THE MYTH OF THE HOOVERCRATS: ALIENATION, MOBILIZATION, AND THE NEW DEAL REALIGNMENT IN TEXAS

A Thesis
by
DONALD SCOTT BARTON

Approved as to style and content by:

Dale Baum
(Chairman)

Larry D. Hill
(Member)

Chester Dunning
(Member)

Larry D. Hill
(Head of Department)

May 1987
ABSTRACT


Donald Scott Barton, B.A., Marshall University

Chairman of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dale Baum

The 1928 election was the first presidential election in which Texas cast its electoral college votes for a Republican. Herbert Hoover's victory has been viewed as an aberration in Texas politics, and the election is thought to have had little impact on subsequent elections. A block of Democratic voters, the Hoovercrats, switched to the Republican party in 1928 because of the Democratic party's nomination of a wet Irish Catholic from New York and returned to the Democratic party in 1932.

The rigorous and systematic use of quantitative methods demonstrates that Hoovercrats were not a viable electoral force in Texas politics and that the 1928 election was the first stage in the forging of the New Deal coalition in Texas. The combined use of quantitative methods and traditional historical techniques shows that Hoover's personal appeal resulted in the mobilization of non-voters and new voters. While the nomination of Alfred E. Smith by the Democrats resulted in massive alienation of the party's previous supporters. Most of Hoover's 1928 supporters moved into the Democratic column in 1932 and remained there in 1936.
remained there in 1936.

The quantitative evidence demonstrates that the most likely groups to drop out of the electorate because of the nomination of Smith were Baptists and rural farm residents. They were replaced in the party by non-church members, Methodists, rural non-farm residents, and urban dwellers. Thus, the 1928 election was the first stage in the forging of a new and viable coalition of voters in Texas.
DEDICATION

To the memory of my grandmother, Opal Hall.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of this project I have incurred many debts. I wish to thank my mother, Ruth Barton, and Mitchelle James for their love and support. I am indebted to my fellow graduate students in the history department for their encouragement and for their friendship. My friend and colleague, Ihor Bemko, has always been available for advice and criticism on this project. Dale Baum, my chairman, taught me the methods and value of quantitative history. He has been a source of encouragement, always patient, and most of all, a friend. Larry Hill and Chester Dunning, the members of my committee, have always reminded me that I am a historian, not a political scientist. They have offered valuable criticisms and provided me with a balanced perspective on the use of quantitative history.

All errors in both fact and interpretation are my own and I must bear the responsibility for them.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II DEMOCRATS, HOOVERCRATS, REPUBLICANS AND NON-VOTERS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III RUM, RELIGION, AND REALIGNMENT</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV RACE AND REALIGNMENT</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V A CLASH OF CULTURES? RURAL/URBAN VOTING PATTERNS FROM 1924 TO 1932</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI CONCLUSION</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 70 |
| VITA | 78 |
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1936 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 IN THE BLACK BELT (in percentage of the electorate) (N=71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN 1924 AND 1928 IN NON-BLACK BELT COUNTIES (in percentage of the electorate) (N=183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the 1928 presidential election Democrats had reason to be confident of victory in Texas. The Lone Star state was one of two states that in presidential elections had never been in the Republican column. But Herbert Hoover, the Republican candidate, polled more votes in Texas than the previous four Republican candidates combined and defeated the Democratic candidate, Alfred Smith, who attracted 100,000 fewer votes than his party's standard-bearer in 1924. Hoover's stunning victory in Texas, along with Republican victories in Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina, broke the "solid South."

Many historians and political scientists have labeled Smith's 1928 defeat as a "critical election." V.O. Key, a noted political scientist, first coined this descriptive label in his ground-breaking and seminal article published in 1955. Pointing to 1928 as a critical election in New England, Key defined a critical election as one in which "the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, . . . more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed." In the wake

This document follows the style of The Journal of American History


of Key's initial formulation of critical elections, political scientists and historians have modified the concept of realignment. Instead of just one critical election they postulated a critical period of two or more elections that disrupts the stable political environment and creates a new party system. In addition to critical elections there are also maintaining and deviating elections. Maintaining elections refer to elections in which the majority party maintains its power, while deviating elections refer to short-term forces which are great enough to cause the temporary defeat of the majority party.\(^4\)

The critical election and party system perspective has divided the American political past into distinct electoral eras. The first party system or "pre-party" system lasted from 1789 to 1827. Andrew Jackson's election in 1828 prefaced the rise of the first truly national parties, the Democrats and the Whigs, and the formation of the second party system. The third party system or the Civil War party system was in place by 1860, resulting from the sectional tensions between North and South over the issue of slavery. Abraham Lincoln's election brought the first sectional party, the Republicans, to power. The Populist protest of the 1890s and dissatisfaction with the Democratic party in the urban Northeast resulted in the fourth party system. The fifth party system was the New Deal party system forged by Franklin D. Roosevelt's election in 1932. The breakdown of the fifth party system and the creation of the sixth party system is a topic of debate among

In critical election theory an electoral era begins with a dramatic voter realignment which consists of a period of stability and ends with another realignment which culminates a period of electoral instability. During the stable phase of a party system, very little party switching occurs. The stable electoral period is followed by fluctuations in voting patterns. Realignment perspective was initially formulated with only active voters in mind, persons disfranchised, disinterested, or not yet eligible were conceptually excluded. Fluctuations in voting patterns could only be explained by partisan switching of voters. Recently, scholars have examined the effects caused by mobilization of new voters and previous non-voters, opening up a valuable new window on our view of the electorate.

Since a critical election or critical period ends with a decay phase and stability is restored, some students of realignment theory point to realignment as a surrogate for revolution. This has led some historians and political scientists to examine the policy consequences of realignment.

Key concluded that before the "Roosevelt revolution" at the polls in 1932, there was a "Smith revolution" in 1928. Samuel Lubell agreed

---


7 Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, Partisan Realignment, 19-20.
with Key's assessment, but he claimed the Smith revolution went beyond just New England to include a "revolt of the cities," essentially in the industrial Northeast, which had previously been a Republican stronghold. Jerome Clubb and Howard Allen challenged the "revolt of the cities" concept by moving beyond just presidential politics and examining minor elections, including congressional and gubernatorial elections. While Smith carried the cities in 1928, the Republicans maintained their strength in the key industrial cities at the bottom of the ballot. From this they concluded that although 1928 was part of a critical period, it was not a critical election.\(^8\)

Some historians have gone beyond labelling elections and have examined the process of realignment. James Sundquist declares that the New Deal coalition was forged by the votes of previous Republicans who switched allegiance in 1932 while Kristi Anderson argues that mobilization of new voters or previous non-voters was crucial to the creation of a Democratic majority.\(^9\)

The Democratic party increased its popularity, according to some historians, because Smith appealed to the immigrants. The Democratic party, despite the loss of the Southern states in the 1928 election, was stronger because recent immigrant voters became firmly entrenched in

---


the Democratic column with the nomination of a "wet" Irish Catholic. This interpretation implies that the Democrats, even without the Depression, might have been able to defeat the Republicans in 1932 by nominating a Protestant candidate bringing the solid South back into the Democratic camp. Ruth Silva's quantitative analysis of the 1928 election concludes that foreign-stock heritage was the best single predictor of the Smith vote. Anderson's mobilization theory for the New Deal realignment also supports the interpretation that Smith, despite his defeat, had a positive influence on the Democratic party, since he mobilized previously uninvolved groups such as immigrants, women, young people, and the urban working class.10

Some students of critical election theory reject 1928 as a crucial element in the creation of the New Deal party system. They point out that realignment is part of the response to a crisis, and the crisis which created the New Deal party system was the Great Depression. Winning the immigrant vote in 1928 did not trigger the transition from the fourth to the fifth party system.11

Realignment theory has recently come under attack as a method for studying political history. Allan Lichtman argues that the realignment perspective impedes the understanding of American political history because it has become too concerned with classifying elections;


11 Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 214-19; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, Partisan Realignment, 28.
thus, the historiographical debate centers on which elections are or are not "critical." Yet, it is possible to apply typologies used to label elections to party outcomes. For example, the Democratic party of Texas could have undergone a realignment in 1928 and 1932 while the same two elections were merely deviating elections for the Republican party. Using critical election theory in this way, the process of change is classified, not the election.¹²

Most historians agree that Smith and the Democrats had little chance for victory in 1928. Still, the election continues to be of interest because of the debate on the substance of the New Deal realignment and also because Smith was the first Catholic to run for president. Students of the contest point to many reasons for Smith's defeat. Most claim that the prosperity of the twenties made Hoover and the Republican party unbeatable in 1928. The Republicans capitalized on seven years of prosperity in the 1928 campaign.¹³

William Leuchtenberg, however, believes that Smith's loss of normally Democratic regions of the country went beyond any single economic issue. Smith grew up on the sidewalks of New York City and was the son of an Irish immigrant. He was the first national urban leader to vie for the nation's highest office, and the struggle over his


nomination by the Democratic party reflected the divisions between rural and urban America. Smith was a symbol of attitudes and beliefs that were foreign to rural Americans, while on the other hand, Hoover was perceived to be the personification of rural America. This interpretation goes very well with the Smith revolution theory since Smith won the cities and America continued on the road to becoming more urban after 1928.\textsuperscript{14}

Isolating the most salient reasons why Smith lost is a difficult task, but some historians have attempted to put the various aspects of the election into perspective. They have stressed that Smith’s nomination drew many immigrants into the Democratic party, and Hoover’s strength was attributable to old-stock Americans identifying with the Republican party.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to their fear of foreign-born citizens, many voters were allegedly dismayed by Smith’s stand on the prohibition issue. This issue drew Protestant ministers into the political arena. Bishop James Cannon of the Methodist church stumped the nation, preaching against "Alcohol Al Smith" and the Democratic party.\textsuperscript{16}

Smith’s Catholic faith has often been pointed to as a major factor in his defeat. A strong anti-Catholic sentiment in the South was one of


\textsuperscript{16}Burner, \textit{The Politics of Provincialism}, 201; Leuchtenberg, \textit{The Perils of Prosperity}, 236.
the major reasons for the breaking of the solid South. Lichtman's sophisticated analysis also points to religion as the major factor in Smith's loss to Hoover in northern states. He argues "that regardless of ethnic background, prohibition status, or economic status; Catholics and Protestants split more decisively in 1928 than in any other year." Thus, the 1928 election was not a critical election; instead, it was an aberrant election. The New Deal realignment was the result of the reaction of the American electorate to the responses of Hoover and Roosevelt to the Depression.17

Almost all studies of the New Deal realignment have focused on northern states. Key's article is on New England; and Lubell, Clubb and Allen also focus on northern cities. Although Sundquist examines primarily northern states, he includes a discussion of the aftershocks of the New Deal realignment in the South after the 1948 election. Anderson's study is based on a survey of Chicago voters. Lichtman analyzes exclusively northern states. Burner's study, however, mentions anti-Catholic sentiment in the South. But Burner does not systematically examine Southern voting patterns nor assesses the impact of religion on the election results in the South.

