

**CROSS-CULTURAL EFFECTS OF CASUALTIES ON FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION MAKING: SOUTH KOREA AND THE
UNITED STATES**

A Dissertation

by

NAM TAE PARK

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2007

Major Subject: Political Science

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee, Nehemia Geva
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Matthew Hoddie
James Bradford
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August 2007

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ABSTRACT

Cross-Cultural Effects of Casualties on Foreign Policy Decision Making: South Korea
and the United States. (August 2007)

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Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva

It is well accepted that casualties incurred as a result of interstate militarized disputes have a significant influence on domestic public opinion and ultimately on foreign policy decision making (FPDM). Although scholars have studied the influence of casualties on FPDM, the major line of research ignores the possibility that different cultural settings may generate different levels of tolerance for human casualties and thereby differentially mediate public reactions. Therefore, I attempt to clarify the impact of cultural factors on interpretation and perception of human casualties in international conflicts by the general public and their implications on consequent foreign policy choices.

I specifically examine two socio-cultural factors in the context of two culturally different states, South Korea and the United States. The two cultural factors are (1) the level of individualism vs. collectivism, and (2) the degree of ambiguity intolerance. I argue that the two factors will possibly affect the public's tolerance of human casualties. I expect that they will affect both the process by which members of the two cultures make decisions and their choices. Cross-national experimental design (in South Korea and the United States) and a comparative case study were employed.

Regarding the decision choice, I found that the expected number of casualties were considered in different ways by American students and Korean students. Different from my expectation, the Korean students perceived the expected number of casualties more negatively than the American students. With regard to the process of decision making, the empirical results support the hypotheses that the different levels of intolerance of ambiguity, a cultural factor, will have an impact on the decision process. Specifically, Korean students, who are less tolerant of ambiguity, needed less information to reach a final decision than did American students.

Overall, although the results did not completely support cultural accounts, cultural explanation has been proven to be a viable ingredient in explaining the different observed patterns of foreign policy decision making. Specifically, a cultural factor, ambiguity intolerance, had an impact on the process rather than the choice. In addition, this study presents some theoretical implications as well as political implications.

DEDICATION

To my wife and children, Cha Suk, Rebekah, Deborah, Grace, and John with all my love and devotion.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is well accepted that casualties incurred as a result of interstate militarized disputes have a significant influence on domestic public opinion and ultimately on foreign policy decision making. Therefore, whenever politicians consider the use of force, they should take into account the possible number of casualties and try to minimize the risks. The following newspaper article provides a good example of how expected casualties are considered in making decisions on the use of force. The account refers to the intense debate between officials of the Defense and State departments in the administration over planned military intervention in Haiti to remove its military leader from power, to stop the killing of innocent Haitians, and, finally, to restore democracy in Haiti.

Defense Secretary William J. Perry proposed to grant amnesty to members of the military junta in Haiti and induce them to leave for comfortable lives in exile. But Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who has emerged as the State Department's chief policy maker on Haiti, argued that offering incentives was morally repugnant. In a sharp exchange, Mr. Perry countered instead that Mr. Talbott represented a strange morality: He argued that it would be immoral for the United States not to do whatever it could to avoid the deaths of American soldiers (*New York Times* August 4, 1994).

As a matter of fact, President Clinton granted amnesty to the Haitian military junta for the atrocities committed against numerous innocent Haitians, by allowing junta

This dissertation follows the style of *The American Political Science Review*.

members to depart to Panama to live comfortable lives. This action was taken purely for the sake of saving American soldiers' lives during the invasion by diffusing the hostility of the Haitian armed forces.

Regarding the significance of the impact of the number of casualties on public support and policy making, some argue for the importance of the non-compensatory role of casualties (Luttwak 1995,1996), others contend that the public's tolerance of casualties depends on the objectives of the military intervention (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). Generally, casualties have been treated in various ways: casualties as a cost (Bennett and Stam 1996; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995), as a representation of the intensity of militarized conflicts, and as a criterion for the success or failure of conflicts. These approaches are similar in that they have treated all types of casualties in the same way. In contrast, some studies have indicated that not all kinds of casualties have the same impact (Mueller 1973, 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997). For instance, Mueller (2004) argues that the causes of the deaths contribute to differences in perception of the significance of casualties.

However, this line of research ignores the possibility that different cultural settings may generate different levels of tolerance for human casualties and thereby produce different public reactions.¹ I doubt that all societies perceive the costs of casualties in the same way. For instance, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's statement

¹ The importance of casualties has been described in several ways: some present it as "sensitivity of casualties" while others uses "tolerance of casualties" (see Gelpi et al. 2005). In this study, I employ both terms.

that he was “prepared to sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers in return for the last grain of the holy heart of Sinai”² would not be easily accepted in Western democracies. This statement may imply that different cultures put distinct values on human casualties, and consequently, the public within these societies may have differing levels of tolerance for casualties. Therefore, I will attempt to clarify the impact of cultural factors on the interpretation and perception of human casualties in international conflicts and their implications for foreign policy choices.

Some political scientists have been quite vocal in insisting on the significance of cultural factors (e.g., Almond and Verba’s 1963 *Civic Culture*). Yet, overall, international relations (IR) scholars have generally overlooked the role of culture in their interpretation of international behavior for the last several decades, especially during the Cold War (Hudson 1997). As a result, culture has not yet been specifically defined in a manner similar to systemic variables, which work relatively well in explaining a state’s behavior. In contrast to political science, cultural approaches to human behavior have been used more extensively in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology.

In the literature on foreign policy decision making, Vertzberger (1990: 267-270) argues that culture, as “a unified set of ideas” among the members of a nation, has a strong influence on shaping “the decision maker’s style of thinking, mode of judgment, and attitude toward information.” Based on this argument, cultural factors are expected to have substantial impact on foreign policy decision making because they affect

² http://www.zionet.co.il/manhigut/en/view_article.php3?article_id=85)

perception, interpretation, and reaction to situations and information. Specifically, I want to unveil how cultural values influence decision processes as well as outcomes in foreign policy decision making.

To accomplish this, I examined two socio-cultural factors within the context of two culturally different states, South Korea and the United States. The two cultural factors are (1) the level of collectivism vs. individualism, and (2) the degree of ambiguity intolerance. I proposed that the two factors could possibly affect the level of public tolerance of human casualties. I expected that they would affect both the process by which the members of each culture made decisions as well as their actual choice. In particular, collectivism pertaining to the group's goals and interests was expected to lead the public to perceive casualties less negatively, making it more likely that they would choose to send troops to take part in an armed conflict. Conversely, individualism should cause the individual members of the public to focus on their own interests, leading people to take a more negative view of casualties. Therefore, I expected that collectivism and individualism would highly influence the decision choice. Similarly, ambiguity intolerance, an epistemic factor, was also expected to have an impact on the process of decision making because it was expected to cause decision makers to hasten to their final decision.

Simply, the general questions addressed in this dissertation are the following:

- ◆ Do the number of casualties have a different impact on foreign policy decision making in different cultures?
Specifically, regarding the decision outcomes, is the impact of the number of casualties on the choice different between South Koreans and Americans ?

- ◆ Concerning the decision process, what is the impact of the number of casualties on how the choice is derived? Further, does the impact of casualties on the decision-making process differ between South Koreans and Americans?

Overview of the Research Project

The Cognitive Calculus decision model (CC model) will be employed to analyze the impact of cultural ingredients on foreign policy decision making (Geva, Mayhar and Redd 1997). The CC model is an online decision model with decision thresholds that are associated with a binary choice (to do or not do). A threshold (TH) is where the decision process stops and a choice is determined. The moves towards the TH represent changes in the Cumulative Choice Propensity (CCP), which are affected by the valence of the items, the relevance, and reliability of the information. Most prominently, the CC model has room for a framework of the specific effects of culture as part of its Implicit Theory of International Relations, which describes “the stored knowledge and beliefs” any decision maker possesses with regard to international events (Geva et al 2000:452).

Method

Cross-national experimental designs (in South Korea and the United States) and a comparative case study were used. Many political scientists assert that the experimental method is the most scientific approach (Lijphart 1971). This is because experiments contribute to the identification of clear and unambiguous causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables by *controlling* other factors that might otherwise affect the dependent variable (Mook 1982; Collier 1993; Lijphart 1975; McDermott 2002).

However, other scholars are pessimistic about experimental designs based on perceived problems of external validity, defined as the generalizability of results, due to an experiment's artificiality (Danilovic 2003). In order to address concerns about the artificiality of experimental research, a detailed examination of historical cases can be a useful complementary method. Comparative case studies will be provided in order to corroborate the findings from the experiments and increase their generalizability. These cases highlight considerations of potential casualties by both South Korea and the United States.

In the two experiments, participants had to make foreign policy decisions in the context of either an international humanitarian crisis or a direct threat to national security. Both types of situations carried a risk of casualties. The design varied the number of expected casualties, as well as the underlying dimensions of the conflict. The experiments were conducted using South Korean undergraduate students and military officers and Texas A&M University undergraduate students as subjects.

Contributions

This dissertation makes several contributions within foreign policy decision making (FPDM). First and most significantly, the results of this study add to the clarification of the effects of number of casualties on foreign policy decision making through the lens of culture. Although the effects of casualties on FPDM have been delineated in various ways, such effects rarely employed the cultural difference as an alternative explanatory variable. Hence, this research will advance the existing literature

on casualties. Second, the neglect of a systematic approach toward the study of socio-cultural impact on foreign policy decision making (FPDM) has been a virtual Achilles' heel within cultural studies. Hence, this research, which entails a more systematic approach along with empirical evidence, will contribute to the methodological development of the examination of cultural influences on FPDM. Moreover, comparison of the experimental results across nations will add to the generalizability of the findings as well as to the underlying conceptualization.

There is also a substantive practical contribution made by this study. Most studies with regard to casualties have been centered on American casualties, their impact on the U.S. public, and their influence on the U.S. FPDM process. Thus, studies on other countries' casualties and their impact on foreign politics are rare. However, there are some practical reasons for examining the influence of other countries' perceptions of casualties. This is especially true for the U.S. given its preference for coalition warfare. For example, the G.W. Bush administration attempted to form a multi-national force to implement its war against Iraq. Although the U.S. requested that its allies send military forces to Iraq, only some joined the effort. If the U.S. had recognized the importance of its allies' perception of casualties, perhaps it would have been more successful in persuading them to join. This research describes differing considerations of casualties, then proposes a few practical implications for U.S. FPDM.

Organization of Dissertation

Chapter I introduces the issues and the research questions, as well as the purposes and an overview of the research design. In addition, I assert that the research will help to strengthen the understanding of the cross-cultural impacts of casualties on foreign policy decision making and advance the field of casualty studies.

The extant literature on this research is presented in chapter II. In this review, I concentrate on the topics of casualties and culture. The state of knowledge is examined in the following: various approaches of the effects of casualties in IR; casualties and their effect on public reactions; culture as a variable in IR and FPDM and the effects of culture on the parameters of process and choice.

Chapter III addresses the conceptual model of the dissertation, the general propositions, hypotheses to be tested, and the method employed. In order to develop the propositions, two different cultural factors are used, collectivism vs. individualism and ambiguity intolerance. I employ the Cognitive Calculus decision model that is geared to measuring both choice and the process, the two principal components in decision making. Experiments are used as the major method to test the hypotheses.

In chapter IV, I present the empirical results of two questionnaires designed to measure the difference between Korean subjects and American subjects along two cultural dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance.

In chapter V, I address the results and analysis of experiment 1, where the context is a hypothetical international humanitarian crisis. Participants are asked to read the humanitarian scenario, review some associated information, and finally make a

decision. The analysis will first compare American students and Korean students. Then a report comparing the Korean students and Korean military officers is presented.

The results and analysis of experiment 2 are illustrated in chapter VI. In contrast to experiment 1, experiment 2 is developed using a fictitious international crisis associated with security concerns, specifically terrorist bombings. The presentation of the results from experiment 2 will follow the pattern of chapter V.

In chapter VII, I provide a comparative case study that serves to corroborate the findings of the two experiments. The results of the two experiments indicate that Korean participants are more sensitive to casualties than are Americans. In this case study, I want to clarify whether or not Koreans are more sensitive than Americans to casualties incurred during international military interventions. In order to do this, it is necessary to choose two cases that contain the risk of casualties or casualties and the public's reactions to them from America and South Korea, respectively.

In chapter VIII, the conclusion, I review the impact of differing perceptions of casualties on foreign policy decision making. I present a summary of the methods (experiments and a comparative case study) employed in this study. I also present a synopsis of the findings from chapters IV, V, VI, and VII. I conclude with a few theoretical and political implications and suggestions, as well as an outline for future research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I address the relevant literature for this research and by focusing on existing bodies of research in terms of casualties, discover a neglected aspect of the study. The two principal topics of the literature are covered: casualties and culture in International Relations literature.

The studies on casualties are divided into two main areas. The first part of the literature review will present works in which the effects of casualties on public support and foreign policy decision making are examined. I also present a competing view of the public's sensitivity to casualties and conditions in which the public becomes tolerant (or intolerant) to casualties. As for culture, I present the literature and arguments as accepted in the field of political science and use culture as a variable in IR and foreign policy decision making, looking at the effects of culture on the parameters of process and choice.

Impacts of Casualties on Public Support and FPDM

Casualties have been treated in various ways in International Relations to help explain the intensity of militarized conflicts. The more casualties a conflict generates, the more severe the conflict is considered to be (Jones et al. 1996). Moreover, casualties are considered an important factor in the evaluation of a nation's success or failure in conflicts. A relatively large number of casualties is viewed as a failure in a military

conflict, whereas a comparatively small number of casualties is viewed as a success. In the context of decision making, with the rational choice perspective, casualties are viewed as a factor of cost when a political leader decides whether or not to initiate a war (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995).

Scholars seem to reach a consensus on the rational cost-benefits, or “ends-means” calculus of casualties (Richman 1995). In utility calculation, costs are divided into direct and indirect. Direct costs explicitly focus on decision makers and their choices. For instance, decision makers are not likely to choose an option that is expected to generate many casualties. On the other hand, indirect cost refers to the impact of casualties on public support that, in turn, has an impact on a political decision maker’s choices. Decision makers’ choice preference is linked to their responsiveness to public opinion and public support for maintaining a particular course of political action (Mintz and Geva 1997). Accordingly, if the use of force is expected to yield casualties, it undermines public support. Consequently, political decision makers in such circumstances would not opt for the choice involving the use of force. In other words, if the popularity of the government is expected to dwindle “in proportion to the war’s cost in blood and money” (Russett 1990: 40), the option of using force would decrease accordingly.

Nincic and Nincic (1995) also view casualties as a cost by using an economic metaphor. The authors argue that once the initial decision to employ military intervention has been made, the government’s commitment to the intervention will be determined by “(a) its perception of the intervention’s toll, and (b) the extent of

continued public support for its policy.” (Nincic and Nincic 1995: 414). However, they conceptualize the costs from the standpoint of two actors: the government, as the source of actual foreign policy decisions, and the public expecting their preferences to be incorporated into the government’s decision-making policy. Although the two parties have a common view on casualties as a cost, they have a fundamentally different conceptualization of the dead: the public perceives casualties as consumers while governments regard them as an investment. Consumers expect a simultaneous return for their costs, whereas investors, who look for future benefits, do not. According to this analogy, when costs, military casualties, begin to go beyond expectations, a government, as an investor, is more likely to remain committed to his military intervention. On the other hand, public support should decrease as the costs, i.e., casualties, go up.

In addition, there are some studies which attempt to present the impact of casualties in different contexts, such as the temporal effects (i.e., at the early stage of war or at a later period of a conflict) (Mueller 1973), through the pattern of accumulation of casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Seguar, and Wilkening 1997), or the cause of death (Mueller 2004).

To explore this idea further, Mueller (1973), for instance, argues that the relationship between mounting casualties and dropping public support is “not a linear manner with an increase from 100 to 1000 being the same as one from 10,000 to 10,900” (Mueller 1973: 60). A small number of casualties in the early stage of a conflict have a significant impact on public opinion. In other words, as the conflict continues, a relatively large number of casualties have less impact on public support because the

public becomes “hardened to the wars’ costs” (Mueller 1973: 62). Thus, as a war continues, the public becomes habituated to casualties, and the public’s reaction to casualties is not as firm as it was in the early stages of the war. This indicates that the public’s sensitivity to casualties would weaken as time goes on. Hence, this study contends that casualties do not always affect public support in the same way.

Gartner and Segura (1998), studying the Vietnam War and the Korean War, focus on the effective patterns of the accumulation of casualties. They categorize two patterns of casualties -- cumulative and marginal. Cumulative casualties are the total number of casualties in a certain conflict, while marginal casualties indicate the rate of increase or decrease of casualties. The cumulative number of casualties should be an appropriate predictor of public support when most of the casualties in a conflict occur at the early stage, and the rate of casualties remains the same or decreases. This was the case in the Korean War. On the other hand, as in the Vietnam War, when casualties are proportionally distributed over the course of the conflict, *marginal* casualties are the most plausible indicator of the level of support for the conflict.

Mueller (2004), in the context of terrorism, emphasizes specific conditions in which casualties occur. Casualties resulting from terrorists’ attacks have a greater impact than those coming from war and militarized disputes. He contends that although the number of casualties from terrorists attacks is far smaller than those from car accidents, the reaction to these casualties is “hasty, ill considered, and over-wrought” because of extensive fear and anxiety over terror (Muller 2004:1). Consequently, the impact of

casualties stemming from terrorist attacks is more significant than that of casualties inflicted by militarized conflicts.

Conditions That Cause the Public to Be More Tolerant to Casualties

There are competing views on the public's sensitivity to casualties: some contend that the public is casualty phobic (Luttwak 1995; Luttwak 1996), others argue for the public's rational approach to casualties (Nincic and Nincic 1995; Jentleson 1992; Gelpi et al. 2005, 2007; Richman 1994; Larson 1996; Mueller 2000). Yet the scope of sensitivity is somewhat diverse: ranging from the minimally sensitive to extremely sensitive. For those who recognize casualties as a necessary cost of war, sensitivity depends on the context such as objectives or whether or not national interests are at stake. Those scholars who view the public as a rational actor recognize casualties as a cost on the rational cost-benefit model or ends-means calculus to determine sensitivity. On the other hand, the latter asserts that casualties are a non-compensatory rule that requires virtually no casualties in shaping support for military intervention. Consequently, potential casualties are a major stumbling block when politicians are considering use of military force.

However, most scholars seem to reach a consensus over the rational approach of the public's sensitivity to casualties (Nincic and Nincic 1995; Larson 1996; Jentleson 1992, 1998; Muller 2000; Gelpi et al. 2005; Hyde 2000; Kull and Ramsy 2001). Based on this logic, those scholars have concentrated on the conditions which serve to facilitate the public's tolerance over casualties.

Jentleson (1992) proposes “the principal policy objective theory” (PPO) on which the public bases its casualty tolerance (Jentleson 1992: 49). He categorizes types of military intervention into foreign policy restraint (FPR) and internal political change (IPC). The FPR focuses on the state that implements aggressive foreign policies against the United States (i.e. Iraq in 1990, when President Hussein invaded Iraq). The IPC concentrates on regime changes that threaten U.S. interests (i.e. the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 during Reagan’s presidency). He contends that the public will accept missions with PPOs focused on what he calls FPR goals as important missions that are worth a substantial cost. Consistent with the study (Jentleson 1992), Jentleson and Britton (1998) add another category of military intervention, humanitarian intervention (HI). They assert that the U.S. public will support HI only if the costs are relatively low.

