

MAX WEBER AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGION:
LIBERATION OR THE IRON CAGE

A Thesis

by

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
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ABSTRACT

Max Weber and the Future of Religion:

Liberation or the Iron Cage (August, 1980)

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This study examines the proposition that a "future" for religion can be located within Max Weber's sociology of religion. This proposition is contrary to the interpretation of Weber which has religion being displaced in the future by a combination of the processes of rationalization, bureaucratization and secularization.

It is the contention of this thesis that significant areas of Weber's work regarding the future of religion have been overlooked or misinterpreted. To support this contention, an analysis of Weber's concepts of bureaucratization, secularization and (especially) rationalization with regard to the future of religion. In addition to this, a careful examination is made of Weber's concept of charisma in its innovative and revolutionary forms.

In the latter part of this study evidence is produced that supports the contention that a viable future for religion is a possibility within Weber's analysis. First, that Weber's multidimensional conception of rationalization has been oversimplified, by inferring that it is only a "negative" process that would displace religion, when in fact

some of its facets are quite positive and even necessary for the future of religion. Second, that it is a mistake to impute to Weber's analysis a low-like determinism which would delineate what the future of religion had to be. Therefore, the scenario of the "Iron Cage" described at the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958) is only one of the possible directions for religion and not the only one. Third, that charisma as a revolutionary force opposing rationalization would continue as a viable force in the future, since the decline of charisma for Weber is not a general historical trend.

In sum, these and other conclusions drawn from a careful analysis of Weber's work provide too many viable alternatives for religion in the future for it ever to disappear completely. Therefore, the initial contention of this thesis is supported.

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Finally, "Now to Him who is able to do exceeding abundantly beyond all that we ask or think, according to the power that works within us, to Him be the glory in the church and in Christ Jesus to all generations forever and ever. Amen." (Ephesians 3:20).

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

An important area of research in the sociology of religion today concerns the future of religion itself (Fenn,1969) and there is a need for an integrated system of predicting the future of religion. This study proposes that a careful analysis and interpretation of Max Weber's sociology of religion can provide an adequate basis for answering this question.

The Present Status of the Question

Max Weber's contributions to sociology in general are extensive and influential (Zaret,1980; Hill,1973). In fact Michael Hill (1973:1) contends that the analysis of religion is the key to Weber's entire analysis of society. However, contemporary analysis of the possible future of religion has generally ignored or misinterpreted Weber's analysis. For example, according to Talcott Parsons (1963:xi), despite the soundness and scope of Weber's theoretical framework of the sociology of religion, its usefulness for analyzing religion today is highly limited. Parsons further gives three reasons why Weberian analysis is more or less "dated" and consequently superseded. Along similar lines, Rainer Baum (1977:311) and contemporary

This thesis follows the literary style of the American Sociological Review.

modernization theorists such as Inkeles and Smith (1974, Lerner (1958) and Portes (1976) have committed what he considers a "common" error in sociological theory by mistakenly carrying Weber's process of rationalization, particularly Zweckrational (instrumental rational) social action to a point whereby religion would be completely displaced by rationalization. Perhaps following Baum (1977), the reason that Weber's analysis has not been used is that if Weber's concept of rationalization is oversimplified and misinterpreted by carrying it to its furthest extreme, there would truly be no future for religion per se. However, it is the contention of this thesis, that Weber's analysis does allow for the possibility of a future for religion.

This study will not attempt an overall analysis of Weber's sociology of religion, but will rather focus on one facet of his theory: that of the possible "future" of religion within the context of Weber's theoretical framework.

First, there is a definite lack of material in Weber's scheme directly regarding the future of religion. His major works on religion: Economy and Society (1968), Ancient Judaism (1952), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958), and The Sociology of Religion (1963) make relatively little mention of the future of religion per se.

Second, the works in which Weber deals with the "end-states" of religion contain a number of ambiguities (Baum,1977). Due to the complexity of Weber's analysis, it is often difficult to discern a directional trend towards one of these end-states. One of Weber's

major contributions to sociology was his analysis of the processes of bureaucratization and rationalization in the course of Western history (Mitzman,1970; Parsons,1963). These dual processes are also crucial in his analysis of religion. In the famous passage from The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber makes the following statement regarding the possible outcome of rationalization.

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future or whether at the end of this tremendous development new prophets will arise, or there will be a great re-birth of old ideas and ideals, or if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of cultural development, it might be truly said: "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved" (1958:182).

A similar theme is brought out in Weber's essay "Science as a Vocation" (1946). "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and above all by the disenchantment of the world" (1946:155). Weber feared that modern society would inevitably lead to a minimization of personal values, standardization of life, conformity of tastes and the gradual disappearance of personal originality. He also lamented modern man's insensitivity to the prophetic "pneuma" (Baum,1970). Paradoxically for Weber, although increasing rationalization increased efficiency of social systems, it also caused a loss of ultimate meaning in the world and was "a dead end progress leading to the cage of bondage" (Gehäuse der Horigkeit, i.e. "The Iron Cage") (Mitzman,1970:188). These statements would seem to lead "logically" to one inevitable conclusion: that there truly is no future for

religion, for religion and religious values will be supplanted by rationalization. To phrase it differently, society will be trapped "in the Iron Cage without any keys."

Third, the sheer complexity of Weber's works on religion becomes problematic. For example, despite the centrality of the concept of rationalization to his analysis, this concept is not easily elucidated. According to Stephen Kalberg (1980:1146), "His scattered and fragmented discussions of this theme are more likely to mystify than to illuminate...and despite its centrality, he nowhere offers a succinct explanation of this theme."

There is also a fourth set of problems in dealing with Weber's analysis. These problems are in the guise of seeming contradictions and paradoxes. For example, Petersen (1979:136) maintains that there are contradictions and ambiguities in Weber's usage of the term "prophet" in Ancient Judaism (1952) and Economy and Society (1968). Since this prophetic role is pivotal, there would appear to be a problem here. An example of a seeming paradox significant for the future of religion is cited by Bendix (1960:283) regarding the "routinization of charisma." On one hand, pure charisma is necessarily routinized into more stable institutionalized forms, while on the other hand, charisma is a recurrent revolutionary force in history.

The above are not meant to imply that Weber's analysis is too complex or contradictory to be used. On the contrary, this study proposes that a careful analysis of Weber's work will reveal the answers to many of these paradoxes and seeming contradictions. Further, this study proposes that the relative complexity of Weber's analysis is

not necessarily a source of confusion, but rather contains a number of possible alternatives for the "end-state" of religion, at least one of which would allow religion a viable future. Therefore, it is a mistake to assume that Weber made no provisions for a future of religion. This study also demonstrates that it is not justified, based on Weber's analysis, to simply abandon any vision of future of religion within the restrictions of a "totally rationalized" society as some have done (Kahler, 1945; Eliade, 1961). The objective of this thesis is to examine the position that a possible future for religion can be located within the framework of Max Weber's sociology of religion, in contrast to the view that in a modern society religion becomes an epiphenomenon replaced by more rationalized social structures. An interpretation of certain portions of Weber's work would lead to the conclusion that there is no future for religion as such. It is our contention, however, that significant areas of Weber's works have been overlooked or improperly interpreted.

Procedure

The procedure involved will be that of a textual analysis of Weber's works to find out what Weber "had to say" regarding the future of religion. As an example of the importance of textual analysis, Baum (1977) maintains that a thorough analysis of Weber's works on the concept of rationalization will reveal that the over-emphasis on Zweck-rationalitat (instrumental rationality) as the most prevalent and insidious form of rationalization is mistaken. Further, he posits that if Weber is interpreted more carefully a different meaning will become known.

This study will necessarily be interpretative based on a logical analysis of Weber's primary sources in order to isolate his basic conceptions from these sources. We will be constructing logical possibilities from these basic assumptions. This type of textual analysis is facilitated by Weber's works being divided into logically distinct categories. The purpose of this interpretative analysis then is to isolate the important concepts Weber developed and then to try to construct logical possibilities. To aid in this endeavor, certain pertinent secondary sources will also be used to illuminate Weber's constructions.

The arguments of this thesis will be divided into two basic conceptual divisions. The second chapter will deal with the phenomenon of "The Iron Cage" as described by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958). This phenomenon is the term used by Weber to describe the possible outcome of a system dominated by a rationalized rigidly "instrumental" orientation manifested in the material acquisitiveness of worldly ascetics. Weber (1958:181) states, "In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak which can be thrown aside at any time,' but fate decreed that the cloak should become an 'iron cage'." Further, in his polemical essay "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany" in Economy and Society, Weber alludes to this condition by speaking of "the housing of that bondage of the future" (1968:1402-3).

The focus for this chapter will be the examination and analysis of those trends and processes which increase or abet the key process

of rationalization (Baum,1970; Parsons,1963; Kalberg,1980). (In other words, those processes which increase or contribute to the "Iron Cage"). This focus will involve an analysis of Weber's types of rationality: practical, theoretical, (and especially) formal and substantive, as well as of Weber's types of social action Zweckrationalitat (instrumental rationality) and Wertrationalitat (value rationality). This analysis of the process of rationalization will involve four steps. First, a brief exposition of Weber's various types of rationalization and social action. Second, a brief analysis of the historical development and consequences of rationalization. Third, an analysis of the consequences for the future of religion of those processes associated with the major trend of rationalization, i.e. bureaucratization and secularization. Involved in this latter objective will be a brief review of the role Weber's analysis plays in contemporary secularization theory. Finally, the characteristics of religion within the Iron Cage itself will be briefly discussed.

The third chapter will focus on the forces "opposing" or the trends counterposing the Iron Cage. The first of these forces is "charisma" in its various forms ("institutional - non-institutional," "prophetic - non-prophetic"). This force is widely regarded as the primary one counterposing the trend of rationalization in the world (Hill, 1973; Parsons,1949). Mitzman (1970:170) states that this "antinomy between rationalization and charisma is the key to Weber's analysis." Charisma will then be analyzed for its implications for the future of religion.

The next part of the chapter will be an exposition of the concept

of "prophecy" in Weber's analysis. To accomplish this, certain sources will be analyzed to determine the historical and sociological roles of prophecy, and its relationship to the phenomena of rationalization and consequently the future of religion. The sources used will be The Sociology of Religion (1963), Ancient Judaism (1952), and Economy and Society (1968). Arising from these sources are the different usages of the term prophet in Weber's writings, (the "historical" prophet and the two subtypes of the class prophet: the "exemplary" and "ethical" prophet). The focus of this section will be on the revolutionary and innovative nature of charisma. Finally, this chapter will deal with the shift of charismatic authority and power into the institutional realm, i.e. "the routinization of charisma."

The fourth and final chapter will draw from the material of the previous chapters to elaborate on those ideas that support the main hypothesis, that a "future" for religion can be postulated within Weber's sociology of religion. This chapter will be composed primarily of the logical extensions and interpretations of Weber's concepts to support this hypothesis.

CHAPTER II
THE PROCESSES OF THE "IRON CAGE"

This chapter will examine both the positive and more especially the negative consequences of the process of the rationalization of action and how these consequences relate to Weber's conceptions of the future of religion. Rationality in its broadest sense is defined by Weber as the increasing propensity to view reality in terms of calculable elements in order to maximize reliability and efficiency. This process was concomittant with the process of bureaucracy (which will be discussed later). Calculation allows for the weighing of immediate benefits and the assessment of relative advantage. According to Weber, "one of the most important aspects of the process of 'rationalization' of action, is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest" (1968:30). However, Weber states that this process by no means exhausts the concept of rationalization of action.

(It) can proceed in a variety of other directions; positively in that of a conscious rationalization of ultimate values; or negatively at the expense not only of custom, but of emotional values and, finally, in favor of a morally skeptical type of rationality, at the expense in any belief in absolute values (1968:30).

Talcott Parsons (1949:123) maintains that, in a sense, the empirical referent of the above statement constitutes the central theme of Weber's series of studies in the sociology of religion. Parsons says

that in so far as he finds it possible to attribute importance to "ideas" in the determination of action, the most important differences between systems of ideas are not so much those in the degree of rationalization as in the direction in which the process of rationalization has taken.

It has often been pointed out that the issues of rationalism and rationalization are particularly well-suited for an overall interpretation of Weber's position (Roth and Schluchter, 1979:13). In fact, these concepts have been considered the key to Weber's analysis (Bendix, 1960: 278). Since a key portion of this study is concerned with rationalization and its consequences for the future of religion, a brief exposition of Weber's types of rationality and social action is presented.