The South has thus been relatively ignored in the study of electoral changes in the first half of the twentieth century. Examination of turnout has led some students of electoral behavior to conclude that the "New Deal party system of which the Solid Democratic South was a crucial part, ironically witnessed no fundamental modification in

southern voting patterns."^{18}

The 1928 election in Texas has received very little attention, and few scholars have analyzed it in the context of realignment theory. Key's discussion of the 1928 bolters suggested that race played a major role in explaining Smith's support: of the forty-five counties with a black population larger than twenty-five percent, Smith won forty. Religious bigotry, prohibition, and Smith's urban immigrant background, were other reasons which caused the Democrats to lose Texas. Hoover, on the other hand, represented traditional Southern values; he was a dry Protestant, from a rural background.^{19}

Just as in studies of national politics, students of the 1928 election in Texas have focused their attention on the impact of religion and prohibition as the major issues of the campaign. A study of the activities of political preachers demonstrates that the greatest shifts in Democratic support came in Tarrant, Dallas, Taylor, and Lubbock counties, which were regions of intense activity by political preachers. One post-election analysis declared that religion was not as important an issue as prohibition while historian Seth Shepard McKay called the election, "just another prohibition contest."^{20}


Traditional accounts of Texas politics in the 1928 election and the 
New Deal period have concentrated on the activities of political elites. 
The most recent study, for example, examines the intricacies of 
intraparty factionalism in Texas during the 1928 campaign and argues 
that this factionalism determined the outcome in Texas. Two other 
works on Texas politics focus on the intraparty affairs of the Republican 
party. Both concentrate on the battle for supremacy in the Texas 
Republican party between R.B. Creager, state Republican party 
chairman, and Congressman Harry Wurzback.21

This study will probably confirm many of the traditional accounts 
of the 1928 election, but it will also challenge some accepted 
interpretations about the contest and its effects on Texas politics. 
Obviously, prohibition and anti-Catholicism were two important factors 
in explaining Smith's defeat in Texas. The extent to which these two 
moralistic issues affected the outcome needs to be explored. Moreover, 
since V.O. Key's work on the 1928 Texas bolters, there has not been a 
systematic study of racism and the 1928 election. Race is an essential 
element when examining any twentieth century election in the South. 
The "lily-white" Republican movement and Smith's liberal stance on race 
could have significantly affected the outcome of the 1928 contest.

The concept of Texas "Hoovercrats" needs to be subjected to close 
scrutiny. A movement by prominent Texans in 1928 to bring Texas 
Democrats into the Hoover camp, while maintaining their allegiance to 

21 Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 374; Paul D. Casdorph, 
A History of the Republican Party in Texas, 1865-1965 (Austin, 
1965), 133-37; Roger M. Olien, From Token to Triumph: The Texas 
Republicans Since 1920 (Dallas, 1982), 43-48.
the rest of the Democratic ticket, could have been totally unsuccessful. Hoover could have received most of his support from previous non-voters thus making the Hoovercrats of very little importance.

Traditional approaches to the 1928 election in Texas have answered many questions, but many questions remain unanswered. For example, it is well-documented that turnout in Texas increased by over 50,000 from 1924 to 1928. Political scientists and historians have assumed that the increase in turnout in Texas and the South reflected the national trend although on a much smaller scale. Turnout in Texas increased by only seven and one-half percent while nationally the increase was nearly twenty-one percent. Yet little, if any attention, has been given to the task of uncovering the partisan preferences of the new voters. Another unanswered question is how prevalent was party switching in 1928. Recently, realignment studies have focused attention on the debate between mobilization and conversion of voters as causes of the New Deal realignment.

Despite statements by some political historians who claim Southern voting patterns remained unchanged throughout the New Deal era, it remains theoretically possible that the Lone Star state's Democratic party underwent a two-stage realignment. Voters who dropped out of the electorate in 1928 could have been replaced by previous non-voters mobilized not only by Roosevelt in 1932 but also by Hoover in 1928. Ironically, anti-Smith sentiment in Texas may have pulled some previous non-voters into the electorate for the first time in

---

1928. These possibilities need to be investigated. One thing, however, is clear: the realignment in Texas did not lead to the creation of a competitive two-party system. Instead, the Democratic party underwent changes in its make-up between 1924 and 1932. Thus, an extremely important task is to identify the voters, in ethnic, religious, and economic terms, who dropped in or out of the active electorate during these years. Democratic voters after the 1928 election may have been less concerned about moral issues, like prohibition, and more concerned about dealing with the effects of the Depression.
CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATS, HOOVERCRATS, REPUBLICANS AND NON-VOTERS

Questions raised about past Texas politics in the previous chapter are not intractable to quantitative solutions. J. Morgan Kousser advocates that historians make creative use of contingency tables containing voter transition probabilities between any two election pairs. While several other methods are available for estimating the voting behavior of individuals from one election to the next, Kousser has proven that ecological regression estimation is the most useful and accurate method.¹

Ecological regression originally was developed by statisticians and employed by sociologists concerned about overcoming the so-called "ecological fallacy." W.S. Robinson dramatically announced in 1950 that individual behavior cannot automatically be assumed from correlations derived from ecological or geographical data. Since Robinson's admonishment there have been many attempts to circumvent the problem of making unbiased assumptions about the behavior of individuals when all the researcher has to work with are aggregated data.²

Although political historians continually confront the problem of drawing conclusions from county election returns and comparable census


data, it was a sociologist who first proposed using ecological regression, rather than correlations, to infer descriptive properties of groups from aggregate data. Leo Goodman’s ecological regression method was subsequently improved W. Phillips Shively, a political scientist, who demonstrated that although Goodman’s technique could within certain limits be refined to draw unbiased conclusions about individual behavior, regression methods result in estimates that cannot be verified unless comparable individual data are available. Nevertheless, the use of ecological regression as refined by Goodman, Shively, and Kousser is a powerful statistical tool which can be used for discovering relationships between various characteristics of voting units postulated to explain variations in the vote. Other methods, like simple regression coefficients, Pearson correlation coefficients, factor analysis, and homogeneous unit analysis that can only be used to generalize intuitively about the voting-unit being analyzed.3

Regression methods enable the students of political history to examine all possible combinations or patterns of voting behavior between any two elections. The potential Texas electorate in a pair of successive elections in the 1920s and 1930s can be divided into eight mutually exclusive categories: (1) voting for the same party in both elections; (2) switching parties; (3) casting ballots in the first election, but not in the

---

second election (even though the poll tax was paid); (4) voting in the first election and ineligible in the second because of nonpayment of poll tax; (5) not voting in the first election (even though the poll tax was paid) and voting in the second; (6) not initially paying the poll tax, thus, not voting in the first election and subsequently voting in the second election; (7) paying the poll tax and not voting in both elections; and finally, (8) not paying the poll tax and thus being ineligible to vote in both elections. Analyzing the size of these groups in pairs of elections makes it possible to explain changes in voting alignments and preferences of all possible voters from one election to the next. By examining a series of elections over a period of time, one can detect subtle changes in the movement of voters into and out of the active electorate and uncover changes in party loyalty.4

This study will use two types of non-voters: namely, those paying poll taxes but not voting, and those not paying the poll tax (and thus being ineligible to vote). In examining Texas electoral changes, the two non-voting groups will be treated not unlike political parties, for not-voting is a political choice that can have tremendous effect on electoral results. While other political historians have utilized non-voters to study political realignment, this study will have the advantage of using two types of non-voters. The poll tax gives the political historian a new window into the electorate. It not only can yield information about disfranchisement but also about mobilization and alienation of voting blocks.

In addition to examining changes in turnout and partisan loyalties over the period 1924-1936, an array of background or explanatory variables describes in a statistical sense the social and economic factors that shaped a particular electoral result. A complete list of variables used is contained in Table 1.