Larson (1996) provides four elements that are expected to have an impact on the public’s casualty tolerance: the perceived benefits, the prospects for success, the costs, and consensus support (or its absence) from political leaders. Specifically, he defines consensus as congressional support. He emphasizes the significant role of consensus or its absence among political leaders that influence the shaping of the public’s attitude toward military intervention.

Mueller (2000) focuses on a different factor than other studies. The author stresses the role of morality on the public’s casualty tolerance. He stresses the importance of the role of benefits resulting from military intervention on the public’s casualty acceptance because the public perceives so little benefit in most military intervention. He argues that the best defense against dropping public support resulting

from casualties is “popular conviction of their compelling moral value.” (Mueller 2000:16).

Gelpi et al. (2005, 2006) argue that the public’s tolerance for casualties is a matter of certain circumstances. According to their theory, they attempt to find some conditions with which the public becomes tolerant to human costs--casualties. Mounting casualties have not always produced a reduction in public support. For example, the U.S. public’s tolerance is shaped by the interaction of two crucial attitudes: “beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and the belief about a war’s likely success.” (Gelpi et al 2005:8). The likelihood of success matters most in determining the public’s willingness to tolerate deaths of U.S. soldiers.

Moskos’ (1996) approach to the public’s casualty tolerance is somewhat unique because he proposes an institutional factor--drafted armed forces. He argues that it is not demographics or a heroic cause that affects the level of the U.S. public’s tolerance over casualties, but rather it is the problem of who is willing to die for the cause. He proposed that Americans accepted the 291,557 battle deaths during WWII because of the elite youths in the military. However, Americans would not be as tolerant as they were then in the current volunteer military. Consequently, Americans’ tolerance of casualties would be increased only “if their leadership and national elites were viewed as self-sacrificing.”(Moskos 1996:12).

These studies suggest that casualties do not always affect the public’s support for foreign policies in the same way. Furthermore, these findings suggest that the impact of casualties have multiple roles to play in decision making and policy preferences of

leaders and the public. Therefore, drawing from the relevant elements of the previous findings, my inquiry revolves around the question “Do casualties have the same impact on people who live in culturally different societies?”

Culture in Political Science

In the discipline of political science in general, cultural accounts have been addressed and treated as an alternative to the rational and institutional perspective. Although some scholars agree that cultural and institutional approaches comprise distinct explanations of variations of political behavior,³ some argue the superiority of cultural accounts, while others contend for the outstanding nature of the institutional view. I present the competing views between cultural and institutional approaches mainly in the study of political and economic development.

The cultural approach in political science has been traced back to Weber in the early twentieth century. He argued that the propensity of the Protestant ethic contributed critically to the prosperity of western capitalism (Weber 1905). Almond and Verba’s (1963) *Civic Culture* is considered the benchmark of the application of the cultural account to political behavior. Specifically, they contend that civic culture causes variations by examining the results in developing democracies among five different societies. In line with this, Putnam and Inglehart are popular scholars who supported cultural accounts in the 1990s.

³ See Jackman and Miller (2005) p.30.

Putnam (2000), in his bestselling book *Bowling Alone*, explains that the rate of civil engagement in American society has plummeted and examines its negative impact on American political behavior, specifically political participation. This reduction of social capital can be seen in the declining rates of active organizational involvement, church membership, and even family dinners. The author attributes this dwindling to longer commutes and an upsurge in the amount of time spent watching television. Overall, Putnam attempts to explain Americans, alteration of political trends using the cultural factor civic engagement.

On the other hand, Jackman and Miller (2005), in the book *Before Norms: Institutions and Civic Culture*, argue that the institutional approach outperforms cultural accounts in explaining variations of political behavior. An underlying premise of the institutional view is that people seek to optimize their benefits from all available options, which is the assumption of the rational choice perspective. Thus, alterations of institutions that lead to change in constraints and incentives cause changed political behavior.

In the discipline of political economy, cultural accounts have been applied to explain economic development. Inglehart's (1990, 1997) attempts to apply a cultural approach to economic development offer a new explanatory power in dealing the diverse levels of economical development. Specifically, there is a large body of studies which delineates the key factors that distinguish the economic success of many east Asian countries from the cultural perspective. Among them, Hofstede and Bond (1998) and Hicks and Redding (1983) argue for the significant role of a cultural asset, labeled

Confucian values, in explaining the rapid industrialization of eastern Asia. Hofstede and Bond (1998) developed a questionnaire to measure Confucian values in eastern cultures that are associated with remarkable economic advancement.

In contrast, North (1990:3-4) defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and emphasized the significant role of institutions in economic performance. In line with this, although Wade (2003) and Amsden (1989) do not ignore the role of cultural factors in accounting for the impressive economic development in east Asian countries, they place more weight on the role of central government than on the function of cultural inheritance in these countries. They assert that an export-oriented industrial strategy, led by a central government, has been the key ingredient for the economic success in east Asian countries.

As I address the competing approaches between cultural and institutional accounts regarding the impact of casualties (i.e. Moskos 1996), this study tests the applicability of the cultural explanation in perceiving casualties.

Culture as a Variable in IR and FPDM

The cultural study in IR is an area that has not been fully explored and is quite underemphasized. A majority of scholars have asserted that culture in IR is not an attractive explanation for various phenomena. Other schools of thought, however, have been quite vocal in insisting on the significance of cultural factors. Yet, overall, IR scholars have generally overlooked the role of culture in their interpretation of

international behavior for the last several decades, especially during the Cold War (Hudson 1997).

There are several compelling reasons why cultural accounts have not been persuasive in IR studies. First, systemic ingredients had been dominant in explaining international events during that period (Galenslen 1986). Distribution of power in the system, introduced by Waltz (1979), has been the most popular source of explanation for several decades. The second problem for the infrequent use of cultural accounts is rather endogenous. Culture has been considered one of the mega-concepts in social science, in line with market, class, and power (Pye 1991). However, it often has been used as a last resort when facing a lack of alternatives to account for variances (Verba 1965). Correspondingly, the cultural approach has been most significantly criticized for non-specific and inconsistent definitions and conceptualization (Geertz 1973). This drawback of the cultural aspect makes it less suitable for present day methodological standardization and the behavioral evolution of social science.

Some scholars have been active in using cultural variables in their research since the 1960s and 1970s in spite of the shortcomings of the cultural approach. However, it is obvious that the present revival of the cultural view is largely due to the recent upheavals in the world's political arenas (Gaenslen 1997). The death of communism and end of the Cold War are the most prominent reasons that encourage scholars to draw on cultural factors and incorporate them into their studies.

Richardson's study (1960) of the impact of cultural similarity on conflict is a seminal work in the cultural perspective. He examines whether or not cultural similarity

and dissimilarity, represented by language and religion, affects the probability of war by exploring 300 wars from 1820 to 1949. In contrast to other findings, he concludes that a significant relationship exists between culture and international war. Cottam's (1977) findings are consistent with Richardson's (1960) argument. In his book, *Foreign Policy Motivation*, he argues that "perception of cultural distance" is one of the significant determinants of "worldview" (315). In other words, the differences between one's own culture and that of the other nation are factors that affect the development of images of other countries (Herrmann et al. 1997), and which drives decision makers into cooperation or conflict. Henderson's two studies (1997, 1998) are also consistent with these results. Henderson (1997) argues that cultural factors have a significant impact on initiating war even when geographical contiguity is controlled. Specifically, the most risky dyads are "religiously dissimilar, territorially contiguous, and ethnically similar pairs of states" (Henderson 1997: 666). This finding is confirmed by the research that examined democratic dyads (Henderson 1998). Henderson concludes that religious similarities have a positive effect on democratic peace, whereas ethnic and linguistic likeness has a negative impact on democratic peace.

Within this perspective, Huntington has recently been the most vocal supporter of the cultural approach. Huntington (1993), in his study *Clash of Civilizations*, suggests that the fundamental source of conflict after the Cold War era will not be ideology or economy but culture. During the Cold War, this source of conflict was kept in check, but in the post-Cold War era, it will be unleashed. Furthermore, he asserts that "the fault line between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" (1993: 22). Therefore,

Huntington predicts that future conflict between civilizations will replace ideological and other forms of conflict as the principal form of conflict in international relations.

As for the cultural approaches to foreign policy decision analysis, it is the least developed subfield of IR literature (Hudson 1997). In contrast to political science, cultural accounts of human behavior have been explored relatively more intensively in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. In support of the cultural claim in the literature on foreign policy decision making, Vertzberger (1990: 267-270) argues that culture, as “a unified set of ideas” among the members of the nations, has a strong influence on shaping “the decision maker’s style of thinking, mode of judgments, and attitude toward information.” Furthermore, he argues that rationality can be interpreted differently in different cultural settings. Evaluations of similar behavior, objects, and events could have different values and judgments in different cultures that form a unique belief system and values. In similar vein, a study by Geva and Hanson (1999) suggests that socio-cultural similarity of a given target nation vis-à-vis the United States has an impact on the perception of its regime; and is related to the choice of policy against that target.

“Cultural schema,” by Hershberg (1993), is an attempt to connect culture with the cognitive approach. He argues that the cognitive approach in IR is the most adequate one in understanding international behavior during the Cold War because the stimulus-response paradigm does not correlate with the fact that different people generate different answers even when given the same stimulus. Specifically, he introduces the “cultural schema theory,” which combines culture and the concept of schema in social

psychology. Schema is defined as a particular cognitive pattern that simplifies the world to make it comprehensible (25). It structures behavior as well as perception. Culture, defined as a shared set of beliefs in the society, consists of commonly shared schemata (30). Individuals who live in the society learn to adopt schemata that are common in their culture. Consequently, the predominance of those schemata yields particular social behaviors. The Cold War schema, for example, helped to unveil the complex but consistent patterns of U.S. foreign policy behavior.

The literature thus suggests that culture has not been frequently used as an explanatory variable because it has not yet been specifically defined in contrast to other systemic variables, which worked relatively well. On the other hand, some attempt has been made to advance an understanding of the impact of culture on conflictual and cooperative behaviors as well as on foreign policy decision making. In this study, I will try to clarify the impact of culture on foreign policy decision making. Specifically, I want to unveil how cultural values influence the structures, processes, and outcome of foreign policy decision making.

Effects of Cultural Dimensions on Foreign Policy Decisions

I chose to use cultural ingredients, which were coined by Hofstede (1997; 2001). He identifies "four main dimensions along which dominant value systems in the forty countries can be ordered and which affect human thinking, organization, and institutions in predictable ways" (Hofstede 1980:11). These cultural indexes are: power distance,

uncertainty avoidance,⁴ individualism vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs femininity.⁵ He developed a questionnaire to measure the different levels of these four cultural indexes among IBM works in fifty different states.

These indexes are popular in cross-cultural studies across academic disciplines. For example, Zurovchak (1997), employs these four indexes to examine the different types of foreign policy decision making between Czechs and Slovaks. On the other hand, Huh (2002), in the thesis for his theological masters degree, uses these four indexes to distinguish leadership values of Korean missionaries in the Philippines.

However, I use only two indexes among the four: individualism vs. collectivism (INCOL) and ambiguity intolerance (AI). When I chose cultural variables for this research, the guidelines that Galenslen (1986) suggests were useful. The author states that cultural explanations which depend on *similarities* in a particular society may also provide a good explanation for the differences between a society and other societies (Galenslen 1986:80). Using this logic, among the four cultural indexes, I chose two which assume the most extreme and diametrically opposite values for Korean society on the one hand, and for American society on the other. Additionally, there should be the least *conceptual distance* as possible between cultural variables and what one hopes to interpret by them (Galenslen 1986:82). In other words, if I want to show the different levels of tolerance of casualties, the cultural variables, here INCOL and AI, are as

⁴ Hereafter, I replace uncertainty avoidance with ambiguity intolerance. The two concepts are ultimately same, but I want to use one terminology throughout this dissertation.

⁵ Power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Masculinity and femininity are defined as “masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distant from each other and femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap.” (Hofsete 1997: 25, 80).

conceptually close to the interpretation and perception for casualties as possible. To be specific, the implications of INCOL and AI have to have reasonable connections to the interpretation and perception of human casualties.

Definitions of the Two Cultural Indexes

Individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance are the most appropriate indexes for this study because Koreans and Americans are significantly different in the two indexes (Hofstede 1997).

Individualism and collectivism are defined as follows (Hofstede 1997: 51): Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout a person's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.

The essential concept that split individualism and collectivism is how personal self is defined. An independent self-construct associated with individualism is defined as "bounded, unitary, and stable" that is different from others (Singelis 1994: 580). When thinking about themselves, individuals tend to refer to their own "preferences, abilities, attributes, characteristics, or goals rather than referring to the thoughts, feelings, or actions of others" (Singelis 1994: 581). They build up self-esteem through expressing and endorsing their own attributes. Regarding communication, they are more likely to express themselves directly.

On the other hand, people who have an interdependent self-construct that pertains to collectivism view themselves as a part of a group. They do not think of themselves and others as separate but intertwined. They gain self-esteem when they are involved in harmonious interpersonal relationships and are capable of adjusting themselves to the group in which they are involved. Hence, they tend to pay attention to others' thoughts, actions, even unexpressed intentions. As for communicating with others, they opt for the use of an indirect manner (Singelis 1994: 581).

Some argue that individualism has been incorporated into the cultures of most northern and western regions of Europe and North America, whereas collectivism has been associated with Asia, Africa, South America, and the Pacific Islands (Triandis 1988; Markus & Kitayama 1991). The principal quality of individualism is placing priority on personal goals over in-groups goals, whereas collectivism puts weight on "subordinating personal goals to those of the in-group" (Triandis 1988). In other words, a collectivistic society is one in which the interest of the group prevails over the interest of the individual, while the interest of the individual predominates over the interest of the group in an individualistic society (Hofstede 1997:50). As to an individuals' identification, collectivists emphasize that human beings cannot be self-identifying, but must be identified as part of the larger group such as the family and state. Thus, an individuals' sacrifice would be valuable if done for the sake of the group, such as for a country. In an individualistic society, individuals try to identify himself or herself based on "I" rather than "we." They also prioritize their personal goals, interests and values over the society to which they belong (Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al., 2002). In

accordance with the above propensities of individualism and collectivism, Table 2-1 presents some comparisons of the two implications in decision making.

Table 2-1 The Implications of INCOL for Decision Making

Individualism	Collectivism
1. Decision procedures, group composition, and forum of decision making are often left to chance.	1. Much attention is given to design procedures, composition of decision making group, and forum of decision making.
2. Task prevails over relationship	2. Relationship prevails over task.
3. Advancement is supposed to be based on skills and performance.	3. Advancement takes groups obligations into account.
4. Conflict is resolved through competitions and or majority rule since group harmony is not a priority	4. Conflict is resolved through negotiation and/or bargaining since group harmony is a high priority.
5. Superior/subordinate relations are based on mutual advantage.	5. Superior/subordinate relations are family like and include protection and loyalty.

Source: Zurovchak (1997) p.130.

Table 2-2 The Implications of AI for Decision Making

Low Ambiguity Intolerance	High Ambiguity Intolerance
1. Few and general rules and SOPs characterize organization.	1. Authority is vested in rules and SOPs that are many and precise throughout the organization.

Source: Zurovchak (1997) p.135.

AI is defined as "the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel different from usual." (Hofstede 2001: xx). In other words, it is a measure of the level of discomfort with "ambiguity, nonconformity, and uncertainty within a society."

(Zurovchak 1997:133). In the context of decision making, there are two contrasting implications of AI. One is that people with a high level of AI tend to seek more information en route to a final choice so as to minimize the uncertainty involved in their decision (Hofstede 1997). In compliance with the quality of AI raised by Hofstede (2001), the implications of AI on decision making are listed in Table 2-2.

An alternative line of thought suggests that people with a high level of AI are less likely to need information en route to a final choice (Kruglanski and Ajzen 1983). According to the authors, in the epistemic perspective, human beings need to have a structure, which is knowledge on a given topic, in order to understand something as well as to minimize ambiguity. If one is less likely to tolerate ambiguity, the need for structure would be heightened. It would then intensify the person's tendency to stick to existing and early information and knowledge, consequently, one is not open to accepting and using new information. In the decision-making context, we assume that decision makers high in AI are likely to seek quick closure and to require less information to make a decision and thereby minimize ambiguity.

I argue that these two cultural factors, the different levels of INCOL and the different levels of AI, influence the levels of tolerance for human casualties in different cultures. Using this argument, I developed a model to portray how those cultural ingredients affect the foreign policy decision-making process and outcome.

CHAPTER III

THEORY, MODEL AND METHOD

This chapter addresses the conceptual model and the general propositions of the dissertation, the hypotheses to be tested and the method employed. In order to develop the propositions, I use two differing cultural factors, collectivism vs. individualism and ambiguity intolerance, and compare results from the United States and South Korea. For this research, I employ the Cognitive Calculus (CC) decision model, which is geared to measure both choice and process, which are the two principal components in decision making. Experiments are used as the major method to test the hypotheses.

What Is the Cognitive Calculus Model?


As I noted above, the CC model is an attempt to bridge the gap between choice and process in decision making in order to overcome the lack of outcome validity in the cognitive decision approach (Geva and Skorick 1999; Geva, Mayhar and Redd 1997; Geva, Mayhar and Skorick 2000; Geva et al. 2003a). The fundamental premise of this model is that "an individual is the engine that conducts the decision-making process" (Geva and Skorick 1997:448). Thus, the model, an on-line process model, attempts to portray how decision makers implement their decision calculus, and show their capabilities in processing, integrating, evaluating, and interacting with many pieces of information, both coming from outside sources and previously existing in the decision maker's mind. Figure 3-1 presents overall description of the CC model.

The Information Context

In order to evaluate and grasp the core of information coming from diverse sources, four criteria are used: *valence*, *relevancy*, *reliability* and *redundancy*. These factors have an impact on the cognitive/computational process of decision making.

The information valence of an item is defined as "the implication an item has for moving choice propensity toward one of the two options" (Geva et al. 2003b:6).

Reliability indicates a decision maker's confidence with the accuracy of incoming information. The relevance of the item reflects "the correlation between the dimension underlying the item, and the dimension underlying the decision maker's choice propensity" (Geva et al. 2003b:6). Redundancy can be defined as "the common variance between or among cues, or simply as information inter-correlation." (Geva et al. 2003b:6).



The Implicit Theory of International Relations (ITIR)

The concept of Implicit Theory of International Relations (ITIR) is introduced when a decision maker translates incoming information into the above mentioned parameters of valence, relevancy, reliability, and redundancy. It indicates that any decision maker holds a “stored knowledge and beliefs” with regard to international events (Geva et al 2000:452). The CC model assumes that there is continuous interaction between incoming information and the ITIR, and this interaction is expressed in terms of: valence, relevancy, reliability and redundancy.

In line with this notion, Taber (1992:80) argues that “any decision maker’s belief system will contain beliefs about ‘how the world works’ in certain contexts.” This knowledge base contains perceived or believed relations that exist between or among concepts that describe the international arena. For instance, an individual’s ITIR may contain the belief that the world will be peaceful or stable if democratic states dominate the world system or if communist states like North Korea were to eventually fail. Thus, ITIR is similar to other conceptualizations suggested previously in the study of foreign policy decision making: international belief system (Taber 1992), operational codes (George 1969; Walker 1977, 1983), images (Herrmann et al. 1997), and cognitive maps (Axelrod 1976; Young 1996).

The principal function of ITIR is to interact with incoming information and consequently affect the interpretation or perception of the information. This interaction would happen constantly during the decision process. It conforms with the proposition of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) that the beliefs of political decision makers wield

influence on the interpretation and perception of international situations and these are reflected in a state's actions. In addition, ITIR is considered to be an integral source for defining the relevance of incoming information and its correlation to other information acquired in the process. Furthermore, belief about the source of information and the compatibility of its valence with previously acquired knowledge may translate into a decision-maker's confidence in an item's reliability (Geva et al., 2000).

