PLATO AND TEXTUAL AUTHORITY: AN EXAMINATION OF

PLATO'S DOMINATIVE INFLUENCE IN FOUR GENRES

OF ETHNOGRAPHY LEADING TO A POSTPLATONIC,

RHETORICAL MODEL OF TEXTUAL AUTHORITY

Volume I

A Dissertation

by

JEFFREY BRETT SCHONBERG

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 1992

Major Subject: English

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Approved as to style and content by:

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December 1992

ABSTRACT

Plato and Textual Authority: An Examination of
Plato's Dominative Influence in Four Genres
of Ethnography Leading to a Postplatonic,
Rhetorical Model of Textual Authority.
(December 1992)
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Plato's authoritative depictions of the philosopher as
the sole guide capable of leading readers to Truth develop
slowly through his dialogues. Through analyses of the
"Meno," the "Phaedo," and the "Timaeus," dialogues repre-
sentative of Plato's early, middle, and late writings, the
ideology-based and dominative characteristics of Plato's
sense of authority are portrayed. Subsequent analyses of
ethnographic texts seen as primary models of the Realist,
Interpretive/Translative, Representative, and Fictive
genres, as well as analyses of selected ethnographies
representing these genres, reveal the extent to which
ethnographers writing in these genres rely on Plato's
monologues disguised as dialogues, on Plato's means of
displacing counterarguments and objectivizing concepts and
definitions through a transcendent rhetoric, and on
Plato's methods of textual organization as their means of
textualizing authority. In light of both these analyses

and the spirit of reflexivity controlling many of the critical perspectives of twentieth century ethnography, a postplatonic model of textual authority focusing on the rhetorical choices made by readers provides an alternative to the pitfalls resulting from the dominative nature of Plato's concept of authority.

DEDICATION

To Jane, whose loving spirit encouraged the writing of these pages as much as my own and without whom the completion of this program and text would never have happened.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The opening of Derek Walcott's play, A Branch of the
Blue Nile, resounds with a note of reflexivity. Surrounded
by her fellow actors and actresses and empowered by the
spirit of William Shakespeare's Anthony and Cleopatra,
Sheila Harris, a black Trinidadian actress, rehearses
Cleopatra's lines: "'Give me my robe, put on my crown; I
have / Immortal longings in me: now no more, / The juice
of Egypt's grape'."[1]   Harvey St. Just, the white English
director and heir to the Shakespearian legacy, criticizes
her performance for lacking sensuality: "What's all this
sexual hesitation, Sheila? You know how sensual his
corpse is to her?"[2] It is this juxtaposing of points of
view and the resulting development of conscious specula-
tion on these points of view that develops the play's
significance. Gavin Fontinelle, the black American actor,
reveals this meaning clearly in Act I, Scene 2:

>   I didn't see myself in the mirror. I just plain
>   refused what they wanted me to see, which was a
>   black man looking back in my face and muttering:
>   'How you going to han'le this, nigger? How you
>   going leap out of the invisible crowd and be your

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Style Manual.

> charming, dazzling self?' I saw me; then the
> mirror changed on me. . . . I began to believe
> what I saw in the mirror because that's how they
> wanted me to look.[3]

Thus, Stephen Breslow notes that Walcott's characters interweave themselves into a "complex cloth of 'real life' interrelationships, many of them mirroring the characterizations and meanings inherent in Shakespeare's drama."[4]

Clifford Geertz makes use of a similar juxtaposition of points of view to create the "cloth of real life" in his description of the Balinese cockfight. After fleeing from a police raid on an illegal cockfight, Geertz and his wife find themselves hiding in the courtyard of a resident in a Balinese village. When a policeman searching for the participants discovers the Geertzs, the narrative takes a reflexive twist:

> Seeing my wife and I, 'White Men,' there in the
> yard, the policeman performed a classic double
> take. . . . Our host . . . leaped instantly to
> our defense, producing an impassioned description
> of who and what we were. . . . We were American
> professors; the government had cleared us; we
> were there to study culture; we were going to
> write a book to tell Americans about Bali.[5]

Geertz further notes that this episode gave him "the kind of immediate, inside-view of an aspect of 'peasant

mentality' that anthropologists . . . normally do not get."[6] In this fashion Geertz, like Gavin Fontinelle, acknowledges the existence of an anthropological "mirror" which, like Gavin Fontinelle's dramatic mirror, reflects what the dominant culture wants to see. More importantly, Geertz's statements reveal the close relation between ethnographic and literary discourse hinted at by M. M. Bakhtin: "In the process of literary creation [my emphasis], languages interanimate each other and objectify precisely that side of one's own (and of the other's) language that pertains to its world view, its inner form, the axiologically accentuated system inherent in it."[7]

The idea that ethnographic discourse operates much like literary discourse makes many anthropologists uncomfortable, especially when the discourse is viewed by these anthropologists as reflecting empirical truth. Such a view holds a prominent position in twentieth-century anthropology, for the ethnographer is commonly seen as the inheritor of nineteenth-century literary and social science experiments with social realism. As a result, the persona of the ethnographer as anthropologist is described by Clifford as the scientific hero "trained in the latest analytic techniques and modes of scientific explanation"[8] and whose task is to form textually conclusions derived from data gathered under the hardships of on-site field-work. Since the 1970's, however, this figure has been

challenged as philosophically unfulfilling because of the
influence of poststructural and postmodern criticism.
Seeking a means of resolving the tension created by what
Crapanzano sees as beliefs in "definitive presentations"
and acknowledgements of "provisional interpretations,"[9]
ethnographers such as George Marcus and Dick Cushman have
begun to pay explicit attention to the ways "ethnographies
achieve their effect as knowledge of 'others'."[10] Stephen
Webster, for example, focuses on anthropologists' need to
view ethnography as "both a literary genre and a critique
of culture based upon a knowledge-constitutive present."[11]
Stephen Tyler goes in the opposite direction in looking at
literature as ethnography. As he indicates, only since
postmodern anthropology "opposes the semiotic notion that
languages and cultures are just conventional systems of
signs separate from human use and intentionality"[12] can
the relationships between such literary genres as ethnog-
raphy and poetry be seen as rhetorical:

> Sorites, polyphony, parataxis, parable, paradox,
> enigma, ellipsis, conceits, and tropes of all
> kinds take their equal place as effective means
> of reasonable discourse along with the so-called
> inferential patterns of dialectic and logic.[13]

Clifford Geertz notes that Kenneth Burke's sense of drama-
tistic "strategies" equally describes the literary genres
of fiction, poetry, and ethnography, pointing out that

"the empirical passage back and forth between cultural productions . . . and personal experiences . . . is mainly negotiated in terms of a conceptual passage between symbol as action and action as symbol."[14] Marcus and Cushman include a brief history of classical rhetoric and cite such contemporary rhetoricians as Chaim Perelman and James Kinneavy, as well as such literary critics as Northrup Frye and Wayne Booth who have made use of rhetorical considerations as starting points for literary criticism, to create a "framework" that "might inform a perspective on ethnographic writing, useful to habitual readers of ethnography."[15] As a result of these insights, percep- tions of ethnographic discourse as a literary genre and thus as rhetorical command increasing critical attention.

A significant body of metaethnographic investigation examines various aspects of the rhetoric of ethnography. Vincent Crapanzano describes the ethnographic text as a working out of a rhetoric of "constitution and deconstitu- tion, incantation and exorcism, creation and destruc- tion."[16] Moreover, this rhetoric makes use of such sty- listic characteristics as the "self-conscious avoidance of the 'I', the elimination of connotative, impassioned, and generally polysemic language, and the calculated use of scientistic, jargonistic, generally monosemic language."[17] Finally, Crapanzano asserts that the ethnographer's audi- ence is created in two parts: "the audience of his own

people and the audience of those other people whom he
refers to in an act of presumptive if not patronizing
incorporation as 'my people'."[18] In a later work, Crapan-
zano distinguishes the life history as a rhetorical trope
whose power derives from its ability to "present a view of
the subject from the perspective of the outsider; it bears
the impress of the narrator."[19] As a result, such a
conscious structuring of information by the ethnographer
reveals

> the extent to which the stylistic manoeuvres, the
> generic constraints and the literary conventional
> limitations impose upon not just simply those
> ethnographic . . . texts we produce, but upon the
> very dialogue from which such texts arise.[20]

More specifically, the combination of ethnographic method
and rhetorical techniques underscores "the anthropolo-
gist's unquestioned presuppositions."[21]

Kevin Dwyer notes that, typically, anthropologists
have not examined "the inevitable tie between what is
studied--the 'Object'--and who studies it--the
'Subject'."[22] Since ethnographers' language presupposes
the "Object" is separated from the "Subject", this "Sub-
ject . . . can be made free of distortion and capable of
observing and capturing the Object in its true nature."[23]
Wayne Booth, in his discussion of the development of the
"objective author" echoes Dwyer's notion of a writer

("Subject") who is "free of distortion:

> All of us would like the novelist somehow to
> operate on the level of our own passion for truth
> and right, a passion which by definition is not
> in the least prejudiced. The argument in favor
> of neutrality is thus useful in so far as it
> warns the novelist that he can seldom afford to
> pour his untransformed biases into his work. The
> deeper he sees into permanency, the more likely
> he is to earn the discerning reader's concur-
> rence.[24]

Booth concludes that neutrality is impossible: " . . .
even the most nearly neutral comment will reveal some sort
of commitment."[25] Similarly, Dwyer concludes that such a
posture creates an "object of knowledge which is 'ab-
stract',"[26] a creation contested by ethnographers advocat-
ing the increased use of life histories which reveal both
concrete objects and subjects through the use of such
tropes as the rite of passage,[27] the journey,[28] and the
acts of "conquest and submission."[29] For Dwyer, the use
of dialogue makes explicit that which is implicit in the
subject-object encounter: "a complex process of adjustment
and readjustment, of false beginnings, hesitation, and
redirection, of streaks of continuity and moments of
rupture."[30]

James Clifford repeats Dwyer's concern for the

relationship between Subject and Object in his discussion
of the oeuvre of Maurice Leenhardt. In addition, like
Dwyer, Clifford advocates an ethnographic rhetoric which,
through the use of dialogue, avoids the "condescending"
epistemic beliefs that "only the ethnographer derives
knowledge about custom from fieldwork collaborations [and]
that the texts and interpretations so constituted are
meaningful only to the author of the eventual
ethnography."[31] What separates Clifford from Dwyer is the
former's specific separation from the structuralist phi-
losophy which still imbues Dwyer's notion of dialogue.
Clifford specifically denies the structuralistic paradigm
through his analysis of Maurice Leenhardt's observation
that theories formed from structuralist perspectives do
not allow for "concrete experience seen from 'the native
point of view'," could not develop "through fieldwork
'rapport' or empathy," and were not the result of decoding
'textualized' behaviour."[32] This point of view allows
Clifford to promote a rhetorical stance from which the
ethnographer "records a social, expressive process he has
initiated and over which he has limited control."[33]
Essentially, then, Clifford makes Dwyer's Object a mean-
ingful portion of the audience of an ethnography and makes
ethnographic rhetoric more inclusively epistemic.

In a later essay, Clifford explicitly discusses the
rhetorical nature of ethnography, tying the genre into the

redefinitions of literature offered by such postmodern theorists as Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, and Terry Eagleton.[34] These positions return to an older view of fiction as "something made or fashioned,"[35] as well as something invented; Clifford, therefore, applies both aspects of the definition in his description of ethnographers as being unable to avoid "expressive tropes, figures, and allegories that select and impose meaning as they translate it."[36] Moreover, Clifford sees ethnography as "moving into areas long occupied by . . . the novel."[37] As a result, the rhetorical nature of the ethnographic text "must now be confronted."[38]

Citing Northrup Frye's admonition that a genre can only be understood in terms of its rhetoric, George Marcus examines the rhetorical nature of ethnographies: "The fundamental question concerning rhetoric as the basis of [the ethnographic] genre is the characteristic manner by which a text's language and organization convince its readers of the truth, or at least of the credibility of its claims."[39] Thus, Marcus echoes Wayne Brockriede's description of rhetoric as inherently argumentative in that rhetoric's use of arguments is a process wherein "people reason their way from one set of problematic ideas to the choice of another."[40] Marcus, therefore, sees the rhetoric of ethnography as those arguments which allow readers to categorize a specific text within the

ethnographic genre:

> . . . while the accomplishment of the rhetorical
> task of setting a work within the ethnographic
> genre does not wholly determine the reaction to
> its specific, focused claims, it does subtly and
> importantly affect this reaction. By the manner
> of conforming to ethnographic rhetoric, an author
> establishes a generalized authority and knowledge
> as an integral dimension, pervading the text
> against which specific reactions to arguments are
> formed by readers.[41]

Edward Bruner similarly concentrates his critical gaze
on the rhetoric of ethnography, but he focuses his criti-
cism on the ethnographic narrative. Seeing the narrative
as the politically essential "guide" for ethnographies,
Bruner discusses the ethnographic narrative's rhetoric as
one which assigns meaning: the rhetoric of the ethnograph-
ic narrative "give[s] meaning to the present in terms of
location in an ordered syntagmatic sequence."[42] The power
of this rhetoric, however, is not an inventive one in an
Aristotelian sense; rather, it is a political one which
forces the ethnographer to make use of a specific means of
textually ordering and making meaningful cultural observa-
tions. As a result, according to Bruner, "only after
[a] . . . narrative becomes dominant is there a reexamina-
tion of the past, a rediscovery of old texts."[43] Bruner's

sense of the politically dominant position of ethnographic
narrative, therefore, evinces Michel Foucault's descrip-
tion of the "old" discursive formula whose power within
the "history of ideas" derives from its past usage.
According to Foucault, such a formula

> reveals history as inertia and weight, as a slow
> accumulation of the past, a silent sedimentation
> of things said; [moreover, within such a formula]
> statements must be treated by weight and in
> accordance with what they have in common . . .
> [for] it is their extent that must be measured;
> the extent of their repetition in time and place,
> the channels by which they are diffused, the
> groups in which they circulate. . . .[44]

In other words, the ethnographic narrative, when seen as
an example of an "old" discursive formula becomes domina-
tive through a political power gained from its historical
use as the means through which the propriety of data,
topics, and research methodology have been determined.
Bruner, therefore, calls for ethnographic discourse whose
rhetorical strength lies not in its ability to organize
and make meaningful ethnological observations on the basis
of their fitting into the "sediment of things said" previ-
ously but in its ability to perceive the present "as part
of a set of relationships involving a constituted past and
a future."[45] This is a rhetoric of discovery, one which

promotes multiple points of view on life's situations.

George Marcus and Dick Cushman survey the history of ethnography, beginning with ethnographic realism and ending with "experimental ethnography" in their discussion of the characteristics of written ethnology. Through their focus on such structural aspects as those they identify as characteristic of ethnograhic realism ("the narrative structure of total ethnography," "the unintrusive presence of the ethnographer in the text," the use of "common denominator people," "the marking of fieldwork experience," "the focus on everyday life situations," "representation of the native point of view," "the stylistic extrapolation of particular data," the "embellishment by jargon," and the "contextual exegesis of native concepts and discourse"),[46] a body of rhetorical tropes is developed and used as support for the claim that ethnograpic rhetoric is a rhetoric of domination, for these tropes are used to repress attempts to move away from stances viewing ethnography as either "grand comparison" or as "data . . . in inductive, nomothetic projects."[47] Yet, Marcus and Cushman note this same rhetoric must "make (common) sense to [the ethnographer's] readers within their own cultural framework, [and] must communicate meanings to these same readers which they are persuaded would make (again, common) sense to the ethnographer's subjects."[48]

The point of these observations, according to the authors, is to show the importance of rhetorical analysis to ethnographers interested in "the personal thought process that goes into producing a text without resurrecting a hypostatized [sic] notion of rhetorical technique."[49] In other words, rhetorical analysis is, for Marcus and Cushman, a means of assessing the nature of ethnographic knowledge claims. Rhetoric's capacity for this type of assessment is important since this aspect of anthropological reflexivity is often emphasized but rarely dealt with adequately.

In addition, a number of ethnographies specifically address the rhetorical nature of ethnographic writing. Jean Briggs notes that since "there are often discrepancies between what people say about themselves and their observed behavior,"[50] she has chosen a form consisting of "a series of vignettes of individual Uktu interacting with members of their family and with their neighbors."[51] Moreover, she includes descriptions of her own feelings, for she describes herself as "an intrinsic part of the research situation"[52] through her actions, her feelings, and her subjects' responses to them. Thus, Briggs reemphasizes the importance of the relationship between Subject and Object highlighted by Kevin Dwyer. More importantly, Briggs's narrative stance mirrors Wayne Booth's treatment of the Jamesian narrator, who focuses on the

"reader's sense of traveling in a real, though intensi-
fied, world."[53] As a result, both Henry James and Jean
Briggs make use of a "general rhetoric in the service of
realism."[54]

Paul Rabinow, however, moves in a different direction,
analyzing the "symbols which give meaning and through
which understanding is possible."[55] The starting point
for this analysis is the actions of a selected group of
Moroccans. Rabinow states explicitly that these actions
make particular "general cultural symbols and
structures,"[56] and thereby provide the ethnographer with a
means of interpretation:

> Man is a self-product of his own past as well as
> a prisoner of it. He lives amid his own self-
> definitions, largely passed down to him or im-
> posed on him. These parameters are neither
> static nor simply external. They are always
> partially integrated and internalized.[57]

What is not explicit here is Rabinow's reliance on the
rhetorical theory of Kenneth Burke, a dependence not
surprising given Burke's close association with structur-
alism. Joseph Gusfield notes this association, showing
how Burke's theories make him a "precursor" of Claude
Lévi-Strauss[58] who, like Burke, sees culture as a system
of differences in which aspects are defined through con-
trasts with other aspects and who blurs the distinctions

between literary and scientific discourse.[59] Moreover,
like Burke, Lévi-Strauss sees culture as the framework of
consciousness within which social relationships acquire
meaning through language: totems are "chosen not because
they are 'good to eat' but because they are 'good to
think'."[60] But while Lévi-Strauss sees only one means of
interpreting these contrasts, Burke sees them as rhetori-
cal. Thus, he describes rhetoric as being "rooted in an
essential function of language itself, a function that is
wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of
language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in
beings that by nature respond to symbols."[61] In other
words, Burke sees the nature of the contrasts between
cultural aspects as both dialectical and polyphonic.
Moreover, Burke describes language as a "species of ac-
tion, symbolic action--and its nature is such that it can
be used as a tool."[62] This is the use Rabinow makes of
the language of his Moroccan objects as they repeat leg-
ends which Rabinow analyzes.

Similarly, Thomas Gregor makes use of Kenneth Burke's
theory of dramatism. Using dramatism as a theoretical
filter through which he can interpret Mehinaku culture,
Gregor begins his text by implicitly adopting Burke's
definition of man:

> Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-
> misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or

moralized by the negative), separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order) and rotten with perfection.[63]

According to Burke's sense of Dramatism, the use of "symbol systems in general"[64] leads to committing the symbolic acts of Dramatism. This starting point allows Gregor to study "the implications of the script for the performance of the roles."[65] More specifically, by adopting Burke's notion of rhetoric, Gregor finds a means of attaining, describing, and interpreting ethnographic truth: "If reality is a social rather than absolute construct, we may approach the contrast of theater and everyday life from the perspective of how both define the situation and establish a sense of reality or authenticity in the beholder."[66]

In a different vein, Hoyt Alverson mines the work of Paul Ricoeur and I. A. Richards for his notion of the rhetorical nature of ethnography. According to Alverson, his text avoids an empiricist "fiction" permeating many ethnographies, for he follows Ricoeur's belief in "the pretense--the vain fiction--that observations simply represent a world of facts."[67] His ethnography, instead, is an interpretation which invites a reader to "witness" Alverson's "quest for meaning."[68] This quest echoes I. A.

Richards' notion of "philosophic inquiry."[69]

According to Richards, a rhetorical theory must "account for understanding and misunderstanding,"[70] for the rhetorician must look at meaning as "a plant that has grown."[71] It is this growth that Alverson asks the reader to follow in that Alverson uses historical treatments of the Tswana to create a meaning, an "interpretation", that is accessible through "the universal features of language."[72] Richards notes that "what a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy."[73] This "delegated efficacy" is, for Richards, the personal evocation any particular word prompts in a reader. Through these implied evocations, Alverson develops his "conceptions of class, of exploitation, of history, of the unseen substrata of memory or consciousness that precede lived experience."[74]

Jean-Paul Dumont, however, explicitly breaks away from the Subject-Object model of ethnography through his description of his intent: "Not only will I . . . direct my gaze at them [the Panare]; in addition, I want to consider how they gaze out at me."[75] As a result, like Rabinow and Gregor, Dumont makes use of a definition of rhetoric in which rhetoric brings Subject and Object together. Thus, he denies the disinterested scientific interpretation of culture as experience and adopts a perspective which "emphasizes not an objective viewpoint but a multiplicity

of viewpoints . . . passed through the warping prism
of . . . consciousness."[76] Such a definition of rhetoric
is offered by Jürgen Habermas, whose work Dumont includes
in his bibliography but does not cite directly.

Habermas concludes that perceiving the world through
such paradigms as work, language, or power does not free
the perception of the interests, or agendas, which shape
human experience. It is only through the identification
of the crises which arise from the conflicts between the
paradigms and the agendas infusing them that alternative
approaches may be developed.[77] According to Habermas,
this identification is a dialectical process which grants
rhetorical power to the speech-acts which, in turn,
"[raise] us out of nature,"[78] for they are "the only
things whose nature we can know."[79]

Habermas's concept of dialectic as a process which
grants rhetorical power to speech acts guides Dumont to
build upon a model involving "dialogue and interaction
rather than one-sided displays of data and conclusions."[80]
This model functions through an identification of the
crises developed by the "confrontation, search for
meaning, and recognition"[81] of both Dumont and the Panare
in the Hegelian fashion described by Dumont. More impor-
tantly, Habermas's notion of dialectic allows Dumont to
create a form of dialogue which "detail[s] the texture of
[his] social insertion among the Panare, the texture of

anthropologizing."[82]

Like Robert Scott, John Chernoff and Victor Crapanzano
see rhetoric as an epistemic activity, one which humans
use to create knowledge, or "truth," in the circumstances
in which they find themselves. According to Scott, knowl-
edge is often "the result of a process of interaction at a
given moment. Thus, rhetoric may be viewed not as a
matter of giving effectiveness to truth but of creating
truth."[83] It is from this implicit belief that both
Chernoff and Crapanzano develop their "interpretations" of
Dagomban and Moroccan culture.

