A GENEALOGY OF CYBORGOTHIC:
AESTHETICS AND ETHICS IN THE AGE OF POSTHUMANISM

A Dissertation

by

DONGSHIN YI

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2007

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ABSTRACT

A Genealogy of Cyborgothic:
Aesthetics and Ethics in the Age of Posthumanism. (May 2007)

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This dissertation considers the future convergence between gothic studies and humanism in the age of posthumanism and proposes “cyborgothic” as a new literary genre that heralds that future. The convergence under consideration is already in progress in that an encounter between human and non-human consistently inspires the two fields, questioning the nature of humans and the treatment of such non-human beings as cyborgs. Such questioning, often conducted within the boundary of humanities, persistently interprets non-human beings as either representing or helping human shortcomings. Accordingly, answers are human-orientated or even human-centered in many cases, and “cyborgothic,” generated out of retrospective investigation into gothic studies and prospective formulation of posthumanism, aims to present different, non-anthropocentric ways to view humans and non-humans on equal terms.

The retrospective investigation into gothic studies focuses on Ann Radcliffe’s *The Mysteries of Udolpho* and Edmund Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the
Sublime and Beautiful to retrieve a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, and in the second chapter, examines Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein against Kant’s aesthetics to demonstrate how this gothic aesthetics becomes obsolete in the tradition of the sublime. This dissertation then addresses Bram Stoker’s Dracula along with Bruno Latour’s Science in Action to reveal problems in fabricating scientific knowledge, especially focusing on sacrifices made in the process. In the forth chapter, I examine Sinclair Lewis’s Arrowsmith with William James’s pragmatism, and consider the question of how moral complications inherent in science have been handled in American society. The last chapter proposes Marge Piercy’s He, She and It as a same cyborgothic text, which tries to develop a way to acknowledge the presence of the cyborg—one that is at once aesthetical and ethical—so as to enable humans and cyborgs to relate each other on equal terms. Thus, “cyborgothic” is being required as a literary attempt to present the age of posthumanism that is no longer anthropocentric.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: BEYOND “THE RUIN OF REPRESENTATION”

In an interview concerning his unfinished work, *On the Genealogy of Ethics*, Michel Foucault, wondering if humans are “able to have an ethics of acts and their pleasure which would be able to take into account the pleasure of the other” (346), contemplated,

What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, not our life? (350)

An affirmation of “the pleasure of the other” indeed takes both an aesthetical appreciation of pleasure and an ethical embrace of the other, and it could move us beyond a “Slave ethics [that] … begins by saying no to an ‘outside,’ an ‘other,’ a non-self” (Nietzsche 171). But it shouldn’t lead us to, as Nietzsche expected, an ethics of “triumphant self-affirmation” (170-71); nor return us to eighteenth century aesthetic moral philosophies, which, under the banner of “the beautiful soul,” appeared as “an alternative to the traditional ethical system of the Christian religion” and established “yet another abstract principle: Humanity itself” (Norton 211, 212)—a principle, I might add, that would haunt us in our every step toward the other. Instead, an aesthetical ethics that

This dissertation follows the style of *The Henry James Review*. 
Foucault—only too briefly—envisioned here would be one of pleasant reciprocity between the self and the other, and, perhaps, between ourselves representing “Humanity” and themselves presenting non-humans. Cyborgothic,¹ which I propose in this dissertation as an infant genre eagerly anticipating the age of posthumanism, is ultimately my literary attempt to pursue what Foucault left unfinished: an aesthetical ethics that “is able to take into account the pleasure of the other.”

The literary attempt to give birth to cyborgothic is first and foremost an effort to impregnate the gothic literature whose revival in the later twentieth century in literature and other cultural media epitomizes the century’s persistent and productive (or counterproductive) engagement with the others, with the cyborg that claims our attention with its versatile (shape-shifting) utility and subversive potentiality. A genealogical work is absolutely necessary in order to ascertain that this new-born genre doesn’t represent the highly specialized yet isolated aesthetics or the triumphantly humanistic yet selfish ethics that have been indiscriminately inherited, and that it is capable of presenting an aesthetical ethics. Traditional literary criticism appears unfit for such a work, since, conforming to the tradition of representation, it has often confined literature either to representing—truthfully or critically—pre-existing problems or virtues or to vacating the prerogative of such problems or virtues by providing endless substitutions of them.²

¹ The name of cyborgothic is a remote adaptation of “cybergothic,” which C. Jodey Castricano in “If a Building Is a Sentence” uses to describe “a mutant form, a hybrid born of traditional gothicism, science fiction, and cyberpunk” (204). I however insist on using “cyborgothic” in my dissertation, because I want to highlight the potential that the cyborg has for posthumanism.
² These two approaches are based on the two basic meanings of representation, as Christopher Prendergast summarizes in his The Triangle of Representation. One is “the
Even in “this prison house of Representation” (Prendergast, ix), however, literature has managed to present imaginary/imaginative worlds, which inspired many to hope for a better future. Cyborgothic portrays one such world for posthumanism, and, in order to see it clearly, we require a future-oriented criticism that is concerned not so much with what is represented in literature and how as with what it presents for the future.³

The possibility of a future-oriented criticism now looms larger than ever because of the growing criticism of and resistance to the long and oppressive tradition of representation, especially made by deconstruction and post-structuralism theorists. Jacques Derrida in his article, “Sending: On Representation,” notes that “our concepts of system and of history are essentially marked by structure and the closure of representation” (304), and, in his usual intricate deconstructionist manner that involves the etymology of the term representation and the history of metaphysics, leads us to a recognition that representation, an act of sending an envoi by Being, exposes the split within Being and “traces of difference” of the other (324). Highly critical of “The system

sense of represent as re-present, to make present again, in two interrelated ways, spatial and temporal” (4). “Representation as the illusory representing of the once-present object,” Prendergast further explains, “connects with a theme that in one way or another runs back to Plato’s censuring of the imitative arts as a kind of disreputable exercise in magic, confusing the senses and the mind with false simulacra” (5). The other meaning of representation is “that of standing for [which] … rests on a principle of substitution. … In this wider sense of representation as standing for, representation can be said in theory to cover the whole field of culture” (5). Of these two meanings of representation, “The first has to do with the arts,” while “The second is political,” and Prendergast argues that in contemporary theory, “there is a displacement from the object of representation to the subject of representation” (5, 10).

³ This might be taken as projection, another kind of representation. But the future-oriented criticism that I suggests focuses not on things we have had and what they can be in the future, but on something we might have in the future and how that imaginary “something” can affect the present and, consequently, the future.
of representation,” Dorothea Olkowski also conducts a “search for concepts and transformational structures characterized by an abstract but fluid ontology that can make sense of difference by accounting for the reality of temporal and spatial change on a pragmatic level while providing appropriate theoretical constructs in whose terms change can be conceived” (2). Olkowski finds in Deleuze’s “designifying practices [that] effect the ruin of representation” a path to such an ontology, which she later names, “the ontology of change and becoming” (30). The deconstruction of metaphysical Being and the construction of an alternative ontology are uprooting the overwrought tradition of representation, upon which most humanistic discourses—often criticized as androcentric or at best anthropocentric—have been founded. A new chapter for the humanities is thus about to open, rendering it legitimate to request a future-oriented criticism so that we can build something on “the ruin of representation.”

Posthumanism, signaling the end of a humanism that has been anthropocentric and an inception of a reciprocal relationship between humans and sub- or non-humans, renews the request for a future-oriented literary criticism. Following the advancement

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4 In *How We Became Posthuman*, N. Katherine Hayles, a leading figure of posthuman theories, gives the following explanation of posthumanism, which deserves a long quote: First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth, and most important, by these and other means, the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be
of technoscience and the accordant expansion of human imagination, the age of posthumanism is distinct from previous ages in that we are more or less able to make conscious choices about how to fabricate the future. More than ever, it rings true to say, “The future is in our hands!” That we have such abilities, however, raises questions: Whose hands are they? What kinds of benefits are there and who will get the benefits? Who represents whom? Given the problems of (mis)representation in the political history of mankind, these questions inscribe into posthumanism less hopes than worries, which are only aggravated if one takes into account the global nature of posthumanism that affects humans and non-humans altogether, wherever or whatever they are. A rigorous critique of the tradition of representation is accordingly much in demand. Literary criticism, if future-oriented, should be more than equipped to meet such a demand, since it deals with imaginary/imaginative works that aren’t necessarily bound by the limitations or practicalities of technoscience. In other words, a future-oriented literary criticism might help us to looks back from a posthuman future that overcomes anthropocentrism, and make future-informed decisions about how to proceed to the age of posthumanism.5

5 In his attempt to theorize a cybernetics-informed fiction, namely, “cybernetic fiction,” David Porush expresses a similar belief in the role of literature and literary criticism.

seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals. (2-3) The posthuman view that Hayles delineates above disclaims the notion of “the liberal humanist subject” (3) that enforces the strict distinction between subject and object, or mind and body. But Hayles’s delineation, highlighting differences of posthumanism from humanism, might render posthumanism as an extension of humanism that in turn becomes “the original prosthesis.”
Bearing apparent relevance to posthumanism, gothic literature and science fiction—two genres that are sampled here to test the genealogy of cyborgothic—have endured a long and ironic relationship with the tradition of representation. In their early days, both genres were often denounced as not representative enough, that is, not concerned with serious—historical, social, and philosophical—issues. It wasn’t, with a few exceptions, until the advent of cultural studies and feminist movements in the late twentieth century that the two genres began to receive critical attention. Ironically, what triggered this belated attention was a totally opposite reason: this time, they are regarded as highly representative, especially about psychologically, historically, or socially repressed feelings, memories or issues. But the ultimate irony, as I shall demonstrate

Underlining that “fiction has confronted … our deepest fears” about machines, he writes, “fiction has tended to approach the machine with a mixture of fascination and revulsion, with ambiguities and paradoxes that can only be resolved in images that are the stuff of art…. Art is one of our only remaining tactics for making the machine vulnerable again” (8). Yet, I might add, art also makes vulnerable those humans who insist on having confrontational relationships with the machine.

6 By science fiction, I mean not just science fiction fantasies but also fiction concerned with the question of science and scientists in society. In this way, the science novels I am examining here anticipate and share the notion of science that science studies theorize, one that defines science as a social activity.

7 As Brian Aldiss acknowledges by saying that “Science fiction was born from the gothic mode, is hardly free of it now” (qtd. in Clemens 213), the convergence of these two genres is extremely recognizable, especially in recent sci-fi movies on vampirism and zombies, which were often subjects of horror films.

8 Gothic novels, as Clara F. McIntyre wrote as early as in 1921, were “relegated to a retired corner of the library self and appealing only to the student bent on literary research” (644). It is indeed true that “A historically grounded study of gothic fiction must begin by acknowledging that the genre itself is a relatively modern construct” (Watt 1). Science fiction, often called SF fantasy, on the other hand, blossomed in the aftermath of the Cold War as a highly popular and commercial genre that aimed to entertain the younger generation, and, as a result, was derided in literary criticism.

9 One remarkable exception might be Eve Sedgwick’s *The Coherence of Gothic Convention*, where she criticizes most gothic studies for taking a “plunge to the
throughout my dissertation, is that their close and enduring contact with the tradition of representation has genetically transformed these two allegedly representational genres into ones that are not only most immune to that tradition but also highly creative in presenting alternatives to it. Only a future-oriented criticism will be able to excavate these alternatives, now hidden under the ruin of representation, and this archeological work will prove gothic literature and science fiction to be more than relevant to posthumanism.

At the heart of the tripartite enterprise—involving gothic literature, science fiction and a future-oriented literary criticism—to construct posthumanism on “the ruin of representation” is the cyborg, “a cybernetic organism,” to quote Donna Haraway, “a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (Simian 148). The mixed origin relates the cyborg to almost every field—politics, law, science, literature, fine art, etc.—of representational practice, but it also legitimates the cyborg to defy any singular genealogy and subsequent filial obligations, since “Their fathers, after all, are inessential” (Simian 151). Unfortunately yet quite expectedly, however, the cyborg has been instantly and systematically appropriated by the tradition of representation, and come to stand for many a human figure—solider, spaceman, woman, foreigner, the disabled, the privileged, the underprivileged, white, black, and so on. Emblematic of this practice of (mis)representing the cyborg, especially

thematics of depth and from there to a psychology of depth,” leaving “unexplored the most characteristic and daring areas of gothic conventions” (140). Sedgwick detects “a particular spatial model” that is shared by gothic novels, one that uses “claptrap,” “live burial,” or “veil” to allow “the position of the self to be massively blocked off from something to which it ought normally to have access” (12).
in literary studies and social sciences, is the discussion of teratology, in which the
cyborg is associated with traditional monsters. Stating that “all forms of talk about what
it means to be human—and post/human—are representations, forged within cultural
contexts,” Elaine L. Graham thus employs monsters, including cyborgs, to perform “a
double function … simultaneously marking the boundaries between normal and the
pathological but also exposing the fragility of the very taken-for-grantedness of such
categories” (39). Such an employment of monsters to unsettle representational
boundaries continues in contemporary gothic studies. Judith Halberstam, on the one
hand, argues that “monsters are meaning machines. They can represent gender, race,
nationality, class, and sexuality in one body” (21), while Edward J. Ingebresten
explores “the use of the word ‘monster’ as metaphor and rubric in Gothic America,”
where monsters become “a necessary social hygiene” (2, 27).

10 “An exploration of the many different hopes and fears surrounding the impact of advanced technologies,” Graham writes in the conclusion of her work, “requires a full register of representational practices, cultural, literary, mythical and scientific” (233). Through this register emerges a strategy to deal with problems inherent in such practices, and Graham’s interest in teratology derives from the presupposition that monsters unsettle boundaries and create a world of “fabulation,” where the strategy is put in practice. Graham’s discussion of monsters and representational practice may sound close to mine, but her ultimate position is anthropological, which is why she insists on using “post/human” as “an intervention” into a notion of humanity, rather than “posthuman” as “a condition” that underwrites something larger than the anthropological world (37).

11 Halberstam in Skin Shows views the monster’s body as the place of such substitution and refers to the skin as “the ultimate boundary” (7). Thus, quoting The Silence of the Lambs as an example, she writes, “fear no longer assumes a depth/surface model; after this movie (but perhaps all along) horror resides at the level of skin itself” (163). “[I]n the modern horror movie,” she continues, “terror rises to the surface, the surface itself becomes a complex web of pleasure and danger; the surface rises to the surface, the surface becomes Leatherface, becomes Demme’s Buffalo Bill, and everything that rises must converge” (163). In this way, Halberstam, like Ingebresten, employs monsters “on a principle of substation,” and continues to inscribe into them the tradition of representation.
Despite being productive in embodying and critiquing human problems, the incorporation of the cyborg into teratology overlooks one important aspect that distinguishes this cybernetic creature from the rest of the monster phylum: we are able to choose how to fabricate and use the cyborg. Depending on how we choose, our posthuman age will be either one that re-presents the humanistic age in a more technologically updated manner or one where a reciprocal—responsive and responsible—relation is in progress between humans and the rest of the world, including cyborgs. Cyborgothic, which portrays the cyborg as straddling the boundary between humanism and posthumanism and leading us from one to the other, accordingly at once demonstrates a technoscientific gothic society, where the cyborg is feared to intensify human problems or admired for its potential ability to solve the problems; and, more importantly, envisions a posthuman society that embraces the cyborg for what it is—a conscious being that is capable of living independently of and forming a reciprocal relationship with humans. Its simultaneously demonstrative and visionary nature undeniably testifies to cyborgothic’s genealogical relation to gothic literature and science fiction. And the ancient history of these two genres that has been blemished by the oppression of representation warns this infant genre, and us as well, that it will repeat the history, unless it cries its eyes out for help from a future-oriented criticism.

Thus, the study of a genealogy of cyborgothic is foremost a mothering gesture to that cry, telling a fabulous story of ancestors who stood above the tradition of representation in order to pacify the scared genre and imbue it with hopes for a different future. The story consists of four parts. The first two parts are about two gothic novels,
Ann Radcliffe’s *The Mysteries of Udolpho* and Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein*. In the former, a maid named Annette makes a beautiful effort to be in an affectionate relationship with her mistress, Emily. It is indeed beautifully done, since she tries to bring into terrifying circumstances the “social quality” of the beautiful, to which Edmund Burke has attributed sympathy and affection. The latter, on the other hand, portrays a world devoid of the beautiful. A nameless and “beautiful” monster comes into this world, only to find its desire for sympathy and affection denied by its creator, Frankenstein, whose subjective and pure world of the Kantian sublime abhors the “social quality” of the beautiful. Yet the novel encodes the possibility for a new society in Walton, who in the end returns to England with his impartial objectivity toward these two aesthetically conflicting characters.

The impartial objectivity of *Frankenstein* soon translates into scientific objectivity, and leads us to the latter half of the story, where two science novels will be discussed. The first one is Bram Stoker’s *Dracula*, written at the end of the “scientific, matter-of-fact nineteenth century” (Stoker, *Dracula* 210). Dracula, a mythical creature that exists outside scientific discourse, threatens not only human lives but also the integrity of science and, by extension, society, so Van Helsing, a prominent scientist, saves the integrity only at the expense of human lives. Even for such a scientifically-engineered society, one that John Stuart Mill designs for an ideal utilitarian society, however, such an expense is, the novel intimates, too costly to be immune from ethical questions. Acutely aware of the necessity of science for the explosively growing American society, *Arrowsmith* in the early twentieth century takes these questions
seriously, and adopts the pragmatic compromise of William James, whose humanism stipulates that science is ethical insofar as it is undertaken by humans and benefits humans. But the novel also reminds us that the humanism James presupposes for his pragmatic society represents only a powerful yet small (mostly male) faction of humanity and, therefore, offers little for women and minorities.

Following the story of its genealogical ancestors, cyborgothic is thus presented in the last chapter as a hybrid creation, combining gothic literature with science fiction, interweaving aesthetics with ethics, and aligning human stories with cyborg stories. Marge Piercy’s *He, She and It*, a sample cyborgothic text, represents a scientifically-induced gothic world, where a cyborg is only a tool, but it also presents motherhood, now extended to the cyborg, as the defining mode of an aesthetically-induced ethics. In this ethics, the cyborg is eligible for the affection and responsibility of a mother, to whom her child is not so much a representation of herself as a presentation of itself that is yet to attain a selfhood. It is the unrepresentable, not in the sense of representing the postmodern sublime, but in a sense of presenting itself indefinitely and “beautifully” for the future, namely, the age of posthumanism. Jean-François Lyotard has written of the unrepresentable in the first sense, but his writing, if extrapolated in the second sense, ironically offers a genuine description of what cyborgothic envisions by presenting the unrepresentable cyborg:

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12 Trying to “offer a positive program for embracing the rich materiality of technology that frees it from being embedded in discourse and representation,” Timothy Lenoir suggests that the “best way to develop intelligent artificial agents is simply to turn them lose and let them evolve,” a suggestion that would make more sense, if we take such agents as if they are children (385).
The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the 
rules of what will have been done. Hence the fact that work and text have been 
the characters of an event; hence also, they always come too late for their author, 
or, what amounts to the same thing, their being put into work, their realization 
(mise en œuvre) always begin to soon. Post modern would have to be 
understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo). (The 
Postmodern Condition 81)

The paradox is of course a postmodern phenomenon that comes from representing 
presentation or presenting representation, that is, from the cohabitation of the past and 
the future in a text. No such paradox would trouble a cyborgothic text that presents a 
presentation of “what will have been done,” not as “an event” but as a lesson to be 
learned. After all, when Karmia at the end of He, She and It says, “If we can love a date 
palm or a puppy or a cyborg, perhaps we can love each other better also” (421), and 
when Foucault asked, “Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, not our life?” 
shouldn’t we try to learn something for our future?13

13 Martha C. Nussbaum would see the question of the cyborg as concerning that of 
justice. Proposing a “capabilities approach” to social justice, which aims to ensure 
members of society of basic entitlements, she argues that “the mistreatment of animals is 
unjust,” rather than unethical, since “they have a right, a moral entitlement, not to be 
treated in that way” (70, 337). Interesting in her effort to move the issues of disabilities 
and animal mistreatments beyond those of “compassion and humanity” toward “issues of 
justice” is that she acknowledges the utility of “Utilitarianism’s focus on the sentience 
that links humans with all other animals and on the badness of pain” (336- 339). Mill’s 
utilitarianism, she underlines, “is distinctly preferable to the mainstream Utilitarian 
view,” because he “strikes an interesting balance between an Aristotelian emphasis on 
activity and flourishing and a Utilitarian emphasis on pleasure and the absence of pain” 
(346). More interesting, especially in relation to my suggestion of motherhood as a way 
to practice an aesthetical ethics, is her emphasis on “paternalism.” She thus argues that
CHAPTER II
A BEAUTIFUL ATTENDANT: THE RISE OF THE GOTHIC AESTHETICS OF
THE BEAUTIFUL

What is often left unattended in the interactive yet ironic literary relationship between two pioneers of gothic literature, Ann Radcliffe and Matthew Lewis, is their different employment of attendants. The relationship, which is at once interactive in that Lewis’s overzealous imitation of Radcliffe’s *The Mysteries of Udolpho* prompts the latter into writing *The Italian*, and also ironic since Lewis’s apparent homage to Radcliffe shocks her only as a “scandalous revision” (Fitzgerald 168), sheds much light on the formation of the early gothic. For, not to mention their enormous contribution to popularizing the genre, the subtle dialectic running through *Udolpho, The Monk*, and *The Italian* that produces the last as “a kind of deparodization of *The Monk*” (Punter 62) encloses the genre within “a world in which social duty, loyalty to the family, tradition, and individual desire are reconciled” (Kilgour, *The Rise of the Gothic Novel* 179). Thus,

“In general, paternalistic treatment is appropriate wherever the individual’s capacity for choice and autonomy is compromised. This principle suggests that paternalism is usually appropriate when we are dealing with nonhuman animals” (375).

Despite “a complex web of influence, disagreement and rejection” between these two writers who “have traditionally been seen as the protagonists of two distinct types of Gothic,” there is, Punter argues, “a considerable and, in a sense, embarrassing identity of thematic preoccupation” with “new kind of role of the reader” as “creative participant” (55, 84, 85).

Maggie Kilgour first observes that “In *The Monk*, individual desires and social requirements were irrevocably opposed” and suggests that Radcliffe is “Correcting this plot, and returning to the model of *Udolpho*” in *The Italian* (*Rise* 179). What Kilgour refers to as “the model of *Udolpho*” is a typical Radcliflean gothic narrative that ensures a heroine of a happy ending and supernatural phenomena of logical explanations. But, as
Radcliffe closes *The Italian* with a scene where “the heroine, unlike Antonia [who is ravished and murdered in the end of *The Monk*], not only keeps her property intact, she also lays claim to a family name” (Fitzgerald 168). Likewise, while “Ambrosio’s relinquishment of his hope for mercy” shows “an interest in psychological and aesthetic deflection [that] replaces the apparent call for openness” and “appears to be the moral desideratum of Lewis’s book,” Schedoni in *The Italian*, “often discussed as the prototype of the villain-hero,” stops short of becoming a fully-developed character since, “relegating his power over the narrative to theatrical displays of strong emotion, she [Radcliffe] creates a figure about whom, in the end, she entertains no moral uncertainties whatsoever” (Napier 115, 137-38). “The suppression of Schedoni at the novel’s close,” Napier continues, “points not only to Radcliffe’s hesitation at confronting the ethical implication of her character but to a scheme in which (as is frequent in the Gothic) the dramatic is discredited in favour of the didactic” (138). Whether it means the restoration of social order (as in Fitzgerald) or a generic failure of the gothic (following Napier), close attention to heroes and heroines in these early gothic novels seems to confirm Radcliffe’s effort to revive “the model of *Udolpho*” (Kilgour, *Rise* 179).

A simple question: will the same degree of attention, if given to those attending to heroes or heroines, verify Radcliffe’s effort? Simple as it may be, the question is hard to answer since attendants have been rarely attended to in gothic studies, a fact that may come as rather a surprise, provided that Horace Walpole, the known founder of the genre, will be introduced later, my contention in this chapter is that Radcliffe in *The Italian* returns less to “the model of *Udolpho*” than to a model that is envisioned in *Udolpho*, one that has clearly been overlooked in gothic studies.
has dedicated a sizable portion—in fact, a lot more than “a few words”—of his “Preface” to the second edition of *The Castle of Otranto* to legitimize their presence.

“With regard to the deportment of the domestics,” he writes,

> The simplicity of their behavior, almost tending to excite smiles, which at first seem not consonant to the serious cast of the work, appeared to me not only not improper, but was marked designedly in that manner. My rule was nature. However grave, important, or melancholy, the sensation of princes and heroes may be, they do not stamp the same affections on their domestics: at least the latter do not, or should not be made to express their passions in the same dignified tone. In my humble opinion, the contrast between the sublime of the one, and the naïveté of the other, sets the pathetic of the former in a stronger light. The very impatience which a reader feels, while delayed by the coarse pleasantry of vulgar actors from arriving at the knowledge of the important catastrophe he expects, perhaps heightens, certainly proves that he has been artfully interested in, the depending event. But I had higher authority than my own opinion for this conduct. That great master of nature, Shakespeare, was the model I copied. Let me ask if his tragedies of Hamlet and Julius Caesar would not lose a considerable share of the spirit and wonderful beauties, if the humour of grave-diggers, the fooleries of Polonius, and the clumsy jests of the Roman citizens were omitted, or vested in heroics? (8-9)

Not to mention that it proves the writer’s artistic merit and his keen awareness of the psychology of the reader, the contrasting presence of attendants or “domestics”
associates the gothic with such a “higher authority” as Shakespeare. To see how subtly
yet effectively their presence is employed in a text, therefore, can demonstrate how
“artfully” the writer understands the text’s relation to the reader and to preceding literary
traditions. If this is the case, shouldn’t attendants in Radcliffe’s work be given as much
attention, if not more, as her heroes and heroines in order to examine her literary
relationship with Lewis and, more importantly, her contribution to the gothic?

So the simple question gains necessity. Sporadic and disparate remarks on
attendants are however all that have failingly met the necessity. Napier, for instance,
points out “disruptions of a unified tone … by Lewis’s inclusion in (and later addition to)
The Monk of comic characters and episodes” but does not address whether Radcliffe’s
inclusion of such characters creates the same “disorienting effect” (125). On the other
hand, Cannon Schmitt’s brief yet comprehensive observation that characterizes
attendants in Radcliffe’s work as representing “localism” only highlights their being
“quaint and laughable to the general protagonists,” although the protagonists’
“Englishness” is made possible “by reformulating localism into nationalism” (857, 858).
But a brief look at attendants in Radcliffe’s and Lewis’s works suggests how insufficient
these remarks are to meet the necessity. The Monk opens with a rather sarcastic
description of a crowd that “was collected by various causes … foreign to the ostensible
motive” in the Capuchin Church in Madrid, and zooms in on an old woman, who

16 This necessity also anticipates the late twentieth-century renewed interest in the gothic
as speaking for those underprivileged, disenfranchised, oppressed or unrepresented—
namely, the others. Though admitting the parallel between this interest and my interest
in attendants, I want to offer a criticism of the revived interest for being either beholden
to gothic villains at most or receptive of female voices at best while leaving attendants
unattended.
“continued to move forwards …. [and] managed to bustle herself into the very body of the Church” (7, 8). The crowd with its heterogeneity and the old woman—the first of a few comic characters to appear in the novel—with her intrusiveness obviously cause “disruptions of a unified tone.” Their disruptiveness is immediately put in suspense as major characters—Antonia the heroine, who is “terrified at such a crowd” and Ambrosio the villain, whose sermon draws “the general admiration” from the crowd—fill the ensuing scenes with their adventures. Just when the much prolonged suspense seems to manage to keep the disruptiveness under control, however, the novel unexpectedly brings it back in the form of “the Mob” that speaks in “a multitude of voices” (355) and “continued to press forward” (356), only to create “a scene of devastation and horror” (358)—as if to justify the author’s distaste for intrusive attendants.

In his pursuit of “authorial powers” that have “no limits and cannot be restrained” (Kilgour, Rise 150, 142 respectively), Lewis might find in the presence of attendants intrusiveness and heterogeneity that would endanger the artistic unity of his text and the uninterrupted invocation of gothic horror. If I may appropriate Kilgour’s

17 Of course, the old woman, Leonella, and other comic characters take virtually no part in these adventures. In fact, Leonella, despite being an aunt to Antonia and sister to Elvira, and although her own house serves as the venue of the atrocities of Ambrosio, whom she does not “like … in the least” (22), is absent for a long while and returns to Madrid only to find “[the] sudden and melancholy fate” (343) of Elvira and Antonia.

18 Ann McWhir, in “The Gothic Transgression of Disbelief: Walpole, Radcliffe and Lewis,” also observes that, contrary to Radcliffe who “intends to be a ‘Teacher and Illuminator,’ … Lewis is certainly a manipulator” (43). She however argues that “powers beyond reason and a reasonable faith,” which are the objects of Lewis’s manipulation, become unmanageable because of their transgressive nature that is “too real” to be manipulated (43). Although McWhir regards supernatural events as examples of such powers, I think her argument is applicable to attendants’ power to disturb and even subvert the “authorial powers” that exude from main characters.
observation that “in Lewis delay is a means of working up to an even nastier and more explosive conclusion” (Kigour, *Rise* 151), “[T]he Mob” is a much suspended and schematic manifestation of this danger. Radcliffe’s *The Italian*, by contrast, provides the minute portrayal and enduring presence of “his [Vivaldi’s] attendant, Paulo,” who is immediately described as “shrewd, inquisitive, insinuating, adroit, possessing much of the spirit of intrigue, together with a considerable portion of humour, which displayed itself not so much in words, as in his manner and countenance, in the archness of his dark, penetrating eye, and in the exquisite adaptation of his gesture to his idea” (Radcliffe, *The Italian* 70). Besides this unusually careful delineation, Paulo is allowed to express his loyalty in such a ridiculous yet formidable loquacity that he even defies the terror of the Inquisition as well as the gravity of the aristocrats (*The Italian* 359, 406). It thus comes as no surprise that he takes over the very ending of the novel and, even after Vivaldi and Ellena exit, stays to say,

… ‘you see how people get through their misfortunes, if they have but a heart to bear up against them, and do nothing that can lie on their conscience afterwards; and how suddenly one comes to be happy again! Who would have guessed that my dear master and I, when we were clapped up in that diabolical place, the Inquisition, should ever come out against into this world! Who would have guessed when we were taken before those old devils of Inquisitors, sitting there all of a row in a place under ground, hung with black, and nothing but torches all around, and faces grinning at us, that looked as black as the gentry aforesaid; and when I was not so much as suffered to open my mouth, no! they would not let me
open my mouth to my master!—who, I say, would have guessed we should ever be let loose again, who would have thought we should ever know what it is to be happy! … O! it’s quite beyond what you can understand. O! giorno felice!

O! giorno felice!’ repeated Paulo, as he bounded forward to mingle in the dance, and ‘O! giorno felice!’ was again shouted in chorus by his joyful companions.

(italian 414-15)

Indeed, “who would have guessed,” other than avid readers of The Mysteries of Udolpho, that The Italian would not have such a grim ending as The Monk? And “who would have guessed,” other than keen observers of Radcliffe, that the “humour,” “foolerries,” and “clumsy jests” of attendants could turn them into not the intrusive “Mob” but the “joyful companions” of the gothic? Paulo’s last words thus deliver a poignant criticism of not only Lewis’s obsessive pursuit of gothic horror but also his hygienic detestation of attendants, and Paulo’s vicarious authority attests to the significance of attendants in retrieving the “model” of the gothic that Udolpho had envisioned but that was unfortunately dismissed by The Monk and, I would argue, in a gothic studies that consistently ignores attendants.

Taking a particular interest in the significance of attendants, the model of the gothic that I purport to retrieve from Udolphe is gothic aesthetics, not just because such an interest, as noted earlier, will illustrate how “artfully” the novel is written, but also because I believe the aesthetics is proposed as a way to cope with or even profit from what is normally known as gothic experience, that is, a series of terrifying events. My purpose is, however, not to rejuvenate the conventional yet almost obsolete aestheticism
of the gothic that has been obsessively concerned with the sublime.\(^{19}\) This kind of aestheticism, which I might call a gothic aesthetics of the sublime, conflated with the literary obsession with “sublime” characters, has defined the novel’s aesthetic relation to Edmund Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* as singularly loyal to the latter’s notion of the sublime. Malcolm Ware in *Sublimity in the Novels of Ann Radcliffe*, for instance, characterizes the various descriptions of sublime landscapes as “products of her own sensitivity to the beauties of external nature and her knowledge of Burke’s *Enquiry*” (31). E.B. Murray on the other hand notes that the Burkean “doctrine of the sublime,” which consists of terror stemming from a threat to self-preservation and delight from immunity to the threat, enlightens the aesthetical value of Radcliffe’s gothic novel, for it is able to bring out “an esthetic alternative to mere beauty that eventually undermined the specious combination of sentiment and conventional morality which had bemused critics and writers alike into believing that the novel was a matter of tears and virtuous example” (50).

Moving away from the literary obsession with “sublime characters” and the aesthetic obsession with the sublime, the gothic aesthetics to be retrieved here takes more interest in attendants and the beautiful.\(^{20}\) Accordingly, it first of all rejects the

\(^{19}\) It is “obsolete” in that the sublime of today becomes less an aesthetic than an epistemological or political category. While post-structuralism or deconstruction regards the sublime as an endless substitution representing the impossibility of a fixed meaning or an essence, psychoanalysis or feminism associates it with the monolithic tradition of male supremacy. The sublime in gothic studies is no exception, as its non-aesthetic implications are highlighted.

\(^{20}\) Sydny M. Conger’s argument that “Radcliffe saw *The Monk* as transgression against her own notion of sensibility as *heightened consciousness*, as the capacity to *penetrate physical surfaces,*” may explain my desire to retrieve a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful,
dominance of the sublime over the relationship between Radcliffe and Burke. The rejection, however, is not of the relationship itself. On the contrary, it is another objective of mine in this chapter to be “sympathetic” to Burke’s aesthetics, which has been misrepresented as prioritizing the sublime so as to re-configure the relationship between Burke’s politics and aesthetics in terms of the beautiful. Though sporadically made and largely unanswered, calls for such a reconfiguration have come from both Burke and his critics. Writing Enquiry with an intention to clarify “the ideas of the sublime and the beautiful [that] were frequently confounded” and, in particular, to stop “[t]he abuse of the word Beauty” (51), Burke believes the beautiful to cultivate sympathy and harmony in society. By contrast, anti-sublime sentiment is manifest in his later political writings, as he writes in his letter to A.J.F. Dupont: “I have no great opinion of that sublime abstract” (O’Brien 23). Critics, many of whom have underappreciated the beautiful in Burke’s aesthetics as inferior and castigated it in his politics as conservative, also begin to show signs of change. David Womersley in his introduction to a new edition of Burke’s early writings, for instance, underscores the importance of “[t]he instinct to bring together Burke’s aesthetics and his politics,” and states that “By juxtaposing The Sublime and Beautiful with Burke’s major political writings of the 1750s and the 1770s, this edition allows a different picture to emerge, in which the aesthetic and political subjects are linked more through the category of the

which prioritizes sensibility to judgment (114). Her essay, however, concentrates on main characters, and “the utopian vision of the feminine sentimental ethic” consequently is exclusive of those lacking sensibility—Conger’s example for the latter is the “elders, who are themselves in the grip of base materialistic drives” in The Italian (144, 143 respectively).
beautiful than the sublime” (xii). Despite his insight into the significance of the beautiful, however, Womersley continues to misrepresent Burke when he excludes *Reflections* from the “different picture to emerge” by asserting that “it [the beautiful] is not the political stance of the *Reflections*” (xii)—an exclusion that is puzzling because “Burke comes to champion beauty in the *Reflections*” (Furniss 39).21

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21 Indeed, in *Reflections*, Burke endeavors to expose the “nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction” whose theoretical extremes, without any consideration of circumstances, culminate in what he calls “this monstrous tragic-comic scene” of the French Revolution (Reflections 90, 92). Moreover, Burke clearly states that his reflections are a matter not of any philosophical or political speculation but of his passions, a statement that resonates with the working of taste that he describes in *Enquiry* as “partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, … concerning the human passions, manners and actions” (*Enquiry* 74). Thus, differentiating himself from Dr. Price, who gave a speech to the Revolution Society in support of the French Revolution, Burke asks,

> Why do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr. Price, and those of his lay flock, who will choose to adopt the sentiments of his discourse?—For this reason—because it is natural I should; because we are so made as to be affected at such spectacles with melancholy sentiments upon the unstable condition of moral prosperity, and the tremendous uncertainty of human greatness; because in those natural feelings we learn great lessons; because in events like these our passions instruct our reason…. (*Reflections* 175)

Rather than drawing his argument from the abstract ideals of humanity and morality, he follows the instruction of the “passions.” The representation of the unchecked power of the sublime runs through his descriptions of the National Assembly, over the power of which “[n]othing in heaven or upon earth can serve as a control” (*Reflections* 133); and of Paris, by the power of which “the leaders of this faction … command the whole legislative and the whole executive government” and stand above “even principles of union” (314). In this terrifying concentration of power on a faction, every one of whose members is “subliming himself into an airy metaphysician” (*Reflections* 300), Burke sees the dangers of the sublime that he has perhaps seen coming since the publication of *Enquiry*, as is observed by Stephen K. White who, underlining the foundational role that aesthetics plays in Burke’s “analysis of political modernity,” writes, “it is Burke’s entwinement of aesthetics with his persistent attention to human finitude that provides him with his insight into the dangers of modern politics. The seeds of this perspective are planted in the *Inquiry*, more specifically in the way he construes the sublime” (4, 27).
Only by admitting the enduring centrality of the beautiful that might appease sublime horrors and cultivate sensibility toward others could we save the distorted—and sometimes even severed—relation between Burke’s aesthetics and politics, and between his *Enquiry* and *Reflections* in particular.\(^\text{22}\) The same admission will also help us reconfigure the relationship between Burke and Radcliffe, which has been dominated by the gothic aesthetics of the sublime.\(^\text{23}\) Finally, it can highlight the role of an attendant, namely, Annette, whom I would call a “beautiful” character, and redefine her relation to Emily, a “sublime” character, not as subservient but as affectionate. The gothic aesthetics that I hope to retrieve in this chapter is therefore not of the sublime but of the beautiful, so it is rightfully called a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful. It requires us to admit the centrality of the beautiful and to reconfigure all these mistreated relations so that they can be looked at as endeavoring to realize what the beautiful, and gothic literature in particular, has for us in gothic situations, including political turmoil.

\(^{22}\) Such an admission of course presupposes that Burke’s aesthetics is guiding his politics. In this light, though somewhat remote from my interest in Burke’s writings, I want to mention here Paul Hindson’s *Burke’s Dramatic Theory of Politics* as a more concrete and literary form of the ongoing debates on the relationship between Burke’s aesthetics and politics. Highlighting “Burke’s ‘political wisdom’ rather than his ‘political doctrine,’” Hindson explains that “Burke’s use of drama” not only “acts as a medium and a metaphor through which to reinforce the moral order of human society” but also “graphically portrays particular aspects of the human condition relevant to politics” (Hindson 4,8).

\(^{23}\) The sublime-centered relationship, it should be noted, has undoubtedly contributed to the success of each text. *Udolpho*, within the recently revived interest in gothic literature, becomes an exemplar of that particular genre, which is being conceptualized as representing the subversive haunting of the psychologically or socio-politically repressed. Burke’s *Enquiry* is, on the other hand, highly valued for pioneering empiricist aesthetics and ushering Kant to finalize the theory of aesthetics. But I would argue that their literary or aesthetic success doesn’t excuse the way aesthetics in both writings is treated in both areas, which is nothing but partial and fragmentary because their aesthetics has been consistently misrepresented as solely interested in the sublime.
1. Annette and Emily: An Affectionate Relationship

After she barely escapes being abducted by Count Morano (an abduction that could ironically terminate her confinement in the castle of Udolpho and the terror of Montoni), Emily, coming out of her “long fits of abstraction,” begs Annette not to “forsake her” (*Udolpho* 350). She then adds, “For since my father died . . . every body forsakes me,” to which Annette makes a reply that is rather out of context: “Your father, ma’amsele! . . . he was dead before you knew me” (*Udolpho* 351). Annette indeed does not forsake her and, “as affectionate as she was simple, lost in these moments all her former fears of remaining in the chamber, and watched alone by Emily, during the whole night” (*Udolpho* 351), just as she faithfully keeps company with Emily and helps her in times of trouble. Yet, she may not be that simple, since, after all, it is Annette who, having sensed Barnardine’s strange behavior, “stole out from the castle, to try to follow you; for, says I, I am sure no good can be planned, or why all this secrecy?”—and so saves Emily (*Udolpho* 353). But she certainly is “affectionate,” because she runs through the allegedly haunted passage under the chapel in order to stop Emily’s abduction, even though, she exclaims, “I would not go into that place again by myself for all the world!” (*Udolpho* 353). Thus, if being affectionate can be defined as being able to overcome one’s terror for the sake of others, Annette proves herself to be so.

Emily in the beginning appears to be as affectionate as Annette. When her father, St. Aubert, falls seriously ill in “a strange wild place” with only a remote possibility of assistance, Emily overcomes “[e]very emotion of selfish fear . . . in search of the chateau she had seen at a distance,” and “Her mind was for some time so entirely occupied by
anxiety and terror for her father, that she felt none for herself” (Udolpho 63, 64). Her unselfish action is in stark contrast with St. Aubert’s earlier behavior, when, unable to recognize Valancourt’s “voice shouting from the road behind” (Udolpho 38), he mistakes him for a bandit and shoots him. But as soon as he sees “the man staggered on his horse, [while] the report of the pistol was followed by a groan” (Udolpho 38), and when he feels no imminent threat, St. Aubert recognizes even “the faint voice of Valancourt” and realize his mistake. In his still terrorized status, St. Aubert “tried to bind up his [Valancourt’s] arm, but his hands trembled so excessively that he could not accomplish it” and, finding Emily unconscious, “scarcely knew what he did” (Udolpho 38). If Emily is set against St. Aubert in the matter of affection, so is Annette, and an affectionate relationship becomes highly conceivable between these two female characters. Annette’s reply, “he was dead before you knew me,” thus seems to allude to that conceivability, now that St. Aubert is no more and Emily finally meets Annette.

Just as Emily and Annette can be united in an affectionate relationship, so can Burke’s political and aesthetical writings. Pointing out the importance of affection to reconstructing the relationship between Burke’s early writings, David Womersley in the introduction to Enquiry suggests, “The linkage established in this way at the very outset of Burke’s career, between the healthy salience of human affection and the rejection of meagre theory for rich circumstance, ran throughout his work” (Womersley, xv).

Interestingly, Conor Cruise O’Brien also makes the same assessment in his introduction to Reflections: “The more one reads Burke the more one is impressed, I think, by a deep inner consistency, not always of language or opinion, but of feeling: a consistency of
which the root principles are a strong capacity for affection” (O’Brien 23). Indeed, Burke in *Enquiry* defines sympathy, a kind of affection by which “we enter into the concerns of others,” as the first of “[t]he three principal links .. in the great chain of society” (91, 90 respectively); and, again in *Reflections*, he argues that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind” (135). Burke’s consistent belief in the instrumentality of affection to civil society opens the possibility of relating his aesthetics to his politics in a constructive and harmonious manner. The possibility, however, has been rarely recognized because of the continued misrepresentation of his aesthetics as devoted to the sublime. In “The Aesthetic Dimension of Burke’s Political Thought,” for instance, Neal Wood contends that, although the beautiful lays down “the principle of friendship, associated with pleasure and found in the natural domestic virtues of affection, compassion, and tenderness” in “the family circle,” Burke’s political theory of “a society of diverse local habits and customs” abides by “the principle of authority” that is shaped by the sublime (49, 52). This disjunction that Wood notes in Burke translates in Isaac Kramnick’s biographical examination into “his basic ambivalence to the two great ideological currents [of aristocratic conservatism and bourgeoisie radicalism] whose confrontation dominated his

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24 The other two are imitation, which will be discussed later, and ambition, which drives men toward self-improvement.
age” (Kramnick 7). Tom Furniss meanwhile contextualizes the disjunction and argues that Burke’s “aesthetic ideology is riven and driven by contradictions which are endemic to the political tensions of its historical context” (Furniss 1, 4). Thus, constantly obscured by the alleged adherence to the sublime that stands for political radicalism, the relation of Burke’s aesthetics to his conservative politics has been viewed as ambivalent or even contradictory, when there would be no such ambivalence in the relation, if seen in terms of affection or the beautiful.

If the relationship between Burke’s aesthetics and politics has been hardly developed because of the intervention of the sublime, the affectionate relationship between Emily and Annette, persistently haunted by Emily’s dead father or, specifically, by his words, is turning into a failure. As his wife’s funeral comes to an end, St. Aubert instructs Emily not to be “wasting in useless sorrow” because “All excess is vicious;

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25 In his biographical and psychological examination of Burke’s life and writings, Kramnick underlines Burke’s ambivalent attitude toward sexuality and refers to Burke’s political ambivalence as “a set of variations on oedipal themes” in his life. Kramnick further explains, “[Burke] wrote … of replacing the great, a displacement of the fact that he had indeed replaced the one great, the father. But he was ambivalent on this score, for throughout his life, he also worshipped and served the great, warding off their feared oedipal punishment” (195).