It may be recalled that in securing the 1928 nomination, Alfred E. Smith split the Democratic forces of Texas. Thomas B. Love, a leading prohibitionist from the Woodrow Wilson era who led the "ultra-drys", opposed Smith because of the New York governor's stand on prohibition. A group of young upstart liberal Democrats, including Charles Francis of Wichita Falls, Connie Renfro of Dallas, Allen Peden of Houston, and Frank Culver, Jr. of Fort Worth, challenged the "drys," hoping to use the Smith campaign to destroy what they termed as the "Love-Sells-Hicks" hegemony over the Texas Democratic party.5

Bitter political opponents set aside their differences to achieve the common purpose of defeating the New York governor. Love joined forces with former Texas governor Oscar B. Colquitt, a recent dry convert who had previously opposed national prohibition. The split in the party between pro and anti-Smith supporters was fully evident in 1927 when William Gibbs McAdoo dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination. Love had been the leading McAdoo supporter in the state. Conversely, former political allies became opponents over their position on Smith, who was easily the frontrunner after McAdoo's decision to drop out of the race. Albert Sidney Burleson, Postmaster General in the

5 Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 374-77.
Wilson administration, and Thomas Watt Gregory, United States Attorney General under Wilson, came out in support of Smith. But
Love, another leading Wilsonian Democrat in Texas, favored any dry candidate and was determined to oppose Smith no matter what the cost.\(^6\)

Although Smith and Hoover appeared poles, they represented many of the same ideals. Hoover has long been seen as an exponent of rugged individualism and a champion of big business. Smith also exemplified the self-made man, having worked his way to the pinnacle of New York politics, and in 1928, to the top of the Democratic party. Like Hoover, Smith espoused a firm belief in the American free enterprise system. The Democrats even emulated the Republican party by choosing a businessman, John Jacob Raskob, to manage Smith’s campaign. More attention has been paid to Raskob’s Catholicism than to his position as the head of General Motors.\(^7\)

Historians have long talked about the "Smith revolution" in 1928, but in Texas it may be possible to posit that there was instead a "Smith revulsion." The traditionally Democratic Lone Star state gave its electoral votes to a Republican presidential candidate for the first time in the state’s electoral history. Hoover garnered 27,162 more votes than Smith. Historians have commonly assumed that Hoover’s margin of victory resulted from large numbers of traditional Democratic voters switching temporarily to the Republicans because of dissatisfaction with


their party's nomination of a wet Irish Catholic from New York. Thus, Hoovercrats voted for Hoover on their presidential ballots while still voting Democratic in the other contests. Most of the supporters of the 1924 Democratic candidate, John W. Davis, sat out the 1928 election. Estimates derived from actual Texas county level voting statistics show that an insignificant number of 1924 Democratic supporters switched to the Republican party in 1928 (see Table 2). The over-emphasis on "Hoovercrats" or Republican crossover voting in Texas is probably attributable to merely "eyeballing" the statewide returns for the 1928 election. The Democrats lost over 140,000 votes from their 1924 total, and it is deductively easy to assume that these votes went into Hoover's column. But this notion assumes that turnout affected both parties equally. Historians thus have assumed that the Democrats lost voters to the Republican party in the presidential election.

If most of Hoover's support did not come from 1924 Democratic voters, then most of his votes came from previous non-voters and new voters. The Hoover vote can be broken down into its various components: 1924 Republican supporters, people who paid the poll tax and did not vote in 1924, people who did not pay the poll tax in 1924, and people not yet eligible to vote in 1924. About forty-two percent of Hoover's support came from persons who had paid the poll tax in 1924, but had not voted, while another seventeen percent came from people not

---

yet eligible to vote in 1924. Nearly all of the 1924 Calvin Coolidge supporters turned out for the Republican party. Hoover received thirty-three percent of his vote from people who repeated their Republican ballots from 1924. Hoover clearly was tapping into a new source of voters in the 1928 contest, as nearly sixty percent of his vote total came from persons who had not voted in 1924 (see Table 2).

Table 2. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP24</th>
<th>PDEM24</th>
<th>POTH24</th>
<th>PPPT24</th>
<th>PNPT24</th>
<th>PNYE24</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentage in this and the following contingency tables were computed with official election returns for the entire state as reported by counties. The number of eligible voters was estimated by using the adult populations of 1920 and 1930 and extrapolating the growth in each county's population. The figures within the cells of the first row of table 1 are the result of a multiple regression with the 1928 Hoover, percentage (Hoover) as dependent and Coolidge, Davis, La Follette, Poll Tax Paid Not Voting 24, Poll Tax Not Paid 24, and Not Yet Eligible 24 as the independent variables. To avoid multicollinearity, the Poll Tax Not Paid 24 was not included in the equation. In a hypothetical county where 100 percent of the votes cast for Coolidge in 1924, the predicated Hoover vote in 1928 was constant plus b1 coefficient. The constant plus b2 gave the estimated proportion of 1924 Democratic supporters who voted for Hoover, constant plus b3 equaled the proportion of La Follette supporters; constant plus b4 gave the estimated proportion on non-voting
poll tax payers; constant plus b5 equaled the proportion of non-poll tax payers who voted for Hoover. To insure summations of urban and rural votes equaled the marginals of the table, each county was weighted according to the adult population of 1930. The "Percentage of the Electorate" are taken from official voting returns and are not estimates. Rounding errors can cause the totals to appear incorrect.

The issues of prohibition, Smith's Catholicism, and Republican prosperity are pointed to as keys to understanding Smith's loss in Texas. Overlooked may be Hoover's own popularity in the Lone Star state. Hoover represented the self-made man, and presented an image Texans admired. His overseas adventures as an engineer and businessman made him well known to diplomats and foreign leaders. His work directing relief in Europe during the First World War, his experience as the leader of the United States Food Administration made him world famous. Hoover was also greatly admired for his work on Mississippi flood relief in 1927. J.B. Cranfill, editor of the *Southern Advance*, declared for Hoover, citing Hoover's work on flood relief in the South as evidence that he would treat the South properly if elected. In the eyes of many Southerners, Hoover was not a typical Republican, but a new type of leader that the South could trust.9

Despite the increase in turnout throughout the 1920s, only about twenty-one percent of the eligible voting population cast ballots in the 1924 contest while twenty-three percent voted in 1928. Non-voters in Texas from 1924, both those paying poll taxes and deciding not to vote in 1924 and those failing to pay poll taxes entered the active electorate in

---

1928. At the same time, many active voters from the 1924 contest dropped out of the active electorate in 1928. This second case best describes the activities of many 1924 John W. Davis supporters in Texas.

Most Davis supporters sat out the 1928 election as nearly two-thirds of the 1924 Democratic voters failed to cast a ballot in 1928 (see Table 2). Estimates derived from voting returns show that just under one-third of the Davis supporters paid the poll tax in 1928 and then failed to vote in the contest. The cross-pressure withdrawal theory of voting applies to most of these 1924 Democratic supporters. They presumably were people who normally voted Democratic but could not bring themselves to switch to the party of Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction. On the other hand, they could not vote for a wet Irish Catholic from New York. Just under one-third of the Davis Democrats did not even pay the poll tax in 1928. They might have been economically disabled farmers or Democrats who anticipated Smith's nomination and were unable or refused to pay the two dollar tax.10

Since Smith was unable to fully mobilize many of Davis's supporters, he too relied on winning the support of previous non-voters. Nearly half of his support came from people who had not voted in the 1924 presidential election. Around eighteen percent of Smith's support came from people who had paid the poll tax in 1924 but did not vote, while around twenty-seven percent of Smith's total came from people who had not paid the poll tax in 1924. Smith also garnered votes from

---

10 Baum, The Civil War Party System, 112; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Garden City, 1963), 211-16.
the supporters of Robert La Follette, the 1924 Progressive candidate for president. While over seventy percent of La Follette's supporters cast ballots for Smith in 1928, they comprised just under ten percent of Smith's vote total (see Table 2).

In comparing the results in the 1928 contest, one can see that both Smith and Hoover relied on previous non-voters. Yet, subtle differences in the make-up of their support still remain to be uncovered. Hoover received twice as much support as Smith from persons who paid the poll tax in 1924 and did not vote. Although most voters who became eligible in the 1928 contest chose to sit out the election, those that did vote were twice as likely to vote Republican as Democrat. The only area in which Smith outpolled his Republican counterpart was in mobilizing persons who had not paid the poll tax in 1924.

In an article published in Buenker's Monthly, Tom Love, the leading Anti-Smith Texas Democrat, predicted that the nomination of Smith would force the "great host of moral voters . . . ," who Love believed carried on in the "Wilsonian Democratic tradition," out of the Democratic party.11 Leaving their party was not taken lightly. Party loyalty was important to rank and file Texas Democrats. Although Smith represented an alien force to them, the Democratic party was perceived to be the only legitimate party in most parts of Texas. The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that switching to the Republican party was indeed too much for many loyal Democrats. Traditional accounts of the 1928 results, however, interpret Love's

statement about forcing Wilsonian Democrats out of the party to mean that former Democrats switched to the Republican party in the 1928 election. Yet, the voters whom Love envisioned switching to the Republican camp in 1928 were insignificant in terms of their raw numerical strength. Most 1924 Democrats faced with the choice of Smith or Hoover chose to sit out the 1928 contest.

The Great Depression smashed whatever hope the Republicans had of creating a viable two-party system in the Lone Star state. When the 1932 presidential election pitted the incumbent Hoover against the Democratic challenger, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Republicans seemed doomed to almost certain defeat because of the scope of the national disaster and Hoover's inability to solve the crisis to the satisfaction of the American people. Nationwide, Roosevelt easily won the 1932 election. In Texas, he received more votes than Hoover and Smith's combined tallies of 1928.\(^\text{12}\)

The breakdown of Roosevelt's Lone Star state coalition was a combination of 1928 Democratic supporters, 1928 Hoover voters, and the mobilization of previous non-voters, including first-time voters and people brought into the electorate by the Depression. Roosevelt was able to maintain most of the support that Smith received in 1928 (see Table3). Estimates show that around ninety-three percent of the 1928 Democrats repeated their Democratic ballots in 1932. This core of Democratic voters represented over forty percent of Roosevelt's total vote.

Like Hoover in 1928, Roosevelt also relied heavily on the support of previous non-voters, as over twenty percent of his total vote came from people who had sat out the 1928 contest (see Table3). Approximately thirteen percent of Roosevelt’s support came from those people who had paid the poll tax in 1928, but had not voted in that year, while just under ten percent of his total vote came from people who had not paid the poll tax in 1928 (see Table3). These new voters might have been mobilized by the threat of the Depression. People who were unexcited by the election rhetoric of prohibition and the tariff, the Depression mobilized these previous non-voters and made them active participants in 1932. Nearly forty percent of the previously ineligible voters cast ballots for Roosevelt in 1932 (see Table3). This was a dramatic shift in the allegiance of recently eligible voters. In 1928 most new voters cast ballots for the Republican party, but in 1932 the Democratic party under Roosevelt reversed this trend.