Chernoff describes himself as a "participant-
observer"[84] in and of the Dagomba world of music and, as a
result, describes his interpretation of that world as
being biased. He further suggests that his role, that of
the anthropologist, "assigns a meaning to situations which
were often extremely complex and ambiguous,"[85] a stance
which "balances the intimacy and depth of his appreciation
of what happened with his explanation of what relevant
factors provided the means for organizing that event's
effectiveness."[86] In other words, meaning is created
through the anthropologist's contact with the Object
culture's actors and acts and his attempts to "balance,"
or translate, that information with or into the system of
knowledge developed between the anthropologist and his own
culture. Thus, rhetoric for Chernoff becomes the

conscious, language-centered means of making sense of the Object-Subject situation. Chernoff points out a specific occurrence in which such a view of rhetoric works. After participating in a ritual to learn the patterns of dead Dagomba master drummers, Chernoff searches rhetorically for meaning:

> . . . my participation [in the ritual] had failed to provide me with any authentic feelings of belonging or understanding. . . . [Yet] my reflections on the ceremony became an issue because, though I am only an amateur musician, I managed to learn to play African drums [to the extent that] whenever I played . . . in the cult I seemed never to make a mistake.[87]

Similarly, Crapanzano makes implicit use of an epistemic rhetoric. In this case, however, Crapanzano uses it as a means of organizing both the arrangement of the entire text and the dialogue which is his predominant means of presenting his interpretations. Claiming that his intent is to "emphasize the degree to which theory itself is a response to the encounter and to the burden that encounter imposes on the psyche of the investigator,"[88] Crapanzano, as did Chernoff, reemphasizes Robert Scott's epistemic view of rhetoric. From this starting point, Crapanzano devises a means of ordering his text which invites the reader to participate in the

ethnographer's meaning-making rhetoric and thus to begin
the reader's own similar process:

>The study as it now stands consists of five parts
>framed by an Introduction and an Epilogue. The
>Introduction presents Tuhami and raises the
>question of personal history and the genres into
>which it is cast. Parts One, Three, and Five are
>records of Tuhami's recitations . . . includ[ing]
>my questions and my explanations of
>references. . . . Part Two, in which I attempt
>to understand the recitations . . . is necessari-
>ly static and so belies that process of continual
>negation from which it is generated. . . . Part
>Four is a more personal meditation on the nature
>of field work . . . [and] is concerned with the
>knowledge of other individuals. The Epilogue
>speaks for itself.[89]

Because of this invitation and its resulting questions,
Crapanzano's text has been described by such other anthro-
pologists as George Marcus and Michael Fischer as "diffi-
cult."[90]

Despite this swell of interest in the rhetorical
nature of ethnographic texts, relatively little scholar-
ship has focused on how the ethnographer textually depicts
a sense of _ethos_ that rhetorically portrays the writer as
a knowledgeable guide to Truth. George Marcus and Dick

Cushman and James Clifford aptly summarize what has been examined. Marcus and Cushman ascribe ethnographic textual authority to "the writer's claim to represent a world as only one who has known it first-hand can."[91] Through close contextual analysis, various rhetorical tropes, including assorted narratives, points of view, and synechdochic and knowledgeable informants, are revealed as the means by which "interpretation and analysis [are] insepa-rably bound up with the systematic and vivid representa-tion of a world that seems total and real to the reader."[92] In other words, ethnographic textual authority is seen as a predetermined sense of prepon, or propriety, agreed upon by reader and writer, and legitimatized through rhetorical tropes. Marcus and Cushman further note that despite the growth of "ethnographic experimen-talism," this view of authority has not changed: "most experiments, however interesting the historic conditions which [give] rise to them, are refinements and represent an essentially involutionary period in the twentieth century."[93]

James Clifford historically places the creation of ethnographic textual authority in the "development of a twentieth-century science of participant-observation,"[94] a source reminiscent of that recognized by Marcus and Cush-man. Yet, Clifford takes his analysis of ethnographic authority an apparent step further by seeing various

ethnographic experiments as new perspectives of authority. Thus, his "modes of authority"--experiential, interpretive, dialogical, polyphonic--seem to lead to the conclusion that ethnographers currently have a "strategic choice" of textual authority. Nonetheless, investigation of the "modes" returns to Marcus and Cushman's definition of authority. The "modes" are still predetermined and legitimated by rhetorical tropes, an observation made earlier by George Marcus: "By the manner of conforming to ethnographic rhetoric, an author establishes a generalized authority and knowledge as an integral dimension [of the] text . . . ."[95]

Vincent Crapanzano emphasizes an Aristotelian view of the suasory nature of textual authority in his view of ethnography as representative of the relationship between Hermes and Zeus: "When Hermes took the post of messenger of the gods, he promised Zeus not to lie. He did not promise to tell the whole truth. Zeus understood. The ethnographer has not."[96] Lane Cooper describes Aristotle's sense of rhetoric as one whose "emphasis is always upon the nature of the person to be persuaded, and the means by which it is possible, and just to persuade him."[97] Similarly, the ethnographer must persuade a reader of "the truth of his message" (Crapanzano's emphasis)[98] by persuading him of the writer's authority through the use of rhetorical tropes supportive of the ethnographer's

"presence at the events described, his perceptual ability, his 'disinterested' perspective, his objectivity, and his sincerity."[99] More importantly, Crapanzano points out the problematic nature of such a conception of authority. It enfeebles its own constitution through its need to justify the relationship between writer and reader and the writer's objectivity.[100]

No scholarly investigations, however, examine Plato's dialogues to see if ethnographic textual authority has its roots in Plato's depictions of the philosopher as the single guide to Truth. More specifically, no scholarly studies have investigated the possible relationships between, for example, Crapanzano's description of ethnographic textual authority as a message rhetorically imbued with a sense of "truth" and Plato's dialogues' characterization of the philosopher as the sole possessor of a dialectic capable of attaining Truth. Further, no scholarly studies have investigated the possible relationships between James Clifford's placement of ethnographic textual authority as an integral part of the distinction between participant and observer and Plato's dialogues' distinction between the soul and the body, between the philosopher and the believer, between "Being" and "Becoming." Although Steven Sangren alludes to Plato's distinction between the body and the soul in his claim that conflating science (the soul) and scientism (the body) leads to a

definition of ethnography as a "'humanistic' as opposed to a 'scientific' discipline,"[101] he goes no further; instead, his emphasis is on showing how nonrealist portrayals of cultures legitimate themselves and how the authority of their writers is developed through an institutional hegemony seen by "many postmodernists . . . as hopelessly ideological."[102] In other words, Sangren's point is that the result of seeing ethnography as a blend of "humanistic" and "scientific" values simply promotes "the hierarchically asymmetrical contrast between humanities and sciences that is one of the mystifying foundations of Western . . . ideology."[103] What ethnographers need to do, then, is overtly ally themselves with "scientific values."[104]

Steven Webster argues for an ethnography based on Gadamer's notion that the hermeneutic cycle envisions understanding as deriving from "an intersubjective dialogue between two different points of view,"[105] on Kermode's notion that "the meaning of the world arises in the intricate imputations of our narrative about it,"[106] and on Rabinowitz's notion of audiences, in which the relationships between "the author and his assumed or intended actual audience (authorial audience) and the internal narrator, typical of realistic fiction, and his intended audience (narrative audience) . . . are the basis for contextual discriminations between truth and fiction."[107]

These starting points are founded on Plato's distinction between dialectic and rhetoric in his dialogues and his subsequent assignation of dialectic and rhetoric to the realm of the soul and the body, to Truth and the senses, to the philosopher and the sophist, and to "Being" and "Becoming." Moreover, by stating that Platonic philosophy, through its "perpetual dialectic of theses and countertheses . . . never loses sight of [Truth],"[108] Webster encourages ethnographers to produce texts whose authority stems from the "ethnographic truth in dialogue."[109]

Finally, Kevin Dwyer postulates a "recursive ethnography" that examines "the tie between the confrontation [between ethnographer and informant] and relevant social forces [in order to] undermine the view that individual action can ever be isolated from . . . the social world."[110] In other words, Dwyer asks for ethnographies focusing on depictions of contexts in which "events + dialogues"[111] portray the contributions of both the ethnographer and the informant. Yet, by not questioning the Platonic origins governing the logocentric emphasis of dialogue, Dwyer's request echoes Plato's argument in Phaedrus: "for each evil that we have reproached in the one there is a corresponding good in the other."[112] Thus Dwyer, to advocate his "dialogue + event," displaces the argument to show knowledge as emerging from writing

instead of generating writing.

Michel Foucault provides a starting point from which the relationships between Plato's dialogues and ethnographic texts and between Plato's textual depiction of the authoritative philosopher and the ethnographer's textual depiction of her own ethos may be shown. Foucault describes authority as a discursive formation in which a group of "relations" creates a determining structure in a text that excludes such statements as "conceptual systematizations, enunciative series, groups, and organizations of objects that might have been possible."[113] In other words, the discursive formation which constitutes textual authority is examinable only when it becomes an object of study in terms of its potential to prohibit alternative perspectives.

Ernesto Grassi's concept of rhetoric is an appropriate source of analytic method here, for his definition of rhetoric as "the basis of the rational thought"[114] provides an observational perspective from which both Plato's and ethnography's perceptions of textual authority may be examined. Chapters two through four of this dissertation, therefore, will examine the four primary strategies ethnographers have chosen to advance the discursive formations of Platonic and ethnographic textual authority. Examining these choices may reveal the domination stemming from the Platonic foundation of each choice and develop

the groundwork necessary for developing finally a postpla-
tonic rhetorical representation of ethnographic textual
authority in chapter five. Chapters two through four,
moreover, will consist of the following sections:

1. an introductory section defining ethnographic
textual authority in terms of the ethnographic
genre being analyzed;

2. a section analyzing a Platonic dialogue as a
means of developing specific characteristics
concerning Plato's depictions of the body and the
soul and/or the believer and the philosopher
and/or "Being" and "Becoming" that may then be
used as hypotheses concerning that ethnographic
genre's depictions of the ethnographer's method
of textualizing ethos;

3. a section whose analysis of an ethnographic
text, acknowledged by ethnographers as a "pri-
mary" example of that genre, in terms of the
hypotheses developed in section two develops a
model of ethnography's reliance on Plato's textual
depiction of authority by which other examples of
the ethnographic genre may be analyzed;

4. a section in which two other examples of the
ethnographic genre are analyzed according to the
model developed in section three as a means of
presenting an overall portrait of ethnography's

reliance on Plato's textual depiction of authority.

Edward Said notes the importance of such a study as the one proposed, stating that of the varied calls for further research made in his text, <u>Orientalism</u>, "the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism."[115] Defined by Said as an

> <u>elaboration</u> not only of a basic geographical distinction . . . but also of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains . . ."[116]

Orientalism's ability to "create but also maintain" implies the ethnographer's perceiver/perceived separation that may be derived from the Platonic split between body and soul. Plato describes this division as one of power:

> . . . if the soul were not in charge of the body, if the body were in its own charge and not monitored by the soul to distinguish cookery and medicine, if it were left by itself to estimate them by the gratification provided, . . . everything would be jumbled together and we should not be able to distinguish medicinal and healthy

concoctions from those of cookery.[117]
This same gap between the ethnographer and his subject,
between the ethnographer and his textualized _ethos_, and
between the text and the reader is the focus of current
means of defining knowledge and methodology in ethnogra-
phy. These definitions, in turn, help form current defini-
tions of ethnographic textual authority. An analysis of
this focus, together with the rhetoric which substantiates
it and a nonplatonic strategy which denies it, may further
Said's attempt to "unlearn" the inherent dominative mode.

Notes

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[9] Vincent Crapanzano, "Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in Ethnographic Description," Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, eds. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley: U of California P, 1986) 51.

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[23] Dwyer 206.

[24] Wayne Booth, <u>The Rhetoric of Fiction</u> (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961) 70.

[25] Booth 76.

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[27] Dwyer 209.

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[29] Dwyer 210.

[30] Dwyer 217.

[31] James Clifford, "Fieldwork, Reciprocity, and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt," Man 15 (1980): 528.

[32] Clifford, "Fieldwork" 525-26.

[33] Clifford, "Fieldwork" 529.

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[35] Clifford, "Introduction" 6.

[36] Clifford, "Introduction" 7.

[37] Clifford, "Introduction" 23.

[38] Clifford, "Introduction" 25

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[73] Richards 35.

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CHAPTER II

PLATO, TEXTUAL AUTHORITY, AND REALIST ETHNOGRAPHY

"[Plato] holds the position of authority, for . . . [he] wants to write the rules much more than he wants to play the game."[1]

Investigations involving the relationships between Plato's dialectical methodologies and ethnographies have largely concentrated on a specific aspect of Platonic thought: logos in terms of the dialectical use of the word, a use which limits the definition to the "true" analytical account of what ethnographers know and write.[2] But what happens if the question changes from "How do Plato's dialectical methods affect ethnography?" to "How do Plato's dialectical methods create ethnography?" What results from seeing Plato's sense of dialectic not as a set of structural motifs which are present in or which must be avoided by ethnographers writing texts but as the source of ethnography itself? What happens to ethnographic textual authority if ethnography is viewed as a creation of Plato's dialectical methods? Jacques Derrida's comment that "'Platonism' . . . sets up the whole of Western metaphysics"[3] alludes to this possibility. Moreover, Jasper Neal's observation concerning Plato's sense of authority with which this chapter opens creates an

interesting possibility regarding ethnographic textual
authority: could it be that ethnographers, like Plato,
textually compose authority by "writing the rules" of
ethnography rather than by "playing the game" of ethnogra-
phy? An examination of one of Plato's early dialogues,
the "Meno," will furnish a starting point from which
answers to these questions may begin to be developed.
Following this examination, an analysis of ethnographic
texts exemplifying the Realist genre of ethnography will
permit the development of hypotheses concerning the rela-
tionships between Plato's depictions of the body and the
soul and/or the believer and the philosopher and/or
"Being" and "Becoming" and ethnographic textual authority.
Chapters three and four will continue this process of
analysis, expanding it to cover the Interpretive/Transla-
tive, Representative, and Fictive genres of ethnography.
Finally, chapter five will postulate a postplatonic sense
of textual authority.

Section I

In the "Meno,"[4] Plato's Socrates frames a dialogue
concerning virtue, its ability to be taught, and the
immortal nature of the soul. Yet, he merely uses this
frame as a means of treating his actual concern; in the
"Meno" this concern involves the association of knowledge
with the human soul and the resultant split between the

soul and the body. He begins this process by asking Meno
for a definition of virtue which treats the concept as a
whole rather than as "a number of virtues": "we have
discovered a number of virtues when we were looking for
one only. This single virtue, which permeates each of
them, we cannot find."[5] The position of ignorance here is
important for three reasons. First, it allows Plato's
Socrates a means of controlling the direction of the
dialogue through his ideological insistence on his own
method. It is only through the "character in respect of
which they [virtues] don't differ at all, but are all the
same"[6] that a definition of virtue can be established
which answers Plato's Socrates's question. In other
words, only Plato's Socrates can answer his own question.
Second, Plato's Socrates's claim of ignorance about the
nature of virtue reinforces Meno's own ignorance, a feel-
ing Meno describes as spellbound: "At this moment I feel
you are exercising magic and witchcraft upon me and posi-
tively laying me under your spell until I am just a mass
of helplessness."[7] As a result of this "helplessness,"
Plato's Socrates becomes the single guide capable of
leading Meno out of the "sea"[8] in which he is drowning.
Moreover, the "helplessness" felt by Meno is the same
feeling experienced by the reader. Thus, Plato uses
Socrates, as Socrates does Meno, to set the reader's
position as one susceptible to manipulation; only through

Plato's Socrates's method can "truth" be attained. Third, once this helpless position is acknowledged by both Meno and the reader, Plato's Socrates's arguments concerning the immortal nature of the soul, its role in attaining knowledge through recollection, and, through exclusion of the body, the separation of body and soul are brought to bear as a hegemonic means of manipulating Meno's and the reader's acceptance of the theories. Both parties, Meno and the reader, must then agree, "No doubt it is as you say."[9]

Of equal importance to the feeling of "helplessness" in the "Meno" is Plato's Socrates's method of acquiring knowledge. In his work with the slave boy, Plato's Socrates states that a set of questions will allow anybody, even an uneducated slave, to "have a knowledge on [a] subject as accurate as anybody's."[10] Yet, these questions must be "tether[ed] . . . by working out the reason."[11] Norman Gulley describes this method as being based on Greek geometrical analysis: "their [Greek] formulation of method . . . reflected principally its function of systematising geometrical knowledge and co-ordinating results by leading propositions back to first principles--to axioms or definitions or something already demonstrated."[12] In other words, the "tether" is a line of causal reasoning which allows an approach to "Truth" through the relationship of propositions to either

accepted principles or undemonstrated postulates. This is the process Plato's Socrates uses to guide the slave boy to a knowledge of an aspect of geometry and to guide Meno and the reader to the "light" of true knowledge of virtue. The slave boy is thus brought to the same feeling of helplessness felt by Meno and the reader. And, as before, Plato's Socrates manipulates every sense of the approach to knowledge: "notice what, starting from this state of perplexity, he [the slave boy] will discover by seeking to truth in company with me."[13]

One final observation on the "Meno" needs to be made: the importance of the figure named Plato's Socrates. Jacques Derrida describes a portrait of Socrates he dis- covered on a post card sold in the Bodleian library:

> Socrates, the one who writes--seated, bent over,
> a scribe or docile copyist, Plato's secretary,
> no? He is in front of Plato, no, Plato is behind
> him, smaller (why smaller?), but standing up.
> With his outstretched finger he looks like he is
> indicating something, designating, showing the
> way or giving an order--or dictating, authoritar-
> ian, masterly, imperious.[14]

In the "Meno," then, Socrates may be seen as the object of manipulation by, or the creation of Plato: Plato's So- crates. Jasper Neal further observes that this Socrates "does not know what is coming. But Plato knows, because

he has moved into the one medium that allows both the creation of fictional time and sequence and the manipulation of the things inside that fictional creation."[15] Plato, therefore, further secures his position by placing his Socrates in the same helpless position occupied by Meno, the slave boy, and the reader. Moreover, he further secures his control of the dialogue, his ability to guide one and all to Truth, his arguments' plausibility, and his method of causal reasoning.

The above analysis of the "Meno" provides an intriguing possibility for answering the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. If Platonism creates ethnography, then could the "Meno" and other Platonic dialogues be the textual sources of the metaphysical basis underlying the Western notions of textual organization and textual authority used by ethnographers writing within the genres of ethnography focused on in this study? Moreover, if the Platonic dialogues do function in this manner, do the ethnographic methods of rhetorically organizing and creating text and textual authority reveal the same ideological and dominative aspects identified in Plato's texts? If so, Derrida's portrait of Plato's Socrates becomes an image of the ethnographer in at least three ways. First, Derrida's Plato becomes the ethnologist using various methods to rhetorically "designate" and authorize a means of translation or interpretation of the Socratic objects

of study, while Socrates becomes the ethnographer attempting to fulfill the assigned role. Further, Meno serves as a representation of the studied culture. Such a metamorphosis echoes another of Edward Said's definitions of Orientalism:

> . . . Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.[16]

Second, the figure of Socrates in Derrida's description becomes the ethnographer whose methods of organizing and creating text and textual authority are determined by Plato. Steven Webster describes ethnographic discourse as typically organized through narrative and theoretical structures. "Pronomial constructs suggesting varied and specific points of view never far abstracted from ethnographer, reader, and informants" are combined with "verbatim monologue accompanied by the author's field glosses if not dialogue" and with "variation in tense-markers which constantly re-invoke a sense of temporal relationships, if not of history."[17]

In the opening lines of the "Meno," Plato's Socrates

provides Meno with a narrative concerning the rise of philosophic questioning among the Thessalians, a people known to the Greeks through their abilities as horsemen and procurers of wealth: "It is Gorgias who has done it. He went to that city and captured the hearts of the foremost of the Aleuadae for his wisdom--among them your own admirer Aristippus--not to speak of other leading Thessalians."[18] Plato's Meno responds with an application of an epistemological theory whose focus is on observable phenomena: "if it is a manly virtue you are after, it is easy to see that the virtue of a man consists in managing the city's affairs capably, and so that he will help his friends and injure his foes while taking care to come to no harm himself."[19] Like Webster's ethnographer, then, Plato structures his process through narrative and theoretical passages, a point which, given Derrida's assertion that Plato's creations underlie all of "Western metaphysics," points to the possibility that Plato's textual structures underlie Western ethnographers' conceptions of textual structure. Similarly, Webster's "suggest[ed] varied and specific points of view" appear to derive from Plato's dialogues. More importantly, by attributing the Aleuadae's interest in philosophic questioning to Gorgias, a noted sophist, and by attributing Meno's theory of "manly virtue" to Aristippus, a disciple of Gorgias, Plato's Socrates aligns Meno's argument with sophistry and

condemns it as antiphilosophic. As a result, Plato's Meno's "manly virtue" is ideologically dominated and dismissed; the methods of philosophy, as they are created by Plato and given authority by his figure of Socrates the philosopher, are the sole means by which the soul can attain knowledge, while the methods of attaining knowledge through man's perceptions, also created by Plato and given authority by such sophists as Gorgias, Aristippus, and Plato's figure of Meno, are the means by which the body may attain information. Since Plato equates virtue and knowledge, the body's information becomes irrelevant. Webster's description of the use of "narrative and theo-retical digression" in ethnographic discourse thus re-flects the hegemony inherent in Plato's use of constructed forms as a means of manipulating the subject and the reader.

This type of exploitation presents itself from the beginning of the "Meno." To displace the sophistic argu-ment and advance his own, Plato's Socrates asks Plato's Meno to forget Gorgias:

> 'let's leave him [Gorgias] out of it, since after
> all he isn't here. What do you yourself say
> virtue is? I do ask you in all earnestness not
> to refuse me, but to speak out. I shall be only
> too happy to be proved wrong if you and Gorgias
> turn out to know this, although I said I had

never met anyone who did.'[20]

Moreover, Plato presents a monologue in the form of a dialogue between Socrates, Meno, the slave boy, and Anytus, a friend of Meno. Since competing arguments have been dismissed as products of Gorgias's sophistry, leaving Plato's Socrates as the sole voice capable of providing the means to attain the truth concerning virtue, the dialogue between Socrates and Meno disappears under the hegemony of Plato's voice. If ethnography, as a creation of Platonism, relies on Plato's methods of organizing and creating text and authority, Webster's "verbatim monologue" reflects the hegemony and ideology of Plato's dialogues; the dialogue forms a script for the monologue's hegemonic and ideologic activities.

Finally, Plato's Socrates uses past tense verbs to embed claims in stories to evoke the power of narrative, uses present tense verbs to show how these stories impinge upon the present, and uses conditional questions to extend the stories' negative power into a possible future where it will result in a complete loss of knowledge unless countered by Plato's philosopher. The scripted dialogue resulting from these tense shifts followed by questions allows Plato to create a series of "temporal relationships" which result in definitions. For example, Plato uses the story of Gorgias's journey to Larissa to establish a narrative supportive of his claim that the

sophists, represented by Gorgias, reduced knowledge to simple axioms: "He [Gorgias] got you into the habit of answering any question you might be asked with the confidence and dignity appropriate to those who know the answers."[21] By switching to a present tense verb, Plato's Socrates reveals the epidemic-like effect the sophists had on Greece. As a result of Gorgias's efforts, "there is a dearth of wisdom [in Athens], and it looks as if it has migrated from our part of the country to yours."[22] Further, by posing conditional questions, Plato reveals a future in which truth is unobtainable: "How can I know a property of something when I don't even know what it is? Do you suppose that somebody entirely ignorant [about] who Meno is could say whether he is handsome and rich and wellborn or the reverse?"[23] This process allows Plato to underscore a means of developing a definition, in this case of virtue, usable only by his Socrates:

> Suppose I asked you what a bee is, what is its
> essential nature, and you replied that bees were
> of many different kinds. What would you say if I
> went on to ask, And is it in being bees that they
> are many and various and different from one
> another? Or would you agree that it is not in
> this respect that they differ, but in something
> else, some other quality like size or beauty?
> Then do the same with the virtues. Even if they

are many and various, yet at least they all have
some common character which makes them virtues.
That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone
who answers the question, What is virtue?[24]

These "relationships," provide the temporal contexts
within which Plato's monologue develops its power.
Jacques Derrida describes the West as being created by
writing, rather than writing as being created by the
West.[25]. In a similar manner, Plato's definitions, like
his Socrates, are created by his use of a scripted dia-
logue to mask his monologue. Further, these definitions
are tied to history, for, like history, the definitions
establish themselves on themselves. As Derrida indicates,
history cannot be traced unless the explorer assumes it
has an origin and a sequence.[26] The origin of Plato's
Socrates's definitions is Plato, and their sequence is the
monologue disguised as a scripted dialogue. In other
words, history, meaning, and Truth become the effects of
Plato's and, through extension, ethnographic writing.

Third, the figures of Plato and Socrates in Derrida's
portrayal become representative of the intertextual rela-
tionships between ethnographers. Although they are not
mentioned overtly, Said includes ethnographers in his
description of those who have incorporated the concept of
Orientalism:

. . . a very large mass of writers, among whom

are poets, novelists, philosophers, political
theorists, economists, and imperial administra-
tors, have accepted the basic distinction between
East and West as the starting point for elaborate
theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and
political accounts concerning the Orient, its
people, customs, 'mind,' destiny, and so on.[27]

Thus, the metaphorical meaning gains power in its inter-
textual form through its guise as methodological "truth."
More specifically, ethnographers gain authoritative power
through using a rhetoric whose roots run through preceding
texts to their source in Plato's dialogues.

It seems, then, that Plato's dialogues form an impor-
tant means of reading ethnographic texts, for ethnogra-
phies appear to be partial recreations of Plato's dis-
course as it unfolds in his dialogues. The question
concerning ethnographic textual authority, however, still
remains partially unaddressed, for if it, too, is a recre-
ation of Plato's discourse, then it, too, should be an
effect of writing, a rhetorical creation whose origin and
sequence are founded on themselves. Such a creation,
according to Ernesto Grassi, is a way humans form their
world, for its rhetoric "contain[s] within itself . . .
history and the structure of a meaningful world."[28] In
other words, by allowing ethnographers to move transcend-
ently from their personal agendas to the domain of _physis_,

Plato's rhetoric provides a means of authoritatively
assigning meaning to the inhabitants of nature. An analy-
sis, based on Grassi's notion of rhetoric, of a selection
of Realist ethnographers' works should indicate the poten-
tial of this perspective to answer the questions posed
earlier. For if Derek Freeman's observation that "the
discipline of anthropology . . . has tended to accept the
reports of ethnographers as entirely empirical [and thus
authoritative] statements"[29] is as accurate as Edward W.
Said's observation that because critical "communities" in
the field of literary theory are "greater than the indi-
vidual adherent or member . . . the ideas, the values, and
the systematic totalizing world-view validated by [a
community] are all bearers of authority,"[30] then Plato's
emminent position as the "writer of the rules" pertaining
to textual authority in these communities and disciplines
bears closer examination.

Section II

"Most accounts of representation, including Plato's,
involve an original and a copy or representation, the
first coming first in time . . . and determining the
second."[31]

Just as Plato uses the "Meno" to "write the rules" of
philosophy, Bronislaw Malinowski uses his Sex and

<u>Repression</u> <u>in</u> <u>Savage</u> <u>Society</u> to "write the rules" of
ethnography. For Malinowski uses the frame of Trobriand
culture as a means of treating his actual concern: the
discrediting of Freudian psychology's belief in the Oedi-
pal complex as a fundamental aspect of humanity that both
predates and creates culture. Thus, Malinowski displaces
the need for one interpretive strategy (Freudian psycholo-
gy) in order to create an ethnography whose rules are
based on another interpretive strategy:

> . . . our sociological point of view brings
>
> us . . . one step nearer towards the correct
>
> interpretation [of the Trobriand matrilineal
>
> society, and] it is clear that we need not rely
>
> so much on roundabout or symbolic reinterpreta-
>
> tions of facts, but can confidently let the facts
>
> speak for themselves.[32]

In this fashion, Malinowski enjoins Plato's method of
textualizing authority, replacing Socrates as the target
of Plato's commanding finger. Moreover, Malinowski adopts
the form of the Platonic monologue, thereby reestablishing
Plato's rhetoric of domination with its hegemonic and
ideologic characteristics.

Malinowski's rhetoric of domination begins with a loud
echo of the beginning of Plato's "Meno":

> . . . by making the tacit assumption that the
>
> Oedipus complex exists in all types of society,

> certain errors have crept into the anthropological
> work of psycho-analysts. Thus they cannot reach
> correct results when they try to trace the Oedi-
> pus complex. . . .[33]

Plato's disregard for Gorgias, then reappears in Malinow-
ski's text with the same results: both Plato and Malinow-
ski create domains outside of the subjects of their dis-
cussions--for Plato it is the association of knowledge
with the human soul and for Malinowski it is the discred-
iting of Freudian psychology's contribution to ethnogra-
phy--allowing them to treat these subjects as objects and
allowing them to play roles as the single purveyors of
empirical truth. With the reader's acceptance of these
warrants, Malinowski can develop the structure of the
remainder of his essay, secure in the ideological power of
Platonic authority: "Part I of the present work is . . .
an attempt based on facts observed at first hand among
savages . . . [while] the treatment of [how the constitu-
tion of the family influences culture and society through
the forces of the family complex] is reserved for Part
II."[34]

Parts I and II of Malinowski's text form the model of
realist ethnography that has been the focus of much of the
reflexive movement's criticism. In this study, however,
the importance of Malinowski's author-pronounced descrip-
tions and explanations of observed cultural practices and

his subsequent authoritative posture is its recreation of the hegemony and ideology of Plato's methods of organizing and creating text and authority, not the tropes through which a sense of "You are there because I was there"[35] is developed. It is through this summoning that Malinowski cultivates both his rhetoric of domination and his textual authority.