26 Rather than looking into the relationship between the sublime and the beautiful, Furniss finds such contradiction within the category of the sublime. While “mov[ing] forwards and backwards between Enquiry and Reflection,” Furniss underscores the ambiguous nature of the sublime as follows:

… to articulate the Reflections with the Enquiry, and to produce the ‘citational play’ which emerges between them, is to see the sublime as at once a source of pain and a relief from that pain, a plague and a necessary panacea, the healthy habit of the English constitution and the dangerous disease of revolutionary radicalism, the threat of revolution and its preventative. In both the Enquiry and the Reflections, plague and panacea, disease and antidote are often hard to tell apart and both texts are beset by the need securely to differentiate between them. (Furniss 123)
even that sorrow, which is amiable in its origin, becomes a selfish and unjust passion, if indulged at the expense of our duties” (*Udolpho* 21, 20 respectively). And later, though exhausted, he resumes his instruction at his death bed and says,

. . . my dear Emily . . . do not indulge in the pride of fine feeling, the romantic error of amiable minds. Those, who really possess sensibility, ought early to be taught, that it is a dangerous quality, which is continually extracting the excess of misery, or delight, from every surrounding circumstance. And, since, in our passage through this world, painful circumstances occur more frequently than pleasing ones, and since our sense of evil is, I fear, more acute than our sense of good, we become the victims of our feelings, unless we can in some degree command them. ... I would not teach you to become insensible, if I could; I would only warn you of the evils of susceptibility, and point out how you may avoid them. Beware, my love, I conjure you, of that self-delusion, which has been fatal to the peace of so many persons; beware of priding yourself on the gracefulness of sensibility; if you yield to this vanity, your happiness is lost for ever. Always remember how much more valuable is the strength of fortitude, than the grace of sensibility. Do not, however, confound fortitude with apathy; apathy cannot know the virtue. Remember, too, that the one act of beneficence, one act of real usefulness, is worth all the abstract sentiment in the world. Sentiment is a disgrace, instead of an ornament, unless it lead us to good actions. (*Udolpho* 79-80)
Murray interprets this “deathbed advice to Emily” as “mainly a warning (with appropriate qualification) against the sensibility which she inherits from him” and as an embodiment of “the guidelines by which Emily’s future conduct should be understood and judged” (118). Ironically, however, St. Aubert has done things that might be exemplary of what his words warn against: his decision to move to La Vallée to which “he had been attached from his infancy” (*Udolpho* 2); his pining for the long lost sister over whose miniature picture he “sighed with a convulsive force,” probably as he has done numberless times since her death (26); his consistent “pensive melancholy,” at the touch of which he “suddenly became silent” and “walked away to where no eye could observe his grief” (*Udolpho* 28, 29). Moreover, as mentioned above, he is so overcome by his own terror when he shoots Valancourt that he barely performs his basic “duties” to the wounded Valancourt and the prostate Emily. Considering all his emotionally excessive behaviors, the deathbed advice sounds more like a confession than “a warning,” as if it is for St. Aubert himself rather than for Emily.

Though mistaken about the right recipient of the “deathbed advice,” Murray unwittingly points to an impending question Emily is soon to face: how can she maintain “the sensibility which she inherits from him [St. Aubert]” while following “the guidelines” that undermine that sensibility? The question at large concerns her taste, since it basically asks her to choose between sensibility and judgment. Referring to the three principles of taste as the senses, the imagination, and the judgment, Burke

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27 In this regard, I disagree with Mary Laughlin Fawcett’s argument, in “*Udolpho’s* Primal Mystery,” that “the novel opposes the restraint of the father to the passion of the daughter,” which is proposed under the assumption that their “differing experiences in nature” are consistent with their actions throughout the novel (490).
explicitly stresses the universality of the senses among people: “the pleasure of all the senses, of the sight, and even of the Taste, that most ambiguous of the senses, is the same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned” (*Enquiry* 68). Such universality, however, becomes less obvious in imagination\(^{28}\) and hardly retrievable in judgment, where “the manners, the characters, the actions, and designs of men, their relations, their virtues and vices” come under the scrutiny of “the reasoning faculty” (*Enquiry* 74). And instead of the universal pleasure drawn from the senses, judgment, “in tying us down to the disagreeable yoke of our reason,” brings up a totally different pleasure that “consists in a sort of conscious pride and superiority, which arises from thinking rightly; but this is an indirect pleasure, a pleasure which does not immediately result from the object which is under contemplation” (*Enquiry* 76). The difference between sensibility and judgment is obviously as social as it is aesthetic—the former places people on equal terms while the latter instantiates hierarchy—and it is very likely that how Emily answers the question of her taste will determine how she relates to Annette as well as others.

To determine the priority between sensibility and judgment is not an easy task since, as St. Aubert confesses, the former can be excessive if not checked by judgment while it can turn into apathy if too much checked. Emphasizing “strength of fortitude,” his words “reasonably” advise that Emily should choose judgment over sensibility,\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) Burke describes imagination as “a sort of creative power” in the mind that combines images from the senses “in a new manner, and according to different order” and draws a pleasure from “tracing resemblances” in “two distinct objects” (*Enquiry* 68, 69). “So far then as Taste belongs to the imagination,” Burke further explains, “in the degree there is a difference, which arises from two causes principally; either from a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object” (*Enquiry* 72).
though he himself seems to have behaved, to the contrary, “unreasonably.” Burke in _Enquiry_, however, offers different advice:

… sensibility and judgment, which are the qualities that compose what we commonly call a Taste, vary exceedingly in various people. From a defect in the former of these qualities, arises a want of Taste; a weakness in the latter, constitutes a wrong or a bad one ….There are others so continually in the agitation of gross and merely sensual pleasures, or so occupied in the low drudgery of avarice, or so heated in the chace of honours and distinction, that their minds, which had been used continually to the storms of these violent and tempestuous passions, can hardly be put in motion by *the delicate and refined play of the imagination*. (_Enquiry_ 74-75 italics mine).

Even when sensibility is subject to “these violent and tempestuous passions,” that is, when it becomes excessive, Burke suggests that imagination, not judgment, come forward to set the excessive sensibility in a proper motion. Furthermore, he makes it clear that “[a] rectitude of judgment … in great measure depend[s] upon sensibility; because if the mind has no bent to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply itself sufficiently to works of that species to acquire a competent knowledge in them” (_Enquiry_ 75). Thus, contrary to St. Aubert, Burke maintains that sensibility, and subsequently imagination, should guide taste while reason and judgment must follow that guidance.  

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29 In this light, I disagree with Burleigh Taylor Wilkins’s belief in “the role that judgment and rational discrimination play in [a truly aesthetic taste]” (Wilkins 142). In his _The Problem of Burke’s Political Philosophy_, Wilkins argues that more attention
Unfortunately, Emily follows the steps of her father, setting her judgment to a task of guiding her sensibility. Just like her father whose judgment and sensibility are at odds, however, Emily finds her judgment unfit for the task, for, in light of Burke, hers is not properly formed—her judgment has not grown out of her sensibility but out of her father’s “reasonable” words. And, again, imitating her father, Emily chooses to displace her judgment onto others, only to contradict her own sensibility. Her judgment of others thus becomes nothing but mere words, making her look superior to them but in fact turning her into a hypocrite. After arriving at the castle of Udolpho, Emily mocks Annette, who just begins to describe the place as haunted by fairies and ghosts, for being easily terrified, and chides her: “Ridiculous! […] you must not indulge such fancies” (Udolpho 231). Likewise, when told of the secret of her chamber that “is haunted, and has been so these many years,” Emily, “endeavouring to laugh away her apprehensions,” tries to “smile at the superstitious terror, which had seized on Annette; for, though she sometimes felt its influence herself, she could smile at it, when apparent in other

should be given to “the moral element in our judgment of certain works of art” (136) in Burke, which I think is a retrospective reading of Burke from the perspective of Kant’s aesthetics that hypothesizes “the moral feeling” as the guiding principle.

30 In her discussion on the narrative form of the gothic in “Narrative as Enchantment in The Mysteries of Udolpho,” Margaret Russett highlights the contrast between Annette as “standing in for “popular belief” and Emily as “the supposedly more discriminating reader who nonetheless ‘puts herself in the circumstance of’ the characters she reads about, fascinated against her own better judgment” (165). Although I agree that the readership of Udolpho involves “the contradictory attitudes of skeptical disdain and awakened curiosity,” I do not think Emily is solely “standing in for” such a readership; it is the relationship of Annette and Emily, and the double-valenced readership they conjure, that should account for what Russett calls “the charm of the gothic” (Russett 166, 160 respectively).
persons” (*Udolpho* 247). Emily’s pretentious calm comes only at the expense of Annette, who, mocked and provoked, precisely points out Emily’s hypocrisy.

Emily endeavoured to correct the superstitious weakness of Annette, though she could not entirely subdue her own; to which the latter only replied, ‘Nay, ma’amselle, you will believe in nothing; you are almost as bad as the Signor [Montoni] himself, who was in a great passion when they told of what had happened, and swore that the first man, who repeated such nonsense, should be thrown into the dungeon under the east turret. This was a hard punishment too, for only talking nonsense, as he called it, but I dare say he had other reasons for calling it so, than you have, ma’am.’ (*Udolpho* 392)

By dissociating Emily from herself and associating her with Montoni, Annette criticizes Emily for imitating her father, for being hypocritical, and for forsaking the affectionate relationship they could have built.

The hope for the affectionate relationship is irretrievably lost when Emily chooses to imitate her dead father, whose legacy thus becomes less an inheritance than an infection in her life. Indeed, the infectious nature of St. Aubert is established early in the novel, when his wife “had, indeed, taken the infection [from St. Aubert], during her attendance upon him” (*Udolpho* 18). It is this kind of infectious imitation that upsets Burke in *Reflections*, as O’Brien observes that “[Burke’s] principal declared concern is the danger of infection spreading from France to England” (O’Brien 17). The revolution particularly worries Burke since it differs from previous “civil confusions” in that the “present confusion, *like a palsy*, has attached the fountain of life itself” (*Reflections* 137)
italics mine). In “the fountain of life” is imitation that “is one of the strongest links of society” because it enables us to “learn every thing,” including “our manners, our opinions, our lives” (Enquiry 95). Thus, while it is necessary to stop imitating the revolution, that shouldn’t amount to suppressing imitation itself, which is why Burke underlines the importance of providing people with a non-revolutionary, non-French British model.

Formerly your [French] affairs were your own concern only. We felt for them as men; but we kept aloof from them, because we were not citizens of France. But when we see the model held up to ourselves, we must feel as Englishmen, and feeling, we must provide as Englishmen. Your affairs, in spite of us, are made a part of our interest; so far at least as to keep at a distance your panacea, or your plague. If it be a panacea, we do not want it. We know the consequences of unnecessary physic. If it be a plague; it is such a plague, that the precautions of the most severe quarantine ought to be established against it. (Reflections 185)

Even when only “an handful of people” feel for and imitate the revolution, and even when they could develop “a panacea,” Burke not only calls for “the most severe quarantine” that may successfully prevent the revolution from becoming “the model”; he also underscores the necessity of offering a different model to encourage imitation.

If the affectionate relationship between Emily and Annette becomes no longer feasible when Emily chooses to imitate her father, whose inheritance turns out to be
infectious, could the relationship have been saved if she imitated Annette? The answer lies in understanding what kind of model Annette offers and how it corrects Emily’s taste that prioritizes judgment. Yet this first of all requires us to be familiar with what kind of problem Emily’s taste has. That is, only when the nature and scope of the problem is recognized can we understand how Annette’s taste must be to solve that problem and present it as a model that Emily should have imitated. Therefore, we now turn our attention to Emily’s taste not to verify its relation to the sublime, as critics invariably have done, but to expose an enduring problem inherent in that relation.

2. A Homogeneous Taste: Emily and the Sublime

Right after she, “like a heroine,” defies Montoni’s attempt to trick her into signing over her estate and, “[f]or the first time, […] felt the full extent of her own superiority to Montoni,” Emily tries to read a book but finds herself “lament[ing] the irresistible force of circumstances over the taste and powers of the mind” (Udolpho 381-83 italics mine). Then, unable to enjoy her favorite book, she asks herself, “Where did the charm exist?—Was it in my mind, or in the imagination of the poet?” and answers, “the fire of the poet is vain, if the mind of his reader is not tempered like his own, however it may be inferior to his in power” (Udolpho 383). Since the question is for “my mind” in particular, her answer that speaks for “the mind of the reader” can’t help

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31 Imitating Annette would be truer to the nature of imitation, if we follow Tom Huhn’s explanation of Burkean imitation as “the capacity for substitution but also the enactment, enhancement, and extension of our affinity to, and ‘affection’ for, one another” (387). For Huhn, imitation is basically a manifestation of sympathy, which he argues characterizes Burke’s theory of taste.
sounding evasive. Why is she so evasive, then? She may be equating her mind with “the mind of his reader,” but doesn’t it mean that her mind is “not tempered” because she is unable to appreciate “the fire of the poet?” Or, if not, is she then suggesting that “the imagination of the poet” succumbs to “the irresistible force of circumstances,” as do her “taste and powers of the mind?” Leaving these questions unaddressed, Emily’s evasive answer only undermines her brief “superiority to Montoni,” for she should find as little confidence in herself as in her mind.

Emily’s mind must be well “tempered,” considering that “St. Aubert cultivated her understanding with the most scrupulous care” (*Udolpho* 6). Particularly, through learning Latin and English, Emily “understand[s] the sublimity of their best poets” and “discovered in her early years a taste for works of genius” (*Udolpho* 6). Her penchant for the sublimity of literature and nature becomes apparent as she more loves “the mountain’s stupendous recesses, where the silence and grandeur of solitude impressed a sacred awe upon her heart,” than “the soft and glowing landscape” (*Udolpho* 6). The journey with her ailing father, who takes a less direct road that, “winding over the heights, afforded more extensive views and greater variety of romantic scenery,” accordingly heightens “her young fancy, struck with the grandeur of the objects around” (*Udolpho* 28). Furthermore, the addition to their company of Valancourt, whose taste St. Aubert “admire[s]” as “He [Valancourt] brings back to my memory the days of my youth” (*Udolpho* 32, 57) and who will in fact replace him as Emily’s protector in La Vallée, completes a cabal in which her taste is constantly rejoined by others of the same
taste. Hence, so long as she is surrounded by St. Aubert and Valancourt, Emily sees no need to question her taste for the sublime, for it is well “tempered” and shared.

But as soon as Valancourt leaves and St. Aubert dies, Emily’s taste begins to look doubtful. On her way back home after her father’s death, she finds “the scenes of the country” only “remind[ing] her, that on her last view of them, St. Aubert was at her side,” and finishes her journey “without any particular occurrence” (Udolpho 92). In addition, her brief meeting with Valancourt in La Vallée is cut short by her aunt Madame Cheron, who becomes the sole custodian of Emily and whose “house and furniture” are totally different from “the modest elegance, to which she had been accustomed” (Udolpho 118). When her aunt, now Madame Montoni, decides to move to Italy, Emily is concerned less with the prospect, as Madame Montoni suggests, of seeing “a romantic country and fine views” than with the socio-political circumstances of the country, for “she considered the tumultuous situation of that country, then torn by civil commotion, where every petty state was at war with its neighbour, and even every castle liable to the attack of an invader” (Udolpho 145). When surrounded by Madame Cheron’s acquaintances whose taste she finds vulgar and inferior, Emily struggles to maintain her taste, which now sounds less absolute than circumstantial, suggesting that it might change.\footnote{Though examining the novel in relation to the readership of the gothic, Scott Mackenzie in “Ann Radcliffe’s Gothic Narrative and the Readers at Home” makes a similar observation about Emily. Unlike Russett, who equates Emily with “the supposedly more discriminating reader,” Mackenzie views Emily as “a metonymy of the reader” and as “an empty sign, overwhelmed by her surroundings” (Mackenzie 420).}
With the fate of her taste out in the open, Emily, on her journey to Italy with the Montonis and others, has two unfamiliar experiences of the sublime. First, confronting the “scenes of sublimity” of the Alps,

Emily’s mind was even so much engaged with new and wonderful images, that they sometimes banished the idea of Valancourt, though they more frequently revived it. These brought to her recollection the prospects among the Pyrenees, which they had admired together, and had believed nothing could excel in grandeur. How often did she wish to express to him the new emotions which this astonishing scenery awakened, and that he could partake of them! sometimes too she endeavoured to anticipate his remarks, and almost imagined him present. She seemed to have arisen into another world, and to have left every trifling thought, every trifling sentiment, in that below; those only of grandeur and sublimity now dilated her mind, and elevated the affections of her heart. (Udolpho 163)

Here, instead of appreciating “new and wonderful images” in solitude, Emily longs for the society of Valancourt so that she can communicate “the new emotions which this astonishing scenery awakened.” At the same time, however, she tries to move away from the extant society by placing herself in “another world.” In this double-edged reaction to the “scenes of sublimity,” her taste for the sublime obviously affects her taste for society, as she prefers a sublime society to a “trifling” one.

The second unfamiliar experience of the sublime takes place when Emily “caught a first view of Italy” where the “solitary grandeur of the objects…immediately surrounded her” (Udolpho 165). The precipices of the mountains make both Emily and
Madame Montoni recoil, but while the latter “only shuddered,” Emily is soon to realize that “with her fears were mingled such various emotions of delight, such admiration, astonishment, and awe, as she had never experienced before” (Udolpho 166). Contrary to her former experiences of the sublime that present no notable threat to her self-preservation, “[t]he precipices of the mountains” of the Alps surprise her since she is at once terrified and delighted by them. This new experience causing “various emotions” is best explained by the Burkean sublime, which Burke attributes to “[w]hatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror” (Enquiry 86). As the subjective feeling of terror becomes the sole determinant of the sublime, however, the integrity of sublime experience becomes ethically ambiguous, since those who are morally despicable like Montoni can be regarded as sublime.  

But, however terrifying and therefore sublime Montoni may appear, it is very unlikely that

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33 In this way, “two ideas as opposite as can be imagined,” Burke speculates, “[are] reconciled in the extremes of both; and both in spite of their opposite nature brought to concur in producing the sublime” (Enquiry 121). For example, “lightning is certainly productive of grandeur” while “darkness is more productive of sublime ideas than light,” just as “A sudden beginning, or sudden cessation of sound of any considerable force, has the same power” (Enquiry 121, 123). This indiscriminative approach to sublime objects, however, could put sublime experience in doubt. James Kirwan thus notes that “a certain confusion creeps in between the imaginary danger that is the basis of the sublimity of the descriptions of the landscape and the imaginary real danger that confronts the heroine” (238). Kenneth W. Graham on the other hand regards “Emily’s irrational attraction to Montoni” as “one facet of Mrs. Radcliffe’s awareness of the potency of that central Gothic situation that brings together maiden, villain and castle over which her narrative lingers with such unconscionable sophistication” (168). And Graham concludes, “the ambivalence of Emily’s love-hate attitude to her demon-lover reflects the ambivalence of her century towards the unregulated imagination” (168).
Emily regards him as such, irrelevant of his moral depravity, and, as a result, the taste for the sublime that underwrites her aesthetic judgment appears untrustworthy.

Furthermore, the way the sublime arouses delight exacerbates the questionable nature of the sublime. Delight in sublime experience requires a certainty, real or imagined, that there is no threat to self-preservation, as Burke clarifies: “[w]hen danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful” (*Enquiry* 86). But how do these “certain distances” or “certain modifications,” as instrumental to sublime experience as the “terrible objects,” turn pain into delight? In other words, what kind of passion do they cause to neutralize pain, which is often thought to be positive (*Enquiry* 83), and to create relative pleasure that is called delight?34 In “The Physiological Sublime,” Vanessa L. Ryan suggests that “the sublime experience despite its origins in solitude provides a stimulus towards action and society” and “sublime delight strengthens the bond of sympathy” (Ryan 277 italics mine). Her argument perplexingly contradicts Burke’s own stipulation—that self-preservation belongs to the sublime and society to the beautiful—but Ryan seems willing to suffer such “a seeming contradiction” (276) because she refuses to admit the positive influence of the beautiful, which she thinks only “leads to dissipation” (276). Without her obvious

34 Burke himself admits the uncertainty in the meaning of this particular word when he writes, “I shall take the best care I can, to use that word in no other sense…. I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit its signification, than to introduce a new one which would not perhaps incorporate so well with the language” (*Enquiry* 84). Perhaps, the lack of a proper word is due to the impossibility of pinpointing the ambiguity of this passion in a single word, an ambiguity which Burke simplifies by using the word “delight.”
prejudice against the beautiful, we could take her as saying that the sublime is complete when the beautiful drives it “toward action and society.” Delight can be therefore defined as the positive effect of the beautiful on the sublime whose terror and pain can be distanced or modified by the intervention of society, and the sublime appears to be dependent on sympathy and the beautiful for its aesthetic production. In other words, it is the passion of the beautiful that counterbalance and appease the passion of the sublime, thus turning pain into delight. It is thus no wonder that Emily, whose taste is based on the penchant for the sublime, becomes suspicious of her taste and asks, “Where did the charm exist?—Was it in my mind, or in the imagination of the poet?” (Udolpho 383).

As if allowing her to consider the question without “the irresistible force of circumstances” that makes “Her senses … dead to the beautiful country,” Emily is immediately sent away to Tuscany, where “she was surprised to observe the beauties, that surrounded it” (Udolpho 224, 413):

The cottage was nearly embowered in the woods, which were chiefly of chestnut intermixed with some cypress, larch and sycamore. Beneath the dark and

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35 Luke Gibbons’s oxymoronic term, “the sympathetic sublime,” could also benefit from not being prejudiced against the beautiful (105). In contrast with “Scottish Enlightenment ethics” where “the operation of sympathy presupposes … homogeneity and sameness, either of our own community or that of a universal human nature,” Burke’s aesthetics facilitates “the absorption of the (concrete) particular into the (abstract) universal by bringing two particulars into contact through the sympathetic shock of the sublime” (Gibbons 107). While admitting that “sympathy” breaks down “the dichotomy between the sublime and the beautiful” and that “sympathy is brought to bear on the terrors of the sublime,” Gibbons rejects the possibility that the beautiful can tame the sublime. Instead, in his adherence to the conventional understanding of Burke’s aesthetics as devoted to the sublime, Gibbons introduces the term, “the sympathetic sublime,” which contradicts Burke’s clear intention to associate sympathy with the beautiful.
spreading branches, appeared, to the north, and to the east, the woody Apennines, rising in majestic amphitheater, not black with pines, as she had been accustomed to see them but their loftiest summits crowned with antient forests of chestnut, oak, and oriental plane, now animated with the rich tints of autumn, and which swept downward to the valley uninterruptedly, except where some bold rocky promontory looked out from among the foliage, and caught the passing gleam.  

(Udolpхо 413)

Her enjoyment of the scenery from the house she is sent to by Montoni outlives a sudden interruption made by “Madeline, the peasant girl [of the house], and Emily is able to see her “pleasant countenance … animated with the pure affections of nature,” even as she remembers that “the others, that surrounded her, expressed, more or less, the worst qualities—cruelty, ferocity, cunning and duplicity; of the latter style of countenance, especially, were those of the peasant and his wife” (Udolpхо 414). Apparently, Emily’s “senses” are so alive as to overcome “the irresistible force of circumstances,” and she is now ready to indulge in the question of her taste.

Thus situated in Tuscany, Emily soon returns to her books, “which even in the hurry of her departure from Udolpхо she had put into her little package,” but “her eyes often wandered from the page to the landscape, whose beauty gradually soothed her mind into gentle melancholy” (Udolpхо 416). She then remembers “[t]he scenes of La Vallée, in the early morn of her life, when she was protected and beloved,” and makes “mournful comparisons” to her recently unprotected life, whose “heavy load…had so long oppressed her” (Udolphoa 417). These comparisons should teach her at once to
yearn retrospectively for the protection and love that La Vallée represents and to dread prospectively harrowing circumstances that Montoni would cause. Her dread soon influences her response to Madeline’s second interruption, when she only conjures up “in terror… [t]he image of Bertrand, with a stiletto in his hand … to her alarmed fancy” (Udolpho 417). And she retreats into “the pensive melancholy of her mind,” instead of accepting the invitation of “the peasants of the country” to their party, where “the sense of her misfortunes” could be lost in “that of a benevolent pleasure” (Udolpho 421).

Terrified of “the irresistible force of circumstances” that, regardless of their being malicious or “benevolent,” makes her taste nothing but an “alarmed fancy,” Emily determines to return to solitude, in which her taste may remain undisturbed. Nelson C. Smith, placing Emily’s “return to common sense” within the overall objective of Radcliffe’s work to “show the extreme effects of sensibility,” observes that “she [Radcliffe] takes the typical heroine of sentimental novels and, using the techniques of the Gothic novel, reveals how such a state of mind [i.e. “this luxuriating in emotion’] brings about many of the terrors which the heroine faces” (Smith 577, 580). Such “a return to common sense,” however, would not be possible without her physical return to solitude, where her taste, free of intervening circumstances, is protected and approved.

Based on her two unfamiliar experiences of the sublime that teach her the importance of having a society homogeneous to her taste, Emily consequently decides to marry

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36 In contrast with Smith’s positive view of the ending, Kim Ian Michasiw, examining the relationship between the Enlightenment and Radcliffe, concludes that “Radcliffe’s Enlightenment heritage … becomes a burden when she forces herself to confront terrors that are not irrational” (329). Unable to bear such a burden, Radcliffe, Michasiw argues by referring to her later novels, can’t help relapsing into “the mystifications she has demolished” and gives up the “return to common sense” (346).
Valancourt and settle in the “pleasant and long-loved shades” of La Vallée (672). But why is in “this final arrangement” included Emily’s decision to separate from Annette, who has undoubtedly been no threat to her (Poovey, “Ideology and The Mysteries of Udolpho” 328)? More significantly, why is the separation followed by a relocation of Annette to the “magnificence of Epourville,” a reward that obviously contradicts Annette’s preference? Keeping these questions in mind, we will try to envision Annette’s taste as a forgotten solution to “the irresistible force of circumstances,” a force that Emily could fend off only by keeping her taste and society homogenous.

3. A Heterogeneous Taste: Annette and the Beautiful

As her unhappy life under Montoni’s wing begins to loom, Emily, alone in her room, finds

[h]er mind, long harassed by distress, now yielded to imaginary terrors; she trembled to look into the obscurity of her spacious chamber, and feared she knew

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37 Recalling this scene, Durant states that “[a]ll of Mrs. Radcliffe’s heroines carry into their adventures the memory of pastoral innocence, where a family protected them from harm” (Durant “Ann Radcliffe” 521). Radcliffe’s reviving of “pastoral innocence” may portray Emily as if “protected by a moral environment,” but in actuality, as Mary Poovey notes, “it does not constitute a convincing solution to the problem of how virtue is to be protected from internal or external threats” (“The Ideology” 328). Continuing her critical reading of Udolpho’s Enlightenment ideology, Poovey therefore comments, Radcliffe dramatizes “no enlightened society” to offset the power of Montoni’s tyranny, she has emphatically shown this harmony not to be “secure,” and the retreat to the domestic comforts of La Vallée hardly illuminates the darkness of the castle Emily has left behind. The anxieties generated by Montoni’s avarice simply continue to haunt the formulaic resolution Radcliffe asserts. (Poovey, “The Ideology” 328)

Emily’s decision regarding her taste that underwrites “the formulaic resolution” is vulnerable to “internal or external threats” that create gothic situations, so is the gothic aesthetics of the sublime to “the irresistible force of circumstances.”
not what; a state of mind, which continued so long, that she would have called up
Annette, her aunt’s woman, had her fears permitted her to rise from her chair,
and to cross the apartment. (*Udolpho* 221)

Her “imaginary terrors” are groundless because Udolpho’s mysteries are yet to come,
but their effects on her seem as real and in a way more enervating than those of real
mysteries, for she is too terrified and disabled even to “rise from her chair.” The
debilitating effect of these “imaginary terrors” may be due to the fact that they are less
circumstantial than intuitive or almost instinctive, that she has absolutely no control over
them. Interesting is that, in such overwhelming terrors, Emily looks for Annette’s
company, though the latter, yet unknown to Emily, is merely called “her aunt’s woman.”
So it seems that Emily’s dependence on Annette is as instinctual as her terrors are:
without any pretext, Annette is placed as opposite and, more importantly, solace to
terrors. But what could be the pretext to this placement of Annette? In other words, what
power does she have so as to make Emily unknowingly and intuitively seek for her
company in times of terror?

Before their relationship becomes more fortified yet less spontaneous by
impending circumstances, on the first night at an inn in Italy, Annette comes to Emily
for the first time in the novel and talks about a “son of a peasant inhabiting the
neighbouring valley” (*Udolpho* 169).

‘He is going to the Carnival at Venice,’ added Annette, ‘for they say he has a fine
hand at playing, and will get a world of money; and the Carnival is just going to
begin: but for my part, I should like to live among these pleasant woods and hills,
better than in a town; and they say Ma’moiselle, we shall see no woods, or hills, or fields, at Venice, for that it is built in the very middle of the sea.’

Emily agreed with the talkative Annette, that this young man was making a change for the worse, and could not forbear silently lamenting, that he should be drawn from the innocence and beauty of these scenes, to the corrupt ones of the voluptuous city.

When she was alone, unable to sleep, the landscapes of her native home, with Valancourt, and the circumstances of her departure, haunted her fancy; she drew pictures of social happiness amidst the grand simplicity of nature, such as she feared she had bade farewell to for ever …. (Udolpho 169)

If the first paragraph, where Annette talks about what she likes, concerns her taste, the second compares her taste to Emily’s taste and suggests the possibility of an aesthetic affinity between them. Notable is that the third paragraph, which could dialectically synthesize the previous paragraphs in Emily’s “fancy,” is devoid of Annette who is demoted to one of “the circumstances of her departure,” just as in reality their relationship culminates in her removal from La Vallée. Instead, Emily’s mind is preoccupied with Valancourt, who can approve and protect her taste, and the three phases of dialectics presage the failed relationship and eventual separation between Emily and Annette.

Annette’s preference for “pleasant woods and hills” over a town at first appears to epitomize her taste. In contrast to Emily’s taste that inclines toward the sublime, Annette likes what might be conventionally categorized under the notion of the beautiful.
Such a strict division, however, turns out to be of no use in determining her taste, for she instantly limits the extent of her preference by associating the town with Venice, where there are “no woods, or hills, or fields.” In other words, Annette circumscribes her emotion by adding a specific example to the statement, and this act of circumscription characterizes her taste as circumstantial rather than absolute. The same characterization continues to be effective, especially when she expresses her terror in words that not only limit pain but also achieve comic relief.38 For example, when asked about sleeping in “the chamber where the black veil hangs” in Udolpho, Annette exclaims, “O, no, ma’amiselle, … I would not sleep in the room, now, for a thousand sequins!” (Udolpho 301). Here, the unimaginable amount of her terror is transferred into and encompassed by such a quantifiable example as “a thousand sequins.” Again, when she is confined in a room for her own safety by Ludovico, Annette exclaims, “O holy Mary! … am I to stay here by myself all night! I shall be frightened out of my senses, and I shall die of hunger; I have had nothing to eat since dinner!” (Udolpho 322). Circumscribed by a variety of things, her terror is thus rightly described, to use Emily’s words, as “heterogeneous distresses” (Udolpho 322), and, if we can extrapolate the words,

38 Underlining “the hybridity of most Gothic novels,” Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik in Gothic and the Comic Turn argue that “the comic turn in Gothic is … a key aspect of Gothic’s essential hybridity” (3, 12). “The result” of comic turns, they continue, “is not so much an abdication of the powers of horror as a process of turning them to creative purpose” (12-13). Thus, they conclude, “The comic turn … does not just function as relief and is not only negatively deconstructive; it is also dialogic, opening up possibilities. Echoing the words of Carol Shields, it is entirely appropriate that in troubled times writers head off in the not so frivolous direction of comic fiction” (166). Though there is no specific mention of Annette, their conclusion well explains the extent and nature of her character and taste.
Annette’s taste that reflects her interest in diverse things can be characterized as heterogeneous taste.

Regardless of her taste, Annette is without delay described as “the talkative Annette.” This image is not particularly limited to her, as Terry Castle points out that “the garrulous servant, modeled in part on Shakespearean prototypes, is a stock figure in eighteenth-century Gothic fiction” (686). Annette undoubtedly plays the role of a typical “garrulous servant,” who offers “a pleasing dramatic contrast.” As noted earlier, however, she functions not just as opposite but also as solace to Emily’s terror, which facilitates a supposition that her garrulity purports not so much to contradict Emily’s gravity as to affect it. In fact, if put under the scrutiny it deserves, Annette’s garrulity turns out to be an image created not so much by her talking too much as by her typical way of talking, namely, circumlocution. That is, almost every time she talks about an important or secretive matter that piques Emily’s curiosity and terror, Annette repeatedly digress by adding to her story diverse matters. For example, while telling Emily of the secret of Signora Laurentini who is allegedly murdered in Udolpho, she shortly interrupts herself by mentioning a “noise” and then resumes: “[Signora Laurentini] was very melancholy and unhappy a long while, and used to walk about upon the terrace, there, under the windows, by herself, and cry so! It would have done your heart good to hear her. That is—I don’t mean good, but it would have made you cry too, as they tell me” (Udolpho 237). Again, Annette puts off her story by turning her focus away from
Signora Laurentini onto undesignated people.\textsuperscript{39} Listening to her circumlocution, Emily in turn becomes impatient and remonstrates with her, “tell me the substance of your tale” (\textit{Udolpho} 237), just as she often does by saying “do not trifle with me” (\textit{Udolpho} 222) or “This trifling is insupportable… pray thee, Annette, do not torture my patience any longer” (\textit{Udolpho} 332).

It is quite appropriate that circumscription is Annette’s way to express her emotion and circumlocution is her way to deliver a story. The circumscription in this case exercises both “the marking out of limits” and “encompassing” (\textit{OED}) since it at once operates by unceasing inclusion, rather than strict exclusion, and restricts emotion from being excessive. This double-edged exercise, though sounding self-contradictory, proves to be effective because sensibility, when self-indulgent, becomes oblivious to surroundings and unable to receive variegated emotional inputs from them.

Circumlocution, defined as “speaking in a roundabout or indirect way” (\textit{OED}), puts the exercise in continuous practice by verbalizing surroundings and keeping them in an affective relationship to the speaker.\textsuperscript{40} In this light, St. Aubert’s deathbed advice might be read as a warning against the unnatural extraction of emotion from “every

\textsuperscript{39} Examining “The temporality created in \textit{Udolpho} [that] is mythic and non-linear … where time flows in circles of repetition,” Richard S. Albright contends that “Radcliffe’s novel served as an antidote to revolutionary fears and also to the whole idea of progress and its temporally dissociative effects, these antidotal properties contributing to its success during this decade” (69, 50 respectively). Though making no such historically specific references, Annette’s procrastination can be also viewed as “an antidote” to gothic terrors.

\textsuperscript{40} Though interested in a different subject, that is, “the poems buried within the novel,” Ellen Arnold seems to underline the significance or subversiveness of circumlocution by pointing out that while “the novel holds up masculine rationality as the ultimate values, … the poems insist on the value of feminine sensibility (21, 23). For, from the narrative point of view, the poems are attendant to the story and delaying it.
surrounding circumstance,” that is, the subjective exclusion of surroundings from affective resources. It is also sensibility’s warning against the arbitrary, willful injunction of judgment that can make one fixate on a single object and its emotional effect. Durant is right in saying that “The real dangers inherent in the gothic world that Mrs. Radcliffe invents are … the possibility that the heroine’s mind might be so coarsened that it would lose its beautiful sensitivity to her circumstances” (“Aesthetic Heroism” 185). Yet, in his preoccupation with the heroine’s aesthetic lesson, namely, “aesthetic heroism,” Durant overlooks the fact that there is more than a warning in the novel, that Annette’s taste, operating by circumscription and circumlocution, creates constant awareness of circumstances that help stop emotion from becoming excessive and opens a strong possibility of an affective, or even affectionate, relationship.

Annette’s heterogeneous taste, operating on circumscription and circumlocution to moderate sensibility, keeps her always “on the wing for the new wonders” (Udolpho 299). In this way, her sensibility enacts the kind of imagination that Burke describes as “a sort of creative power of its own; either in representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and manner in which they were received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and according to a different order” (Enquiry 68). She also juxtaposes “two distinct objects” such as fear and hunger and shows “a far greater alacrity and satisfaction in tracing resemblances,” by which “we produce new images, we unite, we create, we enlarge our stock” (Enquiry 69). Following her homogeneous taste, Emily entrusts her judgment with the task of regulating imagination and controlling sensibility, and she accordingly denounces Annette’s taste for indulging
in “the wonderful” and lacking judgment. But, ironically, Emily turns out to be the one who periodically falls into self-indulgence, as her judgment is “extracting the excess of misery” from her mind and projects it onto “every surrounding object.” Thus, as they are walking toward the chamber in which the picture of Signora Laurentini hangs, Emily asks, ‘Is it veiled?’

‘Dear ma’amelle!’ said Annette, fixing her eyes on Emily’s face, ‘what makes you look so pale?—are you ill?’

‘No, Annette, I am well enough, but I have no desire to see this picture; return into the hall.’

‘What! ma’am, not to see the lady of this castle?’ said the girl—‘the lady, who disappeared so strangely? Well! now, I would have run to the furthest mountain we can see, yonder, to have got a sight of such a picture; and, to speak my mind, that strange story is all, that makes me care about this old castle, though it makes me thrill all over, as it were, whenever I think of it.’

‘Yes, Annette, you love the wonderful; but do you know, that, unless you guard against this inclination, it will lead you into all the misery of superstition?’

Annette might have smiled in her turn, at this sage observation of Emily, who could tremble with ideal terrors, as much as herself, and listen almost as eagerly to the recital of a mysterious story. (Udolpho 278)

Annette’s silent response to Emily’s advice, in which she “might have smiled” rather than actually doing so, follows her, not Emily’s, “sage observation” that poignantly exposes Emily’s tendency to indulge. In fact, it is Emily, not Annette, who, obsessed
with the veil, suffers “the misery of superstition” by her own “inclination” and reveals it through her pale face. Annette “might have smiled” at this irony if she had been aware neither of her own circumstance as a servant, nor of Emily’s “forsake[n]” circumstance (Udolpho 351). In other words, Annette reaches her judgment through “the delicate and refined play of the imagination” (Enquiry 75) that her sensibility encourages by bringing her into contact with heterogeneous circumstances. If Emily has an aesthetic taste for homogeneity, Annette can be said to have a taste for heterogeneity, a taste that is not just expressive of one’s personal preference but also contributory to appeasing sublime terrors and, more importantly, cultivating affectionate relationships. Annette’s heterogeneous taste whose “social quality” is active in gothic situations thus amounts to an aesthetical system in which sensibility takes priority to imagination and judgment. This system, I would propose here, is a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful.  

Annette’s heterogeneous taste resonates with Burke’s insistence on prioritizing sensibility, and “the delicate and refined play of the imagination,” to judgment, whose objective is not to regulate but to conform to this play. Concluding his discussion of taste, Burke thus writes, “It is known that the Taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly as we improve our judgment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by frequent exercise” (Enquiry 77). While granting the contribution of judgment to “the best Taste,” Burke makes it clear that judgment should follow the guidance of

41 If Annette practices the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful by circumscription and circumlocution, the novel as a whole can be seen as practicing the aesthetics by inserting many epigrams and descriptions of picturesque sceneries into the main narrative following Emily. Especially, the descriptions, though invoking sublime feelings in Emily, can divert readers from gothic terrors, implying that the beautiful is necessary to extract sublime pleasure from such terrors.
sensibility so as to be circumstantial and imaginative. For, without such guidance, 
judgment consults nothing but “the naked reason” (75) or “all the nakedness and solitude 
of metaphysical abstraction” in which only “[h]ypocrisy delights” (Reflection 90, 155).
Burke’s emphasis on the guidance of sensibility coincides with his underscoring of 
circumstances, which he believes stand opposite to the sublime and close to the beautiful. 
“Circumstances,” he postulates, “give in reality to every political principle its 
distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render 
every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind” (Reflections 90).
Based on this postulate on circumstances, Burke further develops it as a moral 
imperative: “If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom, when we work only 
upon inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty too, when the subject of our 
demolition and construction is not brick and timber, but sentient beings” (Reflections 
280-81).

But, in Reflections, Burke appears as much hopeful of implementing his postulate 
and subsequent moral imperative in England as mournful of losing them in France, 
where the aftermath of the revolution is devoid of the beautiful:

All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle, and obedience liberal, 
which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation, 
incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private 
society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. 
All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, 
furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and
the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked
shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be
exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion. (*Reflections* 171)

In this passage, “All the pleasing illusions,” “the different shades of life,” “all the decent
drapery of life,” “All the super-added ideas,” and “the wardrobe of a moral imagination”
collectively commemorate the significance of circumstances, by which the beautiful has
“made power gentle” and does “beautify and soften private society,” which is now all
but “exploded” by the “metaphysical abstraction” of the sublime.

We could be equally mournful of the end of *Udolpho*, where the relocation of
Annette in “the magnificence of Epourville,” separated from Emily in La Vallée,
presages the loss of her heterogeneous taste and consequently of the gothic aesthetics of
the beautiful. In a way, the relocation can be seen as an evasive gesture acknowledging
the nature and function of what Annette is capable of, of how the beautiful manages “the
irresistible force of circumstances,” whose heterogeneity is often regarded as terrifying,

42 It is in this pivotal role of circumstance that recent critics look for a way to resolve “an
abundance of apparent contrasts” in Burke (Crowe 11). John Angus Campbell, as early
as 1970, examines Burke’s rhetorical use of circumstance and argues, “Burke has invited
the reader to use circumstance, the mode of argument most congenial to his own cause,
in order to cancel abstraction, the mode of argument most congenial to the cause of the
revolutionaries” (1769). Campbell, however, underlines Burke’s political approach to
circumstance by saying that “he so carefully controls” the circumstance (1773). More
recently and notably, marking the two hundredth anniversary of the publication of
*Reflections*, *The Enduring Edmund Burke: Bicentennial Essays* begins with an essay
stating that “circumstances are working upon our ‘untaught feeling’” (Crowe 22). In the
same edition, Joseph Pappin II in his “Edmund Burke’s Philosophy of Rights” describes
“Burke’s philosophy of the rights of men” as “built upon a political method that is
critical of abstract reasoning based on principles divorced from historical circumstances
and highly critical of the associated concepts of the social contract, the state of nature,
absolute rights and the democratic theory of political representation” (115).
and converts it into an opportunity for an affectionate relationship. By contrast, the
sublime, soon to be strengthened and privileged by Kant at the turn of the nineteenth
century, transforms itself to compensate for the loss, calling for “the emergence of a new
aesthetic-affective dynamic” (White 74). Stephen K. White sums up this new
“dynamic” as follows:

A regenerated, but radically different, sublime was in circulation. One might
characterize this phenomenon as a “humanization” of the sublime. This term has
been used to denote a certain tendency in how the sublime began to be rethought
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century art and literature. Humanization in this sense
means that the object of sublime experience is increasingly associated with feats
of human subjectivity; for example, those of the genius in the eyes of the
romantics, or those of the avant-garde artist who is out to shock her audience.

(White 74)

This “regenerated, but radically different sublime,” unlike the one theorized in Enquiry,
becomes less terrible and more manageable, now that it is humanized, that is, prescribed
by humanly acceptable norms. The gothic, thus subjected to the sway of the sublime
that is, as mentioned earlier, inherently ambiguous, retreats into the dark side of it, while
romanticism enjoys itself on the bright side. In the process, gothic aesthetics, which
entrusts the beautiful with the task of forming an affectionate relationship with the
sublime, has been almost obliterated. As a result, the gothic is unable to satisfy, at least

43 Kant, for one, humanizes the sublime by prescribing “the moral feeling” to it, but as
will be seen in the next chapter, the sublime is bound to go beyond such norms, which
calls for another way to contain it, since the beautiful, which Burke and Radcliffe
suggest as a solution, is dismissed.
for a long while, “[t]he true standard of the arts,” which, Burke adds to his first edition of *Enquiry*, lies “in every man’s power, and an easy observation of the most common, sometimes of the meanest in nature, will give the truest lights, where the greatest sagacity and industry that slights such observation, must leave us in the dark, or what is worse, amuse and mislead us by false lights” (99).

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44 The passage is from Part I, “Introduction on Taste,” which Burke adds to the second edition of *Enquiry*. 
CHAPTER III
A BEAUTIFUL MONSTER: THE FALL OF THE GOTHIC AESTHETICS OF
THE BEAUTIFUL

In the winter of 1999, at a symposium named *Beauty Matters*, Peg Zeglin Brand recalled Arthur C. Danto’s question, “Whatever happened to beauty?” and answered, “It’s back … with a vengeance” (8). Danto, however, may have had a different answer in mind when he asked the question in 1992. In his “Beauty and Morality,” Danto defines this age as “an age of indignation” and underlines “the lesson that art has its limits as a moral arm,” since beauty generally “perceived as consolatory, […] is morally inconsistent with the indignation appropriate to an accusatory art” (“Beauty and Morality” 36, 34 respectively). Disinterested and pacifying, “beauty,” he concludes, “may be in for rather a long exile” (Danto 37). Just for the same reason, however, Kathleen Marie Higgins in “Whatever Happened to Beauty? A Response to Danto” contends that we need beauty because of its “mesmerizing impact … [that] may, even in miserable conditions, rekindle our sensitivity” (283). Higgins believes that “sensitivity” will help us to develop moral insight from “changing circumstances” and ultimately to have “faith in the improvability of things and in the fundamental soundness

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45 The symposium that took place at a conference entitled *Whatever Happened to Beauty?* was convened “to locate one trajectory of the new wave of discussions about beauty beyond the customary confines of analytic aesthetics and to situate it at the intersection of aesthetics, ethics, social-political philosophy, and cultural criticism” (Brand 1).
46 Danto wrote of the conference in *Nation*: “I spent a weekend at the University of Texas, invited there to consider, in the company of artists, critics, historians and philosophers of art, the question ‘Whatever Happened to Beauty?’” And he assessed it as “a stimulating conference if an inconclusive one.”
of what is to be improved” (283). Considering this recurring discussion and interest concerning beauty, it might be safe to say that beauty, vengeful or kind-hearted, is rather out of than “in for rather a long exile.”

