

**EXPLAINING CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: ELECTORAL LAWS,  
CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION, AND THE BALANCE OF POWER  
BETWEEN PARTY LEADERS AND BACKBENCHERS IN LATIN AMERICAN  
NATIONAL LEGISLATURES**

A Dissertation

by

ROSEANNA MICHELLE HEATH

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2007

Major Subject: Political Science

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**ABSTRACT**

Explaining Congressional Reform: Electoral Laws, Congressional Organization, and the Balance of Power Between Party Leaders and Backbenchers in Latin American National Legislatures. (May 2007)

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This research addresses the question under what conditions will rank and file legislators favor or oppose changes in a legislature's internal rules of order. The study deviates from previous approaches to the study of legislatures in four primary ways: 1) the study moves from advanced democratized cases of the U.S. Congress and British House of Commons to cases of neo-democracies; 2) the study considers the interaction between the design of the electoral system and its impact on legislature organization; 3) in addition to chamber level factors, party and individual level factors are considered; and 4) the theory considers when legislators will rebel against attempts by party leadership to alter the internal rules of order.

The central question focused on is what factors influence legislators' willingness to speak out or vote against changes in the internal rules of order following a change in the electoral system design. The theory proposed that when it comes to changing the internal rules of order of a legislative chamber, the effective number of parties in the chamber, the

effect of proposed changes in the rules of order on legislator behavior, party discipline, and the nature of legislator ambition affect the probability that change occurs.

Experimental and statistical methodologies are used to test the hypotheses derived from the theory. Original data were collected from experiments conducted on undergraduate pupils at Texas A&M University. For the statistical analyses, a data set of proposed changes in the rules of order were compiled using archived data from the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress. This multi-method approach was used because of the nature of the question under examination and to minimize limitations of the individual methodologies.

The experimental analyses demonstrate that the operations of the theory are supported in the controlled environment of the experiment. The results from the statistical analyses were, within the restrictions imposed by the data, consistent with both theoretical expectations and the experimental findings. The most consistent factor influencing change in the rules of order is the effect of the proposal followed by party discipline.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Overview

The primary research question examined in this dissertation is under what conditions will rank and file legislators favor or oppose changes in the legislature's internal rules of order?<sup>1</sup> In the 1990s, electoral reform was a common occurrence among Latin American democracies. Changes in the electoral law in some cases altered the incentive structures for legislators; specifically, the change introduced an incentive to cultivate personal vote-seeking behavior. Following these changes in the electoral law, the internal rules of order in some legislative chambers did not create an environment conducive to performing personal vote seeking behavior. This dissertation examines under what conditions legislators favored changes in the rules of order sponsored by party leaders and conditions where legislators were willing to rebel against party leaders and alter the rules of order in such a fashion that permitted legislators to pursue personal vote seeking behaviors and local district interests over partisan interests.

This dissertation explores organizational change within national legislatures in a comparative context. Intense examination of rule changes in the U.S. Congress (e.g., the rebellion against Speaker Cannon in 1910, changes in the committee system, and changes in procedures for committee assignments) provide insight into the process of altering the

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The dissertation's manuscript is in the form of the *American Political Science Review*.

internal organization of a national legislature (Bensel 2000; Binder 1995; Dion and Huber 1996; Dodd 1977; Fenno 1973; Katz and Sala 1996; Shepsle 1988; Sinclair 1989). Yet, when and why legislatures make changes in their internal rules of order has not been examined in Latin American national legislatures. In the 1990s, legislative scholars noted that numerous Latin American legislatures were less marginal in nature than in previous democratic regimes. However, legislatures still took a more reactive role in developing a legislative agenda in these countries, although legislatures evolved from being simply a rubber stamp of approval for an executive agenda.

Consequently, legislatures took on a more active role in national agenda setting; therefore, we ought to consider the organization of these legislatures. The internal organization and structure of an assembly is important as it influences how legislators are able to perform legislative activities. A legislative chamber may make changes in the rules of operation for several different reasons, such as an increase in its workload, a change in the electoral environment, or a change in the relations between the executive and legislative branches of government. This dissertation begins to fill this gap in our understanding about legislatures by studying the relationship between electoral rules and how legislative chambers organize themselves.

In this dissertation, I focus on how electoral rules affect the organization of the legislature. Research on electoral rules suggests that electoral system design contributes to who can win elections and the form of political ambition members of a legislature will exhibit (Ames 1994, 1995; Carey 1996; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox 1987, 1990; Jones 1993, 1995; Lancaster 1986; Powell 1989, 2000; Samuels 2000a, 2000b; Samuels and Shugart 2003; Shugart 1995, 2001; Shugart et al. 2005; and Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).

No research concerning democratic institutions in Latin America exists on whether there is a relationship between electoral system design and the organization of legislative chambers. Thus, this dissertation seeks to contribute to existing literature on Latin American legislatures and electoral rules by examining the effects on the behavior of legislators when the organization of a chamber and electoral rules offer contradictory incentives for legislator behavior. Specifically, the dissertation focuses on changes in electoral laws that alter the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers, and whether such a circumstance leads to a reform in the organization of the national legislature.

### **Congressional Organization and Organizational Change Defined**

Congressional organization refers to the formal, written rules of order that define and regulate the operation of the national assembly (or a chamber within the assembly).<sup>1</sup> Congressional organizational change is an alteration in the formal rules of order (e.g., change in how committee assignments are made).

Formal, written changes in congressional organization are those rules that are

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<sup>1</sup> An intensive study of informal norms of conduct exists on the U.S. Congress. See for example, Matthews (1959, 1968; other examples include: Asher 1973; Binder 1996; Binder and Smith 1997; Hall 1996; Maltzman 1997; Shepsle 1989; Sinclair 1989, 2000). Norms may be an important component to understanding how a chamber operates. The concept of informal norms of conduct ought to be applicable beyond the U.S. case, but the specific norms identified in the U.S. literature are not likely to travel across cases. For example, Matthews (1968) discusses the Senate norm that freshmen Senators do not make formal speeches. Given the lack of research on formal rules of order in Latin American legislatures, it seems important to establish a basic understanding of the formal, written rules and how they change before addressing the informal norms of conduct. Thus, this dissertation focuses on the formal changes in the written rules of order.

adopted and written down in the *reglamento interno* (rules of order or equivalent) of a legislative chamber. Changes in the formal rules are worth considering because if a chamber follows its rules, then the formal rules must be altered to change the procedures. Furthermore, if rules historically are ignored, and electoral reform changes the balance of power between party leaders and legislators, the “winner” in that change should want to formally codify their new powers to defend them in the ongoing power struggle.

I examine five types of changes in the formal rules of order based on literature on legislative organization in the U.S. Congress. The types of change I examine are:

- Changes in committee organization, which includes changes in the way committee assignments are made, how long committee assignments are held, changes in committee staff allocations, and changes in the powers of committees (e.g., how long bills are allowed in committee, ability to mark up bills, or hear sworn testimony).
- Alteration in voting procedures, such as implementation of roll call voting.<sup>2</sup>
- Changes in resources allocated to legislators such as the number of staff, office space, and budget for traveling to districts.
- Formal changes in the structure of the congress or chamber, such as changes in the chamber leadership or their powers, and how leadership positions are selected.
- Changes in floor procedures (such as rules of debate on the floor of the chamber, operation of plenary sessions).

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<sup>2</sup> Implementation of roll call voting may be a change in the informal norms of conduct. Some chambers in Latin America permit roll call votes; however, in reality, roll calls are not used. Thus, a change to actually using roll call votes in some cases might only require a change in the norms of behavior.

### **Rationale for Studying the Internal, Written Rules of the National Legislature**

Why should scholars consider the internal rules of the legislature, and why do they matter? Mezey (1979) among other scholars (Agor 1971; Loewenberg and Patterson 1979) suggested that legislatures in Latin America are marginal in nature: nothing more than rubber stamps of approval for executive decisions. However, recent research suggests that some legislatures in Latin America are policy makers and no longer marginal in nature (Close 1995; Escobar-Lemmon et al. 2005; Jones 1995; Morgenstern 2002, 2004; Shugart and Carey 1992; Taylor-Robinson and Diaz 1999). The capacity of legislators and parties to make policy is determined in part by the organization of the legislature in which they work. Changes in the rules of order affect the legislators' ability to function thereby influencing the ability to make policy. Understanding what motivates legislators and party leaders to pursue changes in the legislature's rules of order is important to understanding how one of the key democratic institutions operates, which in turn influences the legitimacy of democratic rule, particularly whether legislators will be able to represent the people who elected them.

Studies of the U.S. Congress demonstrate that attempts to alter the internal rules of order in legislative assemblies are often efforts to redistribute power among party leaders or legislators (Oleszek 2001; see also Binder 1996; and Krehbiel 1991). Oleszek (2001), in studying the U.S. Congress, suggests that theoretically legislative procedures and policy-making are related in four ways: (a) procedures affect policy outcomes; (b) policy decisions may be expressed through procedural moves; (c) the very nature of the policy itself can

determine the use of specific procedures; and (d) policy outcomes are often influenced by members with procedural experience.

Chamber rules offer stability that permits the legislature to conduct its business without debating procedures constantly. Standardized procedures assist in providing continuity between congressional sessions by establishing rights for members, and provide a form of protection regardless of a member's party identification (e.g., permission to speak in debate, ability to initiate legislation). Indeed, rules of order are not neutral. Rather, the rules may assist or hinder both members and parties efforts to achieve goals including reelection, internal influence and power, and passage of legislation. Further, rules may be used by party leaders to maintain control over rank and file legislators.

### **Changing Electoral Rules to Strengthen Democracy**

To install a democratic regime, in numerous Latin American countries competing political actors negotiated pacts to provide the opportunity to liberalize authoritarian rule and move toward democracy. In some cases, political groups involved in the transition to democracy made concessions. In other cases, actors probably thought that they designed optimal rules for democracy when they created the institutions needed to install democracy (Bermeo 1997; Hagopian 1990; Higley and Gunther 1992; Karl 1986; Munck and Leff 1997; Przeworski 1991; Share and Mainwaring 1986).

After the installation of democracy, decreasing popular legitimacy of democratic institutions prompted leaders of numerous Latin American democracies to adopt constitutional reforms and changes in the electoral system. In the dissertation, I discuss how constitutional reform and electoral engineering were common occurrences when

institutional design was perceived to be a source of decreasing popular support for the democratic regime. The changes in the electoral system prompted by decreased popular legitimacy may change the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in the legislature. A shift in the balance of power occurs when party leaders are less able (or not able) to control candidate nomination access to the ballot, and the change in the electoral law creates the incentive for individual candidates to seek a personal vote.<sup>3</sup>

An example of a change where an extreme shift occurs is moving from a multi-member district, closed-list proportional representation system to a single member district where primaries determine candidates on the ballot. In this case, party leaders no longer control access to the ballot, and candidates have an incentive to seek a personal vote; thus, the balance of power shifts from the party leaders to individual politicians. New electoral rules may change what legislators need to do to achieve their career ambitions or what parties need to do to achieve their electoral goals. It is important to note that this change in the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers may be an unintended or even unanticipated effect of electoral reform.

I propose that in some cases, the existing congressional organization may not be compatible with the new electoral rules (the status quo is no longer desirable), and legislators or parties may find that they are not able to function effectively within the

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<sup>3</sup> These constitutional reforms were not always primarily or exclusively related to making legislators have more power than the leadership. One of the primary reasons was to assist in including small, newer parties (e.g., indigenous groups). These reforms may have empowered legislators more as an adverse effect that resulted in backbenchers possessing more power than before the reforms took place.

existing organization of the congress.<sup>4</sup> Their ineffectiveness may lead to continued or renewed dissatisfaction among the electorate. It may also frustrate legislators or parties as assembly rules and the existing distribution of resources impede legislators from achieving their career goals, or make it difficult for parties to maintain the support of key constituencies (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Pitkin 1967; Przeworski 1991; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; Putnam 1994; Samuels and Shugart 2003). Consequently, a change in electoral rules, particularly one that alters the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers may lead to a change in the organization of the legislature. Thus, cases analyzed in this dissertation will be those specifically where electoral reform occurred.

### **Electoral Changes Examined in the Dissertation**

The specific electoral rule changes I focus on in the dissertation include changes in the shape of constituencies, which may create the need for change in the chamber rules. Creating a single national district rather than multiple regional districts permits legislators to expand whom they attempt to appeal to in the electorate (e.g., teachers or healthcare professionals rather than voters in a narrow geographic constituency). This move away from a narrow geographic constituency to a more expanded constituency permits legislators to target specific groups or sectors that allow legislators to advance activities that are representative interests over partisan interests. This shift in focusing on constituent interests can change inter-party relations as members no longer rely solely on party leaders for

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<sup>4</sup> In some cases, the status quo may no longer be desirable; however, the status quo may be maintained because leadership or Members of Congress are not able to form a coalition to successfully alter the rules of order.

reelection, which may lead to changes in the rules of order regardless as to whether partisan and constituent interests are identical.

In the empirical chapters, I use the cases of the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress to test the theory developed in the first section of the dissertation. Colombia and Peru are appropriate cases to analyze the theory for numerous reasons. First, in both cases, the modification in the electoral code resulted in the adoption of a single national district in place of multi-member districts. However, the two cases vary in that the Colombians use a closed-list proportional representation system whereas the Peruvians use an open-list proportional representation system. This difference may influence the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers as the Colombians control the list order though multiple lists for parties are present. In contrast, the Peruvian party leaders are less able to control the election of candidates as they do not control the order of the list. Thus, Peruvian legislators may be more likely to perform personal vote seeking behaviors than their Colombian counterparts. Given this, Peruvian legislators may be more likely to rebel against party leaders if the leadership proposes changes in the rules of order that harm the ability to perform such behaviors.

Additionally, the party systems in both countries are similar. Both systems experienced an increase in fractionalization among the traditional parties in the countries, creating cohesion difficulties and an increase in new parties winning seats in the Congress, and in the Peruvian case, the Presidency. Both party systems consist of parties that demonstrate moderately weak to weak party discipline, meaning that they are less able to control the actions of representatives. Also, the two cases are similar in that numerous legislators pursue discrete and static ambition with only a few demonstrating a career

pattern suggesting progressive ambition. Given the similarities and differences in the two cases, Colombia and Peru provide us with the ability to test the theory and hypotheses presented in the next chapter.

Other electoral reforms that may influence the likelihood of changing a chamber's rules of order, but are not included in the dissertation, include unfusing elections (Honduras, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela), moving from open-list to closed-list proportional representation or vice versa (Ecuador, Honduras, Colombia), abolishing a chamber (Peru, Venezuela), adoption of a mixed member electoral system (Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia), adoption of a national gender quota for the congress (Argentina, Costa Rica, among others), and change in the electoral timing cycle (Chile). The advantage of using cases that adopt the same type of electoral law is that there should be a similar or identical type of incentive structure for party leaders and legislators to pursue changes in the rules of order. In the cases of Peru and Colombia, reformers expected a change in behavior by focusing on national issues rather than clientelistic, personalistic behavior. Other types of change in the electoral law affect the incentive structure of party leaders and legislators differently; thus, by choosing cases with identical changes in the electoral law, we can control for the incentive structure and observe whether party leaders pursue similar types of changes in the rules of order, and whether legislators rebel against the party leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order. I discuss these alternative changes and how they influence the changes in the internal rules of order in the conclusion chapter under the section on future research.

*Constitutional Change in Colombia and Peru*

In 1991, the modification of the Colombian Constitution created a single national district for Senate elections; thereby, abolishing the previous department-level districts. Under the new law, Senators could appeal to a larger and geographically diffuse constituency than under the smaller pre-reform districts. Though party leaders wanted a larger focus on national issues rather than local ones, legislators within a year or two of the reform reverted back to their previous behavior of focusing on select regions rather than a national constituency (Crisp and Ingall 2002). In this case, Senators may not need to change the rules of order to perform legislative duties; however, party leaders sought changes in the internal rules of order to alter the behavior of Senators so that they would increasingly focus on national issues.

Electoral system design modification took the shape of altering the constituency representation framework in Colombia. Prior to electoral design reform, Colombian legislators often pursued clientelistic, particularistic interests. Consequently, ignoring national interests was common, while legislators focused on interests that benefited large rural networks that supported their political careers (Archer and Shugart 1997; Crisp and Ingall 2002; and Nielsen and Shugart 1997).

Colombian reformers in the specially elected National Constituent Assembly of 1991 pursued three goals aimed at reducing the inefficiency of the National Congress. First, reformers wanted to increase political participation among minorities. Second, they aimed to decrease the high level of corruption and clientelism that existed in the current system. Third, reformers hoped to modify representation by redesigning the Senate so that Senators

would focus on national interests, while the lower chamber focused on local and regional interests (Crisp and Ingall 2002).

Before the 1991 reforms, the election of members of the National Congress occurred through closed-list proportional representation with district magnitude ranging from 2 to 15 in the lower chamber and a DM of two in the Senate (Jones 1995, 18).<sup>5</sup> Party leaders under this system in Colombia do not control the use of the party label in elections. Therefore, multiple lists with different candidates using the same label are common.<sup>6</sup> Candidates would have to develop a personal reputation that would permit them to stand out above other candidates, as intra-party competition is high. Thus, Senators have an incentive to seek a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). The 1991 reforms transformed the Senate into a 100-member chamber elected from a single national district plus two seats for the indigenous population. The goal of this change was to reconstruct the incentive structure for Senators so that they would pursue national interests instead of solely focusing on personalistic, pork barrel politics that were common in the National Congress; however, Senators reverted back to their previous behavior of pursuing pork barrel projects rather than focusing on national issues (Crisp and Ingall 2002).

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<sup>5</sup> The apportionment of seats in the Senate between 1974 and 1991 was two per department. After 1991, there is a single national district (Jones 1995, 18). The Colombian electoral system uses a closed-list proportional representation system under which normally, each party presents a single list in which party leaders choose the final order of the list. In Colombia, parties often produce multiple lists rather than a single list.

<sup>6</sup> The 1994 electoral reform permitted control over party lists though it was not regularly exercised by party leaders. In 2003 a similar reform was adopted which was first used in the 2006 elections. Under this reform, parties are limited to a single list and open list proportional representation was adopted (personal communication with Maria Escobar-Lemmon July 1, 2006).

When this reversion in behavior occurred, party leaders ought to have pursued changes in the organization of the chamber that would either assist in pursuing national issues or constraining legislators from being able to pursue Clientelistic, pork barrel legislation.

In 1993, a new constitution was implemented in Peru. Upon his election in 1990, President Alberto Fujimori switched policy positions on various issues including adoption of what some scholars suggest were the toughest structural adjustment policies in Latin America in response to the debt crisis and ongoing pressures by the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and an increase in violence on the part of the *Sendero Luminoso* (Bowen 2000; Cameron 1997; Carey and Shugart 1998; Cotler 1995; Kenney 2004; McClintock 1994; Schmidt 1996; Stokes 1997). Strong opposition to such reforms within the Congress and increasing conflict between the legislative and executive branches of government led to deadlock, resulting in Fujimori's overthrow of his own government in the *autogolpe* of 1992, which culminated in the dissolution of the National Congress. Quickly, thereafter, a national commission was appointed by the President, which passed several constitutional reforms including modifications in the electoral laws (Kenney 2004).

Reformers outlined the roles of the legislative and executive branches of government. Specifically, the new constitution outlined executive authority including term limits, promotion of military officers, and appointments of ambassadors. The constitutional reform established when the president could dissolve parliament, and when new elections could be called (Carey and Shugart 1998; Jones 1995; Kenney 2004; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In regard to the legislature, the constitution outlines five primary roles: initiate, interpret, and modify legislation, laws, and resolutions; guard the constitution and investigate public officials that violate the constitution; approve all treaties before they are

effective; authorize all loans made to the national government; and approve all presidential appearances outside of the country (Constitution of the Republic, Article 102, 1993).

The Senate was abolished in the 1993 reforms. Prior to the reforms, the lower chamber consisted of 150 members elected from twenty-six districts using open-list proportional representation with an average district magnitude of 6.9 (Kenney 2004, 62). Following the 1993 reforms, the number of seats was reduced to 120, and election occurred through a single national district using open-list proportional representation (Kenney 2004). Given the structure of the electoral system following the modification, we ought to see an increase in personal vote seeking on the part of legislators. Consequently, if the rules of order hindered the ability to perform such legislative duties, we might expect to observe changes in the rules that benefited legislators. Further, if party leaders attempted to alter the rules of order to prevent such personal vote seeking behavior, we might expect to see backbench rebellion against such proposals.

### **Influences on the Probability of Congressional Organizational Reform**

When changes in electoral rules cause backbenchers or parties to need different resources to achieve their career and electoral aspirations, legislators or parties confront the dilemma of whether to modify the formal rules of order or allocation of resources in the chamber. By altering the formal rules, it is possible to correct the incompatibility between the incentives created by the electoral rules and what legislators and parties are able to do within the existing rules of order and distribution of resources within the chamber.