The Types of Rationality

In his analysis of rationality, Weber developed four basic types: practical, theoretical¹, substantive, and formal. In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism² (1958:77) Weber defines practical rationalism as "the type of attitude which sees and judges the world consciously in terms of the worldly interests of the individual ego..." This type of rationalism, instead of actively manipulating the set routines of everyday life in response to a system of absolute values, accepts realities as given and calculates the most expedient means of

¹For the extraction and articulation of these two types of rationality, I rely on Stephen Kalberg's article "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History." *American Sociological Review* 85:1980.

²Hereafter cited as The Protestant Ethic (1958).

dealing with the difficulties they present. Since the key to this type of rationality is pragmatic action effectuated by the choosing of the most adequate means to deal with the exigencies of everyday life, "This type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's capacity for means-end: (Zweck) rational action" (Kalberg,1980:1152).

The pragmatic and this-worldly orientation of practical rationality implies a subordination of individuals to given realities and a concomitant inclination to oppose all orientations based on transcendence of daily routine, i.e. a transcendence to the values of "the beyond" whether secular, utopian or religious. Since most of the characteristics of this type of rationality are similar to those of "formal rationality" - which will be dealt with below - it will not be discussed further.

Another type of rationality articulated by Kalberg (1980:1152) is "theoretical rationality," which is defined as "involving a conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts rather than through action." This is drawn from Weber's essay "The Social Psychology of the World Religions." Theoretical rationalization is undergirded by the "metaphysical need" and demand of thinkers ("the strata of intellectuals") "that the world order in its totality, could and should be a meaningful 'cosmos' " (Weber, 1946:281). In other words, this is the seeking after the ultimate meaning of the world itself. Weber believes this "quest" to be the "core of genuine religious rationalism..." (1946:281). This "coming to grips" with the problem of meaning in the world required a mode of interacting with the transcendent realm. These modes of interacting with the transcendent realm were then transmitted from the intellectual

strata to an entire society through a configuration of sociological factors. Weber (1968:423) cites the development of a professional priesthood as an example of the crystallization of a new stratum of religious practitioners to conduct worship services, with the development of worship services themselves serving as an example of religious rationalization. In turn, these modes of interacting with the epiphenomenal sphere through the constellation of facilitating sociocultural forces became dominant throughout a society.

In the advance of this religious rationalization process, world views were developed as a result of the theoretical rationalizations of conceptions of the supernatural realm (Kalberg,1980:1154). These world views attempted to offer complete explanations of man's plight and his repeated experiencing of injustice (the problem of theodicy). As a consequence, the systematization of these religious world views sought to manipulate the religious values into consistent patterns that would help insure a state of grace for believers. (One of the most famous of these doctrines is the Calvinist belief in "predestination," mentioned in The Protestant Ethic...). In certain sociocultural configurations, these doctrines could significantly influence practical ways of life.

Theoretical rationality, therefore even though it masters reality through thought, contains a potential indirectly to introduce patterns of action. Weber's types of rationalization and their concomitant types of social action that are most important for this analysis however, are "substantive" and "formal" rationality.

Substantive Rationality

In Economy and Society, Weber (1968:85) defines substantive

rationality as "the degree to which the provisioning of given groups of persons (no matter how delimited) is shaped by economically oriented social action under some criterion (past, present, or potential) of ultimate values (Wertende Postulate) regardless of the nature of these ends." Substantive rationality directly orders action into patterns. However, this ordering of action is done not on the purely means-end calculation of solutions to routine problems, but rather on the basis of this potential value postulate. According to Kalberg (1980:1155) this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's inherent capacity for value-rational action.

Wertrational (value rational) action is one of Weber's four types of social action.³ It is the more "individualistic" application of the larger socio-cultural force of substantive rationality. Value rational action is "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success" (1968:25). Weber differentiates value rational action from the affectual type ("determined by the actor's specific affects and feeling states") by its already conscious formation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course of these values. Weber gives examples of this type of orientation as the actions of persons who "regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be

³This study will be primarily concerned with instrumental rationality and value rationality, and will not dwell upon the other two types: affectual and traditional, as they are marginal to Weber's analysis.

required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some cause no matter in what it consists." For Weber, value rational always involves "commands" or "demands" which the author defines as being binding on him. Further, Weber states that only in such cases where human action is motivated by the fulfillment of such unconditional demands, will it be called value rational.

For Weber, substantive rationality is considered to be a "scale" or a unique "standard" against reality's flow of unending empirical events which can be selected, measured and judged (1946:294). Also, in The Protestant Ethic, Weber notes the seeming infinity of these possible value postulates. Therefore, his notion of substantive rationality is contingent upon a "radical perspectivism" in that substantive rationality and rationalization processes based on it always exist in reference to ultimate points of view or "directions" (1958:26). Since there are these different value postulates through radical perspectivism, the existence of a rationalization process depends upon an individual's conscious or unconscious preference for certain ultimate values and the systematization of the individual's action to conform to these values. Weber states also that the "irrational" is not fixed and intrinsically "irrational" but a thing becomes so when "examined from a specifically 'rational' standpoint" (1958:194).⁴ Kalberg (1980: 157) maintains that a proper recognition of Weber's value perspectivism

⁴Weber remarks, "This essay (The Protestant Ethic), if it can make any contribution at all, aims to expose the multifaceted nature of a concept - the 'rational' - that only appears to be a simple one" (1958:194).

particularly as manifested in "Religious Rejections of the World," would mitigate against the common tendency to reduce the multidimensionality of rationalization processes to a single dimension (e.g. bureaucratization).

The type of rationality that has played a uniquely important part in the unfolding of the rationalization processes of the West, by its "opposition" to substantive rationality, is formal rationality.

Formal Rationality

Weber (1968:85) defines formal rationality as "the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied." He further states that a system of economics will be known as "formally" rational according to the extent in which the provision for needs, which he characterizes as being essential for every rational economy, is capable of being expressed in numerical calculable terms, and is so expressed.

This formal rationalization is often concomittant with the rise of industrialization and bureaucracy. A great deal of Weber's political sociology delineates the gradual "evolution" of earlier forms of rule toward the establishment of professional bureaucracies. Mitzman (1970:185) states that this greater technical (formal) rationality of specially trained bureaucracies acts as "a principle of natural selection, which allows them ultimately to triumph over direct rule." This formal rationality legitimates a means-end rational calculation. This is Weber's second type of social action and is also known as "instrumentally rational" Zweckrational action. According to Weber (1968:24) this type of social action is "determined by expectations as to the

behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings: these expectations are used as conditions of means for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends" (1968:24). Weber further says that action can be classified as instrumentally rational when the end-means and secondary results are all taken into account and rationally weighed. This calculation involves the rational consideration of alternative means to the end, the relations to the end of the secondary consequences and also to the relative importance of different possible ends.

Since this form of rationality is characterized by calculation in terms of abstract rules, the decision-making process becomes "impersonal." This "universalistic" orientation regulating action to formal rules and laws is, by definition, opposed to the arbitrary decision-making with regard to the personal qualities of the individuals involved. Therefore, formal rationality is incompatible with charismatic authority and personality. Weber defines bureaucracy as being formally rational in that the type of action that predominates in such an organization is oriented to intellectually analyzable general rules and statutes. Also, the selection of the most adequate means for the continued adherence to these rules is part of "formal" calculation.

As mentioned previously, the types of rationality are related to the types of social action, i.e. formal rationality, is based on men's capacity for instrumentally rational action, and substantive rationality deriving from value rational action (Kalberg,1980:1160). Also, the sociocultural forces of substantive and formal rationality do not

remain as "amorphous regularities of action" but rather, within the configuration of facilitating sociological and historical factors, they become institutionalized as normative regularities of action within legitimate orders. The concept of "elective affinity" Wahlverwandtschaft may be illustrative of the relationship between certain legitimate orders and particular types of action. Elective affinity is defined by Hill (1973:107-8) as "the way in which certain ideas and certain social processes 'seek each other out in history'." For example, when a substantive rationality is declared by a religious leader into doctrines of ethical salvation and institutionalized into an organization, the devout "typically" feel obligated to uphold this "ethical substantive rationality" for reasons of value rationality. However, this is not necessarily the case in that many other configurations are possible, such as substantive rational patterns not being upheld for value rational reasons, but rather as means-end rational means.

In some cases, elective affinities "between legitimate orders that institutionalize a type of rationality and types of social action clearly exist only when these orders are examined in reference to an epoch's particular value constellation" (Kalberg,1980:1162). An example relevant to this study is that of the origin of modern capitalism, which will be described in more detail presently.

After having introduced Weber's various types of rationalization and social action, some of the consequences of rationalization will now be explored. The next section will primarily draw its examples from The Protestant Ethic, although others of Weber's works will also be pertinent.

Illustrations and Examples of Rationalization

To begin this section, a brief explanation of The Protestant Ethic will be undertaken in order to illustrate the development of formal rationalization in the West and its consequent implications for religion.

Weber was interested in "rational bourgeois capitalism" and the principal characteristic of this type of capitalism is "bureaucratic organization" in the service of pecuniary profit in a system of market relations (Parsons, 1949:508). According to Weber, "Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action" (1968:986). Since the rise of bureaucracy is inextricably bound to the development of capitalism and to the development of certain types of rationality, an analysis of bureaucratization is necessary for an explanation of The Protestant Ethic. One of Weber's major foci in The Protestant Ethic was on the factors that aided the development of the modern capitalist system. Accordingly, Weber's main thesis was that simply a "materialistic" view was inadequate for the explanation of the genesis of this capitalist system. For a complete explanation of this phenomenon, different forces must be invoked. According to Parsons (1949:510), "Weber came quite decisively to view that an indispensable (though by no means the only) element in the explanation of the system lay in a system of ultimate values and value attitudes, in turn anchored in and in part dependent upon a definite metaphysical system of ideas." The Geist ("spirit" or "mentality") of capitalism then is a set of mental attitudes directed towards economic attitudes as such.

The spirit of capitalism represents a break with the established traditions towards material acquisition. It is distinguished from the former more traditional attitudes that saw material acquisition as a necessary evil, justified because it was an indispensable means toward something else. Medieval Catholicism, for example, made qualified economic sanctions of the "things of this world" through reference to other-worldly religious interests. However, the "spirit of capitalism" looks on such economic activities not as a means or a necessary evil but rather as an "ethically enjoined end in itself. To earn money is an ethical obligation for its own sake" (Parsons,1949:514). The "spirit of capitalism" represents another break with tradition in that the pursuit of gain is enjoined without limit. Weber denies that this endlessly expanding bundle of concrete wants is the "normal" situation for mankind. The normal situation is rather that rationally acquisitive activities are oriented to a traditionally fixed standard of living (1958:59-60). This breakdown of traditionalism is characteristic primarily of the capitalist orientation and, as a result, acquisition has been freed from any definite prescribed limit and becomes an endless process. Therefore, this attitude towards acquisition has become "rationalized" by holding it to be an ethical duty for its own sake. This aspect of rationalization is noted by Weber in Economy and Society when he discusses his types of action orientation, "one of the most important aspects of the process of 'rationalization of action' is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest" (1968:30).

Another example of the capitalist break with traditionalism and of subsequent rationalization is capitalism's relationship to the actual processes of acquisitive activities (Parsons,1949:514). Instead of accepting the traditional ways of doing things as they were before, the capitalistic attitude reorganizes its procedures systematically in terms of the total task. In this case, only the ultimate end, the "maximization of money" is sacred, but the particular means are not, but one chosen according to the exigencies of the particular situation (Weber,1958:67-9).

The spirit of capitalism, although devoted to unlimited material acquisition and the emancipation from traditionalism both in goal and process, still did not provide emancipation from discipline and control. On the contrary, the capitalist ethic closely regulated economic acquisition and gave its approval to acquisitive activities only under stringent discipline and control. Here Weber (1958:58-9) counterposes the impulsive undisciplined greed of "adventurers" capitalism to the systematic, continuous, rational and honest work in the service of economic acquisition enjoined by the spirit of capitalism.

This rationalization of capitalism is directly tied to bureaucracy. Weber states, "Though by no means alone, the capitalistic system has undeniably played a major role in the development of bureaucracy" (1968:225). Indeed, from a technical viewpoint the most "rational" type of domination is found in the bureaucracy simply because it aims to do nothing more than calculate the most precise and efficient means for the resolution of problems by ordering them into universal and abstract calculations.