In Part I, Malinowski continues to displace Freudian psychology as a source of disputational claims from his "objective" stance and through his "savage facts." Asserting that his point of view makes use of the "special methods of anthropological fieldwork,"[36] Malinowski observes the absence of "anthropological" information derived from these "special methods" in Freudian treatments of the family: "I have not . . . found in any psycho-analytic account any direct and consistent reference to the social milieu. . . ."[37] Moreover, Malinowski limits the applicability of Freudian theory to the "wealthy bourgeois"[38] and at the same time notes that truth may be apprehended only through the methods of anthropology:

> . . . in order to vindicate the truth of the psycho-analytic doctrine, it would be important to consider the lower and the ruder strata of society. . . . For the popular traditions originated in a condition more akin to that of the modern Central and Eastern European peasant, or

of the poor artisan, than to that of the overfed
and nervously overwrought people of modern Vien-
na, London, or New York.[39]

One result of this displacement of Freudian psychology
is it allows Malinowski subsequently to compare European
and American "peasant" families to Melanesian families
using information obtained through his "special methods of
anthropological fieldwork" and classified under the head-
ings of infancy, babyhood, childhood, and adolescence.[40]
(Chapters three through nine, the remainder of Part I,
present this information.) But more importantly, this
displacement of Freudian psychology functions in the same
way as Plato's Meno's feeling of helplessness in the
"Meno." The displacement provides Malinowski a means of
controlling the direction of his investigation through his
ideological insistence on his own method. It is only
through "the sociological aspect in my [Malinowski's]
account"[41] that a truthful examination of the relationship
between the family and society can be established. In
other words, only Malinowski the anthropologist can answer
his own question regarding the plausibility of Freudian
psychology's place in ethnography.

In addition, Malinowski, as the writer of the rules of
the game, becomes the single guide capable of leading the
reader to truth. In his discussion of the "absurd" devel-
opment of sexual rivalry in the family during the infant

stage, Malinowski states:

> Freud and the psycho-analytic school have laid
> great stress on the sexual rivalry between mother
> and daughter, father and son respectively. My
> own opinion is that the rivalry between mother
> and daughter does not begin at this early stage.
> At any rate, I have never observed any traces of
> it. The relations between father and son are
> more complex. . . .[for after the age of three]
> the father sees in the son his successor, the one
> who is to replace him in the family lineage and
> in the household.[42]

Malinowski further describes the rival relationship be-
tween the father and the son as deriving from either the
son's inability to attain the "ideal" of the father or
from "the resentment of future supersession, and the
melancholy of the waning generation."[43] Since Freud's
precepts do not play a part in an explanation of family
relationships, only Malinowski can reveal the way to
truth.

Finally, once the reader accepts the warrant substan-
tiating anthropological method and its point of view as
the means of obtaining truth, Malinowski's arguments
concerning the lack of an association between developing
sexuality and child-parent relationships,[44] the absence of
the sources of Oedipal and Electral complexes in the

matrilineal society of the Trobriand Islands,[45] and the
failure of Freudian psychology to answer questions about
the relationship between families and society manipulate
hegemonically the reader's acceptance of Malinowski's
conclusions. As was true for the Meno, Malinowski's
reader is forced into the position of saying, "No doubt it
is as you say."

Edward Said describes this method of manipulation as
that which "make[s] out of every observable detail a
generalization and out of every generalization an immuta-
ble law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality,
custom, or type [and which makes] living reality into the
stuff of texts."[46] The creation and use of this method is
as important for Malinowski's development of authority as
the displacement of psychoanalytic theory as a source of
competing claims, for it serves as means of evoking Plato-
nism's development of causal reasoning. In the "Meno,"
Plato's Socrates uses a series of questions posed to Meno
and the slave boy to lead his propositions concerning
virtue back to his first principle axiom, which holds that
knowledge is associated with the human soul as it is
differentiated from the human body and is accessible
through writing. In Said's words, Plato's Socrates makes
out of his observations of virtue a generalization about
knowledge's association with the soul and out of that
generalization a law about the nature of the soul-body

division which is made real through the power of the text.
Malinowski, in Sections I and II of his text, duplicates
the process by giving

> an outline of the nuclear complex of another
> society, a matrilineal one, where it has never
> been studied before. We found that this complex
> differs essentially from the patriarchal one, and
> we have shown why it must differ and what social
> forces bring it about. We have drawn our com-
> parison on the broadest basis, and, without
> neglecting sexual factors, we have also systemat-
> ically drawn in the other elements. [Thus] I have
> established that Freud's theories not only rough-
> ly correspond to human psychology, but that they
> follow closely the modification in human nature
> brought about by various constitutions of socie-
> ty. In other words, I have established a deep
> correlation between the type of society and the
> nuclear complex found there.[47]

In Platonic terms, Malinowski forms a "tether" of causal
reasoning which, through propositions concerning Trobriand
and European nuclear families, leads back to axioms stat-
ing the limitations of Freudian psychology and the
truthful nature of anthropological observation.

Part Two of Malinowski's study focuses on the
influences of his description of the Trobriand family on

his portrayal of Trobriand culture and society. In this
fashion, Malinowski extends the model of causal reasoning
ensconced on the grave of Freudian theory dug in Part One
and provides the warrant substantiating his argument that
only his method reveals truth:

> Whenever the passions, kept normally within
> traditional bounds by rigid taboos, customs and
> legal penalties, break through in crime, perver-
> sion, aberration, or in one of those dramatic
> occurrences which shake from time to time the
> humdrum life of a savage society--then these
> passions reveal the matriarchal hatred of the
> maternal uncle or the incestuous wishes towards
> the sister.[48]

Noting generally that criminal or perverse activities
reveal themselves only in individual Trobrianders influ-
enced by Western morality, Malinowski examines closely the
dreams, folklore, myths, and legends of Trobriand Island-
ers to show the causal relationship between the matriline-
al family and the culture.

Malinowski first divides dreams into two categories,
official dreams and free dreams. The first of these is
described as those dreams which follow the prescriptions
of leaders of such actions as fishing or Kula expeditions
and of magicians. Malinowski further considers the sexual
dream as an official dream, observing that the male

dreamer attempts to carry out the sexual action portrayed
in the dream, just as in other official dreams where the
dream determines subsequent conduct. When Malinowski
asked informants if the mother was ever the object of such
dreams, "the answer would be a calm, unshocked
negation."[49] Malinowksi continues: "But whenever the
question would be put about the sister, the answer would
be quite different, with a strong affective reaction."[50]
From this observation, Malinowski concludes that memories
of sexual dreams concerning sisters leave the dreamers
"sad, ashamed, and ill-tempered,"[51] an emotional state
which, when combined with "the influence of spurious
Christian morality and the white man's so-called law and
order . . . [causes] the passions repressed by tribal
tradition [to] break through."[52] For Malinowski this
sexual dream is a potential cause of violence within
Trobriand society.

Trobriand folklore is treated in a similar manner.
Beginning with the realm of "abusive language," Malinowski
states that incestuous swearing in the Trobriands is com-
prised of three statements used when the speaker is jest-
ing, when the speaker is angry, and when the speaker
desires an extreme insult: "'Kwoy inam'--'Cohabit with thy
mother'; 'Kwoy lumuta'--'Cohabit with thy sister'; and
'Kwoy um' kwava'--'Cohabit with thy wife.'"[53] Malinowski
concludes that the reasoning behind this scale of epithets

is one of plausibility:

> . . . the feeling of shame, anger, and social
> degradation [comes from] the barriers of eti-
> quette being pulled down and the naked reality
> brought to light. For the sexual intimacy be-
> tween husband and wife is masked by a most rigid
> etiquette, not so strict of course as that be-
> tween brother and sister, but directly aiming at
> the elimination of any suggestive modes of beha-
> viour.[54]

Apparently, as the likelihood of a sexual occurrence
grows, so does the insulting power of the abusive state-
ment concerning that occurrence. According to Malinowski,
this correspondence represents an inclination to break a
strong taboo that is revealed in his study of Trobriand
myth and legend: ". . . the first ancestral groups whose
appearance is mentioned in the myth consist always of a
woman, sometimes accompanied by her brother, sometimes by
the totemic animal, but never by a husband."[55] Moreover,
in myths concerning cultural achievements, the only posi-
tion occupied by the husband is criminal in nature.
Finally, in myths relating to cultural achievement and
magic, tribal law dictates that knowledge and objects are
to be shared "with [the] younger brother and maternal
nephew"[56] for a price, while knowledge and objects passed
on from father to son are done so "for nothing, out of

sheer affection."[57] Conflicts between characters in these myths, therefore, are between brothers or between nephews and maternal uncles. Thus, Malinowski concludes that

> according to law and morals, two brothers or a
> maternal uncle and his nephew are friends, al-
> lies, and have all feelings and interests in
> common. In real life to a certain degree and
> quite openly in myth, they are enemies, cheat
> each other, murder each other, and suspicion and
> hostility obtain rather than love and union.[58]

This conclusion both supports Malinowski's sociological method through its emphasis on observable manifestations of hostility and refutes Freudian theory's precept of repression through its emphasis on manifested hostility.

The influence of Platonic causality and authority here is unescapable. In the "Meno," having noted that "true teachers" cannot be confused about the subject they teach and that the absence of these teachers prohibits the possibility of students, Plato's Socrates concludes: "Now there turn out to be neither teachers nor students of virtue, so it would appear that virtue cannot be taught."[59] Further, Plato resolves that since virtue is not the product of either knowledge or true opinion, it must be divinely obtained.[60] In this fashion, Plato offers a reader a means of attaining Truth, but it is a deceptive truth for it may be approached only through

method. Malinowski, as ethnographic inheritor of Plato's method, may be seen as taking Plato's place in Derrida's portrait on the post card as the manipulator of the prodding finger through which the reader is provided with concepts, definitions, and a process of inference. According to Grassi, these "essential elements" allow a reader to see "the phenomena in regard to the way they are anchored in a general 'ground' and in a meaning that is thus exclusively 'universal.'"[61] The aspects of "general ground" and "universality" provide the hegemonic and ideologic characteristics of Plato's and Malinowski's use of the rhetorical strategy of displacement. On a second level, Malinowski replaces Socrates as the inheritor of Plato's scripting process. From Plato, Malinowski acquires a process whose goal is the revelation of reality (Truth) through analyzing definitions. A reader is therefore provided with a "purified" vision of the reality that "stands above (or behind) the manifold, particular, different, and relative."[62] Finally, on a third level, the figures of Plato and Socrates in Derrida's portrayal represent the intertextual relationships between ethnographers. Plato's methodology and process, as inherited by Malinowski, provide the model of textual authority which endows subsequent ethnographers with authoritative power. By evoking the dominative rhetoric of Malinowski's purified reality, subsequent ethnographers become much like

the anxious, young poets Harold Bloom describes:

> . . . the young poet loves himself in the Muse
> and fears that she hates herself in him. The
> ephebe cannot know that he is an invalid of
> Cartesian <u>extensiveness</u>, a young man in the
> horror of discovering his own incurable case of
> continuity. By the time he has become a strong
> poet, and so learned this dilemma, he seeks to
> exorcise the necessary guilt of his ingratitude
> by turning his precursor into a fouled version of
> the later poet himself. But that too is a self-
> deception and a banality, for what the strong
> poet thus does is to transform himself into a
> fouled version of himself, and then confound the
> consequence with the figure of the precursor.[63]

An examination of two of these "young" ethnographers will reveal their love of the Platonic Muse and that love's domination of their products.

Section III

". . . this is the effigy of the two greatest counterfeiters of history, comperes preparing the emission we are still plugged into while drawing checks and money orders on it infinitely. In advance they impose everything, they tax, they obliterate the <u>timbres</u>, with their own effigy, and from you to me."[64]

By superimposing Anthony F.C. Wallace's visage onto Socrates's countenance and Bronislaw Malinowski's onto Plato's in Derrida's portrait on the postcard, the process of influence between Malinowski and Wallace may be seen. More importantly, the sense of textual authority in Wallace's The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca becomes apparent. For like Malinowski, Wallace is an inheritor of Plato's method of attaining truth via concepts, definitions, and a process of inference. Wallace, therefore, acquires the authoritative power of Malinowski and Plato through his evocation of the former writers' dominative rhetoric.

Wallace, too, uses a cultural framework--"the story of the late colonial and early reservation history of the Seneca Indians, and of the prophet Handsome Lake, his visions, and the moral and religious revitalization of an American Indian society,"[65]--to treat his actual concern: the formation of data supporting his claims regarding revitalization movements. Thus, Wallace displaces a need for competing interpretive strategies in order to create an ethnography whose rules support another interpretive strategy: ". . . the case of Handsome Lake originally led me to consider the subject [revitalization movements] in a comparative frame of reference."[66] Thus, Wallace enjoins Plato's method of analysis of propositions as it is described in the "Phaedo":

> . . . in every case I first lay down the theory
> which I judge to be soundest, and then whatever
> seems to agree with it--with regard either to
> causes or to anything else--I assume to be true,
> and whatever does not I assume not to be true.[67]

According to Norman Gulley, this method examines the
logical consequences of an initial hypothesis "in order to
see not only what those consequences are, but also what
inconsistencies with other propositions acceptance of the
hypothesis entails."[68] Wallace uses this method as the
framework for an examination of his hypothesis regarding
revitalization movements. Moreover, by using the Senecan
Handsome Lake movement, he provides himself with a corpus
of data from which to view both the consequences of his
hypothesis as it concerns the Seneca and the consequences
of his hypothesis as they concern revitalization theory.
Thus, Wallace joins Malinowksi and Socrates as a receptor
of Plato's commanding finger. Moreover, by adopting the
form of the Platonic monologue, Wallace re-establishes
Plato's rhetoric of domination with its hegemonic and
ideologic characteristics.

Wallace's inherited rhetoric of domination begins with
an echo of Plato's method of hypothesis:

> The Old Way of Handsome Lake . . . is not Chris-
> tian, although it includes some elements borrowed
> from Christianity; it is essentially an amalgam

> of ancient tradition and the innovations of the
> Seneca prophet named Handsome Lake. It was
> developed by several tribes of Iroquois who . . .
> felt a need to lift themselves from defeat,
> demoralization, and despair and to revitalize
> their communities.[69]

Plato's method of "lay[ing] down the theory . . . and then
whatever seems to agree with it [that] I assume to be
true" thus reappears in Wallace's text with the same
results: both Plato and Wallace create domains outside of
the subjects of their discussions (for Plato it is the
separation of the human body and soul on the grounds that
the body is associated with physical pleasures while the
soul is associated with knowledge and wisdom; for Wallace
it is the hypothesis that revitalization movements occur
during periods of heightened stress caused by perceived
deprivations stemming from "defeat, demoralization, and
despair") allowing them to treat these subjects as objects
and allowing them to play roles as the single purveyors of
empirical truth. With the reader's acceptance of these
warrants, Wallace can develop a textual structure based on
the use of written narratives as support for the develop-
ment of a contemporary portrayal of the Seneca Indians'
religion. Because these narratives form a causative
relationship with the portrayal through the dominance of
Wallace's revitalization "theory," Wallace remains secure

in the ideological power of Platonic authority: "This book tells _the_ story of the late colonial and early reservation history of the Seneca Indians. . . ."[70]

The Preface and Parts I through III of Wallace's text reflect the model established for realist ethnography developed by Malinowski, for like his treatment of the Trobriand Islanders, Wallace's depiction of the Seneca Nation is--in adjectives applied to Malinowski's work by George Marcus, Dick Cushman, and Steven Webster--"life-like," and "hegemonic." The Preface describes the religion of Handsome Lake as it is practiced in the twentieth century, while Parts I through III provide the historical context in which citations from written texts form the basis for the process of inference, the concepts, the definitions, and the sense of textual authority Plato established in the "Meno" and Malinowski appropriated in _Sex_ _and_ _the_ _Savage_ _Mind_. These citations, therefore, function in the same way as Plato's constructed feeling of helplessness in the "Meno" and Malinowski's displacement of Freudian theory in _Sex_ _and_ _the_ _Savage_ _Mind_: the reliance on text provides Wallace with a means of controlling the direction of his investigation. It is only through these texts, as cited by Wallace, that a truthful examination of the religion of Handsome Lake as a revitalization movement can be established. Moreover, Wallace, as the manipulator of the game and its rules as established by

Plato and Malinowski, becomes the single guide capable of depicting the Handsome Lake religion in a "lifelike" or realistic manner. As a result, Wallace forces the reader to once again admit, "No doubt it is as you say."

Wallace begins his realist portrayal of twentieth-century Handsome Lake religion with his entrance into it:

> In October, 1951, a friend and I drove up from Philadelphia to see the 'doings' at the Six Nations Meeting at Cold Spring Longhouse on the Allegany Reservation. We ate supper with an Indian family who were expecting us and had prepared a room in their comfortable old frame farmhouse. After supper we walked a couple of hundred yards to the longhouse to see what was going on.[71]

In Platonic terms, this introduction of the reader to the Indian "doings" creates the beginning of the Gulleyan "tether" of causal reasoning which will eventually lead back to the axiom concerning revitalization movements. Or, as Wallace states,

> these ancient pagan festivals, revolving around the universal themes of birth and death, love and hate, food and hunger, health and disease, were old when Handsome Lake was born. In their em-brace he found solace, and theirs is the Old Way that his 'new religion' recommends to the

faithful.

Let us now see how it all began, this new
religion, which in itself was not all new, and
which now is called the Old Way of Handsome
Lake.[72]

Wallace's causal reasoning, a process built on the
warrant that texts provide an insight into the causes of
the Iroquois' feelings of "defeat, demoralization, and
despair [and into the Iroquois' need for a] revital[iza-
tion of] their communities,"[73] continues its development
in his portrayal of the golden age of the Iroquois inter-
tribal league and specifically the Seneca tribe's role in
the creation of the Handsome Lake religion. Relying on
discourse housed in the archives of the New York Histori-
cal Society and the State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
as well as earlier descriptions of the Indian cultures
making up the Iroquois intertribal league edited by such
men as William Beauchamp (Moravian Journals Relating to
Central New York, 1745-66) or written by such men as
Halliday Jackson (Sketch of the Manners, Customs, Religion
and Government of the Seneca Indians in 1800), Wallace
depicts a culture that had

reached out and incorporated [those] things that
Iroquois Indians wanted [from contacts with
French, Dutch, and English traders and that
had] . . . chased off European missionaries,

battled European soldiers to a standstill, and
made obscene gestures when anyone suggested that
[the Indians] should emulate white society.[74]
Further, according to Wallace, Iroquois conduct was "gov-
erned . . . by oral tradition supported by a sense of
duty, a fear of gossip, and a dread of retaliatory witch-
craft,"[75] resulting in a society in which "drunkenness was
perhaps the most serious social problem."[76]

The Iroquois political system and the Seneca family
"drama" are treated in a similar manner. Wallace de-
scribes male responsibilities as those activities associ-
ated with hunting, warfare, and diplomacy, tasks which
kept them away from home for long periods of time.
Iroquois women, therefore, through political power exer-
cised in arenas including the selecting of chiefs, the
lobbying of speakers at town meetings, and the replacing
of dead kin with non-Iroquois captives, maintained the
"genealogical and political continuity in a matrilineal
system in which the primary kin relationship was the one
between mother and daughter."[77] One consequence of this
process of assigning responsibilities, Wallace notes, was
a weakening of the value of marriage: "The relationship
between husband and wife [was a] precarious one [for]
under these conditions it was convenient for the marital
system to be based on virtually free sexual choice, the
mutual satisfaction of spouses, and easy separation."[78] A

similar split of responsibilities is described in the
family unit. Senecan mothers kept the prepubescent girls
at home, assigning them "lighter household duties [and
work] in the fields . . . [while the fathers or other
elder male kinfolk] instructed their sons in the tech-
niques of travel, firemaking, the chase, [and] war."[79] At
the onset of puberty, however,

> the boys retired to the woods under the steward-
> ship of an old man, where they fasted, abstained
> from any sort of sexual activity (which they had
> been free to indulge, to the limit of their
> powers, before), covered themselves with dirt,
> and mortified the flesh in various ways. . . .
> Dreams experienced during such periods of self-
> trial were apt to be regarded as visitations from
> supernatural spirits who might grant orenda, or
> magical power, to the dreamer, and who would
> maintain a special sort of guardianship over
> him.[80]

Pubescent girls, at the time of their first menstrua-
tion,

> retir[ed] into the woods . . . paying particular
> attention to their dreams. With the termination
> of the menstrual period the girl returned to the
> household, but hereafter, whenever she menstruat-
> ed, she would have to live apart in a hut,

avoiding people, and being careful not to step on
a path, or to cook and serve anyone's food, or
(especially) to touch medicines, which would
immediately lose their potency if she handled
them.[81]

In other words, a removal of parental figures from any
possible "interference" in their children's activities at
these times forms the basis for Senecan child-rearing.
Wallace notes the incredulous response of Europeans to
this means of dealing with children by quoting Jesuit and
Quaker descriptions of parental leniency and by connecting
childhood suicides with frustration derived from meddle-
some parents. Moreover, Wallace notes the importance of
the "indulgent" Senecan attitude toward children: "This
theory of child raising . . . was very explicitly recog-
nized, discussed and pondered. Handsome Lake himself, in
later years, insisted that parents love and indulge their
children."[82] More importantly, these descriptions of the
Senecan political system and the relationship between
parents and children form fields for Wallace's claims
concerning the development of revitalization movements.

The remainder of Section I develops other fields for
revitalization claims made in Section Three. Under the
subheading "Iroquois Polity: The Philosophy of Peace," for
example, Wallace portrays the Iroquois League as an
"inward-looking, harmony-maintaining body"[83] whose primary

aim was "keeping domestic quarrels from becoming so bitter that they might prevent cooperation among villages and tribes."[84] Further, Wallace creates a field of claims concerning Iroquois warfare as a domestic policy tool to maintain order as well as a diplomatic tool to prevent economic encroachment by non-League groups and to retaliate for potentially damaging changes in political ties:

> The major functions of Iroquois warfare . . . were, in the early part of the century, threefold: to maintain an emotional equilibrium in individuals who were strongly motivated to avenge, or replace, murdered kinfolk, and thereby to maintain the social equilibrium of kinship units; to extend, or at least maintain, Iroquois political influence over other tribal groups, and thus to provide access by trade or hunting to land rich in peltries; and to perpetuate a political situation in which the threat of retaliation against either party could be used to play off the British and the French against one another.[85]

In addition, Wallace makes both communal religious rituals and more personal rituals involving dreams, fear, and mourning into fields for claims concerning revitalization movements. After dividing a year into time periods dominated by specific religious festivals, Wallace notes that these rituals are "relevant to seasonal subsistence

activities as well as to general themes of belief"[86] whose basic themes are "thankfulness to the spirit beings for past benefits to the community and hope that they would continue to provide them [and thankfulness] to the human participants [in the ceremonies] for their help in order to ensure their continued interest in the communal ceremonies."[87] Rituals dominating more personal aspects of Iroquois life are similarly treated. Stating the "Seneca were rigidly attached to Iroquoian religious traditions [particularly] in looking to their dreams for guidance in all the important affairs of life,"[88] Wallace divides these dreams into two categories: symptomatic dreams and visitation dreams. Symptomatic dreams reveal "a wish of the dreamer's soul. This wish was interpreted either by the dreamer himself or by a clairvoyant [and these interpretations function] as signals for the execution of various more or less conventional patterns of acting out the wish, either literally or symbolically."[89] Visitation dreams, however,

> showed powerful supernatural beings who, in the
> dream, usually spoke personally to the dreamer,
> giving him a message of importance for himself
> and often also for the whole community. Some-
> times these were personality-transformation
> dreams, in which the longings, doubts, and con-
> flicts of the dreamer were suddenly and radically

resolved, the dreamer emerging from his vision
with a new sense of dignity, a new capacity for
playing a hitherto difficult role, and a new
feeling of health and well-being.[90]

Feelings of love and friendship, moreover, are depicted
against a backdrop on which is painted a vision of a
society whose stoic members are controlled by fear:
"Insulted persons . . . in secret sought the help of
witches to punish their enemies. [Thus] neighbors feared
neighbors, and kinsmen their relatives, who might nonethe-
less be responsible through witchcraft for all manner of
misfortune."[91] The "Faces," masks whose origins were in
"individual icons, representations of personal guardian
spirits revealed in dreams [and] institutionalized as
their peculiar suitability to religious and psychothera-
peutic practice led more and more persons to dream of
them,"[92] provide the only protection from the witches.
More important, however, are the symbolic meanings of
these masks. Described by Wallace as representing the
"strange and forgotten part[s] of the self where repressed
and disallowed desires of various sorts, often childish or
infantile in form and content, normally subsisted in
silent turmoil,"[93] form focal points from which defini-
tions of love and friendship are formed and acted upon by
the Seneca. In other words, the masks function as outlets
for the stresses created by the "poised, independent,

self-controlled, self-sacrificing Seneca."[94]

Finally, Wallace turns Seneca rituals concerning mourning and death into a field for revitalization claims. According to Wallace, "the dead were dangerous. The negative side of the passionate mourning for the lost loved one was an elaboration of gruesome fantasies about the cannibalistic appetites and sadistic humor of the dead."[95] Mourning rituals, therefore, take on the twofold appearance of relief for the living and appeasements for the souls of the dead. Since grief is "a principal cause of derangement,"[96] the ritualized funeral practices, survivor behaviors, feasts, and songs both intensify emotions and limit the time accorded to relieving grief. Nonetheless, the rituals also provide a means of protection from the spirits of the dead by either warding off evil intent or providing for the spirit's desire for revenge. Thus, Wallace describes Iroquois warfare as a means of avenging insults: "War-caused bereavement was a state of unavenged insult and shame. [Thus] the Iroquois war complex [was] a part of the mourning process, an acting out of the paranoid resentments that were aroused by loss."[97] Appeasement in these cases is achieved through taking scalps, through returning from campaigns with prisoners to be tortured and killed, or through returning with prisoners to be adopted, thereby replacing the dead.