The resurgent interest in beauty at the turn of the century doesn’t of course mean that beauty has been actually “in exile,” that is, absent. On the contrary, with the art market unceasingly expanding from the nineteenth century onwards and various types of media sending out images and sounds that profess to be “beautiful” throughout the twentieth century, beauty might have been more than abundant. This ostentatious profusion, however, has taken its toll on beauty. As Wendy Steiner points out in *Venus in Exile: The Rejection of Beauty in Twentieth-Century Art* beauty in the twentieth century became at once fascinating and repulsive as it was feminized or, worse, crushed into “the mere charming”—that is, into mere ornaments and fetishes—and deprived of its properties of “harmony, proportion, comfort, and stasis” (155).

Given that, in the previous chapter, the same properties have been found operating in the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, it might be possible to say that such depravation, which “involved a

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47 Robert Jensen in *Marketing Modernism in Fin-de-Siecle Europe* quotes P.G. Hammerton, the publisher of *The Portfolio*, who wrote in 1867, “the power of money over art has never been stronger than it is now” (20). In his study on the “booming export business” of “French modernist” art to Britain and America in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Jensen finds that “The dialogue of money and art is manifest in the language, in the institutions, and in the actions of modernist artists and their audiences” (10).

48 That beauty is “at once fascinating and repulsive” indicates that beauty is conflated with or subjected to the sublime in modern aesthetics, losing its own categorical properties. As will be noted in the following discussion of Kant’s aesthetics in this chapter, the sublime is promised a “moral feeling” that moves a subject beyond such fascination and repulsion, whereas the beautiful isn’t. Deprived of its properties and the moral feeling, the beautiful becomes “the mere charming.”
double dehumanization: art reduced to thing; audience reduced to stereotype” (Steiner xxii), indicates that this gothic aesthetics has been either misplaced in, or more likely banished from, modern society. With the resurgent interest in beauty, therefore, we might be able to locate and enfranchise the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful so that beauty may take, to borrow Marcia Muelder Eaton’s phrase, a “contextual turn,” meaning that “beauty is a contextual property deeply connected to factual beliefs and moral attitudes” (Eaton 11, 12). But, while thus employed, one cannot help asking, “whatever happened to the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful?”

To answer the question, we first need to return to The Mysteries of Udolpho, where the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful works to bind Emily and Annette together in an affectionate relationship despite/ because of “the irresistible force of circumstances.” Ironically, the novel also stages the disappearance of the aesthetics by separating Annette from Emily at the end: Emily lives in “the pleasant and long-loved shades of La Vallée” and Annette is relocated in “the magnificence of Epourville.” Aesthetically, the separation mirrors Emily’s decision to control or at least divert “[the] force of circumstances” so that she can enjoy them selectively and, more important, tastefully “a few months in the year … in tender respect” (Radcliffe 672). It also demonstrates the fact that Emily prioritizes judgment to the unceasing working of sensibility and, subsequently, to the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful that Annette practices in her “beautiful” way of encompassing the force. No matter how emblematic it might be of the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, however, the separation admittedly remains literal and particular. For a more convincing answer to the question of the gothic aesthetics of the
beautiful, we must locate an aesthetic frame that has theorized and universalized the separation, one that has so dominated modern aesthetics as to force beauty into a long exile.

No other aesthetic frame has been more dominant than the one that Immanuel Kant designs in his *Critique of Judgment*, given the indisputable fact that his aesthetics, and his notion of the sublime in particular, has built the most enduring archetype for modern aesthetics. Kari Elise Lokke, in “The Role of Sublimity in the Development of Modernist Aesthetics,” traces “a direct chain of influence from Burke’s treatise, by way of Kant and Schiller and the Schlegel brothers, through Mme. de Staël to the French Symbolists,” a chain that “will render evident the degree to which 19th century standards of poetic beauty are a transformation of the late 18th century concept of sublimity” (421-2). 49 Though primarily concerned with twentieth-century art, Steiner also traces “the aesthetic model” for the “dehumanization of modernism” back to the late eighteenth-century “experience of the Kantian sublime,” in which “the non-recognition of the self in the Other” prohibits the self and “a valuable Other” from having a “pleasurable and complex reciprocity” (xxiv). As Lokke, Steiner, and many others, readily agree, Kant’s aesthetics apparently has succeeded in erecting and propagating a frame that finalizes the

49 Lokke underscores that, contrary to Burke who “sees the mind and body having similar interests” and emphasizes the “extreme emotion and … rather crude psychologizing” of the sublime, Kant upholds “a profound dualism” in which “sublimity represents the struggle to break the limits of sensuous form in order to find a subjective equivalent of infinity within the inner self” (423). Modernist aesthetics, and the aesthetics of French Symbolism in particular, she argues, was a convergence of “the two ends of this tradition [of the sublime],” founded by Burke and Kant in the late eighteenth century (424, 427, 428). This may be true, but I want to point out that Lokke, in doing so, misrepresents Burke as prioritizing the sublime.
separation of the sublime from the beautiful and judgment from sensibility—a frame that I believe is responsible for the disappearance of the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful.

Kant’s aesthetics reframes both Burke’s aesthetics and the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful within the overwrought tradition of the sublime and render them as if preoccupied with the sublime.\footnote{In her discussion of Burke’s sublime, Frances Ferguson is right in saying that “it is still somewhat startling to find that critics influenced by structuralist and deconstructive approaches ignore the neat binarism of ‘the sublime and the beautiful’ in their rush to the ‘real’ subject, the sublime” (45). Such a rush, of course, reflects the predominance of the Kantian sublime in twentieth century aesthetics and the tendency to study Burke only in relation to Kant, which results in overlooking Burke’s theory of the beautiful.} It becomes a critical commonplace—mistakenly, I would argue—that Burke helped introduce the sublime into aesthetics and that the gothic wanted to represent the sublime. David B. Morris, for instance, finds in gothic fiction the rather “uncomfortable fact” that “the quest for a single, unchanging feature or essence is futile,” that “there is no essence of the sublime” (300), and refers to this emptied-out sublime of the gothic as “gothic sublimity.” Vijay Mishra in *Gothic Sublime*, on the other hand, detects “uncanny resemblances” of “the postmodern definitions of the gothic (recall Jackson and Sedgwick in particular) … with Lyotard’s readings of the postmodern sublime” and theorizes “the Gothic sublime” as “a version of the Lacanian Real as ‘the embodiment of a pure negativity’ into which the subject inscribes itself as an absence, a lack in the structure itself” (17). “The Gothic sublime,” he continues, “may be read as a category of the postmodern, insofar as the postmodern is also marked by the problematizing of what had hitherto been an uncritical identity of language and the world” (43). In their delineation of the gothic sublime as a negative version of the Kantian sublime, both Morris and Mishra portrays gothic aesthetics as making a merely
reactionary or at best a subversive gesture to the sublime and disregards the beautiful, hence remaining fragmentary. In fact, Mishra claims that “the Gothic sublime” inevitably “threatens the notion of the beautiful, which is predicated on an aesthetic conception of the harmony of understanding and imagination,” and so “confiscates the domain of the beautiful and denies it a separate existence” (41, 42). Accordingly, “For the gothic,” he states, “there is no such thing as the aesthetics of the beautiful, there is only the superabundance of the sublime” (42).

But the success Kant’s aesthetics enjoys in propagating the sublime and suppressing the beautiful proves to be a seriously limited one, if not a failure, since it is only confined within the field of aesthetics. Attacking the “peculiarly romantic model of the artist as quintessential outsider, set off from society by the special traits of talent and genius,” Larry Gross uses “the image of a reservation” to denote “the alienation of art from ‘real life’” and writes, “we tend to view the arts as institutions that exist at the fringe of society. There are cultural ‘spaces’ that real people visit in their spare, fringe time but that only fringe, spare people inhabit in their real time” (1). In these “spaces” such as schools, museums, galleries, or art markets, aesthetics may have thrived and acquired autonomy, but at the same time, it has let itself become disenfranchised in matters not only of “ethics, socio-political philosophy, and cultural criticism” but of everyday life in society. For these matters, society has to turn to something other than aesthetics, namely, science that is thought to provide more calculated and logical—therefore, more efficient and reasonable—solutions to social issues and ways of life.
Reading Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* with/against Kant’s *Critique* will help us to understand how Kant’s analogy succeeds in setting up a frame that separates the sublime and the beautiful, his aesthetics from the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful. Yet, the novel also shows us the illusive and ultimately failed success of Kant’s aesthetics and intimates what will take the place of aesthetics in matters for which the properties of the beautiful—“harmony, proportion, comfort, and stasis”—have been responsible. The novel’s engagement in debates about Kant’s aesthetics is widely acknowledged, thus endorsing such a reading. Steiner, for example, sees in the novel a prophecy of “the modernist trouble with beauty with astonishing percipience,” and underlines that “*Frankenstein* is as important an investigation of creativity and aesthetic experience in the realm of fiction as Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* was in the realm of philosophy” (3, 4). Vishra on the other hand concludes his study of the gothic sublime with a chapter entitled “Frankenstein: Sublime as Desecration/ Decreation,” and refers to “Frankenstein’s “work-shop of filthy creation” as the perverse site of the technological sublime” (200), which replaces “the ‘purely Kantian’ gothic sublime as an epistemological apparatus for the understanding of a cultural force field called the postmodern” (257). While Steiner and Vishra base the relationship between *Frankenstein* and the *Critique* on the sublime, I will argue in this chapter that the novel

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51 The choice of *Frankenstein* could be further justified, given Chris Baldwick’s observation that the monster stands in opposition to “the insistently organic imagery of Burke’s writings, in which the organic integrity of the state is contrasted with the ridiculous and deadly artificial concoctions of the *philosophes*” (34). Although Baldwick emphasizes its political implications, Burke’s “organic imagery” certainly has an aesthetic orientation, especially given the social nature of the beautiful, and this further suggests how the text might provide a linkage between Burke and Kant.
disturbs that relationship not by splitting the sublime in half (normal/ perverse) but by adding to it the presence of the beautiful, a presence that the monster embodies in the book. The monster, though ugly in his appearance, depends on his sensibility, rather than judgment, and demonstrates characteristics that Burke attributes to the beautiful: “love and affection” and desire for society. Furthermore, *Frankenstein* ingeniously imposes the aesthetic disturbance caused by Frankenstein and the monster upon a third character, Walton, intimating what will happen after the disappearance of the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful.

1. A Sublime Aesthetics: Kant Revisited

   The gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, which we have observed being active in Radcliffe’s *Udolpho*, works by inclusion. Based on the incessant work of sensibility, it works to encompass “the irresistible force of circumstances,” rather than to block it, suggesting that heterogeneous circumstances, if given time and patience, are able to compensate one another and create harmony in the process. Accordingly, the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful asks for no abstract, pre-determined principle, based on which one might immediately make aesthetic judgments of these circumstances. Kant, however, would find this principle-less aesthetics as problematic as he does “the physiological [aesthetics] worked out by Burke and by many clearheaded men among us” (Kant 119). Writing *Critique of Judgment* to accomplish “[the] transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgment,” Kant rejects these aesthetics because of the lack of universality in using pain and pleasure as the basis of aesthetic judgment:
If [...] we place the satisfaction in the object altogether in the fact that it gratifies us by charm or emotion, we must not assume that any *other* man agrees with the aesthetic judgment which we pass, for as to these each one rightly consults his own individual sensibility. But in that case all censorship of taste would disappear, except indeed the example afforded by the accidental agreement of others in their judgments were regarded as *commanding* our assent; and this principle we should probably resist, and should appeal to the natural right of subjecting the judgment, which rests on the immediate feeling of our own well-being, to our own sense and not to that of any other man. (Kant 119)

Kant’s distrust of “individual sensibility,” set up as a direct criticism of Burke, foregrounds his “exposition of aesthetic judgment.” If “the judgment of taste is not to be valid merely egoistically, but according to its inner nature,” he continues, “there must lie at its basis some a priori principle (whether objective or subjective) to which we can never attain by seeking out the empirical laws of mental changes” (119-20).

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52 If Burke emphasizes the active nature of sensibility, Kant presupposes that sensibility is a “passive faculty for perceiving sensations or having ‘intuitions’” (McCloskey 61). Since this “passive faculty” creates “the egocentric predicament,” Mary McCloskey suggests that “Kant’s epistemology [helps] humans escape from the egocentric predicament because their active cognitive powers, imagination and understanding, impose an interpersonal and public pattern upon sensation” (61). But McCloskey’s suggestion doesn’t explain Kant’s eventual resort to ethics, not to epistemology, for help, and it also is contradicted by recent criticism of Kant’s epistemology for engendering egotistical, masculinist, Eurocentric, or anthropocentric strands in modern society.

53 I am aware of the general understanding that Kant in his “resolution of the antinomy of taste” was as critical of empiricist aesthetics as of the rationalist aesthetics that had been founded by Baumgarten and Mendelssohn, “the advocates of beauty as perfection” (Meerbote 14, 7 respectively). As he differentiates the beautiful from the good and “demotes beauty as perfections to second-class citizenship, to the status of adherent or non-free beauty,” Kant is often credited for rendering aesthetics so autonomous that it
Having considered the four moments of the beautiful in “Analytic of the Beautiful,” Kant thus ends the section by proposing “a common sense,” though “indeterminate” itself, as “[the] a priori principle” of the beautiful (77). But Kant is not can be “standing side by side with his metaphysics, his epistemology, and his ethics” (Meerbote 8, 14). But as will be discussed later, such an understanding doesn’t explain why “Analytic of the Sublime” is inserted in his Critique and, more urgently, how the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgments is allowed in this autonomous aesthetics. It seems to me that Kant’s Critique of Judgment ascertains not autonomy but the subjection of aesthetics to reason, and this relocates him in what Meerbote calls “the rationalist camp” (7).

That the a priori principle is “no other than subjective” invites the following questions (37). First, how can we ensure the principle of being a priori? Second, if we can, and if pain and pleasure in “individual sensibility” no longer serve as the basis of aesthetic judgment, what characterizes the principle as aesthetic? Third, if there is an aesthetic principle that is a priori, not individually variable, why does it still have to be “subjective,” not “objective?” And finally, if it is “subjective,” where can we find an assurance that aesthetic judgment is not affected by “subjective” issues? The four moments of “Analytic of the Beautiful” are Kant’s answers to these questions. The first moment—“Taste is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful” (45)—answers the last question, since “the judgment of taste is merely contemplative; i.e., it is a judgment which, indifferent as regards the existence of an object, compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and pain” (44-45). As for the third question, Kant provides the second moment: “The beautiful is that which pleases universally without [requiring] a concept” (54). Although we “speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a characteristic of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object by means of concepts of it),” Kant postulates that aesthetic judgment must be “subjective” because it “involves merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject” (46). The characteristic of the principle of aesthetic judgment is given in the third moment: “Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose” (73). Lastly, the principle of aesthetic judgment must be a priori, since otherwise no judgment is promised universality. That is, there is “a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state” (74), a rule that is the “indeterminate norm of a common sense [which] is actually presupposed by us, as is shown by our claim to lay down judgments of taste” (77).

Derrida observes that in Kant “common sense is constantly presupposed by the Critique, which nevertheless holds back the analysis of it,” and argues that “this suspension ensures the complicity of a moral discourse and an empirical culturalism”
satisfied because, first of all, a common sense can be confused with the universality of sensibility that Burke underlines in his “physiological aesthetics,” from which Kant wants to distance his aesthetics. Secondly, a common sense relies too much on the faculty of cognition, since “the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge” is being suggested as the “ground for presupposing a common sense” (75, 76). That is, although Kant has claimed that “a common sense […] is essentially different from common understanding, which people sometimes call common sense (sensus communis),” such dependency subjects a common sense to common sense, contradicting his own claim. Due to these shortcomings, a common sense, though perhaps fit to be the principle of the beautiful, falls short of becoming the a priori principle that Kant designs for his aesthetics, so he must go somewhere very different from the beautiful to find such a principle, which explains why he inserts “Analytic of the Sublime.”

While “both please in themselves” and “neither presupposes a judgment of sense nor a judgment logically determined,” the sublime and the beautiful have “remarkable differences” (Kant 82), of which Kant writes as he begins “Analytic of the Sublime”:

The beautiful in nature is connected with the form of the object, which consists in having [definite] boundaries. The sublime, on the other hand, is to be found in a

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(The Truth in Painting 35). Derrida’s reading of the Critique illustrates that Kant’s aesthetics is used as “the parergon” whose “anthropological principle” helps maintain this “complicity” and “the analogy between determinant judgments and reflexive judgments” (The Truth 117). His reading will be further discussed later in this section, but I want to point out here that the “complicity” is less in a common sense than in “the moral feeling,” which, in my opinion, Kant introduces to underwrite “the analogy.”
formless object, so far as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is represented, and yet its totality is also present to thought. Thus the beautiful seems to be regarded as the presentation of an indefinite concept of understanding, the sublime as that of a like concept of reason. ... [the feeling of the sublime] is a pleasure that arises only indirectly; viz. it is produced by the feeling of a momentary checking of the vital powers and a consequent stronger overflow of them, so that it seems to be regarded as emotion—not play, but earnest in the exercise of the imagination. Hence it is incompatible with [physical] charm; and as the mind is not merely attracted by the object but is ever being alternately repelled, the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much involve a positive pleasure as admiration or respect, which rather deserves to be called negative pleasure. (82-83)

The beautiful resembles “an indefinite concept of understanding,” i.e. common sense, since it makes us “merely attracted by the object” that affects our “individual sensibility.” By contrast, the sublime is akin to “a like concept of reason,” and we are “alternately repelled [by the object],” which frees us from “common understanding” and “individual sensibility.” The shortcomings of a common sense in the beautiful are thus negated in the sublime that promises “what deserves to be called negative pleasure,” and so Kant comfortably proceeds to find how this “negative pleasure” comes about by explaining the “twofold way of representing the sublime,” namely, the mathematical and dynamic sublimes.
While the mathematical sublime drives from “that in comparison with which everything else is small” and demonstrates in “the very incapacity [of measuring magnitude mathematically] … the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of the same subject,” “the dynamically sublime” enables us to “raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height and discover in us a faculty of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature” (Kant 88, 98, 100-101). The sublime elevates “the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make felt the proper sublimity of its destination” (101). This proper “destination” of the sublime (rather, the purpose of the sublime) doesn’t lead to what is psychological or egotistical but “to what is moral,” validating “the presupposition of the moral feeling [in man][sic]” (105, 106). Delivered by the “twofold way of representing the sublime,” the moral feeling thus ascertains that “the negative pleasure” of the sublime stems from “the unlimited faculty” of/in a subject and remains akin to “the reason, the faculty of ideas,” which is necessarily a priori. With this certainty, Kant concludes his analytics of the beautiful and the sublime by raising “aesthetic judgments … out of empirical psychology … into transcendental philosophy” (106).

The moral feeling is subjective and a priori enough to secure the sublime a prestigious place in transcendental aesthetics, but no such security will be given to Kant’s aesthetics, unless it separates itself from the beautiful, from the principle of a common sense. It must gain an unbridgeable distance from the beautiful and bring the sublime immeasurably close to the moral, so Kant introduces another one of the
“remarkable differences” between those two aesthetic categories. As “the result of the foregoing exposition of the two aesthetical judgments,” Kant in “General Remark upon the Exposition of the Aesthetical Reflective Judgment” offers “the following short explanations:”

The beautiful is what pleases in the mere judgment (and therefore not by the medium of sensation in accordance with a concept of the understanding). It follows at once from this that it must please apart from all interest.

The sublime is what pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of sense. (107)

Noticeable in these “short explanations” is the added emphasis on immediacy by using such words as “at once” and “immediately.” But, in the beautiful, immediacy primarily pertains to a logical sequence, as it only “follows […] from” the observation of “the mere judgment,” which explains the imperative “must.” On the other hand, the explanation of the sublime allows no such interval, and immediacy is literally guaranteed
by the word, “immediately,”

56 even if, according to the “foregoing exposition,” the sublime undergoes a certain process to produce “negative pleasure.”

57 This difference of immediacy in the beautiful and the sublime, though “short” in time, assigns them widely different positions in Kant’s aesthetics, because immediacy is what guarantees the purity of judgment, and purity, in turn, the universal communicability of that judgment. The logical certainty of the “must” may hypothetically ensure the beautiful of immediacy, but it is not so assuring because “Empirically the beautiful interests only in society” (Kant 139). And “If we admit the impulse to society as natural to man, […] we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our feeling to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which everyone’s natural inclination desires” (Kant 139). Although this empirical association of the beautiful with “the impulse to society” is “of no importance,” Kant nevertheless addresses it as follows.

We can only say this much about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in

56 In the original German text, the quoted passage reads:

Schön ist das, was in der bloßen Beurteilung (also nicht vermittelt der Empfindung des Sinnes nach einem Begriffe des Verstandes) gefällt. Hieraus folgt von selbst, daß es ohne alles Interesse gefallen müsse.

Erhaben ist das, was durch seinen Widerstand gegen das Interesse der Sinne unmittelbar gefällt.

The only notable difference from the English version is “von selbst,” which means rather “self-evident” than “at once.” This difference would make my point clearer, if the English translation went with “self-evident,” since that suggests the pleasure of the beautiful solely as a logical necessity.

57 Gary Banham observes that the “Remark” is peculiar, since it “tend[s] to reinforce … the closeness of the sublime feeling to the moral feeling when we might have expected more care to demarcate these two feelings from each other” (92-93).
taste itself. Since it is subservient to inclination, however refined the latter may be, it may easily be confounded with all the inclinations and passions which attain their greatest variety and highest degree in society; and the interest in the beautiful, if it is grounded thereon, can only furnish a very ambiguous transition from the pleasant to the good. (140)

But whether this can or cannot be furthered by taste, taken in its purity, is “what we now have to investigate” (140). For if “the impulse to society” is as “natural to man” as the “a priori principle” of judgment of taste, I’d like to ask why it is of “no importance” in aesthetic experience. Paul Guyer addresses this question in “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste,” noting that “Kant supposes that we do in fact have an empirical interest in communication, as the basis of society, and that because our pleasure in beauty is communicable beautiful objects can become occasions for communication and gratify this inclination” (50). Guyer values “the impulse of society” to the extent that the “transformation of taste from an abstract faculty for the estimation of intersubjectivity into a concert instrument for the socialization of mankind can occur only where some form of society does exist” (50). As Kant has warned, however, it is this kind of instrumentalization of the beautiful that renders intervening interests possible and universal communicability impossible. Consequently, his aesthetics must dispense with the beautiful so as to prohibit “all the inclinations and passions” from confusing the nature of aesthetic experience and tainting the purity of aesthetic judgment.

Due to its faltering immediacy, the beautiful fails to yield the necessary simultaneity of experience and judgment to prevent any interference. Kant thus insists
that the beautiful is “of no importance” in “what we now have to investigate.” Instead, he introduces

… the analogy between the pure judgment of taste which, independently of any interest, causes us to feel a satisfaction and also represents it a priori suitable to humanity in general, and the moral judgment that does the same thing from concepts without any clear, subtle, and premeditated reflection—this analogy leads to a similar immediate interest in the object of the former as those of the latter; only that in the one case the interest is free, in the other it is based on objective laws. To this is to be added our admiration for nature, which displays itself in its beautiful products as art, not merely by chance, but as it were designedly, in accordance with a regular arrangement and as purposiveness without purpose. This latter, as we never meet with it outside ourselves, we naturally seek in ourselves and, in fact, in that which constitutes the ultimate purpose of our being, viz. our moral destination. (143-44)

The principality of the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgments is evident, as it makes the pure and subjective satisfaction in the former judgment “akin to the moral feeling,” which is necessarily universal to humanity (Kant 143).

To call it “the analogy,” however, might be an understatement, for Kant’s aesthetics doesn’t remain simply analogous to “the voice of reason” (93), which interestingly, unlike “the impulse to society,” doesn’t pollute the purity of aesthetic judgment. Ted Cohen in “Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality” suggests that “beauty affords us a certainty we cannot have about goodness,” because without beauty, “we will
have no concrete way of representing what it is to experience a good will” (227, 230). Cohen, I think, should have said the sublime, instead of “beauty,” but he is right in assigning such a symbolic role to the sublime and the analogy that the sublime constitutes. The analogy—again and more to the point of what has been discussed—is an understatement because of its architectural significance for Kant’s philosophical system.  

Jacques Derrida points out that “The first two critiques of pure (speculative and practical) reason had opened an apparently infinite gulf,” wherein there is “an abyss stretching out of sight … established between the domain of the concept of nature, that is, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, that is, the suprasensible” (Derrida, *Truth* 35, 35-36). The third *Critique*, according to Derrida, is designed as a bridge to fill the abyss and to provide “a foundation of unity” to the structure of his philosophy (Kant, qtd in Derrida, *Truth* 36). Derrida thus depicts Kant as making “an argument that one can consider to be the constitution, that which makes the whole edifice of the third *Critique* hold-together-and-stand-upright in the middle of its two great wings (the critique of aesthetic judgment and the critique of teleological judgment),” and states that “This argument is analogy … [that] operates everywhere in the book” (*Truth* 75-76).

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58 Jean-François Lyotard associates the intermediary role of the imagination with the analogy. He speculates, “the imagination can by ‘analogy’ … ‘remodel’ an object of experience and present an object that is not present in the latter” and states, “The analogy transforms, commutes, a given by making it jump from one realm of legislation or one territory of legitimacy to another. It crosses the entire field of possible objects of thought, carrying a relation of representations from one sector to the other” (*Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime* 65, 65-66). To Lyotard, the analogy is what warrants the free play of the imagination in both a priori and a posteriori realms by providing the necessary proximity, or even transparency, between these realms.
Derrida’s interest in the analogy, which works as a parergon or a frame of the *Critique*, is specifically invested in the sublime, which he pinpoints as “that place where the supposedly ‘internal’ order of the philosophical is articulated by (internal and external) necessity with the institutional conditions and forms of teaching,” a place that “deconstruction works as strictly as possible in” (*Truth* 19). But I want to emphasize the analogy as a frame that separates the beautiful from the sublime, from “the supposedly ‘internal’ order” of Kant’s aesthetics that is regulated by reason via “the moral feeling.” With an explicit recourse to the analogy that conflates his aesthetics with “the moral image of world,” Kant is now able to dissociate the sublime from the beautiful, his transcendental aesthetics from Burke’s aesthetics as well as the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, both of which directly deal with the physiological or circumstantial world of things. Alone, his aesthetics finally seems ready to head for its inevitable “destination,” to be incorporated into “the moral image of the world.”

2. A Beautiful Monster

But it’s not. The analogy may be able to leap immediately into the moral world, but aesthetics can’t because it is equivalent neither to the analogy nor to ethics—however close it is, aesthetics still remains only analogically related to them. Aesthetics still need things that represent its a priori principle, which is why Kant in the *Critique* has to take a detour to art in general before advancing to the “Critique of the Teleological Judgment.” This recourse turns out to be as inconvenient as it is dangerously revealing, since “analogy plunges endlessly into the abyss as soon as a certain art is needed to describe
analogically the play of analogy” (Derrida, *Truth* 36). The analogy, paradoxical by nature, can be described only analogically, that is, with examples that will never be identical to the analogy but only analogous to it. The analogy, as Derrida consequently announces, “operates … everywhere in the book,” but its ubiquity ironically amounts to its ethereality, if not its nothingness. No wonder that art occupies in Kant’s aesthetics “a place that is neither theoretical nor practical or else both theoretical and practical” (Derrida, *Truth* 38). That is, it becomes a mere example that stands analogous to the analogy whose existence becomes manifest only by its need of example.

So Frankenstein needs the monster. He needs the monster as a work of art that resembles him and represents what he is, but for the creation of the monster, it is science that he needs. A discrepancy between art and science soon troubles him in “The summer months” leading up to the creation. Those months, he recollects, were “a most beautiful season,” but “[his] eyes were insensible to the charms of nature” (32, 33), and he “forget[s] those friends who were so many miles about” while he “knew … [his]

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59 Referring to the analogy as the frame or parergon of the *Critique*, Derrida articulates the paradox of a parergon as follows: “With respect to the work which can serve as a ground for it [the parergon], it merges into the wall, and then, gradually, into the general text. With respect to the background which the general text is, it merges into the work which stands out against the general background” (*Truth* 61). In this light, the analogy is at once aesthetic and moral, but at the same time, neither of them.

60 This may be an answer to one of the least attended-to questions: why does Frankenstein create the monster in the first place?

61 Paul Sherwin makes a similar observation: “the problem is that if the sublime artist is to “pour a torrent of light into our dark world” of mortal life, he must take a detour through reality” (49). Sherwin’s argument in his “Frankenstein: Creation as Catastrophe” in part corresponds to my argument, especially when he writes, “He [Frankenstein] conceived the creature as a representation of the transfigured creative self, a grandiose embodiment of the creator’s mind” (50). But in his psychoanalytic, and familial, interpretation of the relationship between Frankenstein and the monster, Sherwin doesn’t develop its social implications, which I will discuss below.
silence disquieted them” (33). His sensibility to the beautiful season and society was lost or, to be more exact, deliberately shut off for the sake of his scientific task, which makes him feel “rather like one doomed by slavery to toil in the mines, or any other unwholesome trade, than an artist occupied by his favorite employment” (33). Only after he “beheld the accomplishment of … [his] toils” and “saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open” (34) does Frankenstein realize his mistake. Instead of the ultimate “enthusiasm of success” in accomplishing “the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body,” he feels “breathless horror and disgust” and cries out, “How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite plans and care I had endeavored to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful!—Great God!” (32, 34). “Scientific achievement,” Jonathan Padley rightly points out, “is superseded by what we might think of as negative aesthetic feedback” (197), and Frankenstein finally recognizes the fact that the monster, alive or not, has failed as a work of art.62

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62 The recognition, however, doesn’t revive sensibility in him; the beautiful and society continue to be estranged from his life. Furthermore, his revulsion against the monster, expressed in “disgust and horror,” only magnifies, as he is deliberately (and even unreasonably) insensible to the monster’s entreaty for compassion and yearning for society. His lack of sensibility is indeed so profound that it appears to be generic rather than circumstantial, which underwrites my argument that he is a sublime character. If this is so, his insensibility “to the charms of nature,” to his friends and to everything the beautiful evokes, is hardly attributable to his scientific “toils” of “infusing life in an inanimate body.” On the contrary, it is the “toils” that make him, though temporarily, aware of his insensibility by keeping him in touch with the empirical world that, otherwise, would have been separated from his sublime world. Only after completing the “toils” does he forego this awareness, and for the first time in two years, he regains his usual sublime character and makes a judgment of the monster as a work of art (mis)representing “the moral feeling,” that is, as a failed example of his sublimity.
Frankenstein’s need for an example of his sublimity derives from the preponderance of the sublime in his character. When Walton finds him drifting alone “on a large fragment of ice” and offers help, expecting that “my vessel would have been a resource which he would not have exchanged for the most precious wealth the earth can afford,” Frankenstein, though nothing but “a man on the brink of destruction,” nevertheless asks, “Before I come on board your vessel, … will you have the kindness to inform me whither you are bound?” (12, 13) Walton’s “Astonishment on hearing such a question” might have been even greater if he knew that Frankenstein asked the question because, as he explains later to Walton, “[I] had determined, if you were going southward, still to trust myself to the mercy of the seas, rather than abandon my purpose. I hoped to induce you to grant me a boat with which I could still pursue my enemy” (145). Determined to suffer “separation from all society […] [for] ideas that overlook all sensible interest” (Kant 116), Frankenstein epitomizes the Kantian sublime. Walton’s astonishment accordingly translates into respect, a feeling that Kant attributes to the sublime, when he beatifies Frankenstein.

Even broken in spirit as he is, no one can feel more deeply than he does the beauties of nature. The starry sky, the sea and every sight afforded by these wonderful regions, seems still to have the power of elevating his soul from earth. Such a man has a double existence: he may suffer misery, and be overwhelmed by disappointments; yet when he has retired into himself, he will be like a celestial spirit, that has a halo around him, within whose circle no grief or folly ventures. (16)
Frankenstein, as described by Walton, incarnates the sublime, standing beyond human boundaries like “a celestial spirit,” and his demiurgic story, in which he in actuality describes himself overcoming such boundaries, confirms his sublimity. Indeed, when he looks at “Mont Blanc, in awful majesty,” Frankenstein, far from being humbled, identifies himself with that “awful majesty” and addresses himself to “Wandering spirits”: “take me, as your companion, away from the joys of life” (65).

Frankenstein views the monster only as an example of his sublimity. In his eyes, the monster is neither an ill-proportioned work of art whose features he “selected … as beautiful” nor a scientific wonder that he invents by “infusing life in an inanimate body.” Instead, Frankenstein makes an aesthetic judgment of him in a way that one might with

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63 Frankenstein’s stance to the sublime is obviously in line with what might be called “the romantic sublime,” which “opens out through Kant into the vast and gloomy corridors of German idealism” (Weiskel 5). In his psychoanalytical interpretation, Weiskel suggests “the egotistical sublime” as “a structure beneath the vast epiphenomenal of the sublime” (51, 11 respectively), a structure that is built by such romantic poets as Wordsworth and Keats. He then explains,

Both Wordsworth and Stevens erect a positive theology of the self on the premise that whatever is discovered is, after all, an attribute or potentiality of consciousness in its current state. This sets up an infinite regress in which any determinate state of the self—past or on the verge of becoming past, created (fictional) or discovered (perceptional)—is subsumed into an “I” that is ever expanding, limited only by death or the failure of memory. For such an “I” the present has no unique content and exists in fact as the capacious vessel of the past. Everything external or “out there” is transmuted into the substance of mind, which accumulates like a kind of capital. (52)

The sublime is where “the identity” between the perceiver and the perceived is found in the “ever expanding” “I,” a finding that would enable Frankenstein to dismiss present or future worries the monster signifies. Just as the romantic sublime is soon to die out in literature, so Frankenstein’s wish to be identified with the sublime comes to nothing in *Frankenstein*. But, as I will examine in the next chapter on *Dracula*, its egotistical aspect continues, though non-aesthetically, to survive throughout the nineteenth century as something that is at once warned of and abided by, to borrow Weiskel’s phrase, in “the swarming imperial city” (6).
the mathematical sublime. Defined as “what is great beyond all comparison,” the mathematical sublime denotes a distinct difference between “two operations of the imagination,” namely, “apprehension (apprehensio) and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica)” (Kant 90). While in apprehension, the imagination in its “logical estimation of magnitude” “proceeds of itself to infinity without anything hindering it,” since “the understanding guides it by means of concepts of number,” comprehension “surpasses the power of the imagination” and listens to “the voice of reason” to make an “aesthetical estimation of magnitude” in “one intuition” (Kant 92, 93, 94). The parts of magnitude, therefore, can be apprehended and judged as the beautiful, since the judgment “refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding, in order to harmonize it with the concepts of the latter in general,” but when comprehended in its entirety, magnitude is solely judged as the sublime because the imagination “refer[s] itself to the reason, in order that it may subjectively be in accordance with its ideas” (Kant 94-95). When he terminates the “toils” that have required scientific (therefore, in part mathematical) understanding and infused sensibility into him, Frankenstein immediately stops apprehending the monster in terms of his beautiful features or of his scientific merits, and starts comprehending him as a sublime object, only to find himself confronting in “horror and disgust” a failure.

An aesthetic failure in the beautiful is always partial, since it is due to some features that may be apprehended as neither beautiful nor in proportion. As such, it is remediable by changing those unsatisfactory features or even by accustoming oneself to them (as Burke suggests by underlining habits or customs), if one cares enough. On the
other hand, a failure in the sublime is total, or, more appropriately, “beyond all comparison,” and not remediable—hence destined for desertion or destruction, both of which incidentally Frankenstein attempts, though in vain. But the failure can be nevertheless redeemable at least for the creator. By enforcing the principle of the sublime, that is, the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgments, the creator can immediately turn the aesthetically failed example into a morally despicable object and dispense with it. In the process, he will set himself apart from that object and feel what Kant describes as “negative pleasure.”

In “horror and disgust,” Frankenstein thus judges the monster as ugly, as if imitating Kant’s words: “There is only one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance with nature without destroying all aesthetical satisfaction, […] that which excites disgust” (Kant 155). But the ugly may appear to invoke nothing like “the negative pleasure” of the sublime, or even the pleasure of the beautiful for that matter, which raises a question about its aesthetic category. Thus, asking “in what does this ugliness consist?” Denise Gigante in “Facing the Ugly” proposes that “ugliness in Frankenstein is less of an aesthetic experience than a question of survival” (566). The ugly, she argues, points to Kant’s “theoretical aporia,” since it resembles neither the beautiful nor the sublime but forms its own category.64 Disgust, as the feeling of the ugly,

64 Stephen F. Barker would argue against defining the ugly as a non-aesthetic category. Instead, asking if Kant “intend[s] … to allow for a third category, that the disinterested contemplation of which is painful, that is, the ugly [sic],” he suggests that “ugliness can be properly an aesthetic category only if it is wholly divorced from all such threats and fears, for they represent ‘interest.’” (58). In order to overcome “such threats and fears,” Barker wonders, “shall we not eventually be able to grasp that they are patterned as if to frustrate us, and, discerning this, shall we not then be able to foresee that they will go on
not only “obviates all aesthetic judgment” but also denies that “such ugliness can aesthetically exist” (Gigante 570). But as with other kinds of feelings in Kant’s aesthetics, disgust shouldn’t be taken as a mere physiological reaction but considered in light of its moral implication. As one expresses disgust toward the ugly, one simultaneously rejects the ugly on moral terms and confirms one’s innate moral feeling, constituting the whole situation as a sublime experience. “[J]udgments of ugliness,” Hud Hudson rightly points out, “have something in common with judgments of sublimity” (94). Thus, by feeling “horror and disgust” toward the ugly monster, Frankenstein

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65 This interpretation of disgust that denies the existence of the object might be associated with a feminist and psychological reading that, as Barbara Johnson notes, “see[s] Victor Frankenstein’s disgust at the sight of his creation as a study of postpartum depression, as a representation of maternal rejection of a newborn infant” (246).

66 Hudson however attributes their commonality to the fact that “they both involve a contrapurposive presentation and a disharmony between cognitive powers” (94). While “in the case of the sublime, the contrapurposiveness involves the cognitive faculty of imagination and reason in a disharmony relation,” the ugly is based on “the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding that are involved in a disharmonious relation” (94). But Hudson seems to overlook another important ground of their commonality: such a disharmony in both the sublime and the ugly ultimately ends with the intervention of “the moral feeling,” which helps the subject to gain distance from the object of aesthetic experience. In a way, the distance from the ugly helps “the (male) participants in a moral conflict … invoke ‘justice’ and insist on theoretical objectivity simply to avoid acknowledging responsibilities for the dilemmas,” a distance which culminates in what might be referred to as “Shelley’s modernization of the Prometheus legend” (Hustis, “Responsibly Creative” 851). Such a view resonates with another strain in feminist readings that finds in the novel, to quote Margaret Homans, “the reflex of Mary Shelley’s critique [that] male circumvention of the maternal creates a monster” (153).
evokes “negative pleasure” in himself: horror accounts for the pain caused by the ugliness of the monster and disgust enables Frankenstein to confirm his good soul in his adamant rejection of the monster, working the analogy to the fullest.67

To increase the validity of the analogy that underwrites his rejection of an aesthetically ugly object and illuminates his good soul against the morally despicable object, Frankenstein perpetuates it by judging others’ morality by their physiognomy.68 For instance, on seeing Elizabeth after six years, he says, “An open and capacious forehead gave indications of a good understanding, joined to great frankness of disposition” (51). Likewise, looking at Justine who is wrongly on trial for murdering his youngest brother, William, he describes “her countenance” as “exquisitely beautiful” and laments, “all the kindness which her beauty might otherwise have excited, was obliterated in the minds of the spectators by the imagination of the enormity she was supposed to have committed” (52). The analogy is also in effect when he judges a person of no beauty as morally degenerate. Rescued yet mistakenly incarcerated for murdering Henry Clerval, Frankenstein is taken ill and attended by “an old woman” who is “a hired

67 On a different note, Thomas Dutoit discerns a similar conjunction of aesthetic and moral judgments in the matter of the monster. Focusing at once on the monster’s ugly face, which is unrepresentable and impossible to look at, and on Kantian ethics, which denies “all unions of virtue with happiness,” Dutoit views the monster as exemplifying “the transcendental, i.e. non-empirical, non-phenomenal deduction of the monstrosity of the happiness-virtue couple” (850, 867).

68 Frankenstein’s perpetuation of “this semiotics of the face implicitly endorses late 18th scientific theories that physiognomy and character are closely related,” as is exemplified in “Johann Caspar Lavater’s physiognomical theory … that a person’s inner soul or moral character produces his or her outer appearances” or “Spurzheim and Gall’s phrenological theory … that the contours of the skull determines character and moral nature” (Mellor 19-20). Scott J. Juengel also attests to Frankenstein’s “governing logic of physiognomics,” which is “a visual methodology that seeks to assert an inflexible semiotics of ‘characters’” (356).
nurse, the wife of one of the turnkeys.” And despite the obvious fact that she has helped
him recover, not to mention the fact that he sees her for the first time, Frankenstein
immediately determines that “her countenance expressed all those bad qualities which
often characterize that class. The lines of her face were hard and rude, like that of
persons accustomed to see without sympathizing in sights of misery” (123).

While fervently perpetuated by Frankenstein, the analogy also operates in those
encountering the monster and seems to fortify its universality. On seeing the monster,
the villagers throw “stones and many other kinds of missile weapons” at him (70-71);
Felix strikes him “violently with a stick (91); Walton finds in his face “a vision of such
loathsome, yet appalling hideousness” (152). What completes the universality of the
analogy is nevertheless the fact that the monster himself abides by the principle. Coming
across his reflection “in a transparent pool,” the monster promptly “started back” and
despairs: “it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully
convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest
sensations of despondence and mortification. Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal
effects of this miserable deformity” (77). As he acknowledges his monstrosity solely on
the basis of his appearance, the monster unwittingly condones the way he is (mis)treated
according to the analogy, and he becomes not only the victim of but a participant in the
very structure that causes “the fatal effects of this miserable deformity.” Thus, when he
approaches William with “an idea […] that this little creature was unprejudiced, and had
lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of deformity,” an idea that is miserably
frustrated by this “beautiful child” who “placed his hands before his eyes, and uttered a
shrill scream” (96), the monster succumbs to the analogy and launches its “fatal effects.” That is, he vows to take his “eternal revenge” on his creator, and William becomes the “first victim” who “in a moment […] lay[s] dead” (97).

The analogy, by which Frankenstein frames the monster as a creature who is at once aesthetically horrible and morally disgusting, is almost universally communicated as the monster murders William and the others—Justine, Henry, and Elizabeth. The more condemnable the monster becomes by his heinous crimes, the more effective Frankenstein’s framing works, hence proving his good soul by proxy. When Frankenstein appears to succeed in distributing a story of a monster who deserves a wretched life, however, Frankenstein tells a quite different story about the monster and Frankenstein. Although it names itself after the main character who perpetuates the analogy or has the monster’s narrative enclosed within Frankenstein’s, all of which work on behalf of Frankenstein, the novel adamantly reminds us that Frankenstein is not Frankenstein: Frankenstein’s narrative is eventually torn open as the monster speaks directly to Walton, and his analogy falls apart at the very moment the monster stops being a mere example of the sublime. But even as a failed example, the monster could

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69 Maureen Noelle McLane in “Literate Species” refers to this scene and argues that “In Louis Althusser’s terms, the monster discovers there is no subject before interpellation; the child understands and speaks himself through several ideological state apparatuses” (974). Although William’s reaction may be interpreted as such, it seems very unlikely that the monster, deprived of social interactions, could have such an insight into ISA or, at least, into socially constructed identity.