As previously mentioned, the development of bureaucracy is concomitant with the development of "formal" rationality and bureaucracy is then characterized by its efficiency in administration of economic goals. Its development is abetted by its "technical superiority" (Weber, 1968:987) over other forms of organization. Further, it maintains its "discipline" (one of the characteristics of the spirit of capitalism) by the dominance of a "spirit of formalistic impersonality 'sine ira et studio' without hatred or passion" (Weber, 1968:225). Bureaucratic organization itself requires a "disinterested" impersonal devotion to a specialized task and a readiness to fit into the rational requirements of a complicated scheme of coordinated specialized activities regardless of tradition. This involves a rigid submission to discipline within the task. Parsons (1949:515) states, "The spirit of capitalism is for Weber a special case of the Berufsggeist ('Professional Spirit') which is the special attitude required for the efficient functioning of bureaucracy."

Besides being interested in the "technical" implications of the spirit of capitalism, Weber was also interested in the factors involved in the genesis of this spirit. He contended that a "form of organization" alone was not enough to create the attitudes concerned, since it was possible for a definitely capitalistic form of organization to be administered in a thoroughly traditionalized spirit (1958:65). In short, he thought that "the spirit" itself formed a fundamental causal factor in the genesis of the concrete capitalistic order and was not merely a "reflection" of its "material" elements. He finds the religious ethic of what he calls ascetic Protestantism to be a set of

ideas which were widespread prior to the large-scale development of rational bourgeois capitalism. In The Protestant Ethic, he seeks to identify the congruence between Protestant asceticism and rational bourgeois capitalism.

Calvinism and the Spirit of Capitalism

In relation to material acquisitiveness, Catholic ethics, at least from the Middle Ages on, was by no means completely hostile to the things of this world. It possessed a dualism, but not one nearly so radical as that of early Christianity. To a degree, this early society was blessed with the sanction of the church. However, this relative sanction did not provide a powerful stimulant to the spirit of capitalism. One of the reasons was that acquisitive activities were barely approved at all and in the proportion they become capitalistic they were more and more held under suspicion (Weber, 1968:585). Another reason why capitalistic activities fell under suspicion was that medieval organic social thought conceived of society as a divinely ordained hierarchy of classes, each with its proper place and function for the whole. Since the traditional religious beliefs in the divine order defined what was "normal" in this system, a break from one's station and respective tasks was considered ethically dubious. Also, capitalistic activities with their "impersonal effectiveness" ran counter to the strongly personal type of social activities which received the main religious approval.

One of the important concepts illustrating a particular contest of the typical attitudes associated with a religious movement towards the participation of its adherents in worldly activities is that of

the "calling." According to the spirit of capitalism, the "calling" involves a particular kind of attitude toward a certain class of activities; those involving economic acquisition. According to Parsons (1949:520), the calling is "the principal point of articulation for Weber's purposes between the spirit of capitalism and the system of ideas in question." However, Parsons is quick to state that it would be a serious misinterpretation to suppose that Weber's argument for a causal relationship between the spirit of capitalism and the ethics of ascetic Protestantism rested solely on the calling. Parsons (1949:520) states that it is wrong to understand the calling merely as the "explicit statements made by adherents of this movement of the desirable attitude toward worldly activities." Weber makes the statement in "The Social Psychology of the World Religions" that "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct." One of the most significant of these "interests" is the one concerned with the religious status of an individual, what is known in Calvinistic terms as a "state of grace." Religious ideas are thus important because they direct these interests and also direct relevant action in pursuit of them. Weber, in this regard, is interested in the practical activities that large numbers of men take toward their everyday activities. Weber is concerned then with the "total" consequences of the religious system rather than merely with the logical consequences of the initial system of religious ideas or the expressed wishes of religious leaders for practical conduct based upon them (Parsons, 1949: 527).

Since Weber was interested in the practical implications of the

values in religious systems, his next focus in The Protestant Ethic was on the implications of the Calvinist system itself. One of the key tenets of the Calvinist system was the belief in the transcendence of God. "The deity of Calvinism is 'par excellence' a transcendental one; so much so that he intervenes very little in the world and then only in quite specific areas of activity" (Hill,1973:110). This conception of God as transcendent rather than immanent has some important implications. First, the traditional notion of the "unio mystica" or mystical attitude of union with or absorption in the divine spirit has been eliminated due to the complete hiatus between worldly and divine things. This separation is reinforced by the conception of submission to the revealed divine law for the glory of God. This submission to the divine will corresponds to the belief in "predestination" in relation to the things of this world as assigning to the "elect" the task of building and maintaining the kingdom of God on Earth. With God in this "radically transcendent" position as opposed to an "immanent" one, He relates only to man through the exercise of His will and man becomes above all an instrument (willingly or unwillingly) of the divine will (Weber, 1958:102). This would force man's relations to God in the active, ascetic direction as opposed to the former passive mystical one. "God cannot be approached at all; He can only be served" (Parsons,1949:548).

Asceticism in a general context means an eschewing of the things of this world and a withdrawal, as through monasticism. However, in the case of the Protestants, who themselves eschewed the "traditional" release of monasticism, a withdrawal from the world was not allowed. Consequently, the only recourse for the "worldly ascetic" was not only

to control himself but also the rest of the sinful world through subjection to a discipline to the glory of God.

Another consequence of the transcendence of God is that of man's relationship to nature. Since God is transcendent, and not immanent in nature, He no longer interferes with his decisions, nor alters them. His decisions stand for all eternity. Therefore, God is God and nature is nature, and the sanctification of natural things is idolatrous (Weber, 1958:105). This belief in a divine order has other consequences, the first of which is a faith in the order of nature, which is an important motive in the development of modern science (Parsons, 1949:52). The second consequence is that the Calvinists harbored a strong hostility to ritual as involving superstition and idolatry. Weber gives an interesting example of this rejection of ritual. "The genuine Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and buried his nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order that no superstition, no trust in the effects of magical and sacramental forces on salvation should crop in" (1958:105). Since ritual is a means of linking the divine and the worldly, it is of minimal import for Calvinism. Consequently the religious energies of its adherents are diverted from ritualistic expression to active control over the things of the world (Hill, 1973:111). Since ritual had been cut off, the action of helping form the kingdom on Earth must necessarily take direction of ethical control over the world in the service of an ideal, thus forming an orientation towards practical activity. According to Kalberg, (1980:1167):

Practical rational action patterns were consistently and for all believers awarded psychological premiums

by Calvinism...In placing enormous premiums on disciplined work and methodical ways of life, these doctrines comprehensively sublimated practical rational action, whether in the monastery or 'in the world' into practical ethical action.

In the Calvinistic question of "predestination" there was a divergence between what Weber called the "psychological" and "logical" consequences. Under the "logical" implications of predestination, election could not be recognized by external signs and further, the acts of the individual would have no influence on his "state of grace" since it had been eternally preordained. Therefore, the question was to know if he were saved or damned. Consequently there was a "psychological" break with this orientation since this doctrine was too much to bear. It came to be held then that good works, although they could not directly influence one's salvation, they could be held as signs of grace (Parsons,1949:525; Weber,1958:106).

Another consequence of the doctrine of predestination was the "rationalization of conduct." The Calvinists's conduct, to be acceptable to God, had to be in direct obedience to His will and not as a result of human motivation. Individual good works could be at best a sign of grace. Conduct could be judged only as a "total coherent system," i.e. as an expression of the "kind of man" one was, not as a mass of non-interconnected acts (Weber,1958:26,85-6). Therefore there was an increasing pressure to "consolidate" and rationally systematize one's conduct. The effect of this was that the Calvinist turned to the service of more "impersonal" ends, and into pursuits where he could labor soberly and rationally in a calling acceptable to God. One of the most suitable fields was that of independent business.

In Economy and Society (1968:583) Weber illustrates one of the economic effects engendered by the Calvinistic conception of a transcendent God. He says that one of the most notable effects of Calvinism was the destruction of the traditional forms of charity through the elimination of unsystematic almsgiving. Weber talks about the allowance of mendicancy and almsgiving by the ethical religions:

Calvinism put an end to all of this, and especially to any benevolent attitude toward the beggar. For Calvinism held that the inscrutable God possessed good reasons for having distributed the gifts of fortune unequally. It never ceased to stress the notion that a man proved himself exclusively in his vocational work. Consequently, begging was explicitly stigmatized as a violation of the injunction to love one's neighbor, in this case, the one from whom the beggar solicits (emphasis added).

Weber elaborates on the rationalization carried on by the worldly ascetic.

The person who lives as a worldly ascetic is a rationalist, not only in the sense that he rationally systematizes his own personal patterning of life, but also in his rejection of everything that is ethically irrational, be it aesthetics or personal emotionalism within the world and its order. The distinctive goal always remains the alert methodical control of one's own pattern of life and behavior (1968:544).

When such an ascetic acts within the world, "he must become afflicted with a sort of happy closure of the mind regarding any question about the meaning of the world, for he must not worry about such questions" (1968:548). Weber notes that inner-worldly asceticism found its consistent development on the Calvinist's God inexplicability and total remoteness from every human creation. Weber then posits the consequences of this asceticism. "Thus the worldly Ascetic is the model Berufsmensch (man of a vocation) who neither asks nor needs to ask about the meaning of his objective exercise of a vocation

within the total world - for which his God and not himself bears the responsibility - because for him the consciousness that he is fulfilling in his personal rational behavior, the ultimately unfathomable will of God is sufficient."

In summary, the rise of the Calvinist/inner-worldly ascetic ethic was an illustration of the sociocultural shift from substantive to formal rationality (Hill,1973:221; Kalberg,1980:1174; Mitzman,1970:123). This "shift" involved the gradual liberation of economic and scientific innovation from a substantively rational belief system in which the definition of normality in the social and natural order was articulated by and entrenched in the traditional religious institutions. This "liberation" happened as a result of the *relegation of God and other supernatural agents from their immanent position in the natural order, and their replacement - via Calvinism - by the notion of natural order as a mechanism.* As God was pushed to a position of "radical transcendence," the growth of non-religious specialized idioms for explaining natural and social events become possible: the medieval Catholic definition of what is "normal" that applied to the whole spectrum of social activity was restricted and "straightened up" by placing formal restrictions on the role of religion in political and legal affairs and also by removing some of the traditional blocks on activities in these different spheres. Consequently, since the end of all knowledge was no longer to conform to some immutable, divine cosmos, the search for knowledge acquired an autonomy that made possible the calculation of different courses of action, not on the basis of their contribution to, or conformation with, some natural and normative order, but rather on

the basis of their "relative efficiency."

As substantive rationality's power to order comprehensively all aspects of life in behalf of values waned, a resurgence of the "practical" rational way of life evolved (Weber, 1958:281). This way of life which was in turn subdued by "formal" rationality subdued to the degree that action took place within enterprises and bureaucracies, competed with formal rational patterns of action. Concomitantly, whenever value rational actions within bureaucracies were weakened as a consequence of the "general uprooting of substantive rationalities," purely means-ends Zweckrational rational action penetrated these organizations more easily. The next section will examine the consequences of this and other rationalization processes.

The Consequences of Rationalization

As mentioned previously, one of the primary effects of Calvinism (and particularly the doctrine of predestination) was to increase rational economic association and consolidate the "means of efficiency." Weber posits that one of the effects of this increasing rationalization was the contraposition of ethical religions and rationalized relationships. Weber says that:

it is above all the impersonal and economically rationalized (but for this very reason ethically irrational) character of purely commercial relationships that evokes the suspicion of ethical religions for every purely personal relationship of man to man of whatever sort, even including complete enslavement, may be subjected to ethical requirements and ethically regulated. This is true because the structures of these relationships depend upon the individual wills of the

participants, leaving room in such relationships for manifestations of the virtue of charity. But this is not the situation in realms of economically rationalized relationships, where personal control is exercised in inverse ratio to the degree of rational differentiation of the economic structure (1968:585).

This statement has several important implications. The "personal element" spoken of was reduced in two different ways. First, by what Weber called the "inner isolation of the individual" (1958:108), whereby the individual in ascetic Calvinism was placed totally on his own by the belief in predestination which stated that no other human could be of any aid to him. Indeed, other persons might be a hindrance to him for they might be one of the "damned." According to Parsons (1949:525), this "inner isolation" involved a "radical devaluation not to say mistrust of even the closest human ties. God always came first." The second way in which the personal element was reduced or eliminated was by the nature of the economic associations themselves. According to Weber, "rational economic association always brings about depersonalization and it is impossible to control a universe of Zweckrational (instrumentally rational) activities by charitable appeals to particular individuals" (1968:585). The Zweckrational (instrumentally rational) activities also predominate as a manifestation of formal rationality which, as it was suggested, was itself partly a consequence of the rise of rational capitalism.