The concept and function of ITIR is the main reason that I use the CC model to clarify the impact of culture on perception of casualties. Vertzberber (1990:267) defines culture as "a unified set of ideas" that is developed within a set of shared "premises, values, expectations, and action predispositions" among the members of the nations. Based on this definition, culture has a strong influence on shaping "the decision maker's style of thinking, mode of judgments, and attitude toward information" (Vertzberber 1990: 270). Corresponding to Vertzberber's argument about culture, the CC model, particularly the concept of ITIR, has room for reflecting the impact of culture on the perception and interpretation of casualties in the process of decision making.

In this research, the two different cultural groups, represented by the United States and South Korea, have differing patterns of perceiving and interpreting casualties incurred in a foreign military intervention. Such shared ideas about casualties in the two cultural groups could reside as stored knowledge and beliefs within the ITIR. Hence, when an individual encounters an item of information associated with casualties, previously existing and shared ideas about casualties could wield influence over the perception and interpretation of the information, leading eventually to a final decision.

The Computational Mechanism

Differing from Milton Lodge's online process model (Lodge 1995; Lodge et al. 1989), the CC model describes a threshold (TH) where the online process stops and the choice is made. As pieces of incoming information are integrated into the Cumulative Choice Propensity counter, the decision maker quits processing information and makes a final choice when the choice propensity passes the decision threshold or there is no more information available. This threshold is not fixed, but can be altered based on certain conditions. Factors that affect the location of the threshold (stringent or lenient) are "the importance of the decision" and "the decision style of the decision maker" (Geva et al., 2000:453). For instance, emotional stimulations would lower the threshold and cause decision makers to be quicker in reaching their final choice.

In addition, Geva and colleagues (Geva et al. 2000) contend that most choices are dichotomous, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive, i.e., the choice between doing (a) and not doing (~a). For example, these two choices may consist of sending forces or not sending forces or implementing economic sanctions or not implementing economic sanctions in handling international crises.

Because the CC model seeks to capture the choice and process components of decision making, I employ the CC model in my research for finding the differing impact of casualties on foreign policy decision making in both America and South Korea. In addition, the CC model can accommodate a framework for specific effects of culture as part of its ITIR.

General Propositions

I extracted six propositions that relate to how the two cultural variables influence the public's perception and interpretation of casualties within the framework of the CC model.

It is a generally accepted proposition that human lives are an individual's possession. Casualties cost the life of individual human beings and the public recognizes military deaths as valuable ones. Casualties in this research result from interstate military conflicts such as war, military intervention, etc. Thus, all of these military operations are supposed to have certain causes as typically claimed by a nation's leading politicians. Further, it is typical for people to show respect or give honor to the military casualties of those who pursued national goals. In most cases, national goals during interstate militarized conflicts involve national security.

The propensities of individualism and collectivism lead to different interpretations and evaluations of casualties in a conflict. The literature posits that collectivists are more likely to place greater emphasis on group interests rather than individual ones, while individualists place more weight on the benefits and interests of the person rather than on the interests of the group to which they belong.

Hence, it is reasonable to assume that public reaction to casualties is divided between those who follow collectivism versus those who follow an individualistic orientation. When perceiving casualties, people in collectivistic societies would place more weight on the national goals associated with military conflicts where the soldiers were killed than on the casualties themselves. In contrast, an individualistic public

places more saliency on casualties, a personal belonging, than on the goals for which they died. Therefore, when processing information about a conflict, I expect that human casualties may draw less consideration in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society. Using the CC terminology, two propositions follow:

Proposition 1

The society that follows collectivism (COL) views casualties as less relevant or important than those who follow individualism (IN).

Proposition 2

The society that follows collectivism (COL) puts less negative valence (value) on casualties than those who follow individualism (IN).

As mentioned earlier, there are two opposite views concerning the ambiguity intolerance: (1) ambiguity intolerance raises the decision threshold; (2) ambiguity intolerance lowers the decision threshold. These two interpretations have a direct effect on information processing since lowering and raising the decision threshold influences the number of items a person will acquire prior to stopping the decision process.

On the basis of Hofstede's interpretation (Hofstede 1997), if the decision maker is more likely to avoid ambiguity, he/she will tend to acquire more information before reaching a final choice. Hence, the threshold tends to be higher in this case. Accordingly, a decision maker in a society with a relatively low level of ambiguity intolerance will tend to reach a final decision with less information and, thus, the decision threshold will be lower.

The alternative proposition is based on Kruglanski and Ajzen's (1983) notion that high ambiguity intolerance requires less information and demands that decision makers arrive at closure sooner because ambiguity intolerance requires a structure in

order to comprehend the situation and information, thus intensifying the tendency to adhere to current and early information. Therefore, a decision maker who has high ambiguity intolerance is more likely to have a lower decision threshold and need less information. Based on the two competing theories about the impact of ambiguity intolerance, I propose the two following contending propositions:

Proposition 3a

A public that exhibits a high degree of ambiguity intolerance (wants to minimize ambiguity in the decision) will have a higher threshold of the decision, and thus they will need more information before reaching a final choice.

Proposition 3b

A public that exhibits a high degree of ambiguity intolerance will have a lower decision threshold, and thus will need less information en route to the final choice.

In addition to the above propositions that deal with the effects of the cultural dimensions on process and choice, I include a proposition that is derived directly from the CC model and is explored in this study in conjunction with the cultural factor. This proposition addresses the effects of variations in the saliency of the choice to the decision makers. Specifically, it is posited that the more salient the decision, and the more “urgent” the solution, the lower the decision threshold will be, causing less information to be required prior to making a choice.

Proposition 4

An increase in the salience of the decision to the respondents will decrease the length of the decision process (in time and number of items acquired), and it may increase attention to the information that has been acquired.

Finally, based on the literature that considers casualties associated with a military intervention as a cost and the findings that states are ready to incur more costs for goals

that are more important to them (Hensel and Diehl 1994; Bennett 1998), it is reasonable to propose the following:

Proposition 5

An increase in the number of expected casualties in a military intervention will reduce the public's support for that intervention.

These propositions lead to the following hypotheses that are tested in this study.

Hypotheses

This section proposes hypotheses to be analyzed, as well as outlines the two experiments used as tools for testing them. The hypotheses are designed to test the differences between American and Korean participants with regard to their choices and their decision processes. The two experimental designs are developed in the contexts of a humanitarian scenario and security scenario.

By adapting the CC model, I argue in the proposition that individualism vs. collectivism will have an impact on the decision through both relevance (weight) and valence (value) attributed to the information on the expected casualties. The different levels of ambiguity intolerance will have an impact on the process through the leniency of the threshold. Likewise, increasing the salience of the objective makes things more important, but also more urgent, which results in a lower threshold and a quicker decision.

Based on the propositions outlined earlier and the specific layout of the experiment, the following general set of hypotheses can be derived. These hypotheses separately address the choices people make and the processes they use in making their decision.

Hypotheses about Choice

These hypotheses mainly focus on the expected effect of the collectivism vs. individualism dimension (expressed in the cultural difference between Korea and the United States) on the valence and relevance of the casualty information provided during the experiment.

Collectivists are more likely to put greater emphasis on group interests as opposed to individual ones. In contrast, people who live in a more individualistic society place greater weight on the benefits and interests of the person rather than on the group. Accordingly, I hypothesize that expected human casualties may draw less consideration in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society. Hence, I contend that Koreans, as compared to Americans, would have a greater tolerance for expected casualties when deciding the use of force in military foreign policy.

Ha1: Koreans will be more supportive of a military deployment than will Americans. (Based on propositions 1, 2 and 5)

Ha2 addresses the effect of salience on support for the use of force. The hypothesis reflects the expectation that states are ready to incur more costs for goals that are more important to them (Hensel and Diehl 1994; Bennett 1998). Thus, I hypothesize that the public will more strongly support the use of force as a function of the salience of the objective, especially when the salience is manipulated in the relevance of the victims to the respondents.

Ha2: Higher saliency of the crisis will increase public support for deployment of the military. (Proposition 5)

The next hypothesis addresses the expected interaction of culture and casualties. If valence and relevance of casualties are affected by collectivism or individualism, and if as stated in proposition 2, the number of casualties is less important in the Korean culture, then I can expect an interaction between the two societies and the number of casualties. Americans, having lower levels of collectivism, but higher levels of individualism, place more weight on individual cost rather than cost to the group in comparison to Koreans. Therefore, it is expected that Americans will put more relevance (weight) and valence (value) on the expected casualties associated with policy choices. In conclusion, a change in expected casualties should have a more negative impact on the support for use of force for Americans than for Koreans.

Ha3: The negative impact of higher numbers of casualties on support for the use of force is expected to be stronger for American subjects than for Korean subjects.

Hypotheses Concerning the Process

These hypotheses focus on the expected effects of the ambiguity intolerance dimension that distinguishes between the decision processes of the two nations. This cultural dimension is expected to influence the process mainly through relocating the decision threshold.

The effect of ambiguity intolerance on the decision-making process will be identified by measuring the number of items needed by the subjects to reach final decision, the recall of these the items, and time spent on items. I have already discussed the two competing expectations concerning the effects of the ambiguity intolerance on

the decision threshold. Based on the two different views of ambiguity intolerance, I hereby present both hypotheses.

*Hb1a [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a stringent threshold]:
Relative to Americans, Koreans are more likely to review more items, will recall more items, and spend more time on items, en route to their final decisions.*

*Hb1b [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a lenient threshold]:
Relative to Koreans, Americans are more likely to review more items, will recall more items, and spend more time on items, en route to their final decisions.*

The next hypothesis concerns the effect of issue salience involved in the crisis on the three dependent measures. It focuses on a factor that has been shown to affect the threshold (Bragg and Geva 2004) and is used in part to validate the experimental procedure, as well as to increase the construct validity of the previous hypothesis.

Hb2: Saliency of the decision will decrease the time spent on the decision (urgency) while increasing attention to the items that have been reviewed (higher recall). (Proposition 4)

Method

The major empirical thrust of this dissertation rests on the experimental method. Although the experimental design has been criticized as lacking external validity, some scientists praise the strength of this particular method (Lijphart 1971). The experimental design can better illustrate clear and unambiguous causal relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables by *controlling* other factors that may affect the dependent variable (Mook 1982; Collier 1993; Lijphart 1975; McDermott

2004).⁶ The next section describes the basic context of the experiment designs and how they relate to the hypotheses to be tested.

The General Experimental Contexts

Participants from both societies were asked to make a decision about whether or not to deploy their military forces to a particular international crisis, based on a given scenario and information set that is provided to help them make the choice. To make it relevant to both societies (especially to Korea), the policy was defined as a deployment of military units as part of a multi-lateral U.N. sponsored or approved international force.

As part of the conceptualization, I posited that the objective of intervention may be a factor in the decision process. Hence, depending on the experiment, humanitarian as well as national security objectives were presented.⁷ These were realistic objectives based on previous U.N. interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia. National security is a critical ingredient for the level of tolerance of casualties (Larson 1996). Therefore, exploring the two different interests in separate experimental settings (a humanitarian crisis or a security issue) should have enhanced the robustness of the findings of this study. Because while the different objectives of intervention affect the importance of the decision, I also introduced the factor of salience within each experiment to see how it would mediate the perception of casualties and affect both process and choice.

⁶ Although experiment is a good approach to control environmental factors, there are certainly limitations to such control for experimenters. This is because prior experiences, beliefs, expectations, and the skills of the participants may affect the results of experiments. The random assignment of subjects to experimental conditions is the conventional method of dealing with these (and other) individual differences (McDermott 2002).

⁷ See the experiment scenarios in chapters V and VI.

The information sets that were used to make the decision were based on previous information sets used by Geva (2006).⁸ Immediately after reviewing the scenario, including the saliency manipulation, participants were given the option of seeing as many additional information items as they wanted to help them in making their choice. The information sets included variations in the number of casualties that were expected in the operation, which was one of the main independent variables in the study.

The Experimental Designs

The translation or specification of the theory to an empirical investigation was implemented via computer-based experiments. The study employed two sets of 3x2x2 between-groups factorial designs. The three factors were the level of expected casualties (low-medium-high), the salience of the objective (low-high), and the cultural identity of the participants (Americans and Koreans). The main dependent measures were the participants' support of a use of force policy in a hypothetical conflict and the process parameters. The more detailed descriptions of the experiments are presented in the following sections. Figure 3-2 is the outline of experimental design.

Participants

Each information set was administered to a different group of participants. The three groups were composed of Americans students, South Korean students, and members of the Korean military. The American participants consisted of two hundred

⁸ See Appendix 1 for the information set.

and fifty undergraduate students attending Texas A&M University. They were recruited from introductory political science courses.

There were two Korean groups, the first included three hundred and twenty undergraduate students at universities in the three major cities of Korea-- Seoul, Pusan, and Kwangjoo. The second Korean group was composed of two hundred and thirteen military officers at Korean National Defense University in Seoul. The military officers were all in the masters degree program and were between 25 and 35 years old.

There is no claim that the samples of the study are fully representative of the two societies. While the Korean students were recruited from several universities in three different cities, the American students reflect one location, which is typically considered more conservative than other student bodies. It may be argued that a more diversified sample of American students would produce different findings. However, it should also be noted that in terms of the cultural variables that are expected to differentiate between Americans and Koreans, my findings show that the two samples are different in the predicted direction.⁹ Furthermore, along Mook's (1983) argument on the deductive underpinning of experiment, if the theory is valid, then its derivatives should be expressed in the two specific samples provided that the experiments reflect appropriately the key concepts of the theory.

I administered the experiments in September 2006 with the Korean subjects and in October 2006 with the American subjects. Noting the temporal context of the administration especially for American subjects is important. Terrorists attacks of

⁹ While this argument does not fully discount effects of political ideology (e.g. conservatism) on foreign policy preferences, the main focus of this study is on the effects of culture.


September 11, 2001, and the ongoing war in Iraq could affect the perception of expected casualties when conducting the experiments with American subjects. Specifically, the number of American soldiers killed in the ongoing war was approximately three thousand when the experiments were conducted. Hence, the American participants may have had different expectations concerning fatalities than their Korean counterparts.

Participants in each group were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions.

Procedure

The experiments were administered through an online-based decision program, the Dec-Tracer.¹⁰ Participants were seated in front of computers connected to Dec-Tracer through the Internet. Using Dec-Tracer, participants were presented with scenarios introduced to tasks, and asked to make a foreign policy. The program recorded not only each subjects' final choice but also their overall decision process e.g., time spent and the information reviewed.

¹⁰ The Dec-Tracer program was developed by Uri Geva and Infinity Design.



The experiments proceeded in four basic steps.¹¹ First, participants read the basic instructions, which reviewed the overall procedure of the experiment. Then, the subjects were exposed to the scenarios, either experiment 1 involving the humanitarian scenario or experiment 2 introducing the security scenario. In both experiments, participants were asked whether they supported or rejected deployment of military units of their country as part of a U.N. multilateral force to resolve a crisis. During the second phase, additional information about the crisis was provided. Participants could make

¹¹ Prior to conduct each experiment, participants were asked to read a consent form approved by the Institutional Review Board of Texas A&M University.

their choice and stop reviewing information at any time. The subjects were also asked to indicate how confident they were of the selection they had made.

Third, after the selection of a policy option, participants were provided with a list of countries and asked to list their capitals. This exercise helped to “remove” information from the participants’ short-term memory. Following this distraction the participants were asked to recall the information from the scenario they had read. Finally, the experiments ended with questionnaires designed to assess individualism vs. collectivism (Singelis 1994), ambiguity intolerance (Budner 1962), helping to confirm the relationship between the assumed cultural difference of the countries and the actual cultural beliefs of the two samples of participants.¹² Figure 3-3 shows the flow of the procedure of the experiments.

Experiment 1: Humanitarian Issue

Experiment 1 focused on a humanitarian issue: the hypothetical scenario described a case where the members of the American and Korean Red Cross participate in a humanitarian response in an African country whose citizens are suffering from a relentless civil war. The situation in this country is exacerbating regional tensions, therefore the U.N. Security Council decides to send a U.N. peacekeeping force to stop the killing of civilians and enforce a peace agreement. The scenario is based on the current Dafur crisis in Sudan where the militia (admittedly supported by the Sudanese government) has attacked civilians and killed over 300,000.

¹² See Appendix 2 for the questionnaires.

Figure 3-3: Procedure of the Experiments

Step 1: INTRODUCTION/SCENARIO

Initial Experimental Instructions: Experimenter explains topic of experiment and role subjects are to play. Subjects read informed consent forms. Participants seat themselves at a computer, then randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Then, they start to read the scenarios by using Dec-tracer program.

Step 2: CHECK INFORMATION/MAKING DECISION

Participants could access information when clicking information button in the screen until information sets run out of items or choose a policy option. Participants would select a policy option either sending troops or not sending troops. option.

Item #1:

Item #2:

Item #3:

Item #20:

Step 3: RECALL THE INFORMATION

Participants are asked to recall what they read when clicking information sets.

Step 4: POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE

Participants are given three questionnaire: collectivism (12questions), individualism(12 questions), and ambiguity intolerance(18 questions).

The research design represents two contexts that differ along the two cultural dimensions (individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance), the number of expected casualties (low, medium, high), and the salience of the objective (low- high). The dependent variables of the experiment included process parameters of decision making (number of items used, recall of items, and time spent on items) and the final choice itself (to send forces or not to send forces). Figure 3-4 presents the overall scheme of the experiment.

The highly salient case would be threats to the Red Cross members from the participants' own country, while a low-salience case would be threats to the Red Cross members from a different country. In other words, a highly salient case for American participants would be when members of the American Red Cross are in danger. A low-salience case for American participants would be when Korean Red Cross members are threatened by rebel forces.

Figure 3-4: Experiment 1 Humanitarian Issue

<u>American participants</u>				<u>Korean participants</u>			
	Low casualties	Medium casualties	High casualties		Low casualties	Medium casualties	High casualties
Low salience	A	B	C	Low salience	G	H	I
High salience	D	E	F	High salience	J	K	L

After reading the scenarios, participants could view as many items as they wanted to see. The first item they reviewed was related to the expected number of casualties, which were broken into three variations of the expected number of casualties: 5, 50, and 200. Taking into consideration the number of troops that would be deployed, a regiment of 1,000 soldiers, I regarded 5 as respectively “low casualties,” 50 as “medium casualties,” and 200 as “high casualties.”

Experiment 2: Security Issue

Experiment 2 was basically a conceptual replication of the first experiment, but it moved the decision task from a humanitarian context to a security one. I expected that the two different contexts would result in differing perceptions of casualties. Additionally, Americans and Koreans were expected to differ in their interpretation of expected casualties within the security context.

In this second experiment, the hypothetical scenario stated that the U.N. Security Council had approved the use of force to remove the ground forces of a “target nation” that had invaded a neighboring country. The invading country had also been supportive of international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, this country had been accused of supporting the terrorist bombing that killed Americans or Koreans in the area.

The saliency manipulation in this scenario was introduced in the following form. The highly salient case was expected to be a terrorist attack on citizens of each of the participants’ own countries, while a low-salience case would be a terrorist attack on citizens from another country. In other words, a highly salient case for American

participants would be a terrorist attack on Americans. An example of a low salient case for American participants would be a terrorist attack on Koreans. The variations of the expected number of casualties in the military operations are 5, 50, and 200. The other items in the information set were also adapted to the new scenario. The same independent variables of experiment 1 were employed in the factorial design (3x2x2). Furthermore, a similar set of hypotheses was tested using the same dependent measures.

CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL DIFFERENCE - AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This chapter presents empirical evidence that American students and Korean participants differ along the two cultural dimensions: collectivism vs. individualism and ambiguity intolerance.

