition and that the legislature is dominated by just a few parties. Higher ENP reflects greater competition among political parties, but also can indicate at extreme values political party system fragmentation. Because the range of ENP is below 4 for 2000-2007 for the Mexican states, it is reasonable to think of the indicator as party competition. Taken as this, Figure 7 shows that political party competition has averaged about 2.5 for the period 2000-2007 but varied substantially in its minimum and maximum value, indicating that party politics diverge across states and time.



Figure 7: Variation in Mexican State Political Party Systems

In addition to variation in politics, the Mexican states vary greatly in their government capacity. Corruption and disregard for rule of law has dominated politics in some states while others have made great strides maintaining or restoring respect for the "rules of the game". The state of Querétaro, for example, has recently tripled police salaries, increased police training, and implemented accountability and learning systems in efforts to bolster its police force (Mexico Institute 2009). On the other hand, the organization Mexican Transparency (2007) reported that the State of Mexico is the most corrupt state with the highest incidences of bribery, largely contributing to the national toll that cost on average each Mexican home $138 in 2007.

In all, Mexico offers rich variation on the key explanatory variables in our model and, therefore, allows us to rigorously test the effects of democratic quality as

mediated by government capacity on public service equality. The following section outlines the measurement of the variables used in this test. Following that, the findings of the estimation are presented and discussed.

Measurement of Key Variables

I adopt the same model used in the previous regression analysis to estimate the effect of democracy and state capacity on public service equality over time and subnationally. While the first analysis examined education, health, and sanitation policy areas, we are limited to education services in this model. Data indicating the distribution of health and sanitation services across the Mexican states and across time units were simply not available. Therefore, this analysis focuses on education services as predicted by the quality of democracy, state capacity, the interaction of democracy and capacity, and state GDP. The construction and sources for the primary variables are discussed below. (Note that the data for GDP was taken from INEGI.) (Descriptive statistics may be found in Appendix D.)

Equality of Education Services

To assess how democracy and capacity affect the distribution of public services, I adopt a measure of education services taken from the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) Report (2005) on Mexico that estimates the equality of education services. The UNDP indicator is calculated based on the percentage of each state's adult population that is literate and the percentage of students that complete primary school (matriculation). This indicator reflects the distribution of education services across the state. Higher values indicate that more of the state's population has access to and has benefited from education services while lower values reflect that disparities within the state in the distribution of educational goods. The indicator is measured on a 0 to 1 scale.

Due to the measurement of this variable, I expect a linear relationship between democracy and education service equality. Unlike the equality measure used in the first regression analysis, lower values do not indicate more equality. Rather, lower values simply indicate less of the population has access to and benefits from education services. Therefore, a clear linear relationship is expected where higher levels of democracy are correlated with higher equality in education services.

Democracy

To measure democracy, I focus again on political contestation and participation. Using data taken from the National Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral), I created a democracy measure that is the additive index of party competition for state senate seats and voter turnout for the same elections. Party competition is estimated

as the margin of victory, calculated as the difference between the percentage of votes for the winning party and the percentage of votes for the second-place party. This is similar to Cleary's (2007) measure of political competition for Mexican municipalities. The margin of victory is then reversed so that higher values indicate greater competition. For example, a margin of victory of 60% winning party votes to 40% second-place party votes is 0.2. A margin of victory of 75% winning party to 25% second-place party votes is 0.5. The reversed value of the first is 0.8 and the second is 0.5. Clearly, we can see that the 60% to 40% scenario is a context of greater political competition, which is reflected by the higher value (0.8) of the reversed margin of victory index. This value is then added to voter turnout to create an index that ranges from 0 to 2, with higher values indicating higher quality of democracy. Appendix E presents figures that indicate the values of democracy for each state for the years 2000-2004.

State Government Capacity

A clear indication of a state's capacity and respect for rule of law is tax collection. States that have higher levels of tax revenue have respected the law by enforcing tax collection and have populations that in turn respect the law by paying taxes. States with low tax revenue do not have similar respect for the law. Therefore, I measure state government capacity as the taxes collected by the state government.

The data is taken from INEGI. The amount of taxes collected is representative of respect for rule of law by abiding by tax regulations.

Model

To estimate the effect of democracy and state capacity on education services, I use a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset that consists of 31 Mexican states over the five years from 2000 to 2004. Studies employing data of this type generally adopt the method of regression with panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) to correct for heteroskedasticty. However, Beck and Katz also caution that this method should not be used if the time components are less than 10. Therefore, I cluster by state to correct for any unequal variance across the panels.[12] No corrections are included in the model for autocorrelation because diagnostics did not indicate the need for this.

Results

Table 2 presents the results of the regression estimating the effects of democracy and state capacity on education service equality. The results indicate that both democracy and state capacity work on the subnational level across time to

[12] Alternative models were estimated, including fixed effects and random effects. The results were unchanged.

positively affect the equality of education services. Higher levels of democracy coupled with greater state capacity increase the distribution of education services across the state population even while controlling for state wealth, measured as gross domestic product.

Table 2: Analysis of Equality of Education Services in Mexico, 2000-2004

Dependent variable: education index (higher values = greater equality of services across the state)	
democracy	-0.03
	(0.004)**
state capacity	-2.56E-11
	(0.002)**
democracy*capacity	2.44E-11
	(0.000)**
GDP per capita	1.14E-10
	(0.000)**
constant	0.85
	(0.009)**
n	155
number of groups	31
R^2 within	.67
R^2 between	.02
R^2 overall	0.03

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

To illustrate how democracy and state capacity interact to effect education services, let's examine the marginal effects plots (Figure 8). The first graph shows the marginal effect of democracy on education services across levels of state capacity, measured as state taxes collected. We can see that democracy positively affects the equality of public services in states with lower state capacity and very high state capacity. The second graph shows the marginal effect of state capacity on education services across the quality of democracy. State capacity has a significant positive effect on the equality of education at the highest levels of democracy.



Figure 8: Marginal Effects



Figure 8: Continued

These findings indicate that high levels of democracy are needed for gains in equality of education services. Democracy in this specific context seems to compensate for low levels of state capacity. In states with high levels of political contestation and participation, low state capacity is not a barrier to leveling education equalities. On the other hand, state capacity is only effective at increasing education service equality at high levels of democracy. It is clear that equality is primarily driven by democratic politics, but state capacity is needed to see real gains in education for all the population.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to test the first part of the virtuous cycle running from democracy to equality. Specifically, we tested the effect of quality of democracy on public service inequalities. We also examined the role of government capacity in this relationship. Overall, the empirical analyses supported the contention that higher quality democracies are associated with lower service inequalities; however, limited empirical support was found for the expected mediating effect of government capacity.

The first empirical analysis tested the link between quality of democracy and service inequalities for three policy areas: education, healthcare, and sanitation. I expected, and the findings support, that democracy has a curvilinear relationship with service inequalities. The highest and lowest quality democracies are correlated with low service inequalities in the areas of education and sanitation. Healthcare was not significantly correlated with democracy in any estimations of the model. Government capacity, measured as rule of law, was also not significantly related to service inequalities.

To further explore the role of government capacity, the second empirical analysis tested the same hypotheses on the subnational level and overtime using data on the Mexican states from 2000-2004. This analysis also offered empirical support for the relationship between high quality democracy and service equality, but also

provided evidence that government capacity plays a mediating role in this relationship in the context of high quality democracies.

In all, the empirical analyses show that high quality democracies are correlated with lower service inequalities, and government capacity aids high quality democracies in reducing inequalities. These findings underscore that reducing public service inequalities is largely dependent on a highly competitive political environment as well as a highly capable government. Unfortunately, high capacity cannot substitute for low democratic incentives in the distribution of public services. Electoral incentives are needed to compel politicians to equally dole out service benefits, and this can only be achieved when there is the government capacity to spread these benefits equally.

The following chapter further unpacks the complex relationships between democratic quality, government capacity, and service equalities at the local government level through four case studies. It is important to study service delivery at this level because it is where public services are distributed. The fieldwork cases confirm many of the findings of this chapter but also offer a more nuanced story of service delivery that more fully informs our understanding of how democracies distribute goods.

CHAPTER IV

LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND CAPACITY:

ANALYSIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN FOUR MEXICAN MUNICIPALITIES

As a result of decentralization policies undertaken in the past decades, municipal governments all over the world have been assigned the responsibility of public services, ranging from the complex task of education to more minor public works such as city lighting. Responsibility entails not only the distribution of these works but also the building of infrastructure, the employment of workers, the training of technicians, and the management of these services. One Mexican municipal official I interviewed emphasized the breadth of this responsibility stating, "Municipalities provide *everything*. When the state congressman comes and says 'in the next year we are going to give you a new bridge' - who is going to build it? We are going to build it, not the state, not the federal government. The masons are going to be from our people, the services to that company are going to be provided from us, and the immediate political management is going to be ours."

Local governments not only have the task of administering public services for their populations, but also are the most proximate representatives of government that citizens encounter. Municipalities, therefore, have the duty to provide for the political, social, and economic well-being of their community. This involves the development of

democratic institutions and practices to create a more accountable and accessible local government (Grindle 2000; Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee 2004; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007) as well as the careful examination of community needs and the subsequent execution of municipal resources to achieve "better levels and quality of life in a sustainable way" (Carrera Hernández 2006: 2). Citizens look to municipalities to deliver the goods they expect of government, including public services and democratic practices (Grindle 2000).

The previous chapter empirically demonstrated that the quality of democracy positively affects service equalities on the national level and that government capacity mediates this relationship on the subnational (state) level for the case of Mexico. To further explore how democracy and government capacity work together, we now turn to analysis of public services on the municipal level. Through case studies of four Mexican municipalities built on interviews with municipal officials and government records, we will see that democracy and capacity indeed work together in providing the incentives and capabilities municipal governments require to broadly distribute public services to their populations. This chapter provides a critical piece of the puzzle by unpacking how the quality of municipal democracy and local government capacity affects the pattern of public service delivery on the most basic level it occurs.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline my hypotheses and explain the choice of Mexico as a test case. Second, the history of public service provision in

Mexico is discussed. Third, I outline the research design, followed by, fourth, an elaboration of the data and methods used in the analysis. Fifth, the analysis is presented beginning with discussion of quality of democracy, then municipal capacity, and ending with public service outcomes. Each case is reviewed in the following order: Tulancingo, Hidalgo; Calnali, Hidalgo; Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon; and Aramberri, Nuevo Leon. Sixth, I discuss the generally findings of the case studies, and, seventh, offer concluding thoughts.

Expectations

Like the previous chapter, this analysis tests hypothesis 1 and 2, which may be summarized as: Higher quality democracies with greater government capacity distribute public services more equally than do lower quality democracies. I expect to find a positive correlation between democracy, government capacity, and public service equality. Specifically, I expect to find more equality of public services in municipalities that are high quality democracies and maintain a high level of government capacity. Municipalities where democracy and/or capacity are lacking are unwilling or unable to equally distribute services.

There are four possible pairings of quality of democracy and municipal government capacity if we consider each on a categorical scale ranging from medium-high to low. I chose to couple the medium and high categories together because it is

often more evident “what is not” (ie low category) than “what is” (ie medium to high category). While there are distinctions between the cases ranked as medium-high and high, it is theoretically unclear what effects these grades of democracy or capacity have on public service distributions. On the other hand, it is very clear that a lack of democratic quality or government capacity is negatively associated with equalities in public services. Therefore, there are four pairings between democracy and capacity: 1.) medium-high democracy and medium-high capacity; 2.) medium-high democracy and low capacity; 3.) low democracy and medium-high capacity; and 4.) low democracy and low capacity.

My expectations for each pairing are summarized in Table 3. In the case of high levels of democracy coupled with high degrees of government capacity, I expect high equality in service delivery. Municipal governments should be motivated by electoral incentives to provide services broadly and have the ability to deliver them. On the other extreme in the case of low levels of democracy and low levels of capacity, I expect to find low equality in public services. Municipal governments of this type have little incentive or capability to evenly distribute public services. In the median cases, I expect medium-high levels of democracy but low degrees of capacity as well as low democracy and medium-high capacity to produce unequal service delivery. In the former case, democratic incentives to expand service distribution may be present, but the municipal government is limited in its capacity to actually deliver services. In the latter case of low democracy and medium-high capacity, municipalities have little to no

incentives to broadly distribute services, and, therefore, public services may be doled out as patronage goods targeted at specific populations.

Table 3: Expectations of Municipal Service Delivery

		Democracy	
		MEDIUM - HIGH	LOW
Government Capacity	MEDIUM - HIGH	Medium to high equality in the distribution of services	Low equality in the distribution of services with services targeted at specific populations
	LOW	Low equality of the distribution of services	Low equality of the distribution of services

To test these expectations, I turn to an in-depth examination of four Mexican municipalities. Mexico is an excellent country to test the effect of democracy and government capacity on public service equality because its municipalities are substantially varied in terms of political, technical, and economic attributes while being structurally similar so that comparisons are meaningful. The following section describes the role of Mexican municipalities in public service provision, making the case that the municipal level is an important part of the overall puzzle because it is the party responsible for delivering basic services to the public.

History of Municipal Public Services in Mexico

Mexico is a federalist nation with three levels of government: federal, state, and municipal. There are over 2,400 municipalities across 31 states. The Mexican municipality is comprised of numerous dependent localities and has a principal locality - the *cabercera municipal* - similar to a county seat where the municipal government presides. Municipal governments are headed by a municipal president and council - both elected for 3 year terms - and supported by various appointed officials overseeing municipal functions.

Article 115 of the 1917 federal Constitution designates that the "free Municipality" (*municipio libre*) is the basis of the territorial division of the federation. While Article 115 gave municipalities territorial autonomy, it wasn't until the 1983 amendment of the same article that municipal governments were given the constitutional right to raise revenue and formulate budgets (Carrera Hernández 2006). This amendment also established clearly, for the first time, municipal public service responsibilities (including the administration and funding of): potable water; sewage systems; public safety and traffic, including local road maintenance and road safety; street lighting; public cleaning and maintenance, including trash collection and the maintenance of parks, gardens, and cemeteries; and supervision of slaughterhouses (Rodriguez 1997). Municipalities also assist state and federal governments in the provision of education, healthcare, and emergency fire services. Funding for these

services comes from the federal government but is supplemented by municipal governments. For example, teacher salaries are funded by the federal government but the municipal government pays for and oversees the painting and repair of the school houses. In all, funding of services is a mix of federal, state, and local government assignments with municipal governments responsible for the administration and management of the following services:

- Water and sanitation services
- Road cleaning and maintenance
- Public lighting
- Trash collection
- Education (administration only - funded by federal government)
- Healthcare (administration only - funded by federal government)

The 1983 reform to Article 115 gave municipalities greater fiscal and service responsibilities, but municipal governments were not economically or technically equipped to handle these new assignments. Municipalities turned to state governments for help with the collection of taxes and the delivery of local public services (Carrera Hernández 2006). Fiscal support for municipalities was expanded with the 1997 federal budget reform, called Ramo 33, that assigned economic resources for education, health services, and safety services as well as public infrastructures. The funds required coordination with state governments, but it was made clear that the transfers of funds would not be subject to political control (Grindle 2007). Further

reforms to Article 115 in 2000 gave municipalities the right to impose property taxes on parastatal organizations and to assess property values. It also designated municipalities as "an order of government," not just an arm of the administration, which gave local governments greater policy-making autonomy (Grindle 2007).

Today Mexican municipal governments are varied in their administrative and fiscal autonomy and capacity. Some are largely dependent on federal and state transfers in financing their operations while others generate a large portion of their own revenue. INEGI reports that in 2007, municipal revenue from property, income, and sales tax ranged from 50 pesos to 800,000,000 pesos. Certainly, municipal populations vary greatly as well - the smallest being a few more than 100 and the largest totaling over 1.5 billion (INEGI). Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of the gap between taxes collected demonstrates the diversity of government capacity on the municipal level in Mexico.

Research Design

To examine municipal level quality of democracy and local government capacity, I conducted interviews with municipal government officials and gathered local archival data in four Mexican municipalities.[13] I selected Mexico as the focus of this study because it offers rich variation of both quality of democracy and municipal government

[13] See Appendix F for the set of open-ended interview questions.

capacity. Historically there is a divide between the Northern and Southern states of Mexico with the North being more wealthy, industrialized, and democratic.

To capitalize on the difference between the North and South that exists in Mexico, I selected the Northern state of Nuevo Leon and the Southern state of Hidalgo. Nuevo Leon has close to 4 million inhabitants while Hidalgo has a population of 2 million (INEGI). In 2004, Nuevo Leon had the highest Human Development Index of all 32 Mexico states with a score of 0.85 while Hidalgo ranked 27th with a score of 0.76, indicating that its life expectancy, literacy rate, and gross domestic product are well below that of higher scoring states (UNDP 2005). Highly industrialized, Nuevo Leon has strong agri-industry and export manufacturing sectors. In comparison, Hidalgo's economy relies heavily on mining, mineral extraction, and agriculture. And like many other Northern states, Nuevo Leon saw turnover of the Institutional Revolution Party's (PRI) dominance with the election of National Action Party (PAN) candidate Fernando Canales Clarion in 1997 for governor. Hidalgo has yet to elect a governor outside the PRI. Considering these characteristics, Nuevo Leon is representative of the Northern states of Mexico and Hidalgo the Southern states. More broadly, Nuevo Leon is representative of politically and economically progressive governments in developing regions while Hidalgo is similar to poorer, less democratic governments.