70 It might be appropriate here to add that Frankenstein’s verbatim delivery of the monster’s narrative invites the reader to listen to it as if directly spoken to, which means it is bypassing Frankenstein’s narrative frame. Eleanor Salotto thus points out that in the novel, “Narrative moves from one subject to another” and argues that “The frame narrative … disturbs the notion of unitary identity, on which the notion of autobiography has rested” (190).
still be disruptive to the analogy, if one questions why his ugliness offers a ground for the creature’s moral depravity, not an opportunity to suspect the creator’s (or the artist’s) talent. As Harold Bloom notes, “if Frankenstein had been an aesthetically successful maker, a beautiful ‘monster,’ or even a passable one, would not have been a monster” (6). Not “a successful maker,” Frankenstein positively lacks what Kant calls “[a] talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art,” in short, “genius” (Kant 150). Kant stipulates that “beautiful art is only possible as a product of genius,” and the eventual ugliness of the monster as “a product” accordingly illustrates not the creature’s moral depravity but the creator’s lack of genius, meaning the latter does not have “the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas” (Kant 150, 157). If Frankenstein’s lack of genius caused the ugliness of the monster, and if the unfavorable judgment against the monster was initiated by that ugliness, we should doubt the rectitude of that judgment, since it at once

71 Kant further explains genius as follows:

We thus see (1) that genius is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given …. Hence originality must be its first property. (2) But since it also can produce original nonsense, its products must be models, i.e. exemplary, and they consequently ought not to spring from imitation, but must serve as a standard or rule of judgment for others. (3) It cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its products, but it gives the rule just as nature does. Hence the author of a product for which he is indebted to his genius does not know himself how he has come by his ideas …. (4) Nature, by the medium of genius, does not prescribe rules to science but to art, and to it only in so far as it is to be beautiful art. (150-51)

In light of Kant’s explanation, Frankenstein’s project to create the monster as a beautiful work of art is misguided mainly because it can be done again, that is, it is inherently a scientific project. Unlike “[an] artistic skill” that “cannot be communicated” (Kant 152), “the particulars of his creature’s formation” are certainly communicable if he were not “impenetrable” to Walton’s desire to know “the particulars” (Shelley 146).
obscures Frankenstein’s lack of genius and denies the monster a chance to redeem himself.\textsuperscript{72}

The insertion of the monster’s own narrative intensifies the doubt because it transforms him from the sublime object of an unfavorable judgment to a subject of aesthetic experience, allowing us to look into what is behind his “miserable deformity.”\textsuperscript{73} As an aesthetic subject, the monster demonstrates a strong inclination toward sensibility. Abandoned and uncultivated in his mental infancy, the monster, amid “A strange multiplicity of sensations,” feels “all the events of that period … confused,” since “no distinct ideas occupied my [his] mind” (68). Before long, he is able to adjust himself to environments, so “My sensations,” he relates to Frankenstein, “had, by this time, become distinct, and my mind received every day additional ideas” (69).

Furthermore, he takes pleasure in watching the moon, delights in listening to birds, and tries to imitate “songs of the birds” (71). Even in a state of utter dejection from his experience at a village, he watches De Lacey smiling “with such kindness and affection” and feels “sensations of a peculiar and overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain

\textsuperscript{72} In light of what Kant says in “Anthropology”—“The representation of the sublime, however, can and should be beautiful in itself; otherwise it is uncouth, barbarous, and repugnant to taste” (qtd. In McCloskey 103)—Frankenstein undeniably commits an artistic failure in creating the monster. But it should be noted that this entails a more complex question: is the creation an act of representation or of presentation? The monster is not a mere statue but a living being capable of presenting his thoughts and actions. I will be proposing the monster as an aesthetic subject who possesses that capability.

\textsuperscript{73} “The decision to give the monster an articulate voice,” Chris Baldwick states, “is Mary Shelley’s most important subversion of the category of monstrosity,” since “the traditional ideal of the monstrous was strongly associated with visual display, and monsters were understood primarily as exhibitions of moral vices” (44). I would however argue that the real question is whether we as readers are capable of listening to that “articulate voice.”
and pleasure, such as I had never before experienced” (72). When “the two younger cottagers”—Felix and Agatha—“placed food before the old man, when they reserved none for themselves” (74), the monster, guided by the “mixture of pain and pleasure,” develops a sort of moral sensibility. “This trait of kindness,” he thus recollects, “moved me sensibly. I had been accustomed during the night, to steal a part of their store for my own consumption; but when I found that in doing this I inflicted pain on the cottagers, I abstained” (74). If there is an analogy to be made from this, it is certainly not the analogy between aesthetic and moral judgments responding to “the voice of reason” in the sublime, the one by which the monster is almost immediately and universally framed as a horrible and disgusting object. Rather, it is an analogy between aesthetic and moral sensibilities by which he feels “sensibly” for others, for “love and affection,” and for “society,” and this analogy reframes the monster as an aesthetic subject who is inclined toward the beautiful. The monster is thus contrasted with his creator who is a sublime character, and this contrast is staged in the scene where the monster reappears and talks to Frankenstein for the first time, ominously intimating the upcoming confusion. Just as he expresses his wish to be identified with sublime mountains, Frankenstein “suddenly beheld the figure of a man, at some distance, advancing towards me [himself] with superhuman speed,” a man who “bounded over the crevices in the ice, among which I had walked with caution” (65). Nancy Fredricks sees in this moment “the sublime

74 Burton R. Pollin would argue that this analogy proves the influence of Condillac’s “psychological sensationalism,” which “succinctly asserted that sensations alone (the apprehension of external reality through impressions) can account for the whole development of perceptions and of complex and abstract ideas,” on “the genesis of the work” (105).
backdrop of the Swiss Alps,” against which “Shelley orchestrates a dramatic shift in the reader’s sympathy when she allows the monster to tell his side of the story” (186). Though there is certainly an “orchestration” on Shelley’s part, however, it is due neither to “the sublime backdrop” nor to the monster’s “superhuman” façade but to the “beautiful” story that the monster communicates to Frankenstein as well as the reader.

The insertion of the monster’s analogy disrupts the universality of Frankenstein’s analogy, and aesthetic confusion is inevitable between them, to which one seeks a resolution by separation and destruction and the other by inclusion and construction. The confusion results in the continuous miscommunication and misunderstanding between them—almost to the extent that it becomes irrevocably terrible to the monster and ludicrously illusory to Frankenstein. First of all, the monster, believing in the analogy of sensibility that values “love and affection” and “society,” expects that a gradual deprivation of Frankenstein’s society “will carry despair to him” and possibly makes him sympathetic to his circumstances. “Beautiful” in its rationales, however, his “eternal revenge” on Frankenstein brings about nothing but terrifying consequences as he chooses to kill not Frankenstein but his society, which helps demean that rationale in the eyes of Frankenstein. On the other hand, unable to understand the monster’s dire need of society and trust his promise that, once provided a female, he will leave human society forever, Frankenstein destroys the female. Furthermore, the obvious meaning of the message, “I will be with you on your wedding-night” (116), which the monster delivers upon seeing the destruction of the female, is never communicated to Frankenstein, who mistakes himself for the next victim. Only after witnessing “[t]he murderous mark of the
fiend’s grasp” on Elizabeth’s neck does he realize “the hellish intention of my fiendish adversary”—an intention that has been too transparent to be missed (132, 136 respectively). Likewise, Frankenstein, when in pursuit of the monster, imagines that “a spirit of good followed and directed my steps” and “a repast was set there by the spirits that I had invoked to aid me” (141), blind to the obvious fact that the monster is providing the repast to drag on their community.

Frankenstein’s grand yet impossible purpose to create a beautiful example of himself, of his sublimity, results in an aesthetic confusion involving a series of misunderstandings and miscommunications between the creator and the creation, since the latter turns out to be not so much an object combining the two aesthetically incompatible categories as an aesthetic subject who has his own inclination toward the beautiful, expressive of his “impulse to society.” If the confusion is just between them, there may be an easy resolution, one that Kant’s aesthetics has in fact enforced by separating itself from the beautiful. But the confusion hardly remains aesthetic, since others—for example, William, Justine, Henry, Elizabeth and Walton—will be inevitably affected by it. The confusion has never been an aesthetic one. It is rather a social confusion and appropriately calls for a social, not aesthetic, resolution especially from the person confused by both Frankenstein and the monster yet also obligated to lead a society of his own—namely, Walton.
3. Walton’s Way to “Reason and Virtue”

So they confuse Walton. First of all, Frankenstein, finishing his “strange and
terrific story” (145), says, “swear to me, Walton, that he [the monster] shall not escape;
that you will seek him, and satisfy my vengeance in his death,” but then he seems to
change his mind, asking himself, “do I dare ask you to undertake my pilgrimage, to
endure the hardships that I have undergone? No; I am not so selfish” (145). “Yet,” he
pleads, “swear that he shall not live—swear that he shall not triumph over my
accumulated woes, and live to make another such a wretch as I am” (145). How can
Walton kill the superhuman-powered monster without undertaking a “pilgrimage?” The
answer may lie in taking immediate action. That is, should the monster appear, Walton
must kill him without hesitation, without thinking. He must be obedient to
Frankenstein’s words and judge the monster accordingly as a failed object that needs to
be destroyed. It comes as no surprise that Frankenstein at the end of his request makes
sure that, should he encounter the monster, Walton must “Hear him not” (145). But just
when immediacy appears to be the essence of the confusing message, Walton hears
Frankenstein renewing his request:

The task of his [the monster’s] destruction was mine, but I have failed. When
actuated by selfish and vicious motives, I asked you to undertake my unfinished
work; and I renew this request now, when I am only induced by reason and virtue

Yet I cannot ask you to renounce your country and friends, to fulfil this task;
and now, that you are returning to England, you will have little chance of
meeting with him. But the consideration of these points and the well-balancing of
what you may esteem your duties, I leave to you …. Farewell, Walton! Seek happiness in tranquility, and avoid ambitions, even if it be only the apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and discoveries. Yet why do I say this? I have myself been blasted in these hopes, yet another may succeed.”

(151-52)

Here, while making the same request, Frankenstein changes its cause from his “accumulated woes,” now dismissed as “selfish and vicious motives,” to “reason and virtue,” which call for unselfish “duties toward my fellow creatures.” Yet, he insinuates that the same “reason and virtue” will advise Walton to call off the task so that he doesn’t “renounce” his society. In a sharp contrast to the immediacy requested before, this renewed request, now as ambiguous as it is confusing, begs Walton to use his utmost “reason and virtue” and decide by and for himself before taking any action.

The real encounter with the supposedly culpable object worsens, rather than clarifies, the confusion Frankenstein evokes. Walton sees in the monster, hanging over “the remains of my ill-fated and admirable friend,” nothing but “a form which I cannot find words to describe,” and says, “Never did I behold a vision so horrible as his face, of such loathsome, yet appalling hideousness.” (152). It is only after, he tells us, “I shut my eyes involuntarily, and endeavored to recollect what were my duties,” that Walton names the monster “this destroyer” (152). But his obedience to Frankenstein’s words stops at “recollect[ing]” the words, followed by no immediate action that those words might have urged. Instead, Walton “called on him [the monster] to stay” and communicates with him, only to feel “a mixture of curiosity and compassion” and to be
“touched by the expressions of his misery” (152, 153, 154). Even his brief “indignation […] re-kindled” by “what Frankenstein had said” (154) is “interrupted” by the monster’s self-vindication:

I seek not a fellow-feeling in my misery. No sympathy may I ever find. When I first sought it, it was the love of virtue, the feelings of happiness and affection with which my whole being, overflowed, that I wished to be participated [sic]. But now, that virtue has become to me a shadow, and that happiness and affection are turned into bitter and loathing despair, in what should I seek for sympathy? … For whilst I destroyed his hopes, I did not satisfy my own desires. They were ever ardent and craving; still I desired love and fellowship, and I was still spurned. Was there no injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human kind sinned against me? (154-55).

The monster tells a different story than Frankenstein, a story in which Walton as well as “all human kind” is convincingly accused of making a hasty judgment against him, of doing him “injustice,” and of showing no “reason and virtue” toward him. Now weighing Frankenstein’s words against the monster’s, or Frankenstein’s “reason and virtue” against the monster’s, Walton must come to a decision, one that will determine his relation to these two confusing/confused beings and, more importantly, define—analogically or independently—his “reason and virtue.”

75 Terry W. Thompson notes an interesting parallel between Walton’s self-suspended animosity to the monster and the earlier scene where he encounters Frankenstein who is “in wreck” and “does not turn away from such ugliness” (301). The parallel, Thompson argues, proves that Walton is “the perfect Samaritan” (301), but I disagree with him in that Walton eventually assumes a non-aesthetic/-ethical gaze at the monster and ignores the monster’s want of “society.”
From the first time they meet, Walton seems willing to side with Frankenstein, ready to accept the Kantian analogy by which the latter lives. Indeed, the analogy could help him figure out Frankenstein’s confusing message, because it ascertains transparency between immediacy and “reason and virtue.” That is, the analogy guarantees constancy between the immediate aesthetic response the monster evokes and the following reasonable and moral consideration of his character—in short, between “horror” and “disgust.” Yet, the analogy builds more than an uninterrupted correspondence between aesthetics and ethics, since it heads for “that which constitutes the ultimate purpose of our being, viz. our moral destination.” While admitting that what Kant means by the “destination” is debatable, Gary Banhan reads the Critique concentrating on the second half, “The Critique of Teleological Judgment,” and suggests “a coherent relation both to the First and Second Critiques and also to what Lyotard has termed the ‘fourth critique,’ the critique of political judgment provided in Kant’s ‘political writings’” (1). Without doubt, this “coherent relation” that hypothesizes “the critique of political judgment” doesn’t propose a return to any known kind of political system that can be at odds with Kant’s philosophical system. Rather, as Dieter Heinrich points out, Kant is envisioning

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76 Banham reads “The Critique of Teleological Judgment,” which he regards as one of “the most neglected” of Kant’s writings, and interprets aesthetic judgment as aiming at “two kinds of ‘end’: limit and purpose.” (2). Based on this interpretation, he identifies “the ultimate basis of the recognition that humanity is the end of creation: the capacity of humans to act freely, that is, in accordance with the moral law;” and draws the conclusion that “the task of critical philosophy is thus ultimately political” (184, 186). I agree with Banahm that Kant, writing the Critique of Judgment, wants to solidify the moral foundation of culture that in turn promises the pure/uninterrupted reproduction of humanity (what might be called “a pure auto-affection”) within the human society (76). But, as I have argued in this chapter, Kant, in so doing, practically puts an end to an aesthetic foundation of society in which humans and non-humans can complementarily live.
“a new shape for the philosophical system at large,” which “includes the acknowledgment that ‘respect for the law’ is a primordial motivation. It is impossible to derive it from other impulses or desires, or even from reason in general. Instead, it derives directly from awareness of the validity of the law” (22). The third Critique, Heinrich argues, thus “proceeds to nature as a teleological system and arrives at the moral image of the world” (23).

As a perpetuator of the Kantian analogy, Frankenstein shares Kant’s vision of “the moral image of the world.” He creates the monster and wants him to be the first of “A new species [that] would bless me as its creator and source” (32). This species will consist of those resembling Frankenstein’s sublime character, as Frankenstein anticipates, “[their] many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me” (32). Accordingly, the resultant society will consist of those exemplary of his sublimity, who will inseminate the analogy everywhere. Such a society should appear agreeable to Walton, who finds his desire for society surpassing his “ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before visited” (7). He thus writes to his sister, Ms. Saville, “I

77 “[T]he ascent of reflective judgment from imagination toward understanding,” Heinrich continues, “is precisely how understanding as such enters the play prior to the acquisition of any particular concept” (23, 49). Heinrich refers to this particular working of reflective judgment as “‘exhibition’ (‘Darstellung,’ traditionally translated as ‘presentation’ … [that] ‘Kant employs … within the context as aesthetics’ (47). “To exhibit a concept,” Heinrich explains, “means to associate with it in intuition a manifold of a distinctive unitary (temporal and/or spatial) shape” (48). Although his argument bypasses the important point that respect is a feeling of ascent toward reason, not “toward understanding,” it convincingly explains how aesthetics or, more specifically, the analogy prescribes “the moral image” not only in the play of imagination but also in the empirical world of sensibility, thus framing society within Kant’s philosophical system.
have no friend …. I desire the company of a man who could sympathize with me; whose eyes would repay to mine. You may deem me romantic, my dear sister, but I bitterly feel the want of a friend. I have no one near me, gentle yet courageous, possessed of a cultivated as well as of a capacious mind, whose tastes are like my own, to approve or amend my plans” (10). His friendless situation continues although there are possible candidates for his society: the lieutenant who “retains some of the noblest endowments of humanity” (10) and the master who has “so amiable a nature, that he will not hunt […] because he cannot endure to spill blood” (11). Either the lieutenant or the master could make a good friend for anyone, but Walton rejects them, not to mention the rest of the crew on his ship, since he prefers a society of those “whose tastes are like my [his] own.” Walton however expects Frankenstein to end his lack of society, because, he writes, “I have found a man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery, I should have been happy to have possessed as the brother of my heart” (15). Having finally found one “whose tastes are like” his own, Walton should be as willing to join Frankenstein’s sublime society as he is to imitate and learn from him.

But, we are again reminded, Frankenstein is not Frankenstein. Aesthetics may frame Frankenstein’s society, but, the novel reminds us, it is not what frames Frankenstein’s society. For one thing, the aesthetic confusion between Frankenstein and the monster hardly remains as such. The monster’s “impulse to society” is always answered by horrified, repulsed or hostile faces and ultimately leads to a succession of murders causing social unrest and the derivative mistrials undermining the authorities, to whom Frankenstein’s accusations against the monster sound too frantic and insane to be
trusted. Misunderstandings and miscommunications thus not only persist between these two aesthetic characters but also begin to affect the novel’s society, endangering its “harmony, proportion, comfort, and stasis.” It is thus necessary to prevent Frankenstein and the monster from spreading their confusion for the sake of society, and Walton, trapped right in the middle of the confusion, sees the need drastically increasing.\(^{78}\)

Walton may have found a way to contain Frankenstein, whom he finds fascinating and analogous to himself, when he tries to beatify him, that is, to sublimate him into “a celestial spirit.”\(^{79}\) In this way, they could form an illusory yet nevertheless aesthetical society, provided that Frankenstein, protected and revered, assumes an absent, non-physical presence. With his idea of society based on the moral image of the world, however, Frankenstein refuses to remain sublimated into a transcendental world, and Walton soon realizes how unreasonable and unjust Frankenstein and his aesthetic society can be. When the sailors demand “a solemn promise, that if the vessel should be freed, I

\(^{78}\) Walton’s presence shifts the focus of the main conflict of the novel from between Frankenstein and the monster to between these two and the rest of society, including Walton. In this way, it might be said that, to quote Steven Marcus, “There is a deep justice … in the progressive assimilation in the narrative of Frankenstein to his monster—in his being transformed, as he had made his creature by his own acts, into a figure of abject and undeliverable isolation” (199). Marcus however explains their assimilation as resulting from the lack of “the guidance of a humane and consciously responsible will” in science (199). But this doesn’t explain why science has been less isolated than promoted in society since the publication of the novel, that is, why the “deep justice” has rarely been materialized. Rather, I would argue that their assimilation in the eyes of Walton refers to the upcoming isolation of aesthetics in society.

\(^{79}\) It goes without saying that this had been the way so-called “romantic geniuses” and genuine fine art were often treated in not only romantic, bourgeois society but also in late nineteenth society.
[Walton] would instantly direct my course southward, Walton, while hesitant to forsake his ambition, asks himself, ‘could I, in justice, or even in possibility, refuse this demand?’ (149). But Frankenstein, who ‘appeared hardly to have force enough to attend, now roused himself […] with momentary vigour,’ and suddenly explodes (149):

What do you mean? What do you demand of your captain? Are you then so easily turned from your design? Did you not call this a glorious expedition? And wherefore was it glorious? …. Be steady to your purposes, and firm as a rock. This ice is not made of such stuff as your hearts might be; it is mutable, cannot withstand you, if you say that it shall not. Do not return to your families with the stigma of disgrace marked on your brows. Return as heroes who have fought and conquered, and who know not what it is to turn their back on the foe. (149-50)

Frankenstein’s long remonstrance belittles the imminent danger the crew perceives as a figment of ‘imagination’ and their desire to survive as a cowardly wish, a reference that can be regarded as at once unjustifiable and unreasonable, considering the fact that the crew have been for weeks “immersed in ice,” which continues to “admit of no escape, and threaten every moment to crush my [his] vessel” (148). Inspired by Frankenstein’s

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As with Paul O’Flinn, Baldwick observes “in the form of the crew” the “collective head” of “wage-labour” (55). Aesthetically, the crew anticipates what Terry Eagleton terms “the Marxist sublime,” which would define “The content of socialist revolution” as “excessive of all form, out in advance of its own rhetoric” (214). That is, this “content” should be “unrepresentable by anything but itself, signified only in its ‘absolute movement of becoming,’ and thus a kind of sublimity” (Eagleton 214). Yet, I disagree with Eagleton that the sublime is in “absolute movement of becoming,” since a judgment of the sublime, it seems to me, only happens when the “movement” stops and one thinks of the sublime object not as what is becoming but as what has become, that is, as what must be.
speech that asks them to be “more than men,” Walton determines, “I had rather die, than
return shamefully” (150), but he soon gives in to the crew and writes, “The die is cast; I
have consented to return.” (150). He admires, and even imitates in some aspects,
Frankenstein, but not to the extent that he would sacrifice others as well as himself and
“lead them unwillingly to danger” (151). His decision to return thus illustrates, as
Poovey puts it, “his willingness to deny his desire when it jeopardizes his social
responsibilities” (“My Hideous Progeny” 340). It might be said that Walton learns the
lesson that “To live in a fictional “Paradise” and to promote that aesthetic is amoral”
(Chantler 103), a lesson that is possible only by acknowledging that he is not
Frankenstein but someone who, like the monster, longs for society.81

The confusion brought by the monster only reassures Walton of the lesson and
urges him to question the validity of Frankenstein’s “reason and virtue” and his aesthetic
judgment. The monster’s story convincingly presents sympathy and affection, which
derive from the monster’s aesthetic sensibility, as the “reason and virtue” of a
“beautiful” society. But, however reasonable and virtuous the monster may appear,
Walton can’t help seeing him as hideous and loathsome, a discrepancy that only deepens
his confusion. Furthermore, no idealistic or heroic enterprise could succeed, he has
learned, if sympathy and affection guide a society. Confused yet determined to be
different from Frankenstein and the monster, Walton lets the monster go and makes an

81 Chantler, defining Walton as “a poet at the end of eighteenth century,” interprets the
lesson as stating that “Artist and readers should not disconnect themselves from society”
(103). But I would argue that Walton, through the lesson, recognizes the incompatibility
between society and Frankenstein-like artists and begins to seek for a non-aesthetic way
to “Paradise.”
impersonal, matter-of-fact observation: “He sprung from the cabin-window, as he said this, upon the ice-raft which lay close to the vessel. He was soon borne away by the waves and lost in darkness and distance” (156). If “The kind of responsibility monsters promote is to a thing” (Evans 247), Walton’s (pseudo) objective gaze at the disappearing monster characterizes such responsibility as one that is neither aesthetic nor moral. Rather, the gaze refers to, as Samuel Holmes Vasbinder explains, “Walton’s scientific detachment,” which promotes “the scientific attitude of the new science, particularly skepticism and personal observation” (36, 37). When aesthetics no longer determines his morality and social relations, science, Frankenstein tells us, will take over to deal with matters not only of “ethics, socio-political philosophy, and cultural criticism” but of everyday life in society. Yet, this is another story yet to come, and for that, we will have to return with Walton to England.

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82 While likewise interested in the inconclusiveness of the ending, Spivak sees it as confirming that “[Frankenstein] does not deploy the axiomatics of imperialism” (254). That the monster’s “self-immolation is not consummated in the text” and that “Margaret Saville does not respond to close the text as frame,” Spivak argues, leave “the place of both the English lady and the unnamable monster … left open by this great flawed text and ask “a postcolonial reader to consider this a noble resolution for a nineteenth-century English novel” (258, 259). While I support Spivak’s argument and, by extension, a potential alliance between postcolonialism and gothic studies, I want to point out, based on what has been discussed in this chapter, that she misses the significance of Walton, who actually sees the monster “lost in darkness and distance” and is about to return to England. More importantly, he is the one who is going to “deploy the axiomatics of imperialism” in a way that deals with these unresolved issues more efficiently and productively.
CHAPTER IV

VAN HELSING’S DILEMMA: SCIENCE AND MILL’S UTILITARIANISM

Just before setting out for Dracula’s castle to finish his “horrid task,” described
as a “butcher work” on three female vampires who are “so full of life and voluptuous
beauty that I shudder as though I have come to do murder” (319), Van Helsing, an
eminent scientist, confesses:

The dilemma had me between his horns. Her [Mina], I had not dare [sic] to take
into this place, but left safe from the Vampire in that Holy circle; and yet even
there would be the wolf! I resolve me that my work lay here, and that as to the
wolves we must submit, if it were God’s Will. At any rate it was only death and
freedom beyond. So did I choose for her. Had it but been for myself the choice
had been easy; the maw of the wolf were better to rest in than the grave of the
Vampire! So I make my choice to go on with my work. (319)

The dilemma Van Helsing articulates here is basically between Mina’s life and his work,
but it doesn’t seem to trouble him much, since he quickly makes his “choice to go on
with my work.” His promptness in fact comes as no surprise, for time is really pressing,
and because, with Lucy’s death, it has already been agreed upon that “God’s true dead”
is better than “the devil’s Un-Dead” (193)—even when that means having one’s heart
staked, head cut off, and mouth filled with garlic. Thus, however unsettling it may seem,
the dilemma shouldn’t inconvenience Van Helsing, whose choice has already been
calculated and absolved of prioritizing his work to Mina’s life.
But, even with that certainty, the dilemma remains disturbing—to readers, if not to Van Helsing—for two reasons. First, there is the timely manner in which his writing—in fact, two successive memoranda—appears. Van Helsing, who has contributed almost nothing to what turns out to be “a mass of type-writing” (326), suddenly takes time to record the fact that Mina is turning into a vampire, a fact that he proves by giving her “a test of what she could” (316), that is, of whether she can cross the line of the wafer he draws. He then concludes, “I rejoiced, for I knew that what could not, none of those [female vampires] that we dreaded could. Though there might be danger to her body, yet her soul was safe!” (316). His conclusion obviously underwrites the outcome of the dilemma, conveniently clearing him of any tinge of guilt about leaving Mina alone—perhaps, too conveniently. Indeed, one might ask, isn’t the timing of his writing too timely? On the other hand, in making his choice, Van Helsing assumes that a vampire victim’s body is disposable for the sake of her soul. But, with the body being apparently alive and vampirism virtually unknown, when and how is this assumption contrived and approved so as to facilitate his choice? A definitive answer comes from the scene where Arthur, having asked if Lucy the vampire is “Lucy’s body, or only a demon in her shape” (190), strikes a stake into the body so that everyone sees that “The Thing in the coffin writhed” (193). Van Helsing then begs forgiveness from her fiancé for mutilating Lucy’s body and is told, “Forgiven! God bless you that you have given my dear one her soul again, and me peace” (192). Van Helsing’s assumption is proposed and supported in this scene, but this at the same time implies that there must have been the same kind of dilemma—that is, one set between Lucy’s life/death and Van
Helsing’s task of convincing others of vampirism and getting his assumption approved. If this is true, Van Helsing’s articulation of the dilemma, which at first seems so timely, is after all revealingly untimely. Is it then possible that Van Helsing sees the dilemma in the beginning yet keeps it—intentionally and strategically—hidden in order to execute his work?

Quite obviously, the answer is yes. The secrecy Van Helsing insists on tells us that. Upon examining Lucy’s illness, he presents his opinion only by equivocation and delay. He first says to Seward, “This is no jest, but life and death, perhaps more” (105). When Seward asks for his diagnosis so that they can “arrive at some decision” together, he demurs, “I have sown my corn, and Nature has her word to do in making it sprout; if he sprout at all, there’s some promise; and I wait till the ear begins to swell” (112). And he adds, “this case of our dear miss is one that may be—mind, I say may be—of such interest to us and others that all the rest may not make him kick the beam, … We learn from failure, not from success!” (112). Judging by what he insinuates, Van Helsing clearly knows the cause of Lucy’s illness, but he does nothing to cure her. Complaining that Stoker depends too much on secrecy for his narrative, Jean Marigny in “Secrecy as Strategy in Dracula” argues that Van Helsing’s strategy of equivocation and delay, “based on [an] absurd, useless sense of secrecy, only results in leaving Lucy unprotected in front of her enemy” (4). Marigny’s argument, however, overlooks the possibility that Van Helsing strategically deploys the secrecy for the sake of something more important than Lucy’s life; that his major concern is not with diagnosing or saving Lucy but with
resolving a dilemma that he dares not to articulate until the very end of the novel, that is, when it becomes no longer a dilemma.

The dilemma Van Helsing finally writes about so that everyone can see it and agree with his choice is thus an outdated and almost resolved version of the dilemma that he has known in secret from the beginning. It is this dilemma—which I call “Van Helsing’s dilemma” in this chapter—that we must consider if we want to understand the extent and complexity of Dracula’s threat. As I shall propose, Van Helsing sees Dracula endangering not so much female characters—in fact, their lives turn out to be quite expendable—as modern science and society.83 Apparently, no other character appears to be better equipped for such an understanding of the danger posed by Dracula than Van Helsing. Distinguishable as foreign by his eccentric accent84 and as intellectual by his

83 Gary Day may be right in stating that “there is no attempt to view society as a whole in Dracula” (85). Interpreting both Jonathan and Seward as representing “the alliance of law and medicine … [through which] state intervention in civil society was most evident” (84), Day thus speculates that “The novel is better understood in terms of how it encodes the forms and logic of the professions and the developing administrative apparatus needed to ensure state intervention in an increasing number of areas” (93). Day’s speculation, however, views the novel only as complicit in the modernization (that is, bureaucratization) of civil society and overlooks its critical stance that, through Van Helsing, tries “to view society as a whole.” Inevitably, Day portrays Van Helsing only as an anomaly by emphasizing his foreignness, commenting that “neither Dracula nor Van Helsing are [sic] allowed to write their own records of events” (92)—a faulty comment, given that Van Helsing in fact leaves two memoranda.

84 His foreignness may have little to do with his work in Dracula, except that it makes him more circumspect about the legality of his actions and more dependent on other British characters for the implementation of the actions. Therefore, I disagree with Carrol L. Fry and Carla Edwards’s sociobiological examination of the novel, in which they claim that Van Helsing “forms a band of sturdy men to battle with this hated other in what seems clearly a defense of territory by the equivalent of the primitive hunting pack” (“The New Naturalism” 50). Their claim dismisses the obvious fact that Van Helsing is not English and doesn’t explain why this “band of sturdy men” travels beyond England. Meanwhile, Van Helsing’s foreignness is certainly worth mentioning, since
numerous academic titles as “M.D., D.PH, D.LIT., Etc., Etc.” Van Helsing is indeed introduced as “one of the most advanced scientists of his day” with “an absolutely open mind” (106). Such distinctions endow him at once with the perceptive eye of an outsider and the astute mind of a scientist. No wonder Van Helsing is able to calculate how devastating Dracula’s threat could be to “our scientific, matter-of-fact nineteenth century” (210). But without Van Helsing-like distinctions, we can be just as lost and beguiled as those characters in the novel, unless we take the advantage of living a century later and look back at science and society in the nineteenth century. Bruno Latour takes such a retrospective look at modernity and detects science’s deep engagement in formulating modern society. The resultant formulation is what he calls the “Constitution,” by which modernity’s view of nature and society is, thanks to unsuspected guarantees, never questioned about its inherent self-contradictions even as it works to confirm the “Great Divide” between nature and society—subsequently, between science and culture (Latour, *We Have Never been Modern* 12). But the nationality draws our attention toward Quincey Morris, the other foreigner in the novel, and to his country, America, and leads us to the next chapter.

85 The “Constitution” is born out of two paradoxes and maintained through four guarantees. The paradoxes are first between “Nature is not our construction; it is transcendent and surpasses us infinitely” and “Society is our free construction; it is immanent to our action”; secondly between “Nature is our artificial construction in the laboratory; it is immanent” and “Society is not our construction; it is transcendent and surpasses us infinitely” (Latour, *Modern* 32). Assuming that the binary opposition between nature/science and culture/society is a given property of modern society, Latour observes that the two contradictory characteristics of transcendence and immanence are alternatively found in both nature and society, possibly liquidating the value of the property. But the paradoxes, Latour continues, never emerge thanks to the four constitutional guarantees that root out such possibility. The first guarantee states that “even though we construct Nature, Nature is as if we did not construct it”; the second is “even though we do not construct Society, Society is as if we did construct it”; and the
“Divide,” Latour argues, is more or less ostensible, since there are always hybrids straddling between nature and society, or science and culture. In fact, much in the way power operates in Foucauldian discourse, the modern constitution only works by the continuous operation of prohibition/purification on hybrids. Latour thus points out, “The essential point of this modern Constitution is that it renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable”; at the same time, “the modern Constitution allows the expanded proliferation of the hybrids whose existence, whose very possibility, it denies” (Modern 34). This constant breakdown of the “Divide” proves that the modern constitution has never been what it has claimed to be, and so Latour claims that “we have never been modern.”

If being modern means being adherent to the “Constitution” and complicit in the purification of hybrids, Dracula is unarguably a modern text, since a vampire, as a visibly embodied hybrid, endangers the modern constitution. Malcolm Smith notes that, despite its timeless popularity, “Dracula is a period piece, quintessentially Victorian in its interests and themes, a popular text written by and for Victorians which contains within it—embedded in the text—important evidence of the ideology of its time” (77). More to my point here, David Glover argues that “in Stoker’s novel we find a defence of modernity that looks aggressively toward the future, a defence that is all the more

third stipulates, “Nature and Society must remain absolutely distinct: the work of purification must remain absolutely distinct from the work of mediation” (32). Finally, the last guarantee is to “keep God from interfering with Natural Law as well as with the laws of the Republic,” thus making Him “the crossed-out God of metaphysics” (33). These four guarantees transform “as ifs” into “musts,” the possibility of the paradoxes into the prohibition of them, and the existence of paradoxical hybrids into a messy space to be purified so that they can be directed to their proper place, nature or society.
remarkable for its engagement with the uncertainties of the period. These uncertainties hinge upon the question of boundaries … finally reinstated in new ways in Dracula” (250). But the novel is also a criticism of modernity, although not in the sense that Latour means as he disqualifies modernity, a sense that comes true only if one understands modernity ontologically, that is, as an end-product of the modern constitution. Rather, its criticism presupposes modernity as an epistemological process, whereby hybrids are assigned their proper place either in nature/science or in society/culture. The novel’s epistemological criticism of modernity aims to expose an irony of modernity, which is that the purification ends up producing a hybrid that can’t be processed for the scheme of the modern constitution. This recalcitrant hybrid is no other than a human being.

86 Contextualizing the novel against the advancement of mass culture and technologies at the turn of the century, Jennifer Wicke also argues that “Dracula is not a coherent text; it refracts hysterical images of modernity. One could call it a chaotic reaction-formation in advance of modernism, wildly taking on the imprints of mass culture” (469).
87 Of course, Latour emphasizes the epistemological understanding of modernity, especially in the later chapters (on relativism and redistributions) of his book, but his emphasis rather uses this understanding in order to disclaim a modernity that he supposes to have been previously in place.
Enacting the novel’s ambivalence toward modernity, Van Helsing inevitably becomes an equally ambivalent character. “Van Helsing,” Burton Hatlen observes, “differs from the other ‘good’ characters in one important respect: when we first meet him he is already a fallen creature, for he ‘knows’ evil as well as good, whereas the English characters are all unfallen, immaculately innocent” (84). I’m not sure if knowing evil necessarily makes one “fallen” and not knowing it one “unfallen,” but it is certain that Van Helsing’s dilemma is as ambivalent as he is. Dracula the hybrid threatens not just the life and soul of Lucy and Mina but also the integrity of science and the stability of modern society. Since the stake is much higher with the latter threat, Van Helsing’s choice, even if it means risking lives, could be counted as logical and necessary. But making a choice is only the beginning of the dilemma. To save science and keep its integrity intact, Van Helsing must translate Dracula from a scientifically impossible being, which he, as a folkloric, fictional figure, actually is, into a logical fact that can be scientifically probable and verifiable. Van Helsing also seems willing to risk human life for the sake of science, which in turn promises unerring scientific stability to society. But he can’t dismiss the possibility that society may question such a risk, however

88 In a sense, the novel plays with modernity, which recalls Harriet Hustis’s emphasis on the “performative textuality” of the novel. Interpreting the novel’s prefatory note as a call for the reader’s active participation, Hustis claims, “The reader of Stoker’s novel is thus not one who has suspended disbelief, but one who is apparently skeptical and who will readily recognize ‘a history almost at variance with the possibilities of later-day belief’” (“Black and White” 22). And “The world ‘almost,’” she continues, “marks a space of Performative possibilities and opens the gap wherein the potential affectiveness/effectiveness of Dracula can operate” (“Black and White” 22). Rosemary Jann also speaks of “two voices” in the novel: “one that urges the superior reality of the supernatural, and a second—and I think, ultimately the more authoritative one—that affirms the status quo of scientific reasoning” (273).
logical and necessary, on moral grounds, and becomes suspicious of the integrity of
science, for which, ironically, the risk is made in the first place. In fear of losing the
hard-earned integrity of science, he bypasses science to find a moral ground for human
sacrifices, succumbing to the fact that science alone can’t guarantee the stability of
society. Bearing all these ambivalences that Dracula’s critical engagement in modernity
entails, Van Helsing’s dilemma thus entreats us to examine and modify the alliance
between science and society.

Before delving into Van Helsing’s dilemma, I will first attempt to provide a more
contemporary look at the alliance of science and society in the nineteenth century than
the one offered by Latour’s sketch of modernity, which is after all retrospective. While
the latter obviously helps us share Van Helsing’s understanding of the complexity and
extent of Dracula’s threat and, furthermore, the novel’s critical engagement in modernity,
it is insufficient to explain Van Helsing’s responses to his dilemma. For he doesn’t act
according to Latour’s “Constitution,” which is yet to come, but in terms of concepts
available in nineteenth century British society. That is, the modern constitution may be
something he works for and can be evaluated by, but it is not something he works with
to resolve his dilemma. The next section, therefore, investigates what may have
influenced his responses with an emphasis on John Stuart Mill’s theory of scientific
knowledge and utilitarianism. Mill is important to the investigation for two reasons. First,
his controversy with William Whewell over scientific knowledge and methods, which he
engages through the several editions of A System of Logic, transplants into the field of
science the earlier aesthetic conflict that we have in the previous chapter witnessed
existing between sensibility and judgment. Secondly, allowing the outcome of the controversy to veer from the self-alienating victory of aesthetic judgment, Mill obtains the security of science and later uses it in *Utilitarianism* to design a scientifically engineered society. Contextualizing Van Helsing’s dilemma in terms of this brief overview of Mill’s endeavor to bring science and society together, the following two sections inquire into Van Helsing’s effort to resolve the dilemma in relation to Mill’s endeavor to found a scientifically engineered society. The two key terms that guide the inquiry are skepticism and selfishness, adapted from Van Helsing’s own characterizing of “this age, [which is] so sceptical and selfish” (169). Skepticism defines the scientific side of his dilemma, as science needs to be at once less skeptical to estimate Dracula’s threat and more skeptical to shield itself from such a threat. On the other hand, the third section considers the limitations of Mill’s utilitarian society that uses science to justify selfishness and illustrates why Van Helsing has to break the alliance of science and society, an alliance that he has tried to conserve by regulating skepticism.

1. The Alliance between Science and Society: Revisiting the Controversy between Mill and Whewell

   As we have witnessed in the previous chapter, what might be described as the battle between Burkean sensibility and Kantian judgment, or simply between the beautiful and the sublime, in the field of aesthetics was won by the latter, signaling the end of gothic aesthetics and the beginning of modern aesthetics. Subsequently, little prospect of an affectionate relationship between those attending and those attended or
between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups has come from aesthetics. The battle, however, now continued in the field of science, where empiricism and rationalism collided again. Jessica Riskin traces in the latter half of the 18th century, especially in France, the inroads of a sensibility that “was only gradually becoming a scientific subject but was already fully in place as a scientific tradition” and “propose[s] to call this distinctive 18th century mode of natural science ‘sentimental empiricism’” (Riskin 4). Refuting cultural historians and literary critics whose study of sensibility in Enlightenment often focuses on “English polite society” to associate sensibility with femininity, Riskin argues that “the principal elements of the culture of sensibility—sentimentalism, the notion that sentiments originated in physical sensations, and the conviction that sentiments were in turn the foundation of social life—were … at work in the overwhelmingly male, French sciences [sic]” (Ri skin 8). These male sensibilists criticized the epistemological and moral mistakes of mechanism whose “imperviousness to the reasons governing the relations in nature meant not only a mistaken physics, but

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89 It might be said that “sentimental empiricism” contradicted the then predominant view of nature and understanding of science that Descartes had proposed in the previous century. Susan Bordo in *The Flight to Objectivity* examines “existential and epistemological changes brought about by the dissolution of the organic, finite, maternal universe of the Middle Age and Renaissance,” changes that led to “the Cartesian era” and modern science (7). The universe thus became subjected to “the quest of objectivity” that modern science pursued and transformed into “a paradise for analysis, dissection, and ‘controlled’ experimentation” (Bordo 78). Bordo associates with “the Cartesian masculinization of thought” modern science’s “flight from the feminine [universe]” in an attempt to secure objectivity, and concludes that such “masculinism” has engendered “a characteristic cognitive style, an epistemological stance which is required of men and women in the sciences today” (104). The androcentric nature of modern science will be further discussed in the following two chapters dealing with texts from the twentieth century, when women made significant strides in both society and science and inevitably stepped into the tradition of “masculinism.”
an arrogant and solipsistic self-sufficiency. By contrast, sensitivity to nature’s reasons and relations signaled … a modest, open, socially collaborative approach to natural science” (Riskin 70). Edmund Burke, in his career-long “disapproval of abstract, analytic approaches to science and government,” felt affinity with these sensibilists—in particular, with Antoine Rivarol, who wrote “a sketch of the history of French chemistry, which he took to epitomize the dangerous, analytical tendency” and “the cause of political fanaticism” (Riskin 275, 272 respectively). After reading Rivarol’s political journal, in which he argues that “Analytical thinkers would ‘dissect living men to better understand them,’” Burke pronounced it “brilliant” and appreciated “a great resemblance in our manners of thinking” (Riskin 273). Rivarol, speculates Riskin, may have inspired Burke “to write his own influential reflections on the Revolution” in which “He identified a dangerous insensibility in the analytical abstractions of ‘the geometrician, and the chemists’” (Riskin 272, 273).

If sentimental empiricism in eighteenth and early nineteenth France found in Burke and other empiricists British sympathizers who were to set down “empirical methods of experiment and observation” (Riskin 283), the idealistic rationalism of Kant also settled in Britain where “the appeals by men of science to natural theology were … [more] obvious” than in France (Riskin 35). Heading the British appeals to natural theology was William Whewell, who condemned the “Lockian or sensationalist theory of physical science” for being “erroneous and morally dangerous” since it “reduced scientific knowledge to generalizations of empirical observations” (Yeo, Defining 185, 200). Whewell found “Immanuel Kant’s philosophy … preliminary to his special
purpose” that is “concerned with the ‘foundation of science,’ and with the specific fundamental ideal that made ‘universal and necessary truth possible’ in different branches of science” (Yeo, *Defining* 13). Though recently a subject of serious contentions, Kant’s influence on Whewell is evident in the latter’s “chapters on the Ideas of Space and Time in *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* [which] were almost literal translations of chapters in the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*” (Ducasse 56). It is in that same book that Whewell articulates “a great difference between Locke’s account of sensation and reflexion, and our view of sensation and ideas,” as follows:

He [Locke] is content to say that all the knowledge which we do not receive directly by Sensation, we obtain by Reflex Acts of the mind, which make up his Reflexion. But we hold that there is no Sensation without an act of the mind, and that the mind’s activity is not only reflexly exerted upon itself, but directly upon objects, so as to perceive in them connexions and relations which are not Sensation;… His purpose was to prove that there are no Ideas, except the reflex acts of mind; our endeavour will be to show that the acts of the mind, both direct and reflex, are governed by certain Laws, which may be conveniently termed Ideas (Whewell, *Philosophy of Inductive Sciences* 150).

Uniform in their attack on sensibility and belief in idealism, “Both Kant and Whewell,” writes Yeo, “were concerned with the nature of scientific knowledge….Both thinkers sought to provide an epistemological justification for this knowledge” (*Defining* 13).

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90 All the quotes of Whewell come from *Selected Writings on the History of Science* (edited by Yehuda Elkana).
Whewell’s poignant criticism of Locke expedited the already imminent collision between rationalism and empiricism in the field of science, a collision that is epitomized by what is generally known as the controversy between Whewell and John Stuart Mill. Their controversy began when Mill in the introduction to his *System of Logic* (1843) mentioned Whewell’s *History of the Inductive Sciences* (1837) to “express differences of opinion” (qtd in Strong 209). Exasperated, Whewell responded by writing “On Induction, with special reference to Mr. J. Stuart Mill’s *System of Logic*” (1849), to which Mill in turn made several rebuttals in the later editions of his *Logic*. At the heart of their controversy is the question of how to discover scientific knowledge. Although both Mill and Whewell emphasize induction as the primary means for arriving at scientific knowledge, Mill underscores rigorous observation and experience of facts, from which induction draws new scientific knowledge, whereas Whewell argues for a priori ideas such as space and time, based on which induction forms a conception that is in turn verified by observed facts. Whewell terms such an application a “Colligation of Facts,” in which “facts are bound together by the aid of suitable Conceptions” (*Philosophy of Inductive Sciences* 206), thereby constituting evidence or “interpreted facts” (Strong 229). Facts, Whewell thus claims, “can be of no value, except they are resolved into those exact conceptions which contain the essential circumstances of the case”

91 His association of a priori ideas with the process of induction necessarily denies such ideas being intuitively known. Instead, as Yeo argues, “Whewell … diverged from the original Kantian thesis by postulating the gradual emergence of *a priori* ideas. The most novel aspect of his theory was the contention that contingent truths could be apprehended as necessary truths during the historical development of a scientific discipline” (“William Whewell” 500).
(Philosophy of Inductive Sciences 209), and he thus unquestionably confronts Mill, who uses facts as the foundation of scientific knowledge.