Traditional accounts emphasize the importance of Hoovercrats, who allegedly returned to the Democratic party in 1932 as being essential to Roosevelt’s victory in Texas, but the quantitative evidence presented here demonstrates that Hoovercrats were a negligible part of the electorate in 1928. Thus they could not be a major factor in the 1932 election. Although Hoovercrats were not a major element in the 1928 or 1932 contests, there was a significant number of 1928 Hoover supporters who switched to the Democratic party in 1932. About fifty-five percent of the 1928 Hoover supporters voted for Roosevelt in the 1932 election (see Table3). These former Republican supporters represented over a fourth of Roosevelt’s total vote in the 1932 contest.
Table 3. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP28</th>
<th>DEM28</th>
<th>OTH28</th>
<th>PPPT28</th>
<th>PNPT28</th>
<th>PNYE28</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since most of Hoover's support in 1928 came from previous non-voters, these new Democratic voters mobilized previously by Hoover were a major part of the realignment of the Texas Democratic party. The emphasis on Hoovercrats led historians to assume that 1928 was merely an aberrant election and that 1932 returned Texas politics to its former state. In reality, the 1928 contest was the first stage in a realignment of the Texas Democratic party.

The Texas Democratic party thus underwent a fundamental change in composition between 1924 and 1932. By examining relationships between voting patterns of 1928 and 1932, many have erroneously concluded that many Democrats who had been repelled by Smith and driven into the Republican column in 1928 returned to their party in 1932. But a comparison of voting patterns in the 1924 and 1932 elections reveals that the bulk of 1924 Democratic voters left the
party before 1932. Over sixty-five percent of the 1924 Davis supporters did not even bother to pay the poll tax in 1932. The 1928 nomination of Smith caused many of them to sit out the election despite having paid the poll tax, and in 1932 these former Democratic supporters apparently did not even pay the poll tax (see Table 4).

Table 4. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1932 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP24</th>
<th>PDEM24</th>
<th>POTH24</th>
<th>PPPT24</th>
<th>PNPT24</th>
<th>PNYE24</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roosevelt received most of his support from 1924 non-voters, as over sixty-five percent of his votes came from people who sat out the 1924 contest (see Table 4). Almost thirty percent of his vote came from 1924 poll tax payers who did not vote in that year while almost forty percent came from people who did not pay the poll tax in 1924. The Democratic party thus went through a process of replacing voters who had been alienated by the nomination of Smith in 1928 and in net results actually increased the number of Democratic supporters.
The Depression affected the voting behavior of traditional Republicans as well as the new Republican voters drawn in by Hoover in 1928. Around fifty-five percent of the 1924 Coolidge supporters left the Grand Old Party in 1932 and cast ballots for Roosevelt. At the national level, Roosevelt appealed to many of the Republican progressives, and they bolted their party in 1932. Texas progressive Republicans probably followed the lead of their national counterparts. There is also the possibility that the "wet" Democratic plank in 1932 appealed to the traditionally Republican German-Americans in the Lone Star state.

The 1936 campaign in most accounts was a referendum on the New Deal. The Republicans nominated Alfred Landon from Kansas to run against Roosevelt. Landon ran on a platform that favored a balanced budget and retrenchment from the New Deal policies of Roosevelt. Nationwide, Roosevelt's victory in 1936 helped form the foundation of the so-called "fourth party system," by sweeping away the last vestiges of the older voting coalitions and garnering the support of immigrants, the industrial Northeast and Midwest, blacks, and farmers.

By comparing the 1928 results with the 1936 results it is possible to demonstrate the effects of the short-lived Hoover coalition in Texas on subsequent elections. Around eighty percent of Hoover's 1928 supporters subsequently voted for FDR in 1936 (see Table 5). This represented around thirty-eight percent of Roosevelt's total vote in 1936.

---

13 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 184-90.
14 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 184-190.
Table 5. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 AND 1936 ELECTIONS (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP28</th>
<th>PDEM28</th>
<th>POTH28</th>
<th>PPPT28</th>
<th>PNPT28</th>
<th>PNYE28</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Democratic party in Texas ironically benefited in the long run from the Republican nomination of Hoover. Roosevelt received more votes from the 1928 Hoover coalition than any other grouping of 1928 voters (see Table 5). Voters mobilized by Hoover represented the vanguard of the newly-constructed Democratic party in 1936, for Democratic voters from the 1924 and 1928 contests had a much smaller impact on the composition of the party in 1936. Most of the 1928 Smith supporters dropped out of the electorate by the 1936 contest.

The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that the Hoovercrats were an insignificant group in terms of electoral power in Texas. While many of the elite members of the Democratic party switched parties in 1928, very few rank and file Democrats followed them into the Republican party. In fact most Democrats from the 1924 contest dropped out of the active electorate for at least two presidential
elections. The handful of elites who bolted for Hoover publicized the election and mobilized previous non-voters who carried the day for Hoover.

The 1928 election fundamentally transformed Texas voting patterns. Hoover mobilized new voters while the nomination of Smith forced the old Wilsonian Democrats out of the party. The Democrats quickly regained control of electoral politics in Texas, but the party was transformed, as the new voters mobilized by Hoover, plus new voters drawn in by the Depression moved into the Democratic column under the leadership of Roosevelt.
CHAPTER III

RUM, RELIGION, AND REALIGNMENT

The anti-liquor crusade was part of a general social reform movement that had a tremendous influence on Texas party politics in the years from 1900 to 1920. As early as 1905 political leaders astutely noted that Texas leaned towards becoming a prohibition state. Lewis Gould's analysis of Texas politics demonstrates that "dry" progressives, men like Cullen Thomas, Thomas Love, Morris Sheppard, and Cone Johnson, viewed prohibition as part of a larger fight of reform. The 1928 Democratic nomination of Alfred E. Smith did not mesh with their fundamental ideas about reforming Texas and the nation, and it was viewed as a "slap in the face" to the predominantly white Protestant Texas electorate.¹

Even during the Wilson administration the Southern progressive wing of the Democratic party failed to impose their principles upon the national Democratic party. Nevertheless, many Texas Democrats remained loyal and the Southern Progressive spirit was still strong in Texas during the twenties. The prohibition faction in Texas politics still existed, but after the passage of national prohibition, it turned its energies to "business progressivism," until the nomination of Smith split the Democratic party into two major factions.²

¹ Dewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition (Knoxville, 1983), 160-61, 363 T. W. Carlock to Oscar B. Colquitt, May 15, 1905, Oscar Branch Colquitt Papers (Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas Archives, Austin); Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 28, 284.
Tom Love led the dry-wing of the Texas Democratic party, known as the Anti-Smith Democrats. The drys were spearheaded at the local level by political preachers who linked the issues of prohibition with prejudice against Smith's Catholicism. Believing that the nomination of Smith would result in a Republican victory in Texas, Love and the Anti-Smith Democrats fought to have a "dry" nominated at the Democratic National Convention in Houston. Former state senator and 1922 gubernatorial candidate V.A. Collins urged his fellow Democrats to elect Anti-Smith delegates to the national convention, claiming that Smith would nullify the Eighteenth Amendment if elected.3

Political preachers unambiguously made prohibition one of the major issues in Texas. J.B. Cranfill, a Baptist minister, whose prohibition newspaper, The Advance, designed to elect Hoover, was sure a "wet" would lose four to five states of the "Solid South." In a letter to Hoover, Cranfill assured the Republican nominee that Baptist ministers in Texas were solidly behind him. Texas Baptists were urged to break party lines to defeat a candidate who supported nullification of the Eighteenth Amendment.4

---


4 J.B. Cranfill to George Doran, August 11, 1928, J.B. Cranfill to Tom Connally, February 8, 1928, J.B. Cranfill to Herbert Hoover, May 9, 1928, J.B. Cranfill Papers (University of Texas Archives, Austin); Storey, "Political Parsons: Texas Churchmen and the Election of 1928," 70-74; Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1928.
Other Protestant ministers did their part in attacking Smith's stand on prohibition. The Methodist Episcopal Church South threw the weight of its organization behind the anti-Smith movement when it voted at its national convention to oppose any "wet" candidate. Its official newspaper, *The Texas Christian Advocate*, stated that Smith's acceptance speech clearly made prohibition the issue of the election. Texas Methodists were urged to vote for the Republican party as a matter of principle, since the Democratic party could not demand loyalty over principle.\(^5\)

Religious leaders throughout the state attacked Smith through sermons, rallies, and private letters. A member of the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary wrote that the "vitalities of civilization and the kingdom of God" were at stake in the presidential race. The president of the Methodist affiliated McMurray College, called the New York governor a "dirty drunken bum," and added that the Roman Catholic Church was a subversive organization attempting to gain political control of America. The minister of Trinity Heights Methodist Church in Dallas told his congregation that every Roman Catholic in America would vote for Smith, claiming Catholics had nothing in common with American ideals and that "they would bring reproach upon our liberties." The American Baptist Association declared Smith's religious ties were intolerable because the Roman Catholic Church was a dangerous political organization. *The Baptist Standard*, the official newspaper of the Southern Baptist Convention was an instrumental part

\(^5\) Storey, "Political Parsons," 72-73.
of the anti-Smith campaign conducted by Texas Protestant churches. The Standard repeatedly attacked Smith's Catholicism and his pro-liquor position. One article listed three sources of Smith's support: organized crime (especially liquor traffickers), big business which wanted immigration laws relaxed so they would have a cheap source of labor, and the Catholic Church which hoped to "take charge of the policies" of America and thereby dominate the world. Although such accusations against Smith and the Catholic Church were irrational and had no foundation whatsoever, they struck a responsive chord among many Texas Protestants.