Cultural Difference between American Students and Korean Subjects

Previous literature in cross-national studies by anthropologists and sociologists have asserted (and sometimes demonstrated) that Americans and Koreans are different along cultural dimensions (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Hofstede 2001). Thus, American participants are expected to be different from the Korean participants along the two cultural dimensions of collectivism vs. individualism, and ambiguity intolerance. To test this assumption I used scales that were employed in previous studies to illustrate differences between these two groups (Singelis 1994; Budner 1962).

For collectivism vs. individualism, I used a version of a scale developed by Singelis (1994) (see Appendix 2). The significant element in this scale is that it is based on the notion that individuals can be high or low on both dimensions of collectivism and individualism (that they are not just opposite poles of a continuum). Based on this idea, this scale has two sub-scales for each of the two dimensions: collectivism and individualism. Singelis (1994) initially developed the scale for use with students as subjects. Thus, it is suitable for this research that employs students as subjects in both

Korea and America. Also, the scale I used focuses on the individual's preferences. In this regard, the author culled items from various previously developed scales, then rewrote some questions from the perspective of "I."

For ambiguity intolerance, I used Budner's (1962) scale (see Appendix 2) that has the important feature of separating the positive and negative items associated with ambiguity intolerance. Specifically, it contains sixteen items, eight positive and eight negative. Positive items are geared to check ambiguity intolerance, while negative items are designed to measure ambiguity tolerance. Thus, scoring of negative items is in the reverse direction. Therefore, the sum of the scores from both positive and negative items is the measure of ambiguity intolerance.

Collectivism vs. Individualism Scale

Since the Singles' (1994) scales of collectivism vs. individualism were developed on the basis of changes he introduced to other existing scales. Since converting and adapting scales to be relevant to different cultures requires sensitivity to the members of a culture, I tested the inter-reliability of the items with the total scores on each scale for the two cultures.

Based on informal feedback from Korean and American students, I chose certain items from both questionnaires. In doing so I used two criteria. The first one reflects face validity of the items in terms of their relevance to the cultural dimensions. Second, I considered the correlation between the items and the total for each subscale for the two cultural groups (See Table 4-1). Consequently, I selected six items for collectivism and

seven items for individualism respectively on the basis of the above standards (Appendix 2 for the items selected). In the actual experiment, the final scales were presented in random sequence of items.

Table 4-1: Correlation Scores of Selected Items with the New Totals

Questionnaire	Items	Americans (n=253)	Koreans (n=533)
Collectivism	6	0.564	0.620
	7	0.523	0.663
	9	0.569	0.676
	10	0.598	0.661
	11	0.530	0.560
	12	0.554	0.611
Individualism	14	0.618	0.593
	15	0.458	0.568
	16	0.553	0.416
	19	0.556	0.553
	21	0.551	0.498
	22	0.588	0.492
	23	0.479	0.492

In the next stage I conducted ANOVA tests for the expected difference. Overall, the two groups are significantly different along the cultural indexes: collectivism vs. individualism, and ambiguity intolerance. Korean participants are higher in collectivism, whereas American students are stronger in individualism than are Koreans subjects.

Figure 4 -1 illustrates the mean scores of collectivism among the three groups. The degree of collectivism along the three groups is: Korean military (M=7.63); Korean

students ($M=7.39$); and American students ($M=6.30$). The differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level [$F(2,783)=81.04$, $p<.0001$]. Correspondingly, the Scheffe tests table (Table 4-2) shows that the difference between American students and Korean students are statistically significant, while both Korean groups are not different from each other.




Table 4-2 : Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Collectivism Rating among Three Groups

Group	Mean Diff.	P-value
American students vs. Korean military	-1.327	0.0001**
American students vs. Korean students	-1.087	0.0001**
Korean military vs. Korean students.	0.240	0.089

Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean students=320, *p<0.05, **p<0.01.

Figure 4-2 shows the mean scores of individualism among the three groups: American students (M=7.28), Korean students (M=6.61), Korean students (M=6.24). This pattern is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level [F(2,783)=55.73, p<.0001]. Table 4-3, the Scheffe tests table, demonstrates that the difference between American and Korean students is statistically significant. In this case, the Korean military is more individualistic than the students, but not as individualistic as the American students.




Table 4-3: Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Individualism Rating among Three Groups

Group	Mean Diff.	P-value
American students vs. Korean military	0.662	0.0001***
American students vs. Korean students	1.041	0.0001***
Korean military vs. Korean students.	0.379	0.0014***

Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean students=320, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

In order to see which trait is stronger in each group, I calculated the difference between collectivism and individualism for each participant. A positive score indicates that the person is more collectivistic, and a negative score suggests that the person is more individualistic.

Figure 4-3 shows us the gap between collectivism and individualism among those three groups: Korean groups are more collectivistic than Americans, whereas American subjects are stronger in individualism than Koreans participants. The difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level [$F(2,783)=222.10, p<.0001$]. Table 4-4 is the Scheffe tests table that indicates statistical differences along the three groups. The results show that American students and Korean groups (students and military) are significantly different at 0.001 level [$p<.0001$]. However, there is no statistical difference between the Korean military and Korean students.




Table 4-4 : Scheffe Tests for the Distance between Mean of Collectivism and That of Individualism

Group	Mean Diff.	P-value
American students vs. Korean military	-1.989	0.0001***
American students vs. Korean students	-2.128	0.0001***
Korean military vs. Korean students.	-0.139	0.478

Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean students=320, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Ambiguity Intolerance Scale

According to the following results, it appears that Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity than are Americans. Figure 4-4 illustrates the mean scores of ambiguity intolerance among these three groups. Korean participants (Korean military and

students $M=5.76$) are less tolerant of ambiguity than are American students ($M=4.71$). However, there is no significant difference between the two Koreans groups. This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.01 level [$F(2,783)=293.372, p<.0001$]. The Scheff tests table (Table 4-5) shows that the difference is the statistically significant between American and Korean subjects only.




Table 4-5: Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Ambiguity Intolerance Rating among Three Groups

Group	Mean Diff.	P-value
American students vs. Korean military	-1.176	0.0001***
American students vs. Korean students	-1.139	0.0001***
Korean military vs. Korean students.	0.038	0.792

Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean students=320, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

In conclusion, as expected, American and Korean students are distinguishable in the three facets of cultural mindset: Korean students are more collectivistic than American students, less individualistic than American students, and less tolerant to ambiguity than their American counterparts. It is of interest that despite the age difference and career experience, both the Korean military and Korean students demonstrated similar patterns of cultural influence.¹³

¹³ With the exception along the individualism scale.

CHAPTER V

EXPERIMENT ONE- HUMANITARIAN ISSUE

This chapter describes the setup of experiment 1, which deals with humanitarian issues, and discusses its results. The empirical results are presented separately for choice and for the process parameters. The chapter ends with the discussion of the results.

This experiment was designed to assess the degree to which expected casualties influence public foreign policy decision making in both America and South Korea. The experiment consisted of 2x3 factorial designs in which the factors were the saliency of the conflict (high salience and low salience) and the levels of expected casualties (5, 50, 200). Three groups of participants were used in this experiment: 128 undergraduate students at Texas A&M University; 157 undergraduate students in South Korean universities; and 102 military officers at the Korean National Defense University. Thus, the nature of the groups constituted the third independent variable. Participants in each society were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. They were asked to read about a hypothetical crisis occurring in Chagola, a fictional country in Africa, and then were asked to make a decision about whether or not their country should send troops to handle the crisis.

The saliency manipulation was provided as part of the basic scenario. The manipulation of expected casualties was presented after the crisis scenarios as part of the information set. Dependent variables were the choices participants made, the number of items viewed, the average amount of time taken to view an item of information, and the

proportion of recalled information from the information reviewed. Simple recall may reflect the number of items reviewed. Thus, a variable to check the proportion of recalled items from all items reviewed was devised to indirectly measure- how much attention participants paid to the items of information they saw. In other words, this variable was designed to check sensitivity to information. The average amount of time taken to view items was another measure of attention participants paid to each item.

Experimental Procedure and Manipulations

Participants were informed that they would be introduced to an ongoing conflict in Chagola. Then, they would be asked to decide whether or not their county should send troops as part of a U.N. force in order to mitigate the severity of the conflict. In this regard, all participants were acquainted with the Chagolian crisis via the following depiction:

The U.N. Security Council has convened to review an ongoing conflict in Chagola, an African country. The conflict, between rebel groups and the militia, recruited from local tribes and armed by Chagola's government, has generated over 300,000 civilian deaths. The militia, admittedly supported by the government, has ruthlessly attacked civilian villages in the region where rebel groups camp in order to eliminate the members of the rebel group. The militia has killed noncombatants including women, the elderly, and even children in the villages.

The Security Council defined the situation as "genocide" and decided to send a U.N. multi-national force of peacekeepers to enforce the U.N. resolution to stop the killing of civilians. The U.N. asked that the United States or South Korea provide a combat unit (almost a regiment – 1000 soldiers) to participate in the forceful resolution of the crisis.

Your task is to review new information about the crisis and decide whether or not your country should deploy a combatant to participate in this military mission.

The origins of the conflict have three dimensions: political, ethnic, and economic. Politically, Chagola's current regime has long wanted to uproot the rebellious armed group in that region. In order to do this, Chagola's government has recruited a militia from the local tribes, trained and armed them, and uses them to attack the rebellious groups. Ethnically, the current government has strong characteristics of Arabic Africans. However, the region in which the rebels are housed is dominated by non-Arabic Africans. Therefore, the militia, being controlled by the government, has directly targeted the non-Arabic Africans' villages. In addition, the two ethnic groups have differing economic needs. The Arabic African tribes are nomadic, while the non-Arabic African tribes are farmers. These differing economic needs have led to clashes over access to land and water.

In early 2003, the rebel groups accused the government of oppressing non-Arabic tribes in favor of Arabic tribes, then initiating attacks by government forces and the militia group. In response to these attacks, the militia, controlled by the Chagola's government, attacked the non-Arabic African villages, burned them, raped the women, and killed everyone from the youngest to the oldest. The Human Right Watch, a non-governmental organization monitoring human rights, estimates that over 300,000 people had already died by October 2005. In addition, these armed attacks against noncombatants resulted in unbearable starvation, disease, and refugees. More than 1.8 million people have been displaced from their homes. According to the WHO (the World Health Organization) by September 2005, the estimated death toll was 50,000 from starvation and disease.

The Manipulations

As previously mentioned, the high salience case would be threats to members of the Red Cross of the participants' own country, while a low salient case would be threats to members of the Red Cross from participants' non-native country. Specifically, a high salience for American participants was that members of American Red Cross in the region were faced with serious security threats. A low salience case for American participants was that Korean Red Cross members were threatened by rebel forces. The

situation was reversed for the Korean participants. Table 5-1 represents salience manipulations for the American participants and for the South Korean participants.

Table 5-1: Salience Manipulations for Participants

Groups	Low salience	High salience
Americans participants	<p>Korean Red Cross Since 2004, over fifty members of the Korean Red Cross have been dispatched to help the people in the region, and have attempted to provide food and medicines to the hungry and wounded. However, Chagola's government and militia have prevented them from reaching the people most in need. Worse, militia groups have threatened some members of the Korean Red Cross who were trying to help.</p>	<p>American Red Cross Since 2004, over fifty members of the American Red Cross have been dispatched to help the people in the region, and have attempted to provide food and medicines to the hungry and wounded. However, Chagola's government and militia have prevented them from reaching the people most in need. Worse, militia groups have threatened some members of the American Red Cross who were trying to help.</p>
Koreans participants	<p>American Red Cross Since 2004, over fifty members of the American Red Cross have been dispatched to help the people in the region, and have attempted to provide food and medicines to the hungry and wounded. However, Chagola's government and militia have prevented them from reaching the people most in need. Worse, militia groups have threatened some members of the American Red Cross who were trying to help.</p>	<p>Korean Red Cross Since 2004, over fifty members of the Korean Red Cross have been dispatched to help the people in the region, and have attempted to provide food and medicines to the hungry and wounded. However, Chagola's government and militia have prevented them from reaching the people most in need. Worse, militia groups have threatened some members of the Korean Red Cross who were trying to help.</p>

The Information Sets¹⁴

Immediately after reviewing the scenario, including saliency manipulation, participants were given the option of seeing as many additional information items as they wanted to help them in making their choice. The information set consisted of three sorts of items: items in support of sending troops (twelve items), against sending troops (six items), and neutral to sending troops (two items). Items were considered pro if they were in favor of the use of force policy.

On the contrary, items against sending troops included “The Association of African Americans in the United States opposes sending troops to the region.” Items were considered neutral if they were not related to the case, i.e., “Japan and the United States have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic satellite research in the Pacific.” The sequence of the items reflected a pattern of against sending a force, for sending a force, and neutral for sending a force. The first item of information, which is categorized as an item for not sending troops, is the expected casualties if the country dispatches their troops to the conflict. “The secretary of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around 5, 50, 200.”

Results

The first analyses compared the American students and Korean students. Then, I report the comparison of the Korean students and Korean military officers along some

¹⁴ See Appendix 1 for the information sets.


variables. A 3x2x2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was employed for all the dependent variables.

American Students vs. Korean Students

Choice

I coded the support for military deployment as 1 and 0 if the participant selected not to deploy forces. Figure 5-1 illustrates the proportion of participants who selected to deploy force as a function of the number of expected casualties (across groups and saliency of the conflict). While the pattern of the responses conforms to the expectations (i.e., more expected casualties less support of military deployment) this pattern did not reach an acceptable statistically significant level, $[F(2, 273) = 1.48]$. It should be noted that this experimental factor did not affect the choices in either group $[F < 1.0]$.

The results show that American students are more likely to choose to send troops ($M = .89$), across both salience conditions and casualty levels, than are the Korean Students ($M = .51$). This contrast is statistically significant $[F(1, 273) = 59.46, p < 0.0001]$. But this pattern does not support hypothesis Ha1 which states that Korean students are more likely to support sending troops. In addition, the analysis did not yield the expected interaction between cultural group and the level of expected casualties. I will address these results in the discussion section of this chapter.



Process


Number of items reviewed

In terms of the experimental factors, the 3x2x2 ANOVA did not yield any main-effects of the number of casualties or the salience of the conflict on the number of items participants reviewed. In general, participants made their choice after viewing an average of 6.78 items. As expected in proposition 3b and hypothesis Hb1b concerning the effect of AI on the decision threshold and thereby on the number of items used, the Korean students (who are less tolerant of ambiguity) reviewed fewer items ($M=6.15$) than the American students ($M=7.53$), $[F(1,273)=3.05, p<0.05]$.¹⁵ Thus, the results support hypothesis Hb1b: Relative to Koreans, Americans who are more tolerant to

¹⁵ One-tailed

ambiguity, are more likely to review more items, will recall more of the items, and spend more time on items en route to final decision.

There is a significant interaction effect of casualty, salience, and groups on the number of items reviewed (See Figure 5-2). This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.05 level [$F(2,273)=3.03$, $p<0.04$]. American students usually requested more information for low and high casualties when it was of low salience. On the other hand, Korean students were just the opposite when casualties were in the mid-range. They asked for more information at low salience and at high salience. While I did not have any *a-priori* hypotheses for this interaction, the findings suggest that American students and Korean students are influenced differently by a combination of casualties and salience. So culture (group) mediates the effects of the two factors in a complex way.



Finally, to illustrate the applicability of the CC as a process model, I would expect that those who choose to send troops require more information than those who selected not to send troops. This expectation is based on the fact that since the first item in the information set is negatively valenced with regard to sending troops, it increases the distance of the choice propensity from the “send troops” threshold. In fact (among the Korean students) those who selected to send troops attended to more items ($M=6.55$) than those who selected the other alternative ($M=5.18$), [$F(1, 314)=2.83, p<0.05$]¹⁶.

¹⁶ One-tailed, Not sending troops= 124, Sending troops=196.

Time used to review information

I calculated for each participant the average time used per item (total decision time divided by number of items reviewed). The ANOVA yielded a significant main-effect of saliency (See Table 5-2). When the conflict has a higher saliency, participants were faster reviewing an information item ($M=10.77$ sec.) than when the saliency was lower ($M=13.08$ sec.), [$F(1,273)=3.45, p<0.06$]. This result supports the notion of urgency (and lower TH) associated with saliency. The outcome also supports the first part of hypothesis Hb2¹⁷, namely, that saliency of the decision will decrease the time spent on the decision (urgency) while increasing attention to the items that have been reviewed (higher recall).

Table 5-2: Mean of the Average Time Taken to View Each Information Item

Saliency	Mean	Std. Dev.
High saliency	10.77	6.94
Low saliency	13.08	12.35

Note: N of observations High saliency=193, Low saliency=194

Attention to items


I operationalized the attention to information by assessing the number of items recalled at the final stages of the experiment. However, since American students viewed more items than their Korean counterparts, they have a larger pool of items to recall

¹⁷ The analysis shows that American students were significantly faster in reviewing an item of information than Korean students. However, since this main-effect may represent linguistic differences we have decided not to dwell on this contrast.

from. Hence, I calculated for each participant the proportion of correctly recalled items from the number of items she/he reviewed.

The ANOVA shows a salience main-effect. In conditions of high salience subjects have a higher proportion of recall (.44) than in conditions of low salience (.35), [F(1,273)=4.63,p<0.04]. Hence, high saliency increased the urgency in the process making the decision makers work faster and pay more attention per item.

In addition, American students exhibited a higher proportion of recall (.48) than do Korean students (.32), [F(1,273)=12.17, p<0.0006]. This pattern indicates that American students paid more attention to the information they reviewed than did Korean students, which confirms the notion that the American TH is higher than that of the Korean.



Of interest is the two-way interaction between salience and cultural group on the proportion of items recalled, [F (1,272)=3.06, $p<0.08$]. Figure 5-3 shows that American students are more sensitive to salience than are Koreans students.

Korean Students vs. Korean Military Officers

Choice

Although salience had no significant impact on choice [F (1,247)=0.04], casualties had a significant impact on choice (See Table 5-3). Specifically, Table 5-3 indicates that casualty levels have a significant influence on choosing whether or not to send troops [F(1,247)=3.21, $p<0.041$]. In other words, it indicates that Koreans are more sensitive to casualty levels than Americans for whom the level of casualties had no effect.

Table 5-3: Mean of Choosing to Send Troops

Casualty levels	Mean	Std. Dev.
Low casualty	0.71	0.45
Mid casualty	0.57	0.49
High casualty	0.53	0.50

Note: N. of observations; low casualty 92, mid casualty 87, high casualty 80.

Regarding choice, as expected (c.f. Semmel and Minix 1979), Korean military officers are more likely to choose sending a force than are Korean students (see Table 5-4). This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.01 level [F(1, 273)=18.64, $p< 0.0001$]. Semmel and Minix (1979) argue that soldiers are more likely to take aggressive position

in foreign policy decision making than students as an expression of role expectations. Although different experiences and knowledge of the two groups may affect the choices, one can also consider Nincic and Nincic's (1995) argument concerning differential perspectives of elites and the general public. Here, it is reasonable to assume that the military officers (similar to elites) perceive the expected casualties as an investment with an expectation for future benefits. Meanwhile, students (similar to public) may view the expected casualties from a consumer perspective.


Table 5-4: Mean of Selecting to Send Troops

Groups	Mean	Std. Dev.
Korean students	0.51	0.50
Korean military	0.77	0.42

Note: N of observations Korean students=157, Korean military=102; Choice: sending troops-1, not sending troops-0.