Though Mill is known to have won the controversy, it seems to be less science than society that induced such an outcome, for what determined the victory was “the great popularity quickly attained by Mill’s System of Logic” (Ducasse 51). The decisive impact of “popularity” on the controversy is hardly surprising, as science indeed was far from being an isolated domain in nineteenth century British society. With numerous “Victorian reviews as a forum for the exchange of controversial ideas,” Britain “[i]n contrast to France, … had a sizeable literate public that supported a considerable popular scientific book-publishing enterprise and a network of unreferred magazines,” and this enabled “early Victorian science” to develop “its social character” (Schweber 19). Considering such density and sophistication of “the public discussion of science,” Yeo questions “whether ‘popularization’ is an adequate term,” for “In the 20th century, popularization is conceived as a communication of expert scientific knowledge to a lay audience; but this notion of a clear distinction between expert scientist and lay audience is inappropriate in the early Victorian period” (Defining 38). Yeo instead suggests that science, “as a relatively insecure cultural activity,” be placed in

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92 Recently revived interest in Whewell either questions the validity of Mill’s victory or considers the devastating effect of his victory. Ducasse believes the victory to have “stood in the way of general recognition of the merits of Whewell’s theory of the nature of scientific knowledge and of the process of discovery” (56). Menachem Fisch also argues that since Mill was “far less acquainted than Whewell with either up-to-date science or the philosophical problems it posed, … British philosophy of science remained very much under the influence of Mill’s empiricist philosophy of induction, and consequently largely out of touch with developments in both the physical and the earth and life sciences well into the present century” (5).
“metascientific discourse” to examine “discussions of the method and moral character of men of science, the history of scientific discovery, the hierarchy of its separate disciplines, the application of scientific concepts and reasoning to other areas, and the appropriate means of explaining science to different audiences” (Defining 31). Contextualized within the “metascientific discourse” of the time, Mill’s victory thus raises a revealing question: does his victory mean that empiricism is more scientific than rationalism, or is it rather an indication of the interactive alliance between science and society? I maintain that the latter is the case, believing, with Strong, that “More than a clash of rationalism and empiricism” was involved in the controversy (Strong 210). What more is then involved in “a clash of rationalism and empiricism?” It is this question which will map out our reading of Dracula and investigation of Van Helsing’s dilemma.

2. Skepticism: Van Helsing the Purifier

Jonathan Harker’s travel from the modern West through a pre-modern East to the castle of Dracula is marked by findings disturbing to what he knows to be modern. He first thinks that “the further East you go the more unpunctual are the trains” (11) and later in front of the castle feels, “The time I waited seemed endless” (21). The landlady of the Golden Krone Hotel gives him a crucifix, which he finds “in a time of loneliness and trouble [to] be of help” (33), although Victorian Anglicanism has taught him “to regard such things as in some measure idolatrous” (13). And he asks, “Is it that there is something in the essence of the thing itself, or that it is a medium, a tangible help, in
conveying memories of sympathy and comfort?” (33). Count Dracula, who welcomes him in “excellent English” (22), is seen to “crawl down the castle wall over that dreadful abyss, face down, with his cloak spreading out around him like great wings,” at which Jonathan cannot but wonder, “What manner of man is this, or what manner of creature is it in the semblance of man?” (39). Stranded between what he experiences and what he knows, Jonathan has no answer to his questions and thus confesses, “unless my senses deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere ‘modernity’ cannot kill” (40-41). Instead of accepting the “powers” as an undeniable fact, however, Jonathan keeps “watch[ing] for proof” (44), driving himself into living “in doubt” and distrusting “the evidence of … [his] own senses” (168). As a result, all his experience amounts to nothing but “[his] ignorance” (100).

Meanwhile, in London, Dr. John Seward, head of a psychiatric asylum, is at once intrigued and puzzled by the strange case of his patient, R.M. Renfield, who “is so quaint in his ideas, and so unlike the normal lunatic” (61). To reach “the heart of his mystery” and become “[the] master of the facts of his hallucinations” (61), Seward makes successive and careful observations:

25 April…. Sanguine temperament; great physical strength; morbidly excitable, periods of gloom ending in some fixed idea which I cannot make out.

5 June…. He has certain qualities very largely developed: selfishness, secrecy, and purpose.

18 June…. He has turned his mind now to spiders, and has got several very big fellows in a box.
1 July….when a horrid blow-fly, bloated with some carrion food, buzzed into the
room, he caught it, … and, before I knew what he was going to do, put it
in his mouth and ate it.

8 July.—There is a method in his madness, and the rudimentary idea in my mind
is growing.

19 July…. Renfield has been very sick and has disgorged a whole lot of feathers.

‘My belief is, doctor,’ he [an attendant] said, ‘that he has eaten his birds,
and that he just took and ate them raw!’ (61-71)

Despite these minute observations, Seward can’t match the case of Renfield to any
known kind of lunacy, so he confidently proclaims “the theory proved” and adds, “My
homicidal maniac is of a peculiar kind. I shall have to invent a new classification for him,
and call him a zoophagous (life-eating) maniac” (71). His theory, however, is a mere
description of Renfield’s behaviors given under “a new classification.” In fact, as it turns
out, the theory explains nothing about the cause of the behaviors and predicts little when
Seward wonders, “what would have been his later steps?” (71). What is ironic is that
Seward nonetheless believes vivisection to be a means to find an answer and wishes for
“a sufficient cause” (71) to use that means, when the real answer resides neither in his
theory nor in Renfield’s body.

As they observe confusing facts and struggle to figure them out either by
watching for “proof” or by conjuring up a “theory,” Jonathan and Seward end up making
widely different responses: while Jonathan becomes dubious of his own sensations and
experience and gains no knowledge, Seward, trusting his own observations, develops a
premature theory to add “a new classification” to scientific knowledge. Stephanie Moss gives a succinct account of their difference.

Unlike Seward, who at least believes what he sees when he sees it, Jonathan disavows nonconforming information. He can, therefore, be profiled along with those men who, as Van Helsing puts it, cannot accept what is outside their daily life. This cultural conditioning limits Jonathan’s ability to make meaning. When the talismans of Western reason—maps, books, and dictionaries—fail to decode his observations, events are cognitively disregarded. Unlike Seward, he does not trust his senses when the information they deliver is scientifically atypical. (210)

The difference between Jonathan and Seward, as Moss suggests, reflects more than their contrasting characters. Indeed, scientifically, they seem to make extremely bad cases of rationalism and empiricism. Jonathan’s case corresponds to the rationalist tradition in modern science, whose root is found in Descartes’s philosophy. Skeptical of the “ordinary empirical status of affairs and … the reality of the external world” but confident in the “absolutely indubitable” nature of “the cogito,” Descartes,” speculates Hookway, “appears to allow that, in principle, the whole of science could be established a priori in a system of derivations from axioms whose truth is intuitively evident” (52, 72, 74). Jonathan’s doubt of sense and experience is however neither rewarded by “the cogito” nor supplemented by “axioms,” and he inevitably comes to “doubt everything” (168). Seward’s erroneous theorization, on the other hand, exemplifies empiricists’ indulgence in inductive methods to develop scientific knowledge from observed facts. Whewell criticizes Mill for such indulgence, since it leads not to induction but to
inference “by which we arrive at individual facts from other facts of the same order of particularity” and draw conclusions that are insufficient, if not false, because they may not be based on the right conception (On Discovery 350, 337). Mill himself admits the possibility of many “erroneous inductions” and emphasizes rigorous application of induction to discover “true ones” (Mill, Logic 283), but it is highly unlikely that such application will ever help Seward with Renfield’s case, insofar as he holds onto his mistaken theory.

In spite of their wide difference, however, Jonathan and Seward are both predominantly modern in that their notion of knowledge corresponds to the “Constitution” Latour proposes as the basis of modernity. They constantly divide knowledge into scientific and non-scientific and prohibit any direct contact or exchange between these two kinds of knowledge. While Jonathan’s self-doubt results from his inability to gain any scientific knowledge from what he perceives to be non-scientific experiences, Seward’s indulgence in scientific methods keeps him from learning from supposedly non-scientific knowledge. Thus, the pre-modern villagers’ superstitious knowledge registers neither as a fact in Jonathan’s mind nor as an answer to his extraordinary experience, just as the deranged Renfield’s rants are to Seward nothing but gibberish, even when they make fairly distinct references to Dracula. As long as their

93 William Veeder remarks that “Lower class women are numerous and important in Dracula. They have suffered occlusion at the hands not of Stoker but of his critics” (xii). His remark certainly resonates with my contention in the first chapter that attendants have received little attention, but I might add that such occlusion always happens “at the hands” of major characters in Dracula. A gothic aesthetics of the beautiful that underlines the unceasing operation of sensibility may offer a way to stop this occlusion, since it could have major characters such as Jonathan pay attention to his uneasy feelings, instead of judging these feelings as groundless.
views are pre-determined by the modern constitution, vampirism and the existence of Dracula won’t be enlisted as facts and, needless to say, as pertaining to scientific knowledge. Van Helsing obliquely addresses this problem to Seward:

> You are clever man, friend John; you reason well, and your wit is bold; but you are too prejudiced. You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your daily life is not of account to you. Do you not think that there are things which you cannot understand, and yet which are; that some people see things that others cannot? But there are things old and new which must not be contemplate [sic] by men’s eyes, because they know—or think they know—some things which other men have told them. Ah, it is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all; and if it explain not then it says there is nothing to explain. (170-71)

Whether they want to “explain all” prematurely or to declare “there is nothing to explain,” both Jonathan and Seward are so “prejudiced” for the sake of the modern constitution that they refuse to consider whatever transgresses the constitution. In this sense, John L. Greenway’s remark that “The paradigms regulating Seward’s science are quite conventional” can certainly be extended to Jonathan, and so can his argument that “Seward’s science contributes nothing to understanding Dracula” (228, 229). 94 When it

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94 Quoting contemporary scientific theories, Robert Mighall offers a more contextual explanation: “Seward reveals here that he is so set in the positivist psychiatric paradigm that he would rather apply the Lombrosian and Nordauque theory of the pathological abnormality of the ‘genius mind,’ to himself or to his great mentor, than admit the possibility of the supernatural” (71). Mighall further relates this to the fact that criticism of Dracula has focused on scientifically more accessible subjects such as sexuality at the
comes to the matter of Dracula, as Van Helsing rightly points out, both Seward and Jonathan are “so skeptic” of everything that proves vampirism.

Skepticism certainly works against Van Helsing’s objective to deliver what he knows of vampirism. But he can’t work against it, since, as Moss points out, “Skepticism … also protects the scientific community from those who would exploit it” (199) and, more importantly, it will contribute to consolidating what is to become the modern constitution. Van Helsing’s dilemma deepens as skepticism turns out to be something he has to work at once against and for—in short, he must work with skepticism. He can be neither a “scientist-turned-magician” (Leatherdale, qtd in Frost 6) nor a priest in guise of doctor and lawyer that introduces “an element in the irrational” as something that “has to be relearned by a rational society (Smith 93). For in both cases, science winds up being contaminated by non-scientific guises. Then, how can he make the others less “prejudiced” against vampirism but at the same time indubitably “prejudiced” for the sake of science? He answers by embodying himself as a scientist who purifies—a role that corresponds not only to what Van Helsing actually does in the novel but also to Latour’s theory. That is, he regulates information on vampirism and expense of ignoring the supernatural, but he is not clear about what kind of criticism there could be if the supernatural was taken into consideration.

David Seed, considering the narrative method of the novel, asserts that “Stoker was anticipating skeptical resistance to his subject from the reader. He therefore builds the skepticism into his character and into the very organization of the narrative” (74). Yet, not all the characters are skeptical (as in the case of Quincey). And as will be examined below, Van Helsing in particular is not skeptical himself but knowledgeable of others’ skepticism, which, if we follow Seed’s argument, makes him representative of Stoker in the novel.

Gloria McMillan provides interesting data: “Dr. Van Helsing … revealed himself to be the character most often using [the word] ‘blood’” (334). And she further explains,
interaction between empiricism and rationalism so as to keep science from being contaminated by non-scientific knowledge or any internecine conflict.  

As Seward’s skepticism stems from his empiricist belief in inductive methods for developing scientific knowledge, Van Helsing reinforces this belief, demanding of him nothing but to observe more and apply induction rigorously. After making his initial and “careful examination” of Lucy, Van Helsing offers contradictory opinions. He first tells Seward that “there is no functional cause” and then that “yet there is cause” (108), implying that their job pertains to a scientific investigation of an unknown cause of her illness, namely, “Lucy’s case.” When a “Terrible change for the worse” overcomes Lucy, he, instead of examining Lucy, first asks Seward, “Have you said anything to our young friend the lover of her?” (111). Instructing Seward that “Better he not know as yet,” Van Helsing advises,

And, my good friend John, let me caution you. You deal with the madmen. All

“Van Helsing’s second usage of “blood” concerns its degree of purity,” referring to the fact that he prefers “the British nobleman Lord (Arthur) Godalming’s blood” to his or Seward’s (335).

That Stoker offers the scientist as an answer to the dilemma is not coincidental, given his consistent interest in that profession. Senf notes that “because much of what he wrote features the science and technology of his day and even projects that science into the future, it is tempting to see Stoker as an early writer of science fiction rather than a gothic novelist” (Science 2). But I would point out that it is less science than the scientist that Stoker concentrates on in his novels. Stoker apparently experiments with the status and obligation of the scientist. In his first novel, The Snake’s Pass, he introduces Dick as a scientist who, though hired by an evil man, Murdock, manages to side with good characters by remaining “simply a man of science” (103). On the other hand, his last novel, The Jewel of Seven Stars, features Mr. Trelawny as an ardent scientist who, despite many warnings, conducts “The Great Experiment” (260) in pursuit of ancient knowledge and ends up bringing death to many, including his daughter and himself. Dracula, a novel published between these two works, appropriately has Van Helsing, who is neither a neutral scientist nor an overzealous scientist but a society-minded scientist.
men are mad in some way or the other; and inasmuch as you deal discreetly with your madmen, so deal with God’s madmen, too—the rest of the world. You tell not your madmen what you do nor why you do it; you tell them not what you think. So you shall keep knowledge in its place, where it may rest—where it may gather its kind around it and breed. (111)

In his advice, Van Helsing calls others “madmen” who should not be offered “knowledge.” Given that he keeps his knowledge even from Seward and only says, “Later I shall unfold to you” (111), Van Helsing implicitly demands that Seward become “sane” to be worthy of the “knowledge.” How he defines “madness” and “sanity” in this case is not clear, but he surely shows how Seward can restore sanity: “I counsel you, put down in record even your doubts and surmises. Hereafter it may be of interest to you to see how true you guess” (112). In this way, Van Helsing prescribes to Seward a case, in which a rigorous application of inductive science alone will reveal the truth and keep him from belonging to the category of “madmen.”

Van Helsing’s strategy appears to be working as Seward succumbs to his own desire for knowledge and desperately pleads, “Professor, let me be your pet student again. Tell me the thesis, so that I may apply your knowledge as you go on. At present I

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98 William Hughes suggests that “Lucy’s descent into vampirism is structured as a medical case, the progress of her ‘illness’ being observed and investigated by a variety of participant characters including the patient herself” (142). Hughes explains this “diagnostic process” as symptomatic of “the physiologically biased practice which dominated British medicine in the later nineteenth century” (142). Although Lucy’s case is indeed being “structured as a medical case” to retain its scientific nature, Hughes’s remark omits the fact that Van Helsing is less a “participant” than a constructor of the case, a fact that certainly distinguishes him from Seward as well as the rest of the characters.
am going in my mind from point to point as a mad man, and not a sane one, follows an idea” (172). As if hypnotized by Van Helsing’s counsel, Seward admits being one of the “madmen” and seeks for knowledge for his own sanity, a knowledge that would normally, and ironically, impute madness to its teller. “Now that you are willing to understand,” Van Helsing thus unfolds the knowledge and says, “those so small holes in the children’s throats … were made by Miss Lucy” (173). And finding useless his immediate resistance to the knowledge, Seward, feeling “staggered,” resignedly says, “I could do nothing, … so I plucked up what heart I could and said that we had better hasten,” when reminded by Van Helsing that he will be one of the “two scientists” (173, 174).

What follows between Seward and Van Helsing appropriately partakes of a logical debate between two scientists who try to prove a theory. In front of Lucy’s empty coffin, Van Helsing “was now more sure than ever of his ground, and so emboldened to proceed in his task,” and asks “Are you satisfied now, friend John?” (176) “I felt,” Seward thinks, “all the dogged argumentativeness of my nature awake within me as I answered him,” and so he says,

‘I am satisfied that Lucy’s body is not in that coffin; but that only proves one thing.’

‘And what is that, friend John?’

‘That it is not there.’

‘That is a good logic,’ he said, ‘so far as it goes. But how do you—how can you—account for it not being there?’
‘Perhaps a body-snatcher,’ I suggested. ‘Some of the undertaker’s people may have stolen it.’ I felt that I was speaking folly, and yet it was the only real cause which I could suggest. …’ (176)

Once his theory is subjected to a logical debate, all Van Helsing needs to prove its validity as scientific knowledge is “more proof” (176), and Lucy’s body, which they later find lying in the coffin and looking “more radiantly beautiful than ever” with “The lips … red, nay redder than before,” offers that desired proof (178). At this moment of truth, Seward, having “no answer for this” any longer, “was silent,” while Van Helsing “showed neither chagrin nor triumph” but finally divulges what he has known all along, that is, his knowledge of vampirism and the Un-Dead. Thus, when Van Helsing proposes to “cut off her head and fill her mouth with garlic, and … drive a stake through her body,” Seward realizes, “It made me shudder to think of so mutilating the body of the woman I had loved. And yet the feeling was not so strong as I had expected. I was, in fact, beginning to shudder at the presence of this being, this Un-Dead, as Van Helsing called it, and to loathe it. Is it possible that love is all subjective, or all objective?” (179).

By purifying vampirism into an empirically provable fact, Van Helsing concocts it as scientific knowledge without contaminating Seward’s skepticism for inductive science—that is, without tainting the purity of his scientific blood.99 With Jonathan, who is a rationalist, however, Van Helsing takes a different approach. If Seward has

99 In his “Burying Eternal Life in Bram Stoker’s Dracula: the Sacred in an Age of Reason,” Nur Elmessiri points out that “Dracula is a Body which should disappear forever, its disappearance assisted by a script inscribing and testifying to its absence and by the Host’s being buried in its place”(111). Elmessiri’s point basically explains how Van Helsing’s methodology is used to embody mythical vampirism as a visible scientific fact, but it doesn’t explain why this particular methodology is being used.
committed a methodological error, Jonathan’s trouble is rather fundamental in that he finds no idea corresponding to his sensations, and no knowledge explaining his experiences. What he needs is therefore a scientific concept that confirms what he senses and experiences to be true, and Van Helsing provides exactly this. In his letter to Mina, Van Helsing writes, “I have read your husband’s so wonderful diary. You may sleep without doubt. Strange and terrible as it is, it is true! I will pledge my life on it” (167). By claiming that vampirism is truth, Van Helsing disburdens Jonathan of the harrowing task of making sense of unbelievable experiences, and instead procures for him a scientific concept that explains the experiences. But it should be noted that there is more than a simple concept involved in this, since, as noted above, neither the villagers nor Mina would have had the same impact on Jonathan, whether they offered their knowledge or she her absolute confidence in him. Apparently, to Jonathan, what is being offered is not as important as who offers it—in this case it has to be a trustworthy scientist such as Van Helsing.

Being a rationalist but not a scientist, Jonathan’s dependence on the scientist for scientific knowledge comes as no surprise. Criticizing Mill’s overly extended notion of induction and the subsequent “popularization” of scientific knowledge, Whewell demands, “Who will tell us which of the methods of inquiry those historically real and successful inquiries exemplify? Who will carry these formulae through the history of the sciences, as they have really grown up; and show us that these four methods have been operative in their formation; or that any light is thrown upon the steps of their progress
by reference to these formulae?” (Philosophy of Discovery 346). Elsewhere he provides his own answer:

Whenever any material step in general knowledge has been made,—whenever any philosophical discovery arrests our attention,—some man or men come before us, who have possessed, in an eminent degree, a clearness of the ideas which belong to the subject in question, and who have applied such ideas in a vigorous and distinct manner to ascertained facts and exact observations.

(History of the Inductive Sciences 7)

Whewell’s “some man or men,” reminiscent of Kantian geniuses, obviously refers to the talented few who guide and benefit the general public and whom we now call scientists. It is therefore no coincidence that Whewell virtually invented the term scientist to “describe a cultivator of science in general” (OED).100

Whewell’s view of scientific knowledge as exclusively belonging to selected scientists, if it prevails, will frustrate Mill’s intention to render scientific knowledge accessible to everyone. But Mill nonetheless understands that there are situations where such accessibility is possible only through the integrity and dependability of scientists. Near the end of the extensive chapter on induction in Logic, Mill spares a few pages to explain “the grounds of disbelief,” that is, to consider a case in which “Assertions for which there is abundant positive evidence are often disbelieved, on account of what is

100 Roy Porter, with a particular interest in geologists, examines the development of the scientist as a career and claims that “There is ... a lack of exact congruence between scientists and professionals—in part a function of the evident fact that the communities of few sciences could become professionalized according to the classic prestigious models of medicine and the law” (810). Potter’s claims apparently resonates with Whewell’s vocation idea of scientists.
called their improbability, or impossibility” (Logic 408). An impossible case, “in which the alleged fact conflicts, or appears to conflict, with a real law of causation,” has “two hypotheses..., a supernatural and an unknown natural agency,” and pertains rather to a matter of belief. An improbable case, on the other hand, conflicts “with uniformities of mere co-existence, not proved to be dependent on causation: in other words, with the properties of Kinds” (Mill, Logic 410). In this case, Mill speculates,

the fact asserted is the existence of a new Kind, which in itself is not in the slightest degree incredible, and only to be rejected if the improbability that any variety of object existing at the particular place and time should not have been discovered sooner, be greater than that of error or mendacity in the witnesses. Accordingly, such assertions, when made by credible persons, and of unexplored places, and not disbelieved, but at most regarded as requiring confirmation from subsequent observers. (Logic 411)

It is questionable what Mill means by “credible persons” in this simple procedure to transform improbable facts into truthful ones. Yet he unquestionably stipulates that they shouldn’t be deceived by “fallacious appearances,” “some epidemic delusion, propagated by the contagious influence of popular feeling,” or “some strong interest” such as “religious zeal, party feeling, vanity, or at least the passion for the marvelous” (Logic 412). Credibility thus requires impartiality and objectivity, which, since it is scientific knowledge that Mill is concerned with here, are qualifications for those delivering new scientific knowledge, namely, for scientists.
It is as a credible person, rather than as an empiricist researcher, that Van Helsing presents himself to Jonathan and, later, the others, pretending to supply them with a scientifically approved concept of vampirism. Conveniently, and presumably strategically, he has another scientist, Seward, vouch for the concept to fortify his credibility. Having introduced the concept, Van Helsing assigns the others the role of “subsequent observers” whose task corresponds not to theorization but to, in Whewellian terms, “the colligation of facts.” In other words, they use what they observe not to come up with a new idea or theory but to verify the given concept. In this way, what should have been impossible, whether it is vampirism, the un-dead, or Dracula, is mediated/purified by the two scientists as a probable fact, and the public as “subsequent observers” only have to refer what they experience and confirm it. Furthermore, Van Helsing has them engage in the constant production and circulation of documents. In effect, he forms a quasi-scientific community where Dracula, like an unknown disease, can be observed, analyzed, recorded, and eradicated.\footnote{Examining how scientific knowledge is created and circulated within and outside the scientific community, Latour in *Science in Action* emphasizes the production and circulation of documents. “A document,” he observes, “becomes scientific when its claims stop being isolated and when the number of people engaged in publishing it are many and explicitly indicated in the text” (33). The community that Van Helsing forms here ends up being much like the scientific community Latour describes in that both are to a great extent subject to what he calls “sociologics” (Latour, *Science* 202). That is, their knowledge of vampirism is disclaimed because there will be nothing to gain through “a whole cycle of accumulation” (Latour, *Science* 220) in society when Dracula is killed and becomes of no interest. But, while they are in pursuit of Dracula, the members of Van Helsing’s community are committed to producing documents and accomplishing their object. In this sense, the community in pursuit is more like the scientific community that Thomas Kuhn articulates in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The members resemble “Scientists [who] work from models acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite}
community, after he “took the head of the table” and “asked me [Mina] to act as secretary,” Van Helsing thus points to the abundance of documents that hold vampirism as a fact and says, “I may, I suppose, take it that we are all acquainted with the facts that are in these papers. … There are such beings as vampires; some of us have evidence that they exist” (209). Dracula is now no threat to skepticism, since there are and will be documents that verify his existence. And he is no threat to science, either, because, once Dracula is destroyed and there is nothing to verify, there will be “hardly one authentic document: nothing but a mass of type-writing” (326).

3. Selfishness: The Human as Hybrid

At the end of his brief speculation on Mina’s life, Van Helsing consoles himself, “I resolve me that my work lay here, and that as to the wolves we must submit, if it were God’s will. At any rate it was only death and freedom beyond. So did I choose for her.” Earlier, instead of taking immediate actions that might have saved Lucy’s life, Van Helsing has waited until she turns into a vampire so that others can observe her and confirm the existence of vampirism. Again, when Lucy the vampire is staked, Van Helsing offers others a consolation: “No longer she is the devil’s Un-Dead. She is God’s true dead, whose soul is with Him!” (193). As consistent as his choice of work over life in both cases is Van Helsing’s invocation of religion to justify the loss of life. That Van knowing or needing to know what characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms” (46). Indeed, Jonathan and Seward, as noted above, accept vampirism without altering their paradigm or scientific methods. As a result, no revolutionary insight or paradigm shift occurs to them, and they exert no effort to circulate new knowledge in society.
Helsing invariably seeks for moral support in religion is rather surprising and, to a great extent, disappointing, since his work is after all to make science self-sufficient. While Lucy’s sacrifice is used to prevent science from being tainted by non-scientific impossibilities such as vampirism, Mina’s life is disregarded in order to eradicate the source of contamination. Van Helsing, furthermore, has succeeded in making the others produce documents and participate in developing scientific knowledge, thus creating a scientific community where the two scientists—he and Seward—are leaders. Despite all his success, however, Van Helsing can’t use science to justify his decision to risk human lives—that is, when Lucy stops being “the Thing” and Mina is still not a vampire. Giving up the hard-earned self-sufficiency of science, he simply turns to religion for moral support.

Van Helsing’s retreat into religion, which seems to re-enact Whewell’s “appeals to natural theology,” would come as a disappointment to Mill, who aspired to found his utilitarian society upon science, though his aspiration itself suffered the same type of disappointment. As he begins “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences,” the last chapter of Logic, Mill reaffirms his belief in empiricist and inductive science by claiming that “Principles of evidence and Theories of Method are not to be constructed a priori” (545). Yet he immediately acknowledges the insufficiency of science in conducting “the most complex and most difficult subject of study on which the human mind can be engaged” (Mill, Logic 546). This subject is no other than “man himself,” especially, “the laws of Mind, and, in even a greater degree, those of Society, [which] are so far from having attained a similar state of even partial recognition, that it is still a controversy whether
they are capable of becoming subjects of science in the strict sense of the term” (Mill, Logic 546). Believing “the principles laid down in the preceding Books” to be “useful,” Mill attempts to delve into these difficult areas, namely, moral science and social science, only to admit that innumerable circumstances make it impossible to depend solely on inductive methods. He makes a strategic compromise to incorporate deductive methods and writes, “our observation, though not sufficient as proof, is ample as verification” (Mill, Logic 567). As a result, Mill continues, “we need be under no difficulty in judging how far they [‘the principles’] may be expected to be permanent, or by what circumstances they would be modified or destroyed” (Logic 567). His compromise, which lies in using “the [inductively drawn] empirical laws” in a deductive way, underwrites his definition of “Ethology.” As a branch of moral science that “corresponds to the act of education, in the widest sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective character as well as individual,” ethology is, he defines, “the deductive science [that] is a system of corollaries from Psychology, the experimental science” (Mill, Logic 567, 569). Likewise, “The Social Science … is a deductive science; not, indeed, after the model of geometry, but after that of the more complex physical sciences,” namely, “astronomy” (Mill, Logic 584). And Mill suggests “the Concrete Deductive Method” for social science, by which one “infers the law of each effect from the law of causation on which that effect depends; not, however, from the law merely of one cause, as in the geometrical method; but by considering all the causes which conjunctly influence the effect, and compounding their laws with one another” (Logic 584).
The unfortunate compromise Mill makes in Logic to underpin moral science and social science, however, proves its utility in his Utilitarianism, especially in chapter six, “Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is Susceptible.” Seeking to validate “The utilitarian doctrine … that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end,” Mill claims it to be a fact that “each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness” (Utilitarianism 35). He even subjects desire for virtue to this doctrine, since “Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain” (Utilitarianism 38). Having thus described everyone, whether virtuous or not, as living by the principle of utility, that is, as essentially seeking for his/her own happiness, Mill declares,

We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true—if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness—we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. (Utilitarianism 39)

The “resemblance” between what is “psychologically true” and “the criterion of morality” may have little logical validity, because the psychological truth is yet to be proved, which is, as Mill admits, impossible, and also because the resemblance
arbitrarily denies the possibility of “a part” being different from “the whole.” Its logic is valid only in light of Mill’s *Logic* that provides the moral and social sciences with “the Concrete Deductive Method,” by which it is deemed logical to infer from empirically imperfect observations a principle, according to which ensuing facts are judged deductively.

The scientific foundation established in *Logic* turns out to be instrumental to instituting utilitarian society in that the principle of utility is working on both individual and social levels: private utility and public utility are different only in quantity but not in quality. In this society, morality is not an absolute principle prescribed by what is beyond individuals but a negotiated sum of what is desired by each individual. Having selected Kant from “a priori moralists” and criticized him for failing, “almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct” (*Utilitarianism* 3, 4), Mill avers his belief in individuals’ potential for morality. Unlike “a swine,” human beings, he claims, “have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites and, when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification” (*Utilitarianism* 8). Only by

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102 Mill may have depended on a similar generalization in *Logic* to refute “the Chemical Method,” which surmises that “Men are … when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties: as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water” (*Logic* 573). Instead, Mill firmly states that “Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man. In social phenomena the Composition of Causes is the universal law” (*Logic* 573).

103 The same belief also underwrites Mill’s objection to the classic Benthamite utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, often associated
cultivating such “faculties” into “nobleness of character” does utilitarianism “attain its end” (*Utilitarianism* 11), and Mill speculates,

> Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these objects of contemplation should not be the inheritance of everyone born in a civilized country. As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being should be a selfish egoist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which center in his own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this is sufficiently common even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private affections and sincere interest in the public good are possible, though in unequal degree, to every rightly brought up human being. (*Utilitarianism* 14)

Self-development is thus integral to developing utilitarian morality from the principle of utility, since it enables a human being to turn selfishness into an understanding of other human beings and to cultivate such qualitative ideas as virtue and sympathy. As R.S. Downie in “Mill on Pleasure and Self-Development” articulates, “The connection between ‘individuality’ … and the self-development doctrine lies in Mill’s belief that … to be individual, is to develop by using ‘the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being’ in the choice of one’s own plan of life” (70). Mill’s

with hedonism and consequentialism. Refuting Bentham’s theory of measurable, quantifiable happiness, Mill argues that “It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (*Utilitarianism* 8).
“justification of commending self-development,” Downie concludes, “is simply that it will produce more pleasure for the ‘self’ concerned,” rather than for any social or metaphysical ideals (70).

The scientific community that Van Helsing establishes consists of members with selfish reasons and a collective goal. As such, the community appears to be ideal for utilitarian society. Arthur has lost his fiancé to Dracula and desires revenge; Jonathan, once captive to Dracula, fights for his own sanity as well as his wife, Mina. Seward also has scientific curiosity to satisfy, not to mention that he, like Quincey, has proposed to Lucy. Yet they all want to find and kill Dracula. As a faithful inductive scientist, however, Seward is particularly ready for such a utilitarian society. Observing Renfield and inferring that he is “a possibly dangerous man, probably dangerous if unselfish,” Seward contemplates, “In selfish men caution is as secure an armour for their foes as for themselves. What I think of on this point is, when self is the fixed point the centripetal force is balanced with the centrifugal; when duty, a cause, etc., is the fixed point, the latter force is paramount, and only accident or a series of accidents can balance it” (62). In this rather unorthodox and cryptic remark, Seward regards selfishness as positive because it makes one cautious of one’s own security and prevents one from losing control. He furthermore finds in such unselfish principles as “duty, a cause, etc.,” fewer potential moral benefits than destructive effects on the balance that selfishness maintains. His belief in the value of selfishness strengthens as he watches Mrs. Westenra, to whose illness “any shock may prove fatal,” fail to notice “the terrible change in her daughter to whom she is so attached” (112). Seward then writes, “It is something like the way Dame
Nature gathers round a foreign body an envelope of some insensitive tissue which can protect from evil that which it would otherwise harm by contact. If this be an ordered selfishness, there we should pause before we condemn any one for the vice of egotism, for there may be deeper roots for its causes than we have knowledge of” (112).

With his favorable opinion of selfishness, Seward is able to prevent his own selfishness from becoming too excessive and harming himself. At first, he seems interested only in satisfying his curiosity about Renfield, admitting that “I questioned him [Renfield] more fully than I had ever done, with a view to making myself master of the facts of his hallucination. In my manner of doing it there was, I now see, something of cruelty. I seemed to wish to keep him to the point of his madness” (61). But later he controls his curiosity by putting himself in Renfield’s position and relinquishes the idea of performing vivisection on Renfield: “I must not think too much of this, or I may be tempted; a good cause might turn the scale with me, for may not I too be of an exceptional brain, congenitally?” (71) Recognizing his own vulnerability certainly discourages Seward from becoming too selfish, but it also encourages him to be more vigilant of Dracula’s threat so that he realizes, “Strange that it never struck me that the very next house might be the Count’s hiding-place!” (247). Selfishness, if properly used, can therefore moderate itself, preventing one from harming others and also from being harmed by others.

Dracula, by contrast, exemplifies selfishness improperly used and hardly developed—at least according to Van Helsing’s account. In many respects, he resembles the “Oriental despot” Mill describes in Logic. As he considers the question of whether
moral science, his “ethology,” is empirically feasible, Mill answers it in the negative because it is not possible to perfect ethology by experimenting with individuals. But he inserts in his answer a parenthetic note: “(because, even if we suppose unlimited power of varying the experiments, though no one but an Oriental despot has that power, or, if he had, would probably be disposed to exercise it)” (Logic 565). Indeed, like “an Oriental despot” or the mad scientist Seward could have become, Dracula turns his victims into self-less things used solely for his purpose. Dracula is, as Kilgour describes, “the egotistical individual who defies difference, as in order to assert his own will he drains others of their individuality” (“Vampiric Arts” 54). As Van Helsing rightly proclaims, Dracula has “[a] child brain” that is “selfish and therefore small” (294).

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104 Jasmine Young Hall detects Dracula’s despotism in his relationship with Jonathan Harker, since the latter “as solicitor can have no interest of his own; he is not ‘the man himself’ but a stand-in” (103). In Hall’s terms, Dracula represents monopoly, the economic equivalent of selfishness. Robert A. Smart agrees with such a representation of Dracula by saying that in the novel, “the dangers of monopoly—symbolized by the greed Count Dracula—are successfully thwarted by the combined of a young band of entrepreneurs” (253). Burton Hatlen, by contrast, suggests that “Dracula represents both the repressed masses of workers and a decaying aristocracy” (93). Hatlen’s suggestion, drawn from his view of Dracula as a threat to “the haute bourgeoisies,” however, seems to overlook the fact that an oppressive monopolist is as threatening, if not more, to the bourgeois society.

105 Rather interested in sexual discourse in the novel, Senf also points out that Dracula is “dangerous because he expresses his contempt for authority in the most individualistic ways—through his sexuality” (“Dracula” 99). Sexuality, expressed by “his thirst for blood and the manner in which he satisfies this thirst” (Senf, “Dracula” 99), refers to sexual desire, one of the most primal desires.

106 Van Helsing’s emphasis on Dracula’s selfishness as his major evil implicitly depletes the ethnographic or racial connotation in “an Oriental despot,” rendering Dracula as “a criminal man” among themselves, not an alien from a foreign country. Such depletion turns out to be appropriate when, as quoted below, Mina questions if they should pursue Dracula, who has fled from England. For the pursuit is neither racially nor nationally
Dracula’s exclusive selfishness, however, only serves to limit his seemingly “unlimited power.” Mina postulates that because Dracula is as “selfish as he is a criminal” and solely “intent on being safe, careless of all,” he “frees my soul somewhat of the terrible power which he acquires over me,” when Van Helsing cuts in:

it may be that, as ever is in God’s Providence, the very thing that the evil doer most reckoned on for his selfish good, turns out to be his chiepest harm. The hunter is taken in his own snare, as the great Psalmist says. For now that he [Dracula] think [sic] he is free from every trace of us all, and that he has escaped us with so many hours to him, then his selfish child-brain will whisper him to sleep. He think [sic], too, that as he cut himself off from knowing your mind, there can be no knowledge of him to you; there is where he fail! [sic] That terrible baptism of blood which he give [sic] you makes you free to go to him in spirit, as you have as yet done in your times of freedom, when the sun rise and set. As such times you go by my volition and not by his; and this power to good of you and others, you have won from your suffering at his hands. This is now all more precious that he know it not, and to guard himself have even cut himself off from his knowledge of our where [sic]. We, however, are not all selfish …. (297)

While judging the undeveloped selfishness of Dracula as abhorrent to human beings and disadvantageous to Dracula himself, Van Helsing underlines “We, however, are not all motivated. Instead, it is a sort of moral mission. In this light, I disagree with Fry’s suggestion that the pursuit is to engage “[a] battle with this hated other in what seems clearly a defense of territory by the equivalent of the primitive hunting pack,” since the pursuit extends beyond the land of this “hunting pack.” (“Fictional” 50).
selfish,” implicitly warning that the others could be like him without proper self-
development.107

Although not as dangerous as undeveloped selfishness, there is another kind of
selfishness—to be more exact, the total absence of selfishness—that seems to trouble
Mill. When he considers if “the hero or the martyr,” who is exclusively unselfish and can
“do without happiness,” should be exemplary, Mill offers rather a reserved answer: “He
may be an inspiring proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what
they should” (Utilitarianism 16). And he continues his reservation about such
unselfishness:

It [utilitarianism] refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good…. The only
self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of
the means of happiness, of others, either of mankind collectively or of individual
within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind. (Utilitarianism
16-17)

Mill then explains more specifically,

The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object
of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in thousand) has it in
his power to do this on an extended scale—in other words, to be a public
benefactor—are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to

107 Inversely, Dracula’s entering a society where undeveloped selfishness is condemned
is, to use Royce MacGillivray’s words, “unconsciously suicidal” (64), but ironically, he
can’t help it because he needs people for his selfish reason.
consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. (*Utilitarianism* 19)

Unselfishness is thus acknowledged only to the extent that it serves a certain purpose in society, where it should remain “exceptional” in order for self-development to be the operating norm of that society.

As “so little an egotist,” Mina instantiates unselfishness, traveling around to help Lucy and Jonathan, but her unselfishness almost verges on an indiscriminate sympathy that could contradict the public utility of Van Helsing’s community. If Mina, as Patricia McKee observes, “is pure white insofar as she is ‘nothing in particular’: not because of any material attribute or even any positive sign but because she is open to entertaining any attribute” (52),

108 the problem is that she is as open to Van Helsing as to Dracula. As soon as she is informed of Dracula being the cause of Lucy’s death, Mina writes, “I suppose one ought to pity any thing so hunted as is the Count” (202). In contrast to Seward, unselfish Mina doesn’t appreciate the vulnerability of self, which may explain why she falls a victim to selfish Dracula, along with Lucy who confesses, “I don’t know what to do with myself” (57). Accordingly, they become “two ‘pure’ women … who receive the vampire’s bite [and] become ‘fallen women.’” (Fry, “Fictional” 35).

109 Even

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108 McKee further argues that “Mina functions as the raw material of mass media because she converts her body into representation and then types herself and others as broadly representative signs” (57). But her argument, though appropriate to explain Mina’s role as a medium, doesn’t explain the last change of hers, when, by her own admission, she becomes rather a “selfish” thinker.

109 In line with Fry’s invocation of the image of blank paper, Jennifer L. Fleissner cites Beizer’s description of hysteric women, “the impressionable woman who serves as ‘living writing paper,’ able to be marked by the slightest touch” (439). Fleissner, however, differentiates Mina from such “impressionable” women as Lucy in that the
when “fallen,” however, Mina becomes more unselfish and pleads to her husband, “That poor soul [Dracula] who has wrought all this misery is the saddest case of all. Just think what will be his joy when he too is destroyed in his worser part that his better part may have spiritual immortality. You must be pitiful to him too, though it may not hold your hands from his destruction” (269). Her plea can weaken the public utility Van Helsing lays out for the community. Thus, when she tries to discourage the others from pursuing Dracula and asks, “why need we seek him further, when he is gone away from us?” Van Helsing, vexed by the unwanted interference of her unselfishness, reminds her that she also has a strong selfish reason to complete the pursuit. He thus ventures, “dear Madam Mina, now more than ever must we find him even if we have to follow him to the jaws of Hell! … Because … he can live for centuries, and you are but mortal woman. Time is now to be dreaded—since once he put that mark upon your throat,” even though his reminder would be so devastating as to put her “in a faint” (269).

Quite appropriately, it is only after her unselfishness is contaminated by Dracula’s selfishness, and once her speculations on Dracula’s whereabouts employ scientific methods, that Mina becomes decisively useful to the pursuit and to the community. Instead of merely transcribing documents, Mina traces Dracula’s move for herself and says to Van Helsing, who implores her to “go on,”

former exemplifies “the modern secretary” (446), who can pretend not to know about her work. Based on this differentiation, Fleissner compares Mina to Lucy, and writes, “a Mina painstakingly imaged by the text as unknowing, hypnotic conduit offers a safe alternative to the vision of a Mina who might otherwise ‘never forget’—be permanently imprinted by—her exposure to the monstrous evils the world harbors. Lucy Westenra, the impressionable woman, embodies this familiar threat; hence, Lucy’s body must be disposed of as inappropriate to her time” (447)
“I will try to; but you will forgive me if I seem egotistical.”

“No! fear not, you must be egotist, for it is of you that we think.”

“Then, as he is criminal he is selfish; and as his intellect is small and his action is based on selfishness, he confines himself to one purpose. …” (297)

Based on her speculation, Mina also produces a memorandum that begins with “Ground of inquiry” and ends with her “surmise … that the Count decided to get back to his Castle by water” (304, 305). Diluted by Dracula’s selfishness and encouraged by Van Helsing to be “selfish,” unselfishness in Mina becomes no threat to the community, and she in the end survives to be a fit member of the utilitarian society.¹¹⁰

Van Helsing’s scientific community thus has all its members, selfish or unselfish, on the right track to serve the public utility, a utility that should justify any action taken to accomplish his work on Dracula. Kilgour, tracing the track in terms of writing and art, records that “it [writing] is transformed and redeemed from a solipsistic pursuit into a collective art with a moral and social purpose” (“Vampiric Arts” 55). Their collective writing indeed accomplishes such transformation and redemption, but I think Kilgour is dismissing the fact that the writing is by nature more scientific than artistic in the novel. If, as she states, “true individuality is best preserved through social order” (“Vampiric Arts” 53), this order, at least within Van Helsing’s scientific community, is certainly not that of art but of science and utilitarianism. The community, as in the perfect utilitarian

¹¹⁰ On a different note, Elizabeth Signorotti compares Le Fanu’s “Carmilla” with Dracula and states, “Le Fanu’s disturbing elimination of male alliance through women and his allowing women self-determination is remedied in Dracula. Stoker captures the free-agent women loose at the end of ‘Carmilla’ and returns them to their proper sphere and proper stations as objects for exchange” (627). By being selfish, Mina obviously now becomes manageable and her ideas more exchangeable.
society Mill envisions, assures its members that their actions are morally justified by their scientific certainty or utilitarian principles. But no such assurance is promised outside the scientific/utilitarian society, that is, in the society where the characters have lived and will live. In fact, everyone in the community seems aware of possible conflicts between these two kinds of society, that is, between what is operated by science and what is approved by the public, for they without hesitation keep the work to themselves. Examples of their awareness are plentiful throughout the novel. When Mrs. Westenra dies, it is Seward who “came to speak about the certificate of death,” since “If we do not act properly, and wisely, there may be an inquest” (137). Likewise, when Van Helsing reveals the secret about Lucy to Seward but not to the others, he expresses his concern that Arthur, if he learned of Lucy’s Un-dead status, would think that “it is we [two scientists], mistaken ones, that have killed her by our ideas” (180). Even when Dracula’s presence and atrocity are proven and acknowledged, the members of the community admit having no explanation to give the police if they are caught breaking into Dracula’s Piccadilly house (255). Van Helsing also notes that, because Dracula, if killed, “will soon after fall into dust,” “there would be no evidence against us, in case any suspicion of murder were aroused” (290). All these examples point to the discrepancy between the scientific/utilitarian society and society in general, a discrepancy that they deliberately ignore by isolating themselves from the latter society.