Anti-Smith rhetoric in the pulpit did not necessarily translate into financial support for the Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas. The Anti-Smith Democrats sent out over four thousand requests for funds to Protestant pastors throughout the Lone Star state, but they received contributions from less than twenty-five. This lukewarm support of the leading anti-Smith organization foreshadowed the election results in Texas based on religious voting patterns. While many Texas Protestants opposed Smith, they could not support the alternative—a Republican.

Smith's religious affiliation was also questioned by some of the state's political leaders. Senator Collins declared that the decay of civilization was a result of Catholicism and used the example of Texas's

---


7 Oscar B Colquitt to Dr. W.J. Hearn, September 8, 1928, Oscar Branch Colquitt Papers, (University of Texas Archives, Austin).
southern neighbor, the Republic of Mexico, to illustrate this insight.  

Smith's supporters in Texas were not nearly as active as his opponents. Few Texas politicians actively campaigned for him although many announced that they would vote for the New York governor. U.S. Senator Morris Sheppard, the father of national prohibition, announced he would support Smith in his quest for the presidency. Sheppard remained true to the Democratic party because he believed Smith could not overthrow national prohibition without support in Congress. He also stated the first step to good government was to oust the corrupt centralized Republican party. Jesse Jones, wealthy banker and publisher of the Houston Chronicle, also refused to bolt from the Democratic party. Like Sheppard, Jones thought Smith alone could not change prohibition laws and claimed that Smith's acceptance speech made it clear that the Eighteenth Amendment would be enforced.

Students of the 1928 election in Texas have attributed Smith's defeat to the defection of Protestants from Democratic to Republican ranks. They assert confidently that many Protestant Democrats left their party to support Hoover. But examining patterns of voting according to religious affiliation demonstrates that Protestants preferred not to vote or even vote for Smith rather than switch to the Republican

---


9 Morris Sheppard to J.B. Cranfill, August, 23, 1928, J.B. Cranfill Papers; Jesse Jones to J.B. Cranfill, August 28, 1928, J.B. Cranfill Papers.

party. Hoover received most of his support from people with no religious preference (see Table 6). Nearly sixty percent of his vote came from non-churchgoers while only about a quarter of his vote came from the two most vocal churches against Smith's candidacy, the Methodists and the Baptists. The increase in support from persons with no religious preference, therefore, was as important to Hoover as were abstentions among Protestants.

Table 6. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNOREL</th>
<th>PRAPT</th>
<th>POTHR</th>
<th>PMETH</th>
<th>PCATH</th>
<th>PBLREG</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baptists abstained from voting Democratic at an extremely high rate in 1928. In 1924 around fifty percent of the Baptists in Texas voted Democratic, but in 1928 Baptist support for the Democrats was virtually nil (see Table 6 and Table 7). Baptists who voted in 1928 preferred Hoover to Smith, but only approximately eleven percent of Texas Baptists cast ballots for Hoover. It is of some interest to note that most Baptists paid the poll tax in 1928, but only a small percentage voted in
the contest. Although most Baptists opposed Smith philosophically, they could not vote for the despised party of Reconstruction. Therefore, most Baptists sat out the 1928 election: around forty-four percent chose not to vote, even though they paid the poll tax, while another forty-four percent did not even pay the poll tax (see Table 6).

What happened to the Baptist vote is best explained by the "cross-pressure-withdrawal" theory of voting behavior; that is, "if a group is torn between conflicting stimuli of loyalty to none particular party and support for a cause championed by another, the group is likely to resolve the conflict by not voting."\(^{11}\) In a normal lopsidedly Democratic election in Texas this would have had no real effect, but the 1928 contest was so close that the defection of Baptists from the Democratic party to the ranks of non-voters helped turn the election in Hoover's favor.\(^{12}\)

Baptist support for Hoover was minimal and it can probably be assumed that most Baptists who voted for Hoover had not voted in the 1924 contest because few Democrats crossed party lines between 1924 and 1928 (see Table 6 and 3.2). Baptists favoring Hoover were probably motivated by the twin issues of prohibition and Smith's religion.

The most surprising results were the estimates of the voting behavior of Methodists between 1924 and 1928. Methodists were among the most organized and vocal of the anti-Smith groups in Texas.\(^{13}\) Anti-


\(^{12}\) Hoover won by 27,162 votes and if only thirty percent of the Baptists had voted for Smith this would have translated into over 70,000 additional votes for the Democratic candidate.

\(^{13}\) Storey, "Political Parsons," 67-70.
Smith sentiment was high among Methodist ministers, but the membership apparently did not take their cues from their ministers. Most Methodists, like most Baptists, paid the poll tax in 1924, but they were not as supportive of the Democratic party as their Baptist counterparts. Methodists split their support between John W. Davis, the Democratic candidate, and the Progressive candidate Robert La Follette (see Table 7).

Methodists may have recognized similar progressive attitudes between La Follette and Smith because Methodists supported Smith at a higher rate than they supported Hoover (see Table 6). Estimates suggest that forty percent of Texas Methodists supported Smith while around thirty-one percent cast ballots for Hoover. Methodist support for Smith represented over a quarter of his total vote. Despite anti-Smith rhetoric in the pulpit, Methodist were about three times as likely to vote for
Smith as the electorate-at-large (see Table 6).

Methodists who supported Smith may have followed the political wisdom of the father of national prohibition, Morris Sheppard. Senator Sheppard, a Methodist, supported Smith because politically Smith was more in line with Sheppard's personal philosophy of government. The "corruption" of the Republicans outweighed the "wetness" of Smith in the mind of Sheppard, and this may have guided the decision of some Methodists. Other Methodists may have selected party over principle and voted for Smith.14

The largest single group of potential voters was made up of people with no formal religious affiliation. This group represented over half the votes cast in elections between 1924 and 1932 (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Non-church members are historically a much under-studied group both socially and politically. They have been virtually ignored by historians attempting to explain the relationship between religion and voting behavior.

The breakdown of partisan preference of the non-church members was roughly analogous to the state-at-large totals (see Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). This means that they were a highly predictable group, but the unchurched also had a tremendous impact on the election results.15 Their behavior towards the Democratic party was a major factor in the


15 A word of caution about the category, "No Religious Preference", because of the size of the group it is easy to forget that as a general rule this group tended not to vote in 1928 with only twenty percent participating in the election.
defeat of Smith. In 1924 non-church members represented about fifty-nine percent of the Democratic total vote, but in 1928 they represented only about forty-five percent of Smith's total. More importantly, the number of non-church members casting ballots for the party dropped in half between 1924 and 1928 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). While the comeback of the Democratic party appeared inevitable after the stock market crash and the Depression, it is interesting to note that non-church members were once again a dominating factor in the Democratic party in 1932 (see Table 8).

Table 8. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNOREL</th>
<th>PBAPI</th>
<th>POTHIR</th>
<th>PMETH</th>
<th>PCATH</th>
<th>PBLREG</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRRP28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMPT28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explaining the behavior of the non-church members is almost as difficult as describing the composition of the group. There is very little written about the unchurched, nor are there any guideposts which identify who these people were in terms of social class or economic status. Most non-church members in Texas probably identified with the
dominant white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant constituents of the state, even though they did not have any formal religious affiliation.

Roman Catholicism was the largest religious denominations in Texas, yet it exercised very little political power. Most Texas Catholics were Mexican-Americans. In 1924 and 1928 around seventy percent of the Catholics did not pay the poll tax while around fifteen percent paid the poll tax but did not vote. Historians have postulated that outside of the Southern states, Smith offset the loss of Protestant voters with large numbers of Catholic immigrants who voted for the first time in 1928.\footnote{Lichtman, 	extit{Prejudice and the Old Politics}, 76.} But in Texas, Smith was unable to counter the loss of Protestant votes with Catholic votes. Catholics turned out for Smith at a lower rate than the electorate-at-large (see Table 6).

One explanation for this would be the use of the poll tax in Texas. A traditional method for maintaining Democratic hegemony in Texas actually worked against the Democrats in 1928. In order to vote, one had to pay the poll tax by the first day of February. Since most Catholics were Mexican-Americans from the poorer region of South Texas, they were usually unable to pay the annual poll tax. Even if they had been motivated to pay the tax by the prospect of a Catholic on the ballot for the first time, Smith’s nomination was in July, well after the deadline for poll tax payment, which effectively disfranchised them.\footnote{J. Morgan Kousser, 	extit{The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910} (New Haven, 1974), 205.}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Lichtman, 	extit{Prejudice and the Old Politics}, 76.
  \item J. Morgan Kousser, 	extit{The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910} (New Haven, 1974), 205.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The poll tax served as an even greater stumbling block for the state's black church members. Black church members were by far the most disfranchised religious group in the Lone Star state. According to regression estimates the small percentage of black church members who voted cast ballots for Smith in the 1928 election (see Table 6). The estimates serve as a corrective to the belief by leading Republicans that the "church Negroes" cast ballots for Hoover in 1928. State Republican leaders charged the Democrats with buying votes, but they believed that black church members were immune to this activity and cast Republican ballots. Actually, black church members were already casting ballots for the Democratic party before 1928 (see Table 7).

Contemporaries viewed Hoover's victory in the Lone Star state as an aberration. Senator Sheppard said the results in Texas were not permanent. The Republicans won because they skillfully manipulated the prohibition issue to their advantage. One long-time Democrat claimed Texans were prohibitionists first, party Democrats afterward. A counter to the prevailing view of prohibition as the main reason for Smith's defeat was presented by Martin Crane, a former state attorney general. Crane argued that prohibition was only a smokescreen for religious bigotry. On the surface the defeat of Smith in Texas was a

18 R.B. Creager, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection, (University of Texas Archives, Austin).

19 The next chapter will include a more complete discussion of black voting behavior and participation during this period and a discussion of the impact of race on the 1928 election.

