

**THE TRUTH ABOUT TEXAS: A NATURALISTIC STUDY OF THE  
CONSTRUCTION OF HERITAGE**

Volume I

A Dissertation

by

KEITH HOLLINSHEAD

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 1993

Major Subject: Recreation and Resources Development

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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The Truth About Texas: A Naturalistic Study of the Construction of Heritage. (December 1993)

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Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John L. Crompton

This investigation is set during what some regard an unheroic age --- an era of historical amnesia in the West, where compatriots are increasingly manufactured through the presentation of preferred narratives about the past. It attempts to establish a research agenda in iconology --- on state administrators of heritage-tourism as agents of normalcy, totalizing the histories they externalize. Exploring the preinterpretations (i.e., the unformulated thematics) within the discourse and praxis of these conceivable 'administrator-judges', it scrutinizes *how tourism matters* --- probing meanings of heritage-tourism at supra-individual and macro-cosmic levels. Given the theoretically invertebrate nature of tourism studies upon iconological issues of domination / subjugation involved in the past's 'pasteurization', it becomes a transdisciplinary inquiry of universe maintenance, robbing sociology, philosophy, anthropology, political science, marketing, communications and history for insight into social truth as collective coercive act. Thus, the investigation absorbs a Foucauldian / Nietzschean conceptualization of truthmaking --- where truth is fused with power: the validity of any particular truth is deemed relative to a specific regime-of-power. This fusion is found substantive for both *the study problem* (in exploring the Foucauldian 'gaze' of heritage-tourism administrators) and *the research problem* (exploring social science approaches able to capture the contemporary pluriverse of truths). Hence, concepts of postmodernity are frequently used to distill the temporal and inventive nature of the truths that unfold within 'editorialized heritage'.

Plumbing the possible multivocality of 'the talk' of 'agents of normalcy', the investigation is constructivist, here deploying a naturalistic inquiry methodology as a catalyst study of pastmaking in Texas --- viz., as an adjuvant inquiry *for* the longhaul / blanket research agenda. Timing and access difficulties during summer 1992, however, diminished the interactive, in-dwelling and iterative force of that adjuvant contextualization. Instead, the available discourse was, restrictively, a one-time batch of 'public-professional' literature, published by the target Texan state agency. Nonetheless, several strong cultural warrants were discernible, constituting exemplars of quotidian agency (rather than agents') 'talk' about the past it helps manufacture. These evocative doxa are tentatively interpreted, yielding twenty-one emergent propositions to inform (but *not* direct) the subsequent, particular, case-studies (elsewhere) of the unsheathing research agenda on the eugenics of the past.



## DEDICATION

*The Truth About Texas ...* is dedicated to rulers-of-the-roost back home in England:

- to **Charles James Hollinshead** --- who would have relished the sun on his back and the varied heritages and antiquities of the Hill Country; and,
- to **Joyce Hollinshead** --- who would have enjoyed a few more tall stories of Texas folk, but who palpably would not have appreciated the no-see-ums of the Lonestar world.

*They know El Camino Real to Austin, they know Luby's, but they do not yet know many of the truths and untruths of the Lonestar State. I've some tales now to tell 'em.*

Keith Hollinshead  
31st August 1993  
Just by a country Baptist Church,  
F.M. 2776: Wixon Valley  
Brazos County: Texas

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*The Truth About Texas ...* was conceived and structured in 1991, and sections 1 and 2 were written between September that year and June 1992. In July 1992 the original schema for the dissertation was suspended owing to staffing shortages and pressure from other established priorities at the focal agency for the investigation's adjuvant study (the Tourism Division of the Texas Department of Commerce) in Austin, and on account of the researcher's own sudden appointment to a lecturing position in Yorkshire, England. No effective work was done on the project between late August 1992 and July 1993. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 and all other elements of the work were written up in Texas in the hot summer of July and August 1993.

The researcher would like to express his appreciation for the following individuals for their help and forbearance during the collation of the work:

- **Dr. John L. Crompton** (*Head of Doctoral Dissertation Committee*) --- for his regular effervescences of enthusiasm about the original need for the topic to be covered, and for the vigor with which he felt the researcher *could* do the job. Dr. Crompton is also to be praised for holding his tongue when the researcher disappeared over the horizon in section 1, and into tumblewood country in section 2 --- leashless.

There may be things in *The Truth About Texas ...* that Dr. Crompton is pleased to see revealed to the world. Undoubtedly there is much that he would wish to see in a score of other dissertations. But Dr. Crompton is to be applauded ceaselessly for the way he continued to encourage, and the way he let the outpourings pour. I know of no professor who can match the Lonestar --- Liverpudlian's capacity to galvanize attention on a management issue in leisure. His personal credibility in the field is simply gargantuan.

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- **Dr. William Stewart** (*Former Member of Dissertation Committee*) --- Dr. Stewart is to be thanked for the vim with which he demanded proof of probity in conduct of social science, and for being a most valuable 'Doubting Thomas' during the 1991 birth and 1992 gestation of the work and thereafter. Whilst, by his own empirical and positivist tastes, an unfixed, indeterminate work such as this is clearly only received under sufferance --- it was a gross circumstantial injustice to the work that, when the final

interpretations and recommendations were being imagined in August 1993, Dr. Stewart was on study-leave in Japan. There will be many who will say that the emergent hermeneutics and the unfolding propositions could have done with him being alive and alert in Texas, during those very moments.

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- **And to Texas itself** (*[To] Some Special Places of Spirit, Awe and Mystique*) --- This work was largely conceived out-of-doors, strategically and tactically imagined whilst sitting under the sun, or within shade, at some of the state's best picnic spots. Conceptual advance was found to be notably and regularly forthcoming at the following salubrious and rewarding locales, in particular:

- *State Parks*

- Blanco: The Hill Country;
- Buescher: en route to Austin;
- Cassells-Baykin: in environs of Nacogdoches;
- Guadalupe River --- just north of San Antonio;
- Inks Lake --- a sprint northwest of Austin;
- Lockhart --- just off the 1.10;
- Martin Dies, Jr. --- where piney timbers inspire;
- McKinney Falls --- capital park, Capital City;
- Mother Neff --- in Waco 'Indian Territory'; and
- Rusk / Palestine --- where the sun sets stirringly upon East Texas.

- *Other Prime Sites of Inspiration in the Friendship State*

- Chireno township, East Texas;
- Ratcliff, midst Davy Crockett National Forest, East Texas;
- Cedar Hill, south of Dallas;
- Sandy Creek Park, Lake Travis, Austin;
- Pace Bend Recreation Area, Lake Travis, Austin;
- Lake Austin Metro Park (City Park), Austin;
- circa Fort Lancaster, Crockett County, West Texas;
- Alpine, West Texas;
- circa Fort Davis, West Texas;
- Van Horn, West Texas.

Thank you, y'all.

K.H. --- Old Baylor Park: Independence, Texas: 30th August 1993

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## 1. SYNOPSIS AND INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 SYNOPSIS: THE LONGHAUL / BLANKET RESEARCH AGENDA ON UNIVERSE MAINTENANCE

*This investigation originally began as an iconographic study of the meaning of certain images of the past in Texas for Texans, but in the found shortfall of platform theory in tourism studies on image production, it fast had to endeavor to supply that broad, grounding conceptuality itself. As such, the study quickly gravitated from being a singular contained iconography within the confines of Texas, to being an adjuvant or catalyst study for a more expansive and protracted blanket research agenda (to be conducted hereafter) on iconology (Macaskill 1991) --- that is, an iconology on the deployment of heritage tourism sites, events, and storylines as 'universe making' ideological instruments in and of governments.*

*The Truth About Texas ... is therefore an attempt to help begin to fill a void in the literature of tourism, a field where there has been almost complete silence about the meaning of tourism at the supra-individual level (Crick 1989:311). It is a catalyst investigation which seeks to explore the ways in which tourism matters --- in this case, heritage tourism and viewable historical representation --- over and above the currently well-measured level of conscious individual or personal motivational interest in tourism. It thereby constitutes a study of tourism as a tribal and an ideological indicator as it probes the place and function of tourism narratives as a form of iconological public culture on the macro-cosmic plane.*

*The Truth About Texas ... is an endeavor to help translate, for and into the field of tourism studies, a rich vein of conceptualizations on the use and deployment of ideological forms of public culture, at a time when tourism (as a social science) is still something of a theoretically invertebrate affair (Graburn and Jafari 1991). Since it is unwise, within the supra-individual and the macro-cosmic spheres of complexity, to rely upon lone approaches to studying the values behind social process --- Nash (1984:504-5), for instance, has long rejected the use of single conceptual schemes in the social science of tourism, condemning them as being typically weak and largely ungenerative --- this investigation seeks to cultivate a transdisciplinary approach to the study of the past as public culture. In an age where social science disciplines are losing their old certitudes about their own capacities to locate reality, and in an era when social science methodologists are losing their innocence about the purity of their outlooks on reality, the inquiry is an attempt to pull an host of new insights from other human science and cultural science fields into the orbit of tourism studies. It aims not only to reap from these other disciplines on the ideological value of tourism as an image generator, but it also aims to imbricate those external / contributory disciplines in order to look at the what Hannerz (1989/A) sees as the cavernous zones of ignorance between them.*

*In its entirety, then, The Truth About Texas ... is an attempt to build up a longrun / umbrella research agenda on the manufacture of tourism as public culture: the inquiry in Texas, itself, constitutes*

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The style and format of this dissertation follows that of the Annals of Tourism Research.



*an adjuvant study (for this subsequent umbrella agenda) on what Berger and Luckman (1967) call "universe maintenance." The immediate investigation in Texas, is therefore, a catalyst scrutiny of staged social production in historical tourism, where the past is viewed as a battleground for veracity. The legends and myths of Texas (as the first scenario examined on the developing agenda) are regarded not in their often assumed guise as innocuous storylines and neutral projection about the past, but as collective coercive acts, the conveyance of which advantages some in the present, and in the future, while it also subjugates others.*

*The adjuvant study is premised upon the view that places (in this first instance, Texas) and people (namely, Texans) are significantly constructed by such 'symbols-of-the-past' rather than being the mere point of origin of those symbols. And, with the current rise in the West of wilful nostalgia (Robertson 1990:45), the manufacture of compatriots (as sought through the presentation of preferred narratives about the past (A.D. Smith 1990:181)) becomes increasingly important as it helps inform people (Texans) within a state (Texas), whom they are, where they come from, and where they are going (184). As such, heritage tourism is proffered as a form of social and ideological engineering: the history that is developed and promoted is seen to be eugenic, and severely edited.*

*In investigating the truth in currency about the past in Texas, this first study on the blanket or umbrella research agenda on iconology rejects a realist view of the world: the inquiry positions truth as a perspectival matter. Drawing from Habermas (Seidman 1989:25), the battle for veracity of and over the past is seen as part of the crisis of legitimacy which states and institutions face in the contemporary age, as established and predominant perspectives on all things are now robustly and plurally challenged. To that end, the catalyst study aims to uncover the lead perspectives --- or rather the sedimented truths --- that administrators of the state's heritage tourism have about the history of the state.*

*Through its non-realist, non-objectivist stance, The Truth About Texas ... proceeds on the supposition that there is no prior truth to things --- viz., in this instance, there is no rational foundation to history. The central problem of the adjuvant study then becomes how the truths that are in currency are produced. And in this respect, the study adopts as its major premise, the Foucauldian notion that truth (as perspectival knowledge) cannot be understood independently of power (Rabinow [on Foucault] 1984:7). The alert reader will therefore recognize that in its Foucauldian scrutiny of truth production, the catalyst study proceeds on at least two inter-related levels:*

- *its study problem explores the practice of truthmaking as a rhetorical tool of state governments; and,*
- *its research problem weighs up --- again in terms of rhetoric --- the practice of different truthmaking paradigmatic approaches in social science to produce meaningful findings for the study problem. And both the study and research problem are necessarily set against the contemporary mood and condition of postmodernity --- a rupturing moment in all truth making when the signifying chain between things is held to be breaking down (Lash 1990), and where all sorts of privileged discourse in society (for the study problem) and in social science (for the*

*research problem) are conceivably being abandoned. In this light, postmodernity is used to distill the insights gained on truth production on and about these two respective and reflexive problems.*

*For reasons of clarity, at the outset of the adjuvant study, a number of points need to be boldly stated about this Foucauldian notion of truth that runs through this opening study of the blanket or longrun agenda investigating iconology. Foucault's conceptualization of truth is an updated Nietzschean fusion of reason with power; in it:*

- *truth is held to be only resolvable (i.e., understandable) in the context of a given system of power --- there cannot be any absolute separation between the validity of truths and power, since that validity is always relative to a specific regime of power (Mouffe 1988:38);*
- *truth is best identified as and within the discursive practice of institutions and truth making agencies --- it is the doctrinal and disciplining knowledge of tacitly authorized 'talk' (discourse) and of tacitly authorized 'deed' (praxis);*
- *truth is constantly incited and constantly represses alternative knowledges --- though its own form and nature may be unsuspected to those who wield it (Lindstrom 1990:161); and,*
- *truth tends to help constitute a capillary system of power and right which acts politically to establish, and to insulate, authorities --- and when in circulation, it creates and recreates society in its own image.*

*Hence, given the above notion of truth, the proffered truths about the past in Texas will change as the system of power changes --- and the truths about the state's (or any other state's / nation's) history are seen to be, thereby, both temporal and inventive.*

*In heeding the Foucauldian / Nietzschean notion that truth is entwined with power and right, the catalyst study sets out seeks to explore not so much the truths or idiolects of a given institution that administrates heritage tourism in Texas, but the truths that are held within such an institution. Hence the truths are not assumed to be formal, or even to be truths consciously held. They are assumed to have a non-agency life of their own. The myths, legends and storylines of Texas may emanate from people in or outside of government, but they are assumed to have their own careers not necessarily limited by that administrative agency.*

*Hence the administrators who work with certain truths about the past in Texas are not necessarily assumed to be conscious about either the nature of the truths they work with, nor about the consequence of the furtherance of those truths (through tourism) upon society. In this manner, the adjuvant study seeks to probe the unformulated thematics of the exercise of power they wield --- or rather participate in --- over the past. Accordingly, this Foucauldian outlook on power sees power, itself, as nonsubstantive. Power is seen to be a circular system through which truths are produced and maintained (Morris and Patton 1979:47), and the administrators are seen to act as agents of normalcy as they engage in that power system, carrying out 'the production' and 'the maintenance' of those truths.*

*Under this notion of unformulated discourse and unformulated praxis, the forces of dominance and subjugation of and over the past are held to be largely anonymous. Residents of the state, visitors to the state, and the administrators themselves are all said to be "submitted to governance" (Kritzman in Foucault 1988:83-4). They are all 'docile bodies' in and of the exercise of this capillary system of power (Merquior 1985:93) --- or in other words, of this petty (i.e., everyday --- within the power of mundane detail) and this opaque (i.e., ongoing --- yet hidden) exercise of truth.*

*The designed adjuvant study investigates the capillary system of power by taking advantage of the new age of theorizing that has come to other social science disciplines in the last two decades (Denzin 1986:194; Hays 1985) --- an age which has seen a shift from Parmenidean forms of knowledge about immutable, ahistorical, changeless, things to Heraclitan forms of insight embedded within a grounded time, place and set of actors (Pearce 1989:16-17). As such, the study does not constitute an appeal to a singular form of generalizable truth, but a search for a litany of random, decorated interpretations (Foucault, cited in Merquior 1985:75). In this sense, the catalyst study does not privilege either the fixity of meanings of truths, legends and myths or the fixity of state administrators' perspectives on them. The inquiry therefore hunts for the lived knowledges of the administrators --- which it is recognized will be nonsummative, and will change intersubjectively and contextually: it does not search for aggregative, conceptually abstract, and conclusive statements of universal fact. And it is recognized that the critical meanings and perspectives (and therefore the close definition of the study problem) are apodictic --- i.e., slowly emergent through found associations as the inquiry unsheathes. A study of this unfolding nature can then only yield its hypotheses and its proportional statements at its closure --- and that closure can never be a final one. In accordance, the investigation can only supply imperfect interpreted 'findings', never 'results', ipso facto.*

*Consequently, the adjuvant investigation (in Texas) does not work with regard to the positivist logic of classification but to the constructivist's logic of narrativity (Silverstone 1988:236) --- a logic which admits open and unfixed (rather than closed and fixed) categories of meaning. To repeat, in order to gain the necessary richness of insight to handle the openness of such meanings of truth and such shared accounts about the past, the adjuvant study cannot, axiomatically, be tied to any singular or parent discipline from those that are being raided for insight on dominance / subjugation issues in iconology. Each discipline commits its own forms of hurt upon 'the truth' as its researchers deploy their own suasive rationales to scrutinize worldviews. In their drive towards the truth, each discipline is weakened not so much by its interpretation but by its preinterpretations (White 1978:4). This catalyst study will therefore call up outlooks on truth from several fields --- namely sociology, philosophy, anthropology, political science, marketing, communications and history --- to compensate (and / or complement) the rare views in the tourism literature upon social truth.*

*Although The Truth About Texas ... is a study of particularist / grounded / local perspectives, that is not to say that its focus is microcosmic. Readers should not forget that the adjuvant study seeks to explore the production of the past in Texas as public culture at macrocosmic levels. It seeks to explore*

*the construction of reality (or rather realities) at that nominated broad, communal, supra-individual level. As such it attempts to further the metatheory of reality making in the invention of tradition as recently developed by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and by Home (1986). As such, it must necessarily reflect the potent changes (?) or the advances (?) in consciousness which many believe are firmly embodied in the West within postmodernity. This is critical because postmodernity, as a mood or condition, is deemed to be an unheroic age (Public Service Broadcast 1992): it is commonly identified in social science literature as an era of historical amnesia (Jameson 1985:125) in which the contemporary social system is losing the capacity to retain its own past. One cannot sensibly probe the production of history and the consumption of heritage in a Western state society (like Texas) without mirroring the inherently subversive effect of postmodern imperatives upon the established order-of-things in general, and upon inherited, authentic traditions in particular.*

*While Foucault (1970:359-360) was ambiguous in his own support of the notion of postmodernity, ipsissima verba, he did view the last decades of the twentieth century as an important new period of pluralism and realm of otherness before his sudden death in the early 1980s. What to Habermas is a (or the) aforesaid crisis of legitimation, was in Foucault's view the development of a new period of resistance against the order-of-things, inclusive of resistance against assumed and ascribed histories. Thus, the distilling postmodern mood is used discursively in this study to that critical, and to that questioning, effect. Where established and manifest historical truths dominate and subjugate within tourism, emergent postmodern or resisting truths may indeed also be speaking up for alternative traditions, marginal pasts and (what Foucault calls) darkground populations.*

*In The Truth About Texas ... , Section 1 of the catalyst inquiry provides the background for the study problem by contextualizing historical truth and postmodern concepts of power and culture, and by situating the immediate / adjuvant study of Texas in the three substantive arenas of 'history', 'Texas' and 'tourism'. This first section also contextualizes the background for the selection of constructivism at the level of governing paradigm, and of naturalistic inquiry at the level of methodology.*

*Section 2 provides a review of sample, useful, perspectives on truth from the other stated disciplines. Its aim is to offer illustrative rather than comprehensive insight as to what the literature of tourism could fruitfully borrow from other fields in order to pry into the exercise of the petty and the opaque powers conceivably involved in the government administrators' individual (yet inherently collective) instrumental shaping of the past. The transdisciplinary insight from section 2 is implicitly deemed to relevant for both the immediate conduct (here) of the adjuvant study in Texas, and for the subsequent conduct (elsewhere) of the case studies of the longrun, blanket research agenda on iconology in heritage tourism.*

*Section 3 offers an explanation of the principal considerations involved in the constructivist thinking (at the worldview level) and of naturalistic inquiry (at the data gathering level) for the study of administrator's outlooks on the manufacture of public culture. The section stresses the need to engage in purposive sampling, and like sections 4 and 5 (which follow), it provides a clarification of the*

*methodological decision making processes for both the evolving adjuvant study (in the present), and for the umbrella research agenda (in the hereafter).*

*Section 4 explains how the implementation of the data collecting was envisaged for both the immediate / catalyst study and for the longrun / umbrella research agenda. For both, the need to let the research design unfold, the reliance upon interactive human instrumentation, and the need to replace conventional assessment measures of trustworthiness (such as validity, reliability, and objectivity) with substitute criteria being developed in naturalistic inquiry (such as credibility, dependability and confirmability) is stressed. These latter criteria are held to be better suited to the conduct of inductive data analysis of this type which endeavors to secure the multiple truths supported by the state administrators of heritage tourism as are obtainable predominantly via negotiated / reflexive questioning.*

*Much of Section 4 remains at the abstract level, however, on account of circumstantial difficulties faced by both the host agency for the naturalistic study (the Tourism Division of the Texas Department of Commerce, in Texas) and the researcher. As revealed in subsection 4.2, the Tourism Division had to ask for a postponement of the in situ phase of the naturalistic inquiry on account of the fact that its unit responsible for heritage tourism development and promotion was short-staffed, and heavily committed to the production of two key strategy reports during the designated data collection period of summer 1992. The Division requested that the in-dwelling data collection period (and its shaping period of 'prior ethnography') be put back until the fall of that year, but that had suddenly become impracticable owing to the unexpected appointment of the researcher to a new full-time post abroad --- a position which had to be taken up by then.*

*Sadly --- with respect of the original concept of the study --- corners had to be quickly cut from the originally adopted methodology. For the adjuvant study, the critical interactive, reflexive and prolonged nature of the (essentially) human instrument gathering (based predominantly on the participant observation of, and the long / repetitive / in-depth interviewing of the target state administrators) had to be jettisoned overnight. Since the immediate / catalyst study was intended to be naturalistic in method --- and thereby precisely situated and acutely particularistic in the choice of informants --- it was not possible to switch to another 'equivalent' state agency at this eleventh hour. There are only four full-time administrators in Texas who conceivably work in petty and opaque (or other) fashions as agents of normalcy over truths about the past, and the Tourism Division of the Department of Commerce has them!*

*As a result of these implementation hiccoughs, a covering / substitute data collection process was now put in practice. This emergency step involved the receipt of (rather than the gathering of!) a number of supplied documents detailing Tourism Division activities. These 'public-professional' documents proved to be of some value as 'text', but they tended to reflect the outlooks of the generalized agency rather than the sought, specific perspectives of the target individual-administrator respondents themselves. These documents, moreover, could not be examined 'interactively'; and while they do yield insight into 'talk' (discourse), they are meagre on 'deed' (praxis).*

Given these circumstances, Section 5 then accounts for the continued and evolving analysis of the data in the light of the impossibility (for the adjuvant study) of carrying out the intended 'endless iteration' in the target naturalistic setting. Nonetheless, it was possible to derive a number of exemplars from the received public-professional 'text' --- which are themselves presented in section 6 (in the study's case report). From scrutiny of these exemplars, a number of propositions (twenty-one) were derived from the adjuvant study to inform the blanket research agenda hereafter, and an emergent hypothesis --- i.e., a nominal post hoc hypothesis --- was adopted for this immediate catalyst study. The propositions and the unsheathed hypothesis are detailed under subsection 5.9.

The emergent propositions --- of section 5 --- are premised on an enlarged Geertzian interpretation of the nonhuman text in the public-professional literature. Once synthesized, the twenty-one propositions collapse towards the tentative suggestions that:

- the agency (the Tourism Division of the Department of Commerce, in Texas) does engage in quotidian acts of universe maintenance which advantage a certain, but a slowly changing, *priviligentia*;
- the said agency does engage in quotidian acts to reproduce preferred sorts of Texans borne of the past --- and thereby it does seek to reproduce distinct sorts of knowing / desiring citizens;
- the said agency does engage in quotidian acts which chastise, ostracize, and silence in the selection of sites and events and in the telling of storylines about the past, and about the past-in-the-present;
- the said agency does appear to work through its staff who may themselves act innocently and complacently to pasteurize and / or annihilate the past [though, in the absence of the sustained, interactive iteration, that degree of innocence and complacency of action was not possible to meaningfully inspect]; and,
- the said agency does appear currently to have adopted some events / sites / storylines which quietly appease and moderately correct the discourse of prior narratives which have hitherto been in currency within public circulation on the state's past and on its inheritances [though, again, the absence of reflexive, indepth interviewing and of prolonged participant observation did not permit the intentionality behind that amelioratory activity to be meaningfully inspected].

Section 6 then constitutes the case study mode of reporting of the interpreted 'findings' --- that is, it stands as the hermeneutic output of the adjuvant study, *per se*. The exemplars are structured around the provision of a number of sets (ten) of cultural warrants and of related direct quotations that were found to be evocative within the public-professional literature supplied. As recommended by Ricoeur (1979 and 1981), the function of the presentation of these cultural warrants and these quotations (as interpretations of 'text') is not to reproduce exact or ideal accounts of agency / agents' outlooks on

*pastmaking, but to produce actual and evocative accounts. These exemplars serve as interpretive, and thereby inescapably incomplete and contestable 'findings'.*

*In the final section --- viz., section 7 --- a range of summary comments are drawn from the adjuvant study to inform (but, importantly, not to direct) the succeeding case studies of the longrun / blanket agenda on the possible temporal and inventive nature of pastmaking. These summary statements --- rather than conclusions, per se --- attempt to offer recap ideas upon both the study and the research problems, upon the dialectical role of postmodernity, and upon constructivism as well as upon the substantive arenas of 'history', 'Texas', and 'tourism'.*

*In The Truth About Texas ... both the immediate / adjuvant study and the envisaged longhaul / overall research agenda were conceived to look at the orthodoxy and the orthopraxy of universe maintenance in mythmaking whereby individuals within states are constructed or 'totalized' by governments at an historical juncture, and both the immediate study and the blanket agenda envision heritage tourism as a dangerously under-suspected mechanism for the surveillance and subordination of populations. Both the catalyst study and the emergent / umbrella agenda are also conceived on the premise that all 'talk' (i.e., all discourse and all praxis) inevitably commits violence on people and things (Derrida 1976:101). It is envisaged that such 'violence', or such incidents of domination and / or subjectification, can most fruitfully and reliably be captured by a mixed / transdisciplinary research team, rather than by a lone researcher. Hence, the recommendations for the unfolding design in sections 3, 4, and 5 (for the longrun / umbrella research agenda) are put forward on the understanding that a research team ought to be gathered together for the intensely reflexive and iterative work of the ensuing case studies in other states / nations beyond Texas. Engagement within participative scientific discourse (to gain evocative, endogenic knowledge of this type) is best attempted on or within an agenda empowered by an eclectic crew which attacks the problem on multiple fronts.*

### **1.0.1 INTRODUCTION: THE CATALYST STUDY AND HISTORICAL TRUTH**

Cultural tourism, heritage presentation and historical tourism have all been a significant part of the travel-trade ever since there has been a trade in travel (Lundberg 1985:34-5). Touring away from home, journeying afar or vacationing abroad all present the traveller with various opportunities to experience the conserved past of his or her own society or the preserved achievements of other foreign peoples. "Indeed, all cultures commemorate what makes them distinctive and worthy" (Rinzler and Seitel 1982:7) and most cultures promote both domestic and external access to those esteemed places of exhibitry.

In past centuries the tendency was largely for both the general public and historians to regard history as a neutral and objective undertaking. During the twentieth century the special impartiality and claimed extrinsicality of history has been more commonly questioned however. Nietzsche held a particular contempt for 'the history of historians' and maintained that its privileged neutrality was merely perspectival knowledge (Merquior 1985:26), and Foucault sardonically concluded that history's objectivity could only

in fact be supported from points "outside of time" itself (26). Thus, if the philosophical verdict of Nietzsche and Foucault is accepted, it follows that the history and the old traditional storylines that tourism serves up as a displayed heritage or as a viewable past are in reality forms of cultural interpretation. They are not so much 'hard facts' which are well suited to positivist assessment, they are social science 'artifacts' which are made by human beings, and therefore are subject to contestable meanings and evaluations (Jennings 1989:141 and 148).

This study therefore contributes to the exploration of the manufacture of history as an artifact of tourism for, or rather *within*, the state of Texas as a precursive study to a larger, longhaul research agenda (on many sites and settings around the world) on truthmaking in heritage tourism. And, to explain the dissertation title at the outset, it broadly aims to look at the conceptual and political construction of the heritage of Texas that is made available to tourists. Its purview is the range and mix of those 'constructions' --- which may otherwise be styled as 'interpretations' or yet again as 'social truths'. Clearly, such social truths (or simply, 'truths' for short) are contextual. They are composed by a given set of people living within a given area at a certain point in time, they are otherwise re-constructions of earlier truths emanating from a previous age, or they are borrowed and perhaps translated from a different population. Put another way, social truth of this sort "cannot walk on its own legs. It must be carried by people to other people. It must be made effective through language, through argument and appeal" (Campbell 1982:3). History as social truth is not veridical truth, then, it is interpretive truth --- though keen students of Nietzsche would argue that veridical truth does not exist anywhere: there are only interpretations. There is no pure truth, ipso facto, for anything (Merquior 1985:101).

In considering Texas, for the adjuvant / catalyst study, and other places and regions for the longhaul / umbrella study, as constructed truth, this study examines history not as a given set of events but as a mix of produced myths, images and symbols. Heritage is not fixed, it is selected. In each region of the world some cultural pasts are **included** and **celebrated**: other ethnic sagas are **excluded** and **ignored**. As is the case for everywhere else, the history and heritage of Texas, for instance, in any given age is made and unmade in the present --- not in the past. It is a composite and changeable rhetoric --- the stories and tales Texans tell of themselves, or rather choose to tell of themselves. As such it may be construed as a logical undertaking. Certain people advance certain storylines for certain economic, political, symbolic or other advantages, and deny other legends and accounts for related reasons. This catalyst study attempts to unravel some of that decision-taking by drawing up a framework to determine *what* Texas is in terms of heritage tourism (i.e., which visions of the history of Texas take precedence) and who 'makes' Texas (i.e., which individuals and/or institutions are effective in getting their preferred or manufactured visions utilized in the tourism and heritage market-place). To that end this adjuvant study (like the case studies of the longhaul / blanket agenda, to follow) will not so much be exploring Aristotle's *theoria* --- the immutable truths of natural and scientific knowledge --- it will be plumbing Aristotle's *phronensis* --- the practical and situational truths of social wisdom (Campbell 1982:4-5).



Such an analysis of constructed truth is relatively new in historical tourism. Until recent years the concept appears somewhat foreign to the tourism industry. At the Second World Congress on Heritage Presentation at the University of Warwick in England in September 1988, the notion of interpreted truth was aired by two principal speakers. Neil Cossons, Director of the Science Museum in London, proffered that the determination of 'truth' was in fact one of the prime functions of heritage managers, and Jerzy Swiecinski, Professor of the Polish Academy of Sciences, distinguished seven different interpretations of the meaning of the term 'truth' in museum contexts (Uzzell 1989:6). It appears it is time to tell the truth, or rather to reveal the social truths that underpin viewable history.

If history is social truth, it is a form of social discourse which people engage in, invert and communicate. There will always be alternative versions of any given discourse. Foucault was considerably interested in mapping those discourses and those knowledges within a particular society that were disqualified or disenfranchised in some fashion. His historical genealogy was directed towards the manner in which certain truths were invalidated (see Habermas 1987:280 --- a lecture on Foucault). Accordingly, this current early 1990s adjuvant study (like the case studies of the umbrella / blanket agenda) is *Foucauldian* in its philosophical vision. It attempts to prospect the dark ground of the regional, nugatory and/or supplanted discourses in history. As such the discourse of disqualified history (vis-a-vis qualified history) that exists is extensive. Alternative rhetoric can be grounded in facts, in religious belief, in cultural values, in association, in metaphors, in dreams and in resentments (Campbell 1982:5). Alternative truths, just like approved truths, can be based on logical argument or they can be based on socialized assumptions. Foucault's concept of disqualified knowledges did not distinguish the difference, and nor will this current investigation. A Foucauldian premise for this study is that the truth is what people collectively believe, whether it is platformed upon fact or upon fiction. Put another way, "the truth is [what] the people must *feel* before they will *see*" (attributed to George Washington; Campbell 1982:9).

In investigating the qualifying and the disqualifying discourses about and within the history of Texas, this adjuvant inquiry will look at government at work in defining heritage. Governments have to deal in many ambiguous products (Wilson 1989:372-3) --- heritage is clearly one of them, but it is one in which governments can act with deliberation. It can engage intentionally or unconsciously in what Spivak (1987:132) calls the politics of exclusion. Governments can engage in social control through the definition of history: certain acts, places and behaviors may be approved, others may be bypassed. In Foucauldian analysis, this is the power of government (or of powerbrokers which have an influence upon government) to subjugate knowledges (Hariman 1989:221). It is part of the Foucault's struggle --- repression schema, a conceptualization of dominance structured around the triangle of power, right and truth. Cyclical and mutual forces may be at work. Power is delimited by the rule of right --- a formal delimitation of power - - but the effects of truths in circulation can remold those very rights which in turn can remodel the shape of power. Refabricated power is then in a stronger or weaker position to cultivate new truths (Gordon 1980:92-3).

Hence, successful governments and well-placed players can over-time universalize their own preferred versions of history --- just as well-placed Europeans universalized their own originally Western concept of Orientalism (Said 1978:1). In Foucauldian analysis, where the discourses of a social group, a professional body, an elite or a government merge with applied practice, an *opaque power* complex results (Habermas 1987:283). Successful groups and strong governments are able to use preferred truths to stabilize what becomes *their own* rule of right, and their grip upon power can become unassailable. The connections between 'right', 'truth' and 'power' can thus become not only intricate but expansive. If the capacity of power to reproduce reality is to be charted, it must be pursued at infra-red levels (Merquior 1985:109). Such must, for the catalyst investigation for the longhaul research agenda, be the 'color' of this inquiry across Texas.

In investigating dominant powers at work in shaping the heritage of Texas that is presented through tourism this adjuvant study inevitably has spatial and temporal dimensions. The spatial parameters are really socio-geographic or nominally cultural ones. Although, according to Arlington historian, Sandra Myres (1986:122), Texas is not so much a state as a state-of-mind, as a spatial-cum-mental construction: "it is a blend of West, East, Southwest [U.S.A.] and Urban Texas, a blend of Anglo-European, Indian, Black and Mexican elements." It is in fact, hard to separate these ethnic-cultural elements from geographical ones (Vandiver 1975:47-48). This study will, however, consider in part how those disparate cultural components have infused with the geo-political edifice of the state to play a dominant or subjugated role in the definition of the state's heritage.

The temporal dimensions of history concern the manner in which a given vision of a heritage is situated within its age. They are concerned not so much with history as a set of accepted facts, but with the larger social patterns and interconnections of the day which that set of facts reflects. Just as *spatial* matters can, under certain circumstances, be viewed as *ethnic-cultural* matters, so may *historical* facts regress to being *social* facts (Horowitz 1977:47-9). The main problem for theoretical development in tourism is that investigations into the social reflexivity of historical facts are extremely rare. In the related field of park planning, architectural sociologist Crantz (1982:233) considered 'the shadow side' of park design, viz., the way the provision of urban greenspace mirrored contemporary life and times in the U.S.A. since 1800, and concluded that "the potential for parks to shape and reflect social values is still by no means fully appreciated or understood" (255). Her comments would appear to also suit tourism planning admirably.

In exploring the social construction of the heritage of Texas, for the adjuvant inquiry, it is rather important to take account of how the vicissitudes of *the postmodern age* are affecting visions of history in general and of images of Texas heritage in particular. The pace of change has become frenetic in human affairs during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Jameson (1991:xi) considers that the Western world is currently experiencing an exasperating condition of historical deafness. So enmeshed *in the present* are we *during the present*, that the postmodern people of our age have "forgotten how to think historically in the first place" (ix). He considers that, today, historical impulses are distorted,

repressed and diverted in an unprecedented fashion, so that the "postmodern consciousness [conjures up] its own [ahistorical] condition of possibility" (ix). History, like almost everything else according to Jameson, is succumbing to the consumption of commodification as a process (x). These are major imperatives for the place and form of history. And so, the current inquiry will endeavor to reflect the way visions of Texas accommodate the new ahistorical textuality of the postmodern world. Under late-capitalism, not only is it important, thence, to gauge the history of Texas as social construction, but it is critical that history, itself, is evaluated as social construction.

Postmodern thought is of substantial influence over the way tourism themes and images are being and going-to-be received in the postmodern era --- an age where spatialization appears to be replacing temporalization as the dominant value in Western culture (Jameson in Stephanson 1988:7). Under postmodernity, Jameson considers that 'normal space' and long-accepted things are dissolving. In his estimation, the age is experiencing something of a death of value --- corresponding with Nietzsche's forewarned death of God (28). Hebdige (1986:78) echoes Jameson's view by noting that the postmodern age has experienced an implosion of meaning involving "the replacement of unitary power axes by a pluralism of power/discourse formations ... [and through] the collapse of cultural hierarchies." It is a complex age where "our *representations* of things [in history, in culture, in life are] tending to arouse an enthusiasm and a mood swing not necessarily inspired by the things themselves" (Jameson 1991:x).

Taking the foregoing paragraphs into account, the purpose of the current, catalyst, inquiry is to examine how power actually operates in Texas politics in manufacturing contemporary images of the Texans past for our postmodern market-place in tourism. The investigative approach into the ties of power between the state government and some of its constituencies will draw heavily from Foucault, viz., to critique "the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent" (Foucault in Elders 1974:171) in terms of the shaping of history, but which may lean towards significant preferences in the cultivation and projection of that heritage. The inquiry amounts to a study of the **expressive** side of politics rather than the **instrumental** (Maynard-Moody and Stull 1987:249) exploring the things significant players in cultural tourism in Texas *say* rather than *do*. The heritage of Texas is therefore viewed as a rhetorical construct, and the study examines the values and intentions of these significant players as they are communicated with regard to it.

Under the Foucauldian perspective, the problem with Western political philosophy has conceivably been its over-devotion to utopian theoretical abstractions: "In the West we have consistently approached the problem of political order by building models of the just social order or by searching for general principles by which to evaluate existing conditions" (Rabinow's introduction to Foucault in Rabinow 1984:5), and have been left "almost totally in the dark about the concrete functioning of power in Western societies" (5-6).

Yet, in recent decades, a period of experimentation has begun to take a partial hold over the human and cultural sciences. Characterized by eclecticism, new approaches to science offer the play of

ideas free of the kind of authoritative paradigms which had brought Foucault to analytical despair. This new refreshing era of investigative probation in the social sciences has gathered considerable momentum during the 1980s following Foucault's death and affords "*critical and reflexive views* of subject matter, *openness* to diverse influences embracing whatever seems to work in practice, and *tolerance* of [both the] uncertainty about a field's direction and of [the] incompleteness in some of its projects" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:x; emphasis added). In cultural fields of investigation such as anthropology the new **detective scenario** brought about by this period of experimentation is nowadays "often pictured as the challenge of newer, interpretive programs of research to reigning positivist ones" (x). Considerable discussion on these developments will follow in subsection 1.3.

The current, adjuvant, study of cultural tourism in Texas will constitute an experimental study to try to take advantage of this recent loosening of approaches in social science, and will aim to explore social and political discourse about the construction of Texas via this emergent interpretivist/naturalistic paradigm --- or this recently *refortified* interpretivist/naturalistic paradigm as some would have it. Hence the study at hand is contained within an evolving genre of descriptive analysis rather than being directed within an approach under the "usually more prestigious and totalizing theoretical discourses" (5). And it will gradually be the function of the remaining subsections of this opening section to reveal why that is a wise and necessary decision.

In order to recap some of the key points from this opening subsection of the, catalyst study, the reader is reminded that the current study constitutes a naturalistic investigation of the construction of the heritage of Texas in tourism as a social and political truth. It broadly aims to address (as a pilot inquiry to help form a larger, meaningful, ongoing research agenda on the topic) why the state bureaucracy (or rather its bureaucrats) do what they do in defining the state's past. It will attempt to uncover the distinctive outlooks they have regarding the construction of that heritage --- whether they appear to be aware of the biases that underpin those perspectives and actions or not. And the study aims to inspect the range and mix of constituencies that put pressure upon the state in order to secure preferred shifts in the current and/or enduring vision of the Lonestar State's past.

## **1.1 THE BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY: POSTMODERN CONCEPTS OF POWER AND CULTURE**

### **1.1.1 The Postmodern Debate**

In the opening section brief mention was made of the potential for historical truth to be considerably influenced by postmodernity, where

- some observers would claim the contemporary consciousness to have an ahistorical textuality; and where
- some observers would claim there to be an implosion of meaning in the social, cultural political and other values across the Westernized world.

These charges of historical deafness, and of the death of value, are highly important for this study. A more sustained introduction to postmodernity, ipso facto, is called for.

Postmodernity needs to be understood or at least juxtaposed with reference to this study because of the number and the weight of theorists who have identified a huge agglomerative role for it as the socio-cultural force of change in the later decades of the twentieth century. Before detailing what specifically postmodernity is reckoned to be by its adherents, the nature of these immense portended changes should be clarified. For this end, Foucault's epistemological theory of the history of consciousness is a germane construction (Foucault 1987; Gordon 1980; Rabinow 1984; Merquior 1985). Foucault's theory rides on the idea that the impetus of human consciousness over time advances discontinuously. These discontinuities are recognizable by reformations of various frames-short-of-mind -- known as *epistemes* --- which characterize the particular historical space. Although Foucault does not explain what causes a given epistemic quake, he announces them to have a much deeper morphology in human unconscious than, for instance, Kuhn's epistemological concept of the paradigm has (Kuhn 1970). In their sternest sense, Foucault's epistemes are utterly irreconcilable. He recognized four organizing epistemes of this distinct sort: a preclassical one, a classical one, a modern one, and a contemporary one, which he maintained began to break with its precursor in the 1950s.

In his strict use of the term, Foucault's epistemes were (or are) ascendant modes of sensation and cognizance which color all awareness and behavior at given times. This view proved to be rather extreme for many of Foucault's critics, who could not accept that a particular episteme could entirely dominate *all* perception and activity during any point in time (White and McSwain 1990:56-7). In clarificatory interviews, Foucault acknowledged that zones of different consciousness and hubs of institutional practice survived or synthesized to stand as unrelated epistemes. These alternative epistemes constitute Foucault's positive belief that there could be escape at a particular time from complete domination by given epistemic thought.

Although Foucault's literal use of the term episteme has only won qualified support, his specific determination that the current age was and is experiencing a fundamental *historical* disconnection (Foucault 1970) has received wide acceptance. White and McSwain's (1990:23) prognosis is that shifts of consciousness of late decades are occasioning a hyperpluralism which is "so deep and wide as to deny the possibility for culture in the traditional sense of the term. In place of culture --- which [they] define as the indigenous, spontaneous arriving symbols and rituals by which people are related to each other through their collective unconscious --- technology has installed a set of control routines and the amelioratives and palliatives necessary to make the whole situation at least tolerable." This is White and McSwain's account of postmodernity --- though they prefer to style the grand shift in consciousness as *that technician episteme*. In order to be faithful to theorists who do use the term postmodernity, itself, significant reference will be made in succeeding pages to Habermas, Lyotard, Baudrillard and Jameson -- but the heavyweight contributions of Derrida, Barthes, Bell, Said and others (Foster 1985:x; Ross 1988:xii) should also be acknowledged.

The concept of postmodernity has been subject to much debate. Although the term itself was used by a number of writers in the 1950s and 1960s, the visualization of it did not begin to crystalize until the mid-1970s (Connor 1989:6) when its use considerably multiplied. Principally, the debate concerns whether in fact postmodernity *exists*, as such (6). Does postmodernity have the coherency of an 'age,' a 'zeitgeist' a 'current situation' or anything (Jameson 1991:xi)? Is it indeed a concept, or is it a practice, a style, a period or an economic phase (Foster 1985:ix)? Is it just inflation of discourse across all levels of society (Newman 1985)? Is it a protracted craze sustained "Scheherezade-like by long-winded academics concerned --- to perpetuate themselves?" (Connor 1988:8). Is it just self-validating discourse on the part of a whole host of individuals concerned about their own legitimate place in society (8)?

The following paragraphs will attempt to shape a response to those questions.

First, postmodernity itself will be more tightly defined.

Second, brief mention will be made of some of the critical observations (for historically) of some of the leading theorists on postmodernity.

Third, a number of key aspects of the concept will be drawn out, for the current, adjuvant study.

Fourth, a number of significant difficulties with the concept will be revealed.

And, finally, the relevance postmodernity to culture, to power and to research on culture and power will be scanned.

### 1.1.2 Postmodernity Defined

Foster (1985:xi) believes that it is best to conceive of postmodernity, whether it be in cultural, economic or other settings, as a conflict of old and new modes and therefore also of the interests involved in those styles and fashions. It is, according to Hummel (1990:202-203), a synthesizing world where the novel begins to triumph over the given --- not so much a new physical world, but a state of mind "full of strange meaning, undreamed possibilities and ominous portent." It is an age of the reassertion of *human* values --- possibly the kind of massive shift in sensibility that Nietzsche was expectant about, a century ago (Aronowitz 1988:46).

In this manner postmodern theorists tend to agree that postmodernity is the renunciation of the given: the recantation of accepted thought, of rules governing art, of master political ideologies (46) --- and by extension, for present purposes, the rejection of proscribed history. Thus, postmodern culture is 'resistance,' it is a break with tendency, an anti-aesthetic that rejects hierarchy and celebrates diversity (Foster 1985). It is a rebellion against the idea of formal purity and it disdains the mass culture that modernity was beckoning, spreading from its roots in the pop counterculture of the 1960s (Ingram 1987:76). Postmodernity thus becomes, in the judgement of Jameson, an absolute collapse of differentiation where "the cultural realm becomes identical with the socio-economic" (Connor 1989:47-48).

The above explanations of postmodernity see culture as a body of myths, metaphors and codes, and the productive elements of culture (painting, writing, building, researching, whatever) are inclined to be viewed less as *work* as in the modernist vision, but as *texts*. Thus modernity tends towards the 'given

account' or to the 'accepted text' whereas postmodernity is 'a heterogeneity of texts' (Foster 1985:x-xi). Modernity is the universal statement, the designated technique, the master discourse, but postmodernity is a synthesized account; it is hybridized approaches and it is contradictory texts (xi).

A consensus is emerging that in its relationship to cultural products, postmodernity is distinctively anti-aesthetic (Benjamin 1975; Lash 1987). In this estimation, postmodern views are prone to undoing aesthetic aura in art and of the authority behind other social or cultural texts. The divisions between high and low art and between eminent and unelevated activity is undermined. This is seen to yield three substantive developments (Bagguley, et al. 1990:154):

- the transformed semiotics of everyday life and the consumption of signs or images rather than products (Baudrillard 1981);
- the decentring of stable identities;
- the rise in the number of relatively unanchored social groupings which generate further postmodern thought and funnel postmodern entities.

Hence postmodern texts are self-reflexive, playful and opposed to the standardization of lifestyles and cultures (Turner 1988:75). In Hummel's (1990:203) view the icon of the modern world was the pyramid -- characterizing the hierarchical and divisive nature of the age in contrast; the icon of the postmodern age is the circle --- characterizing the self reflexive practitioner who encounters others on equal terms rather than absolutist and pre-ordained terms. All of this is critical to the current study of history in tourism for the catalyst investigation. Is the history of Texas given, accepted and / or aesthetic --- or is it nowadays heterogeneous, synthesized and / or decentered.

### 1.1.3 Lead Postmodern Theorists

Postmodernity is relevant to historical truth because it not only affects the felt 'aura' or 'privilege' a population is going to hold towards a venerated account (or previously venerated storyline), but it modifies the receptive setting or listening context in which that 'text' is heard. It also affects the number of *contesting* or *competing* texts that is tenable in the modern age --- and they are not the same thing. Contesting texts are different and conflicting versions of essentially the same event. Competing texts are different texts or storylines battling for exposure --- and each "competing text" may have "contesting versions."

Let the background account of postmodernity, so far, be summarized. There is some agreement amongst commentators in the human and cultural sciences that the postmodern condition is a complex conjuncture of conditions (Ross 1988:x), and that it is an epic production in its own right (vii). But there is no consensus as to the meaning or to the politics of postmodernity. It conveys many different ideas to many different people. Since the currents of postmodernity conceivably sensitize individuals in the contemporary age (and, for the present study, individuals inside and outside of government agencies) towards given 'texts,' it is crucially important that leading schools of postmodern thought are

acknowledged. To that end, further elaboration will be offered on the representative commentaries of three of the most prolific commentators on postmodernity --- those of Lyotard, Jameson and Baudrillard.

### 1.1.3.1 Lyotard

Lyotard's views are predominantly expressed in his 1979 publication, *La Condition Postmoderne* (Lyotard 1984). He concerns himself with the place of narrative within knowledge and scientific discourse, and he maintains that modern science is typified by its subjugation of those styles of legitimation which depend upon the narrative. Drawing on the work of Kuhn and Feyerabend, Lyotard sees science as a function of the paradigms that rule scientific thought in each age, and in it (for the contemporary age) he identifies a gradual abandonment of universal perspective (Connor 1989:36). His interest lies in the ways society accommodates and promotes plurality.

Hence this adjuvant study of Texas is Lyotardian in the sense that it will attempt to show how certain forms of historical evidence (chiefly written accounts) may have been privileged as other forms (chiefly narrative accounts) may have been subjugated. Moreover it will also reflect Lyotard in the very methods it deploys: naturalistic inquiry (as discussed in 1.3) is designed to explore many of the kinds of narrative knowledges that modernist-cum-postivist science has disparaged.

### 1.1.3.2 Jameson

Jameson's (1985) seed ideas on postmodernity are contained in *Postmodernity and Consumer Society* though they have been extensively reworked in both 1984 and 1991 in *Postmodernity: or the Cultural Logic of Capitalism* (Jameson 1991). His interest lies in the interface between cultural and societal drives. Recording an acceleration of cycles of style and fashion, the Jameson account pivots upon the steadily rising power of advertising and of electronic media to yield a universal standardization of culture. That culture is highly commodified and highly representative. It is a schizoid pastiche (Connor 1989:45) produced by an intensifying capitalism, and it celebrates *the present*.

Hence this immediate inquiry into the heritage of Texas is Jamesonian in the degree to which it explores whether, in fact, government agencies in tourism in Texas do work with a stable identification of the state's past, and whether there is a fading or a preserved sense of history vis-a-vis the present.

### 1.1.3.3 Baudrillard

Baudrillard's (1975 and 1983) ideas appear in a large number of books, chiefly *The Mirror of Production* and *Simulations*. Like Jameson, he believes it is no longer possible to distinguish the economy of productive spheres from the spheres of ideology and culture. To him, cultural artifacts, images, emotions and sensations are now all part of the economic order: they are 'producible.' The age is now experiencing a political economy of the sign whereby social images and commercial symbols themselves become commodities. Technology predominates: signification thrives. "Capitalism crosses



the entire network of natural, social, sexual and cultural forces, all languages and codes" (Baudrillard 1975:138), as the cult of immediate experience and of intense reality is advanced.

Hence, the investigation at hand (i.e., into the administration government of heritage in tourism) is also Baudrillardian in its broad purpose. In the Baudrillard vision, "signs are no longer required to have any verifiable contact with the world they allegedly represent" (Connor 1989:55); is this indeed for so the signs of the past in the Lonestar State as death with by state tourism administrators? But in the Baudrillard vision, there is "an escalation of the true, of the lived experience (Baudrillard 1983:12); does the state bureaucracy's texts on Texas reflect that Baudrillardian 'regime of the simulcrum'?

#### **1.1.4 Key Aspects of Postmodernity**

Having outlined what several of the leading theorists have stated about postmodernity, some of the key aspects of the subject will now be drawn out. Clearly there is a considerable range of opinion as to what the postmodern condition is, and thereby what its critical tendencies and components are. In summarizing that range, Hebdige (1986:78) notes that postmodernity has been styled as the following amongst others:

- an anti-teleological tendency within epistemology;
- a general attenuation of feeling;
- the predicament of reflexivity;
- a new phase of commodity fetishism;
- a fascination for images, codes, and styles;
- a process of cultural, political or existential fragmentation and/or crisis;
- the decentering of the subject;
- an incredulity towards metanarratives;
- the replacement of unitary power axes by a pluralism of power/discourse formations;
- the implosion of meaning;
- the collapse of cultural hierarchies;
- broad societal and economic shifts into a 'media', 'consumer' or 'multinational' phase;
- and,
- a generalized substitution of spatial for temporal co-ordinates.

Rather than attempt to neatly extract, at this stage, a singular, all-purpose definition for postmodernity, an endeavor will be made to identify the critical components of postmodernity that are believed to have an affect upon the construction of culture. Table 1.1.4./1 is the result of that effort. It distills twenty commonly attributed aspects of postmodernity and briefly notes the relevance of each of those tendencies to the 'production' or 'manufacture' of history. Readers should be warned, however, to remember that no social theorist will ever have assumed all of the listed aspects as part of his/her own use of the term, and almost everyone of them will have been the topic of some sustained debate at some time or other as to its fitting place in an account of postmodernity. Clearly those who view postmodernity as an economic conflagration will give primacy to the capitalistic tendencies, and those who view postmodernity as a political phenomenon will want to give primacy to notions of power.

TABLE 1.1.4./1

POSTMODERNISM AND HISTORICAL TRUTH:  
KEY SHIFTS IN CULTURAL LOGIC AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORY

**NEW POSTMODERN SENSIBILITIES**

● **SOME OVERVIEW ACCOUNTS OF POSTMODERNISM**

1. POSTMODERNISM AS ANTI-HIERARCHY -- The modulation of hierarchy into heterarchy; replacement of patterns of domination and subordination with patterns lacking commonality or order (Connor 1989:9).
2. POSTMODERNISM AS ANTI-TOTALITARIANISM -- The dissolution of every kind of totalizing narrative which claims to govern social activity and representation (Connor 1989:9); e.g., history no longer as the grand tug-of-war between Capital and Labor (Ross 1988:xiv).
3. POSTMODERNISM AS RESISTANCE -- Opposition to the formal or 'official' culture of modernism, and a critical deconstruction of tradition. A questioning rather than an exploitation of cultural order, seeking to explore rather than conceal social and political affiliations (Foster 1985:xii).
4. POSTMODERNISM AS SIMULATION -- The random cannibalization of all of the styles of the past and the play of random stylistic allusion (Jameson 1991:18). Lefebvre's increasing primacy of the neo (18); a world of sheer image.
5. POSTMODERNISM AS ACCELERATED STYLE -- The explosion of types and number of cultural commodities and the quickening change of popularity of social images gives rise to a 'political economy of the sign' (Baudrillard 1975:121).

● **SOME OF THE CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF POSTMODERNISM**

6. POSTMODERNISM AS RULE BY TECHNICISM -- A technicist episteme has ruled the contemporary age since the 1950s (Kass and Catron 1990:24), where in politics for instance decision processes become more reliant upon technical devices such as television polls and electronic voting. Increasingly the value inputs are random and capricious (White and McSwain 1990:50-51; Backman 1987:xxiv).

**SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY**

- The development of a heterotopia consisting of many different and incommensurable versions of history and/or the creation of a centerless historical universe.
- The suspension of metanarratives: those guiding principles and mythologies which control, delimit and interpret world and local events (Lyotard 1984:31-7); e.g., the loss of appeal of Manifest Destiny explanations.
- Unwillingness to accept imperialism of institutions -- after Foucault's studies on power (Yúdice 1988:230). Everything is now contestable; no master storylines are off-limits; no sacred accounts are axiomatically believed or accepted.
- A world of representation whose "nature [has] gone for good" (ix) and where image dominates. The presentation of Plato's simulacrum -- identical copies for which no original ever existed (18).
- History, like most other aspects of culture is subject to the new predominance of technology and the rapid exchange, promotion and distribution of images which tend to have a diminished referential function (Connor 1989:51-2).
- History becomes increasingly subject to defining technologies such as computers which can unify a society's worldview by providing single (easily-describable) metaphorical images (Bolton 1984). Since technology undergoes a rhetorical transformation' (McKeon 1987:12) so does the history it conveys.

## TABLE 1.1.4./1 (Continued)

### NEW POSTMODERN SENSIBILITIES

7. POSTMODERNISM AS REPRESENTATION -- Representation, itself, becomes a new area of commodification (Jameson 1991) where images, styles and representations are no longer just promotional accessories but the products themselves (Connor 1989:46). Baudrillard (1975:122) calls these processes 'the general operationalization of the signifier.'

8. POSTMODERNISM AS SCHIZOPHRENIA -- The postmodern era is a schizophrenic mode of time and space (Foster 1985:ix), an age which privileges certain kitsch styles (xi). There is a tendency for representation to consist of a pure or a random (rather than inherited or esteemed) play of signifiers (Jameson 1987:222).

9. POSTMODERNISM AS RAW EXPERIENCE -- Under postmodernism raw experience and intense reality are celebrated (Baudrillard 1983:12) and the present is privileged. Yet that experience and that reality does not have to be directly encountered: simulated effects are paradoxically a critical part of the conveyance of acute, naked sensations. It is the epoch of the scrupulous facsimile -- the 'hyperreal' (more real than reality) (13).

10. POSTMODERNISM AS POPULISM -- The standard position in late capitalism holds that modernism was and is elitist, whereas postmodernism favors populist accounts. In architecture, Jencks (1980) sees considerable differentiation in modernist architecture, for instance, where buildings have radical disjuncture from their spatial context -- and in postmodernism he sees buildings inserted into the heterogeneous fabric of the city (Jameson 1991:62-63).

### ● SOME OBSERVATIONS ON POSTMODERNISM AND POWER

11. POSTMODERNISM AS MEDIA CREATION -- To some, postmodernism is media designated neologism which stands as testimony to the power of the media in concert with 'interested' academics, to manufacture concepts of the day. Jameson (1991:xiii) queries whether postmodernism is just a lexical neoveent.

### SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

The power of representation, re-representation and de-representation crosses all social, sexual, cultural and national forces and effects the differential histories contained by them. The signs and images utilized may no longer have verifiable contact with the world they represent.

History can be constructed as a schizoid pastiche, a schizophrenic mixture of storylines and of differential accounts rather than of a single monumental theme. The fragments of pre-existing and new texts are ceaselessly reshuffled.

Historical events and encounters can be described in four stages of represented experience: (i) as untouched/un tarnished basic reality; (ii) as a masked or perverted reality; (iii) as an account which masks the absence of basic reality; an (iv) as pure simulacrum, not related at all to reality (10; Connor 1989:55-56).

Under postmodernism, history (like architecture and like other spheres of life) is rendered as publically available discourse (Spivak 1987:ix). The inclination is to offer a history redolent with local, vernacular and/or homespun relevances.

If postmodernism exists in its own right, and is not a reification of the media and/or empire-building academics, does the vocabulary exist to adequately cover its new discourse? In particular, have we the proper conceptual vocabulary to describe the recent history of developing / under-developed/post-colonial regions (Spivak 1987:x)?

TABLE 1.1.4./1 (Continued)

## NEW POSTMODERN SENSIBILITIES

12. POSTMODERNISM AS HYDRATIC BEING -- Many observers of science and society rebelled against the conformity of high modernism in order to open it up to a liberating range of perspectives and to admit a heterogeneity of texts (Foster 1985:xi). Hence postmodern accounts are inclined to triumphalize 'plurality.' And that plurality can be applied back to postmodernism itself: properly, there is no 'postmodernism,' there are 'postmodernisms.' Postmodernism is an hydra.
13. POSTMODERNISM AS MIX OF POWER CENTERS -- Given the decline of metanarratives and of totalizing accounts as explained under 1, 2, and 3 above, postmodern theories are inclined to identify a multiplication of centers of power and activity. Social activity is pictured as having many rather than singular sources of control.
14. POSTMODERNISM AS CONSOLIDATED CAPITALISM -- Some socio-political analysts see postmodernism predominantly in economic terms, as a restructured form of capitalism (Bell 1976). Postmodernism becomes, under such constructions, an immense new area of intensified commodification for multinational capitalism (Jameson 1991:87).
15. POSTMODERNISM AS AGGRESSIVE ADVERTISING -- Postmodern theories attribute the representativity of the age (see 7 above) to the new power of advertising, where awareness and familiarity of important things within the life-space are defined by their very repetitive broadcast on the airwaves.

## ● SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSTMODERNISM

16. POSTMODERNISM AS ANTIDOTE FOR MODERNISM -- Postmodernism is often depicted as a rebellion against the formal purity of classic high modernism (Ingram 1987:76) -- a corrective mode of thought and action emanating from the fall of the modern myths of mastery and entelechic progress (Frampton 1985). Postmodernism arrives with the abandonment of universalist Enlightenment (Ross 1988).

## SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

Where there are 'postmodernisms' rather than a single 'postmodernism,' different entities tend to get highlighted and projected under each distinct postmodernism. Over time the postmodernisms compete against each other. And different postmodernisms have different starting and termination points in history. And competing postmodernisms contest social and historical space with competing 'poststructural' and 'postindustrial' formulations (Jameson 1991:xiii).

In postmodern theory, there are no longer any absolute power centers to authenticate history, and no absolute 'grounds of value' (Connor 1989:8) by which historical texts can be legitimated. History, like all elements of contemporary social life, has to come to terms with 'the legitimation crisis' of our epoch (Habermas 1976).

Recent history becomes the spread of capitalism. And that capitalism becomes postmodernity itself -- ubiquitous and centerless -- within such texts (Connor 1989:48). Marcuse (1968:88-133) maintains that capitalism and bourgeois activity overcome culture, in our most recent history.

Thus a given history is becoming important only if it is profiled in advertising. Historical worth changes: authenticity is replaced by "awe-thenticity." Populations are left with a destabilized / insecure sense of their own history. they get used to receiving force-fed history -- on a changing and changeable diet.

Under high modernism, history is entelechy; the assumed progressive advance of enlightened civilization towards modernism itself. The account was and is an epic, and such development was assumed to be universal in its propriety for the whole of the world. Under high modernism, the history of local and/or non-entelechic societies was relegated as background for real elevated history.

TABLE 1.1.4./1 (Continued)

## NEW POSTMODERN SENSIBILITIES

17. POSTMODERNISM AS DESTROYER OF THE SUBJECT -- Just as Lyotard and other observers see postmodernism as the end of master-narratives (see 2 above) so Baudrillard sees postmodernism as an era of the deals of the subject (Foster 1985:xi). It is such theorists, an age of non-essentialism.

18. POSTMODERNISM AS DECONSTRUCTED TRADITION -- Many accounts of postmodernism stress its value as counter-practice -- as a pastiche of pop- and pseudo-historical forms (see 8 above). Other theories maintain that this underscores the critical instrumentation of postmodernism. They suggest postmodernism is really a questioning orientation which seeks to explore cultural codes in order to unearth concealed social and political affiliations (Foster 1985:xii).

19. POSTMODERNISM AS WESTERN DECLINE -- Owens (1985:57) considers postmodernism to be a crisis in Western representation, as its authority and universal claims are increasingly questioned by, replaced with and synthesized with previously marginal or repressed discourse. Ricoeur (1965:78) had also offered a critique of Western ethnocentrism. In identifying the end of Western sovereignty in terms of cultural authority he advised that "the discovery of the plurality of cultures is never a harmless experience" (Ricoeur in Owens 1985:57).

20. POSTMODERNISM AS HUMAN CONQUEST -- In Jameson's view "postmodernism is what you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good. It is a more fully human world ...," where every day reality is aestheticized (Benjamin 1982). Art is not longer a separate enclosed reality: it enters into the production and reproduction of everything (Baudrillard 1983:151). Art can be anywhere or anything -- human life becomes a work of art (Featherstone 1991:66).

## SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

The disappearance of the individual subject (Jameson 1991:16) also affects accounts of history. All concepts, beliefs, facts and sacred events are now contestable. New forms of paralytic critique emerge which dissolve the line between creative and critical analysis (Foster 1985:x). New histories can be feminist, ethnic, racial, 'local,' et cetera.

For those who see postmodernism as critical deconstruction, the given foundations of a population or a society are unlikely to be accepted without question. Under such anti-foundational standpoints, a particular history should be open to many disparate interpretations. As a consequence of this anti-foundational spirit, new critiques (of perhaps feminism, neomarxism, and whatever) are likely to interpenetrate via synthesized re-articulations. But such conjectural illuminations are necessarily transitory (MacCable 1987:ix) if they are faithfully anti-foundational.

Modernist histories tended to be prohibitive towards non-European accounts: a politics of exclusion has permeated (Spivak 1987:132). History was and is perpetually utilized to legitimate Western actions (Preiswerk and Perrot 1978:145). Historians have tended to non-consciously construct "liveable histories" (Pirrenne 1968:109) which privilege the concepts the historian is open towards. Postmodernism has not halted that practice, it has perhaps loosened the hold of Western sociocentrism over the history and discourse of others.

Postmodernism has displaced to other areas from its origins in aesthetics to "become the new horizon of our cultural, philosophical and political experience" (Laclau 1988:63). This radical change in thought and culture is highly significant for history: it begins to liberate it. "Humankind, having always bowed to external forces -- God, Nature, the necessary laws of History -- can now, at the threshold of postmodernity, consider itself for the first time the creator and constructor of its own history" (79-80). Emancipatory possibilities now are radicalizing Enlightenment, aestheticized for history as in every day life in the aestheticized present.

Given these caveats, what do the twenty tendencies of Table 1.1.4./1 reveal in terms of the construction of history? The following propositions emerge under postmodernity:

- i. That single historical accounts are likely to be superseded by multiple, different accounts;
- ii. That grand master-narratives of history are likely to be increasingly questioned;
- iii. That the worth of each and every tradition is now contestable;
- iv. That considerable latitude exists over the degree to which imaginative and hybridized simulations of historical events can be provided for today's visiting public;
- v. That considerable latitude exists over the type and style of images that may be harnessed to depict history;
- vi. That existing accounts of history may be modified by the kinds of rhetoric and image which are well adapted to the technicized communication of the age;
- vii. That different versions of history will over-time beget novel and differentially-connected symbols and images with which to characterize that account;
- viii. That secure and longstanding presentations of history will compete with what, originally, purists would regard as miscellaneous and promiscuous depictions of history;
- ix. That the proportion of 'untouched' accounts of history in currency will fall vis-a-vis both 'masked versions' and 'pure simulcram';
- x. That the proportion of 'vernacular', 'local' and 'populist' accounts of history in currency will rise vis-a-vis standard elitist accounts;
- xi. That 'old' history is being increasingly 'infused' with new lexical descriptions and conceptual treatments arising from liberated academic, media and previously subjugated parties;
- xii. That the uniformity of the designation of eras and epochs in history is diminishing;
- xiii. That at macro-levels of analysis the number of leading centers of legitimacy for 'authentic' history is rising for given states, regions and nations;
- xiv. That the range of forms and diversity of avenues by which capitalist practice is involved in the interpretation and presentation of history are rising;
- xv. That the certainty of understanding and association with which a population identifies with given celebrated persons, places and events from its history can change considerably in scale and scope overtime;
- xvi. That support is declining for notions of linear progress within historical accounts of given regions;
- xvii. That the extant range of 'alternative'/'adversarial' critiques of the history of states, regions and nations is increasing;
- xviii. That the proportion of new and synthesized interpretations of history amongst emergent 'alternative'/'adversarial' interest groups is increasing;
- xix. That the supremacy of Western Eurocentric explanations for global history is declining vis-a-vis non-Western/non-Eurocentric interpretations;

- xx. That the range of aesthetic treatments commonly utilized within the interpretation of history is increasing.

The above propositions have been composed to detail the liberation of interpretation that is conceivably occurring in the construction of the past around the world. While it will clearly not be possible to test such an extensive set of expectancies within the singular context of this study, the suppositional insight contained within them constitute an important backdrop to the overall research agenda investigation on historical tourism (or heritage in tourism). Hopefully, each proposition can be rigorously examined over a range of settings around the globe, hereafter. This current study of Texas, itself (as the precursor for the developing agenda), can therefore unleash or generate an immense research agenda in the investigation of truth in tourism around the world.

### 1.1.5 Substantial Difficulties with Postmodernity

Table 1.1.4./1 indicates that postmodernity is a multifaceted phenomena and that it clearly conveys different things to different commentators upon power and culture. Such are the broad troubles posed by working within a globate social science conceptual entity.

Yet three more subtle weaknesses about postmodernity warrant comment.

#### 1.1.5.1 Over-Simplification of Currents of Culture and Power

This weakness concerns the degree to which accounts of postmodernity reduce accounts of cultural change and political re-articulation to manageable, but grossly distorted levels of analysis.

For instance, some observers, in reducing postmodernity to the triumph of a 'heterogeneity of texts' over a singular hierarchy of texts appear to imply that *postmodernity equals plurality*. Foster (1985:xi) warns strongly against such a conflation: to him, postmodernity is not just panoramic relativism. He advises that

... postmodernity is not pluralism --- the quixotic notion that all positions in culture and politics are now open and equal. This apocalyptic belief that anything goes, that the 'end of ideology' is here, is simply the inverse of the fatalistic belief that nothing works that we live under a 'total system' without hope of redress ... .

Undoubtedly, there are many postmodernities, and many distinct positions within them. Each position is a critical or a constructed view of culture or of power. What counts is not the definition of postmodernity, per se, but the delineation *at some depth* of the political and social and other affiliations within and behind those constructions. The proscriptive statement "*under postmodernity, anything goes*" ought, for fuller discernment, be replaced with the more discerning question "*under postmodernity, which position has which agenda pushing it forward?*"

Secondly, accounts of postmodernity are frequently communicated in the form of condensed suppositions. Hebdige (1986:78) notes for example, that postmodernity, in this manner, has been lauded

as both "placelessness" and as "the abandonment of placelessness" --- seemingly complete opposites. Simplifications of this sort warrant careful exposition to overcome the problems caused by the constraints of our social science vocabulary. Postmodernity is a dialectic term. It can, for the current illustration, be applied to placelessness perhaps where the aggregate effect of capitalism might produce non-segmented images over and across whole nations (thereby denying local representativity). But other postmodern tendencies can actually cultivate local or subjugated representativities by undermining singular and traditional meta-narratives within that nation. Postmodernity can, then, yield both 'placelessness' *and* 'the abandonment of placelessness' concurrently.

A third problem with the over-simplification of accounts of postmodernity comes with the scale and scope of changes which are attributed to it. The danger persists than all changes in cultural condition or in the practice of power are assumed to be postmodern: if *anything* happens, postmodernity may be seen to be at work. In this fashion, postmodernity is reified into being a huge entity capable of shaping its own destiny. Yet social scientists can be caught between the devil and the-deep-blue-sea. If they take pains to avoid giving postmodernity its own sense of consciousness, they can end up describing a peculiar coaction of all manner of separate but coterminous shifts, trends and turns --- a gargantuan coalescence of social forces and changes without a central impulse. In this light, Jameson has been criticized for identifying such a global set of forces, yet for failing to identify the plenipotentiary powers behind it. His account is said "to lack agency" (Jameson 1991:408).

#### 1.1.5.2 False Opposition to Modernity

In some respects, the term postmodernity is a misnomer. It suggests that postmodernity not only comes after modernity, but that it stands in opposition to it. Thus, the modernist state might be presented as a designing power, anxious to legitimate one pattern of order at the expense of all others --- thereby promoting similarity and uniformity, declaring war on foreign substances and qualities and sapping the coherence and power of resistance of competitive institutions. Such is a nutshell account of Bauman's (1990:157-8) view of modernist state power. Hurried readers of Bauman's account might then assume that since something called postmodernity follows modernity, that the old spirit is completely closed off and ascribe all manner of corrective or compensatory attributes to the new zeitgeist --- a so-called age of unending diversity rather than one of assimilated unity. Such are the pitfalls of *projectionism* (where one entity is only seen through the terms of another) and of *presentism* (where the past is darkened in order to salute the light of the existing age).

But it is unwise to view postmodernity as the antithesis to modernity. The juxtaposition between the two is much more complex than that. In Laclau's estimation (1988:65) postmodernity cannot simply be the rejection of modernity, it amounts to a different modulation of the imperatives of modernity and a more involved proliferation of its regimes of thought. In Thackara's (1988:11) judgement, modernity does not end with the onset of postmodernity: it renews itself during it. In Ross's (1988:xvi) view postmodernity's new politics of difference may at last give articulation to liberated voices of color, gender



and sexual orientation, but it also continues the exploitations and oppressions of modernity --- albeit in new structures and forms. The mere designation of a new age cannot kill off overnight, the practices of the past. Modernity lives on in parallel with, and within postmodernity. The father is father to the son, but also brother to the son.

### 1.1.5.3 The Anti-Epic Epic

In certain senses postmodernity ends up preaching against itself. It arises, in part, as "a dissenting response to the epic, or universal, claims of modernity ... [yet it becomes] an epic production ... itself" (Ross 1988:vii). Lyotard may attack the totality of the generalizable principle and of universal reasoning, but his postmodernist war inescapably becomes an universal itself (see Habermas and Honneth on Lyotard in Connor 1989:39). And, in revealing postmodernity as 'experimental pastiche', Jameson faces a similar paradox: "how can a culture which is allegedly defined by the decisive abandonment of originality and authenticity possibly be exemplified in any 'original' or 'authentic' way itself (49).

The dilemma of Lyotard and Jameson attest to the hermeneutic difficulties that can arise when theory tangles itself up within the social reality it describes (63). It is a matter of self-reflexivity, as Jameson (1991:xi) does admit:

Postmodernity theory is one of those attempts ... to take the temperature of the age without instruments and in a situation in which we are not even sure there is so coherent a thing as an 'age', or zeitgeist or 'system' or 'current situation' any longer. Postmodernity theory is then dialectical at least insofar as it has the wit to seize on that very uncertainty as its first clue and to hold to its Ariadne's thread on its way through what may not turn out to be a labyrinth at all, but a gulag or perhaps a shopping mall.

Postmodernity thereby constitutes a vibrant continental theory charged with denouncing the extirpation of continental theories. Again, postmodern accounts are therefore **dialectical**.

So what may be summarized about these abstract difficulties and the dialectical nature of postmodernity?

First, postmodernity is *uneven* in its effects as it signals the uprooting of the universalist foundations of Enlightenment thought and Enlightenment action.

Second, the judgement as to whether a particular situation, context or condition is in fact postmodern, is *perspectival*. It may be liberating for some, but still exploitative for others --- postmodern from its northern face, modernist from its southern one. So, in announcing that a postmodernity exists, one should clarify for whom it actually exists. The vital question is: *whose interests are being served by this silencing of suppression or by this cultivation of difference?* Whose postmodernity is it? Therefore, if there is a postmodern history, whose is it? Whom dominates through its telling? Whom suffers through its promotion?

Third, postmodernity is not something that can be defined once and for all, and then utilized without modification. What may appear to be a liberating and imaginative synthesis at one moment may soon appear to disenfranchise once deeper levels of awareness arise or once new forms of understanding catch on. Experiencing postmodernity is like being politically correct: it is a *contextual construction*.

Finally, and most importantly, the tissue of the curtilage around postmodernity is soft. *At its border line, postmodernity is osmotic*. In this sense, Heidegger (1971:154) reminds us of the old Greek word *peras* for boundary: "A boundary is not that at which something stops, but as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presenting." Thus, when one reaches the Kingdom of Heterotopia one may find a good deal of postmodern oxygen in the air: but one should then smell harder, fortified by that oxygen to trace the other gases present. All the elements are essentially colorless and difficult to spot, whichever side of the supposed boundary one stands on.

### 1.1.6 Postmodernity and the State

In outlining the force of postmodernity upon the legitimacy of culture and history, the capacity of postmodern tendencies to influence government ought also be affirmed. Clearly, given the range of government types involved from municipal to federal/national, the range of government agencies concerned from 'outright elected' to 'outright appointed,' and the range of government issues encompassed from distributive to redistributive matters, *no* unidimensional government response to postmodernity exists. The level of state sympathy with aestheticized living, with the deconstruction of tradition and with accelerated commodification is plainly a contextual matter, and is also subject to reassessment after each ballot and manifesto re-draft. Thus it is difficult to obtain conclusive views for the affect of postmodernity on the power of civil or political institutions. Extensive longitudinal analysis would be required to win that sort of Gramscian knowledge.

Yet the gravitational attractivity of postmodern thought and inclination upon government is important for the perspectivist or hermeneutic study at hand. Postmodernity has the potential to diffuse through all societal institutions as a culturally imperial force (Jameson in Stephanson 1988:16). Aronowitz (1988:46) maintains that, since World War II, the shifts in sensibility that have come with postmodernity, have occasioned a number of major changes to the politico-cultural problematic. They are reproduced in Table 1.1.6./1 in adapted form. Aronowitz alludes to the problems posed by static concepts of rule over populations. Modern state power had largely occasioned the disempowerment of communal self-management "... sapping the social foundations of communal ... life" (Bauman 1990:157). Vertical (hierarchical) configurations of power are now, though, being challenged by the deterritorialization and the regional differences that came with postmodernity. Responsive governance is beginning to replace "the unthinking automaticism" (157) of Western governance. Aronowitz (1988:49) notes that many observers of state governance strongly emphasize the role of the community, and not the state to be "the best site of economic, political and cultural life." But state governments normally deal in statist history and not

regional history. A reading of Aronowitz suggests that the authoritarian state forms of Western Europe and the U.S. may not be politically equipped to serve up the preferred modern diet of history.

What then, are the priority concerns within this politico-cultural? Five key issues are now identified which impact upon the interface between politics and postmodernity, and which conceivably affect of the manufacture of legitimate state heritage.

They are now outlined as highly relevant background issues to ground the current investigation in the contemporary exigencies of state governance over the past of its people --- a past which may (in each case) no longer be so relevant to the people of today, themselves.

#### **1.1.6.1 Critical Continuities and Discontinuities**

The first issue concerns the politics of ideas: have the moral purposes and ethical issues that guide political action been affected by postmodern tendency? To date, apart from Aronowitz, little work appears to have been done in this area, though Lowi (1979) and Scott and Hart (1979) have explored the tension between the needs of U.S. political interest groups and the changing orientations of democratic society. In examining the broader historical context of the politics of ideas, Herson (1984:3) concludes that continuity far outweighs discontinuity, largely on account of the strong sense of legitimacy with which past political arrangements are normally regarded. He suggests that the more the politics of new ideas threatens to bring a realignment from the previous political order, the fiercer and more intense will the political debate become. The subject of continuity / discontinuity will be aired again under subsection 2.4.

#### **1.1.6.2 Totalizing Vision**

The second political question is an extension of the first. For the given issue, does the government in power act in accordance with some totalitarian impulse towards subordinate and/or dissident cultures and subcultures (in this instance, acting to safeguard a single pure view of heritage) or does it accommodate postmodern tendencies to cultivate creative-diversity and self-expression? Clearly the interests of party platform will be strong on this issue, and the effects of postmodernity may be particularly difficult to discern from the other 'left-wing', 'democratic' and 'egalitarian' drives. To some, this whole research agenda on this socio-political construction of history / heritage indeed an inquiry of the totalization / individuation of people with states, per se.

#### **1.1.6.3 Approved Activities**

In this sense government is seen as a disciplinary system in the Foucauldian mould of governmentality (Gordon 1980:102) in which people's time, labor and conduct are channelled towards preferred activities of production and consumption. The targets for such coercion and observation can be both state employees (are they approving the right approved activities?) or the public (are they participating in the right approved activities?). Such questions concern the degree to which the government seeks or demands conformity to procedure. In matters of heritage, does the state demand

TABLE 1.1.6./1

POSTMODERNISM AND THE RENUNCIATION OF FOUNDATIONAL THOUGHT IN POLITICS:  
KEY SHIFTS GOVERNING THE UNDOING OF IDEOLOGICAL MASTER DISCOURSE

MAJOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL PROBLEMATIC

1. PRODUCTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS NOW DISPERSED AND DETERRITORIALIZED. The dominance of Western Europe and the U.S. has been challenged by Japan, Korea, Malaysia, et cetera.
2. THE NATION-STATE IS ALIVE, BUT BY NO MEANS WELL. Nationalism appears to be in retreat. Transnational corporations have emerged devoid of loyalty to nations of origin.
3. NATIONAL POLITICS SINKS INTO DEEPER CRISIS. The state assumes larger responsibilities for social order and the economy, but becomes increasingly impoverished in terms of revenues to fund these added tasks along with the old duties.
4. THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF STATE REGIMES IS NOW IN QUESTION. Politicians are seen to be unable to control state economies. Deterritorialization of production entails new patterns of everyday life which brings about a 'lost' or a 'new' sense of place. Politicians are seen to be unrepresentative of these new consumer 'places.' The moral basis (and the right to rule) of traditional cultural institutions in Western Europe and the U.S. is being undermined.
5. POLITICAL LIFE IS NO LONGER ROOTED IN A CONCEPTION OF A QUALITATIVELY BETTER LIFE. States no longer lead by promising grand meta-narrative visions or by articulating deliverable utopias. Today realpolitik drives governments, as it also does social movements. New interest groups may gain power on anti-modern platforms -- but they sustain it on instrumental grounds.

SOURCE: Adapted from Aronowitz: 1988:46-49.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

- Does the loss of supremacy in industry affect wider Western European and U.S. confidences? Do re-examinations of industrial method and structure occasion related questioning of established historical truths and assumed entelethic supremacies?
- If economic ties and industrial ties to cherished homelands are now axiomatically broken, does that not render it harder for individuals to retain the ideological discourse about the past which also emanate from those homelands? Is national disloyalty contagious across different subjects of foundational thought?
- Can states afford to bother with heritage and definitions of history? Ought states allocate a significant weight of personnel and resources to the presentation of history? Should heritage be left to private enterprise and to special interest initiative?
- Is the history of the past irrelevant for new consumer societies? Do the moral battles for which leaders and citizens fought in past centuries (i.e., the stuff of history) in Western Europe and the U.S. still have meaning for the resident populations of today? Is it worth the effort to conserve and celebrate these proud moral moments and cherished historical triumphs?
- Centralized governments are perceived as logical developments of modernity. Postmodern movements oppose centralized states and resist statism. They demand minimalist, central states. But the history of the past tends to be the history of centralizing states. Should postmodern states re-select their heritage themes in order to stay in tune with the preferences of today's population? Is it necessary?

compliance through its apparatus of control? Are the approved activities that constitute the subject matter of that compliance changing? Does state compliance reflect postmodern tendency? Is the sum total of the state bureaucrat's efforts an attempt, consciously or subconsciously, to produce a Foucauldian *society of normalization*? (107).

#### 1.1.6.4 Specialized Space

Foucault recognized that disciplinary power is the exercise of authority stemming from expertise. He revealed how in government, as in the private sector, certain white collar workers (whom have come to be known as 'specific intellectuals' (Foucault 1988:107)) exercise authority by expert use of their definitional powers (Hariman 1989:217). They observe and thereby control the specialized space of distinct area of activity. Knowledge may be apolitical by definition, but created bodies of knowledge can be used as an agency of social control (218). Just as professionals such as doctors and lawyers can *discipline* populations through their control of specialized space, so government bureaucrats can discipline populations through their own tightly controlled expertise, leading the population to a distinct/preferred way of life. Wisdom and foolishness are the property of institutions just as much as they are of individuals (Wildavsky 1979:402). Is postmodern tendency affecting the wisdoms and the expertise cherished within the specialized spaces of government (in terms of definitions of culture, of tourism, of heritage, of whatever?).