Part II of Wallace's text reveals the force of his
revitalization theory's external Platonic domain as it was
created in the Preface and Part One, for the claims made
under the heading of the "Decline of the Iroquois" are
empowered by their ability to disrupt the claims made in
these preceding sections. More specifically, by offering
counterclaims in an arrangement which mirrors the form of
Part I, Wallace unleashes the power of his revitalization
theory to create a framework within which only his theory
provides a sense of truth, a sense explained in Part III.
Thus, he forces the reader once again into the position of
Plato's Meno: both must acknowledge the truth of their
guides' claims.

The demise of the Seneca, according to Wallace, fol-
lows a breakdown of the nation's self-portrait as de-
veloped by the arguments enlisted in Part I. Wallace,
therefore, describes this process of ruination as affect-
ing all aspects of the nation's life, for the Seneca
"would be deprived of their military ardor, reduced to
political impotence, corrupted in their customs, disillu-
sioned with their religion, stripped of their hunting
land, and made to look depraved and contemptible in the
eyes of their white and Indian neighbors."[98] As a result,
the Seneca are portrayed as defeated, demoralized, and
despairing of their future; in short, they are perfect
examples for a revitalization theory.

Wallace's process of decline begins with the lapse of the political maneuver which enabled the Seneca to "use the Ohio country as the fulcrum in a game of playing off one side against the other that kept both the French and the British perennially off balance."[99] A growing reliance on trade with English settlements by such Senecan tribal groups as the Mingoes, Delaware, and Wyandot leads to a French perception of a "power deficit so extreme that in their opinion . . . it exceeded the range of Iroquois capacity to redress it."[100] Resultant French military incursions into the Ohio country split the various tribal groups into pro-French and pro-British factions. Their battles, heightened and supported by the European enmity between the French and British, are given the title of The French and Indian War. Following the defeat of the French and their allies, British troops are left in a dominant military position. Thus, French trade and influence is cut off, resulting in a curtailment of trade which, in turn, forces the Iroquois to depend more heavily on British interests. Such a position, as Wallace notes, wrecks the play-off system, institutes a bargaining system, and most importantly, becomes a primary motivation for a number of the Iroquois tribes to view hostile actions as their only resort:

> . . . the Seneca proposal to drive the English out of the Iroquois and Ohio country was

certainly an inspiration to the tribes who joined

in that epidemic of frontier assaults that is now

generally called the Conspiracy of Pontiac.

Pontiac himself had not actually organized a pan-

Indian uprising. That so many local assaults

followed his own carefully prepared attempt . . .

is probably best explained as a concatenation of

a number of factors: the prior circulation of the

Seneca plan . . . ; the subversive encouragements

of the French . . . ; the generally high level of

resentment against the English . . . ; and the

nativistic prophecies of the Delaware

Prophet. . . .[101]

The importance of this description of the Iroquois to

Wallace's textualized authority cannot be understated, for

it brings to bear on the Iroquois nation the power of Wal-

lace's Platonic sense of authority. The rhetoric of

demise Wallace uses as the metaphorical link between his

revitalization theory and the Iroquois reduces the Seneca

and other tribes to examples illustrating the revelatory

vision available from Wallace's removed stance and the

resultant truth of his theory. Thus, "the subversive

encouragements of the French" show the Iroquois' loss of

social equilibrium, and the "high level of resentment

against the English" reveals the tribes' reduction to

political inertia. Finally, the "nativistic prophecies of

the Delaware Prophet" reflect Wallace's observation of the Iroquois' descent into corruption, disillusion, depravity, and contempt. A religious figure, the Prophet traveled amongst the tribes speaking of his visions in which the Creator "informed him of the peril of worldly misery and eternal damnation in which the Indians stood."[102] Only by following a specific code of conduct could the tribes "drive the white men out of their country, recapture the pristine happiness of the aboriginal state, and find the right road again to heaven."[103] Thus, the Prophet's code forms the final causal link between Wallace's revitalization theory and the Seneca. More importantly, it strengthens and broadens the ideology and hegemony of Plato's guiding finger, for through his method of applying concepts, definitions, and the process of inference, the images on Derrida's postcard once again blur as Plato's countenance takes on characteristics of Wallace's visage and Socrates takes on distinctly Senecan features.

Two frameworks of actions still remained, however, before the Iroquois Confederacy was reduced to the ignoble state of "white people." Wallace notes that the first of these frames, the Revolutionary War, saw the Indian nations following initially a policy of neutrality:

> The neutrality was, however, conditional upon the
> contending parties refraining from encroaching
> upon their [the Iroquois] trade, their travel, or

their land. The tribes had, in effect implement-

ed the classic play-off policy again; they would

fight <u>against</u> whoever first invaded their terri-

tory, interfered with their trade and travel,

injured their people, or demanded their alliance,

and <u>for</u> whoever had not upset the status quo.[104]

The warring colonists, however, saw this status quo as

representative of the English system against which they

were fighting. Following a series of incidents in which

members of the Iroquois Confederacy were killed or taken

prisoner by colonists, the Oswego Council decided in 1777

to join the English. The resultant raids in which the

Seneca took part were small in scope, but the psychologi-

cal effect on the American effort was enormous. Frontier

entreaties for protection from these raids did not go

unheard by the military: "Before the Revolution, the Six

Nations and their dependents had lived largely in some

thirty thriving villages scattered from the Mohawk River

to Lake Erie and the Ohio country. Of all these towns, by

the spring of 1780 only two survived undamaged."[105]

The second framework saw the victorious Americans

enter into a vigorous acquisition of Indian lands. Wal-

lace states that the process by which these areas were

obtained was diplomatic in nature:

[This] diplomacy was based on an impromptu legal

theory: that the United States had not only won a

war with Great Britain but had also conquered
Britain's Indian allies and that therefore the
Treaty of Paris of 1783 gave the United States
and its several member states not only political
sovereignty over, but also ownership of the soil
of, all Indian territory south of the Great Lakes
and The St. Lawrence River and East of the Mis-
sissippi River.[106]

Unwilling to suffer the level of fatalities experienced
during the Revolutionary War, the Iroquois did not renew
hostilities upon discovering the American desires revealed
in the Fort Stanwix treaty. As a result, the nations
making up the Confederacy lost their lands. More impor-
tantly, according to Wallace, the land losses symbolized
for both the nations and their western allies a greater
loss in esteem and prestige. The old Iroquois confederacy
disintegrated, leaving only feuding factions whose in-
fighting led to increased impoverishment and stress as
seen in the mounting numbers of Iroquois reliant on white
notions and alcohol. By 1797, only Cornplanter and his
Allegany Seneca retained any of the former Confederacy's
representative power. Wallace concludes:

> . . . the embers of the old confederacy guttered
> out in a welter of liquor, bribery, and high-
> pressure salesmanship. The name of the Great
> League still remained; but its people were now

separated, one from another, on tiny reservations boxed in by white men and white men's fences.[107]

Thus, the Iroquois Confederacy in general and the Seneca in particular are presented as living as a defeated and demoralized people by the beginning of the Nineteenth Century: "[Most] damaging to the spirit . . . was a loss of confidence in their own way of life, a lessening of re-spect for themselves, which resulted from their confronta-tion with the white man's civilization."[108] As a result, individual tribal members clung to older ways of living as revealed in their dress, town council meetings, and reli-gious ceremonies. These were, however, superficial char-acteristics, for life grew more precarious:

> The game was becoming scarce. . . . [t]he river
> from which they took their cooking and drinking
> water periodically flooded the banks of sandy
> loam on which the fields were laid. . . . the
> trails were made almost impassable by snow,
> swamps and fallen timber. . . . [and] the people
> liked to drink . . . in large convivial
> groups.[109]

According to Wallace, this unstable life symbolized the greater instability which was the self-esteem and moral value of the Seneca. Defeat led to disillusion, disillu-sion to doubts of survival. Individual responses to these doubts were increased occasions of drunken hostility,

depression, and accusations of witchcraft. It seemed,
then, that the only two means of salvation lay in either a
return to historically Senecan beliefs or an adoption of
white culture. Wallace refers to the journeyers on these
paths as "conservatives" and "pro-gressives."[110] As would
be expected, each group was represented on each reserva-
tion, and each group worked against the other. Stress,
therefore, continued to increase as seen in higher fre-
quencies of drunkenness, depression, and interfactional
violence.

In order to enforce the truth of his revitalization
hypothesis, Wallace describes the parallel situation of
the "Ragged Conquerors," the "hungry farmers fleeing the
cold and rocky hillsides of New England . . . [and the]
hard-drinking Scotch-Irish weavers driven from Ulster,"[111]
who began to surround the Seneca reservations. Living in
conditions more physically and socially primitive than the
Indians, these people suffered from dietary deficiency
diseases, blamed witches for illnesses, provided little
education for children, and generally labored under "a
general spirit of apathy [that] inhibited the construction
of public works."[112] Since the similarities between these
white settlers' situation and the Senecan situation are
inescapable, Wallace's conclusion's power reverberates
with echoes of Plato's Meno's "It must be true":

It is not surprising, therefore, that across this

dark and barren country a wave of religious en-
thusiasm began to swell. . . . New sects sprang
up; and old denominations, their members congre-
gating in great camp meetings, poured their
sorrows into the first Great Revival.[113]

Federal efforts to incubate white culture on the
reservations were limited by financial shortfalls and the
needs of the Seneca for consumable materials. The Great
Revival, however, provided other means for supporting the
progressive groups on the reservations, and, in Wallace's
view, no one group was more successful at filling this
role than the Quakers: "The Quakers, who were sophisticat-
ed in the theory of cultural progress, adroitly insinuated
that the changes in way of life that they were urging on
the Seneca were changes that their own ancestors had had
to make in times past."[114]

Despite the inroads made on the reservations by the
Quakers, friction between progressive and conservative
groups continued to build, culminating in the Senecan
perception of Henry Simmons's teachings. Simmons had been
teaching Senecan children to read and write English in the
house where Senecan community meetings were held and in
front of which stood the statue of Tarachiawagon, the
primary symbol of conservative Senecan beliefs. Already
in conflict, the two segments of Senecan society were
crystallized by Simmons's presence, and Wallace notes,

"Witch fear began to preoccupy the village[s]."[115] Wallace's portrayal of the situation around the Senecan reservations thus fulfills two tasks: first, it completes the breakdown of the arguments concerning the Seneca in Part I. The picture developed of the Seneca is thus one of a defeated, demoralized, and despairing people. Second, through its ability to explain the process by which the Seneca arrived at the position the tribe was in before the development of Handsome Lake's religious revival, the portrayal leads to an "explosive" empowerment of Wallace's revitalization theory. Part III of the text examines the process of spiritual and physical revitalization as determined by the theory.

Wallace notes in the Introduction of Death and Rebirth that the religion called "The Old Way of Handsome Lake" developed from the Iroquois need to "lift themselves from defeat, demoralization, and despair and to revitalize their communities."[116] Moreover, he states his text does not "attempt to describe in close detail the Iroquois culture."[117] His focus on the prophesies of Handsome Lake, therefore, mirrors Plato's use of geometry in the "Meno": both men make use of textualized examples, empowered by the arguments previously set forth in Parts I and II, to form an ethnocentric "tether" connecting results with the demonstrated examples. Meno's response to Plato's geometry lesson is, "It seems we can't deny

it."[118] Wallace's reader is placed in the same position as Meno, a process described by Edward Said as one in which "the methods and the discourse of Western scholarship confine inferior non-European cultures to a position of subordination [in order that these cultures become] a colony for European texts and culture"[119] and one through which the fallacy of the "relation of equality between hearer [reader] and speaker [writer]" becomes explicit.[120] As a result, Wallace's earlier rhetoric of demise becomes in Part III a rhetoric of actualization with both the Iroquois and the reader, like Meno and Plato's reader, controlled by the power of a previously developed theory.

According to Wallace, Handsome Lake's earliest visions led to prophecies in which he condemned specifically "the drinking of whiskey and the practice of witchcraft and magic" and encouraged the Iroquois to "confess their sins, abandon their evil ways, and achieve salvation before it was too late."[121] In Part Two, Wallace identified alcoholism and belief in witchcraft as signs of the extent to which both the Iroquois culture and the white culture surrounding the Iroquois reservations sank during their demise in the later years of the Eighteenth Century. By destroying these signs through religious revivals fueled by the enormous stress created from feelings of impotence and disillusion, the cultures' physical and spiritual revitalizations begin. Given this theoretical framework,

Wallace's description of the Handsome Lake-led witch hunt takes on the power of a means toward salvation and actualizes Wallace's revitalization theory:

> Handsome Lake . . . articulated the general thesis 'that most of their bodily afflictions and disorders arose from witchcraft,' that he was authorized by the Creator 'to tell the Individuals who are afflicting the disorders on other Individuals,' and 'that the Whiskey is the great Engine which the bad Spirit uses to introduce Witchcraft and many other evils amongst Indians.'[122]

"Tell[ing] the Individuals who are afflicting the disorders" becomes a hunt for witches who, once identified, accused, and absolved through confession or, in two cases, death, engages the "great Engine" of Wallace's concept of revitalization, tethering Handsome Lake's further visions and prophecies to Wallace's rhetoric of actualization.

Handsome Lake's second set of visions, entitled the "Social Gospel" by Wallace, emphasized "the value in daily life of temperance, peace, land retention, acculturation, and domestic morality."[123] These tenets, according to Wallace, further codify Handsome Lake's prophecies by solidifying the role of the nuclear family in place of other kinship ties:

> [Handsome Lake] condemned the man who deserted a

series of women in order to avoid the responsibilities of fatherhood. He condemned the woman who was jealous of her husband's love for his children. He condemned the quarreling between husband and wife. He condemned scandalous gossip about the misbehavior of wives while their husbands were away hunting. He praised the wife who forgave her husband who strayed, but condemned the erring husband. He condemned philandering men. He condemned the punitive mother. He condemned the drunken father. He urged the childless couple to adopt children of the wife's sister rather than separate. He condemned gossiping women who spread rumors that a woman's husband was not the father of her child. And he urged grandchildren to care for aged and helpless grandparents.[124]

In other words, with Handsome Lake as the guide, the Iroquois could begin a journey toward physical and spiritual revitalization, and the reader, with Wallace as the guide, can maintain the journey toward revealed truth.

Nonetheless, in the case of Handsome Lake, success as spiritual leader and moral center of the Iroquois led to political defeat. Unable to control the actions of the chiefs of the villages, he became the representation of the clash between freedom and personal dominance that

always characterized Iroquois culture. Wallace observes
that the "intense ambivalence about dominance was tradi-
tionally expressed in the polarity between the politeness
of day to day encounters and the violence that erupted in
drunken brawls [and] witchcraft accusations. . . ."[125] By
associating the renegade chiefs with the path to damna-
tion, Handsome Lake secured the success of his role as
spiritual guide. Wallace notes that one of Handsome
Lake's followers told a white man that "the prophet would
yet be persecuted and put to death, as the wicked put to
death the Lord Jesus Christ.'"[126] The association between
Christ and Handsome Lake illustrates the solidity of
Handsome Lake's role as spiritual leader. More important
for this discussion, however, is the function the associa-
tion between Christ and Handsome Lake has in solidifying
Wallace's actualization of his revitalization theory. By
linking the salvation offered through belief in Christ to
the salvation offered through following Handsome Lake, the
emotional power of being "born again" is connotedly empha-
sized in Wallace's revitalization, leading both the
Iroquois and the reader to maintain the truth of the
Iroquois revitalization according to the gospel of Wal-
lace. This Christian metaphor is extended in Wallace's
explanation that the friction between spiritual and polit-
ical needs, as represented by Handsome Lake's position in
Iroquois culture, increased after his death until, a

generation later, his disciples, "sickened by the endless contention and threatened by the aggressive proselytizing of the Christian missions, collated and revived his words and made them into the code . . . [called today] The Old Way of Handsome Lake."[127] The relationship of the Christian gospels to the figure of Jesus Christ, then, became the relationship of the code to the figure of Handsome Lake. Further, the emotional strength of religious belief is tethered to Wallace's sense of revitalization, and, finally, to the hegemonic capacity of Plato's method of relating propositions to accepted principles. As a result, the Indians of the Six Nations "became a cleanly, industrious, sober, happy and more prosperous people."[128] And, more importantly, Wallace is able to conclude that his actualized revitalization process portrays the Old Way as "an expression of a somewhat nostalgic and deeply emotional identification with Indianness itself."[129]

Marjorie R. Esman continues the tradition of Wallace's, Malinowski's, and Plato's notion of textual authority in her treatment of Henderson, Louisiana's Cajun culture. Like her predecessors, Esman devises a monologically-based cultural framework in order to portray the "true" Henderson, Louisiana, culture through a series of concepts, definitions, and a process of inference which links these concepts and definitions with her hegemonic and ideologic rhetoric. More specifically, Esman's

cultural framework--"an examination of one Cajun community
and the way it has preserved its identity while making the
transition from tradition to the modern world"[130]--allows
her to treat her actual concern: the formation of data
supporting her claims regarding nationalistic movements.
Like Wallace, Malinowski, and Plato, Esman displaces
competing interpretive strategies in order to create an
ethnography whose rules support her own interpretive
strategy: groups of people making a transition from
"traditional peasant ways" to wider western cultures
follow specific routes which, at the same time, force the

> demise of traditional culture traits. . . . [and
> the maintenance of such] ethnic identities [as] a
> concern for the history of cultural differences,
> an insistence on a separate ethnic classifica-
> tion, a preservation and sometimes a revival of
> old culture traits including language, and . . .
> [an assertion of] the rights to political sover-
> eignty.[131]

As a result, Esman's text echoes her above predecessors'
means of analyzing propositions according to their agree-
ment with an a priori theory. Moreover, by selecting
Henderson, Louisiana's Cajun culture, she provides herself
with a corpus of data from which to view both the conse-
quences of her hypothesis as it concerns the Cajuns and
the consequences of her hypothesis as they concern

cultural transition theory. Thus, Esman joins Wallace, Malinowski, and Socrates as a receptor of Plato's commanding finger. Finally, by adopting the form of the Platonic monologue, Esman reestablishes Plato's rhetoric of domination.

As did Wallace in his treatment of the Iroquois, Esman begins her description of the Cajun residents in Henderson, Louisiana, with a reverberation of Plato's method of hypothesis:

> Within the past two generations, Cajuns have been transformed from self-sufficient peasant farmers and fishers to a people predominantly involved in the U.S. (and international) cash economy. . . . Once largely isolated, they are now connected with the rest of the world via airports, interstate highways, and television. Where they formerly spoke French, they are now bilingual or even monolingual English speakers. The changes in the economic base and in technological opportunities have required changes in the culture; while some aspects of the traditional culture persist, many have been discarded as no longer useful in the modern world. Yet, Cajuns do remain a separate and viable ethnic group with a culture and identity of their own.[132]

And, as it did for Wallace, Esman's adoption of this

method creates a domain outside of the subject of her
discussion; in Esman's case the domain is the hypothesis
that because of nationalistic emotions, subordinate cul-
tures engaged in the process of transforming themselves
into imitations of dominant cultures will abandon tradi-
tions while maintaining ethnic integrity. References to
the "truth" of this hypothesis as seen in Welsh and Basque
cultures and to the demise and growth of traditional
cultures and ethnic activity as described by other ethnog-
raphers force the reader to accept these warrants, thus
privileging Esman's textual structure. Using written
narratives, Esman forms a causative relationship between
her portrayal of the Cajuns and her "theory" of cultural
transition through a transcendent rhetoric. She therefore
remains secure in the hegemony of Platonic textual author-
ity: "Henderson _is_ a community that has been remarkably
successful in retaining its identity and in incorporating
innovations into its traditional culture."[133]

Chapters Two through Ten of Esman's text reflect the
models established for realist ethnography developed by
Malinowski and Wallace, for they objectify the historical
and contemporary lives of Henderson's residents. Like
Plato's constructed feeling of helplessness, Malinowski's
displacement of Freudian theory, and Wallace's citation of
written historical records, Esman's observations provide
her with a means of controlling her investigation: through

her text, the reader is guided to a "lifelike" (i.e.,
realistic) portrait of a Cajun society. For a fourth time,
then, the reader is forced to say, "No doubt it is as you
say."

Esman begins her realist portrayal of Henderson, Loui-
siana, and its Cajun population with a history of the
Cajuns themselves. By connecting the settlement history
of the southern portion of Louisiana with the demands of
the subtropical Louisiana climate, Esman creates the
Platonic tether described earlier in Malinowski's and
Wallace's texts. Thus, staunchly Catholic Nova Scotian
farmers, upon settling in Louisiana, "were not able to
continue their lives unchanged. Cultural patterns derived
from the Acadians' devout Catholicism and a general rural
peasant background persisted in Louisiana, but other
aspects altered considerably."[134] In other words, the
causal reasoning underlying the concept that climactic
change engenders change in, for example, diet and subsist-
ence patterns in part represents the Platonic tether
connecting Esman's Cajuns with axiom concerning cultural
transitions. When combined with changes created by adap-
tations in the social and political arenas, however, the
complete tether develops. Thus, as Esman states

> Cajun culture had evolved . . . as a function of
> a specific set of environmental, social, and
> political circumstances. As these conditions

changed, the culture was no longer fully adapted
to the prevailing circumstances. [Thus] . . .
Cajuns had become aware of the benefits of educa-
tion and full participation in the outside cash
economy, as well as of the use of the English
language. Because prestige accrued to those who
were most acculturated to the U.S. mainstream,
most Cajuns followed that route.[135]

Esman's causal reasoning, a process built on the
warrant that "aspects of Cajun culture have survived in an
updated form: rejected if useless, changed if necessary,
and preserved where appropriate,"[136] continues its devel-
opment in her portrayal of contemporary Cajun perspec-
tives. Relying on observations of Henderson's residents
made between 1979 and 1984, Esman depicts a culture in
which "farms and fisheries remain significant contributors
to local economies. . . . [s]elf-sufficiency has been all
but abandoned. . . . French is . . . spoken by most of
the older people. . . . [and] Catholicism and family ties
remain strong, as does the popularity of traditional
foods."[137] Further, according to Esman, "while the social
and environmental conditions that created the group have
changed, the group maintains a strong sense of its identi-
ty."[138] The metaphor linking Henderson's Cajun culture
and Esman's theory, therefore, is complete. The remainder
of the text reinforces the rhetoric of domination by

objectifying various aspects of Henderson, Louisiana, life as a means of actualizing Esman's theory.

The processes of objectification and actualization begin with Esman's treatment of Henderson's economic reliance on fishing. Having noted earlier that the Acadians "quickly learned that fishing was the most effective way to utilize their new environment,"[139] Esman observes that Henderson's economy continues to depend on fish, most specifically the crawfish, a commodity that "did not become important commercially for many years [and a commodity that was] not always [a] staple food."[140] This microsample of Esman's theory of cultural transformation occurred because of a set of conditions that developed during the 1940's:

> The construction of the new Atchafalaya Basin levees increased flooding within the swamp while they allowed the land outside to drain. The higher water level within the swamp provided a favorable habitat for crawfish and caused a rapid increase in the crawfish supply. [Further] the restaurants in . . . Henderson, located adjacent to the swamp, provided a ready market for a locally recognized and inexpensive food. In addition, during this period increasing numbers of Cajuns were moving to the cities and larger towns of the area. Now, lacking direct access to

the swamps, some were willing to buy small amounts of crawfish for the first time.[141] Objectification of this aspect of Cajun life continues through Esman's discussions of crawfish ponds and the crawfish industry. Noting that the ponds are the key to the success of the industry and that the crawfish industry affects most of the families in Henderson in some manner develops the framework for economic claims whose supporting data reveal the realistic nature of Esman's observations. As a result, observations concerning restaurant growth and crawfish raising, fishing, cooking, peeling, and processing allow both Esman and the reader to "know" this aspect of Cajun culture as an ontologically stable item of study. According to Edward Said, "such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it."[142] It is from this position of domination that Esman's theory of cultural transformation is actualized; the Acadians are textually transformed from farmers who fished and raised cattle to supplement their diets to crawfish catchers and suppliers via a rhetoric of domination empowered by Esman's theory. As did Plato, Malinowski, and Wallace, so does Esman manipulate every sense of the reader's approach to an aspect of life.