20 Dallas Morning News, November 9, 1928; Martin M. Crane to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December, 11, 1928, Martin M. Crane Papers, (University of Texas Archives, Austin).
great moral victory for the Anti-Smith Democrats and the "drys," but the victory was actually very different from their perceptions.

Examining the 1932 election demonstrates that 1928 was more than just a deviating election for the Democratic party. The voting behavior of many religious groups indicates that they did not return to their 1924 loyalties (see Table 8). Comparisons of the 1928 and 1932 elections show that the tendency of Baptists to drop out of the electorate continued in 1932. Over two-thirds of the Baptists in Texas did not pay the poll tax in 1932, compared to thirty-five percent not paying the tax in 1928 (see Table 6 and 3.3). In 1924 nearly all Baptists paid the poll tax (see Table 7). The nomination of Smith clearly alienated many Baptists although some Baptists might have been forced from the active electorate by increasing hard times caused by the Depression. Nevertheless, the national Democratic party in 1932 continued to alienate rural Protestant American by nominating another "wet" New York liberal, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The nationwide transformation of the Democratic party did not go unnoticed by old-line Texas Democrats. Cone Johnson, a staunch supporter of prohibition, commented on the nomination of Smith: "I sat by the central aisle while the parade passed, following Smith's nomination and the faces I saw in the mile-long procession were not American. I wondered where were all the Americans." The national Democratic party image had changed since the days of Woodrow Wilson and many Texas Baptists were uncomfortable with that change. The "wets" won out again during the 1932 Democratic convention and the party came out in favor of repeal of
the Eighteenth amendment.21

Methodists, however, were firm supporters of the Democratic party in 1932: approximately seventy-one percent of Texas Methodists voted for Roosevelt (see Table 8). Methodist apparently had a strong tradition of voting for the most progressive candidate as evidenced by their support for La Follette in 1924, their greater than average support for Smith in 1928 (despite the prohibition issue), and in 1932 their continued support for Roosevelt. Methodists drawn into the electorate by Hoover and the prohibition issue in 1928, continued to vote in 1932, but the impact of the Depression forced them into the Democratic column.

Catholic voting participation doubled between the 1924 election and the 1932 election, with most of the increase coming between the 1928 and 1932 elections. Catholics may have seen opportunities in the Democratic party because of the nomination of Smith in 1928, but many were unable to act until 1932. Many who may have wanted to vote in 1928 were effectively disfranchised because of the Texas poll tax law which required payment by the first day of February.

The relationships between religion and voting patterns reflected the instability of Texas presidential politics during the 1928 and 1932 campaigns. Democrats lost much of their traditional base among Baptist voters, but gained Methodist support. The nominations of Smith and Roosevelt altered the make-up of the Democratic coalition in Texas. While Roosevelt's nomination and the Depression did little to bring Baptists back into the electorate, Methodist turnout and non-church

members replaced them in the Democratic party.
CHAPTER IV
RACE AND REALIGNMENT

No discussion of Southern politics is complete without an assessment of the role of race. V.O. Key claimed that Southern politics "revolve around the position of the Negro." By 1910 across the South black disfranchisement was almost complete. In Texas despite the disfranchisement of blacks through the poll tax, many white Texans pushed for further disfranchisement through implementation of the all white primary. Some believed the poll tax was subverted by politicians paying poll taxes for poor whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Potential black and lower class white voting power was perceived as a threat to the social structure of the state. Fear of black voting and its impact on society was never far below the surface of Texas politics, and it played a role in the 1928 election campaign and the development of the New Deal realignment in Texas.¹

Key postulates that Hoover carried Texas in the 1928 election because of the impact of race. In counties with a black population greater than fifteen percent, Key pointed out that Smith and the Democratic party won fifty-nine of seventy-one counties.² But in the one hundred eighty-three counties with black populations less than fifteen percent, Hoover won one hundred thirty counties. Key speculates that

¹ Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 5.
² For the purposes of this thesis, the counties with greater a black population greater than fifteen percent will be referred to as "black belt counties."
this was because the specter of race was less of a factor in these counties, as the memories of Reconstruction and the myth of black rule were not as strong.³

Key's statements about Texas have been accepted as the standard interpretation about the state's politics in the first half of the twentieth century. Key's thesis can be refined by carefully examining the 1928 election in Texas.

One of the essential problems with Key's argument is the very nature of the issue of race in the 1928 election. While Key is correct in pointing out that the Democratic party raised the specter of "Negro domination" if Hoover were elected, he neglects to point out that the Anti-Smith Democrats also participated in "black-baiting" during the campaign. The Democrats declared that Hoover canceled orders for the segregation of white and black workers in the Bureau of the United States Census. Congressman Sam Rayburn conjured up images of a return of Reconstruction in a speech at Fort Worth's First Baptist Church:

As long as I am a white man, live among white people and respect the white womanhood of the Southland, I will never vote for Herbert Hoover, the advocate of racial social equality and the man who forced white girls working in his department, to share with negro women the lavatories and comfort stations. As long as I honor the memory of my Confederate father to our Southland and wear his name, I will never vote for the election of a party which sent the carpet bagger and the scalawag to the prostrate South with saber and sword to crush the white civilization of the South to the earth. If he is elected President, he will undertake the same policy of abolition of segregation of the races to all of the departments of our government.⁴

³ Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 320-22.
The Anti-Smith Democrats countered the charges against Hoover with a vicious assault on Smith. Former Texas governor Oscar B. Colquitt led the whispering campaign against the New York governor by publicizing a letter which questioned Smith's commitment to keeping Negroes politically in their place. Smith was also accused of supporting a miscegenation bill and a bill to give blacks equal rights in the state of New York. Issue number three of Colquitt's campaign paper, the Constitutional Democrat, had a picture of Ferdenand Morton, a Negro Civil Service Commissioner of New York City, dictating a letter to a white stenographer. Colquitt received numerous requests for this issue because it would vindicate Hoover on the "nigger question." Anti-Smith Democrats defended Hoover's actions in the Commerce department by saying that having census workers in the same office was at President Coolidge's request, who reminded Hoover about a provision in the Civil Service Law against segregation. Anti-Smith Democrats declared that Hoover tried to segregate workers, but Federal law stopped him. The Republicans and Hoover did nothing to counter these assertions by the Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas. Hoover was willing to let the whispering campaign against Smith continue on the religious issue, and it appears he allowed it to continue in the South on the race issue as well.\(^5\)

\(^4\) Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 412.

\(^5\) Reverend Bruce Roberts to Oscar B. Colquitt, October 20, 1928, Oscar Colquitt Papers; B.P. Maddox to O.B. Colquitt, October 13, 1928, Colquitt Papers; Judge Hugh A. Locke (Alabama Anti-Smith Democrats) to O.B. Colquitt, September 19, 1928, Colquitt Papers
Key's assessment of the importance of race in Southern politics fails to take into account the impact of racism within the Democratic party itself and its impact on support for Smith. Colquitt was so worried about "Negro domination" he refused to attend the national meeting of the Anti-Smith Democrats if blacks were represented. The race question thus split the Texas Democratic party and became as useful a tool against Smith as the issues of prohibition and religion.6

Key argues that by identifying the Hoovercrats there is a whole new understanding of the Southern Democratic party.7 Yet, there were very few Hoovercrats in Texas as has already demonstrated.8 Key's arguments about race and politics probably explains more about mobilization and alienation in Southern politics than about the nature of the Southern Democracy.

It is possible to test Key's hypothesis concerning the 1928 results by isolating counties that had black populations greater than fifteen percent. In the black belt counties twenty percent turned out to vote compared to the statewide turnout of twenty-three percent. In 1924 black belt counties mirrored turnout throughout the state. As Key has shown, Smith carried most of the black belt counties, but his margin of victory was only eleven percent of the potential electorate to nine percent

232-33.

6 Headquarters of the Anti-Smith Democrats to Oscar Colquitt, August 1, 1928, Colquitt Papers.

7 Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 318.

8 See chapter two for a discussion of the lack of Hoovercrats in the 1928 election in Texas.
for Hoover (see Table 9).

Table 9. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 AND 1928 IN THE BLACK BELT (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 71).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP24</th>
<th>FDEM24</th>
<th>POTH24</th>
<th>PPFT24</th>
<th>PNPT24</th>
<th>PNYE24</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPFT28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown of Smith’s support in the black belt counties was almost identical to his support statewide. Just under one-third of the 1924 Democratic supporters repeated their vote for Smith in 1928 in the black belt counties, which was the same as the statewide results (see Table 2). Black belt Democratic voters in 1924 were more likely to pay the poll tax in 1928 and not vote than the statewide 1924 Democratic supporters. Around fifty-six percent of the 1924 John Davis supporters paid the poll tax in 1928 and subsequently did not vote, nearly a quarter more than the statewide supporters of the Democratic ticket. This suggests that black belt Democrats traditionally voted, but when faced with prospect of a wet Irish Catholic who was liberal on the race question, they chose to sit out the election. In the black belt the
pressures of two candidates who were not "safe" on the race question resulted in increased not-voting among whites despite having paid the poll tax in 1928 (see Tables 2 and 9).

On the other hand, Hoover ran much weaker in the black belt counties, and the make-up of his support was very different. Hoover was able to retain the small group of 1924 Calvin Coolidge supporters but mobilized most of his support from new voters and those persons who had not paid the poll tax in 1924. The statewide results, by way of comparison, show Hoover receiving miniscule support from 1924 non-poll tax payers. Hoover also received less support in the black belt than in the entire from people not yet eligible to vote in 1924 (see Table 9).