In both states, I chose a large and small municipality to study. The size of the municipality is an important consideration because large and small municipalities face

different supplies and demands for services. Municipalities with a large urban population have a greater demand for services but typically also have a greater supply of revenue for services produced from larger amounts of federal and state aid and business tax revenue than smaller municipalities. While small municipalities may have less supply and demand than larger municipalities, the small municipalities face a challenge in managing rural populations. Dispersed rural populations makes the delivery of services difficult when revenue for resources limited.

In Nuevo Leon, I picked Santa Catarina as the large case and Aramberri as the small case. Santa Catarina is located near the capital city of Monterrey and is the 6th largest municipality with a population of 259,896. Aramberri, with a population of 14,692, is a rural locality located 200 miles from Monterrey. In comparison to these cases, I chose Tulancingo as the large case in Hidalgo and Calnali as the small case. Like Santa Catarina, Tulancingo is located near the capital city of Pachuca. Calnali is located 100 miles north of the capital city. While Tulancingo, the second largest municipality in Hidalgo, has a population of 129,935, Calanali is a rural municipality with a population of 16,705 inhabitants. By selecting cases that are similar in proximity to the capital city and population size, I am able to more confidently say that any variation in their service delivery is a product of local quality of democracy and municipal government capacity. The capital city of each state is avoided as a case because these municipalities may be exceptional as a result of their capital status.

In addition to the North-South split and municipal size, I also selected cases to be representative of each of the major parties that exist in Mexico in order to avoid sample bias towards one party. The two major parties in Mexico are the historically-dominant PRI and the more right-leaning PAN. Despite advances in political competition, these two parties are still the most influential parties in Mexico. I selected a PRI and PAN small and large case from both the Northern and Southern state (see Table 4) My PRI cases are: Tulancingo 2008 municipal administration (large Southern case) and Aramberri 2006 municipal administration (small Northern case). My PAN cases are: Calnali 2005 municipal administration (small Southern case) and Santa Catarina 2006 municipal administration (large Northern case). Choosing mixed pairs of North-South and large-small ensures that ideology or party influence is controlled for in my research design.

Table 4: Control for Political Party of Municipal Administration

	Southern State: Hidalgo			Northern State: Nuevo Leon	
	Large case: *Tulancingo*	Small case: *Calnali*		Large case: *Santa Catarina*	Small case: *Aramberri*
1999	PAN	PRI	2000	PAN	PRI
2002	PRI	PAN	2003	Coalition(PRI)	Coalition (PRI)
2005	PRD	PAN	2006	PAN	Coalition (PRI)
2008	Coalition (PRI)	Convergencia	2009	PAN	PRI

Notes: Administrations shown in bold are those that were interviewed. The label "Coalition" indicates that a coalition of parties won office, and the primary party is listed in parentheses. The difference in years for Hidalgo and Nuevo Leon cases reflects the difference in election cycles.

In all, my research design takes into account development - both political and economic - as well as public service supply and demand. I also incorporate political ideology. Controlling for wealth, industrialization, democratization (historical), revenue for services, demand for services, and political ideology gives us confidence that democracy and government capacity are the mechanisms that produce a change in the equality of public services. The next section outlines how I have measured these key variables.

Data and Methods

In each municipality I interviewed politicians and bureaucrats to assess their municipality's quality of democracy and government capacity.[14] In these interviews, I used the same set of open-ended questions in each municipality to gain insight into the local government's capacity as well as the extent of local democracy from the perspective of the governing administration. To supplement these interviews, I gathered information from state records supplied by INEGI regarding municipal service coverage and municipal economic conditions. Also, I collected data on elections, including victory party, percentage of the votes gained by each party, and voter turnout, from the Federal Institute of Elections.

[14] In Tulancingo, Hidalgo, I interviewed a total of 6 appointed municipal officials and 3 elected officials; in Calnali, Hidalgo - 6 appointed and 1 elected; in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon - 7 appointed and 3 elected; and in Aramberri, Nuevo Leon - 4 appointed and 2 elected.

To assess local quality of democracy, I focused again on political contestation and participation, evaluating municipal political competition and participation as indicated by electoral records.[15] I also carefully considered interview questions asking about political motivations as well as citizen input into municipal government affairs. Like previous analyses, quality of democracy can be thought of as a scale with low and high ends. More politically competitive municipalities with government officials motivated by public service are high quality democracies. On the other extreme, municipalities dominated by one party and experiencing low voter turnout in conjunction with politicians motivated by patronage gains are considered low quality democracies. Electoral competition is a strong motivator in Mexican politics despite the fact that there is no immediate reelection. In my own research, I encountered politicians aiming for higher state offices from the mayoral position. It is critically important for them to maintain strong party ties through good performance as mayors. I also found that unelected municipal officials were motivated to please their political party because they often took up the same or similar appointed post in a different municipality when their party lost office.

To measure municipal government capacity, I turned to more nuanced indicators than the previous chapter that focused on rule of law. While rule of law

[15]Mexico has a history of electoral fraud, particularly under PRI political dominance. The information I use in this chapter regarding voter turnout and votes won by each party were taken from the Federal Election Institute (IFE). This institute carefully considers electoral fraud and discards votes (and voting records) from polling sites that are found to be in violation of electoral rules. Therefore, we can be confident in the electoral results presented in this chapter - there should not be misrepresentations of turnout or competition.

adequately captures how a government "does business", there are more detailed indicators that reflect the capabilities of administrations. Specifically, I evaluate municipal technical and resource capacities. Municipalities with more technically adept employees, more technologically advanced facilities and equipment, as well as greater fiscal resources have higher levels of government capacity. These municipalities are better able to deliver public services to broader segments of their population. To assess municipal government capacity, I relied on interviews questions and financial records. With municipal officials, I discussed their experience in government, political ambitions, and past work that has prepared them for local government leadership to assess the technical capacity of their administration. To tap into resource capacity, I also asked about local government resources allocated for public services, the problems related to resources, and the manner in which funding is distributed. These questions were supplemented with municipal revenue records.

Finally, to evaluate the equality of municipal public services, I evaluated education, health, and sanitation service records. I also asked municipal officials to rank the quality of their public services and to discuss the distribution of services in general, paying particular attention to how certain segments of the municipal population such as rural citizens are affected by municipal services. I also discussed general public works such as trash collection and paving streets with municipal officials. While basic these services affect the daily lives and well-being of citizens and are indicative of the municipal administration's efforts to improve the quality of public services.

The following section presents the case findings. I first discuss the quality of democracy, focusing on specific aspects of local democracy that foster higher political competition and citizen participation. Second, I outline municipal government capacity, specifically evaluating each municipality's fiscal and technical resources. Third, I assess the equality of public services in each case, examining in turn education, health, and water/sanitation services. Public works projects are also considered. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings that synthesizes the most critical themes of the case studies.

Quality of Local Democracy

To assess the quality of democracy, I again turn our attention to political contestation and participation. Like the previous analyses, I measure contestation as electoral competition and participation as voter turnout. To more deeply explore these components I also consider electoral incentives and citizen input into the public service delivery process. In all, three categories are examined: 1.) political contestation/participation, 2.) electoral incentives, and 3.) citizen input. Table 5 breaks down each component into measurable pieces that were considered in interviews or answered with municipal records. This table also presents the quality of democracy rankings of each case on a scale of high to medium-low.

Table 5: Quality of Democracy Ratings					
		Southern State/ Less Developed		Northern State/ More Developed	
		Large Municipality	Small Municipality	Large Municipality	Small Municipality
		PRI	PAN	PAN	PRI
		Tulancingo, Hidalgo	*Calnali, Hidalgo*	*Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon*	*Aramberri, Nuevo Leon*
Political contestation/ participation	Are there numerous parties to chose from?	High	High	High	Low
	Real alternation of political parties in power (not just coalition name changes)?				
	Is voter turnout high?				
Electoral incentives	Are public service promises part of campaigns?	High	Low	High	High
	Do non-elected municipal officials perceive fulfilling electoral promises (for better/ increased public services) as an important part of their job?				
	Are incentives beyond electoral payoffs evident (i.e. making the community better)?				
Citizen input into public service delivery process	Is there an institutionalized outlet for citizen input?	High	High	High	Low
	How is input/participation characterized? Is it constructive/community based (as opposed to individual solicitation of municipality as a patron)?				
	Do citizens actively engage in community-based public service projects?				
	Overall Rating:	High	Medium - High	High	Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to 2 of 3 of the questions is "yes"; low rating given if "no" was predominant. For overall quality of democracy, a high rating is given if high is fulfilled in all 3 categories; medium-low if high is assigned in 2 of 3 categories; and low rating if low is given in 2 of 3 categories.					

The four municipalities studied vary substantially in the quality of each component of democracy. For example, while both Santa Catarina and Tulancingo may be considered high quality democracies, Tulancingo's democracy is limited in terms of citizen input into the service delivery process. In all, Santa Catarina, Tulancingo, and Calnali are ranked as high quality democracies while Aramberri is ranked as a low quality democracy. The following sections detail these rankings.

Tulancingo, Hidalgo

Tulancingo may be characterized as a high quality democracy. Electoral competition and popular participation in elections is healthy. Municipal elections are close, and there are meaningful, distinct parties from which to choose. There is a clear electoral link betweenpoliticians and citizens with campaigns often built around public service issues. Politicians feel motivated to deliver services as a result of this, and appointed municipal officials generally cite betterment of the community as their motivation to increase the quality and breadth of services. In addition to these democratic practices, Tulancingo has a center of citizen input to incorporate communities into their decision-making process. However, municipal officials say more citizen participation is needed in the process of public services.

Electoral competition is high in Tulancingo. The 2008 election was a close race with the coalition of PRI and Nueva Alianza, called "Más por Hidalgo", winning 36% of

the vote and the PRD with 34%. This election was the most competitive election on record in Tulancingo since 1999. Not only is electoral competition high in Tulancingo, the alternation of political parties in power has been good. In 1999, the PAN won the municipal government, followed by the PRI in 2002 and the PRD in 2005. Municipal election voter turnout was about 40% in 2008.

Electoral incentives are mixed in the Tulancingo municipal administration. Those officials who are appointed see that public services are important for elections or, in their words, are "banners that are waved" during electoral periods, however, electoral pressures are generally absent from their daily work. As one official put it, "We work because we are citizens from here, we know the people and the people know us." Certainly that does not mean that politics are absent from the process of public services in which appointed officials are involved, but it means that the personal motivations of appointed functionaries are not focused on elections.

On the other hand, for those elected officials, including the municipal president and the city council members, electoral pressures to address public services are evident. Campaigns focus on water, sewer systems, education, and health services, among other things. In addition to campaign promises, electoral periods are an important time for the current administration to develop public works and services prior to elections. On this one official comments, "Here in Tulancingo you can feel the release of money from the federal and state governments when elections are coming,

and we live in the hope of an election. Because you have elections you have more resources to work, you can do many things that in other situations you couldn't develop."

While electoral incentives and competition is high in Tulancingo, citizen participation is somewhat lacking. There are centers located in the municipal building for citizen input where individuals may officially submit a complaint or suggestion related to public services, specifically, and municipal affairs in general. Beyond this, however, citizens typically do not take an active role in politics or in the process of public services. This is particularly evident in the areas of water, education, and health. Beyond complaints, there is little input from citizens regarding these services, according to municipal officials. While feedback is important because it provides guidance to municipal officials seeking improvements in service delivery, demands for better services do not get things done. Citizen organizations and grassroot movements are missing from Tulancingo; as one municipal official put it, "Tulancingo lacks a participatory culture." Another noted, "The community is unwilling to participate, they participate thinking, criticizing, but not saying I give this or participate like this." In all, citizen input into the process of public services in largely that of negative feedback. To improve services, some officials believe a movement on the part of the citizens to proactively organize and address community problems is needed. The problem is that this requires resources, and these resources both in terms of economic and human capital are lacking from communities. Most communities in Tulancingo are lower

middle/working class, and many are rural, poor communities. To meet the needs of a community school, for example, is beyond the means of these citizens; free time, extra money, or even extra building supplies are not available to citizens with extremely limited household budgets.

Calnali, Hidalgo

The quality of democracy in Calnali is good largely due to electoral competition and citizen participation. Elections are competitive and progressive - surprisingly so for this rural municipality. Moreover, citizens actively participate in elections and community organizations. The quality of democracy is limited in the way that the municipality relates to the public and incorporates citizen input into policymaking.

Political party competition is thriving in Calnali since the end of PRI dominance. In 2002 and 2005 the PAN won municipal elections, and in the most recent elections held in 2008, a new party called Convergencia made state history by winning its first local seats. Similarly, voter turnout and citizen participation is vibrant in Calnali. Citizens have a high turnout record for municipal elections - 45% in 2008 - and have higher than state and national turnout levels for federal elections (64% turnout in Calnali versus 58% nationally and in the state of Hidalgo for 2006). Moreover, community committees routinely meet to discuss service issues. The problem is that historically municipal officials are not responsive to citizens.

While the levels of party competition and popular participation clearly indicate a healthy democracy, the municipal administration limits how these democratic practices are translated into policymaking. Interviews with the 2005-2008 administration did not indicate that electoral incentives were strong motivators for municipal politicians and appointed officials. While every individual interviewed claimed that the betterment of the community is an important priority for them, there was the general implication that the improvement of public services was not possible due to limited resources. Promises may be made in campaigns for improved services, but in practice the administration believed substantial progress was simply beyond the scope of their abilities. It appeared that true electoral incentives - a fear that not delivering on promises made in campaigns will entail political costs - were not evident.

Most municipal officials interviewed agreed that public input has little bearing on local government decisions, including those related to services. Therefore, the limited scope of political openness in Calnali has not been a product of citizen failure to participate, but the result of closed local government doors. Being from an outside party, the newest municipal government has political incentives to change this pattern of involvement by incorporating citizen input into the service process. This would align municipal government practices with the democratic processes of electoral competition and citizen participation and offer the promise of improving the quality of democracy.

Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon

Santa Catarina is the most democratic of all the cases. Electoral competition is high, and electoral incentives are evident. Also, citizen participation is a critical part of the municipal administration's approach to managing public services. There are several programs that have created institutions and outlets to incorporate citizens into the process of public services ranging from call centers to file a complaint or suggestion to community organizations that contribute to the maintenance and building of public infrastructures.

Santa Catarina municipal elections have been tightly contested in the past decade. The PAN has dominated the municipal government since 1997, losing only the 2003-2006 administration to a coalition comprised predominantly of the PRI. Generally elections have been two-party competitions - that of the PAN and the PRI (or a coalition of parties lead by the PRI) - with the exception of the 2006 election where three parties were in tight competition. The most recent election was the most competitive with the PAN winning by a margin of less than 1%. Voter turnout for municipal elections is about 40% in Santa Catarina.

Public services play a more limited role in electoral campaigns than in Tulancingo but maintain a central place in campaign rhetoric. Health services are among the services most mentioned, according to municipal officials, with promises to build new clinics emerging during electoral periods. Other basic services are not as

prevalent in campaign rhetoric because the majority of the population has access to water, electricity, and sanitation in their homes. Also, the state of Nuevo Leon has laws officially limiting specific types of campaigning. Nonetheless, public services are always part of the citizen electoral calculations. As one municipal functionary put it, “People are going to judge you if there is lighting in their house.”

Citizen participation is an important part of the service delivery process. The 2006-2009 administration created several new programs that specifically incorporate citizens into the delivery of public services. A project called “the Program of Common Action” (PAC) was initiated to involve all localities in the development of public works in their communities. PAC’s are committees comprised of elected representatives - a president, secretary, and treasurer - that coordinate the participation of their community to work with the municipal government on projects like painting schools, planting trees, cleaning of public areas and abandoned properties, and developing parks and gardens. There are 172 PACs in Santa Catarina.

Other programs were established to address citizen complaints and petitions related to public services. One program initiated is “Citizen Attention Centers”. These are information booths centrally located in municipal buildings that provide information to citizens about services and direct individuals to the appropriate office to file a complaint or speak to someone to address a need. In addition to these information centers, the administration founded a program called “Direct Line” where

the municipal president and secretaries go to communities twice a month to attend to individual and/or community petitions. In compliance with the program, the municipal government addresses the petitions in less than five days, informing those who filed the petition if the service or program requested will be funded or not.

Aramberri, Nuevo Leon

Aramberri is the least politically developed case of the four studied. Paternalistic politics continue to be the way business is done. The PRI has won every municipal election for over a decade, and there was evidence in interviews that municipal positions were largely used for patronage handouts. Citizen participation also followed a patron pattern with most popular input taking the form of individuals soliciting the mayor for specific services or goods.[16]

Citizen participation is predominantly in the form of solicitation of services. Individual citizens frequently visit the municipal president's office to verbally request particular services, and written requests submitted by individuals or a group of citizens are common. Requests for services and projects are handled differently in the rural

[16] Building on the work of Kitschelt (2007), ideally I would test if patronage handouts in the form of public services are linked to the vote share of the incumbent party. Unfortunately this data is not currently available. With the release of the 2010 INEGI census, data on services by locality will be accessible. This information can then be matched with electoral data to test if the municipal administration favors certain localities over others based on voter support. This study could be expanded to include all of Mexico, although it would be a time-consuming project considering that there are over 2,400 municipalities with numerous localities each.

areas. There, municipal officials are required by state and federal regulations to carefully consider each request and prioritize those that promote employment in order to prevent migration of rural families to larger cities. While the municipal administration gathers these requests and studies them, they are only able to address a few - 40 requests were fulfilled of 400 last year. Also, select citizens serve on project committees, such as the committee for the new health clinic, or area committees, for example, the committee of sustainable rural development. It was implied that these citizens are selected from the political elite, not elected.