The Cajun family life, sex roles, and perpetuation of culture are treated in a similar manner. Esman describes the Cajun families of Henderson as "interrelated," a

situation "compounded by the fact that in the recent past (and sometimes even today) pairs of siblings would marry. . . . The children of these couples are double cousins, making kinship ties even more complicated and more firm than they would be ordinarily."[143] Moreover, financially independent, unmarried, adult children tend to live with their parents rather than maintaining separate households, and young, married couples often obtain trailers which become "extension[s] of the parents' house[s] used for little more than sleeping and for an occasional meal."[144] Further, Esman claims "many single women still living with their parents are now having babies that formerly they would not have had or that would have caused them to marry."[145] Thus, Esman claims the Cajun extended families "demonstrate . . . that in a context of strong family ties and close geographic proximity it may be difficult to distinguish between nuclear and extended family households,"[146] despite the fact that Henderson families "express the standard U.S. norm preferring nuclear households."[147]

Esman's conclusion on extended and nuclear families performs three functions. First, it reinforces her earlier description of Acadia tradition in which kin-based cooperation formed the basis for economic and social survival.[148] Second, her conclusion reinforces her dominative rhetoric, for she depicts the Cajuns as

"something one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts . . . something one illustrates."[149]   Third, her portrayal of the extended Cajun family, tempered by the Cajuns' expressed adherence to the "U.S. norm" further actualizes the transformation theory. Whereas "traditionally, Cajuns were more dependent on kin cooperation than they are now . . . [and] cooperative labor, involving groups of neighbors who were often also kin, was a fundamental part of traditional Cajun culture,"[150] contemporary Cajuns are portrayed as seeing kinship relations as "strong but selective."[151]   In terms of transition theory, then, within specific contexts, traditional culture traits are dropped or modified in favor of traits typical of the more dominant culture surrounding the culture in transition. Thus, Esman can further conclude that within Henderson's Cajun families,

> siblings are not necessarily expected to join one another in personal rivalries. . . . relatives are not expected to do business with one another if better deals can be made with outsiders. . . . [and] people are not expected to give discounts or special consideration in business deals to their relatives.[152]

The Cajun "family drama" is treated in a similar manner. Esman describes Cajun families as placing great value on children for two reasons: Catholic birth control

policy and the rural axiom that children produce more than they consume and therefore provide cheap labor. Further, Cajun women are expected to be married by age 25 and to be bearing children as early as possible. In addition, the elderly are associated with wisdom, while the dead influence behavior through the living's maintenance of photographs and gravesites. Esman notes that "a family that does not maintain their relatives' graves . . . is said not to respect their dead. . . . one of the most serious criticisms the community can level against one of its members."[153] Finally, women's roles are associated with household activities while men's roles involve outside work, "outdoor chores around the house . . . and tinkering with machinery."[154] Thus, the men's lives are less affected by marriage:

> [The men] move from the household run by their mother to that run by their wife. . . . Although girls help their mothers with domestic tasks, they do not have firsthand responsibility until they themselves marry and take charge of their own home. It is the women, therefore, who have the more difficult transition. . . . [for] they must suddenly be home whether or not they want to be; they must cook and clean . . . and they are no longer able to spend as much time with their friends.[155]

As a result, adult women are charged with instilling the key values concerning spiritual and educational participation while adult males deliver instructions concerning hunting, fishing, machinery, and athletics. Moreover, the adult women are responsible traditionally for teaching cultural lessons, for it is in the home that Cajun children learn "their culture is a private one that is little valued in the world beyond Acadiana except as a curiosity. They learn when and how it is appropriate to act Cajun. . . ."[156]

As was true with Esman's treatment of kinship relations, her objectivized descriptions of Cajun sex roles and culture actualize the transformation theory which serves as the focal point of Esman's text. Noting that the Cajun adult women have undergone a change in values to the extent that they are now "concerned with prestige and success. . . . [and, as the objects of an actualized transformation theory] are eager to own the goods that will mark them as prosperous and contemporary rather than poor and backward,"[157] Esman describes the men as now concerned with their status within the local community rather than with their status in the larger American society. The actualization of the theory, then, places adult men as the cultural caretakers. Thus, Esman can conclude that because "among the younger generations, traditional Cajun culture is more apparent among men than

among women, it is men who are more likely to transmit this culture to their children."[158] The result is a "new variety of culture that is neither the old Cajun culture nor the current U.S. one."[159] More specifically, the result is an actualized theory of cultural transformation and a reader who, like Plato's Meno, must state, "No doubt it is as you say."

Chapters Six through Ten of Esman's text follow the same pattern of description and conclusion dominated by a rhetoric of transformation. Under the subheading of "Basic Social Interactions," for example, Esman portrays mechanistically the Cajuns as beings whose social interactions are aimed at "ensur[ing] reasonably peaceful coexistence in most situations."[160] In this light, social activities are categorized into those actions used to impede interpersonal contacts and those used to promote relationships between family members or between individuals and "selected 'strangers.'" The offering of food or drink, for example, is used to promote relationships, while not offering either or substituting coffee for food distances or prohibits relationships. Similarly, social organizations and associations are treated mechanistically as the cohesive factors holding together the Henderson community. Citing anthropological belief that within complex societies in which familial obligations do not arbitrate social relationships and in which artificial

relationships are needed to maintain social cohesion these organizations "form sets of cross-cutting ties and obligations that make it difficult for an individual to break free of the responsibilities and privileges of group membership,"[161] Esman once again portrays the Cajun culture in terms of an actualized transformation theory. Not yet "complex" enough to completely need artificial means of cohesion and not completely bound by kinship obligations, the Cajuns are transformed into a society of benevolent independents who

> firmly believe that people should not be obligated to cooperate or to structure their activities according to the wishes of an organization. Although residents freely help one another with specific chores, this willingness to help out is a product of the voluntary nature of the aid.[162]

Esman's dominative rhetoric of transformation is reminiscent of Said's description of Orientalist rhetoric as reinforcing a "closed system, in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter."[163] More important here, however, is Esman's recreation of the Platonic medium through which her manipulation of "things Cajun" further emphasizes her actualized transformation theory. In other words, just as Plato uses a position of shammed ignorance,

just as Malinowski uses the displacement of Freudian psychology, and just as Wallace uses arguments of growth and demise, Esman uses a rhetorical process of change as a metaphorical link between her transformation theory and the Henderson residents, reducing the Cajuns to examples illustrating the authoritative vision available from Esman's stance and the resultant truth of her theory.

In Chapter Seven Esman's description of politics causing "issues that elsewhere would be simple conflicts [to] become heavily politicized in Henderson [and resulting in]. . . . factional disputes"[164] reemphasizes her earlier descriptions of traditional Cajun independence and feuds so that transformation theory may once again be applied. Noting that the Henderson residents distrust institutions and the individuals representing them to the extent that federal, state, and local elections are diminished to the level of opportunities for gambling, Esman ties this perception of politics and government to the Cajun suspicion of outsiders and desire to handle their own affairs rather than trusting others to deal with them. Then, by applying the anthropological definitions of government as the "official maintenance of order, and politics [as the] manipulation of power,"[165] the Cajuns become political scientists who see "political action . . . reflected in power plays, coalition building, and local-level adversary action [not in] the trappings of

outside government or . . . the maintenance of order."[166] Thus, Esman can claim that transformation theory, applied through education that, in the words of a Henderson citizen, has made "'people . . . smarter now than they used to be' . . . [and capable of making] independent evaluations of the candidates,"[167] develops a "big-man" political system that has displaced the traditional egalitarian system. Within this "big-man" system, a system commonly referred to in anthropological description,

> power accrues to the individual who makes himself
> indispensable to others (big men are virtually
> always male) by doing favors and making personal
> sacrifices on behalf of his constituents. A big
> man has power only because others are willing to
> give it to him in return for favors and services
> rendered. When he loses his ability to do favors
> or provide services for others, a big man usually
> loses the power to a rival who surpasses him in
> generosity.[168]

As a result, Pat Huval, the mayor of Henderson, becomes explainable. Transformation theory explains how an egalitarian system rooted in the traditions of a subordinate culture is replaced by a system characteristic of a larger, dominant culture. Thus, Huval's "big-man" system, a pattern characteristic of U.S. elections at various levels, can maintain itself even though "many Henderson

residents dislike him personally, politically, or both."[169]
Moreover, Huval's method of protecting his political
status makes use of the theory's treatment of ethnic
identities: he can play his status as a French-speaking
Cajun against potential political opponents whose posi-
tions within the community are less demonstrable. Esman
notes, however, that since candidates with equally strong
Cajun identities have begun to challenge Huval's position,
his victory margins have shrunk: "That he [Huval] received
only 58 percent of the vote in 1980 and 52 percent in 1984
demonstrates that Pat's control is not as great as it may
appear."[170] More important for this study, though, are
Esman's portrayal of Huval's political position and her
explanation of Henderson's politics. She makes both Huval
and the rest of the community objects of a theory whose
dominative rhetoric reinvokes the image of Derrida's
description of the relationship between Plato and Socrates
and, by extension, the relationship between the ethnogra-
pher and the studied culture. Esman, like Plato, is the
possessor of the prodding (explaining) finger whose au-
thority derives from her ability to rhetorically create a
Cajun culture whose motivating force lies in transforma-
tion theory.

As a result of this depiction of local political
actions fueled by the dominative rhetoric linking her
transformation theory to the Cajuns, Esman can describe a

causal relation between this local portrayal and Hender-
son's residents' participation in politics on the parish
and state levels: ". . . many Henderson residents vote for
higher-level (parish and state) candidates according to
the tickets endorsed by their local leaders."[171] In
addition, the political causal relation affects such local
actions as restaurant selection and employment opportuni-
ties. As support for this relation, Esman quotes a resi-
dent who describes his life as limited by the relationship
between politics, eating, and work:

> 'I went to [the mayor's restaurant] the other day
> and everybody looked at me like I was the enemy
> or something. All I wanted was to sit and eat
> and mind my own business, and they ran me out of
> there because I'm not one of their crowd. And
> the last time I went to [the chief's restaurant]
> he told me to meet him on the levee [a challenge
> to a fight], so I can't go there anymore either.
> You can't just mind your own business around
> here.'[172]

This strategy of quoting an informant as a means of sup-
porting a previously demonstrated temporal relationship
functions for Esman as it does for Plato: both writers use
the resultant definitions to help maintain the contexts
within which their rhetorics have power. Esman, there-
fore, like Plato, relates Truth to the power of the

written text through its reliance upon itself. In other words, just as the origins of Plato's definitions are in Plato's Socrates, the origins of Esman's definitions are in Esman's cultural transformation theorist. As a result, Plato may quote from the poet Theognis to support his definition associating knowledge with the soul and the Sophists with aspects of the body--"Were mind by art created and instilled / Immense rewards had soon the pockets filled"[173]--and Esman may quote a Henderson resident to support her definition of a Cajun culture energized by transformation theory.

Chapters Eight through Ten complete Esman's Cajun tale in a manner similar to that described in the preceding chapters in that each portrays the Henderson residents as they are dominated by transformation theory. The Cajuns' traditional beliefs, attitudes, and actions are described so that transformation theory may explain their contemporary situation. At the same time, these chapters further emphasize Esman's position as the inheritor of the textual authority flowing from Plato's finger and the Cajun's position as the target of Esman's defining finger. As a result, Esman's reader, like Wallace's, Malinowski, and Meno, finds herself in a context in which her response must once again be, "No doubt it is as you say."

According to Esman, Cajun tradition places an individual's ability to work hard in a position vital to

the Cajun self-image: "Cajuns' folk history--their ac-
counts of their own past--includes the hardship the early
Acadian settlers faced in trying to carve out a new life
in Louisiana."[174] Moreover, this "hardship," as reflected
in the Acadian peasant history and in the Cajuns' tradi-
tional lack of education, manifests itself in the people's
pride in and reliance on mastering several forms of manual
labor as a symbol of this agricultural heritage. As Esman
notes,

> Cajuns are remarkably flexible in what they can
> do. This is true especially for men, who learn a
> variety of skills as children. Most men in the
> Henderson area have basic electrical and plumbing
> skills and are at least partially able to perform
> basic construction tasks. Many build their own
> homes and are also skilled mechanics. This kind
> of resourcefulness and flexibility is a vestige
> of age-old Cajun self-sufficiency, which required
> people to handle most of their own needs.[175]

In fact, according to Esman, the strength of this attitude
in both men and women results in two, apparently contra-
dictory, traits: the Cajuns treat derisively people who
must depend on others for electrical, plumbing, construc-
tion, or mechanical repairs, and the Cajuns view work as
"a necessary evil, a means to an end, a way to stay alive
(and, today, to afford the luxuries that money can

buy)."[176] In other words, the traditional Cajun spirit of independence places such a high value on individual performance that self-employment at minimal pay, frequent job switching for reasons of increased potential earnings, and resentment at taking orders from an employer are common. In this fashion, Esman, like Wallace, Malinowski, and Plato before her, creates a context that allows her to compose a sequence of history and to manipulate the objects of her composition within the sequence. Through transformation theory, Esman can claim that "in recent years Henderson residents, like other Cajuns, have altered their attitudes toward work."[177] The notion that contemporary Cajuns have replaced the traditional view of work as a symbol of self-sufficiency and survival with the wider American view that work symbolizes the accumulation of wealth actualizes the first assumption of Esman's transformation theory: traditional peasant cultures will undergo metamorphoses out of which adherents to nontraditional western culture will emerge. Further description of the contemporary Cajun perspective of work empowers the transitional portion of the theory in which a "preservation of old cultural traits" flavors the adopted western traits. Thus, the contemporary Cajun (i.e. American) concern for wealth is colored by traditional Cajun independence through Esman's portrayal of Benoit, a young man who wants the material signs of wealth "but who does not

enjoy working and does not want to work for an employer
even for a high salary. He wants to make his money inde-
pendently, without having to take orders from somebody
else.[178]

Esman's treatments of Cajun leisure activities in
Chapter Nine and Henderson's relationship with the "out-
side" in Chapter Ten are organized and function in the
same manner as Chapter Eight. Traditionally, "the ability
to 'have a good time' is crucial to Cajun identity."[179]
This importance derives from the isolated, rural, surviv-
al-dominated Cajun history in which leisure activities
were limited. Thus, according to Esman, the Cajun philos-
ophy of life is ruled by three phrases: "lache pas la
patate (literally, 'don't drop the potato'), laissez les
bons temps rouler ('let the good times roll'), and joie de
vivre ('joy of living')."[180] The Cajun perspective of
"outsiders" derives from this same history. Residents of
Breau Bridge, a neighboring town that serves as the center
of commerce and business in this section of Louisiana,
view Henderson's residents as unsophisticated and as
occupants of a much lower level of the social hierarchy,
while the Henderson residents characterize their Breau
Bridge neighbors as snobbish and lacking close-knit rela-
tionships. From a wider perspective, Americans view the
Cajuns as "exotic" (Said would use the term "oriental"),
while the Cajuns view Americans as objects of derision

who, nonetheless, are "suspected of having evil inten-
tions."[181] Traditionally, therefore, leisure activities
symbolize the Cajun spirit of stressing calm in the face
of adversity, of emphasizing the good rather than the bad,
and of finding pleasure in life. Similarly, the tradi-
tional Cajun perspective on outsiders is represented
through a self-image symbolic of a set of values dominated
by the swamp's environment. As she did in Chapter Eight,
Esman composes contexts in Chapters Nine and Ten within
which she can actualize an aspect of her theory of cultur-
al transformation that more than any other aspect reveals
the theory's hegemonic nature.

According to Esman, cultural transformation occurs
through a process of stages, one of which is an insistence
on a separate ethnic classification. Cajun leisure activ-
ities and relationships with "outsiders" become in Esman's
essay the means through which this classification is
portrayed. Noting that "the domain of play contains the
most commonly used expressions in Cajun French"[182] and
that "tourists want to know that Cajuns speak French,"[183]
these aspects of Cajun life become the prominent symbols
used to define contemporary Cajun ethnicity. In other
words, symbolic acts included in such leisure categories
as "Going Out" and "Fishing, Hunting, and Other Hobbies"
are depicted as primary representations of Cajunness.
Since Esman has already determined that adult males are

the cultural caretakers, the symbolic acts are male acts.
Hunting, for example, a leisure activity described by
Esman as one rarely pursued by women, requires a knowledge
of the swamp environment far different from that knowledge
needed by fishermen or other commercial interests. In
fact, "the ability to navigate the swamps and a knowledge
of some of the less accessible . . . spots . . . confers a
degree of prestige on a man regardless of what he does for
a living."[184]
Thus, within Henderson

> there is probably not a single Cajun man . . .
> who has never been hunting, and there are very
> few who do not actively pursue hunting as a
> sport. Boys are given shotguns as soon as they
> are deemed old enough to shoot, sometimes as
> early as eight years old. They accompany their
> fathers and uncles on hunting trips from an early
> age, and the first major kill represents a kind
> of informal rite of passage into a [Cajun] man's
> world. Men hold fond memories of their early
> hunting trips with their fathers and refer to
> them often.[185]

Hunting thus functions symbolically as a representation of
Cajun ethnicity for Cajuns. Yet, through Esman's
transformation theory, hunting as an ethnic symbol has
further become a symbol of what it means to be Cajun for

outsiders desirous for Cajun-guided hunts and Cajun-prepared food obtained through the hunts. Esman can therefore conclude that Henderson's self-image is a "contradictory blend of inferiority, derived from the town's reputation among its neighbors, and pride, derived from the tourists."[186] No doubt, it must be as she says.

It seems, then, that in these ethnographies representative of the Realist genre, the Platonic dialogue as composed in the "Meno" influences text as much as ethnology's field methods do. Moreover, it seems that textual authority in ethnography is much more than the realist trope emphasizing the ethnographer's actual presence within the studied culture. Instead, Realist ethnographies appear to be reapplications of Plato's Socrates on two levels. First, the ethnographer, in order to develop textual authority must rely on the same dominative rhetoric Plato establishes in his dialogues. Without it, the distinction between the ethnographer and the studied culture cannot be established, the direction of the monologue may not be controlled, and the ethnographer may not become the single guide capable of leading the reader to truth. Moreover, without Plato's guiding finger, the ethnographer is left without a line of causal reasoning or a means of using theory to manipulate the studied culture. On the second level, the ethnographer must replace Plato as the wielder of the hegemonic finger, allowing its

target to become, like Socrates, the unknowing means to an end. The studied culture, therefore becomes the subject of a scripted sense of time and history. The ethnographer, through both applications of Plato's relationship with his Socrates, thus "authorizes" both the studied cultures and the ethnographer's own statements and descriptions.

Nonetheless, ethnographers have realized that problems exist in ethnographies in the Realist genre such as the ones described above. Although none have traced thoroughly the source of these problems to Plato's dialogues, difficulties with ethnographic form have led to discussions of and experiments with various aspects of the dialogue. James Clifford, for example, notes that

> to say that an ethnography is composed of discourses and that its different components are dialogically related, is not to say that its textual form should be that of a literal dialogue. Indeed . . . a third participant . . . must function as mediator in any encounter between two individuals. The fictional dialogue, is, in fact, a condensation, a simplified representation of complex, multi-vocalic processes. An alternative way of representing this discursive complexity is to understand the overall course of the research as an ongoing

negotiation.[187]

The next two chapters of this study will examine ethnogra-
phers' attempts to portray this sense of "negotiation" and
its effects on textual authority.

Notes

[1] Jasper Neel, <u>Plato, Derrida, and Writing</u>
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988) 36.

[2] See, for example, Victor Turner's observations in
"Dramatic Ritual/Ritual Drama," <u>A Crack in the Mirror:
Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology</u> ed. Jay
Ruby (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1982) 83-97;
Dennis Tedlock's observations in "Anthropological
Hermeneutics and the Problem of Alphabetic Literacy,"
<u>A Crack in the Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in
Anthropology</u> ed. Jay Ruby (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania
P, 1982) 149-61; James Clifford's observations in "On
Ethnographic Allegory," <u>Writing Culture: The Poetics
and Politics of Ethnography</u> eds. James Clifford and
George E. Marcus (Berkeley: U of California P, 1986)
98-121; and Stephen A. Tyler's observations in
"Post-Modern Ethnography: From Document of the Occult
to Occult Document" <u>Writing Culture: The Poetics
and Politics of Ethnography</u> eds. James Clifford and
George E. Marcus (Berkeley: U of California P, 1986)
122-40.

[3] Jacques Derrida, <u>Writing and Difference</u> trans.
Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 279.

[4] Plato, "Meno," <u>The Collected Dialogues of
Plato</u> eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans.
W.K.C. Guthrie (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969) 353-384.

[5] Plato, "Meno" 74.

[6] Plato, "Meno" 72c.

[7] Plato, "Meno" 80.

[8] Plato, "Meno" 80.

[9] Plato, "Meno" 99b.

[10] Plato, "Meno" 85c.

[11] Plato, "Meno" 98.

[12] Norman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962) 15.

[13] Plato, "Meno" 84d.

[14] Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987) 9.

[15] Neel 13.

[16] Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 3.

[17] Steven Webster, "Realism and Reification in the Ethnographic Genre," Critique of Anthropology 6.1 (1986): 57.

[18] Plato, "Meno" 70b.

[19] Plato, "Meno" 70e.

[20] Plato, "Meno" 70d.

[21] Plato, "Meno" 70c.

[22] Plato, "Meno" 70c-71.

[23] Plato, "Meno" 74b.

[24] Plato, "Meno" 72b-d.

[25] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri

Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974) 158.

[26] Jacques Derrida, _Positions_ trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) 56-59.

[27] Said 2-3.

[28] Ernesto Grassi, "Marxism, Humanism, and the Problem of Imagination in Vico's Works," _Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity_ eds. Georgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Verene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976) 285.

[29] Derek Freeman, _Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth_ (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1984) 292.

[30] Edward W. Said, _The World, the Text, and the Critic_ (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 19.

[31] Said, _The World, the Text, and the Critic_ 200.

[32] Bronislaw Malinowski, _Sex and Repression in Savage Society_ (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1927) 116.

[33] Malinowski 6.

[34] Malinowski 7.

[35] James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority" _Representations_ 1.2 (1983) 118; 123-24.

[36] Malinowski 14.

[37] Malinowski 14.

[38] Malinowski 14.

[39] Malinowski 14-15.

[40] Malinowski 16-17.

[41] Malinowski 33.

[42] Malinowski 38-39.

[43] Malinowski 37-38.

[44] Malinowski 70.

[45] Malinowski 77.

[46] Said 86.

[47] Malinowski 81-82.

[48] Malinowski 83.

[49] Malinowski 95.

[50] Malinowski 95-96.

[51] Malinowski 96.

[52] Malinowski 97.

[53] Malinowski 105.

[54] Malinowski 106-107.

[55] Malinowski 109.

[56] Malinowski 120.

[57] Malinowski 120-121.

[58] Malinowski 121.

[59] Plato, "Meno" 96c.

[60] Plato, "Meno" 100.

[61] Ernesto Grassi, <u>Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition</u> (University Park: The Pennsylvania UP, 1980) 69.

[62] Grassi, <u>Rhetoric</u> 70.

[63] Harold Bloom, <u>The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry</u> (New York: Oxford UP, 1973) 62.

[64] Derrida, <u>Post Card</u> 22.

[65] Anthony F.C. Wallace, <u>The Death and Rebirth</u>

of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1972) vii.

[66] Wallace vii.

[67] Plato, "Phaedo," The Collected Dialogues of
Plato eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans.
Hugh Tredennick (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969) 100.

[68] Gulley 40.

[69] Wallace 3.

[70] Wallace vii.

[71] Wallace 8.

[72] Wallace 17-18.

[73] Wallace 3.

[74] Wallace 25.

[75] Wallace 25.

[76] Wallace 26.

[77] Wallace 29.

[78] Wallace 30.

[79] Wallace 36.

[80] Wallace 37-38.

[81] Wallace 38.

[82] Wallace 39.

[83] Wallace 41.

[84] Wallace 41.

[85] Wallace 45.

[86] Wallace 50.

[87] Wallace 51-52.

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[98] Wallace 111.

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[110] Wallace 202.

[111] Wallace 208.

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[113] Wallace 215-16.

[114] Wallace 222.

[115] Wallace 236.

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117 Wallace vii.

118 Plato, "Meno" 85e.

119 Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic 47.

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121 Wallace 239.

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123 Wallace 263.

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126 Wallace 292.

127 Wallace 303.

128 Wallace 308.

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130 Marjorie R. Esman, Henderson, Louisiana: Cultural Adaptation in a Cajun Community (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985) 2.

131 Esman 127.

132 Esman 1-2.

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138 Esman 9.

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142 Said, _Orientalism_ 32.

143 Esman 39.

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148 Esman 6.

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[186] Esman 125.

[187] Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority" 135.

CHAPTER III

PLATO, TEXTUAL AUTHORITY, AND
INTERPRETIVE/TRANSLATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY

". . . p. a father smaller than his son or disciple, it
happens, p., unless it is S., whom he resembles, devilish-
ly, shows him (to others) and at the same time shows him
the way, sends him, and at the same time apostrophizes
him, which always amounts to saying 'go' or
'come.' . . ."[1]

As indicated in the previous chapter, writers of
ethnographies in the Realist genre, in their attempts to
textualize a sense of authority, appear to reapply Plato's
use of manipulative strategies to portray his Socrates as
the singular guide to truth. Nonetheless, ethnographers
have acknowledged some of the problems inherent in compos-
ing realistic descriptions of cultures.[2]

One result of these and other critiques of realist
ethnography was an attempt by ethnographers to solve the
problems by changing the forms and styles chosen by eth-
nographers. One of these "experiments" is the Interpre-
tive/Translative approach to composing, in which the
authors recall cultural practices so that examination of
both the studied culture and the ethnographers' systems of
knowledge may be accomplished. Such an approach to

"writing" culture has been heralded on the basis that it allows ethnographers, like readers of literary texts, to "read" cultures as systems of symbols. On the other hand, the Interpretive/Translative approach to writing ethnography has been condemned for perpetuating the problems afflicting realist ethnographies.[3]

For the purposes of this study, however, the success of the Interpretive/Translative genre's movement away from the Realist perspective lies only in the possibility that such a move parallels a shift away from Plato's dominating, authoritative ability to deliver such commands as "go" or "come" to his Socrates. More specifically, the question addressed in this chapter is whether the Interpretive/ Translative genre of ethnographies represents a fundamental move away from realist ethnographers' reliance on Plato's techniques for rhetorically creating textual authority. An examination of Plato's "Phaedo" and an application of the results of that examination to Clifford Geertz's The Religion of Java may provide a hypothetical answer to this question. Subsequent analyses of David M. Schneider's American Kinship: A Cultural Account and Vinigi L. Grottanelli's The Python Killer: Stories of Nzema Life, texts which acknowledge their dependence on the model established by Geertz, should test the strength of this answer.