The new electoral rules and the electoral incentives they create can change the balance of power between parties and their backbenchers. Rules were originally written to

reflect the incentives of the dominant party (either leaders or rank and file) at the time the rules were codified. Przeworski (1991) claims that institutions are selected based on whether competing political actors have equal or unequal strength, and whether they would each know the strength of the other players. When the organization of the legislature hinders the ability of parties to achieve electoral goals, leaders of affected parties ought to attempt to change the formal rules. If the incentives created by new electoral rules do not decrease the probability of parties achieving their goals, but do impede individual legislators' achievement of their goals, we ought to expect attempts by backbenchers to alter the formal rules. Based on this argument, I will offer propositions about how the effective number of political parties, degree of party discipline, and the nature of legislator political ambition influence the probability of congressional organizational change.

### **Chapter Organization**

The division of the dissertation is in two sections: (a) construction of a theory to generate predictions about when changes in the formal internal rules of order occur; and (b) testing the theory presented. The first section of the dissertation includes a chapter that presents a theory and hypotheses for explaining congressional changes in the formal internal rules of order when the opportunities available to members in the existing organization do not permit either parties (represented by party leaders in the chamber) or individual legislators to achieve their political goals following a change in the electoral rules, which altered the incentive structures for party leadership or legislators. The second section of the dissertation includes two empirical chapters, using different methodologies (i.e.,

experimental and statistical), to test the model and hypotheses formulated and presented in the first section of the dissertation.

Chapter II reviews the existing literature. I review the role of Latin American legislatures since the third wave of democracy and their transition from marginal to reactive legislatures. Then, I review the literature concerning how incentives and opportunities created by the electoral system design and congressional organization affect the behavior and the balance of power between party leaders and individual legislators in the chamber. After this discussion, I review existing literature on congressional organizational reform in the U.S. Congress. This chapter also presents theory and hypotheses about how chamber, party system, and individual characteristics influence the chances of changing the rules of order including the nature of legislator ambition, the effective number of political parties, and party discipline within a chamber.

Chapter III uses an experimental methodology to test the theory and hypotheses presented in Chapter II.

Chapter IV uses a statistical methodology to examine bill initiation to change the rules of order. The cases in this chapter are the Peruvian Congress, and the Colombian Senate, both cases that experienced a change in the electoral law involving size and shape of the constituency. Specifically, both countries changed the electoral law so that all legislative candidates competed in a single national district rather than several, smaller multi-member districts.

Chapter IV also presents statistical analyses of the Peruvian changes in the rules of order by examining debates on the floor regarding changes in the rules of order. I analyze all of the floor debates concerning changes to the chamber's rules for the past three

congressional sessions. The chapter includes an analysis of the transcript of everyone's speeches as well as an analysis of how each member in the chamber voted.

Chapter V concludes the dissertation by summarizing the theory and findings of the empirical tests in chapters III and IV. It also discusses the broader impact and implications of the findings for future research on legislatures in democratizing countries. Specifically, the chapter summarizes how these findings fit into the existing literature and the contribution this research makes to our understanding of how electoral rules influence how legislative chambers organize themselves.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY**

#### **Introduction**

Recently, a reexamination of Latin American national legislatures led to the questioning of the long-standing argument that Latin American legislatures are marginal in nature. Instead of acting as mere rubber stamps providing symbolic approval of executive action, legislatures have taken the opportunity to make policies independent of the executive, or to modify policies proposed by the executive branch (Ames 2001; Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Siavelis 2000; Taylor-Robinson and Diaz 1999). Given that Latin American legislatures have increased their spheres of legislative activities, exploring how the organization of the legislature impacts the ability of parties and individual legislators to pursue their own policy, power, and electoral goals is the next logical step in developing a comprehensive knowledge of the operation of legislatures.

To install a democratic regime, in numerous Latin American countries, competing political actors negotiated pacts to provide the opportunity to liberalize authoritarian rule. In order to successfully transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, some political groups found it necessary to make concessions to exiting authoritarian actors. These concessions involved the inclusion of tutelary powers and reserved domains to be formalized into the new constitution. Studies suggest that these concessions may inhibit the consolidation of democracy in these Latin American countries. In other cases, political actors probably thought that they designed optimal political rules for consolidation when they created the democratic institutions; however, the construction of the institutions

possessed flaws that were not observed at the time of implementation (Bermeo 1997; Hagopian 1990; Higley and Gunther 1992; Karl 1986; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Munck and Leff 1997; O'Donnell; Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1991; Share and Mainwaring 1986; Valenzuela 1992).

In multiple Latin American countries, following the installation of democracy, political actors became aware of the implications of some of these flaws in the institutions. In some cases, political actors (especially party leaders) noted that it was difficult to control the behavior of legislators. For example, in Colombia, party leaders had a difficult time persuading legislators to promote national interests (Crisp and Ingall 2002). In the case of Colombia, as well as other Latin American countries, political actors altered the electoral system design in order to influence legislator or party behavior. Following a change in the electoral system design, legislators or party leaders may determine that they are no longer capable of functioning effectively. Ineffectiveness on the part of either legislators or party leaders means that, following the change in the electoral system design, they are incapable of doing what they need to do to achieve career ambition or partisan goals. I propose that in this case the change in the electoral system design results in a change in the incentive structures for legislators and party leaders. The congress may be organized in such a fashion that legislators and party leaders are able to function effectively and achieve political goals prior to the change in the electoral law. However, following a change in the electoral law, the chamber may no longer be organized in a fashion that permits these political actors to work effectively.

This raises the important question of what kinds of changes in the electoral system design will invoke a proposal to change the internal rules of order of the congress. I

propose that when a change in the electoral system design creates an incentive for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, whether it is intentional or not, we are likely to see proposed changes in the rules of order. Further, if this change in the electoral rules creates a strong incentive to seek a personal vote, if the legislator fails to obtain a personal vote, he is unlikely to be able to continue a career in politics. This is the condition in which we are more likely to observe rebellion on the backbenchers' part when party leaders propose a change in the rules of order that is not beneficial to individual legislators.

Multiple Latin American legislatures adopted at least one if not several changes in the formal rules of procedure within the assembly.<sup>7</sup> Changes in congressional organization have been studied extensively in the U.S.; however, little research exists on organizational change in Latin American assemblies. This leaves a void in our knowledge concerning the operation of these legislatures that are no longer considered marginal. By expanding beyond the U.S. Congress to Latin America, we can begin to develop an increased comprehension of how the organization of chambers impacts the effectiveness and behavior of legislators in newer democracies. By examining beyond the U.S. case, we can begin to explore how the combination of different electoral system designs interacts with the organization of assemblies in determining how legislators perform their legislative duties.

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<sup>7</sup> A change in the internal rules of order may be a single change or a combination of changes. For the purpose of this dissertation, I include only those changes discussed in Chapter I. The changes in the rules of order do not imply that the production of an entirely new document occurs. In some cases, leaders and backbenchers may desire to alter only a specific section (e.g., how the party awards funding for travel to constituencies, or assignments to committees).

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on rules changes in the U.S. Congress following electoral system reform in the 1990s. Then, I present a theoretical model of the process to alter the rules of order including the intuition behind the actions of party leaders, rebel backbenchers, and the median legislator. I also include a discussion of assumptions made in the model, and the consequences and rationale for each. Once I present the model, I then review the literature and develop hypotheses about how the potential effects of a proposed change in the rules of order will influence the performance of legislative activities on the part of the median legislator. I present hypotheses for how the effective number of parties, party discipline, and about how the nature of legislator ambition influence the likelihood of support for the changes in the rules of order, and ultimately the passing of formal changes in the internal rules of order.

### **Moving Towards a Model to Explain Congressional Organizational Change: The U.S. Case**

When the incentives created by electoral rules and the opportunities offered by the organization of the chamber are different (i.e., incompatible) for either party leaders or backbenchers, there exists an incentive to change the existing rules of order (or to change the electoral rules, though this may be more difficult to accomplish). Studies of the U.S. Congress show that legislators adopt institutions and rules which assist them in achieving reelection (Katz and Sala 1996; Mayhew 1974; Polsby 1968; Schlesinger 1966). In the 1890s, the U.S. states adopted the Australian Ballot replacing the previously used party strip balloting. Under the secret ballot, voters were able to reward or sanction their Representatives if they were seeking reelection. Arguably, this change in the electoral rules

created an incentive to increase credit claiming and personal vote seeking behaviors (Brady 1973; Katz and Sala 1996).

After the adoption of the Australian ballot, if representatives wanted to perform duties that would assist in obtaining reelection, the organization of the U.S. Congress needed to be altered in order for legislators to be effective. Katz and Sala (1996) contend that following the adoption of the ballot, legislators became increasingly interested in constituting institutional arrangements so that they could build a personal reputation that would garner more votes in subsequent elections. Members of Congress began to support the reappointment of incumbents to committees where serving on committees would assist in building a personal reputation, which would increase reelection chances.

Before 1911, the Speaker of the House was the ultimate authority on assigning committees, and was constrained in two ways. First, he was constrained by promises that he made in the previous congressional term, and second, he was constrained by any bargains struck in order to obtain the Speakership itself (Follet 1896; Stewart 1992). Since 1911 following the rebellion against Speaker Cannon over committee assignments, either party caucuses or caucus committees confront the identical threat of backbench revolt of those opposed to unfavorable committee assignments. Thus, the changes in the electoral law (i.e., the adoption of the Australian Secret Ballot) changed the incentive structures of the Members of Congress, which induced a change in how committee assignments were made (Katz and Sala 1996; Stewart 1992).

An assumption of this research is that both political parties (party leaders) and rank and file legislators (backbenchers) have aspirations. Parties want to win elections and maintain or expand their seat share in the legislature. Backbenchers have political career

ambitions.<sup>8</sup> These two actors are engaged in a struggle, as the strategy for achieving their aspirations may not be the same. When national electoral rules are changed, the balance of power in the struggle between party leaders and backbenchers can change, prompting a change in the organization of the chamber to reallocate resources so that the newly strong actor is better able to achieve its aspirations (Katz and Sala 1996). If the rules of order of the chamber hinder the party's ability to achieve election goals, leaders of affected parties ought to seek to change the formal rules of order. If the organization of the legislature does not hinder parties from achieving their goals, but does impede individual legislators from achieving their goals, legislators should attempt to alter the formal rules of order. Both parties and backbenchers may want rule changes to achieve their goals, but the changes they desire may not be identical. I propose that legislators are likely to vote against a leadership proposal if it hinders their ability to perform legislative duties that would assist in achieving some political goal. Thus:

Hypothesis 1: Legislators are more likely to oppose the leadership's proposal to change the internal rules of order if such changes harm the ability of legislators to perform legislative duties that will assist them in achieving some political goal.

### **The Process of Altering the Internal Rules of Order in a Chamber**

A problem facing the chamber leadership when considering whether or not to initiate a proposal to alter the internal rules of a congress is if there exists a strong possibility

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<sup>8</sup> In some cases, legislators who plan to retire or leave politics at the end of their congressional term may no longer have political ambitions, consequently, their behavior may be different from legislators that are planning to seek reelection in the Congress or continue a career in politics outside of the Assembly.

that backbenchers will revolt against leadership if the proposed change negatively affects legislators' abilities to do what is needed to ensure reelection, continue a career in politics or pursue their policy interests. The proposed change would make legislators worse off than the existing rules of order.<sup>9</sup> The leadership is aware that backbenchers may rebel and produce a counter proposal to the initial one proposed by the leadership in order to signal to leaders that legislators are negatively affected by the existing rules of order. Further, a counter proposal may demonstrate that backbenchers are willing to pursue their own agenda if the leadership fails to recognize this effect. In either case, if legislators prefer a rebel backbencher proposal to the leadership's, and vote for the former, the backbench proposal will replace the existing rules of order. To reduce the risk that an unfavorable proposal passes, the leadership may anticipate the behavior of backbenchers and draft a proposal to change the rules of order to preempt a backbench counter proposal, or refrain from initiating a proposal.

It is important to note that in some instances, the backbencher proposal is not unfavorable to the leadership. This situation arises when both leaders and backbenchers need to modify the existing rules of order so that they each have the ability to achieve their goals. In such a case, leaders may propose initially a change that benefits them, but fails to accommodate backbenchers. Then, backbenchers initiate a counter proposal that incorporates components of the leaderships' and backbenchers' needs.

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<sup>9</sup> In developing this model, I use Gerber's (1996) spatial model of legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives in the California State Legislature as a template. Similar to Gerber, my model includes three actors. Additionally, the sequential order of the game and some of the assumptions build on Gerber's presentation.

The occurrence of a counterproposal may be interpreted as a signal to the leadership that backbenchers are also hindered by the existing rules of order though this does not imply that rebels and leaders always have contradictory interests.

The leadership's initial proposal may not be unfavorable to backbenchers. In this circumstance, leaders require no signal from the backbench suggesting that legislators are harmed by the existing rules of order (or the proposed change). Leaders have either incorporated backbenchers' needs in the original proposal, or the backbenchers need no change in chamber rules, and will not be negatively affected by the changes party leaders pose. In sum, leaders can recognize the need of legislators and decrease the likelihood of a counter proposal by rebel backbenchers.

### *Assumptions*

Prior to illustrating the sequential process of altering a chamber's internal rules of order, I make several assumptions for simplification purposes. First, before backbenchers rebel, the leadership commits to a new proposed change in the internal rules of order.<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, both the leadership and rebel backbenchers commit to a preferred change before the legislator votes. Given this commitment by players, an important component of the process modeled is how actors perceive and anticipate future behaviors of other players in the process. I assume that each actor has a preferred rule of order, which is defined both

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<sup>10</sup> The changes in the rules of order do not imply that the production of an entirely new document occurs. In some cases, leaders and backbenchers may desire to alter only a specific section (e.g., how the party caucus awards funds to travel to constituencies, or assignment of committees).

by a utility function and an ideal point. As a player moves away from the ideal point, the utility decreases in value.

Second, I assume complete information; that actors know one another's preferences, costs, the moves of all players in the process preceding theirs, and the content of any proposal to change the rules of order. This assumption means that rebel backbenchers proposing  $B^*$  are aware if a majority of legislators will prefer  $B^*$  over the leadership's proposed  $P^*$ , or the status quo. Likewise, the leadership knows if the backbench is likely to rebel, and if such a change is likely to be preferred over the one proposed by the leadership.<sup>11</sup>

Third, to assist in focusing on the interaction between the three actors, I assume that both the leadership and rebel backbenchers each act as unified actors. Further, I assume that only one  $P^*$  is offered by the leadership; multiple proposals are not in play simultaneously. This assumption may be violated in practice as well, because when the process to change the existing rules of order begins, there may exist multiple parties with conflicting preferences for the internal rules of the chamber, and a coalition of party leaders who compose the chamber leadership. Leaders from different political parties may compete for the chance to affect attempted changes of the existing rules.

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<sup>11</sup> It is important to note that the complete information assumption is violated frequently in reality. Uncertainty surrounds the actual process of altering the rules of order, and actors may be uncertain about the future consequences of their actions. Leadership may be uncertain about the preferences and the resolve of potentially rebellious backbenchers, or even misperceive the affect of proposal changes on legislators. Backbenchers who choose to revolt may miscalculate the costs of rebelling against the leadership, miscalculate the probability that their proposed rules change will receive majority support with or without building a coalition if needed, or propose an alternative that either leaders or other legislators in the chamber reject.

For example, party leaders in a multi-party system may have conflicting preferences. Party leaders that are part of the leadership that controls the congress may want to alter the existing rules to assist them in pursuing the president's agenda, if the president is from the same party. Meanwhile, if a party opposing the president controls chamber leadership, those leaders might alter the rules to make it more difficult for the president's agenda to be implemented. Similarly, opposing party leaders, where the party controls neither the chamber nor the presidency, may attempt to change the rules of order to hinder the governing party. Over time, competing party leaders, depending on the number of political parties in the system and the size of the party majority in the chamber, may form coalitions amongst themselves or determine whether the costs outweigh the benefits of attempting to change parts of the rules.

I assume in the model that by the time party leaders from different political parties initiate a proposal, one group will emerge as the primary sponsor of the proposal, with other party leaders taking a secondary role, or opting to form an opposition to persuade legislators to vote against the proposed  $P^*$ . For the purposes of the spatial model developed in this chapter, I analyze the simplest case, a two-party chamber with one party in control of the chamber leadership. The nature of the party system and its effect on the likelihood of successful rules changes is considered in subsequent chapters.

The rebel backbencher is also a unitary actor in this model. Again, violation of this may occur in practice. In the earlier stages of the process to change the rules, numerous groups of backbenchers with conflicting preferences may compete to offer a counter proposal. For example, backbenchers with progressive ambition may possess different preferences than backbenchers with static ambition. A second example is that some

backbenchers seek to represent national interests, whereas other backbenchers may seek pork and patronage for individuals in their constituencies. Other examples include competing preference for backbenchers from a large political party compared to backbenchers from smaller parties, and backbenchers whose parties have different nominating procedures. Over time, these competing actors may form coalitions amongst themselves or some may drop out of the process (e.g., the proposal dies in committee or is withdrawn due to lack of support). By the time a group of backbenchers initiates an alternative to the leadership's proposal, I assume one group will emerge as the main sponsor of the proposal, with other backbenchers taking a secondary role. Also, as mentioned above for simplification, I assume that the rebel backbencher is from the governing party, though this assumption is relaxed in subsequent chapters.

Concerning legislators who do not participate directly in the rebellion, their preferences are known and fixed.<sup>12</sup> Individual legislators may have different preferences, because they are elected from different political parties, and define their roles differently, and the legislators may have different forms of political ambition. However, a simple majority vote is what is typically required to pass a change in the chamber rules of order, so it is the preference of the median legislator that determines whether a rules change proposal will be approved.

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<sup>12</sup> For the purposes of this model, I assume that the legislator is equivalent to the “median legislator.”

### *Player Costs*

The time and expenditure of resources in order to prepare  $P^*$  (the rules change proposed by party leaders) involves cost on the part of the party leadership. The use of resources spent to propose  $P^*$  may be viewed by the electorate, and in some cases legislators not hindered by existing rules of order, as wasteful. For example, the time and resources used could have been spent on proposing legislation and assisting it through the law-making process on a substantive policy issue such as education or healthcare. For the purpose of the model presented in this chapter, I assume that the party leadership's costs are known and fixed.

I assume that, for rebelling backbenchers, initiating an alternative change to the rules of order is costly. In particular, party leaders may control access to resources that can be taken away. For example, rebelling backbenchers may be assigned to less prestigious committees, their legislation may never be assigned to committee, or never placed on the calendar for floor debate, or they may receive fewer resources for maintaining their staff and traveling to constituencies. Party leaders may also be able to hurt rebels' future political career prospects. In addition, it is costly for rebel backbenchers to take the time to form a group of willing rebel backbenchers, draft an alternative proposal, and seek the votes needed from other legislators to have the bill pass over the leadership's preference. In this model, I assume that costs are known and fixed for rebel backbenchers.

I further assume that there is cost associated with the legislators' votes in the chamber. In each instance where legislators vote between maintaining the status quo or one of the proposed changes, legislators must weigh costs of alienating the party leadership. In the case where the legislator chooses between  $P^*$  and the status quo, legislators consider

whether the leadership is composed of their own party leaders who control access to resources such as committee assignments, the legislative calendar for debate, staff and travel monies to visit constituencies, and ballot access. If the answer is yes, legislators that vote against  $P^*$  may endanger their access to such resources. In addition, legislators consider whether  $P^*$  is more compatible with their needs to pursue their policy, personal, and partisan goals. If  $P^*$  assists more than the status quo, it would be costly to vote against  $P^*$  and maintain the status quo. A similar argument can be made for when legislators vote between  $P^*$  and  $B^*$  (the counter proposal made by rebel backbenchers).

*The Sequential Process of Altering the Rules of Order in a Congressional Chamber*

To provide insight into how leadership's anticipation of backbenchers' preferences affects leadership behavior, I present a model of the process of changing a chamber's internal rules of order as a sequential game. Figure 2-1 illustrates the process of altering the rules of order of a chamber in which there are three players: the party leadership, the rebel backbencher, and the median legislator. The goal of the game is to choose a rule of order that determines a payoff for all players. In the model presented here, the payoffs include each player's ability to achieve reelection or continue a career in politics (ambition goals), or other goals such as policy, power, or partisan goals including maintaining or expanding party seat shares.

The party leadership moves initially, proposing a change in the rules of order,  $P^*$ .<sup>13</sup> When proposing  $P^*$ , the leadership understands that some proposals may result in a group of backbenchers rebelling, proposing a change of their own,  $B^*$ . Once the leadership proposes  $P^*$ , the rebel backbencher moves next, and determine whether or not to initiate a counter proposal,  $B^*$ . If no counter proposal is made, the game ends when legislators vote either against the leadership's proposed  $P^*$ , or vote for  $P^*$ , which replaces the existing rules of order. If a counter proposal,  $B^*$  is made, legislators vote between  $P^*$ ,  $B^*$ , and the status quo,  $SQ$ .