Because addressing service needs is one of the primary functions of the municipal government from the perspective of the citizens, elections often focus on public services. In the last election, campaigns were forged on health services, among others. The president commented that he promised to build a new health clinic during his campaign for the presidential position, which he was able to accomplish with the participation of the state government and federal agencies.

Although services are an important part of elections, they have not created electoral competition. Since 1997, every election has been won by the PRI or a coalition of parties comprised predominantly of the PRI. In the past election, electoral competition was the highest, with the PRI winning only 52% of the vote share; in previous elections the party had won 75% to 92% of votes. In addition to limited

electoral competition, voter turnout for municipal elections is low. For the 2006 municipal election, about 30% of the population voted.

In all there is evidence that the municipality has preserved paternalistic politics. Citizens view the municipal administration as a patron, looking for the provision of specific services to specific individuals or communities. There is no alternation in political power. The PRI has maintained control of the municipal government for decades, and as one citizen put it, "Even when there are new [party] coalitions, it is always the same people". Also, it appears that the political elite utilize the municipal government as a source of patronage jobs. When asked about future ambitions and the possibility of serving again in the municipal administration, many officials replied that there is the expectation to permit others in their party and community the opportunity to work in the municipal government. One official commented, "We know that the rows of the citizens are many that are expecting an opportunity to work in a municipal administration; because in the municipality we don't have many jobs…We have to leave the position so that someone has the same opportunity." Another noted, "In my case one must understand that they already gave us the opportunity and that there are companions behind us." In all, local democracy in Aramberri is limited. Traditional patronage politics remains the standard in this rural community.

Municipal Government Capacity

To evaluate municipal government capacity, I focused on two aspects of capacity: technical expertise and fiscal management. To effectively implement policy, municipal governments must have experienced, trained individuals as well as adequate resources and sound financial management. I examined each of these aspects in interviews and through municipal financial records.

Table 6 outlines the questions I focused on to rate each case on its municipal government capacity. I relied on interviews to gain insight into the technical expertise of the municipal officials, including questions regarding the recruitment of individuals to appointed positions, the education and training of these officials, as well as their experience in their respective fields and prior municipal administrations. To assess the fiscal resources of municipalities, I used both financial records and interview evidence. Specifically, I examined data with regards to revenue sources and tax collection records and considered interviews detailing tax collection efforts as well as innovations in revenue-raising.

In all, the cases were not as varied as with the quality of democracy. The smaller municipalities of Calnali and Aramberri are rated as low capacity while the larger municipalities are rated as high. The small-large split can be explained as an issue of revenue, access to technology, and labor pool limitations (Grindle 2007). Smaller municipalities have large rural populations that typically evade tax collection, limiting

Table 6: Municipal Government Capacity Ratings					
		Southern State/ Less Developed		Northern State/ More Developed	
		Large Municipality	Small Municipality	Large Municipality	Small Municipality
		PRI	PAN	PAN	PRI
		Tulancingo, Hidalgo	*Calnali, Hidalgo*	*Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon*	*Aramberri, Nuevo Leon*
Technical expertise of municipal officials	Are officials experienced in field of work?	High	Low	High	Low
	Do officials have prior experience working for municipal governments?				
	Does the mayor actively recruit experienced individuals to fill municipal government positions (or are jobs handed out on patronage basis)?				
Fiscal management and resources	Does the municipality generate a large portion of its own income (or does it rely heavily on federal/state transfers)?	High	Low	High	Low
	Is there evidence of substantial local tax collection efforts?				
	Is there evidence of innovation in finding revenue sources?				
	Overall Rating:	High	Low	High	Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to the majority of the questions (2 of 3) is "yes"; low rating given if "no" was predominant. For overall quality of democracy, a high rating is given if high is fulfilled in all 2 categories; a low rating otherwise.					

their revenue sources, while larger municipalities have big urban populations with much local business revenue to tax. Moreover, the small administrations I interviewed indicated that they do not heavily pursue tax evaders because they do not have the money to pay taxes. Therefore, both tax base and tax effort is lacking in the small municipalities.

Further limiting their capacity, the small municipalities I studied had problems with attracting qualified, technically-adept individuals to hold appointed positions. Officials I interviewed mentioned numerous times that generally inexperienced and/or untrained individuals are the only ones willing to take up these posts. In the larger municipalities I studied, lack of expertise was the exception among appointed officials; most had considerable education, training, and experience in their respective fields.

Tulancingo, Hidalgo

Tulancingo's municipal administration's capacity is high. This is largely due to the technical expertise of the individuals occupying appointed positions as well as considerable efforts made to boost tax collection. Despite these advances, Tulancingo largely depends on federal transfers for funding.

The government officials comprising the municipal administration have been handpicked by the municipal president for their expertise. While the municipal

president is a professional politician with ambitions for state congressional office, his administration is made of doctors, lawyers, and engineers with education and training obtained from institutions outside of Tulancingo and the state of Hidalgo. All of the municipal officials handling the management of education, health, water, and public works have substantial experience in the respective fields, and none of the officials express a desire for further political offices; on the contrary, all have taken their posts at the request of the president and plan to return to their respective industries and fields upon completion of their term. Only a few of the officials have held prior municipal government posts.

While the technical expertise of Tulancingo's municipal administration is strong, they struggle with managing fiscal resources largely due to the lack of municipal revenue. The municipal government has few economic resources by which to administer public services, relying predominantly on federal and state transfers for funding - over 70% of the municipality's income comes from federal and state sources (INEGI 2009). Local taxes and income from other sources like licenses and surcharges are limited. Municipal officials admit that local tax and fees collection is poor, citing that enforcement efforts need improvement in cases where citizens avoid paying property taxes, business licenses and water surcharge fees. However, improved enforcement of tax and fee laws is not enough. Tulancingo is a traditional society rooted in paternalistic practices in which citizens expect public works and services to be given to them without cost. It is essentially a free rider problem for which there is not a

simple solution. To combat these cultural expectations, the local water agency has launched a campaign to promote the social acceptance of payment for services. While these efforts are a good start, much more needs to be considered to improve the collection of municipal sources of income and combat the problem of nonpayment. For example, the creation of subsidy programs targeted at those who truly cannot afford to pay for usage fees is needed.

Considering that there are few resources to work with in the delivery of services, local government officials make considerable efforts to raise revenue. One way they generate additional income is through the solicitation of funding by state government for specific public works projects. For example, Tulancingo is currently proposing a 23 million dollar project related to trash and sanitation treatment. The municipality has not managed a project of this scope in the past but is looking to generate additional funding for needed projects even if the proposal is somewhat risky due to the amount of money requested.

Another way the municipal administration seeks additional funding is through the solicitation of financing by international organizations and association. For example, proposals are underway to cover the costs of lighting the municipal cathedrals by historical associations. And grant proposals are being considered by international environmental agencies on the basis of municipal efforts to reduce and eliminate

carbon emissions and contamination. This type of funding has not been pursued by other municipalities in Hidalgo, according to the director of planning.

Calnali, Hidalgo

The capacity of Calnali's municipal administration is low. Individuals holding appointed positions have little experience or training in their respective fields. Few have held prior municipal government posts. In addition, Calnali is extremely dependent on federal funding and has a poor record of local tax collection.

Calnali's municipal officials are not career politicians and lack prior government experience, which coupled with insufficient funding means the municipal government has very little capacity with which to deliver quality public services. The municipal government of Calnali is comprised of the elected municipal president, appointed directors of specific service areas, and elected city council members. These officials had little to no experience in their respective duties and plan to return to their jobs as ranchers, teachers, and private industry engineers. None of the municipal government officials, with the exception of one, had prior experience in the municipal administration, specifically, or in government/politics in general.

In addition to lack of expertise, there is a large lack of municipal fiscal resources for public services. The municipality of Calnali predominantly relies on federal and state

government financing with a very small percentage of its income generated locally. In 2007, federal and state funding comprised 96% of the municipality's income. Less than 1,200,000 pesos or $110,000 (USD) was generated from local taxes, usage fees, and licenses. Considering that spending that same year on public works totaled over 10,000,000 pesos, it is clear that the municipality is highly dependent on higher levels of government for the administration and delivery of basic public services and works. Not only does a lack of municipal investment in public works, education, and healthcare mean fewer resources for the delivery of services, it also means that the municipal government has little autonomy in the execution of service programs and policies. In other words, with the majority of funding for resources being federal or state, the municipal is obligated to carry out federal and state objectives with respect to public services. There is limited room for innovation and the implementation of projects and programs tailored to the municipality.

Significant improvements are needed in the recruitment of qualified, experienced individuals for the municipal administration posts and the generation of municipal revenue for public service investment. The former requires a better labor pool, which may not be obtainable in a relatively isolated, rural community. The latter requires considerable efforts on the part of the municipality to enforce the collection of taxes and fees as well as to submit proposals to federal and state governments for funding of special projects, which is difficult with such limited administrative expertise.

Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon

Santa Catarina's municipal administration is highly capable. The individuals holding municipal appointed position generally have both experience in their field as well as in prior government positions. This translates into effective administration of public services as well as success at securing additional funding for public works projects. Resources are sufficient in Santa Catarina largely due to the impressive tax collection efforts of the municipal government.

Santa Catarina's municipal administration is comprised of officials that have considerable experience in their respective fields as well as prior experience in municipal government. Many have served in previous administrations and have even held government positions in other municipalities, including Monterrey, or in state agencies and party organizations. Their expertise is impressive, and it is clear they understand how to get things done because they have done it before. In the case of financial resources - they know how to write proposals, with whom to negotiate funding, and which companies can get the job completed. They are highly skilled and innovative, which has resulted in improvements and advances in municipal public services.

Santa Catarina has sufficient resources to administer public services, according to municipal government officials. A little over half of municipal income comes from federal and state sources (INEGI 2008). The rest is primary made of property taxes,

licenses, and fees that the municipality collects not only from individuals but more importantly from businesses. Collection of property taxes has greatly improved - municipal officials claim that double the homes now pay taxes than those that paid taxes three years ago. Administrators credit increased confidence in the municipal government for the increase in taxes paid. One official explains, “They [citizens] say it is not worth paying if the government is going to steal the money. But when the people see that you begin to work, they begin to pay.” But individual family tax income is not enough because most of the municipality is comprised of lower-middle class families with little taxable property. Neighboring municipalities with larger middle and upper class populations have more tax revenue at their disposal. Businesses make up for the lack of property tax income on the part of families. Businesses - restaurants, stores such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, and factories - generate substantial property tax, license, and fee revenue for the municipality. Recognizing the importance of business for the municipality’s fiscal health, the municipal administration established pro-business policies and programs that decrease the financial barriers of entrance on new businesses and help citizens start micro-businesses such as bakeries.

In addition to tax income, the municipality is adept at securing state and federal funding for special projects such as those mentioned above, including wind energy plants and methane gas factories. Proposals for public works projects begin with the public works office. There the technical plan for the work is devised, laying out the exact details of how the project will be executed. The plan is then sent to the municipal

president who delivers the proposal to state and federal offices and negotiates with politicians and government bureaucracy to convince them of the feasibility of the project and secure funding. Additional revenue gained to finance specific public works not only increases municipal income but also can save money in the future for the municipality if planned right. For example, the wind energy plan is expected to save Santa Catarina 23% on energy bills.

In addition to revenue sources, the municipal administration places importance on the administration of municipal resources. Competent and trustworthy individuals are sought out to manage municipal finances. A good fiscal administrator, treasurer, and comptroller are essential to the fiscal health of the municipality, according to municipal officials.

Aramberri, Nuevo Leon

Aramberri, like Calnali, is a small municipality suffering from a lack of government capacity. The individuals holding the appointed positions of the government have little technical expertise and prior experience in their line of work or in prior administrations. Resources are extremely limited in Aramberri, and the municipal government is heavily dependent on federal funding.

Aramberri's municipal administration generally lacks technical expertise. Very few municipal officials have worked in previous a municipal administration. Only the municipal president and director of planning have served in government position; the president was the previous president's secretary, and the director of planning serving in the same position in the last administration. While one official had prior private business experience in his administrative area, all others were generally lacking in prior experience or expertise in their field. This lack of expertise affects the ability of the municipal government to not only do everyday business but also to innovate. Without the technical knowledge of how the municipal government operates, particularly in conjunction with higher levels of government with respect to public works and services, the municipal administration is limited in its ability to propose new projects and secure additional funding for public services. Supplemental resources are important to advancing the municipality's delivery of public services, and as the next section elaborates, Aramberri greatly needs additional financial support.

Aramberri relies heavily on state and federal resources to provide public services. INEGI reports that in 2007 91% of municipal income was generated from state and federal sources. Municipal officials blame limited resources on the economic capabilities (or lack of) of Aramberri's population. The predominant economic activity is agriculture, which yields little income for families. Also, there is the problem of compliance with tax laws. Property taxes, business licenses, and vehicle registrations, for example, are ways that the municipality can raise revenue, but avoidance of these

taxes and fees by the majority of the population decreases the independent income of the municipality.

Public Services

To evaluate the equality of public services, I carefully weighed municipal education, health, water, and sanitation records with interviews of municipal officials. I considered if the service reached most all of the municipal population and if efforts were explicitly being made by the municipal administration to expand services. Also, I assessed if services were delivered to historically disenfranchised populations, particularly rural or outlying communities as well as women. The specific factors I evaluated for each public service area, including education, health, and water/sanitation, are listed in Table 7.

The rankings for each municipality are also shown in Table 7. Overall, Tulancingo and Santa Catarina are ranked as cases with high equality of basic services, and Calnali and Aramberri are ranked as low. A cursory glance at municipal records shows the disparity among the large municipal cases and the smaller ones. Adult literacy rates, percentages of homes with plumbed water, and percentage of homes with sewer systems are most evenly distributed among the municipal population in Tulancingo and Santa Catarina, as shown in Figure 9. The following sections detail the rankings of each case.

Table 7: Equality of Municipal Public Services					
		Southern State/ Less Developed		Northern State/ More Developed	
		Large Municipality	Small Municipality	Large Municipality	Small Municipality
		PRI	PAN	PAN	PRI
		Tulancingo, Hidalgo	*Calnali, Hidalgo*	*Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon*	*Aramberri, Nuevo Leon*
Education	Is over 90% of the adult population literate?	High	Low	High	Low
	Are there operating schools in rural areas or do rural students commonly attend centrally-located schools?				
	Are there efforts to expanding education services (i.e. buildings, technology) to meet municipal needs?				
Health	Is medical care easily available to rural populations?	Low	Low	High	Low
	Are there enough doctors and medical staff to attend to the medical needs of the municipality?				
	Are there efforts to address women's health issues?				
Water and Sanitation	Do over 90% of homes have sanitation drainage?	High	Low	High	Low
	Do over 90% of homes have plumbed water?				
	Are there efforts to expand and improve water and sanitation services?				
	Overall Rating:	Medium - High	Low	High	Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to the majority of the questions (2 of 3) is "yes"; low rating given if "no" was predominant. For overall quality of democracy, a high rating is given if high is fulfilled in all categories; a medium- high if high is given in 2 of 3 categories; and a low rating otherwise.					



Figure 9: The Distribution of Basic Services **a**cross Four Mexican Municipalities

Tulancingo, Hidalgo

Public services in Tulancingo are sufficient and generally equally distributed to the overwhelming majority of the population, however, many improvements are needed. The municipal population continues to grow, placing increasing demands for services on local government. Moreover, the equipment, buildings, and technology related to basic public services are in need of expansion and replacement to continue to broadly distribute adequate services to the municipal population.

Education in Tulancingo reaches most all citizens. INEGI (2008) reports the municipality's adult literacy rate is 93%. While education is sufficient, the municipal government is involved in efforts to expand education services, including plans for the

building of eleven schools in the next 2 years. There are currently 275 schools in the municipality, including preschool, primary, secondary, technical, and university (INEGI 2008). Although there is an average of 25 students per teacher in preschool and primary levels and 17 students per teacher in secondary and university classes (INEGI 2008), officials managing education services consider increasing the number of teachers a priority. Teachers, particularly in rural schools, are often charged with the instruction of multiple grade levels. Although there may be only a total 20 students, managing multiple grade levels across several teaching areas overburdens the teacher and decreases the personal attention students receive from instructors.

There is also a lack of human capital in health services in Tulancingo, according to municipal health officials. INEGI reports that the municipality has a little over 200 medical professionals (INEGI 2008), but there is not enough staff to handle all patients and medical problems. There is also a lack of up-to-date equipment that enables specialty services. Patients with serious medical issues are sent to Pachuca, the capital of Hidalgo, or Mexico Distrito Federal. Citizens also utilize private clinics located in Tulancingo because they have equipment that public clinics do not. And individuals seeking medical attention in rural areas have to travel to the urban center of the municipality or wait for traveling medical clinics - there are two in the municipality - to reach them. In all, health services in Tulancingo need expansion and improvement, cites municipal officials, particularly the hiring of more doctors and nurses and the modernization of health equipment.

While 93% of homes in Tulancingo have water available from the municipal's supply and system (INEGI 2008), municipal water services need much improvement. Equipment, particularly pumps and pipes, is old, corroded and in need of replacement, and treatment plants need expansion. The municipal administration is currently in the process of replacing equipment but funds are limited to expand treatment plants. And as one municipal official pointed out, it is difficult to invest considerable money and manpower into water treatment when neighboring municipalities linked to your water sources contaminate the system with sewage and trash. In addition to the physical needs that must be addressed to improve water services, the municipality has placed much emphasis on addressing social concerns as well. The municipal water authority has launched a water campaign aimed at educating citizens about the process of water service, including proper disposal of trash and payment for services - a big problem for the municipality.