To further test Key's thesis that 1928 bolters came from non-black belt counties, the results for the the non-black belt counties were examined. Once again Key's arguments appear to be correct on the surface: in counties with a black population less than fifteen percent Hoover won thirteen percent of the potential vote as compared to Smith's eleven percent. But, the breakdown of Smith's support was almost identical in non-black belt counties as in black belt counties. This suggests that Key's arguments about Southern support for Smith are inaccurate. If Key's thesis was accurate, then Smith's support in the non-black belt counties should decrease; instead he polled the same percentage of the vote in both black belt and non-black belt counties. The 1924 Democratic voters also behaved about the same way in 1928 in the non-black belt counties as they did throughout the state. Although

---

9 Non-black belt counties in this thesis were those counties with a black population of less than fifteen percent.
in the black belt counties slightly more 1924 Davis supporters did not pay the poll tax in 1928 (see Table 10).

Table 10. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN 1924 AND 1928 IN NON-BLACK BELT COUNTIES (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 183).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PREP24</th>
<th>FDEM24</th>
<th>POTH24</th>
<th>PPPT24</th>
<th>PNPT24</th>
<th>PNYE24</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown of Hoover's vote in the non-black belt counties was similar to the statewide results. The major difference was that non-black belt counties had a stronger Republican base in 1924, a voter base that moved into Hoover's column in 1928. Hoover's support clearly came from the non-black belt counties Key's thesis thus works when explaining Hoover's base of support (see Table 10).

The results presented here demonstrate that Southern voting patterns were far more complex than differences between black belt and non-black belt counties. While Hoover's vote was directly related to the number of blacks in a county, Smith's vote totals were not as directly related. The more blacks in a county the lower the turnout for Hoover.
Democratic support was Smith’s inability to secure a strong cadre of repeat Democratic voters, regardless of region. In the black belt, most 1924 Democratic voters subsequently paid the poll tax in 1928 and did not vote. While in the non-black belt counties many 1924 Democrats did not even pay the poll tax in 1928.

The specter of "Negro domination" as outlined in the campaigns of the Democrats and the Anti-Smith Democrats clearly affected the outcome of the 1928 election. In the black belt, the race question and other issues alienated many 1924 Democrats and Hoover was unable to mobilize enough new voters to carry the counties. Yet, in the non-black belt counties Hoover mobilized enough new voters to offset his losses in the black belt.

In addition to the impact of the presence of blacks on voting patterns, there is the separate question of racial and ethnic voting patterns in Texas. Although Texas had a predominantly white population in 1930, there were pockets of foreign-born Americans, such as Germans and Italians, in addition to the Hispanic and black populations.

Contemporaries and historians have assumed that German-Americans in Texas cast their ballots for Smith in 1928 because of the prohibition issue. Most observers believe that the German population traditionally voted Republican and switched to the Democratic party in 1928. Some Republicans and Anti-Smith Democrats believed the Republicans lost anywhere between fifty and seventy-five percent of the German vote in 1928. The small Italian farming communities in Texas
also allegedly voted for Smith, although most leading Republicans of the period attributed their attraction to Smith to Catholicism.\(^{10}\)

The movement of voters into and out of the various political parties and the active electorate demonstrates that contemporary observers were only partially correct about the results of the foreign-born vote in Texas. The quantitative evidence suggests that in 1924 foreign-born voters in Texas split between voting for Robert La Follette, the Progressive candidate, Calvin Coolidge, the Republican, and not paying the poll tax (see Table 11).

In 1928 the foreign vote split between Smith and not paying the poll tax. Since there was very little crossover voting between the Republicans and the Democrats, most of the 1928 foreign-born votes for Smith came from the La Follette camp and the 1924 non-voters (see Table 12). An important factor to note is that the foreign-born vote does not take into account the counties in Texas known as the German counties. The so-called "hill country of Texas" was as much culturally German as it was Texan.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 416; Harve Haines, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; Leonard Withington, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; Fred L. Haskett, Publicity Manager of the Anti-Smith Democrats of Texas, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; R.B. Creager, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection (University of Texas Archives, Austin).

Table 11. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNAWHT</th>
<th>PBLACK</th>
<th>PHISP</th>
<th>PFOWHT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another ethnic voting block in Texas was the Hispanic community.

Table 12. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNAWHT</th>
<th>PBLACK</th>
<th>PHISP</th>
<th>PFOWHT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another ethnic voting block in Texas was the Hispanic community.
Mexican-Americans made up eleven percent of the population in 1930. One prominent political scientist in Texas claimed that the Mexican-Americans voted in large numbers for the Democratic party in election after election, arguing that South Texas bosses paid the poll tax for many constituents and then herded them to the polls on election day. \(^{12}\) This may have been true for local elections and even in state primaries, but the quantitative evidence suggests that most Mexican-Americans did not even pay the poll tax. In the 1924 presidential election an insignificant number of Mexican-Americans cast ballots in the contest. According to regression estimates nine percent of the Hispanics paid the poll tax and subsequently did not vote (see Table 11). However, in 1928 Smith mobilized part of the Mexican-American vote: nine percent voted for him. Another nine percent paid the poll tax, but sat out the contest. The remaining eighty-two percent did not pay the poll tax (see Table 12). Some Texans had a fear of bossism and encouraged the Anti-Smith Democrats to stop the alleged illegal voting in South Texas. R.B. Creager declared that most of the Mexican-Americans in the border counties "were voted" for Smith. \(^{13}\) The quantitative evidence demonstrates that relatively few Hispanics paid the poll tax, and few "were voted" for Smith in the 1928 election.


\(^{13}\) R.W. Merrill, First Baptist Church Kerrville, to Oscar Colquitt, Colquitt Papers; and R.B. Creager, Answers to Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection.
The largest single minority in Texas was the black population. Blacks represented fourteen percent of the adult population in 1930. As previously noted most blacks had been disfranchised since 1902 with the passage of the Terrell Election Law. Disfranchisement continued to be an effective tool in Texas as only fourteen percent of the blacks cast ballots in the 1924 election although the estimates suggest that another twenty-one percent paid the poll tax and did not vote. Of those blacks who voted in 1924, most supported the Democratic candidate, Davis (see Table 11). Leading Republicans maintained that the black vote in Texas was getting smaller and the majority of those who voted cast Democratic, not Republican, ballots. They argued that these votes were purchased by the Democrats.\textsuperscript{14} Some of their assumptions about the black vote are substantiated by the quantitative evidence. The black vote did shrink between 1924 and 1928, as only seven percent of the adult blacks cast ballots in 1928 (see Table 12). Fred Haskett of the Anti-Smith Democrats pointed to a group of black Republicans led by "Gooseneck Bill" McDonald who switched to the Democratic party in the 1928 contest.\textsuperscript{15}

The breakdown of racial and ethnic voting patterns demonstrates the effectiveness of disfranchisement in Texas. The two largest minority groups, the Hispanics and the blacks, represented about a fourth of the eligible voting population of Texas, but only about ten percent cast ballots between 1924 and 1928. The New Deal realignment which

\textsuperscript{14} R.B. Creager, Answers to Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection.

\textsuperscript{15} Fred Haskett, Answers to Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection).
included Northern blacks failed to include two large voting blocks in Texas.
CHAPTER V

A CLASH OF CULTURES? RURAL/URBAN VOTING PATTERNS FROM 1924 TO 1932

Some historians view the 1928 presidential election, nationwide, as a clash between rural and urban America. The election split the American electorate for these historians. On one side were Catholic, wet, foreign-born, urban dwelling Americans and on the other were Protestant, dry, white, rural Americans. Herbert Hoover's breaking of the "Solid South" and Alfred Smith's victories in the cities are cited as examples of this duality and proof of its existence. One historian writes that "a complex of political, social, and moral attitudes had established itself, compounded by nativism, fundamentalism, prohibitionism, and a conviction that the American character resided in the farm and the hinterland town."¹ If the 1928 outcome represented a clash of cultures and Hoover's victory was the last gasp of rural America, then an analysis of rural voting patterns should show a movement of rural Americans into the Republican column.

Political scientists V.O. Key and Samuel Lubell both demonstrate that Smith mobilized the industrial centers of the Northeast and Midwest in terms of national politics.² If rural America was repulsed by Smith

and drawn to Hoover, then there is no better case study than the South, for the South was the most homogeneous rural region in America in 1928. Even the cities of the South were considered to be merely extensions of the surrounding areas.³

In the 1924 election the rural population of Texas carried the day for the Democratic party. The rural farm vote for John Davis was twice that of the combined urban and rural non-farm vote in 1924. Rural Texans cast over two-thirds of Davis’s total vote in the 1924 contest (see Table 13).

Table 13. ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1924 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES (in percentage of the electorate) (N=254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRUF</th>
<th>PURF</th>
<th>PRURNF</th>
<th>PECESENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electorate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rural vote in Texas outstripped the urban vote nearly two to one in terms of turnout in 1924. Despite the size of the rural vote in Texas, less than one-third of eligible rural Texans cast ballots (see Table 13). While rural Texans were more likely to vote in 1924 than urban Texans, they were also more likely to pay the poll tax and then not vote. The rural population made up sixty percent of the non-voters who had paid the poll tax in 1924. Rural Texans, according to the quantitative evidence, were split into three groups, just over one-third did not pay the poll tax in 1924; just over one-third paid the poll tax and did not vote; and just under one-third voted (see Table 13).

The urban population of Texas had a very different voting behavior. Only sixteen percent of urban Texans voted in the 1924 election, and another fourteen percent were eligible to vote because they paid the poll tax (see Table 13). The Democrats doubled the Republican party's support among urban dwellers, while Robert La Follette, the Progressive candidate, received most of his support from urban areas (see Table 13).

The rural non-farm population's most distinguishing feature was its lack of electoral participation.4 Like the urban population, over seventy percent of potential rural non-farm voters did not even pay the poll tax in 1924 (see Table 13). Only forty percent of the twenty-eight percent who paid the poll tax voted in the 1924 contest and they split

---

their votes evenly between Calvin Coolidge and Davis.