### **Outcome of Behavior in the Process to Alter the Rules of Order**


In order to solve the game presented, I use backwards induction. In using this method, I commence with the legislator's decision to vote, then move to the rebel backbencher's decision to counter propose  $B^*$ . Finally, I examine the party leadership's decision to propose  $P^*$ .

The legislator is the last player to move in the process. Consequently, the legislator is able to observe all other actors' moves accurately.

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<sup>13</sup> As previously discussed, I assume that the party leadership moves first in the sequence of play. It is possible that backbenchers could make the initial move, but I expect that party leaders would be more likely to be the initial player to propose change in the rules of order for the following reasons. In an institutionalized party system where parties are organized, have strong roots in society, and regulations for inter-party competition, party leadership should be able to consider the potential benefits and costs of pursuing changes in the rules of order with minimum cost. Rebel backbenchers must organize, consider the costs and benefits, initiate the bill, and assist the bill through the law-making process. In addition, for the purpose of this dissertation, I am interested in the condition in which backbenchers will rebel against the party leadership's proposed changes from the status quo.

**FIGURE 2-1 The Sequential Process of Altering the Rules of Order in a Congressional Chamber**



That is, the leadership has proposed  $P^*$ , and the rebel backbenchers have countered with  $B^*$  if they are going to. In addition, since I assume that legislators are aware of their own ideal point and the utility they obtain from each proposed alternative, legislators will vote for the proposed rules of order that provide the highest utility. In the circumstance that there exists a choice between  $P^*$ ,  $B^*$ , and  $SQ$ , the legislator votes for the alternative that provides the highest utility after considering the costs associated with not cooperating with the leadership or rebels. They will also do this when the choice is between  $P^*$  and  $SQ$ . The precise level of utility the legislator receives from each proposal depends on a spatial relationship between the legislators' ideal point, shape of the utility function, and the costs incurred for not cooperating with either the party leadership or rebel backbencher.

When the rebel backbencher moves, the rebels must decide whether or not there is a counter proposal  $B^*$  worth proposing. Specifically, can the rebel backbencher propose a  $B^*$  that increases their own utility enough over  $P^*$ , net the costs of proposing the alternative  $B^*$ . Additionally,  $B^*$  has to be preferred by the legislators who vote on the chamber floor over  $P^*$ . Since I assume that all players have complete information, the rebel backbencher is aware of the proposals that the legislator is likely to vote for on the floor. Given this information, the rebel backbencher will propose  $B^*$  only if the legislators' will vote in favor of it over  $P^*$ .

The party leadership moves initially in the process and confronts the problem of proposing a change to the existing rules of order. The leadership anticipates whether a group of rebel backbenchers will propose  $B^*$  as well as what alternatives legislators are likely to vote in favor of. The leadership desires to propose a change in the rules of order that

does not trigger rebel backbenchers to propose a  $B^*$ , which might lessen the utility of the leadership unless  $B^*$  simply adds backbencher needs to the change proposed by party leaders. The leadership may avert a  $B^*$  proposal by proposing a  $P^*$  that legislators prefer over any potential  $B^*$  by rebel backbenchers. A second way to avert backbench rebellion is for the leadership to propose  $P^*$  that rebel backbenchers prefer over any other potential alternative. In either case, the leadership avoids  $B^*$  and is able to propose  $P^*$  that provides the highest possible utility.

### **Relevant Parties and Party Discipline Effects on Changing the Rules of Order**

Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) examine variances in Latin American presidential systems, including the constitutional powers granted to the president, and how the kind of parties and party systems affect presidential power. In examining these differences, Mainwaring and Shugart consider how parties influence the operation, stability, and consolidation of presidential democracies. First, the authors suggest that the number of political parties in a system influences the degree of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of government. Specifically, in highly fragmented party systems, majority control by a single party is a rare event. Consequently, the president will face the difficult task of building a coalition. Increased party system fragmentation can increase the probability of deadlock as evidenced by Ames' (2001) and Mainwaring's (1999) work on Brazil, Kenney's (2004) work on Fujimori's Peru, and pre 1973 Chile (Scully 1995).

A large effective number of political parties in a chamber may influence backbencher independence. In a system of multiple parties, legislators may have an incentive to act independently from parties, because party leaders will have to overcome

collective action issues and form coalitions with other parties in order to pursue legislative agendas. However, if party leaders control nominations or access to the ballot, there may not be an increase in personal vote seeking by individual legislators. A large number of political parties in the legislature may make changing a chamber's rules more difficult due to the challenge of coordinating across parties to build a coalition to approve the changes in the rules. If parties want to change the rules, they face a collective action problem in order to do so. In the presence of only one or two dominant parties, one of the parties is likely to have a majority or near majority of seats in the chamber. A party that has a majority or near majority of the seats in the congress has a greater likelihood of getting its rules change bill passed through the chamber. As the number of parties increases in the chamber, it may become more difficult to construct a coalition that would support amending the rules. With a larger number of parties in the chamber, several different partisan or personal goals may exist that are incompatible. Leaders of opposition parties will be content to settle back and watch the ensuing battle between majority party legislators and their party leadership if the latter is unable to compromise with its own legislators. Party leaders from opposition parties are even more likely to stand by if the activity weakens the ability of the majority party to appear effective. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: As the effective number of parties in the congress increases, legislators are more likely to oppose changes in the internal rules of order.

Party discipline<sup>14</sup> also affects the president's ability to pursue his agenda, and influences the incentive for legislators to behave independently of party leaders. When there is high party discipline, and leaders can sanction legislators who are disloyal to the party, legislators will be less likely to rebel against the party and function independently. However, in weak disciplined parties, this is not guaranteed, and legislators that have an incentive to act independently of the party may in fact choose to do so.

If parties need to change the internal rules of the chamber to help with achieving electoral goals, then high party discipline can be viewed as a case where there is a large cost associated with the rebel backbenchers' decision to rebel, or a high degree of party loyalty from party backbenchers, should help party leaders achieve the rules change. Low party discipline, where cost to rebel is small or zero, should make it difficult for party leaders to change chamber rules to help the party achieve electoral goals if the party's rules change preferences are incompatible with the resources individual legislators need to achieve their career ambitions. When party discipline is weak, legislators should attempt to change the rules in order to increase their ability to achieve their personal career goals. In order to accomplish the change, legislators must overcome the collective action challenges to construct a majority to pass the changes. Provided legislators can overcome the collective action challenge, when there is weak party discipline, legislators ought to seek changes in the internal rules when existing rules do not assist legislators in continuing their careers in politics.

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<sup>14</sup> Party discipline is not necessarily a characteristic of the party system, but can also be a characteristic of individual parties. For example, the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil is characterized as a high discipline party in a low discipline party system (Mainwaring 1991).

When party discipline is high, legislators are not as likely to rebel against party leadership. The reason for this is multifold. First, in parties with high discipline, there is little incentive to alienate the leadership. This is in part due to the ability of leaders to impose sanctions on rebelling legislators such as lowering their place on the ballot in closed-list systems. If a legislator rebels and the leadership responds by placing the legislator in an unsafe seat, it may not matter if the legislator can function in the legislature or not, because the member is not likely to win the next election. In closed-list systems, alienated party leaders may place candidates in marginal list positions, which significantly decreases the chances they will be reelected. Second, alienated party leaders that control committee assignments may punish legislators by giving them less prestigious committee assignments. In countries where politicians cannot be reelected immediately to a congress, leaders can refuse to appoint rebellious backbenchers to other political offices. Thus, the party leadership ends the legislator's political aspirations, so it matters little if the legislator is effective.

When party discipline is weak, legislators are not constrained by national party leaders in pursuing change. The national party leadership is not an obstacle, because they do not control the electoral fate of legislators. In such cases like Brazil, the constituency or leaders at the state or local level largely control legislators' future political posts. Since the party leadership at the national level does not play a role in controlling the career paths of legislators, rebellion against the national party leadership is more likely. Consequently:

Hypothesis 3: Legislators that are members of parties with high party discipline are less likely to oppose changes in the rules of order sponsored by party leaders.

### **The Effect of Legislator Ambition on Changing the Rules of Order**

Recent research examines ambition theory in the context of Latin American politics (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002; Samuels 2003). In Latin America, static ambition is not always the goal of individual legislators; thus, this assumption must not be a given in Latin America as it is in the U.S. Congress. There are a couple of reasons why we should be cautious with this assumption when examining legislators' behaviors in Latin America. The initial problem with this assumption is that legislators may want to seek reelection, but the electoral rules prohibit immediate reelection. Costa Rican, Ecuadorean, and Mexican legislators confront the problem of no immediate reelection. In Costa Rica and Mexico, legislators must sit out one term before running for reelection to the Assembly. In Ecuador, prior to 1997, legislators could not seek immediate reelection to the Congress. A second problem with this assumption is that legislators may seek reelection, but not obtain it. In Brazil, for example, the turnover rate is high in the Congress. Though legislators seek reelection, most are not successful. Mainwaring (1991), Ames (1994, 2001, 2002), and Samuels (2003) suggest that in Brazil, those candidates seeking reelection to the Congress are weaker candidates. Candidates that possess connections and access tend to pursue progressive ambition; seeking offices outside of the Congress. The third problem with assuming static ambition is that some politicians may view service in the legislature as a stepping-stone to some other political office, either in the executive branch, state, or local government. Another possibility is that some legislators will serve in the legislature for personal reasons, then retire from politics and return to their own businesses.

The nature of legislator career ambition is a third factor that I hypothesize influences the success of proposals to change the internal rules of order. Legislator career

ambition refers to whether legislators pursue discrete (e.g., serve a single term in office), static (e.g., serve in the congress for more than one term), or progressive (e.g., serve in multiple political offices) ambition (Mayhew 1974; Schlesinger 1966). When both party leadership and legislators are constrained by the internal rules of the congress, the legislators ought to vote for a change in the rules proposed by party leadership if the proposed rules change will assist backbenchers in achieving their career goals. When the internal rules do not hinder backbenchers' abilities to pursue career objectives, legislators are less likely to vote to change the rules if it will negatively affect their ability to obtain services for their districts or pass legislation, presuming that passing legislation is how the legislator can achieve political career goals. In other cases, legislators obtain career goals by following cues of party leaders in which case we are not likely to observe a rebellion. In the absence of future political aspirations, party leadership cannot impose the threat of blocking legislators' future attempts at public office if the legislator has no such aspirations. Thus;

Hypothesis 4: Legislators pursuing a political career (i.e., exhibit static or progressive ambition) are more likely to support the leadership proposal than legislators with no career aspirations (i.e., discrete ambition).

### **The Next Step**

The existing literature concerning the relationship between electoral design, congressional organization, and legislators' incentives does little to clarify the questions this dissertation seeks to answer though this literature can be used to derive propositions about when legislators have incentives to cooperate with party leaders. Given the recent wave of democratization that swept through Latin America in the late 1970s through the 1990s, it is

important to consider institutional arrangements, because prolonged discontent among citizens may eventually lead to an increase in violence or the collapse of democracy. One of the ways political actors can address discontent amongst the electorate is to alter the electoral laws, which directly influence and shape incentives for legislators' behaviors. However, when the organization of the congress does not permit legislators to do what is needed to seek reelection or continue a career in politics, discontent may continue among the citizenry and a power struggle between party leaders and individual legislators may ensue over the need to alter the internal rules of order in the congress.

Little literature exists on how the design of the electoral system and legislative organization interact and influence both legislators and party leadership behaviors outside of the U.S. Congress. What occurs when party leaders' incentives differ from legislators' incentives? Who wins the power struggle over access to resources when one side wants to implement reform within the congress, but the opposing side does not want to change the internal rules of order or wants different changes? Is it more difficult for legislators to join forces to implement change than it is for party leaders? This dissertation seeks to address these important questions that have not been considered in previous research. Chapter III begins the empirical section of the dissertation where I use an experimental approach to examine when legislators in a chamber will vote against a party leadership proposal to alter the rules of order in favor of either a rebel backbench alternative to change the rules or to maintain the existing rules of order.

### **CHAPTER III**

## **LEGISLATOR INCENTIVE TO JOIN A BACKBENCH REBELLION TO ALTER THE RULES OF ORDER: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS**

### **Introduction**

This dissertation examines the circumstances under which party leaders and backbenchers in national legislatures will attempt to seek changes in the formal internal rules of order in a given chamber. In this chapter, I use an experimental research design to provide a general test of the overall theory presented in Chapter II. The use of an experimental methodology allows for the creation of a scenario in which we can test the process under which legislators will defect by voting in favor of a backbench alternative to the party leadership proposal to alter the rules of order.

More specifically, this chapter focuses on how members of a chamber vote when faced with a choice among voting for a leadership proposal to alter the rules of order, a rebel backbench alternative for changing the rules of order, or abstaining thereby maintaining the existing rules of order. This chapter begins with a methodological overview, a discussion of the scenario and experimental design, and the procedure for the study.

#### *Internal and External Validity in Experimental Designs*

The literature concerning the design of experiments discusses the importance of internal and external validity. Internal validity is the level of assurance researchers possess in drawing “cause and effect” conclusions from experimental results (Aronson, Wilson, and Brewer 1998, 130). External validity associates with an identified causal relationship that can

be generalized from one particular group of participants in a specified setting to other individuals and settings (Aronson et al. 1998; Campbell and Stanley 1967; Kruglanski and Kroy 1976).

The internal validity of an experiment is upheld when the researcher can claim that the manipulation of an independent variable is the cause of observed variance in the dependent variable. Thus, internal validity of a study is questionable when there are observed variances in experimental groups that are not relevant to the manipulation of explanatory variables, or when the experimenter loses control of the experiment (Aronson et al. 1998; Campbell and Stanley 1967).

Much debate exists over the external validity or generalizability of experimental studies. In considering the threat to external validity, it is important to remember the researcher's specified goal. When the experimenter's goal is to develop and test theory and not to aim at generalizability, external validity is not necessarily a primary concern (Aronson et al. 1998, 132-33; Kruglanski and Kroy 1976; and Mook 1983). The purpose of the experiment in this chapter is to test the theory and hypotheses presented in Chapter II in a controlled setting; therefore, at this point I am not generalizing outside of the laboratory setting in this chapter.

### **Methodological Overview**

To explore legislator behavior on voting for a change in the formal internal rules of order, I use an experimental methodology wherein I present the participant with a hypothetical country in which the participant is a member of the National Assembly. The decision task asks the participant to vote for a preferred set of rules of order- one offered

by party leadership, a second by a group of rebel backbenchers, and the status quo. I conducted the experiments at Texas A&M University. Participants were from the undergraduate population at the university.

The scenario provides the participant with information about the country, the political party and party system the participant is from, the nature of legislator ambition, and the composition of the National Assembly. The participant receives information concerning the existing rules of order, the proposed change in the internal rules of order offered by the party leadership, and the proposed change offered by a group of rebel backbenchers.

#### *Assumptions*

For the purpose of simplification and controlling experimental conditions, several assumptions are made. The primary research question is when is the party leadership constrained in their rules change proposal by the possibility of a backbench rebellion. Thus, in the experiment, I create a scenario where the party leadership originates from the same party the legislator is a member of in order to determine whether a leadership proposal will initiate a backbench rebellion from within the party. I further assume that the rebel backbench proposal is a reaction to the leadership proposal; thus, the party leadership moves initially.

In addition, some groups operate under the condition in which the political party the participant is a member of possesses high party discipline. That is, the party leadership controls the ability of the legislator to successfully achieve political goals (e.g., vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking goals), and can take away this ability if the legislator votes

against the party leadership's proposal. Other groups operate under weak party discipline in which the party leadership is unable to control the outcome of political goals, and cannot sanction legislators if they vote in favor of a rebel backbench proposal over the leadership's proposal.

I assume that the rebel backbench proposal is beneficial for the participants (legislators).<sup>15</sup> I do this in order to determine whether legislators will rebel against party leadership in the most perverse situation possible: when the party leadership proposes a change in the rules that will make it difficult to achieve political goals (e.g., office-seeking, vote-seeking, policy-seeking), but a backbench proposal assists the legislator in achieving their goals. Therefore, some experimental conditions operate under the condition that the party leadership's proposal assists the legislator, while the backbench proposal helps the legislator more. Other experimental groups function under the condition that the leadership proposal harms the legislator's ability to achieve goals, whereas the backbench proposal assists legislators in obtaining political goals.

In addition, I assume that the effective number of political parties is 2 or 4. The variance in the effective number of parties in the chamber allows for testing the theory in a two-party system where party leaders that propose rules changes possess a majority of seats in the chamber, whereas the four-party system permits assessing the problems of overcoming the collective action problem, as well as the problem of putting together a

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<sup>15</sup> I use the term legislator and participant interchangeably though the remainder of this chapter.

coalition for party leaders to make a proposal and of whether enough legislators across parties will vote for the leadership or rebel backbench proposal.<sup>16</sup>

## **The Study**

### *Participants*

Participants in the experiment included 550 undergraduate students from Texas A&M University. Assignment of participants into one of twelve experimental conditions occurred randomly.

### *Design*

The study employed a 2x2x2x3 between groups factorial design. The main dependent variable is the percent of votes for the leadership's proposal to change the rules. I also present results where the dependent variable is the percent of votes for the rebel backbench proposal, and for the status quo. The decision task for the participant is to vote for either the party leadership proposal, the rebel backbench alternative, or vote for neither thereby maintaining the existing rules of order.

There are four independent variables in the experiment. The first independent variable manipulated is the nature of legislator ambition, which is discrete, static, or progressive.

The participant with discrete ambition has a goal of obtaining passage of a legislative bill to build an irrigation project in his or her home district, which will introduce more jobs into

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<sup>16</sup> See Appendix for the experiment packet provided to participants.

the area and will improve farming irrigation in the district. Since participants possess discrete ambition, they are planning to serve a single term in the Assembly and then retire and return to their home district where they own and operate a large banana plantation.

The participant with static ambition desires to build a congressional record that increases the probability of reelection to the National Assembly. Those subjects with progressive ambition seek to continue a career in politics by receiving an appointment in the agriculture ministry. Therefore, the latter legislators seek to build a record during the congressional term that assists in obtaining the appointment.

Second, the effective number of political parties operating in the chamber is dichotomous; the number of parties is either 2 or 4.

The third variable manipulated in the study is whether the party leadership proposal harms or assists the legislator in achieving their political goal. In the case that the proposal harms the legislator more than it benefits, the leadership proposal makes it difficult for the legislators to pursue their political goal. In the other case, the leadership proposal assists the legislator less than a rebel backbench proposal in achieving their political goal of getting the irrigation bill passed into law, which may also assist the legislator in building a congressional reputation that would assist in reelection or continuing a career in politics through an appointment to the ministry of agriculture.

Finally, party discipline is a dichotomous variable operationalized as whether the party leadership possesses the ability to sanction members who defect and vote for the rebel backbench proposal over the leadership's proposal. High party discipline exists when party leaders can prevent legislators from getting their legislation passed and prevent access to the ballot in the next congressional election or executive appointments. In contrast, low party

discipline occurs when the leadership does not possess the ability to block legislation and control access to the ballot and appointed political posts.

To further demonstrate the effect of party discipline, consider the case where legislators want to continue a career in the National Assembly. If party leaders control access to the ballot and order of the list on the ballot, alienated leaders could place a legislator that defects so low on the list that it severely decreases the probability that the legislator could win election, or the leaders could fail to place them on the ballot at all. In the case that the legislator pursues progressive ambition, where party leaders control access to executive office appointments, an alienated party leadership could deny legislators access to these appointments. Last, in the case of discrete ambition, party leaders that control access to resources within the Congress could make it difficult for legislators to achieve their policy goal before their term expires. For example, in this experiment, the participant wants the passage of legislation that would provide an irrigation project in his home constituency that would also benefit his own banana plantation. If the legislator chooses to alienate party leadership by voting against its proposal, the alienated party leader could block favorable committee assignments so the legislator could not be on the committee that would work the bill up for debate on the floor. The leadership could further block the bill from being put on the floor calendar so it could not be brought up for debate at all.

*Research Instrument*

The decision task places the participant in the role of a legislator of a fictional country, Drukenwell. Participants receive an account of the country in which the participant is a newly elected member of the National Assembly.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the participants receive information concerning the proposed changes in the internal rules of order offered by the party leadership and rebel backbenchers, as well as the existing internal rules of order.

The manipulation of the explanatory variables is as follows. First, I introduce the effective number of political parties in the chamber into the scenario; either 2 or 4 in the chamber. Second, I introduce the nature of legislator ambition. The participant possesses discrete, progressive, or static ambition.

Following the discussion of the nature of legislator ambition, the scenario provides information about party discipline to participants. Either the political party can sanction the participant by making it more difficult or even impossible to obtain the political, policy, or career goal the participant is seeking or not. Those cases where the party leadership can sanction I characterized as high party discipline, whereas those cases where party leadership cannot are characteristically low on party discipline.

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<sup>17</sup> The participant is a newly elected member of the National Assembly, serving no previous congressional terms. The rationale for this choice is that since legislators may possess discrete ambition; they can serve a single term in the Assembly. Legislators with static or progressive ambition seek reelection to Congress or appointment to the agriculture ministry; however, I choose to have all participants serve their first term in the Congress in order to increase the internal validity of the study.