Public works have been an immediate priority of the municipality. At the date of the interviews, the municipal administration had been in office less than one year and sought to remedy issues that were immediately manageable. Topping the list was trash collection and street paving. Municipal trash collection has improved with more regular service, and the local government has repaved many streets in the municipality. Also, construction of new highways is planned, and some construction projects are underway. Public works officials considering the improvement of transportation within

the municipality important not only for citizens but also imperative for business and industry transport in the area.

Calnali, Hidalgo

Public services in Calnali are not equally distributed throughout the municipality. The municipality's considerable rural population and mountainous terrain pose problems to delivering adequate education, health, and sanitation services to rural residents. Beyond rural issues, health, water, and education services are not of high quality. The administration's development plan cites that health services are "not sufficient" and that improved water supplies are a "permanent demand of society" (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Calnali, 2006). And while there are numerous schools, they generally lack quality teachers and modern technology.

Education services are of poor quality in Calnali. Schools in Calnali are not up to modern standards, and quality education services are not found in rural areas. This is reflected in Calnali's adult literacy rate of 76% (INEGI 2008). There are numerous schools - 79 in 2006 as compared to 53 in 1994 - but the majority of the schools lack libraries and computers and are in need of repair (INEGI; Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Calnali, 2006). Moreover, the quality of the local teachers is an issue. As one municipal official notes, teachers sent to rural communities are generally those that are young and inexperienced, those given the job as a favor, or those being punished for some

reason by the education higher-ups and bureaucracy; in short, rural teachers are generally lower quality teachers and this has negative consequences on the quality of education in that school. Therefore, rural students in this area are not receiving equal education services.

Health services are also lacking in Calnali. There are only 19 public health professionals in the municipality, and public clinics are not equipped with the technology or expertise to handle serious medical problems. To receive medical attention beyond basic care, citizens must travel to Pachuca, the state's capital city. Rural residents have to travel even further. Municipal officials recognize these grave issues, but comment there are not sufficient fiscal resources to make improvements.

One of the largest problems in Calnali is water and sewage. INEGI reports that 21% of homes in Calnali did not have plumbed water and 26% did not have sewer systems (INEGI 2008). Because the municipality is rural and situated in mountainous terrain, constructing water and sanitation lines to reach all localities is difficult. However, even those localities receiving public services frequently experience water outages and dirty plumbed water. In addition, wastewater is an issue. The municipality needs a water treatment plant to filter sewage before it is drained into the river but lacks the resources to build it (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Calnali, 2006).

Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon

Santa Catarina's public services are sufficient to reach nearly all citizens, and the administration has made great efforts to deliver basic services such as mobile health clinics to outlying communities not located near the center of the municipality. Santa Catarina faces a challenge many municipalities must manage - a growing population. According to one government official, the municipality's population increased by 30,000 inhabitants during 2005-2008. As a result new communities without basic infrastructure are popping up on the edges of the municipality. These communities place demands on the municipal government for water, maintenance of public spaces, trash collection, and for education services and medical attention.

Education services are of good quality in Santa Catarina. The adult literacy rate is 95% (INEGI 2008). There are 264 schools in the municipality, including three technical schools and six universities (INEGI 2008). There are about 27 students per teacher in preschools and primary schools, and 17 students per teacher in upper levels (INEGI 2008). The municipal government is responsible for the running of schools as well as the maintenance and repair of these buildings.

The municipal administration has introduced several new programs to better distribute education services. Faced with limited resources, the administration created a cooperative funding program that involves local communities and parents in raising a portion of funds for specific education projects. For example, to pay for new computers

for the primary school, parents raise a third of the total funds and the municipality provides the remainder. Programs like these enable the local government to fund more projects. In addition to this program, the municipal administration has reached out to older populations by offering adult education classes and computer classes to stay-at-home-moms.

Health services in Santa Catarina are basic but developing. There are several medical clinics and units equipped with x-ray technology and exam rooms that provide general health services. The municipality also has an ambulance service and recently implemented a program to provide medical services to communities with few resources through mobile medical units. These mobile units visit 17 localities within the municipality and offer general medical and dental attention as well as specialized services such as cardiograms. Most of these services are free with a few charging a recovery cost of less than 30 pesos - about the cost of 3 coca-colas. In addition to providing subsidized medical care to these communities, individuals without insurance are treated in municipal clinics, and many travel from other municipalities to receive medical attention. Also, the municipality hosts a monthly health fair, providing medical, gynecological, and dental services. These fairs are targeted to women that do not or cannot travel to the municipal clinics for medical care.

While health services in Santa Catarina provide basic care and take medical services to those in need, municipal healthcare needs improvement. There is a need for

a large hospital equipped with the facilities and technology to conduct surgeries. Currently, the municipality sends emergency surgeries to neighboring municipalities. In addition, more resources are needed to expand healthcare to rural and disabled citizens.

Water and sewer services reach 95% and 97% of the municipality's population, respectively. Beyond these basic services, the municipal government also works in conjunction with state agencies to distribute potable water to the most rural and developing areas. Ensuring that 100% of the municipal population has drinking water is an important priority for the administration.

During the municipal government's administration, much work was accomplished and planned in the area of public works. Two overpasses and a development center were constructed. This specific development center consists of six buildings arranged in a plaza; each building has a specific function - preschool and library, for example - and there is a soccer court located in the plaza. These types of centers are an integral part of communities, explained municipal officials, because they offer easily accessed centers of learning and recreation for families.

Security is another area of public works that the administration has worked diligently to improve. Much like the federal government scene, the municipal administration struggles to control organized crime and drug trafficking. These issues became urgent when the current administration took office three years ago. In the first

month of the administration, one city council member and the secretary of security were killed. The municipal president heavily invested in security measures, pouring 30% of that year's budget into security expenses, including more than doubling the police force and purchasing new arms and equipment for security personnel.

While the municipal government has made substantial improvement to public works and security, they have also undertaken innovative environmental programs. Santa Catarina is the first Mexican municipality to construct a wind energy plant. Also, plans are being made to construct a tire recycling factory in order to reduce the emission of poisonous gases from burning rubber and to be able to reuse or sell the recycled rubber. Another project underway is a methane gas factory run on trash. Landfills are covered with soil and the trash underneath produces methane gas that can be used for an energy source. Programs like these exist in Toronto, Canada and in Los Angeles, California.

Aramberri, Nuevo Leon

The municipal government of Aramberri is primarily concerned with the delivery of basic services and the development of the municipality's infrastructure. Roads, public lighting, sanitation facilities, and piped water are some of the basic services that the municipal administration struggles to deliver to the most rural areas of its territory. In addition to these, healthcare is a concern for the entire municipality. While strides

have been made to provide more services to more localities during the past three years, many homes are without electricity and water, and many families must travel far to receive basic health services.

Aramberri has an impressive number of schools - 175 - and a very low student to teacher ratio - 10 students per teacher. However, these statistics mask the fact that the quality of education is poor. In the small rural localities that comprise much of the municipality, schools lack electricity, water, and sanitation facilities. Without electricity, computers cannot be used, and the lack of potable water and bathrooms adversely affect student health. Moreover, teachers are responsible for instructing multiple grade levels in the majority of schools, even those located in the most developed areas of the municipality. The municipal administration has made some advances in education with the building of eight classrooms with sanitation facilities in the past year as well as combining efforts with higher levels of government to electrify some rural schools.

Strides are also being made to improve health services. The opening of a new health clinic is planned for later this year. The new clinic will be equipped with the technology for x-rays, laboratory analysis, and consults with specialist doctors through the internet. These services will ease the municipality's use of neighboring clinics; Aramberri residents have been traveling 40 minutes or more to use other municipality's clinics because their one clinic did not offer adequate health services. Rural residents rarely seek needed medical attention if possible, according to one municipal official.

In the area of public works, the municipal government of Aramberri is responsible for very few services, including public lighting, maintenance of public areas, and sanitation facilities. The federal government is responsible for electricity, and the state of Nuevo Leon has a separate, autonomous municipal agency in charge of water services. All levels of government struggle to provide these basic services to Aramberri's rural population, but the municipal government has the worst record. While 83% of homes have electricity and 77% have plumbed water, only 36% of homes have sanitation facilities that dispose of sewage (INEGI 2008). Municipal officials claim that delays in service delivery are due to the geography of the municipality, stating, "In the case of mountains the most urgent problem we have is roads and electricity. In some semi-desert communities the problem is water; we have to transport water from long distances." The rural areas of the municipality are diverse in terms of geography, creating different obstacles for infrastructure development. In the mountainous rural communities, it is difficult to build roads and electrical power lines. In the desert communities, the lack of water sources makes it challenging to provide potable water and sanitation facilities.

Discussion of Findings

The case findings support my expectation that municipalities characterized by high quality local democracy and high local government capacity distribute basic public

services more equally, reaching the overwhelming majority of their populations. The two large municipality cases, Santa Catarina (North) and Tulancingo (South), demonstrated a high level of local democracy and government capacity as well as a more equal distribution of public services than the other cases. Here high quality democracy and greater government capacity were coupled with lower inequalities of services. On the other hand, the smaller cases, Aramberri (North) and Calnali (South), were characterized by low quality democracy, poor government capacity, and high inequalities in service delivery. While local democracy in Aramberri is of poor quality, Calnali's quality of democracy is good and shows signs of further development. Voter turnout in Calnali historically has been high, and the most recent election was very competitive, ushering in a new party to power that has the potential to change the way services are delivered.

Returning to my expectations, the cases fit as shown in Table 8. The only cell left remaining is the low democracy - high capacity case. While my fieldwork cases do not fit this scenario, I believe that the expectation would hold that a local government exhibiting low democracy - high capacity would have unequal service distribution with specific populations or groups targeted. I expect that a more wealthy country with pockets of authoritarianism would provide an example of such a case.

Table 8: Findings of Municipal Service Delivery

		Democracy	
		MEDIUM - HIGH	LOW
Government Capacity	MEDIUM - HIGH	Santa Catarina Tulancingo Medium to high equality in the distribution of services	Low equality in the distribution of services with services targeted at specific populations
	LOW	Calnali Low equality of the distribution of services	Aramberri Low equality of the distribution of services

We can conjecture that Aramberri might fulfill the high capacity - low democracy cell if it had more fiscal resources at its disposal. Increased municipal funding could give the administration the capital needed to attract more technically-adept individuals for the appointed positions, which would increase the overall capacity of the municipal government. Increased capacity would give the administration the needed tools to distribute more goods and services to citizens. We have to ask, then, would the pattern of patronage politics that Aramberri and similar governments follow be a “bad thing” if it resulted in greater goods and services? The answer is no if goods and services reach those segments of the population that are in need. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that marginalized groups such as rural citizens would be targeted as

beneficiaries. Why? Simply because they yield very little political clout. The patrons in power are not dependent on marginalized groups for votes. Often these groups have lower voter turnout rates for the very same reasons basic services do not reach them - limited resources and geographical obstacles like traversing deserts and mountains. Therefore, even in the face of improved capacity - greater resources and technical abilities - we would not see more equality in public service delivery because democratic incentives drive political behavior to increase equality.

Beer (2003) in her study of institutional change in Mexico adds another complementary explanation: the lack of electoral competition keeps bureaucrats rather than politicians in control of policy-making. Beer argues that "increasing electoral competition will shift policy-making control from unaccountable bureaucratic actors to elected officials…this happens because politicians selected in competitive election face incentives to extend their influence over greater policy domains in order to meet the demands of their own constituents" (Beer 2003: 120). It may be that in Aramberri, the lack of democracy means that bureaucrats will continue to dictate policy-making in a patron fashion and fail to evenly distribute goods.

Democratic incentives are the key to expanding equality. Politicians are motivated by electoral incentives to distribute public services broadly. This fieldwork has shown that even in the case of no reelection, politicians are motivated by party benefits to seek equality in basic public service delivery. But why the broad distribution

of services and not just improved delivery to constituents - those that voted you into power? In the face of very high political competition, as in the cases of Santa Catarina with less than 1% margin of victory and Tulancingo with a margin of victory of 2%, politicians and government officials perceive the entire municipality as their base of support. It takes convincing the majority of citizens through your performance in government to vote for your party in the next election. Never did I hear in the interviews I conducted mention of “our party’s constituency” or “our voters”. The cases I studied demonstrate that vibrant democracy in the form of high political party competition and high voter turnout creates incentives for politicians to expand equality. These incentives are supported by sufficient government capacity to ensure the policies to increase equality are actually implemented.

This analysis clearly points to the need of government capacity for democratic incentives to be translated into public service equalities. The cases studied underscore that government capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reducing service inequalities. Government capacity in developing contexts such as the ones presented in this chapter largely hinges on fiscal resources. The high capacity cases I studied highlighted the importance of tax revenue and fiscal innovation. While much of the funding and operation of public services is dictated by state and federal governments and is highly formulaic, municipal governments have the opportunity to innovate on the fringes. For example, Tulancingo pursued funding for specific public works with international agencies, and Santa Catarina has successfully secured additional federal

funding for numerous special public works projects. Grindle (2007) in a study of 30 medium-sized Mexican municipalities finds that policy innovation is the norm for these governments. The creation of programs to better assess property taxes and of agencies to manage city events and celebrations, for example, resulted in increased municipal government revenue. Such innovation is not limited to the context of large and medium sized municipalities. Similar institutions and practices could be adopted by smaller local governments. All require little to no financial capital to implement, and should be encouraged by state and federal governments for adoption by municipalities. There is the issue of sustainability of these innovations, as Grindle (2007) points out, and municipalities must formally institutionalize successful initiatives for long-term benefit.

Conclusion

Local governments have the responsibility to deliver basic public services. Their performance is largely dependent on local democracy and capacity. Local governments that have healthy political competition and participation as well as an adequate pool of resources - both fiscal and technical - successfully deliver services to the majority of their population. In these contexts, politicians have the incentives to broadly distribute services and the capacity to do so. Municipalities lacking the capacity to deliver services to all their population tend to have poor services despite the quality of their

democracy, making it clear that capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reducing service inequalities. While this type of local government must struggle to develop politically and fiscally, municipalities that have a high level of democracy coupled with sufficient capacity still face challenges. In the developing world where patronage politics have historically been the rules of the game, municipalities must "transform the traditional vision that sees them as institutions that are inefficient, corrupt, and subordinate to actors central in the promotion of the development of their communities" (Carrera Hernández 2006: 2). And all municipalities regardless of their legacy should aspire to become a "source of processes and resources that…can contribute to the not only local, but national development" (Carrera Hernández 2006: 2). When municipalities rise to these challenges, democracy truly begins to function from the bottom-up and substantially contribute to citizen well-being.

This chapter has unpacked democracy and capacity on the local level in four Mexican municipalities. The findings support the previous chapter's conclusion that governments with high quality democracy coupled with sufficient capacity more equally distribute public services. These two chapters have examined the first part of the virtuous cycle running from quality of democracy to equality of public services. The findings have underscored that democracy is multifaceted, functioning to promote equality primarily through electoral incentives. We have seen that higher electoral competition has been correlated with more equality in public services. Moreover, these chapters have shown that high quality democracies must be supported by adequate

government capacity for electoral incentives to be translated into policy outcomes. Without sufficient resources and technical expertise, no amount of political competition can induce policies that expand equality. Democracy alone is not enough to reduce inequalities.

The second part of the virtuous cycle asserts that equality contributes to the further development of democratic quality by expanding political participation. In the context of public services, we should see greater equality producing higher levels of political participation. Basic public services including education, healthcare, and sanitation enable individuals with the education, health, and political skills needed of active democratic participants. This participation deepens democracy by enlarging the political sphere to include previously marginalized individuals. The next chapter tests these claims.

CHAPTER V

COMPLETING THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE:

PUBLIC SERVICES INCREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation is a critical component of building stable and meaningful democracies. Citizen participation in politics is not only an input device signaling the needs and demands of society to government leaders, but also a mechanism by which to hold politicians accountable. Without political participation, democracy would lack the civic base it requires to function and to improve in quality. However, without sufficient education and healthcare, individuals lack the capabilities to effectively participate in politics. Basic public services expand the political opportunities of individual citizens by enabling them to be active participants in politics. While the previous two chapters explored the first part of the virtuous cycle, dissecting the moving parts of the democracy-equality link, this chapter turns to the reverse, asking - how does equality contribute to the improvement of democratic quality? Specifically, in this chapter we test how public services contribute to democracy by increasing individual political participation.

Before diving into empirical tests, it is important to review our theoretical foundation. The first section of this chapter revisits the virtuous cycle theory, discussing the mechanisms that link equality of public services to improving democracy. Second,

we explore how public services should have a different effect in developing versus developed contexts and outline specific expectations regarding both. Third, the model used to test this relationship is outlined, including specifications of variable measurement, hypotheses, and methods. Fourth, the results of the estimations are presented and interpreted. And finally, I offer some conclusions regarding the findings.

Revisiting the Theoretical Framework

According to the virtuous cycle theoretical framework, democracy expands equality which in turn deepens democracy. Specifically in the context of public services, greater equality in public service provision enhances the quality of democracy through political participation. Basic public services expand the political opportunities available to citizens by enabling them with the skills and capacities needed to be active democratic participants. As a result, greater political participation enlarges the electoral arena, feeding political competition and expanding the overall quality of democracy from the bottom-up.