#### 1.1.6.5 Co-optation: Yea or Nea?

In the light of the previous four questions, it is important to conclude whether a particular government has been co-opted by outside private interests any given issue (Lowi 1979; Moe 1980). At the federal level in the U.S.A., Hecló (1978) has argued that the triangles of power between bureaucrats, congressional committees and clientele --- which used to dominate policy --- are no longer so iron as they once were. In the past political theories of capture have been somewhat mechanistic, and have not probably done justice to the complexity of the relationships between government agencies and interest bodies. But the degree to which the work of government administrators is shaped by the pressures exerted by a select body of external interests is still of prime concern. In terms of Wilson's (1989:79-83) codification of agency capture, what is the nature of the political environment that surrounds the government body in question? Does it yield a client agency, an entrepreneurial agency, an interest-group agency or a majoritarian agency for the issue under analysis? Is postmodern tendency (oops, are postmodern tendencies!!) helping to produce broader political beliefs which affect the freedoms in which government agencies work? Is the agency able to steer with some degree of freedom between multiple centers of power, or is capture an ongoing or imminent matter of fact?

Taken in toto, the above five questions surround the issue as to whether the new currents of thought and practice (which appear to have arrived with postmodernity) are helping re-define politics itself --- redefined to account for the new arrangements of power in society that have devolved around

consciousness and culture. Politics cannot be immune from the re-formulated thought of postmodernity. *Everything* is now contestable, or becoming contestable.

### 1.1.7 Postmodernity and Research

The abandonment of Enlightenment thought that is frequently taken to be postmodernity (or is often assumed to be occasioned by postmodernity) is also occurring in research itself. Inquiry has had its modernist coloration: indeed some would claim the technician quest for universality to have been the number one criteria for properly-conducted research projects (Leedy 1985:85) during the last two centuries at least --- a distinctly modernist undertaking and massive conformity.

But the achievements of science are a function of the governing paradigms of the time, and postmodern tendencies are also now revealing themselves in the social sciences, where "the postmodern moment has arrived" (Van Maanen, Manning and Miller 1990:5). Marcus and Fischer (1986:7) believe that a reassessment is occurring within the human sciences as it is in law, art, architecture, and literature -- fields more commonly associated with postmodernity. As a result of this 'crisis of representation' (8), suppressed forms of legitimation are finding acceptance there. The taste for totalizing frameworks has diminished, and a period rich in experimentation and conceptual risk-taking has resulted for the social and cultural sciences (10).

With the relinquishment of the universalist perspective, decent social science no longer *has* to be positivist (Kirk and Miller 1986:14). Positivism, and its hidden standards of natural objectivity, is no longer the grand unquestioned epic of social science. Analytical modernist science is being joined by, (and in many fields of inquiry, superseded by) science-as-synthesis:

Critics argue that conventional [modernist/positivist] social science dulls the imagination; locks the observed inside rigid category systems having little or nothing to do with the culture of the researched, but everything to do with our [presumptive and methodologically-bound] research culture; promotes an insidious institutionalization of social boundaries that separate 'us' (the observers) from 'them' (the observed); and perhaps most telling, has become rather tedious if not boring, thus losing its power to convince. (Van Maanen, Manning and Miller 1990:5).

Consequently the broad function of **narrative** within social science is no longer predominantly outlawed. New forms of narrative are encouraged, the like of ethnography, polyvocal texts, multigenre narrativation, and impressionistic tales (5). According to Lyotard, (1984; xxv) "postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable." It is a loosening of the hold which had been maintained across designations of proper science by specific totalizing visions of science. Other fragmented narrative-based scholarly communities are not now axiomatically condemned (Marcus and Fischer 1986:8). It is a more fluid approach to knowledge gain (Geertz 1980), where much more borrowing occurs from one discipline to another.

This current study of heritage will endeavor to take advantage of this new presence of postmodern insight in social science in its examination of the manufacture of heritage. The postmodern condition of Texas (in its production of history) will be investigated via a postmodern construction of science. This point will, however, be deliberated at greater depth of analysis under 1.3., where the reflexivity of the study problem (on the content of the inquiry) with the research problem (on the conduct of the investigation to get at that very content) will be set up.

### 1.1.8 Postmodernity and the Construction of History: A Summary

Postmodernity has been introduced as a *dialectical* background for the study and a mix of postmodern concepts concerning power and culture have been explained. Postmodernity is important because it appears to be a highly significant mode of consciousness which is shaping the episteme of the age --- a highly important set of potential influences upon individual and institutional action. As a grand force of late capitalism, its possible gravitational impact on culture is deemed to be imperialistic, and its diffusive effect is screenless (i.e., in certain senses it is an emergent world culture and its impact is broad across economic, social, cultural, political and other regimes of power).

In understanding the dialectical character of postmodernity the following caveats were noted.

Postmodernity is:

- *a holdall concept* --- for which there is no firmly accepted academic or theoretical definition;
- *a misunderstood concept* --- which has not been widely accepted in some social disciplines or human science fields of inquiry;
- *an order-building concept* --- but one which needs to be understood in terms of the new social, economic and political arrangements it is helping reconstruct in the late twentieth century rather than by outlooks on nationalism and legitimacy conventionally applied to previous and more stable ages;
- *a concept grounded in aesthetics and style* --- but one which has expanded to wider cultural and philosophical experiences and is now a conceptualization for **a whole historical period** not just for **certain artistic styles** within it.

Given those important caveats of understanding, it may be concluded that most or all of the following components are usually implicit in the use of the term postmodernity. *The postmodern condition* exists where:

- (i) there is a shift in sensibilities away from foundational thought;
- (ii) discriminations based upon formal purity are renounced;
- (iii) universal perspectives are largely abandoned;
- (iv) heterogeneity triumphs over hierarchy;

- (v) multiple sources of power rather than singular focii exist;
- (vi) everything is contestable, thereby yielding multiple constructions of events and happenings (though those interpretations substantially interpenetrate);
- (vii) Previous signifying chains-of-order breakdown, being replaced by a heightened (or schizophrenic) bricolage;
- (viii) a positive valuation is placed upon transitory, elusive and ephemeral phenomenon;
- (ix) human creativity and potentially appears to be significantly challenged;
- (x) it is not easy to separate the economic or productive realm from the ideological or cultural realm for the entity in question.

Given the perspectival nature of the above ten criteria it is perhaps more fitting to regard postmodernity as a *degree of influence* an object has *when seen from a nominated viewpoint* rather than as an absolute characteristic or palpable constant. It should also be stressed that postmodernity is a deconstructive (and usually reconstructive) condition, not a nihilistic one. It thus tends to stand *not* as a complete break with modernity, but as a modulation of some modernistic influences, a restructuring of others and with only the abandonment of repressive anathemas identifying any complete break with modernity. Generally, postmodernity is uneven in its effects.

Regarding the manufacture of history, per se, postmodernity needs to be addressed because of:

- the fading sense of history associated with its impulses and the apparently increasing refusal of populations to think historically;
- the dissolution of totalizing and meta-narratives (inclusive of epic historical accounts) identified with it;
- the rise of pure simulation in representativity where signs and symbols (of history as for any presented subject) need have no verifiable contact with the world they allegedly represent;
- the increasing popularity of immediate-experience/raw-reality presentations (of history, nature or whatever); and,
- the degree to which commercial and productive bodies now influence vernacular texts on history in terms only of their own interests.

Under instances / representations / characterizations of postmodernity, therefore, there appears to be an overall loss in or of historical sensibility. Heritage is being representatively redefined by the collective influences of postmodernity. People may be said to not only no longer live in *imagined communities* they now live in *imagined worlds*. Assessments of historical and cultural identity in the accelerating non-essentiality of the last quarter of the twentieth century can not afford to treat the insinuations and ascendancies of postmodernity lightly.



## 1.2 THE FOCUS OF THE CATALYST INQUIRY: HERITAGE AND PETTY POWER

### 1.2.1 Introduction to the Focus

Having provided in the previous section an introduction to postmodernity as background for the overall research agenda, attention is now turned towards the focus of the investigation --- the identification of power behind the manufacture of the heritage of Texas as displayed in tourism. This section of the introduction will thereby attempt to outline how, conceivably, the tendencies of postmodernity are conditioning both the heritage that is 'served up' for tourists and the exercise of power that shapes that service. The focus for the study is, then, *the nature of present practice in heritage tourism*. It may best be clarified in the form of two related questions:

- (i) *what is the nature of the present production of the heritage of Texas (in tourism)? [i.e., does the heritage that is 'created through' and/or 'approved by' state government reflect postmodern tendencies?]*
- (ii) *what is the nature of the present exercise of power by state authorities on the heritage of Texas (in tourism)? [i.e., do the activities and the discourse of the state government reveal postmodern tendencies?]*

In order to explain this focus, some recap comments ought to be provided on firstly *the place* of history and heritage under the postmodern condition (1.2.1.1), and, secondly, on *the content* of history and heritage under the postmodern condition (1.2.1.2).

#### 1.2.1.1 Postmodernity and the Sense of History

In Jameson's (1983) view, people in the contemporary age have "begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions." History is repressed (Said 1985:148) as the present is continually reinforced and celebrated, and as individuals are overwhelmed by a flood of signs, symbols, and settings of contemporaneity: "Postmodernity and capitalism join to form an inebriated state of [transformed] consciousness" (Bolton 1988:90). Indeed, in Jameson's (1983) view the disappearance of history is the *one central theme* of postmodernity: the entire contemporary social system "has little by little begun to lose its own capacity to retain its own past" (Thackara 1988:12;on Jameson). Advertising is a chief proponent in this death of history: our consciousness of heritage, like our consciousness of so much else, is continually modified by the constant barrage of 'this-world-now' commercial messages:

Advertising ... forms reality by the way it inserts itself into messages, and into experience generally. Advertising *interrupts*, either by intruding upon the message and breaking it apart or by positioning itself adjacent to the message and competing with it. This interruption is a *fait accompli*: we are forced to take our information and advertising together. They are interwoven, jumbled up, blurred; each adapting the style of the other --- news reportage, entertainment and commercials threaten to become

indistinguishable. Faced with this totality of discourse, and recognizing how little control we have over it, we begin to treat advertising as an unavoidable fact of life --- as nature, as some kind of permanent reality (Bolton 1988:90-91).

If Bolton, Jameson and Said are correct in their judgement, it appears hard for sustained visions of the past to withstand the immediacy of the changeabilities of impression-making today.

### 1.2.1.2 Postmodernity and the Composition of History

Not only do social theorists claim that the postmodern condition has relegated history as a subject of consciousness of people today, they also imply that the *content* of presented history has also been significantly changed by general postmodern tendencies. Five illustrative implications (or extended arguments) of this sort are now offered:

- (i) *The end of certainty?* Under Enlightenment it was believed that knowledge on anything can be gradually built up by careful observation of reality (Lawson 1986:51). It was reasoned that people could indeed know reality, *the one reality*. In knowing it, individuals could discover certainty. In this respect history was an accumulated view of the past, identified as the one reality (albeit an ongoing one) that had already occurred. Under Enlightenment, people could be certain about the facts of an historical age they had not themselves experienced. Under postmodernity, however, such certainties of truth are distrusted. Such singular accounts are coming to be recognized as 'stories' (51), and have to compete with other versions of the same event. How certain then, is the state about the heritage of Texas it chooses to promote?
- (ii) *The end of social progress?* History, under modernity, was a synthesized progressive vision of the past as a development space for current society (Connor 1989:232). It is a commonplace view of postmodern theorists, however, that timeless universal storylines of this sort are increasingly difficult to represent within the sort-lived electronic imagery of today (Thackara 1988:12). It is so much harder for privileged discourses of progressive history to hold sway (Ross 1988:87). Baudrillard (1983), for one, maintains that the flow of mass communications across the world (and the multiplication of different texts and discourses that come with it) render it difficult for art and design --- the starting point for so many postmodern impulses --- to deal in 'meaningful' or 'socially progressive' instruction. The world's audience has become less believing and less accepting under the postmodern condition.

The implication of such writers is that other cultural disciplines or fields of study suffer the same restrictivity on prescriptive communication. Is it so for history? Is there, in fact, growing resistance to canonical messages and to rubrical storylines in terms of the receptivity of heritage and history? Are citizens aware of other social worlds, and is the sheer volume of modern commercial and public propaganda they are subject to clouding over modern channels of communication to such an extent that

it is difficult to obtain 'reach' when the history of a given people is told as a sustained or glorious story of progressive development? Is historical presentation today, denied entelechic storylines on account of postmodern preference?

- (iii) *Decline in significance of sovereign subjects?* Under high modernity, authoritative accounts of things existed and were inclined to be respected. Under postmodernity, however, the tendency is for legitimacy to be bestowable from several, and often contesting, positions. It is thus less likely that each of those different sources of 'certification' will adopt the same criteria for determining given issues or debates. When the criteria of assessments change, the subjects actually considered for assessment tend to change, too. As Foucault regularly proffered, subjects (*ipso facto*) have tended to be regarded in all spheres of human concern as *objects* rather than as *subjects* (Rabinow 1984:10) --- i.e., as things objectified with a definite place and phenomenological existence rather than as what they are supposed to be, viz., 'subjective constructions.' Hence, Foucault endeavored to avoid having subjects at all in his work: he did not want subjects to become sovereign over the actuality he was reporting upon (Foucault 1988:50).

In this respect Foucault's philosophy therefore mirrors postmodern tendency, where individual subjects have to compete with an increasing volume of conflicting accounts and counter-messages in everyday life. If it is harder for fixed subjects to retain sovereignty within discourse generally, is it not --- by extension --- also harder in the postmodern age for specific subjects to retain sovereignty in history? People cannot continually have different standards of receptivity for their diet of history alone, apart from the standards they utilize for the rest of their lives. After all, history itself is just a notional subject, and in the Foucauldian sense, when it is 'found', it disappears or it disintegrates. History can be represented by objects, but it cannot be objectified by anything. So the query is --- are the subjects and representations of history much more varied in number, and much less popular in support than was the case before postmodernity?

- (iv) *The end of single accounts of the past?* According to Ross (1988:xi), one of the profound lessons of postmodernity has been that entities can no longer be guaranteed previously secure or longstanding meanings. Meanings can be taken over and recharacterized "for different purposes, different contexts, and more important, different causes." Under modernity, (though not necessarily only under modernity), the reins of control in this type of definitional powerplay were held by dominant societies, colonizers, and victors: "... groups on the social margin ... preferred ... to struggle for recognition and legitimacy on established 'metropolitan' political ground rather than run the risk of ghettoization by insisting on the 'authenticity' of their respective group identities, ethnic, sexual or otherwise" (xi).

Now, however, under postmodernity, the politics of appropriation do not run exclusively in the favor of 'colonizers.' Radical pluralism across the world has begot new proud and resurgent identities of color, gender, class and sexual orientation. The politics of appropriation are much less predictable. Yet for a given marginalized people --- is it only entities, terms and names which are being repossessed or is the whole of their denied history being retrofitted? Is a competing alternative history ready for airing?

- (v) *The politics of inclusion: but ... inclusion of whom?* As is inherent in each of the four previous points [particularly under (iv)] postmodernity as a social force is prone towards generating relief from oppression and the gaining of new respect for marginal peoples. A 'romance of the marginals' is characteristic of all periods of postmodern cultural politics (Connor 1989:228). The politics and power-plays of high modernity were about *exclusion*: dominant cultures/elites/lead institutions had the place and wherewithal to exclude. The politics and reverberations of advance postmodernity, however, are about *inclusion*: exotic culture/the disenfranchised/emergent parties can each haul themselves up to overnight legitimacy on the special interest sympathies of the age.

Alice Jardine (1985:73) calls this celebration and exploration of the marginal 'gynesis', platforming it on new feminist concepts of social space. No sub-culture or group has on axiomatic route to gynetic franchise, however, or otherwise the revolutions in legitimacy would be immediate and incessant. Sub-cultures and groups [i.e., marginalized others] have to learn how to articulate their cause in order to decenter the phallogocentric biases or other notions that keep them in subjugation (Flax 1987:626,642) --- either in terms of counter-identified terms, or disidentified terms if they operate in a particularly progressive context. Release from marginality is a potential to be strived for or a goal, to be won not an automatic and imminent right.

So, at any given time, in any given place, there is not one excluded people seeking respite from marginalization, there will usually be a plethora of competing claims for social and political recognition. The critical issue in history is, then (for each region of the world), just who are these internal 'outsiders' who seek a 're-certification' of their heritage? Who are the populations subjugated by gender, suppressed by ethnicity, enslaved by progress, subjected by economics, et cetera? (Uzzell 1989:141). Bondage is not a one dimensional matter --- nor is liberation from it. And 'the flavor of the month' for social and political emancipation in history (as of other spheres) is those whom have previously been made subservient by **gender** or by **color**. Undoubtedly, these priorities of liberation or deliverance will change during the next century: new manumissions will be recognized in historical accounts as new inequalities will be realized in everyday life.

Having outlined the specific focus of the study with regard to some of the key problematics of heritage presentation in tourism, amplification will be given in the rest of this subsection to the

juxtaposition between heritage and power --- from the perspective of state governments under postmodernity. This will be done via an elaboration:

- of history's limitless parameters, viz., *history as 'imaginative potential'* rather than history as 'standardized storyline' (1.2.2.);
- of *power* in its naked but omnipresent postmodern meaning, and particularly with regard to its interface with *knowledge* (1.2.3.); and finally,
- of the *place of the state* (1.2.4.1.) and *the role of the state* (1.2.4.2.) as a principal powerbroker in the presentation of heritage tourism.

### 1.2.2 Postmodernity and Neo-Situational History

So far, in outlining the background of this study, history has been presented in *neo-Historicist* form, that is, strongly anti-modern in thrust. This ideology is essentially conservative: it disavows the ideology and styles of modernity as being inhuman and radical discourse. It champions the return to former traditions in every possible way (Frampton 1988:62-3).

But there are other strong strains of thought in postmodernity which are not so reactionary and antiprogressive. Frampton (63) recognizes that moderate thinkers of this different type "welcome the continuing escalation of modernization as an inevitable ... process" and he terms them *neo-Situationists*. They see history, as they would see architecture, art, politics --- all human activity --- as a "constantly varying and unstable mosaic" (63). Their concentration is not upon the condemnation of modernity as a sorry period of misapplied spirit-less expertise (as is the neo-Historicist argument), but upon the latent, liberating possibilities of the present and, especially, upon the future on history as on all forms of human concern and engagement:

Of the two groups it may be claimed that the [neo-Situationists are] the more consistent, for where [neo-Historicists are] culturally and politically retrogressive, they remain committed to the benefits of universal civilization. [They seek] to combine the optimization of techno-science with reactionary culture-politics, exploiting the latter to soften and mask the harsh realities induced by the former. Where the neo-Conservatives [i.e., neo-Historicists] are schizophrenic and culturally *anti-modern*, the neo-Situationists are more strictly *post-modern* in that through repudiating the utopian legacy of the Enlightenment (which some of them see as inseparable from political terror) they proclaim the end of 'master narratives', in all fields, including that of science itself. (63).

In the Frampton assessment, both neo-Historists and neo-Situationists reject Enlightenment history, but they do so with important differences of orientation. Neo-Historicists administer the rites of historicism, and in Frampton's estimation reduce "the cultural present to a perpetual and meaningless regurgitation of a petrified past" (63). Neo-Situationists, in contrast do not see history as untouchable; they quarrel with visions of history as a master narrative, itself, and see it, like anything else, as something there to be unshackled from antiquated worldviews, freed from outdated consciousness.

The neo-Situational oxygenation of history can clearly be enervating for marginalized or uncommitted groups in any population: it can also be threatening to established classes. It therefore warrants further scrutiny for the study of Texas in question. The succeeding paragraphs will amplify neo-Situationism as an alternative outlook on history (1.2.2.1.) before drawing out some of the significant issues that such looser accounts of history occasion. Throughout, emphasis will be retained upon the focus on the interface between heritage and power --- the arena of this ongoing research agenda and of the current study in Texas.

### 1.2.2.1 The Neo-Situational Impulse in Historical Presentation

Individuals and institutions blessed (or cursed!) with neo-Situational instincts do not see history as repressed failure under modernity, they see history as enbroadened possibility, through the extricated exhilarations of late modernity. History is past culture, and to neo-Situationists, advanced modernity and postmodernity began the emancipation of all forms of culture, history included. Neo-Situationists are quintessentially *laissez-faire* postmodernists in their outlook on culture (Thackera 1988:13) --- if, that is, postmodernists can **ever** be quintessential in any regard. History, to neo-Situationists in *History Unlimited*: it is the past unencumbered by establishment straitjackets. The whole world, all of mankind, is potentially an imaginary museum for them (Ricoeur 1965:278), as elevated monopolies on history are disregarded. It is the novel historical texts of emergent forces in culture: the ignoble rather than the celebrated, the ordinary rather than the famous. It is the plain story of miner's lives rather than the grand story of the capitalist mining venture --- but, it is that plain story 'palpitated'. At its extreme, it is any new story conveyed experimentally --- where the panache of the presentation counts towards the message rather than interferes with it. Wherever it can be, it will be the past enlivened by mosaic and montage, punctuated heavily by the present. And the presence of the present in the past is not necessarily felt to be apocryphal. It is not so much known - history - reminded, as surprising - history - revealed. It is not so much *Big Story-Retold* as it is *Little-Local-New-Story-Unfurled*.

### 1.2.2.2 History Upturned: Issues Under Neo-Situationism

For many in each and every society, neo-Situationism --- with-extra-panache-please! --- is dubious history. The following concerns regularly appear to be raised:

- (i) *Intemperate eclecticism* --- with neo-Situationism, historical accounts can fast become unrestrained. Neo-Historicists would see many neo-Situational texts as the facts of history plundered. The fear is that unrelated storylines are in danger of being cross-fertilized *ad lib*, and that the resulting account is a pot-pourri of cannibalized inventions, selected more for their sensational effects than for their veracity. It can fast become, under such judgements, *arriviste* rather than honest history (Frampton 1988:54).
- (ii) *Half-learned history* --- neo-Situational presentations are otherwise prone to be condemned because the given historical account produced is deemed to be shallow. As in architecture, the

'edifice' served up is seen to have 'external finish' but 'poor structure' (54). It is superficial, glib history which lacks reasonable definition of the age it represents. It is trivialized history where the boundary between 'reality' and 'fantasy', and the boundary between 'the museum' and 'the media' are needlessly (or rather purposely) blurred (Uzzell 1989:5).

- (iii) *History as garnish* --- disfavor also results when, in increasingly prevalent neo-Situational settings, a particular history is promised, only to be demeaned and used only as cosmetic flourish, or external finish. History then declines to mere marketable image, and is seen only to serve the present and not the past (Frampton 1988:54). History can fast become patinated (York 1988:161), and relegated to use in incommensurable contexts --- the use in North America of appearance of 'Englishness' to sell MacIntoshes, tea, jam, shoes, Rolls-Royces, interior design, and shirts (161). Such debasement of history offends some because esteemed events, periods or characters from the past are commandeered, and the past is demoted to mere pretence.
- (iv) *History without respect* --- Neo-Situational history is, by definition, 'history-with-little-respect'. Opposition arises quickly to neo-Situational history when it is seen to be 'history-with-no-respect.' Under such criticism, the historians in charge have contravened: they are adjudged to have invaded a privacy of somekind. In this fashion, a historical text meets disapproval because it has gone beyond the limits of a felt decency --- Royal persons from other nations are depicted incongruously (161), sacred happenings from other religions are described in insensitive circumstances, or revered symbols of subcultures are caddishly treated. A cherished past can be mocked in this fashion consciously or subconsciously.

In the above critique of neo-Situationism, dominant impressions of history appeared to be at stake. In Foucauldian terms, history was seen by the critical observer to have been objectified in some unfavorable light by another dominant or a claimant agency (an individual or an institution). The key notions could be said to be:

- *who is the dominator?*
- *what is their purpose in re-juxtaposing history (assuming they do indeed see their own efforts as a re-alignment of some sort)?*
- *was the re-situating action consciously or unconsciously carried out, and were the full range of its resultant effects fully understood (which is not the same point as the previous qualifier; that refers to the sought purpose or goal of the perpetrators, this refers to the level of awareness of consequences comprehended by the perpetrator.*

These issues will conceivably be the stuff of this immediate investigation in Texas in the field of tourism and travel. When history is being re-shaped or re-presented in tourism, does the re-shaping

agency have cognition of how its actions will be received across the range of the domestic and visiting population?

### 1.2.3 The Play of Politics in Heritage Tourism

In the abstract sense this adjuvant study is about the manufacture of heritage tourism in Texas as 'public culture' --- or rather as 'past public culture.' That preferred inheritance is legitimated in some way and holds dominance over other visions as to what Texas was, in order (one must presume) to help those sustaining the legitimated vision to ensure that Texas today remains at or gravitates even further towards their own ascribed vision of what the Lonestar State was, is, or should be. So, when such visions define the past of Texas they are also really designating or legitimating the present too. More will be said on this point in the literature review for the study in section 2. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that some agencies (individuals and/or institutions) have the *power* to impose their definition of Texas over and above other agencies. They have claimed the power, won the power, stolen the power, been assigned the power, or have otherwise inherited the power to shape what Texas was --- and is. They have acquired the right to authorize how Texas should be recalled and celebrated, and therefore they significantly help formulate what Texas *is*.

But what is this power: what are these powers? What did the background section to this study say about 'power'? Should 'the-power-to-reshape-history' and 'the postmodern-power-to-reshape-the-worldorder' be linked? Subsections 1.2.3.1. and 1.2.3.2. consider these issues.

#### 1.2.3.1 Postmodern Accounts of Power

The following key characteristics of power in human and cultural affairs were implicit in the opening discussion of postmodernity:

- (i) Postmodernity is itself *a disruptive conjunction of forces upon any singular monologue of power* (Bolton 1988:94) --- it renders each and every presumed 'final authority' suspect for most subjects (Connor 1989:10);
- (ii) Postmodernity undermines many previously unexamined rights of inherited power: it is "the movement away from clearly-defined and universally-acknowledged grounds of legitimation (226). Postmodern power is the culmination (or the latest stage?) of the view of Marx on modern power, whereby "all that is solid melts into air" (quoted in Berman 1988:36), and of Baudrillard whereby *power is now spreading away from conspicuous centers of control* (see Connor 1988:226).
- (iii) Postmodernity decenters politics and brings about *an expansion of the politics of power*. This results in a reduced likelihood that there will be consensus on most matters;
- (iv) Postmodern uses of power can, however, still retain dimensions of modernity's largely technicist notions of power, and also of the as yet *unchallenged bases of expert power* which have survived unquestioned from previous centuries (see Rabinow 1984:4 on Foucault);



- (v) Postmodernity's sudden "explosion of culture into every aspect of life" (Connor 1988:224), after centuries of slower adaptation, has loosened the fixity of order and power in Western societies; the outcome is crises of place, of knowledge and of identity (Thackara 1988:31) and *an increase in power-plays surrounding place knowledge and identity.*

If those are the key characteristics of power under the postmodern condition, what does that mean power must be? The following section will define power, for the purposes of this ongoing, developing, research agenda.

### 1.2.3.2 The Emergent Concept of Power

Across the five characteristics of 'power' under postmodernity outlined in the immediate paragraphs, traverse five tangential notions of power. They are fundamental ascriptions of power for the study of human and cultural affairs:

- (i) **POWER IS CONSTANTLY BEING EXERCISED AND CHALLENGED.** In the contemporary age individuals and institutions in society are in constant conscious or unconscious battles over the definition of that society. In Foucault's judgement, people and institutions are perpetually engaged in the political struggle to interpret or re-orientate their societies (Rabinow 1984:6). *Powers are constantly being engaged; powers are continuously being contested.*
- (ii) **POWER MAY BE FOUND EVERYWHERE.** Contemporary world-orders and sensations "cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology" (Berman 1988:36). Whilst modernity (and now postmodernity) can be seen to have brought mankind together under cross-tendencies of this sort, the evidential unity is ambivalent -- struggles of identification persist, as does the clash of old and new power structures. *Postmodern unity is a unity of disunity (36): power-plays occur everywhere over every aspect of cultured and human affairs;*
- (iii) **SOME POWER-PLAYS ARE LARGE: MOST POWER-PLAYS ARE PETTY.** Large exhibitions of the exercise of power can, of course, be substantive in their consequence upon society/societies; large demonstrations of the use of power are commonplace and can be easy to spot. But even more pervasive in human and cultural affairs is "the clash of **petty** dominations" (6; on Foucault). The day-to-day grind of ongoing perturbations of authority or rights, and of will are also substantive in their consequence --- it is just that *many of these confrontations are so threaded through the fabric of society that they are waged unsuspectingly, even by those most active in their continuation.* The postmodern world is very complex; there are lots of power-play systems and untold insecurities (Thackara 1988:29).
- (iv) **POWER QUARRELS RISE AND FALL.** The subjects of power battles are not constant. The call for democracy, constitutes the rhetorical battleground for most postmodern power-plays. But democracy is called for unevenly. In the judgement of Kass and Catron (1990:182),

contemporary players in society are much more ready to use power in pursuit of political (legal or procedural) democracy than for social and economic democracy. *The exercise of power has its customs and addictions, but they are gradually changeable.* Societal values can and do alter, but often imperceptibly.

- (v) KNOWLEDGE IS POWER --- YET THAT IS OFTEN NOT KNOWN. In Foucault's judgement, knowledge ought not be cut off from power, for so many of the contests of right and legitimacy in human and cultural affairs emanate from variations of social practice which were originally inspired by around subjective judgements (Rabinow 1984:7; on Foucault). *The perspectival root cause of many power-plays has often been forgotten, and frequently unsuspected.*

Hence in the battles and confrontations of human and cultural affairs , power is infused, multi-faceted and yet imperfectly understood by so many of its protagonists. What is required is a sterner investigation of various proponent's constructions of power and legitimacy. For the current, catalyst inquiry, the initial need is to determine who struggles against whom in the definition of the heritage of Texas (viz., the why, when, where, how, whom of power?) and then to identify the existence of the **micro-power** filaments and not just the **macro-power** networks of that exercise of muscle --- and exercise of perspective.

#### 1.2.4 The State, Heritage and Petty Power

So far, in clarifying the focus of the study, this subsection (1.2) of the study has established that there can be no single historical truth supported by all the citizens and interests existing within a state, and that much of the power-play to define that truth and to implement it is perpetual, is petty and is unsuspected. But these *ongoing, quibbling* and *inexpectant* exercises of authority (along with *ongoing, prominent* and *expectant* exercises of authority on the same subject matter) do not just take place in thin air --- they are bounded by institutional arenas and political venues. These studies of the longhaul research agenda will endeavor to explore that proportion of those quibbling and prominent definitions of truth that take place under state auspices --- though that had more precisely be stated as *under, in* and *around* the designated state agency for tourism, in each case.

##### 1.2.4.1 Techne and Totality Explained

A major premise of this developing research agenda into of the political profile of the state exercise of petty (and large or noteworthy) power, is that public administrations in Western societies are currently locked within a *technicist episteme* which limits the horizon of choice of state action. White and McSwain (1990:23) consider the technicist episteme to be the axiological foundation of advanced societies: a way of thinking and doing that was largely shaped under high modernity, but which did not really begin to take its hold until the 1950s. Thus a considerable tension appears to exist, today, between

a society which is becoming increasingly postmodernist and hyperplural in its social and cultural forms, but which appears to be regulated by forms of government which are modernist and rather limited in vision and relatively closed in access.

Some elaboration is called for on this technicist episteme. As Waldo (1984) exposed, government institutions working under technicist direction tend to work with a naive assertiveness in implementing value-neutral technical methodologies. World War II had given rise to "a new interest in and emphasis upon understanding social processes in a rational, objective manner" (McSwain and White 1990:37). *Practicality* became the order of the day a emphasis in administrative behavior "began to shift away from social philosophy to social theory, and from wisdom and experience to empirical data" (37). Metaphysical considerations sank beneath the rise of rational technicism, and government instrumentalities came to be organized in terms of applied 'control'. The nature of this control and the technical consciousness conceivably reached its clearest exposition in Simon's (1976) text: "Administrative Behavior." Simon held an 'engineering' view of administration, where bureaucrats should be encouraged and enabled to work with *specific* technical knowledge on *definable* issues.

Since World War II, then, governments of the so-called advanced societies have been demystified and technologized just as has been society (Waldo 1984). They have been 'modernized', built upon the conventions of scientific rationalism. Fuelled in this way, by the paradigmatic assumptions of functionalism (Burrell and Morgan 1979), government instrumentalities tended to adopt scientific orientations to reality. Research lent towards the quantitative rather than the qualitative, and the bureaucracy preferred to invest in insight that was explicit, rationally conceived and causally-expressed (White and McSwain 1990:44):

The functionalists seemed to destroy metaphysics by emphasizing the *positive, tangible* aspects of social process and institutional events and by asserting a set of *essential, universal requisites* that are so clear and standard that they serve as workable guides to arranging the affairs of the [given agency or instrumentality] system. Functionalism accomplished this through the conceptual device of reification, however, and as a consequence, it was not truly grounded. Rather the functionalists simply treated individuals as if they possessed a reality independent of social context. It was as if individuals had a set of self-contained motivations that they sought to express in their social lives. Similarly, the overall social system was also reified by treating it as if it possessed a discrete boundary and an independent reality (47; emphasis added).

In this fashion, one can argue that modernist bureaucracies have been inclined to discount the human spirit, have tended to fail to perceive how society and individuals which they are there to serve are fixedly interwoven through 'community,' and the bureaucrats within them have been closed to many of the postmodern impulses of hyper-plural existence. The monolithic rise of technicism, in formulating appropriate rational, scientific and universal roles for such bureaucrats has *not* been open to alternative and/or idiosyncratic visions of the world. Bureaucratic service has become technical and procrustean. Just as this study has already seen how *art* has expanded through the impulses of postmodernity into

almost all spheres of human interest in society, so *techne* (for other reasons) has expanded into almost all spheres of government service. *Techne* renders that service monological, and inspires --- in bureaucrats and administrators --- hopes and goals of controllability (Gadamer 1975:313).

Two of the most prominent socio-political analysts who had warned against the spread of the technicist episteme through decision-making have been Marcuse (1964) and Habermas (1970). Both warn against societies in which government action and business affairs are diluted to the specification of means to given ends for a population which does not have the opportunity to shape the truth or goodness of either those selected means or those adapted ends. Yet, although Marcuse and Habermas attack the over-deployment of rational models of decision making, they do not regard instrumental action, alone, as the malefactor (White 1990:144) --- they recognize it, in fact, to be a necessary tool in sound performance. What Marcuse and Habermas (and also Gadamer) object to is not the grip of instrumental reasoning, per se, but **the absence of interpretive and critical reasoning with it** (144). They fear the very narrowness of practical discourse in governance as they do in society at large.

Foucault's outlook is also germane to the analysis of modernist forms of government action during the postmodern age --- though he (like Marcuse, Habermas and Gadamer) did not specifically write on matters of government, and he did not claim to be a postmodernist --- others have tended to label him as such. Foucault's concern was the role of government departments, professional bodies, academic communities, whatever, as **institutions**, ipso facto. His orbit was the association, the organization or the establishment --- the way IT thinks and the way IT acts. Foucault's aim was to cultivate *distrust of institutions* on account of the unchallenged powers they are inclined to assume over time. In his analysis of the art of government Foucault saw individuals' freedom become subjected to the power of institutions (Merquior 1988:83-4) as the Enlightenment product of *will-to-power* (i.e., the desire for individuals possessing power through their positions within institutions to sustain, to exercise and to increase that power) overrode the humanitarian considerations that may have lead to the creation of the institution in the first place (90).

Foucault's view of power is important for this longhaul research agenda on the manufacture of heritage. Power is a certain type of relation **between** individuals where some people can determine the conduct of others. Power is never exhaustive or coercive: "a man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue ... then he as been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been *subjected to power*" (84; emphasis added). In this manner, Foucault theorized that an individual could be *submitted to government* --- could succumb to the exercise of power of the institution. Any anything --- history and heritage included --- can be *submitted to government*. The art of sound governance, by extension, could cynically be said to not so much be the provision of effective humanitarian or social services, but the effective submittance of individuals. 'Best in contemporary society', to Foucault (1978:8-10) now only equalled 'most economical', sadly.

The longer institutions (viz., government agencies) exist, the more versed becomes the exercise of that relationship of power. Writing principally about Europe, Foucault sees **the succumbing of individuals** as the problem of government. Since the sixteenth century, the state had begun itself to grow as a new political form of power ignoring individuals and looking only for *the interests of a totality* in the form of the interests of a class or group amongst the population. The concretizing methods are, to Foucault (1982:213), the totalization procedures of institutions, the totalizing presence of government. And history and tourism can themselves be totalized. Perhaps this is or has been the case for Texas.

#### 1.2.4.2 Techne and Totality in Texas

If there is merit in the insights of Gadamer, Marcuse, Habermas and Foucault on statism, the catalyst study in question inescapably has to deal with the issues of techne and totality. Is the State of Texas statist in matters of heritage production? But how does or could this focus on the technist episteme and on 'submittance' translate to cultural and historical tourism? The following are conceivably matters that the current adjuvant study ought to address --- though there will not clearly be time to thoroughly roam across all five of these points:

- *the history of State service*: how established are the procedures of the State in dealing with heritage tourism, and therefore how entrenched are the relationships of power?
- *the credo of governmentality*: can one reasonably conclude that State services in heritage tourism are conducted in accordance with a 'best-as-most-economical' catechism? And, if that, or any other widely supported credo is identified, is it explicit or implicit?
- *State responsiveness: service as one for all or as each for each*: is there evidence that the State of Texas has totalized its services in heritage tourism (thereby standardizing service to the advantage of select interests and to the exclusion of idiosyncratic concerns?) Or is, in fact, the State of Texas widely responsive towards particularity? Does the State appear to 'enforce the policy' on heritage tourism --- one policy --- or does it seem to 'handle the situation' --- each situation --- on its own merits (Wilson 1989:37)?
- *Incentives for State service?* Does the State work in heritage tourism in accordance with 'naturally occurring' incentives concerning differentiations and qualities within the historical and cultural environment of Texas, or are the incentives 'agency supplied' (49)? Are the motivations and hence (?) is the purview of State institutionally bound in this regard?
- *Petty-power colorations from other institutions?* Is the behavior of bureaucrats/administrators responsible for heritage/cultural tourism service within the state determined by the incentives or by the mores controlled by institutions other than

the State 'institution' itself? (60). If other institutions are influential over the exercise of petty-power and procedural service, are they professional associations? If bureaucrats/administrators play at God (61) in the planning and/or management of heritage/tourism, what is 'the reference group' (institutional) religion they act out?

One could conclude that the focus of the proposed adjuvant study boils down to a study of technoscience: is the petty-power which *is* at play that of *techné*, and if it is, does it now have a life of its own? Has the State invested, consciously or sub-consciously, in statist value-neutral technical methodologies (Waldo 1990:26)? Or is there, indeed, reasonable opportunity for critical and/or interpretivist rationality to moderate the technical rationalities of State administration? So, the catalyst study is an investigation of the degree of 'response' that exists amongst the 'control' activities of the State/state (White and McSwain 1990:39). The convergent issue, then, is 'whose truth?' (and 'how many truths?') will be told. And why.

### 1.2.5 Summary: A Constant Fight on the Historical Terrain?

The focus of the overall / umbrella agenda and of the immediate / catalyst study has been presented as the tension that may conceivably exist between *the generally liberating urges of the postmodern condition of human and cultural affairs and the statist/modernist technology and networks of the government institutions in position*. The scene is the administration of the heritage tourism within the State. On the one hand, for this tension laden drama, the postmodern age is one where essentialist ties are breaking up --- cultural hierarchies are supposed to be collapsing, aesthetic pluralism is supposed to be flowering, established authenticities are supposed to be losing their cohesive force, and mass production and new communication channels are supposed to be cultivating ephemerality in the marketplace. Yet, on the other hand, modernist and technicist rationality is still supposed to be in process of capturing the institutions of state and national governments and stabilizing them as essentialist. Is this, then, not a recipe for a crisis-of-representation in human and cultural affairs (Marcus and Fischer 1986:8) in Texas as elsewhere? **Are the arts of life clashing with the science of governance?** Can we see a major contemporary crisis of representativity through the mere history served up for the weekend titillation of visitors and travellers? Is cultural heritage that significant in its identifications? Is human-heritage that important in its symbolism?

If the crisis does exist, it is inevitably conflagrating around matters of what Foucault style as 'received wisdom' (Merquior 1985:29). Foundationalist wisdoms in human affairs and culture are being replaced in the so-called advanced societies by what Foucault (see Connor 1989:9) calls a heterotopia --- "the whole centerless universe of the postmodern." Yet state/federal/national governments find it had to evolve forms of oversight that are other than centrist. Can a centrist government based on mechanisms of control comfortably administrate cultural policies demanding of freedom and differentiation? Can it loosen up its system of governance to match the fractionations within society ---

or is petty power, anyway, already exercised through a complex multiplicity of systems (whether it be for tourism or for whichever subject) rather than through the one system (Thackara 1988:29-31)?

The promise for cultural politics in the postmodern age is re-ignoration (Connor 1989:225) --- a world with no institutional boundaries, high or low (Ross 1988:viii). It is *micro-power* networks and relationships rather than macro-power. The reality of State government in the contemporary age, however, appears to be techne --- an order of institutional strength. It is *macro-power* enacted through petty-power, constantly articulated, moment to moment (xii). Such is the tension of governance that this umbrella research agenda and this immediate / adjuvant study conceivably addresses.

### 1.3 THE PROBLEM AND THE SUB-PROBLEM

The aim of this longhaul agenda as has been stated, is the improvement of understanding about the production of heritage in tourism. In pursuit of that goal, the start-up / catalyst study pursues **two** broadly problems **simultaneously**:

- (i) THE ISSUE: *on account of the dearth of research into the politics of tourism --- to provide richer insight into the exercise of State power as the heritage / history of Texas is manufactured; and,*
- (ii) THE SCIENCE DEPLOYED TO GET AT THE ISSUE: *on account of absence of proven research methodologies for the research of politics into government roles in cultural tourism --- to pilot a scientific approach capable of digging out that insight.*

Both of these tasks are constructive: both of these tasks concern the concept of opaque power. In this sense, therefore, the study is an analogy for its own problem.

The constructive nature of the twin tasks is straightforward. In terms of the issue, a construction of the history of Texas is presented to tourists: therefore, *what is the State's role in that construction?* In terms of the science, that history has a symbolic value to visitors to Texas, to Texans, and to State administrators (amongst others): therefore, *what is an effective research approach to construct that symbolic value for such individuals / institutions* (in this case, State administrators?).

The nature of opaque power is somewhat more elusive. Foucault used the term to describe the product of discourse acting in concert with praxis (for a useful questioning of Foucault's theory of power and praxis, see Habermas 1987:283). In broadest regard it refers to the merging of thought and expression (i.e., *discourse*) with ongoing everyday practice (i.e., *praxis*) to produce a structure of power which is rather obscure. Hence, until it is revealed, much opaque power is unsuspected by those controlled by it, by those onlooking, *and* by those wielding it. It is driven by conscious and unconscious motives. It has elements of both legitimacy and illegitimacy. It produces subjugation. But its main effect is to normalize. And in that it can be violent; quietly, pervasively, part unwittingly, part wittingly violent.

Therefore, concerning the issue, *does the State's exercise of place, role and authority constitute the silent rage of opaque power?*

Therefore, concerning the science, *is there a flexible research approach (sufficiently unencumbered by its own opaque normalizing effects) which can follow rather than predetermine the different constructions of heritage expected?*

*In this fashion, the conduct of the adjuvant study mirrors the examined conduct of its target population of administrators.*

In terms of 'the problem' of State decision-making the catalyst study will directly seek to question:

- whether the State's institutional arrangements are 'closed' or 'open' --- i.e., are the structures of power and working concepts so enmeshed as to encourage or deny a widely representative vision of Texas.
- whether the State is alert to the postmodern possibilities and ramifications of the history / heritage it promotes or not?
- whether State administrators have a refined sensitivity to different concepts of the Texas past or not --- and whether they articulate that sensitivity?
- whether State administrators are agents of normalcy in terms of what they do to get involved in to shape the heritage on show and what do *not* get involved in?

The purpose of this section (1.3) of the adjuvant study is, then, to provide a background in scientific reasoning for the selection of a method that can find appropriate responses for the above queries.

First, subsection 1.3.1. outlines the broad paradigmatic choices that are nowadays available in the social sciences. The age is been to be a period of experimentation and risk-taking in human and cultural research (Marcus and Fischer 1986:10). Significant shifts are taking place in the very concept of what social science is and can do (Lyne 1985:65). The *will-to-truth* of established positivist social science methodologies is increasingly suspect (Habermas 1987:248).

Second, subsection 1.3.2. explains the positivist outlook in social science and succeeding subsections (1.3.3. - 1.3.5.) proffer a brief introduction to the available alternative approaches to it, viz., via the paradigms of postpositivism, critical theory and constructivism.

Third, subsection 1.3.6. compares the four paradigms with respect to their capability to meet 'the goodness criteria' established for this study (i.e., how truthful is the truth they uncover?), and the following subsection 1.3.7., covers the reasons for both (i) the selection of constructivism as the most appropriate paradigm of the four, and (ii) the choice of naturalistic inquiry as the particular investigative method under this constructivist approach.

Fourth, it is then possible to explain the study problem at a greater level of scrutiny in terms of the adapted naturalistic method. So, 1.3.8. delineates 'the problem' and 1.3.9. its dependent sub-problems. The last subsection (1.3.10.) offers a recapitulation of some of the leading pointers covered in order to select an appropriate methodology. Those pointers are discussed with regard to their capacity to advance human and cultural understanding over and above the single question at hand.



### 1.3.1. The Social and Human Sciences: Research Paradigms

#### 1.3.1.1 Paradigms and Discourse Introduced

In the second half of the twentieth century considerable debate has simmered and boiled, simmered and boiled, as to what is appropriate in the conduct of science. The paradigms of science --- its basic belief systems --- have been subject to frequent critical surges as particular aspects of the conventional approaches to science have been challenged *ontologically* (i.e., in terms of the nature of reality), *epistemologically* (i.e., in terms of the nature of the relationship between the knower and the known), and *methodologically* (i.e., in terms of approved ways to conduct investigations) (Guba 1990:18). In order to explain the reasons for the selection of the paradigm in which this study is conducted, it is important that these late disjunctions to thought and technique in the research into social and human affairs are traced. Essentially, in Galtung's (1990:102) view, there are three perspectives which are taken account of in social science:

- *the empirical* --- the derivation of knowledge from evidence obtained from observation or experience; (*Hence, loosely, the positivism and post-positivism of this subsection*)
- *the critical* --- where values are explicitly brought in upon the analysis of empirical or other evidence; (*Hence, loosely, the critical theory of this subsection*)
- *the constructive* --- where reality is gauged in terms of alternative possibilities and in terms of the different trajectories of understanding that go with those different visions; (*Hence, loosely, the constructivism of this subsection*).

The three basic perspectives upon science constitute a family of outlooks (101). They can be used to support each other to widen the understanding of a given or non-given subject; yet in reality, that is rarely so (102). Social scientists tend to think and work either empirically *or* critically *or* constructively. It is a rare investigator who can hold back his or her investigative inclinations or preferences in order to choose the most appropriate inquiry perspective (paradigm) for each new study. The researcher may drive the paradigm by manipulating the tools of the method he / she has selected within the paradigm. But the structured thought-lines of the paradigm drive the researchers while he / she carries out the task, consistently drawing attention to some events and outcomes and consistently neglecting or downplaying others.

In recent decades the meaning of accepted scientific enterprise has been increasingly called into question as these a priori structure of assumption are called for examination --- the 'taken-for-granted' of research investigations (Fay 1975:43). The conduct of science is recognized by a growing proportion of social scientists to be subject to its own regimes of petty power and opaque power. Foucault (1980:93) sees science as the quest for truth, and he concerns himself with what was and still is the largely unsuspected structures of power that produce different versions and styles of truth in science. He appears to be alarmed not so much by the *existence* of various assumed rules-of-right which inhabit the

relations of power in science (93) but by the very *potency* of these respective prefigurations in science, and perhaps even more so by the almost axiomatic and un insightful deployment of these rules-of-right.

In Foucault's view, the combination, the admixture of a *practice* (viz., praxis) and a *manner of speaking* (viz., thought and speaking) comprise a *discourse* (Harland 1987:103). Discourse is not just communication, not merely language --- it is the whole structure of thought and action that is represented by a given language. And in social science, certainly in science, Foucault recognizes the existence of different languages, and therefore the existence of different discourses they represent. When one examines the paradigms of science one is studying discourse, then, in regard to the way a combination of thought and action tellingly shape the mobilization of, the direction of or the *progress* of science. And in social science, insight into discourse is perhaps even more crucial than to the natural sciences: "social investigators have never reached the extraordinary degree of basic agreement that characterizes modern natural science" (Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:2; see also Eisenstadt and Curclaru 1976).

### 1.3.1.2 Questions of Truth for Conventional Social Science

Under the scrutiny of the paradigmatic assumptions of conventional (empirical) science and in the inspection of orthodox discourse a number of frequently-occurring dissatisfactions have been raised. Without necessarily pre-judging their merit, ten of them are now presented:

- (i) *Failure to yield promised results.* Social physics had like the natural sciences promised 'triumphs of prediction, control and testability' (Geertz 1983:3), which have palpably not been forthcoming in so many aspects of social inquiry. Technological insight could not be seen to be able to pry everything out, as its proponents had claimed.
- (ii) *An uncovering of important misconceptions.* Social science had followed the natural sciences into believing that the world is a stable place (Manicas 1987:3) which worked to constant patterns and yielded neat and consistent 'knowable' results (41). Social science was now seen to have translated a number of such misconceptions from the physical science to its own human and cultural concerns. Nozick (1974:18) has codified this 'overall design / comprehensive pattern' logic as unsatisfactory "invisible hand explanations."
- (iii) *A tendency to self-confirm.* Both Western medicine and Western mental-health have been condemned by Foucault and others for operating as sciences with self-justificatory reasoning systems (Harland 1987:104). Not only do they rely on circular truths to an unpalatable degree, but that truth "depends overwhelmingly on the prestige and authority accorded to the figure of the doctor in our society" (104). In such instances, explanation is delivered not by science, ipso facto, but by personality. But such 'buffering' is not restricted just to medicine and mental health: it is believed to be duplicated in similar transformations elsewhere in human thought (105). Certain languages of social science utilize a vocabulary that claims a privileged attachment to reality. It uses sentences (in the widest metaphorical use of the term) that are "connected with other sentences rather than with the world" (Rorty 1979:357-394).

- (iv) *Disclosure that opinion is at work.* Proponents of orthodox empirical science aim for the value-free conduct of their investigations: the pervasive intent is to keep one's values, one's biases and one's subjective preferences completely out of the scientific effort (Nachmias and Nachmias 1987:66). But research is now increasingly recognized as not just a *scientific* activity, but a *social* one too: it is not only extremely hard to keep biases at bay, it is also demanding of considerable skill to even recognize where and when one's subjective views are at work --- their influence can be sustained but transparent: "The attempt to eradicate biases [and keep out subjective valuations] is a hopeless and misdirected venture ... . There is no other device for excluding biases in the social sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and sufficiently concertized value premises" (Myrdal 1944:1043). Science cannot free itself from bias. Durkheim (1976:439) acknowledged that even when scientists establish the canons by which 'sound science' is regulated, they are dealing in the subjective: "... science continues to be dependent upon opinion at the very moment when it seems to be making its laws."
- (v) *Over-concern with cause-and-effect.* One of the pivotal 'articles-of-faith' by which proper empirical science is carried out is the tenet that cause-and-effect relationships exist amongst physical and social entities (Sjoberg and Nett 1968:14) and that these relationships can be systematically discovered and diligently plotted. The merit of the axiomatic quest for cause-and-effect explanations has increasingly become suspect in social studies, however than cause / effect rules (Eisner 1990:98). The provision of analogues, instead, is nowadays found to be much more useful for practitioners, for instance, who need to apply knowledge or undertake action (Cronbach 1975).
- (vi) *Broader thought denied.* Empirical science was seen to have survived (and still survives in some spheres) somewhat removed from "the broader currents of modern thought ... a snug and insular enterprise" (Geertz 1983:3). Slowly, social science has taken on board ideas from elsewhere in the human sciences (in this sense a wider designation than conventional social science, extending to law, art, architecture, literature, et cetera [Marcus and Fischer 1986:7]). Through such disparate influences, abstract Parsonian visions of the social system have slipped to disfavor (10), and the personal and more imaginative ethnographic visions have come to popularity (21).
- (vii) *Philosophy side-lined.* Nineteenth century empiricism had been, an age of certainty, an age which encouraged noted scientists (as it did natural scientists) in the production of sweeping global pronouncements. The goal was, then, the universal validity of research (Marcus and Fischer 1986:22). The twentieth century has, however, witnessed the penetration of social science by sharp moral and critical vision. Philosophy was no longer unconcerned in social science: the weight of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Foucault, Habermas, Barthes, Kuhn and others has considerably destabilized the formerly secure technological condition of social

science (Geertz 1983:4). As a result technological vision faltered along with evolutionary / entelechic vision: both had sought global relevance, and both had pursued steady progress towards 'rational' values (Marcus and Fischer 1986:23).

- (viii) *Rejection of different worlds.* The systematic philosophy of the Enlightenment (i.e., high empiricism) had conceptualized objective truth as the common ground for all social science (and all science). Consequently, social science was believed to be or to have a singular discourse (Rorty 1979:382-3): there could only be one valid worldview in the human and cultural sciences. In this line of reasoning, for example, there should only be one sole history of the world. Foucault's archaeology of history, however, strongly challenges that Enlightenment convention. He adjudged that "whereas the orthodox history of human thought is a history of *the different things* that can have been seen in the world by human eyes, 'archaeological' history is a history of *the different worlds* that different human eyes have seen" (Harland 1987:106). But if there can have been different worlds in the past, then it is not hard to realize that there can also be different worlds in the present. In the post-empiricist age, accordingly, archaeologies-of-the-moment exuberate.
- (ix) *Language ignored.* The locus of the ideology which structured social science in the Enlightenment and under high empiricism lay within the economy. During the twentieth century, the pungent critique of first Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer, and later of Habermas, has shifted that locus to culture and to language (Ingram 1987:7). Language, as a substantive power on and within social thought had, in their collective view, been particularly overlooked under empiricism. Social scientists before Adorno tended to assume that *they* themselves were in control of language; after Habermas, only the foolhardy could continue to contend that the vocabulary and grammar of each and every language necessarily constrained the possibilities of expression --- whether it be via the philology of nations, of institutions, of disciplines or of whatever. Foucault (1970:297) summarizes succinctly the new regard for hidden forces of language:
- Expressing their thoughts in words of which they are not the masters, enclosing them in verbal forms whose historical dimensions they are unaware of, men believe that their speech is their servant and do not realize that they are submitting themselves to its demands. The grammatical arrangements of a language are the *a priori* of what can be expressed in it.
- (x): *Slight of history.* A final aspect of orthodox / enlightenment discourse (in social science) which has met calumny from post-empiricists is the impoverishment of history, itself, as context for human and cultural activity. Weber saw the problem as one where "our imagination [for everything] has been schooled in the world of our own everyday experience [and so all action and events get determined on those terms]" (see Weber in Manicas 1987:137). In Habermas's early estimation (he later retreated towards orthodoxy on account of the pitfalls of historical

relativism) this weakness in social science was an absence of historically-situated understanding (Ingram 1987:8-9). Fabian has echoed this by calling for an engagement between investigators of the past and their historic subjects, just as ethnographers of the present tend to encourage emic understanding. The implicit shortfall of historical situation is **a failure of coevalness**, according to Fabian --- where the inquirer does not see the need to position himself / herself in the same historic time and space (and thus categories of thought) as the people of the investigated past in question (Marcus and Fischer 1986:97). "Much like Edward Said's critique of Orientalist writing (for geographical ethnography), Fabian shows how [historical] ethnography has tended to devalue its subjects relative to the [contemporary] West ... " (97).

Given the weight of these dissatisfactions one could argue that "the very foundations of the social sciences are rotten" (Bernstein 1976:xi). What purports to be objective scientific insight is indeed a shrouded ideology --- sometimes unconsciously so, sometimes consciously. The empirical conception of science had proven, to many, to be untenable (Manicas 1987:4). Social science had been seen by Foucault, to be directed in many senses by the ingrained power of conservative forces (Harland 1987:165), and Habermas had shown that the concepts which marshall contemporary discourse in the social sciences "possess meanings which had evolved historically and contain their own sedimentation of past interpretations (Ingram 1987:xiii). When Nietzsche warned of "The Will to Power" that would replace religious belief, and which would be exhibited as the secular ideology of totalitarian 'gangster' politicians, had he perhaps also not the dread of gangster researchers in mind (Johnson 1983:48)?

The very idea of social science is now contestable (Manicas 1987:3). The rising skepticism of the twentieth century has rendered Enlightenment approaches in social science as suspect: "the belief *that increased systematic empirical understanding of how society and politics work would **naturally** lead to the intelligent formulation of policies, ameliorate social inequities and injustices, and enable us to solve the problems of society*" had become doubtful in many quarters of the human and cultural affairs (Bernstein 1976:xii; emphasis added). New social science sensibilities began to flower: a restructuring of human and cultural theory began to emerge. Alternative avenues to knowledge, which had been caste aside in recent centuries as inapt, misdirected and debilitated now were rediscovered with some fervor. Critical perspectives took on renewed vitality. And "phenomenology and hermeneutics, which 'tough-minded' empiricists had viewed with suspicion as 'tender-minded' woolly foreign intrusions, struck many young thinkers as providing a more genuine and perspicuous insight into social relations than did the weary formulas of those who prided themselves on meticulous, rigorous empirical research" (xii).

Hence, in any study which sets out to plumb 'truth' it is important that the longstanding discourse of Enlightenment and empiricism is scaled against the discourse of these new and renewed alternative approaches to social inquiry. Hence the seriousness of the study of paradigms, and the relevance of Kuhn (1970) for this dissertation.

In the four sections that follow immediately, the four leading paradigms of the age will be inspected in terms of their capacity to see into 'truth'. Enlightenment empiricism has become *positivism* (1.3.2), and otherwise Galtung's three fundamental perspectives in inquiry are (to repeat) *postpositivism* (1.3.3) for his 'updated empiricism,' *critical theory* (1.3.4) for his 'value-stated approaches,' and *constructivism* (1.3.5) for his 'alternative realities' accounts.

It is important to point out at the outset, however, that the term paradigm is a rather ambiguous one --- Kuhn is himself supposed to have used it in twenty-two different ways (Mastermen 1970; Bernstein 1976:85-9). The danger exists, then, that the term paradigm can mean all things to all people. Similarly, in much argumentation, disfavored outlooks are inclined to be totalized --- as Ladd (1982:161) found for relativism: "all the common definitions of ... relativism are framed by opponents of relativism ... they are absolutist definitions." Too frequently, it seems that it is assumed that "someone who does not hold your views holds the reciprocal of them, or simply has not got any" (Geertz 1984:264). Debates on discourse can soon become uninformed in these fashions.

So, in order to frame discussion in the immediate four subsections, Eckberg and Hill's (1979:932) delineation of a paradigm will be adapted whereby a paradigm is that form of unified belief shared by a cohesive community and which (in this context) has relevance:

- for substantive matters of concern;
- within a discipline (i.e., never being as wide as a discipline); and,
- to bring those researchers / practitioners into a sustained coalescence on their approach to given problem solution (935).

Paradigms belong rather to ages, to discourses and to *epistemes* rather than to disciplines. Disciplines are structured and formal ways of understanding truth and the world: paradigms, at root, are specific social and rhetorical ways of understanding truth and the world.

### 1.3.2 Positivist Perspectives

The basic premises of conventional positivism and of the three other paradigms are given in Table 1.3.2./1 with regard to their ontology, their epistemology and their methodology. The table and much of the insight that follows in subsection 1.3.2 to 1.3.5 is culled from the published record of the 1989 San Francisco Alternative Paradigms Conference, published by Sage Publications under the sponsorship of Phi Delta Kappa International and The School of Education, Indiana University (Guba 1990).

As Table 1.3.2./1 indicates, the underlying beliefs of positivism are:

#### ■ ONTOLOGY

- a reality does exist 'out there';
- it is driven by immutable natural laws;
- the function of science is to find out what that true nature is and how it 'truly' works;

- the overall purpose of science is the prediction and control of natural phenomena (Guba 1990:19).

#### ■ EPISTEMOLOGY

- its epistemology is objectivist;
- it sustains the view that objectivity is an 'Archimedean point' which enables the investigator to uncover the ways of nature without changing them at all (19).

#### ■ METHODOLOGY

- the proper and preferred methodology is empirical experimentalism (19).

The perspective of positivism that only a 'scientific' (i.e., objectively rational) approach to social problems can produce reliable solutions has been increasingly attacked during the second half of the twentieth century, as has the view that trustworthy solutions can only be obtained via instrumental questioning (Fay 1975:61). Mechanistic science of this sort is felt to be overly expedient by its critics: "it necessarily reifies the basic social institutions and customs of the society it is studying" (58). That reification impoverishes socio-political awareness of the human and cultural subject being studied. It tends to lead to an artificial reinforcement of the place of those reified institutions and customs in society therefore sustaining the presence and the force of those entities in society. The world is only seen in those reified terms: the world *becomes* those reified, conservative, control-oriented, industrialized instrumental terms. Hence positivism is not neutral as its Enlightenment adherents claimed; it has an exceedingly strong ideology which has only been convincingly unmasked in recent decades (64).

The doctrinaire and enduring conservatism of positivism have been codified by Lincoln and Guba (1985:24-28). They are presented in Table 1.3.2./2.

### 1.3.3 Postpositivist Perspectives

In this study the term postpositivism refers to a transformed type of positivism: sometimes the term is used elsewhere to refer to all of the efforts in science that come after high positivism and that do not adhere to strict positivist belief. Here, though, the term is used just in reference to the development of the paradigm, not for the development of all or most inquiry. The platform premises of postpositivism were provided in Table 1.3.2./1. They embrace these key ideas:

#### ■ ONTOLOGY

- the naive realism of positivism is replaced by a posture of critical realism which does recognize that a real world exists, which does acknowledge that real natural causes are at work within that world, *but* which denies that it is possible for humans to faithfully perceive that world on account of the frailties of the sensory and intellectual apparatus (Cook and Campbell 1979:29). Postpositivism retains realism as a pivotal belief, but concedes that humans can never fully know that 'truth' (Guba 1990:20).

TABLE 1.3.2./1

**THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY:  
A COMPARISON OF THREE LEAD STRUCTURAL  
WORLDVIEWS (PARADIGMS)**

Issue	-----Paradigm-----		
	Post-Positivist	Critical Theory	Constructivism
Ontology	<p>Realist</p> <p>Reality exists but can never be fully apprehended -- only incompletely understood -- therefore critical realist</p>	<p>Realist</p> <p>Critical realist (as per post-positivist).</p>	<p>Relativist</p> <p>Realities exist in the form of multiple mental constructions -- socially and experientially based, local and specific, dependent for their form and content on the persons who hold them.</p>
Epistemology	<p>Dualist/Objectivist</p> <p>Objectivity remains a regulatory ideal, but can only be approximated.</p>	<p>Interactive/Subjectivist</p> <p>Values immediate inquiry which is participative and/or reflects the values of human players.</p>	<p>Interactive/Subjectivist</p> <p>Inquirer and inquired are fused into a singular (monistic) entity. Findings are the creation of a process of interaction between the two.</p>
Methodology	<p>Interventionist</p> <p>Modified experimental / manipulative methods emphasizing critical multiplism. Redresses imbalances by doing inquiry in more natural settings.</p>	<p>Participative</p> <p>Dialogic / transformative -- seeking the elimination of false consciousness and the facilitation of a transformed world.</p>	<p>Hermeneutic / Dialectic</p> <p>Individual constructions are elicited and refined hermeneutically, and are compared and contrasted dialectically -- with the aim of generating one (or a few) constructions on which there is general consensus.</p>

SOURCE: Hollinshead 1991/A; originally adapted from Guba 1990: 20, 23, 25, 27, and 78.



## ■ EPISTEMOLOGY

- findings are produced through the interaction of knower and known --- it is not possible for investigators to become affect-less / ahuman beings during the course of the study - -- the frailties and interferences of human communication and insight are admitted;
- *but* it sustains the view that researchers can strive towards that state of neutrality and ought to state outright any predispositions or interferences they were aware of (20-21).

## ■ METHODOLOGY

- postpositivists favor the use of more than one method or more than one approach or more than one means of studying each distinct variable and each problem, viz., triangulation;
- the use of a variety of data collection and analytical techniques (to permit the weaknesses of the methods to cancel each other out) is also favored; it is an extension of triangulation and is known as multiple operationism;
- where emphasis is also placed upon exegesis as well as multiple operationism, the practice of critical multipilism is followed (Cook 1985);
- postpositivists acknowledge the many trade-offs that necessarily exist in the conduct of science, but recognize the need to reduce some of the excesses of the quest for objectivity by:
  - restoring the claim of 'relevance' vis-a-vis 'rigor';
  - not neglecting 'richness' in the pursuit of 'precision';
  - aiming for 'applicability' as well as 'elegance';
  - admitting place for 'the art of discovery' in addition to the positivist goal of 'verification' (Guba 21-23).

Certain caveats ought to be stated about postpositivism: it is a slippery subject.

It is a wide, complex and fast-changing route towards knowledge: there are many different postpositivist approaches. Since most postpositivists recognize that there can be no absolute justifications in science, it may be more correct to use Dewey's old term of '*warranted assertibility*' rather than 'truth' to describe the claims postpositivists who so reject the possibility of absolute authority in science (Phillips 1990:32). Postpositivists do not, however, give up the notion of objectivity, for the effort to try to be precise and unbiased is "a regulative ideal that underlies all inquiry" (Phillips: in press). As Karl Popper (1976:95) --- sometimes celebrated as the first postpositivist --- noted, however, "the objectivity of science is not [properly] a matter of individual scientists but rather the social result of their mutual [thorough and ongoing] criticism."

In certain respects some postpositivists hold to views which are the obverse of those of high positivism. One must resist the temptation, however, to regard either positivism or postpositivism as more

TABLE 1.3.2./2

## REMONSTRANCE AGAINST POSITIVISM: CENSURE UPON THE CLAIMS OF REALIST ONTOLOGY

The following challenges to positivism exist:

1. POSITIVISM LEADS TO AN INADEQUATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF WHAT SCIENCE IS  
 --- efforts to establish 'verifiability' and 'falsifiability' as necessary and sufficient conditions for science have failed.
2. POSITIVISM IS UNABLE TO DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH TWO CRUCIAL AND INTERACTING ASPECTS OF THE THEORY-FACT RELATIONSHIP  
 --- the first is *the problem of induction*: there are always many conclusions that can reasonably be related to certain premises. Thus there is always a large number of theories that can fit observations more or less adequately.  
 --- the second is *the theory-ladenness of facts*: it is impossible to have facts which are not themselves theory determined.
3. POSITIVISM IS OVERLY DEPENDENT ON OPERATIONALISM, WHICH HAS ITSELF BEEN INCREASINGLY JUDGED TO BE INADEQUATE  
 --- operationalism is too shallow, depending as it does almost entirely on sensations for its 'facts' and refusing to deal with meanings or implications; moreover, operationally defined facts are just as theory-laden as any others.
4. POSITIVISM HAS AT LEAST TWO CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE BOTH REPUGNANT AND UNFOUNDED  
 --- the first is *determinism*: it is repugnant because of its implications for free will, and unfounded since (according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle) the future state of particles is not predictable and acts of experimentation will themselves determine the observed state; antiquity about the future is, then, a condition of nature.  
 --- the second is *reductionism*: it is repugnant because it would make all phenomena including human phenomena ultimately subject to a single set of laws, and unfounded because recent findings in many fields rule it out.
5. POSITIVISM HAS PRODUCED RESEARCH WITH HUMAN RESPONDENTS THAT IGNORES THEIR HUMANNESS, A FACT THAT HAS NOT ONLY ETHICAL BUT VALIDITY IMPLICATIONS  
 --- it has emphasized *exogenous* research -- in which all aspects of the research from problem definition through to use-of-findings have been researcher-determined -- to the virtual exclusion of *endogenous* research -- in which the respondents have equal rights of determination.  
 --- it has emphasized *etic* research -- carried out with an outside (objective) perspective.  
 --- to the virtual exclusion of *emic* research -- carried out with an inside perspective (subjective).
6. POSITIVISM FALLS SHORT OF BEING ABLE TO DEAL WITH EMERGENT CONCEPTUAL/EMPIRICAL FORMULATIONS FROM A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING  
 --- Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem: no axiomatic system of mathematics is able to provide information about the completeness and consistency of that axiomatic system.  
 --- Bells Theorem: no theory compatible with quantum theory can require spatially separated events to be independent.
7. POSITIVISM RESTS UPON FIVE ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN  
 --- an ontological assumption of a single, tangible reality that can be broken apart into pieces capable of being studied independently (where the whole is simply the sum of its parts).  
 --- an epistemological assumption about the separation of the observer from the observed.  
 --- an assumption of the temporal and contextual interdependence of observations (that what is true at one time and place may also be true at another time and place).  
 --- an assumption of linear causality: there are no effects without causes and no causes without effects.  
 --- An axiological assumption of value freedom: that the soundness of the methodology guarantees that the results of an inquiry are essentially free from the influence of any value-system/bias.

SOURCE: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba 1985:24-28.

monolithic or indeed as more homogenous than they actually are (Bernstein 1976:xv). There are numerous variants of each. Nonetheless, orthodox positivism does differ considerably from postpositivism --- the former is atomistic, the latter is one of the new structural paradigms of postmodernity, though is unwise to infer that postpositivism is entirely a child of postmodernity. It may be healthier and sufficient to suggest that postpositivism and postmodernity share many of the same anti-foundational impulses.

But postpositivism does depart from positivism in that it attends to the unavoidable human and social character of scientific inquiry. Table 1.3.3./1 lists a set of six pointers from Heron (1981) as to why (in respect of that humanness) the postpositivist paradigm is superior to the positivist paradigm in the search for 'truth' ('warranted assertibility'). The table emphasizes "the subtle, developing interdependence between propositional knowledge, practical knowledge and experiential knowledge" (31), viz., not just science as *product* (statements of inquiry) but science also as *process* (research skills and researcher-respondent intersubjectivities).

In support of Heron's six lines of argument, Lincoln and Guba (1985:46) note, as an aside, that the very terms used for 'people' in the two paradigms reveals much. They suggest that positivists are prone to calling humans 'subjects' or even 'objects-of-inquiry' as if they are inanimate. That corresponds with the rising preference for 'respondents' in postpositivism, a small tribute "to the [inescapably] interactive character of human inquiry.

#### 1.3.4 Critical Theory Perspectives

Critical theory emerged in Germany in the 1920s (Thompson and Held 1982:2). Critical theory is that group of ideologically structured analysis which attempt to integrate theory and practice in the attempt to account for the nature of social theory (Fay 1975:92). It pivots upon the values of its human architects; neo-Marxism, feminism, participatory inquiry are all examples of it. They each have their own *value-window* upon life and science which reveals how life, nature and the world 'really is'.

In the general sense, a critical science is one which attempts to demystify the ways in which culture (or the people within a particular society) are manipulated by political and economic processes. It is a science which exhibits three main features, according to Fay (1975:93-95):

- it accepts the necessity of interpretive understanding in social science:

Whether dealing with contemporary objectifications as historical traditions [the investigator is an] interpreter [and] cannot abstractly free himself from his hermeneutic point of departure. He cannot simply jump over the open horizon of his own life activity and just suspend the context of tradition in which his own subjectivity has been formed in order to submerge himself in a sub-historical stream of life that allows the pleasurable identification of everyone with everyone else (Habermas 1968:181);

TABLE 1.3.3./1

**THE CASE FOR POSTPOSITIVISM OVER POSITIVISM:  
HERON'S SIX CARDINAL POINTS IN FAVOR OF POSTPOSITIVISM  
AS RESPONSIBLE HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCE**

1. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF RESEARCH BEHAVIOR
  - Researchers ought not define one model of behavior for themselves and another for their respondents; the safeguards against this danger are weak-to-non-existent in positivism.
2. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONALITY
  - Researchers should consult with respondents to ensure that their intentionality and the researcher's rendition of it do match; this need is largely unrecognized in positivism, but stressed in many postpositivist approaches.
3. THE ARGUMENT FROM LANGUAGE
  - Language is prone to be regarded as a taken-for-granted under positivism; with postpositivism, the power of language as an archetype for inquiring itself is admitted -- language constitutes a form of interactive inquiry in its own right.
4. THE ARGUMENT FROM EXTENDED EPISTEMOLOGY
  - Positivism has a limited perspective on the theory of knowledge. Advanced postpositivist insight comprehends that science involves not only propositional knowledge (as per positivism) but also practical knowledge (e.g., proficiency at research) and experiential knowledge (e.g., sustained awareness of respondent or subject).
5. THE ARGUMENT FROM AXIOLOGY
  - Positivists assume values have no place in properly conducted investigations; postpositivists recognize, for instance, that 'facts' about people have no secure status as truth until those individuals assent to (and regard as their own) the norms and values of the researcher. Hence values are omnipresent, and can be critically influential.
6. THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ARGUMENT
  - Orthodox positivism has few, if any, methodological checks to guard against the exploitation of people in investigations. Postpositivism emphasizes the need to protect people from being managed or manipulated.

SOURCE: Original source: Heron (1981); adapted from Lincoln and Guba's (1985:30-31) condensed account of Heron.

- it is predicated upon the view that a high number of the actions people carry out are occasioned by social conditions over which they have no control, and that a considerable amount of what people engage in is *not* the product of conscious knowledge or volition. The social order suppresses (or rather *compresses*) free will. People are seen to act with a false consensus about 'reality'; much of their illusion is historically transmitted;
- it maintains that social practices are infused with social theory of one sort or another to the degree that what is regarded as truth is to some lesser or greater extent determined by the way that scientific knowledge relates to individual and institutional practical action. It sees the real barriers to insight to be distorted communication.

But more of this in Table 1.3.4./1 --- first the ground rules of the paradigm need presenting. Again, Table 1.3.2./1 provides a basic presentation of its ontology, epistemology and methodology.

#### ■ ONTOLOGY

- there is an objective reality, but critical theorists see it as one about which people are prone to each having a *false consciousness*;
- the implication of 'false consciousness' is that there is a 'true consciousness' towards which those who are currently guided by wrong, inadequate or improper values can be re-aligned or re-directed;
- the ontology of critical theory becomes a political act in that it (i) it proceeds from a value-determination, and (ii) it provides a demonstration as to how 'oppressed people' ought act to become free of their subjugation (Guba 1990:24) [ --- that is not to say that positivism, post-positivism and constructivism are not also essentially political: it is just to say that the political character of critical theory is overt].

#### ■ EPISTEMOLOGY

- the epistemology of critical theory is subjectivist even though its ontology is realist --- the values of the inquirer actually shape theories of knowledge (24).

#### ■ METHODOLOGY

- critical theorists seek the transformation of the world through the transformation of the understanding and therefore the behavior of individuals (and institutions) --- methodologies are adapted which facilitate this change of consciousness;
- preferred methodologies are dialogic, i.e., discursive approaches designed to uncover better and better points of view over time;
- under critical theory, the most effective approaches are those which bring about collective changes of consciousness and concerted transformation of action (24) [ --- manipulative interventionist methodologies inherently speak against 'true consciousness' and are not, ideationally, acceptable].

Consonantly, critical theory is socially constructed analysis, routinely being voiced over human, social, cultural, political and economic affairs. As Table 1.3.4./1 endeavors to show in terms of its outlook upon truth, it is partisan inquiry (what science is not?) of an exposed kind. It is the bald and open (rather than the cloistered and concealed) infusion of tribal views in and through scientific investigation, as the Table indicates --- where the Frankfurt School (of Critical Theory itself), French structuralism and poststructuralism are established genres. The table does, however, concentrate primarily on the views of the Frankfurt School (Bernstein 1976:xvii) --- especially those of Jürgen Habermas.

As Table 1.3.4./1 attempts to reveal, critical theorists seek to make manifest the involvement of social and cultural researchers in the unclenching of truth and in the transportation of the social relations which the new broadcast of that truth liberalizes. Thus, critical theory is not truth or knowledge alone, it is *knowledge allied to interest* (Aronowitz 1988:51). In that fashion it is the critical account of the normally guarded or the subconscious selectivity of both scientific endeavor and of everyday human action. But, it is also the explicit selectivity of future science and behavior.

Popkewitz (1990:47-8) considers that critical theory is *critical* in two senses. Its first criticality concerns its dependence upon *internal questioning* its rigorous scrutiny of evidence and line of argument. Its second criticality concerns its *external critique of society, power and class (or other relations)*. In the former, perhaps, an intellectual character predominates and in the latter a transformative character triumphs. The Popkewitz (50-51) review of critical theory mirrors the insight contained in Table 1.3.4./1, though he proffers six composite rather than twenty distinctive themes (and his review focuses restrictively upon science in the realm of education). The six Popkewitz characterizations are:

- (i) *certain historical and institutional conditions and practices reduce science to technical activity.*
  - scientific method is in danger, in many spheres, of becoming one method; scientific methods should be *fitting* (particular to the study being undertaken) rather than *procedural*.
- (ii) *the reasoning of science is always bound in time and space.*
  - science has traditions of inquiry which have a 'built in' preferences and patterns; thus science is not universally valid (as positivists and neo-positivists might claim) but it operates by a logic borne in institutional settings and amongst social interests. The epistemology of science is *social*.

TABLE 1.3.4./1

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH:  
TRIBAL SCIENCE AND THE ANALYSIS OF HISTORY

-- with an emphasis upon the views of Jürgen Habermas --

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

CRITICAL THEORY AND SCIENCE

1 CONCERN OVER THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE. In many respects critical theorists follow Nietzsche who saw Western philosophy and science as illusion -- *unlogical from the beginning* (1>1). Positivism is unacceptable to them since it maintains that there cannot be knowledge that transcends the methodological knowledge of empirical science. Orthodox, Cartesian science is unacceptable because it is determined by technical cognitive interests (1>2). Technical interests presupposes its categories: so therefore does empirical science (1>3).

e.g., Concern by critical theorists that empirical science attempts to measure the concept of truth across all societies, ignoring different valuations of different concepts of truth.

2 CONCERN OVER THE DISHONESTY OF SCIENCE. Critical theorists challenge empirical science because it takes for granted explicit points of view on reality 'without mentioning them' (2>1). Orthodox empiricism has its impetus in the ideals of Enlightenment: its hidden regulative ideal is 'progress' (2>2). Habermas and other critical theorists follow the philosopher Gadamer for in his dismissal of the false objectivism of the empirical-analytic sciences, and for his condemnation of the truth they derive as pseudo-knowledge (2>3). Nietzsche considers orthodox science dishonest, because it invokes nature, yet claims mastery over it. It conceptualizes nature, and considers nature to be nothing other than its conceptualizations (2>4). The truths of empirical-analytic science are untrustworthy because they are compulsive (2>5).

e.g., Agitation amongst critical theorists that empirical science only investigates the world it can directly experience; therefore even historical truth is only that which is palpable.

3 CONCERN OVER HYPERFACTUAL METHODS. Critical theorists tend to object to the scientism of orthodox empiricism, i.e., to conventional science's belief in itself, according to Habermas (3>1). Nietzsche saw the rules of logic and calculation of empirical-analytic science as a priori and as a simplified means of control (3>2). That control becomes endemic, and leads to *hyperfactuality* -- the "belief that the real business of science is the collection of data and the advancing of empirical generalizations based [only] on it" (3>3). Critical theorists lie uneasily with this over-emphasis on deriveability (3>4).

e.g., Concern by critical theorists that positivist / neo-positivist science equates knowledge only with science; there is no truth (for positivists and neo-positivists) beyond that which science can discover or corroborate. Thus myth is void, to them.

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

4 CONCERN OVER TECHNOCRATIC CONSCIOUSNESS. The development of large-scale industrial and business organizations has led, according to critical theorists to a re-emphasis of state roles. State activity fundamentally now surrounds the stabilization of the economy on behalf of those organizations. So, the state orbit of activity is reduced and constrained (4>1). The state now is perceived as being bolstered by legitimization systems which create for it interventionist roles designed to protect the self-interested use of capital by those organizations and the accordant mass loyalty of the rest of the society (4>2). 'Public' opinion becomes replaced by 'state' opinion -- which is really 'bourgeoisie opinion'. The public is, itself, denied expression of its consciousness. It is oppressed by the madness of this technocratic will (4>3).

5 CONCERN OVER EMASCULATION OF REASON. Habermas, as a leading critical theorist, fears that under capitalism the balance between the life world and the rationalization of system has been disturbed (5>1). The march of society towards science and technology under Enlightenment cramps reason (5>2). This narrowing of reason in currency is translated through bureaucratic and technological administration to other areas of cultural and community affairs. Thus an instrumental concept of reason (rather than capitalism itself) assumes cultural hegemony in the West (5>3). This instrumental reason produces *unfreedoms* of many kinds.

CRITICAL THEORY AND HUMANITY

6 RECOGNITION OF THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE. Critical theorists, and many other anti- or post-positivists reject orthodox empiricism because (amongst other reasons) it fails to recognize that knowledge of social entities is a social variable (6>1). Critical Theorists believe that social phenomena are 'historically conditioned' and 'culturally determined' (6>2). In this fashion 'knowledge' of 'interest' become a singular aspect of self-reflection in the formation of understanding. Such '*knowledge -constitutive interests*' determine the character of objectivity: 'meaning' thus equates with 'interest' (6>3). Over time, as the volume of knowledge in currency expands exponentially, scientific-social communities claim mastery of various types of truth. Critical theory conjoins Kuhn on his awareness of the social underpinnings of a given change in knowledge: "there is no standard higher than the relevant community" (6>4).

7 RECOGNITION OF CONTESTABLE NATURE OF TRUTH. Empirical-analytic science is not necessarily denigrated by many critical theorists because of its own deficiencies, rather its claim to be the only route to truth is abhorred. Habermas, for instance, objects to its status as a canonical standard (7>1). Critical theorists are akin to surrealists and anthropological ethnographers: in Clifford's words (7>2) they see the interpretation of human affairs as a *contested reality*. During the twentieth century critical theory has been part of the emergence of "a new universe of discourse" formed around the view that humans are self-interpreting creatures (7>3). These new discourses and sensibilities are not action related themselves, but as different/contested versions of reality they feed subsequent 'communicative action' (7>4).

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Under technocratic consciousness journalism changes from an occupation stimulated by conviction to one 'motivated essentially by commerce' (4>4). Can, does or has the state's historical truth gone the same way in the media?

e.g., Are the concepts of historical 'truth' in vogue in the contemporary age instrumental, whereby other non-instrumental truths (viz., unrelated to capitalism) have become, in contrast, unfree?

e.g., If knowledge is social, and formed by 'knowledge-constitutive interests,' what is/are the relevant community/communities that shape the larger historical truths of a place/state/nation?

e.g., How many 'truths' are there for a particular event in history, and how are they different? Which truth has fed which state agency's 'communicative action'?



TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

8 RECOGNITION OF SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-UNDERSTANDING ON KNOWLEDGE FORMATION. During the twentieth century critical theorists have theorized a good deal about the self-constitution of the human species. Self-generation has been considered as productive activity, and self-formation as critical-revolutionary activity (8>1). As a result a given critical theory on social or political matters "must be grounded in the self-understandings of the actors even as it seeks to get them to conceive of themselves and their situations differently" (8>2). If a given critical theory is to endure, it must promote critical self-reflection: "it can succeed only if individuals are able to recognize their own /lives in the descriptions provided by the theory" (8>3). Critical theory is thus a modern manifestation of the Socratican ideal of self-reflection, i.e., the conviction that advanced self-dialogic can free individuals "from the tyranny and bondage of false opinion (doxa)" (8>4). This self-criticism demands, according to Habermas, direct self-confrontation. When deficiencies in a particular critical theory are revealed, the theorist should reject the no-longer-defensible, preserve the valid, and move beyond the initial formulation to new frontiers of reflection (8>5).

9 RECOGNITION THAT SOCIAL THEORY HAS TO BE HISTORICALLY ORIENTED. In Habermas's view, if social theory is to account for the way in which patterns of interpretation (of history or anything) and of related praxis develop and alter, it must be historically oriented. This is not an easy undertaking "for there is no point outside of history from which to view the whole [of history]" (9>1); present day judgements always interfere. Social science is inevitably about the past -- how humans have thought about and translated what has happened, and how past levels of understanding affect present awareness. Critical theorists object, then, to the legacy of positivism which they see as rule - oriented and procedural -- thereby designating the world as asocial and ahistorical. They see the positivists' legacy of evolutionism as being "firmly embedded [in] contemporary thought," so much so that even ethnographic anthropologists had reduced the vision of the whole of Western civilization to the critique of capitalism (9>2). Habermas recognizes, however, that critical theorists can over-compensate against the monopolistic tendencies of positivism: *historicism can itself become a monopolistic vision* (9>3).

10 RECOGNITION THAT EMANCIPATION CAN ONLY BE A FUTURE STATE. Gadamer saw the past as a source of both insight and values that would be continually reformulated in ever new scenarios. Habermas, however, emphasized subjugation and distortion in his accounts of the past. Critical theorists largely follow Habermas in stressing the need to constantly strive to rid the domination and regressions of the past. They are not fired up by Gadamer's awe for the resplendent benefits of tradition (*Überlegenheit*) (10>1), but call for a future age of right and liberality. Ricoeur, though, believes future emancipation can be accommodated within existing cultural acquisitions if a given population can develop 'ethical distance' from their past (10>2).

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Which longstanding accounts of (i) history have survived wholesale in a given place because they relate to current lives; (ii) have been amended to relate to current lives; and (iii) are now rejected because they do not appear to relate to current lives? To what degree are these continuities and discontinuities self-reflected critical theory at work?

e.g., Is there evidence of monopolism in the accounts of the heritage of a given region? If so, is that singular vision an example of evolutionism, of historicism or of some other consuming tendency?

e.g., Are the dominant accounts of a given place/state Gadamerian -- celebrating the past as superior? Or are they in line with critical theory -- part of a continuing push for freedom and latitude?

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

## COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

## CRITICAL THEORY AND POWER

11 MANIFESTATION OF STRUCTURAL POWER. Critical theory is concerned with the deciphering of cultural meaning in societies, but not only with that. It is also concerned with the way these meanings interface with the political and economic order. Critical theory is, then, *fundamentally* and not *tangentially* about the power relations that surround cultural meaning, or which are infused by cultural meaning. Critical theorists seek the manifestation of class dynamics, institutional roles and like power plays (11>1). Habermas, for illustration, sees the power of secularization, of bureaucratization of scientism and of statism as being immense forces acting upon the destabilization of the Judeo-Christian heritage and upon the liberal ideological traditions of the West (11>2). They each demand that individuals lead productive and fulfilling lives, and that mores infiltrates societal institutions, particularly in emergent national and territorial states. There, *public power* is not representative of a 'person' in authority, it is the monopolistic power of 'the state' to act. That public power is almost tangible (11>3).

12 MANIFESTATION OF THE APPARATUS OF LEGITIMATION. In late-capitalist societies critical theorists theorize and on power within the economic system and power within the administrative system of the state. They also study power within the legitimization system of the state -- an increasingly significant sphere during the current century. Habermas believes modern-states face an ongoing *legitimation crisis*: they must continue to gather capital yet they must also sustain the loyalty of the populace. On the one hand they must project the particularist cause of property owners and of administrative-technical elites (to ensure capital accumulation), but on the other they must bring about the general prosperity of society. So particularist class interests must be *hidden* if mass loyalty is to be inspired (12>1). In this manner, legitimization arises from the harmony built between these counter-obligations. Many governments are caught without much latitude to build that harmony (12>2). Baudrillard, however, believes that nowadays "the masses are withdrawing 'without knowing it' from the social and political areas in which power legitimates itself" (12>3). **The public is increasingly absent**, in his view, from the venues of critical debate over this legitimacy.

13 MANIFESTATION OF EXPERT POWER. The public sphere of governance is an important area of critical theory, chiefly covering the degree to which 'the public' is able to play a critical role in and upon government. In the current century, that role is weakening according to many critical theorists. An age of *nonpublic opinion* has been reached (13>1) where the secret policies of interest groups predominate. In Habermas's estimation this growth of nonpublic decision-making has permitted an abridgement of the rationalizations which are available to governments and which lead society (13>2). The felt dominance and limitations of scientific-technological knowledge have already been noted in 1 and 2 above. Allied to it has been (according to much critical theory) a over-abundance of expert theory. The expert 'culture' of science, of morality and of art -- which act upon government and society -- are reckoned to have "become isolated from daily life" (13>3).

## RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Do the instrumentalities of a state act with a monopolistic form of 'public power' to consolidate a particular vision of history? Does a state's history constitute a bourgeois celebration of 'productivity'?

e.g., Do definitions of history play a role in a states government's quest for legitimacy? Does the projected history bolster the inherited rights of elites, or is it designed to inform the masses of the supposed perfection in which the state was formed, and allegedly exists?

e.g., Has the public been excluded from the definitions of history in vogue in a given place or nation? Is that historical truth concocted by *experts* alone who may or may not represent particular view points?

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

14 MANIFESTATION OF FORCES OF CURSORY PRECISION. Empiricists value theories which are productive. Merton informs that for a theory to be fruitful it must be precise and determinate (14>1). Empiricists are inclined to sophisticated use of statistics to approach that precision and determinacy, tending to consider that the only values involved are those in the numbers themselves. Taxonomic and multi-level representations of problems are set up on the premise that the elements being studied are discrete and that the sum of the neat divisions do add up to a tidy whole. Critical theorists tend to regard this type of well-groomed explanation of causation as fragmentary. They suggest that the infinitesimal is unnecessarily celebrated and entitled and that the entirety and the integral are neglected. They see a shallow treatment of the aggregation of human and social activity. The rules of purposive-rational action *objectify* the processes of society as they do of nature (14>2).

15 MANIFESTATION OF IDIOGRAPHIC SOCIAL EVENTS. Cartesian thought is prone to documenting reality as unproblematic, and it works on nomological forms of knowledge. Habermas states that this reductionist approach cannot satisfy critical social science: "[they are] concerned with going beyond this [law-making] goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp *invariant* regularities of social action and [when it is variant and must be] transformed" (15>1). The essential problem in trying to establish general laws for the social sciences is that social entities are 'historically conditioned' and 'culturally determined', so only *narrow and restricted generality* will apply (15>2). Hence, analytic-empiricism runs on nomothetic insight, whereas critical theory gravitates to idiographic awareness.

CRITICAL THEORY AND COMMUNICATION

16 COMPETENCY IN COMMUNICATION. Habermas believes individuals are bound together in a given society by *webs-of-communicative action*. These webs are not mechanistic/structural relationships, but are established within the pertaining cultural tradition (16>1). People are thus entangled (within the societies to which they belong) by the histories they share (16>2). Individuals, according to Habermas, *never* have these communicative actions under control: the action is not always deliberate and intentional, but it is always interactive. A given speech act is not just an utterance, it also completes an act. There is illocutionary force (a performance aspect) as well as propositional content (the factual sense) (16>3). It is the view of Habermas that many of the new social moments of the 1980s [women's, gay, black, ecological and peace movements for instance] carry a communicative ethic amongst themselves -- one usually demanding of a more rational society (16>4).

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., When attempts are made to investigate historical truth, have the researchers taken constant steps to represent the integrity of the lifeworld they seek to explore, or have they adopted methods based on an over selective rationalization? (14>3).

e.g., When an historical truth is uncovered, to whom does it belong? How wide is its particularly significance in space and time?

e.g., Is a particular place/region/state integrated in terms of its societies, its lifeworlds, its histories -- or are there many distinct and unrelated truths? Is communication across that/those societies and truths comfortably unified?

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

17 COMPETENCY IN LANGUAGE. The concept of communicative action (see 16 above) is a crucial part of the Habermas philosophical profile of social and cultural activity. He acknowledges the work of Marx, Weber, Mead, Parsons and others on 'action' [where 'efficiency in co-ordinary the means and ends is the guiding norm' (17>1)] but believes their models are over-instrumental and do not take due heed of the interpersonal nature of action nor its linguistically mediated. In the critical theory of Habermas, action is always inset within an interactive context, and each individual uses different languages depending upon the interpersonal communicative setting. Every speech act implicitly contains *validity claims* which follow the logic of communicative action more than they do the logic of instrumental/strategic action (17>2). The languages in which these validity claims are exercised are learnt intrinsically and autonomously in institutional spheres (17>3). The object of the Habermas concept of "universal pragmatics" is the discovery of the universal systems of rules by which people intuitively use language (17>4) and by which they make those validity claims of "truth", "rightness" or "truthfulness" (17>5). To Habermas the importance of language cannot be stressed enough in analyzing individual, intersubjective and institutional behavior: "what raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know -- language" (17>6).

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., People adopt or play at different roles in society as determined by different institutional and intersubjective settings. Do people also adopt or play with different historical truths as suited to the different settings of their everyday lives?

18 COMPETENCY IN EDUCATION. Critical theorists intend that their theories will affect social and political life through the educative role of critical theory. In Fay's estimation the role of a critical scientist is not so much to uncover quasi-causal laws for policy scientists in order that isolated social conditions can be exactly manipulated to achieve a set purpose, it is instead "to enlighten the social actors so that, coming to see themselves and their social situation in a new way, they themselves can decide to alter the conditions which they find repressive" (18>1). Hence, *consciousness-raising* is a primary competence required of critical theorists. It involves the encouragement of social and political actors towards radically different ways of seeing themselves and their situation. It involves elucidation on the particular mechanisms which debilitate them, but which they have been ignorant and which have taken effect independent of their volition. This educative competence is demanding of interactive skills: the critical theorist has to modulate his/her expression of insight to or for the actors as their self-understandings alter (18>2). Each educative act is, then, a speech situation: "it is not simply a set of principles by which actual social arrangements are ... evaluated. Rather it [is the weighted expression] of the ideals of truth, freedom and justice ... ." (18>3).

e.g., The educative function of critical theory first assumes people are frustrated differentially by social conditions. In what ways has a particular historical truth thwarted freedom and justice?

19 COMPETENCY IN DIALECTICS. Critical social sciences are dialectical: knowledge is attained in them via competency in abstract and disputed reasoning about the truth of doubtful propositions. Meaning is hunted not just through empirical perception but importantly via the logical process of *definition, inclusion, exclusion* and *implication* (19>1). Much of the dialectic of critical theory constitutes self-interpretation (19>2). Much critical science dialectic involves the close scrutiny of speech acts or of accounts of truth 'to get beyond the text' (19>3). That dialectic analysis are embedded in that form of communicative action (19>4). The dialectical approach is needed because of the contradictions that inevitably exist in any social order (19>5)

e.g., What does the text or the speech act say about history? What does the text/speech act (as a piece of communicative action) say about the impact of implied historical truths upon the originator and upon target audience?

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE	RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH
<p>20 COMPETENCY IN UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE. As characteristic 9 (above) revealed, Habermas principally follows the hermeneutic tradition, but warns against unchecked historicism -- a sort of a false universalism or a hidden positivism (20&gt;1). Critical theorists of his ilk are not simply involved in interpretation, they seek to unite such critique with empirical analysis (20&gt;2). Competency in critical science therefore requires a <i>dialectical synthesis</i> of the nomological with the interpreted meaning of the symbolic (or communicate) active (20&gt;3). The causal and the hermeneutic must be linked, although the inquiry must be grounded in an interpretative approach to promote the necessary <b>self-reflection</b> (20&gt;4). Through such synthesis, there can be a purely objective theoretical standpoint, according to Habermas (20&gt;5).</p>	<p>e.g., Historical truth is not just self-sufficient hermeneutic meaning (20&gt;6). What are the social, political and economic conditions that have occasioned or are associated with the given historical truth? Where does that truth lie?</p>

TABLE 1.3.4./1 (Continued)

KEY

1>1	Nietzsche 19?? = 471.	8>1	Habermas 1968:55	16>1	Seidman 1989:184
1>2	Bernstein (on Habermas) 1985:9	8>2	Fay 1975:98	16>2	Schapp in Seidman 1989:184
1>3	Bernstein 1976:119	8>3	Seidman 1989:7	16>3	Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:230
2>1	Merleau-Ponty 1962:viii-ix	8>4	Bernstein 1985:12	16>4	Seidman 1989:23
2>2	Bernstein 1976:52	8>5	Bernstein 1985:15	17>1	Seidman 1989:16-17
2>3	Bernstein 1985:9	9>1	McCarthy 1978:184	17>2	Habermas 1979:148
2>4	Habermas (on Nietzsche) 1968:296	9>2	Marcus and Fischer 1986:129	17>3	Thompson and Held 1982:10
2>5	Nietzsche 19??:526	9>3	Bernstein 1976:197	17>4	Habermas 1979:26
3>1	Bernstein 1976:190	10>1	McCarthy 1978:191-2	17>5	Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:232
3>2	Habermas (on Nietzsche) 1968:295	10>2	Ricoeur in McCarthy 1978:192	17>6	Habermas 1968:314
3>3	Ryan in Bernstein 1976:10	11>1	Seidman 1978:7	18>1	Fay 1975:103
3>4	Bernstein 1976:25	11>2	Seidman 1989:22	18>2	Fay 1975:107
4>1	Thompson and Held 1982:4	11>3	Seidman 1989:233	18>3	Young 1981:291
4>2	Thompson and Held 1982:5	12>1	Seidman 1989:21-22	19>1	R.M. Weaver in Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:55
4>3	Habermas 1973:281-2	12>2	Thompson and Held 1982:5	19>2	Bernstein 1976:113
4>4	Thompson and Held 1982:4	12>3	Ross 1988:53	19>3	F.G. Lawrence in Habermas 1983:ix
5>1	Seidman 1989:24	13>1	Seidman 1989:236	19>4	Taylor 1971:24
5>2	Habermas 1973:254	13>2	Habermas 1976	19>5	Fay 1975:95
5>3	Seidman 1989:5	13>3	Seidman 1989:25	20>1	Bernstein 1985:10
6>1	Bernstein 1976:35	14>1	Mertan 1949:94	20>2	Thompson and Held 1982:3
6>2	Nagel 1961:34	14>2	Habermas 1976/A	20>3	Bernstein 1985:10
6>3	Habermas 1968:289	14>3	Bernstein 1985:23	20>4	Seidman 1989:6-7
6>4	Kuhn 1970:94	15>1	Habermas-Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns -- in Bernstein 1985:11	20>5	Seidman 1989:9
7>1	Bernstein 1985:9	15>2	Nagel 1961:458-60	20>6	McCarthy 1978:183
7>2	Clifford 1981				
7>3	Bernstein 1976:113				
7>4	Bernstein 1976:210				

- (iii) *the projected dichotomy (of positivism) is misleading and obscures research practices.*
- objectivity vis-a-vis subjectivity is the central dualism of conventional research. But objectivity is not a natural quality, as is claimed under orthodox science, it is *not* external to scientific observation, it is not independent of social classification. Objectivity is dependent, therefore, upon changeable levels of awareness. Since subjectivity is the mental state of dispositions and sensitivities in which those 'objects' of awareness are formed, objectivity is not an opposite quality to subjectivity but is 'representative subjectivity.' *Both objectivity and subjectivity are perspectival, by this reckoning.*
- (iv) *the production of knowledge is the production of values.*
- values occur at all levels of science; they can not be extirpated, but have had to be identified and made known. Critical theorists put their emphasis not so much upon what the values are --- they are deemed to be vacuous or meaningless in their own right --- but upon whose values matter in the situation under review. Thus values are seen to be at work helping to produce some kind of repression, and those who have *an emancipatory interest* in a remodelling of that social order (i.e., those who are debased or fatigued by the resulting social condition need to examine the juxtaposition of their own values and practices in helping sustain that subjugation). So, a critical theory must speak directly to the certain actors which it investigates. There must be *involvement* and *participation* in that pry into values at work: there must be informed consciousness.
- (v) *social interests lie behind the claim of disinterestedness in science*
- No idea in science or approach in inquiry lacks a social location or a political consequence. Even when disinterested is claimed, a particular role or social and political position *is* being supported. *Interests abound* in all scientific and social activity.
- (vi) *science is inevitably about the past.*
- Science is inescapably cumulative; knowledge is produced within an age which utilizes *inherited* and *transformed interpretations* of 'truth'.

Hence, both Popkewitz explicitly (65) and Table 1.3.4./1 implicitly, speak for humility in science: the character of knowledge and of agendas of inquiry is delicate and shifting. Truth, according to critical and tribal vision, is precarious.

In this regard, critical theory has much in common with postmodernity, itself. Both concern the absence of absolute standards of value by which things can be judged. Under postmodernist analysis from now onwards (as outlined under 1.1 above), there will be no totalitarian grounds by which assent can be enforced. Under the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory --- or rather according to Habermas himself -- the weakening of tendency and metanarrative has produced a legitimation crisis in Western society.

Thus, postmodernists and critical theorists come at the same issue from more or less compatible outlooks. Indeed Connor (1989:8) considers the acceleration of postmodernity to be a boon to critical theorists, helping improve and reinforce the intensity of their message. Fraser and Nicholson (1988:83) concur on this inter-relatedness, and see postmodernity as a political-cultural current equivalent to feminism in the degree to which it has helped develop the new paradigm of social criticism. Both 'the-collapse-of-the-subject' under postmodernity and 'the-linguistic-turn' of critical theory have contributed to the demise in many quarters of the entrenched monological perspective in science and in socio-political affairs.

### 1.3.5 Constructivist Perspectives

To a certain extent, postpositivist perspectives are compatible with critical theory perspectives. Ontologically, both are realist. Epistemologically, postpositivist outlooks are objectivist --- and it is *possible* to reach an objectivist perspective via critical theory according to Jürgen Habermas. Constructivists, however, do not find it at all easy to come to agreements with positivism or postpositivism. They see empirical-analytic premises as being unacceptably blemished, on account of the beliefs that (Guba 1990:25-26):

- (i) *Facts are mini-theories.* To constructivists, reality can not be known; 'reality' exists only as a mental framework for *ongoing existence*. So facts which are known do not belong to *ongoing existence*, they belong to that *conceived reality*. Accordingly, there can be no facts which are not known, and no facts which exist on their own independent of perception. Every fact is itself a theory (Hesse 1980).
- (ii) *Theories (and therefore facts) can not be known.* No theory can ever be absolutely known, because unequivocal explanation is not possible to achieve. **Life / nature / reality is only and always viewed through the channel of interpretation**, and it is not therefore possible for all individuals to obtain the same account of that reality. This perpetual constraint is known as 'the problem of induction.'
- (iii) *Research is inescapably dyadic.* To constructivists, reality is never attainable; every effort of an investigator to reach objectivity is foiled on account of the interactivity he / she has with the subject / subjects of the investigation. Findings are not what is out there in 'ongoing everyday existence', but are what is created by the process of looking for those things: **findings do not exist independently — they are 'created'**. Knowledge is thus always *constructed* --- hence constructivism.

Those caveats proffered, it is now perhaps sensible to list the basic beliefs of the constructivist paradigm, as originally framed in Table 1.3.2./1:

#### ■ ONTOLOGY

- there are untold possible interpretations of or for any inquiry;



- truths can not be falsified by 'a foundational truth;'
- so --- constructivists are relativists (26).

#### ■ EPISTEMOLOGY

- constructivists hold that there is no Archimedean point under constructivism;
- thus, the theory of the grounds-of-knowledge is subjectivist (or perhaps, again, relativist);
- consonantly, under constructivism, the difference between ontology and epistemology collapses (26).

#### ■ METHODOLOGICALLY

- constructivists explore the variety and range of 'constructions' that exist;
- constructivists endeavor to weight the meanings so uncovered;
- constructivists look for consensus and change amongst those meanings;
- in looking for consensus and change constructivists make considerable use of hermeneutic and dialectic skills;
- in weighing up extant outlooks / perspectives within a society, constructivists commonly try, within the costs of time and effort, to obtain mutual / comparative reactions for each and all of the total range of constructions in currency;
- the end goal is not prediction and control, but it is reconstruction;
- the methodology for this paradigm is crucially dependent upon accurate depiction of the perceptions encountered --- both of the researched and the researching (26-27).

An attempt is now made in Table 1.3.5./1 to register some of the key characteristics of the constructivist paradigm. The table is a companion figure to the earlier critical theory Table (1.3.4./1), and it also lists some problematic questions regarding the constructivist approach, alongside the twenty identified characteristics. The selection of the characteristics themselves owes much to the pioneering work in interpretive social science of Guba and Lincoln. Characteristics 1 to 5 of Table 1.3.5./1 are remodelled accounts of what were originally published as 'the Axioms of the Naturalistic Paradigm' (Lincoln and Guba 1985:36-38). It needs to be pointed out, however, that in that 1985 text the term '*naturalistic*' was used at the level of a paradigm --- the term constructivist had not then replaced it, nor has it completely in that respect. In this 1993 dissertation, of course, the term 'naturalistic' is used at the methodological level and not at the paradigmatic level.

Anyhow, the five axioms --- they are introduced as characteristics 1 to 5 inclusive (in regard to the problem of the assessment of truth in social science) with supporting critique from other theoreticians on hermeneutics, not just Lincoln and Guba.

Characteristics 6 to 19 then present fourteen "logical dependencies" of the five platform axioms --- they were also first listed by Lincoln and Guba (1985:39-43) and they, too, have been re-modelled to take account of the supportive or corrective observations of other interpretivist thinkers. The last

(remaining) characteristic, i.e., 20, completes the set in the table by drawing attention to the pubescence of constructivism as a paradigm.

Overall twenty characteristics of Table 1.3.5./1 maybe regarded as postures by which constructivism is generally operationalized. Qualitative methods *do not have* to be used (characteristic 17): but they normally are. Tacit information *does not have* to be included (characteristic 13): but insight into meaning tends to be impoverished without it. The constructivist research, design and study focus (characteristics 9 and 15) *do not have* to emerge: but those investigations that do not exhibit ongoing re-directions and / or re-conceptualitions are inherently suspect as being *investigator-driven approaches* rather than, constituting *sincerely open inquiries*.

Collectively, the twenty characteristics or postures are not just an alternative to logical positivism, they embody a challenge to its cyberneticism. The characteristics reinforce each other by undermining some of what hermeneutic theorists believe are the all-too-secure beliefs, or rather the shibboleths of positive reason, and of Comptean research processes which are exercises of quasi-mechanistic method rather than truth-seeking explanations (Kuhn 1979:277). The twenty characteristics collectively may be regarded as an assault upon the taken-for-granted traditional substructures of orthodox, technical science --- or, in other words, vigorous questioning of the aggregationalist, accumulative scheme of knowledge gain (Lincoln 1990:84).

Just as *Cartesian* thought tends to surface at each step of analytic-empirical research, so the local and particularist imperatives of *grounded understanding* permeate every act of constructivism. For instance, standard and foundational deductive approaches are not encouraged (e.g., characteristics 12 and 16), no data is supposed to be taken-for-granted without being rigorously cross-checked (e.g., characteristics 8 and 14), and lasting etic labelling of phenomenon is discouraged (e.g., characteristics 7 and 17). Each of these three examples (and all of the six selected characteristics) contribute to constructivists' claim for the high philosophical ground of theoretical sensitivity --- that is, towards strong and healthful differentiation in 'human belief' and 'institutional meaning.'

### 1.3.6 The Research Paradigms: Goodness Criteria and Postmodernity

Having examined the nature of the four leading paradigms in social science and revealed their respective stances towards reality, it is necessary to relate these paradigmatic perspectives more directly to the problem at hand for the catalyst investigation --- the manufacture of the past during the postmodern age as evidenced through the way the heritage of Texas is shaped. Indeed one could suggest that the study faces two inter-related problems --- as was stated in the opening paragraphs to 1.3:

- (i) the problem involved with understanding truth(s) in texts of state concepts of heritage in currency --- i.e., *the problem of the study itself*,
- (ii) the problem involved with how inquiry can fathom that (or rather, those) truths --- i.e., *the problem of science*.

TABLE 1.3.5./1

## CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH: GROUNDED SCIENCE AND THE ANALYSIS OF HISTORY

--- with an emphasis upon the views of Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba

### COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

### RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

#### FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

1 SCIENCE AS MULTIPLE REALITIES. Constructivism does not adhere to the Comptean ideals of science (1>1), but follows the contention of Berger and Luckman that *reality is socially constructed* and that the processes of that construction are immensely important in understanding (1>2). Fundamentally constructivism does not deal with a singular, tangible reality or with immutable natural laws (1>3), but with idiographic knowledge -- or rather *the creation* of idiographic knowledge. Constructivism is the science that has consolidated during the 1980s in answer to the problem of truth that had plagued Weber and Dilthey, viz., "how to render accounts of subjective meaning provided by the human or cultural sciences objective" (1>4). It is an inheritor of the outlook of Taylor, Ricoeur and Gadamer that cultural life is embedded in social views of reality and on the resultant practical activity that is marlialled by those views (1>5). It is an assertion that the theoretical assessment of reality and of social existence should be reproduced as faithfully and closely as possible to the various apprehensions of that reality and should not be a singular Procustean replacement for them. Thus constructivism endeavors to trace the inward conceptual rhythms which exist within individuals, institutions and societies (1>6). It attempts to map the multiple realities that exist, not determine which of those accounts is 'real' or 'realistic' (1>7). Inquiring into these multiple accounts may be expected to be divergent, since each of those inquiries are likely to raise more (and different!) questions than it answers (1>8) generally ruling out real possibilities of prediction and control. Yet, the approach should lead the researcher towards *verstehen* (understanding).

e.g., How many different historical truths are there within a society regarding a set event or happening? Which of these multiple realities is dominant?

2 SCIENCE AS INTERACTIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY. In their emphasis upon the process by which knowledge is created constructivists reject the positivist duality of subject -- object, considering it is more pertinent to comprehend *the interactive monism* of researcher and researched (2>1). The possibilities of understanding are shaped consciously and subconsciously by that mutuality -- the selection of the problem, the choice of design, the adaptation of the setting and the recognition of incidental cues are all influenced by researcher upon researched and vice versa. While positivism tends to consider the inquirer and the object of the inquiry as being independent and prefers stances of detachment of the former towards the latter, constructivism does advance such *dispassion*. Indeed some constructivists privilege the opposite -- the stance of passion in inquiry (2>2) as an effort to be fully empathetic and involved, with the object. The constructivist view of social science is in this sense equivalent to McClintock's vision of 'intimate science' in medicine and physiology: the researcher must have a feeling for the organism being studied

## TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

### COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

(2>3). Such outlooks suggest that genuine scientific knowledge is sifted if there is no rapport between researcher and researched. Commitment is prized over disinterest (2>4).

3 SCIENCE AS IDIOSYNCRATIC INSIGHT. The interpretive approach that is constructivism renders it an apologetic science, and not just a diagnostic one (3>1). Constructivists *justify* for one (the case at hand) rather than generalize for all (every possible case). While Cartesian knowledge pivots upon the external validity of its results, requiring researchers to set up methods which can yield widely -- applicable results, constructivism puts the onus of applicability upon other researchers -- its transferability criteria constitutes the extent to which the case study facilitates the drawing of inferences by the [external] reader which may have applicability in his or her own context or situation (3>2). Constructivists seek acute and integrated insight of the individual case, not nomothetic 'outsight' (3>3). 'Outsight' is particularly hard to coherently offer when one's research approach decidedly promotes multiple research interpretations of multiple views of actuality.

4 SCIENCE AS MEANINGS (NOT CAUSES). Cartesian knowledge seeks the effects (results) of real causes. In terms of its classical episteme it hunts for the continuum of things. Its knowledge for simple things is therefore a *mathesis* (a representative part of a universal order) and for complex things it is a *taxinomia* (the order of things in a whole universe) (4>1). But constructivists see the conventional assumptions by which the universe is ordered by Positivists as axiomatic in themselves (4>2). They create the causality and the objectivity by which the objects become 'objects'. Constructivists recognize that what may be taxonomically or systematically taken as given is sociologically problematical. One simple mathetic event may give rise to many meanings, and many interpretations -- the more so for taxonomic events. The hermeneutic dimension ought not be ignored in the attribution of causes, as is also realized in critical theory (4>3; 4>4). Moreover, constructivists are inclined to support mutual causation rather than singular causation: entities act continuously upon each other -- caused linkages cannot readily be distinguished from effects (4>5).

5 SCIENCE AS UNAVOIDABLY VALUE-BOUND RESEARCH. Analytic-empirical science demands that investigators stand apart from their own values -- outside of time and context, free of bias. But constructivists consider this to be an impossibility: *values impinge at every level of science* (5>1). Like critical theorists they acknowledge that the research effort is itself act of political will (5>2); it does not have to be "openly ideological" to be value bound (5>3). Inquiry is deemed to be value-bound by constructivists in the selection of the research problem, the adaptation of research paradigm, the choice of theory, the identification made during the conduct of the study and the final value-resonance of the study (reinforcing or congruent) (5>4).

### RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., In what details do different interpretations of history vary? What meanings are explicit or implicit in that differentiation?

e.g., What causes do the population under study attribute to a given event, and what is significant about its/their attribution? (Not: 'What are the causes of the event or of the attribution').

e.g., Has the researcher outlined his/her level of awareness as to the values which drove (or helped drive) the selection of the research problem on historical truth? Does he/she appear to be blind to any such values?

TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

## COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

## CONSTRUCTIVISM AND LOCAL MEANING

6 RESEARCH INTO NATURAL SETTINGS. Constructivist theory requires that subjects are studied in natural settings rather than laboratories in order that a whole phenomena or complete scene is assessed. This is so because (i) several fragmented/separate studies do not add up to whole perspectives -- the synergy of the totality is missed; (ii) the full context is necessary in order that other researchers can judge whether that totality matches their own; (iii) the 'mutual shaping' that occurs in the full-context force-field may be quite different than at partial levels of the force-field (6>1). IT is the view of Geertz; moreover, that meaning in culture can only be reasonably interpreted when the whole of the cultural picture is assembled -- the people, the social order and the cosmology (6>2): a given 'text' needs to be examined as a whole before the contribution of the parts can be appreciated (6>3). "Meaning is [then] for a subject, in a situation ... there are not simple elements of meaning" (6>4).

7 RESEARCH FROM GROUNDED DATA. The positivist preference for context-free data (7>1) is not acceptable to constructivists, who choose to develop theories which have *emerged from* (i.e., been grounded in) the data. Constructivists maintain that a priori theories cannot match the capacity of grounded theories for absorbing the multiple realities which are present and maintain they are spoilt by a pre-defined over-emphasis upon dyadic relationships and upon investigator rather than contextual values (7>2). Moreover mutual shaping is presumed to be more faithfully responsive to contextual components rather than to investigator insight (7>3). Grounded theory, then, is that which is discovered, developed and verified systematically from the phenomenon it represents (7>4). The correspondence and commutability between data collected, analysis undertaken and resultant theory is critical in constructivism's specific contexts of human activity. Grounded theory is felt to speak better than a priori theory to the emotional, social and historical coherences of life (7>5) -- viz., to communally sustained consciousness (7>6).

8 RESEARCH VIA CONTEXTUALIZATION. On the continuum from particular to generalizable knowledge, constructivists prefer the former (see 3 above); they prefer *idiographic insight*. Idiographic understanding is predicated on the view that there is a richness of meaning in the small and the symbolic contexts of all areas of cultural and human activity (8>1). The constructivist purpose is to discover where and in which contexts meaning changes. These are the continuities and discontinuities of different contexts (8>2), aspects which are elusive when only reduced relationships or linear causality is sought. But it is not only the 'very small meanings' that escape orthodox linear analysis, for 'very large/common meanings' also fall through the net of mainstream (analytic-empirical) social science (8>3). Constructivists thus prefer to work with the heavily described particulars of the case at hand.

9 RESEARCH DESIGNS 'EMERGE'. Constructivists reject a priori research designs "because it is inconceivable that enough could be known ahead of time about the many multiple realities to devise the design adequately" (9>1). If realities are socially constructed an attempt should reasonably be made to explore all the processes of that construction. The full range of inward conceptual rhythms in each inter-subjective context cannot be known and

## RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Do residents of Texas uphold different historical truths depending upon the size and integrity of social settings?

e.g., What are the best written and verbal reporting methods that suit an investigation of the given population in order to uncover its conceptualizations of history?

e.g., Do the symbols which represent particular historical truths change in any particular ways for any particular inter-subjective settings?

e.g., Where is the most productive place to start the investigation into truth-in-currency in a set population, bearing in mind the full design will not be known until the completion of the study?

TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

## COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

recalled by researchers beforehand, but needs to be carefully uncovered via *continuous dialectical tacking* (9>2). The existential perplexities and aporias of community living can rarely be known immediately (9>3). Moreover, *any action* is capable of offering symbolic meaning (9>4), and no researcher can know at the onset which actions have been and are on the behavioral inventory of the community -- let alone on the inventory of each intersubjective setting. When an investigator seeks to 'world-make' for a set population, much time and effort will be required composing, decomposing, weighing, ordering, deleting and supplementing derived meanings (9>5). All those tasks are routinely demanded of the investigator before he/she is to reasonably claim that he/she now knows the question for which the text is the answer (9>6).

10 RESEARCH IRRESOLUTION. Knowledge is the certainty that entities are real and have distinct properties (10>1). Constructivists simply do not operate with the determinism and certitude of logical positivists (10>2) who assume that science in its own right is the complete gauge of reality and truth (10>3). Like critical theorists constructivists believe truth has local and political expression (10>4), and is both problematic and contested (10>5). Constructivists are hesitant, therefore, about the broad application of their findings (10>6). In constructivist accounts, nature is more likely to be continuous rather than discrete, and dialectic language is preferred to uncontested languages of fact (10>7).

## CONSTRUCTIVISM AND HUMAN MEANING

11 INQUIRY VIA HUMAN STORY-TELLING. Many of the ten characteristics so far discussed draw constructivists towards to hermeneutics -- the theory of interpretation of meaning (via the analysis of *verstehen* -- the re-experiencing or rethinking of what an interviewee/contact/author had originally felt and thought (11>1). Hermeneutic theory is built around 'storytelling', the way individuals self-define themselves or a given setting (11>2) and the way those self-definitions are constituted into concrete varieties of cultural meaning or particular textures of institutional thought (11>3). Clearly these storylines are interpretations and are debatable, just as are all scientific accounts (even logical-positivist interpretations) (11>4). Constructivists prefer to rely on hermeneutics because of the difficulties involved in otherwise reducing the complex world of symbols and signification to predefined empirical elements such as 'prior speech acts' or 'dyadic relationships' (11>5) -- particularly when those elements would also have to be recodified for each intersubjective setting and each change of context (11>6). Hence constructivists elect to use humans (including themselves) as the principal data-gathering instrument for these reasons of adaptability. Other instruments are not sufficiently flexible to comprehend the complexities of differential interaction, and are an intrusive on mutual shaping (11>7). In the *trade-off between adaptability and perfectibility* (11>8) they have little choice.

12 INQUIRY VIA THEORETICAL SAMPLING. In the search for differentiation in human meaning constructivists are inclined to esteem relevant approaches above rigorous approaches (12>1). Culture is an ensemble of texts (12>2) and the constructivist seeks to build up an holist account of that picture embracing the full multiplicity of realities. *Theoretical (or purposive) sampling* is believed to serve that search for 'relevance' and 'holism' better than random or

## RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Is the researcher competent to write up the study of perceptions of history in terms of dialectical rather than purely analytical reason?

e.g., Has the researcher examined the fore-structures of his understanding of the institution or society he/she proposes to study in order to critique where he/she may already be anticipating or presurprising findings?

e.g., Throughout the given survey, has the researcher considered what additional samples or supplementary contexts ought to be explored within the society or institution?

TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

representative sampling. It 'increases the scope or range of the data exposed [and] random or representative sampling is likely to suppress more deviant cases' (12>3). The researcher therefore has a fuller opportunity to ground his/her theory with respect to changed contexts, values and opportunities for mutual shaping. He has, in comparison, a reduced need to discover universals or the deep *permanent* social structures that Enlightenment researchers 'saw' or continue to 'see' (12>4).

13 INQUIRY INCLUSIVE OF TACIT TRUTHS. Under the positivist paradigm epistemology and ontology are structured around deductive inference and, as given under characteristic 4 above, predominantly utilize causal explanations (13>1). Conceivably "the teaching of that [orthodox] method is nothing other than the teaching of a certain kind of history" (13>2) -- "the dream [perhaps] of Western man to be freed from his [sic] passions" (13>3). Entities under study must be observable and must be measurable, according to this conventional logic (13>4). Anti-positivist thinking objects to this exclusive emphasis on the tangible, where "the indices of a phenomena became more important than the phenomenon" (13>5). For that and other reasons, constructivists do not rely just upon propositional knowledge (i.e., that communicable in language, *per se*) they legitimize tacit (i.e., *conative and construed understanding*) (13>6). The inclusion of tacit knowledge is a major pillar of constructivist thought, according to Lincoln and Guba, because (i) many of the nuances of multiple realities can only be tapped by it; (ii) so much of the interaction between inquires and respondent, inquires and object, and on respondent and object occurs on this plane; (iii) felt/intuitive knowledge reflects many social and cultural values which are excluded or denied expression within analytic-empiricism (13>7). Constructivists have no choice but to pursue the tacit.

14 INQUIRY VIA NEGOTIATED UNRAVELING. Constructivist science attempts to unravel the webs of significance people have spun around themselves (14>1). Since those webs have intricate variations dependent upon differences of intersubjective context and situational setting, the unraveling of signification within social existence can only be a painstaking matter. Idealing, every construction ought to be 'negotiated' with and through the social actors involved in that meaning situation, and every *re-construction* ought to be *verified*. Constructivism is inherently a cloudy business: researchers are plumbing the meaning and shared conceptualizations behind the intentions actors have in order that those behaviors can be made clear (14>2). Each 'rule' or constitutive meaning uncovered has to be checked and cross-checked with those supposedly holding it (14>3)(14>4).

15 INQUIRY UPON INDUCTIVE PREMISES. Under constructivism, entities have no inner or constant meaning independent of researcher/respondent/local value systems (15>1). Phenomena do not have an abstract 'life' of their own which can be substantively pre-supposed in research hypotheses. Constructivists believe there are no leaps in nature from solid/discrete entity to solid/discrete entity: nature and life is continuous in the form of an endless but constantly changeable murmur (15>2). Thus, it is not the preconceptions of the inquirer that ought to define the final focus of the study, but the ongoing conceptions of the human respondents: their multiple realities must rule wherever possible (15>3). Just as the design of the study can only **emerge** (see characteristic 9) so must the focus -- or the

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., What are the unspoken and unuttered meanings for a population in terms of its heritage? What are the taken-for-granted about that past set of truths?

e.g., There will always be an infinity of intersubjective settings -- which of them really count for the given study? Which settings and contexts does the local population insist *must* count? What or *who* does the local population say the local population is?

e.g., How does the focus on historical truth change as the investigation proceeds? What major new and unexpected geographic, atmospheric or social contexts is it necessary for the research to tap? What are the large necessary re-directions of focus?

TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

pertinent larger cultural world for the study (15>4). Constructivist theories are not singular 'variable theories' but *pattern theories* which demand intimate contextual knowledge. They themselves are 'findings'.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE STUDY PROCESS

16 INVESTIGATION BY INDUCTIVE MEANS. The previous fifteen characteristics have collectively stressed that it is extremely difficult to comprehend the broad world of human thought solely in terms of linear relationships (16>1). They collectively work on the premise that cybernetic/structuralist thinking is an adequate route, on its own, towards the analysis of meaning because 'structure' is only the designation of 'the visible' (16>2), and too much of the complexity of human signification is lost when researchers admit only predefined and reductionist avenues of analysis (16>3). For these reasons constructivists are uncomfortable with deductive data analysis. They prefer inductive methodologies which (as the previous characteristics allude to): (i) allow the fact that -- as in the preferred mode of Aristotelean investigation -- *the object itself ought to determine the means of its own access* (16>4); (ii) promote plurivocal interpretations of texts and situations (16>5); (iii) facilitate a richer, fuller, more detailed articulation of mutual shaping (16>6).

17 INVESTIGATION VIA QUALITATIVE METHODS. Constructivists more commonly elect to use qualitative methods rather than quantitative methods because the latter's powers of construction are limited -- tending to work from brute data alone (17>1) and tending to work within the steadfast categories set up by the inquirer himself/herself (17>2). Qualitative methods are preferred (though not always: there is nothing absolutely unacceptable in quantification, ipso facto (17>3)) because many qualitative methods have a better developed capacity to tap the unformalizable (17>4), to grasp conceptions which are idiosyncratically *experience-near* (the respondents) (17>5) and to take on board "novel and fresh slants on things" (17>6). Constructivists have many types of qualitative methodologies at their disposal inclusive of ethnographic phenomenological and conversational approaches. Qualitative work is inclined to emphasize the presentation and interpretation of data (finding a best way to allow respondents to speak for themselves) over the cybernetic analysis of that data. In this sense interpretation implies a strong effort to find a satisfactory 'translation' of the data for the different interpretation study audiences, but a minimum of 'interference' to or with that data (17>7).

18 INVESTIGATION VIA DENSE REPORTAGE. In its effort to give understanding to meaning the constructivist paradigm does not converge upon the approximate abstraction of a single model of reality, but cultivates the presentation of **multiple, holistic** and often **competing** texts on reality (18>1). That usually renders reduced models of explanation inferior to the *thick and conflictual* (if necessary) *descriptions* of case-study reporting. 'Thick description' is more flexible at conveying the nuances and subtleties of conflictual belief and of ellipsian sense than is the thin technical/scientific descriptions routinely demanded within conventional analytic-empirical reporting (18>2; 18>3). In producing thick description, constructivists commonly have to go through several re-writes of their case-study reports to ensure that clear analysis is provided rather than purposeless illustration. Though the description is important, it

RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., What intangibles in history, myth and legend has linear science not attended to? Do those elements offer significant new possibilities of inquiry towards the mapping of historical truth?

e.g., If the qualitative method is to make use of a theoretical sampling method, and if the study design continually evolves, *when* is the theoretical sampling (of respondents on history) complete?

e.g., What is the core setting for the articulation of historical truths? Do private views of heritage count, or do only public/community/aggregate?



TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

## COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL SCIENCE

is supposed to be offered in support rather than in place of conceptual specification (18>4). Glaser (18>5) counsels that "the most relevant properties of the core of the inquiry [intersubjective setting and environmental content] should be discussed first, to give the fullest meaning ...".

19 INVESTIGATION PROBITY. Every research endeavor is judged for its probity -- its degree of methodological and analytical soundness. Cartesian and cybernetic science can verify itself (in terms of its own axioms) via the four orthodox empirical criteria of (i) internal validity; (ii) external validity; (iii) reliability; and (iv) objectivity (19>1). But the cultural meaning and the interpretations of constructivism can not be reduced to simple formulas (19>2; 19>3) and it has no like verification procedures in currency. But constructivism does not claim to deal in certainty -- or calculated approximations of determinacy. Its considerations are not univocal as positivists are prone to be. What is demanded of constructivist data is the degree to which it is grounded, the extent to which it faithfully represents a nominated setting. Hence in lieu of the four above criteria which attest to linear *rigor*, Lincoln and Guba (19>4) propose the four criteria of *relevance*; (i) *credibility*; (ii) *transferability*; (iii) *dependability*; and (iv) *confirmability*. They are put forward as parallel criteria to those of conventional verification. They are in Smith's evaluation, the foundational equivalents for grounded theory (19>5).

20 INVESTIGATION APPROACH IN ADOLESCENCE. One significant problem which limits wider acceptance of the constructivist paradigm is the degree to which it is different in its scope from orthodox, technical science. Lincoln (20>1) maintains that conventional science has built and reinforced a scientific way of looking at the world which is antithetical to the hermeneutic and grounded styles of constructivism. It is hard for researchers, by implication, to adopt grounded inquiry because it approach runs *counter to the language, the value and the institutional edifices of linear science*, and because of its presumed objectivity and its sanctified 'detachment'. Logical positivism had almost become *The Norm, The Paradigm for All Science* (20>2). As an alternative-cum-complement to orthodox science, then, constructivism is still in its early youth (20>3). Its adulthood awaits. It neither has a united perspective nor a fixity of focus (20>4). But that is so for all science.

## RELEVANCE FOR HISTORICAL TRUTH

e.g., Will triangulation by researchers help the constructivist inquiry into heritage or will it only confuse the value and intersubjective investigation platform too much? How can that possible confusion be minimized?

e.g., How can the researcher guard against 'going native' -- i.e., adopting wholesale the emic viewpoint upon history without any sense of detachment? Is 'going native' a bad thing?

TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

KEY

1>1	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:8			
1>2	Berger and Luckman 1967:1			
1>3	Lincoln 1990:77			
1>4	Bleicher 1980:215			
1>5	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:17			
1>6	Geertz 1979/B:239			
1>7	Edelman 1977:15			
1>8	Lincoln and Guba 1985:37			
2>1	Lincoln 1990:78			
2>2	Lincoln 1990:86			
2>3	McClintock in Prell 1989:66-7			
2>4	Geertz 1973:230-1			
3>1	Geertz 1973:231			
3>2	Lincoln and Guba 1988:20-1			
3>3	Lincoln and Guba 1985:38			
4>1	Foucault 1970:72			
4>2	Lincoln 1990:70			
4>3	Bloland 1989			
4>4	Bernstein 1983:30-1			
4>5	Lincoln and Guba 1985:38			
5>1	Lincoln 1990:70			
5>2	Keller 1985			
5>3	Lather 1988			
5>4	Lincoln and Guba 1985:38			
6>1	Lincoln and Guba 1985:39			
6>2	Geertz in Rabinow and Sullivan 1979/B:19			
6>3	Ricoeur 1979:86			
6>4	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:6			
7>1	summarizing Taylor 1979:25-73; emphasis added).			
7>2	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:9			
7>3	Lincoln and Guba 1985:41			
7>4	Lincoln and Guba 1985:41			
7>5	Strauss and Corbin 1990:23			
7>6	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:15			
8>1	Taylor 1979:51			
8>2	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:13			
8>3	Bellah 1979:341-363			
9>1	Taylor 1979:52			
9>2	Lincoln and Guba 1985:41			
9>3	Geertz 1979/B:239			
9>4	Ricoeur 1979:100			
9>5	Geertz 1979/A:218-220			
9>6	Goodman 1978:7			
10>1	Bleicher 1980:4			
10>2	Berger and Luckman 1967:1			
10>3	Bloland 1989			
10>4	Bernstein 1983:46			
10>5	Popkewitz 1984			
10>6	Lather 1988			
10>7	Lincoln and Guba 1985:42			
11>1	Lincoln 1985:86			
11>2	Bleicher 1980:1			
11>3	Taylor 1979:69			
11>4	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:4			
11>5	Goodman 1978:2-5			
12>1	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:5			
12>2	Foucault 1970:138			
12>3	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:5			
12>4	Gadamer 1979:114			
13>1	Ricoeur 1979:88-94			
13>2	Lincoln and Guba 1985:40			
13>3	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:8			
13>4	MacIntyre in Bernstein 1983:57			
13>5	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:1			
13>6	Valle and King 1978:4			
13>7	Giorgi 1970:291			
14>1	Bernstein 1983:57			
14>2	Lincoln and Guba 1985:40			
14>3	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:6			
14>4	Fay 1975:73			
15>1	Fay 1975:76			
15>2	Lincoln and Guba 1985:41			
15>3	Lincoln and Guba 1985:42			
15>4	Foucault (not himself necessarily a constructivist) 1970:146-155			
16>1	Lincoln and Guba 1985:42			
16>2	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:12-13			
16>3	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:4			
16>4	Foucault 1970:138			
16>5	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:5			
16>6	Gadamer 1979:114			
	Ricoeur 1979:88-94			
	Lincoln and Guba 1985:40			

## TABLE 1.3.5./1 (Continued)

## KEY (Continued)

17>1	Taylor 1979:53
17>2	Taylor 1979:55 and 65
17>3	Lincoln and Guba 1985:40
17>4	Taylor 1979:66
17>5	Geertz 1979:227
17>6	Strauss and Corbin 1990:21
17>7	Strauss and Corbin 1990:20-21
18>1	Lincoln 1990:73
18>2	Geertz 1973:5-6 and 9-10
18>3	Lincoln and Guba 1985:41-2
18>4	Strauss and Corbin 1990:229
18>5	Glaser 1978:131
19>1	Lincoln and Guba 1985:42
19>2	Taylor 1979:66
19>3	Dreyfus 1972
19>4	Lincoln and Guba 1985:43
19>5	J.K. Smith in Lincoln 1985:71
20>1	Lincoln 1990:85
20>2	Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:9
20>3	Lincoln 1990:87
20>4	Bertstein 1976:xii

It is unwise to introduce the parameters of the first of those problems in the opening section of the dissertation without reference to the second. Those two matters feed and condition each other.

The first problem involves the production and changes to the production of truth under the postmodern condition or age. The second problem involves the analysis of that production of truth under the postmodern age. The postmodern mood does not, one may presume, stop at the doors of science, itself. Hence, just as the first problem (*the problem of the study*) revolves around matters of essentialism, so does the second problem (*the problem of science*). The study problem, for the adjuvant inquiry, asks: 'is the production of historical truth in Texas a matter of modernist practice --- where the character of the production is differentialist --- or does the state manufacture / legitimation of historical truth exhibit postmodern strains --- where it is de-differentialist?' The second problem, then, is a query as to whether science can properly measure the first problem? The researcher should ask not only general *goodness criteria* questions about the respective soundness of the paradigms available --- no paradigm can be supremely sound by all criteria --- but he / she should also ask whether the paradigms can soundly handle the specific issues of the study problem --- in this case matters of essentialism and de-essentialism (or otherwise matters of differentiation and de-differentiation).

So, what has been stated? For the catalyst investigation, the first problem in the study (*the study problem itself*) questions whether there is evidence that the historical truth of Texas is defined by state government agencies with reference to canonical / modernist principles or not. And the second problem (*the problem of science*) surrounds the need to select a research paradigm, and then a research methodology, that is equipped to ask the relevant research questions. The study problem asks: *does the state encourage or deny plural definitions of Texas: i.e., do state administrators promote and project Texas in accordance with a singular / conformist vision of the state's past or are different realities cultivated?* Then the researcher asks of science *to deliver him / her an approach that can distinguish whether that promotion is monist / intolerant or plural / tolerant.*

If postmodernity and the encouragement of "a profound pluralism" might be the fate of our times in human, social and political affairs (Clegg 1990:16), then science itself will have a difficult time remaining modernist and persevering with monisms. *Tolerance* in cultural and life situations is an uneasy bedfellow of *intolerance* in the inquiry utilized to evaluate those cultural and life situations. It would seemingly be hard to substantively uncover disparate and de-differentiated postmodern practice by using restrictive theoretical apparatus that is only designed to reflect essentialist and differentiated practice (20).

Having given these opening caveats on postmodernity / modernity, on de-differentiation / differentiation, and on goodness in science, attention should be more directly focused upon the four paradigms and goodness. Subsections 1.3.0. to 1.3.5. have already collectively drawn attention to the fact that perspectives are changing on what sound science is. If one accepts the constructivist line of argument, science itself can no longer be regarded as a sphere of neutrality and objectivity which can be harnessed to discover ultimate truth. In the constructivist account, scientific knowledge is not appealed

to, *it is made* (Haraway 1988:516). If one accepts the standpoint of critical theory, outlooks on science are never be complete, they are partial discourses or selective regimes of truth (Rabinow 1984:73).

Given this postempirical oxygenation of views of science it is hard to resist the recognition that "all scientific activity is guided by some pre-knowledge embedded in our language. [Each paradigm] makes itself felt not only in the formulation of the aims of science ... but in the communication between scientists concerning the criteria for a successful testing of hypotheses ... ." (Bleicher 1980:119). **Pre-understandings comprehensively guide the questions investigators formulate** (120-1). Though many empiricists and positivists condemn the notion (see for instance Betti and Hirsch, as nominated by Bleicher: 121), a significant number of what formerly were regarded as the objective elements of science are now regarded as subjective. It is becoming a basic premise of almost all schools of science that "all ways of seeing are simultaneously ways of not seeing" (Clegg 1990:20).

Scientific and technological modes of reasoning have not been established as the singular standard of 'proper research' (Stanley 1978:12-13). In the social sciences, it is now increasingly recognized that many domains of inquiry such as religion, politics and ethnics, are not easily suited to such modernist / linear criteria for knowledge (12-13). Although the notion of paradigms is still an evolving one and has not been fully upheld (Newton-Smith 1981; Siegel 1987; Phillips in press), social and cultural scientists are tending to accept the notion that one may use different lenses to look at reality --- or rather one may use avenues of understanding which are mutually exclusive (Skrtic 1990:127). In this sense, "positivism is based on the technical interest that facilitate control and instrumental action [and] constructivism is based on a practical interest in understanding the meaning of social action. [Then] critical theory has an emancipating interest in reducing the distortions that stem from the contradictions between the first two interests" (Firestone 1990:122; see also Bredo and Feinberg: 1982).

The remainder of subsection 1.3. (i.e., subsections 1.3.6. to 1.3.10. inclusive) --- and indeed the rest of the study --- will work on the premise that there are indeed perspectives in science, and the term *paradigm* will be retained. This current sub-section (1.3.6.) will consider what is involved in the selection of goodness criteria to judge which paradigm best fits *the problem of science* in its effort to serve *the problem of the study* --- i.e., the catalyst study --- against the back-drop of a pluralizing and de-differentiating cultural, social and political world.

#### **1.3.6.1 The Inadequacies of Postivism for the Study Problem**

Postempiricists such as Toulmin (1972), Feyerabend (1962), Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) and Harré (1970) have strongly and collectively condemned virtually every premise of orthodox empiricism (see, particular, in Manicas 1987: 243-265, especially the eleven cardinal and liberalizing events on page 243). Recently, Marshall (1990:189-191) summaries this severe criticism of traditional empirical tenets by formulating a list which rejects a number of positivist premises. Four of these rebuttals are reproduced here:

- *1st assumption (of orthodox empiricism): There is a knowable truth.*  
 Rebuttal: there is not just one pervasive truth; observations are not independent of observers.
- *2nd assumption: Values can be excised from the research processes.*  
 Rebuttal: all facts and each level of research involves interpretation in which it is frequently extremely difficult to even be aware of the influence of one's values; it is impossible to immunize research from infection by personal values. Zeller (1987:35) lists six axiological assumptions of constructivism. Her review of the literature indicates that values impregnate inquiry with respect to:
  - the influence of the values of the inquirer;
  - the influence of the values of the respondent;
  - the influence of the values inherent in the paradigm channelling the investigation;
  - the influence of the values embedded in the substantive theory shaping the study;
  - the influence of the values pervasive to the study setting --- viz., the culture, the environment, the socio-politics; and,
  - the other catalyzed values generated from the resonation of the above five seed values with each other.
- *3rd assumption: Good research must empower people by helping them to see the historical meaning of events ... .*  
 Rebuttal: historical truths are just as subjective and relative as current truths.
- *4th assumption: "... good research comes from good method properly applied."*  
 Rebuttal: this premise puts an undue focus on procedures. The evaluation of the soundness of an investigation demands a large number of judgement calls, not just those relating to method. Neither the inquirer, nor the processes of inquiry can be absolutely objective.

Then again, postempiricists reject orthodox empiricism for a number of its componential deficiencies in addition to the above selection of conceptual inadequacies. Once more, just four of those proscriptions are now given:

- *Censure 1: The shift to subjectivism.*  
 Proscription: the fixed set of foundational criteria by which all inquiry is judged is liable to be deficient in its capacity to admit the changeable perspectives of individuals in different intersubjective and contextual settings.
- *Censure 2: The shift to emic understanding.*  
 Proscription: empirical science has a systemic bias in favor of etic viewpoints; its research efforts are driven by early exogamous conceptualizations and not readily take on board unknown / discoverable endogamous ones.

- *Censure 3: The shift to hermeneutics.*

Proscription: empirical science privileges singular / monist versions of truth and can not readily absorb plural / multiple perspectives.

- *Censure 4: The shift to reflexive discourse.*

Proscription: empirical science is routinely designed to yield relatively certain, linear solutions and does not lend itself to the facilitation of alternative / counter-logics of dialogic discourse. In the words of Marcus and Fischer (1986:43) empirical social science "has not considered the full [discursive] description of experience as its task, leaving it to art and literature." In its own certainty it misses out on much of the problematics of each subject's own representations of experience. It throws the baby out with the bath water.

The above eight reasons (viz., four rebuttals and four proscriptions) render empiricist paradigms as poorly equipped approaches to handle the width of different meanings and local historical truths which are expected to ultimately be uncovered around the study problem. The orientation and language of empiricism is that of a "rape model" of research --- one of force and violence (Reinharz 1978; Easlea 1986): it lacks the qualities of trust, cooperation, passion and co-learning of the "lover models" much of postempirical research (Reinharz 1978; Savage 1988).

Fay finds positivist social science to be inadequate because it is weighted towards controllability. Positivist science, to him, is instrumental science, whereby, namely, "to understand an event or state of affairs is to know another event which will invariably produce or prevent it" (Fay 1975:39-40). Positivist social scientists therefore are prone to only "constituting the world from the viewpoint of how one can gain control over it" (40). Positive science is fine for the physical world of production where instrumental solutions are prized, but in Fay's estimation positivist social science has to be guarded against in social science because of the values of technical control and industrialism that it mutually reinforces. In social life / human affairs 'means-ends' analysis is more complex than positivists tend to admit, and positivist approaches tend to understate the significance of value frameworks which exist in life and impinge upon it. All told, these then, are serious shortcomings for a study exploring differentiation in values and in meanings in contextual settings. A study of meaning does not need what Habermas has styled "the transcendental framework" of purposive-rational action nor does it need to derive "technically exploitable knowledge" (Habermas in Thompson: 1981:79).

### **1.3.6.2 Goodness Criteria for the Study**

Although the insight within subsection 1.3.6.1. clearly rules out empiricism for the meaning-explorative and multiple-discourse-analysis envisaged for the study, it needs to be emphasized that, in the words of Firestone (1990:122), there is no "queen science" amongst the paradigms. The paradigm is selected for the particular problem at hand, for the scientific task to be done. The adoption of a

paradigm for each problem encountered *should* involve a detailed consideration of the complex trade-offs amongst the triple imperatives to:

- tap existential reality;
- obtain precise analysis and verdict; and,
- generalize to other situations (123).

Simply, in social science, there is no essential set of independent criteria by which the most appropriate paradigm can be selected (Rorty 1979; Ritzer 1980; Skrtic 1990). Marshall (1990:193), however, has developed a checklist of twenty goodness criteria which individual researchers could utilize to test the fit of a qualitative approach to given social / human problems in science. Since, however, the qualitative / quantitative decision is a methodological level matter, these goodness criteria cannot reasonably be deemed to be a prescription for choice at the higher paradigm level.

So far this section (1.3.6) has emphasized negatives --- namely the ways in which empiricism of the positivist and postpositivist paradigms are unsuited for the analysis of the postmodern issues within this study. In the absence of any clear cut goodness criteria by which an appropriate / best-fit paradigm can immediately be adapted, it is healthy to give positive reasons why the two remaining paradigms (*critical theory* and *constructivism*) are broadly suitable for the development of the proposed research agenda in the assessment of how historical truth is manufactured in governmental settings. Table 1.3.6.2./1 provides those assertive reasons, adapted from Marshall (1990:196).

As Table 1.3.6.2./1 suggests, the two postempiricist paradigms have developed usefulness in research scenarios where there:

- is noted uncertainty on the extent / range of social truth;
- is justification for 'meanings' or for 'actions' being the necessary and sufficient goals of the study;
- are likely to be multiple social / political realities; and where there,
- is reduced need for generalization.

The two postempiricist methods could therefore be said to be better apparatus for the measurement of 'local' truth than Cartesian / empirical methods. By local it is not meant (in this context of scientific knowledge) the mere indexing of "the small, the inconsequential and the trivial as much [as it refers to discernment about] the close at hand, the available and the particular of the many localities and arenas within which the action takes place" (Clegg 1990:14). The localism of postempiricism is the serious and significant counterpoint to the generalism of techno-modernity.

Critical theory and constructivism are both commonly geared to servicing the kind of research problems indicated in Table 1.3.6.2./1. The following section of this investigation (1.3.7) will examine their respective candidacy for the particular research issues of this study of heritage production in Texas.



TABLE 1.3.6.2./1

**THE EXPLORATORY FLEXIBILITIES OF POSTPOSITIVIST RESEARCH:  
COMPLEX HUMAN/SOCIAL CONTEXTS FOR WHICH CRITICAL THEORY  
AND CONSTRUCTIVISM ARE SUITED**

1 *RESEARCH BEYOND SOCIOCENTRISMS* ... where investigative methods are needed which explore beyond the linear order and structural unities of dominant Western ethnocentrism (Skrtic 1990:126);

2 *RESEARCH INTO THE DISCOURSE OF WEAK AND IMPOTENT AS WELL AS THE POTENT AND INFLUENTIAL* ... where inquiry should not be weighted advertently or inadvertently towards the visible, the available, the articulated, and the powerful but should also reach into the 'voices' of the relatively hidden, the closed, the mum and the meager (Johnson 1990:55-57);

3 *RESEARCH INTO EMIC, GROUNDED/LOCAL SETTINGS* ... where investigative means are required which are robust in a multiplicity of 'situated' realities, encounter settings and inter-subjective moments - particularly where those situations are peripheral, disenfranchised or psychologically 'removed' (Glaser and Strauss:1967);

4 *RESEARCH INTO PETTY AND OPAQUE POWER DYNAMICS* ... where inquiry within social, cultural and institutional settings promises or exhibits the influence of macro and/or micro power dynamics inclusive of the inherited discourse of language and text (Greenfield 1985:3);

5 *RESEARCH INTO TACIT/IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING* ... where the intuitive and metaphorical insight of human researchers is harnessed (Geertz 1983:73-93);

6 *RESEARCH INTO MULTIPLE VERITIES* ... where an attempt is needed to get beyond a single dominant world view towards the plurality of alternative social, cultural and lifestyle vocabularies (Goodman 1978:2-6 and 7-17).

SOURCE: Adapted from Marshall:1990:196.

### 1.3.7 The Selection of the Inquiry Paradigm

Two guiding suppositions lie behind the previous subsection (1.3.6.). The first, is that with regard to the *social science of truth* (if not with regard to *all social science* --- if not with regard to *all science*) the goal lies in *understanding* rather than in *explanation* (Zeller 1987:29). The second follows on from the first, and is that truth in social science is more reliably conveyed in particular rather than in general axioms. Stake (1978:6) sums up both of these postulations in his statement that "truth in the field of human affairs is better approximated by statements that are rich with the sense of human encounter [in lieu of] propositional and statements of lawful relationships."

#### 1.3.7.1 The Choice of Postempirical Paradigm

The two aforementioned suppositions will be used to spearhead the selection of a paradigm for the study at hand. Since positivism and postpositivism have been dismissed as being inadequate, the choice lies between the paradigms of critical theory and constructivism. Table 1.3.7.1./1 now is an attempt to compare the approach of critical theory with constructivism in the light of their respective research orientations towards postmodern society --- or perhaps just to 'society'. The feminist views of Donna Haraway (1988) have been taken as loosely representative of critical theory, and these of Clifford Geertz (1983) as broadly illustrative of constructivism.

The reader needs to bare in mind that 1.3.7.1./1 is a hypothetical or much reduced explanation. While its purpose is simple enough --- to contrast two postempirical research outlooks --- the forced nature of its stylization gives rise to a number of difficulties.

(i) *selection of criteria*

the symmetry of the table might give rise to false confidence in the degree to which critical theory and constructivism are equivalent to each other. The table dichotomously provides ten criteria by which their respective outlooks on truth can be assessed, but being dichotomous it is only 'photographic' in form and does not reflect the quality of treatment to or the depth of significance held towards each of the ten. It also understates the degree to which the two paradigms are unlike by de-emphasizing aspects of assessment which are peculiar to each (and do not have an equivalent / matching counterpart in the other paradigm).

(ii) *nominated theorists*

the table only provides insight into one theorist per paradigm, yet critical theory and constructivism are only umbrella terms and both have numerous distinct methodologies and approaches under them. For instance, embodied objectivism is a distinguishable feature of Haraway's feminist account and not necessarily of other feminists let alone other critical theorists. And, likewise, Geertz may dwell upon ideology in his accounts much more decidedly than any other constructivist.

TABLE 1.3.7.1./1

POSTEMPIRICISM AND PARTICULARISM:  
CRITICAL THEORETICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES ON WEBBED KNOWLEDGE

--- a comparison of the outlooks of Haraway and Geertz ---

CRITERIA FOR JUDGING 'TRUTH' IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY	THE ASSUMED <i>CRITICAL THEORETICAL</i> APPROACH OF DONNA HARAWAY	THE ASSUMED <i>CONSTRUCTIVIST</i> APPROACH OF CLIFFORD GEERTZ
1 <i>CORE THEORY</i>	<b>Feminist Theory:</b> Webbed accounts.	<b>Ethnography:</b> Webbed Accounts.
2 <i>KEY TERMINOLOGY</i>	<b>Situated knowledges</b> found through passionate detachments.	<b>Local knowledges</b> found through vocabulary catching.
3 <i>METHODOLOGY</i>	<b>Embodied objectivist/dialectic.</b>	<b>Hermeneutic/dialectic.</b>
4 <i>OVERALL SCIENTIFIC AIM</i>	Identification of <b>multiple visions</b> of people/players.	Identification of <b>multiple constructions</b> of people/players.
5 <i>RESEARCH GOAL FOR EACH INQUIRY</i>	How people/communities/institutions place themselves in society ( <b>oppositional positioning</b> with an emphasis on institutions over individuals).	How people/communities/institutions make their societies and themselves ( <b>worldmaking</b> ; with an emphasis on individuals over institutions).
6 <i>ORGANON (INSTRUMENT OF REASONING)</i>	<b>Critical deconstruction:</b> unpacking of forces of power and its subjugations.	<b>Grounded interpretation:</b> unpacking of principal relevances in the conceptual world.
7 <i>RESEARCH FOCUS</i>	<b>Heteroglossia</b> (situated rather than common languages): emphasis on institutional rhetoric).	<b>Heteroglossia</b> (local rather than common languages): emphasis on grounded utterances/discourse.
8 <i>PARTICULAR TARGET POPULATION</i>	<b>Subjugated individuals</b> and institutions within the world of illusion (i.e. what action can he/she/they take to remedy their subjugation).	Each individual and institution significantly contributing to <b>the local world</b> (i.e., what are the important meanings in the locality).
9 <i>VISION OF SOCIETY</i>	A stage for <b>rhetoric and objectification</b> .	A serious game, a sidewalk drama --- <b>a behavioral text</b> .
10 <i>REGARD FOR UNIVERSAL RATIONALITY</i>	<b>Rejected as partial</b> (partiality causes objectification).	<b>Left for explanatory/diagnostic matters</b> (ethnography is really for ideological/justificatory matters).

SOURCE: Haraway 1988 and Geertz 1983.

(iii) *artificiality of context*

the tables are suppositions, since neither Haraway nor Geertz have specifically written on truth in postmodern society, *per se*. In fact Haraway's views are transposed from her observations upon science and technology, and those of Geertz are translated from his essays on interpretive anthropology. Indeed, although Geertz advises that research attention under his preferred style of interpretive explanation is placed upon *constructions* (in the mode of a Burckhardt, a Weber or a Freud) he does not specifically call himself a constructivist. The term was not, evidently, in vogue in ethnography in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Those limiting riders stated, the Table does have worth. It confirms that both critical theory and constructivism are **ethnophilosophies** (rather than universal rationalities) and that they are **webbed accounts** (rather than master explanations). It presents both critical theory and constructivism as particularist in focus in lieu of being subscribe to a generalized 'world system' view of humanity common under empiricist outlooks.

It also suggests that either of these postempirical paradigms could be utilized to describe the character of historical truth and / or to plumb the nature of state administrative performance in postmodern society. A critical theory investigation, after Haraway, would seek *corrective actions* by which disenfranchised people and vulnerable institutions can strategically reposition or *re-situate* themselves in society. A constructivist study, after Geertz, would seek *rich and deep understanding* of a population's local settings so that their meaningful *signification systems* can be 'known'.

But which paradigm best suits this immediate / adjuvant inquiry's study problem? How can the science problem (of 1.3.6.) be solved to the satisfaction of the study problem?

The determination of appropriate paradigm boils down, in fact, to a clarification of the aims of the study.

If the goal of the study is the unification of research and political action, where the findings are not just for understanding state administration of historical truth in Texas, but for *acting in it* then a critical theory route would be acceptable (Firestone 1990:118). The study would be developed along a four part schema (Fay 1987):

- a theory of *false consciousness* would be molded showing how a groups' limited or incoherent understandings are erroneous and how that falsity helps shape their victimization;
- a theory of *crisis* would follow (based upon that false consciousness) indicating the circumstances under which the moderation of oppressive conditions is possible;
- a theory of *education* would then be required, detailing the broad process required to bring about the weakening of the subjugation of the group / groups and the attainment of the new socio-political / communal conditions; and,

- a theory of *transformative action* would finally be established to translate the above broad educational processes to specific activities that are required to attain the group's / groups' manumission.

But this four-part prototype is not complete, for the four theories are predicated on a fifth theoretical position --- an ongoing narrative theory about *how the world ought to be* once the conditions of subjugation are vanquished.

That five-part model would then constitute a critical theoretical approach to the study at hand, combining the inquiry imperative with the political impulse.

If the goal of the study does not overtly involve political prescription, and the investigator simply seeks to offer an expositive account of a group's perspectives on the production of historical truth in Texas, then a constructivist avenue of research would suit. Here the investigation would hunt for the multiple realities that may exist about 'Texas' and about its 'manufacture.' The resulting theory would be built chiefly upon emic insight (stemming from the language of those investigated) and would embrace the competing and often contesting accounts of different stakeholders. The theory would highlight the meanings, beliefs, ideology of these stakeholders / groups, and would be supported with a thickly described context.

So, for critical theory the aim is to marry insight with action where the recourse proposed is tailored to the interests of nominated political actors / groups. For constructivism, the aim is to provide the non-specific reader(s) (whomever they may be), or the specific reader(s), of and within stakeholder groups, with a faithful rendition of the pertinent information so that he / she / they can take their own informed (but independent and subsequent) decisions.

Since the study is *not* being targeted as exploratory and is *not* targeted towards the specific emancipatory interests of an identified group --- and since the investigator has *no* normative *fifth theoretical position* as to how Texas should be shaped and projected at state level (to liberate a segment(s) of the population) --- the catalyst study will be conducted (henceforward) within the **constructivist** paradigm.

Under constructivism, the adjuvant study will be perspectival in the sense that the distinction between understanding and interpretation is collapsed (J.K. Smith 1990:176). In focusing upon the dominant values that 'live' within the state bureaucracy the study will not be trading in mundanities. As Sapir (1929) noted: "the worlds in which different [groups or] societies live are *distinct worlds* not merely the *same world* with *different labels* attached." People in different jobs, places and situations do not think alike. Their perspectives differ from those who are geographically near, not just those who are geographically far. Conceivably different perspectives make up different worlds. Dominant perspectives, threaded through grand and petty, transparent and opaque forms of power, inevitably privilege some truths rather than others. Individual and institutional perspectives, when powerfully placed and fed into policy

and action, directly and indirectly construct the world people inhabit. Those *dominant / favored ideologies*, meanings and myths have *large consequences* which will now be tracked.

### 1.3.7.2 The Research Implications of the Choice of Constructivism: Naturalist Inquiry as Constructivist Methodology

In order to tidy-up some of the loose-end reasoning of immediate past subsections, Table 1.3.7.2./1 is an attempt to highlight the key axioms of constructivism. They are originally served from Lincoln and Guba (1985:37) and are now juxtaposed in comparison with those of (rejected) positivism. As the table indicates, positivists are inclined to believe there is one reality which is fragmentable into independent variables which can each be studied independently. Thus they maintain that every action can be explained as the result of a real cause that preceded it (Lincoln and Guba 1985:37-38). Constructivists, however, believe that there are **multiple realities** which are divergently recorded dependent upon the reactivity between inquirer and inquired after, and between respondent and context (37-38).

According to Lincoln and Guba, there are many alternative approaches to constructivism. In 1985(7) they listed the following under the paradigmatic term *naturalistic inquiry*:

- postpositivism;
- ethnography;
- phenomenology
- subjectivity;
- case study research;
- qualitative methods;
- hermeneutics; and,
- humanism.

While the above eight were not defined or clinically distinguished within that 1985 text, they were each accepted as naturalistic if:

- (i) the approach does not involve manipulation by the researcher on the *antecedent conditions* of the behavior being studied; and,
- (ii) the approach did not impose an *a priori* classification upon the behavior.

These two criteria were based upon earlier work in psychology by Willems and Raush (1969:46). Anyhow, postpositivist approaches could be deemed to be naturalistic if they met the two key (Willems / Raush modified) criteria.

The handbook that Lincoln and Guba produced is an introductory guide to constructivism, though they only use the term "construction" in relation to 'reality' and to 'mutual shaping' and not as the umbrella term for the paradigm. They retain naturalistic inquiry as their over-arching descriptor for the / their new paradigm. Their 'Naturalistic Inquiry' is the 'Constructivism' of this catalyst study --- and, likely, for the case studies of the ongoing research agenda, too. Since that 1985 text is the only known comprehensive

TABLE 1.3.7.2./1

**A COMPARISON OF THE AXIOMS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM  
WITH THOSE OF POSITIVISM**

<b>Axiom</b>	<b>Perspective of Positivist Paradigm</b>	<b>Perspective of Constructivist Paradigm</b>	<b>Consequential Way-of-Seeing Texan History Under Constructivism [same possible outlooks of the paradigm on heritage]</b>
The nature of reality	Reality is single, tangible, and fragmentable.	Realities are multiple, constructed, and holistic.	Individuals, groups and institutions in Texas have different views on what happened in the past, and assemble their preferred vision of the past not only from different views of events but from different events.
The relationship of knower to the known	Knower and known are independent, a dualism.	Knower and known are interactive, inseparable.	The ideology and beliefs held by individuals, groups and institutions affect not only what is remembered, and what is recalled, about the history of Texas but also the worth or significance of those past events.
The possibility of generalization	Time- and context-free generalizations (nomothetic statements) are possible.	Only time- and context-bound working hypotheses (idiographic statements) are possible.	Individuals, groups and institutions do not necessarily hold constant and singular views about what happened or what was/is important in the heritage of Texas, but those views and articulations may change considerably dependent on the intersubjective and the broader contextual setting.
The possibility of causal linkages	There are real causes, temporally precedent to or simultaneous with their effects.	All entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous shaping, so that it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects.	The individual(s), the contextual environment (place) and the occasion (time) resonate reciprocally with each other in complex ways which are difficult to disentangle in terms of dependencies and independencies: the interactions are variform and changeable. What may be celebrated about the Texan is one situation one day may not be inspirational the next.
The role of values	Inquiry is value-free.	Inquiry is value-bound.	The researchers can not neutralize his/her own views as to what is important in the Texan past: they influence what he/she asks, observes and interpretes when communicating with study respondents.

SOURCE: Adapted from original ideas in Lincoln and Guba 1985:37.

account of constructivism as both paradigm and step-by-step methodology, it will be adapted as *fons et origo* for the current study --- borrowed and translated for the current setting where necessary, wholly remodelled where it is seen to be deficient, and replaced with insight from later philosophers of constructivist social science --- such as Strauss and Corbin (1990), Denzin (1989), Johnson (1990), Guba and Lincoln (1989) themselves and Guba (1990) himself --- where new thought has blossomed.

Since the shell ideas of the methodological approach will be heavily transposed from Lincoln and Guba's pioneering 1985 analysis, though, the current investigation will, to repeat, adopt the term NATURALISTIC INQUIRY whenever specific aspects of methodology are discussed, leaving use of the term CONSTRUCTIVISM for the wider / covering issues at the paradigm level.

In subsection 1.3.6., concern was expressed that positivism and neo-positivist approaches would probably prove inadequate to the task of meaningfully relating to the cardinal sensibilities of postmodernity. The fit between constructivism and postmodernity is, however, given in Figures 1.3.7.2./1 and 1.3.7.2./2.

Figure 1.3.7.2./1 shows seven of the basic shifts in scientific belief from the conventional empiricism of positivism to the subjectivities of constructivism. These seven trends were juxtaposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985:52) from a larger set in Schwartz and Ogilvy (1979:13). Superimposed on top of a notional seven-point continuum from an abstract / aggregate positivist position to an abstract / aggregate constructivist position are the twenty accounts of the cultural logic that have characterized the onset of postmodernity (and which were first presented in Table 1.1.4./1).

Clearly the positioning of the twenty 'overview accounts' of postmodernity is arbitrarily undertaken. An attempt was made to allocate each of the twenty postmodern items to the shift in paradigmatic thought which best reflected it. For the first postmodern account (viz., postmodernity as anti-hierarchy) that was a straight-forward enough task --- it corresponded with the paradigmatic shift from 'hierarchy' to 'anti-hierarchy' and so is positioned at the extreme right of that continuum (nearer heterarchy than hierarchy). For some of the other accounts the hypothetical positioning is debatable. Conceivably, account 5 (viz., postmodernity as accelerated style) relates to each of the following *five* paradigmatic shifts: to 1 ("simple" to "complex"), to 2 ("hierarchy" to "heterarchy"), to 3 ("mechanical" to "holographic"), to 4 ("determinate" to "indeterminate") and to 5 ("assembly" to "mophogenesis"). After much deliberation, it was decided to position it on continuum 5 (and not 1,2,3, or 4) --- again at the constructivism end of the continuum.

Hence the resultant figure (Figure 1.3.7.2./2) is a somewhat discretionary set of superimpositions. It does not reflect the plural perspectives which may be defensible; it does not reflect the dialogic / problematic nature of the act of placement; and it does not reflect the *weight* of the association of each of the twenty accounts of postmodernity with the seven paradigmatic shifts --- it only attests to the direction of change. Yet, given those limitations, the figure does constitute a simple heuristic graphic to confirm that constructivism does indeed appear to reflect the new impulses of postmodernity in somewhat richer fashion than does positivism.



Positivism	From → → → → Continuum → → → To						Constructivism
1 Simple Realities				13			Complex Realities Real-world entities are a diverse lot of complex systems and organisms.
2 Hierarchic Concepts of Order				14 15		1 10	Heterarchic Concepts of Order Systems and organisms experience many simultaneous and potentially equally dominant orderings-none of which are "naturally" ordered.
3 Mechanical Images				6	7 11		Holographic Images Images of systems and organisms are created by a dynamic process of interaction that is (metaphorically) similar to the holograph, the three -dimensional images of which are stored and recreated by the interference patterns of laser beams.
4 Determinacy					18	2 3	Indeterminacy Future states of systems and organisms are in principle unpredictable.

FIGURE 1.3.7.2./1 SHIFTS IN BASIC BELIEFS: DOMINANT / ORTHODOX POSITIVISM TO EMERGENT / HUMANISTIC CONSTRUCTIVISM --- the new paradigm of Schwartz and Ogilvy

Positivism								Constructivism
5 Linearly								<p>Mutually Causal Systems and organisms evolve and change together in such a way (with feedback and feedforward), as to make the distinction between cause and effect meaningless.</p>
6 Assembly								<p>Morphogenesis New forms of systems and organisms unpredicted (and unpredictable) from any of their parts can arise spontaneously under conditions of diversity, openness, complexity, mutual causality, and indeterminacy.</p>
7 Objective Views								<p>Perspectival Views Mental processes, instruments, and even disciplines are not neutral.</p>

SOURCE: The seven major shifts from positivism to constructivism as 'found' by Schwartz and Ogilvy (1979) and adapted here from Lincoln and Guba 1985:51 to 56 [see following Figure (1.3.7.2./2) for an explanation of numbers 1 to 20.

FIGURE 1.3.7.2./1 (Continued)

In order to more fully delineate what Lincoln and Guba discern as naturalistic inquiry (under the panoply of constructivism), Table 1.3.7.2./2 lists a selection of the descriptors they have nominated for each of the seven basic beliefs of 'the emergent paradigm' as first given under Figures 1.3.7.2./1 and 1.3.7.2./2. The reader should acknowledge that Table 1.3.7.2./2 is only illustrative: it lists merely twenty-one descriptors, uniformly allocated across the seven basic beliefs. Lincoln and Guba's original list (itself a reduced version of the Schwartz and Ogilvy compilation) contained some sixty-four descriptors with an allocation ranging from twelve as the highest (for *heterarchy*) to five for the lowest (for holography).