Another consequence of Weber's previous statement on depersonalization is the removal of ethical directions. This is one of the most important consequences, in that Weber suggests that purely personal relationships may be subjected to ethical requirements and be ethically

regulated. The reason being that the respective wills of the individuals are involved. In a Calvinistic/asceticist dominated economic realm, there is little room for the interplay of personal will. Also, by definition, the rise of bureaucratic structure needed for the efficient management of capitalistic enterprise is based partially on impersonality or the "lack of respect for individual persons." The removal of the "interpersonal" element corresponds with a lessening of ethical regulation of activities. Further, as rationalization increases, personal control and the interpersonal element decrease, placing rationalization and ethics in an inversely proportional relationship.

As previously mentioned, part of the ascetic ethic was a belief in a divine order. Corresponding to this was a faith in the order of nature. Since there was a natural order, careful analysis could discern its order. Parsons (1949:523) states that this belief in a discernable natural order was "undoubtedly a highly important motive in the development of modern science." However, for Weber, this rise of science was not without its problems. For him the rise of science as a *mode of knowing and experiencing* foreboded fateful consequences, in that it threatened to pull even values out of the arena of "belief" and place them in the realm of calculation. Consequently, with the rise of the scientific world view even "values" could become subject to empirical observation, mathematical measurement and testing. In "Science as a Vocation" (1946:139) Weber says,

Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by

calculation. This means that the world is "disenchanted."⁵ One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master the spirits....Technical means and calculations perform the service.

This development stood in opposition to all religious world views which as "ethical postulates" asserted the meaningfulness of worldly life and actions as a result of their valuation for particular salvation paths (Kalberg,1980:1174). This development is also related to the problem of "ultimate meaning" in the world.

The relationship of the problem of "meaning" to the development of modern culture in Weber's thought is similar to the notion of estrangement to capitalism in Marx. Only in (capitalistically) undeveloped cultures is meaning inherent in the life cycle (for Weber) and in the productive forces (for Marx) (Mitzman,1970:221). For Weber, this problem of meaning begins its development in the problem of "theodicy": the justification of God's existence in the face of massive and frequently unmerited human suffering. Yet the very posing of the question of theodicy seems to presuppose the separation of man from God which was the hallmark of asceticism. Since, by Calvinistic definition, God was unknowable and unapproachable, the problem of suffering could not be explained. In Weber's view, the "historical" quest for a cosmic, theological answer to the question of suffering is the beginning of philosophical and rational thought. According to Weber, (1946:153) theology itself represents an intellectual rationalization of the possession of sacred values. The end of this process is

⁵More will be said of the consequences of this "disenchantment of the world" in the section on secularization.

not only in the emancipation of rational thought from all religious beliefs, but also in the abandonment of any notion of an inherent meaning in worldly affairs. Weber states, "Wherever rational empirical knowledge has consistently carried out the 'disenchantment of the world' and its transformation into a causal mechanism, there appears the ultimate challenge to the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a divinely ordered cosmos with some kind of ethically meaningful direction" (1946:123).

Thus in the course of mastering the world through empirical thought and of creating a cosmos of art and philosophy, human culture lost all sense of its own ultimate meaning. Parallel to the direction of human thought toward emancipation from all concepts not susceptible to empirical proof ran the direction of human culture towards a life style (rational bourgeois capitalism) in which man values only the process of acquiring goods, but not the experience of life as such. It is somewhat paradoxical, that the advancement of rationalization, while being somewhat "liberating", i.e. from traditionalism, also helped engender the loss of the ultimate meaning of the world. Also, the rationalization processes ("theoretical" rationalization according to Kalberg's definition) that had molded the values of religions into internally unified configurations of values that comprehensively explained the perpetuation of this-worldly suffering (the problem of theodicy) became emancipated from their subjugation to values. When these processes became focuses with the domain of science, they came to exist as "empty" abstract processes. In "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," Weber states one of the consequences of this divergence of theoretical rationalization and values, through the process of

intellectualization.

The general result of the modern form of thoroughly rationalizing the conception of the world and the way of life, theoretically and practically in a purposive manner, has been that religion has been shifted into the realm of the irrational. This has become more the case the further the purposive type of rationalization has progressed, if one takes the standpoint of an intellectual articulation of an image of the world (1958:281).

In "Religious Rejections of the World" (1946:352), Weber posits that religion and the intellectual sphere are necessarily divergent because of the "unavoidable disparity among ultimate forms of images of the world." Further, he states that there is no "unbroken religion" working as a ritual force which is not at some point forced to demand "the sacrifice of the intellect."

Secularization

Given Weber's "individualistic" orientation, one of the keys to understanding the social location of the individual is in the study of religion. In Weber's analysis, the social conditions of individualization appear in the perspective of the historical religions and their relation to historical societies. This view is supported by Thomas Luckmann (1976), who also believes that Weber recognized that the problem of individual existence in society is a "religious" problem. Therefore, since the problem of individual existence is a religious one, changes affecting religion would affect the individual. Luckmann states, "When it came to the question of the individual in the modern society, both Weber and Durkheim linked it directly to the secularization of the modern world" (1976:12).

For Weber, the secular position of modern man is seen as the end

result of a long process, which has been going on for millenia, but which had been accelerated through the rise of ascetic Calvinism and the subsequent development of rational systems of economic action. "Calvinism was the culmination of the process which had been initiated by the Hebrew prophets and propelled by Hellenistic scientific thought, Entzauberung der Welt, the "disenchantment of the world" (Hill,1973: 117). Fenn (1969:161) states that in this process of disenchantment "mythology has yielded to ontology to empiricism." The process of disenchantment has generated a new race of "disenchanted gods, values, and orders" and also impersonal forces to define for secular man the terms of his freedom.

The effect of this disenchantment is "radical" in that through the advance of "progress" the roots of meaning in life are attacked. This advance of progress produces a "leveling" effect in that modern man exists in a "secular eternity devoid of meaning" (Fenn,1969:163). In "Science as a Vocation" (1946:150), Weber explains that modern man

catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive and therefore for him, death is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very progressiveness it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness.

The process of secularization is more than just disenchantment. The single universe of discourse has fractured into a "multiplicity of universes" each with its own rules, methods and objects of concern. Secularization has meant the withdrawal of areas of thought and life from religious control, and finally also from metaphysical control. Each of these "multiple universes" explores the objects of its concerns

in terms of immanent laws of development and interprets these events in the light of their interconnections with one another, not in relation to some external source of meaning. Weber, in the statement previously mentioned from "Science as a Vocation" (1946:139) said that all things could be mastered by rational calculation without recourse to magical means in order to master the spirits. (And this has implications for the loss of ultimate meaning in the world).

One of the consequences of the removal of the ultimate meaning of the world is the segregation of religion to its discrete institutional sphere. Religion, then, becomes one of these separate universes. With this restriction to a discrete (as opposed to the traditional cosmology) sphere, there has occurred a concomitant challenge to the credibility of religion. Also elements of the religious have acted as independent forces which altered the structure of plausibility (the impact of Calvinism on the growth of capitalism is just such an episode). The interaction on religion and society produces paradoxical results: thus while religious elements may be seen as important formative influences of the modern secularized world, this world largely precludes the impact of religion as an independent influence. Peter Berger (1967:127) puts it well, "we would contend that here lies the great historical irony between religion and secularization, an irony that can be put graphically by saying that, historically speaking, 'Christianity has been its own gravedigger'."

Weber says that disenchantment, rationalization and intellectualization is "the fate of our times" (1946:155). Also, that the most sublime and ultimate values have retreated from a public to a private

realm and that the prophetic "pneuma" (spirit) has dwindled to a whisper. Shiner (1967:216) says the proponents of this desacralization thesis do not agree as to how far this process can go, but if it is carried to its "logical" conclusion, religion, insofar as it is bound to an acknowledgment of the "sacred" or "holy," will ultimately disappear.

Bureaucratization

The rise of capitalism was both aided by and somewhat "causative" of the development of bureaucracy. As rationalization increased along with the Calvinist organization of business and other external affairs according to the criterion of maximum efficiency, so did bureaucratization. Weber listed the positive and negative directions that rationalization could take in Economy and Society (1968:30). It appears bureaucratization has been the vehicle leading the process of rationalization in a "negative" direction. A bureaucracy is a "completely rationalized organization" which "maximizes efficiency." Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a rational way of life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing contexts. Quite generally, one can only say that the bureaucratization of all domination very strongly furthers the direction of rational matter-of-factness and the personality type of the "professional expert" (1968:998). It is a "living machine" (1968:1402) which is by definition impersonal. In this "machine" impersonal expertise dominates subjective and "traditionally" sanctioned patterns of deference (1968:965). The bureaucratic order replaces the belief in the sanctity of traditional norms by compliance with rationally determined rules and by the knowledge that these rules can be superseded by others if one has the necessary power.

Bureaucracy itself is characterized by specialization and careerism. In the West, these aspects are clearly related to the Calvinist valuation of man as a Berufsmensch (man of a vocation) and also to the Calvinist orientation of extreme individualism, or what Weber calls the "inner isolation of the individual" (1958:108). As the society becomes larger, the need for a more rational and more complex bureaucracy "comes to the fore." Weber states that of all of the other historically rationalized forms and agencies of the modern order, bureaucracy is the most "persistent" and "escape proof" (1968:948). It thus is "escape proof" because of the rational training and specialization that help to perpetuate it. As a society becomes increasingly bureaucratized, its social life becomes increasingly Zweckrational (goal-rational) as persons approach the bureaucracy as the entity which can help to manage their affairs for them in a restricted usage, a sense of self-interest. This growth of formal rationality is reinforced as the bureaucracy becomes an entity unto itself and persons become employed by the bureaucracy itself. Although, again by definition, bureaucracy has a "leveling effect" and is "no respecter of persons," the problem is that as bureaucracy becomes an entity unto itself, it begins to overshadow the individual and begins to dominate his interests.

Weber, just as he saw the struggle between theology and science active in the process of the disenchantment of the world, saw the advance of history as a struggle between the need for economic efficiency and the relevant value systems for social life. The battle lines of this struggle are drawn between charismatic authority and legal/bureaucratic authority. However, the battle is definitely tilted in the

favor of one the "combatants."

In his polemic essay "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany," Weber (1968:1121) talks of the consequences for political life in bureaucratization. He states, "it is this sober fact of universal bureaucratization that is behind what the literati euphemistically call "the socialism of the future, behind slogans of 'organized society,' 'cooperative economy' and all similar contemporary phrases. Even if they aim at opposite, they always promote the rise of bureaucracy" (1968:1400). In this same context he says that bureaucracy determines the character of the present age and the foreseeable future. He states, "the future belongs to bureaucratization" (1968:1401).

An even more insidious reference on the nature of bureaucratization comes when Weber writes of the combination of the "inanimate machine" (which is mind objectified) and the "animate machine" (the bureaucracy). The inanimate machine has the power to force men into its service and to dominate their everyday working life as is actually the case in the factory. Objectified intelligence is the bureaucratic organization, with "its specialization of trained skills, its division of jurisdiction, its rules and hierarchical relations of authority. Together with the inanimate machine, it is busy fabricating 'the shell of bondage' which perhaps men will be forced to occupy someday as powerless as the Fellah's of ancient Egypt" (1968:1402) (emphasis added).

The Ultimate Consequences of Rationalization

The following analysis does not intend to imply that all of the characteristics of formal rationality, secularization or bureaucratization are negative. With regard to the future of religion however, this

section will be primarily focused on the negative effects. If the three main components, rationalization, bureaucratization and secularization are "logically" extended to their fullest, they will lead to a set of undesirable, from Weber's viewpoint, end-states. They will constitute what Weber called in The Protestant Ethic "The Iron Cage."

Weber is not alone in his decidedly gloomy view of the future. It is the logic of rationalization, which Mitzman (1970:187) defines as "Weber's undialectical, and ultimately political counterpart of Marx's theory of capital accumulation" which permits comparison not only with Marx but with Nietzsche as well. Mitzman states that Weber's fascination with the political, religious, and ethical antitheses of ascetic rationalization flowed from an aristocratic presentiment shared by both of his predecessors that such rationalization was "the prelude to a human catastrophe." All three men saw it as leading to an unparalleled reification of values and institutions and a corresponding destruction of essential aspects of human personality: grace, dignity, personal creativity, spontaneity and ultimate meaningfulness (Mitzman, 1970:187; Stammer, 1971:191). Although the three agreed upon the effects of rationalization, they differed in how the transcendence of these reified structures related to the ongoing process of history. Marx saw a historical dialectic at work in the accumulation of capital which would prepare the material basis for a non-exploitative realm of freedom and insure the internal disintegration of capitalism. Marx's outlook was than a more positive one with the "classless state" being the ultimate goal. Weber in his "post-breakdown Weltanschauung" shared with Marx the perception of an ever-increasing rationality and efficiency. However,

for some of the reasons mentioned, his view was not "utopian" per se, since at the end of The Protestant Ethic (1958:182) he saw one of the possible (and this is crucially important for this thesis) outcomes of this rationalization process as der Gehause der Horigkeit (the "cage of bondage" i.e. the "Iron Cage").