Why are public services so important for individual political participation? Sen asserts that the arrangements society makes for basic services "are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding a preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities" (1999: 39). Consumption of public services equips

citizens with the health and skills needed to participate politically. Basic healthcare, clean water, and adequate sanitation facilities ensures that individuals are physically capable to participate. Although these services seem so basic that they should have little impact, consider that at any given time more than half of the poor in the developing world are ill from causes related to hygiene, sanitation and water supply (Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council 2008). We can imagine such sickness prevents these individuals from political activities such as walking to the voting polls to cast their ballot or taking part in a community meeting to solve local problems. The provision of basic public services is absolutely essential to the physical health and well-being of citizens in the developing world.

While healthcare, water and sanitation services physically enable individuals to participate, education cultivates the skills needed to be politically active. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone put it, "…education imparts information about politics and cognate fields and about a variety of skills, some of which facilitate political learning". They go on to say, "Schooling increases one's capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and intangible subjects, that is subjects like politics" (1980: 18).

Clearly, we can see that basic services are essential to improving the physical and cognitive abilities of citizens. Particularly in the developing world, these capacities are needed to participate politically. The expansion of the distribution of basic services enlarges political opportunities and participation in this context. However, in developed

nations, basic public services should not affect political participation because average citizens have the needed capacities to participate. In the developed world, inequalities of basic services are generally smaller and typically involve better quality rather than access to services.

In other words, the starting point for developing and developed countries is different. While public services increase political participation in the former, improvements in the equality of services should have little effect in the latter. However, if we were to trace developed countries back to their period of advancement, we would be able to apply this theoretical framework with the expectation that expanded equality in public services improved participation and deepened democracy.[17] The next section further teases out these theoretical expectations with regards to a country's level of development in terms of quality of democracy and government capacity.

Theoretical Expectations

Development may be couched in terms that we have used throughout this study - democratic quality and government capacity. Developed nations are generally high quality democracies that have a high degree of government capacity while developing nations are most typified by their lack of government capacity and vary in their quality

[17] Historical analyses of this sort are simply beyond the scope of this project.

of democracy. Considering the same quality of democracy-government capacity pairings presented in the previous chapter examining public services in Mexican municipalities (see Table 3), we may assign specific theoretical expectations to four scenarios: 1.) medium to high quality democracy- medium to high government capacity; 2.) medium to high quality of democracy-low government capacity; 3.) low quality democracy- medium to high government capacity; and 4.) low quality democracy-low government capacity. Table 9 presents the hypothesized effect of these contexts on political participation.

Assuming that high quality democracy coupled with high levels of government capacity represents a developed political context, we know from the analyses presented in the previous two chapters that such governments are correlated with high equality of basic public services while the other three democracy-capacity pairings are associated with lower equality. Therefore, we should not expect public services to impact political participation in high quality democracies with high government capacity. In this context, individual capacities should be beyond the point that expansion of basic services influences political opportunities. This may be why we see declining levels of participation in high quality democracies. In other words, the virtuous cycle of basic public services may run its course; the expansion of other forms of equal opportunities and outcomes such as income inequalities or expansion of gay and lesbian rights may positively affect democratic quality in this context. If high quality

democracy-high capacity scenarios are not affected by public services, where do we theoretically expect their influence?

Table 9: Theoretical Expectations of Political Participation

		Democracy	
		HIGH	MEDIUM - LOW
Government Capacity	HIGH	No effect of public services on participation due to "developed" starting point	No effect of public services on participation due to lack of democratic incentives
	MEDIUM - LOW	Effect of public services due to "developing" starting point and presence of democratic incentives	No effect of public services on participation due to lack of democratic incentives

Returning again to our findings of the previous chapters, we know that high quality democracy produces strong electoral incentives for the equal distribution of public services but that low government capacity limits these motivations from being translated into actual policy outcomes. Therefore, we may expect that public services influence individual political participation in this context because the political environment is one that is responsive to citizens. This gets to citizen motivation for participation; incentives for participation are simply absent in the context of political

non-responsiveness. Even if one has the capacity to participate, there is little motivation to do so when politicians disregard citizen input. Public services, therefore, should not have a noticeable effect on political participation in medium to low quality democracies regardless of government capacity.

To summarize, basic public services expand individual capacities to participate. Therefore, we should see an increase in political participation with public service provision. However, this relationship is expected only in a developing context where democratic political incentives exist but government capacity is limited. In this context, politicians have electoral incentives to be responsive, and voters, therefore, are motivated to participate. Moreover, the baseline of individual well-being is so low that basic public services have a large positive impact on the capabilities of citizens, not only motivating them but also enabling them to participate. The next section presents a model of individual-level political participation with public services as the focus.

Modeling Participation as a Result of Public Services: Variables, Hypotheses, and Methods

While the previous two chapters have examined public service equalities with governments as the units of analysis, we now turn to the individual citizen. Because consumption of public services and political participation varies individual to individual, it is important to examine these processes on this level. It is also important to couch

the individual within the larger political system. Therefore, I use survey data to capture individual-level factors and model them nested in the democracy-capacity pairings presented in the previous section.

I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Political Culture Surveys and the Afrobarometer to test how public services affect political participation in Latin America and Africa. The LAPOP survey was conducted in 2006 and covers 13 countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.[18] The Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2005 and covers 15 countries: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. In all, this analysis draws on a total of 28 countries from the developing world with over 70,000 respondents.

The countries included in the analysis offer cases of each democracy-capacity pairing. Figure 10 illustrates where the cases fall with regards to the four democratic quality and government capacity categories. There are a substantial number of countries in the low quality democracy-low capacity category (LL), fewer in the low quality democracy- medium to high capacity category (LH), and a good amount in the medium to high quality democracy-low capacity category (HL). The medium to high quality democracy- medium to high government capacity category (HH) is limited to

[18] Bolivia is excluded because it was oversampled.



Country Codes:

1	Benin	6	Ecuador	11	Kenya	16	Mozambique	21	Peru	26	Uruguay
2	Botswana	7	El Salvador	12	Lesotho	17	Namibia	22	Senegal	27	Venezuela
3	Chile	8	Ghana	13	Madagascar	18	Nicaragua	23	South Africa	28	Zambia
4	Colombia	9	Guatemala	14	Malawi	19	Nigeria	24	Tanzania		
5	Costa Rica	10	Honduras	15	Mexico	20	Panama	25	Uganda		

Categories:
HH = high democracy-high capacity

HL = high democracy-low capacity

LH = medium to low democracy-high capacity

LL = medium to low democracy-low capacity

Figure 10: Democracy-Capacity Case Pairings

one case: Costa Rica.[19] However, because we are examining individual-level behavior, we have a sufficient number of responses to adequately examine political participation in this scenario.[20]

To study political participation, I examine individual-level incidences of voting and protest. Each survey asks respondents if they have voted in the last presidential election or ever participated in a demonstration or public protest. Both measures are dichotomous variables (yes/no). For full variable descriptions and coding information, see Appendix G. For descriptive statistics, see Appendix H. The following paragraphs summarize the individual-level factors I expect to influence the choice to vote and protest.

Foremost, I expect public services to affect political participation. Greater availability and consumption of basic services expand opportunities to participate as individuals gain the capabilities needed to be active democratic participants. On the other hand, poor services hinder participation. To measure availability and

[19] I categorized those cases with electoral competition greater than 0.85 to be "high quality" democracies. A positive value of rule of law categorized cases as "high" government capacity; "low" was assigned to negative values. The country cases were categorized as follows: HH - Costa Rica; HL - Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Benin, Zambia; LH - Chile, Uruguay, Botswana, South Africa; LL - Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. Sensitivity tests were run moving the threshold of 0.85 for "high quality" democracy up and down by 0.5 to 0.8 and 0.9. The results of the models were generally the same.

[20] Note that Costa Rica has one of the lowest reported service inequalities of the cases studied. In the case of plumbed water, the difference between urban and rural residents reporting access is 9% in comparison to 50% in Nicaragua, 65% in Zambia, and 85% in Zimbabwe. This supports our assumption that "developed" can be represented by high quality democracy-high government capacity. Certainly, developed countries have low service inequalities similar to Costa Rica's.

consumption of services on the individual-level, I rely on survey questions that ask respondents to evaluate basic public services. A good evaluation arguably indicates that the respondent has access to and benefits from consumption of the service. A bad evaluation reflects that the respondent either has limited access to or benefit from the service.

Simple cross-tabulations of service evaluations and access to clean water indicate that this is a valid assumption. For the African countries sampled, 68% of those individuals that rate public services as "bad" also have no access to a community water system, and 63% of respondents that evaluate services as "good" have access to piped water. For Latin Americans, the "good" ratings are similar, but the "bad" ratings are less supportive of my assumption. In the Latin American countries sampled, 81% of individuals rating services as "good" have piped water in their home while 22% of those saying services are "bad" do not have piped water in their homes. The low overlap of "bad" services and no access to water for Latin Americans may be the result of the survey question. As elaborated below, the question asks about services in general, not just water. Regardless of the reason behind it, the overall cross-tabulations demonstrate that evaluations of public services are related to access, consumption, and personal benefit.

To measure public services I use the LAPOP question that asks, "Would you say that the services the municipality is giving to the people are very good, good, not good

or not bad, bad, or very bad?" The Afrobarometer asks, "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Improving basic health services? Addressing educational needs? Delivering household water?" I have collapsed the responses to a 1 to 3 scale with 1 indicating a "bad" evaluation, 2 indicating an "average" rating, and 3 indicating a "good" evaluation. I expect good public service evaluations to be positively related to political participation. Those individuals benefiting from public services have the capabilities and incentives to politically participate while those lacking access to or benefit from services do not have the means or motivation to participate.

Moving on from public services, there are numerous other individual-level factors related to political participation. Studies of political behavior have underscored the importance of economic conditions and government evaluations. Research has shown that national economic evaluations (sociotropic) have a strong effect on political participation (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1986; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Although this research focuses predominantly on vote choice, I include national economic evaluations in the model to test if economic conditions influence the choice to participate in politics. I expect those with positive evaluations of their economic situation to participate politically in order to see continued positive outcomes and check government leaders who manage the economy. To measure evaluations of the national economy I use survey questions that ask respondents to rate the national

economy on a 5 point scale (1 = very bad; 2= bad; 3= neither good or bad; 4= good; 5= very good).

In addition to economic evaluations, assessments of the government are influential to political participation. I measure government evaluations in terms of individual perceptions of democracy, corruption, and crime. If individuals perceive their democracy as a farce, believe that government corruption is widespread, or fear crime, they have less confidence in democracy and rule of law and are less likely to take part in politics (Booth and Seligson 2009). To measure perceptions of democracy I use the survey question that asks respondents how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country (1= very dissatisfied; 2= dissatisfied; 3= satisfied; 4= very satisfied). To measure corruption perceptions, I use the survey question that asks respondents to evaluate the level of corruption of government officials on a 4 point scale with higher values indicating more perceived corruption. To capture crime perceptions, I use survey questions that ask respondents how secure they feel in their home and neighborhood, measured on a 4 point scale with higher values indicating greater insecurity and fear of crime. I expect that positive evaluations of democracy are associated with higher levels of participation, and I hypothesize individuals with lower perceptions of corruption and crime participate more than those with perceptions that corruption and crime are rampant.

Political behavior studies have also underscored the importance of political interest (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Jackman & Miller 1995; Blais 2000). Individuals with higher levels of political interest participate more. To measure political interest, I use a survey question that asks respondents to rate their own political interest. The measure ranges from 1 to 4 with 1 indicating "not interested at all" and 4 "very interested".

I also control for demographic characteristics that effect political behavior, including age, gender, education, employment status, and income. Studies of the United States have found that more educated, older and wealthy individuals participate in politics more (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Jackman & Miller 1995; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Blais 2000). More educated individuals possess civic skills required to participate, and individuals of a higher socio-economic status are more likely to participate than those with fewer resources because they typically have the time, energy, and resources to do so. Age represents both generational differences and life-cycle effects, and older individuals have experience with the political system. In all, education, wealth, and age reduce the transactional costs of voting.

To measure education I use a 9 point scale that reports levels of education completed, ranging from no formal education to completion of primary school to post graduate work. To measure wealth I created a measure that records the number of major possessions the individual has, including a vehicle, television, radio, and

telephone. This measure is appropriate for the developing world where fiscal resources and capital flows are limited. Higher values indicate greater wealth.[21] Age is measured in years. Employment status and gender are also controlled for in the model.

In all, I model political participation on the individual-level as a correlate of evaluations of public services, the economy, and the government. I also take into account the personal characteristics of political interest, age, gender, education, employment status, and income. These variables constitute the "baseline" model. To capture country-level effects on individual behavior, I estimate the model for each category of democracy-capacity.

To capture the country-level political context, I return to the quality of democracy and government capacity measures used in Chapter III with few modifications. To measure quality of democracy, I limit the measure to electoral competition and exclude voter turnout so that there would not be any empirical issues with predicting political participation with a measure incorporating political participation. Electoral completion is measured on a 0 to 1 scale with higher values indicating more competition. The measure was constructed from two indicators taken from the Database of Political Institutions. I took the margin of majority indicator (of the legislature) and standardized it by the legislative fractionalization indicator so that

[21] See Booth and Seligson (2009) for a similar income measure.

we could fully capture the political competition.[22] High margins of majority indicate that the governing party holds a higher proportion of the legislative seats, and, therefore, political competition is lower. However, politicians in more highly fractionalized legislatures face high electoral competition because the number of parties in the system is greater. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the two measures.

To measure government capacity, I used the same measure as in Chapter III - rule of law. The variable is taken from the World Bank's Governance Indicators dataset. I matched each democracy-capacity pairing with individual observations based on country. Note that the democracy-pairing was lagged two years with the idea that variance in these political and resource contexts take time to be felt by the general public.

To estimate the models I use ordered logit analysis. I pool the LAPOP and Afrobarometer surveys and include country fixed effects to account for any unobserved country-level variation. I also cluster by region. Estimations of the model by country are presented in Appendix I.

[22] Specifically, I took the margin of majority measure, multiplied it by (1 - fractionalization), then subtracted this value from 1 to create the electoral competition variable.

Results: Evidence of a Virtuous Cycle

The results of the models are presented in Table 10. The results provide strong support for the virtuous cycle, showing that public services are correlated with political participation in the context of high quality democracy-low capacity, as expected. The following explores these findings, beginning with discussion of the effect of public services across the democracy-capacity pairings then moving onto the effects of individual-level perceptions and characteristics on political participation.

Democracy-Capacity Pairings

The effect of public services is only evident in the high quality democracy-low government capacity models, supporting our expectation that basic public services improve individual capacities and expand opportunities to participate only in the context of developing, highly politically competitive democracies. Basic public services are theoretically irrelevant to political participation in high quality democracies with high government capacity because basic services have long been delivered to the majority of the citizens. And public services do not affect participation in medium-low quality democracies because there are little to no incentives for individuals - even those endowed by basic services with the capacity to participate - to be active in a nonresponsive political environment. In all, the findings support our theoretical expectations (see Table 9).

Table 10: The Effect of Public Services on Political Participation										
	VOTE					PROTEST				
	pooled	HH	HL	LH	LL	pooled	HH	HL	LH	LL
public service evaluation	0.04	0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.10	0.04	0.01
	(0.004)**	(0.047)	(0.005)**	(0.097)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.007)**	(0.129)	(0.030)
democracy evaluation	0.11	0.26	0.03	0.28	0.11	-0.04	-0.15	-0.04	0.02	-0.06
	(0.022)**	(0.046)**	(0.006)**	(0.059)**	(0.028)**	(0.059)	(0.055)**	(0.037)	(0.070)	(0.124)
corruption evaluation	0.02	0.15	0.04	-0.16	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.14	-0.02
	(0.030)	(0.038)**	(0.009)**	(0.021)**	(0.087)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.025)**	(0.009)*
crime evaluation	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	-0.07	0.05	-0.04	0.09	0.03	0.05
	(0.004)**	(0.031)	(0.000)**	(0.070)	(0.001)**	(0.012)**	(0.036)	(0.016)**	(0.016)	(0.021)*
national economy	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	0.10	0.02
	(0.029)	(0.037)**	(0.014)	(0.016)*	(0.055)	(0.017)	(0.042)	(0.017)**	(0.033)**	(0.041)
political interest	0.30	0.36	0.25	0.32	0.33	0.37	0.17	0.39	0.44	0.33
	(0.036)**	(0.036)**	(0.017)**	(0.088)**	(0.117)**	(0.022)**	(0.037)**	(0.005)**	(0.061)**	(0.039)**
age	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.004)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.026)**	(0.020)**	(0.007)	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.006)	(0.017)
female	0.14	0.36	0.17	0.12	-0.06	-0.37	-0.39	-0.54	-0.33	-0.10
	(0.145)	(0.073)**	(0.019)**	(0.226)	(0.162)	(0.124)**	(0.083)**	(0.037)**	(0.068)**	(0.094)
income	0.11	0.37	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.21	0.06	0.01	0.11
	(0.011)**	(0.043)**	(0.014)**	(0.063)	(0.023)**	(0.024)**	(0.055)**	(0.015)**	(0.054)	(0.010)**
employed	0.40	0.31	0.50	0.21	0.36	0.16	0.20	0.05	0.06	0.31
	(0.033)**	(0.073)**	(0.017)**	(0.179)	(0.072)**	(0.102)	(0.083)*	(0.009)**	(0.002)**	(0.147)*
education	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.03	0.08	0.16	0.26	0.18	0.18	0.08
	(0.024)**	(0.019)**	(0.006)**	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.065)*	(0.018)**	(0.016)**	(0.180)	(0.073)
n	70,308	5,608	36,418	9,088	19,194	70,334	5,604	36,149	9,085	19,496
R^2	0.13	0.09	0.14	0.25	0.11	0.20	0.08	0.11	0.17	0.27

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; country dummies excluded for presentation purposes; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; HH= high quality democracy and high government capacity; HL= high quality democracy and low government capacity; LH= low-medium quality democracy and high government capacity; LL= low-medium quality democracy and low government capacity

The findings indicate that public service evaluations increase the likelihood of voting. Individuals evaluating public services as "bad" have an 81.5% probability of voting while those with "good" perceptions of services have an 83.2% likelihood of voting. While this increase seems small, it is the largest gain in the probability of voting of all the government evaluation variables, as illustrated in Figure 11.