The Schwartz-Ogilvy / Lincoln-Guba descriptors provide a set of methodological guidelines for the conduct of naturalistic inquiry:

- the descriptors on "complexity" address the reality that complex systems and organisms can undergo revolutionary-qualitative as well as incremental / evolutionary changes in the quantitative mode --- a critical point in terms of its clear limitations on the possibilities of prediction;
- the descriptors on "heterarchy" address the reality that human action is orientated more towards pluralism than to singularity of impulse (a critical point in terms of the uncertainties of knowing *which* impulse will be responded to *when* --- *dimensionality* can rarely if ever be singular in social / societal affairs;
- the descriptors on "holography" address the reality that in any setting everything is interconnected within the grounded nature of that full context --- the removal of a small element can change the whole context;
- the descriptors on "indeterminacy" address the reality that in complex systems, future possibilities can be known, but precise outcomes cannot be predicted --- hence, the concept of predictability is less useful than the concept of probability;
- the descriptors on "mutual causality" address the fact that change occurs more by adaptation than by conquest or replacement --- and that the symbiotic adaptability of entities in encounters tends to produce unpredictable consequences or results which are somewhat elusive for empirical-analytic methodologies to trace;
- the descriptors on "morphogenesis" address the reality that fluctuations in systems and differences in interactions produce new systems and organisms --- a newly perceived order can arise even from what was formerly perceived as disorder; and,
- the descriptors on "perspective" address the reality that what the observer believes about a system or about organisms considerably determines what he / she believes he / she is seeing --- **objectivity is an illusion, and knowledge can only ever be partial.**

Individually and collectively the twenty-one descriptors of Table 1.3.7.2./2 (or more properly, the full herd of Lincoln-Guba descriptors and the wide field of Schwartz-Ogilvy insights) speak volumes to the perspectival nature of truth. Metaphorically, logico-positive inquirers have been prone to viewing humans

Positivism	Continuum				Constructivism
	From	→	→	→	To
1 Simple Realities			13= Postmodernism as mix of power		Complex Realities Real-world entities are a diverse lot of complex systems and organisms.
2 Hierarchic Concepts of Order			14= Postmodernism as consolidated 15= Postmodernism as aggressive advertising 19= Postmodernism as Western decline	1= Postmodernism as anti-hierarchy 10= Postmodernism as populism	Heterarchic Concepts of Order Systems and organisms experience many simultaneous and potentially equally dominant orderings-none of which are "naturally" ordered.
3 Mechanical Images			6= Postmodernism as rule by technicism 7= Postmodernism as representation 11= Postmodernism as media creation		Holographic Images Images of systems and organisms are created by a dynamic process of interaction that is (metaphorically) similar to the holograph, the three -dimensional images of which are stored and recreated by the interference patterns of laser beams.
4 Determinacy			2= Postmodernism as anti-totalitarianism 3= Postmodernism as resistance 18= Postmodernism as deconstructed tradition		Indeterminacy Future states of systems and organisms are in principle unpredictable.

FIGURE 1.3.7.2./2 THE NOTION POSITIONS OF NEW POSTMODERN SENSIBILITIES BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM --- conceptual placement of the twenty sensibilities from Table 1.1.4./1 vis-a-vis the seven Schwartz and Ogilvy characteristics

Positivism				Constructivism
5 Linearly Causal	16= Postmodernism as antidote for modernism			Mutually Causal Systems and organisms evolve and change together in such a way (with feedback and feedforward), as to make the distinction between cause and effect meaningless.
6 Assembly	5= Postmodernism as accelerated style 8= Postmodernism as schizophrenia 17= Postmodernism as destroyer of the subject			Morphogenesis New forms of systems and organisms unpredicted (and unpredictable) from any of their parts can arise spontaneously under conditions of diversity, openness, complexity, mutual causality, and indeterminacy.
7 Objective Views	4= Postmodernism as simulation 9= Postmodernism as raw experience 12= Postmodernism as hydratic being 20= Postmodernism as human conquest			Perspectival Views Mental processes instruments, and even disciplines are not neutral.

SOURCE: ● The seven shifts from positivism to constructivism - adapted from the treatment of Schwartz and Ogilvy in Lincoln and Guba 1985:51 to 56.  
● The twenty new sensibilities --- from Table 1.1.4./1 -- as applied in Figure 1.3.7.2./1

FIGURE 1.3.7.2./2 (Continued)

TABLE 1.3.7.2./2

## SELECTIVE DESCRIPTORS FOR THE BASIC BELIEFS OF NATURALISM

-- Examples of the Strauss and Ogilvy (1979) characterizations of the emergent paradigm --

BASIC BELIEF OF NATURALISM		SAMPLE DESCRIPTOR
1 COMPLEXITY	1.1	- All boundaries in actual ecosystems are arbitrary.
	1.2	- Systems and organisms cannot be separated from their environments because their meaning and even their existence depends upon their interactions with other systems and organisms.
	1.3	- Systems and organisms cannot be decomposed (fragmented) into individual elements (parts) because their unique systemic and organic properties transcend the elements (parts).
2 HETERARCHY	2.1	- The order we experience is a function of an activity of ordering performed by the mind; all apparently "real" orders are also determined by a mental ordering activity.
	2.2	- 'Hierarchies' are multiple and overlapping.
	2.3	- Movement among systems or organisms is not mere compromise or averaging; it may be unpredictable and different from the interests or tendencies of the interacting systems or organisms.
3 HOLOGRAPHY	3.1	- Information is distributed throughout the system rather than concentrated at specific points.
	3.2	- At each point information about the whole is contained in the part.
	3.3	- Not only can the entire reality be found in the part, but the part can be found in the whole.
4 INDETERMINACY	4.1	- Ambiguity about the future is the condition of nature.
	4.2	- There is a reciprocal involvement between the knower and the known.
	4.3	- Study in depth usually increases uncertainty.

TABLE 1.3.7.2./2 (Continued)

BASIC BELIEF OF NATURALISM		SAMPLE DESCRIPTOR
5 MUTUAL CAUSALITY	5.1 5.2 5.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strict deterministic causality is replaced by <i>unpredictable innovation arising morphogenetically</i> through mutually causal interactions and fluctuations.</li> <li>- The universe is an interconnected network, an indivisible whole.</li> <li>- To understand a system or organism completely requires knowledge of its history, which cannot be known completely from its present condition.</li> </ul>
6 MORPHOGENES	6.1 6.2 6.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- New and different systems and organisms arise out of old through a complex process that amplifies deviation through reciprocal (mutual) causality (positive feedback and feedforward) and through interactions with the surrounding environment.</li> <li>- Fluctuations in a system or organism are not merely random errors or deviations from the significant average; rather, such fluctuations can be the source of a new order.</li> <li>- Change is not only continuous and quantitative but discontinuous and qualitative.</li> </ul>
7 PERSPECTIVE	7.1 7.2 7.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Where and how one looks at systems and organisms affects what will be seen, the knower's perspective is crucial in determining what is known.</li> <li>- No description, model, or theory is every complete; what is required is a <i>multiplicity of perspectives</i>, each of which enriches and complements the others.</li> <li>- Knowledge is protected not by abstracting from all perspectives (the claim for objectivity) but by balancing multiple perspectives to constrain bias (the claim for fairness).</li> </ul>

SOURCE: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba 1985:56-62.

as 'machines.' These naturalistic characterizations attempt, instead, to refocus the analysis of 'humans' literally towards the unpredictabilities of behavior, association and vision. They acknowledge the endless and ever-changing **mutualities** in which cultural and socio-political affairs are conducted, and the fact that constructions of the truth concerning those affairs are always predisposed and inescapably imperfect.

Later, (in Section 3), a particular approach to naturalistic inquiry will be adopted. The method selected will be one which has the following rationale: it will:

- attempt to build up a relatively strong description of the contextual settings for human experience (something which is rarely ever the goal under positivism (Marcus and Fischer 1986:43));
- attempt to map contextualized *meaning* within symbol systems rather than *generalized exactitude*; and,
- attempt to develop grounded researched instruments which explore the incoherences of social belief and action, not just the precise and neatly bounded coherencies (185).

### 1.3.8 The Problem

Having selected the research approach for the blanket research agenda (inclusive of the adjuvant investigation) study it is now possible to formally state the research problem. This will be done in five steps:

- Step One* (viz., 1.3.8.1): *Identification of the study questions* --- for the overall / longhaul investigation;
- Step Two* (viz., 1.3.8.2): *Clarification of the study context* (a recap of what already has been presented about the importance of the question);
- Step Three* (viz., 1.3.8.3): *Clarification of question / context fit*;
- Step Four* (viz., 1.3.8.4): *Clarification of question / method fit*;
- Step Five* (viz., 1.3.8.5): *Statement of the study problem* (which will be followed by 1.3.9 --- the sub-problems (a statement of the study sub-problems revealing their juxtaposition with the problem itself).

#### 1.3.8.1 Identification of the Study Questions

The purpose of this study is **to develop a sustainable research agenda capable of investigating over time the manufacture of the past in the governance and administration of national or state tourism**. To that end, the catalyst subject for the establishment of the research agenda is the production of the heritage of Texas. Within that broad subject area the adjuvant study seeks to explore the way Texas is served up / shaped up as a drawcard for instate and inbound (to-the-state) visitors. Thus the presented history and the interpreted heritage of Texas is viewed as a 'truth' (or sets of truths) which is broadcast to both manifest and latent visitors. The adjuvant study questions some of the ways by which that truth is assembled --- or put another way --- the way that Texas is conceived for visitors (and travelling state residents) by certain state administrators who have certain (it cannot be 'all') responsibilities for promotion and development of the state's heritage. In examining the production of 'Texas' in this fashion at this explicit level, the catalyst study also questions at implicit levels:



- *the question of dominance* --- whose ways-of-seeing Texas are dominant, and whose are excluded?
- *the question of public interest* --- is there a relatively coherent and universal public conception of the Texas past?
- *the question of values* --- whether or not there is a coherent / universal Texan heritage) in terms of whether there is evidence that within the manufacture of 'Historic Texas' in tourism certain private values are being made into public values at the significant expensive of other private values?

Thus, this immediate / adjuvant investigation seeks to examine reality construction in the administration of state tourism in order to derive a longterm research agenda that can explore the reality making of history in tourism and travel **in Texas and beyond**. The aim of the catalyst study is to explore how "Texas" is manufactured through the articulations (*the discourse*) and the practices (*the praxis*) of those state administrators who are responsible for the selection and promotion of the state's past.

### 1.3.8.2 Clarification of the Study Context

Now that the broad questions or the arena of the study has been presented, some recapitulation is required on the background to the study. It will be provided in three cardinal areas:

*1st Grounding Component (viz., 1.3.8.2/i): Historical Truth;*

*2nd Grounding Component (viz., 1.3.8.2/ii): Postmodernity;*

*3rd Grounding Component (viz., 1.3.8.2/iii): Power.*

Key points from each of these grounding components (or **substantive areas**) will now be recalled from the gelling research agenda study so far.

#### (i) *Recap: Historical Truth*

Historical truth is about ways-of-seeing in the constructivist sense that a nation, a region, a place does not have one 'proven' or 'factual' history it has untold possibilities of 'truth'. If there are multiple realities in the present, there are multiple accounts of the past. In an extension of Althusserian judgement (Harland 1987:101), the concept of historical truth cannot rest on a matched correspondence of 'historical ideas' to 'actual past events'. There can never be a standardized, scientific history. History cannot be made universal because its truths are dependent upon subject-making --- and subject making is perspectival. According to Foucault, subjectification involves the turning of human beings (and things / events associated with them) into objects by *commonplace dividing practices* (e.g., 'lepers are different than others'), by *scientific classification* (e.g., through language systems, not through actuality itself) and by *subjectification* (e.g., where people transform themselves or others into subjects) (Rabinow 1984:7-11). When subject making has occurred --- consciously or subconsciously --- it is

maintained, in Foucault's view, through the discourse of life, labor and language, where discourse is *not* separate from social practice (8-10).

Under this melding of discourse and practice the transmission of a heritage amounts to the transmission of **meaning**. Things from the past (inclusive of 'memories' and 'facts') get passed on to others down the ages not just because of the material or other 'comforts' they provide "but for the information they convey about *the owner* and his or her ties to [significant] others" (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981: 239; emphasis added). Where meanings and ideologies are entrenched, the historical truth that a given people associate with them also tend to endure. Historical truths which are supported by a rich depth of meaning can become 'locked in aspic', that is almost unchallenged within the culture or subculture. But historical truths which are supported by the powerful and the privileged also endure. One could suggest that those who control the artifacts also control the facts. In this way "[world] history is [but] a strong Western [male] story culture buffs tell each other" (Haraway 1988:577).

- (ii) *Recap: Postmodernity.* The earlier subsections of this study indicated that ways-of-seeing are changing under postmodernity / post-structuralism / late-capitalism because of the changes in socio-political and societal legitimacies that have sprung from the de-aestheticization and de-differentiation of the last several decades. The collapse of cultural hierarchies and the implosion of cultural meaning (Ross 1988:x-xi) have, in the West, rendered many of the previously established social codes as *passé*. In the new development of ethical awareness that arrived with postmodernity, there is now an "irreducible diversity of voices and interests" (Connor 1989:244) to heed in terms of articulations of the present and accounts of the past. Relationships based upon inherited metanarratives are no longer so concrete.
- (iii) *Recap: Power.* Few would ever argue that ways-of-seeing are considerably affected by the exercise of power within each society. In the past, however, the exercise of power was largely felt to be *formal / known / overt* power --- power which powerholders could and did *display*. Since Foucault, however, power is also much more commonly known to also have *informal, unsuspected* and *hidden* faces --- power can also exist in a relationship between people which neither the power-holder nor the recipient (nor frequently both) knew was being enacted. Thus there is **opaque power** as well as **transparent power**. But power also lies in the longterm gaze as well as in the immediate act. And power can lie in the everyday minuscule actions under such gazes as well as in the evoked decision-making incidents of life. Thus, there is **petty power** as well as **eminent power**.

Where opaque power and petty power are embedded within elites or restricted groups in given states or settings, that society can become in Foucault's term *carceral* (Merquior 1985:98). In this fashion, power is central and well-anchored, but not necessarily fully suspected even by those wielding it. Carceral

society is 'disciplined' society. The prevailing universe is socio-politically conceived and constructed by those in the van of the advantageously placed 'disciplines'. The institutions people are 'in' affect their view of the world; and those 'insiders' work out the institution's vision of the world upon 'outsiders' wherever the influence of other institutions is at bay. At state level, state institutions can wield a monopolistic and / or statist gaze over the population. The end result *can* among other things become 'statist historical truth', 'statist heritage', and 'statist tourism'.

### 1.3.8.3 Clarification of the Fit Between Study Questions and Study Context

For the research agenda both the study question and the study context address matters of dominance. *The study question* raises the query as to whether state administrators (in operationalizing their own bureaucratic-personal way-of-seeing the truth of Texas) subjugate other people. *The study contexts* clarify that deliberation by pointing out that what is legitimate historical truth / heritage:

- can conceivably change depending upon how many people / bodies and who support a particular account of the past;
- is currently conceivably much affected by the anti-foundational and anti-essentialist strains of the age; and,
- is conceivably being reinforced by a host of unsuspected (as well as suspected) ways by unknown actors upon unknowing publics.

Hence, behind tourism and behind heritage a statist, disciplining bureaucracy is possibly at work. Sometimes its 'gaze' is possibly engaged forcefully and consciously *and is driven*. Sometimes its 'gaze' is quotidian, and stays focal all night, all week, all year --- ceaselessly; *it drives* itself.

If Foucault is correct, it is unwise to separate *knowledge* from *power* (Rabinow 1984:7): they reinforce each other. Certain historical truths are sustained by opaque, petty and other forms of power under the state's gaze (or under other institutional gazes). And those truths are selected because they reflect on the legitimacy, the nobility and the notability of those who have selected those truths. Thus, if Foucault's theorization does apply to 1992 Texas tourism --- and there is, in fact, a statist heritage --- some / few / all of its bureaucrats conceivably play the role of *agents of normalcy*. For the projected heritage of Texas, there may be what Foucault styles "an universal reign of the normative" (Merquior 1985:95-6), where the state bureaucrats are both the driven drivers and the driving drivers of that normalization. If so, they are not just administrators, they have the role (as agents of normalcy) of *administrator-judge* --- equivalent to the role of other such agents under other gazes (e.g., the *doctor-judge*, the *educator-judge* and the *social worker-judge* (96)).

But Foucault wrote largely as postmodernity knocked. *He* has died: *it* has evidently entered. Does the Foucault theorization of the power-knowledge nexus still apply (if it ever did)? A late observer of postmodernity might suggest that postmodernity has changed the face of **legitimation** so much in the last three or more decades that Foucault's power-knowledge nexus is so much harder to identify or work

through. Fraser and Nicholson (1988:87) now argue that legitimation is no longer exclusive / centrist discourse: it has become **plural, local and immanent**. In this light, the role of bureaucrats is *not* that of *agents of normalcy*, it is of *agents of sensitivity*. Administrators must learn to be Lyotardian --- i.e., sensitive to differences and tolerant of incommensurability (Lyotard 1984).

Thus, the study has to feel for the tension between the centrist / disciplining imperatives of a previous era, and the new more-widely spread powerplays of the postmodern heterotopia. Is the projected heritage of Texas still constructed by a precious, privileged few, or is Texas now constructed by multiform sources of significant influence --- in a myriad of treatments of de-differentiated designers? Are the dominant values centrist / statist / elitist or are they populist / schizophrenic / globally-connected? Is there a *power-knowledge nexus* behind the projection of heritage in tourism in Texas, or is it more fitting to say there is an accelerating *powers-knowledges hydra* in advance of the promotion of the state's history-on-show?

#### 1.3.8.4 Clarification of Fit Between Questions and Method

In order to gain understanding, for the catalyst study, about administrators' ways-of-seeing the Texas past --- and in order to understand which features of the state's heritage they privilege and which special interests they relate to in history, culture and related fields --- the adjuvant study inevitably becomes a matter of *problem setting* rather than *problem solving* (Wolcott 1990:31). The goal of the adjuvant study is to produce new and improved understanding of the choices administrators make in terms of the state's projection of history in tourism. The critical issue involved (in beginning to comprehend that choice process) is to know how the administrators' inherited / current discourse on the state's past has interfaced with their inherited / current practices. Together the discourse and the practice form (in Weber's terms) *the administrator's action* that is being studied (Gubrium 1988:14), though the term *the administrator's articulation* (21) may more directly convey the significance of meaning behind discourse and practice. That articulation includes *official* and *unofficial* discourse and *official* and *unofficial* practices which inevitably cut across each other in a myriad of ways-of-seeing within the state agency (Geertz 1973; Frost et al., 1985). The study does *not* just seek at the outset to gain insight into *official* authoritative texts or policy documents (i.e., discourse and practices).

**The catalyst study therefore seeks to explore how Texas is 'made' through the articulations in talk and in deed of its administrators.** The crucial findings therefore surround the way those administrators construct the reality of the state's past. Although data is important, the study is less about the gathering of data than it is about the interpretation of that data. It is more about the structures of meaning than it is about calculation of behaviors (Gubrium 1988:5). Thus, the study demands a paradigm which can enter "the world of the [state bureaucrats] as it exists and obtains data without any deliberate intervention to alter the setting" (Locke, et al., 1987:84).

In exploring discourse and practice (or "text" or "deed" as preferred) the study question seeks (at the method level) a mode of inquiry which is sufficiently flexible to address the indeterminacies and the mutual causalities of real-world contexts. *In such complex settings of articulation, the distinction between cause and effect is meaningless.* The research design must search for non-observables as well as observables --- that is, must recognize that covert cognitive and social processes are embedded within overt administrative / decision-taking activities. Thus, meaning, belief, intentions, common-sense are not mere subjectives --- they become **socially shared mental objects** (van Dijk 1987:33). The tacit has to be explored in terms of its mix within the propositional, and the research design can only emerge or unfold once much is known about both the propositional and the tacit.

Given this fit between the research questions and the research setting, the study demands 'arthopological / nonprobability' sampling rather than probability sampling: "Hence, the validity of the sample depends not so much upon the number of cases as upon the proper specification of the informant ... . Within [an] extensive degree of specification [of age, occupational experience, situational relationships, configurational relationships, and other variables], each informant is studied as *a perfect example*, an organic representation of his [sic!] cultural [and discourse-bound] experience" (Mead 1953:646; emphasis added). More recently, this thinking has been recognized in Cook and Campbell's (1979) model of deliberative sampling for heterogeneity, and in Johnson's (1990:23) views on the selection of ethnographic informants:

"Whereas in stratified [probability] samples one is attempting to minimize within-strata variance and maximize between-strata variance in the selection of respondents, among [ethnographic] informants one is attempting to minimize variation in knowledge or information for a single informant or cluster of informants while maximizing variation in knowledge among other individual informants or clusters in which knowledge or information is homogeneous."

For all of these reasons, **the constructivist paradigm** has been adopted, and naturalistic methods will be utilized to gain understanding of the interface between discourse and practice in the selected state administrative settings.

### 1.3.8.5 Statement of the Study Problem

Having clarified the broad study questions, and clarified them in terms of the proposed study context and method, it is necessary to express the study questions in more determinate fashion.

Here, then, is the definitive statement of the study problems. They concerns the possible role and function of bureaucrats as stewards *and* shapers of the history and heritage.

With this purpose in mind, the research agenda has two principal study problems:

- **First Study Problem --- Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Truth:**

*The first purpose of the study is to examine the contribution of a range of critical social science / cultural studies literatures to the invention and interpretation of the past.*

This first study problem relates to the catalyst study at to each of the succeeding case studies of the blanket / longhaul research agenda.

In respect of the first study problem, the investigation will draw cognizance from the literature of a range of fields of inquiry that offer insight into the way in which public culture is governed, manufactured and / or transmitted. To this end, the study follows the strong clamor of Towner and Wall (1991:72) for many more interdisciplinary approaches to the investigation of tourism. Hence, the study will endeavor to imbricate the outlooks of the following fields on 'the legitimation of the past:'

- Sociology
- Philosophy
- Anthropology
- Political Science
- Marketing
- Communication
- History
- Tourism

In toto, the eight disciplines have also been selected in response to Morgan's (1983:368-76) call for **conscious pluralism** in research practice where there are ontological uncertainties. To Morgan, singular perspectives in social science are critically limiting. In this study, then, the intent is to gain insight into the nature of public culture and universe maintenance by rubbing up or playing off each literature on or against each other literature to gain --- overall --- richer, symbiotic insight.

Each of the above disciplines is regarded as having a significant bearing on reality construction for public culture. These literatures will be examined in terms of both their overt / formulated thematics on reality making and their 'unformulated thematics' (Foucault 1970:xi). It is important to recognize that disciplines and schools of thoughts in social science routinely make sense of the world in quite different ways from each other. As such the disciplines *themselves* can act as much as **political entities** as **scientific ones** (White 1978:239-40 and 253), and the structure and traditions of their outlooks are always, inevitably loaded in the way communal truths are gauged. Thus, if tourism research is to learn from each of the other seven literatures (and from other disciplines) it ought to be acknowledged that they are all not only interpretive but **preinterpretive**. The vogue meanings and the preinterpretations in currency are themselves 'social entities' (Berger and Luckman 1967:61).

In looking at reality construction, the said disciplines have their own suatory rationales (Lyne 1985:66). They can be viewed as a mix of different metaphors by which the understanding of the way the past is represented and / or invented. Each discipline --- or rather, each metaphor --- tends to have its investigative blindspots in the way the manufacture of public culture is viewed. Since none can ever offer a perfect or unblighted perspective on truth creation, an attempt will be made in the study to gain *redundancy in analysis* --- where the strengths of the various metaphors begin to cover the blindspots of others.

Each of the eight platform disciplines will be used to raise substantial questions about the role and function of the projection of the past in a state through tourism. In different ways they are held up to see heritage / history in tourism management as 'a communicating environment' which privileges some and subjugates others. The examination of the contributions of the eight disciplines is a critical element of the endeavor to build a longterm, sustainable research agenda on the topic.

- **Second Study Problem --- Agents of Normalcy in Heritage Construction:**

*The second purpose of the study will be to examine what state administrators who are responsible for the projection of the history and heritage of Texas in tourism view as being worthy of promotion and development from the state's past.*

This second study problem relates specifically to the immediate / adjuvant investigation.

In respect of the second study problem, the inquiry concerns the role and function of bureaucrats as stewards and shapers of the history and heritage of the Lonestar State. It examines their performance in the transmittance of *meaning* about the past of Texas as viewable public culture.

### 1.3.9 Statement of the Study Sub-Problems

Given the two problems statements --- as detailed under subsection 1.3.8.5 --- the longhaul agenda and the catalyst investigation has the following sub-problems (known here as objectives):

- Sub-problem 1 = Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Truth  
Objective 1 (for the research agenda);
- Sub-problem 2 = Agents of Normalcy in Heritage Construction  
Objectives 2-7 (for the adjuvant study).

These seven objectives are as follows:

- Objective 1:  
*To identify the contribution of eight critical disciplines to the understanding of universe maintenance (reality making) in the governance and projection of heritage.*  
This objective constitutes a multi-disciplinary or transdisciplinary examination of the manufacture and promotion of the past.
- Objective 2:  
*To identify what state heritage administrators consider to be the significant aspects or features from the Texas past in regard to their worth as promotable or developmentable themes, drawcards or attractions in tourism?*  
This objective is concerned with the judgement of historical truth and merit.
- Objective 3:  
*To determine how state heritage administrators select what is important about the people, places, events, myths and other facets of Texan history in terms of its relevance to the state's image and appeal in tourism?*

This objective embraces the legitimation of celebrated entities.

- Objective 4:

*To understand with whom state heritage administrators have regular and ongoing dialogue about the state's history and heritage in order to support, correct, improve or add to their knowledge of the projected and projectable Texas past?*

This objective covers the diversity of dialogue with political interests and special interests.

- Objective 5:

*To examine what the discourse that state heritage administrators engage in expresses or signals about underlying structures and strategies of dominance and subjugation in those administrators' cognition of the past?*

This objective probes the subjugatory consequences of the discourse-and-practice uncovered.

- Objective 6:

*To gauge what other real or possible effects the discourse that state heritage administrators engage in has within the state and beyond the state?*

This objective seeks to inquire into the related and tangential effects of the discourse / practice.

- Objective 7:

*To assess the ways in which state heritage administrators change or modify their dialogue, their discourse and / or their practice when dealing with different social, cultural, political or other groups / institutions / settings?*

This objective weighs the social and political context of reality making and pursues its postmodern reflexivity.

### 1.3.10 Summary: The Advance of Science

A number of important issues on knowledge accumulation in the social sciences stem from the deliberations of section 1.3:

(i) THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: AN OLD BATTLE RENEWED

The issues concerned in the selection of research paradigms may be late twentieth century in name, but they have an extremely long past. Logico positivism, for instance, would represent what von Wright (1971:2) nominates as the *Platonic* (or Galilean) tradition which is predictive and endeavors to pursue causal-mechanistic points of view, while constructivism would qualify under what von Wright would style as the *Aristotelian* tradition --- the effort to understand things teleologically. This paradigm question is, then, old wine in a new bottle.

(ii) SCIENCE CHANGES

Legitimacies change in all science over the decades, and in social science those upheavals in permissibilities perhaps are modified at a much faster rate than occurs within the natural sciences. The rise of critical science and of constructivism is part of an overall shift towards **particularism**, away from **generalizability**. Though such changes can each seem contained



in effect, their full and extended consequence (and on occasions their aggregate significance) can be immense. Many, if not all of the contemporary assumptions of postpositivism, for example, run in reverse direction to the tenets of positivism that were unchallenged in many quarters of both the natural and social sciences even as late as in the late 1970s. Social science is thus seen to be undergoing its own 'crisis-of-representation' (Marcus and Fischer 1986:8).

(iii) CONVERGENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE WITH PHILOSOPHY

In Giddens's estimation (1981:vii) the late popularity of the post-empiricist paradigms now testifies to an end to the old orthodox twinned consensus in social science of *functionalism* (in methodology) and *positivism* (in epistemology). Social science, one could argue, is growing towards philosophy in its conceptualization. White and McSwain (1990:23) warn, however, that social science is still captive within the technicist episteme, which, in Heidegger's noted judgement, is representative of the imperialism of technology --- an imperialism which results in the alienation of individuals from experience.

(iv) TRUTH IS NOW 'POLITICAL'

Many social scientists (notably theorists of postmodernity and postindustrialism), nowadays maintain that social science, like society, is experiencing the steady rejection by individuals of authoritarian and homogenized forms of experience and of monolithic accounts of 'truth'. Increasingly, social science is admitting multiple versions of reality and intangible contributions to those realities. In science, again as in society, the different schools of truth that exist, are now giving rise to a 'general politics of truth' (Foucault in Rabinow 1984:73). "The present is [certainly] a time of reassessment of dominant ideas across the human sciences" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:7).

(v) RHETORIC IN SCIENCE

Rhetoric has played a part *in science* even since there has been science, but awareness of that fact has only begun to spread *about and across science* in the last two decades (Prelli 1989). Foucault believed that the progressivist rhetoric of orthodox empiricism (in celebration of non-reversible, accumulative processes) was merely a reflection in science of a broader societal rationality to that end (Gordon 1980:241). The new rhetoric for naturalistic inquiry is much removed from that: it leans towards the axiomatic and the holistic instead (Zeller 1987:52-54).

(vi) SYNTHESIZED SCIENCE

Some analysts have called for a blending of positivist thought with post-empiricist thought, and Campbell, for example, has called for a post-postpositivist science which integrates experimental evidence with predictive confirmation (cited in Brewer and Collins 1981:15-16). Such a stable synthesis would, however, in Lincoln and Guba's (1985:28-33) view, be exceedingly difficult to attain because of the intensity of the opposing assumptions involved. Thompson, Locander and Pollio (1989:142) advise that "attempts to ... 'harden' interpretive methods with a dose of positivist procedures often results in failure to reach the aims of either approach."

## (vii) LOOSENING OF BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE

In Zeller's view (1987:66) "the old boundaries between fact and fiction, between science and art, are breaking down." Naturalistic inquiry is able to take advantage of the consequential new sanctions for deep and enigmatic explication. Emic ethnographic evidence and idiographic reportage are both increasingly deemed to be warrantable --- well beyond their formerly perceived limited territoriality.

## (viii) YOUTH OF NATURALISTIC INQUIRY

Naturalistic inquiry is still, to many social scientists, a new and relatively untried approach. It is still evolving, having been, (by some accounts) trapped in the inappropriate reporting mode of positivist preferences (46). Its adherents see much promise for the approach however, for a number of reasons:

- *risen significance of culture*: culture has tended to become an increasingly differentiated but still a problematic subject in social science, enriching the call for further possible insights on it from naturalistic theorists. At the same time, naturalistic inquiry itself is developing because of the improved capacity of researchers to shape their own theoretical approaches on culture by borrowing from the wider range of other methodologists in social science (Geertz 1980). The very expansion of conceptual structures on culture (D'Andrade 1984:114-116) hastens, through such cross-fertilization, the capability of naturalistic inquiry to explore material and ideological reality.
- *risen significance of history*: since the epistemological foundations of empirical rationalist discourse have begun to be challenged, with some alacrity, in the human sciences, the new or rediscovered routes to knowledge have tended (following Foucault and Althusser) to re-appreciate the value of the historical conditions of knowledge (Macdonnell 1986:67). Indeed Foucault's belief that 'the problem of reason is *historical* and *political* rather than *ontological* or *juridical*' has found considerable acceptance in the social and human sciences in the last couple of decades (Rabinow 1984:14). Foucault had uncovered and promoted the realization that a given community in society (or in science itself) thinks and understands in a particular way partly because of its antecedent circumstances. Empirical rationalities are not well equipped to explore the tacit beliefs and meanings of such antecedence for and within those communities (Hindless 1977): naturalistic inquiries are in contrasts, expressly formulated to that end.
- *risen significance of language*: after the revelations of Ricoeur and Habermas language, itself, is no longer looked on as a passive conduit for science, but as a strong determinant of reason and therefore *of science* in its own right (Thompson 1981:3). Language is now judged not only to be an important dimension of social life but also of science and of philosophy. Language is not only used to communicate, it can *influence* and *control* idea formation according to Richards (1938:196). *Language itself is loaded*, having its own active

effects upon science because of its participatory powers to name, to define, to abstract, and to symbolize. Thoughts are now known not just to be expressed through the use of language but also by the limiting and empowering intervention of language. In many instances the need to explore that intervention is critical: empirical positive methodologies are prone to neglecting these situating influences of language upon the formation of beliefs. Forms of naturalistic inquiry, however, are purposive and deliberative in their questioning of language, *per se*.

To semanticists, moreover, meanings are contained not in *things* (or even in *words*), but in people using language differentially in various intersubjective and contextual settings (Campbell 1982:235). In that light Gadamer (in Bleicher 1980:136) argues that the world is constituted 'linguistically', and the skills of hermeneutics, rhetoric and of naturalistic inquiry, and like approaches to *human* understanding, ought to be in demand to deconstruct that communicative assembly. 'Our consciousness of the world is affected by history and fulfilled by language' (Lloyd 1983:8 --- explaining Gadamer's views on our new twentieth century understanding of the construction of reality).

#### 1.4 THEORY BUILDING

This longhaul research agenda is experimental in a number of substantial ways:

- it is partly focusing upon the anti-essentialist issues of postmodernity --- matters that have scarcely received any coverage in the tourism literature;
- it acknowledges the effect of that anti-foundational spirit in the selection of its research paradigm --- constructivism; and,
- it adopts at the methodological level, the naturalistic mode of inquiry for which the investigator has not yet been able to find any previous examples in tourism research.

Given the weight of these three considerations, several points ought to be clarified about envisaged composition of theory for or from the research agenda.

In the following paragraphs seven important points on theory development are discussed which have a bearing on grounded theory, and a short implication from each is provided for the agenda in question. These implications strongly reinforce the logical dependencies of the constructivist paradigm as given under subsection 1.3.3 and in Table 1.3.5./1.

##### (i) THE SUBJECT OF TOURISM

The study *is* about tourism, but not exclusively about tourism. The study is conceived on the understanding that, as Farrell (1982:xix) recognized, tourism does not exist in a vacuum with its own distinct theories and intelligences. For fuller meaning of actions in tourism it is necessary to explore beyond what is commonly accepted as tourism to historicize and situate the tourist's and the policy-maker's actions. Just as tourism, as a subject, is only a notional group of activities which under

investigation is so frequently hard to distinguish from general behavior, so tourism theories ultimately wash into general theories from life and society. One could indeed argue that tourism itself has no intrinsic or exclusive meaning: the whole of this catalyst study could plausibly be written without ever having to mention the word. Hence the celebration of myth, legend and place is not only a matter of travel and tourism, and it would be insular to only look for theoretical significance from narrowly-sanctioned tourism literature. The study then is necessarily a relatively wider political-ethnology of tourism, utilizing ethnology in a wide sense. Its *public* scope is *thinking*, viz., the rhetorical thinking processes that people / bureaucrats use in tourism administration, and in socio-political discourse, to define the *past* of Texas and therefore also its present.

In taking 'a panoramic view' through tourism rather than 'a single shot' of tourism, the study can also avoid what Foucault styled as 'specific intellectualism' --- a descriptor for sectorial specialists who speak through the protected authority and sanctity of their position not through "any special claim to reason" (Rabinow on Foucault 1984:23). Such securely located experts work with a small coterie of others equally well-placed, and they collectively have the power of life or death over their specialism. They are inclined *not* to be universal intellectuals able to speak to 'eternal knowledges', but have irrevocable strongholds on contained and secluded fields of inquiry (Foucault 1980:129). Their theories are routinely incestuous.

*Implication for the research agenda being conceived:*

#### **UNIVERSAL INTELLECTUALISM**

*The case studies of the research agenda will endeavor to overcome the limitations of specific intellectualism by developing theories reflexive of an ethnology of tourism.*

#### (ii) AN EXAMINATION OF **MEANING** NOT OF **DECISIONS**

In exploring explicit and implicit definitions of Texas, the study pursues the idea that the human action of tourists and administrators can spring from their sense of meaning just as it can from their rational or other forms of decision-making. In the past tourism research has accentuated the study of the latter --- that is, of instrumental activity and / or choice. This Texas catalyst study is an effort to build theory also upon tacit and symbolic meaning, however, concerns which have (apart from exploratory work on image development and image response) has been quite neglected in travel / tourism inquiry. Theoretically, then, the study targets *the hidden forces of allegiance* (to Texas) *and association* (interest in and awareness of Texas). In theorizing about 'meaning', it is part of what Foucault (1970: Ch.x:5) deemed to be the rescue of the countersciences from their discredited 'anthropological sleep.'

*Implication for the research agenda being conceived:*

#### **SCIENCE AND COUNTERSCIENCE**

*The case studies of the research agenda will endeavor to build theory from meaning as well as from propositional knowledge, recognizing that theories and facts are not independent.*

## (iii) THEORETICAL SATURATION?

Theories are the building-blocks of social science (Taylor and Sen in Lloyd 1983:21) as they are of natural science: according to some they are all there in science to link life-experience to understanding. But the longstanding search for 'real' knowledge has at times produced an oversupply of theorizing with an over-reliance upon causal theorizing (John Dunn in Lloyd 1983:21). It is the judgement of Habermas that social theorists ought not be so demanding of explicit theory. The sought ideological diet can be too rich when immaculate theoretical design is all that is sought. In lieu of solid theory is all that is sought. Habermas (1968 and 1973) praises the virtues the plain self-concepts of people --- respondents and researchers alike. His view is that if inquiry is to lead to insight that directly relates to realworld practice, then it is advantageous for that insight to be borne within and expressed through human agency. It is then, the verdict of Habermas that theories can artificialize; theories can over-reduce; and that theories are, by themselves, are always 'removed'.

Gadamer (in Bleicher 1980:133), on *this* instance, concurs with Habermas: "it is not so much our [rational] judgements as it is our prejudices that constitutes our being ... [they] are the biaser of our openness to the world." One of the critical pitfalls of conventional science is that its theories abstract reality, and conceal the possibility of questioning these prejudices and biases (135). It looks for regularity and generality, and it thereby obscures the uniqueness of entities (Gadamer in Rabinow and Sullivan 1979:116) and it is prone to forgetting its own historicity (157).

So the message of Habermas is that orthodox scientific theories are normally fine to a part in their own right, but theories consistently presented *alone* can speak to a torpidity of thought, to an impracticaling of vision, and to a lack of depth in representativity of consciousness. Self-formation and self-reflection have been under-valued: "it is only in the dialectical work out of these situations that the participants confront the *conflicts* and *contradictions* implicit in their situation, and realize the disparity between their [own] initial 'certitude' and the [other possible] 'truths' (Bernstein 1976:204).

*Implication for the research agenda being conceived:*

**PARTICULARISM AND HUMAN AGENCY**

*The case studies of the research agenda will endeavor to improve understanding through explicit theory-building where is attainable but predominantly through situated representation of human agency.*

## (iv) PROBLEM ELUSIVENESS

It is evident that the warnings by Habermas and others given under (iii) above, do not reach the ears of a large proportion of social scientists. Grand theories are perpetually sought. But little theories 'found' rarely gravitate to grand theories 'applauded.' Frequently, the scenario being studies proves to be so entwined that no acceptable 'universal theories' emerge, though they continue to be hunted. But, as pointed out under (iii), one does *not* have to have theories. For the study of bureaucracy, Wilson (1989=sci) doubts, after 'wrestling with the subject ... all these decades', that there ever will be "anything

worth calling *organization theory*'. The theories that had been spawned over those decades were, in his estimation, too abstract or too general to be of explanatory worth.

In this light it is interesting to note that Foucault shied away from theory formation, believing that the constant quest for confirmable theories in the scientific mode-of-the-moment only stifles reason. Though he intellectualized for so long on history, for instance, he did not pursue a general theory of history --- he preferred to try, instead, to historicize debates and exchanges along the way.

(v) NOT ANALYSIS BUT SYNTHESIS

Under modernity, theory helps: modernity is an analytic world. Under modernity "things", including human beings are taken apart. The whole modern world takes itself apart --- by the hypothesizing approval of science, which can test and recognize in reality only *that which is already preconceived ...*" (Hummel 1990:214). Once the singular bits of a problem or human issue are known, it is presumed that --- through theories --- they could be reconstituted and understood as an entirety.

Under postmodernity, however, new forms of science (such as naturalistic inquiry) are emerging, are being cultivated, and / or are re-emerging which do not seek to cut things / people up in order to theoretically reassemble them. These new styles of inquiry seek instead to read things or people into the or those **human settings and human contexts** in which they act. Thus abstract theory is less useful here than synthesized interpretation. Science and reason are not rejected, they are incorporated into the case study or hermeneutic account from the perspective of its human agents rather than left in recondite juxta position to it (215). "There are always factors that make it useless to try to generalize therefrom" (Lincoln and Guba 1985:123). It is the *uniqueness* of each new situation that also warrants interpretation.

(vi) THE QUICKSAND OF POSTMODERNITY

The heterotopia and heteroglossia of postmodernity cause problems for theory formation. Postmodernity is anti-foundationalist --- it undoes the concreteness of meanings. It seeks plural accounts. Terms are terms in context, not in inherency. Terms are contextual: they refuse distillation to any absolute meaning (Ross 1988:xi). Orthodox science tries to categorize --- it presupposes and it celebrates" the indispensable core of ... conceptual thought" (Bernstein 1976:119). But under postmodernity, categories are ephemeral (for *the* moment, for *each* gathering), presuppositions are purposely bypassed and 'indispensable cores' are dispensable.

So, theories may exist under postmodernity, but they are prone to being built upon relatively shifting sands. They are innately problematical.

(vii) THE MULTI-CHANNEL DISCURSIVITY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is Foucault's view (see Rabinow 1984:25) that the social sciences differ from the physical sciences in their discursivity. He explains himself with reference to authorial 'founders of discursivity'. Under the physical sciences, the work of leading figures such as Einstein, Clerk, and Maxwell are

absorbed into and surpassed by the work of those that came after them. This state-of-affairs is not so characteristic of the social sciences. Once an inconsistency has been found in the work of a Freud or a Marx, it does not render all of the theories suspect. Later theorists merely take what they want or can use from them for their own dissuasive purposes --- and different social scientists will re-deploy different concepts and notions. Thus a Freud or a Marx is not suddenly proven 'false' absolutely, for once and for all; his / her views are instead 'selected-when-pertinent', 'rejected-when-not-pertinent'. Thus discursivity is prone to following singular routeways in the physical sciences, whereas under the social sciences there are inordinate possibilities for disursivity (Foucault 1969:156-7). And tourism studies has so far been excessively shy of discursivity.

### 1.5 THE EMERGENT HYPOTHESES

This study has emphasized that, within constructivism, the problem of truth is investigated by grounded scientific methods. Table 1.3.5./1 revealed that in hermeneutic and interpretive science research designs are generally not a priori ones but are emergent, since the full range of internal conceptualizations is not or cannot be known at the outset. The point is succinctly put by Glaser and Strauss (1967:41):

It must be emphasized that [in grounded theory, the] intêgration of the theory is best [achieved] when it emerges, like the concepts. The theory should never just be put together, nor should a formal [hypothetical] theory model be applied to it until one is sure it will fit and will not force the data. Possible use of a formal model of integration can be determined only after a substantive model has sufficiently emerged. The truly emergent, integrating framework, which encompasses the fullest possible diversity of categories and properties, becomes an open-ended because, as new categories or properties are generated and related, there seems always to be a place for them in the scheme.

Several points warrant amplification from the above:

(i) *Theory from the data*

Under *grounded* theory, the **theory** itself is discovered **from the data**. It should fit the immediate, local setting. Theories which are 'theory-driven' are not considered to be grounded theories (Johnson 1990:40).

(ii) *Conceptualization not verification*

Orthodox science has lately been accused of triumphalizing verification and for paying insufficient attention to the prevenient step of discovering which concepts and hypotheses are appropriate for the setting being investigated (Glaser and Strauss 1967:1-2) Advocates of grounded science maintain that exhaustive rounds of deconstruction and conceptualization are obligatory before hypotheses ought to be considered, Hypotheses follow, then: they do not lead. The early formulation of hypotheses tend to close off unforeseen and unknown avenues of relevant data gathering.

(iii) *Archaeological level of theorization*

Grounded theory works upon what Foucault (1973:xiii) termed 'the *archaeological* level of knowledge' rather than the epistemological. Its theory must be logically deduced with regard to contextual fit, and ought to be suited to its supposed 'local uses.' The adoption of grounded theory "can help to forestall the opportunistic use of theories that have dubious fit and working capacity" (Glaser and Strauss 1967:4).

The use of a grounded emergent design in the naturalistic inquiry has a number of implications for this study:

● it necessitates the deployment of purposive sampling (see Table 1.3.5./1) in order to explore (as necessary):

- extreme cases;
- deviant cases;
- typical cases;
- maximum variant cases;
- critical cases;
- sensitive cases; and,
- politically important cases.

It may also be necessary to undertake convenience sampling should the study exhibit time, money or logistical difficulties (Lincoln and Gusa 1985:102);

● it requires continuous interaction and continues interpretation on the part of the investigator since the dialectical - dislogical character of human agency research cannot be reasonably undertaken without it. Moreover, high levels of respondent collaboration and awareness are difficult to attain without it, and committed interaction is necessary if the investigator to harness anything approaching his / her complete range of sense, perceptions, and witness.

● it necessitates that since the forms of the study (again, see Table 1.3.5./1) cascade gradually from the study, the researcher must maintain a comprehensive audit trail to reveal that 'unfolding'.

● it demands strong patience on the part of the investigator to hold back on hypothesis formulation. At the outset, the study can normally only be painted in broad outline: **fully developed initial designs in grounded sciences are immediately suspect**. The natural indeterminacy of evidence at the outset must be admitted;

● it demands considerable skill to explain the processes to other researchers foreign to grounded / naturalistic / hermeneutic inquiry methods. Established specifications for sound research design have, to-date, developed almost entirely in response to orthodox analytic-empirical science;

● it necessitates either frequent and delicate interaction or frequent and substantive iteration in accordance with the changing research design. These changes of approval can be exceedingly



demanding of **mental energy** (there are no standard procedures to lead the researcher through, **time** (how long will how many new purposive sampling exercises take?) and **cost** (grounded sciences is notably difficult to budget for).

Though these operational problems are manifold, the naturalistic investigator has little choice. In the study of situated human agency "there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than *the process of establishing an order among things*" (Foucault 1970:xix; emphasis added). The naturalistic researcher has to offer an initial design statement but he / she is unwise to commence his / her inquiring with a results-delineating set of hypotheses in the fashion of linear science. Under naturalistic inquiry, *nothing* ought to be presaged: *no relationships* between things ought to be foreclosed.

Figure 1.5.1./1 now explains the **emergent** nature of naturalistic inquiry, the criticality of the research iterations and the relatively late chronological occurrence of the unfolded theory (Lincoln and Gusa 1985:188). The emergent nature of the design for the catalyst study will be taken up again in Section 3, 4, and 5 hereafter.

## 1.6 THE DELIMITATIONS

This research agenda being developed is tracing a thin and undeveloped path through a complex area. It is a virginal study of political decision making at state level in tourism, focussing upon the understudied subjects of heritage, myth and legend. Furthermore, it introduces new paradigmatic thought to tourism (i.e., constructive) via previously untried naturalistic inquiry methodologies.


Under that pioneering spirit, the investigation faces several limitations of impact. They tend to be perspectival difficulties, rather than absolute or categorical shortcomings:

### (i) PERFIDITIES OF POLICY ANALYSIS

The investigation looks at policy analysis, an area of investigation for which the technical base of inquiry is not strong --- even something of an art rather than a science (Wildavsky 1979:15-16). Bureaucratic decisions are fundamentally political decisions: they are ultimately not knowable. Bureaucratic decisions are operationally matters of compromise: they are, in the final analysis, *not* predictable (121).

### (ii) MULTI-LEVEL PARTICULARISM

Sub-sections 1.3.2 to 1.3.5. inclusive have stressed that postempirical modes of investigation like naturalistic inquiry are grounded perspectives. It needs to be re-emphasized, however, that particularism is not one --- dimensional, but is situationally prescribed on many different levels. Thus the findings that will emanate from the catalyst study pertain only to the contexts of the study, in the inter-subjective settings which occurred, and in accordance with the interpretation mustered by the single investigator.



SOURCE: Lincoln and Guba 1985:188.

FIGURE 1.5.1./1 THE EMERGENT NATURE OF NATURALISTIC DESIGN

The figure shows the pivotal role of research interactions and the (relatively) late determination of grounded theory

Put another way, it is unwise to generalize the findings about the production of heritage in Texas to further afield because:

- Heritage / myth / legend *may mean more* to bureaucrats (or everyone) in Texas than in other states / abroad;
- the postmodern influences which appear to be de-establishing meta-narratives in history may be especially virulent in Texas (or may not even have reached into the big Lonestar State);
- the view of the respondents (sampled) towards heritage may be extremely biased in ways unobserved by the investigator; and,
- the investigator's own identification of heritage and cultural tourism may not tap the full range of heritage developmental and cultural travel in Texas --- or may have been misconceived during the study period by the respondents.

And so on. Naturalistic inquiry is fraught with difficulties of interpersonal communication and of study repetition. But then so are all research modes. Many of the above problematic dimensions would exist in most investigative methods, though there may *not* even be regarded as salient or influential.

### (iii) ENIGMATIC, AUTHORIAL INSIGHT

In the absence of previous policy analysis on decision making in tourism, this study is drawn towards the borrowing of concepts from other researchers and analysts whose observations were not made on the travel industry or in cultural tourism, per se. That may not please provincial thinkers in tourism research. Others, whether inside tourism or not, may find the concepts borrowed to be over-inventive, and difficult to grasp if an immersion in moral philosophy (for Habermas, for instance) or in semiotics (for Baudrillard) has not been gained.

Foucault's terms are notably idiosyncratic: his archaeology has nothing directly to do with what the profession of archaeologists do and his 'genealogy' has nothing to do with human or animal biology. His use of words "is definitely poles apart from the [normal] cautiousness of analytical philosophy (Merquior 1985:18). Moreover, the socio-political philosophy of Habermas, Baudrillard and Foucault is of a discursive sort which orthodox, deliberate researchers in tourism might find obscure. Authorial analysts are perhaps only accepted by each scientific community if they have journeyed up traditional, conventional well-trodden paths of research --- paths which are known by that particular community.

Foucault is a notable, but engrossing social analyst --- a social science quandary. His source of insight is almost unknowable itself: is it acceptable science? Rabinow (1984:25) notes that "what Foucault describes are figures who provide a paradigmatic set of terms, images and concepts which organize thinking and experience about the past, the present and the future of society, doing so in a way *which enigmatically surpasses the specific claims they put forth*". Foucault (and to a lesser extent Habermas and Baudrillard) may be extremely hard for prudent, suspicious social scientists and deliberate and unprecipitate tourism investigators to situate (24), but so much instructive and inspissate perception

is lost if he (they) is (are) shunned. As Giddens (1987:8) said originally of Goffman: 'the social world never seems the same after having read [Foucault]."

(iv) THE USE OF POSTMODERNITY --- AN ETHEREAL EPISTEME

Cautions conventional researchers may not only want to rebut which they may judge to be the short-cut, authorial reasoning of the discursivists whose observations are commonplace within this study, and they may also want to quibble at certain of the insubstantial themes it ranges across. Do conceivably tenuous epistemes like 'superstructuralism', 'postindustrialism' and 'habitus' have a place in social science, let alone in tourism research? They each appear to lack a simple, central unity (Harland 1987:184). Do vaporous immaterialities like de-differentiation, aestheticization, de-auraticization, and deconstruction really belong in studies of the matter-of-fact travel-trade world of sun, sand and service? Should postmodernity indeed be admitted as a major organizing premise of the study when, of the so-called postmodern analysts utilized, Lyotard is "one of the few ... who actually uses the term" (Fraxer and Nicholson 1988:86)? Clearly, all social thinkers will not agree on this point, nor will scrutineers of the tourism industry. The value of the use of the concept of postmodernity --- or rather the concepts of postmodernities --- lie in their potential for discursivity, not in their substantiality. Yet discourse analysis is quite rare, as yet, in the literature of tourism.

(v) FINDINGS NOT SOLUTIONS

Another limitation of the study, for some, is that it poses and fabricates a rather wide-ranging problem, but does not *solve it*, ipso facto. Linear-mindsets tend to want linear and resolved solutions. They are drawn towards taken-for-granted facts and prefer expedient results. Dialectics and discursive critique can be, to them, suffocating. Goodness in 'accepted' science is all explanation and clean enlightenment. They might not accept even the need to have an inferential of investigation like naturalistic inquiring. They will not enthuse at procedures which can only ever yield 'findings' not 'solutions; (Lincoln and Guba 1985:357-392) especially when these findings are of a non-accumulative kind (Lincoln 1990:84), which can never be comprehensively or absolutely 'right'.

(vi) ONLY SOFT-SCIENCE

A future common criticism of naturalistic inquiry is that it is a form of interpretive ethnography which misses "the 'cold', 'hard' issues of power, interest, economics, and historical change [which] are elided in favor of simply portraying the native point-of-view as richly as possible" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:77). That may prove to be a weakness of the development of the research agenda --- but if it is, it would be through poor execution (in this respect) rather than through any inherent imperfection within constructivist / naturalistic inquiry. Indeed, what makes interpretative representation challenging is its capacity to include those 'cold' outside forces as an integral part of ... the 'inside', the cultural {or socio-

political] unit itself" (77). That is in fact, one of the central questions asked of constructivism --- it is in many senses, its very *raison d'être*.

## 1.7 THE DEFINITIONS DEPLOYED IN THE STUDY

The following are key terms as used within the longhaul / blanket research agenda in general and the adjuvant / catalyst study in particular:

### ● CULTURAL WARRANTS

--- Cultural warrants are generalizations that are accepted within a culture (Cooper 1989:70). They constitute those collections of statements that may ordinarily be regarded as the commonsense of a population on a subject. Cultural warrants derive their persuasive power either through appeal to reason or to sense. The tacit knowledges held within cultural warrants may be blatantly contradictory.

Cultural warrants generally reflect the standard values held by or within a population. In the 1960s, Steele and Redding (1962:83-91) composed a list of sixteen standard American values. The first five of these "cultural warrants" were:

- Puritan and Pioneer Morality
- The Value of the Individual
- Achievement and Success
- Change and Progress
- Ethical Equality and Equal Opportunity

### ● DISCIPLINAL KNOWLEDGE

--- Disciplines occur in Western scholarship through "the disintegration and wizened specialization" of Western understanding (Lindstrom 1990:46). Disciplines --- in the widest sense of the term --- are procedures for packaging knowledge: "the discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse" (Foucault 1981:61) --- consisting of a body of knowledge content, and a set of procedures for regulating knowledge. Disciplines disqualify for conversation those who do not adhere to this preferred knowledge content and procedural rules (Bourdieu 1977:665).

### ● DISCOURSE

--- To scholars of rhetoric and of communication, discourse is any verbal or written expression held or supported by a group / body / community. In the current work it is use to refer to those central pillars of the structure of knowledge (Foss, Foss, Trapp 1985:195) that are supported by a given or approved set of discursive practices. Thereby, discourse is that set of 'talk' or social knowledge --- organized to rules of 'saying' --- which help forms the practices (praxis) which bind people together within the preferred or unfolding aspects on the world. Thus, discourse tends to be the 'talk' or 'outlooks' of contending populations. During the establishment of the overall

/ longrun research agenda, and the adjuvant / catalyst study, the probity of truth can only be gauged within a particular discourse.

Discourse is always a situational, a tactical and an ambiguous phenomenon (Spurr 1983:11). The subjects of discourse are always dialectical and transformative (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:96-7) --- meaning that the boundaries of things in discourse are never fixed.

- DISTORY

--- Distory is history after the Disney companies have got to it. It is what Fjellman (1992:59) calls Disney's Norman Rockwell view of history, designed to soothe visitors by providing a nostalgic false history. Distory, when cleverly presented through the technological expertise of 'Disney realism', can become a community of memory --- a central part of the U.S. shared experience. It is simple, surreal, storytelling of the type of history that Disney and its transnational corporate partners can live with.

- DOCTRINAL KNOWLEDGE

--- Like disciplines, (see "disciplinary knowledge") doctrines regulate the social distribution of knowledge as well as the rights and qualifications of individuals to talk. A doctrine "binds individuals to certain types of enunciation and forbids them all others; but it [also] uses, in return, certain types of enunciation to bind individuals amongst themselves, and to differentiate them by that very fact from all others" (Foucault 1981:64). In Lindstrom's view (1990:50) doctrinal knowledge has greater potential than disciplinary knowledge to ground political organizations of believers (or at least, of consumers of knowledge), who subjectivity come to be defined in terms of ruling doctrinal truths. To Foucault (1981:64) "the doctrine always stands as the sign, manifestation, and instrument of a prior adherence to a class, a social status, a race, a nationality, an interest, a revolt, a resistance, or an acceptance". In Lindstrom's view, people who control the production, deployment, and consumption of this kind of knowledge achieve power within the networks and relationships that doctrinal knowledge helps establish.

- DOXA

--- Doxa are things / ideas / events that are held by a given population or cultural order to be natural (Barnes and Duncan 1992:253). They are assumed not to have been made / manufactured / occasioned by people (whereas other populations or cultural orders might *not* agree with that assessment). Doxa, to Barthes (1977:47) are "the voice of nature at work" --- where the work of the given transformative cultural order goes unquestioned.

- HISTORICIDE

--- Historicide is Wallace's (1985) term for the way that the Disney companies substantively change or preselect historical storylines, where the past is annihilated in favor of storylines which advantage the Disney companies, their corporate partners, or otherwise themes / ideas / images supported by one or other. Historicide constitutes an extreme pastmodernization of history and

heritage (see pastmodernization [below]). Its use is not now necessarily restricted just to Disney sites and Disney productions, per se.

● **PASTMODERNIZATION**

--- To pastmodernize is to render eugenic treatment to the past; it is the 'improvement' of history; it is the re-invention of inheritance or the remaking of traditions in order to benefit a cause, an idea, or a specific population in the present (and / or future) (*Term coined by researcher*).

● **TEXT**

--- In semiotics the term text used to be used to describe a particular narrative pattern or plot (Eco 1979; Barthes 1972; Barthes 1977). Recently, though, the term has expanded considerably in its use (Geertz 1983) and is now utilized to refer to any interpretable knowledge structure, or 'site' of human understanding (Ricoeur 1971; Ricoeur 1981).

To Geertz (1973) the culture of a population is an ensemble of texts which anthropologists / ethnographers / interpreters have to learn to read. They act like theories / models / paradigms as mental schema, and people are socialized or submerged into them primarily --- at the level of the overall society --- and secondarily --- within specific groups, segments or subcultures (Hirschman and Holbrook 1992:57).

● **THICK DESCRIPTION**

--- According to Denzin (1989:31) thick description "attempts to rescue the meanings and experiences that have occurred in the field situation [by capturing] the interpretations persons bring to the events that have been recorded ... . [It] attempts to uncover the means that inform and structure the subject's experiences". Thus, thick description has the following features:

- it gives the context of an act;
- it states the intentions and meanings that organize the action;
- it traces the evolution and development of the act;
- it presents the action as a text (see 'text') that can then be interpreted (33).

In contrast, "a thin description simply reports facts, independent of intentions or the circumstances that surround an action" (33).

The provision of thick description by *actual* (rather than *ideal*) exemplars is the fundamental goal of dialectical investigation and of naturalistic inquiry.

## 1.8 THE ASSUMPTIONS

This study --- to establish the research agenda on truthmaking in the manufacture of the public past --- is being conducted on the premise that the traditional statutory domain of tourism research has been rather restrictive. It aims to raise a whole set of issues which have not conventionally been part of the disciplinary focus. The study, consonantly, seeks to change the appreciative framework by which certain tourism developments and services are assessed --- notably giving impetus to political,

anthropological, and other forms of insight which have not been heavily utilized in past research into the travel trade or into the business of tourism.

Yet the study is not just a kindling of awareness into policy and into ethnography. It Foucauldian sparks of various sorts ignite concerns in many other areas of human and cultural investigation. The overall study probes the foundations of social science that underlie tourism: it pokes into the modern rationalities that are held in governance and which bring about tourism development of some sorts and not of others.

Ten assumptions may now be stated which fuel all of this probing and poking.

- *Assumption One: Tourism As A Second Story Field*

The first assumption behind the development of the research agenda amounts to the conviction that extant tourism research literature and existing travel trade investigative methodologies are inadequate and insufficient to gain the insight required to contribute significantly to this research problem on truthmaking. The use of tourism literature --- to inquire into the social construction of things --- alone would be extremely short-sighted: if White's pointed admonition may be borrowed (as given in Spivak 1987:126) --- it would be akin "[to] baring one's notion of the soundness of a building's foundations [by examining only] the structural properties of its second or third story." If the rich veins of *meaning* of history are to be *meaningfully* plumbed, a much broader, wider, deeper disciplinary base must be looked into. Tourism can rarely ever be anything other than an applied and dependent field of inquiry.

- *Assumption Two: The Power of Groups*

The second assumption constitutes the view that, in investigating the manufacture of cultural entities, different groups in society hold different views (in this case, for the catalyst study, of the heritage of Texas) and they have over the years acquired various power and rights to exert those views (in this instance to shape the image and resource inventory of the state as a historical drawcard in tourism). A coherent theory, or at least improved insight into the way those groups communicate *to*, *at* and *upon* state government and otherwise influence the bureaucracy is needed. Some of the groups are noticeably durable: their influence forces the silent inclusion of some sites and themes and the silent exclusion of others, as Texas is promoted and projected.

- *Assumption Three: The Under-Recognized Worth of Interpretation*

The third assumption is that much of the insight required (to understand how historical tourism is served up) is interpretive in nature. This assumption is predicated upon the view that the pursuit of general laws in tourism research (as for other more established fields) has directly lead to the unfortunate stripping away of critical context: "To test the generality of our hypotheses, we remove the subjects of our studies from their natural social settings; their normal roles and social networks are left behind as they



enter our experimental laboratories, much as we leave our shoes outside on entering a shrine" (Mishler 1979:2).

This third assumption is thus a commentary upon both "the cloudy notion of ... unitary reason" (Merquior 1985:19) and upon "the transcendental Subject" (19). It is an argument for specified conditions rather than for general laws --- an implicit questioning of the merit of the persistent use of the safeguard statement "all other things being equal" in orthodox / empirical science (Mischler 1979:8). Instead, the assumption embraces a philosophical anthropology which regards individuals and groups as active and proficient interpreters of their human and cultural milieu (Overton 1973; Spiro 1951).

- *Assumption Four: Elaborate Accounts*

The fourth assumption amounts to the view that in order to decently supply appropriate insight (for the adjuvant study) into the political, social and behavioral context that make up the settings in which influence is channelled concerning the make-up of Texas (as a 'past'), thick and thorough accounts of the interactions of those political players and heritage shapers is required. Thus, dense and detailed descriptions of multiple contexts are called for, reliant upon "participants' [own] perspectives or [intersubjective] definitions of the situation" (Mischler 1979:11). The quest is for "the conceptual structures that inform our subjects' acts, the 'said' of social discourse" (Geertz 1973: 27) on history and heritage, which are believed to be discernible in *texts* which speak for both discourse and praxis.

- *Assumption Five: Reflexivity of Action and Context*

The Fifth assumption is built upon the judgement that "action and context are not mutually independent; they are reflexive, in that meaning and context are produced simultaneously by the actors [studied] in and through their interaction" (Mischler 1979:15). Thus the aim of the work does not necessarily have to be relativist, that is an investigation (for the catalyst study) built upon the comparative study of cultural scenarios (how the 'past' is created / projected in Texas vis-a-vis Louisiana or New Mexico). It is appropriate to study the shaping of the Lonestar State's past in its own terms idiographically, i.e., by examining solely the nature of the relationship between culture (in this case the creation / projection of the Texan heritage) and the processes of communication and influence in Texas itself. The primary concern is the construction of the communication field bureaucrats in Texas tune into, and how the different contexts and settings they are open or subject to do shape their administrative product --- the Texan history.

- *Assumption Six: Identification of Hidden Subjectification*

For the sixth assumption, it is necessary to turn again to Foucault, who believed that modern science and philosophy was over-concerned with the uncovering of "adult autonomous reason" (Merquior 1985:17). In Foucault's estimation, scientists and philosophers have been (or were in his case) "interested essentially in the problem of how a scientific object is [/ was] constituted" (17). But Foucault

wanted to know how such objects themselves became the object of human interest (in life) and of possible knowledge (in science and philosophy). What Foucault recognized was the importance of identifying forms of rationality and historical conditions at work --- on, in short, *how objects became subjects*, or rather Subjects viz., grounded subjects. Thus Foucault's quest was the revelation of "hidden, unconscious determinations of thought" (17), particularly by freeing science and philosophy from the transcendence of "the hated Subject" (17).

So how does Foucault's interest in the primacy of transparent consciousness translate to this work? Well, it conceivably does so in the sense that historical people, sites themes themselves can be viewed as 'scientific objects' in the Foucauldian sense, which can attain the status of myths and thereby act on their own in society as social entities. The resultant (sixth) assumption is, then, that certain historical objects became unconsciously elevated to the level of lead subjects in the telling of history. Lead subjects vary in accordance with group identifications. This work, therefore, should be able to deconstruct something of the hidden and unsuspected nature of that transcendence.

- *Assumption Seven: History as Socialized Truth*

Assumption seven stems from the previous assumption. Implicit in assumption six, is the view that historical truths are learned through socialization. Hence assumption seven is comprises the view that the documentation of recorded observations largely (through contextual interviewing) does enable group, socialized and internalized meanings to be deconstructed, and does enable researchers to spot political and administrative reciprocities at work in the projection of heritage symbols and in the promotion of historical images. These reciprocities are assumed to be non-neutral.

- *Assumption Eight: Substantive Changes to the Appreciation of Historical Truths*

The eighth assumption also stems from assumption six, and focuses upon the belief that different subcultures and segments of the population, both within and beyond Texas (for the adjuvant study), uphold different versions of the historical truth. It constitutes the view that, in the late decades of the twentieth century; previously established historical truths are now subject to a rising tide of new postmodern and destabilizing pressures. It is believed to be important, therefore, to map which of these esteemed historical truths appear to be enduring ones, and which novel or liberated assessments of history have taken hold. Similarly, it is useful to monitor whether Thackara (1988:8) is correct in his assessment, that the onset of the postindustrial age has brought about a diminution of the valve of 'things' vis-a-vis 'ideas' and 'cultural production'. The Thackara view and the assumption itself, imply that the forces of postmodernity are themselves capable of redesigning history.

- *Assumption Nine: The Context is the Subject*

This assumption is the last of the three assumptions that stem from the Foucauldian premise which undergirds assumption six (i.e., that historical truth is socialized history, but that actors are not

always aware of the existence or strength of that socialization). Assumption nine comprises the judgement that historical truth is not only non-neutral but it is contextual --- meaning that different truths are upheld dependent upon the interobjective, spatial and temporal circumstance. Hence, this assumption dissolves the very distinction between *subject* and *context*. Meaning is always 'within context' therefore (Mischler 1979:14), and the task of the constructivist researcher is therefore to identify how any given historical truth relates to larger settings and encompassing environments. Thus the hunt for pure variables, viz., "for measures of unitary dimensions that [are] not contaminated by other variables" (3) is inadequate here; it comprises an insufficient science. Such determinations, made through factor analysis through scaling techniques or through like reductionist approaches are generally impoverished. To date, they lack crucial measures of **contextual elaboration**.

• *Assumption Ten: Training in Discourse not in Subjects*

The final assumption synthesizes all of the other assumptions with reference to praxis. It is a premise of this study that tourism practitioners (and researchers) and historians are trained in 'subjects' rather than in 'discourse'. If Foucault's insight is upheld, for the catalyst study, for example, Texas can not only be seen as a collection of subjects (The Alamo, President Houston, Cherokees, Spanish Missions, Whatever) it can also be seen as 'public thought' (that is, as 'discourse'). The Texas that is promoted may be identified, then, as "though as a social practice" (Merquior 1985:18).

The critical question is then whether in fact tourism practitioners and heritage administrators can indeed be schooled to identify 'public thought' at work in the selective sacralization of places and in the competitive eulogy of antecedents. As yet, however, little constructivist 'training research' appears to have been done (Applegate and Sypher 1988:43).

Taken together the above ten assumptions support the umbrella premise that the dominant conventional analytic-empirical approach to social science is not well equipped to handle the issues of meaning and situationalism faced by this study. Essentially, the work to establish the research agenda is an investigation of dominance --- viz., the manner in which some definitions of reality (in this case, of the historic past) hold away over others. According to Habermas, the old and ubiquitous model of repression and emancipation which Marcuse and Freud developed has now been replaced by Foucault's pluralism of power / discourse formations (refer to Bernstein 1985:171). Foucault's work is accordingly set 'on a different playing field' which cannot be so comfortably supported by predetermined theories, by preconceived categorizations nor by presumed differentiations (171). In this sense, Foucault's work is shocking: it disturbs the cosiness of the social thought that has, for so much of the twentieth century, been built on Cartesian attitudes and on given, internal theoretical dynamics.

The shock of Foucault --- in alliance with Lyotard, Feyerabend, Hesse and others --- is to point out the immensity of the blindness that exists in research when researchers only rely upon identified (i.e., already known / dominant) modes of *thought*, *categorization* and *inquiry* to study identified (i.e., again already known / dominant) perspectives on social, human and cultural issues. After the shock of Foucault

and other French textualities, even more social researchers have increasingly come to recognize the forced nature and self-referential thinking cycles of logical-positivist thought. To some extent there has been a revival of the Baconian 'anything goes that works' spirit in social science (170). But in other respects, social science has grown more humble. And the arrogance of identified research methods has been disturbed by the recognition of Pêcheux that social and cultural researchers must take considerable pains not only to *counter-identify*, but also to *disidentify*. And that is where postmodernity conceivably fits in. Postmodernity can be conceived as the temporal face and the spatial face of Foucault's power / discourse plurality and of the anti-totalitarian, anti-hierarchical teaching of Pêcheux. In this sense, Foucault, Pêcheux and postmodernity all lead towards resistance against domination, to re-experience (set in natural / grounded / local situations) and to the rise of varied and creative humanity over the mental and appreciative strictures of modernity. And Lincoln and Guba now, in timely fashion, have begun to supply improved tools towards the mapping of the heterotopia. Before Foucault, before Feyerabend, and before Pêcheux, so few would have bothered to listen to them.

So these ten assumptions suggest that human and cultural research is always, inescapably a *political act*. It either works in support of existing structures of dominance in society and science or it seeks to redress them. In this sense, 'there is no interesting epistemological difference between the aims and procedure of [social] scientists and those of politicians' [170].

And what is the consequence of these ten assumptions, (along with the realization that research itself is a political act), for this study? It means that the research effort must be broadly conducted. Human and cultural research that only takes a microscopic look at presumed issues is heavily constrained research of and into *human* experience. A wide look at the rationalities adopted (consciously or nonconsciously) by the respondents and by the researcher, himself / herself, will be particularly valuable. The philosophies, the politics and the discourse involved have too readily been ignored in the past. "If, however the humanities and the social science are to get any serious grip on the world, if they are to enable their [target practitioners and policy-makers] to use their studies, then it is imperative that there is a general recasting of the humanities and social sciences [towards disidentified and interdisciplinary knowledge]" (Spivak 1987:xvii). Much has already been stated in section 1 of this study on; the need, under postmodernity, for disidentified understanding. Section 2 will subsequently elaborate the need for and benefits of pan-disciplinary approaches to the human and cultural issues posed by a problem such as the definition of Texas.

## 1.9 THE NEED FOR THE STUDY

So far, section 1 has concentrated upon the definition and situation of *the problem of the study itself* and *the problem of the science* adopted to gain insight into that study problem [refer back to 1.3.6.]. Although some introductory comments were made on *the necessity for the study* in subsections 1.1 and 1.2 and, in passing elsewhere, the need for the investigation has not been apprehensively gauged. This is now the function of subsection 1.9 --- to clarify the reasons why such an inquiry is timely.

Consequently:

- Subsection 1.9.1. provides some *broad and stereobate needs* for the investigation;
- Section 1.91. amplifies the shortfall of the current understanding of power / discourse in relation to history;
- Section 1.9.3 explains *the Texan heteroglossia*, that is offers a critique of the problem of the catalyst study from a number of lead dominant / subjugated perspectives;
- Section 1.9.4 outlines the criticality of the problem for *the field of tourism research*;
- And section 1.9.5 attempts to uncover a number of *operational perspectives* on the state administration of heritage in tourism.

The same approach will be utilized for each of these five need commentaries:

- (i) an introductory NEEDS STATEMENT (1.9.1.1., 1.9.2.1, et seq.) will address the major needs (in each of the five cases) that the current research literature suggests for the problem;
- (ii) a second subsection (1.9.1.2., 1.9.2.2, et seq.) will offer a selection of FINDINGS that have to-date been uncovered regarding the embedded nature of these needs;
- (iii) a third subsection (1.9.1.3., 1.9.2.3., et seq.) will draw brief attention to those TRIED INVESTIGATIVE APPROACHES that are already known;
- (iv) and a final subsection (1.9.1.4, 1.9.2.4, et seq.) will reveal a small range of UNTRIED INVESTIGATIVE APPROACHES that the current research literature has explicitly called for or otherwise implicitly beckoned, but which have not as yet been meaningfully explored.

### **1.9.1 The Need in General: Praxis and Discourse**

The following observations (1.9.1.1. to 1.9.1.4.) are offered on the pandemic issues, within the praxis / discourse duality, which have a bearing on the work's *study* and / or *science* problems.

#### **1.9.1.1 Statement of Needs for Further Research on Discourse / Praxis**

Four principal needs have so far been identified which 'need' further analysis (at the general level):

##### **(i) THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY**

The fundamental issue the study problem addresses is the matter of sovereignty (Foucault Gordon 1980:95). It concerns the right of *the* state in a Western society to define *that* state in its own interest (consciously or nonconsciously) and the associated legal obligation of the state population to obey (or rather, to accept) that definition. The issue revolves around questions of totality: to what extent should a state population have a *given* heritage? To what extent is postmodernity "a war on totality" for such a history or for anything, (Lyotard 1984:82) and a movement for ad hoc, contextual, plural and limited storylines? (Hartsock 1987:190).

Put another way, the issue of sovereignty is the problem of governmentality. To what extent can the state be "envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality, or ... of a class or a group among the citizens (Rabinow 1984:14)? To what extent does the state's totalization procedures (assuming some are found) give society priority over the individual (Harland 1987:9)?

*\* Therefore, the identified need in the catalyst study is to gain insight into where the state's powers stop and start regarding definitions of the Texas heritage.*

## (ii) THE ISSUE OF PRACTICAL DISCOURSE

Forms of cultural imperialism through ethnocentrism and through the power of normalization persist in Western society. Although it is not everything that gets caught up in the spreading webs of power of the state, the subjection of individuals and groups has conceivably increased in type and form (Rabinow --- on Foucault --- 1984:22). The areas and venues of dominance that exist within society are manifold, but it is more sensibly viewed as the dominance of the system and not dominance by individuals according to Gordon (1980:96). Subcultures encounter subcultures, and groups encounter groups *indirectly*, "by means other than the shock of [direct] domination and [outright conquest] (Owens 1985:57). These indirect means comprise of "matters of political, legal, and moral [and other] judgement [and] fall in the realm of practical discourse" (White 1990:133). Such practical discourse constitutes "discussion, debate, deliberation and argumentation over what is true or false, good or bad, right or wrong, and what should be desired" (133). In Foucault's view, thereby, practical discourse in the Western society is inclined to be latent and brutal (Gordon 1980:95).

*\* Therefore, the identified need in the adjuvant study is to discover when and how individuals and groups within and beyond Texas are subjugated by the everyday practical discourse of the state bureaucracy in tourism.*

## (iii) THE ISSUE OF POWER FLOW

In the Foucauldian context of petty and opaque power, the concept of power is, to repeat, systemic and it refers to the potential of stakeholders to have social or societal influence through the communication of knowledge or through the exercise of praxis. "Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (98). The essential requirement is then to know whom these 'vehicles' or 'stakeholders' are, and "what [they] have in mind [on behalf of society] (96).

*\* Therefore, on the development of this research agenda, the identified need is to map the distribution of power in the bureaucracy, and to note the critical stakeholders or vehicles who 'serve up', 'deal in' or 'deliver' the discourse.*

(iv) THE ISSUE OF ADMINISTRATORS' ATTENTIVITY

It was the view of rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke (1950:39) that "only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within". Does this apply to state discourse or heritage? Can the state or anyone in the name of the state 'push uncomfortable themes, problems and arguments below the threshold of attention (Habermas in Seidman 1989:276). Is the legitimacy of state concepts of heritage in tourism troublesome as perceived by state bureaucrats?

*\* Therefore, the identified need for each of the subsequent studies of the longhaul research agenda is to discover whether the members of the state bureaucracy who administrate the discourse on heritage regard any of the aspects of that discourse / praxis as particularly troublesome, unacceptable or illegitimate.*

**1.9.1.2 Findings on Discourse / Praxis**

The following are some of recent general findings on the exercise of power in governance:

- *Power in chain-like* --- "power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather only as something which functions as a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands ... [It] is employed and exercised through a net-like organization (Foucault in Gordon 1980:98).
- *Power has multiple technologies* --- in the seventeenth and eighteenth century power in Western governance used to function through signs and levies, but now it circulates through many new technologies. Power now differentiates through multiple sites of social production and sources of social service (Foucault in Rabinow 1984:66).
- *Power lies in past programs* --- once enacted via policy, power can "become more and more its own cause" (Wildavsky 1979:81). Accordingly, "public agencies are ever more involved in making adjustment to past programs [and therefore policies], creating new ones to overcome difficulties, and responding to forces originating [elsewhere] in society [as a result of the continued activity of the past program]" (81).
- *Truth makes laws and therefore truth makes power* --- to get into power and to stay in power, individuals or groups 'must produce truth as [they] must produce wealth' (Foucault-in Gordon 1980:93). In fact, one "must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place" (93/4). It is the dominant truth that makes the law, produces the discourse, judges the population and remakes power. So many "claims to 'authentic' cultural identity [are highly suspect] nostalgic and / or reactionary" (Mattelart, Delcourt and Mattelart 1986:6) --- but that does not deny them the strength to become the new truth.
- *Much power is spread through identification* --- When an individual or a group identifies, it associates of affiliates closely with another person, group, symbol or thing (Campbell 1982:136). When persons or groups identify with each other they comprise shared qualities and characteristics. Power circulates well between those identifying parties / partners where they can conceive of many truths in common.
- *Access to power is well regulated* --- Dominant authorities regulate entry into leading social strata by legal, cultural, ritualistic and other means (Turner 1988:20). Through those same mechanisms, access to power and truth designation is also controlled.

● *Rise of professional power and professional truths* --- In the U.S.A. (or rather, the West?) bureaucrats "whose authority rests on the offices they are holding are being eclipsed in power and significance by [other agency members] whose authority derives from the professional training they receive" (Wilson 1989:ix). Lately, "the specialization made possible by size divorces most professionals from direct contact with [their] clients" (Wildavsky 1979:76), in the exercise of their power and in the communication of their discourse.

● *Recognition of place of rhetoric in power exchanges and truth communication* --- In the estimation of Geertz (1973:207-13) "ideologies transform sentiment into significance and so make it *socially available*" only through the interaction of social forces and rhetoric. For power to 'be effective' and for discourse to 'reach', the power / discourse / must have its skilled rhetoricians. "Rhetoric is an essential component in [any social change]" (Gross 1989:102).

● *Awareness of symbolic influences on administrators activities* --- Researchers of administrative affairs no longer have to be exclusively dependent upon 'rational man' schemes of instrumental action in order to construct their theories of practical discourse (White 1990:145). Researchers are not encouraged to explore "what norms, values or socially shared meanings are important to the administrator and how they influence his or her actions" (146), whether they be words, images, themes institutions or whatever. Administrators do not only deal in 'truth': they themselves are crucially affected by it. They not only help regulate the pleasure of the senses and minds of the population, but conceivably have their own administrative performance enlivened or dulled by such 'peak experiences'.

● *Countervailing Inspectives on administrative responsibility* --- This subsection (1.9.1.2.) has already emphasized the conflict that may arise between the political and profession bases of administrative responsibility. A further countervailing influence may be the personal bases for responsibility a bureaucrat has (Harnan 1990:157). Personal commitments may be regarded by the individual administrators as a valid and sufficient basis for moral activity, and can affect the keenness which power is wielded and discourse communicated.

### 1.9.1.3 Recent Approaches on Discourse / Praxis

Something of a theoretical vacuum appears to exist, following Foucault's death, on the general relationship between power and discourse in institutional governance and in state administration. In the late 1980s, having produced a major twenty-chapter study of the U.S. bureaucracy, Wilson's (1989:xi) principal conclusion is that there is considerable variety in the way bureaucrats work and in the nature of the inoperatives which they are subject to. "Some bureaucrats are hacks but most are not; ... there is a lot of self-serving activity in agencies but also a lot that seems genuinely directed towards larger goals; ... some agencies work like Weberian bureaucrats, producing and applying rules, and some do not" (xi).

Wilson's view is not trite, it is based upon the sensible judgement that bureaucracies differ considerably in the environments they work within, in the type of their administrative portfolio, and in the



range of constraint which they face. In essence, Wilson suggests there are four types of U.S. bureaucracies:

- *productive organizations* --- in which both outputs and outcomes can be observed;
- *procedural organizations* --- in which outputs but not outcomes can be observed;
- *craft organizations* --- in which outcomes but not outputs can be observed;
- *coping organizations* --- in which neither outputs nor outcomes can be observed. (159).

Building his views on Mintzberg's (1979) work of a decade earlier, Wilson urges caution with the use of his topology. He notes that many agencies just do not fit within it, and he regrets from registering his views as 'theory'. But his topology does emphasize how difficult it can be to derive a singular method of evaluation to gauge the success of any single agency in terms of its consequences.

Productive organizations, having clear and attainable goals, are more easily evaluated from the standpoint of economic efficiency and thus the cost of any given constraint is more easily assessed. Coping and procedural organizations are impossible to evaluate in terms of economic efficiency and so the cost of a constraint is hard to assess. Craft organizations are a mixed case; because their outputs are observable, we know if they are attaining their goal, but because their work is hard to observe we may think mistakenly that we can alter those work procedures without paying a cost in goal attainment: (332).

So, certainly there appears to be fodder for 'perspectival analysis' within each type of classified bureaucracy. Efficiency and effectiveness criteria will invariably pull against each other, and the necessarily fragmented nature of agency coverage in spatial and temporal terms will continually prohibit coherency of service. A crucial difficulty in this respect is that bureaucracies, like societies, are incarnate. "Because [they] are incarnate ... it is easy to lapse into methodological individualism, in which [the agency like] society disappears and why individuals exist" (Manicas 1987:273). Analysis tends to yield the fragmented and unconnected observations of individuals, not the tempered or weighted view of the bureaucracy itself.

Existing approaches on praxis / discourse, moreover, lean towards work with definitions of rationality that reflect instrumental reason (Dunn 1981). Available theory states that an administrator's thought is 'rational' in the sense that it adheres to 'laws' of deductive cognition whereby that administrator calculates the proper measures to take towards a clearly targeted end, and that all that occurs where there are also 'rational' guidelines to help him / her integrate all necessary activity towards that cleanly identifiable goal (Horkheimer 1974). White (1990:132) muses that such an "image of reason and rationality seems appropriate for administrators because [appositely] it typifies the act of getting things done."

In White's view the, the longstanding image of administrative reason or of praxis / discourse, is one highly instrumental. Better administrative thought and communicative action is assumed to be better rational praxis and discourse. The contemporary literature "fails to account for other modes of thought

and action in identifying and choosing means and ends" (132), and political, legal and moral judgements in practical discourse are understudied (133). Researchers have been rare who have been able to break away from the 'scientific' assessment of administrative thought and practical action.

#### 1.9.1.4 Underserve, Approaches on Discourse / Praxis

There appears to be clear limits to the value of the rational model as a (or the only) mode of instrumental reason. But there are alternative investigative bases to determine how the administrator's means and ends are determined. Much of these latest approaches requires inquiry via critical theory and by hermeneutics (interpretivism) (White 133). What are some of these crucial underserved approaches?