Following the discussion of party discipline, I present the party leadership's proposal to change the rules of order next. The party leaders' proposal is either beneficial (but less so than the rebel backbench proposal) or harmful to the participants' goal seeking behaviors. Following the leadership proposal, I present the rebel backbench alternative to the participants and inform them that the proposal assists the legislator in performing legislative duties.

After participants read the country scenario and pertinent information concerning the legislature as described above, the participants voted for the party leadership proposal, the rebel backbench proposal, or maintaining the existing rules of order. Following the scenario and voting for the preferred rules of order, the participant completes a questionnaire that assesses his or her perceptions and manipulation of the explanatory variables. The questions asked participants what was their political goal, what are their career goals, what are the number of effective parties in the chamber, how can leadership punish members that vote against the party leadership proposal, what alternative did they select, and what factors in the scenario influenced their final vote (see Appendix I).

## **Analysis**

### *Manipulation Checks*

To determine whether participants accurately perceived manipulations of the explanatory variables in the experiment, I calculated the percentage of participants' responses to questions in the post experiment questionnaire concerning the manipulation of the effective number of parties, party discipline, the nature of legislator ambition, and

whether party leadership and rebel backbench proposals assisted or harmed participants' ability to perform legislative duties that assisted them in achieving the passage of legislation, reelection, or obtaining an appointment in the agriculture ministry. Given that the manipulation checks suggest that some of the participants may not have understood the effects, I dropped the 166 participants (30% of all participants) that did not respond correctly to the post-test manipulation checks.<sup>18</sup>

To evaluate whether participants correctly interpret the effect of the effective number of parties in the chamber, the questionnaire asks participants what the number of parties in the Assembly is and how many seats does each party hold. Their potential choices are 2 or 4. To assure that the participants understand whether their party needed to form a coalition in order to obtain passage of legislation, the questionnaire asks what the political party you are a member of and is it the majority party in congress? This is a simple yes or no question. Forty-three of the 550 participants answered this question incorrectly given their assigned condition, and I dropped them from the sample.

In assessing the effect of the party leadership proposal on participants' decision to vote for the party leadership proposal over a rebel backbench alternative or maintaining the existing rules, subjects were asked in the post questionnaire whether the party leadership proposal helped or harmed their ability to achieve their political goal. The participants had the option of choosing helped or harmed. Seventy-one of the 550 participants answered this question incorrectly given their assigned condition, and were dropped from the sample.

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<sup>18</sup> In some cases, the 166 participants removed from the sample answered more than one post question incorrectly; consequently, there is overlap and the number of participants in the discussion that follows adds up to 257 rather than 166.

I also calculated a percentage on the participants' comprehension of whether the backbench alternative helped or harmed their performance more or less than the party leadership's proposal. For example, the party leadership proposal would be more harmful if the President of the Congress completely controls the assignment of legislation on the floor for debate compared to a backbench proposal when a committee of legislators from different parties determined where legislation was placed on the calendar for floor debate. The participants chose for a response whether the backbench alternative helped or harmed the median legislator. Sixty-one of the 550 participants answered this question incorrectly given their assigned condition and I removed from the sample.

Further, I test if participants understand whether party leaders can sanction them if they decide to vote against the leadership proposal in favor of the backbench alternative or maintaining the status quo. The post questionnaire asks subjects how party leaders can punish them if they do not vote for their leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order. I coded answers based on whether participants state that the party leaders can punish them, and how (e.g., whether participants acknowledge when leadership controls the legislative calendar and the debate schedule, and if leaders control political appointments). Sixty-three of the 550 participants answered this question incorrectly and I removed them from the sample.

Last, I tested for the understanding of legislator ambition. Participants respond in the post questionnaire to a question about their primary political goal. I coded responses based on whether participants report that their goal is to seek passage of the bill as they are not returning to the congress, if they are seeking reelection, or if they seek a political

appointment in the agriculture ministry. Nineteen of the 550 participants answered this question incorrectly and I removed them from the sample.

*Analysis I: Voting for Either the Party Leadership Proposal or the Backbench Alternative*

To assess whether the association between the explanatory variables affects voting for the party leadership proposal, I analyzed the data with a 2x2x2x3 Analysis of Variance (see Table 3-1). The explanatory variables that affect the participants' decisions to vote in favor of the party leadership proposal should demonstrate observable main effects. Table 3-1 illustrates that there are two significant main effects on voting for the party leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order: effect of the proposal, and the nature of legislator ambition. Additionally, there are two significant interactive effects.

**TABLE 3-1 Summary of Analysis of Variance for Voting in Favor or Against the Leadership's Proposed Change in the Rules of Order**


<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F Value</b>	<b>P Value</b>
Effective number of parties	1	.034	.034	.265	.6072
Party discipline	1	.399	.399	3.086	.0798
Nature of legislator ambition	2	1.402	.701	5.420	.0048
Effect of the proposal	1	10.549	10.549	81.575	.0000
Effective number of parties*	1	.928	.928	7.179	.0077
Effect of the proposal					
Party discipline*	2	.574	.287	2.219	.1102
Nature of legislator ambition					
Party discipline*	1	.068	.068	.529	.4674
Effect of the proposal					
Nature of legislator ambition*	2	4.47	2.24	17.282	.0000
Effect of the proposal					
Residual	373	46.92	129		

Dependent variable: participants voted for the party leadership proposal (coded 0) or voted for the backbench alternative or to maintain the existing rules of order (coded 1). Effect of the proposal coded 1 if it helped in the performance of legislative duties and coded 0 if harmed in the performance of legislative duties. Nature of legislator ambition coded 3 for discrete ambition, 2 for static ambition, and 1 for progressive ambition. Effective member of parties in the chamber coded as either 2 or 4. Party discipline coded 1 for high discipline and coded 0 for weak discipline.


In the analysis, there is no statistically significant relationship between the effective number of parties in the chamber and the likelihood of voting for the leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order. The effect of party discipline is in the hypothesized direction and is on the threshold of being significant. Participants from parties with high discipline are more likely to vote for the leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order.

Figure 3-1 illustrates that there is a significant main effect between the nature of legislator ambition and the likelihood of voting for the leadership proposal. Participants in the study that exhibit progressive ambition are the most common type of legislator to vote for the leadership proposal holding all other effects constant (mean=.818) followed by participants with static ambition (mean=.729) and discrete ambition (mean= .688) [ $F(1,373) = 5.420, p < .0001$ ]. According to hypothesis 4, I expect this same relationship; that is, participants with progressive and static ambition ought to vote with the party leadership more so than those exhibiting discrete ambition. Thus, this finding provides support for hypothesis 4.

**FIGURE 3-1 Effect of Ambition on Voting for Leadership Proposal**



The second significant main effect in this analysis is for the effect of the proposal (see Figure 3-2). Holding all other variables constant, participants in the study are more likely to vote for the leadership proposal when it assists them in performing their legislative duties (mean=.914) as opposed to (mean=.550) when the proposal harms the legislators' abilities to perform legislative duties [ $F(1, 373) = 81.58, p < .0001$ ]. This finding provides support for hypothesis 1 which predicts legislators are more likely to support rules changes that assist them in performing legislative duties and then obtaining some political goal.




In addition to the two significant main effects, there are also two significant interactive effects on the likelihood of voting for the party leadership proposal. First, the interaction between the nature of legislator ambition and the effect of the proposal is statistically significant. This provides support for an interaction between the effects anticipated separately by hypotheses 1 and 4. Participants with progressive (mean=.972) followed by static ambition (mean=.889) were more likely to vote for the leadership when it assists them in performing their legislative duties than those participants exhibiting discrete ambition (mean=.87). When the proposal harms the ability to perform legislative duties, participants with progressive ambition (mean=.756) are more likely to vote with the leadership followed by those with static (mean=.569) then discrete ambition (mean=.403)

[ $F(1, 373) = 17.282, p < .0001$ ]. These results indicate that the greater a legislator's ambitions, the greater the effect of a leader proposal that would assist those ambitions on the likelihood of voting for the proposal.


There is also a statistically significant interactive effect between the effective number of parties in the chamber and the effect of the proposal on the likelihood of voting for the leadership proposal to alter the rules of order. Figure 3-4 demonstrates that the legislators from a chamber with 2 effective parties and a proposal that assists them in performing their duties are especially likely to vote for the leadership's proposal to change the rules of order (mean=.974) [ $F(1,373) = 7.179, p=.007$ ]. When the leadership proposal interferes with the ability to perform legislative duties, participants are especially less likely to vote for the leadership proposal when there are 2 effective parties (mean=.47) compared to when there are 4 effective parties in the chamber (mean=.593) [ $F(1,373)= 7.179, p=.0077$ ].

**Figure 3-3 Interactive Effect of Ambition and Effect of Proposal on Voting for Leadership Proposal**



This interaction indicates that the effect of a leadership proposal that will assist members with their political goals is much stronger when there are fewer effective parties in a chamber.

**FIGURE 3-4 Interactive Effect of the Effective Number of Parties and Effect of the Proposal on Voting for the Leadership Proposal**



*Analysis II: Voting for Either the Backbench Alternative or Maintaining the Existing Rules of Order*

Given that participants are given the option of maintaining the existing rules of order, the next analysis examines whether there is a significant impact on those rebelling against the party leadership to vote for either the backbench alternative or to maintain the existing rules of order. Table 3-2 shows that there are two main effects and two interactive effects on the likelihood of voting for either the backbench alternative or to maintain the existing rules of order.

**TABLE 3-2 Summary of Analysis of Variance for Voting Against or in Favor of Maintaining the Existing Rules of Order**

<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F Value</b>	<b>P Value</b>
Effective number of parties	1	.00000058	.00000058	.00003	.9952
Party discipline	1	1.8	1.8	11.221	.0000
Nature of legislator ambition	2	.335	1.67	1.044	.35376
Effect of the proposal	1	1.054	1.054	6.572	.0109
Effective number of parties*	1	.984	.984	6.137	.0139
Effect of the proposal					
Party discipline*	2	.272	.136	.848	.4294
Nature of legislator ambition					
Party discipline*	1	6.387	6.387	38.829	.0000
Effect of the proposal					
Nature of legislator ambition*	2	.864	.432	2.692	.0696
Effect of the proposal					
Residual	272	41.857	160		

Dependent variable: participants voted for the existing rules of order (coded 0) or voted for the backbench alternative (coded 1). Effect of the proposal coded 1 if it helped in the performance of legislative duties and coded 0 if harmed in the performance of legislative duties. Nature of legislator ambition coded 3 for discrete ambition, 2 for static ambition, and 1 for progressive ambition. Effective member of parties in the chamber coded as either 2 or 4. Party discipline coded 1 for high discipline and coded 0 for weak discipline.

The main effects for the effective number of parties and the nature of legislator ambition are not statistically significant in this model. The first of these is not significant because the difference between the two groups is not distinguishable (mean=.654 for 2 parties and .674 for 4 parties). Further, there is no distinguishable difference between the means for the effect of nature of legislator ambition on voting to maintain the existing rules of order as opposed to supporting the rebel proposal (mean=.642 for discrete, .677 for progressive, and .676 for static ambition).

However, as observed in Figure 3-5, there is a significant difference in the means between groups for the effect of the proposal. When the leaders' proposed change in the rules of order aids legislators in performing their legislative duties, participants are more likely to vote to maintain the existing rules of order rather than support the rebels (mean=.729) compared to when the proposed change by the leadership harms their abilities

(mean=.558) [ $F(1,272)=6.572, p=.0109$ ]. This finding provides indirect support for hypothesis 1. Those participants who did not vote for the leadership proposal were at least more likely to vote for the status quo when the leaders' new proposal was more beneficial. Thus, these participants were relatively less likely to "rebel" entirely from the preferences of their party leaders.

**Figure 3-5 Effect of Proposal on Voting to Maintain Existing Rules**




Figure 3-6 illustrates the significant main effect between party discipline and voting to maintain the existing rules of order. Participants are more likely to vote for maintaining the existing rules of order over the backbench alternative when there is high party discipline (mean=.695) as opposed to when participants are from parties characterized by weak party

discipline (mean=.639) [ $F = (1,272) = 11.221, p = .0009$ ]. Those members who did not vote for the leaders' new proposal were at least more likely to vote for the status quo when there was high party discipline. Thus, these participants were relatively less likely to rebel entirely from the preferences of their party leaders.

**FIGURE 3-6 Effect of Party Discipline on Voting to Maintain the Existing Rules of Order**




Figure 3-7 illustrates the significant interactive effect between party discipline and the effect of the leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order. In the group where there is strong party discipline and the leadership's proposal assists legislators in performing legislative activities that assists in achieving their political goal, participants especially vote to maintain the existing rules of order (mean=.813) compared to when the proposal assists participants but there is weak party discipline (mean=.675). When the leadership proposal

hinders the ability to perform legislative duties and subjects are from parties with high discipline, participants are more likely to vote to maintain the existing rules of order (mean=.786) than when participants are from parties with weak discipline (mean=.292)[F(1,272) 38.829,  $p < .0000$ ].

This finding provides support for an interaction between the effects anticipated separately for hypotheses 1 and 3. The results indicate that the effect of weak party discipline on members' decision to vote for the backbench alternative is enhanced significantly when the leaders' proposed change harms the ability to pursue political goals.

**FIGURE 3-7 Interactive Effect of Party Discipline and Effect of Proposal on Voting to Maintain the Existing Rules**





Figure 3-8 demonstrates the significant interactive effect between the effective number of parties and the effect of the leadership's proposal. The results suggest that participants are more likely to vote for the backbench alternative over the existing rules of order when the proposal hurts their ability to perform legislative duties and when there are 4 effective parties in the chamber (mean=.521) as opposed to 2 parties (mean=.645). When the leadership proposal aids participants in performing legislative duties aimed at achieving their political goals, participants vote to maintain the existing rules of order more so when there are 2 effective parties (mean=.781) as opposed to 4 effective parties in the chamber (mean=.658) [ $F(1,272)=6.137, p=.01$ ]. This finding provides support for an interaction between the effects anticipated separately by hypotheses 1 and 2. The results indicate that the effect of a harmful leadership proposal on voting for the rebel alternative is greatly enhanced when there is a greater number of effective parties in the chamber.

**FIGURE 3-8 Interactive Effect of the Effective Number of Parties and Effect of the Proposal on Voting to Maintain the Existing Rules**



## Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the results of an ANOVA analysis to test the hypotheses concerning the effect of the effective number of parties, party discipline, whether the party leadership proposal helped or harmed legislators in performing legislative duties, and the nature of legislator ambition on whether participants voted for a proposed change in the internal rules of order sponsored by party leadership, a rebel backbench alternative, or maintaining the existing rules of order.

Only one hypothesis, that for the effect of the proposal for legislators' ambitions (H1), received support in both analyses. Arguably, the analysis for whether legislators voted for the party leaders' new proposal over both the alternatives offers the strongest test of the

theory. Both in this analysis and in the one for whether those not voting for the leaders' new proposal choose the backbenchers' proposal or status quo, however, I can reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the effect of the proposal and votes. Thus more favorable leader proposals produce more legislator support in both analyses.

In the first analysis the hypothesis (H4) for the nature of legislators' ambition was also supported. That is, legislators with high political ambitions were more willing to vote with the leadership. Perhaps because the support of high ambition members was so high for the leaders' proposal explains why this variable is not significant in the second analysis.

In the second analysis – for those who did not support the leaders' proposal and to assess whether they voted with the backbenchers or for the status quo – there is support for the hypothesis about party discipline (H3). Members from parties with higher discipline were at least more likely to vote for the status quo than with the backbenchers if they could not support the leaders' new proposals (in Analysis I). This finding offers qualified support for the general importance of party discipline envisioned in the theory. Voting for the status quo is evidence at least some deference to the party leadership and, specifically, its existing legislative rules.

Finally, the effect of the proposal interacts with three other of the hypothesized causes in the two sets of analyses. In the first and primary analysis, the effect of the proposal interacts with both the nature of legislator ambition and the number of parties, in ways that support the underlying hypotheses, to enhance support for the leaders' proposal. Similarly, the effect of the proposal interacts with the number of parties and with the strength of party discipline to enhance the likelihood of voting for the status quo among those members who could not support the leaders' new proposal. These interactive effects

suggest that the hypothesized causes of support for legislative leaders are more complex than the conventional, linear-effects hypotheses imply. More specifically, the effect of the proposal is clearly the most consistently supported hypothesized cause here – both for its significant main effect in the first analysis and for how it interacts with other predictors in both analyses. Political party discipline could be interpreted to be the second most potent predictor, because it has at least a notable independent effect in the second analysis, as well as interactive one there. Third, the number of parties might be argued to have notable but weaker or more conditioned effects – since this variable only relates to voting over rules choices in interaction with other variables, though in both analyses.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall, general test of the theory concerning when a legislator is willing to vote against a party leadership proposal to alter the internal rules of order in congress that benefits partisan interests but not necessarily legislators' individual interests. To test the theory in an experimental setting, I exposed participants to a hypothetical country and scenario, where subjects assumed the role of a member of congress. In this role, participants voted for either the party leadership or rebel backbench alternative to alter the rules of order. A third alternative was to abstain from voting for either proposal, which maintains the existing rules of order. Participants received information that they possessed discrete, static, or progressive ambition. They are further told that as the effective number of parties in the chamber is either 2 or 4. They are also provided with information about whether party leaders are able to impose sanctions on legislators that vote against the leadership proposal or abstain from voting. They receive copies of a leadership proposal, a backbench alternative, and the existing rules of order.

This chapter focuses on the legislator's decision to vote for or against a change, or maintain the existing rules of order. The experiment examines legislators' voting when controlling whether the party leadership proposal helps or hinders legislators' political goals, party discipline, the effective number of parties, and the nature of legislator ambition. The use of an experimental methodology permits researchers to test theory and hypotheses in a controlled setting. This controlled setting allows for the manipulation of variables and assists in developing confidence that causal mechanisms are as specified in the theory. The findings presented in this experimental study offer provisional support for the theory and hypotheses presented in Chapter II. In the next chapter, testing of the theory and hypotheses moves from the experimental setting to Latin America, specifically, the cases of Colombia and Peru.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **CHANGING THE SHAPE AND SIZE OF THE CONSTITUENCY: THE CASES OF COLOMBIA AND PERU**

#### **Introduction**

While Chapter III used an experimental design to provide a complete test of the theory, this chapter moves the testing of the theory from the laboratory to the field. Unfortunately, when moving from the lab to the real world, the search for cases where a pure test of the phenomenon scientists seek to explain is difficult at times. Couple this with the lack of available data, scholars must seek outcroppings of evidence or multiple, imperfect examples of the phenomenon being studied that are relevant in some sense to the theory being tested (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). In this chapter, I use cases from Peru and Colombia to provide an imperfect, empirical test to the theory and hypotheses outlined in Chapter II.

In Latin America, electoral reform was a common occurrence in the 1990s. One such reform included altering the shape and size of the constituency legislators were elected from. Existing research suggests that despite these reforms, legislators failed to alter their behaviors as was thought would occur. For example, Colombia adopted a single national district for the Senate, moving away from multiple districts so that senators would focus more on national issues rather than local interests alone, but this change did not occur. Crisp and Ingall (2002) pose that legislators realized that they could continue to win elections by focusing on local concerns, so the electoral incentives did not change. In this analysis, I explore the possibility that the organization of the Senate interfered with the

senators' abilities to pursue national interests. Though, it is important to note that the change in constituency through the adoption of a single national district may decrease personal vote seeking behavior. If that is the case, I expect to find evidence of attempts to change the rules of order by party leaders but not necessarily rank and file legislators. This chapter commences with background information on the rules of order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress. See Chapter I, which provides a brief overview of electoral reform and party system for those political systems. Then I turn to an analysis of bill initiation to alter the internal rules of order in Colombia and Peru in order to test hypotheses presented in Chapter II. Then I examine debate participation and voting to alter the rules of order in the Peruvian Congress using a series of multinomial logistic regressions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.

### **Case Selection**

In this chapter, I test the theory and hypotheses presented in Chapters II. The cases examined in this analysis are the Colombian Senate and the Peruvian Congress, two cases where there was a change in the size and shape of constituencies legislators seek election from. Table 4-1 provides a summary of the nature of legislator ambition, party discipline, and the effective number of parties in the chamber for each of the congressional terms to be analyzed.