Figure 11: The Effect of Government Evaluations on Voting

Protest participation, unlike voting, is negatively related to public service evaluations. Individuals with "good" evaluations of public services have a 16.7% probability of protesting. Respondents reporting "bad" evaluations of public services have a 19.6% likelihood of protesting.

Why does protest behavior exhibit a negative relationship with democracy while voting is positively associated with democracy? We know that not all political participation is equal. Some types of participation require more sophisticated skills such as organizing a community group to solve a neighborhood problem, and others demand more resources, including time and money, such as working for a political campaign and contributing monetarily to a political party. While this is true of political participation in general, we cannot make the broad assumption that voting requires a different skill set or more resources than protesting - not when we are considering the developing world. In developed countries, voting does require more education, particularly the ability to read and write, than protest, which requires that you have the physical ability to show up to the demonstration site and take part in the activities. But, high levels of education are not necessarily required to vote in most of the developed world. Ballots are often colored-coded to correspond to political parties so that even the illiterate may cast a vote. Therefore, we cannot say that the difference between voting and protest lies with the form of participation. So what underlies a positive correlation of public service evaluations with voting and a negative association with protest?

Previous studies have found that voting is generally motivated by satisfaction while protest is driven by dissatisfaction (Bean 1991; Booth 1991; Foley 1996; Norris 1999; Canache 2002; Norris 2002; Booth 2006). If we consider that the public service measure used in the analysis also captures satisfaction with public services, the

negative association of service evaluations and protest is reasonable. In this sense we can think about the service evaluation variable as reflecting quality of public services. Individuals that perceive the quality of their services to be lacking tend to protest more than those satisfied with public services. Dissatisfaction with democracy, crime, and the national economy are also associated with protest behavior, as shown in Table 10. The next section further discusses the individual level perceptions and characteristics that are correlated with political participation.

Individual Perceptions and Characteristics

The individual correlates of political participation are mixed across the democracy-capacity pairings. To more easily interpret these results, we can estimate and compare predicted probabilities. Note, however, that these should be interpreted in terms of magnitude only because we are comparing across different models. A 20% likelihood of voting in low quality democracy-low capacity countries, for example, should not be understood as the same as a 20% probability of voting in the high quality democracy-low capacity cases. Nonetheless, we can use the predicted probabilities to identify patterns across models and interpret changes within models. For example, in the high quality democracy-low capacity scenario, a move from the minimum to maximum value of crime evaluations increases the probability of protest by 4% while the same move from minimum to maximum national economic perceptions decreases

the likelihood of protest by 6%. We can say that in this context, economic evaluations have a larger effect than crime perceptions on protest behavior.

Democracy evaluations have a significant, positive effect on voting and a negative effect on protest for citizens in the high quality democracy-high government capacity cases. An individual in this political context that is "very dissatisfied" with the functioning of democracy has a 66% probability of voting while a citizen "very satisfied" with democracy has an 80% likelihood of voting. Regarding protest participation, dissatisfied individuals have a 19% probability of protesting, and satisfied citizens have a 13% likelihood of protesting. Similarly, evaluations of government corruption have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting in all high democracy cases but a negative influence on the probability of voting in the low quality democracy-high government capacity type as well as a positive effect on protest behavior in all low quality democracies.

Crime evaluations decrease the likelihood of voting but increase the probability of protest in low government capacity countries. In low quality democracy-low government capacity countries, "very insecure" individuals fearing crime in their homes have a 79% probability of voting while "very secure" citizens have an 83% likelihood of voting.[23] "Very secure" citizens have a 16% likelihood of protesting in high quality

[23] The effect of crime on voting in the high quality democracy-low government capacity model is also negative and significant, but the magnitude of the effect is marginal, decreasing the probability of voting by less than 1% with a move from the minimum to maximum value.

democracies with low government capacity while the same type of citizen has a 40% probability of protesting in low quality democracies with low capacity. “Very secure” individuals have a 20% likelihood of protesting in high quality democracy-low capacity cases while respondents who share the same perceptions of crime in low quality democracy-low capacity countries have a 43% probability of protesting.

Moving on to the effect of individual characteristics on political participation, political participation has the most robust influence on the likelihood of voting and protest. Regardless of the democracy-capacity type, more interested individuals are more likely to participate. In the context of high quality democracy-low capacity, “very interested” individuals have an 89% probability of voting while respondents with no interest have a 79% likelihood of voting. In the same context, “very interested” respondents have a 33% likelihood of protest while individual with no interest in politics have a 13% probability of protest.

Females are more likely to vote while males are more likely to protest. Individuals with higher levels of education and older citizens are more likely to vote and protest with the exception of citizens in low quality democracies. Employed and wealthier individuals are more likely to participate with the exception of citizens in low quality democracy- high government capacity countries.

Conclusion

This chapter has tested the second part of the virtuous cycle that runs from equality back to democratic quality. Specifically, we have examined how public service equality contributes to the improvement of democracy via political participation. Analyses testing the effect of public service evaluations on political participation have shown that public services increase the likelihood of voting in the context of high quality democracy-low government capacity. In the same context, public service evaluations were negatively associated with protest behavior. In addition, the empirical analyses demonstrated there are numerous individual-level factors related to participation including perceptions of democracy, corruption, and crime as well as political interest, age, gender, education, employment status, and income.

The finding that public services positively increase political participation in the context of high quality democracy-low government capacity has important policy implications. Foremost it underscores the importance of improving public services as a way to expand political opportunities in the developing world. Considering that 52% of individuals in the high quality democracies with low capacity studied rated their public services as “average”, there is huge potential for improvement of basic services that can reap political rewards for politicians in the short-run and substantial gains for the development of democracy in the long-run. The concluding chapter elaborates on the policy implications of this study as well as the previous chapters’ analyses.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The quality of democracy is a complicated concept - both in abstract and real terms. Scholars disagree what constitutes democracy and how we may assess the quality of democracy, and average citizens have diverse ideas of what democracy means and how it may improve. But regardless of this lack of consensus and parsimony, we have an obligation to study democratic quality. Most of the world is democratic in some way, shape or form, and many of these countries are struggling - struggling to hold free and fair elections, to keep Parliament intact, to build transparent practices, to keep the national economy afloat, to combat natural disasters, and to alleviate poverty. The study of democratic quality can help us to better understand how these struggling countries may improve democracy so that the challenges they face do not threaten to derail democracy as the form of governance.

I have approached the study of democratic quality in a comprehensive manner, considering both what scholars and citizens deem important. Consolidating these ideas, I stripped democratic quality to its bare bones, focusing solely on procedure and substantive outcomes in broad terms. I constructed a theoretical framework termed "the virtuous cycle" built on the vast scholarship examining democratic quality, and we traced one substantive outcome - equality of public services - through this cycle. The

following outlines what I consider to be the contributions of this theoretical framework. A summary of the findings are discussed, and I present policy implications grounded in the findings of this study. Finally, I end with a few concluding thoughts and mention of some avenues of future research based on this work.

Merit of the Virtuous Cycle Framework

The virtuous cycle is an attempt at a conceptual framework for better understanding how we may improve the quality of democracy. Certainly other more esteemed scholars (O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005) have offered theories with the similar intention of assessing the quality of democracy. I believe my theoretical framework contributes to this scholarship and moves the study of democracy forward by outlining quality of democracy as a simple system between procedure and substance. I purposively separate procedural aspects of democracy from its substantive outcomes so that the causes and consequences of democratic quality are not confused, theoretically or empirically. Considering that one of the largest divides in the scholarship on democratic quality focuses on the "too much" or "too little" argument, this framework has the potential to bridge the divide between procedural and substantive scholarly approaches.

In addition, this theoretical framework has the merit of being empirically testable. Because I have outlined the procedural and substantive components of

democratic quality in broad, basic terms, the framework is easily applied to a variety of contexts. I have given a clear way to measure equality as the difference of the distribution of benefits across subnational units. Moreover, the framework may be explored across various units of analysis. I tested it using national, state, and local government data as well as using individual-level concepts. Also, although I apply the framework to the specific context of public services, a variety of equality outcomes may be examined, including income inequality as well as women's and/or minority groups' political and civil rights and liberties.

Finally, the virtuous cycle framework is accessible to non-academics because of its simplicity and grounding in measurable, but real, outcomes. Politicians and policy-makers alike will be able to trace the effects of democratic institutions and practices as well as the political ramifications of expanded equality. This may aid in policy formulation and implementation. In this sense the framework is most valuable as it has the potential to affect the daily lives of marginalized citizens all over the world.

The next section summarizes the findings of my application of this theoretical framework to the context of public services. In all, I found evidence that a virtuous cycle indeed exists between the quality of democracy and equality in public services. High quality democracies are robustly associated with lower inequalities of basic public services.

Summary of Findings

This project tested the virtuous cycle using three separate but related studies. The first analysis drew on global data to test the correlation of democratic quality, measured as an additive index of electoral competition and voter turnout, on public service equality in three policy areas - education, healthcare, and sanitation. This study also explored the mediating role of government capacity. The second analysis examined the same relationships in the context of local governments using data from four Mexican municipalities. The final study explored the relationship between public services and political participation on the individual level using survey data from Latin America and Africa.

The tests of the first part of the virtuous cycle, examining the relationship between democracy and equality as well as the mediating role of government capacity, robustly supported the association of democracy and equality but provided limited evidence of the mediating effect of capacity. The global analysis of education and sanitation showed that high quality democracies are associated with lower inequalities in these areas. Healthcare inequalities were not significantly related to democratic quality. Also, government capacity was not significantly related to service inequalities in these estimations. Conjecturing that the insignificance of government capacity may be due to measurement and empirical issues, an additional analysis was presented using data from the Mexican states for the years 2000-2004. This estimation demonstrated

that capacity does mediate the effect of democratic quality; higher quality democracies bolstered by higher levels of government capacity have lower inequalities in education services. To further investigate the correlations of democratic quality and government capacity with service inequalities, we examined public service distribution in four Mexican municipalities.

The case studies supported the findings of the previous analyses but provided more a nuanced story of public service provision. Again, the higher quality democracies coupled with good government capacity had the lowest service inequalities, but we were able to unpack democratic quality and government capacity to see what mechanisms motivated more equal service coverage in these cases. We found that intense electoral competition coupled with strong party ties provided incentives to politicians to distribute municipal goods broadly in order to build voter support for their party in the next election. We also found that participatory budgeting practices, community committees that worked in conjunction with the municipal government, and municipal centers of citizen input were democratic innovations, to borrow Smith's (2009) term, that engaged citizens more fully with service provision and resulted in more equal and efficient delivery of basic services. With regards to government capacity, we found that municipal revenue was an important source of autonomy in policy-making and resource pool to fund local public service projects beyond that of federal transfers. Technical expertise also emerged as a critical element of government capacity. Those municipalities with highly trained and experienced officials were much

better at delivering services. We also found that the lack of government capacity could not be compensated for by high levels of democratic quality. Only in the context of high quality democracy and high government capacity were services delivered equally. This underscores that government capacity provides the means to achieve what democratic incentives set out to accomplish. Capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reducing inequalities; likewise, democracy is necessary but not sufficient. The two must be coupled together to achieve the expansion of equality in substantive terms.

The final empirical analysis moved on to test the second part of the virtuous cycle running from equality back to democracy. We examined the correlation of public service evaluations on political participation using individual level survey data. We found that individuals reporting "good" public service evaluations were more likely to vote in the context of high quality democracies with limited government capacity. This finding offers evidence that public service provision in a developing context where democratic incentives are present is distinctive, and such patterns of provision provide individuals with the skills they need to actively participate in politics.

Taken together, these three studies support that a virtuous cycle exists between democratic quality and public service equality. High quality democracies coupled with high levels of government capacity were found to more equally provide basic services. As a result of the expansion of service provision , individuals are equipped with the capacity needed to participate in politics. High quality democracy results in expanded

equality, and in turn, expanded equality opens new opportunities for participation and, therefore, contributes to the improvement of democratic quality.

While these findings speak directly to high quality democracies, they are also applicable (and most usefully applied) to lower quality democracies. Countries seeking to improve their democracy can take the results of these studies to identify areas in which they may improve democratic practices and/or government capacity in order to better distribute public services. From there, public services should expand the collective opportunities available to their population and build democracy from the bottom-up through increased political participation. This assumes, however, that politicians and reformers indeed welcome increased citizen input into the policy process. The following section outlines ways to improve democracy and government capacity with particular attention paid to the service delivery process.

Policy Implications

Two key factors were shown in the analyses of this project to increase policy responsiveness, generally, and public service equality, specifically: democracy and government capacity. In particular, the global analysis and case studies pointed to strong electoral competition as a significant attribute of high quality democracies, and the political participation models demonstrated high electoral competition provides incentives for citizens to engage in politics as they know politicians will be responsive.

Also the case studies underscored the importance of institutionalized channels of citizen input. In addition, the Mexican time-series analysis demonstrated that government capacity in terms of taxes collected is critical to public service delivery, and the case studies showed that technical expertise and experience were characteristics of municipal administration with high capacity.

These findings point to specific institutions and policies that may be implemented to bolster democracy and government capacity. While electoral competition is largely dependent on the nature of the party system, there are some institutional designs that foster greater competition than others. Decreasing the costs of entry into the political party system is one way governments can encourage healthy competition. However, in combination with other political, social, and economic conditions, low barriers to entry may lead to instability and fragmentation of the party system, which could make competition meaningless if the party system is in chaos (Haggard and Kaufman 1997). Another way to increase competition is to allow incumbents to run for reelection. A recent study of Brazilian municipal elections shows that competition steeply rose in those races where incumbent mayors ran for office (Chamon, Mello, Firpo 2009). Finally, electoral districting rules may be reassigned to increase competition in cases where old boundaries are consolidating too much power in the hands of one party or another (Gelman and King 1994).

Institutionalized channels of citizen input are another way to strengthen democracy. The case studies analyzed accomplished this in numerous ways, including municipal offices and phone hotlines of citizen input where individuals can file an official complaint or request regarding municipal services, citizen community committees that work in conjunction with municipal administration to maintain community buildings and parks as well as manage public works related to the neighborhood, and participatory budgeting where citizens raise part of the funding for public works projects and the municipality funds the rest. Institutional innovations like this (see Smith 2009) are ways the governments may increase non-traditional forms of citizen input and participation, which enhances democracy by further incorporating the people.

The issue with such innovations is their sustainability, as Grindle (2007) points out. While they achieve greater participation for a few years while the administration that put the institution in place governs, it is typical for the next administration, especially if the rival political party, to suspend the practice altogether or rename and revamp it, losing continuity with citizens. It is imperative that such institutions are formalized so that they have a more long-term impact on democracy.

Strengthening government capacity involves increasing government revenues as well as technical expertise of bureaucrats, according to the findings of the Mexican state analysis and case studies. Granted these results are in the context of the

developing world, but for that reason alone, they seem to capture needed improvements in resource-constrained environments. Increasing government revenues, particularly that of local governments where services are distributed, is important because it allows municipal administrations to tailor public service programs to fit the needs of the community. In other words, it allows innovation on the fringes. Such programs like participatory budgeting are not possible if the municipality cannot fund public works projects (i.e. new computers for the primary school in Barrio "X") beyond basic services.

To increase revenues, it is critical that governments collect taxes and user fees. Tax collection is difficult in communities where residents have little income. To meet this challenge, local governments, in particular, must provide incentives for paying taxes. One clear way to motivate individuals to pay fees is to provide good services. But often this is not enough when patronage legacies have created a culture of giving services in return for political support. Therefore, it is important that the municipality educates citizens as to how to pay for services and why services must be funded by each individual home. For example, in Tulancingo, Hidalgo, the municipal government has launched a water campaign to teach citizens about water services and proper handling of the water system in homes. This campaign is largely aimed at combating a "culture of social beneficiaries", as one municipal official that I interviewed put it. While campaigns such as these may prove to be helpful at changing viewpoints regarding public services, governments must back these with action. Acting like a true

business where payment is given for services rendered is necessary. However, governments also have the responsibility of setting up a program (and enforcing it strictly) that meets the needs of the poorest homes in the community - those that truly cannot afford services. Working out a subsidy plan using local funds seems unlikely because municipalities have few resources with which to work, but it seems reasonable that federal governments could devise a subsidy program with state and local governments to provide basic services for the marginalized.

Local governments may also increase revenues through the solicitation of funding for special projects. In my fieldwork, I found Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon to be very successful at securing additional funding from federal programs that target specific projects. Much of their funding success was due to their innovation on projects like wind energy. But certainly funding is also targeted at public works projects that are more basic in poorer municipalities that cannot afford to undertake, for example, the building of a new water treatment plant. Such programs are typical of the Latin America region; Schady (2000) notes the Peruvian Social Fund specifically targeted the poorest provinces with the intent to redistribute funding to improve access to social services.