Firstly, stronger theories are required to explain how agencies relate to their environment. March and Olson (1975:153) imply that 'actions and events [in the broad environment] ... sometimes have little to do with what an organization does'. Internal decisions seem to be made and procedures adopted by bureaucracies with little regard to the external 'world'. Wildavsky (1979:68) maintains that there is frequently 'deliberate defiance' of outside environmental cues and conditions: "because the environment in each major policy area is more internal than external [the agency] reacts more to internal needs than to external events. That is, each sector creates the environment to which, in turn, it best responds."

Secondly, the challenge is to produce theories that relate to the overall system of government, not to discrete individual agencies. There is no tourism system of government, there is one state system of government. Just as Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom (1988) concluded in their analysis of local government in the United States, state government service for any; single area of service is not self-contained: 'the *system of ... governance* is not confined to formal units of government. Governance demands high levels of coproductive efforts across tiers and units of the given system; it necessitates the development of the craft and act of association. Governance, is in fact, human society at work: "human societies...function as complexly nested sets of economic and political relationships that cannot in practice be disjointed from one another, much as biological organisms are composed of completely nested physiological structures reflected in neural systems, motor systems and circulatory systems" (213).

Thirdly, much more work needs to be done in output analysis, to find out for said areas of government responsibility who makes decisions on behalf of the responsible agency and how choices are made from competing courses of action. How units of government allocate resources or outputs to different groups is not just a matter of equity 'policy'. The noted Pressman and Wildavsky (1974) study of the influences on implementation decisions in government decision-taking in Oakland, California needs to be updated and repeated in many other geographical areas and for many other contexts of governmental responsibility. Such involved macro-level investigations must also, however, take a sustained, longitudinal form. The width and breath of operational contexts and influencing networks cannot be absorbed overnight, for researchers do not only have to comprehend one context / one network, they have to make an attempt to map the significant networks and contexts for all the significant

players. They have to almost get to know in each and every circumstance what each player / influence has spent on a career, or an eternity, learning.

Fourthly, in tracing praxis / discourse, researchers of administrative rationalities (plural!) need to collectively work up more robust, inquiring and flexible theories on power, and the general mechanisms through which various sorts of power operate, or are operated. Is power in the given context 'capillary' in the Foucauldian mould (Gordon 1980:96) or is it 'idiosyncratic'? What are the sources, extremities and final destinations of that particular piece, exercise or conduit of power? How does the 'experience of power' relate to other 'institutional' or 'personal' experiences for the administrators or the other influential purveyors of praxis / discourse?

Finally, the postmodern tendencies which impinge upon the exercise of practical discourse in each setting need to be gauged. The difficulty for state governments in this regard is that they are frequently far from being in control of their own 'national' space. Economic realities are more certainly, perhaps, influenced by national governments --- and conceivably by the international market (Stephanson 1988:16). Thus it is important that the seeming effects, or the 'cultural imperialisms', of late / international capitalism are monitored. How do this postmodern imperialisms, if they do exist, affect governance, and the will of the population to accept governance? But if these are large postmodern effects, they may not at all stem from extra-territorial conditions. If that is the case, and the effects are not 'international' in source or impulse, who then are postmodernity's protagonists in the resealing or the reshaping of the power of 'the state' --- or of states in the U.S. context? Are these protagonists professionals, management classes, industrial labor or those with local capital (Bagguley, et al., 1990:169)? What aspects of the bureaucracy praxis or the State discourse has been rendered contestable under postmodernity, which were not contestable before (Ross 1988:xv)? Which of the metanarratives that bolster the bureaucracy, or which **make** the State are now devoid of support? And which metanarratives appear to be surviving postmodernity to continue to provide comfort to the administration or a dynastic lifeline to those groups who have inherited the state?

## **1.9.2 The Need in Particular: Historical Truth**

Having explained some of the major needs that are outstanding or seemingly overdue in terms of general research into praxis / discourse, attention will now be turned towards those specific shortfalls of understanding of truth in history which have a possible effect on this investigations study and / or science problems.

### **1.9.2.1 Statement of Needs for Further Research on Historical Truth**

Many problematics surround our knowledge of what history means for given populations. Ten of these problematics are now introduced on account of their relevance to the ongoing context to define or to refashion the heritage of a state (State).

## (i) A 'RENAISSANCE' FOR HERITAGE, ITSELF?

Although, we are today supposed to be living in an age of historical deafness, certain aspects of history appear to be undergoing a revivification with regard to popular support in the Western world. Great Britain has seen new museums appear "at the rate of one a fortnight" (Lumley 1988:1); France has a major public museum construction policy (1) and --- since 1979 --- a Commission for Ethnological Heritage (4); the landscape of the 1980s in the U.S.A. had become 'creeping heritage' (Lowenthal 1985:xv). "We moderns [in the West] have so devoted the resources of our science to taxidermy [in the widest sense of the word] that there is virtually nothing that is not considerably more lively after death than it was before (Dennis 1974:165).

But is all this in fact symptomatic of a regeneracy of history? Do citizens of postmodernity / postindustrialism / late capitalism need their past revealed and their inheritances displayed more so than previous generations? Has history a Larger Place in our minds and in our miscellanies? No thorough, 'hard' longitudinal 'evidence' is yet known, hereon.

## (ii) AN APOSTASY FOR NATIONALISM?

The development of the research agenda on state / national truthmaking must consider questions of nationalism. Even in Texas --- for the adjuvant study --- the state is frequently deemed to be a separate or chosen 'nation' (see subsection 1.9.3.7 hereafter).

At various times since the Second World War, currents of thought have surfaced which have celebrated "the ultimate downfall of nationalism" (Alter 1985:1), as hopes were raised that 'one world' would soon grow to be fact. Frequently, since 1945, important questions have been asked as to whether nationalism was become "devoid of a function in the contemporary world" (3). Certainly, the impulses of postmodernity have fuelled this critique of nationalism, for postmodernity is 'anti-tendency', and nationalism is one of the strongest 'tendencies' one can have or asperse.

But nationalism will not lie quiet. It repeatedly appears to resurrect itself as a generic political and historical force, and continues "to be an universal historical principle decisively structuring international relations and the domestic order of states (2). The juxtaposition of nationalism to nations and to the global throes and throws of postmodernity is an involved and ever-altering dialectic, therefore. "Nationalism presupposes the image of the nation as a manifest, latent or desired form of collective identity and relates it to the nation-state as a co-evolving anticipated form of political organization (Arnason 1990:209). These images change in focus and centrality. Moreover 'notions' (and hence the acceptability of 'nationalism') is inescapably a selective and affiliative entity: they are constructive. In the noted verdict of Marcel Mauss, there can be no objective criteria by which nations, nationhood or nationalism is 'approved' --- they are each self-definitional (211).

Perhaps, in the last decades of the twentieth century, however, affiliations to 'ethnie' are superseding these to nationalism. Are nations becoming territorialized --- viz., centralized, politicized,

legally and economically united, civic --- but without the assimilative force, the myths, and the symbolic memory of 'ethnie' blocks (Smith 1986:152).

And if nationalism is in decline, relative to ethnie, does nationalism only apply to nations? Or can it 'nationalism' apply to any large centralized and politicized state or State? Can 'nationalism' apply to the Lonestar 'Nation'?

(iii) THE EROSION OF CERTAINTY IN HISTORY? Many historians and museum officials view themselves as being uniquely qualified to be just and fair in the assessment and communication of the past (Kirby 1988:99). They have been, one might suggest, inclined towards surety, proud in their judgements on yesteryear and assertive in articulating them. "Professional historians [have often seen] their mission as the stripping away of myth and the exposure of unvarnished truth (Buenger and Calvert 1991:xi). But the postmodern rejection of universal standards of value and of morality have hit hard at the infallibilisms of history. Postmodernity has brought an erosion of certainty (Burgin 1986:192-198), an agonistics of opposition (Connor 1989:243), and an irreducible diversity of voices and interests (244). Consequently the *natural* predispositions which enwrap historians (as they naturally do everyone) are a little more easily spotted (Buenger and Calvert 1991:xi) from many more perspectives.

But yet, from many other perspectives, historians are still unimpeachably eminent and *the* history they partificate upon is given and gospel. Conceivably, perhaps the history metered out in museums represents, to many individuals, the most unchallengeable source of factuality they receive? "It is still assumed in some quarters that museums are *neutral* environments and that museum activities --- collecting, recording, researching and exhibiting --- can be carried out without bias" (Kirby 1988:99).

Perhaps, for some historical subjects certain populations only want *one* given and gospel past? Perhaps, ironically, the Bigger the story, the Less the number of storylines are acceptable?

(iv) THE DEMISE OF HISTORY?

A few paragraphs ago, the problematic regeneracy of **heritage** (under (i)) was introduced. It is now necessary to balance it with something of a corollary --- the problematic atavism of **history**!

One of the fundamental consequences of modernity was the creation of an absolute gulf between the past and the future (Connor 1989:24). The past had little functional value for modernity. Has, to some extent, postmodernity accentuated that consequence, that relegation of history?

Jameson, as outlined under 1.2.1.1. above, considers that postmodernity has brought about the abolition of historicity and of historical depth (see Stephanson 1988:4). He suggests that 'historical consciousness' and 'the sense of the past' are becoming lost, so that historical time has become distorted. Unable to guide and interpret for the present age, history is no longer the object-pole of our being, and things *dissolve*; there are less / fewer / no(?) intensified experiences from the past which cognitively inform the present (4-7). David Donald (1977) had similarly recognized the bleakness of the era brought about

by the deemed irrelevance of history: to him, people no longer are so keen to learn from the lessons of the mistakes of previous peoples and times.

Despairingly for history and for historians, people increasingly live for the moment. For Lasch (1979:30) to live for oneself not for one's predecessors or for posterity is the prevailing passion in narcissistic North America.

The key problematic, then, is how long does a given history last? How long will storylines of the past keep being relevant? In terms of interpretations of history, Woodward (1986) reckons that scholarly writings on history currently have a shelf-life of about twenty years. But may that same concept be applied to oral / folk / common history? Does Everyman's Past have a shelf-life? Do myths have a life-cycle?

Thus, problematic (i) presents the possible flowering of heritage, and yet proposition (iv) sees history, itself, conceivably buried.

#### (v) WHICH ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES?

Under the Foucauldian vision, the genealogist of history does not just examine mainstream or surface history but channels his prospecting towards 'the darkground' where *local*, *marginal*, and *alternative* histories may lurk. These alternative histories --- and in aggregate human society, marginal storylines will always exist --- exist in slumber, variously opposed by the structures and ways-of-living and ways-of-thinking that surround them (Habermas 1987:280). They are naive truths, lowly positioned on the knowledge hierarchies beneath mainstream levels of social cognition and accepted science (Foucault 1980:82). They are disqualified truths.

But, for any given state or territory, what are these hidden histories (Lumley 1988:12)? Are they of women, of the environment, of oral culture (Horne 1986), of Blacks (Wolfe 1987)? The hardest of all to know of, find or see are those truths disenfranchised by system, denied by structure. The ideology embedded in process and in form is so difficult to spot (Williamson 1978) since in history as for all truths it is the *fait accompli*. For instance

European tourism is so patriarchal that to go on repeating the point would be tedious. With exceptions such as the Virgin Mary or Joan of Arc, women are simply not there. They make their appearances as dummies of study peasant women in folk museum reconstructions of peasant kitchens, or in other useful supporting roles; they may be seen nude, or partly nude, created as an object for the male gaze (Horne 1984).

So, does male intolerance or ignorance shape the truths in currency for the state or place in question? How many other gazes and subtle but mighty discriminations are there unsuspectingly molding the history of localities?

## (vi) WHAT WILL: WHOSE WILL?

If historical truth is not objectified by the unwitting but meticulous attentions of the anonymous gaze or the unprehesive and constant compositions of the nameless gaze, it may be tainted by will. History can be transformed by sheer acts of imaginative will (Connor 1989:227). Frequently the will to rewrite history will be accompanied by military force. As such it can be unarguably spotted as is evidently the case at the time of writing in Yugoslavia:

By bombing Dubrovnik's medieval heart, Yugoslavia's federal generals have made plain that they are no longer waging war to protect Serbian minorities or to capture strategic positions but to assert a victory of Serbian culture over Croatian. In a war designed to rewrite history, churches, palaces and museums are 'legitimate' targets, not accidental casualties. The Zagreb national museum believes that 214 out of 224 registered Croatian monuments have come under fire. Half of these have been either badly damaged or destroyed... .

The co-ordinated attack on Dubrovnik's center, where the treasures include the baroque cathedral housing Titian's Assumption, the 14th century rector's palace and the Sponza palace and clocktower, indicates the target is now Croatia's cultural heritage.

The Serbs say Dubrovnik, 'the pearl of the Adriatic,' was never Croatian, and does not belong to an independent Croatia... .

The main point is simply to take Dubrovnik away from the Croats... . (Boyes 1991:12).

At other times, and in other places the imaginative will is much more ethereal, a mysterious power "starting from despotic centrality [which] becomes by the half-way point a 'multiplicity of relations' ... and it culminates, at the extreme pole, with resistances ... so small and so tenuous that, literally speaking, atoms of power and atoms of resistance merge at this microscopic level" (Baudrillard 1987:37).

Baudrillard suggests that local and disenfranchised histories cannot often resist the force of the imaginative will of mainstream truths. Alternative histories are unable to tactically outflank the dominant foci of political and cultural power and end up mimicking them. Thus "the spread of power away from *conspicuous* centers of control [seemingly to accommodate marginal truths and lifespaces] ... is not diffusion but a consolidation of control, *a spiralling of power into a system that can resist any resistance*" (Connors translation of Baudrillard: Connors 1989:226; emphasis added). Thus, to Baudrillard, imaginative will is at its strongest in the hollow arenas of regulated simulation where each piece of historical resistance or cultural contradiction can be predicted, checked and absorbed into the dominant discourse. These simulated worlds, are 'metastable': they can clausalize opposing truths, proselyte them, and reconstitute alternative history into sublimated and stable truth.

## (vii) IS 'STATE SIGNIFICANCE' SIGNIFICANT?

Nations and states are artificial human constructions, generally of an ephemeral nature in terms of the total history of mankind. At any given time during recent centuries (i.e., since there have been 'nations' as such) many peoples or large subcultures have been denied nationhood --- even through they

deem themselves to be a distinct nation other than those who have militarily, territorially or administratively enveloped them. In the present era perhaps the Basques, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Tibetans "are arbitrarily denied their own states" (Alter 1985:119).

Nations and states are often difficult entities to work within with regard to longitudinal human history because they do not correspond neatly with the geophysical regions in which society has co-existed with nature. There will inevitably be a lack of fit between the way the modern nation or the emergent state of the day relates to the broad environment and the way nations of old or precursor states used to consider they ruled or lay across those tracts of land.

Moreover, nations and states have particularist historical predispositions about the evolution of their present society in relation to that geo-physicality. New Yorkers triumphalize the Labor of the Dutch Colonists, Californians heavily feature Spanish missionary work (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:101) and Catholic / Republican people of Ireland define their 'Green' ancestors as 'Irish' and the 'Orange' forefolk of others as 'alien / non-Irish'. Such interests can dominate the telling of history to the denial or rejection of wider and longer storylines. But such particularist truths can become official national or state truths. 'National merit' and 'state significant' can accrue to select narrative.

One reason why wider and longer themes are excluded is that the majority of historians are trained to deal with "little questions about particular cases" (101) rather than being schooled to handle larger questions of cultural change, mass population translocation or heritage diffusion. They are trained to observe the readily notable in history --- the hiccoughs of history, not the mundane health of past existence. The small and local issues are inadequately screened against the ongoing and broader universalisms. Local middens, local battlegrounds and local high streets are not just local or state features of history: they can have a significance at the national, the extra-national and the continental levels. But which level is *truly* significant?

(vii) PATRIOTISMS NOW PURCHASABLE?

Problematic (ii) introduced the possible eclipse of many nationalistic tendencies. But has the now pejorative (in many social groups and subcultures) been replaced to a limited extent by quieter and lower key patriotisms? Patriotism is the love of one's homeland (Alter 1985:6) or "the will to maintain and defend what is one's own and cherished" (Huizinga 1959:97) --- but should the term patriotism now be applied to all manner of contemporary group feelings? Does patriotism no longer relate to the hearth and to the homeland, per se, but to the contents of the home and the transient identifications that go with it? Is patriotism now consumptive (Bourdieu 1979), or rather in this sense of the term, *only* consumptive?

One is reminded, for instance, of the fact that "from 1970 to 1980 the population of North American Indians increased from 700,000 to 1.4 million, including the creation of several new tribes" (Friedman 1990:311). Is that predominantly a genuine revitalization of indigenous cultural pride or is it testament for the main borrowed and commodified ethnicity? Is patriotism, in many of its forms, now reduced to being an element in one's narcissism or one's conspicuous culture-hood?



## (ix) IS HISTORY NOT CONSUMPTIVE BUT CONSUMING?

Myth is generally presented in opposition to history, even though, to the dismay of many poor, part-time or non-zealous historians that distinction is predominantly an inaccurate one (Woodward / Vidal 1988:56-58). To many diehards, myth is spurious, history is genuine. The former is usually presented as being subjective and possessive and the latter as objective and neutral.

But it is becoming hard, as our understanding of the production of historical truth enriches, to separate myth from history. Both myth AND history are subjective, and one could argue that certain peoples around the world are becoming increasingly possessive about their myth AND their history. Oppressed peoples are becoming consumed by their myths, engrossed by their histories. Myth and history are becoming cultural identity where foreign pressures threaten: myth and history have become a political act where the antifoundationalism and globalization of postmodernity knocks (Asad 1990:239), hence, possibly, the confrontationist threat to Islam by Salman Rushdie (239-269). Selfhood is suddenly a desperate matter for populations --- and for authors! "The very consumption of modernist [sic; postmodernist, perhaps?] literature is suddenly an highly dangerous act (Friedman 1990:312). Where a desired collective is intimidated externally (or internally), sacred symbols proliferate and meanings throb. Myth and history have suddenly become certain people's **whole being**, and their **complete meaning**.

## (x) PRISONERS OF ONE'S PAST?

People in each and every age are prisoners of their past. The views, lifestyles and places of habitation are molded by their antecedents in an endless multitude of ways. Today, "we are acting parts in a play that we have never read and never seen, whose plot we don't know, whose existence we can glimpse, but whose beginning and end are beyond our present imagination and conception (Laing 1971:87).

People inherit a multiplicity of ethnocentrism which were borne in earlier attempts to explain the world. The history of the twentieth century has conceivably been dominated by the entelechic Western view to provide a single tabula rasa --- a Western tabula rasa --- for the world (Touraine 1990:139). Yet so many of the perpetrators of this ethnocentric, entelechic vision are not conscious of the part they are playing in it, nor necessarily conscious of the damage they are doing to other cultures and to other truths.

Touraine believes that the second half of the twentieth century has gradually brought about the shattering of the Western modernistic and developmentalist specter, with '[other] nationalisms liberating themselves from the colonial system, each searching for their proper vision of a modernity which is everywhere different" (139).

But is that so? Is the advance of the Western presence, with the Western present and the Western past in ruins? Or are occidental ethnocentrism become almost systemic, universalizing reason, mobilizing economic and social resources and substantively constraining the future world's right to know the non-Occidental past? Is the world's grand play largely always going to be a North Atlantic drama?

### 1.9.2.2 Findings on Historical Truth

The previous subsection (1.9.2.1) presented some of major problematics on truth in history --- that is, of areas in need of considerable further research. This current section now attempts to briefly draw out some of the findings that investigations into the production of truth have already uncovered. These findings help contribute to the public knowledge in history --- such as myth, legend and sacred themes --- is constructed.

#### (i) EVERYTHING CAN BE HISTORY

A first important finding in historical research is that whilst almost everything can be history, historians tend to have strong beliefs about what is proper history. In North America, for instance, the term 'historic' is utilized by some historians and preservationists with reference to structures stemming from both before and after the European migrations to the Americas (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:10). Such a problem exists because *potentially* all things have an historical significance. Sadly --- though some would say thankfully --- historians and preservationists make such decisions all of the time without considered thought. They make axiomatic and immediate assessments about what would qualify for state National Registers of Monuments / Sites (8), when in fact "all buildings [and structures] are buildings of historic interest" (Summerson quoted: 95). It is the learnings and preferences of historians and preservationists --- allied to the political process --- who decides, after all, what is significant and worthy of state registration.

#### (ii) THE PULL OF HISTORY

Everything potentially can be history, as has been just stated, and history can potentially be everything as was stated under 1.9.2.1. But in many places around the world history cannot be anything - -- for circumstantial reasons:

A ruin, which appears worthy of restoration to Western eyes may demand investment of national funds which the local [i.e., the country's] government feels would be better spent on programs to improve agriculture or village water supplied. Suakin, a romantic ruined city on the Sudanese Red Sea coast, might seem to the Americans to be a splendid candidate for restoration and development into an historic theme park. To the Sudanese national, however, programs for improving housing for the present population of this old seaport and for developing local industries must receive a higher priority, and even if foreign investment funds were available for the construction of an historic preserve at Suakin, they would not be able to underwrite the improvements in local infrastructure which are so much more pressing (Newcomb 1979:224).

Thus history has its spell, but history must compete with other lifecourse realities and other political actualities. The evaluation of historical merit is once more seen to be perspectival.

## (iii) THE PULSES OF HISTORY

Historians reveal that different continental and now global imperatives drive human political and state activity in different eras. A guiding tenet of nineteenth century realpolitik was the principle of the nation-state which established itself "with remarkable speed and dynamism" (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:94) over city-state configurations. In twentieth century capital city manoeuvres, the surge for independence from colonial or imperial overlordship has characterized recent history. But the problem occurs that when those histories are conveyed, for it is often so hard for historians and site interpreters to speak beyond current realities. Prussia was a mighty component of Europe, yet scarcely anyone wants to see Prussia of old today, because there is no everyday Prussian 'political' reinforcement today: the proud Prussia pulse is [momentarily?] dormant. Similarly the vast and steamy mysteries of the Congo are lost on youngsters today, unless they are advised that the Congo of their history books is the Zaire and the Brazzaville of their own age. The capricious Congo cadence is, consequently, dormant.

## (iv) THE POWER OF LATE COSMOPOLITAN HISTORY

The history twentieth might principally be the story of independence, gained, but that is not the only vast storyline of these decades. There is now a world culture: ergo, there is now an immediate world history. That, as Hannerz warns (1990:237) does not mean there is a replication of uniformity across the globe, it means the world now consists of a knitted diversity of cultures. There is "an increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures" (237). Thus, in a new power-block like Europe, the history of Europe now **matters** so much than it used to in proportion to the distinct history of the land / throne / kingdom of England *versus* the land / throne / republic of France. Furthermore, in the new cosmopolitan and metropolitan realities of the melting-pot nations of the twentieth century, the former 'alien' history of enemies is now in part the acknowledged past of mainstreamers. It is now safe, for instance, for the Hispanic communities of Los Angeles to loudly lobby to develop the historic city Plaza there --- Spanish and Mexican traditions are no longer outlawed truths in 'the City of Angels' (Newcomb 1979:223/4).

## (v) SOFT NATURE OF MUCH HISTORICAL INSIGHT

The contemporary practice of historians, preservationists and interpreters is frequently criticized for being incomplete in other ways, too. So often only 'decent', 'acceptable' or 'accordant' history is served up. Hard, nasty, and unpalatable history is remolded into soft and pleasing storylines.

Bennett (1988:64-70) advises, for instance, that the Beamish Open Air Museum in the North of England exemplifies the British capacity "to transform industrialism from a set of ruptural events into a moment in the unfolding of harmonious relations between rulers and ruled."

In a similar vein, Reynolds (1981:2) challenges the conventional ideas about the relatively harmonious takeover of the Australian, outback from Aboriginal people. Past and recent historical accounts have been softened by the search for a single mode of black behavior towards the advancing whites: the diversity, contradiction and competing objectives (and thereby a lack of harmony) has been

considerably understated. Then, too, the 'Australian' blacks were not necessarily the particularly peaceful and passive people that orthodox history has drawn them as: Reynolds (123) finds an overwhelming ubiquity of conflict, banditry and duplicity against the encroaching Europeans as he correctively offers the harder facts of the frontier's resistances.


(vi) INSULAR NATURE OF MUCH HISTORICAL INSIGHT

It is the view of King, Hickman and Berg (1977:189-190) that the planning and management of historical preservation and conservation in the U.S.A. is considerably hampered because of the limited range of disciplinary backgrounds that exist amongst senior decision makers in heritage interpretation. Whilst they current regret the absence of effective standards and procedures which could guide such executives on historical truth and cultural authenticity, their longterm fear is that over-regulation of this sort may suddenly arise as a worse evil, something which could cement the insular views of the narrow pool of historians and preservationists on given topics. King, Hickman and Berg believe that if agency policies are concretized in the twentieth century along the lines of current agency orientations, the field of visitable and viewable history will become increasingly narrow, self-serving and intellectually sterile (191). The absence of involvement of anthropologists in historic preservation is deemed to be particularly grave: "it is easy to envision a future of research ... and preservation only of those properties that represent dominant Anglo-American conceptions of historicity, propriety, and aesthetics" (191).

(vii) THE TRAINING OF HISTORIANS: IMPACT MAKING

King, Hickman and Berg suppose that where it is prevalent the insular nature of historical insight in practice within heritage interpretation often stems substantively from the inadequate breadth of training that historians and preservationists have. They prefer to identify HISTORIC PRESERVATION as a subfield of CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, and nominate both as divisionary aspects of SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT. Clearly there is sense in their judgement, though others may quibble that the relationship between historic preservation and cultural resource management is essentially lead by 'administrative / developmental' imperatives, while that between historic preservation and social impact assessment is fundamentally lead by 'research' imperatives. Nonetheless a slightly revised version of the King, Hickman and Berg relationship tier is provided in matching Figures 1.9.2.2./1 and 1.9.2.2./2. They illustrate the view that a host of disciplines contribute to historic preservation along with history itself, but that cultural resource management is chiefly the more restricted concern of anthropology and archaeology alongside history. Social Impact Assessment draws heaviest upon, perhaps, anthropology, sociology and economics, along with history.


The figures illustrate the view that historic preservation tends to concern itself with tangible aspects of past cultural systems and historical activities. Insight into the interpretation and the projection of the preserved site need not just relate to the palpable, however. It is the strong view of King, Hickman and Berg that historians, conservationists, preservationists and interpreters of historic / heritage sites



**Key:** Main disciplines are shown in CAPITALS, contributing ones in lower case.

SOURCE: Adapted from King, Hickman and Berg (1979:9).

FIGURE 1.9.2.2./1 THE RELATIONSHIP OF HISTORIC PRESENTATION TO LARGER WORLD ISSUES: THE RESEARCH IMPERATIVE ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION



**Key:** Main disciplines are shown in CAPITALS, contributing ones in lower case.

SOURCE: Adapted from King, Hickman and Berg (1979:9).

FIGURE 1.9.2.2./2 THE RELATIONSHIP OF HISTORIC PRESENTATION TO LARGER WORLD ISSUES: THE ADMINISTRATIVE / DEVELOPMENTAL IMPERATIVE ARISING FROM HISTORIC PRESERVATION

should also be widely schooled in the knowledge base of cultural resource management and in the broad issues and realpolitik of social impact assessment. Otherwise practitioners in history / heritage are merely being trained in the technical matters and in the site specifics of singular venerated case. They maintain that historians (plus) are not generally schooled in the wider cultural, societal and political significance of veneration.

(viii) THE TRAINING OF HISTORIANS: THE MAKING OF MULTIPLE STORYLINES

Too frequently, numerous observers of heritage conservation and interpretation inform us, the past is pillaged. Too frequently, we are advised that the past is looted not only by fast-buck developers and urban-industrial magnates, but by --- historians and interpreters themselves. Meyer (1973) reminds that important site after important site have been ruthlessly exploited by narrow-minded, self-interested public museum officials and private collectors who have carted off treasures, antiquities and artifacts.

Yet it is not just with the removal of the visible and the portable that such historians and interpreters (of various sorts) have transgressed. They have also erred by not recognizing the biases with which they have viewed the past. To repeat, "professional [and private / amateur] historians often see their mission as stripping away myth and exposing unvarnished truth. Yet cultural biases bind historians just as they do society at large" (Buenger and Calvert 1991:xi).

Buenger and Calvert maintain that scholars are interpreters of history and must not be trained to just look at the past solely from dominant or favored perspectives, but they ought to be trained to see how different groups and societies look at the past AND how different generations of previous decades and centuries have looked at the past. This very question of bias in museums and in presentations of viewable history is one to which the profession has only recently turned with vigor (Carbo 1988:89). Site interpreters, collectors and museum directors are only just beginning to collectively recognize and acknowledge that they are continually disqualifying other / alternative / multiple truths, and that the petty, the opaque and the ongoing limited width of the interpretations they routinely deal in (though they do not tend to use or recognize those terms!) may be continuously wrecking havoc amongst the range of strong and pertinent truths that each and every site or characterization possesses. The field is only just beginning to recognize that it should be training itself and monitoring itself in the width and quality of its conveyance of multiple truths about the past. It is just beginning to identify the need for a more panoramic and constructive *constructive* future for the past (or rather, pasts) it holds in its tutelage.

The delivery of broader constructions of the past, and the provision of multiple accounts, will not be an easy matter for either public or private sector historians and interpreters to carry out. As Table 1.9.2.2./1 indicates, heritage experts within the public domain are subject to local political pressures, and the spent past has no active political constituency able to lobby for corrective or ameliorative interpretation. Then heritage enthusiasts in the private sector have in most Western countries, the constitutional or inherited right to do or say almost what they want with those elements or features of the past they have been able to own or purchase. Modern urban-industrial / cosmopolitan societies (unlike

TABLE 1.9.2.2./1

**CONTRASTS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  
INTERESTS IN PLANNING THE PAST:  
SHOWING KEY POSITIVITIES AND NEGATIVITIES IN  
WESTERN PRACTICE**

<b>PUBLIC INTERESTS</b>	<b>PRIVATE INTERESTS</b>
<i>POSITIVE ASPECTS</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● a continuity factor in the form of the professional civil servant</li> <li>● equipped with the legal powers to block destruction or to support preservation</li> <li>● dispensers of public monies designated for preservation support</li> <li>● a force expressing the interests of the public at large</li> <li>● the opponents of special pleading</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● concerned citizens expressing their proprietary sentiments regarding historical relics</li> <li>● experts in local history and museum operations and in playing the role of enlightened lay people</li> <li>● users of the preserved past whose patronage is essential</li> <li>● the commercial firms involved in theme-park uses of the past</li> <li>● voters effective in mounting pressure campaigns in support of preservation actions or to raise funds</li> </ul>
<i>NEGATIVE ASPECTS</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● sensitive and susceptible to political pressures originating from office holders or from public or private special interest groups</li> <li>● insensitive to needs and programs which are out of the ordinary or which are not broadly popular with the public at large</li> <li>● conservative about break-through approaches and about complex planning issues relating to urban or natural environments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● special interest pleaders</li> <li>● not able to reflect all the public viewpoints or even a balanced scan of them</li> <li>● characterized by group memberships which are volatile and shifting in numbers, which in fact makes a continuity of viewpoint difficult to establish or maintain</li> </ul>

SOURCE: Newcomb 1979:228



many traditional or primal societies) do not have the in-built protection with regard to the past, where indigenous, communal, or inherited storylines are held under relatively stable and consistent care on behalf of the society by respected 'elders'. For the Pueblo people of the Rio Grande, all phenomena --- animate and inanimate, including history --- were knowable and controllable within specific myth cycles (Kupfer 1988:244). The uninitiated young who did not know the approved myths, legends and knowledges were considered to be "not-yet-fully-human" (244) and were deemed to be 'raw' and 'uncooked' individuals. Yet, in cosmopolitan, Western society, the raw and the uncooked can actively own or purchase components of the past and can determinedly lead the interpretation of myth and legend. One could argue that here, the opportunity for debasement of the past is just so much greater. Modern-day, contemporary society has none of the close respectful control of indigenous societies. Veneration is for sale. The not-yet-fully-human can buy their way to the mastership of the past.

### 1.9.2.3 Recent Approaches on Historical Truth

Michel Foucault (1972:14) considered history to predominantly be "a place of rest, certainty, reconciliation, a place of tranquilized sleep." His archaeology of knowledge saw history has a place where the weight of the past and the majority of possible / potential truths were caste off into slumber: only select realities of the past and re-punctuated versions of yore earned the light of day in succeeding ages.

Recently, approaches have emerged which are designed to help individuals and institutions identify and 'correct' some of the pitfalls of that very selectiveness. Clearly, many of those responsible for these varians attempt to 'lubricate', to 'level out' or to 'democratize' history will never have read Foucault (nor should they, necessarily!) and obviously, it will never ever be possible to completely smooth out history and symmetries the past's past with the or any of the present's past. New discriminations, new injustices and new reasons to disidentify will emerge as the decades and centuries roll on. Currently the antidotal and reformatory impulses are to realign towards race, to correct towards color and to genuflect to gender in the re-telling of the past. Inevitably, new ameliorative and counteractive impulses will emerge to join them and possibly take over from them as the major corrective and rehabilitative work upon heritage interpretation and historical truth. What will they be for the twenty-first century? This question tantalizes for 2092, ... and 2192, ... and beyond.

But what have these mandatory 'curative' or 'remedial' approaches been in the present era? Two examples of the therapeutic treatment of history warrant explanation.

With regard to research, national / state governments are beginning to authorize 'comprehensive' approaches to the audit of items of viewable history. The California Department of Parks and Recreation has maintained, since the 1970s an inventory of "visible history" (State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation 1976). Undoubtedly no such collation can ever be ultimately or absolutely comprehensive to suit everyone's standards of thoroughness, but the principle and the endeavor has to be applauded. Identified history is being rendered a little more 'open'.

With regard to operational research, the Republic of Indonesia's 'Indonesia in Miniature' is a museum-cum-park of 120 hectares (300 acres) conceived to explain the many subcultures and different ways-of-living that are enwrapped within the modern state. No doubt the function of the truth conveyance there is not only to inform visitors of the diversity of the archipelago cultures of Indonesia, but to catalyze patriotic feelings and integrative sentiments on the part of those very different peoples themselves (Newcomb 1979:51). The discourse of such approaches rarely ever is just externally pitched.

#### 1.9.2.4 Underserved Approaches on Historical Truth

Subsections 1.9.2.1. to 1.9.2.3. suggest that society and its institutions are not yet advanced in its intent or capacity to self-examine its own concepts and themes of historical truth. The six aspects below are conceivably some of the more critical approaches to inquiry and practice that nations and states could encourage should they indeed wish to pursue healthier and better balanced interpretations of the past.

Firstly, the assumptive base of historic preservation of heritage management can generally be more rigorously applied. Exhaustive analysis, according to King, Hickman and Berg (1977:220) is required in terms of:

- *what* is conserved / preserved / interpreted?
- *for whom* that care / stewardship / projection is pitched at?
- *for which* purposes / functions / goals is that effort / endeavor / enterprise conducted?
- *around which* periods / places / personalities are the historical themes and storylines built?
- *who* takes charge of the research / monitoring / evaluation of the crucial consistency and continuity tasks necessitated?
- *with whose* monies / resources / services are the historical truths constructed?
- *which* of the interpretations will be singular / paired (alternatives) / multiple?
- *how* will ongoing audits be structured to check into the continuing rationalities represented by permanent / limited duration / special exhibits and presentations?
- et cetera.

Secondly, the legitimacy of the actions of state administrators merits fuller and sincere attention with particular reference to the rights / way / freedoms it has to act on behalf of its population in defining nationhood, in selecting which traditional commonalities for are right and ripe articulation, and in otherwise engendering 'politically correct' national consciousness (Alter 1985:11-18).

Thirdly, approaches into the cultural concepts of *value* regularly warrant systematic and refreshing avenues of inquiry. In the field of cultural resource management, conceptualizations of group perceptions of value still are inclined to be adolescent (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:103). As was noted in the opening subsections of this work, Appadurai (1986:3) has recognized that places, events and commodities have social lives. Anthropologists, historians, political economists can gain considerably by

working together with greater frequency, to uncover the myriad of meanings behind human transactions and attributions in order to trace the historical circulation of things.

Fourthly, while the separation of rhetoric from reality in the interpretation of history, and in historical preservation, appears to have been recognized for some time (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:187) the degree and manner by which skilled or petty / opaque rhetoric in historical interpretation actually creates reality (or rather forges new realities) is imperfectly known and admitted. When the National Trust (Mulloy 1973) (in the U.S.A., or equivalent bodies elsewhere) talks about 'the rich eclectic diversity' of the peoples of North America, does that have a sizeable effect upon present day integration? When cotton-belt states talk of 'the old Southern ways of living', does that have strong resonance on the unification of contemporary styles of life?

Fifthly, approaches into the historic image of 'other' / 'foreign' / 'overseas' places is so commonly underserved. Smith (1984) undertook a vast artefactual and literary enquiring into the perceptions Europeans have and hold of the history of the people of the South Pacific, but comprehensive categorical analyzes utilizing other statistical, discriminative or comparative techniques appear to be rare. It is *assumed* that the Alamo is a world recognized symbol of victory in defeat (King, Hickman and Berg 1977:197). It is *assumed* that Chief Sitting Bull is a world renowned symbol of vanishing First Americans (Stedman 1982:173-192). It is *assumed* that the Rhonda Valley is a world received symbol of urban-industrialism (Urry 1990:105). Yet, such judgements have rarely been scientifically corroborated. Delving into 'myth' is just not seen, possibly, as 'decent' science in enough places.

Finally, the relationship between 'public' and 'private' history has rarely been approached in anything other than impoverished fashion. Can the views of Lasch (1979:31/2) on the rise of narcissism in contemporary North American society be translated to *the use or deployment of history*? Is there examined awareness of the ways in which the past history of individuals is composed for 'private performance' or for 'transcendental self-attention' or for 'conspicuous consumption'? Is there scrutiny of the 'indigenous' ancestry, the 'German' heritage and / or the 'African' antecedence --- all at which are now being heavily claimed by various individuals as perhaps an acceptable facet-of-fashion over and above any real value as a testimony-to-truth? Are there many examples of the study of the capture of *public* / other / any inheritance for *private* self-projection?

### 1.9.3 The Need In Particular: Texas

Texas is the screen for this adjuvant study. To-date, in the investigation, it has not been heavily represented. Observations on the Lonestar State have only been made in passing. In this subsection (1.9.3), however, the study problem for the catalyst investigation is directly addressed in relation to Texan issues and Texan perspectives.

Before a number of subtopics (ten --- 1.9.3./1 to 1.9.3./10) are specifically encountered, initial attention is given to the overall cultural heritage of the state.

### 1.9.3./0 The Discourse of Texas

Fundamentally the study problem asks whose state Texas is --- i.e., whom do state bureaucrats appear to represent when they make their large AND small (particularly their small and recurrent administrative decisions). One could argue that the adjuvant study is, therefore, a political-economy of the truth --- but it would be one in the Foucauldian mode, utilizing technical AND critical AND interpretative understanding to get at the issues. Thus the study problem constitutes a rare inquiry into *both* procedural and substantive values (Morgan and Rohr 1986; Morgan 1987) in Texas --- the way administrative process juxtaposes with esteemed display of sentiment.

To that end, the catalyst study begins to ask the following questions of and about Texas:

- *To what degree is Texas a distinct entity?*

To what degree do Texans think of themselves as different (Meinig 1969:124)? To what extent do Texans have residual values different from the rest of the region / nation / continent? To what measure are Texans separate from the larger, enveloping U.S. myth (O'Connor 1986:229)? To what compass are Texans apart from the even grander, continuing European-Protestant (or just European) conquest of the New Continent? Or in what fashion may one almost completely identify Texans not so much as distinct Lonestar citizens, but as SuperAmericans (the chronological culmination of what North American society has been able to produce) or as SuperEuropeans (who had to deal with the fiercest(?), the longest(?), the most durable(?) and the most recent(?) of the 'Western' frontiers (139)?

- *In what fashion is Texas a doctored historical concept?*

To what extent has eugenics been and being practiced in Texas where the quality of its population is not so much improved by the doctoring of genes but by the doctoring of heritage? And if there has been select breeding of this subtle sort, which strains of humankind have been notionally reproduced and which have been summarily excised or diminished?

- *Is there, in most regards, one Texas or are there many Texas?*

Has culture triumphed over nature to produce one Texas in the present, and in the surviving accounts of the state's past? Or does nature take priority over culture in the shaping of the people within the state? Is Texas one integrated cultural or geographical morphological region, or is it several distinct regions (Meinig 1969:121)?

- *Does Texas consist of one singular cultural region?*

Is there a distinct Texan way-of-living with its own distinguished set of shared assumptions? Is there, in the Foucauldian sense, a well accepted order-of-things (Merquior 1985:54) in Texas --- a swag of unconscious meanings which are critical between and amongst fellow Texans? Or are there many distinct cultural regions --- as many as nine (Maxwell and Crain 1990:2)(?) --- where the 'internal' similarities have deeper significance than the 'external' continuities across the whole state?

- *Is Texas a totalized state in terms of its cultural history where an entrenched sector / groups have been impore an hegemony over historical and heritage interpretations?* Is there a unified Texan

myth to which all major legends and storylines adhere? Is what Foucault called "the apparatus of historical truth" (Rabinow 1984) held in a relatively stable and consistent set of hands? **Is the state the least competitive of states** (as is sometimes claimed (Maxwell and Crain 1990:133-136)) in terms of the degree of control held over history heritage as well as over other more established issues of state intrigue? Or is the sheer geographical size of the state --- and the great variety of peoples, groups and interests that occasions --- producing a legitimacy crisis for those who used to wield control over the state image and identity?

- *Is Texas growing more homogenous or is it becoming more differentiated over time? Do any significant barriers, befall new immigrants to Texas (there, one must suppose, can never be a barrier-free social and cultural world for newcomers), brought about through definitions of history and heritage in currency? Do the ethnocentrism of myth, legend and fable translate or transfer themselves to present day groups / populations whom have historically been the butt of such grand and petty discriminations? Do new immigrants adapt to, and largely adopt, the dominant / mainstream myths, legends and storylines of Texas?*
- *Is Texas remaining stable as-it-was during its first century since 1836 (if indeed it was then 'stable'), or is it being substantively decentered (Owens 1985:57)? Is Texas becoming schizophrenic in terms of its culture or heritage (Stephanson 1988:21) because post-war / sunbelt / cosmopolitan Texas is more eclectic than the Texas of past patronage? Is there a hierarchy of decision-takers and identity-shakers on heritage matters in Texas, or is there an (emergent / growing / established) heteroglossia?*
- *Has Texas recently, or is Texas suffering from any Foucauldian discontinuities regarding its identifications (Rabinow 1984:9)? Is the new-present of the Lonestar State out-of-harmony with the old-past of the state? Texas and America have strong agrarian origins (Tocqueville 1969) --- is Texas 'still-agrarian' (Bellah 1985:38) in its ideologies? Do its strongest ethos and institutions still spring from autonomous, small-scale, face-to-face, rural-community, living (39)?*
- *Do the traditional images of Texan history and heritage attract and arrest the modern population within the state(?) beyond the state? Or do the myths / legends / storylines of Texas disturb, annoy or turn off sectors of the 1990s population? Are the images and identities and the cherished episodes of Texan history believable in the modern day age / postmodern mood? Or are some of those tales and triumphs suspect or beyond support?*

It is the function of the associated tables (1.9.3.1./1 to 1.9.3.10./1) to provide background intelligence on the above set of questions. Taken in toto, the tables constitute a state-of-the-art inspection into 'truth' formation for the state. The insight has been obtained principally from the Texas Committee for the Humanities text on Texas Myths (O'Connor 1986) and from the recently released Buenger and Calvert (1991) account of established and emergent interpretations of the state's manufacture of past

history and heritage. This state-of-knowledge insight has been organized into ten subject-areas, arbitrarily selected from the lead classifications of the O'Connor and the Buenger and Calvert manuscripts. They are:

- 1.9.3.1 Myth Introduced
- 1.9.3.2 Texas Myth in General
- 1.9.3.3 The Frontier --- People and Nature
- 1.9.3.4 Race and Color
- 1.9.3.5 Women
- 1.9.3.6 Individual Freedoms and the Good Life
- 1.9.3.7 Texas in and as 'America' - Statehood
- 1.9.3.8 Sunbelt Texas and the Future
- 1.9.3.9 Historians of Texas
- 1.9.3.10 Political Versions of the Texas Story

No strong attempt is made in the set of ten tables to differentiate absolutely between *myth* and *history*. Both are deemed to be versions of truth about the past. Myth is normally a 'folkloric' or 'fabulous' (in the older / 'proper' sense of the term rather than the contemporary / 'vacuous' application of the word) version of the truth about the past. But, to repeat, myth can become accepted history, and one may suppose that accepted history can retreat or metamorphose into myth. It all depends who is constructing the particular 'history' at hand.

But what does this set of ten tables reveal? They are each, now, briefly explained. The purpose here is to be illustrative, not comprehensive.

### **1.9.3.1 Myth Introduced**

There is no single, widely approved definition for myth across all disciplines (Buenger and Calvert 1991:x), for in various contexts it functions as 'mythology' and / or 'legend' and / or 'archetype' and / or 'imaginative poetry' and / or 'communal psychic response' and / or 'hero generator' (Cavan 1986:9-15). Principally, though, mythmaking activity occurs within societies around those customs and institutions which require justification (Malinowski 1954:144). *Myth is therefore a cultural force and an organizing force in society* (Cowan 1986:9) --- as is suggested in Table 1.9.3.1./1 --- which helps construct and maintain the moral and social order of the society. Myth tends to emphasize the unusual rather than the commonplace, and its explanations of phenomenon tend to be in highly exaggerated terms (Myres 1986:133).

Under high positivism, myth tended to be disparaged as being unscientific understanding. Recently, however, myth has resurfaced in social science on a critical set of cultural, social, political perspectives on the world --- as is indicated in Table 1.9.3.1./1 by the insight already gained into social coherence and the intelligence sought into shared imagined worlds. In the current work to set up the

research agenda into history-making via tourism, it is important to learn who is or endeavors to legitimize which myths (for which purposes) and who is or endeavors to neutralize which myths (for which reasons).

### 1.9.3.2 Texas Myth in General

Myth is important because it helps dictate both what historians consider are worthy subjects for investigation and what the public regard as important about the roots, traditions and inheritances of a place. As Table 1.9.3.2./1 implies, the oral and other myths of Texas (as for other myths in other regions) *may preclude certain citizens within the state from identifying or fully identifying with the state*. The skewed chronologies and reconceived accounts of Texan myth and history, the table suggests, inevitably will advantage some groups / segments / elites over others within the state population. The nineteenth and twentieth century newness of the myths of Texas clearly diminish, for example, the importance of those populations which lived in present-day Texas prior to the 1800s.

Yet, as Table 1.9.3.2./1 also implies, scholars / interpreters / citizens / tourists / et cetera may not be able to differentiate many of the myths and truths of Texas from the broader U.S. / Southern / Western accounts of the past.

### 1.9.3.3 The Frontier --- People and Nature

Table 1.9.3.3./1 discloses the 'fact' that in the myths and legends of the state, the tracts of Texas have, during the last two centuries, so frequently meant or stood for *opportunity* for the mythmaking group. In this regard, Texas has been solidly and consistently championed as a removed but expansive frontier wonderland --- a torrid and testing 'country', but yet an accommodating one, once mastered. The table intimates that this white, male, Anglo-American interpretation of Texas has almost become a **monomyth** for the state.

### 1.9.3.4 Race and Color

The implication of Table 1.9.3.4./1 is that in Texas the quality of life and the realms of opportunity and freedom available to non-Anglo-Americans have tended to *dissolve in the face of the weight, magnitude and repetivity of the white / English-language / Christian master discourse* on the past. Blacks, Hispanics, and 'Indians', have particularly been subjugated by the petty and opaque presence of the ruling Protestant and progressivist reverberations of the predominant Lonestar state truths. The fact that the first Anglo-Americans were at times quite loyal to Mexico is *not* heavily celebrated today, for instance. El Paso --- which today is sixty percent Hispanic and forty percent Anglo --- is not projected as a heartland city (Miller 1991:299), but it is a different almost externalized city within the domination conception of the Lonestar constellation of settlements. And the contribution of blacks and 'Indians' to the projected might of the state is not eagerly cultivated within the most powerful of the myths. Table 1.9.3.4./1 makes manifest the fact that the eclectic population of Texas does not have an eclectic mythology about the

**TABLE 1.9.3.1/1**  
**MYTH INTRODUCED:**  
**THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO MYTHS IN GENERAL**

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

***The Statements***

- Myths can compete (1>1).
- Myths can interpret history (1>2).
- Myths can vanquish history (1>3).
- Myths can help a population settle into a new territory or geophysical region.
- Myths can narrate the sacred history of a people (1>4).
- Myths can enable a group or society to place themselves with a larger destiny than their own mundane existence.
- Mythical reasoning can enable a group member to gain a whole belief or an entire worldview where parts are apprehended with a graspable totality (1>5).
- Myths can bind the natural and the supernatural into a coherent whole (1>6).
- Myths evolve (1>7).

***Related Questions***

- Which group own, have which myths?
- Which importances, perspectives and rationalities do myths reveal for the given population/groups?/
- Which other historical truths do the myths at hand undo or threaten?
- What do the extort myths say about the origin of the region or the special properties of the area?
- What do the extant myths say about the religion, the beliefs or the venerated traditions of the people?
- Which cosmological, creative or provenant storylines does the particular myth point to?
- Which are the larger, comprehensive, unifying myths a society has?
- Which critical, life-sustaining or dangerous events and occurrences is the given myth attending to?
- Which myths has a population recently dropped from its repertoire and which ideas have been relegated from which prevailing myths?



TABLE 1.9.3.1./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- A. Myths "serve principally to establish a sociological character" (1>8).
- B. Myths are "a perennial force within both the human psyche and the social order (1>9).
- C. Myth patterns the social order by authenticating experience (1>10).
- D. Myths are often magnified fears: anxieties and irresolutions are elevated into myth and (sometimes) thereby converted into an institution (1>11).
- E. Myths are political (1>12).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Myths, during the Enlightenment, were fundamentally regarded as falsehoods --- "opposite to historical fact and counter to scientific evidence" (1>13).
- Myths (being regarded as untruths) were regarded as evidencing immature rationalities.
- Myths are now being studied as anthropomorphic projections of truth and value.

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- Myths transmit values across the generations (1>14).
- Myths instruct, authoritatively (1>15).
- Myths establish a charter for the present (1>16).
- Myths should not be judged by standards of historicity (1>17).
- Myths are not necessarily 'false' (1>18).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- Which values are currently being transferred across to youngsters in overt or subtle fashion, for the given population?
- Which are the exemplary heroes of the population, as revealed in didactic myth?
- Has a new myth recently emerged for the given population to legitimize the rise or the rights of its rulers/leaders/elders?
- Where do myth and history vehemently clash?
- Who insists/claims/demands that another groups myths are false and why do they need to be so.

TABLE 1.9.3.1./1 (Continued)

## KEY

1>1	O'Connor 1986	
1>2	Schorer 1960:355	
1>3	O'Connor 1986	
1>4	Eliade 1968:5	
1>5	Richards 1969:172	
1>6	Enstam 1986:139	
1>7	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xi	
1>8	Malinowski 1954:144	
1>9	Muller, Lang, Taylor, Frazer and Durkheim summarized by O'Connor 1986:7	
1>10	O'Connor 1986:8	
1>11	Cuthbertsan 1986:183	
1>12	O'Connor 1986:4	
1>13	O'Connor 1986:3	
1>14	Enstam 1986:139	
1>15	Eliade 1968	
1>16	Bauman 1986:25	
1>17	Bauman 1986:25	
1>18	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xi	

**TABLE 1.9.3.2./1**  
**TEXAS MYTH IN GENERAL:**  
**THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST**

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

**The Statements**

- Texans are completely different individuals than other North Americans (in myth).
- For certain episodes of the Texan past, the distinction between 'myth' and 'history' has collapsed --- there is almost no history (for the Alamo, the border ballads et cetera)! (2>2).
- Texan myths are fundamentally European (in civility), Puritan (in commitment), American (in confidence) and Southern-African (in courtesy) (2>3).
- The Texan myths are recent and composite, yet uncommonly virulent (2>4).
- North American myths frequently are arcadian and salute 'The Earthly Paradise', 'The New Eden', 'The Golden Age' (2>5).
- North American myths speak *natively* of the "authentic American as a figure of heroic innocence and vast potentialities, posed at the start of a new history" (2>6).
- North American myths celebrate manifest destiny.
- North American myths accentuate the American's brave and enriching confrontation with 'the Other' (2>8).
- The inherited Texan choice of hero favors the 'tough', the 'resourceful' and the 'powerful': it is heavily, heavily male (2>9).

**FINDINGS**

- The oral myths of Texas have sustained the state's identity and given its society shared values and common goals (2>10).
- The myths of Texas are ambiguously located variously with and within 'Southern' and 'Western' U.S. history (2>11).
- North American people are 'twice born'. Their culture is fundamentally a transplanted one from Europe, but they have to also reidentify with the lands and cultural imprint of the New World. There is an absence of sustained/continuous/rooted North American culture in site (2>12).
- The Texas myth and Texas written histories have a heavy nineteenth century orientation (2>13).
- The history of North America is essentially a NEW history loaded with a moral posture towards the future (2>14).

**Related Sample Questions**

- Are Texans different in myth, or are they merely transplanted Americans (U.S. Americans): are the Texas legends/storylines/impulses quite removed in type/style/form from anyone else (2>1)?
- Where has myth in Texas obliterated or cannibalized 'history' (assuming that 'history' is something separate from myth)?
- Which commonplace elements or features of Texan myths escape this simple taxonomy: What other strong strains persist in Texan legend?
- Have the Texan myths in currency changed substantively during the twentieth century?
- Are Texan myths festooned with the romantic pastoralism of Arcadian images?
- Are Texan myths still loaded with visions of immense opportunity?
- Do Texan myths not celebrate manifest destiny with particular vehemance (2>7)?
- Do Texan myths heavily emphasize the Texan's brave and enriching confrontation with 'the Other'?
- Do the new Texan myths of the 1980s and 1990s also reflect a strong, strong viraginous bias?

TABLE 1.9.3.2./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- Many of the present day public conceptions of Texan folklore stem from 'romantic' and 'nationalistic' writers (such as J. Frank Dobie) who expressed aim was to IMPROVE history (2>15).
- Much Texan history and myth is late and new: many of its principal features/buildings/site still stand (such as the Alamo) or are still available to regenerate the myth (2>16).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Gradual recognition has arisen of the need to study the nature and function of myth for the state's ethnic groups (2>17).
- Gradual recognition has arisen of the need to submit the myths of Texas to rigorous ongoing examination (2>18).
- Texan myth has begun to be identified in terms of (1) cosmological storylines (of 'indian' peoples); (ii) hero legends (of border bandits and Alamo defenders, for example); (iii) folk tales (of cow camp and early settlements, for example); (iv) other fables and fictions (2>19).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- Texas has been formed in recorded time.
- Texas historians have had difficulty rejecting and denying old truths (2>21).
- The Institute of Texan Cultures has recently begun to draw attention to imbalances in the telling of historical truth in the state --- particularly with regard to the shortfall of treatment of ethnic men and women (2>22).
- The historical demography of Texas largely excludes the Tejana (Mexican Texan), Indian, black storylines (2>23).
- Do visitors to Texas (and inhabitants of the state) have a developed sense of how 'myth' differs from 'history'?
- The following socio-economic storylines appear to be *underserved* in the myths of Texas --- oil and cotton (in comparison to ranching); --- cities and large towns (in comparison to rural settlements and small towns) (2>25).
- Folklife festivals and folklore events are presentations of the past, but they do help construct the present (2>26).
- Groups which are excluded from a state/regional/ area myth will feel alienated from the state's history and from the state itself (2>27).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- How does oral history, fictional literature and myth (i.e., the state's semi-sacred history) relate to the state's official history (i.e., the formal-sacred history)? (2>20).
- Which old understandings have been discarded (and why?)?
- Which possible/potential/manifest imbalances has the Institute of Texan Cultures 'uncovered' and which has it played no role in identifying?
- Which storylines of which European countries/European immigrants are also strongly underserved in the historical demography of Texas?
- What are the different expectations visitors from beyond Texas bring to the state before they have visited any preserved/conserved/interpreted sites/museums/heritage centers? How do their prior experiences and presuppositions vary (2>24)?
- Which other socio-economic storylines are underserved in Texas?
- Which 'themes' or 'truths' are celebrated and re-generated in Texas through current folklife festivals?
- Which groups or segments of the Texas population currently feel alienated from the state's history and/or from the state?

## KEY (Table 1.9.3.2./1)

2>1	Cowan 1986:20
2>2	O'Connor 1986:vi
2>3	Cowan 1986:19-20
2>4	Cowan 1986:20-21
2>5	Marx 1964:3, 229
2>6	Lewis 1955:4-5
2>7	Veninga 1986:230
2>8	Cowan 1986:18-19
2>9	Myres 1986:124
2>10	Buenger and Calvert 1981:xiii
2>11	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxiii
2>12	Cowan 1986:16
2>13	Myres 1986:122-123
2>14	Lewis 1955:4-5
2>15	Wittlif 1966:93
2>16	Cowan 1986:14
2>17	O'Connor 1986:7
2>18	Buenger and Calvert 1991:backcover
2>19	O'Connor 1986:vii
2>20	Fehrenbach 1986:206
2>21	Buenger and Calvert 1991:backcover
2>22	Myres 1986:129
2>23	Ernstam 1986:143
2>24	Veninga 1986:234
2>25	Ernstam 1986:142
2>26	MacCannell 1976:8-9
2>27	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxiii - xxxiv

**TABLE 1.9.3.3./1**  
**THE FRONTIER ---**  
**PEOPLE AND NATURE: THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST IN TEXAS**

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

**The Statements**

- Texas has always been or appeared to be 'Big Country' --- it has seemed to be infinite. In many visions of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and tracts of California have been included therein (3>1).
- The Texan frontier was merely the next/last adaptation of 'The West Beyond the Mississippi's' frontier: always shadowy it could be pictured in almost any guise (3>2).
- The frontier is not simply the border --- it was a distinct way-of-life (3>3).
- A common cord of survivorship runs through the Texan frontier myths and truths (3>4): frontier survivors are 'Big People'.
- Storylines about 'cattle' give the State of Texas its Western cowboys, and a glamor that the prosaic south did not have (3>5).
- For the past in Texas, studies of the importance of the frontier 'easily surpass' those of the plantation (3>6).
- *The frontier thesis* of Frederick Jackson Turner influenced many of the national historians of the 1930s and thereafter in the U.S.A. (3>8).
- The Texas Rangers play a quintessential part in the story of the Texan frontier: they did not just 'defeat their enemies, they emasculated them' (3>9).
- The world of frontier experience in Australia is gendered: the land and its wildness is female, but the conquest of its is male (3>11). The same frontier celebration of masculinity holds for the North American (and Texan?) frontiers.
- The discourse of the frontier is nationalistic: it takes a special and rare community of spirit to triumph over the huge infinity of the frontier (3>12).
- The Texan frontier --- the Texan wilderness --- must be surmounted, according to Texan myth: the challenge ought not be disdained (3>13).

**Related Questions**

- Are the 'Big Country' themes of Texas purely 'Anglo' storylines or did the Mexican/Spanish/'Indian'/Other myths develop 'big' stories for what is now Texas?
- Which of the Texas myths contain distinct properties/features of the American frontier --- and which distinctly Texan elements/characteristics do they contain?
- Does the frontier have/offer still a distinct way-of-life?
- Do the 'myths' and 'truths' created today, within the Texan heritage, continue to accentuate the skills of survivorship and the grand, larger than life quality and quantity of implied Texan 'character'?
- Do tourists identify Texas more with Western or Southern themes?
- What are the proportional gaps (if any) in the 'frontier' Texan history of the nineteenth century --- in addition to 'the antebellum economy' and the 'Civil War' and 'The Reconstruction' eras (3>7)?
- Has the frontier thesis of F.W. Turner influenced many of the state historians of Texas at the expense of other significant frontier storylines?
- The mythical qualities of the Texas Rangers --- in Webb's and others' frontier histories were 'meet and right' for the standards of past Texan society (3>10), but are not 'meet and right' for the standards of Texan society today?
- In Texan myth, the land is tamed and civilization is introduced almost exclusively through male prowess?
- Without the frontier there cannot be 'nationhood' for Texan myth and truth?
- Texan myth and legend loudly acknowledges the beauty of the frontier and the wilderness only after it ('she') has been conquered (3>14)?

TABLE 1.9.3.3/1 (Continued)

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

**FINDINGS**

- The frontier in Texas sits only two or three generations back from the present (3>15).
- The conquest of the American frontier lasted some 280 years and is epic (3>16); the Texan conquest of the frontier plays a culminating part in that long saga.
- Stephen F. Austin, and many other great figures in Texan history and politics, saw the Texan frontier as a natural and inevitable extension of 'the American West' (3>17).
- Flourishing 'national' industries tend to build up around frontier sagas and storylines (3>18).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Students of myth, legend and history in Texas have begun to explore the following *frontier themes* (amongst others):
  - the clash of indigenous and immigrant cultures;
  - the supernatural;
  - the clash of race and color;
  - 'anglo' privilege;
  - 'black' subculture
  - the conquest of the wilderness;
 (3>19).  
 And of:
  - Tejano perspectives;
  - Texas women;
  - Modernity
 (3>20).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNTRIED**

**Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- In Australia, the working dog, for instance, --- especially the Blue Heeler --- is of noted significance to contemporary images of outback/frontier identity (3>21).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- What constitutes the iconography of the Texan frontier of the past and of the present? Has it changed? Is it changed?

TABLE 1.9.3.3./1 (Continued)

KEY

3>1	Goetzman 1986:71
3>2	Cowan 1986:19
3>3	Cowan 1986:20
3>4	Fehrenbach 1986:225
3>5	Calvert 1991:197
3>6	Buenger 1991:331
3>7	Buenger 1991:331-2
3>8	Calvert 1991:200
3>9	Fehrenbach 1986:211-2
3>10	Fehrenbach 1986:211
3>11	Marcus 1989:18
3>12	Marcus 1989:19
3>13	Doughty 1986:117
3>14	Hubbell 1965:303
3>15	Ernstam 1986:139
3>16	Ernstam 1986:140
3>17	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxix
3>18	Marcus 1989:18
3>19	O'Connor 1986
3>20	Buenger and Calvert 1991
3>21	Marcus 1989:17



RACE AND COLOR:  
THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST IN TEXAS

STATEMENT OF NEEDS

*The Statements*

- **Race and Color: General Issues**
- Each country or region is trapped in minefield of historical prejudice: ages have different standards of propriety in terms of discriminatory/non-discriminatory practices (4>1).
- **White Issues**
- The Darwinian notion of 'the white man's burden' helped drive the conquest and development of Texas (4>2).
- **Black Issues**
- 'Juneteenth' is an important celebration in black communities in Texas, commemorating the arrival of news in the state of emancipation from slavery (June 19th 1865) (4>3).
- African culture survived much more strongly in America during slavery than was formerly and generally presumed (4>4).
- **Hispanic Issues**
- Many Anglo-Americans in Texas take confidence from the fact that Anglo-Americans conquered the tracts of 'Texas' in ten years --- something that they maintain that Hispanic people (in the widest sense of the term) had been unable to do during a 300 year period (4>5).
- Before the 1950s, Texan historians tended to mention Tejanos tangentially --- chiefly as bandits who battled cattlemen, frontiersmen and Texas Rangers (4>6).
- In the writings of famous Texan historian Walker Prescott Webb (especially within 'The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defence': 1935) Mexicans 'lost at every turn' against 'the quiet, deliberate, gentlemen' of the Texas Rangers (4>7).
- The inadequacies of Mexican character (sic!) were linked to the Inquisition and to their high quotient of Indian blood amongst other supposed failings (4>8) --- in the lead Texan history books of the first half of the twentieth century.

*Related Sample Questions*

- Which social/cultural practices of the first quarter of the 19th century, of the second quarter, of the third quarter, et seq., would nowadays be regarded as discriminatory by race or color?
- What historical, literary, autobiographical evidence is there that Texas was gradually settled **progressively** in tune with an envisaged predestiny?
- Which other happenings/sites/personalities in Texas (or the South, or the West?) have a growing significance for celebration and/or commemoration amongst black people?
- Which African cultural traits survived strongly through or via slavery in Texas to become evidential Afro-Americanisms of the late-twentieth century?
- What proportion of visitors coming to Texas (for the first time) know that Texas was a separate nation for ten years?
- In what fashions were Tejanos people presented in myth and literature (in early Texan accounts) in positive/favorable/self-defining light?
- In the pages of W.P. Webb, are the Mexican/Tejano people ever presented in positivist/favorable/self-defining light?
- Which were the other stereotypical failings of Mexican/Tejano people according to the mainstream Texan textbooks?

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

## STATEMENT OF NEEDS

*The Statements*

- To J. Frank Dobie --- influential social historian of Texas --- Texan Mexicans were quaint and colorful people, but not were never painted flatteringly so (4>9).
- Even the first serious Mexican-American account of Texas Mexicans (4>10) --- a master's thesis by Jovita González in 1930 --- tended to adapt condescending Anglo portrayals of Tejanos (4>11).
- The behavior of Tejano people was often regarded as irresponsible by Protestant migrants arriving from the north-east (i.e., from the U.S.A.). The different patterns of behavior and preferences shocked them (4>13).
- Tejano women were deemed, in accordance with Anglo ethnocentrism, to be notably promiscuous and uncontrolled (4>14).
- The history of Texas parallels real-life in many instances --- particularly regarding Texas Rangerhood. The Rangers played their part (as is now recognized) in the brutalization of the Tejano/Mexican populations; then, mainstream history itself brutalized those same people (4>15).
- The degree to which Anglo-American culture in Texas has borrowed/copied/adopted Tejano/Mexican/Hispanic features has been strongly underestimated in mainstream Texan myth and history (4>17).
- Hero and villain reverse roles in Mexican - vs. - North American/Texan histories --- as evidenced from studies of Tejano-Mexican history since 1950 (4>19).
- In post-1950 Tejano-Mexican accounts of history, and in much remodelled Anglo history, the Mexican is no longer 'a passive peon' (4>21).
- **Native North American/'Indian' issues:**
- Anglo-Americans in Texas have long misunderstood the economic and ethical systems of 'Indian' people (4>22).
- Just as Anglo-Americans were puzzled by and misconstrued 'Indian' perspectives upon material possessions, so Native North Americans in and around Texas were confused by the immigrants' views of ownership (4>23).
- Respective religious and moralities tended to be grossly mis-identified (4>24).

*Related Sample Questions*

- Are there any instances/examples with J.F. Dobie's works of Mexican/Tejano people occupying center stage for any sustained episode or storyline (in non-patronizing fashion)?
- Why were Mexican-American histories of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950's NOT revisionist (4>12)?
- Which aspects, if any, of family/commune living within Tejano/Mexican/Hispanic communities tended not to be acknowledged or seemingly appreciated by Anglo observers/writers/historians?
- Have any ethnocentrism regarding the extended family life of Tejano/Mexican/Hispanic communities survived continuously from the eighteenth to the last decades of the twentieth century?
- Which corrective Tejano/Mexican accounts of Texas Rangerhood have emerged in recent decades (4>16)?
- Which are the many, many features of cowmanship --- i.e., of the famous cowboy culture of Texas --- were originally Tejano/Mexican/Hispanic frontier values (4>18)?
- Recent Tejano-Mexican history has proven the Texas Rangers to have been the hated nemesis of border Hispanics (4>20): what other major 'reorientations' have emerged?
- In which fashions do post 1950 historical accounts in Texas (viz, Tejano-Mexican accounts and Anglo-American accounts) no longer present Tejanos as 'passive folks'?
- In which major ways have the myths and histories of Anglo-American Texas misinterpreted 'Indian' culture/society/lifeworlds?
- What other aspects of living appear to have been respectively misconstrued in life and in myth/history by Native North American and immigrants/Euro-Americans in Texas?
- Which 'Indian' religious and moral matters are commonly mis-identified by first-time visitors to Texas today?

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS***The Statements*

- Anglo-American history and myth tend to record that Native North Americans did not wage their battles by 'civilized' rules (4>25).
- **Issues about Other Peoples of Texas:**
- Many Texans have no clues as to where their forefamilies came from (4>26).

*Related Sample Questions*

- Have contemporary Anglo-American perspectives on 'Indian' fighting strategies (and upon the cultural logic behind them) changed from previously commonplace conceptions?
- What proportion of Texan inhabitants nominate the history that is important to them as being exclusively 'North American' by origin?

**FINDINGS**

- **Race and Color: General Issues:**
- Most societies view their own cultures as the pivot-point of historical importance (4>27); and so it was with the relationships between North European 'Texas' and Spanish 'Texas'. Nineteenth century ethnocentrism were particularly virulent.
- The Northern Europeans, who were predominant amongst the early settlers and pioneers in Texas, inherited the militant traditionalism of European reformers notably with regard to the religious rupture with Rome, the secularization of life, the creation of great 'national' power and the absolutism of the state (4>28).
- The pioneering push towards Texas was part of the triumph of 'English modernity' --- the expansion of Nordic European protestantism and the creation of an Anglo-American world enthroned on the determined conquest of materiality (4>29).
- Given the widespread successes of Nordic protestantism, the result was an arrogant superiority complex for North Americans over Hispanics/Mexicans, and an inferiority complex amongst the Mexicans against the confident/progressivisms of North European secularization (4>30).
- Protestant Texans tended to consider themselves --- overtime --- as a breed apart, a special select population advancing the claims of independence, the North American dream and materiality (4>31).
- Yet, 'Texas' has always had a mixed population (4>32) being more heterogenous than any other state of the Union except California and New York (4>33).
- Today, the Institute of Texan Cultures deals with thirty ethnic distinct groups --- each with their own myths and historical truths (4>34).
- Texas is, nowadays, increasingly *culturally plural* --- and it is becoming much harder to sustain singular coherent myths and one consistent/integrated history across the state's population (4>35).
- 'Mythic' Texas now mirrors 'Real' Texas --- it is a blend of West, East, Southwest and Urban Texas (4>36).
- 'Legendary' Texas now parallels 'Actual' Texas --- it is a mix of Anglo-European, Indian, black, Mexican and other elements (4>37).
- The ethnic-cultural composition of Texas still, however, has strong geographical influences (4>38).
- **White Issues:**
- The 'white'/European imperative for Texans principally stemmed from the 'The Good Book': viz., 'to have dominion' and 'to fill the earth and subdue it' (4>39).
- The biblical injunction for Texans, for Anglo-Texans, and for Texans was to *subjugate* all of God's creatures inclusive of the 'Indian' and the 'Mexican' *species* (4>40).
- Stephen F. Austin proved to be a particularly important and influential impresario --- out to conquer the land and those upon it. He felt he was leading Anglo-Texans, spiritually and as of right, to a new civilization, to a promised Canaan (4>41).

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- The creation of Anglo-Texas represented Old Testament imperatives: it was the construction of a new 'Jerusalem' (4>42).
- The existence of the Spanish/Catholic culture in Texas permitted Anglo-Texans/Texans to define themselves by contrast (4>43).
- Yet the Anglo-Texan myth embraces a love-hate relationship with the Spanish peoples (4>44).
- Anglo-Texans themselves extended the Southern 'gentlemanly traditions' in a Western/democratic code chiefly evidenced through the cowboy traditions and image (4>45).
- This cowboy/action-man/gentleman myth has been kept powerfully alive in film and fiction --- notably by the generations of Texan historians from Henderson K. Yoakum to Walter Prescott Webb (4>46).
- The cowboy culture of Texas was male-driven; men idealized women but were alienated from them (4>47).
- The Typical Texan/Wild Cowhand had crystallized into his stereotypical chivalrous/merciless frontiersman's attributer by the 1860s (4>48).
- In folk literature, the Typical Texan became the David Crockett of the almanacs, the Pecos Bill of the West (4>49).
- By the second-half of the twentieth century, the David Crockett/Wild Cowhand type has become a money-making 'baron' --- from cattle, from cotton, from oil, from wherever: Pecos Bill becomes J.R. Ewing (4>50).
- Gradually, the oilmen (the business-oilmen) of Texas consider themselves to be the inheritors of the 'bigger than life'/'tough as they come' Texan spirit (4>51).
- ● **Black Issues:**
- Many White/European Texans have held a continual fear of blacks, as was recognized in such events as the Colorado County slave rebellion, the Gainesville hangings, and the expulsion of blacks from Comanche County --- and as has been institutionalized in 'the white primary' vote which excluded blacks from voting (4>52).
- Black representations and identities are more 'Southern' than 'Western' (4>53).
- The only blacks to approach mythic status are the likes of Sam Pickens --- the black cowboy/rodeo star --- and William Goyers --- the mulatto revolutionary (4>54).
- During the nineteenth century the church became the center of community life for African-Americans in Texas, particularly for rural blacks (4>55), and especially after emancipation (4>56) to become a haven in a general world of hostility (4>57).
- Many white/European Texans felt black/Afro-Americans readily wished to emulate the lifestyle and achievements of the so called 'lead', white society (4>58).
- In Texas, as around the U.S.A. a *national myth of sameness* emerged: black identity and cultural perspectives were largely denied in the legend and truths in circulation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (4>59).
- ● **Hispanic Issues:**
- The historiography of the 1930s and 1940s --- a healthy period of output in historical writings in Texas --- tends to cement established nineteenth century perspectives on Texan history (4>60).
- Revisionist Tejano/Mexican/Hispanic historians faced immense difficulties in 'correcting' the established Anglo-Texan myths about the 'Spanish' presence/involvement in Texan history --- they faced the institutional wealth of the Anglo community and they faced the state-sanctioned, Alamo-fuelled 'truths' (4>61).
- Before the 1950s the largely uncomplimentary Anglo view of the Tejanos was not challenged. Revisions first appeared in the early 1950s (4>62). Before then Anglo-American consciousness was inclined to present Tejanos as 'the Mexican problem' (4>63).
- Though corrective studies appeared (for Tejanos/Hispanic matters) the assumption remained in the histories and truths of Texas-through the 1950s and early 1960s --- that the Tejanos had just not had a heritage or background that merited proper and professional analysis (4>64).
- Even Fehrenbach's celebrated 1980 volume on Texan history was notably short on its coverage of Spanish (and Indian) Texas (4>65).
- During the late twentieth century, Tejano/Hispanic historians have continued to feel the absence of nineteenth century 'Spanish' historians: they have no-one (on which to base their accounts) who had described Mexicans or Texas-Mexicans as ACTORS in the due process of history (4>66).

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- The leading Tejano historian of the early twentieth century --- Castañeda --- had, moreover, been primarily interested in the Spanish colonial era, not Mexicans as minorities in Texas (4>67).
- Until the rise of Henry Cisneros, mayor of San Antonio, there had not been 'an elder statesman' of substantive presence on the broad statewide stage --- in Texas -- to give representative leadership in political and civic activity to Hispanic causes and to Tejano truths (4>68).
- Recently, Crisp has argued against the force of De Leóns views on what racial attitudes to Hispanics; Crisp maintains that De León overemphasized the fixity of the white perspective, and maintains white outlooks on 'Hispanics' to be constantly in flux (4>69).
- **Native North American/'Indian' Issues:**
- The believability of Native North American 'truths' in Texas is hampered by the fact that neither of the surviving native peoples --- the Alabama-Coushatta and the Tigua -- are indigenous to Texas: they moved here during the late historical past (viz., during the white occupancy) (4>70).
- The coherency of Native North American 'truths' in Texas is disturbed by the fact that the 'Indian' cultural landscape was many hued --- different in language, dialect, cosmology, economics, social form, political connections and in experience of white materiality (4>71).
- The very existence of the strength of the stereotype about Native North American homogeneity only widened further the chasm of understanding between Anglo-Americans and Indians (4>72).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- **Black Issues:**
- Extensive analysis of the history of blacks in Texas has only occurred in recent years --- a late turn to 'objectivity' (or rather multisociality) in understanding race relations (4>73).
- The weight of input by black scholars, according to Barr, had and has remained low owing to their heavy teaching loads, and to the problems they faced gaining access to research materials (4>74).
- Studies of black family histories is growing but has been notably retarded (4>75).
- County studies in Texas have been prone to the exclusion of references to blacks or to the presentation only of white perspectives (4>76).
- **Hispanic Issues:**
- Castañeda's accounts of the past are 'history with a mission' --- viz., they have an immense Roman Catholic slant (4>77).
- The late 1960s and 1970s saw a large increase in coverage of the Tejano past --- viz., the rise of Chicano history (4>78).
- The emergent cadre of Chicanologists was aided by a few Anglo-American investigators (4>79).
- Emphasis in these new 'truths' of Texas turns to the victimization of the Mexicans of Texas (4>80).
- More frequently, the Tejanos have nowadays come to be portrayed as victims of oppression (4>81).
- Shockleys 1970s text, 'Chicano Revolt in a Texas Town', was an important signifier of the degree to which Hispanics were now more positively being presented akin to their own image as a bicultural people (4>82).
- Weddle, a non-academic historian, had also become accepted as an informed authority on Spanish colonial Texas (4>83).
- Recent trends in Tejano historiography have included a range of refreshing subjects such as 'social differentiation' and 'ideological cleavages' within Hispanic communities (4>84).

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- But the power of established Texan heroes continued to *suffocate*: lately Kilgore's 'How Did Davy Die?' text constitutes a dispassionate attempt to review the major hero constructing myth --- the Alamo. It has "rankled those who placed Texas chauvinism above historical veracity" (4>85).
- The Alamo has continued to attract great attention --- from popular writers and recognized historians alike: it remains the launch-pad for the projection of myth and ideological storylines in and of Texas (4>86). Even revisionists give it a pivotal place in their corrective accounts of truth (4>87).
- Other important re-writes, from the Hispanic viewpoint, include Barr's study of the 1835 storming of Bexar (4>88). He maintains the Texans triumphed because of advantages of position and arms, not on account of superior valor.
- ● **Native North American/Indian' Issues:**
- In 1961, W.W. Newcomb produced a rather comprehensive account of the Native North Americans of Texas which painstakingly described the lifestyles and lifeworld differences between the societies of the Western Gulf Area (e.g., the Coahuiltecans), the nomadic societies of the Plains (e.g., the Tonkawas), and the gardening societies of fertile areas of the state (e.g., the Caddo Confederacies) (4>89).
- The 1961 text (reprinted frequently during the 1980s) has not been surpassed by any later research collation. Its authority remains unchallenged, yet it is twenty-five years out-of-date in terms of investigation insight and critical understanding (4>90).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- ● **Race and Color: General Issues:**
- Scholars rarely conduct research outside of a (normally their own) cultural context. The historians researching in the 1930s, 1940s (and frequently thereafter, too) were inclined to conduct their inquiries into the state's past in alignment with heavily preconditioned perspectives (4>91).
- Much of the pre-1950s mainstream Anglo-American accounts of the history of Texas were, by the standards of the 1990s, racist (4>92). Walter Prescott Webb and like Anglo-American historians are now regarded by some as having lived in an age of institutionalized Jim Crowism, and were prone to regarding people of color as inferior (4>93).
- Terms differ considerably across cultures. It is not always easy to simply translate historical concepts like 'liberalism' to straight translatable equivalents in other cultures/languages (4>94).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- How would a multiple-perspective interpretive study of a Texas period/event/theme in history be set up to ensure that the study problem was not an absolute given, and that alternative or plural perspectives of it would be forthcoming?
- What were the commonplace grounded predispositions of the Anglo-American historians of the 1930s/1940s/1950s, and how have those orientations influenced present day popular and academic versions of Texas myth and history?
- Which concepts appear to be most commonly misconstrued / misrepresented / misapplied in accounts of a given alternative culture?

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED***Statement of Generalized Study Problems*

- ● **White Issues:**
- Ortega y Medina believes the misunderstandings and mutual resentments that have existed (and still exist?) between the Anglo-Saxon (British and U.S.) and Hispanic (Spanish and Ibero-American) worlds actually thwarts open dialogue between Anglo-American and Hispanic-Americas (4>95).

- Much of the Anglo-American accounts of the past of Texas have been dismissed as 'sloppy' where 'homage' has been unduly mixed with 'history' (4>96).

- The former doyen of the Anglo-American writers, W.P. Webb, has been condemned for being not so much 'an historian of the frontier' but as 'a symbolic frontiersman' (4>98).

- ● **Black Issues:**

- Questionable generalizations about Afro-Americans still exist in the lead - selling history texts for Texas --- along with the retention of dated stereotypes about blacks and the omission of new and recently researched themes (4>99).

- The black history of Texas needs "an infusion of soul" (4>101).

- ● **Hispanic Issues:**

- The Spanish period of Texan history (1519-1821) lasted much longer than the Anglo-American rule over Texas has lasted. Much documentation of relevance for this long period is believed to remain relatively untapped in Mexico and Spain (4>102).
- 'Texas' has been held under 37 Spanish governors, 15 Mexican governors, 5 presidents of the republic of Texas, and 47 state governors (4>103).

*Related Generalized Study Problem Questions*

- [It may however be possible to research into alternative worlds via critical theory and constructivist forms of investigation --- neither of which Ortega y Medina appears to have considered]. Are there widespread strong and/or negative and/or stereotypical feelings amongst the Hispanic people of Texas towards the mainstream Anglo-American culture of Texas? Are there widespread strong and/or negative, and/or stereotypical feelings amongst the Anglo-American people of Texas towards the Hispanic culture of Texas?
- W.P. Webb is supposed to have been unable "to think badly of the Texas Rangers" (4>97): which other 'Webbian' characterizations of Anglo-Texans continually erred towards the positive?
- Has Webb's supposed 'symbolic frontiersmanship' indeed passed into the common 'truths' and the imagined realities of late twentieth century Texans?
- Which anti-black stereotypes and questionable statements should be omitted during a disidentified re-write or straightforward revision of the following prominent texts on Texan history:
  - Richardson, Wallace and Anderson (1988)
  - Anderson and Worster (1986)
  - Fehrenbach (1980) ? (4>100).
- How ought the black history of Texas be decently and appropriately be disidentified (to attain a beneficial measure of 'soul')?
- What new insight can be thrown on the relationships the Spanish pioneers and rulers held with the indigenous Indian populations of Texas in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?
- Which under-recognized landmarks in Texas survive as tribute to the care and control of the 37 Spanish governors and the 15 Mexican governors?

TABLE 1.9.3.4.1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED***Statement of Generalized Study Problems*

- Castañeda's volumes record evidence of events in the history of Texas which are nowhere else recorded. They warrant much fuller and closer scrutiny (4>104). Hopefully Chipman's projected 1992 publication on the history of Spanish Texas will prepare the way for more rigorous assaults on the Castañeda volumes (4>105).
- In revisions of Texan history it would be easy to label all Tejanos as victims of Anglo-American oppression. Some discernment is needed, however, to differentiate which Tejanos suffered from which subjugations (4>106).
- The heterogeneous nature of Tejano experience has been underestimated in the telling of the 'truths' of Texas (4>107).
- The Tejano experience is further diversified regionally (4>108).
- History has been notably slow in Texas in utilizing theories and conceptualizations from other fields (4>109).
- According to De León, there is "a plethora of topics [concerning the Texas Mexicans] that beg for notice" (4>110). They include:
  - Hispanic life in urban centers;
  - The role of Tejano elites;
  - The politics of the Tejana masses;
  - Insight from Tejana biographies;
  - Hispanic/Tejano women;
  - Relations between whites and Tejano by time by place by other variables;
  - Relations between Tejanos and other immigrants by time by place by other variables.