Michael Hill (1973:34) brings out another example of Weber's pessimism in the face of scientific rationalization when he compares him to James Frazer. Frazer's vision of the future is to be sure uncertain, for he writes "will the great movement which for centuries has been slowly altering the complexion of thought be continued in the near future? Or will a reaction set in which may arrest progress and even undo much that has been done?" (1933:714). Frazer's viewpoint was then that science was an avenue of progress, which could be actively helped along. In the famous statement in The Protestant Ethic, Weber writes:

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or if neither, mechanized petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance (1958:182).

Hill (1973:34) stated that Frazer "proclaimed the 'disenchantment of the world,' while Weber may have regarded it with a type of agonized fatalism."

From The Protestant Ethic, and the Munich lectures of 1919, "Politics as a Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation," the threat of "inescapable" decline darkens Weber's horizons. With the exception of a brief period after the outbreak of World War I, Weber no longer viewed the German people (or the proletariat) as capable of being inspired by the "breath of powerful national passion" that permeated the Jacobin

convocation. Mitzman (1970:168) writes that in Weber's analysis, "The 'Leitmotiv' of Western history has changed from progress through self-liberation to enslavement through rationalization." Stammer (1971:205) notes that Weber was appalled at the prospect of a society "dominated in perpetuum by the latter day inheritors of the Puritan ethic." He further notes that this revulsion shows up despite Weber's attempts to remain "value-free" in his partisanship in the social typology for "the man of culture" kultur Mensch. Also, Mommsen (1965:29) notes the favoritism in this typology.

Despite the fact that the belief in a "spirit" of capitalism has died out in our time, capitalism's "economic rationalism" has not been weakened. Capitalism presently exists as an all encompassing "cosmos." Weber (1958:182) states that this capitalism effectively coerces all individuals, even those not directly concerned with economic acquisition to conform to its demands (this is partly due to the bureaucratic domination Weber spoke of when he alluded to "that bondage of the future" (1968:1402). According to Weber, "The Puritan wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to do so" (emphasis added). Fate has decreed that the "cloak" of the care for external goods should become an "Iron Cage." Paradoxically, asceticism which gave rational bourgeois capitalism its impetus is no longer needed by capitalism because capitalism has become an entity unto itself. As capitalism becomes "greater than the sum of its parts" it breaks away from some of the important values of the asceticist doctrine, "the idea of duty to one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (1958:182). It is this divorce from ultimate values that may be the most telling

consequence of all. "For of the last stage of this cultural development it might well be truly said, 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart: this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.'"

In summary, the processes rationalization, secularization and bureaucratization could be spoken of metaphorically as the "bars of the Iron Cage." However, it is the contention of this thesis that it is wrong to automatically assume that religion will be inexorably "pushed" into this cage, according to Weber's analysis. Given the complexity and multidimensionality of these concepts (in particular rationalization), it is an oversimplification to assume that this is the only possible outcome. The final chapter of this thesis will attempt to elucidate some of the parts of Weber's sociology of religion which allow a "flexibility" regarding the future of religion rather than a strict, inexorable "determinism." In other words, attempt to show that the "Iron Cage" is only a possibility not a necessity, and that there is the possibility for a future of religion within Weber's analysis.

One of the forces opposing the "negative" forces of rationalization is "charisma." For even within Weber's nightmarish cosmos of "sterile bureaucrats and parceled-out souls" (Mitzman,1970:189) the emotional life force of "charisma" has the potential to achieve a "break-through" of the existing rationalized order (Baum,1970:163).

This antinomy between charisma and rationalization is of key importance in Weber's analysis (Parsons,1963:xxxiii; Mitzman,1970:320; Hill,1973:140; Roth and Schluchter,1979:128-131). Therefore, the next chapter will focus on charisma as a force opposing rationalization.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF CHARISMA

This chapter specifically will be concerned with charisma and charismatic leadership and with the position and function of the prophet in its various usages, and how both of these relate to the future of religion. To accomplish this, an analytical division will be made between Weber's general use of charisma and charismatic leadership per se and the more specific manifestations in the various types, such as the types of "prophet."

The Types of Legitimate Domination

In his analysis of legitimate domination, Weber (1968:212) indicates that the concept of legitimacy is the normative nexus in which social relationships in any society having differentiated authority roles are conducted. In order to indicate the general grounds on which such legitimacy might be claimed and accepted, Weber constructed his famous three ideal-types of legitimate authority. These can be seen as the ways in which the claim to and acceptance of legitimacy on the part of the holder of authority on the one hand, and his subordinates on the other, might be phrased (Hill, 1973:144).

Weber states that the validity of claims to legitimacy may rest

on one or a combination of more than one of three 'pure types' of authority:

1. Rational grounds - resting in a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).

2. Traditional grounds - resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,

3. Charismatic grounds - resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns of order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority) (1968:215).

Weber then draws a distinction between legal authority where obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order, and is extended to persons occupying offices of authority under it only as long as they issue commands compatible with the legal limits of their competence and traditional authority. Obedience then, is owed to the person of the chief who occupies a traditionally sanctioned position of authority and behaves in accordance with traditional prescriptions. In charismatic authority, the charismatic leader as such is obeyed as a result of personal trust in him and the only restriction on the leader is the extent to which his revelation, heroism or exemplary

qualities "fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma" (1968:328). In Weber's account there follow two points of clarification. The first is that the concept of "charisma" - "the gift of grace" - (this will be defined and explained more fully shortly) has been taken from the vocabulary of early Christianity and has been used by Rudolph Sohm in his Kirchenrecht in a way that clarified its usage as far as early Christian organization was concerned.

The source from which Weber derived his concept of charisma was primarily concerned with the way in which Christian organization was attached to this quality of spiritual endowment rather than to any other principle of administration. Sohm states that the "organization of Christianity is not legal but charismatic. Christianity is organized by the distribution of gifts of grace (charismata)..." The implication of the concept in its original usage is likely to distinguish the organizational base of the Christian church from that of surrounding social institutions. This has the effect of setting limits on the institutional contexts in which charisma may be located. There has been much debate about the extent to which the concept can be lifted out of its restricted religious setting and generalized to include other types of specific "callings," especially within the political sphere (Hill, 1973:148). Weber clearly intended it to be a generalized concept, since his typology of legitimate authority is one of his most generalized uses of ideal-typical models.

Weber's second point of clarification is to emphasize that the concept of "pure" charisma stands at one end of a continuum considered with its transformation: "Later on the transformation of pure charisma

by the process routinization will be discussed and thereby the relevance of the concept to the understanding of empirical systems of authority considerably increased" (1968:216). Further, Weber states that "in its pure form, charismatic authority may be said to exist only in natu nascendi (in the process of originating) (1968:246). Clearly then, Weber intended that charismatic authority should be seen as part of a historical process rather than as an isolated and remote type of authority.

Following the line of Weber's analysis, we will in due course turn to the routinization of charisma and its consequences, but first the definition and characteristics of "pure" charisma will be examined.

The Characteristics of Charisma

In Economy and Society (1968:241), Weber states:

The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a "leader."

Later in this same section, Weber again states the belief of the followers, that the leader possesses divine inspiration which is highly important. "What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' or 'disciples'" (1968:242).

The link between the charismatic hero and his followers is direct; it is not mediated by established institutions, organizations, doctrines or rituals. The charismatic hero occupies no office within established religions or military organizations (1968:1112-3). If this hero

occupies an office, the attribution of charisma is not based upon his office:

The charismatic hero does not deduce his authority from codes and statutes, as is the case with the jurisdiction of office; nor does he deduce his authority from traditional custom or feudal vows of faith as is the case of patrimonial power. The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds (1946:248-9).

The charismatic leader's claim to leadership is not on the basis of office, but rather upon the belief in the direct and unmediated possession of the gift of grace. An example of this is Weber's illustration of the role of the prophet in Ancient Judaism, whereby the prophet attained clarity and assurance through a direct personal call from Yahweh (1952:290) since the recognition of charismatic gifts and their continued flow from the leader is crucial. Failure in such activities is evidence to his followers that he no longer possesses charisma. Weber states, "If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears deserted by his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear." (1968:242).

In all of these cases, the evocation of charisma and charismatic leadership always leads away from the world of everyday life (Bensman and Givant, 1975:575). It is Ausseralltaglich (something out of the ordinary) and, as we shall see consequently somewhat precarious. Since it is "extraordinary," charismatic authority is opposed to both rational and traditional authority in several ways. First, in contrast to traditional authority which is bound to the precedents handed down from

the past and to this extent is also oriented to rules. Within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past and is in this sense a truly "revolutionary" force. Second, in contrast to bureaucratic authority which is "specifically rational in the sense of being bound to intellectually analyzable rules" (1968:244), charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules.

Another contrast between bureaucracy and charisma is that "pure charisma is specifically foreign to economic considerations" (1968:244). In another instance, Weber puts it even more succinctly, "Bureaucracy depends on continuous income, at least a potiori on a money economy and tax money, but charisma lives in and not 'off' this world" (1968:1113). This places charisma directly opposite of the rationalized material acquisitiveness supported by ascetic Calvinism that Weber noted in The Protestant Ethic.

One of the most important characteristics of charisma is what Weber calls its "revolutionary nature" (1968:1115). Weber notes that the mere fact of recognizing the personal mission of a charismatic master establishes his power, and this recognition derives from "the surrender of the faithful to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is alien to all regulation and tradition and is therefore viewed as divine..." (1968:1115). As a result of this mode of legitimation, genuine charismatic domination knows no abstract laws and regulations and no formal adjudication. Its law flows from the highly personal experience of divine grace and rejects all external order solely for the sake of glorifying genuine prophetic and heroic ethos. "Hence in a

revolutionary and sovereign manner, charismatic domination transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms: "It has been written..., but I say unto you..."(Weber,1968:1115). Thus in Weber's analysis pure charisma can be a means by which traditional and rationally organized power structures and their bases of legitimacy are replaced by new and discontinuous forms of order, which are subsequently justified with new bases of legitimacy (Bensman and Givant,1975:575). It is this rejuvenating and revolutionary quality of charisma that provides the necessary antithesis to the "petrifying" effects of rationalization and its concomitant bureaucratization.

This emphasis on the revolutionary nature of charisma is not to infer that bureaucratization is not also a "revolutionary" force, at least with regard to tradition. On the contrary, Weber states that it has been a major reorganizational force. In Western society, however, there is a great difference in the way these "revolutions" occur. Bureaucratization revolutionizes from technical means, "from without," by first changing the material and social orders and through them the people by changing the conditions of adaptation through a rational determination of the means and ends. On the other hand, "Charismatic belief revolutionizes men 'from within' and shapes material and social conditions according to its revolutionary will." Instead of replacing the belief in the sanctity of traditional norms by compliance with rationally determined rules as the bureaucratic order does, charisma "disrupts rational rule as well as tradition altogether and overturns all notions of sanctity" (1968:1117) (emphasis added).

As an adjunct to this revolutionary character of charisma is a

process in Weber's analysis which has been described as "charismatic breakthrough" (Parsons,1963; Hill,1973). This process is based upon the idea of charisma as a driving force of social change (Parsons,1963: xxix). Mommsen (1965:30) states that according to Weber's analysis, "religious convictions, in the final instance the religious charisma of individual saints and prophets, are the principal driving force of social change - though not of every social movement." In Weber's analysis, in order to break away from existing conditions and establish new lines of historical development, the power of objectively existing material interests was not enough. What was required were the repercussions of spiritual forces from the transcendental area of a normally religious charisma. Weber apparently did not wish his conception to be understood directly in an idealistic sense, but rather in his famous statement states:

Interests (material and ideal) and not ideas, have frequently as pointsmen indicated the lines along which the dynamic power of interest propels action. The "view of life" will determine from what and for what one wants to be or - be it said - can be "saved." Whether from political or social bondage to some Messianic future kingdom on this side of the grave or from some absolute evil and bondage to sin into a perpetual free state of bliss in the bosom of some divine Father; or from the chains of the finite and the threat of Hell manifested in pain, disease and death into everlasting bliss in some earthly or paradisaal future existence (1946:280).