On the eve of the 1928 election rural Texans appeared to be the most powerful electoral group in terms of their raw numerical strength. Rural Texans already had a tradition of voting and a vast number of potential voters from among those who had paid the poll tax but did not vote in 1924. If the battle between urban and rural Texas was decided in the 1928 election, rural Texans would have to carry the day for Hoover. The quantitative evidence demonstrates that this perception of the election results was not true. Hoover received only a fourth of his total vote from rural farm residents and another fourth from rural non-farm residents. The rural farm vote in Texas was actually higher for Smith: the New York governor outpolled Hoover among rural Texans thirteen percent to seven percent (see Table 14).

Table 14. **ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1928 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES** (in percentage of the electorate) \((N=254)\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRURF</th>
<th>PURE</th>
<th>PRURNF</th>
<th>PECELENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage electorate</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part of the reason for Hoover's disappointing showing among rural farm residents was the farm issue. In the 1920s the rural farm population was devastated by declining farm prices and the lack of a coherent platform by either party to deal with rural problems. This failure resulted in an increased number of Texas farmers sitting out the 1928 presidential election. The Republicans had promised relief for farmers in the 1924 election, and Hoover promised to bring relief in 1928. But farmers already had a healthy dislike for Hoover before he was even nominated. They blamed him for their troubles in the immediate post-World War I period because of his activities as the Food Administrator during the war. Farmers hoped to block his nomination by staging a massive protest at the convention site in Kansas City. Turnout for the protest was small, but farmers who attended carried signs emblazoned with "Anyone but Hoover!" Since the Republicans offered little substantial relief with the McNary-Haugen Bill, the Democrats hoped to seize the initiative and win the farm vote with their own relief plan. Smith failed to do this, because he would not commit himself to any particular farm relief bill he continually stressed the development of a bi-partisan commission which would investigate the farm problem. Smith hoped to attract the support of Midwestern farmers and stumped the farm belt. He failed to make any major speeches on the farm issue in the South, and this apparently cost him dearly in the long run. He attacked Hoover's plans for farm relief and

the Republican record on the farm issue, but failed to give farmers an alternative. Since farmers were faced with no real alternatives in the 1928 election, most of them chose to sit out the contest. Only twenty-one percent of the Texas rural farm population voted in 1928, compared to twenty-nine percent in 1924. Around thirty-two percent of the rural electorate paid the poll tax in 1928 and did not vote in the election (see Table 14). Traditional Democratic loyalties kept only about half of the 1924 rural farm vote behind Smith in 1928. The rural farm vote dropped by only seven percent between 1924 and 1928 statewide, but it dropped fifty percent between the same two elections for the Democratic party (see Table 14). Texas farmers were trapped by the complex web of electoral politics of the 1928 contest. The national Democratic party betrayed them by nominating Smith, who was everything they abhorred, yet the Republicans had failed to deliver farm relief in 1924 and had nominated Hoover. This left most farmers with little choice except to drop out of the electorate.

Contemporary observers were thus correct when they stated that the farm issue had very little weight in the 1928 election. State Republican leaders believed the farm issue did not cost them any votes, declaring that most farmers trusted and voted for Hoover. Apparently

6 Peel and Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, 66-68; Alfred E. Smith, The Campaign Addresses of Governor Alfred E. Smith, Democratic Candidate for President, 1928 (Washington, D.C., 1929), 27-42.

7 Leonard Withington, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; Harve Haines, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection; R.B. Creager, Answers to Republican Party Questionnaire, Norman Brown Collection, (University of Texas Archives, Austin).
Texas farmers did not trust Smith or Hoover. Smith's failure to campaign in the rural South cost him a possible victory in the Lone Star state, since most 1924 rural Democratic voters felt betrayed by the national party and sat out the election.

Since Hoover did not carry the farm vote in Texas, the key to his victory in Texas was the urban and rural non-farm vote. These two groups were pulled into the active electorate by the 1928 campaign. The strong urban element in Hoover's vote totals was the result of three possible reasons: the Republican prosperity of the twenties, the strength of the Klan in the cities, and the almost rural nature of Southern cities. The Klu Klux Klan was very strong in the urban South in the twenties and the nomination of a wet Irish Catholic probably brought many of them into the electorate. Cities, even Southern cities, benefited from the tremendous prosperity of the twenties. This, combined with the Democratic party's alienation of many Southerners, resulted in an increase in urban support for the Republicans.8

The already weakened rural farm electorate was crushed by the Depression. Only thirty-four percent of rural Texans paid the poll tax in 1932, compared to fifty-two percent in 1928, and sixty-three percent in 1924. The Depression decreased the number of rural farm residents who paid the poll tax and then did not vote. In 1932, only eight percent of the rural farm population paid the poll tax and did not cast a ballot in the presidential election (see Table 15). Many rural residents could not afford to pay the two dollar poll tax and then allow their political voice

---

8 Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug, 416.
to go unheard. The decrease in paying the poll tax and not voting and the increase in not paying the poll tax in 1932 is evidence of the changes brought by the Depression to Texas politics.

Table 15. **ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS IN THE 1932 ELECTION AND RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENCES** (in percentage of the electorate) (N = 254).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRURF</th>
<th>PURL</th>
<th>PRURNF</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREP24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPT24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPT24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the rural farm vote decreased in the state as a whole, it increased for the Democratic party. Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to return the party’s share of the farm vote to its 1924 levels. Just over a fourth of the rural residents cast ballots for Roosevelt in 1932. The farm vote represented forty-one percent of Roosevelt’s total vote in 1932, compared to over sixty-five percent of Davis’s vote in 1924, indicating the farm vote had lost some of its power between 1924 and 1932 (see Table 15).

Since the farm vote only returned to its pre-1928 levels, the inclusion of more urban and rural non-farm voters decreased the importance of the farm vote in Roosevelt’s coalition in Texas. The urban
vote represented about a third of Roosevelt's vote total, while the rural non-farm vote accounted for about a fourth of his support (see Table 15). These new Democratic voters were probably many of the same voters mobilized by Hoover in 1928.

Texas election patterns demonstrate that interpretations hinging upon rural/urban conflict in 1928 are too simplistic to explain the complex voting behavior of the New Deal realignment. While Texas farmers were repulsed by the values represented by Smith, they were not drawn to the Republican party because of the lack of a farm relief program. The "revolt of the cities" in Texas describes the Hoover vote, not the Smith vote. The patterns of alienation and mobilization demonstrated in earlier chapters continue when examining the rural/urban dimension of Texas presidential politics. Farmers alienated by Smith were replaced in the electorate by urban and rural non-farm residents, and many of these voters subsequently became important components of the New Deal coalition in Texas.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Historians claim the New Deal realignment and especially the 1928 election had little impact on Southern voting behavior. This thesis has attempted to challenge that assumption by using both traditional historical methods and quantitative political methods in analyzing Texas politics from 1924 to 1932. The nominations of Alfred Smith and Herbert Hoover fundamentally changed politics in the Lone Star state. The Democratic party underwent a two-stage realignment with the 1928 election as the first stage.

The first stage of the realignment was very complex with several elements. During the 1928 election, alienation and mobilization of the electorate were the key features. Many 1924 Democrats were alienated by the nomination of Smith because he was Catholic, "wet", and an immigrant's son from New York City. Baptists and rural farm Texans were the most likely to turn away from the party in 1928. Democrats who left the party in 1928 chose to sit out the election rather than vote for Hoover.

The 1928 election is an excellent example of the "cross-pressure-withdrawal" theory of voting behavior. Many rural farm residents and Baptists could not vote for Smith, but neither could they vote for Hoover. Hoover represented Reconstruction and "Negro domination" to many Texans, especially those of the black belt counties.
Hoover mobilized many first-time voters, previous non-voters, non-church members, and urban dwellers. Smith, despite the loss, also mobilized new voters. The largest single group of voters who voted for Smith was the Methodists. Many Methodists, despite the urgings of their ministers, cast their ballots for Smith. The second stage of the realignment was the 1932 election. The Depression ruined whatever chances there were for a viable Republican party in Texas. Roosevelt mobilized vast numbers of 1928 Hoover supporters, as well as most of the 1928 Smith voters. Roosevelt attracted first-time voters. He also pulled in urban and rural non-farm voters, continuing a process started by Hoover in 1928. Thus, the 1928 election and the New Deal realignment altered the political scene in Texas.

The impact of these new voting alignments was immediately felt in Texas state politics. In 1930 Tom Love, one of the leading Anti-Smith Democrats, lost in his bid for the governor's mansion. Most observers attribute his loss to Love's support of Hoover in 1928 and the subsequent Depression. In light of the quantitative evidence presented here, Love's defeat should be re-examined. Love hoped to garner the votes of the 1928 Hoover supporters, people who he believed were former Democratic voters. In reality, the 1928 Hoover supporters were persons with little experience in the Texas primary process. In short, the 1928 election transformed Texas politics and had an immediate impact on the Lone Star state's elections.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS

Brown, Norman D. Collection University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Burleson, Albert Sidney. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Colquitt, Oscar Branch. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Crane, Martin M. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Cranfill, J.B. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Jones, Jesse. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

Love, Thomas B. Biographical File. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

Moody, Dan. Biographical File. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

Sheppard, Morris. Papers. University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS


BOOKS


ARTICLES


"Texas Hoovercrats." Outlook and Independent 150 (November 28, 1928): 1243-44.


NEWSPAPERS and PERIODICALS

Austin American-Statesman, 1926-1936.
Houston Chronicle, 1926-1936.
Houston Post, 1926-1936.


SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS


ARTICLES


**DISSERTATIONS and THeses**


VITA

Donald Scott Barton was born on December 8, 1958 in Columbus, Ohio. He graduated in May 1983 from Marshall University with a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in History. His permanent address is 100 Jersey #12, College Station, TX 77840.