●● **Native North American/'Indian' Issues:**

- Little has surfaced as to the ways and fashions in which Native North Americans absorbed or otherwise reacted to Spanish culture (4>111).

*Related Generalized Study Problem Questions*

- Where does Castañeda's accounts strongly conflict with other constructions of Spanish Texas?
- Which Tejanos individuals/groups/segments of the population were subjugated by what labor exploitation, lynchings, community ostracism, or other large or petty dominations?
  - Which Tejano individuals/groups/segments resisted Anglo-American modernization when, and which Tejanos adopted bicultural lifeworlds under the Anglo-American hegemony?
  - Which distinct ideological differences may constructively be applied where and when for Tejanos in the history of Texas?
  - How may other disciplines be employed to recreate Hispanic lifeworlds, or to situate Tejano perspectives in different decades or amongst different generations?
  - How can the traditional historical interpretations of 'truth' be supplemented with, or revised through, the use of underserved anthropological/ethnographic/other bodies of knowledge?



TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

## KEY

4>1	Ortega y Medina 1986:61	4>34	O'Connor 1986:viii	4>68	Miller 1991:294-5
4>2	Ortega y Medina 1986:64	4>35	O'Connor 1986:viii-ix	4>69	Crisp in De León 1991:32-33
4>3	Bauman 1986:35	4>36	Myres 1986:122	4>70	Bauman 1986:24
4>4	Stuckey 1986:101	4>37	Myres 1986:122	4>71	Newcomb 1986:47
4>5	Fehrenbach 1986:207-8	4>38	Myres 1986:122	4>72	Newcomb 1986:47
4>6	De León 1991:21	4>39	Goetman 1986:70	4>73	Barr 1991:79
4>7	De León 1991:22-23	4>40	Goetman 1986:71	4>74	Barr 1991:51
4>8	Webb 1935:14	4>41	Doughty 1986:106	4>75	Barr 1991:62
4>9	De León 1991:22	4>42	Fehrenbach 1986:209	4>76	Barr 1991:79
4>10	González 1930	4>43	Goetzman 1986:72	4>77	Chipman 1991:12
4>11	De León 1991:23	4>44	Goetzman 1986:72	4>78	De León 1991:29; Acuña 1987; Meier and Rivera 1972; Weber 1973; De León 1980; Rocha 1984
4>12	De León 1991:23	4>45	Myres 1986:126	4>79	De León 1991:30
4>13	Ernstam 1986:143	4>46	Myres 1986:127	4>80	De León 1991:32; McLemore 1973:656- 70
4>14	Ernstam 1986:143	4>47	Stoeltje 1975	4>81	De León 1991:40
4>15	Fehrenbach 1991	4>48	Leach 1952:1-3; Robertson 1980:135- 146; Franz 1976:4	4>82	De León 1991:37; Shockley 1974
4>16	Fehrenbach 1991:213-4	4>49	Blair 1940:451; Myres 1986:125	4>83	Chipman 1991:113
4>17	Fehrenbach 1991	4>50	Leach 1952:4-5; Myres 1986:125-6	4>84	De León 1991:41; Garcia 1983
4>18	Dary 1989:3-26 and 67-87	4>51	Lemann 1986:163-4	4>85	Lack 1991:149-50; Kijgore 1978
4>19	De León 1991:20	4>52	Cuthbertson 1986:183	4>86	Lack 1991:150
4>20	De León 1991:34	4>53	Myres 1986:129	4>87	Graham 1985:35-66
4>21	Baily 1979:42-61 (for an extensive list of other/related references see De León 1991:35-6)	4>54	Myres 1986:129	4>88	Barr 1990
4>22	Newcomb 1986:52	4>55	Ernstam 1986:144	4>89	Newcomb 1988
4>23	Newcomb 1986:52-56	4>56	Smallword quoted in Campbell 1991:178	4>90	Chipman 1991:127
4>24	Newcomb 1986:55-59	4>57	Delaney 1988:8-10	4>91	De León 1991:21
4>25	Fehrenbach 1986:211	4>58	Stamp 1955:viii	4>92	De León 1991:21; Hernández 1983:64
4>26	Fehrenbach 1986:221	4>59	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxii	4>93	De León 1991:21
4>27	Chipman 1991:103	4>60	De León 1991:25	4>94	Ortega y Medina 1986:65
4>28	Ortega y Medina 1986:62	4>61	De León 1991:25	4>95	Ortega y Medina 1986:61
4>29	Ortega y Medina 1986:61	4>62	De León 1991:25-6	4>96	McMurty 1968:40,43
4>30	Ortega y Medina 1986:69	4>63	De León 1991:24-5	4>97	Graham 1983:27
4>31	Davis 1991:3	4>64	De León 1991:29	4>98	McMurty 1968:40,43
4>32	Davis 1991:3	4>65	Chipman 1991:125-6; Fehrenbach 1980	4>99	Barr 1991:79
4>33	Calvert 1991:197	4>66	De León 1991:21-2		
		4>67	De León 1991:22; Almaráz 1976:27-37		

TABLE 1.9.3.4./1 (Continued)

## KEY (Continued)

4>100	Barr 1991:79
4>101	Woodward 1969:16
4>102	Chipman 1991:102
4>103	Maxwell and Crain 1990:2
4>104	Chipman 1991:111
4>105	Chipman 1991:102
4>106	De León 1991:40
4>107	De León 1991:40-1
4>108	De León 1991:45-6
4>109	De León 1991:46
4>110	De León 1991:46
4>111	Weddle 1986; Chipman 1991:127

TABLE 1.9.3.5./1

## WOMEN: THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST IN TEXAS

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS***The Statements*

- Women have largely been ignored in the telling of the past truths of Texas: they have not made it, substantively, to the index of the history books of the state (5>1).
- A revised version of the Handbook of Texas (formerly written by W.P. Webb, H.B. Carroll, and E.S. Branda (5>2)) is due to be published during the 1990s --- with a significant increase in women's history (5>3).
- The 'good ol' girl' syndrome of Texas frontier myth and history annoys modern women (5>4).
- In recent years the rewriting of Texas history has banished some old stereotypes about women in the Texan past, only to replace them with new stereotypes (5>5).

**FINDINGS**

- Myres suggests that representations of women in the history of Texas conform to Riley's broader Western/frontier stereotypes of: (i) 'Calamity Janes'; (ii) sex objects; (iii) the frontier suffragist; (iv) the saint in a sunbonnet (5>6). Stoeltje (5>7), and Myres herself (5>8), present alternative yet similar typologies.
- A common women's myth is 'the hard-times' storyline which feeds off selective mercy, and an interest in presenting the unusual at the expense of the commonplace (5>9).
- In frontier/rural Texas in the nineteenth century, women were idealized --- a relatively common trait for the century. Though idealized, women were supposed to acknowledge male superiority and male prerogatives (5>10).
- The stereotypes and myths about women in rural America are extremely powerful frames of reference which limit and constrain historical insight (5>11).

*Related Questions*

- Which themes involving women and womanhood have been particularly under-recognized by male historians and by male myth makers?
- Are there any significant differences between women's truths as men's truths in the telling of the past of Texas?
- Which rare and/or commonplace aspects of female society at the frontier have been overlooked in the telling of the Texan past?
- Which surviving and emergent stereotypes particularly offend the sensibilities of women in Texas?

TABLE 1.9.3.5./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- An important event for research into women's 'truths' came in 1981 with the 'Texas Women: A Celebration of History' exhibit. It has done much to stimulate wider awareness of women's history, especially through the associated 'Texas Women's History Month.' The exhibit is now housed at Texas Women's University (5>12).
- Elsewhere in the south of the U.S., the thesis has been explored that 'modernization' has been the major force in the nineteenth century advance and adaptation of women's culture and lifestyles (5>13). It has not been utilized in Texas (5>14).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- The bodyweight of women's history in Texas is frontier history (5>15).
- Western women's history, where it does exist, reasonably accommodates the perspectives of Anglo, Hispanic and 'Indian' women, but does not readily accommodate those of black women (5>16).
- The family experience of adaptation to Texas has been poorly told (5>17).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- Have southern and immigrant themes and issues been understated in the telling of women's truths about or from the Texan past?
- Which black women's themes and issues have been understated in the telling of the Western 'truths' about or from the Texan past?
- Can the 'family experience of adaptation' be utilized as a strong theme of the settlement of Texas?

TABLE 1.9.3.5./1 (Continued)

## KEY

5>1	Myres 1986:130
5>2	Webb, Carroll and Branda 1952
5>3	Downs 1991:100-1
5>4	Fehrenbach 1986:221
5>5	Myres 1982:9
5>6	Myres 1986:130-1; Riley 1977:191,194
5>7	Stoeltje 1975:27
5>8	Myres 1982:1-4
5>9	Henson 1982:2
5>10	Stoeltje 1975:40
5>11	Faragher 1981:541-2
5>12	Downs 1991:100
5>13	Friedman 1985
5>14	Downs 1991:87
5>15	Downs 1991:86
5>16	Downs 1991:88
5>17	Armitage and Jameson 1987:4-5, 15-17, 159-61

TABLE 1.9.3.6./1  
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND THE GOOD LIFE:  
THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST IN TEXAS

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

**The Statements**

- The myths about family life in Texas are unbalanced, and omit or de-emphasize many important features, notably: (i) oil and cotton fade in comparison to ranching; (ii) cities and towns are diminished in importance; and (iii) the black, Tejano, 'Indian', 'other European' backgrounds of families are deaccentuated (6>1).
- The traditional Anglo myth sustains itself still in Texas, running through the cowboy, the cattle baron, the Ranger, the wildcatter to the Texas developer. The myth celebrates 'individualism', 'courage', 'risk-taking', and 'optimism' for instance (6>2).
- The emergent myths of Texas continue to cultivate 'ruggedness' and 'eccentricity' amongst the oilmen and amongst other modern-day occupations they champion (6>3).
- Folklore and legend focuses its attention in Texas upon *individuals* (6>4) --- even more so than for other Western states/regions/places (6>4).
- There are few myths about the family in Texan lore and history because myth demands unusual/extraordinary/challenging circumstance not the usuality/straight-forwardness/domesticity of the family hearth (6>5).
- Family myths floundered particularly in the frontier regions of West Texas and East Texas (6>6).
- Folklore and myth in Texas particularly celebrates the lives of *ordinary people* (6>7).
- Myth and legend in Texas champion labor/toll work in excess of that prized and praised in most other regions of the world (6>9).
- The Alamo, itself, has been incorporated into the myths and lore of Texas as 'a symbol of individualistic freedom' (6>11).
- The Alamo, itself, has been built into the myths and lore of Texas as a magical locus of power (6>12).
- 'The-moment-Travis-drew-the-line' has been built into the myths and lore of Texas the supreme moment of heroic legend (6>13).

**Related Questions**

- Which occupational, cultural and point-of-origin tensions are understated in the telling of Texan histories?
- What are the other features, if any, of the traditional Anglo myth in Texas?
- What other qualities and occupations do the emergent myths of Texas champion?
- Have the characterizations of 'esteemed' individuality changed over the decades in Texas?
- What other components do myths necessarily emphasize in general, and in Texas in particular?
- In what ways did 'family' and 'individuality' myths each respectively vary across the different regions of Texas?
- Do the traditional folktales and myths of Texas lack 'the dynasty image' altogether --- as claimed by Enstam (6>8)?
- Is it reasonable to conclude that the marriage of Protestantism and capitalism gave rise, or substantively empowered, to any other elements of Texan myths (--- assuming it did give rise to that of 'work' (6>10))?
- What else does the Alamo consistently symbolize in Texan folk traditions?
- Which other sites/places/buildings are consistently deemed to be magical/inspirational/powerful in Texan lore?
- Does Texas myth/lore/legend have any other profound moments central to its adulation of individuality?

TABLE 1.9.3.6./1 (Continued)

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS***The Statements*

- Much of the history of Texas is predicated on the view that the state had 'a golden age' in the nineteenth century (6>14). Dobie, Haley, Lea and Webb are all prone to celebrating the open range era when the raw energies of the Spanish were combined with the new zeal of the Anglo-Americans to yield the vast cattlemen's society (6>15).
- In the twentieth century, notably in the 1950s, Davy Crockett has perhaps been the representative figure of the golden age and the rugged individuality of Texas society (6>16).
- In present day Texas, particularly in urban Texas the pursuit of money 'permeates the air' (6>17).
- The rich in Texas have now absorbed and adopted the ranching mythology of yore (6>18).
- Texans nowadays see themselves as a special breed of American --- and seek to conspicuously display that through the independent ownership of vast material possessions (6>19).
- In Texas, power struggles are supposed to occur in the business world and not in local politics. Those who triumph in business in Texas are axiomatically given great latitude in other areas of life (6>20).
- Politics in Texan mythology is a resplendent spectator sport, but not necessarily an activity which mixes well with the raw frontier spirit and the land claiming, progressivist 'Lonestar' mentality (6>21). Government is not supposed to be the scene of decision-taking and conflict, but of implementation and like-minded interest (6>22).
- Non-Texans assume Texas to be venal (6>23).

**FINDINGS**

- The initial culture and economy which developed in Anglo-American Texas (in the 1840s, 1850s, 1860s and 1870s) identified strongly with the Deep South. The majority of 'the planters and plain folk' who settled antebellum Texas were southerners. They brought in a predominantly agricultural economy akin to that of the established southern states (6>24).
- The planters extended the Old South to its natural limits in East Texas: it could not solidify in the raw terrain and the raw society of the cowcamp territories of West Texas (6>25).

*Related Questions*

- What evidence do Dobie, Haley, Lea, Webb and others reveal, to indicate that the nineteenth century was so special for Texas?
- What does Davy Crockett symbolize to first-time visitors to Texas?
- What evidence is there in Texas that the pursuit of money 'permeates the air' more pungently than for other states?
- What are the dominant 'Texan' status symbols (i.e., those which ideologically speak for Texas) in the contemporary age?
- How do contemporary Texans compare to other states in terms of the ownership of land, material possessions, vehicles, boats, et cetera?
- How important is 'city politics'/'local politics' in Texas vis-a-vis other states of the U.S.A.?
- How many of the 'Tribal Heroes' of Texas are principally politicians? How does that compare with other states?
- How do first-time visitors to the U.S.A. rate Texans (in comparison to the inhabitants of other states) in terms of venality?

TABLE 1.9.3.6./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- While the eastern one-third of Texas sustains *the traditionalistic culture* of the plantation society of the Deep South (6>26), the rest of the state (especially Central and West Texas) was settled by folk from the upper South and further afield and resonates with *the individualistic culture* which had originated in the Middle Atlantic states of the U.S.A. (6>27).
- The individualistic culture blurs the distinction between economic and political life. Where it is dominant in Texas, 'cowboy entrepreneurs' mix politics and business visibly. Corruption in politics is inclined to be seen as representation of the defective world --- as is scarcely different from business dealings. Community protest against improbity is minimal, and tends to evaporate quickly (6>28).
- Overtime, the inhabitants of Texas won and furthered a robust independence; they developed special characteristics on account of the purging, but rewarding, experiences of routine life on the frontier (6>29).
- In the middle of the nineteenth century, the inhabitants of the state developed a virile patriotism from the surety that they were a generation who were decidedly and actively *making history* (6>30). These pioneers and settlers were fiercely independent and resentful of government interference.
- In the twentieth century, this intense independence is conceivably echoed by the urban Texans antithesis to strong planning and to the regimentation of zoning; entrepreneurial freedoms must be cultivated (6>31).
- Just as the 'American Dream' wild frontier of nineteenth century Texas was ubiquitously privatized (once 'captured'), so the large 'unlimited opportunity' American cities of late twentieth century Texas are pervasively privatized --- strongly split along lines of race, class and age (6>32).
- At times during the twentieth century, intellectuals and other elements of Texan society have championed 'the West' at the exclusion of the chastised 'South'. During the depression, the West was more easily able to represent 'hope and opportunity' than the contained South (6>33). Significantly, Webb, Haley, Holden and others conspired in their various productions of myth to model a functional past for the state around the vigorous but invigorating taming of the frontier (6>34).
- The provincialisms of Texas appear to be well known beyond Texas; newcomers often appear to immediately demonstrate extremely strong 'Texan' inclinations and 'Lonestar' perspectives on life when they move to live in Texas (6>35).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Cuthbertson (6>36) has recently synthesized the meaning of myth in Texas in terms of four key political functions. They are reproduced in Table 1.9.3.6/2. Cuthbertson's work suggests that since the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the myths of Texas have placed a growing emphasis upon wealth as a source of political power (6>37). The myths of Texas, by this reckoning, have emphasized *the political acceptability of wealth* in Texas and its ready translation into power.
- Other recent Cuthbertson work has analyzed the way the myth or more properly the idea of freedom has evolved in Texas (6>38) --- or rather in Texan politics. The development of the legend of freedom in the state is now given in Table 1.9.3.6/3, and it reveals how the meaning of freedom has shifted in small degrees over the decades (6>39). Texas became a noted symbol of human freedom around the world --- an area which beckoned promise and escape to emigrants who wish to remove themselves from the difficulties of the Old World or the constraints of their own old world. Today, conceivably, Texas remains "a powerfully liberating myth for thousands of illegal aliens (6>40).



TABLE 1.9.3.6./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- Marcus has recently commenced an agenda of study on the establishment and maintenance of business dynasties in Texas --- concentrating upon the middle class lineages of Galveston (6>41). He is attempting to remodel a common framework from ethnographic analysis in an untried metropolitan setting. Marcus holds the view that, in Texas, there is in the twentieth century a continuing ideology of family capitalism (more commonly characteristic of the nineteenth century), but that while "the accumulation of unlimited personal wealth is unambiguously admired ... its perpetuation is not" (6>42).
- Marcus has begun to look at the ways in which dynastic customs have been invented and reinvented over various generational adaptations (6>43). He is currently developing concepts of dynastic *caretaking* by which lineages encourage the cultivation of qualities or properties of "the right stuff" --- embodied traits/activities/consumptions (6>44).
- Leading cultural figures in Texas --- like symphony conductors/big city preachers/museum curators --- are not as prominent in general society in Texas as they would be elsewhere in the U.S., notably in the North East (6>45).
- The persistent political climate in Texas emphasizes respect towards and deference to individuals who have triumphed economically. Even the 'have nots' are prone to identifying with the well-off 'haves' (6>46).
- Today, Texans have an extremely romantic overattachment to the oil and to the lumber industries in terms of those industries' actual economic merit in the state's past and in the present -- that is, out-of-proportion to that of the sulphur industry, the natural gas industry, and to other industries (6>47).
- The Texas economy has generally been more diverse in its productive and manufacturing base than that of other southern states (6>48), but that reality is not clearly apparent to non-Texans. A one-industry myth survives, for Texas.
- In the told history of Texas, manufacturing has also been neglected (6>49).
- The history of the economy and contribution to Texas of the Dallas-Fort Worth region has not been studied with rigor, compared to other cities/towns/regions of Texas (6>50).
- Dallas is the least Texan place in Texas (6>51).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- How important are the dynastic lineages of Texas to Texan history and to the development of the state? How important are the real dynasties, and how important are the fictional/mythic dynasties (6>42)?
- [But such caretaking is not just the stewardship of entities important to lineages, it also embraces entities important to Texas --- where those lineages are positionally and politically secure with in the state]. Have 'the right stuffs' of lineages transletted to 'the right stuffs' of Texas? How are dynastic authorities over 'the right stuff' sustained in Texas outside of the lineage of origin?
- Do leading cultural figures play a prominent role in the shaping of myth/history in Texas?
- Do the perspectives/support/enthusiasms of Texans differ from various groups of non-Texans vis-a-vis the nomination of admirable / laudable / celebratable Texans?
- Does considerably more myth/historical legend emanate from the oil and lumber industries than from other industries in Texas?
- What is the current conception of non-Texans in terms of the width of its past and present economic base? What do first-time visitors expect to see in the Texan environment in terms of industrial/productive/economic activity?
- Is manufacturing also proportionately under-represented in the derivation of the myths and the 'truths' of Texas?
- Is the contribution of the conurbation (and now metropolplex) of Dallas-Fort Worth to the past and present 'myths' and 'truths' of Texas considerably lower in proportion to other cities/towns/regions of Texas?
- Do non-Texans indeed consider Dallas to be the least Texan place of the major cities of Texas?

TABLE 1.9.3.6./1 (Continued)

## KEY

6>1	Ernstam 1986:142-3	6>36	Cuthbertson 1986:178
6>2	Veringa 1986:229	6>37	Cuthbertson 1986:177
6>3	Buenger 1991:336	6>38	Cuthbertson 1986:181
6>4	Ernstam 1986:147	6>39	Cuthbertson 1986:180
6>5	Ernstam 1986:147	6>40	Cuthbertson 1986:182
6>6	Ernstam 1986:151-3	6>41	Marcus in Marcus and Fischer 1986:169-173
6>7	Ernstam 1986:156	6>42	Marcus in Marcus and Fischer 1986:170
6>8	Ernstam 1986:156	6>43	Marcus in Marcus and Fischer 1988:171
6>9	Smith 1986:194	6>44	Marcus in Marcus and Fischer 1988:171-2
6>10	Fehrenbach 1980:87	6>45	Lemann 1986:166
6>11	Cuthbertson 1986:177	6>46	Maxwell and Crain 1990:133
6>12	Cuthbertson 1986:179; Huberman and Hugetz 1984	6>47	Buenger 1991:317-8
6>13	Cuthbertson 1986:180	6>48	Buenger 1991:329
6>14	Buenger 1991:311	6>49	Buenger 1991:329
6>15	Buenger 1991:312	6>50	Buenger 1991:329
6>16	Cuthbertson 1986:177	6>51	Lemann 1986:170
6>17	Lemann 1986:166		
6>18	Lemann 1986:167		
6>19	Davis 1991:3		
6>20	Lemann 1986:167		
6>21	Fehrenbach 1986:217		
6>22	Lemann 1986:167		
6>23	Lemann 1986:169		
6>24	Lowe and Campbell 1987		
6>25	Fehrenbach 1986:216		
6>26	Elazar 1984		
6>27	Elazar 1984		
6>28	Maxwell and Crain 1990:68		
6>29	Lack 1991:158		
6>30	Lack 1991:158		
6>31	Miller 1991:284-5		
6>32	Sumner 1978:135		
6>33	Buenger 1991:339		
6>34	Buenger 1991:339; Tobin 1976		
6>35	Davis 1991:4		

TABLE 1.9.3.6./2

## FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL MYTH IN TEXAS

<i>Function</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>Legitimizing</b>	Texas was initially a " <b>state of nature.</b> " It became a " <b>state of mind.</b> " Noble Savages had to be Christianized and the land conquered, for the Devil had slipped into Paradise. Legitimacy was found in the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority, Manifest Destiny, the liberal ideas of the Mexican Constitution of 1824, and the need to destroy tyrants to protect natural rights.
<b>Legalizing</b>	Legal myths are reflected in the various constitutions of the state. Law and order is symbolized by the <b>Texas Rangers</b> , "the gentlemen in the white hats," who appear as "los Rinches" in the Mexican-American mythology.
<b>Reinforcing</b>	Education uses certain heroic models of virtue and patriotism to reinforce cultural values. A synthesis of models taken from classical history, the frontier, and the American Revolution support the tradition of <b>individualistic freedom</b> and the government itself.
<b>Justifying</b>	Myths also support the social and economic establishment of the state, the economic power-holders based on <b>oil, cattle, banking, and cotton.</b>

SOURCE: Cuthbertson 1986:178

TABLE 1.9.3.6./3

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN TEXAS

<i>Historical Period</i>	<i>Concept of Freedom</i>
<b>Frontier (1820s-36)</b>	The frontier is <b>prepolitical</b> . Texas is a gateway to freedom that allows an escape from the past. Freedom is really limited to Anglos. In fact, Indian "freedom" is a threat. Settlers discover the TANSTAF principle, or "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch in Texas." Freedom is viewed as <b>freedom from hardships</b> .
<b>Republic (1836-45)</b>	Freedom begins to be translated into political terms of constitutional and human rights, <b>freedom from Mexican oppression</b> , freedom to expand territorially and to take control of the community's own affairs. The struggle for freedom reenacts that of the American Revolution, with the themes of the "pursuit of happiness" and government by consent of the governed.
<b>War between the States and Reconstruction (1861-76)</b>	<b>Freedom from the Union</b> ironically means support of the institution of slavery as the war inverts and confuses fundamental values. The countermyth urges Texas to free itself from the Confederates. The Reconstruction period marks Texas' effort to free itself from carpetbaggers and the like. The cowboy enters with the "freedom of the range."
<b>Democratic dominance: "The old politics" (1870s-1970s)</b>	There are several themes, which occasionally contradict. There is <b>freedom from economic oppression in the form of the corporations and freedom from economic inequality</b> . There is freedom from the national government, bureaucracy, regulation, and interference with the individual.
<b>Two-party system: "The new politics" (1980s-2050)</b>	Freedom includes more <b>meaningful political choices</b> , removal of obstacles to political participation, and the broadening of the base of the electorate, so that Texas by the year 2050 stresses increasingly not only the toleration of eccentricity, which has always characterized its political culture, but toleration of diversity. Space and technology open up new frontiers for maximizing freedom and the democratic process. There is a continuing split between the liberal concept of freedom as moral permissiveness and the conservative concept of freedom as moral responsibility.

SOURCE: Cuthbertson 1986:181

TABLE 1.9.3.7./1

## TEXAS IN AND AS 'AMERICA' --- STATEHOOD: THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST IN TEXAS

### STATEMENT OF NEEDS

#### *The Statements*

- All the important aspects of Texan history occurred in / on / within North America (7>1).
- The dominant viewpoint in Texan history is that Texas was not settled but *conquered* (7>2).
- A common feature of Texas history is that the first Texans were 'a chosen race' (7>3).
- At the center of Texas are the Texas Rangers: a select group who could 'ride like a Mexican, track like a Comanche, shoot like a Kentuckian, and fight like the devil' (7>4). And boasting, bragging, rodamontade is a significant part of a Ranger's armory.
- Texans are more American than other Americans (7>6), particularly in their conquest of space and distance. Miller believes Texans now promote Texas not just as the archetype of the Sunbelt but of the U.S.A. (7>7). The Dallas Cowboys are significantly and acceptably projected as 'America's Football Team' (7>8).
- The 'Saga Texana' closely mirrors the larger and longer 'Saga Americana' (7>9).
- The 'Saga Texana' is *still* a vision of infinite possibility (7>10).
- Although Texas was only a separate country for a brief and troubled time, the nationalism of the age lingered long after the annexation in the U.S.A. (7>11).

### FINDINGS

- The vicissitudes of frontier living separated Texans from other peoples, as did the sorry circumstance of a large proportion of early Texans. Many Texans were 'expatriates, fleeing from the law, from creditors or from failed family situations. They celebrated the vastness and the freedoms of the frontier, despite the new vicissitudes they faced (7>12). Yet, storylines about 'flight' and 'escapism' have tended to be underplayed and understated in the myths and the 'truths' of Texas.

#### *Related Sample Questions*

- Do any significant Texan myths or 'truths' emanate from beyond / outside North America? Are the Texan stories only 'American' ones?
- In what ways do the myths and 'truths' of Texas reinforce the perspective that Texas was infact conquered and not just settled?
- Do the new / emergent / evolving myths and 'truths' of Texas bolster the view that the first Texans and/or all Texans indeed were / are 'a chosen race'?
- Is boastfulness / bragging / rodamontade a significant feature of Texan myth and legend? Is bombast and outright trickery particularly lauded in the myths of Texas (7>5).
- In what consistent ways does the mythical discourse of Texas stiffen the view that Texans are the biggest of 'Big Country' individuals [if indeed that hardening of image does occur]?
- In what, consistent ways, if any, does the 'Saga Texana' depart from the 'Saga Americana'?
- Are the emergent / evolving myths and 'truths' of new immigrants to Texas inclined to have a vision of infinite possibility, today?
- In what ways do the myths and 'truths' of Texas still cultivate a separatism --- a 'Texan' nationalism?

TABLE 1.9.3.7./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Nackman has theorized that pride in separatist nationhood in Texas survived despite the young Republics difficulties in defence, diplomacy, war and finance (7>13). The Republic cultivated its nationalism via a strong set of identifying symbols --- the Lonestar flag, a battleground of mighty deeds, the sacred Alamo 'tomb'. They help sustain Texas as a country within a country (7>14).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNTRIED**

**Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- In later ages, observers became conditioned to seeing the past in the light of what subsequently DID happen. But actors and participants in history did not know, in Texas in the 1830s for instance, that Texas would be solidly enwrapped within the 'empire' of the U.S.A. to the north, rather than the 'empire' of Spain/Mexico to the south. Nor did they know where the Texan boundaries would stop and start --- assuming, for present purposes, that they are now 'completely defined'. In the 1850s groups of Texans, for example, agitated for the reopening of the African slave-trade (7>15), and some Texans upheld the ideals of 'Texas' being part of a Knights of the Golden Circle slaveholding empire pivoting on Havana, Cuba (7>16). The study of such constructions is not merely hypothetical: such views / hopes / expectations (however 'false' they may now be 'known' to be) guided behavior and activity --- as similar 'false' notions / desires / anticipations ARE guiding behavior and activity today.

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- What are the major expectancies and anticipations of the inhabitants of Texas that were proven to be impossible to attain by the later course of history? Which powerful Texan aspirations and prospects have been forgotten or overlooked as the past has taken a different path?

TABLE 1.9.3.7./1 (Continued)

## KEY

7>1	Fehrenbach 1986:221-2
7>2	Fehrenbach 1968:447
7>3	Fehrenbach 1968:447
7>4	Goetzman 1986:76
7>5	Goetzman 1986:77
7>6	Goetzman 1986:74
7>7	Miller 1991:282
7>8	Rooney et al 1982:276
7>9	Goetzman 1986:74; Veringa 1986:229
7>10	Goetzman 1986:79
7>11	Lack 1991:155
7>12	Lack 1991:155
7>13	Nackman 1975
7>14	Nackman 1975: 6,55
7>15	Fornell 1956
7>16	Dunn 1967; Bridges 1941; Crenshaw 1941

state's creation, nor a decently multicultural stable of truths about the state's subsequent development over the changing decades.

#### **1.9.3.5 Women**

The evidence on the manufacture of legend and of heritage in Texas --- as accounted for in Table 1.9.3.5./1, teaches that the *male* grip on past truth is so fixed that it suffocates. As a group or as individuals, the women who have lived for, lived in, fought for and fought in Texas, and the women who have 'conquered', 'cultivated' and 'cared for' Texas have yet to be mainstreamed with the state's history. The table implies that by the fresher social standards and 'politically correct' dues of the present day, the bulk of the legends and truths of Texas are somewhat anachronistic.

#### **1.9.3.6 Individual Freedoms and the Good Life**

Some of the common qualities that are triumphalized amongst the leading myths of Texas are those of self-independence, pluck, penetrability, and sanguinity. As Table 1.9.3.6./1 displays, the truths of the Texan past reveal that, in Texas, a grand and profitable existence is available amongst immense acres and vast resources to those who are particularly rugged and hardworking --- assuming of course that one gender, race, color, religious disposition or other unfortunate traits did not interfere to reduce such promisory possibilities.

Accompanying Table 1.9.3.6./1 are 1.9.3.6./2 and 1.9.3.6./3. These latter two tables were drawn up by Gilbert Cuthbertson, and they explain how myth is a metaphor for certain approved rational appeals --- or put another way, how myths and historical legend can constitute a model storyline which leads the myth-holder to an approved truth and onto an appropriate future (Cuthbertson 1986:174). Table 1.9.3.6./2 identifies the way certain myths in Texas can legitimize, legalize and reinforce particular ways-of-living (e.g., the creed of individuality) and justifies select economic or social activities over and above others.

But the routes to freedom and to the good life are not absolute. The prescribed path to liberty and to bliss change in Texas, as elsewhere. Table 1.9.3.6./3 is Cuthbertson's assessment of how some of the Tejan / Texian conceptualizations of liberality and right have ripened into the known Texan ideas of freedom which are expected by many to lead Texans into the first half of the twenty-first century.

#### **1.9.3.7 Texas In and as 'America' --- Statehood**

The next table (1.9.3.7./1) summarizes the largely Manichean view of the past that has characterized much of the history and truths of the Texan past. The main myths of Texas celebrate Texans, themselves, as a chosen 'race'. A 'Saga Texana' is outlined as generally a notably pungent visualization of the wider and older 'Saga Americana'. The table identifies the incipient nationalism within the Texan spirit which has survived long after the 1830 / 40s decade of separate identity as a distinct Republic. The evidence within the table alludes to the fact that in historical accounts Texas was and is



TABLE 1.9.3.8./1  
SUNBELT TEXAS AND THE FUTURE:  
THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

***The Statements***

- Although eighty percent of Texans now reside in urban areas (8>1), people in all walks of life still, conspicuously, act 'country' --- driving pickup trucks, using rural syntax, and evoking simple / uncomplicated outlooks on life' (8>2).
- In the late twentieth century the stories of pioneer experiences along, for instance, the Chisholm Trail may appear to have little direct relevance for the citizens of modern urban 'expressway' Texas (8>3). The state's population has been suburbanized (8>4), and Dallas, for example, may seem to be an incongruous urban sprawl set on the featureless prairie (8>5). Yet, the aggregate myth and literature made available to Texans is weighted heavily towards the small town and the rural (8>6).
- [Other views conflict with the two above statements]. Myers believes Texans are finally becoming less singular, less identifiably Texan (8>9) --- viz, Texans are greatest 'worry' (8>10) is that they are losing the cohesion that bonded them together, and which told Texans whom they were and whom they are (8>11).
- Texans are becoming 'homogenized' [i.e., Americanized] (8>12), and the theme of the age is the absorption of Texas into the culture and society of the rest of the U.S.A. (8>13).
- The rural myth of Texas is *not* transportable to the city (8>14). Texan cities like Houston and Dallas are becoming like Minneapolis and Kansas City --- 'Anywhere, U.S.A., cities' (8>15).
- In recent decades 'sunbelt glitz' has been sprinkled on the history of Texas obscuring frameworks for understanding the past (8>16). The Sunbelt experience of modern-day Texas has cast a shadow retroactively over the state. The Texan past is now presented in the context of a wider Sunbelt region (8>17).
- Meinig, however, calls much of the Sunbelt region, 'Imperial Texas' --- running east through Louisiana, north through Oklahoma and the Rockies and west through New Mexico (8>18). Miller considers that Texas gathered a disproportionate part of the wealth, prosperity and status of the Sunbelt boom (8>19).

***Related Questions***

- What are the major symbols of country life in use by the urban people of Texas today?
- What evidence is there that there is a 'flight-from-modernity' within the myths and 'truths' of Texas being produced in the popular history books of Texas today (8>7)? What evidence is there that preindustrial / ranch-based / rural topics (or similar) are the ideal or worthy topics for popular historians in Texas today? (8>8).
- Amongst those Texans who do consider that they are losing their distinctiveness as a people --- what changes / happenings / developments are considered to have brought out this diminution of singularity?
- What evidence is there that Texans are increasingly adopting generalized 'American' myths and 'truths' at the expense of Texan myths and 'truths', per se?
- Is there strong evidence that the distinctive Anglo-Texan myths and 'truths' of Texas are being significantly retained or substantively cultivated in Houston and/or Dallas?
- Is there significant evidence that the history or myth of Texas has been revamped in recent years to reflect Sunbelt storylines and experiences at the expense of established Anglo-Texan storylines?
- Is there evidence that the relatively late suburbanization of Texas (8>20) is a reflection of the late growth in the adaption of 'Sunbelt' values (as distinct from traditional Anglo-Texan/rural values) in Texan cities --- at the expense of those earlier values?

TABLE 1.9.3.8./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- The grand and relatively speedy adaptation of Texas from a rural and agrarian state in the late nineteenth century to one which is intensively urban --- with 80.5% urban, well above the national average --- has *not* been fully mapped by historians (8>21).
- Three decades ago Texas had none of the ten largest cities in the U.S.A.; today it has three of them (8>22). The cities of Texas are expanding massively, and in seemingly odd geophysical environments (8>23). The state's metropolitan population jumped 8.8 million from 1940 to 1980 (8>24).
- The Texas populations no longer live in settlements whose siting is shaped by rivers or other natural features. The automobile is shaping the spatial design and layout of Houston and San Antonio, for instance, much more strongly than it has done for Boston, New York and other cities of the east (8>25).
- With the gradual buildup of their population and the slow increase in their density, the future of Sunbelt Texan cities now tends to mirror those of the urban east of the U.S.A. (8>26). The recent rapid population growth (especially of the cities) is expected to be maintained --- increasing by 107% from 1980 to 2025. During this time, the Hispanic quotient of the population will rise from 21% to 35% (8>27).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- During the twentieth century, scholars around the world have begun to see great similarities within the myths of various places. Diverse cultures have astonishingly similar themes --- the world has a 'monomyth', almost. Beneath the surface trappings of a region's myths, remain similar legends and 'truths' to other places (8>28).
- Implicit in the above view is, perhaps, the view that myths are much more readable across cultures than was originally thought --- and also will become more readable as the world becomes increasingly globalized.
- Yet, many of the stronger themes within the myths and 'truths' of Texas "rub some modern sensibilities raw" (8>29) --- particularly (i) the 'chosen people' self assuredness of Texans; (ii) the male pungency of the storylines; and (iii) the celebration of self-reliance as virtue (at the demise of weak/disabled/unlucky individuals).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED**

*Statement of Generalized Study Problems*

- Historians of Texas frequently ignore the development of the state in the twentieth century, because its evolution conflicts with earlier legends (8>30). Recent Texas politics, for instance, is an almost untouched subject (8>31).
- The economic history of the state has not been thoroughly covered, particularly that of the twentieth century. Historians generally produce about twice the material for the seventy-five years of the nineteenth century than for the nine of the twentieth (8>32). The face and socio-economic contours of Texas altered considerably with the coming of the railways (8>33), but few historians have concerned themselves with the wider impact of the railroads on society (8>34).

*Related Generalized Study Problem Questions*

- What are the totally new/refreshing myths, 'truths' and legends of Texas in the twentieth century --- which have no precursor in the nineteenth?
- Why have certain industries/economic activities (such as the oil industry) generated a host of myths and legends while others (such as the railways) have not?

TABLE 1.9.3.8./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- The 'Manifest Destiny' myths of Texas of the nineteenth century may still survive in the state in the twentieth century in disguised form (8>35). There are those who maintain that the 'Silican Valley' of Texas (the three hundred mile corridor from Dallas to Austin to San Antonio) is rightly the hub for future imentions and manufacture (8>36). And, similarly, N.A.S.A. was destined for Texas, and the Supercollider had to come to Texas.
- Established symbols frequently become distorted through use over an extended period of time. The original context and nature of myth may be forgotten or commonly misinterpreted. A final victory of modernity occurs over sociocultural inheritance when established themes or behaviors are stripped from their original contexts and redeployed as modern playthings (8>37). Is this happening in Texas with the work of the Institute of Texan Cultures and the state's numerous folklife festivals?
- O'Connor's edited text on Texas myths is composed in part to begin to answer the question whether myths 'of violent conquest' can ever accommodate the myths 'of the vanquished' (8>38). The ongoing challenge for the people of Texas is whether a shared culture can be forged by them from the multiple, sometimes conflicting histories and traditions (8>39).
- In the twenty-first century there will inevitably be a call to re-write the history of Texas in order to report on some of the lost/forgotten/unsavory moments of the Texan past; (i) the fact that Texas was Indian country; (ii) the fact that the Mexican empire was decadent; (iii) the fact that Texas was seized by the Teutonic peoples (8>40).
- Or --- perhaps historians have already underestimated the degree to which alien/oppositional/marginal elements have already been infused into the leading myths and 'truths' of Texas (8>42)?

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- Is there a twentieth century translation of 'Manifest Destiny' active in Texas as a socio-economic/political/cultural force?
- Which customary practices/behaviors/activities in Texas appear to have lost their everyday original authenticity or 'normalcy' in recent decades to be replaced by enacted or artificialized versions of themselves?
- Is there evidence that the patricial myths and 'truths' of Anglo-American Texas have been re-caste in recent decades?
- Is there evidence that this "pabulum of a new folk consciousness" (8>41) is emerging through official/interpreting agencies (responsible for the projection of history) in the state?
- Are there significant instances of alien/oppositional/marginal 'truths' being incorporated into the legends of Texas --- but which have only come-to-light within the last decade?

TABLE 1.9.3.8./1 (Continued)

## KEY

8>1	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxx	8>36	Veninga 1986:230
8>2	Enstam 1986:165	8>37	MacConnell 1976:8-9
8>3	Miller 1991:279	8>38	O'Connor 1986: back-flap
8>4	Miller 1991:291-2	8>39	Veninga 1986
8>5	Miller 1991:279	8>40	Fehrenbach 1986:222
8>6	Buenger and Calvert 1991:5	8>41	Fehrenbach 1986:222
8>7	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxi	8>42	Veninga 1986:228
8>8	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxi		
8>9	Myres 1986:136		
8>10	Lemann 1986:169		
8>11	Veninga 1986:231-3		
8>12	Lemann 1986:165		
8>13	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxi		
8>14	Lemann 1986:165		
8>15	Lemann 1986:165		
8>16	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxi		
8>17	Miller 1991:280		
8>18	Meinig 1969		
8>19	Miller 1991:282		
8>20	Miller 1991:291		
8>21	Calvert 1991:197		
8>22	Ablett 1987		
8>23	Miller 1991:280		
8>24	Miller 1991:282		
8>25	Miller 1991:305		
8>26	Miller 1991:306		
8>27	Maxwell and Crain 1990:24		
8>28	Veninga 1986:225		
8>29	Fehrenbach 1986:219-20		
8>30	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxi		
8>31	Hendrickson 1991:251		
8>32	Fehrenbach 1986:223		
8>33	Miller 1991:307		
8>34	Buenger 1991:321		
8>35	Veninga 1986:230		

TABLE 1.9.3.9./1  
HISTORIANS OF TEXAS:  
THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST

**STATEMENT OF NEEDS**

***The Statements***

- The official history of Texas may be characterized as "the unique experience of Anglo-Saxon males wrestling the wilderness from savage Indians and vernal Mexicans" (9>1). The universities researching Texan history were very much Anglo male preserves, and their interests absorbed the fiction and folklore of the frontier (9>2).
- The University of Texas [U.T.] ruled over the preparation of professional historians concerned in the history of Texas. The first generation of U.T. historians adhered closely to F.J. Turner's (9>3) treatise on U.S. history and faithfully applied it to Texan events (9>4).
- Texas history has stayed very much within 'the heroic mold' and has not been subject to the revisionism that has been gradually adopted during the course of the twentieth century in so many other areas of U.S. history (9>5).
- The most virulent theme, perhaps, of the 1991 Buenger and Calvert synthesis of interpretations of Texas history is (the authors themselves declare) the ethnocentric/highly segmented approaches of the select group of historians of Texas (9>6).
- Before the 1950s, the historians of Texas were inclined to see, within the state, a strong cultural and ethnic homogeneity that just did not exist (9>8); during the 1940s, especially minorities were largely ignored in the telling of the past of Texas (9>9). At the start of the century, G.P. Garrison had believed that 'scientific history' would indeed support the view that the Texan character was superior --- something progressively produced through the social darwinism of history's own course (9>11).
- The writing of so much Texan history has been filiopietistic (9>12) notably in public school texts which have presented the *linear* history of A people --- patriarchal, full of sacred moments and matching epic heroes (9>13). Only by the 1960s was the history of Texas no longer the celebration of progress by a people with a supposed homogenous value system: "the melting pot [then] turned into a salad bowl" (9>14).

***Related Sample Questions***

- How did the research and teaching systems of the universities teaching Texan history reinforce the Anglo-American myths?
- How have later historians of Texas departed from the themes and ideas of F. J. Turner?
- Why were the revisionist impulses of the century not strong in Texas?
- Why do the historians of Texas write with such apparently pronounced digress of emotion and pride (9>7)?
- Why were the historians of Texas 'timid' in their coverage of cultural topics (9>10)?
- Is there evidence in Texas today to strongly suggest that the cultural pluralism of the rewritten histories of the 1960s and 1970s has gone too far (9>15)?

## TABLE 1.9.3.9/1 (Continued)

### STATEMENT OF NEEDS

#### *The Statements*

● J.F. Dobie, the famous public folklorist and social historian, believed that folklore could be 'improved' via the writing of it (9>16). But Bauman regards Dobie's work as a 'regional literature' rather than as 'folklore', ipso facto (9>17). Too many historians in Texas have rendered their history 'lovable' and/or 'palatable' (9>18).

#### *Related Sample Questions*

● Have the more plural and neutral imprints of the 1960s and 1970s replaced prior practices in the telling of Texan histories or have they merely overlaid them (9>19)? Is the modern telling of history the nineteenth century still, therefore inescapably 'heroic' and 'atypical' (9>20)?

### FINDINGS

● Stagner concludes that universalities from the previous century still dominate our understanding of past truths, today, because the prevailing nineteenth mindsets have been well channelled into the twentieth. His analysis draws him to the view that Webb and Dobie have been the principal conduits for those perspectives (9>21). The problem with Webb, in the similar summary assessment of Buenger and Calvert (9>22) is that his own students and appreciators turned him into "a combination saint and history by encouraging their own graduate students to focus upon [his] life and labor. ... Challenging the giants of the past would have required the killing off of their surrogate parents." The same two contemporary historians do not even regard Dobie to be an historian --- they do acknowledge that he was a prime shaper of intellectual life in Texas (9>23). ● Such platform setting historians have not only been a conduit for nineteenth century views on history, they have in strong and/or subtle ways opined on all of life about them. In the judgement of Buenger and Calvert, for instance, Ramsdell's work had not just southern 'moorings', but leant decidedly towards the regnant white southern outlook on race (9>22), and Phillips' paternalistic views over slavery, amongst other things, sustained a fifty year grip on the lead writings on Texan truth (9>25). ● The overall assessment of Buenger and Calvert, in the current year of writing [1991] (9>26) is that the writing of Texan history has been spoiled through inbreeding (9>27). The state has a single family-tree running back to Garrison, Ramsdell, Barker, Webb and Dobie. The governing rule of the University of Texas --- and its "western outpost" at Texas Tech (9>28) has yielded a stifling abundance of incestuous interpretation. ● The study of the past of Texas has not attracted any regular flows of fresh analytical insight: it had (has?) become an unsophisticated arena of American history (9>29). The introduction of new historical methodologies has lagged (9>30). It has unduly relied, or perhaps learnt to rely on, the written records of what were chiefly white male elites (9>31).

### RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED

● In recent decades (since the 1950s) there has been a general movement in the interpretation of the history of Texas away from consensus history: Anglo-American male history is increasingly felt to have lived beyond its monopolistic shelf-life (9>32). The older, previously entrenched explanations for the advance of the Texan way of life have more frequently failed to suffice. *Subjugated, disenfranchised* and *local histories* have increasingly been seen to surface from the bodyweight of orthodox truths (9>33). Researchers have learnt to look beyond the narrow provincialisms of old. ● During the 1960s 'new social history' emerged validating the study of *ordinary* men and women (9>34). Its ripples reached Texas to gradually redefine numerous truths (9>35). 'New social history' is, of course, not one refreshing perspective, but the critique, analysis and inspection of the past from a wide diversity of new angles --- principally from relatively unheard ethnic, subcultural and political standpoints (9>36). ● 'New social history' is still very new. In the view of Buenger and Calvert, it unfortunately tends to (i) ignore the *political* boundaries and the realities of the different and differing regions it speaks about; (ii) gravitate towards piecemeal accounts of history --- rendering longitudinal and latitudinal synthesis difficult; and (iii) be without coalescing structure or magnetic storylines, thereby reducing its broader appeal amongst the public (9>37).

TABLE 1.9.3.9./1 (Continued)

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- But new social history continues to catalyze history, itself oxygenated by new modes of enquiry from non-Americans, notably that by the New Marxist intellectuals of France and by British social theorists such as Hobsbawm and Thompson (9>38).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSCORED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- Buenger and Calvert theorize that Texans are people who do not know themselves or their past very well, and are people who for whom the world has an over-homogenized view (9>39). Much of the pride Texans have in their own (concocted) substantiality continues to elude thorough research. *Important questions into the unity and equanimity of the state have just not been asked --- to an unparalleled degree (9>40).*
- Old research approaches still contain the outlooks in vogue: still yield debilitating history (9>41). An excessive romanticism still constrains and delimits what the historians of Texas are encouraged to attend to (9>42). In rhetorical terms, Texas is still very much one grand *enthymeme* (9>43) perhaps, an assumed construction in which historians and the general public jointly participate to build a single readily-communicated vision of pride and supercapacity.
- Of particular concern is the dearth of different approaches into the study of twentieth century history --- the subject warrants "work on all topics" (9>44), especially those mid and late century developments and retrogressions that follow the depression (9>45).
- Texas lacks synthesis in its historical analysis (9>46). In art, the Dallas Nine are a noted fusion of Hispanic/Indian/Old South/Midwestern plains craft and intellectual activity (9>47). In art, for comparison, the Dallas Nine escape from undifferentiated culture and monotony of expression. Their Texan art is 'eclectic' and 'molten' rather than 'provincial' and 'fixated' (9>48). There is no equivalent Dallas Nine conglomerative approach(es) to Texan history.

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- Which new methods of investigation have *not* yet been deployed in history to enquire into the supposed Texan homoousia and into the state's myth of synonymy?
- Is Texas still predominantly one enthymeme --- and if so, how should the principal components of that shared rhetorical construction be explored?
- Which new 'power' and 'political-economy' approaches are particularly wanting to augment existing analysis of twentieth century Texas? How has and is the state changing?
- How can the historians of Texas, like those for Southern history (9>49), encourage interdisciplinary approaches to the state's history, i.e., towards the demise of shallow nativism in Texan myth and 'truth'? Which heterotopic postmodern accounts of the state's possible postmodernity are ripe for deployment?

TABLE 1.9.3.9/1 (Continued)

## KEY

9>1	Stagner 1981:165-181	9>36	Berkhofer 1973:21-28
9>2	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xiv	9>37	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxiv-xxxv
9>3	Turner 1920	9>38	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiv
9>4	Payne 1972:79,82,103-5,122-138	9>39	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxiii
9>5	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xx	9>40	Buenger 1991:331
9>6	Buenger and Calvert 1991	9>41	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxv
9>7	Hendrickson 1991	9>42	Buenger 1991:341
9>8	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxviii	9>43	Campbell 1982:139
9>9	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiii	9>44	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxii
9>10	Davis 1991:7-8	9>45	Buenger 1991:336
9>11	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xiv-xv	9>46	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxxv
9>12	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxvi	9>47	Davis 1991:8
9>13	Veninga 1986:229	9>48	Stewart 1985
9>14	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiii	9>49	Buenger 1991:340
9>15	Veninga 1986:231		
9>16	Wittliff 1966:93		
9>17	Bauman 1986:37		
9>18	Fehrenbach 1986:209-10		
9>19	Buenger 1991:340		
9>20	Buenger 1991:340		
9>21	Stagner 1981:180-1		
9>22	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xx		
9>23	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xv		
9>24	Ramsdell 1910; Buenger and Calvert 1991:xvi		
9>25	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxi		
9>26	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xx		
9>27	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xx		
9>28	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xx		
9>29	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiii		
9>30	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxv		
9>31	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiv		
9>32	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxiv		
9>33	Buenger and Calvert 1991:xxv		
9>34	Stave 1977		
9>35	Miller 1991:283		



TABLE 1.9.3.10./1

## POLITICAL VERSIONS OF THE TEXAS STORY: THE STATE OF RESEARCH INTO THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAST

### STATEMENT OF NEEDS

#### *The Statements*

- Maxwell and Crain consider Texas to be a place of immense diversity, with hardly any other single-functioning-society anywhere in the world able to match it for *dissimilarity of population* (10>1). They acknowledge that the vast geographical extent of the state gives it a multifirmity of interests/peoples/groups well beyond that of most other states (10>2).
- Yet special interest groups, like the bureaucracy, are not clearly defined single entities. And special interest groups often can not be simply distinguished from the bureaucracy. Revolving doors exist; iron triangle alliances flourish; and petty mutual influence of all sorts occurs (10>3).
- The State of Texas has a poor track record in government in promoting women and minorities into positions of power within the bureaucracy where they can influence dealings with special interest groups (10>4). The following scenarios applied in 1990: (i) of the 28 statewide elective offices, each one is held by a white male except for the treasurer (Ann Richards [subsequently elected Governor of the State]) and a supreme court post (Raul Gonzalez); (ii) the state agency workforce (excluding colleges and universities) is 58.2% male, 18.2% Hispanic and 11.3% black. Yet of those earning \$43,000 or more, 80.4% are male, 6% are Hispanic and 4% are black; (iii) Each agency of the state bureaucracy has a significant majority of males in administrative positions --- even the Human Services Department [H.S.D.]. The H.S.D. has 78.1% women amongst its employees, but only 34.4% of its administrators are women (10>5).

### FINDINGS

- Theodore Lowi's 'interest-group liberalism' critique upholds the judgement that in U.S. society, the contemporary prominence of the role of interests groups and the associated readiness of government agencies to respond to them has given rise to a divisive society and to a somewhat enfeebled bureaucracy, and to a situation where political are denied the chance to offer sustained leadership in government (10>6). Lowi writes mainly about the Federal level. Analysts who oppose Lowi's views maintain that well-organized groups will always be able to find ways to exert their influence within the U.S. system of governance.

#### *Related Sample Questions*

- But which of these new interest groups are expanding or consolidating with substantial force and conviction under postmodernity or under the postindustrial age? Which new/emergent/adopting special interest groups are increasing their pressure upon definitions of historical truth in Texas?
- Which special interest groups are in bed with which elements of the bureaucracy? Which special interest lobby/meddle/consort with the bureaucracy over historical or heritage authenticities in Texas?
- What proportion of women and minorities are in senior positions of influence over (a) history/heritage matters; (b) tourism/travel development in the Texas bureaucracy? What proportion of other 'significant' (in 'size'/volubility/'recognition') are in senior positions of influence over (a) and (b) above in the state administration?

TABLE 1.9.3.10./1 (Continued)

**FINDINGS**

- In Texas, Maxwell and Crain believe that Lowi's theory does not convincingly apply. In the state the distinctive lack of party system (in Texas itself) leads to what is fundamentally a 'no-party system' for the making of public policy (10>7). An organizational vacuum has resulted, into which strong interest groups have powerfully stepped.
- In Texas, most ethnic organizations have been fragmentary and not very large. In many areas they exist for only a short while before being replaced after a void or lull by a like body targeting a similar sector of the population (10>8).
- In Texas, two of the younger Mexican-American associations, for instance, have begun to achieve notability: viz., the Progressive Voters League and the Mexican-American Legal Defence and Education Fund. Much Mexican-American energy has been recently expended at the direct political rather than at the special interest community-group level via the advancement of a distinct political party, La Raza Unida (10>9). The party has principally been activated by 'Chicanos' --- younger Mexican-Americans.
- In Texas it appears that the interests groups are currently least able to compete in community and state politics are the state's blacks and Hispanics: "At the bottom of the status ladder, they are given little attention by most public officials (except for the few whose constituencies consist primarily of these minorities). Past legal restrictions and continuing economic and social considerations have deprived the members of these groups of extensive political experience, of large-scale financial resources for political action, and of a reservoir of skilled political leaders" (10>10).

**RESEARCH APPROACHES TRIED**

- Observation of the work of state bureaucrats in Texas (in terms of (i) their professional training; (ii) the information sources they utilize; and (iii) the discretion they deploy) suggests that state administrators are extensively engaged in the play of politics are do themselves take up roles which heavily sway resultant policy (10>11). In Texas it seems that it is not readily possible to separate the formation of public policy from politics: *the given bureaucracy's activities are so regularly political themselves.*

**RESEARCH APPROACHES UNDERSERVED****Statement of Generalized Study Problems**

- A significant characteristic about the state bureaucracy in Texas is that no single official appears to be in charge of apparatus of government. "As in many other states, the administration of laws in Texas is fragmented into several elective and numerous appointed positions. Although the principle of hierarchy exists within each department, the formal organization of the Texas bureaucracy follows the basic administrative principle of hierarchy only up to a point. ... There is no single official in the Texas government who bears the ultimate responsibility for the actions of the Texas bureaucracy" (10>12).

**Related Generalized Study Problem Questions**

- So --- is there in fact anyone responsible in the State of Texas for (i) the coordination of the planning and the implementation of state (agency) services in tourism?; (ii) the monitoring and evaluation of tourism developments and promotions which focus on history/heritage(?); (iii) the monitoring and evolution of developments and promotions in history/heritage which have a significance for tourism(?)

TABLE 1.9.3.10./1 (Continued)

## KEY

10>1	Maxwell and Crain 1990:130
10>2	Maxwell and Crain 1990:130
10>3	Maxwell and Crain 1990:226-227
10>4	Sills 1990:245
10>5	Sills 1990:245-6
10>6	Lowi 1979
10>7	Maxwell and Crain 1990:150
10>8	Maxwell and Crain 1990:139
10>9	Maxwell and Crain 1990:140
10>10	Maxwell and Crain 1990:149
10>11	Maxwell and Crain 1990:225
10>12	Maxwell and Crain 1990:235

still very much a country within a country --- and that to be non-Texan within these borders (according to the weight of the aggregate truths) was certainly something inauspicious, there.

### 1.9.3.8 Sunbelt Texas and the Future

In the succeeding Table 1.9.3.8./1, the continuing predominance of the inherited vision (in history and myth) of Texas as an 'all cowboys and glorious revolution' is identified. Yet contemporary Texas is found to be an intensively urban state, increasingly inhabited by immigrants to the state from elsewhere in the U.S.A. and from abroad. The table strongly questions the fit of frontier monomyth with sunbelt, multicultural Texas --- but it also recognizes that there are some substantial similarities of emotive rationalization between the Texan frontier expressionism of the nineteenth and the Texan sunbelt expression of recent decades: both are vigorously proclaim the ready opportunism of the imagined past and present of Texas.

### 1.9.3.9 Historians of Texas

The penultimate table of the set draws attention to the fact that the very historians of prominence in Texas have been, themselves, immense barriers to the measured analysis of and scholarly investigation into the state's past. Table 1.9.3.9./1 alludes to the realization that the evidentially shallow nativism of the self-belief so many of the inhabitants of Texas has been well matched by the evidentially shallow nativism of the truths codified by so many of the historians of Texas. The table infers that in Texas, the refreshing but scant insights of 'new social history' and of other novel approaches has generally not been able to replace the heavily biased and jingoistic interpretations of Garrison, Ramsdell, Webb, Dobie and like 'respected historians'. Just as historical eras overlay each other in Texas, so are historical accounts built up layer on top of layer. The present may be a template on the past, but in this fashion it the written past of Texas is also a template for the written present of Texas. Old proud provincialism and established uncatholicities are drawn into present-day consciousness through this capillary characteristic of Texan historical interpretation.

### 1.9.3.10 Political Versions of the Texas Story

The final table, of the ten, signifies that (like all other places) Texas is an arena in which different people try and construct a past which bestows political or other advantages on themselves: individuals and groups participate in *a game to manufacture a 'usable past'*. Clearly those who feel they are held prisoner by a past which debilitates are prone to revising or re-emphasizing those truths. But the game is never played anywhere upon a level playing-field. As Table 1.9.3.10./1 imparts for *history* itself --- and as Maxwell and Crain (1990:149) convincingly suppose elsewhere for *public policy in general*:

Whether the great inequalities in impact of various parts of the Texas population can be reconciled with democracy depends on what one means by democracy. If democracy implies only equality of legal status (the right to organize), then democracy is substantially in existence already in Texas. If it implies equality of opportunity to

influence the public policies that affect one's [and others] lives, then it is debatable whether democracy exists in Texas today. If it implies equality of benefits from the operation of those [practices] and policies, then such equality is obviously not to be found [in Texas].

Taken in toto, the ten tables 1.9.3.1./1 to 1.9.3.10./1 (plus borrowed supplementary tables 1.9.3.6./2 and 1.9.3.6./3) collectively argue that the past of Texas suffers a dual provincialism to a quite unusual degree. The largely patriarchal and Protestant patriotisms are reflected back by an astonishingly insular and somewhat intolerant brotherhood of historians. The *truth* about Texas has and is considerably brutalized by a state (or rather a genuinely Lonestar 'nationalistic') chauvinism, and hardened in the past (but still also in the present) by the very prodigality and the very profligacy of anecdotal historical accountancy.

Given that judgement on the double-force of nativism in Texas, the principal research needs on and about the truth are now summarized in Table 1.9.3.11./1. The table calls for an investigation into the progress of revisionist interpretations and projections of history and heritage in Texas in relation to the entrenched triumphalization of individualistic culture and of the 'epic' moments of the Anglo-American nineteenth century.

#### **1.9.4 The Need in Particular --- Tourism**

The next two sections (i.e., this one 1.9.4. on *the outstanding tourism issues* and 1.9.5 on the *role of the state bureaucracy* in administrating heritage) are essentially short riders for section 1.9.3.

the critical need within this study in terms of the understanding of tourism is to determine how the administration of tourism in modern-day (or postmodern?) Texas juxtaposes with the conveyance of historical truth in Texas. Does it further glorify the extreme characterizations of the Texan past as constructed in myth and legend, or does it somehow compensate for them?

Little work appears to have been carried out to gauge the effect of tourism as a magnifier or moderator of tendency in historical presentation. A superficial assessment would suggest that tourism would inherently lean towards the role of magnification of bias in established storylines. Tourists, one may reasonably presume, inherently travel to witness the different, the unusual and the spectacular --- at least with respect to what is commonly viewable in their own localities. Therefore, tourists do seek out the epic, the grand and the notorious rather than the ordinary, the tame and the run-of-the-mill.

Though travel and individualized tourism has existed for centuries, mass tourism is arguably only a twentieth century phenomenon. It amounts to the quest for new cultural, geographic, historical and other experiences. In Jameson's (1991:32) view, new cultural and other experiences are increasingly euphoric --- and by implication, tourists, as the seekers of those intensities, are players, participants and patrons of euphoria. Thereby, it may be reasonable to expect tourism to cumulatively accentuate the euphoric properties of a given history as it should for a given geography or a given nature.

TABLE 1.9.3.11./1  
 THE PRINCIPAL CHARACTERIZATION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH IN TEXAS:  
 SHOWING SOME OUTSTANDING RESEARCH NEEDS IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE

Area of Discourse	Principal Finding from the Literature	Principle Research Needs in Texas on the Manufacture of Historical Truth
1 Myth and History	Myth and history are exceedingly difficult to differentiate(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Who constructs the myths and who constructs the histories?</li> </ul>
2 Texas Myth in General	Texan history is fundamentally European, Puritan, American and Southern Afrarian myth(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Which current groups/segment(s) of the Texas population are alienated from the state's past?</li> </ul>
3 The Frontier - People and Nature	Texan myth and history are inescapably frontier storylines: therefore, Texas is vigorous nationalistic(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Do contemporary interpretations of Texan history still triumphalize survivorship?</li> </ul>
4 Race and Color	The Darwinian notion of 'the-white-mans-burden' has driven accounts of the conquest of the development of Texas(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Do state sponsored tourism ventures and promotions in Texas still heavily promote Manifest Destiny themes --- directly or indirectly?</li> </ul>
5 Women	Women have been stereotyped out of the limelight of Texas myth and history(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Are any substantive sites/events/themes of Texan history nowadays mainstreaming women?</li> </ul>
6 Individual Freedoms and the Goodlife	The Texan past is largely a mix of traditionalistic culture in the East, and individualistic culture in the Center and West(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The great, great majority of magical/powerful/inspirational sites and places projected in the state of Texas continue to be Anglo-American ones?</li> </ul>
7 Texas in and as 'America' --- Statehood	The myths and history of Texas predominantly address the development of a chosen 'race'(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The great, great majority of themes projected about the Texan past speak to the conquest of the land and territory of what is now Texas?</li> </ul>

TABLE 1.9.3.11./1 (Continued)

Area of Discourse	Principal Finding	Principal Research Needs
8 Sunbelt Texas and the Future	The myths and histories of contemporary Texas are predominantly rural myths set in a cosmopolitan/urban state(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The projection of the Texan past continues to heavily stress its nineteenth century decades?</li> </ul>
9 Historians of Texas	They myths and histories of Texas have predominantly been linear, epic and 'improved'(?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Revisionist versions of Texan myth and history continue to flounder?</li> </ul>
10 Political Versions of the Texas Story	The myths and histories of Texas have largely been one huge enthymeme in salute of the populations mythical synonymy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Heterotopic accounts of Texan myth and history do not thrive in Texas?</li> </ul>

SOURCE: The above perspectives have been culled from several texts, chiefly O'Connor (1986) and Buenger and Calvert (1991).

It is not, presumably, to be expected that tourism can (like current historians in the Lonestar State) --- if one may borrow an image from Buenger and Calvert (1991:xxiv) --- "step out of the shadow of past interpretations of Texas." The modern-day tourism industry is, in Austin, San Antonio and afield, perhaps even more dependent upon Garrison, Ramsdell, Webb, Dobie and all to a point of concentration well beyond that by which modern-day historians are beholden to the past stalwarts of their own discipline.

If the past professional Texan scribes and storytellers did not know the Texan past very well, that weakness and discrepancy is more likely to be spotted by other present-day professional scribes and storytellers than it is by the relatively trusting and uninquiring promoters and developers of the tourism industry. Historians nominally study history, evaluate myth and reinterpret the past. *Tourism practitioners and researcher nominally accept history as given*, borrow myth and ride-on-the-bandwagon of other people's homework on the past. Tourism practitioners are inclined to be dependent, secondary players in the purveyance of stories and the projection of sites.

If, therefore, the historians and mythmakers of yesteryear in Texas have largely succeeded in pulling a set of woolly truths over the eyes of the historians and myth-conveyors of today (as was frequently inferred in tables 1.9.3.1./1 to 1.9.3.10./1) then one may not reasonably expect the purblind practitioners of the travel-trade and the wheelers-and-dealers of the tourism industry to see clearly through that woven wool. The literature indicates that the petty practices and the opaque discourse of pre-1950s historians of Texas have quietly and steadily lulled post-1950s historians of Texas into extreme positions of **shallow nativism**. In contrast, tourism practitioners and administrators (the subjects of this study) may be expected to draw much more swiftly, and unsuspectingly directly, from that insular provincialism. The need in tourism, then, is to gauge the irresistibility of the enthymeme of Garrison / Ramsdell / Webb / Dobie / and Company (viz., the Saga Texacana) to the state decision-makers in tourism. Can the bureaucrats of Austin recognize, resist, or even revise the pungent and established state past they have been handed?

### 1.9.5 The Need in Particular --- State Administration of Heritage in Tourism

Here, it is now conceivably only necessary, now, to pull together the ideas already presented. The parameters of the outstanding research needs on the performance of the bureaucracy in the management and oversight have been copiously intimated in scattered fashion during subsections 1.9.1. to 1.9.4. already.

What needs to be clarified here is that, the catalyst study --- like the overall / longhaul research agenda:

(i) *is about sovereignty*

Many observers of the last decades of the twentieth century believe (in the words of the British / European statesman, Roy Jenkins (1991:49) that "sovereignty is [becoming] an almost total illusion in the modern world". Do the administrators of heritage in tourism in Texas feel any rippled effects of this supposed ubiquitous ill-wind or global tide? Is Anglo-American Texas sovereign with them,



or has / is that formerly supreme image been whittled away by other socio-cultural or socio-political preferences --- or otherwise by competing 'illusions'?

(ii) *is about dominance*

Are the state administrators of heritage in tourism, through the monitoring of their large and petty jurisdictions and through the exercise of their transparent and opaque powers enabling any special interests in and of the past to dominate any other special interests of the past? Or are they, given their own understanding of the contemporary pressures of pluralism under postmodernity / postindustrialism, consciously seeking to advance some groups and sectors and / or subjugate others?

(iii) *is about operational knowledges*

Do the bureaucrats of Texas appear to be responding to any known concepts of phronesis (i.e., ethical knowledge --- Ross 1988:36) as they conduct their work, or do they appear to support the tenets of any 'specific science', any distinct episteme?

The existing literature on the administration of heritage in tourism has so far been found to be rather silent on such matters. The past, the present and the future are very much in peril in terms of our appreciation to the tourism and travel research community. The surviving needs may be starkly stated: it is time there was **some** informed intelligence upon these matters of heritage manufacture.

## 1.10 THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY

### 1.10.1 The Study as a Grounded Investigation Itself

Wildavsky (1979:385-6) maintains that too much 'stake claiming' occurs in the study of fields such as government administration and policy analysis. Too frequently, in his view, researchers think only in terms of disciplinary domains and the broader paddocks of thought such as theology, geometry and natural history have been fragmented into an infinitude of smaller **disciplinary fiefdoms** (386) the like of 'econometrics', social psychology, political economy, et cetera. The tendency is for each fiefdom seeks to secure a promised land of professionalism for itself: the independence of the domain is especially prized, and boundary conflicts proliferate. A gross danger lurks, whereby contested professionalism can / does appear to drive enquiry rather than the quest for understanding steers it.

Fay parallels Wildavsky in recognizing the necessary supremacy of the imperative search for human understanding over the exercise and development of singular domain theory. In the social / cultural / human sciences he advocates that human meaning is obtained in a deeper and fuller diagnostic sense when it is "set inside **the broader framework** of political philosophy" (Fay 1975:69; emphasis added). And Manicas echoes both Fay and Wildavsky, by stressing the criticality of contextualization. When an historical investigation is mounted, there are considerable gains in insight to be won when the

assumptions and categories of historical analysis are **reconnected** to what is generally regarded as the separate histories of 'philosophy', 'science', 'political thought' and such (Manicas 1987:4).

Thus, the development of the research agenda on truthmaking in heritage tourism will take heed of the stern warnings of Wildavsky, Fay and Manicas against the anti-contextualization of so much human / social / cultural inquiry. It will seek to ground itself widely in the politics of human decision-making, and in the philosophies of the interpretation of meaning. In looking at Texas in the adjuvant inquiry, it should be noted that Davis has, in the current year of writing bemoaned the absence of cross, inter and mixed disciplinary studies of the state. He pointedly advises that a vacuum of conjoint approaches exists: there appears to be an absence of skilled "professionals' brave and flexible enough to bridge several fields (Davis 1991:19). The contextualization and the grounding of each study is all the poorer, in his estimation.

Accordingly, this study will attempt the brave and the flexible. It will seek to imbricate the perspectives held at different human / social / cultural standpoints on the taking on administrative decisions regarding history and heritage. In aiming to **imbricate** *it will endeavor to arrange the perspectives of relevant / contributory / neighboring disciplines so as to overlap the subject*. It will not seek the precision of singular disciplinary vision or even of a singular theoretical outlook: too much false consciousness and misguided simplicity lurks within such efforts to be directly and exactly focussed on such a complex macro-level issue. Too much tends to be presumed: too much is prone to be overlooked. Far too many studies are unnecessarily streamlined, aiming for the plain merit of **zero redundancy**, which others now see to be a highly dubious and target and form of cognizance (Landau 1986:471). If this work is genuinely to be constructive, is sincerely going to deploy naturalistic methodologies, and is faithfully going to explore *meaning* it must seek contextualization itself --- it must seek the positivities of **duplication, overlap** and **redundancy** not the preinterpretations of zero redundancy. The precision implicit in zero redundancy in social research speaks too readily to precluded thinking, to false consciousness and to prejudged standards of perfection. Duplication of approach in human / cultural inquiry speaks, instead, to a reinforcement of findings --- the findings revealed are more readily amplified in their wider context of meaning. In regard to reliability in research, one could claim (as Landau (1991:475) does for reliability in administrative practice) that "it requires only arithmetic increases in redundancy to yield geometric increases in reliability."

Consequently neither the research agenda nor the catalyst study of Texas have been designed to be a separatist inquiry, supreme on an isolated and precise theoretical foundation. It seeks a duplication of overlap of perspective. Its guiding principle is that of imbrication --- it searches for the benefits deriving from what Landau calls "interwoven and competing redundancies" (479). The resultant grounding of the insight into meaning should be more richly contextualized. The whole multi-disciplinary or rather transdisciplinary imbrication, according to the principle, should be more reliable than any of its component perspectives. The study therefore hunts for competing intelligence on the meaning of truth

in heritage and in administration --- not for a single predestined and exact theorization upon the subject. This imbricative study is no exercise, then, in **theoretical brinkmanship** where "when one bulb blows, everything goes" (481): it aims to accommodate a range of different and contributory perspectives on the social / human / cultural construction of meaning. That implicit redundancy inevitably generates a wider range of opportunities for understanding in the establishment of the proposed research agenda on the subject (i.e., it embraces alternative routes of insight) and provides a greater potentiality for creative implementation based on the hypotheses that emerge in any single study (i.e., the resultant responses can more flexibly be drawn from a wider pool of competing / complementary insights).

Clearly, abstract rationality locked within a principle (viz., *the principle of imbrication*) does not transfer axiomatically to concrete research practice. The obvious problem is that, ultimately, every distinct disciplinary perspective could or ought to be harnessed to improve the studies redundancy. Considerable attention must therefore be put towards the selection of what Fay (1975:68) has called the politically and socially (perhaps the word 'conceptually' is better) relevant dimensions of the inquiry. Since social science is blocked off into domains, the line has to be drawn somewhere as to which disciplinary fiefdoms hold the most pertinence to the problem at hand. The work, consonantly, cannot be entirely free of presupposition: no study can --- or otherwise it would never take place. Some problem HAS to be assumed. Some perspectives on it HAVE to be taken. One cannot investigate history and heritage from nowhere --- from a void in disciplinary formation or a vacuum in theoretical construction.

It is necessary, then, to select the most apt disciplines which appear to be able to best contribute to the context-improving redundancy. In making that selection one is drawn towards the conclusion that each different discipline constitutes a single or several rhetorics of inquiry (Lyne 1985:66). The *academic rhetoric* is the *disciplinary glue* that binds together different intellectual interests within a single domain or subdomain of discourse (67). But in the imbricated investigation, one is not looking for disciplinary glue, one is looking for *redundancy glue*. In this instance, one is looking to see how competing and disciplinary discourse can be drawn together to offer enriched understanding on the set problem. To that end, one is not necessarily looking for uniform and exact argumentation, but for emergent and enriched argumentation.

To recap upon a point made in subsection 1.3, this constructivist investigation is *not* dependent upon a reductionist ideal: it does not seek generalizable context-free categories of understanding. It seeks, in the adjuvant study, a mixed disciplinary configuration on the bureaucratic problems being analyzed in Texas. It endeavors to build conjoint insight into the study of the meaning of truth from the differing available discourse of the times. And this is where the work leans heavily on Foucault --- the complex adisciplinarian and elusive intellectual of our era (Merquior 1985:13).

The development of the research agenda on truthmaking will be undertaken with a considerable regard for Foucault's insight on truth / power / insight, recognizing that --- as state beforehand --- the problem of reason (or in this case the question of understanding) is not so much juridical or ontological it is historical and political. The current subsection (1.10.1) has so far rested on the assumption that

different academic or research domains have *historically* built up different rhetorics (otherwise known as distinct discourse) and then *politically* go to war with them, often unknowingly. But what Foucault reminds, is that it appears to be the same in the conduct of all other social / human / cultural affairs. Reason and understanding have strong and frequently unsuspected historical and political profiles (9). Foucault instruct that within institutions discourse and praxis are peculiarly and architecturally inter-connected (Habermas 1987:242). Just as social science is built up on domains of **subject-centered reason**, so administrative and management practice elsewhere is formulated around transformed or glorified subjects, which within that institutional purview become *monological*. Foucault teaches the subject-centered reason inevitably forces a merger between discourse and practice within institutions. Meaning becomes inflexibly locked within the subject-centered reasoning that each institution cultivates. It is necessary not just to examine the surface context of that merger of discourse and praxis, but its buried context --- its *historical* and *political* foundations (248).

Thus, under the Foucauldian perspective, state administrators are not just neutral decision-takers acting upon each separate heritage project and each distinct tourism scheme --- they are conceivably also stewards of monological thinking (Kass and Catron 1990:65). They work within a context of administrative legitimacy --- a context which inescapably holds to certain subject-centered reason rather than to others. In this catalyst study within Texas, the subject-centered reason revolves around concepts of TRUTH --- or rather around historically and politically determined versions of truth.

Accordingly, tourism decisions become a weapon of legitimacy. The decisions taken reinforce or disturb inherited concepts of the past, and reinforce or disturb the rights of certain individuals and groups to speak for the heritage of Texas over the claims of others. Tourism thus becomes a powerful element of social control. The rational activities of bureaucrats in tourism management, heritage care and history promotion, privilege some and subjugate others --- just as Foucault disclosed potential within the powerplays of medicine and elsewhere (see Foucault in Rabinow 1984:282).

The field of tourism therefore should not neglect to study its **rhizomata** --- those subterranean stems of subject-centered reason which suspectingly and unsuspectingly give off all manner of roots (for 'roots' read *legitimacies*) and shoots (for *shoots* read *subjugations*). The remaining paragraphs of 1.10 signify how the current investigation proposes to begin to do just that.

### 1.10.2 The Subsequent Sections

Section 2 of the study looks at the rhizomata of truth from the perspective eight different disciplines inclusive of tourism. It constitutes a *literature review* of the sociological, philosophical, anthropological, political science, marketing, history, and communications domain accounts of truth, in addition to that discourse with tourism and travel research. The aggregate review is an attempt to uncover what is deemed to be true or false within each of the eight discourse. It constitutes an attempt to find out what is institutionally fixed and architecturally embodied in the modes of analysis which have

been favored within each of the eight disciplines. It is an endeavor to determine whether there are indeed any major or easily observable subject-centered rationalities which facilitate or obscure the social / human / cultural understanding of meaning in history. It is an attempt to ascertain which pertinent will-to-truths within various socio-political discourse can be harnessed to improve the framing of research questions in the subsequent sections 3, 4, and 5 --- and in the broader development of a research agenda on the manufacture of heritage in travel and tourism.

The next part of the study, viz., section 3, takes up the methodological questions that were first turned over in subsections 1.3 to 1.6 inclusive. The naturalistic inquiry is conceptualized as one which is targeted upon *the capillary activities and consequences* of the petty and opaque workings of bureaucrats. The naturalistic methodology is explained by which the study seeks to construct the ongoing, the political, and the administrative capillary relations of administrators in heritage tourism. Thus the section explains why it is thought that the particular naturalistic study design proposed for the adjuvant study is an appropriate structural scheme for the identified administrative operational setting in Texas. It is reinforced that the naturalistic methodology adopted and adapted is being shaped to (i) identify different / parallel / competing historical truths as recognized by administrative decision-takers; and (ii) to identify asymmetries in the coercive influences that those administrators consciously or unconsciously deal in.

The following section (4) then outlines the research procedures that are to be utilized --- structured, of course, around the heavy reliance upon *the human as the research instrument* and around the necessary evolution of the research agenda's and the catalyst study's focus. The implementation of the adjuvant investigation then unfolds in its directed effort to decipher and construct the large and the subtle ethnocentrism and the large and the subtle political and operational biases by which those administrators carry out their duties in their respective partly-prescribed and partly-interpreted visions as to what the state of Texas should be served with in terms of the promotion and development of its heritage.

Section 5 then processes the naturalistic data obtained and probes for 'findings' from them rather than drawing out definitive 'results' (as already explained in subsection 1.3.3.). The need to gain trustworthiness for these findings is emphasized with regard to the *credibility*, the *dependability*, and the *confirmability*, of the naturalistic methodology utilized. Before the findings are summarized, the form of the emergent / post hoc hypotheses is clarified, and a number of propositions or truthmaking in heritage tourism are drawn up.

The penultimate part of the investigation, section 6, is an attempt to complete the interpretation of discourse and praxis at work by providing a number of examples which illustrate key findings of the adjuvant study. The aim here is not to offer a complete account of power at play in the shaping of truth in the administration of heritage in Texas, but to offer some strong examples of actual truthmaking. The aim in providing these examples is to *contextualize*, that is to relocate the found phenomenon back into the working roles and daily administrative routines of the individuals studied --- or in Denzin's (1989:128)

terms, back into their daily / working "lives". These examples are illustrative vignettes of interpretation-built-upon-description. They are selected to illuminate the meanings and conceptual structures that comprise the administrator's own experience (Geertz 1973:27) in developing and projecting the past of Texas. Those examples seek to avoid the problems of the presentation of 'results' or 'findings' as a gloss (via a thin description, or account) and they each seek elaboration of the *context*, the *interaction*, and the *history* of that administrators activity (as represented by the illustrative episode of discourse or praxis selected (Denzin 1989:112). They are each interpretations, and not ideal evocations.

For the final section (7), it should be remembered that the catalyst study is not a single enquiry into tourism or into heritage per se, it has a study problem and a research problem that warrant finalized comment, and it reaches many many areas of contributory and competing discourse. If the description of Richard Schweder (1984:30-1) can be borrowed, the investigation comprises not so much a singularly sustained figure but "a polyphonic figure": it is a study with several agendas. It is now the job of this final section to tie them up --- or rather down! By way of review, tourism is not seen as an independent event. In the adjuvant study, it is seen as a significant part of the social / human / cultural life of Texas that has prodigious resonance on the profiles of power, dominance and subjugation with the state. An effort is therefore made to re-weave those webs of significance through the earlier eight disciplinary domains. That done, the implications of the catalyst study are then examined in the setting of Texas and in the context of history and heritage in terms of the pressures of postmodernity that the study was originally introduced through, and in terms of the future truths that future present-ages and present-populations are destined to construct around the pasts they choose to manufacture and / or accidentally privilege.

The last four sections of the work distinguish recommendations for the research agenda ( $\Delta$ ) from recommendations made for the catalyst study itself / alone ( $\Delta\Delta$ ). For instance, sections 3, 4, and 5 each have short re-cap statements to clarify what is being suggested for the blanket / longhaul agenda, and what is being proposed exclusively with regard to the immediate / adjuvant inquiry in Texas.

## 2. REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

### 2.0 INTRODUCTION: THE LITERATURE ON THE DISCOURSE OF POWER AND HISTORICAL TRUTH

The literature review which follows is premised on the view of the 'Annales' school of history in France, which emphasizes the need to integrate the conclusions and approaches of numerous 'other' disciplines into any investigations of human behavior and society (Towner and Wall 1991:72). It is based upon the judgement of Braudel that to understand history, for instance, one should inquire into the relationship between the broader-scale continuities of the gradually evolving environment in which man lives and the more immediate technological, societal and human imperatives of existence --- and also with the everyday modes of behavior of the individual. In Braudel's (1958) terms, these are the *longue-durée*, the *conjunctures* and the *événements* respectively.