These religious systems organized the world into an intrinsically meaningful cosmos, and as a result these religious attitudes were transformed in everyday life to a methodical way of life. From this spiritual attitude religious groups develop an extraordinary capacity and a creative power that bring about social changes. Therefore, great religious movements, particularly in their initial and not yet

institutionalized forms are among the really dynamic and revolutionary forces of history.

This process of change and charismatic breakthrough will be discussed more thoroughly in the following section on the role and characteristics on prophecy.

The Nature and Characteristics of Prophecy

In Economy and Society (1968:439), Weber states, "We shall understand 'prophet' to mean a purely individual bearer of charisma, who by virtue of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment." As mentioned previously, charisma by definition is an individual attribute or phenomenon. This is especially the case with the prophet. He invokes his claim to leadership not on the basis of office but rather on the belief in the direct and unmediated possession of the gift of grace: "For our purposes here, the personal call is the decisive element distinguishing the prophet from the priest. The latter lays claim to authority by virtue of his service in a sacred tradition while the prophet's claim is based on personal revelation and charisma (1968:440). Weber goes on to say that it is no accident that almost no prophets have emerged from the priestly class (this has consequences which shall be explored further shortly).

The prophet is also separated from the magician in that the prophet exerts his power by virtue of his personal gifts and the core of his mission is doctrine or commandment, rather than magic. Weber supported this position by his usage of the term prophet in Ancient Judaism:

The prophet, unlike ordinary pathologically ecstatic men, had no vision, dreamed no dreams, and heard no mysterious voices. Rather, he attained clarity and

assurance through a corporeal divine voice of what Yahweh meant by these day dreams, or the vision, or the ecstatic excitement and what Yahweh had commanded him to say in communicable words.... Always the prophets calling came directly from Yahweh, and the classical prophets among them told us of their visionary or auditory "call" (1952: 290-1).

The activity of the prophet is non-professional hence economically gratuitous. According To Weber,

What distinguishes the prophet in the sense that we are employing the term, from the types just described is an economic factor, i.e. that his prophecy is unremunerated. Thus Amos indignantly rejected the term "nabi" (prophets who practiced divination as well as magical healing and counseling). This criterion of gratuitous service also distinguishes the prophet from priest (1968:441).

So then, the Amt (office) is what distinguishes the priest from the prophet above all. As shall be seen this is one of the elements that juxtaposes prophecy and the more "traditional" religious institutions.

According to Reinhard Bendix (1960:299), Ancient Judaism is "a study in the sociology of innovation." A brief examination of Ancient Judaism then will provide examples of the previously mentioned "charismatic breakthrough" and of the independence of religious ideas and serves to illustrate Weber's usages of the term "prophet."

According to Weber, the prophetic books of the old Testament were based upon an earlier form of prophecy called "nabiism" which was an ecstatic religious practice common to other religious traditions as well as to ancient Israel. Nabiism first emerges as war prophecy where the Israelite prophets appear as bands of military dervishes who proclaim the holy wars of Yahweh against the Canannites. At this time their social location was in the loosely organized, semi-nomadic armies of the Israelite tribal confederacy. With the establishment and consolidation

of the monarchy, especially under Solomon, and the accompanying demilitarization of the peasantry and growth of a permanent military organization under the king, this type of prophecy became obsolete. However, in the ninth century B.C. and subsequently a new type of prophecy emerged, characterized not by ecstasy as a source of inspiration, but by the development of a group of political and military ideologists who formed "a stratum of genteel intellectuals" (1952:279). Furthermore, their message was no longer one of good fortune, but rather one of doom and judgement. These "emissary prophets" were seen as standing in opposition to the official institutional (traditional) structure of the monarchy and priesthood. These prophet's interests were not in acting as spokesmen for protest movements, but in gratuitous oracles based on ethical constructions.

Weber was quite explicit that it was not so much the message they brought that resulted in their independent social location as the reverse: "The complete inner independence of the prophets was not so much a result as a most important cause of their practice" (1952:278) (emphasis added). Because they were socially detached, their message was gratuitous. Weber states, "One does not pay for evil omens, nor expose oneself to them" (1952:279). Therefore, Weber was quite categorical in fixing the social location of prophecy outside the institutional setting.

The canonical prophets stood out because of the novelty of their message. This is precisely the aspect of "new obligations" which Weber saw as typical of charismatic movements (Hill, 1973:168). The message of the prophets drove them outside the pale of the traditional

religious institutions. Peter Berger refers to this process as the "radicalization" of the message and this radicalization involved "the staggering idea that Yahweh might abandon Israel as such" (1963:948).

One of the dominant themes in Weber's work was that ideas, especially religious ideas must be seen to some extent to have a historical efficacy of their own and cannot simply be understood as a "reflection" or even a "function" of some underlying social processes. (This has been tagged Weber's "Anti-Marxian" theme). This idea comes from Weber's previously mentioned statement that "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest" (1946:280). A "charismatic breakthrough" then, represents the sudden eruption of new forces often linked to quite new ideas. Talcott Parsons states that "the prophet is above all the agent of breakthrough to a higher...social order" (1963:xxxiii). This breakthrough is a break against the traditional social order to a new "higher" social order. Therefore, instead of being a "reflection" of already existing social processes, the charismatic forces powerfully "act back" upon the pre-existing processes, and indeed initiate new processes of their own.

In Ancient Judaism, Weber emphatically rejected the idea that the canonical prophets "reflected" some particular interest i.e. that of the countryside against the city or of the lower classes against their rulers. The message and the motives of the prophets for proclaiming it were religious. This is reinforced by Weber's "conceptualization of the bearer of charisma," in this case the prophet, being by definition

somewhat individualistic. The prophet is perceived as the solitary individual representing no one except Yahweh. Therefore, the prophet in this instance is pitted against the established and traditional social order.

By the radical shift in their message in the ninth century B.C., the prophets in a sense engendered a crisis and initiated a radical "definition of the situation" of their own. This further illustrates the relative "independence" of the ideas from the societal interests and also illustrates the notion of the innovating characteristics of charisma.

Given Weber's emphasis on the role of ideas in society, however, he does appear to conceive of such religious innovations as originating in some realm of pure spirit completely independent of the social structure. This would infer an extreme idealism in Weber's work that is not there (Berger, 1963:950). In Weber's analysis, rather the nature and conditions of a society or group governing the assumption of charisma establishes much of the subsequent characteristics of charisma. Weber's understanding of the relation of ideas to history can be seen most clearly in his concept of "elective affinity" Wahlverwandtschaft. This is the way in which certain ideas and certain social processes "seek each other out in history." Thus while Weber posits the autonomy of ideas vis-a-vis any specific social structure, he also posits that these ideas occur in a social context and for these ideas to be historically efficacious they must find a social group to serve as their "carrier." For a prophet then to succeed i.e. to truly "breakthrough," he must have social backing. Berger states:

If therefore, one searches for the social location of a charismatic phenomenon in the context of Weber's sociology of religion, one is not implying that the charismatic phenomenon can be understood as a direct ideological consequence of that location. Rather one is trying to clarify the social context that favored, in the sense of "elective affinity" the emergence of the innovating forces (1963:950).

Following the idea of "elective affinity" it appears that Weber argues that prophets are to some extent an expression of their political and religious environments (Petersen,1979:133). This is illustrated by Weber's two "subtypes" of the class prophet, the "ethical" prophet and the "exemplary" prophet.

Ethical and Exemplary Prophecy

In Economy and Society Weber has two final types of prophecy each represented by a specific historical figure, and representing a particular religious ethic. The first type is the "ethical" prophet, who by Weber's definition is represented historically by Zoroaster and Muhammad. The prophet in this case is an instrument for the proclamation of a god and his will, be this a concrete command or an abstract norm. Since this type of prophet has received a commission from god directly, his preaching demands obedience as an ethical duty.

One of the most important characteristics of this type of prophet was that of his relationship to god (which was, as mentioned, a reflection of his religious environment). To the ethical prophet, Weber states that god was "personal, transcendental, and ethical": personal because he had to receive his call and charisma from a personal source, transcendental because only a transcendental god required a messenger to the human domain, and ethical because the focus of the message was

precisely that, ethical. God in this situation is presumed to be totally "other" and separated from man, "He can not be approached, he can only be worshipped." Also, salvation in this case was offered through obedience to God's command. This is primarily the pattern of the Hebrew prophets and consequently similar to the "transcendent" relationship characteristic of Calvinism as mentioned in Chapter II.

The second pattern is that of the exemplary type prophet, who was represented historically by the Buddha. This type of prophet is an exemplary type of man who, by personal example demonstrates to others the way to religious salvation. The preaching of this type of prophet says little about a divine mission or an ethical duty of obedience. It, however, directs itself to the self interest of those who crave salvation recommending to them the same "path" that he himself followed. God for this type of prophet was immanent, somewhat impersonal, and not necessarily linked to an ethical system. Also, this conception of God implied a divinity immanent in history, i.e. a "divine order."

In addition to being linked to particular geographic and theological milieu, the types of prophets were also linked to certain social strata and certain types of rationalities. Weber traces a line of continuity between the ethical rationality of plebian strata (which is a form of material rationality) and formal rationality. This line of continuity is absent between formal rationality and the aristocratic code of "being." There is also no line of continuity between formal rationality and mystical religiosity. Weber suggests a close correlation between mysticism and aristocracy. An example is when he identifies mystical illumination as the characteristic religious tendency of

privileged classes (1968:505). Another example is that "being" is not only emblematic of the aristocratic ethos, but typifies the mystical experience as well (1968:552-3).

Perhaps the most important for the concerns here is the correlation of both the mystic and aristocratic ethics with exemplary prophecy and of the ascetic and plebian with ethical prophecy (Mitzman,1970:243). The ethical prophet, rooted in the ascetic/plebian code of transcending a reality "filled with pain," preaches a rational monality of subser-vience to the will of an all powerful transcendent deity in whose service men are mere "instruments" for the realization of his commands. The exemplary prophet, like the mystic and the aristocrat does not preach, but simply offers his own standard of "being," which is this kind of prophet's condition of contemplative "possession of the Divine" as a model for those who would follow him.

According to Weber, (1968:450), regardless of whether a religious prophet is predominantly of the ethical or predominantly of the exemplary type,

Prophetic revelation involves, for both the prophet himself and for his followers - and this is the element common to both varieties - a unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated meaningful attitude toward life. To the prophet, both the life of the man and the world, both social and cosmic events have a certain systematic and coherent meaning to which men's conduct must be oriented if it is to bring salvation and after which it must be patterned in an integrally meaningful manner.

This conception of the world as a cosmos and meaningfully ordered totality is in opposition to the world view mentioned in Chapter II, whereby increasing rationalization coupled with ascetic Calvinism brought about a loss of ultimate meaning and subsequent disenchantment

of the world. These latter processes contributed to the formation of the Iron Cage, so then pure charisma as manifested in prophecy opposes the formation of this cage.

As seen previously, routinization and rationalization paved the way for the rise of bureaucratic man. Charismatic leadership is capable of checking these trends, at least up to a point. This is not to say, however, that Weber advocated charismatic breakthroughs and revolutions as the only way out of the troubles which beset modern bureaucratic societies. He maintained that under modern conditions charismatic leadership can only achieve something of lasting importance if the new impulses it generates are implemented through rational types of social organization, rather than through mere ephemeral retinues. The last section of this chapter then will examine briefly the process whereby charisma becomes transformed (not lost or "evaporated"): the routinization of charisma.

The Routinization of Charisma

As mentioned before, charismatic authority originates as something "out of the everyday" Ausseralltaglich and is therefore by definition unstable, since it is not possible to live "out of the everyday" for any length of time. As a result, there is a transformation of the charismatically initiated process to a more everyday existence Veralltaglichung des Charisma: this is "routinization."

Pure charisma (as exemplified by the prophet) is personal, direct, radical and revolutionary. However, for a charismatic movement to be successful, charisma must become somewhat "changed," in that its leadership becomes routinized and de-radicalized. Indeed if the ideas of a

charismatic leader are to exert any historical influence they must form the basis for a charismatic group - which typically contains the leader and his disciples - and on this basis must develop into a charismatic movement. Weber states:

If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon but to take on the character of a permanent relationship, a community of disciples or followers, or a party organization or any sort of political or hierocratic organization, it is necessary for the character of charismatic authority to become radically changed (1968:246).