If he wants his work to have no legal or even moral repercussions, Van Helsing needs to keep vampirism a secret and the scientific community in isolation. This need, insofar as the members of the community are concerned, is quite well satisfied, and this
self-sufficient community seems ready to implement Mill’s design for a utilitarian society. But that he turns to religion for moral justification intimates his decision to forgo such self-sufficiency, break off the isolation of the community, and, by extension, reject Mill’s design. The invocation of religion thus exposes a problem that no scientific community, and perhaps no utilitarian society, could solve, no matter how insulated and self-sufficient it is. This irresolvable problem is a human being, as dramatically exemplified by the two human sacrifices Van Helsing has to make. Ironically, it is not Lucy, Mina or even Dracula but Van Helsing himself who is responsible for bringing up the problem. Relying on the authority and credibility of the scientist, not of science, for the sake of skepticism, Van Helsing betrays that, as David Glover points out, “science … signifies nature brought under the control of the full human subject” (252). And “This humanistic focus,” which Van Helsing epitomizes since he “embodies the uncompromising authority of the scientific voice,” inevitably extends from him to Lucy and Mina when he decides to sacrifice the latter (Glover 252). Once seen from the “humanistic focus,” his decision becomes not so much about what a scientist can do to a thing like a vampire as about what a human being does to another human being. Can he justify his decision to sacrifice Lucy and Mina logically and scientifically? In other words, is his science able to cover human affairs? Mill attempted to subject human beings to logical explanations or scientific laws, but his attempt only shows that a human being is not to be understood either by empiricism or by rationalism. Far from expressing his deep faith, Van Helsing’s invocation of religion is thus a painful admission of the failure of Mill’s attempt, of the end of his scientific community, and of
the limitations of science and utilitarianism. After all, the novel tells us, no science is selfish enough to neglect a human self.

So we are now—after witnessing how Van Helsing resolves his dilemma—left with another dilemma. Science, if unchecked, will attempt to subject even human beings to its supposedly absolute laws, relentlessly disregarding moral ramifications and unwittingly causing social repercussions. Yet it, if unchecked, can bring a great deal of knowledge and prosperity to human beings through its seemingly boundless applicability, proving the greatness of humanity and expediting the progress of civilization. As something to be at once feared and revered for its potentials, science has to be reinstated within society in a way that stops its fearfulness from undermining its reverence and, at the same time, its reverence from realizing its fear. That is, the alliance of science and society must be modified in such a way that at once frees and controls science. A quest for this seemingly paradoxical way out of the dilemma that science has for society will begin, and perhaps end, by accounting for what triggers the dilemma, namely, human beings. In other words, it is a “humanistic focus” that we need in order to understand the modified version of the alliance in the aftermath of *Dracula*. For such a quest, and for the new alliance of science and society, however, we need to turn to the twentieth century, to the newly and explosively growing country of Quincey who is now absent in *Dracula*’s society, and to an American society where, according to Stoker’s 111 Religion, to which Van Helsing quickly turns to justify human sacrifices, is certainly not the way, because it historically proved to deter the development of modern science. Furthermore, nineteenth century science was particularly eager to separate itself from religion and became almost successful with the advent of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.
own remarks, “hospitality is unbounded,” women are held “in the high regard,” “the
condition of education” is greatly improving, people are of “the practical nature,” and
which is turning into “a nation of specialists” (“Glimpse” 16, 19, 20, 25; “Americans”
84).
CHAPTER V

A HUMANISTIC SCIENCE IN A PRAGMATIC SOCIETY:

RE-READING SINCLAIR LEWIS’S ARROWSMITH

In *American Myth, American Reality*, James Oliver Robertson, underlining the social function of American myths “to maintain common ideals, common images and referents, common behaviors” (17), writes that “Science, based on the metaphor of evolution, tied to all the imagery and promise of progress, became by the beginning of the 20th century a new American myth” (280). This new myth was, Robertson argues, “as universal, as evangelical, as full of the promise of ultimate truth, of absolute answers to ultimate questions” as Christianity, and brought no substantial disruptions to the two traditionally dominant mythologies of individualism and religion in that “Progress, the American destiny, and science became mutually interacting, mutually dependent processes” (Robertson 280). Science would bring about technological innovations that would in turn improve individuals’ lives. At the same time, its theoretical integrity could end “the disputes between science and religion” and begin (Robertson here quotes Lester Ward) “the age of [scientific] investigation” of “the phenomena of the universe” to find uniform, and divine, laws regulating the phenomena (288). No demystifying attacks, according to Robertson’s account, came from the advent of science, which now led the older myths of individualism and religion to put in practice the idea of progressivism in American society.

In retrospect, given the scientific and social progress America has made throughout the twentieth century, Robertson’s description of three myths—science,
individualism, and religion—as collaborating for the sake of progressivism may be accurate. Despite its historical accuracy, however, his description sounds too idyllic, blotting out some details that might have blemished the relationship. In *A Social History of American Technology*, Ruth Schwartz Cowan points out different, and often opposite, circumstances for “inventor, entrepreneur, and engineer [who were] involved in creating industrialized society in the years between 1870 and 1920” (119). As “the scientific basis for the electrical and chemical industries became both more complex and more obvious,” inventors and engineers gave up their independence and were professionalized, subsumed to “the era of the corporate inventor [and engineer]” (124, 128). Yet the same era was “the golden age of entrepreneurship … because of the cooperative assistance of local, state, and federal governments” (130). The rise of entrepreneurship, however, facilitated the dominance and intervention of such interested groups as businessmen and politicians in the field of “technoscience,” and tarnished the integrity of the “Technological utopianism and scientific management” that “would create prosperity and material comfort for ordinary people, a set of ideas that is sometimes referred to as the American Dream[sic]” (213). Concluding her book, Cowan thus offers “one crucial

Indeed, scientific and technological developments have been so extensive and impressive that they can invoke what David Nye calls “the technological sublime,” which is “an essentially religious feeling” (xiii). Furthermore, Nye continues in his *American Technological Sublime*, “in the United States, where the sublime has increasingly become a group experience, … these experiences [of the sublime] often have overt political consequences, both as matters of public display and as issues of social policy,” and subsequently inspired the “democratic virtue” of seeing oneself “as part of the moral vanguard, leading the world toward universal democracy” to realize “the power of democracy” illustrated in “such public improvements” (xviii, 36).
lesson … that because of technoscience we cannot trust the experts to make decisions about these issues because none of them is disinterested” (223).\textsuperscript{113}

One might find the same lesson in Charles E. Rosenberg’s \textit{No Other Gods: on Science and American Social Thought}. In his book, Rosenberg asserts that “the social uses and social character of science are too important and too complex to be left to scientists,” and, seeking “to avoid a polarized world,” he introduces the notion of “The ecology of knowledge” (xvi, 226). Underlining the critical role of “would-be scholars and academic entrepreneurs, enthusiastic in their motivation, secure in their righteousness, and confident in their special knowledge” of the “economic and technological development of modern America,” Rosenberg’s “ecology of knowledge” takes “an actor-oriented approach” to “the history of science” (242), an approach that, by taking scientists’ personal dilemmas and decisions into consideration, exposes demystifying contingencies that Robertson chooses to ignore.

Though illuminating the non-idyllic side of the relationship between science and society where individualism and religion had been in place, however, Rosenberg’s “actor-oriented approach” ironically can bring his proposed “ecology of knowledge”

\textsuperscript{113} In “Technology in American Culture,” Morrell Heald also points out that, in the early twentieth century, “The history of science and technology in America, as elsewhere, shows a steady progression toward professionalism and specialization out of the amateur status they so often enjoyed in the early phases of the Industrial Revolution” (165). Lamenting the lack of recognition of the fact that “our social institutions have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to absorb and adapt to change” in science and technology, Heald calls for “more adequate conceptions of what technology offers, and upon what terms,” conceptions that might underwrite Cowan’s “crucial lesson” (166, 168). In this chapter, sharing Heald’s concerns, I shall examine how “our social institutions” have acquired such “a remarkable capacity.”
back into “[the] polarized world,” since it tends to regard society as working against scientists, when American society, more than anywhere else in the world, has been fruitful ground for science. In other words, his approach might neglect society’s contributions to the “ecology of knowledge.” It is this problem of negligence that Rosenberg unfortunately commits in his reading of Sinclair Lewis’s *Arrowsmith*. The novel, according to him, features Martin Arrowsmith as “a hero not of deeds, but of the spirit [whose] scientific calling is not a concession to material values, but a means of overcoming them in the austere world of pure science” (123). Martin’s “stumbling quest for personal integrity … provides the novel’s moral structure,” ending with his victory over the material world (123). Thus, in the conclusion of the novel, Rosenberg finds nothing but “an indictment of the handicaps placed in the scientist’s path by American society [and] … a rejection at the same time of the scientific community whose values justify this indictment” (131).

Rosenberg’s choice of *Arrowsmith* in his attempt to consider the conflict between scientists and American society is quite appropriate, since the novel arguably performs “an anatomy of the obstacles in the scientist’s way” (D.J. Dooley 63). Bentley Glass also endows the novel with an “isolated stature” among novels with scientist-protagonists, since, in it, Lewis “probe[s] not only the depths of human personality and the breadth of human relationship, but … [has] acquired an appreciation of the prevailing outlook of the scientist upon life and of the methods and spirit of science itself” (293). Also, Rosenberg’s assessment of the novel’s conclusion resonates with the common understanding of the novel’s hero as “an idealistic truth-seeker who is able to transcend
the selfish, ugly environments that defeat the chief characters in *Main Street* and *Babbitt* (Hutchisson 48). Complicit in delivering a celebratory portrayal of the scientist and his idealism, however, the “actor-oriented approach,” which these critics as well as Rosenberg take, neglects the novel’s effort to deliver at once a realistic picture of a society that accommodates, rather than antagonizes, the scientist and a critical outlook on the idealism that, in its uncompromising integrity, yields no compassion for those against it. Once framed within this picture of an accommodating society and viewed with a critical outlook on scientific idealism, the portrayal of the scientist emerges as only a part of the novel. That *Arrowsmith* has rarely been read beyond its main actor testifies to the prevailing shortsightedness in criticism of the novel and might explain why the novel as well as the writer—despite his being the first American recipient of the Noble Prize in Literature and the novel’s being known as his best work—has inspired few literary debates. The novel, I would argue, has to be read again beyond this myopic vision, which has made critics of the novel see nothing but an embattled yet triumphant hero.

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114 Robert J. Griffin is right in saying that “There is nothing wrong with interpreting Martin’s experience as representative of the fate of idealism or the disinterested search for truth in twentieth-century America, so long as we remember that the idealism has its dubious aspects and that questions are raised about the validity of his disinterest” (12-13). We might be able to remember better, I might add, if we see “Martin’s experience” as illustrative of a society that enables such an experience.

115 In line with general criticism of the novel, Frederic I. Carpenter describes Lewis in his early novels as concentrating on “his idealistic heroes,” including Martin, who, “like Thoreau, …suffered exile from social ‘reality.’” Carpenter nevertheless finds in the conclusion of *Arrowsmith* a conception of scientific truth that is neither “sentimental” nor “trivial,” and writes of Martin’s resignation from the Institute: “he does so without romantic illusions concerning either his own righteousness or his probable success” (421). This conception of scientific truth that ascribes no heroism to the hero’s decision is, as I shall show here, a pragmatic one.
Quite appropriately, my re-reading of the novel begins with the very first page where we see “a ragged girl of fourteen” driving a wagon and taking care of her family. When her feverish father suggests that she “turn down towards Cincinnati,” she answers that “We’re going on jus’ long as we can. Going West! They’s whole lot of new things I aim to be seeing!” (1). This young girl of strong determination is, we are immediately told, “the great-grandmother of Martin Arrowsmith” (1). It has been pointed out that there is a strong connection between her frontierism and Martin’s idealism. Michael Augspurger, for example, observes that “claiming his autonomy from not only bureaucracy and commercial concerns, but from the responsibilities of family, Arrowsmith paraphrases his great-grandmother” (93). But what has invariably remained uncontested in this connection is the apparent gender difference. That is, without considering the question of why frontierism is represented by a young girl, Augspurger takes for granted the male claim on idealism and frontierism. The questionable nature of the connection is further highlighted by the geographical movement of the Arrowsmiths—Martin and Leora—who continue to pioneer new social territories.

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116 I’d like to add another difference between Martin and his great-grandmother: while the latter doesn’t turn away from “the responsibilities of family” to claim her autonomy, Martin chooses to leave his family. In my opinion, Augspurger should have taken notice of this difference when he argues that Martin represents “the emerging managerial class” (74). If Martin belongs to a class that is the “modern embodiment” of the pioneers, shouldn’t he achieve his autonomy, like pioneers did, while accepting familial responsibilities, instead of abandoning them? 117 In his examination of the pioneer theme in Lewis’s novels, Glen A. Love briefly observes that “Lewis’s sympathetic treatment” is more directed to “‘outdoor’ women like Carol Kennicott in Main Street, Edith Cortright in Dodsworth, and Ann Vicker” than to “‘indoor’ women like Joyce Landon of Arrowsmith” (561). But focusing on male characters in Arrowsmith, Love doesn’t extend the same observation to the novel, ignoring the fact that Joyce is more of an “outdoor” woman—she first meets Martin in St. Hubert.
Reversing the great grandmother’s journey to the West, Martin and Leora start their life in Wheatsylvania in South Dakota and move toward the East—Natulius in Iowa, Chicago, and New York. This geographical move toward more urbanized landscapes might mean to Martin nothing but incremental obstacles for his idealism. But, if we consider the fact that it is Leora who encourages Martin to move on, just as his great-grandmother had done in her determination to go west, their migration might be seen as a twentieth century female version of frontierism. And, quite befittingly, the more urbanized places are, the more opportunities—social, cultural, professional, or even political—there will be for women.\footnote{Refuting Fredrick Jackson Turner’s description of the frontier as “an experience shared by men rather than by women,” David M. Potter argues, “The wilderness may have been the frontier for American men, and the cabin in the clearing the symbol of their independence, but the city was the frontier for American women and the business office was what gave economic independence and the opportunity to follow a course of their own” (212). Yet Potter’s argument overlooks women’s active participation in defining the “American character,” which prompts Alice Kessler-Harris’s criticism that “In Potter’s world, women are passive people who have not participated in the creation of normative prescriptions and values of our society” (227). Kessler-Harris then points out, “With students, ethnic minorities, and some workers who have come to these questions [regarding social traditions] from different directions, women have begun to explore alternatives to the competitive search for success. Notions of collectivity and nurturance, humanitarian and egalitarian goals, enter the national vocabulary” (229). As we shall see, Kessler-Harris’s point particularly resonates with Arrowsmith’s criticism of science and pragmatism.}

If the very beginning of the novel suggests a critical outlook on the uncontested connection between Martin’s idealism and his great-grandmother’s frontierism, or a male appropriation of a female story, the very ending offers a revealing picture of the relationship of science and society. The final pages, though often read as finalizing Martin’s dream of becoming an authentic scientist and as proving Sinclair Lewis’s
loyalty to idealism, provide a panoramic view of the society. Almus Pickerbaugh, once an opportunistic scientist of Natulius and now a congressman, is being promised by the President of the United States the position of the first Secretary of Health and Eugenics, while the League of Cultural Agencies consisting of philanthropic institutions and commercial clinics broadcasts “Dr. Holabird’s epochal address” that draws the attention of “a million ardently listening lovers of science” (485). Bert Tozer, brother of Leora, “with modest satisfaction” listens to his minister in Wheatsylvania, but Professor Max Gottlieb, now decrepit and anemic, “sat unmoving and alone, in a dark small room above the banging city street” (486). Far away from the graves of Gustaf Sondelius and Leora, and also separated from his wealthy second wife, Joyce, who complains, “He’s never going to see how egotistical it is to think he’s the only man living who’s always right,” Martin, “in a clumsy boat … far out on the water,” says to Terry, “I feel as if I were really beginning to work now, … and maybe we’ll get something permanent—and probably we’ll fail!” (486). The hero’s realistic—neither optimistic nor pessimistic—determination may be laudable in its own right, but, as the panoramic view insinuates, he is only one of the many inhabitants of this society. There is no definitive focal point in this final picture of the society, where Martin, with his eventual return to idealism, seems to be not so much winning his integrity as settling in a comfortable niche that the society has for him.

From the above re-reading of the novel’s beginning and ending emerge two issues I will explore in this chapter: the dismissal of female characters’ contribution to and criticism of science and society; and the social accommodation of what might be
called pure science. The latter presents the novel not as “an indictment” of practical values or “a rejection” of scientific communities but as an affirmation of a society where diverse truths and values may co-exist, though, to a great extent, separately and independently. The novel, in other words, pictures American society as a negotiating ground between the emerging myth of science and traditional myths such as individualism and religion. Underwriting these social negotiations is, as I shall discuss further in the next section, William James’s pragmatism, a philosophy that develops from his explicit agenda to end controversies between scientific empiricism and philosophical idealism. On the other hand, a consideration of female characters who are virtually forgotten yet undeniably present throughout the novel will extract from *Arrowsmith* a revealing criticism, not a mere affirmation, of the extant pragmatic society. Successful as it may be in accommodating science and propelling progressivism, the pragmatic society turns out to be a selfish one, since it chooses to neglect women and those unable or prohibited to participate in progressivism. In this way, the novel certainly anticipates late twentieth-century feminist and post-colonial criticisms of science and American society, whose objective is best described by Donna Haraway. Proposing a “feminist objectivity” that would realize “situated knowledge” in “scientific and technological, late industrial, militarized, racist and male dominant societies, that is, here, in the belly of the monster, in the United States in the late 1980s,” Haraway imagines that “Science becomes the myth not of what escapes human agency and responsibility in a realm above the fray, but rather of accountability and responsibility for translations and solidarities linking the cacophonous visions and visionary voices that
characterize the knowledge of the subjugated” (Simians 188, 192). In its added emphasis on the female characters’ contribution to and criticism of science and society, *Arrowsmith* thus provisionally tells us that “the subjugated” won’t remain thus neglected but will haunt the pragmatic, scientific society to claim their rightful shares in the realms of individualism, religion and science.

1. William James’s Pragmatism

   We have observed in the previous chapter on *Dracula* how failingly science, which has succeeded in fortifying its integrity against irrational or supernatural elements, accounts for humanity. No scientific laws or principles would completely be capable of predicting or justifying human actions, especially when the actions affect other humans and bring up moral complications. John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian principles, proposed in his *System of Logic* and *Utilitarianism*, turn out to be no exception to this, as he constantly compromises with rationalism to subject human beings to the principles. Likewise, having faithfully followed Mill’s steps, Van Helsing ends up admitting the insufficiency of science to justify human sacrifices and invokes religion for moral support. This somewhat extemporaneous invocation of religion, disappointing as it should be to Mill as well as to Van Helsing himself, might come as an unforgivable, and to a certain extent anachronistic, gesture to Victorian science and society, for it could destroy what Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* had achieved in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Published in 1859, Darwin’s book “confirmed more rigorously what positivism had for long asserted—that the history of the world is the history of progress
and that there was no need of supernatural intervention during the ages to account for whatever had happened” (Annan 34). Acting as one of the “great dissolver[s] of faith in mid-Victorian England,” his book ensures that “the descent of man was incorporated into the positivist cosmology” (Annan 32, 34). No such “positivist cosmology,” Van Helsing seems to warn, would be able to answer the moral problems that science might pose for humanity, and his invocation of religion is a desperate call for a change in the alliance of science and society so that science can remain autonomous—mostly, independent of religion—and continue to benefit society. 

The demand for a modified alliance of science and society that also involves religion has been fiercer in America than in Britain, since, in the American society that was in the making, science was as necessary for survival and development as religion was for tradition and morality. George Cotkin points out these conflicting necessities and holds them accountable for creating “the crisis of individual autonomy which gripped Americans in the late nineteenth century” (8), a crisis he articulates as follows:

the implications of mechanistic science and the impact of Darwinism plunged many thoughtful Americans into a state of intellectual somnambulance. They suffered because science as a culture icon or normative concept seemed to have dangerously undermined many cherished assumptions of American religion and

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119 Insofar as they believe in absolute presence or laws that explain everything, science and religion might remain incompatible, which has been proved in the early history of modern science, especially by the notable examples of Bruno, Copernicus, and Galileo. As we will see, pragmatism tries to induce compatibility between them by refuting the possibility of something absolute, which is also to change the very foundations of science and religion. No wonder it has been accused of enacting relativism or nihilism and remained out of favor until the advent of post-structuralism and deconstruction in the late twentieth century.
individualism…. Although many intellectuals proved inventive and effective in combining the new assumptions of science with previously favored religious faith, the effective weight of this revolution in science was to raise more questions than it answered. Consequently, doubt appeared as a defining and characteristic stance for many intellectuals. For those intellectuals who still preached a doctrine of confident progress, their nostrums increasingly seemed shallow, vain attempts to convince themselves that science meant no harm to traditional systems of thought. (Cotkin 8)

As neither science nor “traditional systems of thought” could be done away with, “the crisis of individual autonomy” persisted in the absence of active and flexible philosophical and social frameworks that could embrace both. William James, who was himself in “a state of intellectual somnambulance” that led to “his depression and debility,” introduced one such framework, namely, pragmatism, where “plurality and movement would be celebrated as the linchpins of freedom in the modern world” (Cotkin 9).

James, who admired Mill’s empiricism and utilitarianism to the extent that he dedicated his *Pragmatism* to the latter, shared Mill’s distaste for Kant’s idealistic rationalism, which he blamed for fostering abstract idealism among American intellectuals. Comparing Hume’s empiricism with Kant’s “circuitous and ponderous artificialities,” James finds the latter “pathetic” (“Philosophical Conceptions and

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120 Timothy L.S. Sprigge notes that “James’s objection to absolute idealism was most fundamentally moral,” since it “regarded the world as a perfect Whole and all the evil in it, properly understood, as contributory to its perfection” (166).
Practical Results” 361), and he judges Kant “a mere curio, a specimen” who “bequeaths us not one single conception which is both indispensable to philosophy and which philosophy either did not possess before him, or was not destined inevitably to acquire after him through the growth of men’s reflection upon the hypotheses by which science interprets nature” (“Philosophical Conceptions” 361). Defiant as he is to Kant, James is equally critical of the unimaginative materialistic empiricism that hypothesizes a universe as deterministic as that proposed by abstract idealism. To James, they are just two “monistic” traditions that concordantly endorse absolutism, silencing independence and freedom. James replaces them with the theory of “radical empiricism,” which “treats the doctrine of monism itself as an [sic] hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, … does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square” (“Radical Empiricism” 134). While endless controversies between rationalism and empiricism, or “Idealism and Realism,” amount to “a chaos of mutually repellent solipsism,” his radical empiricism defines truth as a matter of (personal) belief. He then suggests that “our several minds commune” through “the mutual resemblance of those of our perceptual feelings,” which are “pieces of knowledge-of-acquaintance” and where “all our knowledge-about must end” (“Radical

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121 All the quotes from James, unless otherwise noted, are from McDermott’s edition, and I will provide the title of the essay from which each quote is taken.
122 Ellen Kappy Suckiel uses different names for these “two major intellectual paradigms” that James finds “to be deeply flawed”: “scientific rationalism” and “the speculative metaphysical philosophy” (31). Suckiel speculates that James rejects both paradigms because they are “too abstract” to be interested in “problems of genuine human interest” and to become useful tools “for meeting human concerns” (31).
Empiricism” 150-51). “These percepts, these *termini*, these sensible things, these mere matters-of-acquaintance,” he continues, “are the only realities we ever directly know” and “are the mother-earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last limits, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the mind” (“Radical Empiricism” 151). As “metaphysical discussions,” having no such termini in sight, “are so much like fighting with the air,” James proposes that radical empiricism must resemble “‘Scientific’ theories,” which “always terminate in definite percepts” (“Radical Empiricism” 151).

Radical empiricism, proposed as a scientific theory, may be able to terminate endless controversies between empiricism and rationalism, but it immediately places James in the middle of the problematic relationship between science and religion, one that haunts the end of *Dracula* and the society in which Lewis wrote *Arrowsmith*.

Apparently, James is aware of this problem:

> Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist proclivity in existence as there are at the present day. Our children, one may say, are almost born scientific. But our esteem for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout. Now take a man of this type, and let him be also a philosophic amateur, unwilling to mix a hodge-podge system after the fashion of a common layman, and what does he find his situation to be, in this blessed year of our Lord 1906? He wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants a religion. (“The Present Dilemma in Philosophy” 366)

These two contradictory desires of the “amateur” translate into a need for “a system that will combine … the scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them …
[with] the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type” (“The Present Dilemma” 368). And the need mires the “amateur” in a “dilemma,” in which, James articulates, “You find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows” (“The Present Dilemma” 368).

Pragmatism emerges as a timely solution to this dilemma, as “It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts,” so that “Science and metaphysics would come much nearer together, would in fact work absolutely hand in hand” (“The Present Dilemma” 373; “What Pragmatism Means” 379). Retaining “the empiricist attitude,” the job of a pragmatist is, James stipulates, “to bring out of each [metaphysical] word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience” (“What Pragmatism Means” 380). Truth, metaphysical or physical, thus “becomes a class-name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience” and “is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good” (“What Pragmatism Means” 385, 388).

Richard M. Gale however argues that James, by turning to mysticism in his later life, gives up science for religion. Interested in “the primary clash between James’s Promethean and mystical selves,” Gale posits, “The pragmatic James reduced the whole meaning of claims about God and the absolute to our being licensed to take moral holiday or feel safe and secure because all is well, but the mystical James finds their meaning in experiences of a unifying presence” (17, 18). I am not sure if James’s turn to religion necessarily means burying his pragmatism. To a certain extent, I’d like to suggest that James’s change is also a pragmatic way to deal with what he might have experienced or felt about mystical or supernatural beings. In other words, if pragmatism is for James a means to find a better way to open oneself to diverse experiences and make sense of them, what better way is there to engage in and explain mystic or supernatural experiences than religion?
In short, “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons” (“What Pragmatism Means” 388).

Offered by James as a means to handle various problems, whether they are philosophical, religious or social, pragmatism continued to develop throughout the first half of the twentieth century, especially in the work of John Dewey, who renamed pragmatism instrumentalism. Noticeable in Dewey’s “pragmatic outlook” is his emphasis on the philosophy’s “American origin” (Jackson 61). He stated in 1925 that “it is beyond doubt that the progressive and unstable character of American life and civilization has facilitated the birth of a philosophy which regards the world as being in a continuous formation, where there is still place for indeterminism, for the new and for a

124 Charles Sanders Peirce founded the “principle of pragmatism,” which James explains as follows: “the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active” (348-49). The principle might be best expressed in Peirce’s theory of “scientific intelligence,” which, “rooted in our instinctual drives,” defines “Our capacity to learn from experience” as “closely connected with our capacity to subject our conceptions, assertions, and inferences to criticism” (Colapietro 15). The emphasis on experience as a means to verify or correct conceptions obviously resonates with Burke’s underlining of sensibility as guiding judgment and, therefore, stands against Kantian rationalism. But, as Rorty observes, Peirce “does not become engaged, in the way in which James and Dewey did, with the problem which dominated Kant’s thought and which was at the center of 19th century thought in every Western country: the problem of how to reconcile science and religion” (260). Concentrating on pragmatism’s anti-authoritarianism, Rorty further distinguishes Dewey from James by saying that the former was more successful … in purifying religion of the appeal to authority” (265). Having considered the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful in earlier chapters, I find it very interesting that Rorty explains the distinction in terms of taste: “This was … because James got a kick out of sublimity—out of the sense of limitlessness whereas Dewey did not…. His [Dewey’s] taste is for the beautiful” (265).
real future” (qtd in Jackson 61). One might see in this statement more than “a touch of [patriotic] pride”—and Jackson speculates that Dewey must have sensed its chauvinistic connotation because he quickly added, “this idea is not exclusively American” (qtd in Jackson 61). No matter how one interprets Dewey’s statement, however, it seems undeniable that pragmatism is a homespun philosophy for American society. Yet this could also mean that “American life and civilization” have been as responsive to as it was responsible for pragmatism, benefiting from and being benefited by it. And science, as an integral part of “American life and civilization,” has been no stranger to this interactive relationship between pragmatism and American society.

My reading of *Arrowsmith* is deeply involved in this relationship, and aims to interpret the novel not as a shortsighted portrayal of an idealistic scientist who confronts the materialistic world but as a broad picture of a pragmatic society that is capable of accommodating the scientist, regardless of his ostensible detestation for what the society values. That is, the novel draws up the kind of society pragmatism is envisioning for American society, where individualism, science and religion work together to realize the mythology of progressivism. Underlying this society is, as I shall later demonstrate,

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125 David A. Hollinger cites Henry Steele Commager, who said in 1950 that pragmatism is “almost the official philosophy of America” (88). Yet Hollinger also mentions that “In 1980, ‘pragmatism’ is a concept most American historians have proved they can get along without” (88). He explains “the case of the vanishing pragmatist” as a result of “the case of the vanishing American” (89). I am not sure if the decline of pragmatism as an academic discipline necessarily signifies its actual decline. As I shall show in this chapter, pragmatism as an approach to negotiate different systems has contributed to establishing a society that holds such systems with minimum frictions. And once such a society was in place, which has been the case in America for a certain time, pragmatism has to enjoy its success in its disappearance. In this sense, I don’t think it accidental that the revived interest in pragmatism coincided with the rise of interdisciplinary movements in the 1980s.
pragmatism’s and science’s loyal commitment to humanism that offers a negotiating
ground for potential social issues, a humanism that would continue to expand to embrace
formerly dispossessed humans, namely, women and minorities, throughout the twentieth
century. The advent of cyborgs, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, will pose a
direct challenge to this pragmatic, scientific and humanistic society, but I may be getting
ahead of myself. First, we have to return to the end of the nineteenth century.

2. A Pragmatic Society: Science under the Ideology of Separate Spheres

In Britain, Dr. Seward, head of a psychiatric asylum, finds himself addressed by
“the woman who performed the last offices for the dead … in a confidential, brother-
professional way” at Lucy’s funeral. The woman says, “She [Lucy] makes a very
beautiful corpse, sir…. It’s not too much to say that she will do credit to our
establishment!” (147). She may be simply referring to Lucy’s beautiful features, but the
way she says this—or more exactly, the way Seward takes it, namely, “[the] confidential,
brother-professional way”—unexpectedly twists its meaning. That is, he might be
looking at Lucy not as an aesthetically beautiful person but as “a very beautiful corpse”
that would make a scientifically interesting specimen. Indeed, Lucy could, Seward notes
earlier, “afford him a curious psychological study” (57), and, now dead from a
mysterious illness, should make as interesting a case that “will do credit to our
establishment” as his lunatic patient Renfield on whom he wants to perform vivisection.
Yet, such a sangfroid medical gaze at the once beloved Lucy might have been disturbing,
for Seward, instead of responding to the woman, turns his eyes to another “brother-
professional,” Van Helsing, who “never kept far away” (147) from Lucy and, at it turns out, from Seward.

Later in America, in a bacteriology class where he “was about to assassinate a guinea pig with anthrax germs,” Professor Max Gottlieb, “glancing at the other guinea pig in the prison of its battery jar, meditated, ‘Wretched innocent! Why should I murder him, to teach Dummkopfe? It would be better to experiment on that fat young man’” (35, 37). His chilling meditation, thanks to the parenthesis enclosing it, is kept to himself, but his adherence to the pure science that underpins his meditation remains unchanged and is occasionally made public throughout his career, overshadowing the life of his protégé, Martin Arrowsmith. Modeled after Jacque Loeb’s mechanistic philosophy, the adherence, namely, “Gottliebism,” refers to a commitment to an “unswerving quest for causes” that dismisses any kind of personal or social interventions, a dismissal that reflects his doubt of “the superiority of divine mankind to the cheerful dogs, the infallibly graceful cats, the immoral and un-agitated and irreligious horses, the superbly adventuring seagulls” (119, 135). Gottlieb, in his devotion to pure science, believes that “mankind” is no different from other species and therefore disposable for the sake of scientific truth, and describes “pathogenic germs” as “elegantly functioning … with [their] lovely flagella” (42). Martin, just as devoted, later “blundered into the effect of phage on the mutation of bacterial species” and describes them as “very beautiful, very delicate” (470).

Undoubtedly, these two scientists in America are as committed, if not more, to science as those two scientists in Britain, for scientific merits determine their moral or aesthetic judgments. Indeed, the Americans are so committed that they are willing to accept
human sacrifices and insist on experimenting with the people of St. Hubert who are
dying of the plague in order to verify the accuracy of Martin’s principle.

While alike in their commitment to science, the American scientists in
*Arrowsmith* seem to enjoy more independence and freedom in expressing and acting on
that commitment than their British counterparts in *Dracula*. It is not that the paradoxical
nature of the commitment—that it can turn the scientist into at once a selfless benefactor
and a selfish dictator—goes unnoticed in *Arrowsmith*. “After a consultation with
Gottlieb and a worried conference with Leora about the danger of handling the germs,”
for instance, Martin risks his life to study bubonic plague for “the possibilities of
preventing it and curing it with phage” (364). Yet, just as well, he is as willing to risk
others’ lives to test his phage as he is to leave his family to pursue his research. This
open—even blunt, if we recall how cautious Van Helsing has been in *Dracula*—
acknowledgment of the paradox inherent in science, however, does little to deter the two
committed scientists from conducting their scientific research; on the contrary, they are
surprisingly encouraged and provisionally condoned for the moral complications they
might cause to their society. This difference, I shall argue, can be attributed to a
pragmatic reconfiguration, led by James, of the alliance of science and society, which
has been disrupted in *Dracula*.

Developing what he calls “radical empiricism,” James defines knowledge as a
product of relations that involve “both our physical and our mental worlds” (“The
Knowing of Things Together” 158), and to know something is, James argues, “always
knowing-together. You cannot separate the consciousness of one part from that of all the
rest’ (“The Knowing” 159). He ruminates on this collective nature of knowledge and asks, “Can we account for such a being-known-together of complex facts like these [i.e. “The field of view, the chord of music, the glass of lemonade”]?” (“The Knowing” 159). While admitting that he has no positive answer, James nonetheless ventures an answer: he proposes to integrate knowledge with its practical consequence, insisting that we ask, “Grant an idea or belief to be true, … what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? … What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?” (“Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism” 311). He then states that “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot” (“Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism” 311), and presents “The pragmatist view … of the truth-relation [which] is that it has a definite content, and that everything in it is experienceable. Its whole nature can be told in positive terms” (“Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism” 314-15). Scientific truth is no exception to—in fact, a model example of—this “pragmatist view,” and the validity of truth is not inexorably verified by some sort of “higher unifying agency” but flexibly incremented by those experiencing its “cash value” “in positive terms” (“Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism” 311).

The pragmatic view that equates truth with something “experienceable” and consequential in life posits that a truth is always a “working hypothesis,” constantly subject to verification or refutation (“The Sentiment of Rationality” 336). This opens an active cycle of belief and truth, which commits a pragmatist to what James calls “truth-processes”: 
these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is indifferent) and so on indefinitely. ("Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth" 439)

This indefinite cycle alternating belief and truth calls for endless actions and generates valuable consequences in the life of a pragmatist, to whom science and religion are just different ways to continue that cycle.

Both Gottlieb and Martin seem to be on the pragmatic cycle of belief and truth, doing scientific research relentlessly and receiving due, though rarely unconditional, credits from various groups in society—university, pharmaceutical corporate, clinic, scientific community, or philanthropic institution. Gottlieb, whose idealism is rooted in the European—mostly, German—tradition of philosophy of science, promotes such a cycle when he explains the vocational, rather than the professional, idea of the scientist, which he refers to as “the religion of a scientist”:

To be a scientist—it is not just a different job, so that a man should choose

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126 George Haines IV writes of the tradition as follows: “although early starts in developing the method of invention had been made by the English, Scots, Dutch, and French, from whom the Germans gained their earliest insights, it was the Germans who brought the method to perfection. This was not a cultural accident; the process appears as a characteristic off-shoot of German culture” (100). He then points to “German idealist philosophy” as an “important element in German culture” and adds, “What lay perhaps at the heart of this culture, other than the dynastic will, was an overwhelming belief in the necessity of order, for systematic arrangement, flowing from an ineradicable faith in the importance of theoretical knowledge as a guide to practice, a faith taught by every major German philosopher” (101).
between being a scientist and being an explorer, or a bond-salesman or a physician or a king or a farmer. … The normal man, he does not care much what he does except that he should eat and sleep and make love. But the scientist is intensely religious … . He wants that everything should be subject to inexorable laws.” (301)

But, however pragmatic and therefore American his idealism may sound, Gottlieb is as unbecoming to American society as his broken English is to the suave, well-phrased speeches made by “the Men of Measured Merriment”—a name that he uses to refer to worldly men. Accordingly, he is constantly featured as different and foreign, if not suspicious and dangerous. A “German Jew, born in Saxony in 1850,” Gottlieb “went at forty … sadly off to the America which could never become militaristic or anti-Semitic” (132, 133), and comes to the University of Winnemac, which is “the property of the people of the state,” and is designed to be “a mill to turn out men and women who will lead moral lives, play bridge, drive good cars, be enterprising in business, and occasionally mention books, though they are not expected to have time to read them” (8). In this university operating like “a Ford Motor Factory,” he is known to be “so devoted to Pure Science, to art for art’s sake, that he would rather have people die by the right therapy than be cured by the wrong. Having built a shrine for humanity, he wanted to kick out of it all mere human beings” (133-34). Suspicions about Gottlieb and his devotion to “Pure Science” follow him as he moves to presumably more accommodating environments such as Hunziker or the McGurk Institute. Especially, at the Institute, during the First World War, he is identified “not as the great and impersonal
immunologist but as a suspect German Jew,” although “He believed that he had ceased
to be a German, now, and become a countryman of Lincoln” (328, 327). Constant
suspicion of him and his work summarizes his life in America and culminates in his
dramatic downfall. In “senile dementia,” thus, “he’s just suddenly forgotten all his
English” (436), and his German becomes as non-communicative to his family and
friends as his idealism is to the society.

Notable, and ironic as well, is that his dramatic downfall derives not from the
society but from Gottlieb himself, who carries his scientific idealism outside his
laboratory into non-scientific fields. For example, he “conceived that there might, in this
world, be a medical school which should be altogether scientific, ruled by exact
quantitative biology and chemistry, with spectacle-fitting and most of surgery ignored,”
and he “wrote to Dean Silva politely bidding him step down and hand over his school”
(137-38, 138). As soon as he “tried to become an executive and a reformer,” however,
Gottlieb gets fired from the university. Later, he becomes the director of the McGurk
Institute, a position that he accepts not only because, he explains, “dis gives me the
chance to do big t’ings and make a free scientific institute for all you boys,” but also
because “those fools at Winnemac that laughed at my idea of a real medical school …
will see” (359)—and perhaps because his rival to the directorship is none other than the
Dr. Silva who has fired him from the university. Working as director, however, he not
only turns both his research and the Institute into “shambles” (360), but also delays the
Institute’s involvement in St. Hubert’s, a delay which may be responsible for many
preventable deaths. Failing as director and dissatisfied as scientist, Gottlieb becomes “so
unwell as to drop his work even for a few months” and retires to “a dark small room” (429, 486).

Compared to Gottlieb’s downfall that lands him nowhere in society, Martin’s eventual retreat into a rural cabin, where he will freely pursue his research with another scientist, Terry Wickett, sits well in that society. In fact, though initially not so rewarding in money or fame, Martin’s decision can bring a lot of “cash value” to his research since he can now devote himself solely to his science, perhaps with subsequent rewards in money and fame—things that will guarantee him a secure place in society. The contrasting prospect of Martin’s life mainly comes from his decision to resign from the Institute and leave his family, a decision that has eluded Gottlieb, who is enamored with his own vision of a scientifically-engineered society. The decision implies that Martin, though sharing Gottlieb’s belief in and devotion to scientific truth, has a different view of how far he can impose science upon society, that is, of the relationship between science and society.

While offering no such clear vision of a pragmatic society as Mill has done of utilitarian society, James assumed “responsibility for addressing public problems and for applying insights gained from one’s technical work to public issues” (Cotkin 153, 4 respectively). Cotkin thus describes James as “a public philosopher” who “saw openness to diversity and acceptance of individualism as the birthmarks of this natural ideal of community and tradition” (167). Asking if “a specific political agenda exist[s] within the social expression of Pragmatism,” Cotkin concludes that James’s “pragmatic assumptions and requirements demand that action be constrained by tradition, common
sense, and long-term gains” (171). The emphasis on “tradition” and “common sense”
could prevent sudden changes of beliefs and values of individuals and, consequently,
unnecessary conflicts in society, but it might also shape a pragmatic society into a
conventional, if not hierarchical, one. Yet the pragmatist society that James envisions
can remain progressive and equalizing by enforcing what might be called “the ideology
of separate spheres.” According to this ideology, the society is compartmentalized into
various spheres, and each sphere holds people with a similar belief and value system,
cultivating a pragmatic environment where its inhabitants are communally encouraged to
cash in their belief.

127 Seigfried in her examination of James’s androcentrism, which we will discuss later,
explains “the ideology of separate spheres” as a system that “restricts women to the
privacy of the home and reserves the public sphere for men” (111). But I would use the
ideology to denote not just a gendered separation but also separations by belief and value,
thus aiming not so much to maintain the traditional separation of domestic and public
spheres as to divide the public sphere into many sub-spheres, each of which becomes a
perfect environment for practicing pragmatism. “The ideology of separate spheres” also
explains James’s distaste for American imperialism, which at first put him in a bind,
since his belief in individualism as well as heroism contradicted his effort “to examine
how to prevent the exuberant individual from dominating others and how to halt an
energetic nation from exercising its will over all alien culture” (Cotkin 126). The support
of community and tradition, wherein individualism and heroism are already defined and
shared, is thus seen as James’s solution to this contradiction.

128 Gale might call the ideology James’s “promethean solution” to form “the unifying
relation between worlds” (195). The solution, Gale explains, suggests that “Each of the
worlds is a self-contained unity; some even have their own ontology, conceptual system,
presuppositions, and doxastic principles for making and justifying claims within that
world” (195). To a certain extent, the ideology appears to take after the Taylorism that
Fredrick Taylor introduced in *The Principle of Scientific Management*. But, as Martha
Banta points out, “James realized the limitations of the scientific method. He thought it
wishful thinking to expect that the new ethics could counter the hurts caused by
scientific principles of the kind that backed Taylor’s management theories” (101). The
pragmatic solution that bears “the ideology of separate spheres,” as we will see below,
takes moral problems into consideration and proposes humanism, not “scientific
principles,” as its principle of operation.
In this light, the term “cash value,” which at first shocked many with its vulgarity, becomes instrumental to the practice of “the ideology of separate spheres.” Given the fact that James’s America was rapidly turning into a capitalistic society, where money takes on symbolic meanings as it represents not only exchange value but also social, political and even cultural ones, the significance of cash value doesn’t simply pertain to its immediate, practical use; it should also be considered in terms of circulation and accumulation, by which one can secure his/her social place and prestige without ever presenting such a practical use. Citing Lewis Mumford, who “noted William James’s ‘persistent use of financial metaphors’… [and] treated that usage as evidence of an ‘attitude of compromise’ with a civilization that honored business enterprises as its highest calling,” James Livingston states, “we may well notice that the ‘cash value’ of language resides in the surplus—not the equivalence or the equilibrium—it produces” (153, 155). In his understanding of pragmatism as “a comic frame of acceptance … [of] the transition from proprietary to corporate capitalism, circa 1890-1940,” Livingston suggests that “pragmatism is a narrative form that permits a new cultural history of the Progressive Era by putting the ‘capitalist vocabulary of behavior’ to work” (153, 156).\footnote{Livingston uses the word “comic” to underline his argument that we should “refuse a tragic form in narrating … the rise of corporate capitalism” and instead “acknowledge the comic potential, the redeeming value, of corporate capitalism, of proletarianization and ‘reification’” (149).}

But James’s pragmatic “narrative” wouldn’t be entirely of capitalism, silencing other belief and value systems. Rather, underlying the usage of “cash value” is his social and political program that aims to increase the circularity and storability of such diverse
systems by compartmentalizing society, a program that is certainly applicable and extremely useful to as diversified a realm as American society.

Martin, who is “a Typical Pure-bred Anglo-Saxon American,” meaning that “he was a union of German, French, Scotch, Irish, … Spanish, Jewish, English, Primitive Britain, Celt, Phoenician, Roman, German, Dane, and Swede” (2), goes through experiences as diverse as his bloodlines. In the process, he gradually learns “the ideology of separate spheres” and, more importantly, figures out a sphere where his cash value can be circulated and accumulated. Starting as a small-town boy who does chores at Doc Vickerson’s rundown office, he becomes a medical student at University of Winnemac and then an intern at the Zenith Hospital. Having married Leora, he moves to her home, Wheatsylvania, to work as a physician and later finds himself in Natulius as vice director of the health department. After his brief stay in a Chicago clinic, he comes to New York to work at the McGurk Institute, which sends him to St. Hubert to eradicate plague. Finally, remarried to Joyce Landon, whose affluence and posh life he enjoys briefly, Martin retreats into a small cabin. Compared to Gottlieb, who “was never interested in practicing medicine” (132) and whose experiences in America are highly limited, Martin, if he capitalizes on his diverse experiences, should be able to develop his own notion of scientific truth, which, distinct from that of Gottlieb, will be a pragmatic one.