Just as important as fiscal resources are technical resources for building government capacity. Technically-adept individuals are needed to fill bureaucratic positions in order to implement policies effectively. This means seeking qualified

individuals and paying them adequately to keep them. It also entails continuing training and education of bureaucrats to keep them up-to-date on technology and other policy area-specific changes. In addition, for countries like Mexico, this may mean that turnover of key bureaucratic positions with every election should be changed. It is costly to invest in the training of individuals occupying posts that will turnover in three years. Moreover, it is difficult to find experienced professionals willing to take such a short-term job.

Building the technical expertise of bureaucrats should not only be a priority for local governments, but for state and national governments as well. The lack of skilled bureaucrats in municipal administrations severely hampers any federal and state investment in local infrastructure. For example, in one small rural municipality I studied, federal primary schools were empty and in disrepair because the municipal administration lacked bureaucrats who would go through the necessary channels to recruit rural students for school and enforce truancy laws. This underscores that infrastructure building from above by governments or non-governmental agencies must be coupled with technical training of the bureaucrats that oversee public works and services. This has serious implications for countries like Iraq where billions of dollars are being spent to build basic infrastructures. Resources should also be spent on building adept bureaucracies to manage these if long-term success is to be achieved.

Concluding Thoughts

In all, this project has been an effort to bring together divergent scholarship on and meanings of democratic quality into a singular theoretical framework that can trace democratic quality through substantive outcomes of equality. This framework has the potential to be applied to a myriad of political and policy areas, including but not limited to minority rights, women's equality, and income equality. It offers us a tool by which to historically and contemporarily dissect how democracy develops, separating out the procedural aspects from the substantive contributions. In this sense, it also provides us real policy answers for struggling democratic regimes. It is my hope that the virtuous cycle framework may be fruitfully studied and applied as a way to improve the quality of democracy.

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APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR GLOBAL REGRESSION, CHAPTER III

	minimum	maximum	mean	std. deviation
education inequality	0.41	3.42	1.60	0.71
health inequality	3.30	66.80	30.97	19.84
sanitation inequality	0.00	80.00	26.88	17.73
democracy	0.00	1.89	1.29	0.41
rule of law	-2.07	1.95	-0.٤٥	0.90
GDP logged	4.94	10.51	7.10	1.48

APPENDIX B

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY VARIABLE

The measure of democratic quality that I constructed is an additive index of political contestation and political participation. I use the political competition measure from the Database of Political Institutions that indicates the legislative margin of majority (in seats) and subtract it from 0.5 to gauge the distance between the government party's fraction of the seats and a perfect balance between ruling and opposition parties. I then take the absolute value and multiple it by 2 and subtract from 1 in order to make the scale range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating a nondemocratic balance of legislative power (the ruling party holds all seats) and 1 indicating a perfect balance of power between the government's party and the opposition party or parties. Finally I add this to voter turnout for legislative elections.

Democratic quality = 1- (|0.5 - legislative margin of victory | * 2) + voter turnout

EXAMPLE: URUGUAY 2005							
Step:	*margin of majority*	*subtract from 0.5*	*absolute value*	*multiply by 2*	*subtract from 1*	*voter turnout*	*quality of democracy score*
Description:	fraction of seats held by governing party	distance from equal balance of governing and opposition parties	remove any negative values	make scale 0 to 1	flip scale to reflect political competition	legislative elections	0 to 2 scale
Value:	0.525253	-0.02525	0.025253	0.050505	0.949495	.8962	1.85

APPENDIX C

COUNTRY YEARS INCLUDED IN ANALYSES, CHAPTER III

Education Regression:

Albania	1998	Finland	2000	Moldova	2006
Albania	2002	France	2006	Morocco	2007
Algeria	2002	Ghana	2007	Nigeria	2000
Argentina	2006	Great Britain	2006	Poland	2005
Australia	2005	Hungary	1998	Romania	1998
Bangladesh	2002	India	2006	Romania	2005
Brazil	2006	Indonesia	2006	Slovenia	2005
Bulgaria	2006	Iran	2007	Spain	2000
Burkina Faso	2007	Italy	2005	Sweden	2006
Canada	2000	Malaysia	2006	Thailand	2007
Chile	2000	Mali	2007	Trinidad	2006
Chile	2005	Mexico	2000	United States	2006
Cyprus	2006	Mexico	2005	Venezuela	2000
Egypt	2000	Moldova	2002	Vietnam	2006

Healthcare Regression:

Armenia	2000	Guinea	2005	Morocco	2003
Armenia	2005	Haiti	2000	Mozambique	2003
Azerbaijan	2006	Haiti	2005	Namibia	2000
Bangladesh	2004	Honduras	2005	Namibia	2006
Benin	2006	India	2005	Niger	2006
Bolivia	1998	Indonesia	2002	Nigeria	2003
Bolivia	2003	Jordan	2002	Pakistan	2006
Burkina Faso	1998	Jordan	2007	Peru	2000
Burkina Faso	2003	Kenya	2003	Philippines	1998
Cambodia	2000	Lesotho	2004	Philippines	2003
Cameroon	2004	Liberia	2007	Senegal	2005
Chad	2004	Madagascar	2003	Tanzania	2004
Egypt	2000	Malawi	2000	Turkey	1998
Egypt	2005	Malawi	2004	Uganda	2000
Ghana	1998	Mali	2006	Uganda	2006
Ghana	2003	Mauritania	2000	Ukraine	2007
Guatemala	1998	Moldova	2005	Zambia	2007
				Zimbabwe	2005

Sanitation Regression:

Albania	2000	Guinea	2000	Nigeria	2000
Algeria	2000	Guinea-Bissau	2000	Pakistan	2000
Armenia	2000	Guyana	2000	Panama	2000
Australia	2000	Haiti	2000	Papua New Guinea	2000
Austria	2000	Honduras	2000	Paraguay	2000
Azerbaijan	2000	Hungary	2000	Peru	2000
Bangladesh	2000	India	2000	Philippines	2000
Benin	2000	Indonesia	2000	Romania	2000
Bolivia	2000	Iran	2000	Russian Federation	2000
Botswana	2000	Jamaica	2000	Senegal	2000
Brazil	2000	Japan	2000	Sierra Leone	2000
Bulgaria	2000	Jordan	2000	Solomon Islands	2000
Burkina Faso	2000	Kazakhstan	2000	South Africa	2000
Cambodia	2000	Kenya	2000	Sri Lanka	2000
Cameroon	2000	Lebanon	2000	Sweden	2000
Canada	2000	Lesotho	2000	Switzerland	2000
Central African Rep.	2000	Liberia	2000	Tajikistan	2000
Chad	2000	Madagascar	2000	Tanzania	2000
Chile	2000	Malawi	2000	Thailand	2000
Costa Rica	2000	Mali	2000	Trinidad & Tobago	2000
Cyprus	2000	Mauritania	2000	Tunisia	2000
Djibouti	2000	Mexico	2000	Turkey	2000
Ecuador	2000	Moldova	2000	Uganda	2000
Egypt	2000	Mongolia	2000	Ukraine	2000
El Salvador	2000	Morocco	2000	United States	2000
Equatorial Guinea	2000	Mozambique	2000	Uruguay	2000
Finland	2000	Namibia	2000	Uzbekistan	2000
Gambia	2000	Netherlands	2000	Venezuela	2000
Ghana	2000	Nicaragua	2000	Yemen	2000
Guatemala	2000	Niger	2000	Zambia	2000
				Zimbabwe	2000

APPENDIX D

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MEXICAN STATE REGRESSION, CHAPTER III

	minimum	maximum	mean	std. deviation
education inequality	0.72	0.88	0.82	0.03
democracy	1.12	1.71	1.44	0.16
government capacity	1.96+e07	2.42+e09	3.95+e08	4.86+e08
GDP	2.64+e07	6.60+e08	1.46+e08	123+e08

APPENDIX E

DEMOCRACY IN THE MEXICAN STATES, 2000-2004



Note: Democracy score = margin of victory + voter turnout (for legislative elections). Democracy values listed on the following page for each state.

State Code	Year	Democracy Score	State Code	Year	Democracy Score
1	2000	1.5509	8	2004	1.55
1	2001	1.5509	9	2000	1.4871
1	2002	1.5509	9	2001	1.4871
1	2003	1.2586	9	2002	1.4871
1	2004	1.2586	9	2003	1.1281
2	2000	1.4588	9	2004	1.1281
2	2001	1.4588	10	2000	1.6147
2	2002	1.4588	10	2001	1.6147
2	2003	1.2141	10	2002	1.6147
2	2004	1.2141	10	2003	1.3065
3	2000	1.6004	10	2004	1.3065
3	2001	1.6004	11	2000	1.3842
3	2002	1.6004	11	2001	1.3842
3	2003	1.2327	11	2002	1.3842
3	2004	1.2327	11	2003	1.366
4	2000	1.5083	11	2004	1.366
4	2001	1.5083	12	2000	1.473
4	2002	1.5083	12	2001	1.473
4	2003	1.6002	12	2002	1.473
4	2004	1.6002	12	2003	1.3047
5	2000	1.3467	12	2004	1.3047
5	2001	1.3467	13	2000	1.4757
5	2002	1.3467	13	2001	1.4757
5	2003	1.1289	13	2002	1.4757
5	2004	1.1289	13	2003	1.1483
6	2000	1.5046	13	2004	1.1483
6	2001	1.5046	14	2000	1.5381
6	2002	1.5046	14	2001	1.5381
6	2003	1.2499	14	2002	1.5381
6	2004	1.2499	14	2003	1.5387
7	2000	1.5465	14	2004	1.5387
7	2001	1.5465	15	2000	1.5178
7	2002	1.5465	15	2001	1.5178
7	2003	1.1987	15	2002	1.5178
7	2004	1.1987	15	2003	1.2785
8	2000	1.6629	15	2004	1.2785
8	2001	1.6629	16	2000	1.5481
8	2002	1.6629	16	2001	1.5481
8	2003	1.55	16	2002	1.5481

State code	Year	Democracy score
16	2003	1.4657
16	2004	1.4657
17	2000	1.421
17	2001	1.421
17	2002	1.421
17	2003	1.1215
17	2004	1.1215
18	2000	1.5646
18	2001	1.5646
18	2002	1.5646
18	2003	1.3857
18	2004	1.3857
19	2000	1.4008
19	2001	1.4008
19	2002	1.4008
19	2003	1.129
19	2004	1.129
20	2000	1.6187
20	2001	1.6187
20	2002	1.6187
20	2003	1.266
20	2004	1.266
21	2000	1.5626
21	2001	1.5626
21	2002	1.5626
21	2003	1.514
21	2004	1.514
22	2000	1.5997
22	2001	1.5997
22	2002	1.5997
22	2003	1.1899
22	2004	1.1899
23	2000	1.6105
23	2001	1.6105
23	2002	1.6105
23	2003	1.4098
23	2004	1.4098
24	2000	1.3236
24	2001	1.3236
24	2002	1.3236
24	2003	1.1466
24	2004	1.1466
25	2000	1.5884
25	2001	1.5884
25	2002	1.5884
25	2003	1.522
25	2004	1.522
26	2000	1.5837
26	2001	1.5837
26	2002	1.5837
26	2003	1.2964
26	2004	1.2964
27	2000	1.6101
27	2001	1.6101
27	2002	1.6101
27	2003	1.2223
27	2004	1.2223
28	2000	1.5696
28	2001	1.5696
28	2002	1.5696
28	2003	1.3057
28	2004	1.3057
29	2000	1.5617
29	2001	1.5617
29	2002	1.5617
29	2003	1.4027
29	2004	1.4027
30	2000	1.7139
30	2001	1.7139
30	2002	1.7139
30	2003	1.3607
30	2004	1.3607
31	2000	1.465
31	2001	1.465
31	2002	1.465
31	2003	1.2558
31	2004	1.2558

APPENDIX F

OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A. La Información de la Posición del Gobierno Municipal

1. ¿Ha trabajado usted en otros puestos de la administración municipal? Y si ese es el caso, cuántos años en total ha estado usted trabajando en el gobierno municipal?
2. ¿En el futuro, cuáles son sus aspiraciones profesionales?

B. Los Servicios Municipales

1. ¿Qué servicios en la cuidad son responsabilidad de su gobierno?
2. ¿Cuánta autonomía del nivel estatal y federal tienen para tomar decisiones con respecto a los servicios públicos? ¿Usted cree que existe mucho control estatal sobre la forma de proveer servicios públicos? Sin hay un plan estatal y uno municipal, cual tiene prioridad?
3. ¿Cómo calificaría usted la calidad de sus servicios de la ciudad?
4. ¿Qué servicios locales necesitan mejorar?
5. ¿Cree usted que los funcionarios públicos se sienten presionados para proporcionar servicios públicos por motivos electorales?
6. ¿Cómo cambiado la competencia electoral en los ultimos pasados?
7. ¿Usted tiene la impresión de que los partidos políticos se preocupan por los servicios públicos? ¿Qué importancia tienen los servicios públicos

para su partido? ¿Los ciudadanos le expresan a los partidos la necesidad de mejores servicios públicos? ¿Cómo?

C. La Capacidad del Recurso del Gobierno Municipal

1. ¿Cuál es la fuente de los recursos económicos de la ciudad para financiar los servicios municipales? ¿Cómo ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?
2. ¿Su ciudad tiene muchos o pocos recursos para los servicios municipales? ¿Cómo ha cambiado esto con el tiempo?
3. ¿Cuál es el problema más grande entre los recursos económicos municipales que reciben para proveer los servicios públicos?
4. ¿Es eficiente la recaudación fiscal de la ciudad?
5. ¿En una escala de 1-10 donde 1 es la menor y 10 es la mayor, cuánta autonomía tiene el gobierno municipal para administrar los servicios públicos? ¿Y para recaudar los impuestos?
6. ¿Cómo se establecen las prioridades sobre los servicios públicos que se deben proveer?

D. La Interacción entre el gobierno municipal y los ciudadanos

1. ¿Cómo interactúa el gobierno municipal con el ayuntamiento?
2. ¿Cómo participan los ciudadanos en el proceso de la entrega de servicios?
3. ¿Tienen los ciudadanos la oportunidad de solicitar los servicios específicos? ¿Cómo?

4. ¿Piensa usted que la mayoría de ciudadanos está satisfecha con los servicios de la ciudad?
5. ¿Aproximadamente cuántas organizaciones del ciudadano existen?

APPENDIX G

CHAPTER IV VARIABLE CODING

Individual level variables are listed below with their corresponding survey questions and recoded values. Values were chosen to maintain consistency between the two surveys and reflect the expected relationship among the variables. Please see the LAPOP and Afrobarometer codebooks for original values, available at: www.lapopsurveys.org and www.afrobarometer.org.

Vote

LAPOP: Did you vote in the 2005 presidential elections?

Afrobarometer: Did you vote in the most recent national election?

Coding: 1= yes; 0=no

Protest

LAPOP: Have you participated in a demonstration or public protest?

Afrobarometer: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. Attended a demonstration or protest march?

Coding: 1= yes; 0= no

Public service evaluation

LAPOP: "Would you say that the services your municipality provides the people are excellent, good, average, bad, or very bad?"

Afrobarometer: "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: Improving basic health services? Addressing educational needs? Delivering household water?" (mean of health, education, and water evaluations)

Coding: 1= bad; 2= average; 3= good

Democracy evaluation

LAPOP: In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in your country?

Afrobarometer: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?

Coding: 1= very dissatisfied; 2= dissatisfied; 3= satisfied; 4= very satisified

Corruption evaluation

LAPOP: From your own experience or what you have heard, is the corruption of government officials very widespread, widespread, somewhat widespread, or not widespread?

Afrobarometer: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption: The President/Prime Minister and officials in his office? Members of

Parliament? Elected local government councilors? National government officials? Local government officials? (mean)

Coding: 1= not widespread/none; 2= some/ somewhat widespread; 3= most/ widespread; 4= all/ very widespread

Crime evaluation

LAPOP: Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and think of the possibility of becoming a victim of assault or robbery, do you feel secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, very insecure?

Afrobarometer: Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family feared crime in your own home? Never, once or twice, several to many times, or always?

Coding: 1= very secure/ never; 2= secure/ once or twice; 3= insecure/ several to many times; 4= very insecure/ always

Political interest

LAPOP: How much interest do you have in politics?

Afrobarometer: How interested would you say you are in public affairs?

Coding: 1= none; 2= not very interested; 3= somewhat interested; 4= very interested

National economic evaluation

LAPOP: In general, how would you qualify the economic situation of the country?

Afrobarometer: In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country?

Coding: 1= very bad; 2= bad; 3= neither good nor bad; 4= good; 5= very good

Age

Respondent age in years

Female

Respondent gender

Education

0 = no formal schooling
1 = some primary
2 = completed primary
3 = some secondary
4 = completed secondary
5 = completed technical
6 = some university
7 = completed university
8 = post graduate

Employed

Respondent employment status (1=employed)

Income

LAPOP: Do you own a car? TV? Telephone (not cellular)?

Afrobarometer: Do you own a car? TV? Radio?