**TABLE 4-1 Comparing the Nature of Legislator Ambition, Party Discipline, and the Effective Number of Political Parties in Colombia and Peru, 1993-2005**

<b>Session/ Variable</b>	<b>Colombia Senate</b>		<b>Peruvian Chamber</b>
<b>Nature of legislator ambition</b>			
Static		Static	
1993	46%	1995	30%
1998	54%	1999	47%
2002	47%	2002	34%
Discrete		Discrete	
1993	53%	1995	65%
1998	45%	1999	52%
2002	50%	2002	61%
Progressive		Progressive	
1993	1%		5%
1998	1%		1%
2002	3%		5%
<b>Party discipline</b>	Weak	<b>Party discipline</b>	Moderately weak
<b>Effective number of parties</b>			
		<b>Effective number of parties</b>	
1993	2.66	1993	2.9
1998	3.23	1998	3.8
2002	3.23	2002	4.4

Sources: Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002; [www.senado.gov.co/](http://www.senado.gov.co/) (Colombian Senate webpage) 2005; and <http://www.congreso.gob.pe> (Peruvian National Congress web page) 2005. The nature of legislator ambition takes three forms. First, discrete ambition refers to legislators who served a single term in Congress with no other evidence of a political career. Second, static ambition refers to legislators who served more than one term in the Congress. Third, progressive ambition refers to legislators who served at least one term in the Congress and possessed some other politically elected or appointed office such as ambassador, executive agency director, or ministry appointment. Party discipline characterized by weak suggests that party leaders do not control either access or placement to the ballot, do not control access to resources in the Congress, and do not control executive resources such as budget for pork barrel projects. Moderately weak parties do not control one of the two resources, and do not control order of the list on ballots in national elections. I calculated the effective number of parties in the chamber using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) techniques.

## **The Internal Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress**

### *The Internal Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate*

Constitutional reforms in Colombia occurred in 1991. The reforms included the adoption of a single national district to replace the previous system of multimember districts for the election of Senators. The rationale behind this reform is that if senators are elected in a single national district, they will focus on national issues over local and sectoral issues. The reformers designed the change so that the lower chamber of the Congress focuses on local interests while the Senate focuses on national issues. However, research suggests that the senators did not alter their behavior following the change in the electoral law (Crisp and Ingall 2002). The first term where we might observe attempts to alter the rules of order that assist senators and party leaders in the Senate in pursuing national interests over local interests is the 1993 congressional term.

Between 1993 and 2005, there were approximately sixty attempted changes in the internal rules of order in the Colombian Senate. Of these, thirty-six passed into law, and eight of these changes relate to rules that assist legislators in cultivating a personal vote. The other changes in the rules of order passed during this period were either small changes in the wording of the rules that were already in existence, or changes in the oversight function of the Congress. This occurred after the discovery of President Samper Pizano's corruption and abuses of presidential power. While oversight is an important function and strengthens the powers of Congress, these changes are not relevant to changing the rules of order in such a fashion as to change individual legislators' behaviors in pursuing a personal vote

following a change in the electoral rules; therefore, I excluded such changes from the analysis.

The discussion below describes the rules of order before and after the change in the electoral law related to the changes in the committee structure and organization, alteration in voting procedures, changes in the allocation of resources, and changes in floor procedures. See Chapter I for a discussion of what sort of changes are included in each category.

#### *Changes in Committee Organization*

Between 1993 and 2005, no successful or unsuccessful attempts to alter the rules of order concerning standing committee organization occurred.

#### *Alteration in Voting Procedures*

A single attempt to alter the rules of order in relation to voting procedures occurred on June 3, 1996. The Senate passed a change in the internal rules of order related to the use of secret voting. Prior to the change, a secret vote only occurred when the President of the Chamber ordered one, usually when it was near an election. Otherwise, there was no provision for secret voting. Following the change, senators could request secret voting under certain conditions. Secret votes could be requested when politicians face accusations in front of the Senate. Further, before changes in the rules of order, the Chairs of permanent, special, or investigative committees had the power to designate whether there would be nominal or secret voting in the hearing. After the change, the Chair of the

committee no longer makes this designation alone. Any senator on the committee the legislation comes from can now make the designation of secret voting.

The ability to request secret voting is beneficial to senators for a couple of reasons. First, secret voting permits legislators to vote without fearing sanctions from party leaders if they choose to vote against the party on legislation under consideration. Consequently, senators could vote for legislation that assists them in building a reputation that assists them in obtaining reelection, or in the case of discrete ambition, obtaining a policy goal that may not coincide with partisan interests. The change in the rules may impair party leaders from being able to sanction members that vote against their preferences if they cannot determine who voted against their policy preferences.

#### *Changes in Allocation of Resources*

Numerous changes to the internal rules of order in regards to the allocation of resources to senators occurred between 1993 and 2005. All changes proposed involving the allocation of resources passed. First, on August 22, 1996, a change in media access occurred. Prior to the change there was no formal rule about providing time for senators to inform constituents about their legislative activities. Following the change in the rules of order, thirty minutes per week on the “*inravision*” channel broadcasted throughout the country are given to each senator. Senators can use this time to inform constituents about activities that benefit them. By guaranteeing a particular amount of time to each senator on a weekly basis, senators can build a reputation that will assist them in career and policy goals because media coverage provides them with the technology to spread their message to a greater number of constituents. This change in the rules can also benefit party leaders as

senators from their party can appear effective and promote partisan policy interests, which can assist the party in maintaining or expanding their seat share in forthcoming elections. This change can prompt senators to use this allocation of resources to either work on national issues or help them claim credit for local interests. This change further creates an advantage for incumbents.

A second type of change in the internal rules of order concerning the allocation of resources occurred on June 3, 1993 and then again on March 29, 1995. The original change in 1993 increased the congressional staff to 6 per legislator, whereas before, there was no formal rule about the number of staff members allocated to each senator. The change in 1995 resulted in an increase from 6 to 10 in the staff provided to each senator. In addition, the change called for an overall increase in the salary of staff positions for the personnel plant (e.g. maintenance, secretaries, committee secretaries, archive staff, etc). Increasing staff size can make senators more efficient in the office, and provide them with the staff to respond to constituent requests, letters, and phone calls. The senators with staff can also perform more research for potential legislation. By having a larger staff, senators can be more responsive to constituents at either the national or local level, which can be beneficial to both party leaders and individual senators.

#### *Changes in Chamber Structure*

No successful or unsuccessful attempts to alter the rules of order concerning chamber structure occurred between 1993 and 2005.

*Changes in Floor Procedures*

Law 974, which passed on July 22 2005, changed several parts of the rules of order related to floor procedures in the Senate. The first change involved Article 80 of the rules of order, which concerns the elaboration and continuation of debate and orders of the day. Prior to the change in the rules, it was not clear who scheduled the time allocation for debates and orders of the day. In some cases senators took large amounts of time giving speeches. Following the change in the rules, the *Mesa Directiva* became the official body of the Congress that set the timetables for debate on the floor as well as orders of the day. The *Mesa Directiva* allocates a specific amount of time for upcoming orders of the day as well as debates. This change could be harmful to senators. This change in the rules makes it important to know what groups are represented in the *Mesa Directiva*; there would be a significant difference if only the governing party sat on the *Directiva* or if all parties were represented. This change could be harmful to senators if their party is not represented on the *directiva* and allocation of time for participating in debates occurred in a biased manner.

A second change from Law 974 involves Article 97, which discusses interruptions during debate. Prior to the change in the rules, the norm for those wanting to speak in debate was to get the attention of the President of the Chamber and wait to be called on. Once called on, the senator could speak about whatever he liked. Consequently, Colombian Senators could sidetrack the debate by discussing topics irrelevant to the debate at hand. Following the change in Article 97, the President of the Chamber must recognize senators before speaking, and they can only speak about the issue being debated at that time. This in effect makes filibustering difficult. This change in the rules of order benefits both party leaders and senators. The primary reason for this is because this change keeps legislators

from talking about topics not relevant to the debate, which can backlog legislation and block legislation that either party leaders or senators want brought to a vote after debate. However, if the legislator's party or constituents oppose the bill, this new rule makes it difficult to use debate as a delaying strategy.

A third change in the rules involves Article 103, which discusses the number of interruptions each senator has during the course of debate. Prior to the change in the rules, it seems that there was no limit on the number of times senators could interrupt a colleague in debate. Following the change in the rules, the limit on the number of interruptions was two per Senator unless the senator sponsored the bill. If the senator sponsors the bill, then there is no limit to the number of times he may speak during debate. This rule change benefits the sponsor of the bill; however, if senators oppose the bill, this change in the rules makes it difficult to use debate participation as a means of delaying the passage of legislation.

Law 974 also altered Article 102. Prior to the change, the President of the Chamber was responsible for setting the duration that each speech in debate could be. Following the change, the *mesa directiva* sets the limit for participation in debate to twenty minutes per person. Thus, the rules declare the time for participation in debate. This limit of twenty minutes can make it difficult for those opposing the bill to block the legislation by filibustering. On the other hand, it provides a set amount of time for each senator to speak so that more senators may participate, which may assist them in building a reputation that will assist them in their career goals.

### *The Internal Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress*

Constitutional reform occurred in 1992 under President Fujimori. The reforms abolished the Senate and there are 120 seats in the Congress. Additionally, a single national district replaced the previously used multimember districts in which Members of Congress ran for election. Congressional elections occurred in 1992 and the 1993 congressional term was the first term where changes in the internal rules of order could be made that assisted party leaders and legislators in performing legislative duties.

Between 1993 and 2005, numerous attempted changes in the internal rules of order in the Peruvian Congress occurred. Of these, six proposed changes were passed into law. This section presents the chamber rules before and after the change in the internal rules of order concerning committee structure and organization, alteration in voting procedures, allocation of resources, the structure of the chamber, and floor procedures.

### *Changes in Committee Structure and Organization*

During the period under investigation, two attempted changes to Article 35 of the rules of order related to committee structure and organization in the Peruvian Congress. Both proposals passed. The first change to Article 35 occurred on December 15, 2000. Prior to the change in the internal rules of order, the *mesa directiva* made committee assignments in consultation with the chamber president within the first week of the session opening. Under this change, committee assignments are made in the same manner but at the end of the congressional session. For example, in December 2000, the committee assignments were made for the legislative session scheduled to open in 2001. This change proposed by party leaders benefited party leaders, especially the governing party (*Cambio 90*)

at the time of the change, because they were able to assign committees according to their preferences and not the preferences of minority parties or the governing party (*Peru Posible*) in the next session.

The second change to Article 35 occurred on August 6, 2001. This change altered the permanent committee structure by abolishing some committees, while consolidating others. Specific changes were made to the following committees: consumers regulating public services, decentralization, fight against drugs, industry, commerce, and services. This restructuring of committees is potentially harmful to legislators whose sat on abolished committees. If legislators used those committees to build a reputation that would assist in achieving policy or career goals, the abolishment of their committees would hinder their ability to pursue those goals. Additionally, legislators that served on consolidated committees may have a difficult time getting on the new committee, as there are fewer seats on each committee. In contrast, with the decrease in the number of committees following the consolidation, this change could benefit legislators in that they spent less time doing committee work, and they devoted that time to some other legislative activity.

#### *Alteration in Voting Procedures*

No attempts to alter the rules of order regarding voting procedures occurred between 1993 and 2005.

#### *Changes in Allocation of Resources*

Between 1993 and 2005 there was a single attempt to change the internal rules of order related to the allocation of resources to legislators, which was sponsored by party

leaders. Article 23 of the internal rules of order concerns attendance and salary remuneration by the Congress. Prior to the change in the rules there existed no strict attendance policy or punishment for missing sessions, committee hearings, etc. However, following this change in the rules of order, a reduction in a member's salary could be taken by the *mesa directiva* if legislators do not attend sessions, debates, votes, committee meetings and hearings, etc. without an excused absence, which typically included illness or death in the family. The reduction in salary varies and is reduced by 6.25% if legislators fail to attend 75% of meetings and sessions, but the amount is not greater than 50% of the legislator's salary. This benefits party leaders because a reduction in salary is a sanction on legislators that do not attend sessions. Also, this is beneficial to legislators because attendance should increase following the change, which assists in solving the problem where a lack of quorum results in delayed voting on legislation.

#### *Changes in the Structure of the Chamber*

No attempts to alter the rules of order regarding the structure of the chamber occurred between 1993 and 2005.

#### *Changes in Floor Procedures*

Between 1993 and 2005, one successful change in the internal rules of order and one unsuccessful proposal to change the rules of order in regard to floor procedures occurred. The successful change relates to Article 78, which outlines the procedures for debate. Prior to the rules change, the Article was vague about what was permitted in debate, who determined who spoke in debate, did a quorum have to be present in order to

carry on with debate, etc. Following the change in October 2001, bills cannot be debated on the floor of the chamber unless a quorum is present at the time of the debate. Further, a committee is put together by the *Mesa Directiva*, which reviews the bill and determines what parts of the bill are eligible for debate. If no quorum is present at the time of debate, then the bill may not be brought up for debate in the remainder of the plenary session. Once debate fails because of no quorum, the *mesa directiva* reschedules the bill on the legislative calendar before being debated. In the case of party leaders, the change is beneficial because the rules establish that the *Mesa Directiva* sets the criteria for what is debatable, how many legislators must be present in order to achieve a quorum, and what happens to a bill if there is no quorum. On the other hand, if there is no quorum present the rules clearly state debate on the bill cannot occur so party leaders cannot wait until later in the session when a quorum is met to debate a given bill. This change can be beneficial to legislators in that if they do not want a bill debated, they make sure that a quorum is not present when the debate is scheduled, and the bill must then be rescheduled at a different plenary session.

A second change in the internal rules of order regarding floor procedures, which did not pass was proposed in October 2000. This proposal would have permitted the chamber leadership to censure legislators who failed to attend debates and plenary sessions on the floor of the chamber. This change is somewhat similar to the change discussed earlier where legislators received a reduction in their salary for not attending sessions or committee meetings. The difference is that this second proposed change provides the chamber leadership with the ability to publicly censor legislators from the governing and minority parties if they fail to attend plenary sessions, committee meetings, etc. This is harmful to minority party legislators if the chamber leadership used this proposed change to censure

legislators from minority parties but not governing party members. Additionally, this change is harmful to legislators because if they are censured this could damage their reputation, which could prevent them from achieving goals of continuing in politics or reelection to the Congress. Table 4-2 provides a summary of proposed changes in the rules of order in both the Peruvian Congress and the Colombian Senate.

### **Data and Variables**

To test the hypotheses discussed in Chapter II, I collected data on the nature of legislator ambition, the effective number of political parties, degree of party discipline, bill sponsorship, and whether proposed bills would benefit some or all parties and some or all legislators, which I describe below in greater detail. The data from Colombia include the congressional sessions between 1993 and 2005. This period of data commences with the first congressional term following the constitutional reforms in 1991, which includes the first opportunity to pursue a change in the internal rules of order in the Senate. The Senate's rules of order from before the 1991 electoral reform were carried forward in the

**TABLE 4-2 Summary of Changes in the Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress, 1993-2005.**

<i><b>Date</b></i> <i><b>Legislator</b></i>	<i><b>Change Proposed</b></i>	<i><b>Passed</b></i>	<i><b>Benefits Party Leaders</b></i>	<i><b>Benefits</b></i>
<i><b>Colombia</b></i>				
<i>Changes in Committee Structure and Organization</i>				
No changes proposed				
<i>Alteration in Voting Procedures</i>				
6/3/1996	Secret voting permitted	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Allocation of Resources</i>				
8/22/1996	Media access	Yes	Yes	Yes
3/1993	Increase in staff	Yes	Yes	Yes
3/29/1995	Increase in staff	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Change in Chamber Structure</i>				
No changes proposed				
<i>Change in Floor Procedures</i>				
7/22/05	Speech limits	Yes	Yes	No
7/22/05	Recognition to speak	Yes	Yes	Yes
7/22/05	No. of interruptions	Yes	Yes	No
7/22/05	Debate limits	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i><b>Peru</b></i>				
<i>Changes in Committee Structure and Organization</i>				
12/15/2000	When assignments made	Yes	Yes	No
8/6/2001	Permanent committee restructuring	Yes	Yes	No
<i>Alteration in Voting Procedures</i>				
No changes proposed				
<i>Changes in Allocation of Resources</i>				
8/1998	Salary, Attendance	Yes	Yes	No
<i>Change in Chamber Structure</i>				
No change proposed				
<i>Change in Floor Procedures</i>				
10/2000	Public censor	No	Yes	No
10/2001	Quorum counts	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The data in this table summarize the types of changes made in the rules of order in the Colombian Senate and the Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005. The first column provides the date (when available) of sponsorship for each bill. The third column indicates whether the proposed change passed and became law. The fourth and fifth column provides information as to whether the proposed change benefited party leaders and rank and file legislators.

new senatorial term in 1992. The data from Peru include the congressional sessions between 1993 and 2005. Similar to its Colombian counterpart, this period commences with the first congressional session following President Fujimori's new constitution that altered the size and shape of the constituency. Again, this period includes the first opportunity for party leaders or legislators to pursue change in the chamber's internal rules of order. The new unicameral Congress used the rules of order from the former lower chamber.

There are three dependent variables in the analyses presented in this chapter. The initial dependent variable indicates whether a legislator sponsored a bill to change the rules of order. The data focus on sponsoring bills, not just laws, as I am interested in identifying factors that make a legislator take action and pursue a change in the internal rules of order. Bill sponsorship is one means of indicating that a legislator supports the idea of reforming the rules of order. Even if the bills fail to become law, the bill initiative itself signals the leadership that a problem exists in the congressional organization for legislators. I coded this variable 1 if the legislator proposed a bill initiative to change the rules of order. I coded the variable 0 if the legislator did not propose such a bill. In the case of co-sponsorship, each legislator sponsoring was coded 1.

In the case of Peru, data are available for whether legislators participated in debates to alter the rules of order. The second dependent variable identifies debate participation behaviors when altering the rules of order. This variable is categorical in nature and I coded it 1 if the legislator voiced support for the proposed change in the rules of order. I coded the variable -1 if the legislator voiced opposition to the proposed change in the rules of order. Last, I coded the legislators 0 if they did not speak in the debate for a proposed change in the internal rules of order.

The Peruvian Congress records roll call votes taken in the legislature; therefore, the third dependent variable used in this analysis is how legislators voted on proposed changes to alter the rules of order. This variable is also categorical in nature and has three categories. I coded the legislator 1 if he or she voted in favor of the proposed change in the rules of order. I coded the legislator 0 if he or she abstained or was absent when the vote on the proposed change in the rules occurred. Last, I coded the legislator -1 if he or she voted against the proposed change in the rules of order.

Hypothesis 1 states that legislators are more likely to oppose the leadership's proposal to change the internal rules of order if such changes harm the ability of legislators to perform legislative duties that assist them in achieving some political goal. To operationalize the effect of the leadership's proposal to alter the rules of order on legislators' ability, I created a categorical independent variable. If the proposed change in the rules of order assisted legislators in pursuing activities that would support only partisan interests, I coded the variable -1. I coded the variable 1 if the proposed change assisted legislators in performing legislative duties that support constituent interests over partisan ones. I coded the variable 0 if the proposed change assists legislators in performing activities that support both partisan and constituent interests.

In Hypothesis 2, I predict that as the effective number of parties in the congress increases, legislators are more likely to oppose changes in the internal rules of order.

To capture this phenomenon, I created an index for the effective number of political parties in the chamber using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) technique.<sup>19</sup>

In hypothesis 3, I predict that legislators that are members of parties with high party discipline are less likely to oppose changes in the rules of order sponsored by party leaders than legislators from parties with weak discipline. To capture party discipline, I created a categorical explanatory variable for whether party leaders could sanction rebel backbenchers. I based the coding on whether party leaders control: (a) nomination and access to the ballot in elections; (b) legislative resources such as committee assignments and the legislative calendar; and (c) executive resources such as budget for pork and appointments to the executive branch of government. I considered party leaders to possess high discipline if party leaders controlled all three resource pools and I coded the variable as a 1. I coded the variable as moderately high discipline if party leaders controlled two of the three resource pools, and I coded the variable 0. I coded the variable as weak party discipline (-1) if party leaders did not control any of three resource pools.

I predicted in hypothesis 4 that legislators pursuing a political career (i.e., exhibit static or progressive ambition) are more likely to support the leadership proposal than legislators with no career aspirations (i.e., discrete ambition). I created a dichotomous variable for career ambition. Those serving a single term in the Congress then leaving politics (i.e., discrete ambition) I coded as 0; legislators continuing a career in politics (i.e., exhibiting static or progressive ambition) I coded as 1.

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<sup>19</sup> I use the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) Index to calculate the effective number of parties, where  $S_i$  is the fractional share of seats in the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party.

$$\text{ENPP} = 1 / \sum_i S_i^2$$

I chose to combine the static and progressive ambition categories in order to capture whether the legislator desired to continue a political career. Granted that progressive and static ambition may require pacifying a different set of constituents or party leaders, the legislators still have political aspirations, and that is what this variable is designed to capture.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to the explanatory variables discussed above, other factors may influence whether a legislator will sponsor a bill to alter the rules of order, vote against, or voice opposition to a bill to alter the rules of order. Seniority may influence whether a legislator sponsors a bill, or voice opposition against a proposed change in the rules of order. Studies of the U.S. Congress (Hall 1996, Matthews 1959; Sinclair 2000) and some Latin American countries (Escobar-Lemmon et al. 2004) suggest that senior Members of Congress are more active than those serving their initial terms in the chamber. Consequently, I created a control variable for the number of terms a legislator served.

Party leaders may be more likely to propose bills and participate in debate than rank and file members. Thus, I created a control variable for whether the legislator was a member of some party leadership.