Process

Korean military and students show no critical differences in the process of decision making except an interaction effect. A two-way interaction was obtained between salience and group. The pattern is illustrated in Figure 5-4. Korean military subjects spent more time reviewing information in cases of high salience, while Korean students put more time into viewing information in cases of low salience. This pattern is statistically significant at a 0.05 level [$F(1,247)=6.12, p<0.014$].



Summary of Findings

In summary, Korean students are most sensitive to variations in casualties and to casualties in general. However, salience has no significant impact on the choice. Collectivism as a factor that should have affected the value of casualties is not confirmed by the experimental findings, especially due to the lack of interaction effect between groups and levels of casualties. Treatment of salience does not have an effect.

As for the decision process, as I expected, ambiguity tolerance has an impact on the process of decision making. Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity than are American students in their decisions. As Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) argued, intolerance of ambiguity lowers the threshold of decision making. Accordingly, Korean students lowered their threshold and needed to view fewer items. In accordance with the number

of items reviewed, Korean students recalled fewer items than American students did. The ratio of recalled items from items reviewed is smaller for Korean students than for American students. It indicates that Korean students paid less attention to information than American students.¹⁸

Saliency has an effect on the process, especially for American students. Saliency speeded the process but resulted in more recall, which expresses in increased attention. However, further research is required to prove if saliency lowers or makes the decision threshold higher.

Discussion

Experiment 1 employed two types of dependent variables- choices either to send troops or to not send troops - and several process parameters, which are the number of items reviewed, proportion of recalled items, and average time taken to review each item. First, I will discuss some issues with regard to the two groups,- American students vs. Korean students. Then I will address issues from the three groups including the Korean military.

¹⁸ However, it is not consistent with the initial expectation that Korean students would spend more seconds reviewing each information item than American students. If Korean students used more time to review items, they should have recalled more items than American students. Thus, I contend that the linguistic difference between the English and Korean languages caused the inconsistency. Items of information in Korean were longer than those in English. Consequently, it required more time for Korean students to comprehend them.

Choice

Putting it succinctly, unlike the suggestion of hypothesis Ha1, American students are more likely to choose to send troops ($M=0.89$) than Korean students ($M=0.51$). Korean choices are more sensitive to casualties. However, salience has no effect on the choice. The results are contrary to my expectation, as the findings suggest that the casualty items had less weight for the Americans than for Koreans.

There are two explanations for this finding. One is associated with the propensity for collectivism in the Korean culture interpreted by Kunda (1999). I have initially proposed that collectivism vs. individualism have an impact on the evaluation of costs (i.e. expected casualties). In other words, a collectivistic society (i.e. South Korea) puts less negative value on casualties than an individualistic society. However casualties are a cost in a cost-benefit analysis. Although Bragg (2006) argues that people are inclined to focus more on the costs of political decisions than on the benefits, we need to recognize that support for sending troops is a function of the costs and benefits of the intervention.

It is plausible in the humanitarian context, that South Korean students and American students define benefits from military intervention differently. It is also possible that the collectivist orientation of the Koreans is focused on a narrow in-group concept. Hence, the Koreans may be less sensitive to the perils of the victims of the humanitarian crisis than the Americans. In other words, although Korean students and American students perceive the same costs (same number of expected casualties in the experiment), the perceptions of benefits are different for both cases. Therefore, Korean

students and American students show different levels of support for sending troops because of the different anticipated benefits resulting from the military intervention.

I explore this argument in the second experiment of this project where the scenario offers similar benefits to the Korean and American students. Specifically, the second experiment involves security threats that are relevant to both societies. Here, Korean students and American students may expect similar benefits from a military intervention associated with a security issue than from a military intervention associated with a humanitarian issue.

In addition, one might also consider the argument of habituation (Mueller 1979). The numerous cases of military interventions and casualties associated with the U.S. foreign policy could have made Americans less sensitive to the expected number of casualties. On the other hand, fewer cases of military interventions and casualties in Korean history may have led Koreans to be more responsive to the expected casualties. As Muller (1973) contends, public becomes habituated to casualties. It is plausible that numerous past cases of military interventions and casualties incurred have made Americans less sensitive to the expected number of casualties. In fact, since 1946 the United States has been involved in eighty cases of military interventions while Korea has participated in eleven cases of international military operations. Regarding military casualties resulting from those military interventions, the United States has suffered a significant number of casualties: the Korean War (33,714), the Vietnam War (58,226), and the Gulf War (382). Currently the ongoing war in Iraq has produced nearly 3,000 deaths. However, for South Korea, after the Vietnam War where 4,770 Korean soldiers

were killed, no considerable number of casualties has been associated with military interventions. Hence, it is plausible that Americans have become habituated to casualties, and are less sensitive to them, while Koreans are more susceptible to numbers of casualties.

The argument of habituation is acceptable if I refer to the temporal contexts of administration of the experiments. The American public was somewhat habituated to casualties since the War in Iraq which began in 2003. During September and October of 2006 when conducting the experiments, the numbers of the U.S. casualties were around three thousand. These actual casualties may cause Americans to be less sensitive to potential casualties.

Finally, the observed differences in policy preferences between the Koreans and the Americans may be considered within the general debate on the effects of institutional versus cultural factors. As Moskos (1996) argues, institutional ingredients may have an impact on the different perception of casualties, especially, since South Korea and the U.S. have adapted different military personnel policies. South Korea has utilized a draft for their armed forces, while America has employed voluntary military recruitment in past Vietnam War. As such, it is plausible that this institutional difference accounts for the increased level of sensitivity among Koreans toward casualties compared to the Americans. Exploring this possibility in a future study would provide a promising research topic.

Regarding the impact of salience on choice, the fact that the target of hostilities, which defined saliency, had no impact on the choice suggests that the subjects did not consider this element as part of the choice calculus.

Decision Process

Korean students are less tolerant of ambiguity. They operated with a more lenient threshold than American students. Hence, I hypothesized that Korean students would likely make a decision after reviewing fewer items than American students. The empirical results support this hypothesis (Hb1b) that Korean students arrived at a decision with fewer items.

Since we assumed that for Korean students the casualty information items had more impact than for Americans, and since it is a negative and the first item, and since all the rest of items were pointing at both directions, then Korean students who selected to send troops needed more information than those who selected the not send troops option. Those who chose not send troops made it on the basis of fewer items than those who chose to send troops. Specifically all participants began the decision process with negative information: the first item of information to be seen was the expected number of casualties, participants who chose to send troops made the decision at greater distance from the threshold than those who chose not to send troops. Consequently, under these conditions, the Cognitive Calculus model requires more information to support the sending of troops choice than the decision not to sending troops. Empirical evidence supports the prediction that participants who selected to send troops needed more

information to reach the threshold than the participants choosing not to send troops. It, therefore, expands the support for the Cognitive Calculus decision model.

CHAPTER VI

EXPERIMENT TWO-SECURITY ISSUE

As with experiment 1, this experiment was designed to assess the degree to which expected casualties influence military foreign policy decision making in both America and South Korea. However, in contrast to experiment 1, experiment 2 focused on the condition of national security concern. Two goals were pursued in these two experiments: I predicted that the two different conditions, a humanitarian issue vs. a security issue, resulted in the differing perceptions of casualties. As I argued in chapter V, it is reasonable to consider both the costs and benefits involved in decision making. Consequently, the experiment associated with the security issue would present more similar benefits for both Korean students and American students than the experiment associated with the humanitarian issue. Thus, I expected that Americans and Koreans would interpret expected casualties differently as they pertain to security concerns.

The outline of experiment 2 is the same as for experiment 1: The experiment consisted of a 2x3 factorial design in which the factors were saliency manipulation (high salience and low salience) and the levels of expected casualties (5, 50, 200). The three groups of participants who took part in this experiment consisted of 125 undergraduate students at Texas A&M University, 163 undergraduate students in South Korea, and 108 military officers at the Korea National Defense University. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Participants read about a fictitious crisis occurring in Chagola, a hypothetical country in Southern Asia and then were asked to

make a decision about whether or not the United States (Korea) should send troops try and help contain the crisis.

The saliency manipulation was presented as part of the basic scenario and manipulation of expected casualties was offered after the crisis scenarios as part of the information set. Dependent variables which were designed to delineate both the choice itself and decision process included: the choices subjects made, the number of items reviewed, recall of information from the information sets, the average amount of time used to review the information, and the proportion of recalled information from the information reviewed.

Experimental Procedure and Manipulations

The main elements of the context of experiment 2 included a failed state, concern over nuclear non-proliferation, and international terrorism. The scenario described an unstable state that supported international terrorism and has illegally invaded a neighboring country to possess its natural uranium field. International terror organizations, who had bombed Americans (Koreans), were suspected to be associated with this state. The U.N. tried to cope with the illegitimate attack, by urging America (South Korea) to send troops and to help organize U.N. coalition forces.

Participants were asked to read about ongoing security threats in Chaloga, a hypothetical state. Then, they were asked to decide whether or not their county should send troops or not in order to respond to the terrorists attacks. All participants were introduced to the Chagolian crisis via the following depiction:

Introductory Scenario

The U.N. Security Council has reviewed an emerging issue between two small maritime states in Southeast Asia: Chagola and Sagonia. Chagola has invaded Sagonia, a neighboring country, in order to gain exclusive control of a uranium field, which has recently been discovered near the border between the two states. As a result of this offensive, Chagola now controls two major cities in Sagonia, which forced Sagonia to abandon all rights to the uranium field.

The U.N. defined the Chagolan attack as an illegitimate invasion, and has urged Chagola to withdraw its forces from Sagonia immediately.

Unfortunately, all diplomatic efforts by the U.N. to negotiate a withdrawal of Chagola's forces from Sagonia have failed. The U.N. Security Council authorized a multi-national force to enforce the U.N. resolution.

Specifically, the U.N. asks that the United States (Korea) provide a combat unit (almost a regiment – 1,000 soldiers) to participate in the forceful resolution of the crisis.

Your task is to review new information about the crisis and decide whether or not your country should deploy combatants to participate in this military operation.

Chagola

Chagola is a small independent nation in Southeast Asia, on the rim of the western Pacific, with a population of 20 million people. Chagola is a mountainous nation with a dense tropical forest. Becoming an independent state after World War II, Chagola has been unstable because of its young democracy and conflicts among various tribes. In 1990, an army general, Sardi, seized political power through a military coup. In spite of intense efforts to develop its economy, Chagola's financial problems have been exacerbated. In order to resolve these political and economic difficulties, Sardi wishes to divert the public's attention to the external world. He insists that Chagola's hardships have chiefly been caused by the so called modern imperialists who profit from exploration and use of raw materials and labor in Chagola. Because of this, he implemented an aggressive foreign policy toward the developed states. Worse, he admittedly supports international terrorism and has made alliances with international terror organizations. He has provided them with shelter, training facilities, and even weaponry. In addition, a few internationally known terrorist organizations have been harbored in Chagola's dense forest.

The recent discovery of uranium near the country's border with Sagonia, a neighboring state, has raised questions of who owns the territory in which the uranium was found. The large quantity and high quality of the uranium make developing a nuclear weapon easy. In the midst of these tense negotiations, Chagola launched a ground attack in order to take exclusive control of the uranium field. Most western states are worried that if Chagola controls the field, there is a very high probability that they will sell the uranium to various parties, including rogue nations and terrorist groups.

The Manipulations

As I stated earlier, the high salience case would be a terrorist attack on the participant's own country, while a low salient case would be a terrorist attack to participants' non-native country. For instance, a high salience for American participants would be that terrorists attacked and consequently killed a certain number of Americans in the region. A low salience case for American participants would be that Koreans in the region were targeted and killed by terrorists. Table 6-1 illustrates the details of the saliency manipulations.

Table 6-1: Salience Manipulations for Participants

Groups	Low salience	High salience
Americans participants	<p>In addition, Chagola’s regime has been accused of supporting several terrorist attacks. The regime has also publicly criticized Korea’s economic foreign policy toward South Asia as modern imperialism because Korea has been the leading figure in foreign investment and trade in South Asia. An apartment building in Sagonia, the neighboring country of Chagola, exploded on the 13th of last month at 8:00 p.m., causing partial destruction of the building and <u>killing twenty-three and injuring many Koreans</u>, including women and children. Many Korean workers lived in the apartments, most of them in managerial positions in a Korean investment enterprise. Two terrorist groups harbored in Chagola admitted responsibility for the bombing. Most western states affirmed that the Chagolan regime was undoubtedly connected to the attack and the Korean government is seeking ways to respond.</p>	<p>In addition, Chagola’s regime has been accused of supporting several terrorist attacks. On the 12th of last month, a bus carrying Americans exploded at 12:30 p.m. in the capital city of Sagonia, a neighboring country of Chagola, as it pulled up to its stop in front of the restaurant California, known to be frequented by <u>Americans</u> living in Sagonia, particularly U.S. embassy staff. The blast <u>killed twenty-three and injured many</u>, including women and children. The two terrorist organizations harbored in Chagola claimed responsibility for the explosion. The CIA has tracked down a connection between the suspected terrorist groups and Chagola’s regime. The U.S. government has imposed economic sanctions on Chagola as a result of the support of the terrorists.</p>
Koreans participants	<p>In addition, Chagola’s regime has been accused of supporting several terrorist attacks. On the 12th of last month, a bus carrying Americans exploded at 12:30 p.m. in the capital city of Sagonia, a neighboring country of Chagola, as it pulled up to its stop in front of the restaurant California, known to be frequented by <u>Americans</u> living in Sagonia, particularly U.S. embassy staff. The blast killed <u>twenty-three and injured many</u>, including women and children. The two terrorist organizations harbored in Chagola claimed responsibility for the explosion. The CIA has tracked down a connection between the suspected terrorist groups and Chagola’s regime. The U.S. government has imposed economic sanctions on Chagola as a result of the support of the terrorists.</p>	<p>In addition, Chagola’s regime has been accused of supporting a couple of terrorist attacks. The regime has also publicly criticized Korea’s economic foreign policy toward South Asia as modern imperialism because Korea has been the leading figure in foreign investment and trade in South Asia. An apartment building in Sagonia, the neighboring country of Chagola, exploded on the 13th of last month at 8:00 p.m., causing partial destruction of the building and killing <u>twenty-three and injuring many Koreans</u>, including women and children. Many Korean workers lived in the apartments, most of them in managerial positions in a Korean investment enterprise. Two terrorist groups harbored in Chagola admitted responsibility for the bombing. Most western states affirmed that the Chagolan regime was undoubtedly connected to the attack and the Korean government is seeking ways to respond.</p>

The Information Set¹⁹

After reviewing the scenario, including saliency manipulation, participants were introduced to additional information to help them make the decision of whether or not to deploy their country's forces to the region. Participants could review information up to a point at which they selected one of the options or exhausted all the information because the participants had control over the inflow of the information.

The information set consisted of the three sorts of items: pro to sending troops (twelve items), against-sending troops (six items), and neutral to sending troops (two items). Items were considered pro to sending troops if they were in favor of a use of force policy. An instance of pro to sending troops is "A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Americans believe that the United States should use of force against Chagola." On the contrary, items were viewed as against sending troops if they were not supportive of the use of force policy. The items included "Several analysts were against multi-national forces because eventually the United States will pay the major price." Neutral items were considered if they were not related to the case, i.e. "Japan and the United States have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific." The sequence of the items was against sending forces, pro to sending forces, and neutral to sending forces. The first item of information is the expected casualties, categorized as an item for not sending troops: "The secretary of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around 5, (50, 200)."

¹⁹ See Appendix 1 for the full information sets.

Table 6-2: Propensity to Send Troops

Groups	Mean	Std. Dev
American students	0.88	0.32
Korean students	0.71	0.45

Note: N of observations American students=125, Korean students=163; Choice: sending troops-1, not sending troops-0.

Results

The first set of analyses compared the American students and Korean students. Then, a comparison of Korean students and Korean military officers is presented. A 3x2x2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) is employed for all the dependent variables.

American Students vs. Korean Students

Choice

Neither casualty nor salience has a statistically significant impact on the choice, but the direction of impact of one of the variables matches my expectations: The more the expected casualties, the less likely are participants to choose the sending of troops option [$F(2, 378) = 1.49$].

Table 6-2 shows that American students are more likely to choose the sending of troops option than Korean students across salience conditions and casualty levels. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level [$F(1, 276) = 12.41, p < 0.0005$]. This pattern is consistent with the finding in the previous chapter (humanitarian context). The result is different from the hypothesis H_{a1} that Korean students would be more inclined to select the sending troops policy. As I proposed in Chapter V, the two explanations

would be plausible for this result. I will elaborate it in detail in the following section that presents the differences of the two experiments.

Although American students did not present a significantly different propensity in terms of “to send troops,” in the two experiments, the Korean students’ propensity for sending troops is greater in the security issue condition ($M=0.71$) than in the humanitarian issue condition ($M=0.51$). I delineate this difference between American students and Korean students in a later part of this chapter.

Process


Number of items reviewed

Saliency has a significant impact on number of items reviewed: The higher the saliency issue, the less participants needed to access items (See Table 6-3, $F(1, 276)=5.06, p<0.0255$). This supports Hb2 that high saliency implies urgency and lowers the decision threshold. Consequently, participants needed to review fewer numbers of items when dealing with high saliency than with low saliency. However, no significant difference was detected with regard to the number of items reviewed between the two cultural groups.

Table 6-3: Number of Items Reviewed

Saliency	Mean	Std. Dev
High saliency	5.29	0.50
Low saliency	6.78	0.56

Note: N of observations High saliency=147, Low saliency=141



The interaction effect between salience and groups on items accessed is illustrated in Figure 6-1. The difference in the number of items between high salience and low salience is greater with American students than with Korean students. Thus, it indicates that American students are more sensitive to salience than are Korean students with regard to the amount of information reviewed. In addition, this interaction is a part of the replication of the result from the experiment with a humanitarian context. More specifically, American students reviewed more items when dealing with humanitarian issues than did Korean students. Figure 6-1 shows that American students reviewed more items than did Korean students in the case of low salience only. Thus, this partially supports the finding from the experiment with a humanitarian context.

Table 6-4: Mean of the Average Time Taken to View Each Information Item


Groups	Mean	Std. Dev
American students	12.06	6.18
Koreans students	17.93	39.23

Note: N of observations American students=125, Korean students=163.

Time used to review information

Table 6-4 tells us that American students are faster in reviewing each information item than Korean students. This is consistent with the results of experiment 1 and the pattern is statistically significant at 0.1 the level [$F(1,276)=2.84, p<0.092$].

Figure 6-2 illustrates the interactive effect of salience and group on average time used per item. These results indicate that Korean students are more diverse between low salience and high salience with the time used to see each piece of information than American students. This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.1 level [$F(2,276)=3.27, p<0.071$]. Comparing Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2, demonstrates the differing ways in dealing with urgency between the two groups. American students took the same amount of time read items across salience, but they needed fewer items in cases of high salience. Alternatively, Korean students responded to urgency in a manner opposite to American students: Korean students needed almost the same amount of information across salience. However, they were almost twice as fast at reviewing each item with high salience.



Korean Students vs. Korean Military Officers

Choice

Korean military officers and Korean students are different in choosing whether or not to send troops: Korean military officers are more likely to choose to send troops than are Korean students. It is similar to the result from the experiment on the humanitarian issue. Table 6-5 shows the difference which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level²⁰ [F(1, 259)=5.15, p<0.024].

²⁰ Korean military officers are closer to the propensity of American students.

Table 6-5: Means of Selecting to Send Troops

Groups	Mean	Std. Dev
Korean military	0.83	0.37
Korean students	0.71	0.45

Note: N of observations Korean students=163, Korean military=108 ; Choice: sending troops-1, not sending troops-0.

Process

Items reviewed

Among the three independent variables, each group had a unique impact on the number of items reviewed: Korean military officers viewed more items than did Korean students. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level [See Table 6-6 $F(1,262)=4.29, p<0.39$]. However, neither salience nor casualty has a significant impact on the number of items reviewed.