Section I

In the "Phaedo," Plato's Socrates again frames a dialogue concerning the immortality of the soul. And, as he did in the "Meno," Plato's Socrates uses this frame as a means of treating another concern: presenting again a monologue disguised as a dialogue. Within this "dialogue," Plato associates philosophy with the human soul, thereby splitting again the soul and the body, and recognizes that knowledge must also be associated with the soul. This structure, however, is positioned within yet a larger "dialogue" created by the conversation between Phaedo and Echecrates concerning the execution of Socrates. In other words, Echecrates, like the reader, is given an after-the-fact interpretation/translation of Socrates's pronouncements concerning philosophy, knowledge, the human soul, and the body. More importantly, unlike Echecrates, the reader is given a portrait of Plato as a man whose controlling finger directs from a distance not only his character of Socrates but also the character of Echecrates. This distancing is illuminated by Phaedo's statement that "Plato was ill" and was therefore not in attendance at Socrates's execution.[4] Thus, the reader of Plato's dialogue is reliant upon the machinations of a narrator hidden behind the veils created by artificial personae and a textual form selected for its ability to

allow Plato's Socrates to say, "I am saying [writing] all
this because I want you to share [accept or be controlled
by] my point of view."[5]

Plato's external "dialogue" begins with Echecrates's
asking Phaedo if he was with Socrates at the time of his
execution or if Phaedo had only secondhand knowledge of
the event. Phaedo's affirmation of his presence at the
event is important for at least three reasons. First, it
allows Plato's Phaedo a means of controlling the direction
of the dialogue through his having been present at the
proceedings and therefore as a possessor of the truth of
what occurred. It is only through Phaedo's recollections
and interpretations that the truth of the occasions sur-
rounding the execution can be established and Echecrates's
request concerning the "actual circumstances" of So-
crates's death be fulfilled. In other words, only Plato's
Phaedo can provide the answers to any questions. Second,
Plato's Phaedo's claim of "being there" reinforces the
differing natures of Phaedo's and Echecrates's feelings of
ignorance. Echecrates's ignorance of the execution is
inferior, for he asks, "But what about the actual circum-
stances of his death, Phaedo? What was said and done, and
which of the master's companions were with him? Or did
the authorities refuse them admission, so that he passed
away without a friend at his side?"[6] His questions, in
other words, are prompted by the bodily senses. As a

result, like Meno in the earlier dialogue, Echecrates is
helpless; only Plato's Phaedo can guide Echecrates to
knowledge. Thus, Phaedo's ignorance is one designed to
underscore his position as the singular guide. Phaedo
observes objectively his perception of the execution:

> . . . my own feelings at the time were quite
> extraordinary. It never occurred to me to feel
> sorry for him, as you might have expected me to
> feel at the deathbed of a very dear friend. I
> could not help feeling that even on his way to
> the other world he would be under the providence
> of God and that when he arrived there all would
> be well with him, if it ever has been so with
> anybody. So I felt no sorrow at all, as you
> might have expected on such a solemn occasion,
> and at the same time I felt no pleasure at being
> occupied in our usual philosophical dis-
> cussions. . . . I felt an absolutely incompre-
> hensible emotion, a sort of curious blend of
> pleasure and pain combined. . . .[7]

Because Plato's Phaedo is a student of Plato's Socrates,
he knows the ultimate destination of the philosopher's
soul. In addition, because he is this disciple, he knows
of the relationship of the emotions with the body. He is,
therefore, the only guide capable of showing Echecrates
the problems with his questions: they are not the

questions of a philosopher. Moreover, because both are the
creations of Plato, Plato knows the ultimate destination
of the "dialogue." Pleasure and pain, opposing concepts,
form the methodological starting points from which both
Plato's Phaedo and Plato's Socrates establish truth.
Thus, Plato designates both Echecrates's and the reader's
positions as susceptible to manipulation; only through
Plato's Phaedo can the truth regarding Plato's Socrates's
final meeting with his disciples be attained. Third, once
this position of ignorance is acknowledged by Echecrates's
acceptance of Phaedo's presence at the execution and of
his ability to function as guide, the path to the interior
"dialogue" is cleared. Thus, Plato's Socrates's arguments
concerning the immortal nature of the soul, its relation-
ship with knowledge, and through the association of the
body with sensuals, the separation of body and soul are
brought to bear in a fashion that manipulates Echecrates's
and the reader's acceptance of Plato's Phaedo's and
Plato's Socrates's sense of Truth. Both parties, Eche-
crates and the reader, must then agree, as did Meno earli-
er, "it is [was] as you say."

The interior "dialogue" between Plato's Socrates and
his friends and disciples on the day of his death reestab-
lishes and enlarges the method of acquiring knowledge
developed in the "Meno." Through Plato's Phaedo's narra-
tion, Plato's Socrates poses a set of questions designed

to lead to the separation between body and soul, between desire, pleasure, and the senses and reason and thought. Plato's Socrates begins by asking, "Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?"[8] As in the "Meno," an ethnocentric "tether" develops from this initial question and leads into a causal line of reasoning. Plato, however, makes it clear that the study of death through sensorally obtained information is misguided at best and potentially damaging to the soul. This warrant underlies the split between the soul and the body and becomes overt when Plato's Phaedo tells Echecrates that Plato's Socrates had to "guard against the same sort of risk which people run when they watch and study an eclipse of the sun; they really do sometimes injure their eyes. . . ."[9] Instead, knowledge may only be obtained through a syllogistic examination of a conclusion in order to find the premises needed to support that conclusion: "I am assuming the existence of absolute beauty and goodness . . . [in order] to explain causation to you, and to find a proof that the soul is immortal."[10] The form that this syllogistic investigation takes is one of oppositions which, when seen as the linguistic products of a proposition, lead to the premises needed to support that concluding proposition. For example, Plato's Socrates opposes the terms "oddness" and "evenness" as linguistic symbols of the concluding proposition that the soul is immortal. Further

exploration of these symbols leads Plato's Socrates's audience, including Echecrates, to the premise needed to support the conclusion--namely "any things which, though not themselves opposites, always have opposites in them, [and] similarly do not admit the opposite form to that which is in them, but on its approach either cease to exist or retire before it."[11] In other words, while the body and soul are no more opposites than the odd and even numbers, their linguistic symbols imply an opposition which causes those symbols to reflect the chasm which divides them. Thus, since the body is represented by the linguistic symbol "mortal," the soul must be represented by the opposing linguistic symbol "immortal." In light of this explanation, Cebes, a cohort of Plato's Phaedo who is also attending Plato's Socrates, responds that the soul's immortality, as well as Plato's authority, has been proven "most completely."[12] Thus, Plato's Socrates leads his audience in the "Phaedo" to see that

> true philosophers make dying their profession,
> and that to them of all men death is least alarm-
> ing. Look at it in this way. If they are thor-
> oughly dissatisfied with the body, and long to
> have their souls independent of it, when this
> happens would it not be entirely unreasonable to
> be frightened and distressed? Would they not
> naturally be glad to set out for the place where

there is a prospect of attaining the object of
their lifelong desire--which is wisdom--and of
escaping from an unwelcome association?[13]

Moreover, as he did in the "Meno," in the interior
"dialogue," Plato's Socrates manipulates every sense of
both his attendants' and the reader's approach to Truth.
As the practitioner of philosophy, the "greatest of the
arts,"[14] Plato's Socrates sets himself, and thus Plato, as
the model philosopher, the single guide capable of discov-
ering Truth. He can thus claim that a "true philosopher,"
knowing the body to be a hindrance and knowing the rela-
tionship between the soul and knowledge, is "the man who
pursues the truth by applying his pure and unadulterated
thought to the pure and unadulterated object, cutting
himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and
virtually all the rest of his body."[15] As a result,
Simmias, the temporary spokesperson for the attendants,
and the reader must accept Plato's Socrates's conclusion:
". . . if you see anyone distressed at the prospect of
dying . . . it will be proof enough that he is a lover not
of wisdom but of the body."[16] Accepting the warrant that
Plato's Socrates is the "lover of wisdom" and is, there-
fore, the single guide capable of discovering the truth
leads to Simmias's and the reader's echo of Meno: "Yes,
you [Plato's Socrates] are quite right."[17] This echo, as
it did in the "Meno," reverberates throughout the rest of

the "Phaedo."

Of equal importance to Plato's manipulative stance in the "Phaedo" is his definition of Reality, for it is this definition that characterizes the nature of Plato's Socrates's method of attaining knowledge. According to Plato's Socrates, it is only through "the course of reflection . . . that the soul gets a clear view of facts."[18] In other words, Reality has nothing to do with "distractions such as hearing or sight or pain or plaesure [sic]."[19] Instead, Reality is the moral (in the sense that the body, because of its reliance on the senses is immoral) "nature of any given thing"[20] attainable by the soul through its inquiry. "Goodness," as a result, becomes a quality of the method of the soul's inquiry. Authority, then, derives from a soul's ability to apply the method of Plato's Socrates, for the only "good" inquiry is the one which hegemonically objectivizes a "thing" in order to discover its reality.

Norman Gulley describes the knowledge attained through Plato's method as the knowledge of the "world of Forms": "'goodness' is constituted by the systematic order of the world of Forms, and . . . the 'goodness' of the order of the physical world is derivative from this."[21] The implication of this definition of Reality, goodness, authority, and method for ethnographers will be discussed later. For now, however, the importance of these definitions is that

they allow Plato's method to be applied generally; nothing is outside of its realm of applicability.

The figures of Plato's Socrates and Phaedo themselves are as important to the dominative rhetoric in the "Phaedo" as Plato's Socrates is to the dominative rhetoric in the "Meno." Both are creations of Plato and as such are as manipulated and placed in as helpless of positions as those occupied by Echecrates, Simmias, and the reader. In terms of the portrait discovered in the Bodleian library described by Jacques Derrida and explained in the previous chapter of this study, Plato's commanding finger dominates their _ethos_ and _logos_, for by planting them in his controlled environment, Plato secures his control of the dialogues and further establishes his singular ability to guide one and all to Truth through plausible arguments and causal reasoning.

This initial analysis of the "Phaedo" provides a starting point for examining the Platonic dialogue's continuing influence on ethnography in general and on the Interpretive/Translative genre of ethnography in particular. If this genre's texts reveal the same ideological and hegemonic aspects identified thus far in the "Phaedo," Derrida's portrait of Plato's relationship with Socrates, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, becomes an image of Interpretive/Translative ethnographers in at least three ways. First, Plato becomes representative of

the ethnographer using various agendas to "designate" and script rhetorically a translation or interpretation of the Socrates-like objects of study. Second, the figures of Socrates and Phaedo as the receivers of Plato's commands become representative of the ethnographer whose scripting process is rhetorically determined by Plato. Third, the figures of Plato and Socrates in Derrida's discovered portrayal become representative of the intertextual rela-tionships between ethnographers. Thus, they gain authori-tative power through evoking a dominative rhetoric whose roots run through preceding texts to their source in the Platonic dialogue. An analysis of Clifford Geertz's <u>The Religion of Java</u>, a text typical of the Interpretive/ Translative genre, will further indicate these ethnogra-phers' reliance on the Platonic model and clarify the intertextual relationship between the Realist and In-terpretive/Translative genres.

Section II

". . . writing is a repetition of Platonism, which is nothing more than the reinhabiting of an already existing structure."[22]

If Clifford Geertz "reinhabits" Plato's dialogically hidden monologue in <u>The Religion of Java</u>, then

similarities between the texts should become apparent.
Examining Geertz's "Introduction" shows that like Plato,
Geertz uses several frames to shape and control his text.
The first of these is the structure comprised of the
"dialogue" between ethnographer and reader, a form Geertz
uses to distance himself from the text. Described in
terms of "good ethnographic reporting," Geertz's reader is
thus placed in the same subordinate position as Plato's
Echecrates:

> . . . one of the characteristics of good ethno-
> graphic reporting . . . is that the ethnographer
> is able to get out of the way of his data, to
> make himself translucent so that the reader can
> see for himself something of what the facts look
> like and so judge the ethnographer's summaries
> and generalizations in terms of the ethnogra-
> pher's actual perceptions.[23]

By emphasizing his "translucence," Geertz removes himself
from consideration and directs the reader's concentration
to the "data" to be presented in the following sections,
just as Plato uses Phaedo's listing of Socrates's attend-
ants[24] to displace himself and to direct both Echecrates
and the reader to Plato's Phaedo's subsequent interpreta-
tion of Socrates's statements. Just as Socrates's pro-
nouncements are enscripted by Plato, then, Geertz's de-
scriptions are of Geertz's structures; as a result, the

reader, like Echecrates, is given after-the-fact interpre-
tations/translations by a figure whose pen directs not
only the character of the persona in the text but also the
character of Javanese culture. Geertz's request that the
reader "judge the ethnographer's summaries and generaliza-
tions in terms of the ethnographer's actual perceptions,"
therefore, sounds like Plato's Socrates when he tells
Cebes and Simmias,

> [my account] is still open to a number of doubts
> and objections. . . . If it is something else
> that you two are considering, never mind, but if
> you feel any difficulty about our discussion,
> don't hesitate to put forward your own views, and
> point out any way in which you think that my
> account could be improved. And by all means make
> use of my services too, if you think I can help
> at all to solve the difficulty.[25]

Moreover, examining Geertz's "Introduction" shows that
like Plato, Geertz uses a second interior "dialogue" in
which Java's culture is depicted as a series of structures
whose linguistic symbols create oppositions that, when
examined syllogistically, lead to premises supporting his
actual concern: defining ethnography as a method of han-
dling the "symbolic dimensions of social action . . .
[in order to] make available to us answers that
others . . . have given, and thus to include them in the

consultable record of what man has said,"[26] in order to further substantiate the theory that "religion does not play only an integrative, socially harmonizing role in society but also a divisive one, thus reflecting the balance between integrative and disintegrative forces which exist in any social system."[27] Like Plato, then, Geertz creates a narrative which, through examinations of the symbolic oppositions deriving from such narrower structures as Javanese social classes and the workings of religion within these classes, leads into a causal line of reasoning. This causal line, in turn, reveals the truth of both Geertz's definition of ethnography and his theory of religion.

Hypothetically, Geertz's text thus appears to take on the textualized authority of Plato's dialogue through Geertz's inheritance of the relations depicted in Derrida's "portrait." Harold Bloom describes this process of entitlement as part of intellectual revisionism: ". . . revisionism follows received doctrine along to a certain point, and then deviates, insisting that a wrong direction was taken at just that point, and no other."[28] In other words, if Geertz acquires Plato's textual authority, he does so through "reinhabiting" the Platonic textual legacy he receives from realist ethnographers, for the "wrong direction" realist ethnography chose lies along a path marked by the positivist signs of an "experimental science

in search of law,"[29] not by ethnography's use of Plato's textual methods. Thus, as an heir to Bronislaw Malinow- ski, Geertz would fill both of the positions highlighted in the portrait of Socrates and Plato; Geertz would be both commanded and commanding, for Plato would dominate his _ethos_ and _logos_ as much as Geertz would dominate the Javanese. The text resulting from this sense of being dominated and being dominant would be a set of structured portraits whose linguistic symbols of opposition can be syllogistically examined. The results of this examination would be premises linked by a transcendent rhetoric to a proposition rhetorically imbued with a sense of truth. Textual authority, therefore, would be created through the formation of a rhetorical path to the "correct" view of reality.

Geertz begins developing this rhetorical path by creating a set of structures that form an initial means of perceiving Javanese culture:

> . . . five major occupational types--farmer, petty trader, independent artisan, manual labor- er, and white-collar clerk, teacher, or adminis- trator--represent the Javanese population of Modjokuto . . . [and yield] three main cultural types which reflect the moral organization of Javanese culture as it is manifested in Modjoku- to, the general ideas of order in terms of which

the Javanese farmer, laborer, artisan, trader, or
clerk shapes his behavior in all areas of
life. These are the <u>abangan</u>, <u>santri</u>, and <u>pri-
jaji</u>.[30]

Moreover, by stating that his purpose is to "bring home
the reality of the complexity, depth and richness of [the
Javanese] spiritual life,"[31] Geertz ties together the two
frames of the "dialogue" between ethnographer and reader
and the depiction of Java as a series of structures. More
importantly, Geertz's statement lends credence to the
hypothesis that he is a holder of Socrates's chair. For
just as Plato uses Echecrates's desire for Phaedo to tell
him (Echecrates) "all about it from the very beginning,"[32]
Geertz uses the reader's desire for a "bringing home," a
translation, of the exotic Javanese as a means of bridging
the gap between his dialogical frames. The structural
arrangement of the text is thus set; like Plato's Phaedo's
reconstruction of Plato's Socrates's arguments, in which
the reader comes to acknowledge Plato's truth concerning
the relationship between knowledge and the soul, through
Geertz's reconstruction of Geertz's descriptions and field
notes, the reader comes to acknowledge Geertz's truth
concerning the relationship between interpretations of
cultural symbol systems and ethnographic theory.

Norman Gulley notes that three assumptions underlie
Plato's theory of knowledge as it is revealed in the

linguistic symbols of opposition derived from the structures comprising the "Phaedo:" "(i) that non-sensible Forms exist: (ii) that sensible instances of Forms are imperfect 'copies' of Forms: (iii) that these instances, in virtue of their resemblance to Forms, are able to act as 'reminders' of Forms."[33] What Gulley does not describe is the process by which these assumptions are developed. According to the text of the "Phaedo," the first assumption derives itself from Simmias's agreement with Socrates's claim that "a person on seeing or hearing or otherwise noticing one thing not only becomes conscious of that thing but also thinks of a something else which is an object of a different sort of knowledge."[34] The second and third assumptions are put in others' mouths in similar fashions. Assumption two's birth lies in Simmias's agreement with Socrates's statement that "this thing which I can see has a tendency to be like something else, but it falls short and cannot be really like it, only a poor imitation."[35] Assumption three takes its life from Simmias's agreement with Socrates's conclusion that "we refer, as copies to their patterns, all the objects of our physical perception [to these Forms]."[36] The text, however, is misleading, for what Plato accomplishes is nothing less than a sleight of hand (pen) trick: he replaces his own monologue with dialogues that displace him as the source of Gulley's assumptions and that substitute three

personae who function both as shields to ward off competing arguments and, through the silence surrounding Socrates's solitary position of philosopher, Phaedo's solitary position of interpreter/translator for Echecrates's query, and Echecrates's solitary position of ignorance, as a means of controlling the direction of the text.

Similarly, three assumptions underlie Geertz's theory of the power of cultural symbols derived from portrayals of cultural structures as revelatory mechanisms of the integrative and disintegrative nature of religion. The first of these assumptions is that the Javanese "village religious system commonly consists of a balanced integration of animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements."[37] The second assumption is that this abangan portion of society represents "a stress on the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism . . . [the] santri [represents] a stress on the Islamic aspects of the syncretism . . . [and the] prijaji [represents] the Hinduist aspects."[38] The third assumption is that the first two assumptions assure the reader that the perceptions to be described are Javanese perceptions. Thus the reader can see "how variation in ritual, contrast in belief, and conflict in values lie concealed behind the simple statement that Java is more that 90 per cent Moslem."[39] Parts One through Three of the text focus, therefore, on revealing the truth of the first two of these warrants,

while Part Four's conclusions, although essentially reli-
ant on the truth of the third assumption, depend also on
the maintained force of the warrants of the arguments
created in Parts One through Three. In other words,
Geertz recreates in his text the same disposition that
structures the "Phaedo." He, like Plato, replaces his own
monologue with a dialogue that displaces him as the source
of the directing assumptions and that substitutes two
personae--the observant ethnographer and the willing
Javanese--who function both as shields to ward off compet-
ing arguments and, through the silence surrounding
Geertz's ethnographer's solitary position of cultural
interpreter/translator for the reader's queries and the
Javanese's solitary position as the object of inquiry, as
means of controlling the direction of the text.

As a result, Geertz's text inherits a further charac-
teristic of the Platonic text. Jasper Neel describes
Plato's writing as text that "would have us believe that
no one is in control, that it is a disinterested movement
toward truth set in operation and kept in motion by the
power of dialectic as exercised by the superior philoso-
pher, Socrates."[40] Geertz's text similarly moves the
reader "toward truth." As did Plato before him, Geertz
removes himself from the text, thereby focusing the
reader's attention on the "disinterested" dialectic
created by his Socrates-like persona and directed at the

objectivized Javanese. The result for both men is a translative voice disguised as several voices. Edward W. Said describes the intent of this voice as dominative, for its producer's existence is based solely on its "constitutive will-to-power over the Orient":

> For decades the Orientalists had spoken about the Orient, they had translated texts, they had explained civilizations, religions, dynasties, cultures, mentalities--as academic objects. . . . The Orientalist was an expert . . . whose job in society was to interpret the Orient for his compatriots . . . [by] standing before a distant, barely intelligible civilization or cultural monument [and reducing] the obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly grasping the hard-to-reach object . . . [through] metaphors of depth, secrecy, and sexual promise . . . [in order to make effective] academic Orientalism.[41]

More specifically, the result is a textual authority whose hegemonic power of interpretation is strengthened by the ideological certainty of its ability to translate objects into truth (Forms).

This initial analysis thus supports the hypothesis that Geertz's text is a "reinhabiting" of Plato's methods and his descriptions of the authoritative philosopher.

Part One of Geertz's text, "The 'Abangan' Variant," further reveals the extent to which Geertz relies on Plato's oppositional methodology. Geertz begins by establishing the Javanese slametan as a structure whose symbols of opposition may be syllogistically examined:

> In Modjokuto the slametan forms a kind of social universal joint, fitting the various aspects of social life and individual experience together in a way which minimizes uncertainty, tension, and conflict--or at least it is supposed to do so. The altered form of twentieth-century urban and suburban life in Java makes it rather less efficient as an integrating mechanism and rather less satisfying as a religious experience for many people . . . .[42]

Geertz's metaphorical "social universal joint," in other words, functions as a Grassian archai, for without its primary character, Geertz's text could not "comport" itself. Moreover, the language of the metaphor itself suggests Grassi's belief that apodictic, or demonstrative, language is the "indicative . . . framework within which the proof [of the archai] can come into existence."[43] As a result, the remainder of Geertz's definition becomes an explanation of its archai, or cause; for it "constitutes a process which [has] a temporal nature, for as something that has happened it is a historical phenomenon which has

passed through different moments of time."[44]   More specifi-
cally, Geertz's description of the twentieth-century
<u>slametan</u> as "less efficient as an integrating mechanism
and rather less satisfying as a religious experience"
creates both the framework for Geertz's subsequent objec-
tivization of the Javanese as they are used to create
temporal proof for the authority of Geertz's <u>archai</u> and
his position as the receiver of Plato's commanding finger;
the rules dictating the interpretation of the Javanese's
symbols of opposition are the same rules created by Plato
when he defines the philosopher in terms of his own image:

> A philosopher's soul will take the view which I
> have described. It will not first expect to be
> set free by philosophy, and then allow pleasure
> and pain to reduce it once more to bondage. . . .
> No, this soul secures immunity from its desires
> by following reason and abiding always in her
> company, and by contemplating the true and divine
> and unconjecturable, and drawing inspiration from
> it, because such a soul believes that this is the
> right way to live while life endures, and that
> after death it reaches a place which is kindred
> and similar to its own nature. . . .[45]

As a result, the meaning of the <u>slametan</u> develops through
the Platonic causal "tether." Just as Plato's Socrates
provides structures through the mouth of Plato's Phaedo

whose symbolic oppositions lead to premises supporting the
proposition that as a philosopher, Socrates must look
forward to death, Geertz, the revisionist heir of realist
ethnography, provides as structures for the tether narra-
tive segments from informants whose symbolic oppositions
lead to the premises supporting the proposition (archai)
of the "social universal joint." Slametans are given for
two reasons: "'When you give a slametan, nobody feels any
different from anyone else and so they don't want to split
up. Also a slametan protects you against the spirits, so
they will not upset you.'"[46] The result for both Plato
and Geertz is thus the same. Plato's Echecrates wants
more structures that generate further symbolic opposi-
tions: "What I really need now is another proof. . . .
Tell me, how did Socrates pick up the trail again?"[47]
Geertz's reader, seeing the causal relationship between
the "social universal joint," the feelings of social
equality and spiritual protection derived from the "uni-
versal joint," and the potential for problems caused by
the twentieth century's "altered form," has the same
desire. And where Plato's Echecrates's question forms the
pathway by which Plato may approach the oppositional
symbols of the good and bad in the human soul, Geertz's
conclusion that the "abangan . . . personifies the
possibility of unforeseen bad fortune in terms of spirit
beliefs and attempts to deal with the spirits by means of

the slametan"[48] leads the reader to his next set of propo-
sitions--abangan spirit beliefs.

Geertz's treatment of abangan spirit beliefs focuses
on defining memedi, lelembut, and tujul spirits as a realm
in which there is "general agreement on the reality and
importance of supernatural beings"[49] and as a realm of
disagreement and potential problems in that "each individ-
ual seems to have some ideas of his own as to their [the
spirits'] exact nature."[50] Moreover, these spirits are
further defined as "a set of concrete, specific, rather
sharply defined discrete images--unconnected visual meta-
phors giving form to vague and otherwise incomprehensible
experiences."[51] These definitions thus propel the spirits
into a position dominated by Geertz's proposition de-
scribed in terms of the "social universal joint." The
abangan "general agreement" on the spirits provides the
symbols representing a socially cohesive effect, while the
"individual ideas" and the "visual metaphors" provide the
symbolic possibility of problems stemming from competing
interpretations of the spirits' natures and needs.