Further, Weber states that the movement "cannot remain stable but either becomes traditionalized or rationalized or both" (1968:246). Which course is taken does not depend primarily upon the subjective intentions of the followers or of the leader; it is rather dependent upon the institutional framework of the movement and especially upon the economic order. "The routinization in quite essential respects is quite identical with adjustment to the conditions of the economy, that is, to the continuously effective routines of daily life. In this, the economy leads and is not led" (1968:1121). As the group becomes larger the original ideas will undergo a process of transformation as the needs and desires of the followers "select out" of an elect into the charismatic message those features that manifestly coincide with those needs. Thus the ideas "achieve their historical importance at the expense of their initial purity" (Hill,1973:170). Charisma may actually survive the leader within the group by becoming in at least partially bestowed upon whomever occupies the office (Weber,1968:248-9). In so becoming, charisma is transferable. In becoming attached to an office in an established political, religious or military order, it becomes "less

radical" (Bensman and Givant,1975:576). In such circumstances the magic or grace of charisma can become the basis for the legitimacy of the order itself. Thus Weber develops "subtypes" of legitimized, routinized and depersonalized charisma. The first is the charisma of office Amt-scharisma (defined above). The second is "lineage charisma" Gentilcharisma whereby a whole clan or kin group may claim unusual power and privilege on the basis of descent from a charismatic hero (1968:1136). The third is "hereditary charisma" in which a prince or king may justify his rule by descent from a charismatic hero, i.e. charisma via bloodlines (Weber,1968:248).

The observation that charisma can be transmitted to wide range of institutional roles, many of which will also contain traditional components (by the election of successors) does create some problems. It might appear that all institutions contain charismatic elements. Peter Worsley (1968:xix-1) contends that this diffuseness is justification for dropping the term "charisma" altogether. However, Talcott Parsons (1963:xxxiv) regards the pervasiveness of individual charisma as implying something very close to Durkheim's notion of the "collective sacred."

This raises a paradoxical situation in that on one hand we have Weber's statement "In its pure form, charismatic authority may be said to exist only in natu nascendi (in the process of originating) (1968: 246), which implies that routinization is not connected to charisma since it would necessarily represent its disappearance or transformation into some other form of authority relationship. On the other hand, we can view charisma as being so dispersed and pervasive that its

innovatory potential becomes nebulous and ineffacious. Also this view blurs charisma's being a type of legitimate authority and a source of "new obligations." Weber states however in several different contexts that charisma has been a recurrent phenomenon because persons believed to have been endowed with this "gift of grace" by their followers have asserted their leadership under all historical conditions. Therefore, charismatic leadership gives way to routinization but it also represents an ever recurrent phenomenon.

The "solutions" to this seeming paradox and its consequences for the future of religion will be among the areas analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
LOGICAL EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will present conclusions and the "logical extensions" drawn from the previous chapters, and will be focused upon the premise that within Weber's analysis a future for religion is indeed a possibility. This will be done via the medium of examining more carefully some of Weber's concepts mentioned in the previous chapters. The first of these concepts to be examined is the crucial one of the Entzauberung der Welt (disenchantment of the world).

The Disenchantment of the World

Entzauberung, literally "demagification," has a very specific significance for Weber: it is one of the two major axes followed by rationalization processes in the area of religion (1951:226). It relates particularly to religious rationalization processes in the West, and characterized especially the transformation from medieval Catholicism to Calvinism. In the second chapter, the origin and genesis of this process is traced through the rise of the protestant ethic as well as through rationalization and the concomittant rise of science. Perhaps Weber's clearest statement regarding "disenchantment" is in "Science as a Vocation": "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization, intellectualization and above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'" (1946:155). The "problem" with the concept is that it would

appear that this "disenchantment" is an artifact of recent times, i.e. that it has only occurred within the last two centuries in the West. However, historically this has not been the case. Calvinism was the culmination of the historical process initiated by the Hebrew prophets and propelled by Hellenistic scientific thought (Weber, 1946:139-42). The Hebrew religion, with its notion of God as a transcendent (as opposed to immanent), unapproachable, completely "other" being, began this process. The view of the world shifted from that where God was immanent and could be reached by one having the proper magical means to reach Him, to one where magic, per se, as a means of ordering and controlling the world was eschewed. Historically, as seen in Chapter Three, the priesthood as a step of rationalization and consequently demagification began to divorce itself from its former magical means. Another even more important part of this demagification was that the division between God and the world created a religious "dualism." (As shall be seen presently, this dualism had far-reaching consequences). The point is that religions since the time of the Hebrews have been dualistic and ergo, the world since this time has been disenchanted. Therefore, it is not an artifact of present times, as shall be seen disenchantment/demagification sui generis is not a process that necessarily leads to the abolition of religion at all. It is contended rather that this demagification and consequent dualism has been a "natural" historical development.

To further explore the implications of the "disenchantment of the world" we utilize Weber's essay "Science as a Vocation" (1946) as well as his methodological essays "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in

Sociology and Economics" (1949) and "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1949).⁶ The focus of this section will be to explore the crucial relationship between science and the "disenchantment of the world."

In "Science," Weber makes clear that one of the forces contributing to the progress of "disenchantment of the world" is science (1946: 139). Weber states that this process of disenchantment means:

that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service (1946:139) (emphasis added).

With the rise of pluralism then, came the belief that all worldly things could be mastered by calculation. Concomittant to the rise of this pluralism, which broke the monopoly of salvation religion, is the rise of science reinforcing this belief in "things" being mastered by science. This rise in "calculability" is also connected to the rise of Zweckrational (instrumental rational) social action. Therefore, the question of pluralism, as well as the one about the role of science, affects the question of the modern world's meaning. (Roth and Schluchter, 1979:71).

It would seem then that science can displace religion. This contention raises several questions. If science has indeed displaced religion, must it also take over its specific function, i.e. that of

⁶Hereafter referred to as "Science," "Ethical Neutrality," and "Objectivity" respectively.

providing a unified system of meaning for the world? It logically follows that even in a society where the "religious monopoly" has been broken, i.e. a disenchanted world, there is still a problem of meaning. It would also follow that the former dominant powers of religion would then be assigned to the rising realm of science. However, when Weber's concept of science is more carefully examined, it becomes apparent that it is not so, and could not be so.

For Weber, a central problem was whether Wissenschaft (science) finds its purpose in furthering technical progress (or rationalization). However, in order to examine the value of science for the "whole of mankind" (Weber,1946:140), on the basis of this question, we must have not only a notion of this entity but also an idea about its meaning. For only when technical progress serves this meaning can the support of "technical progress" constitute the task of science, and in turn only then can we say that "the result of scientific work is important in the sense of being worth knowing" (Weber,1946:143).

There are two conceivable ways to ascertain the meaning of human life and make it a constituent component of science: 1) either science recognizes it with its own means or, 2) it is provided by another agency in a manner that will not endanger the nature of scientific knowledge (Roth and Schluchter,1979:77). In "Science" (1946:143), Weber declares that the first solution is not feasible. He lists the "formal illusions" that were once joined to the attempt to elevate science into an instrument giving meaning to human life. Science has been unable to show us the way to true being, true art, true nature, true God, or true happiness. Weber then quotes Tolstoi as saying, "Science is meaningless

because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important to us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'"(1946:143). Basically, science has been successful only as an empirical enterprise, and this only by abandoning the attempt to give meaning to life. According to Roth and Schluchter, "Thus science has increased its practical value at the expense of its value as a guide to life Gesinnungswert. That is its dilemma. Weber believes that science cannot resolve it with its own means" (1979:78).

If science then cannot provide meaning, the question arises, who can? The most apparent and historically founded answer is that salvation religion has been one of the prime agencies offering meaning. However, as mentioned previously, it appears that religion would inevitably come into conflict with and be "cancelled out" by the rationality standards of modern science. However, on examination of Weber's views on the limitations and qualifications on the role of science, this is found not to be the case.

In various places in his methodological essays, Weber emphasizes the relationship of metaphysical presuppositions/assumptions to science. In "Objectivity" (1949:110), Weber states that "The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge..." (emphasis in original). In Weber's analysis, all action, religious action included, depends on presuppositions and assumptions, which must be believed in order to establish its meaning. In "Science" (1946:144-5), Weber lists the various presuppositions of the natural sciences,

medicine, and the cultural sciences. According to Roth and Schluchter (1979:81), "these sciences accomplish rationalizations that are 'valuable' only if these presuppositions are accepted." Schluchter also states that religion (and the discipline that rationalizes it, theology) proceeds from presuppositions of its own. Also, he maintains that it cannot be derived from Weber's analysis that one presupposition is inferior to another, "Given Weber's theoretical assumptions, whoever designates religious action seems to indulge in personal prejudices" (1979:81).

It is highly important to note that although science proceeds from these metaphysical assumptions, the ultimate decisions about meaning are made with the help of science, but not by science itself. According to Roth and Schluchter (1979:83), "The meaning of science lies in making possible and at the same time restricting our leeway for decision-making." Science can serve as a facilitator for decision-making in that it shifts the decision into the subjective sphere through the principle of value-freedom.

For Weber, knowledge is not limited to science. Consequently, there are certain portions of knowledge that are, so to speak, "beyond" the boundaries of science. Although science proceeds from metaphysical assumptions/presuppositions, it cannot approve or disapprove of these metaphysical assumptions. In other words, and this is crucial, it cannot speak to ultimate values. Weber makes this position clear in "Ethical Neutrality" (1949:17) when he states that the "inherent dignity" of a value is not "demonstrable or refutable with means afforded by any science." Also, in "Objectivity" (1949:111) Weber states:

In the empirical social sciences...the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which is in the last analysis, one oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such (emphasis in original).

Since it is not within the realm of science to call into question the validity of ultimate values, and religion as mentioned is one of the agencies giving the world ultimate values and meanings, salvation religion and science are not mutually exclusive. To put it another way, if through science we can not call into question a Weltanschauung i.e. a world view of ultimate value, why then would a religious orientation come into conflict with science? Both of these entities have separate domains. Science is not (and Weber maintains cannot be) a religion, but rather a specialized activity. Again logically these views are not mutually exclusive, and Weber in a letter to Ferdinand Tonnies, reinforces the idea that science will not displace religion although they may clash when religion "oversteps its bounds."

It goes without saying that religions must clash with scientific truth insofar as they assert empirical facts or the causal impact on them of something supernatural. However, when I studied modern Catholic literature in Rome a few years ago, I became convinced how hopeless it is to think that there are any scientific results this church cannot digest. The steady slow impact of the practical consequences of our view of nature and history may perhaps make these ecclesiastical powers wither away...but no anticlericalism based on 'metaphysical' naturalism can accomplish this (Roth and Schlucter, 1979:82) (emphasis added).

Weber is saying that this passing away of ecclesiastical powers is only

a possibility and certainly not a necessity.⁷

Ultimate values are not necessarily incompatible with empirical reality. "The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values, in which the meaning of our existence is rooted is not incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints, from which empirical reality gets its significance. Both these views are, one the contrary, in harmony with each other" (Weber, 1949:11) (emphasis added). Later in this same essay, Weber posits that all research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization that has been oriented toward a particular subject matter through particular problems and the establishment of its methodological principals will begin to consider the analysis of data as an end in itself. It will consequently "discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general" (1949:112). However, Weber states that periodically "the atmosphere changes...the significance of the unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight." Weber is saying that as cultural problems arise, the orientation that is not linked to the ultimate value-ideas of the culture is inadequate to handle these cultural problems. Consequently only when science re-orientes its analytical apparatus to view events from the "heights of thought" can it find

⁷In this same letter, Weber states that although he personally is "religiously unmusical" and has no personal need for religious edifices, he is by no means anti-religious or irreligious.

meaning and solve these culture-based problems. This implies a "reflexivity" between ultimate values and science, in that although science cannot address the validity of these ultimate values, it must, so to speak, "be cognizant" of them. This shows the "dualism" of science, in that it is conscious of these metaphysical values as well as the empirical aspect of scientific analysis. This indicates that it is a mistake to view Weber's interpretation of science as including only the "empirical" aspect.

One of the implications of this section is that although the "disenchantment of the world" is already a historical fact for Weber, this disenchantment does not necessarily mean the complete triumph of a "naturalism" because science can not establish this. Also, this disenchantment does not mean the end of religion, because salvation religions require the disenchantment of the world. Furthermore, if science cannot "speak" to ultimate values, and itself offers no substitute meanings, it logically cannot "displace" religion. This is significant in and of itself and also because it takes away some of the deterministic or "evolutionary" nature that Weber's theory seems to have at first perusal. Therefore, it is an incorrect oversimplification because it mistakenly identifies it with a metaphysical doctrine (naturalism). Also, it is a mistake to impute a rigidity to Weber's theories, that a more careful analysis of his work implies that he did not intend.