This literature review recognizes, therefore, the criticality of the need to integrate different disciplinary perspectives on human and cultural understanding. It is supported by the view that there is no single correct view of any issue or matter under investigation, but there are many possible correct views, each possessing its own rules of determination. In its adoption of a Foucauldian perspective on understanding, the literature review is an interdisciplinary or rather transdisciplinary one, built upon the view that (particularly in the last century) there has been a surfeit of narrow *conceptual overdetermination* of history and of the social sciences (White 1978:256; on Foucault). Yet the literature review is but a mirror on actuality, for all disciplines change slowly (and in some respects, at pace) borrowing and being nudged by neighboring disciplines (Marcus and Fischer 1986:17). No discipline has only one single, resolute, internal dynamic --- however secure and established and self-productive any particular field of inquiry may appear to be to certain 'insiders' at any point in time, or even through the course of any lifetime.

If the study problem of this investigation is about the nature of administrative activity --- and the mastery of some truths over others, the research problem is about the nature of scientific explanation --- and the mastery of various different scientific schools of thought over the lived and inherited world. Both the study problem and the research problem are therefore about empowerment (in each instance, 'which truths get ennobled?'), and both are about dominance ('whose *past*, *present*, and *future* triumphs and whose is subjugated?' --- whether it be in administrative purview for **the study problem** or in scientific understanding of **the research problem**). The two mirror each other closely. Examination of 'dominance' within the study problem throws light upon the capacity of the research techniques to map dominant truths; examination of the 'dominant' rhetoric of certain scientific approaches draws attention to the rhetorics that may similarly be at work in administration, in society, everywhere. The study problem and the research problem thus entwine. And so this literature review is not restrictively in search of study problem insight, or about research problem representation --- it is necessarily about both.

Cassirer has celebrated the strength and benefactions of scientific scrutiny: "there is no second power in our modern world which may be compared with scientific thought" (Cassirer in White 1978:29). But the value of Foucault is that he, perhaps more than any other philosopher (?), warns that science has (within it) its negative forces as well as its positive ones. To Cassirer, science is the summit and consummation of human activities: its triumphs dazzle (30). To Foucault, science is but another scene of human intrigue and of false consciousness: its conduct is ordinary. What counts in Foucault's estimation is *who* is able to *legitimize what* in science, as in any or all fields of human endeavor. There are always legitimate grounds for differences of opinion, but certain kinds of knowledge have mastery over others at different times. Different kinds of knowledge compete to determine *what constitutes the facts*.

The literature review that follows is an attempt to throw light on how different metaphors have been used to organize our ways of interpreting the past --- and through representations of it, the present and the future. Different disciplines have favored the use of different metaphors. Each metaphor, or rather each organizing perspective has not only its Cassirerean strengths but its Foucauldian frailties. Each metaphor --- each discipline --- tends to have investigative blindspots. That is unavoidable. And that is why those outlooks are metaphors and disciplines are not perfect perspectives. For example, the lead metaphors in anthropology tend towards "*ineffectiveness in dealing with issues of historical context and political economy*" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:34). One therefore can gain by trying to gain redundancy in analysis --- as was stressed at the end of section 1 --- where the strengths of various metaphors (read different disciplines) begin to cover over the blindspots of others.

But such imbrication can only ever be skeletal. Just as there are always more 'facts' available than can ever be recorded in any socio-cultural study, so there are always more imperfect or inadequate perspectives than can ever be found. The current study can only imbricate, thereby, in terms of the illumination afforded by certain priority metaphors --- by, that is, the accumulated wisdom of certain lead and inherited disciplines. And in carrying out that imbrication, the metaphors of inquiry will overlap and a considerable amount of repetitivity is inevitable.

The literature review has a role to play, then, in showing how the truth that is seen and recognized is governed by that metaphors that are used to hunt it down. What becomes important, then, is not so much the depth of any single perspective or truth --- i.e., the skilled use of any single metaphor overburdened with data (in White's (1978:47) poignant phrase) --- but the richness of interpretation and understanding of truth from a mix of contributing perspectives.

In this manner, the literature review is concerned with Foucault's problem of knowledge --- i.e., 'What is knowledge?' and 'What is truth?' (Foucault, in Gordon 1980:66). It concerns itself with the way different disciplines attempt to appreciate how things *really* are, and how that appreciation is *hindered* just as much as is it *furthered* by the organizing capacity of the discipline (White 1978:233). Hence the literature review is postulated on Foucault's (1970) supposition that institutions, disciplines and scientific communities colonize 'the order of things' through the violent acts they render to reality through their linguistic practices and through their epistemological convictions (White --- on Foucault --- 1978:239-40).



It is important, then, that the literature addresses the ideological commitments of the disciplines that contribute to and impair our understanding of historical truth. Disciplines do not just have favored metaphors, they have preferred notions of 'science', of 'objectivity' and of 'explanation'. Such are the ideological **commitments** of the discipline. And after Foucault's inspection of the powerplay within medicine, mental health and other areas, we now tend to recognize disciplines to be as much **political** entities as they are **scientific**. Ultimately, what one should seek, if one is a Foucauldian purist, is "[the] apprehension of the world as it might have existed before human consciousness appeared in it" (253), before metaphors began to enrich but limit our grasp of the world, and before disciplines began to empower but delimit our understanding of it. But can one ever obtain a **pre-political truth** --- that is, one can never secure a reality unsullied by 'commitments'?

In heeding the call of Towner and Wall for a more commonplace adoption of interdisciplinary perspectives in tourism --- a calling for 'multidisciplinarity' echoed in the introduction to that special issue of the *Annals of Tourism Research* (Graburn and Jafari 1991:71) --- and in respect of Foucault's cognizance into the deep structures of human and agency consciousness (White 1978:230) --- this literature review attempts to uncover what critical disciplines say about the study's central axes of *historical truth*, of *the vision and power of the state* and of the *appeal of heritage* in tourism and in life. The literature review is a recountal of the conventional typologies of disciplines to those axes --- a brief transcription of the inner dynamics of the thought processes by which those disciplines have customarily been given to represent truth, power and heritage.

To some, the Foucauldian unmasking and dismemberment of various disciplinary approaches to knowledge leads not only to the demystification of thought and practice, but eventually to the death of things (233). They fear, perhaps, a total loss of meaning --- a complete absence of structure to understanding. But the dismemberment of disciplines can in fact be a creative process. The disordering of representation can throw much insight on "the true nature of the relationship between 'words and things'" (233) --- in this case between our accumulated rationalizations of history and of the past as it occurred. Just because each and every discipline is seen to be dubious and political, does not mean that things in and of the past cannot be properly studied. By White's (233) judgement on Foucault, *disremembrance* is really a tribute to *the temporality of all things*. The past is prisoner to each present, and disciplines are its custodial guards.

In reviewing the literature of various disciplines upon historical truth, primacy will be given to the **discourse** of the selected disciplines. And in this sense, Foucauldian discourse is not merely that which is *represented* or *communicated*, it is also that which is *practiced* (Merquior 1985:76). Thus the review of the diverse literatures on power and historical truth amount to each disciplines capacity to make sense of the world (in this case of the past and of the administration of the past) and to act upon that sense. The discourse introduced has been selected because of the insight it gives upon the discipline's will-to-know. It is, consonantly, not only **interpretive** it is **preinterpretive** (White 1978:4). By this it is meant

that it is selected not merely for what it says about WHAT the discipline comprehends but HOW and WHY that sort of comprehension came about.

In focusing upon the discourse of disciplines the literature review is necessarily metaphysical. It looks into the problematical domains of the experience of the selected disciplines, for that is where the interpretive strength or rather tendencies of the discipline's current metaphors is conceivable most pungent. Consequently, the discourse presented may be regarded as antithetical, having more to say about the relationships between 'old' and 'new' meanings within the discipline than between those meanings and the facts or events they purport to represent. But then, *all* interpretation has been deemed to be antithetical in this regard (Bloom 1975:76).

The forthcoming literature review, to sum up, principally accounts for what Foucault (1970:xi) styled as 'the unformulated thematics' --- i.e., the unconscious levels of knowledge. While the study problem probes the unformulated thematics of the contemporary projection about the Texan past, the research problem peers into the unformulated thematics of various social sciences. And this immersion in discourse will attempt to present what Marcus and Fischer (1986:85) designate as the *hard / cold* knowledge of political science and marketing with the *warm / soft* knowledge of cultural and human studies. That is a rare but necessary endeavor if the study is to approach a satisfactorily grounding in our state-of-the-art understanding of power and historical truth. Grounded in this interdisciplinary or rather transdisciplinary fashion, the literature review has an important part to play in the defamiliarization of the past with respect to both the 'hard' practicalities of power and action in society and the 'soft' nurturing realities of cultural identification. Given that, one may be able to justify that in this scarce instance, an attempt is being taken to free interpretation from its usual subservience to explanation.

### **2.0.1 The Transdisciplinary Literature on Power and Truth: The Imbricated Approach to the Review**

The literature review considers key perspectives on power and historical truths within the following disciplines:

- 2.1 Sociology
- 2.2 Philosophy
- 2.3 Anthropology
- 2.4 Political Science
- 2.5 Marketing
- 2.6 Communications
- 2.7 History
- 2.8 Tourism.

The first four disciplines (Sociology, Philosophy, Anthropology, and Political Science) are arbitrarily deemed to be the **major** ground-floor disciplines that insight into the way truth can be gauged in the social sciences. For these four disciplines, the perspectives encountered on power and truth will be critiqued under the following ten headings:

1 *A General Introduction To The Discipline's Contemporary Outlooks*  
 [Identified as "Introduction": 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.3.1, and 2.4.1]

Disciplines have their own soft logics --- their own suatory rationales (Lyne 1985:66). This opening subsection will introduce that suasion for each case --- to the argumentative tendencies peculiar to each discipline. It will attempt to briefly explain how the rhetoric of the discipline's favored or topical approaches to research constitutes a disciplinary technology (Rabinow 1984:17) and how it exerts control upon the individual investigators enclosed within that conceptual 'space'. Recall, from section 1, that Foucault found the problem of reason to be not juridical or ontological but historical and political --- even for disciplines (14).

2 *A Specific Introduction To The Discipline's Contemporary Outlook Upon Power and Historical Truth*  
 [Identified as 'Outlook on Power and Truth': 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.3.2, and 2.4.2]

An attempt is taken to introduce some of the disciplines critical 'anticipations' towards power and truth in terms of each field-of-study's Cassirerean discrimination, or as others would have it, its Foucauldian deceptions. Hence this subsection highlights certain of the key insights gained into 'truth' and certain of 'the disciplinary violence' (Habermas 1987:245) that has been done to 'truth'.

3 *Acknowledgement Of Similar Investigations Upon Power and Truth*  
 [Identified as 'Similar Investigations': 2.1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, and 2.4.3]

Comment here will be offered on the insight available from known significant studies within the discipline that have yielded parallel findings on either 'the discourse of power' or 'the power of discourse' - -- each of which could have a bearing upon this study's research problem as well as upon its study problem.

4 *Acknowledgement Of Related Inquiries Into The State Administration Of Heritage*  
 [Identified as 'related inquiries': 2.4.1.4, 2.2.4, 2.3.4, and 2.4.4]

Until recently, culture --- a slippery 'global' concept --- tended to be systematically elided from many studies of the political economy (Marcus and Fischer 1986:85). The 1980s, however, witnessed an upsurge of disciplinary and interdisciplinary interest in 'it' (Featherstone 1990:2), and the designing powers of states to promote similarity and uniformity over cultural patterns has begun to be traced with some frequency (Bauman 1990:158). This subsection explores, in that light, the insight gained within the said disciplines into the incessant nativism of states who in various ways project "an incessant propaganda of shared attitudes" (154).

5 *Acknowledgement Of Principal Related Researchers Into Discursivity*  
 [Identified as 'Related Researchers': 2.1.5, 2.2.5, 2.3.5, and 2.4.5]

To repeat, this study as a whole looks at discursivity --- viz., the way in the catalyst study discourse reinforces practice and the way practices bolster discourse in the administrative projection of dominant imagined visions of Texas. The master theories on discursivity have arguably been Weber, Kuhn and Foucault (Rabinow 1984:26), but it is Foucault who has done most to highlight discourse formation at work, and the fashion in which the endless variety of strategies of 'domination' and 'subjugation' can intersect (Habermas 1987:127). This subsection therefore explores (within each of the

eight disciplines) the contribution of other theorists where they have been significant to our understanding of the cross-fertilization of discourse and proxis. Where none or few have been found to have a substantive voice on the matter, the contribution of Foucault --- the adisciplinarian, himself --- is commented upon vis-a-vis that field-of-inquiry.

6 *Appreciation Of Related Perspectives From The Specific Discipline On The Dominance / Subjugation Issues*  
 [Identified as 'Related Perspectives': 2.1.6, 2.2.6, 2.3.6, and 2.4.6]

If Lecourt (1975:189) is correct, knowledge exists in "great layers obedient to specific structural laws." Epistemes and disciplines have their own foundational and theoretical ideologies which prevent them from closely examining and / or borrowing from, respectively, other epistemes or parallel disciplines. In this way useful perspectives in cousin or neighboring or even unrelated fields can lie out of commission. It is now realized, for instance, that 'semiology' (an organizing perspective on 'signs') was proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure --- often credited as the founder of modern linguistics --- in the opening years of this century: it remained a sleeping idea under the 1960s when anthropologists and literary critics "impressed by the success of linguistics, sought to profit from its methodological insights and found themselves developing the semiological science that Saussure had postulated" (Culler 1983:70).

This subsection will therefore take heed of the Saussurean lesson and will chase perspectives from the other disciplines which may enrich understanding of the value plural issues being probed in Texas, within the adjuvant investigation.

7 *Appreciation Of Related Concepts From The Specific Discipline On The Dominance / Subjugation Issues*  
 [Identified as 'Related Concepts': 2.1.7, 2.2.7, 2.3.7, and 2.4.7]

In this subsection, potentially useful concepts (as distinguished from the *perspectives* of '6' above) will be presented where they have been found in the articulations of the other disciplines. The concept is said to be 'in fashion' when there is no fundamental, real, ideological or moral reason for it. If the concept is otherwise, that is --- structurally embedded within the essential thinking of the discipline, it may therefore be regarded as 'part of that field's discourse' rather than being 'in fashion' (Dario Fo, in Ross 1988:viii).

8 *Appreciation Of Related Means / Methods / Modes Of Data Analysis From The Specific Discipline On The Dominance / Subjugation Issues*  
 [Identified as 'Related Data Analysis': 2.1.8, 2.2.8, 2.3.8, and 2.4.8]

In this subsection, the particular disciplines will be interrogated in terms of the way they use / 'play with' / argue with data in order to pursue their sought approaches to truth. This involves an 'underground' look at those methods, because so many researchers within each discipline simply do not know in fact they argue (Lyne 1985:66) --- and most (conceivably) do not overtly reveal it.

9 *Cross-Evaluation With Themes and Ideas On Postmodernity*  
 [Identified as 'Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity': 2.1.9, 2.2.9, 2.3.9, and 2.4.9]

Postmodernity is almost a rich culture in its own right --- as was explained in section 1.1. It is 'diversity,' it is 'variety,' it is a 'richness of popular and local discourses / codes / practices' (Featherstone

1990:2). And, true to that concept, there are postmodern ways of looking at postmodernity. Many of these outlooks will reinforce each other as they examine the encroaching twentieth century culture of postmodernity, just as, for instance, the various Euro-American discourses of the nineteenth century --- 'the colonialist', 'the racist' and 'the sexist', for example --- stiffened in similar hues the aggregate regard for 'encroaching' Native American culture (Carr 1984:46). This subsection, then, not only attempts to locate further significant cognizance on postmodernity, but it also takes up this matter of 'discourse reinforcement.'

10      *Summary: The Imbricated Synthesis On Power and Truth*  
 [[Identified as 'Summary': 2.1.10, 2.2.10, 2.3.10, and 2.4.10]

The final subsection for each discipline summarizes the key theoretical and methodological insight that stem from that field's fixed or preferred modes of inquiry. Hence through 'tacking' through these main points of synthesis in 2.1.10, 2.2.10., et seq. a richer and more fully integrated outlook on dominance and subjugation in heritage construction may be obtained. The end result is a much improved set of perspectives on the administrative context in which historical truth is created and / or projected; and that is (if the concept of the '*unsociological*' contribution of Foucault to 'the social' --- as nominated by Habermas (1987:242) --- may be borrowed) an '*unadministrative*' look at that administrative milieu.

Following the review of the literature of the four major, ground-floor disciplines by these ten perspectives, the other four (more **applied**) disciplines will be examined in terms of their contributions to power and truth, against a shorter set of perspectives. That reduced list will be explained at the start of subsection 2.5.

Before these first four of the selected disciplines are examined through the above schema, two caveats are necessary. The first (2.0.2) is a rubric on postmodernity, to draw attention to some important points about the manner in which disciplines can and do look at such an octopoidal entity. The second (2.0.3) is a similar rubric on meaning, to recapture some of the critical interdisciplinary nuances of 'meaning' for the constructivist methodologies which follow in sections 3, 4 and 5.

## 2.0.2      **Related Disciplinary Understanding: The Discourses on Postmodernity**

All expressions of the image or content of a mass phenomenon or a majority culture necessarily becomes a 'reduction' or a 'shrinking' of entities (Nettleford 1986:9-10). Thus complicated social behaviors and / or involved cultural relationships tend to become translated as broad narratives --- often broad uni-directional or uni-interpreted narratives. It is Foucault who warns screenlessly (i.e., ubiquitously) against the imperialism of such contained or diluted accounts. Researchers must learn to recognize the ways in which they slenderize the dialectic and problematic nature of things --- or at least the way they are drawn into slenderizing the condition of things by the academic and disciplinary pressures of explanation. It is more rewarding both intrinsically and extrinsically to give a bold 'solution' for things than to remain in awe and uncertainty about that subject's 'possibilities'. The former appears masterful: the

latter appears vacant. Supporters of given disciplines have a wanton desire to know something --- preferably from the perspective of their host field's established ordering of the world.

And so, (in the catalyst study) again, to postmodernity --- or rather to the confrontation-cum-confluence of "the narratives of Texas" with the "narratives of postmodernity." Reduced accounts of this convergence would conceivably have the culture and storylines of the state weighed down by the dominant certitudes of Eurocentric modernity and Protestant and other enlightenments, i.e., a state *waiting* to be liberated by the impulses of postmodernity swirling around it. In this manner the inherited vision of the nineteenth century socio-political majority (with its strong unified memories) gradually washes out as the disparate and memoryless global culture of postmodernity (Smith 1990:179) streams in. The established majority of the purveyors of historical 'Texan' truth of the nineteenth century becomes the globalized 'marginal majority' (Wallerstein 1990:41) of the twenty-first.

Table 2.0.2./1 lists twenty of the major current conceptualizations about the loss of authority of Western nations and states over matters of cultural control and representativity. These conceptualizations are 'reduced', and they are 'interdisciplinary': their theoretical force is felt, moreover, in each of the eight disciplines subsequently covered in this section (2).

The processes of postmodernity to which the table refers, are part of the slow establishment of a global ecumene --- a worldwide "region of persistent culture interaction and exchange" (Kopytoff 1987:10; Hannerz 1989). The term *globalization* is preferred to that of *internationalization* since these processes that have accompanied postmodernity --- in some senses preceding it, and in others being coterminous with it --- are relatively (but importantly) free of any literal inter nation-state exchanges (Robertson 1990:15-30). These processes of globalization have accelerated considerably since the 1880s.

The implications of the socio-political changes occasioned through globalization and / or postmodernization --- as evidenced in Table 2.0.2./1 --- are highly germane for this endeavor to establish a research agenda on truthmaking in heritage tourism. They suggest that the cultural imperialisms of the 1990s (and for the foreseeable future?) are no longer 'national' or 'statist' in the West. Yet, in subsection 1.9.3. of this work it was recorded that the surviving 'historical truths' of Texas are, in fact, heavily 'national' and 'statist'. That appears to put the state administrators of the heritage of Texas in a rather invidious position. Unless Texas is immune to these Western-led imperatives of globalization and postmodernity, they are conceivably peddling something of an outdated storyline. They are possibly peddling a heavy dose of state triumphalism when in other socio-political respects, such 'national reminiscences' and 'statist ideologies' are no longer in unqualified favor. Does it therefore mean that the heritage industry and the tourism industry has special license to peddle spent ideologies --- in Texas(?), or elsewhere too? The following subsections (2.1 to 2.8) will endeavor to unleash interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary insight on that postmodern penumbra.

In order to study the effect of large, worldwide systemic forces like globalization and postmodernity upon governance and upon cultural production, some researchers have called for a new

TABLE 2.0.2./1

## THE DISCOURSE ON POSTMODERNITY'S LOSS OF PLACE AND PAST

*THE MAJOR BUT REDUCED THEORIES OF GLOBALIZATION UPON  
POSTMODERNITY'S INFLUENCE UPON THE STATE AND UPON  
GEO-HISTORICAL TRUTH*

- **A chronological account of how the instrumental role of nation states in cultural production is, in many senses, becoming obsolete as the cosmopolitan patchwork of resurgent ethnic and technological - led global/communications forms of culture lose their spatial and temporal bearings.**
- The world has been dominated since the mid-eighteenth century by **unitary nation states** --- viz., national societies consisting of a culturally-homogenized, *administered* citizenry (1>1; 1>2);
- In such nation-states, assimilation was tantamount to a **'declaration of war' on foreign substances and qualities**: the practice of assimilation was an implicit confirmation of the social hierarchy (2>1);
- These modern states were able to undermine the integrity and strength of resistance of contesting social institutions as **a collectively maintained, communal way of life** was defined and enforced (3>1);
- The nationalization of the state --- i.e., the *estatization* of the nation admixed the issue of **political loyalty** with that of **cultural conformity** (4>1);
- With the onset of postmodernity, states have slowly begun to become denationalized --- where the **state** is gradually **distinguished from the nation** (5>1);
- A **'resurgence of ethnicity'** is encouraged through (or at least coincides with) the postmodernization of Western societies and as membership of the state's body politic separates from ethnic membership (6>1);
- States are forced to become more tolerant towards **ethnic diversity**, and the age of state-driven 'cultural crusades' slowly evaporates (7>1);
- Culture begins to lose its instrumental role "in servicing the systemic reproduction and [in] underwriting the social integration", and it becomes part of **private spheres of interest and engagement** (8>1);
- Ethnicity becomes one of the 'tribal-poles' around which individual identities form and are projected' in the diminished presence of **the weakening centrifugal forces** of the state (9>1);
- Ethnic differences begin --- in many but not all places --- to generate **reduced levels of antagonism** and inter-community conflict as many --- but not all --- heterophobia begin to wilt (10>1);
- **Ethnicity** becomes a basic if **informal organizing principle** of Western society --- particularly in the U.S.A. --- but not the only such to be, or the overriding allegiance (11>1);
- With the rise of vast telecommunications systems and the mass media, **continental and global aspects of culture** begin to take seed, growing over many local/ethnic/communal cultures (12>1);
- Yet --- these same communications networks also makes possible a denser interaction between the members of such local/ethnic/communal cultures, which inspires a **resurgence of many ethnic 'nationalisms'** (13>1);
- The rising global and continental cultures of the communications/media systems face technical problems: their technical solutions yield **a relatively calculated and artificial culture** (14>1);
- Global/continental culture rapidly becomes a largely **'constructed'/'imagined' culture** --- heavily expressive and heavily symbolic (15>1);
- The new *ethnic* and the new *global/communications* cultural models of postmodernity --- unlike the models of modernity are **not grounded in the realities of the nation state** (16>1);
- In the present age, as postmodern impulses conceivably accelerate, it becomes important to regard **national societies as only one reference point** for the way individuals conceptualize themselves (17>1);
- The imperialisms of the present age are increasingly non-national, as 'nations' and 'nationalism' --- both of which had been highly functional in a world of competing industrial states --- become less necessary in **the service society** of an interdependent/postmodern world established upon **technical knowledge** (18>1);
- While the resurgent ethnic culture still retains some strong ties to local/sacred territories, the emergent global/communications culture is **not linked to particular places** (19>1);
- With ethnic cultures spreading through migration, and with global/communications culture technologically diffusing across continents, **the emergent postmodern cultural models of today are fast becoming cut off from 'true' concepts of the past** (20>1).

SOURCE: Mainly derived from 'Theory, Culture and Society' articles reprinted in Featherstone:1990.

TABLE 2.0.2./1 (Continued)

## KEY

1>1	McNeil 1986
1>2	Anderson 1983
2>1	Bauman 1990:158
3>1	Bauman 1990:158
4>1	Bauman 1990:161
5>1	Bauman 1990:167
6>1	Bauman 1990:167
7>1	Bauman 1990:167-8
8>1	Bauman 1990:167
9>1	Bauman 1990:167
10>1	Bauman 1990:167-8
11>1	Smith 1990:173
12>1	Smith 1990:175
13>1	Richmond 1984
14>1	Gouldner 1979
15>1	Smith 1990:177-179
16>1	Bauman 1989:152
17>1	Robertson 1990:26
18>1	Smith 1990:176
19>1	Smith 1990:177
20>1	Smith 1990:177



discipline for 'matters universal' (Bergeson 1980). Other investigators in the humanities have raised objection to this stated necessity: Robertson (1990:19) believes that the synthesized recomposition of existing social theory "in its broadest sense" is preferable to the development of a new field of inquiry. This viewpoint is supported by Giddens and Turner (1987:1) who call for the cultivation of collective outlooks for such universal programs of research --- outlooks which they argue should reach across a broad range of the social and cultural sciences, but which have 'concern-for-world-flows-and-global-change' as the central hermeneutic arising from them.

Whether or not a new world-as-a-whole discipline is ultimately created, inquiry into the orbicular social and communal developments that act substantively upon governments and upon cultural institutions will continue to be a slippery matter. As stated in section 1, "what is striking [about postmodernity] is precisely the degree of consensus in postmodernist discourse that there is no longer any consensus [about what definitely, postmodernity *is*]" (Connor 1989:10). Postmodern theory is an host of incommensurabilities: postmodern practice is a welter of paradox (Montag 1988:91-2). Postmodernity itself, ipso facto, is better understood not so much as **a totalizing force** acting within society, but as **a discursive function** by which other ideas / developments / conceptualizations may be gauged (Connor 1989:10). Hence the supreme value of being able to cross-test the worth and fit of eight contemporary disciplinary perspectives on postmodernity in this section (2.1 to 2.8).

To Connor (1988:10) the valuable question is not what postmodernity *is*, but what it *achieves*. To Fish (1980:3) the proper query is not what postmodernity *means* but what it *does*. Both Connor and Fish question the subject contextually. Postmodernity is well enwrapped in the somewhat obscure distinctions between the global and the local. As Robertson (1990:19) has succinctly pointed out such social and cultural contours are very complex, even to the degree that it is now reasonable to speak of "the global institutionalization of the lifeworld and the localization of globality."

Since postmodernity is so tentacular and thereby so unavoidably problematic, it has to be defined in context with considerable care. Today, "each individual is a member of many groups, and indeed of groups of very different kinds --- groups classified by gender, by race, by language, by class, by nationality, etc." (Wallerstein 1990:31). In this way so many individuals engage in so many 'cultures', each of which are affected quite differentially by the imprint of postmodernity.

Although the tendencies of postmodernity, are pronounced, they are rarely conclusive (Bauman 1990:167). The conditions under which postmodernity survives or thrives are highly involved conjunctures (Ross 1988:x). *There can not realistically be a single social theory of postmodernity* --- nor should there be for any human theme and / or cultural force. The imbricated commentary on postmodernity's consequences (or rather, the consequence of postmodernities) for state power and for historical representation is merely a common sense step --- an episodic analysis of the grand, contemporary, epic-diluting epic.

### 2.0.3 Related Disciplinary Understanding: Meaning in Discourse

Having provided the first caveat on the interdisciplinary literature on power and truth --- a caveat on the discourse of postmodernity --- this second (companion) subsection is a similar rubric on meaning. It is an attempt to show the relationship between particular meanings and particular discourse.

Table 2.0.3./1 has been conceived to draw attention to recent Foucauldian developments in the understanding of the 'meaning' of things as they are in currency within discourses. It registers these crucial precepts which are variously held by theoreticians of discourse:

- **Meanings are not homogenous:** both the words used and the meanings of words change from one discipline to another, from one discourse to another [ --- from point 1 of Table 2.0.3./1].
- in general, a discourse is that set of meanings (or social knowledges) that is current or convenient to a particular group or community; in particular, academic or disciplinary discourse is that **social knowledge** which prevails within distinct paradigms or within distinct fields of inquiry [ --- point 2 of Table 2.0.3./1];
- Discourses conceivably play a significant part in **holding social groups / communities together** [ --- point 3];
- Just as people 'make' discourse, so **discourse 'makes' people** [ --- point 4];
- Discourses are structured by '**rules**' which compose **the practices by which the world is surveyed and represented**; those very representations help maintain the societies and / or groups who have developed them [ --- point 5];
- **Objects do not have meaning in nature or in language:** that meaning is created for them in discourse [ --- point 6];
- **Classes in power use discourse** (and related practice) **to subjugate other classes** (while those classes simultaneously attempt to exert 'power' over them) and to 'individualize' people [ --- point 7];
- Meanings within discourse evolve not so much in their own right, but **by contending against** other representations of objects proffered by competing discourses [ --- point 8];
- In the last two decades, a number of large and **interfeeding resistances** to globalizing discourses have emerged [ --- point 9];
- Currently, **threatened pre-modern traditions** are (on all continents) being speedily recomposed within the new **discourses-of-resistance** against the encroaching universalisms of the cosmopolis [ --- point 10].

Overall, Table 2.0.3./1 suggests that meanings are not nowadays regarded as the relatively unchanging and homogenous representations of entities regardless of discipline, regardless of field of

TABLE 2.0.3./1

## AN EXPLANATION OF MEANING IN DISCOURSE

**This table presents the contemporary Foucauldian view that meanings are based upon a pure logic of ideas and proffers the emerging view that meanings are social and political as much as idealistic.**

- 1 **THE MULTIPLICITY OF DISCOURSE** Social theorists used to believe that languages were homogenous (i.e., that people speaking a given language all spoke the same language --- in terms of a common code of meanings and utterances (1>1). Recent work on discourse, however, rejects the view that a single or general system lies behind all discourse (1>2). Discourse differ within the institutions and through the practices that form them, and discourse also change contextually in terms of who is communicating and whom is being addressed. There is no basic accord or indivisibility in discourse. "The institutions which prompt people to speak [including the disciplines] ... store and distribute the things which are said" (1>3). The meanings held and the conceptions of individuals --- and thereby the discourse of individuals --- are, under the multicultural and polyethnicity of societies today, "rendered [even] more complex by gender, ethnic and racial considerations" (1>4).
- 2 **ALL MEANINGS ARE SOCIAL** Communities and groups can be constituted in terms of their meanings they adopt and the rhetoric they use (2>1): "village sewing circles, urban carouses, workers' lunchtime [gatherings], etc., will all have their own type. Each situation, fixed and sustained by social custom, commands a particular kind of organization of audience" (2>2). Differences in discourse are not just those of class, they are now broadly felt to be differences of the knowledges held by particular groups/bodies/orders-of-people. Groups of various sorts use or change or invent their discourse "to gain power over situations" (2>3). This appears to be so far academic knowledges as for any other: they are social representations of reality as much as they are *privileged* or *analytic* representations (2>4). Even in disciplines that claim rich argumentative rigor, "the power of academic arguments may lie more in keeping certain discursive practices alive than in forcing a confrontation with reality (2>5). Every piece of communication --- inclusive of every academic piece of communication --- presupposes a social signification system (2>6).
- 3 **DISCOURSE IS SOCIAL PRODUCTION** Discourse is socially constituted through those institutional practices and these techniques of groups/organizations/agencies where meanings are cultivated (3>1). Discourse is, therefore, involved in the social production of meaning (3>2), and constitute the repertoires of conventional understanding and expression held by those groups/organizations/agencies. Some now argue that it is the discourse itself which holds social processes together (3>3): "the socializing power of academic discourse can act as a centripetal force ... pulling participants into self-isolating vocabularies (3>4). Yet, who holds a particular discourse can be a most difficult matter to resolve.
- 4 **THROUGH DISCOURSE, PEOPLE ARE 'MADE' INTO SUBJECTS** In Foucault's view people are made by their culture --- particularly by the knowledges which compose their adopted or forced discourse (4>1). Pêcheux echoes this by proposing that this very manufacture of people is ongoing and occurs in even 'concrete' and 'everyday' situations (4>2). And yet it is people who make those very discourses that make people. Althusser's thesis is that "it is man [sic] who makes history" (4>3). By extension, it is therefore people who make the storylines and the ground-rules by which people live: it is people who manufacture social inequalities whether it be sustained by the discourse of their histories or by the discourse of their other economic or cultural dealings.

TABLE 2.0.3.1 (Continued)

- 5 **DISCOURSE HAS RULES** Discourse has their own internal axioms and regulations (5>1), just as at a larger scale epistemes are formed by definite 'intestinal' rules. It is these 'rules' which structure the system of the discourse and of the episteme (5>2). Such rules --- and hence, such discourse --- emerge historically. They constitute the hidden mechanisms through which a group or society passes on its knowledges and at the same time *helps preserve itself*, concealed behind that representation of the world (5>3). To Foucault such rules compose the 'practices' of the discourse (5>4). These practices are 'the codes of knowledge' or rather the **gaze** of the profession/discipline/society (5>5). Individuals are not so much *amputated* by the rules of each discourse (i.e., of each social order) as they are *fabricated* within it. Such is the disciplinary power that emanates from each discourse (5>6).
- 6 **MEANINGS RESIDE IN SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE** Contemporary theorists of discourse tend towards the view that the meaning of things do not exist naturally: there is no natural order of definable things (6>1) and no neutral truth to be discovered about things --- no matter how precise the line of argument or how acute the research approach (6>2). Science is itself only an effort to designate the real (6>3). Meaning then, according to current thought on discourse, does not lie in nature, nor does it lie in language, *ipso facto*: they can only be found "in the concrete forms of differing social and institutional practice" (6>4). Each discourse develops certain concepts about reality at the expense of others and creates certain objects as entities within the world (6>5).
- 7 **DISCOURSE GENERALLY REPRESENTS EFFORTS AT CONTROL NOT PROHIBITION** To Foucault, the power that lies behind discourse and practice is exercised more frequently in terms of *control* than *prohibition* (7>1). Accordingly that power is a power of relations and it is generally 'productive' (7>2). The discipline of discourse and the discipline of practice constitute the means by which the power of dominant classes are exercised --- and when that class operates through government, 'the government of individualization' results (7>3). Such subjugation is often carried out through subtle, calculated technologies of subjection (7>4), and through it, the government constructs the individuals it prefers (7>5). Anyone can be so 'disciplined' by government, though it ought to be clarified that Foucault did probably not mean that the subjugation was always one way --- one class subjugating another (7>6).
- 8 **DISCOURSE GENERALLY EXISTS ANTAGONISTICALLY IN RELATION TO OTHERS** To Pêcheux, discourse is frequently set up in counteractive relations to the ideologies present within other discourse (8>1). In such instances, the discourse is significant for its political dimensionality. This amounts to the exterior value of the meanings of words and phrases --- and has "nothing at all to do with purely linguistic properties" (8>2). Pêcheux maintains that discourse is constructed over time through struggles against contrary ideologies: hence *meanings exist antagonistically* (8>3).
- 9 **IDEOLOGIES WITHIN DISCOURSES TEND TO FORM IN OPPOSITION TO DOMINANT ORDERS-OF-THINGS** Althusser believed that ideologies have predominantly tended to form *in resistance* to ruling ideologies (9>1). The very construction of culture has, historically, always been a key ideological battleground for opposing interests (9>2). During the 1970s Foucault had begun to notice a strong connection between practices in currency in Western society and an emergent set of resistances which had developed amongst women/gays/the psychiatrized/prisoners and the like (9>3). These evolving or re-shaped discourses challenged the ongoing individualization of the population they were part of: the new discourse asserted the right to be different (9>4). In similar vein, a number of non-Western fundamentalisms have developed reformed discourse to challenge the religious 'Westoxication' of all people around the globe (9>5). Such discourses and practices resist the establishment of the West as the universal/default point of reference for the world (9>6).
- 10 **DISCOURSES TEND TO BE 'POLITICAL'** No discourse is neutral; all are ideologically positioned (10>1). In the last decades of the twentieth century, the ethnic cores of nations --- as identified in pre-modern traditions/memories/myths/values/symbols are proving most resilient to the imposing discourse and practice of globalization and cosmopolitanism (10>2). Localism thrives in new senses as territorially anchored and bounded cultures resist universal individuation. These new, burgeoning discourse now amount to 'a culture shock prevention industry' (10>3), as the marginalized have to rapidly learn how to counteract advancing cosmopolitan subjection.

TABLE 2.0.3./1 (Continued)

## KEY

1>1 Macdonell 1986:8-9	7>2 Foucault 1980:119 and 198
1>2 Macdonell 1986:9	7>3 Foucault 1982:212
1>3 Foucault 1979:11	7>4 Foucault 1977/B:221
1>4 Robertson 1990:27	7>5 Foucault 1982:212
2>1 Lyne 1985:68	7>6 Macdonnell 1986:120
2>2 Volosinov 1973:97	8>1 Pécheux 1982:185-6
2>3 Bruns 1982	8>2 Pécheux 1982:185
2>4 Rorty 1979:165-212	8>3 Pécheux 1982:111
2>5 Rorty 1979:68	9>1 Althusser 1971:139
2>6 Eco 1979:7	9>2 Wallerstein 1990:39
3>1 Laclau 1980:87	9>3 Foucault 1982:211
3>2 Macdonnell 1986:4	9>4 Foucault 1982:211-2
3>3 Macdonnell 1986:96	9>5 Beyer 1980:373-396
3>4 Lyne 1985:68	9>6 Sakai 1988
4>1 Foucault 1982:208	10>1 Pécheux 1982:152
4>2 Pécheux 1982:37-40	10>2 Featherstone 1990:10
4>3 Althusser 1976:40	10>3 Hannerz 1990:245
5>1 Foucault 1972:120	
5>2 Pécheux 1982:112	
5>3 Foucault 1977/A:225	
5>4 Foucault 1972:181	
5>5 Foucault 1973:51 and 90	
5>6 Foucault 1977/B:217 and 226	
6>1 Macdonell 1986:6	
6>2 Macdonell 1986:7	
6>3 Pécheux 1982:141	
6>4 Macdonell 1986:12	
6>5 Macdonell 1986:3	
7>1 Foucault 1979:41	

inquiry. The table teaches that researchers must be vigilant in their examination of critical terms across disciplines. The literature warns that no single epistemological logic governs the construction of meanings: no uniform ontological rationality guides the use of meanings. Meanings are **social entities** within the communication repertoires of fields-of-study / disciplines / paradigms rather than being 'universal,' 'perfect' or 'truthful' designations of reality.

That stated, however, it should also be realized that any sustained attempt to isolate meanings within disciplines, and thereby to slice knowledge up into "neat, isolated fields is simply not realistic" (Albert 1987:82). There is bound to be much repetition in the pages that follow --- and Foucault is one theorist, at least, whose views are peripatetic, and cannot be confined to any single field of inquiry. Redundancy of perspective is therefore to be expected, and ought --- in most if not all instances --- to be applauded.

## 2.1 THE SOCIOLOGY LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH

### 2.1.1 Introduction

The sociology literature is fundamentally of interest for this study with regard to its insight into the way people --- not so much individually or in isolation, but collectively and corporately --- interact with their social worlds. The relationship of interest here is that of humans as producers and the social world as product. But this or these relationships as recognized in the sociology literature is / are far from being direct and straightforward whereby the producer always shapes the product. The relationship is a continuing dialectical process (Berger and Luckman 1967:61).

Sociological theory today generally maintains that **members of societies live by the ideas of that society**. It is the relationship between these ideas and their sustaining social processes that tends to be dialectical:

Man [sic!] is biologically predestined to construct and to inhabit a world with others. This world becomes for him the dominant and definitive reality. Its limits are set by nature, but once constructed, this world acts back upon nature. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world the human organism itself is transformed. In this same dialectic man produces reality and therefore produces himself (183).

The dialectic character of humans and their society has, then, chiefly been recognized in terms of 'humans and nature' and 'humans and society'. Firstly, the dialectic between people and nature unfolds in the specific *socio-historical circumstances* people are born into. Life expectancy, for instance, varies with social location. Societies can maim and kill, having institutionally programmed powers over life and death.

Secondly, the dialectic between people and society is revealed in the way societies create the ideas --- *the subjective realities* --- people live by. Identity is sustained by social relations: formed by

social processes it continues to be moderated and re-caste by social forces during the lifetime of individuals.

Sociologists therefore explore, amongst other things, the fashions in which societies establish sets of meanings through which people relate themselves to the world about them and to the communities and cultural groups that have evolved within it. They focus upon the participation of individuals within those communities. When different groups want different things and are unable to compromise, impasse or attrition characterizes the relationships within society. A 'politics of consensus' is replaced by 'a politics of stymie' within the said society (Bell 1976:148).

Sociologists therefore study the 'games' played between living and communicating people. Focusing upon the aggregate or community level, they study the social functioning of communal organizations and the aggregate impulses rather than the idiosyncratic behaviors of individuals. And in investigating this social functioning, sociologists map *the sociology of knowledge* within those given societies, viz., the way reality is differentially conceived across groups and the way some things rather than others are assumed to be 'knowledge'.

In exploring social knowledges, sociologists plumb the consciousness of people-in-groups. Theoretically, this amounts to the way the institutional order of given societies is objectified. Or, put another way, sociologists study **reification** --- "the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things" (Berger and Luckman 1967:89). Ironically, then, the real relationship between people and the world becomes reversed in much of the theory of sociology: "Man [sic!] the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product" (89). People --- the constructivists --- are assumed to be constructions of a thinking and an active order.

### 2.1.2 Outlook on Power and Truth

Sociological theories are normally drawn to the view that individuals are not born as members of given societies, but are born with *a predisposition towards sociality*. The individual can only become a member of this or any given society, once he has internalized its values (Berger and Luckman 1967:129) and accepted the power of its institutions and his / her own responsibilities in supporting them.

The process of becoming is rarely a straightforward, axiomatic or comfortable one. To borrow from Rousseau, each society is held together by coercion --- by the army, the militia and the police, or via a moral order based upon rules of common law and upon the necessity of individuals to respect one another (Rousseau in Bell 1976:154).

Some social theorists would claim that the celebration of history is fully part of those coercive processes. Marx believed that humans largely make their own preferred history within the limitations of inherited 'historical possibilities' (164). History has its part to play, thereby, in the preservation of privilege. Indeed the whole of human culture (not just history) has been designated as the creation of people --- "a constructed world to maintain *continuity*" (170).

Each society thus has both rituals of inclusion and incorporation, and ceremonies of relinquishment. They are contained within a symbolic universe for the particular society. This symbolic universe constitutes **a collective memory** (Halbwachs 1950; Halbwachs 1952), which houses all of the revered events in an integrated storyline. That collective memory socializes other individuals, and ties contemporary people with their predecessors and their successors in a relatively cohesive unity --- a self-maintaining storyline (Berger and Luckman 1967:105).

Yet the inheritance of the past are rarely passively accepted heritages from the past (Sapir 1924:417). Those visions of the past are buffeted, collide and occlude with other different visions, and the emergent account still demands the creative participation of the society's current community of individuals in order to further it (418).

Today, sociologists report that the transference of integrated cultures and composite histories from one generation to another appears to be becoming an increasingly delicate matter. Nowadays in the Western world, cultures tend to be less reflexive of the prevailing society alone: "the system of social relations is [becoming] so complex and differentiated, and experiences are so specialized, complicated or incomprehensible, that it is difficult to find common symbols to relate one experience to another" (Bell 1976:95).

Bell (119) espouses the view that today, Western societies endure *a problem of coherency*: a relative absence of coherence of 'sustenance' and 'experience', not just of 'social form'. In his estimation, the United States has always lacked the unifying ground of a geographical and spiritual center --- and though he writes ostensibly of artists and literary figures, his judgement is clearly intended to cover society in its entirety. Societies are becoming bewildered by the sheer diversity of cultural domains they contain (102).

Bell sees this bewilderment as both a crisis of belief and a loss of *civitas* --- i.e., "that spontaneous willingness to obey the law, to respect the rights of others, to forgo the temptations of private enrichment at the expense of the public weal" (245). In his estimation, *culture in post-industrial society* is less related to the past than previous cultures used to be. Personal feelings and individual experiences are becoming the main arbiter of what is appropriate in society as "[the] novelty of sensation becomes the main engine of change" (132). **Culture is becoming self-authored**, as former and established authorities are less able to dictate or lead what is 'authentic' for that given society. New sensibilities tend towards the immediate and the idiosyncratic where 'the great chain of continuity' is no longer so relevant (132).

And yet, despite the rising singularity of experience, societies in the West still tinker with their own past truths. Sociologists still report that a 'sense of history' is still important in nation-building. Modern nation-states engage in "an incessant propaganda of shared attitudes" (Bauman 1990:154), as they attempt to celebrate and further particular revisions of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Since patriots have to be made (Shafer 1955:121), the power-brokerage of and about



history has a pivotal role in social engineering. As Rousseau (1953:176-7) advised the King of Poland, patriots must not only be encouraged out of inclination and passion, but they must be created out of necessity.

The shaping of the truth about the past by elites and dominant forces in society is recognized by contemporary sociologists to be a war against ambivalence. Dominant forces in cities / states / nations find less trouble when 'neutral' individuals and 'strangers' are assimilated. And that assimilation is no self-administered change: it stands for 'conversion' --- citizens are 'made alike' (Bauman 1990:156). Contemporary state power has accordingly meant the weakening of many forms of communal self-management as states have deliberately engaged in the management of social processes, inclusive of the selective refurbishment of history. States and elites have endeavored "to create artificially what nature could not be expected to provide" (157). Such is *the modern designing power* of contemporary states --- a quite new sort of power of an untrammelled initiative, breadth and latitude (Bauman 1987). Such, according to the sociology literature, is the elitist and statist endeavor to validate one motif of history at the expense of all of the others and thereby one habit of living in lieu of 'foreign' behaviors and 'strange' pursuits. Assimilated histories overtly confirm the social hierarchy (Bauman 1990:158).

### 2.1.3 Similar Investigations

In reviewing the sociology literature for similar investigations upon power and truth, sociologists are predominantly drawn to investigating the way contemporary social change is altering the balance of forces in society. In Western society in particular, a shift is taking place amongst those who are able to exert the power to articulate truth about culture and heritage.

After Foucault, there is an inclination in sociology to see "power" on a wider horizon --- less commonly as only a negative functional arm of repression which imposes, and more often as a productive webbing of competitive and / or complementary networks or sources of power which contest in their attempt to enable individuals and institutions. Clearly, however, such terms as 'negative' and 'enabling' are loaded valuations, and the sociological insight rendered is subject to the critical theoretical stance of the investigator and research audience.

Foucault's lesson for sociologists is an important one: **power** is *a matter of relations* not merely *a matter of instrumentality*. Potentially those relations can be relations-of-war or relations-of-peace (Foucault, in Morris and Patton 1979:39) --- dependent upon the interpreting standpoint of the observer. What Foucault instructs is that even the peaceful cooperation of groups and institutions over cultural and heritage matters can be interpreted as a form of war, and that the agencies of the State exist latently for groups and populations within given societies as one alternative mode amongst many by which that 'war' or that 'peace' may be waged. After Foucault, then, sociologists are learning that individuals and groups can remake themselves, but can only do so within the confines of the limits of **the relations of power** that have inherited or established. In that light, sociologists are finding it to be crucially important to

measure the limits of those relations for dominant and subordinate groups in society. They now seek to plot the rise and fall of the cultural war effort or the cultural peace effort as different members of that society and of the research community would judge it.

Sociologists of the second half of the twentieth century have been operating under the rise of adversary culture (Bell 1976:40) where the mix of different traditions and inheritances gaining legitimacy in society has widened significantly. The dominant bourgeois worldview which, based on rationalistic matter-of-fact programatics, had a hold over the cultural, religious and educational order of Western states --- not just over the techno-economic system --- has slowly begun to wane (53). Anti-bourgeois elements within Western societies have struggled during the twentieth century to attain autonomy from totalized social structures, and since the 1960s, the antinomian and anti-institutional coloration of these resistances has deepened considerably. The inherited nineteenth century social structure has been the target of the onslaught of different cultural forces and sub-cultural impulses from both within and beyond each given society. Different / alternative / oppositional cultures --- often originally practiced by a marginal, an extreme or an elusive cénacle within states --- have gradually become cogent and well-founded at greater levels of permissibility, re-appreciated by larger numbers and / or copied by new zealots (54).

Sociologists generally recognize that the 1960s were highly important for this cultivation and, flowering of attritional sensibilities. The decade proved to have a noisy, anti-cognitive and anti-intellectual mood which sapped the pragmatisms of the inherited bourgeois predominancies which had flowed from the nineteenth century. In the social order, the politics of groups fused with the art of groups as the war over cultural representation came less to be about *precious content* or *proper interpretation*, and more commonly about *preferred form* and *interesting style*.

These changes to cultural representativity accelerated in the U.S.A., which unlike Europe, did not have the continuing persistence of l'ancien régime directing cultural form and caretaking historical truth: "once modernism broke down, the absence of traditional forms of culture in the United States opened up a field for a whole new cultural production across the board" (Jamieson, in Stephanson 1988:8). Thus, in the Lonestar State for instance, contemporary sociologists would be highly interested to explore whether the prevailing nineteenth century Anglo, Protestant and other leanings (which have been seen to characterize the molding of Texan truths --- as summarized in subsection 1.9) are plausible evidence for the survival of Europe's l'ancien régime into the late twentieth century.

In looking at the social forms of power that underpin versions of truth in currency, Barthes has closely studied myth. By his account, myths are those storylines which have lost their historical quality -- they are emptied of history (Barthes 1972:142). Predominantly, in his view, myths belong to bourgeois society and constitute a form of depoliticized speech. And pointedly, in that sense, the word *political* has a fuller meaning than its normal usage: it describes or relates to "the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, *in their power of making the world*" (143; emphasis added).

To Barthes, the function of myth is to talk about precious things and events in a purified, innocent way --- to give them "a natural and an eternal justification ... a clarity which is not that of an exploration

but that of a statement-of-fact" (143). So, myths act efficiently: they abolish the involved nature of human activities, replacing them with the simple essences of being. Myths are thereby anti-dialectic, to Barthes. They permit social populations to *celebrate* definite things, not necessarily to *act* them out (144). And myths do not necessarily have to have a relationship with 'truth', but they do need to have one with 'use'.

In the estimation of Barthes, myths belong statistically and politically 'on the right'. To him myths are essential and expansive and can take hold of almost anything, "all aspects of law, of morality, of aesthetics, of diplomacy, of household equipment, of literature, [and] of entertainment" (148). Thus the function of bourgeois myth is theoretical, and it is plenary: to externalize selected norms within and across the society.

And where, otherwise, myths 'on the left' exist, they are necessarily inessential. They rarely stretch into the wide arenas of human relationships, and rarely take hold of objects. They focus upon the political notions held by social groups. And the myths of the left cannot fabulize to the fullness of society, because they are always defined by or in relation to the precious space and goals of particular groups within society --- normally to the oppressed, be they the proletarian or the colonized (148). Such leftist storylines tend to be 'real' and 'truthful', and consonantly in Barthes judgement, they make poor or only transient myth.

But myth is not the be-all and end-all of the articulation of social truths by oppressed populations. Other sociologists and social theorists have investigated the re-emergence of ethnic communities and subdued cultures around the world (Richmond 1984). The U.S.A. has been the principal stage for this sociological inquiry, with its examples of 'melting pot' assimilation. The twentieth century has seen the institutions of the U.S.A. attempt in practice to uphold the rhetoric of certain prominent national and civil rights leaders by attempting to integrate through diversity: "Ethnicity has become one of the basic, if informal, organizing principles of American society" (Smith 1990:173), so long as it did not represent itself as a challenge to the overriding allegiance to 'the official nationalism' of the flag, the Revolutionary myths and the Constitution (173).

Pace, the new prominence of ethnicity within nations has been conjoined at international levels by the rise of transnational cultures. In researching the power behind these new global truths, sociologists have found --- as stated in subsection 2.0.2. --- that this supposedly emergent-global-culture is tied neither to place or period. Smith (177) sees it as being widely diffused in space, "cut off from any past ... calculated and artificial": indeed, he judges it to be quite different from all inherited conceptualizations of culture and social truth handed down from previous centuries.

Prominent attention amongst sociologists today, then, is placed under the way contemporary cultures are '*constructed*'. The quest within the discipline is to determine which social groups are able to claim mastery over both nature and history in the new fabrications of culture and truth. Accordingly, state-of-the-art attention in the field is turning to **the deconstruction** of these emergent ethnic and global cultures. Nowadays sociologists explore whether the truths are 'real' or 'invented' traditions, and to what

degree the symbolization of those cultures have had a longstanding, a staggered or a sudden-and-imaginative life.

#### 2.1.4 Related Inquiries

In investigating the way states have administered heritage, sociologists have been attracted to the special problems of legitimation that governments face as they are faced with having to deal with the increasing autonomy of a rising number of *subuniverses* (i.e., different subcultural groups and different ethnic populations) under their charge (Berger and Luckman 1967:87). States not only have to confront the issue of how to *keep-out-the-outsiders*, they have to *keep-the-insiders-in* (87).

The consequence of this sociological and socio-political work is that **the notion of the state is changing**. Particularly in the works of Foucault, sociologists are recognizing that the state's *discipline* does not "derive its effectiveness from the power of the state" on the contrary, the state, in a large measure depends for its effective domination on the existence of discipline" (Foucault, in Morris and Patton 1979:125). The discipline to which Foucault refers is **the capillary nature of power** which bourgeois society "has made its own [and which is diffused and finely distributed through the social field" (131).

Through its capillary nature and its changed used within society, power *may no longer*, by the mid and late twentieth century, *be cleanly identified with individuals who wield it*: nowadays it amounts to an apparatus over which no-one is proprietary. But it is "exercised continuously and anonymously through the minutiae of bodily activities, spatial dispositions [and other required administrative functions]" (131). And this explanation of the petty and opaque activity of the state in power tallies with Barthes' outlook on the mythologies of the state in power. When Foucault uncovers "the hidden hand" of the state and its nameless capillary actors, he is accounting, to a large part, for the mystifications which Barthes (1972:9) alluded to and by which petit-bourgeois culture, petit-bourgeois history and petit-bourgeois truths have been or are transformed into an universal heritage for all of the state's population.

Following Foucault and Barthes, succeeding sociologists have explored the **estatization** of the state --- the way governments have nationalized selective myth, heritage and truth and have "blended the issue of political loyalty and trustworthiness" (Bauman 1990:161). Estatization is synonymous with cultural conformity --- as was acknowledged under 2.1.3.

Estatization --- the issues that surround the nationalization of the state --- is a hugely important area of conceptualization for this study of power behind the construction of heritage. States were never originally unified as citizens of later given ages like to proudly or even nostalgically infer. States are *political, territorial and administrative impositions* which over time have come to be cemented over a given geographic area and across the people within it. In recent decades, sociologists have come to understand that past social science has largely endorsed a substantive 'Myth of Cultural Integration' (Archer 1990:117). Researchers and laypersons alike have assumed that because states are states and societies are societies, they are and HAVE BEEN (for a long time) integrated. But, lately, with the undoing of the

'Myth of Cultural Integration', important work has been conducted into the degree to which different cultural groups and subcultures actually maintain themselves in some considerable vibrancy within dominant states and overarching societies. Sociologists have traced how cultural contradictions and irregularities within and between belief systems make just as important a contribution to social change as anything neat and regular going on in the structural domain (Archer 1988).

In order to maintain their hold on power, on authority and over the future, states (or dominant groups running states) have to deal with these suspected and unsuspected cultural contradictions. They learn to estatize. The persistent task is "*to deal with the problem of strangers, not [the problem of] enemies*" (Bauman 1990:153; original emphasis). States and societies are not like tribes: so commonly, nation states and provinces extend rule over a particular territory *before* they can claim the loyalty of the populations therein (153). Territorial states and provinces have to enforce the friendship of subject populations wherever it has not arisen in its own right: nation states and commonwealths "must artificially rectify the failures of nature (to create by design what nature fails to achieve by default)" (153).

Mandates and dominions have, one could argue, necessarily to collectivize 'friendship' amongst their non-tribal citizenry through studied effort and concentrated force. Those who dominate the state have, necessarily, *to successfully imagine an appropriate community*, and to successfully transfer the idea of that chosen community to the people they have under their care (Anderson 1983). Accord --- wherever it is not already tribal, inherited and complete --- has to be conscripted and exhorted. If the internal citizenry are not yet 'friends', they have to be made into 'friends': only *friends* are trustable natives for the within states (Bauman 1990:153).

In this fashion, according to Bauman, estatization is mobilized: "nationalism seeks the state ... and the state spawns nationalism" (153). *Other* loyalties and *other* feelings within the citizenry have to be minimized or removed (Schafer 1955:119) as the given state continues the promotion of its preferred account of **nativism** and its ongoing process of **nativization**. The indoctrination of the population is ceaseless --- the reindoctrination of 'old loyal' friends and the new-indoctrination of 'emergent strangers'. And if Foucault is correct, the agitprops for the state are of both formal and knowing sorts (the official propagandists) *and* informal and unknowing sorts (the capillary administrators of preferred style and close detail). In these obvious and these inexpectant fashions, the current sociological literature suggests that dominant groups and individuals within states attempt to render the state society *friction-less* --- to force ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural homogeneity.

The construction of an approved history is felt to be a vital part of estatization. Renegade memories, obstinate storylines have to be undermined or quietly muffled in favor of the concordant history and of the affinitous heritage. Univocity about the past is a critical task. The existence of strangers with their own persevering truths about yesteryear, and / or this year, weakens the social and administrative intactness of the territorial state (Alter 1989). The inheritances of troublesome strangers have to be assailed as similarities --- both real and imagined --- are carefully tilled and forcefully trained all across the state's territory.

Contemporary sociologists are active, then, in their study of the way modern states and dominions attempt to stifle the coherence of resistant subcultures and truths about heritage. Sociologists explore the ways in which manifestly competitive or potentially competitive institutions and beliefs are harried by the state as it slowly mobilizes towards the goal of absolute sovereignty. Yet that does not mean that states and mandants tend to be triumphant in this ongoing projectionism. Smith (1990:174) --- to repeat --- maintains that the era of the nation-state is now over. He sees the world as one led by economic giants and superpower nations, no longer by medium or small-scale dominions. 'State' culture is losing out to 'continental' or 'global' culture (175). Just as states have to learn how to estaticize and engineer a 'national' self-sameness, the varied populations of nations are finding increasing levels of cultural harmony and increasing opportunities for rewarding participation in 'the other', or rather in 'each-other's-other!' And novel forms of differing and changeable social practices (which owe little sustained association with stable territories) now erupt or breakout. Just as Western states are learning how to channel and regulate many of the loyalties of the strangers in their midst, their own populations of 'inherited friends' and 'captured strangers' are being enticed by an ever-altering round of non-statist cultural forces and forms.

The contemporary period is a dialectic age --- an age of seeming, considerable contradictions. It is now incumbent upon sociologists and social theorists to work out in which cultural forms states are gaining in their efforts towards cultural imperialism --- and in which the populations of states are being more thoroughly attracted by global appeals and flows. It may be that, for a given state, **it is only possible for it to remain substantively nationalist through the management of its heritage**. Its culture is fast becoming global and universal *except for* its history and its heritage tourism. Is this so for Texas? Is this so for Texas?

Modern states --- if they wish to instill 'national feeling' --- have to be vigilant regarding the range of cultures being expressed because modern societies are becoming increasingly pluralistic: "they have a shared core universe, taken for granted as such, [but they also have] different partial universes coexisting in a state of mutual accommodation" (Berger and Luckman 1967:125). That pluralism is inherently subversive: it does not lie comfortably in those states whose leaders and elites have operated, or seek to operate, within monopolistic situations which "presuppose a high degree of social-structural stability, and [which] are themselves structurally stabilizing" (122). The degree to which a subsociety can maintain itself within plural, modern society appears to depend upon 'the structural configurations' within that society (126), the strength of traditional definition of reality (122), and the complexity of the distribution of truths within that society (166) --- amongst other factors. The "unsuccessful socialization [of strangers / outsiders / newcomers] may [also] be the result of different significant others mediating different objective realities to the individual" (167).

But where states, or state power-brokers, want to try to regulate a matter or to impose a certain set of truths, administrative agencies are established. As Berger and Luckman point out, "institutions ..

imply historicity and control" in their very being (54). The objectivity of the institutional world as "an humanly produced, constructed objectivity" (60). Just as language forces their users into their patterns of structuring thought, so institutions force their users into dealing with the world in terms of the patterns of their objectifications. And so, by focusing upon objectification, sociologists bring scholarly attention back to the constant reification of the world. State administrative institutions can reify heritage, as they can latently reify anything.

### 2.1.5 Related Researchers

The current study of the construction of heritage and its discursive problematics, draws upon a considerable body of sociological literature. Many of the leading social scientists who offer apposite insight into power / truth / knowledge have already been referred to. In this subsection, brief comment will be given on an illustrative set of those leading sociological researchers. It should be recognized at the outset, however, that not all of these researchers would necessarily claim to be, primarily, sociologists. Foucault maintains that he belonged to no discipline --- in the then existing use of that term. And Hobsbawm, for instance, is usually identified as an economist: his name will, moreover, also crop up under the examination of the history literature (2.7.) hereafter.

Nonetheless, *The Truth About Texas ...* harnesses insight from:

- *Durkheim* --- it is Durkheim who explored the manner in which societies *celebrated themselves* and who explored the vivacity with which a group or population of people with shared purposes and common values **effervesced**, i.e., articulated their own communal sense of spirit (Turner 1982:16);
- *Weber* --- it is Weber who theorized that no society had ever existed without some *religious conception of the world*. Where religion, ipso facto, had diminished during the century, Weber suggests that cults appear. Cults generally claim esoteric knowledge; they celebrate communal rites and gregarious truths. To Weber, cults emphasized magic (rather than the theology of religion), and they fed on ritual and myth. Where "religion [had found / finds] its central anchorage --- revelation --- undermined by rationalism, and [where] the central core of its beliefs 'demythologize' into history", societies then become **secularized**. Perhaps then, there the fierce celebration of Texas is cultish: perhaps it is substantively a modern replacement secular unity?
- *Foucault* --- it is Foucault who has drawn attention to the fact, sociologically speaking, that so much of the force behind institutional power in society is social. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries power has been exercised through the imposition on broader society of **the habits** of definite groups. Foucault's work parallels Durkheim in an important respect: where Durkheim had talk of *anomie* and the level of determination that 'the system' of society imposed on the individual, Foucault theorizes about the mechanisms of compulsive disciplining which exist within society (Morris and Patton 1979:66). Foucault would follow Durkheim in stating that "*society, as*

*the subject matter of sociology, is the system of disciplining'* (66; emphases added). To Durkheim and Foucault, sociological insight demands that investigators examine the internal strategies which are endemic to the exercise of power within any social system.

Foucault's contribution to sociological insight into the discursivity of the administration of heritage revolves around the prescriptive use of power. To him, dominant elements in society use their power(s) to specify *norms* and articulate them through *normalizing discourse* and *normalizing practice* over and upon subject populations. Foucault saw how power and truth are tied together where that power is social and that truth is social knowledge:

No power is formed without a system of communication, registration, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is tied in its existence and functioning to other forms of power. No power on the other hand, is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of a knowledge. At this level, there is not knowledge on one side and society on the other, or science and the State, but fundamental forms of 'power-knowledge' (Foucault in Kremer-Marietti 1974:201-205).

To Foucault, then, **power is not independent of society**: the body, the person, all individuals are caught inside *a network of power-relations* --- "a single process of 'epistemologico-juridical' formation" (Foucault 1977/B:23). What Foucault claims to uncover is the theoretically autonomous realm of technologies-of-power (Morris and Patton 1979:123) --- the way a given disciplinary power emerges within and is distributed across a particular disciplinary space (Foucault 1977/B:145). The selection and projection of history can be such a disciplining space for the state and people of Texas.

- *Berger and Luckman* --- it is Berger and Luckman who strongly encouraged 'sociologists-of-knowledge' to concern themselves with **the social construction of reality**. They followed both the social-philosopher, Alfred Schutz (1962:149) (who had judged knowledge to be socially distributed) and Durkheim (1950:14), who had advised sociologists to "consider social facts as things." Over time, Berger and Luckman (1967:20) came to see consciousness as being both social --- i.e., after Schutz --- and alive (or at least 'international', in the sense of being directed towards objects --- i.e., after Durkheim). They stressed that *consciousness of and about the world is multiple*, changing both amongst different people and for a given person in different contexts and settings (21). They acknowledged that such relationships were critically inter-subjective (23) and that it was an extremely difficult task to map the interactive nature of a given individual's relations with others and thereby **the multiple realities** he or she participated in. Perhaps more than any other researchers; Berger and Luckman showed how the sociology of knowledge ought to permeate all fields of social, cultural and human activity. Their ideas are pivotal for the research agenda on truthmaking, being developed.



- *Anderson* --- it is Anderson who illuminated the manner in which central government agencies, education authorities, the media and special interest groups have fabricated or elaborated **imagined communities** which inculcate a strong sense of belonging for or within a state (Hamnett, McDowell and Sarre 1989:17), and which somehow represent what Sapir (1924:405) had interpreted as the synonymous culture of the place --- the distinct 'spirit' or 'genius' of a people. Clearly Anderson's work parallels that of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) who have endeavored to show how the 'modern' traditions of given ages have been so frequently *invented* in the service of diverse purposes --- notably in the "attempt to establish the continuity of a group with a suitable awe-laden historical past (13-14).

### 2.1.6 Related Perspectives

The following five perspectives from the sociology literature, amongst others, the pertinent to studies of dominance and subjugation:

#### • Contemporary Society as Disjuncture

In Bell's (1976:36) view, "historically, most cultures and social structures have exhibited unity," whereas today there is "radical disjunction" between the social structure (the techno-economic order) and the culture of societies. Bell maintains that this **disjuncture** creates a pervasive set of tensions in society (85) between the efficiency and functional rationality of the techno-economic order and the essential prodigality and promiscuity of culture. The 'rational cosmology' which has shaped Western thought from the fifteenth century onwards is, in Bell's view, fast being overturned, and the very coherence of Western society is disintegrating (119). If Bell's fears are justified, is this rendering it more and more difficult for states to purvey unified storylines concerning 'privileged', 'sanctified,' or functional versions of the past? Where the techno-economic order closely mirrors the order of cultural production, it is a simpler task for dominant classes to subjugate others by the transmittance of a singular or consistent mix of truths. The sociology literature suggests that the larger the number of different 'orders' in society, and the wider the gulfs between them, the greater will be *both* the level of socio-political disjuncture within that society and the competitiveness of different truths about the past and the present.

#### • Contemporary Society as Unbridled Hedonism

Bell (65) is adamant that the cultural transformations and tensions which characterize modern society are due to the rise of mass consumption --- a process which, in America, defines what were 'luxuries' as 'necessities', and which constitutes a materialist hedonism. The result is the wearing down of 'Americanism' --- "a poor recipe for national unity and [common] purpose" and a weak affirmation of the past (281). The contemporary search is for 'the new' as an enlargement of horizon, and for a heightening of experiences of all sorts (118). Feelings are increasingly venerated vis-a-vis judgements --- something which has given rise in California, in particular, to the "godless; gregarious pursuit of pleasure" (Time 1969:60). The available varieties of culture are, to Bell, bewildering --- and the sheer *mix*

of 'cultural demesnes' denies Americans (particularly) the chance to respond to a consistent center. They have a reducing opportunity to focus upon a geographical or spiritual postulate --- a cultural core which can provide authority and reinforcement (102). It all would seem to suggest, by Bell's assessment, that grand unifying cultural storylines are becoming dated and less able to insinuate in the U.S.A. Populations, therefore, are increasingly likely to be subjugated by their own desire for new, sensory-loaded, titillating experiences rather than by experiences which emanate from a discipline metered out by 'past others'.

• **Contemporary Society as Placeless Place**

An increasing proportion of the people of the West are *not* perpetually anchored by religious or other 'territorial' roots to particular home-places (Bell 1976:119). Specific time and specific space no longer constitute umbilical coordinates for them --- a condition which Bell (116) calls "the loss of psychic distance." Jameson agrees to some extent with Bell, and considers that, in the cities of the modern age, there has been a dissolution of spatial and temporal orientation just as there has been a dissolution in the value of physical things. The result is that the new urban zones of Western cities offer the inhabitant or the visitor very little spatial or temporal perspective (Jameson in Stephanson 1988:7). Travellers and citizens today are losing their capability to cognitively position themselves within space and time within different given places. The decentered nature of global, multinational culture offers a reduced number of different physical lineaments and authentic historical features by which the particular character of a place and of its past can be 'read' (7). Each urban place is becoming a **simulacrum** of somewhere else (8), albeit of everywhere else. By extension, one may presume that the inheritors of past truths at given place are less able to dominant culture and social life by reinforcing their favored truths in the design and the atmosphere of these places today. *Placeless places* tend to have fewer 'cues' which relate to idiosyncratic pasts. People are less likely to subjugate or 'encourage', therefore, towards behaving in distinctive / local ways, or to appreciate styles of living peculiar to given distinguishable residential situations.

• **Contemporary Society as Indiscriminate Living**

Susan Sontag has viewed the mode of contemporary Western society as being anti-cognitive and anti-intellectual --- an age in which given content, given styles, and given interpretations are being heavily attacked. She believes that the 1960s cultivated 'cooler' sensibilities --- that is, types and levels of appreciation which could not be negated and which were *not* strongly based on disseminations between things (Sontag quoted in Bell:122). The movements which have typified mass society since the 1960s are fueled by an invigorated hunger for experience as a wider panorama upon the world (in regard to its geography, its current affairs, and its cultures) has come within the scope of all kinds of people. This quest for the relatively 'instructured', 'informal', and 'cool' *participation in the new* has been led in many respects by the arts. Appreciation of the arts has become 'a voyage of discovery' in new art forms in which a much greater proportion of the population participate: and art forms crossover, art styles mingle

syncretically to Bell (100). Individuals are not so concerned to legitimate their lifestyle by traditional discriminations within the arts or within life: they become indiscriminate in regard to longstanding standards of value, though ironically they do increasingly seek to differentiate themselves from others by the degree to which they can exhibit their indulgence in the syncretic and the new. People are indiscriminate in terms of longstanding dominances, but are still disciplined by the desire or need to set themselves apart, or above their neighbors --- even if the pursuits they indulge in or are subjugated by are, perhaps, rather less enduring.

#### • Contemporary Society as Sanctified Delusion

The final perspective from the sociology literature concerns the function of myth in society --- particularly with regard to what Barthes (1972) calls the 'mythologies' of life. To Barthes myths are **delusions** acted out in society --- *delusions that can be exposed* (Culler 1983:33). Myths are the second-order meaning that things or events can have --- meanings legitimated by social usage. Thus "wine, for example, is not one drink among others in France, but a 'totem-drink', corresponding to the milk of the Dutch cow or the tea ceremoniously taken by the British Royal Family;" (Barthes quoted and interpreted by Culler;34). To French people "wine gives thus a foundation for a collective morality," (Barthes 1972:59) and "to believe in wine is a *coercive*, collective act ... a ritual of social integration (78-9; emphasis added). Barthes suggests that by developing such mythologies, societies seek to explain nature --- even to dominate nature. He maintains that by formulating mythologies of such scale, cultures "seek to make their own norms seem facts of nature" (Culler 1983:34). A product such a wine becomes "an ornament in the ... ceremonials of French daily life" (Barthes 1972:60), while Bachelard has viewed water and milk as, sociologically, 'the neutral: the anti-wine' (60).

In Barthes view, just as French people conventionalize 'wine', so do wrestlers --- to take another famous one of his mythological explanations, --- conventionalize their sport. In wrestling, for instance, fairness itself becomes the genre, the theater. The appearance of fairness is conventionalized: "in actual fact a fair fight is nothing but an exaggerated polite one --- the contestants confront each other with zeal, not rage ... ." (Barthes 1972:22).

To Barthes mythologies transcribe reality. In his estimation this is particularly so with photography. The art, or rather the practice of photography began when photographs of 'the notable' were taken: the resultant effect is that nowadays, whatever is photographed is *made notable*" (Barthes 1981:34). Perhaps in one sense, then, the mythologies of photography shatters delusions rather than support them. It is "a promiscuous way of seeing which cannot be limited to an elite, as art [can]: (Urry 1990:139). To Sontag (1979:131) photography embodies a "zeal for debunking the high culture of the past ... its conscientious courting of vulgarity ... its skill in reconciling avant-garde ambitious with the rewards of commercialism ... its transformation of art into cultural document [all democratize human experience].

The predominant focus of sociologists on mythologies, however, is the way they are used to render "Nature and History confused at every turn in accounts of contemporary life" (Barthes 1983:33).

When 'Nature' and 'History' are subdued by mythology, it is relatively easier for their replacement *natural* 'what-goes-without-saying' social stereotypes and ideological impositions to be prescribed. And since the act of mythologization necessarily demands 'generations' of times, only *stable* and *mainstream* acts, behaviors, things and events can be so mandated.

### 2.1.7 Related Concepts

In the sociology literature, the following concepts are conceivably predominant in their use in the generation of theories on dominance and subjugation --- they are commented upon here because of their relevance to the petty thralidoms and opaque enslavements being investigated in the current study:

#### • Culture

The conceptualization of culture, as used in sociology, is one of those concepts which borrows heavily from other disciplines (Shweder and Le Vine 1984:7). In sociology as in anthropology, culture is generally regarded as a system of inherited symbols, conceptions and meanings in which a given society perpetuates its knowledges and attitudes (Geertz 1973:89). It is the dynamic component of each 'civilization' which develops and perpetuates that society's worldviews and practices (Bell 1976:33), and it is the continual process by which that society (or a group, or a person) continually sustains coherent identity (936). Over recent years, an important change has come about with regard to the way social theorists see 'culture', as has been acknowledged by D'Andrade (in Shweder): "when I was a graduate student, one imagined people in a culture; ten years later, **culture was all in their heads**". Thus, what counts in sociology and in related social sciences of late, is not what culture is as a separate entity, per se, but how it is constructed in the imagination of individuals, groups, and societies.

#### • Power

This investigation is not molded around any general sociological theory of power, but around Foucault's specific concept. Power is a central theme of Foucault's work-after 1970 or thereabouts --- (Morris and Patton 1979:7) and it is a pillar, dialectic concept of this adjuvant study of the manufacture of Texas. Table 2.1.7./1 details the hypotheses that Foucault felt ought to be fundamental to analyses of power.

As the table shows, in Foucault's judgement the power of **normalization** unavoidably exists within every agency / institution / social body, and it *interfeeds* with the power that inherently exists within other types of human relationships. But, to Foucault, the force of power is not monolithic, single and / or unidirectional --- it is multiple, variable in form, and can be a *power of resistance* as well as a *power of dominion*. It never "totally on one side" of an operational relationship (60). According to Foucault,

TABLE 2.1.7./1  
 FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF POWER:  
 POWER AS AN UNAVOIDABLE FORM OF DOMINATION

<i>Foucault's Broad Hypothesis</i>	<i>Amplification</i>
● Power is coextensive with the social body;	--- while each social agency or institution necessarily gives rise to forms of power, there are not necessarily any basic freedoms for individuals within or under that social body.
● Power is intermingled with other types of relations;	--- power conditions the 'production,' 'kinship,' 'family,' 'sexual,' and 'other,' structures within the given society or social body, and they in turn condition both power and each other.
● The relations of power take multiple rather than singular or unique forms of interdiction and punishment;	--- the <i>logique</i> of these relations and struggles is best examined via step-by-step historical reflection.
● The relations of power are dispersed and heteromorphous, being transformed by inertia and by various distractions and resistances;	--- routinely, there is no neat, binary order where one side dominates a dominated, but there is a multiform production of relations.
● Power is available to be used in the service of a dominant economic or other interest as a potential resource rather than as an axiomatic concomitant of its activities;	--- and power is also available for use by other parties who may be subjugated in other respects.
● The exercise of power always yields or is involved with resistances;	--- power does not have to come from anywhere --- it exists both in the relations of agencies and institutions and the enactment of strategies.

SOURCE: Adapted from Morris and Patton 1979:55-7.

power does not just exist for use by people as a possession, it itself 'acts' (59). And it acts chiefly through its symbiotic association with knowledge (62-3). Because of this tendency of power to act reciprocally with knowledge, institutions overtime are prone to the development it, capillary *apparatus* through which:

- power acts;
- knowledge is conveyed;
- disciplining (both 'up' and 'down') occurs; and,
- habits are formed.

Habits are those prescribed activities / behaviors understandings to which people subject themselves within the institutional setting of that *power-knowledge reciprocity*. Moreover, since the eighteenth century, Foucault considers that neither 'power' nor 'knowledge' have tended to be free-floating within these institutional contexts --- they are 'manufactured' within the apparatus or rather the relationships of normalization.

Before the eighteenth century, in Foucault's judgement, the Western world "had a society in which power took the **visible** form of hierarchy and sovereignty" (65). Such power used to be readily distinguished through the process of its legitimation: most institutional power was demarcated through ceremony, and was highly discernible and highly apparent. But during the nineteenth century, especially, institutional power also began to be claimed by *non-sovereign groups* and also began to act much more frequently through the knowledges possessed within such non-regnant and non-hierarchical populations. Power did not necessarily have to originate alongside or within *authenticated knowledges* (64). Power could now be imposed by a much wider range of definite groups, could impose itself through a much wider range of definite groups, and could *be imposed to* normalizing within the knowledges of a much wider range of groups.

In the current study of Texas, then, the oeuvre of Foucault may be followed to explore whether there is evidence that power works by itself. In this respect one would also be following Nietzsche, who suggests that power is fundamentally a matter of the relations of force and *not* merely the sustained conduct of economic relations (129). Neither Foucault nor Nietzsche claimed to have established **a** or **any coherent theory of power**, but they do claim to have advanced a **suitable grid** by which certain power and / or certain historical events and practices can be closely scrutinized (129). Through the use of that 'grid', researchers should be more discriminately able to explore the two-way capillary nature of power --- i.e., the way its enactment reaches *into* and *from* given populations rather than being merely seen *above* or *alongside* them. After Foucault, as Table 2.1.7./1 implies, sociologists have less confidence in attributing as a phenomenon held by individuals who exercise it *exclusively* by right of birth or indeed who use it *exclusively* by dint of any right. After Foucault's grid, "power becomes a machine which belongs to no-one" (131). Its subtle forms of opaque 'life' and its petty 'disbursal' are now identified in and across an ever-widening range of social and cultural contexts. The exercise of institutional power

is now more frequently seen to be something of deeper consequence than the ostentatious display or one-way expenditure of power.

If Foucault's *historical* style of sociological analysis is acceptable on this matter, then it is imperative that researchers of the administrative dealings and doings of institutions look for the ways in which it is "exercised continuously and anonymously through the minutiae of bodily activities, spatial positions or lines of visibility" (131) --- and also for the ways it exercises itself. Investigators are thereby looking into the **disciplinary drive** that may exist within administrative bodies (Merquior 1985:92), where (for instance, in the administration of heritage tourism) the citizens of Texas, tourists to Texas, and state administrators themselves are **the docile bodies** (93) of the Nietzschean / Foucauldian grid.

#### • Reification

The concept of reification has already been introduced earlier in this section. Just a little more, for clarity, ought to be stated here on the subject. Reification, as was noted, is the ideation of human and social entities as if they had a *living* existence --- that is, the conceptualization of the outcomes of human thought and endeavor as if those brainchildren / concoctions / creations actually had a life of their own. As Berger and Luckman (1967:90) point out, much reification lies conveniently "in the consciousness of the man in the street" --- in the necessary superficialities and inescapable sort-cut understandings of our respective perspectives.

But reification is also commonplace within the rationalities and scientific constructions of theorists. And reification there is inevitably more dangerous, notably when the possibility exists of a limited number of intellectuals or a select net of "universal experts holding an effective monopoly over all ultimate definitions of reality" (121) which may exist in a given society or *in the world* concerning the said subject.

Debates on the nature of reification demand high levels of discernment for "as soon as an objective social world is established, the possibility of reification is never far away" (89). Indeed the bodyweight of Durkheimian sociology has even been dismissed as composing a reified view of social events (Monnerot 1946; Cuvillier 1948). To Berger and Luckman (201) the line between objectification and reification is a fine but an important one. Durkheim (and latterly, also the constructivists of the 1990s) may objectify social facts as things provided that it is still recognized that they are still the outcome of *human construction* (201). If that recognition is absent, reification stands to thrive, instead, and human agency stands to be critically undervalued or ignored. So, careful sociologists would urge that, in the study of Texas, vigilance is taken to discern which groups objectify which subjects within the Texan past, and whether those subjects for each of the stated groups are regarded as taken-for-granted truths, devoid of human agency. To what extent, then, does the state of Texas purvey an objectified Lonestar past, and to what extent is it a reified one? Do different groups / communities in Texas understand that many of their most beloved truths are merely 'social products': they have no objective reality beyond human procurement?

This matter will be aired again in the review of the history literature (2.7) and the review of the tourism literature (2.8) where the contemporary development of heritage sites ad nauseam is seen to be the objectified manufacture of **public culture** --- particularly in the work of Horne (1984).

#### • Subjects

This fourth concept, that of *the* subject, follows on from the three other sociological concepts given, and for it, the discussion returns to Foucault. To recall; concept one was "culture", two was "power", and three was "reification". What Foucault states (in his genealogical look at sociological processes) is that **in each culture, power acts with knowledge to reify certain subjects** --- often beyond the consciousness of the holders or users or channels of that power-knowledge. But to understand the treatment of such subjects, and to trace their origins in and through the past, one has to drop each 'subject' itself: "one has to disperse with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that is to say, to attain an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within the historical texture" (Morris and Patton 1979:135). What Foucault is stating is that, to understand a subject, investigators need to withhold from accepting the taken-for-granted 'nature' or 'existence' of the subject and to ascertain wherever possible how some things / some understandings / some assumptions came to be fabricated as that distinct subject. Every subject, one could summarize for Foucault, *should* be taken in with a pinch of salt.

By extension, under the Foucauldian delineation of subjects, history "is a process without a subject, or rather it may be described from the standpoint of number of subjects" (124). **Each and every subject, to Foucault, is but the articulation or the representation of power itself** (124). Those with power have prospects to be satisfied, outlooks to 'impose' on the world: "*the final trait of effective history is the affirmation of knowledge as perspective*" (Foucault in Bouchard 1978:158). So, in the catalyst study, for Texas: what subject (?) --- whose perspective? How has power acted on the history of the state to create which pedigree subjects?

#### 2.1.8 Related Data Analysis

In this subsection the aim is to discern from the literature of sociology what may be learnt from *related* approaches / avenues / aspects of data analysis for the current study. Hence, in Table 2.1.8./1, a number of areas where sociologists currently prospect, or where one could reasonably expect sociologists to prospect are given.