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<sup>20</sup> The operationalization of legislator's ambition I based on data showing the career path of a given legislator. Thus, this coding assumes that the career path is identical to the aspirations of the legislator. This coding may fail to capture a legislator's ambition if it evolves over an electoral term, and it assumes that the next political office achieved was the post that the legislator wanted. Another issue is those legislators that died while in office, as we are not certain what their next political post would have been. Finally, some legislators may take a break from politics, but plan to return in the future. Consequently, those legislators in the later terms in the data set may be coded as discrete ambition when in fact they plan to return to politics in the future.

I collected names of party leaders from the *Europa World Yearbook* and from political party web pages from each party in the chamber that had a website. I collected the names of the chamber leadership from the congressional web page for each country. Those legislators that were party leaders I coded 1 and rank and file members of the chamber I coded 0.

## **Analysis**

### *Bill Sponsorship in Colombia and Peru*

Table 4-3 provides an aggregate presentation of bill sponsorship in Colombia and Peru between 1992 and 2004. In the Colombian Senate there were nine proposed changes to the internal rules of order that meet the criteria outlined in Chapter I; thus, bill sponsorship is relatively rare. In Colombia, all senators proposing a bill to alter the rules of order served less than 4 years in the Senate. Consequently, senators serving in their first term in office are more likely to sponsor bills to alter the rules in the Colombian Senate. Of those senators proposing a bill to alter the rules of order, 98% of the total chamber are not party leaders compared to 2% that are party leaders. Of those senators sponsoring a bill, it is common that they initiated a previous bill to alter the rules of order. Further, in the Senate, senators from weak disciplined parties sponsor more bills to alter the rules than those from moderate or high disciplined parties. This provides support for hypothesis 3 as I predicted that legislators from weak disciplined parties are less likely to rebel against party leadership.

**TABLE 4-3 Characteristics of Bill Sponsors to Alter the Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress 1993-2005**

Variable	Colombia			Peru		
	% Legislators	% Proposing	% Not Proposing	% Legislators	% Proposing	% Not Proposing
Years served in chamber:						
1 to 4 years	89%	3%	97%	75%	2%	98%
5 to 7 years	10%	50%	50%	22%	13%	87%
> 8 years	1%	0%	100%	3%	17%	83%
Member of party leadership:						
Yes	2%	17%	83%	20%	9%	91%
No	98%	2%	98%	80%	2%	98%
Sponsored a different bill to alter the rules of order:						
Yes	2%	95%	5%	3%	79%	21%
No	98%	1%	99%	97%	98%	2%
Discipline of the party legislator from:						
Weak discipline	57%	4%	96%	48%	9%	91%
Moderate discipline	12%	0%	100%	23%	5%	95%
Strong discipline	31%	2%	98%	28%	0%	100%
Career in politics:						
Yes	42%	2%	98%	56%	8%	92%
No	58%	3%	97%	44%	0%	100%

Note; The grey columns indicate the overall percentage of legislators with each given characteristic within each country. For example, 89 % of the Colombian Senate is composed of Senators serving between one and four years in the Congress. The column labeled percent proposing indicates the percentage of legislators proposing a bill to alter the internal rules of order. Last, the column labeled percent not proposing indicates the percentage of legislators in each chamber that did not propose a bill to alter the internal rules of order.

Last, of those sponsoring bills to alter the rules of order, senators that did not possess a career in politics were more likely to sponsor bills to change the rules than senators who possessed some form of career in politics. This finding supports hypothesis 4, which predicted that legislators with no career would rebel over those with a political career.

In Peru six proposed alterations in the rules of order that meet the criteria outlined in Chapter I occurred. Of those Representatives proposing a bill to alter the rules of order, a greater percentage serve between 5 and 7 years in the chamber compared to those serving greater than 8 years or less than 4 years. Further, party leaders are less likely to sponsor bills to alter the rules of order compared to those that are rank and file members of the chamber. Third, in support of hypothesis 3, Representatives from weak disciplined parties are more likely to sponsor a bill to alter the rules of order than those from moderate or high disciplined parties. Last, in support of hypothesis 4, all Representatives sponsoring a bill to alter the rules of order have a future political career. No legislators without a career sponsor bills to alter the rules of order.

Table 4-4 presents characteristics of the chamber when proposals were made to alter the rules of order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005. In Colombia, the proposal of a majority of the bills occurs when there are relatively few effective parties in the chamber. In contrast, sponsoring bills to alter the rules of order is more likely when the effective number of parties is greater than three in the Peruvian Congress.

**TABLE 4-4 Characteristics of the Chamber when Altering the Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress, 1993-2005**

<b>Variable: Effective Number of Parties:</b>	<b>Colombia % Bills Proposed</b>	<b>Peru % Bills Proposed</b>
2.4	33.3%	-
2.6	55.5%	-
3.23	11.1%	-
3.8	-	83.3%
4.4	-	16.7%

This table reports when sponsorship of bills to alter the rules of order were made in Colombia and Peru in relation to the effective number of parties in the chamber. The first column indicates the number of effective parties in the chamber. The second column reports the percentage of bills to alter the rules of order in Colombia, and the third column provides the same information for the Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005.

Table 4-5 presents the characteristics of bills to alter the rules of order. Bills to alter the rules of order in Colombia are equal in severity. Specifically, an equal number of bills assist legislators in pursuing constituent over partisan interests, assist legislators equally in pursuing both constituent and partisan interests, and assist in pursuing only partisan interests. In comparison, the Peruvian Representatives are more likely to sponsor bills that assist legislators in pursuing both constituent and partisan interests followed by changes that assist in pursuing only constituent interests.

**TABLE 4-5 Characteristics of Bills Proposed to Alter the Rules of Order in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress, 1993-2005**

<b>Variable: Effect of Proposal</b>	<b>Colombia % Bills Proposed</b>	<b>Peru % Bills Proposed</b>
Ability to support constituent over partisan interests	33.3%	33.3%
Ability to support both constituent and partisan interests	33.3%	50%
Ability to support partisan interests only	33.4%	16.7%

This table reports when sponsorship of bills to alter the rules of order were made in Colombia and Peru in relation to the effect of the proposal on the ability to pursue constituent interests over partisan interests. The first column indicates the effect of the proposal. The second column reports the percentage of bills to alter the rules of order in Colombia, and the third column provides the same information for the Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005.

*Debate Participation on Altering the Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress*

Given the small number of bills sponsored to alter the rules of order, I now turn to a multivariate analysis of debate participation and roll call votes in the Peruvian Congress.<sup>21</sup> Table 4-6 presents the results of a multinomial logit regression model of debate participation in the Peruvian Congress. In the analysis, each coefficient is the predicted marginal effect of an independent variable on the log-odds between two of the three following alternatives: voicing opposition, voicing support, or not participating in a debate to alter the rules of order in the chamber. By examining the coefficients across columns, the observer can assess the influence of explanatory variables on debate participation.<sup>22</sup>

In the results, there exist statistically significant relationships for each of the explanatory variables predicted to influence the likelihood of debate participation. Column 1 shows the probability of voicing support for a proposed change in the rules of order increases as the proposal permits legislators to pursue both partisan and constituent or primarily constituent interests. When the effect of the proposal permits pursuing constituent interests over partisan interests, the likelihood of voicing support rather than opposition increases.

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<sup>21</sup> Due to data availability, the multivariate analyses of debate participation and roll call voting includes only the case of Peru as the Colombian Senate does not record voting and debate participation is not readily available.

<sup>22</sup> Defining of coefficients refers to a reserved category; therefore, it is possible to calculate three additional sets of coefficients since they are linear transformations of the coefficients presented in the first three columns of coefficients presented in the table (Whitten and Palmer 1996, 241).

However, when the effect of the proposal permits the pursuing of mainly partisan interests, legislators are more likely to not participate in debate as opposed to voicing opposition.

This finding provides support for hypothesis 1.

**TABLE 4-6 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Debate Participation in the Peruvian Congress**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Ln[Spoke Against/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>
Effect of proposal	1.26*** (.36)	-.47 (.28)	-1.73** (.29)
Effective number of parties	-1.71*** (.36)	-.76** (.29)	.95*** (.25)
Party discipline	-.54 (.31)	.55* (.24)	1.09*** (.24)
Career in politics	-.23 (.27)	-.64** (.22)	-.41* (.20)
Constant	7.25*** (1.44)	5.12*** (1.18)	-2.13** (.97)
Number of observations	847		
Pseudo R2	.05		
LR Chi (2)	77.92		

The dependent variable is coded -1 if the legislator voiced opposition, 0 if the legislator did not participate in the debate, and 1 if voiced support for a proposed change in the internal rules of order. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

Calculating predicted probabilities to estimate the substantive effect of the variable reveals when effect of the proposal is set at the maximum value (assists leaders but not legislators), 59% of legislators voiced opposition, 32% chose not to participate, and 9% voiced support (see Figure 4-1).<sup>23</sup>

Contrary to expectation, the effective number of parties in the chamber influences the probability of participating in debate; however, the finding is in the opposite direction than expected. Column 1 shows as the effective number of parties in the chamber increases, the probability of speaking in favor of a proposed change in the rules of order increases. Additionally, column 3 shows as the effective number of parties decreases, the probability of voicing opposition decreases; legislators are more likely not to participate in debate as opposed to voicing opposition. When set at the minimum value, 31% spoke against a proposed change, 63% did not participate, and 5% voiced support. When there is a greater number of effective parties (set at the maximum value), 9% of legislators spoke against proposed changes, 74% did not participate in debate, and 17% spoke in favor of proposed alterations in the rules of order.


Support for hypothesis 3 exists as legislators from high discipline parties are more likely to voice support for changes than those from weak discipline parties.

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<sup>23</sup> I used CLARIFY software (King, Tomz, and Whittenberg 2000; Tomz, Whittenberg, and King 2001) in conjunction with STATA to compute predicted probabilities. This statistical package permits the user to hold all variables at constant values while estimating probabilities based on different values of a variable of primary interest. I hold continuous variables at their mean and dichotomous variables at their mode, which is an observed value in the dataset rather than the unobserved mean.

Additionally, column 3 shows when from a high discipline party, legislators are more likely to speak against proposed changes as opposed to not participating. In the case where party leaders do not possess any ability to sanction rebels, 28 % spoke against the proposal, 58% did not participate, and 13% spoke in favor of the proposal.

**FIGURE 4-1 Effect of Effective Parties on the Probability of Debate Participation to Alter the Rules of Order**



There also exists a significant relationship between having a career in politics and participating in debate. Columns 2 and 3 show legislators without a political career at the time of participation are more likely to not participate in debate as opposed to either voicing support or opposition for proposed changes in the rules of order.

Table 4-7 presents the same multinomial logit model, except I include variables for being a member of the party leadership and seniority. The reason that being a party leader

might be important is that party leaders may be sponsors of bills to alter the rules of order. If this is the case, I expect that these leaders participate in debate concerning the outcome of the proposal. A second factor that may influence debate participation is seniority. Studies conducted on the U.S. Congress find that senior members in Congress are more likely to participate in floor procedures including debate more so than freshmen Members of Congress (Brady 1991; Hall 1996; Hurley and Kerr 2000, 1997; Hurley and Wilson 1989; Kernell 1977; Polsby et al. 1969).

In the analysis, all parameter estimates for the variables included in Table 4-6 remain in the same direction and statistical significance in Table 4-7 except for three changes. First, the career in politics variable switches directions in the first column, but is still not statistically significant. Second, the effective number of parties in the chamber is no longer significant in the second column. Last, the career in politics variable is no longer statistically significant in the third column. In addition, both being a party leader and seniority have a statistically significant impact on the probability of participating in debate.


Table 4-7 shows that being a party leader has a statistically significant impact on participating in debate. Column 3 shows being a party leader decreases the probability of not participating in debate and increases the probability of voicing opposition. I expect party leaders to be more vocal than rank and file members of the chamber. Of rank and file members, 11% spoke against proposed changes in the rules, 78% did not participate, and 10% voiced support for proposed changes. In contrast, 30% of party leaders voiced opposition to proposed changes in the rules, 57% did not speak, and 12% voiced support for proposed alterations in the rules of order.

**TABLE 4-7 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Debate Participation in the Peruvian Congress Controlling for Party Leader and Seniority**

Variable	<b>Ln[Spoke Against/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>
Effect of proposal	1.44*** (.38)	-.47 (.28)	-1.91*** (.31)
Effective number of parties	-1.59*** (.39)	-.39 (.31)	1.2*** (.28)
Party discipline	-.55 (.32)	.61** (.25)	1.15*** (.25)
Career in politics	.36 (.37)	.14 (.31)	-.22 (.25)
Party leader	.79** (.31)	-.52* (.26)	-1.31*** (.23)
Seniority	.98** (.34)	-1.01*** (.26)	-.03 (.27)
Constant	7.66*** (1.5)	4.81*** (1.21)	-2.85** (1.04)
Number of observations	842		
Pseudo R2	.10		
LRchi(2)	129.12		

The dependent variable is coded -1 if the legislator voiced opposition, 0 if the legislator did not participate in the debate, and 1 if voiced support for a proposed change in the internal rules of order. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

**FIGURE 4-2 Effect of Party Leader on Probability of Debate Participation to Alter Rules of Order**



Seniority of the legislator also has a significant influence on the probability of participating in debates to alter the rules of order. Senior members of the chamber are more likely to participate in debate than members serving their first term in office. Columns 1 and 2 show less senior members are less likely to voice opposition or not to participate than voicing support in proposed changes in the rules. Of those members serving their first term in Congress, 14% voiced opposition, 8% voiced support, and 77% did not participate in debates on proposed changes in the internal rules of order (see Figure 4-2).

Table 4-8 presents the same model as Table 4-7 except it includes interaction variables between the four initial explanatory variables presented in Table 4-6. In this analysis, all of the parameter estimates from the preceding model remain in the same

direction except seniority, which changes in column 3. Party discipline becomes statistically significant in the initial column and is not significant in the second column. Three of the four interactive variables are statistically significant in the model. There exists no statistically significant relationship for the interaction variable between having a career in politics and the effect of the proposal on debate participation to alter the rules of order. I calculated a likelihood ratio test with the assumption that the earlier model from Table 4-6 is nested within the model presented in Table 4-8. The result of the LR Chi2 test is equal to 79.25, which permits the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no association. Thus, the inclusion of the interaction and control variables provides an improved model specification.

Table 4-8 demonstrates a significant interaction between party discipline and having a career in politics. The results in column 2 suggest that legislators are more likely to refrain from participating rather than voicing opposition when there is high discipline and legislators have a career in politics as opposed to not participating in politics. When party leaders have the resources to sanction rebels, legislators did not participate in debate more so when they had a career than when they did not have a political career. This finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of party discipline and career in politics anticipated separately by hypothesis 3 and 4. The results indicate that the influence of high party discipline on not participating in debate as opposed to voicing opposition is greatly enhanced when legislators possess a career in politics than when they do not have a political career.

Table 4-8 shows a significant interaction between party discipline and the effect of the leadership proposal. The results in column 1 suggest that legislators are more likely to voice opposition rather than support when there is high party discipline and the effect of

**TABLE 4-8 Multinomial Logit Regression Interactive Variable Model for Debate Participation in the Peruvian Congress**

Variable	Ln[Spoke Against/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)	Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)	Ln[Didn't Speak/ Spoke Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)
Effect of proposal	4.81 (2.84)	-5.09* (2.22)	-9.90*** (2.1)
Effective number of parties	-2.01*** (.49)	-.01 (.36)	2.00*** (.38)
Party discipline	-1.12** (.46)	.55 (.34)	1.67*** (.36)
Career in politics	.19 (.43)	.14 (.36)	-.05 (.29)
Party leader	.83** (.32)	-.59 (.27)	-1.42*** (.24)
Seniority	-1.16** (.38)	-.92*** (.27)	.24 (.31)
Party discipline * career in politics	.23 (.62)	.31* (.47)	.08 (.49)
Party discipline * effect of proposal	.91*** (.34)	.07 (.26)	-.84*** (.26)
Career in politics* effect of proposal	-.13 (.74)	-.17 (.57)	-.05 (.59)
Effect of proposal* effective number of parties	-.73 (.65)	1.15* (.52)	1.88*** (.47)
Constant	9.03*** (1.88)	3.07* (1.40)	-5.96*** (1.44)
Number of observations	842		
Pseudo R2	.12		
LRChi (2)	157.94		

The dependent variable is coded -1 if the legislator voiced opposition, 0 if the legislator did not participate in the debate, and 1 if voiced support for a proposed change in the internal rules of order. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

the proposal assists legislators in performing legislative duties more so than when it harms their ability to perform legislative duties. When party leaders can sanction legislators who

rebel, legislators are more likely to voice opposition instead of support when the proposal to change the rules assists the performance of legislative duties. Additionally, the results in column 3 suggest that legislators from weak discipline parties are more likely to speak against proposed changes rather than not participate when proposals harmed the ability to perform legislative duties.

This finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of party discipline and the effect of the proposal anticipated separately by hypotheses 1 and 3. The results indicate that the influence of high discipline on voicing opposition over support is greatly enhanced when the effect of the proposal assists performance of legislative duties rather than harming the ability to perform legislative duties. The influence of weak discipline on voicing opposition rather than not participating is enhanced when proposals harm the ability to perform legislative duties.

Last, Table 4-8 shows a significant interaction between the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties. The results in column 2 suggest that legislators are more likely not to speak rather than voice support when the effect of the proposal assists legislators in performing legislative duties and there exist a higher number of effective parties. When the proposal assists legislators in performing duties, legislators are more likely to not participate rather than voice support when there are a greater number of effective parties in a chamber. Also, column 3 shows when the proposal harms legislators, they are less likely to not participate as opposed to voicing opposition when there are relatively few effective parties. This finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties anticipated separately by

hypothesis 1 and 2. The results indicate that the influence of a helpful proposal on not participating is much higher when there are a high number of effective parties.

*Voting to Alter the Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress*

Table 4-9 illustrates the results of a multinomial logit regression model of voting in the Peruvian Congress. In this analysis, coefficients are the predicted marginal effects of each explanatory variable on the log-odds between two of the following three alternatives: voting in favor, abstaining, or voting against a proposed change to alter the internal rules of order. By viewing the coefficients across columns, one can depict the influence of explanatory variables on voting to alter the internal rules of order.

The results demonstrate that there exist statistically significant relationships between the likelihood of voting to alter the rules of order and the effect of the proposal, the effective number of parties in the chamber, and party discipline. There exists no relationship between having a career in politics and the likelihood of voting to alter the rules of order.

**TABLE 4-9 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Voting to Change the Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Ln[Vote Against/ Vote in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Abstain/ Vote in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln [Abstain/ Vote Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>
Effect of proposal	.96*** (.21)	-.46 (.41)	-1.42*** (.44)
Effective number of parties	-.67*** (.19)	.93* (.41)	1.60*** (.43)
Party discipline	-.80*** (.18)	.23 (.34)	1.03** (.36)
Career in politics	.19 (.15)	.41 (.33)	.22 (.34)
Constant	1.98** (.72)	-6.55*** (1.67)	-8.53*** (1.74)
Number of observations	847		
Pseudo R2	.03		
LR chi(2)	39.52		

The dependent variable in this model is how the legislator voted for the proposed change in the internal rules of order. I coded the variable -1 if the legislator voted against a proposed change in the rules, 0 if the legislator was absent when the vote occurred, and 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the proposed change. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

In contrast to expectations, column 1 shows the probability of voting in favor of a proposed change in the rules of order decreases as the proposed change permits legislators to pursue constituent interests over partisan ones. Column 3 shows when the effect of the proposal permitted legislators to pursue partisan interests, a decreased likelihood of abstaining as opposed to voting against the proposed change in the rules of order occurred.

In calculating predicted probabilities to estimate the substantive impact of the effect of the proposal shows that the likelihood of voting against a proposal is 20% when the proposed change permits pacifying partisan interests, 40% when the proposal permits pacifying both partisan and constituent interests, and 64% when the proposed change

permits pacifying constituent interests over partisan ones. The probability of voting in favor decreases from 73% when legislators can support partisan interests to 35% when they can support constituent interests.

Column 1 shows increasing party discipline has a significant impact on the likelihood of voting against a proposed change in the internal rules of order. The probability of voting against proposed changes in the rules of order decreases as party discipline increases. This finding provides support for hypothesis 3.

Further, there exists a significant relationship between the likelihood of voting against a proposed change in the rules of order and the effective number of parties in the chamber; however, the relationship is opposite to what was originally hypothesized. Columns 1 and 2 show as the effective number of parties increases in the chamber, there is an increased likelihood of voting in favor of proposed changes in the rules of order. When the effective number of parties is set at the minimum, 30% of legislators vote in favor of the proposed change in the rules. Sixty-nine percent of legislators vote against the proposed change in the rules of order when there is a low number of effective of parties.