But such a pragmatic notion of scientific truth wouldn’t be Martin’s unless he overcomes “The Shadow of Max Gottlieb,” a name that Lewis originally considered for the title of the novel (Richardson 226). Indeed, after his first encounter with Gottlieb, Martin raises a question, “What is Truth?” (13). But, watching medical students in his
frat house entertaining different beliefs and goals, he begins to feel that there is “no one clear path to Truth but a thousand paths to a thousand truths far-off and doubtful” (20). In his variegated experiences of failure and success, he constantly alternates between “Dr. Arrowsmith” the practical physician and “Martin” the authentic scientist (128), and slowly fabricates his answer to the question of truth. He learns that in a small town like Wheatsylvania, scientific truth exists only by “call[ing] some older doctor in consultation” and having newspapers confirm the truth; and that “clean, cold, unfriendly truth, Max Gottlieb’s truth,” doesn’t matter, if, by “tampering with it,” scientists like Pickerbaugh can give “more fresh air and cleaner yard and less alcohol” to the people of Natulius (244). And, while serving as “a faithful mechanic in that most competent, most clean and brisk and visionless medical factory, the Rouncefield Clinic,” he comes to a full circle of his truth-seeking journey by repeating what he has said in the beginning, but with more confidence:

He insisted that there is no Truth but only many truths; that Truth is not a colored bird to be chased among the rocks and captured by its tail, but a skeptical attitude toward life. He insisted that no one could expect more than, by stubbornness or luck, to have the kind of work he enjoyed and an ability to become better acquainted with the facts of that work than the average job-holder. (294)

This final lesson—that there are “only many truths,” each of which one can find in “the kind of work he enjoyed and … become[s] better acquainted with” without attempting to subjugate other truths to his truth—transforms the abstract question of truth into a concrete question of how to apply truth to one’s work and life. Martin thus asks himself,
“What is this Martin Arrowsmith and whither is he going?” (294). He soon ends what turns out to have been “a broad preliminary survey … in the fields of medical practice and public health” (307) and begins his life as a research scientist at the McGurk Institute, where he is devoted to his work and restrains himself from expecting more than that.

The “preliminary survey” of various spheres of society teaches Martin that each sphere has its own system of confirming and utilizing truth and that his science is just one of these spheres. It further shows him that the society is not a scientifically-engineered but a pragmatically configured enterprise, supporting “the ideology of separate spheres.” In a word, he now comprehends that it is a pragmatist society. Based on this comprehension, he decides to resign from the Institute and leave his family to live in Terry’s cabin, where he practices what he believes and values most—pure science. For the Institute, which is to be subsumed to a more social and political organization, namely, the League of Agencies, won’t be able to provide a sphere for an authentic scientist like him; his family, despite the garage-laboratory Joyce has built for him, will demand more of his time and attention. Isolating himself from these social and domestic spheres is the only and best decision he could think of to hold onto his own sphere, since it is, he has learned from his “preliminary survey,” how one survives in the pragmatist society. Martin the authentic scientist is after all a devout pragmatist.
3. An Un-pragmatic Humanism in Pragmatism and Science

*Arrowsmith* delivers a panoramic picture of the pragmatic society that provides science with an autonomous sphere where authentic scientists—Martin, for example—work for and by themselves, but that doesn’t mean that the novel is entirely committed to that society. On the contrary, though more often than not neglected by critics, Lewis’s, to borrow Stephen Conroy’s terms, “sociological imagination” (348) is clearly at work and offers a critical outlook on pragmatism and its humanism. This outlook, which has in fact been sustained from the very beginning where Martin’s great-grandmother is introduced, becomes manifest in two events taking place later in the novel: first, the insertion of the plague-stricken St. Hubert where Martin is sent at once to save the population and to conduct scientific experimentation on that population; secondly, Leora’s death that is overly sentimentalized by Lewis’s description yet quickly snubbed by Martin’s experimentation and unfaithful behavior. As I shall argue, these two events refer to subversive forces in the pragmatic society that assail the integrity of what sustains the society, namely, humanism. St. Hubert stands for a challenge mainly from outside the pragmatic society, one that, anticipating late twentieth-century discussions of post-colonialism and globalism, asks the society to include different nations and peoples in its humanistic programs. Meanwhile, Leora’s death exposes a challenge within the society, and Joyce continues this challenge, referencing feminist movements whose demands of rights for the other half of humanity—women—have changed American society greatly the twentieth century. Adding these challenges from within and without the pragmatic society to its panoramic picture of that society, *Arrowsmith* thus makes a
subversive, and a potentially contributory, gesture toward the humanism that underwrites the society as well as its science.

The pragmatist society that Arrowsmith captures ensures its citizens at once of individualism and communalism, provided that each of them abides by “the ideology of separate spheres.” A unique system of truth and value is communally experienced and approved within a sphere, where work and success will be promised immensely to individuals who agree to follow the system. Spheres, differentiated by region, profession, culture, etc., grow in size and number, and they contribute to the overall development of the society. The problem of the pragmatist society, however, is that these growing spheres are bound to overlap each other, that different systems of truth and value will collide with each other. As Conroy rightly comments on Martin’s final decision, “Isolation is a solution which cannot work, by virtue of the very lack of any meaningful interaction with an ongoing society” (355). James appears to belittle the problem, believing that different spheres are capable of making “meaningful interaction[s].” Throughout many essays concordantly entitled “The One and the Many,” he ascertains that the world, at once malleable and pluralistic, is always an expansive and unfinished business that operates not by reducing but by multiplying relations. James refers to such business as “concatenation” and explains,

There are other systems of concatenation besides the noetic concatenation. We ourselves are constantly adding to the connections of things, organizing labor-unions, establishing postal, consular, mercantile, railroad, telegraph, colonial, and
other systems that bind us and things together in ever wider reticulations. Some of these systems involve others, some do not. You cannot have a telephone system without air and copper connections, but you can have air and copper connections without telephones. You cannot have love without acquaintance, but you can have acquaintance without love, etc. the same thing, moreover, can belong to many systems, as when a man is connected with other objects by heat, by gravitation, by love, and by knowledge. (“The One and the Many” 265)

In “this sober view,” the pluralistic world concatenates different systems or spheres according to their needs so as to avoid any conflicts of interest, and James concludes that “the world is ‘one’ in some respects, and ‘many’ in others” (“The One” 266).

But concatenation is admittedly not so much a solution to conflicts between spheres as a description of a pluralistic society that has already resolved them. As H.M. Kallen points out, James’s pragmatism “aims less to be a ‘system’ than a narration of what is taking place and a plan for meeting events” (628). To concatenate different spheres in conflict, there must be something that transcends yet is immanent to the spheres, and its power should stand not for oppression and control but for independence and freedom to those inhabiting the spheres. Humanism, James contends, serves as this amorphous and even paradoxical solution, on which the integrity and stability of the pragmatist society depends—no surprise he originally intended to name his pragmatism “humanism.” Turning the question of truth, whether it is scientific, philosophical or religious, into a matter of each human being’s belief and experience, James adopts Schiller’s designation of “the name of ‘Humanism’ for the doctrine that to
unascertainable extent our truths are man-made products” (“Pragmatism and Humanism” 451) and regards “The world … [as] waiting to receive its final touches at our hands” (“Pragmatism and Humanism” 456). The power of human beings and the malleability of the world are thus the two mainstays of his pragmatism, and he explains, “humanism is for me a religion susceptible of reasoned defence” and its “pluralistic form … takes … a stronger hold on reality than any other philosophy” (“The Essence of Humanism” 306). “The religion of humanity” (“The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” 619), as James calls it, proves its “cash-value,” that is, “its matchless intellectual economy,” since “It gets rid, not only of the standing ‘problems’ that monism engenders (‘problem of evil’ ‘problem of freedom,’ and the like), but of other metaphysical mysteries and paradoxes as well” (“The Essence” 306).

Equally matchless is humanism’s cash value in the social economy of the pragmatist society. Despite or perhaps because of its significance to his pragmatism, James rarely tries to define what he means by “the religion of humanity” or “humanism,” and, if he does, he does it not by what human beings are but by what human beings do: insofar as they act on their belief and pursue its cash value in actual life, they are.

130 Speaking of instrumentalism, an offshoot of pragmatism, Warner Fite thus argues that it is “a form of anthropomorphism” (418). Fite proposes to develop this anthropomorphism into “a whole-hearted humanism” that can “satisfy both the realistic claims of natural science and the humanistic demands of pragmatism” (427).

131 Emphasizing that “James’s philosophy is essentially a philosophy of man—a humanism,” Patrick Kieran Dooley examines the centrality of humanism in James’s epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics (2). Describing truth as man-made, religion as “man-centered,” and morality as “accommodate[ing] the experiences of the ‘whole man,’” James, argues Dooley, “suggests that the pragmatist has been honest enough to acknowledge the role of subjective, human interests in our choice of theories” (82, 80, 128 respectively). But such honesty, as we will see, becomes suspicious when the extent and nature of humanism is put into question.
considered human and, subsequently, pragmatic. Ambiguous in definition yet verifiable in practice at every moment, humanism becomes applicable not only to different kinds of human activities and values but also to different spheres, thus providing a common ground between the spheres.\textsuperscript{132} Within each sphere, humanism underwrites the belief and value the sphere professes. \textit{Arrowsmith} provides ample examples: the scientific community consists of authentic scientists such as Gottlieb, Terry and Martin who consider it human to pursue pure science and find scientific truth; provincial societies like Wheatsylvania equates humanity with commitment to community and to its customs and mores; physicians at the Rouncefield clinic serve the affluent section of humanity by providing them with best and constant care, just as corporate entrepreneurs like Hunziker do by at once developing medicines for the sick and rewarding stockholders for their investment. In these different spheres of the society, people may pursue different goals, but they are common in believing their work in one way or another to be beneficial to human beings, that is, in practicing humanism.

Given the centrality of humanism in a pragmatic society, it is not coincidental that the McGurk Institute, a philanthropic enterprise, finally brings Martin and Gottlieb back together, nor is the fact that the League of Cultural Agencies, established by merging two major philanthropic institutes, celebrates its inception at the end of the

\textsuperscript{132} F.H. Bradley takes issue with James’s notion of humanism and points out, “In speaking of that which he terms ‘humanism’ Prof. James would have felt himself compelled, we might have supposed, to deal with such dangerous ambiguities and such distressing uncertainties” (228). Suspicious of James’s solution to such ambiguities, which is to find “the expedient in the long run and on the whole,” Bradley argues that “Prof. James’s Pragmatism is essentially ambiguous, and that he throughout is unconsciously led to take advantage of its ambiguity” (228, 229).
novel. Considering these philanthropic enterprises growing in size and influence, there is a certain truism in Gottlieb’s statement that “The world has always been ruled by the Philanthropists” (302). If pragmatism transformed American society into a pragmatist society where humanism is practiced, philanthropy as one of the most notable practitioners has in turn “reflected a distinctively American character” and “has been both index and agent,” since it “helped create an American middle way between a type of capitalism of the old world … and socialism” (Curti 424, 436). Furthermore, recognizing the fact that “science is an inherently communal activity” and also the necessity that “Someone … make it his business to look after these community functions,” those “Philanthropists of the 1920s took on this role” and aimed “to develop institutional contexts that encouraged creative research by individuals and small groups” (Kohler 13). Despite their distinctive purpose and work, however, philanthropic

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133 In his examination of the complementary relationship between philanthropy and the social sciences in America, Barry D. Karl notes the social/political relevance of philanthropy to American society: “The emergence of administrative bureaucracies in government shares with the history of modern philanthropy a role in the American understanding of social management and democratic individuality which makes it incumbent upon us to trace their relationship” (18).

134 But the relationship between science and philanthropy wasn’t one-dimensional, since the increase of philanthropic work in size and impact created a need of what might be called “‘philanthropology,’ the study of the scientific principles of philanthropy” (Bremmer 90). Science thus helped characterize philanthropy as different from charity and close to social reform, as can be seen in Carnegie’s philanthropic investment in “libraries, parks, concert halls, museums, ‘swimming baths,’ and institutions” (Bremmer 108). In Carnegie’s own words, the best means of benefiting the community is to place within its reach the ladders upon which the aspiring can rise—parks, and means of recreation, by which men are helped in body and mind; works of art, certain to give pleasure and improve the public taste, and public institutions of various kinds, which will improve the general condition of the people;—in this manner returning their surplus wealth to the mass of their fellows in the forms best calculated to do them
institutes are by nature ambiguous, if not paradoxical, enterprises: capitalists invest money in programs that would turn up no profits; women, instead of men, are often in charge of institutes whose operations exert considerable influence on the public; religious participants help people with no overt mission to convert people; politicians and militaries grant, even encourage, philanthropic aid to enemy states. The McGurk Institute that is financed by Ross McGurk the businessman and run by his wife, Capitola, offers a fine example of such an ambiguous enterprise.

Humanism may seem as open to everyone in a pragmatic society as it is effective to enforce the ideology of separate spheres. But its openness entails serious limitations. With an “explicit agenda … to arouse interest in exploring the mutual benefits of a feminist pragmatism and a pragmatist feminism,” Charlene Haddock Seigfried exposes “androcentric biases” deeply rooted in James, who “equates humanness with maleness and believes that women’s proper role is to serve men’s interests” (Pragmatism 17, 14, 111 respectively). Seigfried argues that James’s “metaphysics of relations and … epistemology based on sympathetic concrete observation” ironically underwrite his “sentimentalizing of the patriarchal status quo”—ironical since he fails to make a lasting good.

135 Jon Van Til in his attempt to define American philanthropy comments on the variegated motivations that drive philanthropy:

In the context of secular American society, such behavior [of philanthropy] is often tinged with the self-interest of the donor: cause-related marketing aimed in part at increasing sales; conspicuous giving of facilities named for donors; public listing of donors by degree of contribution, with implied gains in social standing for the contributors; mandated “volunteerism” designed to inculcate values of service as well as skill for adult success among the young; and in some cases, philanthropy as expiation for the commission of a public nuisance or even offense. Modern philanthropy is in many ways an arena in which mixed motives prevail. (33)
“sympathetic concrete observation” on women and consequently yet unwittingly contradicts his own philosophical belief (Pragmatism 114, 119). James’s failure is all the more surprising because, in upholding “the patriarchal status quo,” he is reaching an “uncharacteristic disagreement with Mill, from whom he “first learned the pragmatic openness of mind” and whom he would like to “picture as our leader were he alive today.” Seigfried sees this disagreement as “further evidence of the operation of prejudice” against women in James’s pragmatism (Pragmatism 116). The reason James rejects “women’s full humanity and rationality [which] would necessarily ‘break up the accepted system’ of male domination” is, Seigfried argues, that he “could not relinquish the privileges that accrued to him under the old system” (Pragmatism 135). I am not sure that selfish attachment to “privileges” is really what leads James, who after all “desperately wanted to be on the margin with … the misfits of society” (Seigfried, Pragmatism 138), away from Mill and his own pragmatic belief. But it is certainly likely that his view of “the accepted system” as an ideal condition for the pragmatist society makes him balance “humanness with his own Eurocentric maleness [that] effectively renders women and other races, nationalities, and classes as less than fully human” (Seigfried, Pragmatism 122).

136 Mill expresses his view of women’s rights, and marriage in particular, in The Subjection of Women. His view can be thought of as revolutionary, since, reflecting his “passion for absolute equality,” it criticizes customs—for instance, marriage—for cultivating inequality between men and women (Seigfried 119). It should however be noted that Mill’s argument is one of many derivatives from his vision of a scientifically engineered society. That is, I think his main concern is not so much with promoting women’s right as with endowing utilitarian principles with the absoluteness of scientific laws, which explains why his interest in women’s issues is virtually non-existent in his other writings.
The humanism that underwrites Martin’s science and *Arrowsmith*’s pragmatic society thus demonstrates its biases against “women and other races, nationalities, and classes” when “the accepted system” of the society is removed. As soon as he is settling in his laboratory at the McGurk Institute and pursuing his dream of becoming an authentic scientist, Martin suddenly finds himself setting out for St. Hubert, an island in the West Indies, where the plague threatens to wipe out the entire population. The phage that he has been developing, if his formula is right, can save not just the islanders but future victims of the plague, and Martin acquires a large stock of the phage on his ship heading for the island. Superseding this humanitarian mission is, however, a plan for a scientific experimentation that Gottlieb, now director of the Institute, has specifically instructed Martin to conduct in order to verify the formula of his phage. The experimentation, Gottlieb explains to Martin, is “to use the phage with only half your patients and keep the others as controls, under normal hygienic conditions but without the phage, [and] then you could make an absolute determination of its value, as complete as what we have of mosquito transmission of yellow fever” (376). A devout proponent of Gottliebism, Martin without hesitation “swore by Jacques Loeb that he would observe test conditions” (376-78). Furthermore, hypothetically, the experimentation, by sacrificing a small number of people (who are also of different race), will eventually and permanently benefit humanity in general, as Gottlieb reminds Martin: “You must pity, oh, so much the generation after generation yet to come that you can refuse to let yourself indulge in pity for the men you will see dying” (382). Thus blessed with Gottlieb’s belief that the experimentation would benefit both science and humanity,
Martin, along with other “representatives of Ross McGurk,” arrives in St. Hubert, where they are “practically prisoners till the epidemic’s over” (391).

Remote from the well-partitioned pragmatic society and imprisoned in an island where the plague spreads across whatever discriminatory line—racial, economic or political—there has been, however, Martin begins to feel uneasy about the experimentation. The hypothetical humanity that he believes would benefit from the experimentation corresponds neither to the humanity that the dying population of St. Hubert insinuates, nor to the humanity that Gustaf Sondelius envisions when he encourages Martin to “get converted to humanity” (381). The reality of St. Hubert, where people are “suffering by the thousand” and “an odor of rotting” stenches everywhere, entertains no abstract notion of humanity that science hypothesizes, and Martin, who has taken for granted such a notion in his scientific research, “did not feel superior to humanity” (381, 398). As his notion of humanity and consequently the humanitarian purpose of the experimentation become doubtful, so does Martin’s belief in the priority of conducting the experimentation. With no Gottlieb supporting the experimentation, he works less as a scientist and, instead, “began to meditate a political campaign as he would have meditated an experiment,” and is “(though he still resisted) tempted to forget experimentation, to give up the possible saving of millions for the immediate saving of thousands” (404). Horrifying scenes of the plague, ranging from “men shrieking in delirium” to “the face of terror—sunken bloody eyes, drawn face, open mouth—which marks the Black Death” and “an exquisite girl child in coma on the edge of death,” thus overpower Martin to the extent that “It came to him that Gottlieb, in
his secluded innocence, had not realized what it meant to gain leave to experiment amid
the hysteria of an epidemic” (405).

St. Hubert, where people used to live by “the caste” but are now dying of the
plague regardless of their caste, in fact requires Martin to develop a new notion of
humanity, that is, a humanism that disclaims the ideology of separate spheres. Since
nothing—castes, profession, wealth, sex, race, or any kind of hypothetical category—
remains intact to defend the ideology, it would be quite appropriate that Martin, as a
pragmatist as well as an empirical scientist, capitalizes on his new experiences of the
epidemic and modifies, or even discards, his notion of humanism. But strangely, he
doesn’t. What he does instead is to insist on acquiring a separate sphere for his
experimentation. His uncharacteristic, un-pragmatic denial of reality and insistence on
“the ideology of separate spheres” demystifies the superiority of the hypothetical
humanism that pragmatism and science presuppose. In other words, the pragmatic
humanism secures him and, by extension, science a well-guarded and independent place
in the pragmatic society, but the new humanism that he vaguely senses in St. Hubert
provides no such security. Against the undiscriminating and concrete humanism that
painfully emerges in St. Hubert, Martin’s hypothetical humanism appears too selfish and
uncompromising to remain pragmatic.

The humanism of St. Hubert rejects the abstract notion of humanity that
pragmatism and science uphold. Instead, it manifests itself in concrete experiences that
invoke sympathetic feelings toward people in suffering and pain. Insofar as Martin’s
scientific and pragmatist gaze commands our view of the island, however, we are more
or less forced into blindness to such feelings and the new humanism. Furthermore, the welcoming reception Martin receives upon returning to the pragmatic society in America, when he is praised as a hero-scientist, quickly shifts our attention back to him, and we could be as misinformed of his experiences as those reading about him in the newspapers. It might be that, while presenting St. Hubert as a place of a different humanism that is critical of the pragmatic humanism, the novel admits the impenetrability of the pragmatic society to such an outside criticism. But the novel makes another—and more explicit—gesture to criticize the humanism of pragmatism and science by holding Martin’s commanding view in suspense and delivering an unusually vivid description of Leora’s death. When Martin is away in St. Swithin’s Parish to do his experimentation, Leora, “left alone in the isolated house, with no telephone,” contracts the plague and,

Aching, fighting the ache, she struggled up, wrapped about her a shabby cloak which one of the maids had abandoned in flight, and in the darkness staggered out to find help. As she came to the highway she stumbled, and lay under the hedge, unmoving, like a hurt animal. On hands and knees she crawled back into the Lodge, and between times, as her brain went dark, she nearly forgot the pain in her longing for Martin.

She was bewildered; she was lonely; she dared not start on her long journey without his hand to comfort her. She listened for him—listened—tense with listening. “You will come! I know you’ll come and help me! I know. You’ll come! Martin! Sandy! Sandy!” she sobbed.
Then she slipped down into the kindly coma. There was no more pain, and all the shadowy house was quiet but for her hoarse and struggling breath.

(422-23)

Considering that Lewis has maintained his objective—sometimes, even cynical—attitude throughout his work, the dramatic sentimentalism overflowing the scene, which is further heightened when Martin in the following scene kisses Joyce, shouldn’t be dismissed as an uncharacteristic artistic indulgence. It rather accentuates Martin’s negligence of Leora while intimating her significance that, complicit in Martin’s devotion to science and disregard of the particularity of human beings, we have often overlooked. Indeed, the sentimentalism, I would argue, signifies the novel’s poignant criticism of pragmatism and science for disseminating a highly prejudiced—that is, androcentric—notion of humanism.

Although he might be a selfless scientist in his own sphere of science, both Leora and Joyce know how “selfish” or “egotistical” Martin can be for the sake of his science. These two female characters’ responses to his selfishness are however quite opposite. Leora lets him have his selfish way by acting unselfishly around him and thus becomes subservient to his life, which seems to be the only way to avoid conflicts of interest between them. Accordingly, Martin finds that “She was indeed the first girl to whom he had ever talked without self-consciousness” (62). And against her non-assertive and “sexless” self that “encouraged him to confidence in his evolving ambition and disdain” (76), Martin’s selfishness as a pragmatist scientist remains free. Yet Leora’s contribution to making Martin an authentic scientist goes further than letting him be self-indulgent.
She not only shows “a genius for keeping out of his way, for not demanding to be noticed, so that, while he plunged into his books” he also “shut[s] out the world that had pounded at him”—the kind of security that he later finds at the Institute “by closing his door” (118, 321). Furthermore, while demanding little of domestic duties from him as a husband, she either discourages him from “stumbling into [the] respectability” of a country physician by saying, “when you become the Sunday School superintendent, you needn’t expect me to play the organ and smile at the cute jokes you make about Willy’s not learning his Golden Tex” (179); or she prevents him from being distracted by non-scientific episodes such as hanging with Tregold’s society or having an extramarital affair with Orchid. Also, Leora keeps encouraging him to take new—increasingly more science-related—jobs, since she makes no complaints of his successive failures and instead expresses her willingness to move. Most importantly, she corrects the trajectory of his movement by reminding Martin of Gottlieb from time to time. So when Martin admits that “the sight of the Famous Surgeons [at Rouncefield clinic] disturbed his ancient faith that he was somehow a superior person,” Leora intervenes: “I’ve got a lovely description for your dratted Famous Surgeons. You know how polite and important they are, and they smile so carefully? Well, don’t your remember you once

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Leora is curiously intuitive, especially as to people like Martin and Gottlieb. When she just runs across the latter, she exclaims,  
he’s the greatest man I’ve ever seen! I don’t know how I know, but he is! Dr. Silva is darling, but that was a great man! I wish—I wish we were going to see him again. There’s the first man I ever laid eyes on that I’d leave you for, if he wanted me. He’s so—oh, he’s like a sword—no, he’s like a brain walking. Oh, Sandy, he looked so wretched. I wanted to cry. I’d black his shoes! (131) That she is intuitive apparently characterizes her as a stereotypical female character who is often emotional, subjective, or even mystic.
said that Professor Gottlieb called all such people like that ‘men of measured merriment’?” (294). Unassuming about herself yet loyal to Martin’s devotion to science, Leora creates an ideal environment for the authentic scientist-to-be.

Ideal as it may be for Martin, the environment is obviously created at the expense of Leora. That is, her cash value in this pragmatist sphere is based on her sacrificing herself, forsaking her own goal, and, finally, assimilating her humanism into that of Martin.138 By contrast, neither subservient nor unselfish, Joyce, aptly described as “The Arranger” (473), tries to create a half-way environment for Martin and herself: she makes a laboratory for him in their house or plans to move near his cabin in Vermont so that his scientific life and her social life may co-exist.139 As her enormous wealth symbolizes, her cash value as “the Arranger” in this newly created environment could be as self-sufficient, independent, and even consequential, if not more so, than Martin’s as a pragmatic scientist. Now the question is if Martin’s selfish humanism can adapt itself to

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138 In “Is America a Paradise for Women?” Lewis makes an interesting, satirical observation about the relationship between men and women in America:

in fact, men have accomplished but one thing in America—they have, by some magic which one would suppose to be beyond their powers, kept women from knowing how lucky a human being is to be born a woman in these United States, to be born one of the ruling sex and not one of that pompous, waddling, slightly ridiculous, and pathetic race of belated children known as men! (307)

Lewis’s observation seems to correspond to Leora’s condition and obviously reflects the fact that he “was consciously exploring through fiction the choices and pressures that women felt personally and socially during the first third of the twentieth century” (Maglin 103).

139 It might be possible to relate Joyce to early feminist pragmatists whose presence “has been invisible too long” (Seigfried, “Can” 75). In order to end “such culturally induced amnesia,” Seigfried focuses on Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who “preferred to think of herself as a humanist rather than a feminist,” and whose “valorization of humanity over sexuality is expressed through thoroughgoing exposes of the surreptitious assimilation of human characteristics to male ones” (“Can” 79).
Joyce’s arrangements, that is, if he can become less selfish to cope with her constructive humanism. Joyce apparently thinks so, as she constantly attempts to get close to him. Martin, however, doesn’t. Just as he is unable to accept a different kind of humanism in St. Hubert, Martin turns away from Joyce’s constructive humanism, since the latter won’t provide such an isolated yet secure place as that he has in the pragmatic society. That is, for the independence and freedom that the ideology of separate spheres grants him, he denies the same benefits to others. Seen against St. Hubert’s concrete humanism and Joyce’s constructive humanism, and even against Leora’s self-sacrificing humanism, therefore, Martin’s egotistical and androcentric humanism is only an isolated and diminutive case that will be eventually be opened and examined by those engaging in, as Conroy has noted, “meaningful interaction[s] of an ongoing society, by women and minorities.”

In retrospect, the examination has continued throughout twentieth century American society and turned out to be a fierce and revealing criticism of science and also of the pragmatist society in America, but it can lead, as we have hoped and will in the future, to a very constructive and moving embrace of what science and the pragmatic society will offer to humanism, that is, of a posthuman world where humans—men and women alike—and nonhumans can and must co-exist. It is such an embrace that I hope to offer, one that is not only not androcentric but also not anthropocentric, in my final chapter.

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140 John Patrick Diggins’s question that concludes his “Pragmatism and Its Limits” sums this up: “Old questions,” Dewey advised, “are solved by disappearing.” What about new questions like truth and power, questions vital to gender and race? Does pragmatism have an answer to questions that refuse to disappear?” (229)
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: THE BIRTH OF CYBORGOTHIC: MOTHERING

THE CYBORG IN MARGE PIERCY’S HE, SHE AND IT

Before it is even born, the cyborg has already been torn apart, and each of its pieces is now in the hands of humans. Different humans find different uses for the piece they possess. Some see a chance for much enhanced—whether physically or mentally, or both—human beings named “teleoperators” (Johnsen 84), who will work in space or military programs. Indeed, Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, whose collaboration instituted what might be called cyborg studies, have stated that “The purpose of the Cyborg, as well as his own homeostatic systems, is to provide an organizational system in which such robot-like problems are taken care of automatically and unconsciously, leaving man free to explore, to create, to think, and to feel” (31).

Others expect medical breakthroughs that can help disabled or debilitated human beings, especially in the field of reproductive technologies that “are transforming … conceptions of what it is to be human, male, female, reproductive, parent, child, fetus, family, race, and even population” (Clarke 149). Just for the same reasons, however, there are people who worry about fierce conflicts or unbridgeable gaps between those privileged for such benefits and those not, which has inspired many contemporary science fiction texts and

141 Note that I am saying “born,” instead of “created,” “made,” or “fabricated.” As will be clearer in this chapter, the emphasis on the notion of the cyborg being born is intended to criticize the use of the cyborg as a metaphor and to invoke in humans parental responsibilities for it. It also aims to underwrite my primary definition of the cyborg as a conscious being, rather than as an enhanced or modified human being, which is why I insists on using “it,” not “he,” to refer to the cyborg.
movies, notably those dealing with genetic engineering and cloning. Since the cyborg, if put to work, must have intelligence and physicality equivalent to, if not surpassing, human workers, some are concerned with the possibility that it might revolt against and eventually usurp mankind, as is presented in Karel Čapek’s *R.U.R.*, where the term robot was first introduced. Hopes and fears, some real and some imaginary, seem to engulf those having their hands on a piece of the cyborg and claiming their right to use their piece to determine parameters—sexual, racial, physical, political, cultural, intellectual, philosophical, etc.—of the cyborg. Thus, the birth of the cyborg, if it ever comes, will be heralded by clamors and skirmishes from and between these concerned humans, who, having given birth to it, demand their parental rights without assuming their parental responsibilities.

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142 Besides such precursors as Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* and H.G. Wells’s *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, contemporary examples include *The Aliens* series, *Gattaca*, *The Fly*, and Michael Marshal Smith’s *Spares*. For more examples and details, see Daniel Dinello’s *Technophobia*, chapter seven in particular, where he examines cinematic and literary stories that deal with “eugenics, cloning, genetic discrimination, the exploitation of the body as a commodity, the safety of genetically modified food, and the potential for catastrophic accidents in experimentation with transgenic species, as well as genetic imperialism practiced by greedy international corporations” (222).

143 LeiLani Nishime offers an interesting summary of “Cyborg representations in the past twenty years,” where she divides them into three categories: “bad cyborgs,” “good cyborgs,” and “mulatto cyborgs” (37). The mulatto cyborg, she explains, “Like the good cyborg, … lives in the chaotic spaces between organic and artificial. But unlike the good cyborg, the mulatto cyborg is stripped of romanticism and nostalgia. He mocks the liberal humanist invitation to pass as human” (44). In other words, the mulatto cyborg “unflinchingly confronts and exposes hybridity” (44-45). Yet her characterization of the mulatto cyborg raises the questions of how to define good and bad (that is, for whom is the cyborg good or bad?) and also of why hybridity, if it assigns the mulatto cyborg a distinct category, remains entangled with the “mixed-race subjectivity” that characterizes humans (47).
Science, in-vitro fertilized with the cyborg by ambitious human parents, has shared and suffered from their hopes and fears. This partnership between science and humans is of course nothing new, and so are the hopes and fears. The pragmatic arrangement that employs humanism to underwrite science and its autonomy in society has proven its utility through the unprecedented advancement of science and technology, which highlights the hopes and obscures the fears. Yet, as investigated in the previous chapter, the humanism hypothesized in that arrangement was egotistical, prejudiced and uncompromising, and has inevitably drawn from women and minorities criticisms and requests to live up to what its name stands for, that is, to take every human being, regardless of their sex, race, wealth or nationality, into consideration. Feminists, diverse racial/ethnic groups, postmodernists, and post-colonialists, separately and collectively, have made remarkable—though, admittedly, still far from complete—progress in making their requests heard and met throughout the twentieth century, a progress that can be gauged not only statistically but also in terms of growing suspicions about the

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144 Referring to the technoscientific apparatuses of the military, the capitalistic market, the ecosystem, and entertainment, Donna Haraway states, “The offspring of these technoscientific wombs are cyborgs—imploded germinal entities, densely packed condensations of worlds, shocked into being from the force of the implosion of the natural and the artificial, nature and culture, subject and object, machine and organic body, money and lives, narrative and reality” (Modest 14). Yet, with all her high expectation of “these illegitimate offspring [that] are exceedingly unfaithful to their origins” (Simian 151), she later gives up the cyborg for a more effective metaphor, namely, the vampire.

145 The collective work by these different yet often overlapping groups is most noticeable in third wave feminism or postfeminism, as Ann Brooks notes: “Feminist and post-colonialist theorists have recognized the potential of postmodernism to advance debates around identity, nationality and difference already articulated within these political and cultural movements” (92). Postfeminism in its critical distance from second wave feminism and genuine interest in ecology obviously bears similarity to my discussion of a cyborg ontology/ethics in this chapter.
very foundations of science and humanism, ones that have been left uncontested for so long—scientific objectivity and the definition of a human.  

Refuting “an apparent immunity for the scientific enterprise from the kind of critical and causal scrutiny that science recommends for all the other regularities of nature and social life,” Sandra Harding, among many feminist critics of science, proposes to “adopt the alternative view that science is a fully social activity” (Science Question 56). Citing Margaret Rossiter’s survey of women scientists in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, whose entry into the anthropocentric sciences was blocked or controlled, Harding first retraces “the woman question in science,” against which science’s “discourse of value-neutrality, objectivity, social impartiality appears to serve projects of social control” (Science Question 67), and then raises “the science question in feminism” to demonstrate how women can improve science. The latter question, she believes, would provide as an alternative to the androcentric sciences “a feminist epistemological standpoint [that] is an interested social location (‘interested’ in the sense of ‘engaged,’ not ‘biased’), the conditions for which bestow upon its occupants scientific and epistemic advantage” (Science Question 148). Dismissing the value-neutral and impartial notion of objectivity as “weak” in that it overlooks social prejudices inherent in scientific research and, as a result, fails to maximize objectivity, Harding later continues to develop this feminist standpoint into “strong objectivity,”

146 Bart Simon describes posthumanism as a continuation of the progress, as it adopts “an interdisciplinary perspective informed by academic poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminist and postcolonial studies, and science and technology studies” (Simon 2-3).
whose openness to diversified views of nature and society underpins “feminist science” (Whose Science? 142-43, 307).

The advent of the cyborg may not pose a big challenge to feminist science, whose “strong objectivity,” unlike the “weak objectivity” that tries to “describe and explain the world primarily from the perspective of the lives of the dominant groups,” professes to embrace the perspectives of different “races, classes, and gender[s]” (Whose Science? 307). But that the cyborg can affiliate with non-human beings makes one wonder if the embrace can be extended to those not categorized by “races, classes, and gender,” in other words, to those that can’t be comprehended in human terms. The cyborg thus challenges the partnership between science and humanism, demanding it to be an at least tripartite collaboration that includes non-human beings. The challenge, if properly met, may transplant the partnership safely—that is, without damaging it seriously—in the age of posthumanism, as N. Katherine Hayles hopes in How We Became Posthuman,

The posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that faction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice. (286)
The cyborg will help configure the tripartite partnership of posthumanism, where science, humans, and non-humans interface. But if the “certain conception of the human” or, in Hayles’s own words, “a liberal humanist view of the self” refuses to be terminated, it will end up thwarting any attempt at the new partnership, and the cyborg will be blamed for intensifying constant conflicts between those clinging onto that concept and for those anticipating posthumanism.

So the birth of the cyborg, as it is now awaited on the verge of posthumanism by ambitious and heavy-handed human parents, may signal either the completion of the quest for unanswered hopes or the beginning of a world that is realizing imagined fears; but it will never be an occasion for celebration. Deeply mired in human hopes and fears, namely, human problems, the birthday appears to offer no joy for this newborn creature and its own future. Cyborgothic, which I will introduce in this chapter as a genre that eagerly anticipates the upcoming age of posthumanism, foremost tells stories of this joyless birthday of the cyborg. Yet, in this way, cyborgothic can at least serve as a poignant criticism of the anthropocentrism inherent in human society and science that gives rise to a gothic future for both humans and cyborgs. John R.R. Christie in his “A Tragedy of Cyborgs” demonstrates such a critical reading of cyborgothic texts. Quoting

147 In a similar vein, David Tomas, who explores “some conditions and mechanisms that transform an art practice into a laboratory for the production and exploration of one kind of quasi-mechanized human body” (255), states that his exploration...
self-sacrificing cyborgs such as Terminator in *Terminator II: Judgment Day* (1991), Andrew Martin in *Bicentennial Man* (1999), and Data in *Star Trek: Nemesis* (2002), he asks why there is this suicidal trend in cyborgs. His answer is that “even the Good Cyborg cannot survive its narrative” because “its survival would contain the potential of machine hegemony” (Christie 5). In other words, it is anthropocentrism that, in competition with “machine hegemony,” renders no place for good cyborgs in human society.

But cyborgothic, which is genetically related to science fiction and gothic literature, does not just immerse itself in the past, in old hopes and fears about science and technology that the cyborg only epitomizes and intensifies. The gothic and science texts examined in the earlier chapters have consistently proven their comprehension of the extant society and commitment to a future society. As much as they are haunted by sublime characters and egotistical scientists whose thoughts and actions (mis)represent horrors lurking in their society, these texts are also inhabited by those unappreciated or underprivileged, who, while undertaking or even incarnating such horrors, also present ways to overcome them and envision a better society for themselves as well as those privileged. Into gothic novels, these inhabitants have encoded a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful, by which terrifying circumstances are circumscribed and even offered as an opportunity to develop an affectionate relationship, though the ensuing dominance of the sublime deactivates the gothic aesthetics of the beautiful and defines the gothic solely as representing what terrifies our mind and body. Science novels on the other hand have been concerned with a dilemma—science is considered at once beneficial and
detrimental to human society—and have proposed to resolve it by subjecting science to humanism. But the resolution works by marginalizing women and minorities and, therefore, remains incomplete; science novels demonstrate that the resolution won’t be successful unless it takes account of these inhabitants on the margins of science and humanism. The cyborg, already dismembered and abused in this human—and to a great extent, anthropocentric—society, certainly affiliates with these inhabitants, and it can, as their rightful descendent, present humans with a means to move beyond anthropocentrism toward a posthuman society, just as its ancestors have done for their society. Cyborgothic, whose genealogy testifies to the potential the cyborg has for posthumanism, is thus a story for, not of, the future.

This chapter is my speculative attempt to read Piercy’s *He, She and It* as a cyborgothic text. It must be speculative, since I can’t represent the cyborg that is yet to be born, so my presentation is admittedly a product of human imagination. But, as Olivier Dyens puts it well, “creatures of our imagination, by contaminating our basic representational construct of reality, affect, in a very direct way, our genetic system (culture and genomes being closely linked to one another)” (Dyens 79). Cyborgothic, even as an imagined testament to the cyborg’s future, can imbue our reality with its culture and change “our genetic system” so as to prepare us for the age of posthumanism. Having identified the genes to be inscribed in this particular genre, I am challenged in the same way that we are challenged in the aftermath of the Human Genome Project. That is, now that “the concept of the genetic body-text” is likely to be available to us in a near future, we might be able to enforce “genetic screening as ‘laissez-fairs eugenics’” in
order to rename the others—those socially and historically disempowered and underprivileged—“genetic Other[s]” (Wilson 31, 25); or we can “capture … the sense not only of being able to predict the expression of certain genes (simple future), but of being able to specify those predictions temporally and understand the conditions of gene expression in order to look forward as though looking back (future perfect)” (Wald 698-99). At this critical juncture that may lead us either to a totalitarian future or to a posthuman future, my presentation of cyborgothic thus aims to accept the invitation “to fashion novel ethical frameworks suitable for the new world created by genomic technology” (Mitchell 377).

My choice of Marge Piercy’s *He, She and It* as a sample cyborgothic text is based on the writer’s deep engagement with contemporary feminist debates on science and society,148 and also on my belief that the novel can be “a mother text” to nascent cyborgothic genre.149 The world in the middle of the twenty-first century the novel

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148 My reading of the novel as envisioning a breakthrough out of anthropocentrism certainly recalls the (pragmatist) ecofeminist strand in postfeminism, which insists on dealing with “nonhuman nature” (Mack-Canty 169). Ecofeminism, a mixture of ecology and feminism, proposes that “we act out of a recognition of our interdependency with others, all others: human and nonhuman” and analyzes “how the subjugation of women, other suppressed people and nature are interconnected” (Mack-Canty 169, 171). Piercy’s interest in ecofeminism is particularly traceable in her earlier novel, *Women on the Edge of Time*.

149 Other texts that can be included in this genre are: Kathy Acker’s *Empire of the Senseless*, where Abhor, “part robot, and part black,” journeys with Thivai through an apocalyptic world she hates, and in the end thinks, “one day, maybe, there’d be a human society in a world which is beautiful, a society which wasn’t just disgust” (227); Richard Calder’s trilogy, “Dead Girls,” “Dead Boys,” and “Dead Things,” the titles of which obviously intimate relevance to *He, She and It*; Paul Di Filippo’s “Little Worker,” a story written from the perspective of a cyborg maid that is in love with its master; *I. Robot*, a film inspired by Asimov’s stories and finished with a suggestive scene, where Sonny, a well-advanced robot, is to lead other robots to build a robot society.
portrays is one that has already gone through what the twentieth-century world fearfully imagines about the cyborg. After “the cyber riots,” it was agreed that “robots were forbidden to be made in human form” to pacify people’s fear of “intelligent machines” and desire to “feel secure” (48). Instead, humans now choose to let themselves to be modified or enhanced to the extent that there are “apes … altered chemically and surgically and by special implants for inhuman strength and speed” (13). This pseudo-anthropocentric world that denies robots human qualities and defines humans as modifiable origins is also a highly capitalistic one, most of which is owned by mega corporate enclaves known as “multis.” The rest is filled with independent yet diminutive free towns like Tikva, allegedly inhabitable territories such as “The Black Zone,” or slums called “the Glop,” where, besides various gang groups, “Day workers and gang niños and the unemployed lived” (31). These two factions of the human world are now about to renew old conflicts, and in the middle of these impending conflicts stands a cyborg made in human form and named Yod, awaiting either to be used by Avram its creator as an updated version of a military solution or to be acknowledged as a conscious and independent being.

At the beginning of a relationship that develops from one between a woman and a machine toward one between lovers, Yod the cyborg tells Shira the woman, “I’m conscious of my existence. I think, I plan, I feel, I react. […] I feel the desire for companionship” (Piercy 93, emphasis added), and continues:

“Avram told me nothing. I accessed his notes. Except for Gimel, who could quite honestly be called retarded, Avram destroyed every one of my brothers.”
“All the cyborgs who preceded you, you mean.”

“They were all conscious, Shira, except for Gimel. Fully alive minds.”

“That upsets you.”

“If your mother had killed eight siblings of yours before your birth because they didn’t measure up to her ideas of what she wanted, wouldn’t you be alarmed?”

“You fear he’ll destroy you also?” (Piercy 93)

Shira explicitly refuses to think of cyborgs in familial terms, a refusal that derives from her resistance to anthropomorphizing a machine, as evidenced by her substitution of “destroy” for “kill.” Intertwined with her explicit refusal is her insistence on sexual difference. When Yod uses “your mother” to explain cyborgs’ precarious situation in general terms, Shira quickly corrects it and uses a male pronoun, “he,” as if to imply that the atrocious act—whether killing siblings or destroying cyborgs—should be attributed to his work, not hers. It turns out that her insistence on sexual difference helps her anthropomorphize the cyborg, but, in doing so, she ignores Yod’s “desire for companionship,” a desire that in actuality prompts their dialogue in the first place.

The above dialogue illustrates first of all the trajectory of Shira’s relationship with Yod, in which, despite her initial resistance, Shira ends up being deeply involved in and committed to anthropomorphizing Yod to the extent that she accepts it as at once a husband to herself and a stepfather to her son, Ari, and thus forms one “weird yet

Commenting on Shira’s masculinization of Yod, Joan Haran argues, “Attempts to recuperate heterosexuality do not succeed because of the failure to reconceive masculinity” (97). But I think the existence of the “woman-made” Yod testifies that she has indeed reconceived masculinity, though this means that the cyborg comes under a discourse of sexuality that is fundamentally human.
fulfilling family” (359). But she is in the end so attached to Yod’s uniqueness as a human being that she decides not to reproduce a new cyborg, or perhaps more than one, which might have fulfilled its “desire for companionship” and the possibility of a cyborg ethics that extends this companionship to humans. Instead, she destroys the crystal that holds all the information necessary to create a Yod-like cyborg. The dialogue is furthermore suggestive of the trajectory of this chapter. Informed by the title of the novel, the chapter proceeds to tell three stories: his story, her story, and its story. In his story, the cyborg remains a metaphor for a tool, sophisticated and even anthropomorphized only to be of better use for humans. It is reproducible as well as disposable, serving only anthropocentric purposes. His story of the cyborg is thus one that Avram the father/creator or Y-S, a society with “the male dominance” (4), would repeatedly tell us, unless we stop using the cyborg as a metaphor for a tool. Her story, on the other hand, is one of incorporating the cyborg into feminist history and discourse, in which it becomes anthropomorphized in order not to be a better tool but to become eligible for all the benefits and rights that humans enjoy. The boundary enclosing the notion of a human is stretched so much and becomes so thin in the story that it seems to verge on transparency, but it is still a human story, meaning that such transparency is available when the cyborg stops being a cyborg. While Shira and Malkah may have succeeded in anthropomorphizing Yod, their success is followed by a painful recognition that an anthropomorphized cyborg is after all “a mistake” (412). Finally, reading the novel as a cyborgothic text, the chapter attempts to propose motherhood as a way to appreciate its story, which can’t be told in human language. Developed from a female ethics that is
presented in her story by female characters, motherhood is an aesthetics-based ethics that extrapolates a gothic aesthetics of the beautiful in the age of posthumanism and bid humans to be ethically affectionate to cyborgs.\textsuperscript{151}

1. His Story: The Cyborg Is a Metaphor

A mass of clay that is given life by words—prayers and chants—and activates “the entrance of the Word into Matter” (64), the Golem “looks more or less like a man” and yearns to learn human ways of living. But it nevertheless remains “a tool,” whose life and fate, if it has a life and a fate, are constantly interfered with and irretrievably prescribed by the words of its creator, Judah Loeb (108). In a way, the Golem is an embodied metaphor for Judah’s words, one that it can never claim as its own. The immaterial words that proclaim their precedence over the material body are pure and invulnerable to circumstances that the body undergoes, and so is the creator’s mind, which the words inhabit. The Golem’s strength that saves Jews from the gentiles of Prague, and its promise to live humbly and wish to be a man, thus bring no change to the meaning of the words as well as to the mind of the creator, who in the end unsays the words to return the Golem back to clay. No wonder we hear Malkah confess, “like the Ptolemaic universe, my story has a human center” (18), since all that is left of the Golem is a story that a human tells another human about a metaphor for human words.