The Routinization of Charisma

In Chapter Three, we established the importance of Weber's concept of charisma as a revolutionary, innovative and revitalizing force. In

an increasingly rationalized world, charisma could serve as the counter-vailing force that would give direction to and provide "life" for religion as well as in the political sphere. At the end of that chapter, we dealt with charisma's institutionalization into more "stable" roles and its subsequent routinization. Reinhard Bendix (1960:253) concludes that for Weber, charisma and its routinization were omnipresent possibilities in all phases of history and had to be examined anew in each case. This suggests a more "historically flexible" concept of charisma and its routinization rather than one that is a fixed universal. Charles Bosk (1979) maintains through a historical study of the Zaddik sect within Orthodox Judaism, that examining charisma and its routinization within this specific context allows for more "flexibility" than is normally assumed for these concepts.

In the routinization of charisma, there is a paradoxical relationship. In Economy and Society (1968:246) Weber states that "charismatic authority may be said to exist only in natu nascendi (that is only in the process of originating). At its face value, this seems to deny that routinization is in any way connected with charisma since it represents its "evaporation" or transformation into some other type of authority relationship. On the other hand, charisma can be viewed as being so dispersed and pervasive throughout a whole range of institutional areas that its innovatory potential becomes almost nebulous and the term becomes synonymous with the "central features of man's existence" (Parsons, 1963:xxxiv). This option blurs much of the precision which the concept of charisma as a type of legitimate authority and a source of new obligations contains.

Michael Hill (1973:172) has proposed a "solution" to this paradox which he holds is true to Weber's analysis. He proposes the concept of "latency." According to Hill, although the process of routinization is concerned with the development of more formalized roles and ideological definitions and thus depicts a movement toward traditional or rational-legal types of legitimation, "we still hold open the possibility that any institution which claims a charismatic pedigree will retain in its structure of roles, a latent form of charisma, which is available as a source of legitimacy for office holders who are involved in the process of innovation" (1973:172).

Following Weber's usage of "office charisma" (1968:248-9) this is a logical approach. For the possession of amtscharisma (office charisma) does not necessarily imply the personal charismatic propagation of new obligations, but it does however provide a valid basis on which this might develop. A logical extension of this view finds routinized charismatic institutions as bearing the "imprint" of their founder. Along this line, S.N. Eisenstadt (1968:xxi) regards the test of a charismatic leader as being "his ability to leave a continuous impact on an institutional structure - to transform any given institutional setting by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision, by infesting the regular orderly offices with some of his charismatic qualities and aura.

There are some important implications for this concept. In a rationalized world, religious organizations would logically become heavily bureaucratized with a formal structure and clearly defined roles. It also appears that bureaucracy is by definition inimical to

charismatic leadership and breakthrough. However, using the concept of latency, even in a rationalized/bureaucratized world there is a potential source for charismatic innovation, providing that the institution has a "charismatic pedigree." In other words, an institution such as the (contemporary) church could draw back from its own charismatic beginnings as a constant source of innovation and breakthrough. This innovation can emerge as extra-institutional change in affecting the structure of its "cosmos" i.e. the pattern illustrated in Ancient Judaism whereby the prophetic challenge came from outside the established organization. This innovation can also occur in the form of intra-institutional leverage i.e. within the organization itself (Berger, 1963). The above interpretations allow for charisma to continue as an innovative, revolutionary, vitalizing force counterbalancing the forces of bureaucratization and rationalization, and in other words, opposing those forces which would lead to the "Iron Cage." Although Weber saw charisma and rationalization locked in a "struggle unto death" and also sometimes painted a gloomy future for religion, he was highly partisan in viewing this eternal struggle. With his individualistic orientation, he was "guilty" of a strong bias towards the charismatic (Mommsen, 1965:28; Mitzman, 1970:260).

The Multi-dimensionality of Weber's Theories

In the second chapter we examined Weber's various usages of rationalization and his types of social action. It is our contention these crucial processes have often been given a simplistic interpretation that failed to gauge the subtleties inherent within Weber's definitions

and usages of them. This oversimplification of the complex process of rationalization has been noted by Reinhard Bendix (1960:279) who states:

The value of Weber's studies lies in the analysis of the many different meanings of "rationalization" in the various spheres of human activity. Though Weber often referred to these different meanings as manifestations of one over-all process, his constant analysis of the historical foundations of "rationalization" and of its possible irrational consequences should guard against the idea that for him this process was either inevitable, unequivocal, or irreversible.

In Economy and Society (1968:30), Weber specifically states that the processes of rationalization could go in more than one direction, i.e. that it could proceed either "positively" or "negatively." It is then an oversimplification to only be aware of the "negative" aspects of rationalization. Along these same lines is Rainer Baum's (1977) contention that contemporary modernization theory has laid too much emphasis on the type of rationality which Weber "assigned little if any significance as a modernizing force" and that is Zweckrationalitat (instrumental rationality). This over-emphasis on instrumental rationality is partly understandable, for Weber himself referred to modern man as a Zweckrational creature par excellence. Also, in his sociology of law (1968:863ff), he predicted the penetration of this type of rationality into all spheres of society via the effects of modern law. However, Baum contends that more attention to Wertrationalitat (value rationality) and to the way that he used the interplay of the two in his substantive work on the modern condition would have prevented modernization theory's preoccupation with Zweckrationalitat. According to Baum (1977: 310), "Compared to Max Weber's sophisticated multidimensional conception of rationality, the single-minded focus on Zweckrationalitat as crucial

to modernization and modernity constitutes a regression to theoretical primitivism" (emphasis added).

Since instrumental rationality is defined as being oriented to a choice between a set of individual ends and the most efficient or expedient means to achieve them, it has been linked with the rise of the scientific orientation, in that scientific analysis can "help" persons make decisions about ends. Contemporary modernization theorists such as Lerner (1958), Inkeles and Smith (1974) and Portes (1976) have extended Weber's concept of Zweckrationalitat to a point where the secular ideology (via the rise of science) has usurped the place of religious commitment completely. This extension contains what Baum (1977:311) calls a "profound element of ideological or religious regression." This particular secularization/modernization thesis treats science as an aid to man who no longer faces profound problems of choice among competing ends for society. (This particular belief in the role of science is one that of course Weber did not share). This thesis implies that man is no longer linked to values, ultimate and otherwise. (This is parallel to the previously discussed thesis which has religion being displaced and superseded completely by science). This type of modernization theory also implies an end to ideology/religion in that the competing ends in society have become utilitarian versions of the "good life" i.e. economic growth, higher incomes, etc. In view of Weber's concern with Wertrationalitat (value rationality) and the associated economic ethics as being of great importance this seems highly questionable. Further, in the above section Weber posited the crucial importance if not indeed the universality of ultimate values. Science, or anything in the

guise of science, cannot usurp the crucial position of these ultimate values, be they derived from metaphysics or religion, according to Weber's analysis.

This brings us back to the nature of Weber's theory itself. Economy and Society is sometimes difficult to follow because Weber constantly alternates between sociological generalization and historical explanation without warning. Bendix (1971:160) maintains that it is important for us to distinguish between logical and historical validity. He takes as his example the development of bureaucracy in modern society. He states, "There is no bureaucracy which is fully developed and void of all feeling." Bendix maintains that Weber repeatedly emphasized the unarticulated variety of the facts which indicated that "rigorous concepts must be correctly applied, not as schemes for the violation of historical data, but as tools by which to determine the character of a phenomenon by assessing how far it approaches one of the other 'ideal type'" (Weber, 1924:280). According to Bendix (1971:160) Weber opposed "the fashionable constructions of general schemes of development" and suggested instead the exposition of the nature of various developments as a research project (Weber, 1924:288).

In a similar sense, Guenther Roth (1979:125) called Weber's theories "secular" as opposed to "developmental theories" (because the term "developmental" carries an evolutionary connotation with it). Roth maintains that in his lifetime Weber opposed the contemporary evolutionary fashions in favor of a specifically historical explanation of the unique Western development. According to Roth: "Weber did not deny that there was a general development of culture (allgemeine Kulturen-

kulturenwicklung) involving structural differentiation and rationalization on various levels, but it was neither a necessary unfolding according to some law nor an inexorable teleological process (1979:176) (emphasis added).

At the end of The Protestant Ethic, there is no mistaking the sense of pessimism in Weber's writing. However, with his usages of phrases like "Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether, finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage" and "No one knows who will live in this cage in the future" (emphasis added), Weber left his options open. Admittedly, in this statement there was at least the possibility that a totally disenchanting world might lie at the end of the developments which had led to Western capitalism. However, it was just that one possibility, not necessarily the only one. The problem then, with an oversimplified view of Weber's analysis is that it limits him to only one eventual outcome, and this I believe is unjustified.

Weber then has been misinterpreted through the oversimplification of the multidimensional process of rationalization. In addition to this oversimplification, those who would see Weber's social science as predicting the dissolution and replacement of religion in the future have misinterpreted Weber's conception of the nature of social science itself. For Weber, social science is "the science of action, of consciously motivated behavior" (Portis, 1980:2).⁸ However, not all behavior obviously qualifies as action. Action, which is defined as consciously directed behavior is a fact of experience, with science itself being one of its manifestations. "Consequently, Weber is undeniably justified in

⁸For a more complete explanation of this see Portis (1980).

choosing to study it scientifically, and any social science that attempts to reduce action to mere behavior explained by determinate laws rather than volition, must remain incomplete" (Portis,1980:3) (emphasis added). Behavior, then which is action, must be explained rather by volition and the motives "causing" that behavior. This explanation of behavior by motives rather than by determinate laws, entails an ideographic, rather than a nomological social science (Weber,1975:128). Weber did not deny that such universal laws of human behavior might exist, but these "laws" would have but limited usefulness for social science in explaining action because they could not give an adequate account of a specific act (Weber,1975:128; Portis,1980:3). In Economy and Society (1968:29), Weber implies that although sociological investigation is concerned with "typical modes of action," and differs from history whose subject is the causal explanation of important individual events, its focus remains ideographic rather than nomological. Therefore, Weber has no great deterministic, nomological scheme that clearly delineates that the future of a given institution would be Weber's conception of social science then precludes his ever saying that the scenario of the "Iron Cage" has to be the future of religion. Weber unlike Marx or Durkheim has no deterministic scheme for the future of religion, and to impute such a determinism to his analysis would be a mistake. Those who would use Weber's analysis in the future should be aware of this error mistakenly committed by some.

Summary and Conclusions

This research then has not been intended to develop a comprehensive neo-Weberian theory of religion, but rather to suggest that within

Weber's sociology of religion there are elements which point to a continued viability for religion rather than its inevitable termination.

It has been the purpose of this study to develop the thesis that a possible "future" for religion could be discerned within the bounds of Max Weber's sociological analysis of religion. In the course of this thesis, I have arrived at several major conclusions. First, that given the complexity and multidimensionality of Weber's key concepts of rationalization, it is a mistake to believe that all facets of the process of rationalization are "negative": some parts are "positive" even "necessary" for the future of religion. It is a "two-way street."

Second, the metaphorical condition described by Weber at the end of The Protestant Ethic as the "Iron Cage" with its combination of bureaucratization, rationalization and secularization is a distinct possibility, but only one of the possible end-states of religion and that there are forces such as charisma which oppose such a development coming to fruition. Those who see this cage as the only possible end-state of religion in modernization theory have confused outcome with genesis. Further, there are simply too many "loose ends" or, to speak metaphorically, too many "ways out of the cage" for the Iron Cage to be the final resting place of religion.

I follow Hill (1973), Mitzman (1971), Roth and Schluchter (1979) and Bendix (1946) in stating that Weber's theoretical scheme is among the most applicable for analyzing religion in both its past and future forms. Unfortunately, no one save Hill (1973) has attempted to formulate Weber's analysis into a more contemporary sociology of religion.

There is a need to further analyze Weber's works on world religions

in order to better develop more sophisticated concepts applicable within a cross-cultural comparative context. This effort may result in more comprehensive theories dealing with the relations between modernization and religious institutions. For example, given that religion can be seen as a lasting phenomenon which need not disappear under "modern" conditions, a more comprehensive understanding of Weber's works may be able to place into a theoretical framework the twentieth century's emergence of cults, sects and charismatic leaders, all of which challenge the thesis that the process of the "Iron Cage" is inevitable.

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