Table 4-10 shows a similar multinomial logit model as the previous table; however, I include seniority and being a party leader as variables in the model. There is no relationship between the likelihood of voting to change the rules of order and being a party leader. There exists a significant relationship between seniority and voting against proposed changes in the rules of order. Columns 2 and 3 show senior members of the chamber are more likely to abstain from voting on proposed changes in the internal rules of order as opposed to voting in favor or against proposed changes in the rules of order. The calculation of predicted probabilities demonstrates that 62% of legislators serving in their

first term in the Congress vote in favor of proposed changes in the rules of order. Thirty-six percent of legislators with less than five years of experience vote against proposed changes in the rules of order. Also of interest, senior members of the chamber are more likely to abstain from voting on proposed changes in the rules of order compared to less senior members. Only 3% of legislators serving less than five years abstained from voting.

Given the contradictory findings in regards to the effect of the proposal, the effective number of parties, and the lack of a significant relationship between having a career in politics and the likelihood of voting for or against a proposed change in the rules of order, Table 4-11 presents a third multinomial logit model with interactive variables. I calculated a likelihood ratio test with the assumption that the earlier model from Table 4-9 is nested within the model presented in Table 4-11. The result of the LR Chi2 test is equal to 97.96, which permits the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no association. Thus, the inclusion of the interaction and control variables provides an improved model specification. In the model, three of the four interactive variables have significant relationships. First, there is no significant relationship between party discipline and having a career in politics.

**TABLE 4-10 Multinomial Logistic Regression for Voting to Change the Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress Controlling for Party Leader and Seniority**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Ln[Vote Against/ Vote in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Abstain/ Vote in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln [Abstain/ Vote Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>
Effect of the proposal	1.03*** (.22)	-.52 (.42)	-1.55*** (.44)
Effective number of parties	-.73*** (.20)	.53 (.43)	1.26** (.45)
Party discipline	-.84*** (.18)	.24 (.34)	1.08** (.36)
Career in politics	.28 (.19)	-.52 (.50)	-.79 (.51)
Party leader	.22 (.19)	-.68 (.48)	-.89 (.49)
Seniority	.21 (.20)	1.19** (.38)	1.40** (.40)
Constant	2.42*** (.75)	-6.08 (1.64)	-8.51*** (1.72)
Number of observations	842		
Pseudo R2	.04		
LR Chi (2))	57.59		

The dependent variable in this model is how the legislator voted for the proposed change in the internal rules of order. I coded the variable -1 if the legislator voted against a proposed change in the rules, 0 if the legislator was absent when the vote occurred, and 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the proposed change. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

**TABLE 4-11 Multinomial Logistic Regression Interactive Model for Voting to Change the Rules of Order in the Peruvian Congress**

Variable	<b>Ln[Voted Against/ Voted in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Abstained/ Voted in Favor] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>	<b>Ln[Abstained/ Voted Against] Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)</b>
Effect of proposal	34.40*** (3.93)	1.65 (5.86)	-32.74*** (6.81)
Effective number of parties	-3.54*** (.46)	.41 (.81)	3.96*** (.89)
Party discipline	-20.94*** (2.88)	-5.02 (3.87)	15.93*** (4.71)
Career in politics	-1.00 (2.05)	2.44 (3.85)	3.44 (4.12)
Party leader	.34 (.21)	-.80 (.50)	-1.15* (.52)
Seniority	-.80** (.27)	1.44** (.46)	2.24*** (.51)
Party discipline * career in politics	-.82 (.69)	.92 (.67)	1.74 (.93)
Party discipline * effect of proposal	4.87*** (.68)	-.27 (.43)	-1.13** (.47)
Career in politics* effect of proposal	.86*** (.23)	-.53 (.91)	-1.39 (1.11)
Effect of proposal* effective number of parties	-8.13*** (.94)	-.45 (1.36)	7.68*** (1.59)
Constant	14.13*** (1.86)	-5.78 (3.46)	-19.91*** (3.75)
Number of observations	842		
Pseudo R2	.19		
LRChi (2)	258.57		

The dependent variable in this model is how the legislator voted for the proposed change in the internal rules of order. I coded the variable -1 if the legislator voted against a proposed change in the rules, 0 if the legislator was absent when the vote occurred, and 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the proposed change. \*p is statistically significant at the .05 level, \*\*p significant at the .01 level, and \*\*\* p is significant at the .0001 level for a two-tailed test.

Table 4-11 illustrates a significant interaction between party discipline and effect of the proposal on voting to change the rules of order. The results in column 1 suggest that legislators are more likely to vote against a proposal as opposed to voting in favor when there is high party discipline and the proposal assists legislators in performing duties. When party leaders possess the ability to sanction rebels, legislators are more likely to vote against proposals that assisted them in performing legislative duties that benefited constituent interests but not partisan goals. Column 3 shows legislators from weak discipline parties are less likely to abstain as opposed to voting against proposals when the proposed change harmed legislators' ability to perform legislative duties. This finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of party discipline and the effect of the proposal anticipated separately by hypothesis 2 and 3. The results indicate that the influence of high discipline on voting against rather than in favor of proposals is much greater when the proposal assists legislators in performing legislative duties. Further, the influence of weak discipline on abstaining rather than voting against is relatively less when the proposal harms the ability to perform legislative duties that would pacify constituent interests but not necessarily partisan ones.

Table 4-11 shows a significant interaction between having a career in politics and the effect of the proposal. The results in column 1 suggest that legislators are more likely to vote against rather than in favor when they have a career in politics and the proposed change assists legislators in performing legislative duties. When legislators possess a career in politics, they are more likely to vote against proposals that potentially harmed partisan goals. Legislators without a political career were less likely to abstain and more likely to vote against proposals that harmed legislators' ability to perform legislative duties. This

finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of having a career in politics and the effect of the proposal anticipated separately by hypothesis 1 and 4. The results indicate that the influence of having a career in politics on voting against rather than in favor of a proposal is enhanced when the proposal benefits legislators but not party leaders. In addition, the influence of not having a career in politics on voting against as opposed to abstaining is enhanced when proposals harm the ability to perform legislative duties.

Table 4-11 also illustrates a significant interaction between the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties. The results in column 1 suggest that legislators are less likely to vote against rather than in favor when the proposal harms legislators ability to and there are few effective parties in the chamber. Legislators were less likely to vote against a harmful proposal when there were fewer effective parties. Further, the results in column 3 show that legislators were more likely to abstain rather than vote against proposals when the proposal assisted in the performance of legislative duties and there were a greater number of effective parties. The finding provides support for an interaction between the influence of the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties anticipated separately by hypotheses 1 and 2.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I presented a series of analyses to test the hypotheses concerning the effect of the effective number of parties, party discipline, whether the proposal to change the rules assisted or harmed legislators, and having a career in politics on bills sponsorship, debate participation, and voting behaviors toward altering the rules of order in the

Colombian Senate (for bill sponsorship only), and the Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005.

Hypothesis 1, the effect of the proposal on supporting change in the internal rules of order, received support in each analysis presented in this chapter. Both in the analysis of debate participation and voting for change in the rules of order, legislators were more likely to support change that assisted with performing duties that benefited constituent interests but not necessarily partisan interests. Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the effect of the proposal and supporting change in the internal rules of order. The more favorable the proposal, the more likely that legislators will support change in both debate participation and voting to alter the rules of order.

Hypothesis 2, regarding the effective number of parties and supporting change to the rules of order received support in each of the analyses presented in the chapter. Legislators in both the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress were less likely to propose change when there were fewer effective parties in the respective chamber. Legislators were more likely to vote in favor of proposed changes in Peru as the number of parties decreased, and the legislators were more likely to abstain rather than vote against proposed changes as the number of effective parties increased in the chamber. A similar pattern occurs when examining debate participation in Peru.

Additionally, hypothesis 3, the effect of party discipline on supporting change in the rules received support across the analyses presented in this chapter. Legislators from weak discipline parties were more likely to sponsor bills to alter the rules of order than those from high discipline parties in both the Colombian and Peruvian cases. In Peru, legislators from high discipline parties were more likely to abstain than voice opposition, and they

were more likely to voice support rather than opposition in debates to alter the rules of order. A similar pattern occurs in voting behavior in that legislators from high discipline parties were more likely to abstain than vote against proposed change, and they were more likely to vote in favor than against proposed changes to alter the rules of order.

In the analysis on bill sponsorship, there is evidence that having a career in politics has influence, but this is not the case in the analyses on debate participation and voting to alter the rules of order. In Colombia, senators without a career were more likely to sponsor bills than those senators with a career in politics. In contrast, Peruvian legislators that sponsored a bill to alter the rules all had some type of political career. The relationship between having a career in politics, alone, is not statistically significant in either the model of debate participation or the model of voting behavior to alter the rules of order in Peru.

Finally, the effect of the proposal interacts with three other of the explanatory variables in the analysis of debate participation and voting behavior in the Peruvian Congress. In the analysis of debate participation, the effect of the proposal interacts with party discipline and the effective number of parties, in ways that support the underlying hypotheses, to enhance support for voicing opposition in debate. In the analysis of voting to change the rules of order, the effect of the proposal interacts with party discipline, the effective number of parties, and having a career in politics to enhance the likelihood of voting against proposed changes in the rules of order. These interactive effects suggest that the hypothesized causes of support for legislative leaders are more complex than the conventional linear effects the hypotheses imply.

In these analyses, the effect of the proposal is the most consistently supported hypothesized influence on bill sponsorship, debate participation, and voting. The second

most important predictor is arguably party discipline in that it has a notable independent influence in each analyses as well as interactive influence in the analyses of debate participation and voting. Third, the effective number of parties is arguably a notable but somewhat weaker influence on debate participation and voting behavior. Last, a career in politics has only a weak, inconsistent influence across the three analyses in this chapter.

The dissertation concludes with the following chapter. In Chapter V, I synthesize the findings presented in Chapters III and IV. I present a discussion of where there is evidence of a backbench rebellion in the Peruvian Congress between 1993 and 2005. In addition, I discuss how the findings in the dissertation fit into the existing literature and the contribution these results make to understanding of the interaction between the electoral systems and the implication for democratic consolidation. Last, I present potential future avenues of research.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

#### **Introduction**

This dissertation commenced with the observation that the empirical research conducted on changes in congressional organization in the U.S. Congress has not extended to the study of Latin American national legislatures. Recent research on legislatures in Latin America suggests that these legislative bodies now take on a more active role in developing a legislative agenda in these countries. Since legislatures are pursuing a more active role, we ought to consider the way these chambers are organized. More specifically, those Latin American legislatures may not be as active as those legislatures in advanced Western democracies, but as Carey and Shugart (1998) posed, more Latin American legislatures are assuming proactive or reactive roles. I posed in the introduction that there exists a gap in the literature concerning the relationship between electoral rules and how legislatures organize. Research suggests that the electoral system design contributes directly to who can win elections and the political ambition legislators pursue. Thus, the electoral system design influences the incentive structure for legislators; that is, will they pursue a partisan or personal vote. I proposed that changes in the electoral laws in some Latin American countries beginning in the 1990s altered the incentive structure so that some legislators became ineffective under the existing rules of order. This dissertation sought to address what happens in legislatures where the goals of party leaders and backbenchers produce different incentives, and asks when will a power struggle break out over altering the rules of order in a chamber.

Chapter II provided a review of the existing literature concerning the role of legislatures in third wave democracies in Latin America, as well as a review of executive-legislative interactions, the influence of party discipline and the relevant number of effective parties in the party system, and the nature of career ambition on the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. In the introductory chapter, I outlined the research design employed to analyze changes in the rules of order. The review of the literature provided the essentials for the theoretical foundation presented in Chapter II. The theory and hypotheses presented in Chapter II were empirically tested in Chapters III and IV.

This final chapter synthesizes the empirical findings from the previous three chapters. I also present an overall analysis of the electoral system-legislative rules interaction, and I present conclusions generated from the empirical findings. Additionally, I summarize how these findings fit into the existing literature and the contribution this research makes to our overall understanding of electoral system design-legislative interaction. Last, I propose future avenues of research to advance our understanding of the impact of the organization of the congress on the ability of legislators to pursue partisan or personal votes.

### **Empirical Findings**

Chapter III presented an experimental analysis while Chapter IV provided a statistical analysis to examine rule changes in the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress. The explanatory variables examined in these studies included the effective number of political parties in a chamber, level of party discipline, effect of the leadership proposal, and

the nature of legislator ambition. This section synthesizes the findings presented earlier in the dissertation.

### *Effect of the Leadership Proposal*

Hypothesis 1 predicts that legislators are more likely to oppose the leadership's proposal to change the internal rules of order if such changes harm the ability of legislators to perform legislative duties that will assist them in achieving some political goal. In the experimental analysis the effect of the leadership proposal has a statistically significant relationship in both analyses presented. In the case where legislators voted for the party leaders' new proposal over the backbench alternative, participants supported leaders' proposals that assisted them in achieving their political goals. Also, the effect of the proposal interacts with three other causes (i.e., party discipline, ambition, effective number of parties) providing further support for the underlying hypotheses. In the statistical analyses presented in Chapter IV, evidence supports the hypothesis concerning the effect of the proposal. In both the analysis of debate participation and voting to alter the rules of order, legislators were more likely to voice support or vote in favor of proposals that assisted them in performing legislative duties that assisted in achieving political goals. The more favorable the proposal to alter the rules of order, the more likely legislators supported change either through debate participation and voting to alter the rules of order. Based on these analyses, the effect of the leadership proposal is the most consistently supported hypothesis. The findings of this study imply that legislators do consider the types of changes in the rules of order proposed by party leaders. More specifically, legislators consider that

when there are negative implications for their ability to perform legislative duties, legislators may rebel against party leadership when they propose harmful changes in the rules of order.

### *Effective Number of Parties*

Hypothesis 2 predicts that as the effective number of parties in the congress increases, legislators are more likely to oppose changes in the internal rules of order. In the experimental analysis, alone the effective number of parties does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship for voting for the leadership proposal. Yet, there is an interactive effect between the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties, which provides some support for the hypothesis. A similar result is found in the statistical analyses of the Peruvian Congress and the Colombian Senate. In both cases, legislators were less likely to sponsor bills to alter the rules of order when there were few effective parties in the chamber. Further, in the Peruvian case, legislators were more likely to voice support and vote in favor changes in the rules of order when there were few parties in the chamber. Legislators were more likely to abstain and less likely to oppose changes in the rules directly by voting against or voicing opposition as the number of effective parties in the chamber increased. Additionally, there is again an interactive effect between the effect of the proposal and the effective number of parties in both the analysis of voting and debate participation in the Peruvian Congress. Thus, there is a weak, conditional effect on supporting change in the rules of order depending on the number of effective parties in the chamber. Thus, we can infer from the findings that the effective number of parties provides minimal explanation for supporting or opposing changes in the rules of order.

*Party Discipline*

Hypothesis 3 predicts that legislators that are members of parties with high party discipline are less likely to oppose changes in the rules of order sponsored by party leaders. The analyses provide substantial support for this hypothesis as well. In the experimental analysis that examined where participants did not support the leaders' proposal whether they voted for the backbench alternative or maintaining the existing rules of order, I find that participants from high discipline parties were at least more likely to vote to maintain the existing rules of order than with the backbenchers if they did not support the leaders' proposal in the first analysis presented in Chapter III. Additionally, the findings indicate that the interactive effect between the effect of the proposal and party discipline enhanced the probability of voting to maintain the existing rules of order among those members that were not willing to support the leadership's proposal.

The hypothesized influence of party discipline received support in Chapter IV as well. In both the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress, legislators from weak discipline parties were more likely to sponsor bills to change the rules of order than those members from high discipline parties, where leaders had the ability to sanction legislators that alienated the leadership. In both analyses of debate participation and voting to change the rules in Peru, legislators were more likely to voice support or vote in favor of proposed changes rather than voice opposition or vote against proposals when legislators were from high disciplined parties. Further, legislators from high discipline parties were more likely to abstain from debate or voting as opposed to voting against or voicing opposition than legislators from weak discipline parties. In the analyses, the second most important predictor is arguably party discipline in that discipline has a notable independent effect as

well as interactive influence in each of the analyses presented in the dissertation. Thus, overall, legislators are more likely to support leadership changes in the rules of order when they are from weak discipline parties. Further, legislators from high disciplined parties are more likely to abstain than directly rebel against changing the rules of order than those members from parties where leaders cannot sanction legislators for their behavior. A potential explanation for the findings presented in this study is that party discipline and the fear of reprisal is enough to cause legislators to vote for a bill to change the rules even if it would hurt their ability to perform legislative duties or refrain from voting in favor of a proposal that assists them if it will alienate party leadership.

#### *Nature of Legislator Ambition*

Hypothesis 4 predicts that legislators pursuing a political career (i.e., exhibit static or progressive ambition) are more likely to support the leadership proposal than legislators with no career aspirations (i.e., exhibit discrete ambition). In the experimental analysis examining whether participants voted for the leaders' proposal to alter the rules of order, a strong relationship exists. That is, participants exhibiting political career ambitions were more likely to support leadership changes in the rules of order than those that did not possess political career ambitions. In the statistical analyses in Chapter IV, the results are more ambiguous about the relationship between career ambition and supporting change in the rules of order. When examining bill sponsorship in the Colombian Senate, legislators were more likely to sponsor a bill if they did not show evidence of possessing high career ambitions. However, the opposite occurs in the Peruvian case. All bills to alter the rules of order in the Peruvian case were sponsored by legislators with career ambitions. When

examining debate participation and voting records for changing the rules of order, no statistically significant relationship exists for ambition by itself. In voting to alter the rules of order, the interactive effect between the effect of proposal and having a career in politics enhances the effect of voting against a proposed change in the rules of order. Thus, though in the hypothesized direction, having a career in politics has only a weak influence on the likelihood of supporting or opposing changes in the internal rules of order in the Peruvian and Colombian cases. These findings imply that legislators with career ambitions are more likely to support leadership proposed changes in the rules of order because if they are required to consider the leadership and the party when continuing a career in politics then it is rational for the legislator to support the leadership. This may in part explain why Colombian legislators without career ambitions sponsored bills to change the rules because prior to 2003 they did not have to rely necessarily on party leaders or the party to pursue a career in the legislature.

### **Evidence of a Backbench Rebellion**

Is there evidence that backbenchers rebel against party leaders in Latin America? In Peru, the results suggest that backbench rebellion occurred, but not so in the case of Colombia. In Colombia, party leaders proposed all changes in the rules of order focused on in this dissertation. Further, all of the changes examined here passed without incident.

In October 2000, the party leaders from *Peru Posible* proposed a change to Article 57, which if passed, permitted the chamber leadership to officially censure legislators that failed to attend sessions and committee meetings. In this case, the party with a plurality of seats proposed the bill, but could not get a quorum present so no vote was taken on the

proposal. This suggests that the party leaders possessed weak discipline over their deputies, and it appears that backbenchers rebelled against the party leadership proposal by not attending the session.

A second case where evidence of weak party discipline and rebellion occurred in the Peruvian chamber is the December 2000 debate over Article 35. In this proposed change, the outgoing chamber leadership (*PERU 2000*) proposed to change the rules by assigning committees to legislators at the end of the congressional session rather than the beginning of the session in order to save time. The initial vote taken on the measure involved whether they should wait until the beginning of the next session to take action on the proposal. Forty-one members voted against waiting, four abstained from voting, and fifty-four members were absent. After this motion passed, a second vote on changing the rules so that the committee assignments were made at the end of the congressional session instead of the beginning occurred. In the final vote tally, fifty-four members voted in favor of the bill, zero against, three abstained, but the number of legislators absent increased to sixty-three. Those absent were from both the governing and opposition parties, which suggest that a few legislators from the governing party rebelled by being absent when the vote occurred. If enough members were absent a quorum would not have been met. This again suggests weak party discipline on the part of the *Peru Posible* leadership.

There is no evidence of a backbench rebellion in Colombia given the limited data available. There are several potential explanations for why this is the case. One potential explanation for the absence of rebellion is that party discipline was high enough to block a rebellion. Given the relatively weak party discipline in regards of controlling access to the ballot before 2003, this is not the most plausible explanation. A second potential

explanation is that party discipline was so low legislators could not develop a large enough collective to rebel even if they wanted to. Another plausible explanation for the lack of rebellion is that there was no need to rebel because the sponsored changes did not prevent a majority of legislators from performing duties that would assist in their political goals.

### **Understanding the Interaction between Electoral System Design and the Organization of the Legislature**

The findings of this dissertation assist in explaining reform in the internal rules of a legislature. Existing research suggests that constitutional reformers changed the electoral system design for several reasons. These reasons included dissatisfaction with democratic institutions, failure of legislators to pursue national or state and local interests, and partisan interests trumping constituent or legislator interests

Once change in the electoral rules occurred, legislators did not change their behavior immediately. For example, the constitutional reform in Colombia in 1991, the adoption of a single national electoral district for senators was intended to encourage senators to focus on national issues rather than state or local issues only. However, once that change in the electoral law occurred, legislators continued to focus on local and state interests rather than increasing the focus on national issues. Consequently, party leaders reexamined their attempt to encourage senators to pursue national interests. One potential explanation for why legislators' behavior did not change immediately is due to the rules of order in the Congress. If the design of the rules of order is such that legislators can focus on state or local interests, then the rules would need to be changed so that legislators could adapt their behavior to start focusing on different issues. Once change in the electoral law

occurs, one may not immediately observe changes in legislator behavior. Consequently, party leaders may have to alter the rules of order of a congress in order for the change in behavior to occur.