It is this story of a metaphor that Malkah, “await[ing] his response” (402), records for Yod, whose life, we are told at the end of the novel, ends up being no

\textsuperscript{151} A small portion of the following sections is from “Toward a Posthuman Ethics,” an article that I published in \textit{Reconstruction} 4.3 (Summer 2004).
different from that of the Golem. \(^{152}\) Yod, created by Avram to protect Tikva from
corporate enclaves like Y-S and programmed/trained by Malkah and Shira to pass as a
human being, makes such progress that it almost becomes an legitimate member of
Shira’s family and also of the community of the town. Yet its existence is not
determined by the progress it accomplishes, not to mention its expressive desire for a
human life, but by the objective that Avram has prescribed for it. In the end, Yod thus
destructs itself at a meeting with Y-S executives in an attempt to save, though
temporarily, its town and, more importantly, its family. Read with a particular emphasis
on the ending, Yod’s story is similar to the Golem’s, as if acting as an updated metaphor
to the latter. Nothing has changed for these two creatures in terms of the continuing
invocation of a metaphor, and, for that matter, neither has anything changed for the
humans who remain deaf to the creatures’ wishes to survive.

Telling the story of the Golem, Malkah of course wants this updated metaphor to
be different, “less humble” (114), and more human, perhaps to the extent that it can
break off the metaphoric relationship with its creator. While working with Avram, she
has surreptitiously and carefully worked against him and endowed the cyborg with
strong “pain and pleasure centers,” making it capable of having diverse human
experiences, including that of sexual intercourse (114). Subversion and transgression

\(^{152}\) Eleonora Federici argues that “Malkah’s decision to tell him [Yod] the story of the
Golem … can be seen as an attempt to create for him a historical memory and a
belonging to human tradition…. Malkah’s narrative is then pervaded by that feeling of
humanism that Piercy puts in her stories, and by the sense of history and tradition that
accompany our lives” (137). The irony, however, lies in the fact that “a belonging to
human tradition” is as illusory a concept to Yod as it is to the Golem, hence leaving
these creatures with a desire for “belonging” that can never be satisfied.
thus characterize Malkah’s updated metaphor, whose emotional sensors will counterbalance Avram’s pure logic and rationality. Thus programmed, Yod represents the politically charged cyborg that Haraway has configured in “A Cyborg Manifesto.” Believing that “it gives us our politics,” Haraway in this influential manifesto writes of the cyborg: “The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins” (Simian 150, 151). “So my cyborg myth is,” Haraway continues, “about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work” (Simian 154). Her own exploration proceeds into the fields of informatics, biology, and feminist writing, all of which can benefit from employing cyborg imagery as a means of finding “a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (Simian 181).

The potential of the cyborg as a metaphor for transgression and liberation, however, remains underachieved as, contrary to Haraway’s expectation, the cyborg continues to be “a literalized, hypermasculine, and relative figure” (Bartsch 7). Consequently, Bartsch and others argue that Haraway abandons it and turns to the vampire, whose “praxis negotiates the artificial limits of language, engages the risks of its political space, and promises connections to monstrous possibilities—all of which Haraway demands in her postmodern jeremiad” (Bartsch 16).  

153 Marianne Dekoven also points out Haraway’s “figuration of the cyborg as a potent guerilla warrior” who engages in a “border war,” Ellen Mortensen also has argued that “it is hard to discern in what way her version of the postmodern warrior deviates from previous ‘masculine’
notes, “by 2003, the cyborg is no longer an adequate figure, paradigm, trope, or fantasy for Haraway” who takes “an ethical turn” and concerns herself with “the other—not the other as (m)other, that formulation once familiar to the Lacanian feminism of jouissance and sexual difference, but the Levinasian other as the universal location of absolute and unknowable difference, of the not-self, that calls us to ethical responsibility” (1694).

Haraway’s abandonment of the cyborg and subsequent turn to ethics is suggestive of the deeply metaphysical and highly illusive nature of metaphor that refuses

Haraway invokes the figure of the vampire to explain “OncoMouse™ [which] is the first patented animal in the world” (Modest 79). “Created through the ordinary practices that make metaphor into material fact,” Haraway writes of the animal: “her status as an invention who/which remains a living animal is what makes her a vampire, subsisting in the realms of the undead…. The existence of vampires tropes the purity of lineage, certainty of kind, boundary of community, order of sex, closure of race, inertness of objects, liveliness of subjects, and clarity of gender” (Modest 79-80). I would argue however that both the cyborg and the vampire are metaphors or tropes for Haraway, and her transition from one to another seems to me a continuation of her search for a metaphor for her theory of situated knowledge in technoscience. In this light, a real change takes place later in The Companion Species Manifesto, where she confesses, “I appropriated cyborgs to do feminist work in Reagan’s Star Wars times of the mid-1980s. By the end of the millennium, cyborgs could no longer do the work of a proper herding dog to gather up the threads needed for critical inquiry. So I go happily to the dogs” (4-5). Haraway’s interest in dogs, in my opinion, reflects her dissatisfaction in dealing with metaphors and signifies the ethical turn that DeKoven mentions. So she emphasizes, “Dogs are not surrogates for theory; they are not here just to think with. They are here to live with” (The Companion 5). I do share Haraway’s dissatisfaction with metaphors and belief in the significance of ethics, but my regret is nevertheless that she abandons cyborgs because they become useless, which seems to me an irresponsible, if not unethical act, given that they might come “here to live,” too.
to be played with or transgressed. Jacques Derrida warns of this nature, since metaphor makes “Everything [...] belong to the great immobile chain of Aristotelian ontology, with its theory of the analogy of Being, its logic, its epistemology, and more precisely its poetics and its rhetoric” (Derrida, *Margins* 236). In this sense,

Metaphor, therefore, is determined by philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning, an economy of the proper without irreparable damage, a certainly inevitable detour, but also a history with its sights on, and within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation of literal, proper meaning. This is why the philosophical evaluation of metaphor always has been ambiguous: metaphor is dangerous and foreign as concerns *intuition* (vision or contact), *concept* (the grasping or proper presence of the signified), and *consciousness* (proximity or self-presence); but it is in complicity with what it endangers, is necessary to it in the extent to which the de-tour is a re-turn guided by the function of resemblance (*mimēsis* or *homoiōsis*), under the law of the same. (Derrida, *Margins* 270)

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155 Nancy Leys Stephan attributes the persistence of metaphor in science to its efficiency—quick to use and productive—and she writes:

Especially important to the functioning of interactive metaphors in science is their ability to neglect or even suppress information about human experience of the world that does not fit the similarity implied by the metaphor. In their ‘similarity-creating’ capacity, metaphors involve the scientist in a selection of those aspects of reality that are compatible with the metaphor. This selection process is often quite unconscious…. To reiterate, because a metaphor or analogy does not directly present a pre-existing nature but instead helps ‘construct’ that nature, the metaphor generates data that conform to it, and accommodates data that are in apparent contradiction to it, so that nature is seen via the metaphor and the metaphor becomes part of the logic of science itself. (46-47)

The danger of metaphor is also apparent in scientific research, since only “those aspects of reality that are compatible with the metaphor” are included, while radically new aspects are excluded and, thus, new knowledge is hard to come by in science.
Discussions of the cyborg seem puzzled by the ambiguity of metaphor, as they either look for a way to make the cyborg more human-like or to heighten a fear of the cyborg that is already too much human-like. In this seeming paradox that is a cybernetic reproduction of the antithesis between technophilia and technophobia, these two representative factions of discussions in actuality share the same foundation of humanity and the same methodology of human-semblance, thus establishing a metaphoric relationship where the cyborg ever imitates the human but never is the human.

The metaphoric relationship between the human and the cyborg thus sets out a project that simultaneously serves two purposes. First, the project aims to assign, “under the law of the same,” insurmountable difference and inferiority to the cyborg, because it can be similar to but never the same as the human. Although arguments in favor of the hybridity of the cyborg aim to blur the demarcation between human and nonhuman, “the law of the same” still lurks behind these discussions, if the cyborg wants to be not different from the human and the human desires to be different from the human. Difference between the human and the cyborg thus hardly means equity between different entities; it is a difference that always presupposes the priority of “the same,” namely, humanity. Yod’s exasperation as it settles down in its “own place” with “all the facilities humans require” exactly points to this presupposition (238 emphasis added). Yod seems to ask itself, rather than Shira, “Am I imitating behavior I can never match? [. . .] Am I pretending at something I’ll always fail?” (238). It seems that Yod’s question has already been answered: the cyborg as a metaphor is always a failing one, since “the
law of the same” that resurfaces whenever the cyborg imitates the human precludes the possibility of identity between them.

If the first purpose of the project of metaphor involves the cyborg, it is the human to which the second purpose pertains. Examining exhaustively the concept of metaphor in philosophy, Derrida points out the presence of “one metaphor” which is “disappearing in its own radiance, the hidden source of light, of truth, and of meaning, the erasure of the visage of Being” (Derrida, *Margins* 219, 268). Only the human can form a metaphoric relationship with “this extra metaphor,” since, Derrida argues, “Man alone takes pleasure in imitating, man alone learns to imitate, man alone learns by imitation” (*Margins* 219, 237). The privilege to be able to imitate “Being,” to be in a metaphoric relationship with it, puts the human in a position superior to nonhumans. In the new metaphoric relationship with the cyborg, however, the human appears to be willing to give up such “pleasure” to the cyborg. Instead, by letting themselves always yet never fully be imitated by the cyborg, the human now pursues a more ambitious goal of taking the place of “Being.”

The double-edged project of the metaphoric relationship to turn the cyborg into the imitator and the human into the imitated explains why Haraway’s deployment of the cyborg as a subversive and transgressive metaphor has to be abandoned.\(^{156}\) How can it be

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\(^{156}\) This double-edged project also resonates with James J. Sheehan’s suggestion of two reasons for “A categorical denial that it will ever be possible to build machines that can think like humans” (Introduction 140). They are, Sheehan enumerates, first of all, “a belief in some spiritual attribute that separates humans from machines” and secondly the fact that “being human is inseparable from the feelings and perceptions that come from our physical existence” (Introduction 140). If the first reason relates to the sublimation of human beings into Being in the project of metaphor, the second concerns the
break boundaries between the human and the cyborg when the former is becoming boundless? The failure of the cyborg provides a grim prospect for the posthuman future, because the project makes questionable the advancement of the cyborg and cyberspace signaling “The End of Man.”

Pointing out the problematic status of the cyborg in postmodernism, Viviane Casimir thus warns, “Cyberspace world is a return of Cartesian and Newtonian epistemology where the entity “human-organism” reappropriates the center, the logos, the transcendental through an anthropomorphism” (279). The project furthermore makes doubtful the possibility of a posthumanism that is conditioned by cyborgization and human disembodiment because these two are virtually the outcomes of the metaphoric relationship. Neil Badmington as well as N. Katherine Hayles, recalling Hans Moravec’s musing on the possibility of mindloading, express a similar doubt by saying, “there is nothing more terrifying than a posthumanism that claims to be terminating ‘Man’ while actually extending ‘his’ term in office” (Badmington 16).

Of course, having observed the highly biased notion of humanism that science adopts in a pragmatic society in the previous chapter, we should be able to read the impossibility of fully imitating the human. But Sheehan seems more interested in the way technology and machines put into question “the categorical denial” and, consequently, the defense of humanity. He thus writes elsewhere, “Sociobiology and artificial intelligence, as metaphors, draw on and help to shape our answers to the persistent question of what it means to be human” (“Coda” 263).

That this phrase appears in numerous writings on posthumanism makes it unnecessary to give an actual citation, which would probably have to give the credit to Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992).

For Moravec’s proposal, Badmington quotes Hayles from *How We Became Posthuman*, who says, “I was reading Hans Moravec’s *Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence*, enjoying the ingenious variety of his robots, when I happened upon the passage where he argues it will soon be possible to download human consciousness into a computer” (1).
double meaning in Badmington’s warning. That is, “Man” is indeed a man who has been perpetuating androcentrism under the false name of humanism. That this story of a metaphor comes at the expense of women’s stories encourages such a reading. Chava, Judah’s brilliant and scholarly granddaughter, might have stopped “the creation of the golem,” which she would regard, Judah suspects, “as usurping not only the power of the Eternal but the power of women, to give birth, to give life” (60). Pondering whether he should create the Golem, however, Judah simply decides not “to discuss something this holy with a woman” (60), although he knows her to be “that rare combination of brilliant and sensible” (372). Chava’s sensible warning is precluded in the creation of the Golem, and so is, in its eventual destruction, her secret plan to include the Golem in her life-long wish to visit Israel. Malkah and Shira have put so much effort into making Yod “a person,” but later their effort comes to nothing when Avram’s intent to use it as a weapon prevails. Tikva, their “anarcho-feminist town” that upholds “libertarian socialism” (404), might have supported these two women, if given time and peace, but with the patriarchal and hierarchical corporate enclave Y-S encroaching upon it, the town has to become equally violent and militaristic in order to save themselves. Yod, created as a weapon, has no choice but to comply with Avram’s prescribed words. After all, the story of the Golem or Yod as a metaphor is his story, one that silences other stories. But we have also learned that it is important to listen to such untold stories, if we want a better society, which is why we first turn to her story, hoping it will lead us to its story.
2. Her Story: The Cyborg Is Our Ontology

Asking, “Could there be a cyborg ethics?” (12), the editors of *Cyborg Handbook* imagine “new constructions of good and evil” that they hope will help humans to deal with “cyborgian problems” (12). It is clear from their hope that they understand a cyborg ethics as a branch of human ethics that is an ethics *of* (that is, about) cyborgs rather than an ethics *of* (that is, by) *cyborgs*. Only when cyborgs trouble humans does this ethics surface to make them less troublesome for humans, and there seems little prospect for cyborgs to have an ethics for themselves. But, however anthropocentric it might have been in the editor’s mind, a cyborg ethics can nevertheless allow cyborgs to break off the metaphoric relationship with humans and go beyond anthropocentrism, since, according to Emmanuel Levinas, only ethics precedes metaphysics.

Staging one of the most consequential challenges to the law of the same, Levinas takes issue with “The correlation between knowledge and being” that defines “our philosophical tradition” in the West as adherent to “the first philosophy of Aristotle … where the ultimate explanation of intelligibility in terms of the primary causality of God is a reference to a God defined by being *qua* being” (76). In this first philosophy, namely, metaphysics, “Knowledge is re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain *other* to it” (Levinas 77). Yet this also means knowledge emerges at the expense of whatever is “*other* to it,” and Levinas points out that “prior to any knowledge about death, mortality lies in the Other” (83). Recognizing this “mortality,” or “the other’s death even before *being,*” is to assume “A responsibility for the Other, […] a responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or
whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself” (Levinas 83). One must answer this call, before looking for “the correlation between knowledge and being,” by acknowledging and taking responsibility for the Other that is different and beyond the law of the same. As a result, Levinas proposes “Ethics as first philosophy.”

Inspired by Levinas but at the same time critical of his (mis)representation of the feminine, Luce Irigaray has developed a feminist ethics based on and emphasizing sexual difference. Believing “Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date—at least in the West—and without reducing fecundity to the reproduction of bodies and flesh,” she proposes “an ethics of sexual difference” (*An Ethics of Sexual Differences* 5). Especially, she emphasizes the role of science in underwriting her ethics by saying that, “Given that science is one of the last figures, if not the last figure, used to represent absolute knowledge, it is—ethically—essential that we ask science to reconsider the nonneutrality of the supposedly universal subject that constitutes its scientific theory and practice” (*An Ethics* 5, 121). Such reconsideration will expose the separation between “the ‘truth’ of science and that of life” (*An Ethics* 125) and remind us that “the world is not undifferentiated, not neuter, particularly insofar as the sexes are concerned” (*An Ethics* 126). This remainder, however, would remain unarticulated in men’s language that presupposes the language of the same for humanity and is incapable of expressing differences, especially sexual difference. Thus, Irigaray further explores how to articulate an ethics of sexual difference, proposing that women “play with mimesis” by “assume[ing] the feminine
role deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it” \((This\ Sex\ 76)\).\(^{159}\)

Compared to the dualistic relation, to which male inhabitants—for instance, the authoritative father Avram and the profligate son Gadi—subject themselves, there seems no psychological deep-structure by which one can map out the relationship between females in Tikva. The three generations of women—Malkah, Riva, and Shira—lead widely different lives. Malkah the grandmother has had a very free life-style, mentally as well as physically, and wants to have new experiences for herself, while Riva the daughter lives very dangerously and adventurously as an information pirate. Shira the granddaughter is “old-fashioned” \((39)\) enough to get married and bear a baby herself, but later becomes so open as to have a relationship with a machine, which even surprises her revolutionary mother. A structuralized characterization of their relations is further unlikely, simply because they don’t know each other very well. Especially, it turns out that Shira has been lied to about her family and mother, as Malkah later explains, “I made up that little myth about our [matriarchal] family to explain to you why you were being raised by me instead of your mother…. Your mother is a political fugitive” \((79)\). Riva also stages her own death, deceiving her mother and daughter and leaving them

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\(^{159}\) Such play should be followed by creating a new language for women, since, Irigaray warns, “if we keep on speaking the same language together, we’re going to reproduce the same history” \((This\ Sex\ 205)\). That is, “if we don’t invent a language, if we don’t find our body’s language,” the play ends up making “too few gestures to accompany our story” \((This\ Sex\ 214)\). Irigaray proposes one such invention for \textit{parler femme} in her “conception of two syntaxes (one masculine, one feminine) which cannot accurately be described by the number ‘two’ since ‘they are not susceptible to comparison [and] … irreducible in their strangeness and eccentricity one to the other’” \((Fuss\ 63)\).
mistakenly to mourn for her for some time. No one is required to direct or imitate another in this female relationship, where differences are simply taken for granted. If an ethics of sexual difference is effective in deactivating the law of the same and underwriting differences between women as well as between men and women, it is certainly practiced by these women in Tikva.  

Given the affinity between women and cyborgs in their socio-political deprivation, it might be possible to extrapolate from a female ethics a cyborg ethics that embraces difference between the human and the cyborg. Indeed, the more it is trained as a male to be a lover and later a stepfather, the more Yod is anthropomorphized and, therefore, accepted by the human society of Tikva as well as Malkah and Shira. Although the impending conflict with Y-S unfortunately puts a sudden stop to the extrapolating process, the success that Yod has accomplished in making itself a legitimate member of human society testifies to the possibility that cyborgs, if well-trained, can implement a cyborg ethics in human society. But, when Yod destroys itself to save its human friends but at the same time kills Avram to stop the creation of another metaphor, Malkah gives up the idea of making more cyborgs, and confesses, “Yod was a mistake. You’re the right path, Nili. It’s better to make people into partial machines than to create machines that feel and yet are controlled like cleaning robots. The creation of a conscious being as any kind of tool … is a disaster” (412). Shira follows Malkah’s step, and disposes of the crystal that has all the information necessary to create a Yod-like

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160 There is also a sense of affirmation toward female reproduction, as all three women, including Riva who is a lesbian, find it important to continue their family line. But at the same time, they use this particular female role to build a matriarchal family, where males become more or less sperm-donors.
cyborg. As long as they keep anthropomorphizing Yod, Malkah and Shira will see it as “a mistake” that shouldn’t be repeated or as a unique human being that must not be cloned. In doing so, they will never see Yod for what it is: a very advanced cyborg that can be reproduced with the same capability and trained as a different being. And their blindness to this fact provides an important insight into the difference between women and cyborgs.

The world of sexual difference, Irigaray insists, involves “[a] transition to a new age [that] requires a change in our perception and conception of space-time, the inhabiting of places, and of containers, or envelops of identity” (An Ethics 7-8), and this change, for women, begins by loving themselves, for there is “no love of other without love of same” (An Ethics 104). This “love of self” for women “presupposes that several tasks have been successfully tackled” (An Ethics 67). First, “No more hierarchy of maternal and paternal functions which reduces them to the effect of the division of labor”; secondly, “No more dissociation of love and eroticism”; thirdly, “The possibility that the female could be many; that women would form a social group”; fourthly, “The existence of a female divine…. Herself with herself, in advance of any procreation. This way she becomes capable of respecting herself in her childhood and in her maternal creative function” (An Ethics 67-68). The first two seem to have met in Yod’s brief life. In its love for Shira, sexual intercourse is not a goal but an affirmation of love that is perpetuated for neither ejaculation nor reproduction but for the participants’ “need to touch” and “be touched” (182). Furthermore, it is not subject to, as Malkah speculates, “any Oedipal taboos, for he was not born of woman” (162), and its “weird yet fulfilling
family” is without “[the] hierarchy of maternal and paternal functions” in that Yod is viewed not as a father, “a figure of authority,” but as a superior and “all-capable playfellow” (377).

The two remaining conditions, which are basically extending or expanding the first two onto social levels, however, remain unfulfilled. These conditions stipulate that women exist before they are subjected to males, and that the potentiality of their existence should be admitted by women themselves as well as men. That is, the beginning of a female ethics that asks women to love themselves coincides with that of an ontology for women, one to which women’s existence gives undeniable certainty. But no such certainty is available for cyborgs, and, needless to say, no possibility for a cyborg ontology/ethics. As Shira says, the problem is that “there’s no culture of cyborgs for you to fit into. The only society is human,” and the only way cyborgs can be eligible for ethical consideration is to be anthropomorphized according to an ethics of sexual difference (238).

Shira may have almost successfully anthropomorphized Yod by turning it into “him,” who represents the kind of lover/husband/father that women idealize, but in doing so, she neutralizes its “desire for companionship” and neglects the ontological difference between women and cyborgs, which must be considered before we ever imagine a cyborg ethics. That is, while her insistence on sexual difference as underwriting a female ethics has facilitated anthropomorphizing the cyborg, it has also contributed to re-defining its relationship with humans as metaphoric, since it now is to be a metaphor for either an ideal man or woman for a female ethics. We must thus take
heed not to give too easy a nod to Haraway’s claim, “The cyborg is our ontology” (150). For given the absence of a cyborg ontology, her claim can be interpreted either as an arbitrary assignment of a chimerical ontology to cyborgs that are yet to have an ontology or as an attempt to subject cyborgs to “our ontology” that is about to colonize the realm of machines. The possibility of “a radically different ontology” that cyborgs must have is indefinitely delayed.

3. Its Story: Mothering cyborgs

The problem is, one might say, that there aren’t enough cyborgs. That is, it may not be possible to know what a cyborg ontology, and a consequent cyborg ethics, will be until cyborgs’ “desire for companionship” is fulfilled by their being genuinely plural and in love with themselves. But even in imaginative works where there are many cyborgs, the principle of no love between cyborgs seems absolute. Humanoids in Jack Williamson’s *The Humanoids* are of one mind to extend “the wise benevolence of the Prime Directive” (178), that is to realize an ideal utilitarian world by brain-washing humans, and so are the members of the Borg from *Star Trek* series, which allow no

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161 The insistence on sexual difference, which engenders ceaseless controversies between essentialism and constructionism among feminists, might work against feminism’s engagement in posthumanism. Paula Rubinowitz thus points out, “Polarized positions of feminism can’t speak for posthumanism. Feminism must be self-retrospective and self-reflexive” (100).

162 Bronwen Clavert identifies the presence of Haraway’s “cyborg politics,” with its emphasis on incorporation and hybridity, in the ending of the novel, where “the women of the Black Zone … move forward and begin to create a more inclusive community” (56). Yet, as I argue below, the “inclusive community” excludes men and forgoes the possibility of introducing new conscious beings such as cyborgs, which, as Calvert notes, is an act of “skirting, rather than solving, the problems of inequality” (56).
difference between themselves, including those “assimilated” into their “collective.”

Or those that might desire “companionship” are considered anomalies and hunted down, as is the case with the replicants in *Blade Runner*. In fact, most cyborgs, if they are to populate an imaginary world, engage in a war, almost always divided between those protecting humans and those operating by some utilitarian laws that prescribe humans as inefficient. Even Yod, who is aware of its “desire for companionship,” doubts the possibility of “attraction between cyborgs” when it says that “We would both yearn toward the type of being who made us—if these other cyborgs … also possess the ability to yearn” (326). As long as this yearning is directed toward humans, as long as cyborgs subscribe to the metaphoric relationship that defines them either as a tool or as a humanizer, a cyborg ontology will never be, and neither will a cyborg ethics, regardless of their numbers.

So the problem that renders a cyborg ontology/ethics impossible lies in our insistence on defining cyborgs as our own—that is, either as our property or as our own kind that fails to meet our expectations. In this way, little change will be made in the metaphoric relationship that has engendered androcentrism and at best anthropocentrism.

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163 Descendent of military cyborgs, humanoids in Williamson’s novel are “android mechanicals of a new type,” created in order to “restrain men from war,” and it is “impossible to tell them from men” (40). In the novel, humanoids, made by a scientist named Mansfield on a planet, Wing IV, continue to accomplish their objective by all means, such as brainwashing humans. On the other hand, the Borg from Star Trek is a race of cyborgs that collectively and relentlessly try to assimilate other races—human or not. Although the members of the Borg are indistinguishable in mind, in an episode called “I, Borg,” where a Borg is captured and given the name of “Hugh,” which in turn gives it individuality, it is suggested that they can be of different mind.

164 Unlike Philip K. Dick’s original novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* Ridley Scott’s film features a very philosophical-minded android, Roy Batty, that actually cares about other androids.
with or without the existence of a cyborg or, for that matter, cyborgs. To solve this problem, to break ourselves and cyborgs out of the prison of metaphor, we may have to see cyborgs as their own or, at least, imagine them having their own story to tell us. Yet this brings up another problem, the kind of problem that has troubled Irigaray in her attempt to develop a female ethics. How do we listen to its story when it has no language of its own to tell it, when all it has is the human language, where it is only a metaphor?

Adapting Levinas’s ethics without its “anthropologocentric features” that view “life still in terms of an opposition between human and nonhuman, where the human logos of ethics is the defining factor, whereas the nonhuman is understood merely as the derivative negation of humanity,” Silvia Benso asks a similar question in relation to things: “what if things were capable of expressing an ethical signification, an alterity that goes beyond the structures of meaning within which things have been enframed—an alterity that demands the resoluteness of an ethical response on the side of human beings?” (43, xxx respectively). And she answers by proposing an “ethics of things”:

Things signify both a subject and an object for ethics. Of things means thus the directionality of a double movement: that which moves out from the things to reach the I and the other, and that which, in response to the first, moves from the I and the other to reach the things and to be concerned by them. The first movement is that of the demand or the appeal that things place on human beings by their mere impenetrable presencing there. It is the thingly side of the ethics of things. The second movement is that of tenderness, as the response to the demand and the properly human configuration of the ethics of things. (142)
Less impenetrable yet more active than things, cyborgs will make more appealing gestures than “presencing there,” and we will need to configure something more responsive than tenderness, which Benso develops from “the feminine” and describes as “both the passivity of vulnerability, like the sensitivity of the skin, and the activity of responsive treatment of another” (227).¹⁶⁵

Haraway’s use of “the immune system” as “a plan for meaningful action to construct and maintain the boundaries for what may count as self and other in the crucial realms of the normal and the pathological” might be relevant here (Simian 204). Suspicious of the boundaries between self and other that the immune system presupposes to ensure “immunity and invulnerability,” Haraway asks, “When is a self enough of a self that its boundaries become central to entire institutionalized discourses in medicine, war, and business?” (Simian 224). And she answers that “the perfection of the fully defended, ‘victorious’ self is a chilling fantasy” (Simian 224). As with her use of the cyborg, “the immune system” may be invoking too many images of diseases to maximize its political edge, but this certainly anticipates “the proper human configuration” of a cyborg ontology/ethics. In this configuration, the cyborg will affect us humans in the same way a virus overtakes us, affecting and exhausting our mind and body. It may even transform us. But at the same time, unlike a virus, it is welcomed and

¹⁶⁵ Ollivier Dyens makes a similar observation in relation to the cyborg: “The cyborg directly questions the validity of human ontology. By its very presence, it forces us to consider the possibility of perfectly simulated human core attributes such as love, intelligence, conscience, and even soul” (82). But Dyens consistently relates the cyborg to the human by saying that “The cyborg is the implosion of our former definition” (81) or “The cyborg is a semantic transformation of the body” (82), and ends up understanding the cyborg only as a metaphor with no ontological status.
sought for by us. Only with this configuration, which leaves us vulnerable yet nevertheless responsive to the cyborg, can we reach its story that is encoded in a cyborgothic text.

Implied in the explicit conflicts between multis and the rest of the world in the novel is a story of two custody battles. One is over a human child, with which the novel begins. Shira fights against her husband, Josh, over the custody of their son, Ari, and Y-S decides to give it to the husband, a decision that turns out to be a ruse to use Shira to get information on Yod the cyborg. The first custody battle thus directly relates to the much larger custody battle over Yod between Tikva and Y-S, or corporate enclaves and free towns. This custody battle over Yod ends, when, in order to end the parental dispute between Tikva and Y-S, Yod destroys itself to kill the high executives of the patriarchal Y-S, but at the same destroys the lab where it was created to kill its “father,” Avram. Yet one should question whether corporate enclaves will continue to fail to create a cyborg, when a small town such as Tikva has succeeded in doing so. It seems that the sacrifice of the cyborg only delays the dispute between the patriarchal Y-S and the matriarchal Tikva, and, as a result, a dystopian outlook on the future of the world emerges from the second custody battle. But the novel is not with “utopian energies,” which can overpower the dystopian outlook and also envision a utopian world where we can find the configuration that helps us to reach its story (Booker 345). These energies and new configurations are what Shira and Ari promise to us by winning the second custody battle.

The custody battle over Ari, and the thought of losing him, make Shira think what he means to her and how he changes her life. She says to Malkah, “he’s life itself
to me…. He carries my heart in him,” and realizes that playing with him makes her “a child again,” meaning she has to assume as many identities to respond to him as Malkah does to join “elaborate group correspondences and … games inside the Net” (7, 74). Yet, unlike the anonymous and mentally-induced entertainments that Malkah enjoys in the Net for herself by chatting online with others or Gadi in stymies for himself by creating virtual environments, Ari demands so much time and attention from Shira that “she lost the habit [of immersing herself into stymies] when Ari was born, for she could not cut herself off from him in that complete sensory overload” (10). To play with Ari and become “a child again” is not a selfish entertainment but a communal act, where she has to use all her senses in order to respond to and learn from her son. By engaging in this act, she is able to share his “excitement to see live animals” and “emotional attachment to it [a robot]” (36, 76). That the custody battle ends up by giving her a chance to raise Ari with the memory of Yod, Gimel the robot, the intelligent house, and kittens, along with other humans, thus means that “she had to learn to know her son all over again,” to appreciate his “excitement” and “emotional attachment” about non-human beings (348).

What is being restored through the first custody battle over Ari is Shira’s motherhood, the ability to be affected by and responsive to one who is yet to tell its story. Piercy puts so much emphasis on the importance of motherhood for a utopian future that she experiments with the possibility of its dissemination across the gender line by saying that “Nurturing is a strong value. Communal responsibility for a child begins at birth” (“Love and Sex” 137). Robin Silbergleid locates her experiment in Women on the Edge of Time, and argues that Piercy proposes “a completely egalitarian method of child
care … by allowing men to mother” (166). “Piercy,” continues Silbergleid, “moves beyond the essentialism which underlies many feminist constructions of citizenship that emphasize woman’s special needs as reproducer” (166). Comparing mothering as a communal and negotiating act with the act of writing “a corporately-authored text” (73), Elaine Orr also points out,

> In the future, the historical role or character—“mother”—is maintained and at the same time multiplied: mothering itself is reproduced, becoming an amalgamation of caretaking activities synchronically performed by community members. Thus, the replacing of female biological reproduction with technological birth, rather than minimizing mother, maximizes it through narrative constructions of multiple, extra-uterine bonds. Put differently, Piercy’s showing of technological mothering publicizes women’s historical labor and amplifies the possibilities for maternal stories. (62)

If she experiments with motherhood by expanding it across the gender line in Mattapoisett, where the inhabitants—both male and female—are socially and biologically transformed into mothers, Piercy in Tikva apparently takes her experiment one step further to cross the boundary between humans and non-humans. Thus,

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166 Mattapoisett is a utopian town in the future, from which Luciente comes through time-travel to meet Connie, a minority woman committed to a mental institution and experimented on by the doctors in 1970, in Piercy’s *Woman on The Edge of Time*. In this communal town, everyone, regardless of their gender, shares work, child-caring, and politics.

167 Summarizing the trajectory of feminist debates on motherhood in America, Ann Snitow concludes her article with a series of questions: “Do we want this presently capacious identity, mother, to expand or to contract? How special do we want mothering be? In other words, what does feminism gain by the privileging of motherhood? … do
Malkah and Shira learn that they should train Yod by “talking in that partial way one does to children” and by treating it “like a bright child” (66, 86). As Anna Martinson rightly puts it, there is a continuous “maternal programming” in both of Piercy’s novels (57).

If it can be extrapolated in the relationship between humans and non-humans, including cyborgs, motherhood can be instructive to a female ethics of sexual difference that, due to its anthropocentric discourse, falls short of underwriting that relationship. In contrast to Irigaray who imagines feminine divinity as “something extradiscursive,” Kelly Oliver thus “propose[s] that the divine is the result of an encounter between two different people,” that is, “through our embodied dialogues with each other, especially through the wonder of love” (171). In her re-reading of Nietzsche and Derrida as well as other ethicists who “attempt to open up philosophy to its others” (xi), Oliver finds in the mother-child relation the first model of the divine, of relations that transcend differences between the participants. And she writes,

My ethical ontology, based on a description of the maternal body or the mother’s feminists want men to become mothers, too, that is, to have primary childcare responsibilities?” (42). Snitow admits there is no known consensus among feminists as regards these questions, but my suggestion here is to expand motherhood not as an enlarged identity that disregards sexuality but as a pragmatic practice that does not necessarily involve a human child. That is, modeled after female mothering, the proposed motherhood might be applied to toward non-human beings, including cyborgs, in practice and to develop pragmatic knowledge of such beings. In this light, my suggestion of motherhood is in line with a pragmatist feminism that works beyond essentialist or gendered approaches to ontology and epistemology and, inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s thought, takes an ecological view that “treat[s] our understandings of another as working hypotheses rather than as self-evident finalities” (Sullivan 207).

As she traces Piercy’s adherence to ecofeminism in her two novels, Martinson emphasizes this “maternal programming,” since in it, “nature and nurture” are “virtually indistinguishable” because “programming becomes a metaphor for socialization” (57).
relation to the child … does not purport to describe the mother’s phenomenological experience of maternity, childbirth, or child care. This model is not developed on the basis of some supposition about how a mother feels or how it feels to be a mother. It is not a so-called ethics of care. Rather, the power of this theory comes from the fact that we all have mothers, dead or alive, known or unknown. So far, all human beings have been born of women’s bodies. Moreover, like any model, it describes the pattern, logic, or structure of a relationship that is not necessarily inherent in only this particular model. The model is meant to vividly indicate how intersubjective relationships operate (186).

This “ethics of maternity” that is based on “our first relationship … with the maternal body” thus precedes Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference and, therefore, can serve as a model for all kinds of social relations that aim to develop intersubjectivity.

Ann Weinstone in Avatar Bodies complains about “posthumanism’s near exclusive focus on the human-nonhuman touch and its preference for routing questions of ethics through relationship between people and technologies or other non human entities” (5). She then argues that “posthumanism has failed to develop a vocabulary with which it might speak of care, of responsibility” (16). Believing that “the maternal body” can be assumed by whoever—regardless of his/her sexuality—approaches a cyborg as if it is a child, I would now suggest motherhood as the “vocabulary” or configuration that lets its story emerge not necessarily as a comprehensible narrative but as an aesthetic experience that leads to an affectionate and responsible, that is, an ethical
relationship between humans and non-humans. If cyborgothic is indeed
genealogically related to gothic literature and science fiction, it should be born with the
capability to present motherhood as an aesthetic-ethical configuration. A gothic
aesthetics of the beautiful that underlines consistent attention to people and surroundings
and envisions an affectionate relationship between them, combined with science fiction’s
persistent effort to warn of the dilemma of science and suggest ethics as a resolution,
should be enough to ensure that inborn capability. Yet cyborgothic, representing the
genetic heritage of these two genres, goes further to present how motherhood will work
in practice in the age of posthumanism. In *He, She and It*, the mother-trained Yod learns
motherhood, just as it learns to appreciate concepts like freedom or happiness (173, 364) and to sympathize with Shira’s need of a child (260). It learns them not by certain
words or programs inscribed into it but by being responsive to others’ feelings and
appreciative of what it can’t give or have. Watching Ari grow and realizing what it will

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169 In his critique of Andrew Pickering’s theory of posthumanism, Mark Peter Jones
agrees with Pickering that “posthumanism can recognize purpose solely in the actions of
human beings; it cannot accept an ontology that equates people and things” (295). Jones
however rejects “the concept of nonhuman (or material) agency” that Pickering
introduces “in hopes of overcoming the limitations of both interpretive sociology and
poststructuralism without resorting to Latour’s problematic equation of people and
things,” citing the inherent inconsistency between the sociological interpretation that
requires human agency and the poststructuralist negation of agency (292). As a result,
material agency is an inconsistent concept that pictures posthumanism as speaking from
nowhere. Instead, Jones proposes to introduce a pragmatic notion of human agency into
posthumanism. Motherhood might be taken as an ethical configuration of this pragmatic
notion.

170 That Yod learns motherhood and tries to nurture Ari should countermand, if not break
down, “the notion of the cyborg [that] serves to diagnose the present and to disrupt the
very idea of ‘natural reproduction’ as a kind of no-longer-useful and perhaps dangerous
assumption” (Dumit 11). That is, the fear of the cyborg as depriving humans of the right
to “natural reproduction” shouldn’t overshadow the possibility of the cyborg being a
nurturing presence to a child born naturally or artificially.
never own and comprehend, that is, a childhood, Yod “was endlessly engrossed” and tells Shira, “I never was a child, so Ari’s mysterious to me. With every observation, I am learning about you, understanding Malkah and every one of you. Because so were you all. Once you were smaller than you are…. It’s as if you used to be somebody else. A dozen other people, of different sizes” (377). Thus, Shira and Ari begin at the end of the novel a family that is without the presence of the corporate-made fathers and yet retains the memory of the mother-trained father, realizing the matriarchy that Shira used to believe.

In *My Mother Was a Computer*, Hayles explains the title as “alluding to the displacement of Mother Nature by the Universal Computer” (3). It articulates, she continues, “a certain kind of anthropomorphic projection that creates (mis)understandings of the computer’s functioning…. This projection also has a reverse undertow, for it brings into question the extent to which human beings can be understood as computer programs” (5). In this interactive relation that leaves impressions as deep as those mothers leave on her children, “We humanize the virtual creatures; they

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171 Josh, Shira’s human husband, is given the custody of Ari by Y-S, unknowingly involved in Y-S’s ruse to get information on Yod. That Josh is a corporate-made father is indeed materialized when a virtual impersonator of him, who has been killed by Yod earlier, attends a meeting between Y-S and Shira in the Net. Yod, by contrast, is a mother-trained father in that it is first trained to be a male by women and then learns to be a parent by observing Shira and her love for Ari. Although it is absent in Shira’s family in the end, Yod certainly leaves strong impressions on the remaining members of the family, ones that can be carried over by other non-human beings such as animals, the intelligent house, and Gimel, a prototype of Yod that Shira gives Ari “as a playfellow” (424).

172 Anca Vlasopolos describes Yod as “a compound of grandmotherly/motherly love,… of the taboo attraction of daughter to father-in-law, ultimately of woman’s knowing of woman’s pleasure” (62). But I think Yod’s transformation is interpreted less erotically than ethically.
computationalize us; and the recursive loops cycling through the system bind both behaviors together in a network of complex coadaptations” (201).\textsuperscript{173} Such a network resists the conventional divide between subject and object, organic and material, or humans and nonhumans, and “an essential component of coming to terms with the ethical implications of intelligent machines is,” Hayles concludes, “recognizing the mutuality of our interactions with them, the complex dynamics through which they create us even as we create them” (243). Shira’s family, now with many “it”s—kittens, Gimel, the house—and humans, exemplifies this reciprocal network, and Ari, as She expects, “would be even more a child of the age of information, because he would be raised by one human and one computer” and, I might add, as a rightful inhabitant of the impending posthuman age (323).\textsuperscript{174}

Last Words

The twenty-first century began with a story of a cyborg named David in Steven Spielberg’s film, \textit{A.I.} (2001). David, created by Professor Hobby who wants a perfect representation of his lost son and test-driven by a couple looking for a substitute for their

\textsuperscript{173} Sherry Turkle observes interactions between children and computers in contemporary society, and argues that the computer “presents itself to the child as a thing that is not quite a thing, a mind that is not quite a mind. As such, it changes the way children think about who are their nearest neighbors…. Today’s children appropriate computers through identification with them as psychological entities and come to see them as their new nearest neighbors” (233).

\textsuperscript{174} Such a reciprocal network might be an affective version of the early cybernetic society model that “can only be understood through a study of the messages and the communication facilities which belong to it” (Wiener 9). As a result, “in the future development of these messages and communication facilities, messages between man and machines, between machine and man, and between machine and machine,” Wiener argues, “are destined to play an ever-increasing part” (9).
comatose son, is “a robot who can love”—that is, the professor explains, a “love like the love of a child for its parents.” Indeed, with the original imprint that is supposed to endow it with the capability to love and the motherly care that its corporate-assigned “mommy,” Monica, provides, David demonstrates an enduring and loyal love for her, which indicates that the professor has succeeded in making “a child-substitute Mecha.” But what moves the film forward is not this success story, but “the real conundrum” that follows the success: as one female African American student of the professor asks at the very beginning, “Can you get a human to love them back?” The unexpected return of the once-comatose human son terminates the possibility that David can be loved back by Monica, to whom it is after all only a substitute. Thus begins the story of David, where “the real conundrum” is resolved only when humans disappear from the entire planet and aliens come to hear David’s wish to be loved by “mommy”—and even then, it has to be only a day-long love between David and a cloned “mommy.” No wonder the film is narrated like a fairy tale.

Given the preceding discussion of cyborgothic, the film seems to offer a right pathway into the new century by imagining a posthuman world, a world for which cyborgs are ready but humans are not. Because of the discrepancy in readiness, the world is still a gothic world, where old and illegal “Mechas” are dumped by truck and destroyed in what is called “The Flesh Fair.” But this fair, which might be one of the most horrifying scenes in David’s eyes, is also where we find the most positive message for the audience which is yet to enter that world. Besides the apparent love and caring between the “Mechas” that face their destruction, the humans at the fair, who have been
enjoying the destructive show, suddenly become silent when they see David, a child, on stage. The ringmaster of the show then urges them, “Do not be fooled … by the artistry of this creation,” which is “built like a boy to disarm us.” He reminds them that the child-robot is a new addition to the “series of insults to human dignity.” The crowd, however, is too affected by this boy-shaped cyborg to agree with the ringmaster, and they tear down the show. Have they then lost their “human dignity?” I think not, for at this very moment, they don’t act like bewildered humans who lust after their lost dignity. They are already dignified humans who have learned that “motherhood” matters, whatever or whoever David is. No one has to be more human, or less human, to be a human in the age of posthumanism—one just needs to be as human as a mother.

175 The ringmaster reminds me of Stephen Budiansky who thinks of pain animals have as “‘mere pain,’ not meaningful and profound like our pain, intriguing as a scientific matter but morally negligible” (Scully 4). “The premise of animal ‘rights,’” Budiansky argues, “is that sentience is sentience, that an animal by virtue above all of its capacity to feel pain deserves equal consideration. But sentience is not sentience, and pain isn’t even pain…. Consciousness is a wonderful gift and a wonderful curse that, all the evidence suggests, is not in the realm of the sentient experiences of other creatures” (qtd in Scully 4). But, I wonder, doesn’t he dismiss as illusive our sentient, meaningful, and conscious pain that comes from seeing an animal in pain? That is, as all those sublime characters have done, doesn’t he try to subject to sensibility to judgment?
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