Geertz first divides the spirits into three catego-
ries: spirits that frighten, spirits that may possess
humans, and spirits that may be used as tools. The first
of these, the memedis, are "almost exactly equivalent to
our 'spooks'. . . . [to the extent that] some show signs
of having been borrowed from European sources."[52] These

include the skeleton, the sheet-covered ghost, and the
ever-present, mysterious shadow. Others, more Indonesian
in nature, include the spirit "whose head is where his
genitals should be and who walks on his hands, breathing
fire,"[53] the ghostly prostitute who entices men to their
own castration, and the playful gendruwos, who "enjoy
playing practical jokes on people . . . [but should not
be] trifled with, and one should not even talk about
them--although everyone does--for they may overhear and
become annoyed."[54] The second group, spirits that may
possess people, may cause mental or physical illnesses
which can result in death. As an example of this type of
spirit, Geertz provides anecdotally the story of a worker
who, while cutting bamboo, accidentally broke
an invisible earthenware pot owned by one of the
spirits. . . . Some of the spirits who were living there
and who were santris (Moslems) had a big prayer house to
say their prayers in; and the earthenware pot was one of
those large pots the santris use to wash their feet and
hands in before they pray. The breaking of their pot made
the santri spirits very angry, and they gave one of the
workmen a crack on the back of the head. He felt the blow
and immediately went home, but by the time he arrived
there he was crazy, raving on and on in a meaningless
manner.[55]

Finally, the third group of spirits Geertz describes

are the _tujuls_, spirits whose powers help their human
owners accomplish specific goals. Ownership of these
spirits places the possessor in a specific social class,
for according to Geertz, these people

> are always rich, often having become so quite
>
> suddenly, and usually but not always, they are
>
> misers; they wear old clothes, bathe in the river
>
> with the poverty-stricken coolies, and eat corn
>
> and cassava--a poor man's dish--rather than rice,
>
> while all the time . . . their house is full of
>
> gold bars. Also, they seem to be deviant social-
>
> ly. They talk loudly, are aggressive, lack
>
> manners, are sloppy dressers, and have a quite
>
> unJavanese habit of blurting out at people just
>
> what is on their minds.[56]

In addition to the three major groups of spirits in
Java are large numbers of place spirits (_Demits_) and
guardian spirits (_Danjangs_). According to Geertz, the
demits symbolize a creation myth that is really a "coloni-
zation myth" in which the _demits_ present a story of "an
incoming flow of migrants pushing back the harmful spirits
into the mountains, uncultivated wild places, and the
Indian Ocean as they move from the north coast to the
south, all the while adopting some of the more helpful
ones as protectors of themselves and their new settle-
ments."[57] Like the _demits_, the _danjangs_ live in

specific locations and may be petitioned for aid. These
guardian spirits, however, are believed to be spirits of
actual historic figures who were buried, usually near the
centers of their villages. Thus their graves became holy
places, and the spirits continue to watch over their
villages' welfare.[58]

All of these spirits, Geertz says, "provide for those
who believe in their existence a set of ready-made answers
to the questions posed by puzzling experiences, symbolic
pictographs of the imagination within whose framework even
the anomalous seems inevitable."[59] In other words, the
world of the spirits symbolizes the world of the humans.
As Geertz notes, in the spirit world "prijaji spirits lord
it over abangan ones, Chinese spirits open stores and
exploit the natives, and santri spirits spend their time
in praying and thinking up ways to make things difficult
for unbelievers."[60] In a wider sense, these spirit be-
liefs enact the domination of culture over nature: "As
Javanese culture advances and the heavy tropical forest
turns into rice fields and house lands, the spirits re-
treat to the remaining woods, the volcano cones, and the
Indian Ocean.[61]

The effect of these symbolic relations on the abangan
individual's perceptions of his relationship with the
Javanese culture is important. Geertz concludes that as
this individual "becomes more civilized in the Javanese

pattern, he is less likely to be empty, confused, and disoriented, and thus prey to be entered by a spirit."[62] In this sense then, the _slametan_ symbolic oppositions, described earlier as representing a means of social equalization and a means of protection from spirits, represents a reassertion and reinforcement of the general cultural order and its power to hold back the forces of disorder:

> [It] states the values that animate traditional Javanese peasant culture. . . . And it is at . . . those points in Javanese life when the need for the statement of these values is greatest, when the spirits and the nonhuman disorder they represent are most threatening, that the _slametan_ tends to occur.[63]

Thus having led the reader to the exotic occurrence cycles of the _slametans_, Geertz treats these cycles in a manner similar to his treatment of spirits. He divides them into four categories: dilemmas of life, Moslem ceremonies, social functions, and irregular occurrences. Geertz uses the ceremonies as the structures generating symbols whose oppositions allow his use of the Javanese conception of time as a means of generating a premise supporting his proposition concerning the "social universal joint." According to Geertz, the basis of this notion of time lies in _tjotjog_: "To _tjotjog_ means to fit, as a key does in a lock. . . . In the broadest and most

abstract sense two separate items <u>tjotjog</u> when their coin-
cidence forms an aesthetic pattern."[64] In order to dis-
cover the most favorable pattern, the Javanese consult
<u>petungan</u> systems, processes of numerological divination.
These systems vary in complexity, and like the spirit
systems, they connote social success. Geertz observes
that these <u>petungans</u> were "the property of . . . special-
ist[s] . . . [and have] only lately . . . been diffused
among the common people. [Further,] . . . the possession
of a <u>petungan</u> system somewhat different from those of
one's neighbors and accounted superior to them . . . gives
one an edge over others in the business of
living. . . ."[65] In other words, knowing why, when, how,
and to which spirit to conduct a <u>slametan</u> enhances the
possibilities of social equality, spiritual protection,
and therefore social success.

The <u>slametans</u> thus form the structures whose symbols
of opposition are seen in the "the fussy, detailed little
gestures surrounding birth to the large, often rather
elaborate feasts and entertainments accompanying
circumcision and marriage to the muted, emotionally
constricted rituals of death,"[66] and they provide partici-
pants with the feelings associated with membership in an
understood world. As a result, the features of the
"gestures" become clad with a range of meanings for the
<u>slametan</u> partakers. Geertz provides, for example, a menu

for a <u>tingkeban</u> <u>slametan</u> held at the seventh month of
pregnancy of a first child and a brief description of the
food items' meanings:

> (1) A dish of rice for each guest with white rice
> on the top, yellow underneath. The white rice
> symbolizes purity, the yellow love. This should
> be served in a banana-leaf basket held together
> with a steel needle (kings and nobles are said to
> have used gold ones in the 'old days') so that
> the child will be strong and sharp of mind.
> (2) Rice mixed with grated coconut and a whole
> stuffed chicken. This is intended both to honor
> the Prophet Mohammad and to secure <u>slamet</u> for all
> the participants in the feast and for the unborn
> child. Usually there is included here an offer-
> ing to <u>Dewi</u> <u>Pertimah</u> (literally: 'The Hindu
> Goddess Fatimah'--i.e., Muhammad's daughter with
> a Hindu title!) of two bananas joined at the
> base.[67]

In addition, a variety of offerings are made to the
spirits, including "a miniature hair comb, another, finer-
type comb, a paper of pins, a tiny water jug of Mid-
Eastern type, various types of flowers, spices, and medic-
inal herbs from the garden, [and] an egg."[68] Moreover,
the foods and spirit gifts are accompanied by various
ceremonies and <u>djapa</u> (spells). Geertz provides the

following narrative which describes the process through which the expectant parents at a <u>tingkeban</u> are made divine:

> A tub of water strewn with flower petals is
> prepared, the water taken, theoretically, from
> seven different springs. It is said that it is
> in such a bath that gods and goddesses always
> bathe, and so the married couple are momentarily
> viewed as divine, and scoopfuls of this water are
> poured over them by the <u>dukun</u> . . . who chants a
> spell . . . :

>> In the name of God, the Merciful, the
>> Compassionate! My intention is to
>> bathe this husband and wife, I <u>tingkeb</u>
>> them with water from seven springs.
>> May all their descendants have well-
>> being from this day forward. This is
>> necessary because of Allah (may He be
>> exalted!). The creation of Allah.[69]

Geertz describes similarly circumcision (<u>Sunatan</u>) and marriage (<u>Kepanggihan</u>) <u>slametans</u>. The circumcision <u>slametan</u> is depicted as a repetition of the marriage <u>slametan</u> without "those elements pertaining to the actual joining of the couple."[70] In this fashion, the circumcision and marriage ceremonies are enscripted through a narrative emphasizing the symbolic oppositions in the foods, offerings, rituals, and spells. The objective of

the narrative is Geertz's conclusion concerning the social
and economic meanings of these slametans as they are
developed within the context of rukun (traditionalized
cooperation). Geertz defines this concept as a value that

> ties together a group not of oversocialized
> primitive communists but of rather self-contained
> peasant materialists with a clear realization of
> where their own interests lie; and it does
> so . . . by defining actual modes, means, and
> forms of specifically limited inter-individual
> cooperation within clearly defined social con-
> texts.[71]

The death slametans associated with funerals (lajatan)
illustrate this same value. Emphasizing the partici-
pants' "calm, undemonstrative, almost languid letting
go,"[72] Geertz explains that the abangan notions of a
contextualized social and economic equality buoyed by the
capacity for social success are further symbolized by
their belief in life after death. According to Geertz,
this belief is made up of sampurna, "which indicates . . .
that the individual personality completely disappears
after death and nothing is left of the person but dust"[73]
and reincarnation, "which explain[s] personal peculiari-
ties in their children and strange behavior on the part of
an odd animal now and then. . . ."[74]

Geertz's reliance here on Plato's causal method is

inescapable, for his use of the _slametan_ as a structure generating such symbols as foods, offerings, rituals, and spells mirrors Plato's initial description of causality. In the "Phaedo," having noted that it was in a book by Anaxagoras that he found "an authority on causation who was after [his] own heart,"[75], Plato's Socrates describes this concept of "causation" as a process of the mind: "mind in producing order sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it."[76] In other words, the importance of the _slametan_ lies not in the foods, offerings, rituals, and spells themselves but in the "orderly" meanings the mind makes of these "individual things." Geertz's use of these items as symbols, therefore, allows him to form the orderly symbolic meaning of economic and social success.

Plato's Socrates, however, concludes that for the true philosopher this process of causality is not enough:

> [Anaxagoras, however,] was just about as inconsistent as if someone were to say, The cause of everything that Socrates does is mind--and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the reason why I am lying here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews. . . . But to say that it is because of them that I do what I am doing, and not through choice of what is best--although my actions are

> controlled by mind--would be a very lax and
> inaccurate form of expression. So I decided that
> I must have recourse to theories, and use them in
> trying to discover the truth about things.[77]

In other words, Plato's Socrates resolves that causation
is not the product of the meaning of an object but is
instead that object's meaning's grounding in the opposi-
tional symbols of the "theory" which created it. Thus,
Plato's Socrates states that "the one thing that makes
[an] object beautiful is the presence in it or association
with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of
absolute beauty."[78] More specifically, only through the
examining syllogistically the oppositional symbols of
"ugliness" and "beauty" generated by an object can the
philosopher develop the premises needed to support the
Truth of "absolute beauty." Geertz's reliance on this
aspect of Plato's causation theory is as obvious as it is
on the earlier part of the theory, for he syllogistically
examines the opposed meanings of social and economic
success and failure to substantiate the premise that
religious ceremonies create "uncertainty, tension, and
conflict" as well as certainty, serenity, and peace. This
premise is vital to the Truth of the "social universal
joint."

In this fashion, both Plato and Geertz offer the
reader a means of attaining Truth; but it is a deceptive

truth, for it may only be approached by the philosopher. Since Plato's and Geertz's voices are the only voices heard in their dialogically hidden monologues, theirs are the philosophic voices. Thus, they are the single authorities capable of leading their readers through the textual method of seeing a structure as the source of oppositional symbols whose interpretations lead to premises supporting the "theory." Geertz, as an heir of Plato's methods, therefore takes both Plato's and Socrates's places in Derrida's portrait as the manipulator of and the receiver of the prodding finger through which the reader is provided with theories, concepts, and definitions.

Part Two of Geertz's text reveals the dominative force of his "social universal joint" as it was created in Part One, for the claims that present the _slametan_ as the structure generating the opposed symbols of social certainty and peace and social uncertainty and friction empower the claims that present the Islamic sense of doctrine as the structure generating symbols with the same meanings. More specifically, by depicting the Islamic _santri_ through the application of the same claims as were used to objectify the _abangan_, Geertz unleashes the power of his metaphorical theory to create a framework within which only his theory provides a sense of truth, a sense explained in Part Four. Thus, he forces the reader once again into the position of Plato's Echecrates: both must

acknowledge the truth of their guides' claims.

Feelings of social certainty and peace, according to Geertz, stem from the _santri_ perception of Islamic doctrine as the symbol of community, a perception which follows the lines of the _slametan_ as it is described in Part One. Geertz therefore describes the effects of these feelings as characterizing all aspects of _santri_ life, for this portion of Javanese society focuses its energies on the

> application of Islamic doctrine to life. The kinds of _santris_ vary from those whose difference from their _abangan_ neighbors seems to lie entirely in their insistence that they are true Moslems, while their neighbors are not, to those whose commitment to Islam dominates almost all of their life. But, for all, a concern for dogma has to some extent replaced a concern for ritual.[79]

As a result, the _santri_ are portrayed as dwellers in a world comprised of concentric circles moving outward from the individual and connected by Islamic doctrine; in short, the _santri_ are perfect examples for Geertz's "social universal joint" theory.

Geertz's application of his theory to the _santri_ of Java and his subsequent process of causation as the framework for his arguments begin with a short description of

Islam as a structure. According to Geertz, Islam is "a religion of ethical prophecy"[80] in which its adherents "live . . . not so much in the brilliant glare of religious innovation as in the half-light of doctrinal orthodoxy."[81] Brought to Indonesia by merchants from India, the religion established roots in the cities and towns "where continued contact with Hadhramaut Arabs, a developing merchant ethic, the growth of nationalism, and modernist influences from the Islamic reform movements of Egypt and India combined to produce . . . a living faith in Indonesia."[82] As a result, differences in religious attitudes, stemming from the differences in urban and rural attitudes and practices, began to separate abangans and santris. Whereas the abangans are "tolerant about religious beliefs . . . [and believe that if] one performs the correct passage rituals, one is not an animal,"[83] the santris are entrenched in their "self-declared religious superiority to the [abangans and focus their concerns on] the moral and social interpretations of [Islamic doctrine]."[84] Moreover, where abangan ritual, because of a lack of religious organization, emphasizes the basic family unit, santri doctrine, because of its reliance on "teachers, judges, and officials, and schools, courts, and religious bureaucracies,"[85] emphasizes a community of believers. Thus, the santri "never see their religion as a mere set of beliefs. . . . Instead, they always

conceive of it as institutionalized in some social group,"[86] speak of it in terms of "a social organization in which the Islamic creed is the defining element,"[87] and center it on four institutions: the Islamic political parties and their

> social and charitable organizations; the religious school system; that division of the central-government bureaucracy . . . concerned with the administration of the Moslem law . . . and the . . . congregational organization which focuses around the village mosque and the neighborhood prayerhouse.[88]

The importance of this description of the santri religion to Geertz's authoritative stance cannot be understated, for it brings to bear on the Javanese culture the power of Geertz's authority as inherited from Plato. The rhetoric of social cohesion Geertz uses as the link between his "social universal joint" theory and the Javanese reduces the santri to examples illustrating the revelatory vision available from Geertz's stance as the translator of Javanese culture into recognizable structures and the interpreter of the symbols generated by those structures. Thus, Geertz's rhetorical portrayal of Islam as a structure "institutionalized in some social group" and discussed as a "social organization [built around] the Islamic creed" highlight the cohesive power of Geertz's "social

universal joint," while the four institutional aspects of the center of Javanese Islam portray the possible sources of twentieth-century friction capable of destablizing the "universal joint." As a result, Geertz's notion of Islam forms a causal link between Geertz's theory and the Javanese. More importantly, it strengthens and broadens the ideology and hegemony of Plato's guiding finger, for his method of syllogistically examining the symbols of opposition created by structures is the only method the authoritative philosopher can use to attain Truth.

Geertz constructs two historical frameworks surrounding Javanese Islam to syllogistically examine the oppositional symbols stemming from his portrayal of the santri. Geertz states that the first of these frames, the development of Islam in the town of Modjokuto, follows the same path described in the abangan colonization myth:

> There was . . . about 1900 . . . around the town of Modjokuto . . . a solid core of displaced north coasters who, having come from an area in which the Islamic aspects of the Javanese religious syncretism had from the beginning been taken rather more seriously than elsewhere . . . [which formed] the body of both the Islamic reform movement and the conservative reaction to it when these developed in Modjokuto.
> [In addition, about] 1910 there began to come

into the town of Modjokuto itself, also from the
north coast, a group of itinerant Javanese trad-
ers . . . [whose roots lay in] the urban trade
centers such as Kudus, Gresik, and Lamongan.
They were representatives of a petty merchandis-
ing tradition stretching back to . . . sixteenth
century . . . Indian and Malay traders . . . [who
had] aped the business methods, the style of
life, and the religious customs of the Arabs.[89]

The result of this influx was a formation of a type of
Islamic middle class in which the santris were simply
richer than their abangan counterparts because the former
could never attain prijaji status.[90]

Geertz further links with the spread of Islam ideolog-
ical changes instigated by the growth of communism during
the 1920's and 1930's, the incursions of Imperial Japan
during the 1940's, and the formation of the Indonesian
Republic after World War II. Struggles within labor and
political groups, culminating in the development of a
militant communist element, alienated a large number of
government workers and teachers. Their desertion from the
Communist movement weakened the party to such an extent
that a santri leadership core whose "vigorous [feelings
of] anti-Communism . . . continues to animate much of
Islamic politics today"[91] rose to power. Various politi-
cal interests, however, reenforced the continued existence

of multiple parties, creating a fragmented scene dominated by bickering and fueled by the rise of Dutch plantations and native labor unions and the fall of commodity prices. The Japanese domination during World War II, however, forced "all politicized <u>santris</u> into a single organization . . . [in part through the Japanese] favoritism toward the <u>santri</u> element of the population in an attempt to woo them to Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology"[92] and in part through the Javanese ability to see the Japanese, according to Geertz's translation, manipulated "'the <u>santris</u> . . . against the rest of the population and favored them, trying to use them . . . as agents of their policy.'"[93] Thus, the unified party called Masjumi was established. Following the defeat of Japan, the Republic of Indonesia was established but soon disintegrated in face of renewed Dutch imperialism and the resultant revolution. When eventually Indonesia regained its freedom, however, "the unity imposed by the Japanese and necessitated by the revolution [against the Dutch] soon evaporated."[94] Masjumi splintered once more into various factions, leaving 1950's Java "with one minor and two major political parties, plus a modernist-inspired social and charitable organization more or less attached . . . to one of the parties."[95]

The second historical framework Geertz uses to syllo-gistically examine the oppositional symbols stemming from

his portrayal of the _santri_ establishes the ideological

background developed through the doctrinal differences

between conservative and modern _santris_. Although, for

example, both _kolot_ (conservatives) and _moderen_ (modern-

ists) believe in divine determinism (_takdir_), the groups

differ in their beliefs in "the extent to which the doc-

trine of determination is invoked to explain actual behav-

ior and . . . [in the] amount of stress put on the Koranic

command to work as against that put upon the power of God

to determine the details of individual behavior."[96] More

specifically, _kolot_ invoke _takdir_ to explain all realms of

human failure and success, while _moderen_ restrict _takdir_

to those realms outside of human control. Further, among

the _kolot_, the _slametans_ and mysticism are adapted to

Islam by renaming the _slametan's_ invoked spirits _djins_ and

by associating mysticism with one of the Islamic mystic

sects. The _moderen_, however, both disappear, for the

moderen view both _abangan_ and _prijaji_ as wrong. Geertz

notes that in a general sense, then, the _kolot_ emphasize

"the immediately consummatory aspects of religion . . .

[as seen in their] concern with 'blessings,' with 'inner

peace,' and [with their] relative tolerance towards

abangan ritual and . . . [_prijaji_] mysticism,"[97] while the

moderen emphasize "hard work and religious purity and the

concern for social progress."[98]

Thus, the _santri_ population of Modjokuto are presented

as representations of their respective political and
religious parties by the end of the 1950's. Geertz,
therefore, can state that almost all the santri in Modjok-
uto are either Masjumi (moderen) or Nahdatul Ulama
(kolot). In other words, the parties and their member-
ships function as the symbols of social cohesion whose
examination partially reveals the premise metaphorically
represented by the "social universal joint." In addition,
the twentieth-century destabilizing aspects are revealed
in these parties, for both are shaken by conflicts between
the younger and more educated newer members and the older
leaders. In the Nahdatul Ulama, this friction, according
to Geertz, is seen as an attempt to make the party more
like the Masjumi. In the Masjumi party, however, this
discord is perceived as occurring between those who want
to secularize the party and those who want to maintain
piety. Geertz concludes that this conflict "points to the
fact that the crucially difficult problem of organization
the two parties face is how to relate the fairly well-
organized central structure to the more or less inchoate
peasant mass upon which they rely for support."[99]
Moreover, he points to the top-down hierarchical
structures of the politico-religious organizations with
their bureaucracies as representations of this conflict:
projects aimed at increasing the successes of such peasant
associations as youth and labor groups are undermined in

the Nahdatul Ulama by both a "shortage of effective leaders to carry out such projects . . . [and by] the traditional Koran teachers with their double influence on the party--politically as advisors to its leadership and religiously as preceptors to its rank and file."[100] In the Masjumi organiztion, however, the peasant associations are undermined by a "tendency on the part of the highly organized urban leadership of the party to over-centralize such organizations as are formed, with the result that they become detached from the rural context."[101] More importantly, both situations symbolically reveal the stresses that develop within the <u>santri</u> community when the "universal joint" is destabilized.

In order to reinforce the truth of his theory as it has developed thus far, Geertz describes the symbols of social harmony and stresses associated with the <u>santri</u> educational system, a complex alien to both the highly ritualized <u>abangan</u> religion and the nonsystematic <u>prijaji</u> mystical orders. According to Geertz, the center of the traditional educational system lies in the <u>pondok</u>, a school consisting of a teacher-leader (<u>kijaji</u>), a body of male students (<u>santris</u>), and the primary buildings needed for the school to function: dormitories for the students, a house for the teacher, and a mosque for studies and prayer. Boys of the ages of ten to twelve years, the age of self-reliance, begin attending the <u>pondok</u> "returning home

from time to time for short periods (and for circum-
cision)."[102] Instruction consists of classes lasting from
one to five hours in which "the <u>kijaji</u> chants pasages from
books of religious commentary . . . and the <u>santris</u> echo
him. [The emphasis here] is not the content but the
form."[103] While attending the <u>pondok</u>, the <u>santris</u> live in
the dormitories, cook and wash for themselves, and engage
in an economic system wherein they work in the fields of
the important Moslems in the general community, labor in
cloth-dying, cigarette-making, or tailoring shops, and
receive small allowances of money and rice from home. In
addition, the students "go at their own speed, learning as
much or as little as seems necessary to them. When a book
is completed one 'graduates' for that book. . . . But
there are no 'grades' . . . and one does not graduate from
the school but merely leaves when one feels like it or has
a need to."[104] Upon completing their stays in the <u>pondoks</u>
and upon entering into marriages arranged by their par-
ents, the students perform their own prayers, go to
mosques on Fridays, help support the <u>pondoks</u> if they
can afford to, and visit their old <u>kijajis</u> for advice,
spiritual counsel, or curing.[105] At this time the <u>lang-
gars</u>, small, neighborhood prayer and study houses, replace
the <u>pondoks</u> as the centers of <u>kolot</u> religious education.
In the <u>langgars</u>, the "village men will gather . . . an
hour or so each evening after sunset prayer . . . to pray

and chant the chants they learned at pondok.[106]

Through the above description of the conservative Islamic education system as it exists in the area around Modjokuto, Geertz accomplishes several tasks. First, he systematically portrays a process of religious and social enculturation through which the attributes of santri social stability and success are learned:

> the rich man's son went to Mecca to discover what the meaning and form of Islam were in fact supposed to be; adolescent boys exposed themselves to the kijaji's learning in schools supported by the members of the entire community; adult men changed in the langgars and instructed their women and young children in the bare essentials of Islam, and contributed what they could spiritually and materially toward maintaining Islam. . . .[107]

Second, the maintainence of this kolot educational system in the face of the Masjumi introduction of schools based on Western models and of curriculum emphasizing mathematics, reading, writing, and general science, symbolizes a source of social friction which continually rocks the "universal joint" theory. Yet, Geertz notes that "it must be remembered that to a certain extent the Modjokuto situation is a particular one, so that comments about the Modjokuto branches of national organizations

should not be taken to be necessarily characteristic, except in a rather broad sense, of these organizations throughout Java."[108] Thus, Geertz's focus on these aspects of <u>santri</u> culture mirrors Plato's use of beauty and size in the <u>Phaedo</u>: both men make use of textualized structures that create symbolic oppositions. The social friction interpretation of these symbols, when examined syllogistically, forms a premise supporting Geertz's social universal joint. Echecrates's response to Plato's Socrates's structures, symbols, interpretations, and syllogisms, as translated by Phaedo, is, ". . . it seems to me that Socrates made his meaning extraordinarily clear to even a limited intelligence."[109] Geertz's reader is placed in the same position as Echecrates, a stance which mirrors the relationship between the Geertz and his objectivized <u>santri</u>: both exemplify the fallacious nature of what Edward Said calls the "relation of equality."[110] As a result, Geertz's rhetorics of cohesion and friction take on an additional layer of actualization, thereby reinforcing both the truth of Geertz's theory and his authority.

Geertz's concluding remarks on <u>santri</u> religious ritual follow this same pattern, for they syllogistically examine the symbols of both the cohesion and the stresses stemming from the structures of religion and society. While morning, noon, afternoon and evening prayers are

conducted for the most part in the homes of the worship-
pers, sunset prayers are said by small groups of males in
the langgars and Friday noon prayers are said by the whole
village ummat (community) in the mosque. According to
Geertz, it is this "intersection of the temporally pat-
terned prayers . . . and the spatially outlined social
groups of household, neighborhood, and village which
organizes the elemental Islamic congregation, the individ-
ual's most immediate ummat, which in turn has a marked
tendency to be incorporated as a unit into one of the two
over-arching santri political parties."[111] Moreover,
since the prayers themselves are said roughly at the same
time (morning, noon, afternoon, and evening) and in the
same places (in individual homes, langgars, or mosques) by
the same people (the ummat), the very act of praying
supports the social bonds established by the other aspects
of the community to an extent illustrated by Geertz's
recollection of a santri who "quit driving a taxi and
returned to being a farmer because his taxi-driving took
him on long trips during which it was impossible to [pray]
correctly."[112] The same example, nonetheless, points to
the potential for friction within the community, for as
Geertz notes, "in the town, the prayer pattern fits less
well."[113] More specifically, urban activities associated
with business, politics, and the military often conflict
with the scheduled prayer times, causing stresses to build

both in individuals and in society. In addition, the
content and form of the prayers contribute to social
unity. As "obligatory acts of worship,"[114] the prayers of
the individuals making up the ummat become identical, and
since the prayers take the form of brief, ritualized
incantations, they fit easily into the daily lives of the
santri. Friction may develop equally as easily when
obligations are unmet.

Friday services, however, reflect more substantially
the cohesion and potential friction between the social and
religious arenas in Geertz's discussion; they function as
a "symbolic coming together of the ummat of the entire
village; and the sense of having a 'mosque of one's own'
is strong enough so that people who move into town from
nearby villages often return to the mosque in these vil-
lages for Friday prayer."[115] Beginning and ending with
ritualized prayers performed by individuals at their own
paces, the central portion of the Friday services is the
chotbah, or sermon. The chotbah is the source of friction
within the conservative kolot and between the kolot and
the moderen, for the conservatives accept only Arabic
chotbahs "written years ago by a famous Javanese kijaji
from Semarang."[116] The modernists, however, as well as
the younger, more educated members of the kolot favor
either Javanese-language sermons created by the local
imams which focus on political concerns or the translated

Javanese-language sermons distributed by the government's
Bureau of Religious Propoganda. As a result, controversy
develops concerning both the concept of translation and
the use of mosques as dissemination points for political
instruction. Both concerns shake the unity created by
Islamic belief and ritual. More importantly, both suc-
cessfully support the truthfulness of Geertz's theory and
hence his position of authority.