The table strongly suggests that sociologists increasingly seek to explore the complexities of temporary / situational / intersubjective forms of social meaning and not just the longer more certain and stable characteristics of the structure of given societies. It suggests that in the West the social unit of analysis in sociology is no longer predominantly *the group* --- viz., the guild / the tribe / the city --- but is *the individual person* and how he or she participates almost autonomously with an intricate and variable



TABLE 2.1.8./1

SELECTED AREAS OF DATA ANALYSIS FROM THE SOCIOLOGY  
LITERATURE WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON MATTERS OF DOMINANCE  
AND SUBJUGATION IN CULTURE AND HERITAGE

BROAD AREA OF CONTEMPORARY INVESTIGATION	DATA QUEST
● Research into the Persistent Elements and Shaping Forces of Society	● In the realm of <i>values</i> , what are the legitimating elements within the society; in <i>culture</i> , what are the repositories of expressive symbolism; in <i>social structure</i> , how is the distribution of persons and resources carried out to meet social needs (1>1)?
● Research into the Sources of Instability in Society	● What, if any, are the multi-racial or the multi-tribal or other multi-group sources of ongoing conflict within or across the given society (2>1)?
● Research into the Breakup of Consensus	● What other overt and visible or hidden and invisible factors contribute to the fragmentation of previous or existing consensus within society (3>1)?
● Research into Institutionalization	● What are the processes of institutionalization which apply to each area of collective conduct? What are the processes of habitation that exist within society (4>1)? What are the alternative symbolic universes within a given society (4>2)?
● Research into Language	● How does the language of a given group or society force patterns of behavior upon the activities of people? How does the language used to describe events and activities typify, anonymize, or reduce experience (5>1)? What is the effect of the function and role of language as a depository of 'collective sedimentation' about that society (5>2)?
● Research into the Intersubjectivities of Social Thought and Action	● What is the profile of a given social thought? Social thoughts do not so much exist --- they are 'held' between certain people in certain contexts. Social thoughts do not 'become' they are revealed (6>1). What are the important surface myths/images/delusions which apply to contextual spaces in society vis-a-vis the broader and deeper structures (6>2)?

TABLE 2.1.8./1 (Continued)

## KEY

1>1	Bell 1976:191-2
2>1	Bell 1976:181
3>1	Bell 1976:182
4>1	Berger and Luckman 1967:63
4>2	Berger and Luckman 1967:107
5>1	Berger and Luckman 1967:38-39
5>2	Berger and Luckman 1967:69
6>1	Jameson in Stephanson 1988:14
6>2	Culler (on Barthes) 1983:38

*web of associations*, i.e., social guilds / tribes / city-groups within the given society (Bell 1976:16) --- or even beyond given societies.

### 2.1.9 Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity

Since the work of, firstly, Schutz and, secondly, Berger and Luckman, sociologists have tended to accept the view that knowledge is socially distributed across society: "the important principle ... is that the relationship between knowledge and its social base is a dialectical one, that is knowledge is a social product *and* knowledge is a factor in social change" (Berger and Luckman 1967:87). Hence, as national and societal universes and subuniverses become increasingly accessible to 'externals', each universe and subuniverse faces issues of legitimation: "the outsiders have to be kept out ... the insiders have to be kept in [and] ... an entire legitimating machinery is at work" (87-88). The machinery legitimates the correctness of individual's subjective identity in each society.

Sociologists nowadays are drawn to the recognition that *all social reality is unsteady*: all societies are "constructions in the face of chaos" (103), being assailed by outsider-individuals and external-constructions of reality, and thereby by alternative symbolic universes. Thus, societies are drawn towards **nihilation** --- viz., the endeavor to account for wrongful or nonconformist definitions of reality via the concepts of the orthodox central universe. Thus sociologists seek to understand the social organization within those universes (i.e., within those societies) that "permits the definers to do their defining" (116). This universe-sustaining authorization has occasioned the deployment of full-time personal on the work of national 'legitimation' --- and conflict frequently occurs between different pools of experts on what in fact ought to be 'legitimate' for the state in question. Hence, "there will always be a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of reality.

In many instances --- in many states --- certain universal experts will hold an effective monopoly over the essential definitions of reality that exist. Monopolistic outcomes like this are more likely to prosper, according to Berger and Luckman, where there is a high degree of social-structural stability. In such situations "traditional definitions of reality inhibit social change" (122).

But the pluralism of modern urban-industrial society poses a threat to the maintenance of monopolism. Though Berger and Luckman did not use the term 'postmodernity', they did acknowledge the onset of the new conditions of high differentiation and of rapid social change which were beginning to characterize Western urban society in the 1960s --- and which may be taken to be representative of the rising postmodernity mood. This accelerating pluralism, according to Berger and Luckman, "encourages both skepticism and innovation and is thus inherently subversive of the taken-for-granted reality of the traditional *status quo*" (125). Hence, Berger and Luckman were fully alert to the kind of assault upon objectified definitions of reality that the postmodernity of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s could subsequently be said to have occasioned. The emergent modern society of the West --- which would nowadays more commonly be styled the postmodern society --- was then nominated as a pluralistic one,

that is, one with "a shared core universe, taken for granted as such, and different partial universes coexisting in a state of mutual accommodation" (125).

In this manner, the sociological insight of Berger and Luckman recognizes that the institutions and the symbolic universes of modern society (read postmodern society) are validated by 'living individuals' who have solid social roles and concrete social positions. The relationship between the notions they deal in and the surrounding societal processes (in which they participate) are characteristically dialectical ones. The definitions of reality that these 'living individuals' are charged to produce have a self-fulfilling potency: yet postmodernity is rendering the internalization of that prescribed reality as an increasingly difficult and suspect matter.

The sociology literature tends to view postmodernity as a new mood which has flowered, to begin to bring about the death of restrictive bourgeois world-views and its 'modern' knowledges. Thus postmodernity is *an adventure of consciousness* beyond rationalistic, techno-economic perspectives. It comprises an instinctivity where "impulse and pleasure are real and life-affirming; all else is neuroses and death" (Bell 1976:51). As presented in the sociology literature postmodernity is *acting out* rather than the continuance of *received social distinction*. It is the triumph of cultural antinomianism and of anti-institutionalism. It is in aggregate the rise of cultural sensibility against the durable social structure.

It is the view of Barthes (1972:159) that people are *excessively* concerned about reality, in defining the world in which they live and ought to live --- and in nominating the upholding preferred mythologies. Yet perhaps the sociology literature suggests that postmodernity is helping liberate individuals from obliged moral and cultural life: "the postmodern temper demands that what was previously played out in fantasy and imagination must be acted out in life as well" (Bell 1976:53-54). Society is still seen in the literature as 'a web of consciousness', 'a form of imagination', or 'a social construction', but these very webs in which people live are becoming much more varied in temper and style --- and much more idiosyncratic (Berger and Luckman 1967:22).

The changing demographic and political map of the world's Western states has enabled new cultural and affinitous groups to mobilize real social power to erect and support a wider variety of universal and subuniversal constructions. There exists within the given Western society a multitude of moods, a multitude of loyalties and thereby a multiplicity of social opportunities --- and hence, a multiplicity of social problems. In postmodern society, individuals have an "extraordinary freedom to ransack the world storehouse [of cultural affiliations] and to engorge any and every style" (Bell 1976:13). Indeed Bell considers that the axial freedom of modern culture is this capacity of the individual to expressively "remake the 'self' in order to achieve self-realization and self-fulfillment" (13).

Put another way, people today in Western society have an unparalleled opportunity to invent, change or wallow in chosen myths. And importantly, under postmodernity people "do not have a relationship based on **truth** but on **use**" (Barthes 1972:144). Heritage is not so much inherited and sustained as invented and enacted. Thus myths do have their histories and their geographies --- but they really ripen as and when they spread. In the judgement of Barthes (149) they ripen under postmodernity

--- though he himself did not necessarily admit that term --- through *use* rather than *pedigree*. History can readily evaporate from the myths people prefer to use (151): "people can enjoy [the beauty of the myth] without wondering where it comes from". Under postmodernity, then --- if Barthes may be taken as being comprehensively representative of sociological insight --- people "constantly drift between the object and demystification". The powers of social inventiveness and of cultural construction are in many respects it seems outweighing the power of the whole, original truths (159).

### 2.1.10 Summary

Subsection 2.1 (2.1.1. to 2.1.9.) has attempted to explain the investigative routes by which sociologists investigate the existence of social truths in culture. The following are some of the crucial insights into the inquiry biases of the literature examined:

#### 1 Knowledge As Social Currency

There appears to be considerable interest amongst sociologists in the way *knowledge* itself defines reality. Different truths --- i.e., different versions of 'knowledge' --- are patterned across a society and across societies. These truths often not only define what is authentic, appropriate and permissible within the society, but they structure the very way the world's past and present (and future) are perceived.

#### 2 The World As A Constructed Order

In sociology, researchers frequently work with the Durkheimian notion that the humanity of people is inextricably connected to their sociality. In Berger and Luckman's (1967:51) memorable phrase, "*homo sapiens* is always, and in the same measure *homo socius*". People acting, thinking, believing together form / shape / construct the human environment in which they live. This perspective requires that sociologists trace what people in given societies reify in the world about them, and how that reification is authorized and how adherence to it is monitored.

#### 3 Society As Coherency

Particular societies are thought to exist in the sociological sense where there is coherency of thought and action amongst an universe or a subuniverse as distinct from other universes or subuniverses. Sociological universes need not necessarily correspond with political, administrative or jurisdictional universes. The problem for sociologists, today, is that the accelerated pace of change in the social and techno-economic order is weakening the coherency of social and human universes and subuniverses. The system of social relations in which people live is becoming so much more complex and differentiated. "the experiences [people adopt and support] are so specialized, complicated or incomprehensible, that it is difficult to find common symbols to relate one experience to another" (Bell 1976:95).

#### 4 Existence As Dialectical Life

Sociologists explore the subjective realities in which the lives of people are contained: therefore, they are drawn towards analysis of the identities people adopt or adapt to. Identities are created by social processes, but they are rarely absolute, concrete or unchangeable. Identities stand in a dialectical

relationship with society: "once crystallized [they are] maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social relations" (Berger and Luckman 1967:173). The work of sociologists in exploring these very elaborate dialectical processes is extremely difficult. They are particularly hamstrung by the weaknesses of language which tends to be insufficiently rich or differentiated to describe or explain the multiple and contradictory relationships in which identities are continuously suspended. Sociologists find existence and identity to be increasingly fluid and intersubjective rather than monolithic and constant.

## 5 Existence As Power-Defined

Current sociological thought has been much influenced by Nietzsche, who recognized that the means by which human culture is developed and encouraged within its citizenry is not just a matter of ideology and consciousness, it is also a much more clearcut and threatening matter of 'blood and cruelty':

Man [sic!] could never do without blood, torture and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself ... the severity of the penal code [for instance] provides an especially significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon these slaves of momentary affects and desires (Nietzsche 1969:61).

Foucault follows Nietzsche's insight, and sees that people, their identities and their loyalties are caught in a network of power relations. When he speaks of the way the body is so captured, he is talking metonymically for the person and also metonymically for persons and for institutions:

... the body is ... directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it, they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonials, to emit signs (Foucault 1977/B: 25).

Thus to Nietzsche, and to Foucault, and to many subsequent sociologists, the body (or rather 'people', 'identities' and 'loyalties') are held within certain **social systems of punishment** which regulate living. Such sociologists have learnt that social life thus has a largely unsuspected political technology to it. *Reality is antagonistically networked and aggressively socialized.*

## 6 Reality As Episode

The work of sociologists during the twentieth century has variously found, revealed and / or re-emphasized that the symbolic universes that people live within stand as an attempt to order the world --- the present world and the past world --- into a cohesive unity that is respected by all of its members. Socialized individuals today are bound in with their predecessors and their successors in 'a meaningful totality'. But sociological investigations reveal that a given society's institutional order is continually disturbed by the existence of other realities that are empty and senseless as viewed in **its** own terms.

What Berger and Luckman (1967:104) have highlighted is the very incompleteness of all such world constructions:

Human existence is, *ab initio*, an ongoing externalization. As man [sic, again!] externalizes himself, he constructs the world **into** which he externalizes himself. In the process of externalization, he projects his own meanings into reality. Symbolic universes [then tend to] proclaim that *all* reality is humanly meaningful [in their own terms] ... .

But as sociologists point out, other universes reify different things, respect different beliefs and revere different pasts. The social life of each universe is therefore desultory and perilous when seen from the confrontations it axiomatically engages in to combat or overcome competing externalizations. Under postmodernity, human and cultural universes have become increasingly destabilized as various old and new externalizations have projected their reach further, faster and more fervidly. The social order of the West has been found by sociologists to be precarious --- a short or long episode in the order of life in the particular locality. It is increasingly hard to distinguish the sacred from the profane in Western societies.

#### 7 Power As De-Sovereigned Discipline

Following Foucault, sociologists are mapping new forms of *disciplining power* over human and cultural affairs in society. Until the eighteenth century, almost all disciplining power was demarcated --- it emanated from a sovereign and a ceremonial base. But so much of the disciplining power within social and cultural universes is nowadays *concealed*. The normalizing forces exist in discourse and praxis: their normalizing force is heavily redolent rather than heavily ritualized.

#### 8 The Past As Lost

Under postmodernity the past is, according to much sociological insight, becoming eclipsed as individuals in Western societies are slowly failing to respect past principles of experience and judgement. The rational cosmology which has lead Western thought for the last five or more centuries is being overturned (Bell 1976:118-119) as old religious anchorages and cultural moorings are upheld with diminishing vigor. When the past is *not* reaffirmed, it is increasingly hard for established national unity to be maintained. Sociologists warn that the old obligations that people respected towards each other, towards 'their' heritage and towards 'their' future are then put in question. The loss of a past means that the loss of a polity is also more likely. Hence, sociologists are keen to explore who wishes to affirm which past, and which pasts are passé.

#### 9 Culture As Spurious Expression

Many sociologists explore the interdependence between economic-political spheres and the socio-cultural order. Clearly, dominant powers administratively or commercially can reap vast and immediate effects from the visible culture (i.e., *their* visible culture) that is expressed in newly won geographical or territorial domains --- their economic-political imperatives can strongly penetrate cultural forms. But imposed cultures are never passively accepted (Sapir 1924:417). Their expressions are often dubiously virile; their spreads are often spurious. Previous local traditions and past flavorings can remain

quietly underground in a quiet-life form, to strongly and healthy reappear later from their subjugated darkground as still vibrant possibilities or as re-kindled projections. Sociologists are revealing that the socio-cultural order can also survive quite independent of economic-political spheres of interest. A Cultural form expressed at any given time or place by an individual, may not be *the* cultural form that is revered by that person, or the cultural form he or she would prefer to express.

## 10 Life and Culture as a Game

Sociologists recognize that each and every society concocts a mix of meanings through which its population(s) orientate themselves to the world around them. In pre-industrial societies, those meanings were principally established with respect to the inherited physical and geographic environment: life was primarily a game waged against nature (Bell 1976:147). But sociologists now tend to recognize that modernity has technicized and rationalized the world to considerable extent. The world is increasingly *a manufactured artifact* where life is mechanically paced, and where time is mechanically spaced. Under industrial-urban societies, life has also become a game against fabricated nature (147). Group life now has to resist not just the elements and the natural environment but also resist intensely artificial environments. Group consciousness may therefore battle predominantly against *imagined order* and less frequently against elemented constraints. The postmodern temper of an human collective or group may only *have* to significantly measure itself against socially constructed consciousness.

## 2.2 THE PHILOSOPHY LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH

### 2.2.1 Introduction

Philosophy, as reviewed for this study, is somewhat akin to sociology in that it explores the way in which social forces *restrain* individuals. Whereas sociology concerns the way individuals within a given society are *disciplined* by cultural entities and institutional forces, philosophy concerns the way they are **controlled by thought processes**. Sociology explores the power of organizations and rites in channelling individual (or rather group) behavior. Philosophy --- in the Foucauldian sense examined here --- commonly explores the power of *ideological productions*, viz., the ideology of education, the ideology of democracy, the ideology of governance (Foucault in Gordon 1980:102). Sociology inquires into the work of the apparatus of control that exist in society: philosophy plumbs the reasonings which lead to the erection of those apparatuses.

Questions of truth are certainly central to philosophy. One could argue that for much of humankind until the eighteenth century or thereabouts, **matters of truth were matters of belief**. And one could propose that questions of belief were questions of knowing. But during the eighteenth century, in particular, spheres of knowing became distinct from spheres of belief (Habermas 1987:19). Science, morality and art, for instance, grew apart as distinct realms of human consciousness evolved --- each of



which held their own regimes of truth, justice and validity. Philosophy peeks into those different realms, and it fathoms the new, **differentiated truths** that emerge in various fields of endeavor.

In delving into different truths, *philosophy* as a discipline *takes nothing for granted*, weighing up with the maximum precision available what individuals and bodies believe to be 'reality' and 'knowledge' (Berger and Luckman 1967:2). At a basic level, the thoughtlines and knowledge-lines that philosophy sifts through are cultural codes: they order human experience. At an aggregate level these thoughtlines constitute grand but largely *unconscious and anonymous forms of understanding* --- the epistemes of section 1, the a priori discourse of society or of global gatherings.

In prying into cultural codes and into epistemes, philosophy examines the regimes of truth that collectives assume to be true. Under Nietzsche's conceptualization, that constitutes an examination of reason from outside of the horizon of that reason (Habermas 1987:96). Under Foucauldian conceptualization, it is --- to repeat an well-titled premise of this work --- philosophy as recognized within the capillary connections of discourse to practice (242). That comprises the main perspective on philosophy that this inquiry seeks to harness --- a Nietzschean account as punctuated by Foucault and others.

This arena of philosophy in view is not philosophy with a capital 'P' --- Foundational Philosophy --- it is philosophy grounded within political and social practice (Fraser and Nicholson 1988:85). It is a Kantian conceptualization of philosophy --- that is, philosophy embodied in knowledge and social behavior (Kritzman's editorial note in Foucault 1988:86). It is not distinct or pristine philosophy, but it is philosophy weaved into 'the present' (86). The crucial interest is perhaps not so much in *philosophy as philosophy*, but as *philosophy as anthropology* --- i.e., of the anthropology of conceptual systems (McCarthy 1978:164), otherwise identified as Foucault's buried foundations of meaning *inside* discourse and praxis (Habermas 1987:248). It is **philosophy as biopolitics**: the identification of bounded understanding and ideology within human agency / agencies (271).

### 2.2.2 Outlook on Power and Truth

In seeking to investigate power and truth, philosophers fundamentally consider the rationality of human actions --- viz., respectively, the rationality which explains who uses what power for which purposes, and the rationality which undergirds truth-directedness. Essentially, the issues behind these two rationalities are the same, and concern the desiderata an individual (or group) considers in order to determine either the how or the when of the use of power *to handle a practical problem of doing* or to otherwise determine either the why or the how of the use of various methods utilized to solve an abstract problem of reality. Both supposedly involve the identification of the judgements that an individual or a group uses to act 'rationally' --- i.e., his / her / its / their own interest(s) (Kekes 1987:275). Thus philosophers toil to discover, amongst other things, what rationality 'is' --- or perhaps what rationality 'means'. And in that struggle, there is no consensus: the issue is still wide open (Bunge 1987:5).

The philosophers' debate upon rationality proliferates because the requirement to be rational exists in such an extensive range of human circumstance where a problem has to be 'solved' or a truth has to be 'known' in order to function within the said society. But while philosophers demand much more precise definitional use of terms such as 'true', 'false', 'fact' and 'reality' (Albert 1987:71), philosophers have been unable to establish a single defensible standard by which all conceptual activity may be judged (Kekes 1987:265). Philosophers have come to recognize that rationality is the search for the truth for its own sake, or rather within its own terms (Agassi 1987:251). According to philosophers, for instance, the search for truth in science is only a longstanding tournament --- a "game with certain rules" (Albert 1987:75).

Philosophy's contemporary outlook upon power and historical truth are very much related, then, and pivot upon the Nietzschean concept of will-to-power. If science is a game to demonstrate or exercise will-to-power, the human sciences are in fact 'no science' according to Foucault (Merquior 1985:75). Thus Foucault, like many other twentieth century philosophers, accepts the Nietzschean view that, at bottom, *all scientific truth --- perhaps all knowledge --- is suspect in the pretence of its objectivity* (147): "truth is always power-ridden" (147).

If this contemporary philosophical outlook upon power and truth is extended to heritage and culture, "history in the singular has to be dissolved" (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:251). Foucault accounts for this by explaining that if historical truth, per se, is dependent upon the varied functioning of power, then there can be no singular, global, united historiography: a sole macroconsciousness about the past is not tenable, and instead there will necessarily be not so much "a manifold of [different] narrative histories, but ... a plurality of irregularly emerging and disappearing islands of [historical] discourse" (251).

Thus to Foucauldian philosophy "no place is left for any overarching meaning [about the past]" (253) and historical accounts are kaleidoscopic. Under his 'archaeological' philosophy the developing Foucault then saw historical truth --- or better, historical truths --- as that / those which hardened "into an iceberg covered with crystalline formations of discourse [on the past]" (253). The later, maturing philosophy of Foucault, however, maintained the outlook that such icebergs were far from being fixed --- they moved: "discourse formations are displaced and regroup, they undulate back and forth" (253). Foucault acknowledged that anti-scientific will-to-power was a to-and-fro, discursive force upon historical reason.

If Foucault's codification of will-to-power may be taken as representative of the discipline of philosophy's questioning of theories of power and truth, one may conclude that the direct identification of truth with **will-to-power** rather than with **will-to-knowledge** removes truth from the arena of historical metaphysics to the arena of force and potency. Each society has such an arena of power, and an accordant 'general politics of truth', that is "a type of discourse [about the past] which it accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault, in Gordon 1980:131).

Since historical truth is more a matter of power than of metaphysics, Foucault considers that it has a similar political economy to other social truths. Table 2.2.2./1 now provides a list of the five characteristic traits of such a political economy. As the table suggests, *truth* according to Foucault:

- does *not* exist outside of power;
- is a thing produced in the world, not an independent, self-maintaining entity;
- exists in **regimes of power**;
- is regulated by 'mechanisms and instances' which are sanctioned by authorizing bodies (131).

Implicit in Foucault's analysis of truth (as given in the five traits of Table 2.2.2./1) is the view that institutions tend to assume there is an order-to-things: events and organisms do perform to a definite schema --- they obey a plan recognized by that institution (read body, read society) (Foucault 1970:266-7). And equally implicit in the Table's identified traits is the assumption that individuals can know and learn the truth, the right truth --- meaning that particular institution (read body, read society) does have access to this true 'order of things' (312).

If the philosophy of the five traits of Table 2.2.2./1 is particularized from the political economy of truth-in-general down to the political economy of historical truth, historicity can be interpreted as the attempt to recreate the huge assemblage of the past as 'a vast resemblance' arranged around selected and favored human significances (270). The past is translated into fragmented time --- a series of institutionally or societally significant events. And the criticality of postmodernity is that the need to historicize is itself under threat, comprising a

disappearance of a sense of history, the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past [and] has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social formations have had in one way or another to preserve (Jameson 1985:125).

Hence, to sum up this subsection, philosophers concern themselves with the nature of power and truth in the world, and broadly attempt to codify the human rationalities which drive the exercise of power and actuate the quest for truth. Yet in evaluating Foucault's contribution to our comprehension of rational behavior and thought, his legacy is not just the confirmation of the Nietzschean (and certain others') view that there are in fact **multiple truths**, but there are **multiple ways of articulating them**. Truth, after Foucault, is thereby not just a matter of the *philosophy of power*, it is also a matter of the *philosophy of resistance* (Kritzman 1988:xxiv). If Habermas had philosophized that cultural systems are peculiarly resistant to administrative control (see Habermas in McCarthy 1978:370), Foucault has shown that all manner of cultural groups and cultural institutions within society are able *to take a share of available power* and project their own preferred version of truth via its capillary actions. *Power is not* and *truths are not* the sole preserve of the dominant: **the fully subjugated and the partly subjugated keep the game going, too.**

TABLE 2.2.2./1

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRUTH:  
FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF TRUTH AS  
WILL-TO-POWER

FOUCAULT'S FIVE TRAITS OF TRUTH

- 1 Truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it;
  - 2 Truth is subject to constant economic and political incitement;
  - 3 Truth is objectified in diverse forms and is diffused and consumed in an immense range of ways;
  - 4 Truth is produced and transmitted under the dominant (if not exclusive) control of a few great political and economic apparatus --- such as universities, the army, the media;
  - 5 Truth is itself, the subject of ideological struggles and ongoing political and social confirmation.
- 

SOURCE: Foucault in Gordon 1980:131-2.

According to this outlook, then, there is no one kind of power, no one sort of rationality, no one system of thought. The sovereignties of potency and of conceptualization are shared by those above with those below. That is perhaps a quintessential statement to sum up the understanding of contemporary outlook of philosophy on power and truth.

### 2.2.3 Similar Investigations

Since the ongoing study of the shaping of the past in Texas is distinctively Foucauldian in its philosophical premises, this subsection will concentrate on similar investigations --- or rather the original investigations --- conducted on power and truth by the French archaeologist-cum-genealogist of knowledge.

Foucault appears to have been interested in 'the concrete political action' that can be fuelled by research, rather than by any adherence to purity and to idealized conceptualization. In this he appears to have followed his countryman, Sartre, who had warned "that the intellectual must suppress himself as intellectual in order to put his skills at the services of the masses" (Kritzman in Foucault 1988:xiii). Hence, in examining the nature of power as a body of knowledge and as a form of social discipline, Foucault claims he was not interested in constructing a theory of Power with a capital "P" (38). He does not see himself as a theoretician of explanation of unique instances, but as an analyzer of the power relations of institutions **on a longitudinal axis** --- "involving several centuries" (39). He aims for 'strong thesis' not empirically proven theory. Thus for Foucault, power is not a precise matter of mappable cause and effect, but it is the relation between individuals:

The characteristic feature of power is that some men [sic!] can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct --- but never exhaustively or coercively. A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or result (83-4).

Consonantly, Foucault seeks to comment upon the interplay of rationalities that are at stake, not to isolate any refined explanatory matter or substance called 'Power' as such. Foucault seeks instrumental rationality at a macro or global level (viz., 'the power exerted by men over women', 'the power held by a bureaucracy over a population' --- not the Power of a singular agent or entity over another distinct agent or entity (84).

Foucault's views on power as a type of relation between individuals --- or between individuals and institutions --- echo some of the insights of Habermas into right and permissibility. While Foucault featured the 'power' relations between people / agencies, Habermas pondered the matters of legitimation involving people / agencies. To Habermas (1974:54), the public sphere has become 'refeudalized'. Large public and private organizations wield authority over the ranks of the citizenry and can exclude the masses

from decision-taking. But they must secure "plebiscitary support among the mass of the population through the development of demonstrative publicity" (54). As for Foucault, the public contributes to its own subjugation --- but it does have the opportunity to resist and refuse. And what for Foucault is the domination of a population by the ongoing petty and opaque powers of the dominant classes as exercised through large public and / or private organizations, is for Habermas the subjugation of a population by the everyday technical legitimacies of the dominant classes (McCarthy 1978:382-3).

Yet the Marxian concept of class struggle applies to neither Foucault nor Habermas. Neither see a particular class or group as *consistently* the defined 'target group' of instrumental power (for Foucault) or instrumental legitimation (for Habermas). Both recognize that domination decidedly exists in contemporary society, but neither is able to identify a clearcut recipient class for that subjection on a longitudinal basis.

The new power in and of governance that Foucault (and to a lesser extent, Habermas) wish to analyze --- albeit critically rather than empirically --- is both *continuous* and *anonymous* (Rabinow 1984:19; Merquior 1985:114). Indeed power is not seen so much as that which is exercised independently over others in a clinical manner but as an operation in which one and all is caught (Foucault 1980:156): **everyone becomes his or her own controller and watchdog** (Rabinow 1984:19).

This is a profound point for Foucault in his investigations, as was suggested in section 1.2. It makes up Foucault's 'eye-of-power' --- the gaze through which surveillance is carried out, through which a given dominant influence is maintained and through which a ceaseless normalization is enacted (Harland 1987:164). Foucault's discovered **panoptic vision** is then an all pervasive gaze, an omnipresent disciplinary power to which individuals are subjected *and* by which individuals subject and regulate themselves (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:272). Foucault's thesis is that it survives and thrives in barracks, schools, hospitals and prisons (272). But, is it also kept up at tourism sites and heritage reserves --- and in the administrative corridors where the themes, programs and packages for such sites are conceived and / or reconceived?

#### 2.2.4 Related Inquiries

The previous subsection (2.2.3) outlined critical philosophical research upon power and truth. This subsection will attempt to cover critical philosophical research upon the state administration of heritage. Like subsection 2.2.3 it will pivot upon the thinking of Habermas in support of --- thought not necessarily in agreement with --- Foucault.

Social theories tend to be reasonably united in their view that the expansion of the state in the West --- under the development of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries --- has given rise to a greater involvement of administrators and technicians in social and economic affairs (Habermas 1970:63-4; 106-7). The judgements of social theorists, of course, vary in the degree to which the effect of that increased involvement is 'good' or 'bad'.

It is the view of Habermas that a **crisis of legitimacy** can occur where former matters of civil privatism excessively fall under the widening orbit of administrative rationality (McCarthy 1978:349). To Habermas (1976:47-48):

a legitimation deficit means that it is not possible by administrative means to maintain effective normative structures to the extent required [to maintain the social, cultural and community fabric as it was] ... . While organizational rationality spreads, cultural traditions are undermined and weakened ... for traditions important for legitimation cannot be regenerated administratively.

What Habermas suggests is that the enlarging interests of the state requires a greater need for legitimation --- that is, of the justification for government intervention in wider spheres of influence. This call for legitimacy amounts to a rationalization of what were relatively 'natural processes': it "destroys the unquestionable character of [the] validity claims that were previously taken for granted; *it stirs up matters that were previously settled by cultural tradition in an unproblematic way*" (McCarthy 1978:369-70; emphasis is added).

Habermas philosophizes that the expanded activity of the state into social and communal matters advances the **politicization** of aspects of society and community living which had hitherto been located in the private realm. He sees health matters, education issues and family planning concerns, for instance, as examples of social and interpersonal activities which have commonly become politicized --- or perhaps **thematized** by the encroachment of administrative rationality (Habermas 1976:72). By this, he means that reduced, communicable and administratable lines of argument and aspects of service tend to replace the former, wider panoply of argument and service.

Yet Habermas notes that aspects of life vary considerably in the degree to which they can be taken over by the state. To him, for instance, cultural matters are particularly resistant to administrative control (McCarthy 1978:370). It is exceedingly difficult, in his view, for the state to be able to produce the kinds of meaning that underpin cultural form, participation and presentation (Habermas 1976:70). What Habermas seems to be theorizing is that administrative rationality can and is being extended over many, many more fields --- but the fields vary in the degree to which they can be readily absorbed into the state, with cultural and ideological matters being notably hard to appropriate responsibility and direction for.

Hence, by an extension of the thoughts of Habermas, the state can and will assume care and tutelage for tourism and heritage, but will find it exceedingly difficult to complete that appropriation of those subjects where the citizenry feels or recognizes politicization at work. Again by extension, if the screenless theories of Habermas on thematicization are applied to tourism and heritage, it suggests that pronounced or advanced thematicization will *inevitably* beget a crisis of legitimacy for the state. Where the administration of heritage necessitates governance over matters of ideology and meaning, it is hard for states to retain longitudinal authority. If that legitimacy is unduly stretched it may only be offset by the provision of alternative rewards for the citizenry. That is, if the state falters in its productive care over meaning and ideology, it must necessarily be able to otherwise motivate by yielding the values of money,

success, leisure, security, et cetera (McCarthy 1978:370). Tourism and heritage --- where they concern issues of identity and ideology --- are what Habermas would identify as generators of cultural meaning and which cannot be 'randomly functionalized' (Habermas 1976: 74-75).

To Habermas, then, a legitimation crisis and a motivational crisis interfeed: where state administrators are troubled by weaknesses of posture in terms of their legitimacy of action, they must be effective in terms of their control of and over the system of socio-cultural motivation for the population. Thus, heritage and cultural tourism may have a part to play, if this reading of Habermas is correct, in the compensatory problematics --- in terms of the 'legitimation' and 'motivation' --- of governance.

Seen from a related but slightly different light, the philosophy of Habermas suggests that state administrations are caught up between major conflicting imperatives during late capitalism. They are caught between the conflicting impulse to 'plan the economy' (for the general good of all) and to 'protect private accumulation' (for the particular good of those whom have historically been most able to influence government, exert leverage upon government and / or 'create' legitimacy) (Thompson and Held 1982:10). Thus taken together, Habermas seems to be stating that it is these two counteracting obligations --- i.e., to service the collective-welfare-economy and the privatized-business-economy --- that gives rise to both the crisis of legitimacy and the crisis of motivation. And, taken together, these two crises manufacture (for the state) a position of vulnerability which becomes ever more complex as the state assumes wider and wider responsibilities. These two crises together --- this admixed position of spiralling vulnerability --- constitutes an overall crisis of rationality for those who wield power.

Hence to Habermas, the fundamental perversity of governance under late capitalism concerns the presentation and servicing of private interests in governance as though they are public interests --- something that will be raised more fully under the analysis of the work of C.O. Jones (1978) in political science --- viz., in subsection 2.4., below. This, stated differently, amounts to the private appropriation of the symbols and preferments of public office --- the appropriation of public privilege and wealth by a *priviligentia* (McCarthy 1978:358). Under the perspective of Habermas, the expanded activity of the state takes government intervention into new aspects of life. But in the West as the intervention spreads, it is not only administrative rationality that spreads with it, but also capitalist rationality. The economic system is *coupled* to the political system (Habermas 1976:36). Acting in tandem, the economic system and the political system undermine previous cultural traditions and generate new ones: the united spread of capitalist and economic rationality can weaken the inherited socio-cultural system and can re-style it (47-48).

By the twentieth century, then, Habermas believes that "meanings and norms previously fixed by tradition and belonging to the boundary conditions of the political system [had now become] publicly thematized. In this way, the scope of discursive will-formation expands" (47-48). In this way, the encroachments of administrative and capitalist rationality subject new sectors of social and cultural life to organizational planning. *Private will-formation* when in governance can become *public will-formation*, then, and can sap what were previously civil privatisms in culture and heritage.



Yet Habermas does not see the expansion of administrative and / or capitalist rationality as an axiomatic or straightline process. To him, the traditions important for the legitimation of those in power cannot be 'regenerated administratively'. Groups and interests in government can never gain *absolute control* over the manufacture of legitimacy. They can directly attempt to reshape 'recognized heritage' to reflect their own origins and preferred policies, they can indirectly attempt to influence 'recognized heritage' for the same ends, but the sheer weight of social, cultural, heritage and other aspects of legitimacy are too numerous and intricate for any single interest group to consistently have mastery over.

Foucault's philosophy on the state administration of heritage mirrors that of Habermas in its recognition that the everyday plays of rationality / rationalities are ceaseless. Where Habermas tends to be implicit, Foucault yields much more explicit insight: Foucault maintains (as was stated in subsection 1.2) that people-in-groups / people-in-institutions / people-in-power relationships engage in the petty dominations of power struggles all of the time (Rabinow 1984:6) and that the use of certain ideas and the choice of certain subjects rather than others emanates *from* or *in* the reason with which those individuals work. That reason --- that rationality is enwrapped within the power-knowledge relationship. **Neither knowledge nor the rationalities it utilizes are external to these everyday power fights.**

In this respect Foucault (Rabinow 1984:6) considers his own philosophy to be "a little bit Nietzschean." When he says, for instance, that "the idea of justice is itself an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power," (6) he is evidently speaking both metonymically and in the mold of Nietzsche. The 'idea of justice' stands for 'any reasoned idea' and 'concepts of heritage' can be 'any reasoned idea'.

To Foucault, it is selected and adopted reason that fuels knowledge in institutional actions and in power relationships. It is selected and adopted reason that 'controls' things in the capillary exercise of power. Foucault's investigations of sexual ethics, for example, can be regarded as a metonymical study of control by such moral reason (Merquior 1985:128). One may reasonably suppose that Foucault's thesis (on the everyday manner in which the rationalities which feed knowledge-power relationships) also applies to the institutional or 'discourse-praxis' control over heritage.

In examining Foucault's work, Habermas finds that in the Frenchman's later works Foucault's power --- and inherently the rationalities that compose that power --- are outlined almost tangibly. Power --- and therefore these rationalities --- occurs in face-to-face confrontations: it comprises (and they comprise) the interactions of 'warring parties' (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:255). As Foucault (1979:24) claims, himself: "power is war", and by that one can summarize that Foucault means that the rationalities which mobilize power-knowledge are the unspoken warfare --- "the silent, secret civil war that re-inscribes conflict in various social institutions" (Merquior 1985:110).

For Foucault, then, the rationalities that endow 'power-knowledge' give rise to what amounts to *relations of war*. The ongoing conflicts of power that are waged, according to Foucault, ought not be seen

as conflicts of law but as conflicts of knowledge and thereby as conflicts over ways of reasoning (65). And where such reasonings, such knowledges, such powers are exercised through state apparatus, they are essentially repressive --- constituting an abstractive technology which negates and suppresses along a whole series of networks of state concerns involving the body, sexuality, the family, kinships, "and so forth" (63-4). And heritage, one may summarize, duly qualifies amongst the 'and so forth' --- part of the multiple and differentiated reality in which states nowadays are so regularly drawn to act (66). Different rationalities discipline people in society, according to Foucault, through the different concrete systems of punishment that power-knowledge is called to act through. *Punishment is not transmitted through the juridical structure of society alone*: it is also prosecuted through the political economy of moral and rational ideas, such as (for Foucault) 'the political economy of the body' in particular (172). And if there can be a political economy of evolved reason about 'the body', there can conceivably be a political economy of evolved reason about 'heritage.'

Both Habermas and Foucault have been strongly concerned in the power of the state of normalize, and although neither made specific observations about heritage, per se, their insights into the expansion of administrative rationality (Habermas) and normalization (Foucault) also appear to be readily applicable for heritage issues. At the general level, both Habermas and Foucault focus on the spread of reason which enables the power of the state to produce 'an increasingly totalizing' (Rabinow 1984:22) web of control over individuals in society --- which appears to be "dependent on its ability to produce an increasing specification of individuality [for the lives and meaning of the population of that state]" (22).

In terms of philosophical insight, both Habermas and Foucault place considerable power in the edifice of the state --- not so much in its political or instrumental mechanisms, but in the empowering reason it utilizes. The state's rationality, acting through the state's apparatus, thereby is found (by Habermas and Foucault) to constitute an extensive instrument of persuasion for the dominant groups --- the priviligentia --- over subjugated groups. Not even Marx had recognized the degree to which dominant groups could make privileged use out of the state's fund of rationality to subject others. But then the views of Marx on class / interest group domination have rarely been put forward as an essentially **philosophical** explanation of the processes of exploitation within states.

### 2.2.5 Related Researchers

In this short subsection the contribution of the three European humanists, Nietzsche, Foucault and Habermas will be reviewed in relation to the philosophical discourse on power and truth. The aim, here, is to tie down a number of points explicitly which may so far have only been implicitly stated in relation to the three continental thinkers.

Nietzsche is examined because of the girth of his pioneering work in philosophy to "discover values that best serve the social good" (Zimmern in Nietzsche 1989:vii), and because of the weight of his platform reasoning concerning the classical properties of virtue and truth.

But Nietzsche is really the opener to these pages and paragraphs on capillary power. The subsection actually concentrates, oncemore(?!), upon Foucault and Habermas --- perhaps the two leading late-twentieth century philosophers of discursivity. The following paragraphs may be construed as a comparative critique of Foucault's historical philosophy vis-a-vis Habermas's reasoning on rational society.

- Nietzsche* --- it is Nietzsche who first saw and articulated with conviction that truths are *relative, shifting, and never absolute* (Faber in Nietzsche 1984:xiv) and who was conceivably the spiritual forefather of truth (xiv). In attacking the philosophical understanding that there is indeed a 'real world' as distinct from the world of appearances (xix), Nietzsche could be regarded as **the free spirit** behind this attempt to set up a research agenda in truthmaking --- the philosopher who first mapped the history and political force of 'social truths'. Following Nietzsche, reason no longer tends to be regarded as merely a sort of reconciling *self-knowledge* for individuals but as a much broader *source of power and discourse* through, in and across society "equivalent [as a driving force] to the unifying power of religion" (Habermas 1987:85). It is Nietzsche who opens up the avenues by which the dialectic of enlightenment comes to be rejected by a rising number of twentieth century philosophers, and by which modernity "loses its singular [and privileged] status" (87). It is Nietzsche who brings out the revision of the concept of reason whereby it is no longer confined within its own self-reflected image but is rediscovered acting through art and myth through all of the 'practical' spheres of life and society (90). It is Nietzsche whose critique of **the will-to-power** enabled philosophers to hunt for reason within all manner of disparate power locations. Hence, in the sense that he was the first philosopher to substantively provide *a critique of reason beyond the confines of reason*, Nietzsche is the teacher for the skeptical scholars, Foucault and Habermas.
- Foucault* --- it is Foucault who followed Nietzsche by inspecting the historical life-course of reason in the way that it builds up in commensurable systems of ordering of the world from various groups, institutional or societal standpoints (Merquior 1985:35). As a philosopher, then, Foucault tests "the borders of our [group and epistemic] ways of thinking" (35). His historical philosophy plumbs the way in which agency or societal reason produces cultural codes which impose organization and elegance upon experience.

Hayden White (1973:53) labels Foucault a *dispersive structuralist* because he supposedly and enigmatically reveals the explicabilities of "**the irreducible variety of human nature**". White suggests that the philosophy of Foucault does not seek to conjoin found features of behavior into a single, universal humanitas, but as a dispersal structuralist he is drawn towards *the identification of societal and cultural heterogeneity*. people are seen to be highly differentiated and highly dispersed in behaviors and attachments.

White's point is a crucial one to comprehend what Foucault's philosophy is about. As a dispersive theorist, Foucault **radically historicizes** the objects he inquires into (Merquior

1985:72): "if [one] is looking into madness from a dispersive viewpoint, madness as such just vanishes: all that is left is one particular social game, a set of meanings labelled as such" (72). Hence Foucault took to Nietzschean thought attentively: "things do not mean anything by themselves, but only insofar as they get a meaning from the historical creature, man [sic!]" (72). But Foucault does not suck profoundly from just Nietzsche. Habermas (1987:238-239) considers that early-Foucault imports much from Lévi-Strauss, Bataille and Bachelard, having an unresolved passion and tension for the eclectic vision of a Bataille on the one hand and for the positivist powers of analysis of a Lévi-Strauss on the other. Directly in terms of his philosophy, however, Foucault is believed by Merquior (1985:39) to have captured the conceptual spirit of Bachelard in particular, and the conceptual reasoning of Cavailles and Canguilhem. Merquior (39-40) proposes that it was probably Bachelard's 'false continuities' which inspired the Foucauldian philosophy on 'discontinuity', that it was Bachelard's 'caesural view' of scientific development which passed to Foucault via Canguilhem, and that it was Bachelard's strong anti-empiricism which heavily tinged Foucault's approach to reasoning.

But despite these healthy problematic and constructivist antecedents --- or perhaps because of them(?) --- Foucault is no unimpeachable social philosopher, as Table 2.2.5./1 indicates.

To Fontana (in Foucault 1984:48) the intentionality of Foucault is regularly elusive --- a broad fault. But to Merquior, Foucault operates with what are, at times, some crippling conceptual weaknesses --- and it is they that are mainly highlighted in Table 2.2.5./1.

The weaknesses uncovered in the table certainly do appear to challenge the accuracy with which Foucault worked: they suggest that Foucault's own need for neat conceptual order and for what Merquior (1985:56) styled as 'verbal drama' at the expense of tight evidence matched to logical argument. Most of the weaknesses that Merquior identifies --- and which the table lists --- stem from the rigidity of Foucault's view that "in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one **episteme** that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge" (Foucault 1970:168). Later, in 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' (1972) Foucault warns readers not to view epistemes as totalitarian or holistic concepts, and he then prefers to talk of '**discursive formations**' instead (Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:194). What perhaps Foucault had recognized was that there is a natural dilemma over the nomination of global worldviews like 'epistemes': if the worldview is loose / flexible / plural rather than being tight / distinct / singular it can itself hardly compose a united or unified episteme. Foucault was caught in his own taxonomy: his governing rules were over-governing.

In terms of this early philosophy, Foucault may be condemned for being eloquent and grandiose at the expense of being sagacious. In his later historical philosophy, notably in his genealogical world (see Habermas 1987:243 for a useful analysis of the differences between Foucault's 'archaeological' philosophy and his genealogical philosophy), he turns more strongly to cogency.

TABLE 2.2.5./1

## WEAKNESSES IN FOUCAULT'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

... as is particularly revealed in his early (i.e., his 'archaeological') reasoning

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## SEVEN DELIMITING ASPECTS OF FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHICAL PROSE

- Foucault's presentation of epistemes is inclined to be **monolithic** --- he over-emphasizes the fit or place of *single epistemes* within any given age;
  - Foucault's heavy reliance upon *unconnected* monolithic episteme leads to the neglect of **transepistemic** thought and knowledge-lines --- he fails to recognize that some consciousness and some conceptualizations are multi-rooted;
  - Foucault's insistence that epistemes come and go *all of a sudden* overlooks the **epistemic lags** that commonly occur with streams of thought --- epistemes may be expected to have natural 'pioneers' and natural 'diehards' who extend the life-course of thought-lines;
  - Foucault's tight explanation of epistemes fails to respect theories and knowledge which **return to conceptual popularity** after periods of disfavor --- or which *undulate* in conceptual appeal over time;
  - Foucault's neat search for patterns of understanding for, or within, given ages becomes (perhaps) *a search for epistemes, per se* --- it is inclined to **overstress the force and acceptance** of some streams of thought and to raise them to the level of "needed" epistemes;
  - Foucault's resultant search for ordered/understandable/communicable epistemes also generates **Intraepistemic** problems --- he tends to under-account for *collapses* or *splinter effects* within epistemes;
  - Foucault's resultant quest for solid/integrated/distinct epistemes is inclined to overlook the existence of **Intraepistemic breaks** --- he accentuates the discontinuities between epistemes, but under-profiles those *within* epistemes.
- 

SOURCE: Adapted from Merquior 1985:56-75.

He then finds multiple sources of power, and multiple interacting regimes of knowledge within particular communities. At deeper levels of analysis, the interest group of privilegia --- that is, the intellectual / reasoning / powerbroking interest group --- is now harried by him, and the grander episteme is left as an introductory or surface 'construction'.

- *Habermas* --- it is Habermas who, like Foucault, has also produced much post-war philosophical insight into **discursivity** and into emancipatory interests under the domination of knowledge acting through and with power. But for Habermas, the crucial element in the domination of some individuals and groups by others is neither knowledge or power as such, it is '**communication**'. At the core of his theories, Habermas seeks to show how language is internally connected with practice --- how one's communication (or an interest group's communication) is enwrapped within his / her (its) assumed knowledge of *how certain things should be done* (McCarthy 1978:163). To Habermas, speaking and acting are socially related within institutions, and therefore social systems can best be conceived of as symbolically structured lifeworlds (Held 1982:188). Hence it is through routine communication and through preferred language that the values and identifications of a given institution or society are thematized: the system of communication (and therefore of knowledge and power) is self regulated (Habermas 1976:4). In that sense Habermas is not superficially unlike Foucault.

For Foucault, it is relatively easy to identify the father-figures behind his philosophy. For Habermas, however, the task is much more murky, for he "never has been content to rely on a single intellectual tradition. Instead, he is a synthesizer: he makes use of those ideas of a school or individual he finds valuable in order to 'open up subjects from the inside out'" (Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:217).

So what are the important forms of reasoning that Habermas has borrowed? Foss, Foss and Trapp (1985) nominate six philosophical traditions which have been used by Habermas to examine discursivity and emancipatory interest:

- (i) *Marxism* --- Habermas does not offer himself as a Marxist, but he is crucially concerned about the way in which many aspects of society appear to be controlled by the process of production --- particularly when the at "is not immediately comprehensible to members of that society because of ideologies or illusionary belief systems which, though false, are taken to be adequate by society" (218).
- (ii) *Critical Theory* --- Habermas is a member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, which is loaded with critical theorists who view knowledge as something "inevitably connected with the situation and the interests of those involved [rather than being] something objective and uncontaminated by the inquirer or researcher" (218) as was detailed in subsection 1.3.2. of this study. Consequently, Habermas inherited the view

that a social order in question can be faithfully represented in the form of a rational critique of a field of pivotal ideas.

- (iii) *Hermeneutics* --- Following Heidegger, Habermas considers that hermeneutics (again, recall its introduction in section 1) --- i.e., the study of interpretation and understanding -- is of considerable value for critical theory, notably when the researcher can build up a sustained dialogue between the text and the interpreter. But hermeneutics is not merely the study of literal meaning within texts; it can be and is now applied to all situations in life. While Gadamer informs that its most reliable use lies in understanding 'ways of being', Habermas finds it more appropriate to explore 'ways of knowing' (Ricoeur 1973; Misgeld 1977; Mendelson 1979).
- (iv) *Positivism* --- Habermas consistently argues against positivism for its restrictive outlook on the world. While he can accept the deployment of positivist techniques (recall subsection 1.3.0) for investigations into the natural world, he finds positivism generally **dehumanizing** when it is applied to matters human. He maintains that the validities upon which positivism is structured are both inefficient and ineffective at taking account of the highly critical subjectivities by which individuals and communities lead their lives.
- (v) *Freudian Psychoanalysis* --- Habermas recognizes that a vibrancy exists between Freud's interpretations of individuals and his own of society: both focus upon self deception. While Freud's psychoanalysis attempts to reconstruct the rationalities underpinning *individual* neuroses, Habermas attempts to reconstruct the reasonings which result in *societal* ideologies. While Freud seeks to free the individual from his / her dysfunctional unconsciousness, Habermas seeks equivalent group or communal emancipation via critical theory.
- (vi) *Philosophy of Language* --- Habermas has absorbed much of the insight of linguistic researchers who have philosophized about meaning, verification and logical force in language (Searle 1971). The observations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and others on 'ordinary language' have influenced him decidedly, notably concerning "the way language is used in interaction [as] a more important source of meaning than its logical structure or [as] the way words stand for the things they represent" (Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:224). Thus the precise meaning of a given speech-act cannot be ascertained until both the communication context and the governing rules of intentionality are known (224).

Thus what for Foucault was insight into power and truth through an understanding of the reciprocities between *knowledge* and *praxis*, is for Habermas gained by insight into the way *work* and *social interaction* interpenetrate. And, as for Foucault, there has been much pointed criticism of his insight over the last two to three decades. A number of these detractions are offered in Table 2.2.5./2.

TABLE 2.2.5./2

## WEAKNESSES IN HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY ON RATIONAL SOCIETY

**... as is particularly revealed in his insight into the relationship  
between knowledge and human interests**

## SEVEN IMPUTATIONS AGAINST HABERMAS'S CRITICAL THEORY

- Habermas's critical theory overstates the significance of the winning of *legitimacy* by state and governing institutions --- **societies cohere through many other ways**, too (1>1);
- Habermas too frequently leaves the **practical implications** of his theories as undeveloped --- much of his writing is dense, remaining in "an unsatisfactory state of *abstractness*" (2>1);
- Habermas is sketchy and **unelaborate** in pivotal passages of analysis --- "theory ought at least be able to discuss more than *the merry-go-round of continual enlightenment*" (3>1);
- Habermas fails to support his models with **concrete data** --- his models are rarely thoroughly *shown* to be relevant or proper (4>1);
- Habermas builds much of his theses upon the concept of the ideal speech situation, a conceptualization "[which] presupposes **universal norms of rationality**" (5>1) --- it appears that Habermas infers that one "can only argue from the very presupposition [one] set out to question" and thus *real argument or arbitration is not thereby possible* (5>2);
- Habermas concentrates too restrictively upon the 'ideological' and 'technical' roles of subjugation, which stems, in part, from his **extreme anti-positivism** (6>1) --- he does not try to formulate a *realist posture* towards empirical evidence (6>2);
- Habermas has been unable to present his ideas in a unifying *systems-theoretic* or a co-ordinated *action-theoretic* **integrated framework** (7>1) --- he consistently claims that his ideas are still evolving towards such ends (7>2).

SOURCE: Various, notably Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985.



TABLE 2.2.5./2 (Continued)

## KEY

1>1	Held 1982
2>1	Held 1982
3>1	Howard 1974:300
4>1	Nielsen 1977:9
5>1	Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:239
5>2	Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:239
6>1	Scott 1978:13; and Nielson 1977
6>2	Foss, Foss and Trapp 1985:238-9
7>1	McCarthy 1978:379
7>2	Habermas 1982:219

The criticisms of Habermas revealed in Table 2.2.5./2 suggest that although many of his adherents find his theses to be thoroughly insightful, a good deal of his reasoning along the way is unconvincingly circular. While Foucault is often criticized for trying to totalize his theories within realworld situations (even being so condemned by Habermas (1987:xv), himself), the imputations of Table 2.2.5./2 signify that many commentators feel that, in direct contrast, Habermas isolates his theories from reality and is inherently unable to even take the *first* steps towards totalization. So, while Habermas (247) may muse that Foucault is too frequently self-referential, other philosophers appear to judge Habermas as being guilty of self-referentiality on a much more primal basis.

### 2.2.6 Related Perspectives

The following ten perspectives from the philosophy literature rank as some of the more significant approaches to the study of dominance and subjugation in cultural and heritage matters:

#### • Truth as Non-Sovereign Power

In Foucault's estimation, the way institutions, societies and states are ruled and administered is fast-changing. In order to understand how the apparatuses of control work it is now necessary, in his view, to adopt a whole new perspective on the nature of power in governance. The supreme power that needs to be respected and analyzed is no longer *the politico-administrative regime of power* predominant in past centuries. The old juridical edifices of power through sovereignty is being conjoined by or replaced with newer / alternative forms of power, viz., *non-sovereign power* (Foucault 1980:102-3). The **power of sovereignty** is being quietly supplanted in so many arenas of governance and areas of life by the **power of detail**:

In 'feudal' society, says Foucault, power was chiefly sovereignty and [it was] confined to 'general mechanisms of domination'; power had then 'little hold on detail'. But the classical age invented new mechanisms of power, endowed with 'highly specific procedural techniques' as well as new instruments and apparatuses. A new type of power --- disciplinary domination --- became 'one of the great inventions of bourgeois society'. Unlike random sovereign power, which was chiefly exercised 'over the earth and its products', disciplinary power concentrated on human bodies and their operations'. So, instead of discontinuous levies, modern man [sic!] got constant surveillance (Merquior 1985:113).

What has begun to count in terms of power / rule / governance is the degree to which people are regulated and **confined** through *the force of detail*. People are categorized; a machinery of governance was, or is, being set up in so many fields of life by which people are categorized as 'acceptable' / 'appropriate' or 'non-acceptable' / 'non-appropriate'. Foucault's philosophical insight may first have recognized within the politics of hospitalization (see the Foucault-Bono interview in Foucault 1988:163-165), but now it is applied to the widest political playgrounds of contemporary life.

Hence, Foucault's philosophical perspective views power as a force which is exercised, (or, more preferably, as a relationship which is conducted) constantly by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous matter via impositions and bounded duties recurring through the calendar: this all "resupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign" (Foucault 1980:104). Those material advantages (and other related benefits accruing) help sustain the continuous and capillary nature of oversight that individuals are subjected to within or by institutions and society --- and by themselves. And they help explain the permanent systems of surveillance (i.e., of self-regulation) that individuals engage in over themselves.

#### • **Truth as Competitive Legitimacy**

What perhaps Foucault saw as the gradual withering of sovereignty, Habermas interprets as "the deformation and disintegration of the public sphere" (McCarthy 1978:381). Under the increasingly capitalizing state of the nineteenth century and the capitalist state of the twentieth, Habermas sees the creation in the West of a liberated public sphere which is no longer reliant upon the recondite and supramundane rights of the absolutist state. Habermas maintains that recent centuries have therefore brought about "the replacement of the rule of authority with that of reason" (381), and the public sphere has been the principal battleground at which different interests compete to have their-own-science / their-own-narrative / their-own-history recognized as 'the truth'. The fight has been for legitimacy: the fight is for legitimacy.

To Habermas, then, traditional society is being ever-replaced by capitalist society where the primacy of 'the arcane' is being replaced by that of 'the market'. To him, "legitimation no longer comes primarily 'from above' (from traditional world views) but 'from below' (from the inherent 'justice' of the market" (362). He suggests that the social power of capitalist institutions challenges previous political dependencies, and enables 'the market' itself to assume an ideological function. Truth emanates less from longstanding classes whose dominance arises in the spiritual and the imperial, but from the narratives which emerge dominant from cybernetic conflicts (Habermas 1976:26).

#### • **Power as Productive Truth**

In their respective philosophies, neither Foucault nor Habermas ultimately saw the exercise of power as an axiomatically restrictive and / or negative set of events. In uncovering the indissoluble unity between the formations of power and the formations of knowledge, Foucault did not just view that unity as a repressive and negative --- he saw it also as a productive one. The mature, i.e., later, Foucault perceived productive capacity as a network which runs through the whole social body which *participates* in that power relationship (Foucault, in Rabinow 1984:61). Granted, the earlier Foucault (chiefly in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* --- first published in French in 1969) had held a relatively limited view of power which stressed its coercive, prohibitory and excluding properties (Merquior 1985:108-109). But with *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977/B:194) took a more balanced perspective on power: he now philosophized that the power-knowledge relationship **can** produce --- it can and does produce --- 'objects', 'reality', 'truth', et cetera.

In contrast, the philosophy of Habermas does not necessarily picture 'power' (or even 'power' tied to 'knowledge') as something which produces things, but he saw the whole relation-of-production as a generative force which yields the relationships which produce things: "those relations are sustained at the level of language and governed by the rules of communicative action" (Thompson and Held 1982:9-10), and social wealth is thereby created and distributed systemically through those created relationships.

#### • Truth as Renewal

The philosophies of both Foucault and Habermas see truth as self-generative. To the former, the 'genetic' function of truth has been seen since feudalism is the power of the bourgeoisie. The powers, rights and truths of the bourgeoisie have been **self-amplifying** --- "in a mode not of conservation but of successive transformations" (Foucault 1980:160).

For the latter, it has been appropriate to regard truth --- particularly in the form of cultural knowledges --- as interpretations which have to prove themselves against other 'facts', 'norms', 'experiences', that is "against the world" (Habermas in Seidman 1989:174). Thus, when truths are accepted and confirmed, traditions are renewed and whole **lifeworlds** are revived (1975). Habermas implies that *when truths compete, lifeworlds compete*. "He wants to do justice to the integrity of the life-world and social systems, and to show how each presupposes the other. We cannot understand the character of the life-world unless we understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand social systems unless we see how they arise out of activities of social agents" (Bernstein 1985:22). Such is the communicative rationality that Habermas diagnoses; the rationalities behind competing truths and lifeworlds gradually battle to colonize communicated human experience and communal society.

#### • Rationality as Pilots-of-Conflict

Both Foucault and Habermas support the view that in politics and in inter-and intra-societal conflict, resistance against power tends not just to be an objection to 'a given violence' or to 'the given action of an institution' but is so regularly conflict between rationalities. To Foucault (1988:84), the crucial consideration is the nature of the rationalities at stake during or over the conflict. To Habermas, it is rationality which steers the respective institution, the society and the system. "A particular breakdown in steering performances [i.e., of system integration] leads to a breakdown in social integration" (McCarthy [on Habermas] 1978:365). For instance, for Habermas, a shortcoming in 'administrative rationality' arises when the government is unable to honor obligations arising from the economic system (366).

To a considerable degree, both Foucault and Habermas are well along the road to Superstructuralism in their philosophical perspectives upon rationality. Both largely view reason as being overtaken by rationality: that is, conscious Reason is now replaced and controlled by various specific Rationalizations to a smothering degree (Harland 1987:59). And behind each specific Rationalization "lurks imperatives for self-preservation and domination" --- a Nietzschean conceptualization that was also

furthered by Horkheimer and Adorno (Habermas 1987:122). Behind positivism's persistent 'claim of objectivity' for example, lies a monstrous 'claim to rightness' (122).

#### • **The World as The-World-Distorted**

Nietzsche's will-to-power thesis has had, since the turn of the century, a prodigious influence upon the philosophy of the current age. Nietzsche had theorized the existence of a will-to-power behind knowledge and behind moral action. Forms of science and types of reasoning are propelled to dominance by this will-to-power, a will which forces individuals and institutions to adopt illusory perceptions and justifications (Habermas [on Nietzsche] 1987:95).

In Foucault's work, Nietzsche's will-to-power philosophy may be recognized in the way, for instance, that knowledge and language support each other. Understanding and terminology both tend to stem from will-to-power, and they are "rigorously" interwoven. The given representation is recognized by the observer through the will-to-power, and it is categorized and communicated along a framework emanating from that will-to-power (Foucault 1970:86). Thus the efforts to *look for*, *to find* and *to describe* the object are all powered by that will. Will-to-power reinforces itself repeatedly in this manner.

In Habermas, the Nietzschean will-to-power ruminations are seen through his theory of communicative action. By this thesis the life-world of everyday life is a deformed one, a view of the 'real world' reinterpreted in terms of purposive rationalizations. For each individual / group / institution, this process of rationalization is selective: knowledge is sought in terms of issues encountered relative to the degree of threat they pose (i.e., do not pose) to "the communicative integrity" (Bernstein [on Habermas] 1985:23) of the lifeworld held by that individual / group / institution. The world is consistently and persistently distorted *defensively* (24), according to the Habermas perspective upon systemic rationalization.

#### • **Ideologies as Reverberating Justification**

Foucault and Habermas adopt reasonably similar stances with regard to ideology. Neither are pivotally interested in ideology, ipso facto, and both see ideologies as being shaped by subconscious will-formations.

For Foucault, ideology is significant not in its own right as a subject or an institution, but as an articulated subject which a given individual or group wishes to identify with, in support of their own general politics of truth. An ideology arises, or is legitimated in terms of its value for the given regime of truths it can support or justify.

For Habermas, ideologies tend to be illusory belief systems which particular groups invest in. Again, the ideology is used to justify, and under Habermas's outlook, individuals can only be freed once the deceptive and embedded nature of that ideology is revealed to them and for them.

Neither Foucault nor Habermas is Althusserian in his regard for ideology. Althusser had celebrated ideology in its own right, and had accorded it a pivotal action role --- a causal role --- in its regeneration of particular socio-political edifices overtime (Harland 1987:49). Thus, for Foucault and Habermas, ideologies reverberate rather than regenerate.

### • Mythology as Unifying Narrative

A short comment on the philosophy of Barthes ought to be added to qualify the immediate previous set of paragraphs on 'ideology'. Just as Foucault has revealed the largely-unsuspected existence of institutional rationalities behind the *everyday* petty and opaque activities of individuals and agencies, and just as Habermas has revealed the existence of dominant forms of thought and construction behind the *everyday* knowledge and communication systems of work and life, so Barthes also finds the ongoing working of communal constructions behind *everyday* activities. While Althusser had suggested that the power of ideologies behind mundane behavior must be accounted for, Barthes uncovered the work of mythologies behind the ordinary social entities.

Under the philosophy of Barthes, the world's objects are not just concrete objects: Physical objects can represent highly important abstract notions: "the solid world turns out to be not so solid after all" (Harland [on Barthes] 1987:52).

To Barthes, people do not just eat steak, they eat the idea of steak (52). To Barthes, wine is not just a drink to taste, it is an important representative element or signifier of a whole style of living (53). In this way, steak and wine become totems for valued communal ideas and images: products and entities 'stand for' esteemed ways of thinking and living. 'Steakhood' is socially unifying. 'Wine-ness' is communally integrating.

Under Barthesian analysis, the aim is to identify the **sense-of-society** that things or even places have. It is a philosophy which, when translated to the world of business, suggests there are critical signifying reasons why a product may succeed in one society and not in others. It is a philosophy which to Harland is **superstructuralist: it helps explain how people have and are being "controlled by Rationalizations and False Consciousness which have replaced Reason"** (59).

And from the philosophy of Barthes and others --- to evaluate these life-shaping and order-building mythologies --- has come the field of semiotics. Not yet a science (63), semiotics endeavors to analyze the dominant myths of lead sections of the population. To semioticians, these myths subjugate these dominating groups *before* they are used by them to subjugate the otherwise subjugated. Myths therefore are seen to control down and up.

### • Things as Humans' Things

Another philosophical perspective that needs to be briefly addressed is the concept of the inherent meaning of things. According to Veyne (1978:226-31 and 240), Foucault is the *first true positivist* since he is the first to see the full impossibility of historical objects having a meaning independent of the perception of people. According to Veyne, while Nietzsche had challenged the view that things have a meaning in themselves, it was Foucault who attributed the meaning of things to humans (Merquior 1985:73). Nietzsche had recognized the changeability of ascribed meaning, then Foucault 'confirmed' that things have no inherent quiddity. To Foucault (1977/B:142) things do not have secret essences: there is no *noumenon* to be discovered for each and every thing. Things do not have an invariant universal

fundamental meaning: the meanings things 'have' originate with humans. Noumenon, like phenomenon, belong to the wonder of individuals and / or the gaze of institutions --- according to Foucauldian philosophy on meaning. Under Foucault, objectivity always seems to be anthropocentric.

#### • Things as Historical Meaning

The final perspective flows on from the penultimate one, and again the essential Foucauldian philosophy behind it owes some clarification to the historian, Veyne. If objectivity is inescapably anthropocentric, it must necessarily be historical. Human understanding has its own past: objectivity evolves. Meanings have their genealogies --- which empower them and delimit them. To Foucault (1979), technologies of power in each age legitimate the domain of accepted objects, and they channel the measures of validity by which things are considered 'acceptable' / 'unacceptable', 'true' or 'false' within that social world. And this, is the judgement of Veyne (1981:52), is 'pure history': it is not history as the past is now, it is history as the past then was in *that* present. Every fact, event or thing is historical --- to the age of each present.

### 2.2.7 Related Concepts

Under the philosophy perspectives of Foucault and Habermas on dominance and subjugation, the following ten concepts are notable. The first eight emanate from the literature of the 'historical' philosophy of Foucault, and the last two from the hermeneutic philosophy of Habermas. None of the ten concepts are fresh to this study. The aim in presenting them is to clarify important nuances and inter-connections which may not yet have been emphasized strongly enough so far.

#### • Truth

The historical philosophy of Foucault ranges across a welter of political matters --- viz., consciousness, ideology, alienation, illusion, error to nominate some pivotal ones. But the point of debate that underscores each of these issues --- according to the Foucauldian vision --- is truth. 'Social and cultural confrontation', 'domination and subjugation', 'the battle for the lifeworld' --- as these conflicts for rights and for power may be variously called --- are reducible to *the effort to define and project truth* --- if ever Foucault may be reduced. That is, if ever the insight of the philosopher-critic of 'the subject' can faithfully be reduced to 'a subject'. The effort to do so appears to be a conflict of fidelity!

Table 2.2.7./1 now clarifies what Foucault stated truth was and is. He considers truth to be the discourse that collectives / agencies / communities produce --- a discourse that is constantly incited politically and economically. As such truth exists in various forms and is the object of immense diffusion (Foucault, in Morris and Patton 1979:46). It is 'manufactured' under control and articulated chiefly through the dominant political and economic capillary apparatus available to the group / institution / society. It is subject to considerable debate and to ongoing efforts to obtain ideological redefinition. Thus, as Table 2.2.7./1 implies, there are frequent if not perpetual power-struggles *for* truth and *around* truth (46).

TABLE 2.2.7./1

FOUCAULT'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT TRUTH:  
'PROPOSITIONS' ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRUTH

---

- Truth is the **ensemble of ordered procedures** by which groups/institutions/societies produce, regulate, distribute, circulate and take action upon articulated statements;
  - Truth is linked to a regime of truth which is **a circular system** consisting of both the set of relations of power which produce and sustain it, and the effects of power which induces and redirects it;
  - Truth is present everywhere: the regime of truth functions as the ideological, the superstructural and **the conditioning formative force** behind, for instance, both capitalism and socialism;
  - Truth is not just a realm of consciousness: **it also acts** as an institution which produces and exists as a political economy in its own right;
  - Truth is a system of power which **generates** social, economic, cultural and other forms of **hegemony**.
- 

SOURCE: Adapted from Foucault as interviewed by Alexassandro Fontano and Pasquale Pasquino as translated by Paul Patton and Meaghan Morris (Morris and Patton 1979:47).



- **Genealogy**

Foucault's analyses examine the microphysics of power that surround regimes of truth (Kritzman, in Foucault 1988:xviii). His study of these power relationships amounts to an investigation of the experiences and the militances that have and do work in and around each identified regime. As such, they are genealogical studies of how the regimes has and does objectify through its knowledge, its practices and its associations.

Foucault's genealogy is offered not so much as a magisterial or comprehensive historical account of rational action, but is presented as an intelligible, a reflected and an a-scientific assessment of the rationalizations by which the group / institution / society has grown --- or has cultivated itself (Foucault 1980:242). It is a constructed historical account "of the objectification of objectivities" (McCarthy [on Foucault] 1987:xiv) --- a critique of the essential ideologies and knowledges by which collectives have become constructed.

Genealogy is 'late-Foucault', and stresses the significances of 'power' and 'practices' in lieu of his earlier emphases upon 'knowledge' and 'language' (Harland 1987:155). His genealogical phase thereby explores the manner in which institutional behaviors have been formed and are implemented in contrast to his earlier archaeological work which tended to limit its interest to the "truth-constituting rules of exclusion" (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:248) developing or developed within particular discourse. Thus, Foucault's archaeology examines the autonomous nature of forms of knowledge, something which itself is made subordinate later to the way knowledge and truth are articulated through evolving power technologies (268). Hence, crudely put, archaeological work amounts to the history of an institution's efforts to differentiate itself, while genealogical work amounts to the history of the institutions's structuralistic activity (256).

- **Subject-Centered Reason**

Foucault shares in the structuralist criticism of subject-centered knowledge (Merquior 1985:77). To Foucault, having definite / fixed / axiomatic subjects assumes too much: it prevents the wider mutualities amongst things from being seen. Subject-centered reason "[kills-off] dialogical relationships ... [and] monologically [turns subjects] in upon themselves, into objects for one another, and only objects" (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:246).

Hence, Foucault's genealogy was not envisaged as the search for the *origin* of designated subjects, but was an effort to uncover the *beginnings* of discourse formations (250; original emphasis). To Foucault, for instance, history must be *detached from any perpetual subject-focused image* through which its anthropocentric understanding is structured. "This idea of a *document pregnant with meaning* has to be called into question ... ." (250). Subject-centered history, then, is unacceptable 'phenomenological' and 'anthropological' history (239). Subjects ought to disappear from history, according to Foucault: but, then, care should be taken (in his estimation) not to over-objectify 'objects' either (Merquior 1985:77). To Foucault, what counts is the regularities and discontinuities of discourse

not the structuring of the 'personalities' of and in storylines and the telling of 'unique events'. Subject centered history and object centered history both tend to be 'historical *a priori*' (81).

- **Discontinuity**

Foucault applies his concept of historicity almost everywhere. He finds historicity in nature, he finds it in science. And he finds much disfavor with classicist interpretations of nature, science and life. He finds that neither nature, science nor life "obey the gentle and continuist schemes of development ordinarily accepted" in science and society (Foucault, in Morris and Patton 1979:31).

In nature he challenges the view that there are remarkable forms of continuity in the world --- an assumption which almost appears to be an *a priori*, itself. To Foucault, nature can not be categorized by series, by order of degradation. Nature is fluid, loose, disordered --- there is no single analogy of arrangement, no single function by which the performance or resemblances of natural entities can be established. There will always be **discontinuities** in life and nature --- no taxonomy can comprehensively account for nature's fluid and subtle articulations. Nature is not a tightly ordered nor a regulated 'mechanism' (Foucault 1979:270-273). Hence, Foucault cannot accept the Classicist *requirement* that nature should be continuous (146-147).

And to Foucault, the discontinuities of nature are mirrored in the discontinuities of science. It is simply not possible to establish or identify a foolproof gradation of beings or entities. Eras are human categories: they cannot faithfully prescribe "the *internal* time of beings" (150) of any substantive continuity. "Intemperate interruptions ... have constantly dispersed [all things], destroyed them, mingled them, separated them, and interwoven them ... ." (150). Language, thought, reasoning --- like nature --- all have their discontinuities which scientists and researchers have much understated. Language, thought, reasoning --- like nature --- are, to Foucault, elusive. There can be no perfect order to things. Nature is an endless murmur (155). **All classifications are contestable**, being necessarily based on single or few elevated objects of knowledge at the expense of all objects.

Foucault's concept of discontinuity is perhaps best identified through his views on 'knowledge'. In his archaeology, Foucault supported a Kuhnian **caesural account** of paradigm shifts in medical thought (Merquior 1985:33). To Foucault, as to Kuhn, knowledge is *the imposition of fundamental cultural codes upon experience* (36). And the 'advance' of knowledge is discontinuous --- there can be no sturdy or uniform systems of knowledge "marching to a more faithful rendering, a more realistic grasp of a constant, stable object" (39).

To Foucault, epistemes succeed one another arbitrarily --- "without any inner logic" (42). Truths, in any field, consist of "radically heterogenous blocks of knowledge" (42), and truth in history, for instance is axiomatically caesural and non-linear. New truths arise discontinuously from prevailing truths. Old truths revive making breaks from dominant interpretations. History cannot be incessant: regnant interpretations will always be subject to social, political, cultural, economic and other pressures.

### • Opaque Power

The concept of opaque power is a platform idea behind the study and was introduced in subsection 1.1 as that complex of power resultant from the merger of strong discourse with strong practice within any given field. Table 2.2.7./2 now attempts to add to that introductory explanation of opaque power. The Foucauldian propositions it lists show how Foucault conceptualized that opaque power was that unity of *legitimate* with *illegitimate* agency, and that conjoining of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' motivation which results in "a normatively unassailable formation of power" (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:283). Opaque power is for Foucault what for Nietzsche was the fusion of reason and power (127).

But the propositions of Table 2.2.7./2 never constituted a distinct theory in Foucault's mind. In Patton's (1979:129) view, they constitute 'certain conceptions of power' which Foucault tended to emphasize rather than standing as a coherent theory. They compose an indicative grid-rather than a totalizing theory --- by which historical phenomena can be assessed (129).

### • Capillary Power

Foucault considers that opaque powers normalize: they have a local, constant, productive and all-pervasive character --- as the propositions of Table 2.2.7./2 infer. Hence, Foucault believes the effect of opaque powers to be capillary within the given society. It is a 'biopower' which invades or is absorbed *into people's bodies rather than into their heads*, or rather than into their heads alone (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:283).

Hence to Foucault, a given disciplinary power within society will be capillary in the sense that it will "extend its operations into the population rather than simply remaining at its borders" (Patton 1979:131). Through this capillary action, the disciplining power is not limited to negative and external effects, but it becomes a positive force "internal to the daily activities of people" (131).

In this fashion *the people begin to normalize themselves*. Society becomes **carceral** in the sense that people imprison themselves by their own self-disciplinary activities (Merquior 1985:108). Carceral society thrives on capillary action: it is society maintained by surveillance and society sustained by self-surveillance (Foucault 1980:196-7). The result, for Foucault, is **an imaginary geopolitics** which exist within the carceral city: there is a geography to 'the democratisation of objects' to 'the modes of tabulation' and to 'the organization of domains' (70-1). Everything is historical, but the real effects of history are *not* uniform.

### • The Panopticon

To Foucault (1980:71) 'Panoptism' is that collective set of instruments and techniques through which capillary powers work in carceral society. it particularly is rife where dominant parties are able to contain the generative force of power within the state apparatus thereby rendering it "the major, privileged, capital and almost unique instrument of power of one class over another" (72).

Taking his idea of the mechanisms by which power spreads from Jeremy Bentham's physical plan for the prison panopticon (Rabinow 1984:18), Foucault attempts to illustrate the technology of power

TABLE 2.2.7./2

FOUCAULT'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT OPAQUE POWER:  
'PROPOSITIONS' ON THE COALESCENCE OF DISCOURSE  
AND PRAXIS

- 
- Opaque power exists in complex strategic relations between groups within a given society rather than being a substantive entity (3>1);
  - Opaque power is present in these economic and other relations of force by which groups consciously and unconsciously struggle for predominance over others (1>1);
  - Opaque power is a silent, secret civil form of unspoken warfare which exists within various social institutions (2>1);
  - Opaque power exists as a rhetoric of social power which emanates from within a dominant group / dominant groups and spreads across the society that ideology and interests subjugate (4>1);
  - Opaque power is an omnipresent 'set'/'mix' of relations of power, the sovereignty of which is sustained by homogenous apparatuses of power (5>1);
  - Opaque power generally has (within its sustaining apparatus) strategies, programs and technologies which correspond with each other (6>1);
  - Opaque power is constantly being transformed by the self-amplifying power of the subjugating groups through which it runs (7>1);
  - Opaque power is not an entity which is possessed, but it is a network of relations which acts through corrected individuals over a given social field (8>1);
  - Opaque power is productive: it produces 'knowledge' (9>1);
  - Opaque power is productive: its products are 'people' (10>1);
- 

SOURCE: Foucault 1980, Merquior 1985, Rabinow 1984, and Morris and Patton 1979.

TABLE 2.2.7./2 (Continued)

## KEY

- 1>1 Foucault being interviewed by the Révoltes Logiques collective --- in Morris and Patton 1979:49-58
- 2>1 Merquior 1985:110
- 3>1 Foucault 1980:235-6
- 4>1 Foucault 1980:236
- 5>1 Foucault 1980:246-7
- 6>1 Foucault 1980:247
- 7>1 Foucault 1980:159-60
- 8>1 Notes on a lecture by Foucault, translated by W. Suchting --- in Morris and Patton 1979:59
- 9>1 Rabinow 1984:61; and Merquior 1985:100
- 10>1 Merquior 1985:111

relations --- explaining them in terms of the mundane, and the ordinary behaviors of people. The Panopticon's system of **surveillance** works *continuously* and *anonymously* over a population, and in time the Panopticon's system of **self-surveillance** works *continuously* and *anonymously* through a population. Almost everyone becomes caught by its normalizing gaze (Foucault 1980:156).

The perpetual judgement of the Panopticon is explained here by Foucault (1984:156) in terms of the 1830s repression of a madman. The Pinel quotation he selects may be taken as representative of the broader disciplinary forces of wider society.

Everything was organized so that the madman would recognize himself in a world of judgement that enveloped him on all sides; he must know that he is watched, judged and condemned; from transgression to punishment, the connection must be evident, as a guilt recognized by all: 'We profit from the circumstance of the both, remind him of the transgression, or of the omission of an important duty, and with the aid of a faucet suddenly release a shower of cold water upon his head, which often disconcerts the madman or drives out a predominant idea by a strong and unexpected impression; if the idea persists, the shower is repeated, but care is taken to avoid the hard tone and the shocking terms that would cause rebellion; on the contrary, the madman is made to understand that it is for his sake and reluctantly that we resort to such violent measures; sometimes we add a joke, taking care not to go too far with it" (Pinel 1836:205).

Just as the surveillance of the guard imposes on the madman, so in science does positivism impose on scientists (163) and so do all manner of other unreasons impose elsewhere. *Normalization is not only found in the asylum.*

#### • **Alternative Knowledges**

But Foucault's philosophy, as has been repeatedly stated, does not just concern itself with negating forces. Power can also be positive, and counterpowers within the networks of disciplinary power. These counterpowers are the local, marginal and alternative knowledges of Foucault's darkground (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:280). In the 1960s and 1970s they are the rising **disqualified knowledges** (Foucault 1980:82). They are the truths of the subjugated, the dissident, and the resistant. They are seen by him to be playing an increasingly important role in the imagination of identities, places and events.

#### • **Crises**

The final two philosophical concepts comes from Habermas. Both relate strongly to Foucault's thoughts on power and knowledge.

The first is the Habermas conceptualization of crisis. To Habermas, a crisis occurs when people within a given population believe their social identity has been seriously disturbed by structural changes in society. In liberal-capitalist (Western) societies, Habermas believed that the majority of crises arise out of the rights and strengths of individuals and groups to gather profit from entrepreneurial activity.

To Habermas, dominant groups in states were vulnerable to **a rationality crisis** when they were snagged between the competing impulse to provide and plan for all and otherwise to preserve their own

specific privileges (Thompson and Held 1982:10). Here, perhaps, if Habermas can be compared with Foucault, those dominant groups are perhaps least likely to face a rationality crisis where they can make their own economic, cultural and other interests synonymous with the state and thereby with the population(s) over which they are then sovereign.

Three other major 'Western' crises are possible, according to Habermas; they are given in Table 2.2.7./3:

- (i) **an economic crisis** occurs where the necessary quantity of consumables is not produced (183);
- (ii) **a legitimization crisis** occurs where the necessary quantity of 'generalized motivation' is not yielded (183); *and*
- (iii) **a motivational crisis** occurs where the necessary quantity of 'social meaning' is not inspired (183).

In the final analysis, Habermas believes that class structure is the main source of these crises -- particularly of the legitimization crisis. These class-based problems are accentuated today as the state -- under the control of some dominant groups and ideologies --- makes even more frequent incursions into what were originally 'private' matters (185). As the state expands its area of interest, or area of surveillance, the traditions through which it used to produce motivations are losing their hold (185). The pre-capitalist elements (such as the civic ethic and that of religious integrity) and the bourgeois elements they come to be interwoven with (such as 'possessive individualism' and 'utilitarianism') are being eroded (185).

#### • **Consensus Truth**

The final philosophical concept that warrants brief explanation from the discipline's literature is the thinking of Habermas on consensus truth. Classicist and modernist views of science had largely been predicated on an effort to reach, secure and fertilize 'pure knowledge'. But Habermas systematically set out to unveil the illusion behind such strides (Thompson and Held 1982:6). To Habermas the search for truth in science and life had in fact only been platformed on a tacit commitment to a **naive realism** --- recall the use of that term in subsections 1.3.0. to 1.3.3. on the research paradigms of social / human science. Hence, to him, science is *not* a clean and unblemished quest for 'fact', 'falsity', and 'reality', it is **a game of social rules**. The search for an Archimedean point of truth-in-knowledge is pointless to Habermas; there can be no absolute truth-warranting criterion in the human sciences (Albert 1987:75).

The Habermas concept of truth pivots on knowledge-constitutive interests: it is *a consensus explanation of truth* --- "a theory which either simply does not take the idea of adequate representation into account at all, or [which] treats it as a rather unimportant and unproblematic moments" (76). To Habermas, thereby, truths are held within 'communication communities': in such colleges of thought it is not necessary to tie the idea of truth to any universal or fixed axis of certainty.

TABLE 2.2.7./3

THE FOUR POSSIBLE CRISIS TENDENCIES OF  
ADVANCED CAPITALISM

Habermas on issues of structure, status and legitimacy

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Point of Origin for Capitalism (the three sub-systems)	Potential System Crisis	Potential Identity Crisis
■ECONOMIC	1. <i>Economic Crisis</i>	-----
■POLITICAL	2. <i>Rationality Crisis</i>	3. <i>Legitimation Crisis</i>
■SOCIO-CULTURAL	-----	4. <i>Motivation Crisis</i>

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SOURCE: Held, in Thompson and Held 1982:183.