Table 6-6: Number of Information Items Reviewed

Groups	Mean	Std. Dev
Korean military	7.70	8.08
Korean students	5.90	6.79

Note: N of observations Korean military=111, Korean students=163

Time used to review information

Table 6-7 indicates that Korean students spent more time per information item than the Korean military officers did. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.1 level [$F(1,262)=3.17, p < 0.075$]. This pattern is consistent with the results from experiment

1. It seems likely that Korean students are less familiar with situations or terms associated with national security. Hence, they needed more time to comprehend the information.

Table 6-7: Mean Average Time Taken to Review Each Information Item

Groups	Mean	Std. Dev
Korean military	11.24	5.86
Koreans students	17.93	39.23

Note: N of observations Korean military=111, Korean students=163

Summary of Findings

In summary, in contrast to hypothesis (Ha1) Korean students are more sensitive to variations in casualties. However, salience had no significant impact on the choice. Cultural factors, collectivism and individualism, also did not affect the choice. With regard to the processing of decisions, intolerance of ambiguity lowers the threshold of decision making and expedites the process in general. Higher salience seems to lower the threshold and requires fewer information items than lower salience, which supports Hypothesis (Hb1b). However, casualties do not have a significant impact on the process, which supports Hypothesis (Hb2).

Discussion

In this experiment 2, as in experiment 1, I examined two types of dependent variables. First of all, I will discuss some issues with regard to two groups: American

students vs. Korean students, then later I will address issues from three groups including the Korean military.

Choice

Over all, American students are more likely to choose to send troops ($M=0.88$) than are Korean students ($M=0.71$). This is different from my expectation, but frequent experiences of military interventions and incurred casualties would be an alternative reason for a cultural explanation (collectivism and individualism). However, neither salience nor casualties have a significant impact on the choice. Regarding the impact of salience on the choice, the fact that the target of hostilities which defined saliency had no impact on the choice suggests that the subjects did not consider this element as part of choice calculus.

Decision Process

Unlike experiment 1, salience has significant impacts on the decision process in experiment 2. Specifically, salience affects the number of items reviewed, time used to review information, and the average time used to review information. Participants evaluating items of high salience needed fewer items than with low salience. Therefore, I argue that high salience lowers the threshold of decision making.

The level of expected casualties has an impact on the time used to review information only with Korean subjects. The more casualties expected, the more time

participants used. Thus, I conclude that Koreans are more sensitive to the level of expected casualties than American students.

The groups affected the number of items reviewed, the average amount of time taken to view each item of information, and the number of items recalled. Examining Figure 6-2, for Americans, high salience decreases the number of items reviewed but the same attention is given to items across salience. For Koreans, salience does not affect the number of items, but does affect the attention to the items read.

The Differences between the Two Experiments


In this section, I present some differences of decision choices between the two experiments. Humanitarian issue oriented and security issue oriented experiments have different impacts on the decision choice.

The difference of the mean rating of choosing to send troops between the humanitarian and security case is far greater with Korean participants than with American students (See Figure 6-3). Specifically, as we see in Figure 6-3, the proportion of choosing to send troops for American students is almost the same in the two cases. However, the case of Korean students is more distinguishable. How can we account for the differences between American students and Korean students in terms of the proportion of selecting to send troops?

I suggest two explanations in the discussion of Chapter V. I propose that collectivism offers an excellent explanation. Kunda (1999) contends that the definition

of the in-group is narrower in collectivistic society than in less collectivistic one. These individuals are less concerned about others' welfare than themselves.

In other words, the size of in-group defined is smaller with Korean participants than with American participants since Koreans are more collectivistic than Americans. Thus, Korean participants are less concerned with others' issues than are American participants. By this logic, the humanitarian crisis was less attractive to Korean subjects than the security issue oriented crisis because the humanitarian issue may be located beyond Korean's boundary of their defined in-group. Therefore, the difference between the proportion of sending troops in a humanitarian case and in a security case is greater with Korean students than with American students.



Level of casualties and salience are perceived as more critical in humanitarian settings than in security settings. Several results indicate that participants consider casualties more seriously in the humanitarian setting than in the security setting. It is reasonable that participants become more deterministic with security issues than with humanitarian issues, regardless of its costs. Because security threatens directly, people are more likely to be responsive to the given threats, even more aggressive in response to security issues than humanitarian ones. Therefore, casualty and salience would become less important in the decision calculus with a security issue than with a humanitarian issue.

As I argued in chapter V, the policy choice reflects not only the costs (i.e. casualties), but the expected benefits. Furthermore, it was suggested that the security context may overcome the “narrowness” associated with the Korean “ingroup” concept and consequently “push” the Koreans to increase support for military intervention in this context compared to the humanitarian scenario.

In addition, casualties have been considered more with Korean subjects in general than with American subjects. Specifically, casualties have a statistically significant impact on the decision choice only with the Korean military and Korean students in the humanitarian issue.

CHAPTER VII

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Purpose

This case study was developed to support the two principal findings of experiments conducted to determine the influence that the number of possible casualties had on decisions made by South Koreans and Americans about whether or not to involve troops in a conflict. The results of the two experiments indicate that Korean participants are more sensitive to casualties than are Americans.

Regarding the process of decision making, the results from the experiments indicate that Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity, and this lowers the threshold at which decisions are made. Consequently, the Koreans needed less information and took much less time to reach a final decision. In this case study, I want to confirm the results obtained from the two experiments with two cases from America and South Korea. In compliance with the results, it was necessary to choose a case that was expected to have casualties and to gauge the American and South Korean public's reactions to them.

Case Selection

I selected two humanitarian military interventions for analysis, one each by America and South Korea. I chose these cases because the experimental analysis showed that casualties were more seriously considered in humanitarian issues than in security issues. Thus, humanitarian military interventions are more appropriate in

presenting the differing perception of casualties and different patterns of ambiguity intolerance of two different cultures.

Between the two prominent comparative methods, Most Similar System design (hereinafter MSS) and Most Different System design (hereinafter MDS), I employed the MSS design. The degree of variation across cases in the dependent variables is most prominent difference between them (Frendresis 1983: 263). Researchers need to select cases as similar as possible for the MSS design and the cases should present considerable variances with regard to the dependent variables. On the other hand, in the MDS approach, the selected cases should show different systemic characteristics where there are no major differences in the dependent variables. The experimental findings are different in the dependent variables, which are decision outcomes and some decision process parameters. Hence, the MSS design is appropriate for this case study.

The MSS design is used in cases in which political systems are highly similar or identical in as many ways as possible, with the exception of the variables to be examined (Lijphart 1971). However, the field of possible choices for South Korea was very limited due to the relatively few cases of such interventions. I considered four variables which needed to be as similar as possible for both the American and Korean cases. First, the temporal contexts of the two cases should be as close as possible. The perception of casualties may vary based on time. In other words, the perception of casualties would be different in the 1980s and the 1990s. Secondly, each case is required to be near each country geographically. As experiment 1 shows, a humanitarian case in an African country could not draw proper attention from Korean subjects. Third, each case is

required to be approved by the U.N. or be a U.N. requested military intervention because Larson (1996) argues that international support mediates the sensitivity to casualties. The fourth factor is that the cases need to include concern for potential casualties so different impacts of expected casualties could be examined.

Taking into consideration the factors mentioned above, I examined the decision to send troops to East Timor in September 1999, as requested by the U.N. The U.S. involvement in Haiti September 1994 is examined for the American case. The two cases developed during the same historical era. The U.S. involvement in Haiti was under President Clinton's presidency and in 1999, the Korean government was under President Dae Jung Kim. Geographically, the two cases are not far from the two countries respectively. The East Timor humanitarian crisis occurred in South East Asia near South Korea. Haiti is a state in the Caribbean sea where there are U.S. interests. The two cases were supported by the U.N., which is very significant for public support for the use of force (Larson 1996). Fourth, both cases included the concern of expected casualties.

South Korean Military Involvement in East Timor, 1999

Background

East Timor, officially the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste or Timor-Leste, is a state in Southeast Asia consisting of the eastern half of the island of Timor. It is located about 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia.

East Timor had been a Portuguese colony with a Roman Catholic cultural identity until 28 November 1975, when it declared its independence from Portugal. But

within ninety days of declaring independence, it was invaded by Indonesia and was annexed as the province of East Timor.

For almost two decades, from 1975 to 1999, there had been a ceaseless East Timorese guerrilla war against the Indonesian forces. During this unstable period, Indonesia's desperate efforts to incorporate them resulted in abuse of the East Timorese by Indonesia's military forces, allegedly causing 100,000 to 250,000 Timorese deaths.²¹

In the end, the Indonesian government allowed the East Timorese to choose through popular referendum whether they wanted independence or to remain an autonomous province of Indonesia. The East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence in a U.N. sponsored vote on August 30, 1999. As a result, East Timor was plunged into chaos because pro-Indonesian factions intensified their attacks on the East Timor populace.

The Indonesian government announced a decision to allow U.N. peace-keeping forces to come into its chaotic land to try and pacify violence-torn East Timor. Including South Korea, eighteen countries joined together to form a U.N. coalition force to stop the killing of Timorese by the anti-government militia in 1999.²² Australia pledged the major role in sending troops and conducting peace-keeping operations (PKO) in East Timor. The South Korean government decided to send a total of 419 troops to East Timor to join the U.N. peace-keeping mission. It marked the first dispatch of South Korean combat soldiers to a foreign country since the Vietnam War.

²¹ See CIA World Fact Book, East Timor crisis.

²² Australia 4,747 (49%), Thailand 1,584 (16%), Philippines 658 (7%), Canada 592 (6%), South Korea 419 (4%), Italy 274 (3%), Kenya 254 (3%), Portugal 207 (2%), United States 112 (1%), France 105 (1%), Germany 73 (1%), Brazil 48 (0.5%), Iceland 41, Malaysia 30, Singapore 30, Jordan 19, Fiji 6, Norway 4, Denmark 2. Total 9643. 1999. 12. Choi 2006, 69.

Concern over Possible Casualties

The Grand National Party (GNP), a major opposition party, was at the center in raising possible casualty concerns when congressmen met to decide the issue of whether or not to send troops to join the U.N. coalition (*Korea Times* September 17, 1994). The GNP argued that the dispatched troops could be driven into armed clashes with the anti-independence Indonesian militiamen, incurring casualties among the Korean soldiers. Furthermore, they condemned President Dae Jung Kim for jeopardizing soldiers for the sake of his own interests.²³ Another concern raised by the opposition party was diplomatic: that a military deployment would have an especially negative impact on the nation's ties with Indonesia.

As a matter of fact, South Korea has sustained an amenable relationship with Indonesia, both diplomatically and economically. Indonesia has been the fourth largest trade partner of South Korea for many years. More importantly, around ten thousand South Koreans currently live in Indonesia and any negative impact on the relationship between the two states could endanger the safety of these Koreans.

As a result of this argument, the government and ruling party took both diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, Sunyoung Hong, minister of diplomacy and foreign trade, called the ambassador of Indonesia in Seoul to gauge the Indonesian government's reaction to the possibility of South Korea dispatching troops to East Timor. The ambassador provided a positive response from Indonesia about sending

²³ Some lawmakers from the opposition party alleged that President Kim hoped to earn the Nobel Peace Prize, that he intended to help East Timor in order to earn a good reputation internationally (*Korea Times* September 15, 1994).

Korean troops (*Dongal Ilbo*, September 21, 1999). Another step the Korean government took was to send a team of special envoys, who had contacts high in the Indonesian military, to Indonesia to determine the possible reaction of Indonesian politicians. They met with several high ranking individuals in the Indonesian military, including army chief of staff Wiranto. They were assured that Korean troops would be safe if they took a neutral position on the independence issue of East Timor.

The concern of possible casualties influenced the mission of the Korean troops. The Korean government had encountered serious opposition from the GNP, who wanted to minimize the risks that might lead to Korean casualties (Choi 2003). Thus, the Korean ministry of Defense firmly confined the mission of Korean troops in East Timor to concentrate purely on humanitarian operations. So, the main body of Korean troops were medics and engineers and the rest of them were combat units for providing security only. In order to reinforce this intention, Korean troops took charge of Lautem, an eastern part of Timor, where there was less opportunity to face anti-independence militia and, consequently, less chance to suffer casualties.

In addition, the concern over casualties had an impact on the configuration of troops sent. The Korean government contended that the inclusion of a combat unit was necessary in order to protect military medics and engineers from possible attack by the anti-independence militiamen (*Korea Herald* September 16, 1999). Specifically, Vice-foreign Minister Joun-yung Sun said that the government planned to dispatch armed infantry for protection against provocations by the armed East Timorese militias (*Korea*

Herald September 18, 1999). In other words, the infantries deployed as part of their military contingent went as force protection, not as fighting units.

Fortunately, no combat casualties occurred when Korean troops worked toward ameliorating East Timor's stability. However, five Korean soldiers died in an accident when they drowned in a flash flood in East Timor.

Ambiguity Intolerance

Regarding the decision, ambiguity intolerance resulted in very fast decision making and required little information. Empirical evidence shows that Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity than Americans, which lowers the decision-making threshold. Consequently, Koreans need less information and take less time to reach a final decision.

The Korean government had been quick in making the decision to send troops to East Timor. In addition, the Korean government attempted to expedite the implementation of the decision. An examination of the chronological order highlights how quickly the Korean government decided. On September 4, soon after the announcement of the results of the vote for independence for East Timor from Indonesia, the pro-Jakarta militia began assaults on the Timorese. At that time, the U.N. unofficially sent a letter to ask South Korea to dispatch the PKO to resolve the ongoing turmoil. However, since the U.N. request, the crisis was not covered by the media and did not receive much attention from the public or the Korean government.

During the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, which was held in Auckland, New Zealand on September 12, the South Korean president, Dae Jung

Kim, expressed the need for international help in East Timor's struggle to form a democratic state. Furthermore, President Kim mentioned that the Korean government would contribute in some ways to help East Timor. The U.N. Security Council, on September 16, passed a resolution to send U.N. PKO troops to East Timor. At that time, the U.N. officially requested that the South Korean government dispatch troops as part of the U.N. multi-national force.

Soon, the Korean National Security Council decided to send troops to try and help pacify the chaos in East Timor. On September 21, this was confirmed as an official government position through a central government meeting. The same day, the Korean government submitted the proposal for conformation to the National Congress. It took only three business days from the time the U.N. officially asked South Korea to dispatch troops to East Timor until the decision was made. However, the approval of the National Congress was still required.

The opposition party criticized the move to engage troops in East Timor as "hasty" (*Korea Times* September 17, 1999). It was pointed out by the opposition party that the Korean government made the decision with little information. The GNP continuously condemned the government for not fully considering all factors or acquiring more information. Specifically, the Secretary of the GNP, Representative Sunbong Ha, criticized the lack of consideration of all possible outcomes before dispatching troops (*Donga Ilbo* September 14, 1999): "I doubt that the government did take into consideration the long term impact of sending troops on the relationship with Indonesia." It was also pointed out during the first meeting of the diplomacy and foreign

trade committee of the National Congress that the bill proposed by the central government might not have been completely reviewed. Some lawmakers opposing the proposed bill argued that the government had not reviewed the necessary information about the ripple effect of sending troops to East Timor (Choi 2003:111). In line with this, the opposition party had been opposed to reviewing that bill.

In response to the claim of little consideration of possible ripple effects, the Korean government met with an ambassador of Indonesia in Seoul and also sent a team of special envoys to Indonesia to confirm the attitudes of high-ranking Indonesian political and military leaders (*Donga Ilbo* September 21, 1999). Eventually, due to the action of the Korean government, the proposed bill passed the National Congress on September 27.

The U.S. Military Involvement in Haiti 1994

Historical Background

Haiti, officially the Republic of Haiti, a former French colony, became the first independent black republic in the region when declaring its independence on January 1, 1804 (Wiarda and Kline 2000). It possesses one-third of the Caribbean island sharing it with the Dominican Republic and has a population of 8.5 million people (*CIA World Fact Book*).²⁴

Throughout the nineteenth century, Haiti was ruled by a series of presidents with short tenures. However, political stability became fragile when an enraged crowd killed

²⁴ See *CIA World Fact Book*.

the president, Guillaume Sam, in 1915. In the midst of this political turmoil, the United States invaded Haiti and occupied it. The United States imposed a constitution and implemented policies to improve the politics and economy of Haiti. However, the U.S. efforts suffered at the hands of nationalists rebels who waged a strong guerilla war. As a result, the U.S. occupation ended in 1934.

After the United States left Haiti, Duvalier came to power in the country's first universal suffrage election in 1957. He then declared himself president for life. To make matters worse, his nineteen-year-old son succeeded him in office in 1971. The son governed Haiti until 1986, when anti-government riots broke out throughout the nation and deposed him. After a few years of upheaval, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, was elected as president in 1991. However, Aristide's presidency was terminated by a military coup nine months after his inauguration.

The overthrow of Aristide's democratic regime by the military leader, General Cedras, led to economic sanctions and the political isolation of Haiti by the international community. It ultimately resulted in a second U.S. military intervention by the Clinton administration on September 19, 1994.

After military leaders took over in 1991, they used violence to maliciously oppress political opposition to their military rule. The more the United States and the international community criticized the junta's terrorization of their population, the harsher were the policies the military leaders put in place. Human Rights Watch reported that the ruling military groups began to initiate horrifying tactics like raping women and burning down entire neighborhoods (*New York Times* July 6, 1994). In this

terrible situation, Haiti was a land where brutality and hunger reigned. On Monday July 4, 1994 a boat loaded with 300 refugees capsized about 100 miles northwest of Port-au-Prince resulting in the drowning of 150 people. On the same day, 3,247 Haitians were stopped from entering the United States by Coast Guard cutters. Such a surge of Haitian refugees forced the Clinton administration to look for a policy to restore peace and order in Haiti and to stop Haitians from seeking asylum (*Washington Post*, July 7, 1994).

Exacerbation of the Haitian Crisis

On March 1993, President Clinton met with ousted Haitian president Aristide. The Clinton administration attempted to seek an internal political solution to the Haitian crisis that could incorporate both Aristide and the military junta into a coalition government. At the same time, the Clinton administration conducted a gradual tightening of economic sanctions on Haiti. Specifically, President Clinton announced in June 1993, more sanctions that prevented military coup supporters from entering the United States and froze their assets in America. Simultaneously, the U.N. imposed a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti.

These efforts of the Clinton administration consequently led Aristide and Cedras to sign the so-called Governor's Island Agreement on July 3, 1993, which framed an outline of redemocratization of Haiti. According to the agreement, the U.S.S. *Harlan County*, with lightly armed U.S. soldiers and twenty-five Canadian military trainers aboard, was sent to Port-au-Prince and reached its destination on October 11, 2003. However, the ship turned back to homeport after encountering hostile bluffs from

Haitian soldiers. Worse, the military junta had failed to meet any of the conditions in the Governor's Island Agreement. Finally, in April 1994, White House patience was exhausted by the ruling military junta's continuous defiance and provocations.

On May 2, 1994 President Clinton announced a dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward Haiti. He stated that "It was time for them to go" referring to the leaders of Haiti's military junta (*Washington Post*, May 4, 1994). Additionally, President Clinton, for the first time, signaled the possibility of the use of force to pressure Haitian military leaders relinquish power.

In May 1994, the Clinton administration also announced changes in the Haitian refugee policy: the United States would continue to interdict all Haitian boat people, but they would be allowed to apply for political refugee status instead of being automatically repatriated. This modification yielded a stunning amount of Haitian boat people fleeing their native country. "During the whole of 1993, around 2,000 Haitians put to sea in search of asylum in the United States in June 1994 alone, the number jumped to 5,603." (*Washington Post*, 7 July 1994). Panama suddenly reneged on its agreement to provisionally house 10,000 Haitian refugees. Other Caribbean countries were also reluctant to provide help. The surge of Haitian refugees fully occupied Clinton's high officials and facilitated the discussion of military options.