Once party leaders recognize that they have to alter the rules of order, then they must propose a change in the rules of order that legislators will vote in favor of, or risk a backbench rebellion in which rogue legislators propose their own change in the rules of order that may not benefit party leadership. The factors explored in this dissertation that assist in explaining whether the party leadership can propose a change in the rules that both avoids a backbench rebellion and passes with enough legislators' votes include: the effective number of political parties, party discipline, being a member of the president's party, being a member of the governing party in a congress, and the nature of legislator ambition. As demonstrated earlier in the empirical sections of the dissertation and the earlier portion of this chapter, the effective number of parties, specifically a high number of parties, a high level of party discipline, a helpful proposal to alter the rules of order, and to a weaker degree the nature of legislator ambition all influenced the successful likelihood of a change in the rules of order proposed by the party leadership.

### **Future Research**

There exist several notable avenues for future research that would extend the results produced in this dissertation. First, as mentioned above, party leaders may have to recognize the need for altering the rules of order to prompt a change in legislator behavior following changes in the electoral law. Future research should consider how much time goes by before party leaders recognize a need or attempt to change the rules of order

following a change in the electoral law. Future research should examine whether there is a need for the party to lose an election before recognizing the need to alter rules. Also, an in-depth analysis of sponsored bills and participation in debates that discusses whether there exists contradiction between electoral rules and the rules that explains the lack of change in behavior of legislators would be useful in cases besides Peru.

A second avenue for future research is to examine legislator productivity both before and after changes in the internal rules of order. Do legislators actually change their behavior following a change in the electoral law, or must one wait for a change in the rules of order to observe behavior change, and if behavior changes then? By examining legislator productivity before the change in the electoral law, after the electoral law, and after a change in the internal rules of order, we can determine whether or what change actually alters the behavior of legislators. Specific types of legislative productivity to examine include committee work, bill sponsorship, and participation in debate procedures. Further, researchers ought to examine the types of legislation that pass following the changes. If constitutional reformers wanted legislators to target national issues, do they? One can begin by examining those types of bills to see if they have a better chance of passing than they did before. Are national issues simply being proposed, when before the change in the electoral rule such issues were ignored as was the case in Colombia (Crisp and Ingall 2002).

Further, if proposed bills covering national issues prior to electoral law change failed to pass, scholars ought to examine where in the legislative process those bills stalled (i.e., in committee, on the floor in debate). Following changes in the rules of order, scholars ought to compare whether this change fixes the stalling of those bills. For example, if national issue bills failed to make it out of committee before a change in the rules of order, but

actually make it out of committee following the change in the rules of order, this would add substantially to knowledge concerning how changes in the legislative organization can improve legislative productivity.

A third avenue for future research concerns the adoption of gender quota laws and corresponding changes to the internal rules of order. Is it necessary for a critical mass of female legislators to be present in the legislature before we will see changes in the internal rules of order? Will women party leaders attempt to change the rules of order so that women can pursue their own agendas if they are not consistent with their male colleagues, and can these proposed changes successfully pass in the Congress? Given the literature on descriptive representation (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Pitkin 1967), if women's interests can only be represented by women and those interests are national ones but male colleagues are pursuing local interests, this may create the need for women to seek changes that men may not. Further, in cases where negotiations occur or a potential backbench rebellion is likely, will women be able to demand that changes be made to the internal rules of order as part of the negotiation where if there was no negotiation then those demands might not be addressed by their male colleagues?

A fourth avenue of research is to expand the types of rules changes examined, specifically, changes in oversight function. Arguably, an increased oversight power could assist legislators in building a personal reputation for oversight, which might assist in obtaining votes in forthcoming elections. In Chile's lower house, researchers suggest that deputies with oversight power indeed used this to build a reputation (Taylor-Robinson 2005).

In Peru, a bill was proposed to alter the rules of order in regards to oversight function, but this was not one of the categories I chose to focus on in the dissertation. This proposal was made by a backbencher and not a party leader. The proposal specifically altered how to organize oversight committees. The proposed change determined whether oversight committees could only make recommendations or if the legislative body had the constitutional authority to sanction political officials outside of the Congress. The bill passed and stated that the legislature could make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning censuring political officials outside of Congress. In general, following the change, the Court ruled based on the recommendations of the Congress, so this increases the power of the legislature. The exercise of the oversight function could assist legislators in building a national reputation for oversight if they sit on the committees or subcommittees that review the actions of political officials. Further research should examine whether changes in the oversight function actually assist legislators in building a personal reputation that assists them in achieving career goals. Further, future research should examine other types of proposed and actual changes in the rules of order to determine if specific types of rules are more likely to lead to a backbench rebellion.

A final avenue for future research concerns whether different types of electoral law changes result in different changes in the internal rules of order. Do all types of electoral law changes result in similar changes in the internal rules of a chamber, or do they result in different changes in the rules. Examples of other types of electoral law change to examine include the adoption of a mixed member electoral system, unfusing of national elections, moving from a closed-list proportional representation to an open-list proportional

representation system of elections or vice versa, and changes in the timing of the electoral cycle (e.g., concurrent, non-concurrent, or mixed congressional-executive elections).

## **Conclusion**

This dissertation examines changes in the internal rules of order in national Latin American legislatures. The dissertation begins the process of closing a gap in our knowledge concerning legislatures and the consequences of constitutional reform by altering the electoral system design, and the consequential influences on the legislative branch of government in these countries. Existing research on electoral system design suggests that electoral rules influence who can win elections, and what form of legislator ambition legislators are likely to pursue. Thus, it is possible that the rules of order of a chamber can help or hinder legislators in the performance of legislative duties related to their ambition goals. This dissertation analyzes what factors contribute to whether legislators will sponsor bills to alter the rules of order and when legislators are likely to vote for changes in the rules of order. The dissertation proposes a theory to explain when legislators will rebel against party leadership and sponsor their own bills to change the rules of order, and when legislators will participate in debate and vote for changes in the rules of order. The dissertation explores whether the effective number of parties, party discipline, the effect of the leadership proposal, and the nature of legislator ambition impact sponsoring of a bill to alter the rules or voting in favor of a rules change. The findings of this dissertation provide provisional support for the theory and hypotheses presented.

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**APPENDIX**  
**EXPERIMENT BOOKLET**

**Subject ID:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date of Completion:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Instructions**

**Deciding to change the internal rules of order in national legislatures**

In this study, the interest of the researcher concerns learning about when members of congress will support changing the internal rules of order, which is the document that governs how the congress operates when in session. More specifically, the researcher seeks to understand how certain factors might influence members' of congress decisions to either support a change in the rules of order sponsored by the party leadership, or a change in the rules of order sponsored by a group of legislators. Your understanding will be expressed by the decision you (as a member of congress) make in the context of a hypothetical situation in which there are two proposals to change the rules of order.

In the next page, you will be provided with information about a hypothetical country in which you are a member of the party with the most seats in the chamber. You will be provided with information concerning the make up of the congress, your political goals, and other factors. Then, you will be provided with two proposals to change the rules of order. One proposal sponsored by party leadership and the second by a group of legislators. Once you are provided with this information, you will be asked to vote between the two proposals, or vote for neither proposal in favor of maintaining the existing rules of order without change. Following completion of the exercise, you will be asked to complete a post-simulation questionnaire that asks questions about your perceptions concerning the exercise. Please answer all questions, as they are vital to the successful completion of this project.

If you have any questions at any point during the experiment, please ask the researcher.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

## Scenario

### The Republic of Drukenwell and the National Congress

In March of 2004, you were elected a member of the National Congress in the country of Drukenwell. Drukenwell is a democratic republic with a history of democracy mixed with periods of harsh military rule. The current democratic regime came into power in 1978. The capital is Csiliar. The dominant religion of the country is Christianity (i.e., Roman Catholicism). Drukenwell has an estimated population of 23,543,000. The country is a presidential democratic republic divided into 22 departments and one capital district.

**(manipulation of effective number of parties 2.910)** There are two major parties in the National Congress. You are a member of the Rylothian National Party currently controlling the National Congress. There are 120 seats in the Congress. The Rylothian National Party controls 67 seats, whereas the opposition party (Capiston Liberal Party) controls 17 seats, the ABRA Revolutionary Party holds 8 seats, the Haiku Party controls 6 seats, and nine other small parties hold the remaining 22 seats. The Rylothian National Party possess a majority by 7 seats, which means it does not have to form a coalition with other parties to get legislation passed.

Or

**(manipulation of the effective number of parties 4.417178)** There are four major parties in the National Congress. You are a member of the Rylothian National Party currently controlling the National Congress. There are 120 seats in the Congress. The Rylothian National Party controls 45 seats, whereas the opposition party (Capiston Liberal Party) controls 27 seats, the ABRA Revolutionary Party has 17 seats, the Haiku Party controls 12 seats, and 7 other small parties hold the remaining 19 seats. No party possesses a majority, which means that party leaders must form a coalition among other parties in order to get legislation passed.

**(manipulation of the nature of legislator ambition: discrete ambition)** You are from the department of Yslivia. This department is largely a rural area, and employment is largely in agriculture. The primary products are wheat and bananas. You own one of the largest banana plantations in the country. The citizens have been pushing for a large irrigation project to be implemented in the region, which would increase the water supply to the area; however, the measure has not passed in the National Congress.

You ran for election, hoping that once elected, your primary goal would be to sponsor legislation for this irrigation project, and get it passed by Congress and signed into law. You want this to happen in this congressional term, and you have no plans to seek reelection or continue a career in politics after your current term in office expires. Instead, you plan to return to your home department, and continue to oversee the operation of your banana plantation. You are like most of your colleagues in the legislature in that you do not plan to stand for reelection. Like most of your colleagues, you plan to return to your former occupation at the end of the term.

OR

**(manipulation of nature of legislator ambition: progressive ambition)** You are from the department of Yslivia. This department is largely a rural area, and employment is largely in agriculture. The primary products are wheat and bananas. You own one of the largest banana plantations in the country. The citizens have been pushing for a large irrigation project to be implemented in the region, which would increase the water supply to the area; however, the measure has not passed in the National Congress.

You ran for election, and now that you are in the Congress, your primary goal is to build a congressional record that that will help you in building a political career outside of the Congress. Your future political goals include an appointment as the minister of agriculture. You are like most of your colleagues in the legislature in that you plan to seek a career in politics outside of the National Congress. Like approximately half of your colleagues, you plan to continue in politics by either seeking an executive branch appointment, or an elected position in state politics such as a governorship. The remaining half of legislators in the chamber plan to continue a political career by seeking reelection to the national Congress.

OR

**(manipulation of nature of legislator ambition: static ambition)** You are from the department of Yslivia. This department is largely a rural area, and employment is largely in agriculture. The primary products are wheat and bananas. You own one of the largest banana plantations in the country. The citizens have been pushing for a large irrigation project to be implemented in the region, which would increase the water supply to the area; however, the measure has not passed in the National Congress.

You ran for election, and now that you are in the Congress, your primary goal is to build a congressional record that will help you in having a career in the National Congress. Since you want to be reelected to the Congress, you want to pursue projects and legislation that will assist you and the party's reputation. You are like approximately half of your colleagues in the legislature in that you plan to run for reelection to the Congress. Like those colleagues, you plan to continue a career in politics by continuing in the National Congress as a legislator. The remaining half of the legislators in the chamber plan to continue a career in politics by either seeking an executive branch appointment , or an elected position in state politics such as a governorship.

**(manipulation of party discipline high)** The Rylothian National Party, which you are a member of, possesses the ability to sanction members if they are not loyal to the party. Within the congress, the party leadership controls the legislative calendar including whether and when legislation will be debated on the floor of the Congress. Members that alienate the leadership may have trouble getting their legislation onto the floor for debate. Further

members may find that they have trouble gaining political appointments if they plan to continue a career in politics outside of the National Congress.

OR

**(manipulation of party discipline low)**The Rylothian National Party, which you are a member of, does not possess the ability to sanction members if they are not loyal to the party. Within the Congress, the party leadership does not control the legislative agenda alone. A commission composed of individuals from all parties in the chamber meet once a month to compose the monthly calendar for debates on the floor. Members that alienate their party leadership can still get their legislation scheduled on the floor for debate by approaching any member of the commission that composes the calendar. Further, members can still gain political office appointments without party leadership endorsements.

## **Drukenwell's National Congress Existing Rules of Order Concerning Committee Assignments**

One of the ways Members of Congress pursue policy and address party and constituent wants and needs is working through committees. All legislation proposed is assigned to a committee, which reviews the proposal, suggests and makes changes to the language of the bill before it is placed on the legislative calendar and debated on the floor of the congress. Given the significance of the committee process, committee assignments are important to legislators in the Congress. Some committees may be more powerful and more desirable than others. Below is a description of the existing rules of order in the National Congress concerning how committee assignments are made to legislators.

***Article 2.3.1. Concerning the allocation of committee assignments in the National Congress.*** *The distribution of committee assignments is made in proportion to the % of seats each political party holds in the Congress, as is the assignment of committee chairmanships. This means that the party with the largest number of seats in the National Congress also possesses the greatest number of seats on each committee as well as chairmanships. Thus, if a party controls 60% of the seats in the Congress, the party controls 60% of the chairmanships, and the party controls 60% of the seats on each committee. Assignments are made at the beginning of the applicable congressional session (once every two years) by the President of the Congress. The President of the Congress presides over the Committee on Committees. This committee is composed of 10 individuals; the President and Vice President of the Congress, and other members appointed by the President of the Congress using the same rules used for making committee assignments. If a party has 60% of the seats in the chamber then they would get 60% of the remaining seats on the Committee on Committees. Committee assignments are for two years; therefore, legislators do not remain on the same committee for their entire congressional terms, and they cannot be reappointed to the same committee consecutively. Further, legislator preferences are not taken into consideration by the Committee on Committees.*

**The Rylothian National Party Leadership proposes a change in the internal rules of order concerning how committee assignments are made**

A member of your congressional staff has brought you a memo from the majority leader of the Rylothian National Party about an upcoming vote to alter the rules of order governing committee assignments in the National Congress. Turn the page to see the memo.

**The Rylothian National Party**  
**4522 West View Road**  
**Capiston, Drukenwell**  
**9345-34564**  
**rylothiannatl@gov.drukenwell**

**To: Legislators from the Rylothian National Party**  
**From: Party Leadership, Jackson Brown Majority Leader**  
**Subject: Upcoming proposal to change the rules of order of Congress**

Dear Fellow Legislator:

As you know, with the recent 2004 elections, a new electoral rule changed the district size candidates run for election in. Before the 2004 election, districts were equivalent to the departments; therefore, there were 22 districts and one capital district. The number of seats in each district ranged from 2 to 15. Under the new rule, all candidates were elected from one single national district; thus, all candidates competed against one another for one of the 120 seats in the National Congress.

Though our party won the greatest number of seats in the chamber, we recently proposed to change the internal rules of order so that Members of Congress can better serve party needs. This proposal would help party leaders to have better control over how committee assignments are made. Specifically, the chamber president will control committee assignments of legislators, and chairmanship appointments.

Attached is the proposed change party leadership made. The proposal has already been in committee, and has been debated on the floor. This is the final language of the bill that is scheduled to be voted on this week in the Congress. We hope we can count on your vote for the proposal

Sincerely,

Jackson Brown, Majority Leader

***(manipulation leadership proposal) Article 2.3.1. Concerning the allocation of committee assignments in the National Congress.***

- *The distribution of committee assignments is made in proportion to the number of political parties with seats in the National Congress.*
- *The party controlling the greatest number of seats in the chamber also possesses the greatest number of seats on each committee.*
- *Each party with seats in Congress will have at least 2 members from their party on each committee. All remaining seats are allocated by the President of the Congress.*
- *The Committee on Committees will be abolished. This means that the President of the Congress alone allocates committee assignments without consideration of individual legislators' preferences.*
- *Each Member of Congress has at least one committee assignment, but no more than 7 assignments.*
- *The President of the Congress also appoints chairmanships at his own discretion.*

OR

***(manipulation leadership proposal) Article 2.3.1. Concerning the allocation of committee assignments in the National Congress.***

- *Committee assignments are made by a committee on committees composed of the President of the Congress, the Vice-President of the Congress, and four other members appointed by the President of the Congress.*
- *The President of the Congress serves as the chair of this committee.*
- *There is no limit to the number of committees a member sits on, and assignments are not allocated on the basis of legislators' preferred committees.*
- *Committee assignments are good for 2 years with no reappointment to the same committees in the same congressional term.*

The decision that you are confronted with here is whether you will for or against this proposal to change the rules of order.

**ARCO (Alliance for Reforming Congressional Organization) proposes an alternative change to the rules of order in response to the proposal made by the party leadership of the Rylothian National Party**

Your congressional staff member has brought you a second memo issued in reaction to the memo by the majority leader of the Rylothian National Party about the upcoming vote to change the rules of order within the Congress. This memo was sent by ARCO (Alliance for Reforming Congressional Organization), which is a group of legislators that meets weekly to discuss issues concerning congressional organization. Turn the page to see this memo.

**ARCO**  
**Alliance for Reforming Congress**  
**The Republic of Drukenwell**

**To: Legislators in the National Congress**  
**From: Robert Walpole Disraeli, ARCO President**  
**Subject: Proposal to change the rules of order of the congress**

Dear Fellow Legislator:

In reaction to the Rylothian National Party Leadership's proposal to change the rules of order, a group of legislators known as ARCO, composed of members of each party in the congress, have carefully reviewed the existing rules of order and the proposal by party leadership to alter the rules of order. The ARCO group expresses the concern that the proposed change may indeed look after the party's interests, but may lack in assisting legislators with their own political goals separate from party goals.

We would like to bring to your attention that ARCO devised an alternative change in the rules of order separate from the party leadership's. This alternative will help legislators in their legislative duties in a couple of ways. First, our proposal assures that all members will get at least one of their preferred assignments. Second, legislators can be reappointed to the same committees. There is also a rotation, so if legislators want to work on different committees in their congressional term, this proposal will permit this to occur. The proposal has already been through committee and is scheduled for a floor vote the same day as the party leadership's proposal. We ask that you consider voting for our alternative proposal in the upcoming floor vote.

Attached is the final language of the bill. We hope we can count on your vote.

Sincerely,

Robert Walpole Disraeli  
ARCO President

***Article 2.3.1. Concerning the allocation of committee assignments in the National Congress.***

- *Committee assignments are made by a committee on committees composed of members from each political party with seats in the Congress.*
- *Each Member of Congress submits a list of preferred committees to this committee. Each Member is a member of at least one committee but no more than 5.*
- *All members get at least one of their preferred assignments.*
- *Further, committee assignments are reallocated every year at the beginning of the congressional session so that a rotation on committees occurs.*
- *Members can be reappointed to no more than two of the same committees in a congressional term.*

**Now, turn the page and make your decision about which proposal you will vote in favor of.**

**The Decision I make is: (Please only choose one alternative)**

**\_\_\_ As a Member of Congress, I vote for the PARTY LEADERSHIP'S PROPOSAL that would change the internal rules of order.**

**\_\_\_ As a Member of Congress, I vote for the ARCO PROPOSAL to change the internal rules of order.**

**\_\_\_ As a Member of Congress, I vote against both the party leadership's proposal, and the legislator proposal. I prefer the existing rules of order.**

**SUBJECT ID:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date of Completion:** \_\_\_\_\_

### **Post-Simulation Assessment Document**

**Instructions:** Considering the information provided to you while making your decision about whether to vote for a change in the internal rules of order in the congress. Please answer the following question regarding the situation you have just dealt with and your decisions as to whether to vote for changes, and if so which changes.

1. Was the political party you are a member of the majority party in the Congress?

**YES                      or                      NO**

2. What was your major political goal as a legislator in the Congress?

3. Did the party leadership's proposal help or hurt you as a legislator?

**HELPED                      or                      HURT**

4. Did the party leadership's proposal interfere with you achieving your political goal in the Congress?

**YES                      or                      NO**

5. Did the legislator's (ARCO) alternative proposal help or hurt you as a legislator?

**HELPED                      or                      HURT**

6. Did the legislator's (ARCO) alternative proposal interfere with you achieving your political goal in the Congress?

**YES                      or                      NO**

7. How did you vote?

8. Which factors influenced your final decision? (Circle those applicable)

**Desire to seek office**

**Fear of reprimand by party leaders**

**The number of political parties in the National Congress**

**Desire to get some policy passed**

9. How could party leadership punish you if you didn't vote for their proposal to change the rules of order?

10. Did you consider whether party leaders or legislators would have to form a coalition to propose a change in the rules of order when you voted?

11. How many parties were in the chamber?

**2.9**

or

**4.4**

## VITA

Roseanna Michelle Heath received her Bachelor of Arts degree in political science from Texas A&M University in 1999. She entered the political science program in 2001, and she received her Doctor of Philosophy in May 2007. Her research interests include democratization in developing countries and the role of women in politics in these countries. Her research was published in the journals *Women in Politics*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Party Politics*, and *Electoral Studies*.

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