Coding: 0= do not own a car, tv, telephone/radio; 1= own 1 of three; 2= own 2 of three; 3= own all 3 (or multiples of all three)

APPENDIX H

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPATION MODELS

		HH				HL				LH				LL			
		mean	std dev	min	max	mean	std dev	min	max	mean	std dev	min	max	mean	std dev	min	max
VOTE MODELS	vote	0.71	0.45	0	1	0.78	0.42	0	1	0.75	0.43	0	1	0.78	0.41	0	1
	public service eval	1.91	0.72	1	3	2.08	0.70	1	3	2.08	0.62	1	3	2.04	0.60	1	3
	democracy eval	2.59	0.70	1	4	2.32	0.72	1	4	2.68	0.76	1	4	2.53	0.89	1	4
	corruption eval	3.33	0.81	1	4	3.31	0.86	1	4	2.78	0.84	1	4	2.92	0.96	1	4
	crime eval	2.43	1.04	1	4	2.40	0.96	1	4	2.26	1.00	1	4	1.94	1.00	1	4
	economic eval	2.35	0.90	1	5	2.32	0.87	1	5	3.01	0.96	1	5	2.66	1.11	1	5
	political interest	2.00	0.99	1	4	1.98	0.94	1	4	2.25	1.10	1	4	2.52	1.09	1	4
	age	40.17	16.48	18	90	37.61	14.69	18	97	41.17	15.72	18	92	35.57	13.68	16	95
	female	0.51	0.50	0	1	0.53	0.50	0	1	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.49	0.50	0	1
	income	2.14	0.77	0	3	1.55	0.83	0	3	1.83	0.88	0	3	1.41	0.88	0	3
	employed	0.51	0.50	0	1	0.41	0.49	0	1	0.48	0.50	0	1	0.50	0.50	0	1
	education	2.71	2.02	0	8	3.08	1.93	0	8	3.38	1.75	0	8	2.67	1.87	0	8
PROTEST MODELS	protest	0.18	0.38	0	1	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.42	0.49	0	1
	public service eval	1.91	0.71	1	3	2.08	0.70	1	3	2.08	0.62	1	3	2.04	0.60	1	3
	democracy eval	2.59	0.70	1	4	2.32	0.72	1	4	2.68	0.76	1	4	2.53	0.88	1	4
	corruption eval	3.33	0.81	1	4	3.31	0.86	1	4	2.78	0.84	1	4	2.92	0.96	1	4
	crime eval	2.43	1.04	1	4	2.40	0.96	1	4	2.26	1.00	1	4	1.95	1.00	1	4
	economic eval	2.35	0.90	1	5	2.31	0.87	1	5	3.01	0.96	1	5	2.66	1.10	1	5
	political interest	2.00	0.98	1	4	1.98	0.94	1	4	2.25	1.10	1	4	2.50	1.10	1	4
	age	40.16	16.48	18	90	37.59	14.69	18	97	41.18	15.72	18	92	35.39	13.71	16	95
	female	0.51	0.50	0	1	0.53	0.50	0	1	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.49	0.50	0	1
	income	2.14	0.77	0	3	1.55	0.83	0	3	1.83	0.88	0	3	1.41	0.88	0	3
	employed	0.51	0.50	0	1	0.41	0.49	0	1	0.48	0.50	0	1	0.50	0.50	0	1
	education	2.71	2.02	0	8	3.08	1.93	0	8	3.38	1.75	0	8	2.66	1.86	0	8

APPENDIX I

COUNTRY MODELS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Dependent variable = vote

	Benin	Botswana	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Madagascar	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa
public service eval	-0.084	-0.033	-0.224	0.526	-0.269	-0.52	-0.364	0.139	-0.068	0.075	0.238	0.312
	0.404	0.233	0.271	0.300*	0.303	0.52	0.179**	0.228	0.237	0.114	0.34	0.142**
democracy eval	0.058	0.068	0.148	0.088	-0.082	0.358	0.22	0.073	0.331	0.203	0.012	0.25
	0.165	0.086	0.131	0.108	0.13	0.142**	0.106**	0.128	0.122***	0.065***	0.113	0.072***
corruption eval	-0.327	0.052	-0.152	-0.109	-0.362	-0.199	-0.148	-0.15	0.117	0.125	-0.059	-0.291
	0.173*	0.136	0.19	0.149	0.234	0.189	0.145	0.179	0.134	0.078	0.15	0.094***
crime eval	0.005	0	0.202	0.098	-0.009	-0.255	-0.009	-0.214	0.013	-0.193	-0.046	0.204
	0.149	0.098	0.15	0.082	0.141	0.135*	0.146	0.133	0.136	0.059***	0.132	0.063***
economic eval	-0.03	0.021	0.103	-0.115	-0.138	-0.029	0.034	0.219	-0.045	0.01	-0.278	0.043
	0.172	0.073	0.102	0.074	0.104	0.127	0.091	0.121*	0.091	0.043	0.129**	0.054
political interest	0.267	0.159	0.118	0.133	0.3	0.363	0.17	-0.152	0.235	0.342	0.157	0.281
	0.128**	0.082*	0.115	0.084	0.136**	0.127***	0.098*	0.127	0.123*	0.051***	0.096	0.061***
age	0.081	0.055	0.005	0.095	0.063	0.082	0.087	0.063	0.106	0.064	0.11	0.047
	0.016***	0.009***	0.009	0.010***	0.010***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.014***	0.006***	0.012***	0.006***
female	0.073	0.122	-0.354	-0.689	0.069	-0.41	0.25	-0.338	-0.642	-0.169	-0.178	-0.364
	0.306	0.169	0.25	0.170***	0.282	0.243*	0.212	0.312	0.207***	0.103*	0.222	0.131***
employed	0.749	-0.122	-0.355	0.438	0.158	0.114	0.26	0.381	0.923	0.548	0.222	0.093
	0.319**	0.193	0.26	0.179**	0.372	0.244	0.385	0.306	0.235***	0.109***	0.247	0.137
income	-0.073	0.153	0.146	-0.05	0.479	0.182	-0.369	0.042	-0.165	0.147	0.35	0.103
	0.209	0.099	0.153	0.124	0.185***	0.169	0.177**	0.164	0.118	0.062**	0.135***	0.071
education	-0.067	0.029	-0.075	0.026	0.044	0.012	-0.024	0.201	0.224	0.002	0.038	0.11
	0.093	0.063	0.076	0.059	0.102	0.091	0.093	0.097**	0.086***	0.031	0.062	0.048**
n	660	790	658	853	430	556	641	524	831	2101	578	1700

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX I: CONTINUED

Dependent variable = vote

	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico
public service eval	-0.233	-0.544	0.229	-0.071	-0.008	0.021	0.097	0.077	-0.055	0.099	-0.149
	0.517	0.234**	0.229	0.06	0.043	0.047	0.041**	0.039**	0.105	0.060*	0.102
democracy eval	0.301	0.142	0.062	0.3	0.188	0.256	0.012	0.009	0.101	0.151	0.088
	0.258	0.09	0.109	0.060***	0.044***	0.046***	0.042	0.043	0.109	0.061**	0.105
corruption eval	0.518	-0.022	0.092	-0.142	-0.053	0.145	0.075	-0.101	0.425	0.188	0.108
	0.39	0.129	0.147	0.046***	0.036	0.038***	0.039*	0.031***	0.094***	0.049***	0.075
crime eval	-0.319	-0.047	-0.063	-0.071	-0.002	-0.024	0.029	-0.062	-0.045	-0.131	-0.072
	0.246	0.081	0.092	0.041*	0.03	0.031	0.031	0.028**	0.079	0.042***	0.074
economic eval	0.175	0.287	0.02	0.486	0.241	0.362	0.147	0.324	0.714	0.577	0.368
	0.256	0.078***	0.089	0.046***	0.032***	0.036***	0.037***	0.032***	0.087***	0.052***	0.076***
political interest	-0.238	-0.032	-0.179	0.009	0.062	0.117	0.034	0.017	-0.277	0.093	0.135
	0.232	0.067	0.078**	0.05	0.036*	0.037***	0.037	0.035	0.085***	0.048*	0.085
age	0.149	0.166	0.071	0.116	0.033	0.02	0.066	0.049	0.064	0.03	0.084
	0.032***	0.014***	0.010***	0.004***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***	0.002***	0.006***	0.003***	0.007***
female	0.203	-0.179	-0.204	0.401	0.037	0.357	0.052	0.157	0.239	0.304	-0.081
	0.492	0.169	0.174	0.084***	0.063	0.073***	0.059	0.063**	0.141*	0.096***	0.153
employed	1.139	0.69	0.558	0.377	0.294	0.307	0.079	0.328	0.826	0.63	0.715
	0.508**	0.157***	0.216***	0.082***	0.064***	0.073***	0.104	0.063***	0.205***	0.096***	0.219***
income	0.852	0.127	0.37	0.178	0.137	0.371	-0.138	0.099	-0.041	0.142	0.246
	0.369**	0.128	0.119***	0.052***	0.044***	0.043***	0.039***	0.038***	0.084	0.051***	0.087***
education	0.044	-0.047	0.085	-0.047	0.153	0.146	0.196	0.102	0.188	0.102	0.131
	0.247	0.056	0.069	0.029	0.020***	0.019***	0.018***	0.019***	0.048***	0.029***	0.045***
n	256	1306	754	5320	5152	5608	10664	6296	1322	4916	1466

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX I:CONTINUED

Dependent variable = vote

	Nicaragua	Panama	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
public service eval	0.08	0.129	0.18	-0.293	0.003
	0.09	0.069*	0.091**	0.169*	0.065
democracy eval	-0.16	-0.243	-0.032	0.594	0.103
	0.089*	0.060***	0.086	0.186***	0.061*
corruption eval	0.074	0.183	0.381	-0.146	0.12
	0.076	0.044***	0.061***	0.145	0.056**
crime eval	-0.086	-0.064	0.058	0.374	0.017
	0.065	0.048	0.065	0.122***	0.044
economic eval	0.307	0.319	-0.124	0.034	0.47
	0.064***	0.049***	0.065*	0.11	0.049***
political interest	0.086	0.062	-0.133	0.191	0.076
	0.075	0.049	0.079*	0.146	0.052
age	0.036	0.061	0.036	0.089	0.047
	0.005***	0.003***	0.004***	0.011***	0.004***
female	0.021	0.577	0.506	-0.248	0.076
	0.137	0.087***	0.119***	0.232	0.087
employed	0.715	1.147	1.01	0.725	-0.11
	0.150***	0.091***	0.120***	0.276***	0.087
income	0.197	0.235	0.148	0.254	-0.056
	0.090**	0.060***	0.079*	0.145*	0.057
education	0.173	0.113	0.344	0.215	0.105
	0.045***	0.026***	0.038***	0.075***	0.023***
n	1568	4732	5372	1278	3976

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX I: CONTINUED

Dependent variable = protest

	Benin	Botswana	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Madagascar	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa
public service eval	0.07	0.25	0.044	-0.317	-0.713	-0.478	-0.009	-0.153	0.229	0.082	0.249	0.312
	0.249	0.245	0.195	0.299	0.362**	0.768	0.195	0.225	0.196	0.105	0.298	0.142**
democracy eval	0.278	-0.124	-0.064	-0.033	-0.253	0.088	0.045	0.334	0.244	0.031	0.248	0.25
	0.105***	0.089	0.099	0.106	0.161	0.213	0.114	0.124***	0.101**	0.059	0.099**	0.072***
corruption eval	-0.31	-0.069	0.069	0.249	-0.716	0.066	0.033	-0.042	-0.006	0.115	-0.175	-0.291
	0.107***	0.137	0.138	0.149*	0.289**	0.299	0.158	0.183	0.111	0.072	0.13	0.094***
crime eval	-0.216	0.087	0.036	-0.031	-0.127	-0.1	0.028	-0.108	-0.265	0.112	0.168	0.204
	0.091**	0.101	0.096	0.081	0.177	0.209	0.158	0.129	0.108**	0.056**	0.129	0.063***
economic eval	0.454	0.141	0.177	0.407	0.617	0.138	0.053	-0.057	0.408	0.3	0.27	0.281
	0.080***	0.084*	0.082**	0.083***	0.159***	0.194	0.114	0.124	0.104***	0.047***	0.083***	0.061***
political interest	0.017	0.138	0.156	0.092	-0.108	0.269	-0.058	0.173	-0.164	-0.005	-0.048	0.043
	0.104	0.075*	0.070**	0.074	0.128	0.198	0.098	0.121	0.077**	0.04	0.11	0.054
age	0.017	0.04	0.032	0.064	0.054	0.052	0.01	0.032	0.038	0.032	0.007	0.047
	0.006**	0.008***	0.006***	0.009***	0.013***	0.018***	0.009	0.011***	0.008***	0.004***	0.007	0.006***
female	-0.141	-0.064	-0.295	0.381	-0.389	0.345	-0.297	-0.155	0.919	-0.41	0.26	-0.364
	0.189	0.173	0.181	0.170**	0.368	0.369	0.234	0.303	0.166***	0.095***	0.197	0.131***
employed	0.33	0.201	0.44	0.358	0.017	0.143	0.064	0.061	0.523	0.701	-0.023	0.093
	0.216	0.2	0.178**	0.179**	0.464	0.377	0.405	0.278	0.175***	0.098***	0.213	0.137
income	0.012	0.099	-0.185	-0.103	0.248	0.42	-0.22	-0.046	0.112	0.197	-0.166	0.103
	0.125	0.101	0.108*	0.122	0.223	0.254*	0.199	0.155	0.094	0.058***	0.12	0.071
education	-0.091	-0.074	-0.005	-0.118	-0.313	-0.19	0.049	-0.101	-0.14	0.074	-0.002	0.11
	0.061	0.064	0.053	0.058**	0.116***	0.131	0.108	0.09	0.063**	0.028***	0.052	0.048**
n	659	787	662	853	430	557	640	521	827	2083	576	1700

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX I: CONTINUED

Dependent variable = protest

	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico
public service eval	-1.245	-0.037	0.371	-0.012	-0.056	-0.058	-0.139	-0.04	-0.225	-0.042	0.037
	0.489**	0.242	0.215*	0.055	0.052	0.053	0.036***	0.064	0.121*	0.058	0.112
democracy eval	-0.477	-0.072	-0.043	0.126	-0.324	-0.153	0.116	-0.329	-0.408	-0.187	-0.336
	0.276*	0.092	0.102	0.057**	0.053***	0.055***	0.037***	0.070***	0.131***	0.060***	0.116***
corruption eval	-0.602	-0.295	0.046	-0.117	0.001	0.045	0.056	0.251	0.324	0.088	0.283
	0.328*	0.130**	0.137	0.044***	0.045	0.048	0.038	0.060***	0.125***	0.053*	0.093***
crime eval	0.228	0.079	0.036	0.012	0.073	-0.036	0.04	0.016	-0.137	0.013	-0.182
	0.254	0.086	0.087	0.039	0.037*	0.036	0.027	0.047	0.095	0.042	0.084**
economic eval	0.591	0.336	0.405	0.447	0.378	0.17	0.41	0.637	0.314	0.138	0.196
	0.229***	0.078***	0.084***	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***	0.029***	0.047***	0.084***	0.043***	0.082**
political interest	0.195	-0.055	-0.164	0.068	-0.098	-0.041	-0.087	-0.409	0.032	0.032	-0.074
	0.212	0.068	0.073**	0.046	0.043**	0.042	0.033***	0.063***	0.102	0.047	0.092
age	0.021	0.076	0.038	-0.004	0.013	0.008	-0.011	0.015	0.008	0.006	0.029
	0.018	0.011***	0.008***	0.002*	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***	0.006	0.003**	0.006***
female	0.291	0.026	-0.064	-0.423	-0.466	-0.392	-0.899	-0.947	0.413	-0.242	-0.026
	0.445	0.173	0.162	0.076***	0.077***	0.083***	0.052***	0.107***	0.180**	0.090***	0.172
employed	-1.156	0.43	0.102	0.067	-0.159	0.202	0.015	0.366	0.065	0.12	-0.09
	0.436***	0.161***	0.197	0.075	0.077**	0.083**	0.088	0.099***	0.276	0.09	0.247
income	1.285	0.167	-0.043	0.007	0.068	0.209	0.281	-0.006	-0.103	-0.163	-0.123
	0.403***	0.13	0.109	0.047	0.053	0.055***	0.035***	0.063	0.101	0.050***	0.101
education	0.034	-0.089	-0.055	0.321	0.23	0.264	0.138	0.19	0.154	0.255	0.177
	0.21	0.056	0.064	0.026***	0.022***	0.018***	0.015***	0.028***	0.051***	0.024***	0.044***
n	254	1307	754	5316	5152	5604	10536	6300	1292	5248	1392

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX I: CONTINUED

Dependent variable = protest

	Nicaragua	Panama	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
public service eval	0.07	-0.072	-0.203	-0.179	0.003
	0.124	0.067	0.052***	0.101*	0.065
democracy eval	-0.135	0.29	-0.15	0.081	0.103
	0.123	0.057***	0.051***	0.119	0.061*
corruption eval	0.232	-0.046	0.139	-0.292	0.12
	0.119*	0.043	0.044***	0.094***	0.056**
crime eval	-0.167	0.42	0.067	0.097	0.017
	0.093*	0.046***	0.038*	0.076	0.044
economic eval	0.246	0.466	0.207	0.548	0.47
	0.078***	0.042***	0.036***	0.067***	0.049***
political interest	0.032	0.109	-0.2	0.267	0.076
	0.101	0.045**	0.043***	0.088***	0.052
age	-0.001	0.007	0.015	0.019	0.047
	0.006	0.003**	0.002***	0.005***	0.004***
female	0.428	-0.354	-0.369	0.228	0.076
	0.196**	0.082***	0.069***	0.149	0.087
employed	0.249	-0.048	0.18	-0.161	-0.11
	0.237	0.082	0.067***	0.222	0.087
income	0.002	0.016	-0.089	0.166	-0.056
	0.115	0.054	0.044**	0.095*	0.057
education	0.21	0.193	0.191	0.3	0.105
	0.050***	0.022***	0.019***	0.040***	0.023***
n	1558	4708	5356	1278	3976

Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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