The situation in Haiti continued to worsen. Haitian military rulers forced all international human rights monitors out of the country on July 13, 1994. Then, the U.N. Security Council approved U.S. military intervention in Haiti at the end of July. The

Clinton administration had also permitted a last-ditch CIA attempt to depose the military ruling groups, but it failed (*Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1994).

Thus, all non-military means had been exhausted. President Clinton approved a final version of a military invasion plan at a meeting with his top advisors on August 26 (*New York Times*, September 20, 1994). Most high U.S. officials were pessimistic concerning the possibility of former President Carter's last minute negotiations to reach an agreement with the ruling junta. Under the agreement, the U.S. military invasion on September 9, 1994 resulted in no hostile resistance from the Haitian armed forces. Also the ruling military junta left for exile in Panama on October 1994, and ousted Haitian president Aristide came back to his native country and was restored to power.

Concern for Possible Casualties

Whenever the use of force option was on the table, concern over possible casualties was always addressed. Specifically, May 4, 1994, President Clinton for the first time stated the possibility of the use of force regarding the Haitian issue (*Washington Times* May 4, 1994). Thus, whenever the Clinton administration considered military intervention, the concern over expected casualties had been addressed.

In general, U.S. officials had been sensitized to potential casualties by the recent horrible deaths of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia, during the previous year. The Clinton administration seemed to be determined to not repeat the experience of Somalia. Concern over potential casualties also led to a spilt among Clinton's officials

over the use of military intervention to settle the Haitian crisis (*New York Times*, August 4, 1994). Defense Secretary Perry firmly opposed to the early use of military force. On the other hand, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, the State Department's chief policy maker on Haiti, favored an early military invasion of Haiti.

Although analysts foresaw considerable human costs because of messy street-to-street battles between the United States and Haitian armed forces (*Boston Herald*, August 4, 1994), most U.S. intelligence officials and Pentagon officials expected that an U.S.-led invasion would quickly sweep away Haiti's ill trained and equipped armed forces (*New York Times* May 30, 1994).²⁵ However, U.S. officials argued that American armed forces in Haiti would face the more difficult task of stabilizing Haitian society after Aristide returned to power. Consequently, this might exact a higher cost in U.S. soldiers lives. Thus, "The problem is not getting in but is getting out." (ibid).

Only when all other measures had proved to be unsuccessful, did President Clinton order military intervention despite expected casualties. However, U.S. officials took several steps to minimize American casualties. First, an overwhelming force of 20,000 soldiers, mostly from special operation forces, would be poured into the small island nation to enable them to quickly secure most of Haiti without any substantial losses.

Another measure used to hold down risks after the invasion was the Pentagon request for rapid transfer of police duties to other agencies. In line with this concern, the

²⁵ The Haitian armed forces composed of about 7,500 to 7,700 men. Reportedly about half of the force stayed in the capital. Additionally, 1,300 police officers are stationed in Port-au-Prince. Ground forces have only six American made lightly armored vehicles and four or five 105 –millimeter artillery and 75 millimeter guns. The Haitian air force consists of two Italian aircraft for training and some cargo planes. The navy has only four patrol boats (*New York Times* May 30, 1994).

Clinton administration attempted to organize multi-national peace-keeping forces to share the burden under the U.N. flag. Concerning these efforts, the United States consulted with Canada, Argentine and some African nations.

When Clinton's top national security advisors met on August 4, 1994 (*New York Times* August 4, 1994), Defense Secretary Perry also suggested offering incentives to the Haitian junta in order to decrease the probability of casualties. Talbott, deputy secretary of state, argued that offering incentives such as amnesty and comfortable lives in exile was morally repugnant. Secretary Perry harshly countered that "it would be immoral for the U.S. not to do whatever it could do avoid the deaths of American soldiers and the spending of taxpayer's money." (Ibid). In line with this effort to reduce risks, President Clinton permitted a sentence to be included in the agreement, led by a former president Carter, that promised to grant amnesty to the military junta for the violent repression committed against their citizens.

Possible casualties were a significant factor for the United States when considering the use of force in Haiti. The concern of expected casualties had an impact on the configuration of troops. Pouring 20,000 soldiers into a tiny island was designed to quickly sweep out ill-equipped and ill-trained Haitian armed forces. However, the casualty concern was not enough to change the U.S. military mission itself.

Ambiguity Intolerance

The Clinton administration showed a high level of ambiguity tolerance. This is reflected in their patient review of all plausible choices and the gradual increasing

pressure on the Haitian military leadership. Specifically, as I presented in an earlier section, the Clinton administration had considered every possible option prior to choosing the use of force option. In keeping with this pattern, the American government took three years to decide to militarily intervene after Haitian president Aristide's overthrow in 1993. In other words, the Clinton administration needed a great deal of time to reach the final decision of military intervention in Haiti.

Conclusion

In the two cases, the concern over expected casualties was one of the integral considerations for both South Korea and the United States when contemplating sending troops. However, its impact was different between the two cases.

In the South Korean case, sending troops to East Timor, the concern over possible casualties influenced the mission of the Korean troops as well as the composition of the troops sent. Thus, the Korean ministry of Defense confined the mission of Korean troops in East Timor to concentrate on purely humanitarian operations. In order to reinforce this intention, the Korean troops took charge of Lautem, a region of East Timor, where there would be less opportunity to face anti-independence militia and consequently less chance to incur casualties. In addition, the Korean government included a combat unit to protect military medics and engineers, the main body of the Korean troops, from possible attack by the anti-independence militiamen.

In the U.S. case, possible casualties were a significant factor when considering use of force in Haiti. The concern over expected casualties had an impact on the

organization of troops. Pouring 20,000 soldiers into a tiny land was intended to quickly gain military superiority. However, the United States did not alter the mission of their troops in Haiti. Therefore, I conclude that these cases indirectly indicate that expected casualties had more impact in the Korean case than in the U.S. case.

Regarding ambiguity intolerance, the two cases represented the differing patterns well. South Koreans displayed less tolerance for ambiguity in reaching a final decision. The Korean government quickly made the decision and it swiftly passed the National Congress. In contrast, the Clinton administration took almost two years to handle the Haiti case, they tried every possible diplomatic approach before finally resorting to military power.

One could argue that institutional factors matter in these cases. I mentioned earlier (on the basis of Moskos 1996) that different military recruiting policies may affect the perception of casualties. Naturally, the institutional structures that underlie the political processes differ between the two nations. It is possible that the inherent checks and balances in the American political system will affect the “speed” of the decision process as well as the amount of information that is included in the deliberation process. Although I acknowledge the potential of such institutional variables to account for the decisions, I use the case study to suggest the plausibility of cultural factors as an additional source for explanation.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I will review the argument that differing perceptions of casualties affect FPDM. I will present a summary of the methods (experiments and a case study) employed in this study. I will also present a synopsis of the findings from Chapters IV- VII. I conclude with a few theoretical and political implications, suggestions, and an outline for future research.

Reviewing the Arguments

No significant criticism has been raised against the argument that casualties incurred in interstate militarized conflicts have a critical influence on public support and consequently on FPDM. However, a comprehensive and cross-cultural framework for explaining the impact of casualties on FPDM has not been proposed yet.

Casualties have been treated in various ways: casualties as a cost (Bennett and Stam 1996; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995), as representatives of the intensity of militarized conflicts, and as a criterion for the success or failure of conflicts. These approaches are similar in that all types of casualties are interpreted in the same way.

Other studies, on the contrary, indicate that not all kinds of casualties have the same impact (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997). For instance, Mueller (1973) argues that the public becomes habituated to casualties as conflict continues. In other words, a small number of

casualties in the early stages of a conflict has a significant impact on public opinion, but as the conflict continues, it requires a relatively larger number of casualties to have an impact on public support. In line with this, Gartner and Segura (1998) contend that marginal casualties could explain the fluctuation of public opinion during a war.

In addition, scholars have not paid substantive attention to the possibility that different cultures may have differing levels of sensitivity to human casualties that will affect public reactions. Based on this, I employed the two cultural aspects, which are expected to affect the perception of casualties and finally FPDM. Specifically, I looked at the two socio-cultural ingredients: “the level of collectivism vs. individualism, and the degree of ambiguity intolerance” in the context of two culturally different countries, South Korea and the United States.

In a collectivistic society, the interest of the group prevails over the interest of individuals, while in an individualistic society, the interest of the individual dominates the interest of the group (Hofstede 1997:50). In a collectivistic society, then, individuals’ sacrifices would be more valuable if done for the sake of the group. Thus, in a collectivistic society, a public is expected to perceive casualties less negatively and are more likely to send troops when considering military intervention. In an individualists society, individuals prefer to identify themselves based on ‘I’ rather than ‘we.’ They also prioritize their personal goals, interests, and values over those of the society to which they belong (Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002). Consequently, individualism which is related to an emphasis on individual’s interests will lead people to view potential casualties more negatively.

Based on these propositions, I expected that collectivism vs. individualism would affect the choice, while ambiguity intolerance would have an impact on the process of decision making. The following hypotheses are derived from my propositions:

Ha1: Koreans are more supportive of military deployment than Americans.

Ha2: Higher saliency of the crisis will increase public support for military deployment.

Ha3: The negative impact of the number of casualties on support for use of force is expected to be stronger for American subjects than Korean subjects.

Hb1a [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a stringent threshold]: Relative to Americans, Koreans are more likely to review more items, recall more items, and spend more time, en route to a final decision.

Hb1b [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a lenient threshold]: Relative to Koreans, Americans are more likely to review more items, recall more items, and spend more time on items, en route to a final decision.

Hb2: Saliency of the decision will decrease time spent on the decision (urgency) while increasing attention to the items that have been reviewed (higher recall).

A Summary of the Methods

Existing studies in cross-national studies, anthropology, and sociology suggest that Americans and Koreans differ along cultural dimensions, I attempted to reconfirm these differences by utilizing two scales (Singelis 1994; Budner 1962).

For collectivism vs. individualism, I used, the Singelis scale (1994) (see Appendix 2). This scale has two sub-scales for each of the two dimensions: collectivism and individualism. To measure ambiguity intolerance, I used a scale (see Appendix 2)

(Budner 1962) that contained positive and negative items. The positive items are geared to check ambiguity intolerance, while negative items are designed to measure ambiguity tolerance.

In order to answer the main research questions, I developed two cross-cultural experiments that were built around either a humanitarian or a security issue. Three levels of possible casualties were presented in each experiment.

Experiment 1 focused on the humanitarian issue. The hypothetical scenario described a case where the American and Korean Red Cross were participating in a humanitarian response in an African country whose citizens were suffering from a relentless civil war. Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of the first experiment, but it moved the decision task to a security context. A failed state that supported international terrorism had illegally invaded a neighboring country in order to possess a natural uranium field. International terror organizations, who had bombed Americans (Koreans), were suspected of being associated with the failed state. In the course of working to cope with the illegitimate attack, the U.N. urged America (S. Korea) to send troops to join the international force.

I predicted that these experimental results would show differing perceptions of casualties based on whether participants were exposed to the humanitarian fictions crisis or the security issue. Additionally, I expected Americans and Koreans subjects to perceive casualties differently.

I used Korean students, military officers, and American students as subjects for my experiments. However, I do not claim that Texas A&M University undergraduate

students, typically more conservative than those of American students from other locations, are fully representative of general American students. Nevertheless, if my theory is correct, the tests should support my hypotheses even with these participants.

A case study was developed to support the two principal findings of the experiments. I wanted to find historical evidence of the influence of possible casualties on decisions made by South Koreans and Americans about whether or not to involve troops in a conflict. I selected two humanitarian military interventions for analysis, one each by America and South Korea. To explore the Korean perspective, I examined the decision to send troops to East Timor in September 1999, as requested by the U.N. The U.S. involvement in Haiti September 1994 is examined for the U.S. case.

Summaries of the Findings of Chapters IV, V, VI, VII

Chapter IV presents the empirical findings that clarify the different levels of collectivism vs. individualism and ambiguity intolerance in the two target nations. As expected, the Korean students are more collectivistic than American students, less individualistic than American students, and less tolerant to ambiguity than American students. Thus, analyses in the experiment focuses on American students and Korean students. The different results obtained from the Korean military officers and Korean student participants may be caused by their differing ages and experience levels. It is plausible that additional analysis on the Korean military and students need to be implemented later, but this study focused mainly on the comparison of American and Korean students.

Chapter V offers several findings of experiment 1, the humanitarian context. The Korean students were shown to be more sensitive to variations in casualties and to casualties in general. However, salience had no significant impact on the choice. Moreover collectivism, a factor that should have affected the value of casualties, did not work. Furthermore, there was no interaction effect between group and salience. The treatment of salience did not affect on the choice but had an impact on the process of decision making.

The results do not support the hypothesis (*H₁*) that Korean students, who are more collectivistic and less individualistic, are less sensitive to potential casualties, and more likely than American students to support the use of force. The empirical evidence shows that Koreans are more sensitive to expected casualties, and consequently less supportive of the use of force than American students.

Concerning the justification of the empirical results of choice participants made, I propose two alternate accounts. One is associated with a propensity of collectivism in the Korean culture as pointed out by Kunda (1999). I have initially proposed that collectivism vs. individualism has an impact on the evaluation of costs (i.e. expected casualties). In other words, a collectivistic society (i.e. South Korea) puts less negative value on casualties than an individualistic society. However, when we focus on a cost-benefit analysis we need to recognize that support for sending troops is also a function of the benefits of the intervention. We need to recognize that support for sending troops is a function of the costs and benefits of the intervention.

In the humanitarian context, it seems that the collectivist orientation of the Koreans reflect a narrow in-group. Koreans may be less sensitive to the perils of the victims of the humanitarian crisis than the Americans. In other words, although Korean students and American students perceive the same costs (same number of expected casualties in the experiment), the perception of benefits from it differs. Therefore, Korean students and American students show different levels of support for sending troops because of the different anticipated benefits resulting from the military intervention.

This argument leads us to conduct a security-oriented experiment that offers as similar benefits as possible for both Korean students and American students. An experiment that involves security issues would be suitable for this argument. Korean students and American students may expect rather similar benefits from a military intervention associated with a security issue than from a military intervention associated with a humanitarian issue.

Another explanation is Muller's (1973) argument of habituation to casualties. Particularly, he argues that since the public becomes habituated to casualties, public support is more impacted by casualties incurred in the early stage of a conflict rather than those suffered in the later stages. In adapting Muller's theory, I posit that Americans who have numerous previous cases of military intervention and have perceived many casualties over time have thus become less attentive to expected casualties. In addition, when considering the current deaths incurred from the War in Iraq, the argument of habituation makes sense.

However, in Korea, where cases of military intervention and casualties are rare, the population is more sensitive to expected casualties. As a matter of fact, the death of a Korean enlisted man as a result of the suicide bombing intended to kill Vice President Cheney in Afghanistan in March 2007, was the first Korean armed forces casualty in a military intervention since the Vietnam War, where 4,770 Korean soldiers died.

With respect to the process of decision making, the results of the experiment support my propositions that American students are more patient in the face of ambiguity than Koreans. Correspondingly, American students need more information and time to reach a final choice. As Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) argue, intolerance of ambiguity lowers the threshold of decision making. Accordingly, Korean students had a lower threshold and needed fewer items of information. In accordance with number of items reviewed, Korean students recalled fewer items than American students did. The ratio of recalled items from the items reviewed is smaller for Korean students than for American students. This indicates that Korean students paid less attention to the information provided than American students.

The findings of Chapter VI, the experiment associated with the security threat, are consistent with the ones of Chapter V, the humanitarian response. In summary, Korean students were more sensitive to variations in casualties. However, salience had no significant impact on choice. The cultural factors of collectivism and individualism had no overall effect on the choices made. With regard to the decision process, intolerance of ambiguity lowered the threshold of decision making and expedited the process in general. Higher salience seemed to lower the threshold and require fewer

items of information than low salience. Casualties did not have a significant impact on the decision process in comparison between American and Korean students. However, it had a significant impact on the process when comparing Korean students and Korean military officers only.

Korean students and American students differ in dealing with salience. For American students, high salience decreases the number of items reviewed but they retain the same attention to items across salience. On the other hand, for Koreans, salience does not affect the number of items reviewed, but has an impact on attention paid in reviewing items.

The case study also shows support for the main findings of the two experiments. Of course, the concern over expected casualties is a significant factor for both South Korea and the United States when pondering military interventions. However, the role that this concern played in the eventual decision was somewhat different between the two cases.

In the South Korean decision to send troops to East Timor, the concern over possible casualties was at the center of the opposition party. The concern over possible casualties also affected the configuration and the mission of the troops. The Korean government strictly limited the mission of the troops to purely humanitarian operations. Then, at the operational level, the dispatched Korean troops were careful to choose an area of responsibility where they had the least chance to face the militia, eventually to reduce any possibility of incurring casualties. Additionally, the combat units with the deployed force were included to protect the medics and engineers, the main body of the

troops. In the end, there were indeed no Korean combat deaths in the East Timor operation.

Potential casualties were also a significant consideration when the United States was considering military intervention in Haiti. One result was the size of the military deployment to reduce U.S. fatalities as much as possible. However, in their case, the concern over potential casualties did not alter the mission of the troops.

The two cases were also different in terms of their decision processes. The South Korean government was relatively quick in making a final decision and did not need all acquirable information. In contrast, the U.S. government took almost two years to deal with the Haitian crisis. They proceeded step by step gradually increasing the levels of pressure and seemingly exploring every available piece of information about alternatives in the case.

Overall, the main question of this study has been whether potential casualties to be incurred during military interventions are perceived in different ways in culturally differing societies. Subsequently, I also asked what were the specific impacts of culture and their mechanisms to affect decision making.

Regarding the decision choice, I found that the expected number of casualties was considered in different ways between the American and the Korean students. The Korean students perceived the expected number of casualties more negatively than the American students. This was different from my expectation that the Korean students would be more collectivistic and less individualistic, and so show decreased sensitivity to the expected number of casualties and more likely to send troops abroad.

With regards to process of decision making, the empirical results support the hypotheses that the different levels of intolerance of ambiguity, a cultural factor, will have an impact on the decision process. Specifically, the Korean students, who are less tolerant of ambiguity, needed less information to reach a final decision than did American students. Saliency also affects the decision process. Higher saliency seemed to lower the threshold and require fewer items of information than low saliency.

Cultural accounts is a feasible explanation for the different results between experiment 1, with its humanitarian context, and experiment 2, set in a security context. The different proportions between the humanitarian and security scenarios of participants choosing to send troops was greater for the Koreans than for the Americans. This can be attributed to the Koreans, who are more collectivistic than Americans, setting a narrower in-group definition and thus being less concerned about others' problems and welfare. Continuing this logic, it should be expected that the humanitarian-oriented crisis did not draw as much attention from Korean participants as the security-oriented one. This was indeed the case, showing the different preferences in making the decision to send troops in the two experiments.

On the other hand, American students, being less collectivistic, consequently formed a larger in-group definition than the Koreans, displaying more concern about others' interests and welfare. Hence, American participants showed almost identical preferences toward choosing to send troops across the two experiments.

Overall, although the results did not completely support cultural accounts, cultural explanations have proven to be a viable ingredient in explaining the different

observed patterns of foreign policy decision making. Specifically, a cultural factor, ambiguity intolerance, had an impact on the process rather than the choice.

Comparing the Results of the Two Different Experiments

I used two different contexts for the experiments: humanitarian issue oriented and security issue oriented. These two different contexts impacted both choice and the decision process.

Regarding choice, Korean subjects showed a far greater likelihood of choosing to send troops in the security threat context than in the humanitarian situation. The proportions of American students choosing to send troops were almost the same in the two cases. I suggest that collectivism offers a reasonable explanation for this difference by using Kunda's (1999) argument. This author contends that the definition of the in-group is narrower in a collectivistic society than in a less collectivistic one, thus individuals in collectivism are less concerned about others' welfare than themselves.

By this logic, Korean subjects, who are more collectivistic, define the size of their in-group as smaller than American participants, who are less collectivistic. Thus, Korean participants are less concerned with others' issues than American students. In other words, Korean subjects were less interested in the humanitarian oriented crisis than in the security oriented crisis, because the humanitarian issue may be located beyond the Koreans' defined boundary of in-group. Therefore, the difference between the mean ratings of sending troops in the humanitarian case and in the security threat case is greater with Korean students than with American students.

Casualties and salience are perceived in different ways across the two experimental contexts. These two are considered more seriously in the humanitarian context than in the security context. Specifically, the results of the experiments show that the level of expected casualties and the salience have some statistically significant effects on the dependent variables. It is reasonable that participants become more deterministic in the security scenario than in the humanitarian one, regardless of its costs. Therefore, casualties and salience show themselves to be less important in the decision calculus arising from the security context.

In addition, casualties were more carefully considered by Korean subjects in general than by American subjects. Specifically, casualties had a statistically significant impact on the choice only when comparing Korean military vs. Korean students in the humanitarian issue. In other words, the more casualties involved, the less likely are Korean subjects to choose to send troops.

I argue that the security scenario made participants more solid and firm in making a decision than the humanitarian scenario. This was the case because participants lowered their decision threshold in the security scenario, resulting in their need of fewer items of information.

Theoretical and Political Implications

This study bears some theoretical implications as well as political implications. The results of this study clarify that culture matters in foreign policy decision making. Although the direction of the predicted effects of the cultural factors on choice in this

study is not confirmed, the findings support the predictions concerning process. The perception of casualties was different in the two cultural settings. This supports the claim that culture represents knowledge, beliefs, and values that are expected to affect perception, interpretation and reactions to environments and situations.

Another theoretical implication is associated with costs and benefits decision calculus. The findings from the two experiments show that while the American students are more supportive of the military intervention than the Korean students, the anticipated costs of the military deployment (i.e., anticipated casualties) had no significant effect on the choice. Furthermore, the expectation that the “individualistic” Americans will be more sensitive to the cost (i.e., casualties) than the “collectivists” Korean did not hold. It is plausible that rather than focusing only on the *cost* element in a cost-benefit analysis, our results suggest that the support for sending the troops is a function of the *benefits* of the intervention. Correspondingly, Koreans subjects are more supportive of the use of force with a security issue than a humanitarian issue because Korean subjects expect more benefits from security oriented military intervention than from humanitarian oriented intervention.

Although I concentrated on culture in this study, I presented some institutional factors that may play a role in perceiving expected casualties. First, the different military recruiting systems between South Korea and the United States have an impact on the perception of expected casualties. Secondly, the different levels of checks and balances in the two political systems may play a role. In addition, the American public may play a more important role in supporting foreign policy than the Korean public. Third, the

legitimacy of sending forces to intervene in foreign conflicts differs in the two societies and may influence different levels of support for military intervention.

This study expands the applicability of the CC model. In Chapter V, since we assumed that for Korean students the casualty information (items) had more impact than for American students, and since it is a negative and first item, Korean students who selected to send troops needed more information than those who selected not to send troops. Those who chose not to send troops made their decision on the basis of negative items unlike those who chose to send troops. Specifically, all participants began the decision process with negative information, the first item of information to be seen was the expected number of casualties, then participants who chose to send troops had a greater distance from the threshold than those who chose not to send troops. Consequently, under these conditions, the Cognitive Calculus model requires more information support the sending of troops choice than in the decision to not send troops. Empirical evidence supports the prediction that participants selecting to send troops needed more information to reach the decision threshold than did the participants choosing not to send troops. So it expands the applicability of the Cognitive Calculus decision model.

The political implication of this study is practical. If more collectivistic societies are less interested in international humanitarian interventions, then those planning such operations should expect it to be more difficult to draw participation from nations with this type of cultural characteristic. Further, some countries may perceive, interpret, and react differently to the same international issue because of their cultures. Thus, when

making foreign policy decisions, states should take into account the target nation's cultural characteristics and their likely impact on the issues.

Outline for Future Research

There are a few topics associated with this study appropriate for future research. First, I believe valuable findings would be discovered from comparing Korean students and Korean military officers. As I discussed, although some findings are similar for the two groups, a few different propensities from the two Korean groups were found.

Secondly, I would like to study political institutions in light of their interaction with culture. Specifically, would my findings be replicated if conducted in an individualistic nation in Europe? As a matter of fact, some European states were reluctant to send troops to Iraq as they were requested by the United States. This probably was related to the legitimacy of foreign military intervention. So, I expect that employing interactive variables of cultural and institutional ingredients enhance understanding of the puzzle of public reactions to anticipated casualties.

The third future research topic would be to conduct experiments with American military groups. If so, it would be a balanced comparison of the groups: Korean students vs. American students and Korean military vs. American military. We could then possibly identify the different perceptions of casualties.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Information Sets

Information set: American participant in Security issue

Following each item is its classification: Pro use of force=PF; Against use of force= AF; Neutral= NE.

1. [AF] The secretary of defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff predict that the U.S. expected casualties in this operation will be 5, 50, 200.
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Americans believe that the U.S. should use of force against Chagola.
3. [AF] An intelligence analyst believes that China may use any military interruption by the US against Chagola as an excuse to attack Taiwan, thereby instigating a wider regional conflict
4. [PF] Some political advisors believe the use of force will be supported in Congress.
5. [NE] Japan and the U.S. have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific.
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that taking the uranium mines out of the hands of rouge states is the “most urgent task” facing America.
7. [AF] Organization of Southeast Asian states opposes the use of force resolution by U.N.
8. [PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN coalition force if the U.S. decides to send troops.
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the US uses force against Chagola. This will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions would not be effective.

11. [PF] The Joint Chief of Staff considers that the increase in the activity of Chagolian ground forces suggests that Chagola might advance to conquer more cities in Sagonia.
12. [NE] Mexican police arrested 42 current and former government employees involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in Mexico.
- 13.[PF] Several neighboring countries have experienced conflicts with Chagola have expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. forces to use their airspace.
14. [PF] Chagola's National Radio Broadcast calls the U.S. "malicious tyranny of modern imperialism."
15. [AF] Chagola trades with many other states, thereby the economic sanctions would expect to be effective. Several analysts were against multi-national forces because eventually U.S. is paying the major price.
16. [PF] The Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA report that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to terrorist groups which have claimed responsibility for embassy bombings in the past several years.
17. [PF] Some major news paper's editorials express public support of use of force against Chagola.
18. [PF] A high U.N. official said that "Backdoor" negotiations between U.N. and the Chagola regime have failed.
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that using force could destabilize the region and will result in another Vietnam-like quagmire.
20. [PF] CIA interpreted reliable information that Chagloian government have contacted several states in the Middle East who are eager to acquire nuclear capability.

Information set: American participant in Humanitarian issue

1. [AF] The sectary of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around a couple of 5, 50, 200.
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Americans believe that the U.S. should send troops to the region.

3. [AF] Editorials in various newspapers are criticizing the administration for inflated military spending.
4. [PF] Some political advisors expect that sending force will be supported in Congress.
5. [NE] Japan and the U.S. have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific.
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that to make the region more peaceful is the “most urgent task” in Africa.
7. [AF] association of African Americans in the U.S. opposes sending troops to the region.
8. [PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN coalition force if the U.S. decides to send troops.
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the US sends troops against Chagola. This will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions would not be effective.
11. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola have expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. forces to use their airspace.
12. [NE] Mexican police arrested 42 current and former government employees involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in Mexico.
13. [PF] Chogola’s National Radio Broadcast calls the UN “the puppet of malicious strong powers”
14. [PF] The Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA report that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to a few internationally notorious terrorist groups.
15. [AF] Some terrorists organization harbored in Chagola have promised to attack American if the U.S. joins the UN coalition force.

16. [PF] Chagola is the top five countries who are the worst human rights records of this year by Amnesty International.
17. [PF] A high U.N. official said that “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and the Chagola regime have failed.
18. [PF] The Association of African Americans in America urges the federal government to do something in responding to the on going genocide in the region.
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that sending force could destabilize the region and further result in more severe civil war among the factions in Chagola.
20. [PF] Some major news papers expect that the opposition party will also support sending the troops.

Information set: Korean participant in Security issue

Following each item is its classification: Pro use of force=PF; Against use of force= AF; Neutral= NE.

1. [AF] The secretary of defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff predict that the Korea expected casualties in this operation will be 5, 50, 200.
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Koreans believe that the Korea should send troops against Chagola..
3. [AF] An intelligence analyst believes that China may use any military intervention by the US against Chagola as an excuse to attack Taiwan, thereby instigating a wider regional conflict.
4. [PF] Some political advisors believe the use of force will be supported in Congress.
5. [NE] Japan and Korea have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific.
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that Korea has to help to stop selling uranium to rouge states.
7. [AF] Organization of Southeast Asian states opposes the use of force resolution by U.N.

8. [PF] Britain, Canada, China , Japan, and the U.S. have decided to join the UN coalition force.
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if Korea uses force against Chagola. This will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions would not be effective.
11. [PF] The Joint Chief of Staff considers that the increase in the activity of Chagolian ground forces suggests that Chagola might advance to conquer more cities in Sagonia.
12. [NE] Chinese police arrested 42 current and former government employees involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in Mexico.
13. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. forces to use their airspace.
14. [PF] Chagola's National Radio Broadcast calls Korea "malicious modern economic imperialist "
15. [AF] Chagola trades with many other states, thereby the economic sanctions would expect to be effective. Several analysts were against multi-national forces because eventually Korea is paying the major price.
16. [PF] CIA reports that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to terrorist groups which have claimed responsibility for embassy bombings in the past several years.
17. [PF] Some major news paper's editorials express public support of use of force against Chagola.
18. [PF] A high U.N. official said that "Backdoor" negotiations between U.N. and the Chagola regime have failed.
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that using force could destabilize the region and will result in another Vietnam-like quagmire.
20. [PF] CIA interpreted reliable information that Chagolian government have contacted a couple of states in the Middle East who are eager to acquire nuclear capability.

Information set: Korean participant in Humanitarian issue

- 1.[AF] The ministry of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around a couple of 5, 50, 200.
- 2.[PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Koreans believe that Korea should send troops to the region.
3. [AF] Most editorials in the newspapers analyze that sending troops in Africa would not be helpful in enhancing the influence of Korea over the region.
4. [PF] Some political advisors believe to send force will be supported in Congress.
5. [NE] Japan and the Korea have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific.
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that to make the region more peaceful is the “most urgent task” in Africa.
7. [AF] Association of African Americans in the U.S. opposes sending troops to the region.
8. [PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN coalition force.
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the Korea sends troops against Chagola. It will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions would not be effective.
11. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola have expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. forces to use their airspace.
12. [NE] Chinese police arrested 42 current and former government employees involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in China.
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14. [PF] CIA reports that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to a few internationally notorious terrorist groups.
15. [AF] Some terrorists organization harbored in Chagola have promised to attack Koreans if Korea joins the UN coalition force.
16. [PF] Chagola is the top five countries who are the worst human rights records of this year by Amnesty International.
17. [PF] A high U.N. official said that “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and the Chagola regime have failed.
18. [PF] The Association of African Americans in America urges the federal government to do something in responding to the on going genocide in the region.
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that sending force could destabilize the region and further result in more severe civil war among the factions in Chagola.
20. [PF] Some major newspapers expect that the opposition party will also support sending the troops

Appendix 2: The questionnaires

1. Questions about the experiment

Date : _____

날짜: _____

Experimental ID: _____ (From the screen)

Experimental ID: _____ (화면에 있는 번호를 적으십시오)

What option did you choose (mark one): Send troops

귀하의 선택은? 해외파병에 동의함.

해외파병에 반대함

Sending troops: _____

Not sending troops: _____

How confident are you with your choice? (circle a number)

Low confidence 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High confidence

당신은 위에서 당신이 결정한것에 대하여 얼마나 신뢰하는가?

신뢰못함 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 강하게 신뢰함.

In general, how relevant were the items of information?

Low relevance 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High relevance

귀하는 의사결정을 위해서 몇건의 주어진 정보들을 확인했습니다. 그러면 주어진 정보들이 해외파병 관련 의사결정과 얼마나 연관성이 있었습니까?

거의 관련없었음 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 아주 연관 깊었음

In this page you are asked to fill in the capital city of each of the countries listed below. Note, the two first capitals were already inserted as an example.

주어진 국가들의 수도 이름을 아는대로 적으시오.

예) 미국	워싱턴 디시
예) 아르헨티나	브에노스 아이레스
앙골라	
오스트리아	
벨기에	
볼리비아	
브라질	
불가리아	
캐나다	
칠레	
코스타리카	
쿠바	
이집트	
잉글랜드	
프랑스	
그리스	
인디아	
이란	
이스라엘	
이탈리아	
일본	
요르단	
케냐	
레바논	
멕시코	
필리핀	
폴란드	
러시아	
스페인	
터어키	
자이레	

To express your opinions, imagine an Agree scale that varies from 1 to a maximum of 9. (1) stands for “not agree at all”, and (9) stands for “complete agree”. In other words, the larger number, the greater will be degree you agree. Give one number (either 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) to each item below.

다음의 40 문항의 질문들은 귀하가 어떤것을 중요시여기고 그렇지 않은가에 대한 설문조사 문항들입니다. 여기서 숫자 **“1”의 의미는** 중요하지 않다 또는 그렇게 생각하지 않는다, 전혀 동의 하지 않는다는 의미이고 **숫자 “9”의 의미는** 아주 중요하다, 강하게 그렇게 생각한다, 확실히 동의한다는 의미입니다.

Items for collectivism

1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 선배님들이나 교수님들을 존경한다.

전혀 동의하지 않는다.[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9] 확실히 동의한다.

2. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

내가 소속된 그룹의 사람들과 조화를 이루는것이 중요하다.

3. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나의 행복은 나의 주위사람들과 밀접한 관계가 있다.

4. I would offer my seat in a but to my professor
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 버스에서 나의 지도 교수님께 자리를 양보하겠다.

5. I respect people who are modest about themselves
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 겸손한 사람들을 존경한다.

6. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 내가 속해 있는 조직이나 단체의 이익을 위해서 나의 개인적인 이익을 희생할 수 있다.

7. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 가끔 다른 사람들과의 관계가 내 개인적인 성취보다도 중요하다고 생각한다.

8. I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education/career plans
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 진로 선택시 부모님의 의견을 존중해야 한다.

9. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

내가 속한 그룹의 의사결정을 존중하는 것이 나에게 있어서 중요하다.

10. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I'm not happy with the group
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

비록 내가 속한 단체가 별로 맘에 안들지만, 그 단체가 나를 필요로 한다면 계속 남겠다.

11. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

만약 가족이 어떤 일에 실패할 경우 나는 어떤 책임감을 느낀다.

12. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument.
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

내가 속한 그룹 사람들과 완전히 의견이 불일치 할지라도 나는 그 사람들과 언쟁을 피한다.

Items for individualism

13. I'd rather say "No" directly, than risk being misunderstood.
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나는 오해를 살 위험이 있는 경우는 과감히 "아니오"라고 말하겠다.
14. Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 수업시간에 자신의 의견을 강하게 주장하는것은 나에게는 전혀 문제가 안된다.
15. Having a lively imagination is important to me
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 마음껏 상상의 나래를 펼치는 것은 내게 중요하다.
16. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards.
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나는 많은 사람들 앞에서 칭찬이나 상을 받는 것이 별로 불편하지 않다.
17. I am the same person at home that I am at school
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나는 학교에서나 집에서나 항상 동일한 사람이다.
18. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나 자신의 문제부터 처리하는 것이 가장 시급하다.
19. I act the same way no matter who I am with
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나는 같이 있는 상대가 누구냐에 관계없이 항상 동일하게 행동하려고 한다.
20. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after meet them, even when they are much older than I am
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]
 나는 나보다 연장자를 처음 만났을 때라도 그사람의 이름을 부르는것이 마음편하다.
21. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met
 [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 방금소개 받은 사람과 직설적이고 확실하게 이야기 하는 것을 좋아한다.

22. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 많은 점에서 다른사람들과 독특하고 다르다는 사실이 기쁘다

23. My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나의 정체성이 다른사람들과 관계없다는 사실이 나에게 매우 중요하다.

24. I value being in good health above everything
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 무엇보다도 건강이 중요하다고 생각한다.

*Selected items are 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23

Singelis, Theodore M. 1994. "The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* Vol 20(5): 580-591.

3. The questionnaire: tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity

Positive items

1. An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

어떤 전문가가 확실한 해답을 제시하지 못한다면 그는 충분한 지식이 없는사람이다.

전혀 그렇지 않다.
Tolerance 높음

확실히 그렇다.
tolerance 낮음 (애매한것은 못참아!)

2. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

세상에 풀리지 않는 문제는 없다.

3. A good job is one where is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

쉬운 일거리란 해결방법이 확실한 일거리다.

4. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

결국에는 크고 복잡한 일을 하는것 보다는 작고 간단한 일을 하는것이 더 많은 일을 할 수 있는 길이다.

5. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

항상 해오던것을 하는것이 전혀 낯선것을 하는것보다 좋다.

6. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

7. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 전혀 모르는 사람들과의 모임보다 잘 아는 사람들과의 모임이 더 편하다.

8. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

우리는 모두 같은 이상과 가치관을 빨리 소유할 수록 더 좋다.

Negative items.

9. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

나는 외국에서 일정기간 동안 사는것도 좋다고 생각한다.
전혀 그렇지 않다. 확실히 동의한다.

Tolerance 낮음(모르는외국 못참아)
외국도 팬찮아)

Tolerance 높음(모르는

10. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

항상 시간표와 일정표 맞춰사는 사람은 가끔 삶의 진정한 기쁨을 놓칠 수도 있다.

11. It is more fun to tackle to a complicated problem than to solve a simple one
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

간단한 문제를 푸는것보다 복잡하고 어려운 문제를 해결하는 것이 더 재미있다.

12. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

다른 새로운 것들을 시도하는 사람들이 가장 멋지고 흥미롭게 보인다.

13. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

“예” “아니오”라고 단순하고 확실히 대답하기를 좋아하는 사람들은 문제가 진짜 얼마나 복잡한줄을 모른다.

14. Many of our most important discussions are based upon insufficient information
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

부족한 정보들에 바탕을 두고 우리는 우리삶의 가장 중요한 문제들을 논의 하곤한다.

15. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a chance for one to show initiative and originality
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

선생님들은 가끔 학생들의 창의성과 독창성을 확인할 목적으로 애매모호한 숙제를 내준다.

16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things.
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9]

좋은 선생님이란 당신의 사물을 보는 관점에 대하여 놀라움을 표해주는 선생님이다.

Budner, Stanley. 1962. "Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable" *Journal of Personality* 30: 29-59.

4. Some information about yourself (for statistical purposes)

1.. Are you:

귀하의 성별은?

1. male (남성)
2. female (여성)

2. How old are you?

귀하는 나이는 ?

1. Under 20(20 세 이하)
2. 20-24
3. 25-29
4. 30-34
5. 35-39
6. 40-49
7. 50-59
8. 60 or over (60 세 이상)

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