Part Three of Geertz's text describes the prijaji
aspect of Javanese culture through the same use of struc-
ture, symbols, and syllogistic examination established in
Parts One and Two. Citing Robert Redfield's hypothesis
concerning the development of urban gentry and rural
peasantry as initial structures, Geertz constructs a
framework in which the abangan occupy the peasant niche
while the prijaji inhabit the highest social niche.
Between the two is a "persistent cultural dialogue . . . a
constant interchange of cultural material in which fading
urban forms 'coarsen' and 'sink' into the peasant mass and
elaborated rural forms 'etherealize' and 'rise' into the
urban elite."[117] In other words, within Geertz's frame,
the abangan and prijaji become perverse symbolic mirrors
whose interpreted reflections both attract and repel the
denizens of Geertz's paradigm.

Denoting originally those people who could trace their
geneologies back to the kings of precolonial Java, the

prijaji, under Dutch rule, found their ranks widened by "commoners pulled into the [government] bureaucracy as the supply of authentic aristocrats ran out."[118] Thus, the term's contemporary meaning refers both to government workers and those who, besides having royal ancestry, manifest the prijaji ethic. According to Geertz, this ethic is characterized by "its intense sense for status differences, its calm assertion of spiritual superiority, and its dual emphasis on the inner life of refined feeling and the external life of polite form."[119] What resulted from this exacting world view was a society whose upper strata, lacking any other means of social control, maintained their status through military power and religious fervor.

This description of the Javanese prijaji echoes Realist ethnographers' "lifelike" depictions, for it describes a historical context in which the group being studied developed and sets the stage for an examination of selected characteristics of the group. These characteristics, as well as citations from the writings of other ethnographers, form the basis for the structures, the symbols, and the syllogistic examination of the meanings of the symbols, and thus the same sense of textual authority established by Plato in the "Phaedo," appropriated by realist ethnographers, and inherited by Geertz. Moreover, Geertz's continued reliance on Plato's dialogically hidden

monologue and on his causitive method provide him a means
of controlling the direction of his investigation of the
prijaji. Only through this script can the prijaji support
for power of the "social universal joint." Further,
Geertz's continued role as the manipulator of the game and
its rules as established by Plato allows him to continue
as the single guide capable of depicting the prijaji. As
a result, Geertz once again forces the reader into the
position of Plato's Echecrates, who, as the receiver of
Plato's Phaedo's translation, must acknowledge Phaedo's,
and therefore Plato's, authority.

As he did in Parts One and Two, Geertz divides the
prijaji into structures creating oppositional symbols.
Beginning with definitions of the precepts of the prijaji
Weltanschauung, Geertz creates a framework within which
the prijaji function as examples supporting the truth of
the "social universal joint" theory. Citing Max Weber's
concept of charisma as the reservoir of prijaji religious
power, a wellspring that

> [correlates] with political eminence . . . [and
> culminates] in the immobile king, the
> incarnation of Vishnu of Shiva, meditating in his
> castle at the center of the universe. . . .
> [These meditations flow] outward and
> downward . . . attenuating as [they sink] through
> each layer in the bureaucracy, draining weakly at

last into the peasant masses.[120]
Geertz describes the source and the end of this stream as
corresponding with _alus_ and _kasur_, the two key precepts of
the _prijaji_ world view. More specifically, _alus_ invokes
the _prijaji_ qualities of refinement, subtleness, and
civilization, while _kasur_ invokes the peasant qualities of
coarseness, indiscrimination, and barbarism. These con-
cepts, combined with the notions of _batin_ and _lair_ (the
inner and outer realms of human experience), form Geertz's
infrastructure within which his portrait of the _prijaji_ is
symbolized by a scale:

> . . . the combination of the _lair-batin_ distinc-
> tion and the _kasur-to-alus_ continuum brings about
> a situation in which the ascent from the uncivi-
> lized animistic peasant to the hyper-civilized
> divine king takes place not only in terms of
> greater mystical achievements, more and more
> highly developed skills of inward-looking mysti-
> cal achievements, more and more highly developed
> skills of inward-looking contemplation and re-
> finement of subjective experience, but also in
> greater and greater formal control over the
> external aspects of individual actions, trans-
> forming them into art or near-art.[121]

The remainder of Section Three develops other _prijaji_
characteristics as settings which illuminate both the

frame described above and Geertz's "social universal joint" theory. Under the headings "The Role of Classical Art" and "The Role of Popular Art," for example, Geertz portrays "non-santri" art as exemplum categorized as alus art, kasar art, or national art. By making distinctions between abangan and prijaji perceptions of the sets of art forms belonging to these three classes, they come to highlight the caste continuum as it represents Geertz's depiction of the prijaji. For instance, under the heading of alus art, Geertz includes the wajang, a shadow play "which uses leather or wooden puppets to dramatize stories from the Javanese versions of the . . . Mahabharata and the Ramayana, or mythological versions of the history of the kingdoms of pre-colonial Java."[122] The abangan view the wajang as "a popular drama of legendary heroes" and, since "anyone attending a wajang is safe from all harm at least as long as it is going on . . . [they only see as important] the ritual efficacy of the performance,"[123] as part of the slametan system. The prijaji, however, see the wajang as statements supporting their philosophy. The characters and their actions, purposes, and explanations reveal that

> insofar as one can perceive ultimate reality,
> which is within oneself as an ultimate feeling,
> rasa, one will be free of the distracting effects
> of earthly emotions--not only compassion, but

anger, fear, love, hope, despair, and all. This
gives one great power--either for good . . . or
for evil . . . for mysticism is an amoral science
anyone can employ. It brings knowledge; and, as
in science generally, knowledge is power for good
or for evil. Good and evil are human values
only, and God is in everything . . . and every-
thing is in God.[124]

Thus, differences in interpretation of the wajang repre-
sent differences in social caste. More importantly, the
wajang, as well as the other alus art forms, function as
implements of both social harmony and social friction. As
part of the slametan complex, the wajang's ability to
appease the appetites and inhibit the powers of spirits
adds to the feelings of social equality and success in
slametan participants. Similarly, the wajang promotes
social solidarity in the prijaji, for, as Geertz notes, in
this social class both the slametan and the wajang have
lost their religious overtones. This secularization
liberates "speculation about the 'meaning' of the wajang,
[encourages] . . . interpretation of its content. And
this tends to bring the shadow-play into even closer inte-
gration with the prijaji. . . ."[125] Yet, these associa-
tions also create friction. Within the abangan, questions
of ritualistic accuracy and timing regarding the wajang
promote stress, while within the prijaji, epithets

regarding the _kasur_ nature of certain interpretations of the _wajang_ create similar frictions. Moreover, the _aban-gan_ see the _prijaji_ preoccupation with mystical interpretations as signs of an aristocratic tradition which has subjugated them for centuries. The premise of Geertz's theory, therefore, is once again reinforced.

The _ludrug_, a staged performance with both serious and comical motifs used to both entertain and instruct and one of the favorite forms of popular art in Modjokuto, is treated in a similar fashion. Described by Geertz as a drama quite similar to that produced in the West, the _ludrug_ "is played in _ngoko_, low-Javanese, except where _krama_ or Indonesian are necessary for realism . . . , and has plots set in the present or the immediate past, with characters from 'everyday life.'"[126] Moreover, the _lu-drug's_ association with the fringes of legality adds to its observer's enjoyment. Geertz notes that

> before the war the Dutch forbade popular plays of this sort, unless licensed, on the ground that the plays were 'communist' . . . and the Japanese forbade them altogether. Even now, some _ludrug_ troupes are restrained from being even more explicitly political only by the weather-eye of the government.[127]

As was true with classical art, the popular _ludrug_ promotes both social cohesion and dissonance. But where

the _wajang_ operates within Geertz's religious and philo-
sophical frameworks, the _ludrug_ operates within a frame-
work Geertz's calls "social change." More specifically,
it serves as a symbol of social stability to its _abangan_
observers, for the _ludrug_'s didactic nature and its treat-
ment of contemporary social and political problems provide
the _abangan_ with a sense of permanence. As Geertz ob-
serves, "the clowns, the female impersonators . . . [and]
the dancers . . . all tie the play to familiar cultural
forms, so that a peasant who is really only half-clear as
to what the plot is all about can laugh at the clowns,
wonder at the transvestites, and enjoy the dancers."[128]
At the same time, the _prijaji_ view the _ludrug_ as a symbol
of _kasar_, for it is tainted by its association with poli-
tics and urban aspects of daily life.

   In addition, Geertz makes both _prijaji_ mysticism and
the mystical sects themselves into structures generating
symbols of opposition. His syllogistic examination of
these symbols supports his "social universal joint" prem-
ise. After defining mysticism as the meditation on and
study of the individual's inner life, Geertz breaks this
definition down into eight postulates common to the variety
of sects pursuing mystical awareness. More important,
however, is his explanation of his process of analysis, a
statement which, through its implicit paean to Platonic
method, clarifies his position as both subject and wielder

of Plato's authoritative finger. Geertz states that in order to provide a framework capable of ordering the Javanese cultural data, he "should like first to state [his] own summary formulation of this system and then attempt to show how [his] postulates appear in the formulations of [his] informants themselves.[129] The result of this rationale is that the text presents the _prijaji_ as products of Geertz's interpretive process. The _prijaji_ thus become objectivized samples who, for example, through Geertz's hypothesized "psychological sequence," support both the "social universal joint" premise and Geertz's sense of authority. The sequence portrays a hypothetical _prijaji_ troubled psyche as it moves through four stages:

> (1) Aggression may not be directly expressed.
> (2) Therefore, one in part represses it and in part dissimulates it through the various etiquette forms. (3) Severe frustration . . . thus puts the individual in an impossible dilemma of either expressing his suddenly accentuated aggressive feelings . . . or of turning the aroused hate inward against the self, bringing depression. . . . (4) In order to avoid this dilemma one tries to calm one's emotions entirely, to put oneself beyond both disappointment and surprise.[130]

As support for this hypothesis, Geertz provides the

testimony of an informant in which, like Plato's Phaedo, Geertz's observing ethnographer reports the following:

> 'Suppose you lose something. Now a man who doesn't know "science," who is unenlightened, will get angry, disappointed, and generally depressed and upset within. However, the man who knows will be peaceful.' I questioned how this was possible if one lost something very important, say an heirloom which had been in one's family for a long time. He replied: 'Well, you would just say, "Yes, so it's lost, it's lost"; or you would reflect and say "Such an object is losable; it is not eternal. Some day it had to be destroyed anyway, so why get upset about it?"'[131]

The "social universal joint" premise and Geertz's authority are therefore textually supported by the individual's "psychological sequence."

The mystical sects themselves also function in this manner. Geertz describes five of them, ranging from the Budi Setia, a group whose agendas are "heavily influenced by the international theosophy movement of Annie Besant, a somewhat Westernized (in this case Dutchified) version of Eastern mysticism"[132] to the Kawruh Kasunjatan, a group that "emphasizes practice to the relative exclusion of speculative theory . . . and so includes both various

secret and semi-secret means of attaining mystical experience and a somewhat animistic notion of the content of that experience."[133] Geertz further describes the latter of these sects as a loosely organized body of disciples who are given "specialized training in one set of mystic practices [primarily in self-hypnosis]"[134] by a guru who can be either self-appointed or promoted by an existing guru. Successful training allows the student to contact a "spirit brother," an ethereal power linked to the student by his umbilical cord and afterbirth, who can help him attain victories in business and love affairs.

Once again, however, the importance of the Kawruh Kasunjatan in Geertz's text is not in the sect's ability to fulfill its goals; rather, it is the sect's ability to support Geertz's "social universal joint" premise. As a result, all the sects are shown as structures whose symbols of opposition reveal "inherent anti-institutional and individualistic nature of mysticism as a religious form [as well as] the pressures of party politics, the increased means of communication, and the felt need for more social application of religious beliefs."[135]

Geertz notes in the Introduction of The Religion of Java that "Java . . . is not easily characterized under a single label or easily pictured in terms of a dominant theme. [Thus] I have tried . . . to show . . . variation in ritual, contrast in belief and conflict in values."[136]

Moreover, he remarks at the beginning of his conclusions in
Part Four that the abangan, santri, and prijaji are not
encapsulized types but are "enclosed in the same social
structure, share many common values, and are . . . not
nearly so definable as social entities as a . . . discus-
sion of their religious practices would indicate."[137] His
focus on the opposed aspects of the three groups making up
Javanese society thus mirrors Plato's use of textualized
structures generating symbols whose meanings reflect
oppositions. For just as Plato uses the syllogistic
examination of these opposed meanings as a causal line of
reasoning which leads to a theoretical Truth, Geertz's
conclusions, empowered by the syllogistic examination of
the symbols of opposition set forth in Parts One, Two, and
Three, form an ethnographic "tether" connecting his con-
clusions with the truth of his theory regarding religion's
impact on a culture. Further, Plato's Phaedo concludes
his description of Socrates in the "Phaedo" by stating,
"Such, Echecrates, was the end of our comrade, who was, we
may fairly say, of all those whom we knew in our time, the
bravest and also the wisest and most upright man."[138] By
equating Plato's Socrates with the "wisdom" and "upright-
ness" of the philosopher, Plato uses his Phaedo to affirm
the ability of Plato's method to attain Truth and to
affirm Plato's authority. Geertz echoes this conclusion
with his observation that the Javanese, of all the

cultures he has observed, best exemplify the implications of the "social universal joint" theory, for within their culture, "religion does not play only an integrative, socially harmonizing role in society but also a divisive one, thus reflecting the balance between integrative and disintegrative forces which exist in any social system."[139] As a result, both Geertz's method for attaining the Truth of his theory and his authority are affirmed. In addition, Geert's observation allows his rhetoric opposing conflict and integration to become in Part Four a rhetoric of actualization with both the Javanese and Geertz's reader, like Plato's Phaedo, Echecrates, and his reader, controlled by the power of a previously developed theory.

According to Geertz, the friction within Javanese culture derives from the ideological, class, political, and psychological aspects of the abangan, santri, and prijaji as they have been opposed and interpreted in Parts One through Three. Similarly, the integrative mood within Javanese culture derives from the Javanese propensity to vilify the present "in terms of the past . . . and [from] the growing strength of nationalism"[140] as these aspects have been interpreted in the same sections of the text. More specifically, by showing how the opposed Javanese religious systems function as structures creating systems of symbols having meanings which reveal cultural

characteristics of integration and division when viewed
from a starting point metaphorically represented by
Geertz's "universal joint," the Javanese culture may be
translated into Western terms. With this theoretical
framework, Geertz's descriptions of holidays as ceremonial
structures creating symbols of social integration and
conflict support the "universal joint" premise and actual-
ize the theory concerning religion's effects on a culture:

> In general, _abangans_ and _santris_ tend to regard
> the . . . national holidays as a largely _prijaji_
> concern and are 'ashamed' or 'embarrassed' to go
> to them. [However,] the largest of the
> nationalist holidays is . . . August Seventeenth,
> Freedom Day, . . . [whose symbols] are . . . not
> those of Islam nor of traditional _abangan_ reli-
> gion nor of mysticism, but those of modern na-
> tionalism or of intelligentsia culture.[141]

Differentiating symbol systems on the basis of the
interpretations of the symbols engages the social engine
which Geertz's universal joint connects to the Javanese
culture, thereby creating the causal tether between the
machine and Geertz's rhetoric of actualization.

The _Rijaja_, or End of Fast Holiday, best reveals these
symbol systems as Geertz uses them, for

> the holiday, coming as a gala climax of the Fast
> month, manages to hold within itself the whole

range of religious belief and practice character-
istic of present-day Modjokuto. <u>Abangan</u>, <u>santri</u>,
and <u>prijaji</u>; ardent nationalist and subdued
traditionalist; peasant, trader, and clerk;
townsman and villager--all can find somewhere in
this most syncretic of public festivals the sort
of symbol congenial to them.[142]

In other words, by using the <u>Rijaja</u> as the context for
applying the theory of the "social universal joint" to the
symbols of opposition invoked by the holiday, Geertz
presents his reader with a translation of a culture that
"indicates the reality and the attainability of what is
now the explicit ideal of all Indonesians--cultural unity
and continuing social progress."[143]

In this fashion, Geertz's Platonic inheritance pro-
vides the models of textual method and authority which
subsequent ethnographers writing in the Interpretive/
Translative genre copy. By evoking the dominative
rhetoric of Geertz, these ethnographers become, as did the
realist ethnographers who followed Malinowski, the "young"
ethnographers whose Bloomian searches for their own en-
scripting processes reveal the continuing domination of
the textual authority of Plato.

Section III

"The back [dossier] of the chair between the two bodies
[Plato and Socrates] . . . is a marriage contract. I
always think about those contracts that they are only
signed by one--they are far from being without value, on
the contrary. And even when both sign, it's twice by a
single one."[144]

By superimposing David M. Schneider's visage onto So-
crates's countenance and Clifford Geertz's onto Plato's in
Derrida's portrait on the postcard--a transference made
easier by Schneider's acknowledgment of Geertz's influenc-
ing "finger"--Harold Bloom's process of influence which
links Schneider's American Kinship with Geertz's texts may
be seen. More importantly, the sense of textual authority
in Schneider's text becomes apparent. For like Geertz,
Schneider is an inheritor of Plato's method of using
structures to create symbols of opposition whose interpre-
tations, when examined syllogistically, lead to premises
supporting a proposition of Truth. Schneider, therefore,
acquires the authoritative power of Geertz and Plato
through his evocation of his models' rhetoric of entitle-
ment. According to Kenneth Burke, such a rhetoric creates
a multi-layered context wherein text acquires meaning on
one level through the relations sculpted by its own word-
ing and on a second level through the words' "symbolic or

symptomatic significance."[145] Within this universe of
discourse, the writer "acts; [and] in the course of acting
[the writer] organizes the opposition to [that] act . . .
and insofar as one can encompass such opposition, seeing
the situation anew in terms of it, one has dialectically
arrived thus roundabout at knowledge."[146] As a result,
Schneider occupies the objective stance of his predeces-
sors; within this universe he is God the Organizer, the
single guide to truth. In the "Phaedo", this position is
filled by Plato and is described as the source of those
"assumptions [which, if studied closely will lead to] the
truth of the matter."[147] In other words, Schneider's
stance within this universe of discourse is one of domina-
tion; as the creator of the rules guiding the text, he is
the authority.

Schneider, like Geertz, uses several frames to shape
and control his text. The first of these portrays Ameri-
can kinship as a "system of symbols." According to
Schneider, culture in general consists of a number of
symbol systems, one of which is kinship. Another is
language. The ethnographer's initial job is finding the
relationships between these systems and using those rela-
tionships as the means of assigning meanings to the sys-
tems' symbols. In this manner, the ethnographer creates a
starting place from which he or she may discover "which of
the many meanings applies when, and which of the many

meanings does not apply or is not relevant under what circumstances; and finally, how the different meanings of the [symbols] relate to each other."[148]

The creation of this frame accomplishes two tasks. First, the notion of culture as including systems of symbols, one of which is called "kinship" and another "language," creates a textual universe within which "various things in our way of living, are thought to be singled out by words which stand for them."[149] Yet, within this universe the reverse is also true; various words are "singled out" by things which stand for them. As Burke notes, "the things of experience become . . . the materialization of [the spirit of these words and] their [the things of experience] derivation could come both from the forms of language and from the group motives that language possesses by reason of its nature as a social product."[150] This is a Platonic universe, for the text which creates it, according to Burke, involves a "Platonist transcendence whereby a 'symbolic' motive is discerned in purely material things or situations."[151] Thus, Schneider's use of the "symbolic systems" frame anchors him firmly in the Platonic heritage. Second, the frame allows Schneider to distance himself from his textual creation, for his role as ethnographic interpreter of the symbol systems, as provider of the "definitions of the units and rules, the culture of American kinship"[152]

places him outside of the textual universe he creates.
Again Plato is implicitly evoked here, for the same tactic
is used in the "Phaedo" to direct Echecrates and the
reader to Plato's Phaedo's interpretation of Socrates's
statements. More importantly, Schneider's description of
himself as the interpreter/translator of the "definitions"
illuminates the nature of Platonic textual authority as it
functions in Interpretive/Translative ethnography. For
Plato, authority and the soul's knowledge are intertwined.
Such knowledge, however, is not obtained through direct
sensible observation: "by observing objects with my eyes
and trying to comprehend them with each of my other senses
I might blind my soul altogether."[153] Instead, "true"
knowledge, the knowledge of the soul, comes from analyzing
propositions: "I must have recourse to theories, and use
them in trying to discover the truth about things."[154]
Truths are stated in the form of hypotheses which are
explored and evaluated:

> If anyone should fasten upon the hypothesis
> itself, you would disregard him and refuse to
> answer until you could consider whether its conse-
> quences were mutually consistent or not. And
> when you had to substantiate the hypothesis
> itself, you would proceed in the same way, assum-
> ing whatever more ultimate hypothesis commended
> itself most to you, until you reached one which

was satisfactory.[155]

According to Norman Gulley, these processes of exploration and evaluation involve

> an examination of the logical consequences of the
> initial hypothesis, in order to see not only what
> those consequences are, but also what inconsist-
> encies with other propositions acceptance of the
> hypothesis entails, and whether there is any
> contradiction implicit within the hypothesis
> itself. It involves further an analysis which
> will discover the propositions from which the
> hypothesis itself is deductible.[156]

Schneider notes that his study is "not concerned with the patterns of behavior as formulated from systematic obser-vations of each of its actual occurrences."[157] Rather, he describes his methodology in terms which echo both Plato and Gulley:

> Suppose that we know that there are cultural
> units X, Y, and Z. And suppose that the rule is
> that units X and Y appear together, but X always
> appears associated with Z. Now we observe what
> actually happens in a carefully selected sample
> of cases. Direct observation shows that in 32.7
> per cent of the cases X and Y appear together and
> that in no instances which are observed does Z
> ever occur when X is present. Do we infer that

the rule is weak where 32.7 per cent of the cases
deviate from it and that there is no rule where
100 per cent of the cases fail to conform to it?
We do not at all. The question of whether there
is a rule formulated as a cultural rule cannot be
decided on the basis of such evidence.[158]

The result of this description is the reengagment of
Platonic method and textual authority in Schneider's text.

The dominative rhetoric stemming from the adoption of
this method and its sense of authority begins with
Schneider's proposition concerning the relationship be-
tween the anthropologist and his "good" informants. By
describing the former as initially adrift in a sea of
hypotheses and the latter as those who are "able to offer
useful insights and generalizations, [and] are able to
volunteer ideas which are always of some value,"[159]
Schneider constructs a starting point which resonates with
the power of Genesis 1:1-4:

In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth. And the earth was formless and void, and
darkness was over the surface of the deep; and the
Spirit of God was moving over the surface of the
waters. Then God said, 'Let there be light'; and
there was light. And God saw that the light was
good; and God separated the light from the dark-
ness.

By creating the heavens of theory, the earth of culture, and the darkness of hypotheses, the anthropologist's spirit may move between them and over the waters of data. Then, by identifying the "good" informant, the "good" light may illuminate the "good" data, and the anthropologist may separate the appropriate hypotheses from the rest.

Less poetically, Schneider describes illumination as occurring when data is identified as data, a process which is self-empowering since "the more positive the field worker is that he knows exactly what he wants . . . the more likely it is that the informant will . . . help him find just exactly that."[160] Thus, as "data pile up, many become redundant. . . . It is at this time that hypotheses about what are and are not cultural units, their definitions, and the ways in which they are articulated become crucial."[161] Schneider's starting point thus mirrors Plato's starting point of defining truth by its ability to agree with theory, and the results of using this point are the same for both men: both create domains outside of the subjects of their discussions, allowing them to treat their subjects as objects and to play roles as the single purveyors of empirical truth. In Plato's case, the creation of this domain permits him to manipulate a previously determined postulate (the soul's immortality and its association with knowledge and wisdom).

The result of this objectivization of knowledge leads to another postulate--that knowing a concept implies the ability to account for it: ". . . a person who knows a subject [can] thoroughly explain what he knows."[162] More specifically, the ability to give an account of a subject must be based on the definition of knowledge which highlights the subject as one worth accounting for. Put more simply, Plato's Socrates may authoritatively explain an object's beauty, for example, because the entire context within which the explanation occurs--that is, the definitions of knowledge and methodology--are equally as constructed as Socrates is. In Schneider's case the result is the same; with the reader's acceptance of the warrant that American kinship is analyzable in this fashion, Schneider can develop an authoritative text because the context for the text is also constructed by Schneider. What remains to be developed is a means of establishing a causative relationship, or "tether," between Schneider's universe of symbols and American kinship.

Plato once again provides such a link through his Socrates's discussion of the attributes of largeness and smallness. According to Plato, these qualities "absolutely refuse to tolerate coming into being [in that they derive] from one another."[163] In other words, smallness and largeness are distinct concepts in terms of themselves. Schneider's depiction of three kinds of variance

in American kinship follows this same pattern, for the variants are described in terms of "rate" (frequency of occurrence), "alternate forms" (choices), and "variant forms" (degree of committment).[164] The textual structure that develops from these variants focuses on the language created by each object, an exploration which takes as its metalanguage the terminology of distinctive feature analysis.

Divided into two parts, Schneider's text reflects the model established for Interpretive/Translative ethnography by Clifford Geertz, for like his treatment of the Javanese, Schneider's depiction of American kinship focuses on symbolic dimensions. Part One specifically deals with the symbolic language created when an American is labeled a relative, for it is this language that forms the basis for Schneider's opposed interpretations of these symbols and for his syllogistic examination of them. The premises revealed by this examination support both his proposition and the sense of textual authority.

Schneider further divides this language into two groups, basic terms and derivative terms, with the latter consisting of modified forms of the former. In addition, Schneider divides the modifiers into two groups. The first, restrictive modifiers, consists of those modifiers which signify blood relations, while the second, unrestrictive modifiers, consists of those modifiers which

signify the range of kinsmen by noting measures of dis-
tance. The resulting symbolic opposions reveal

> a substantial part of the definition of what is
> and what is not relative. The first criterion,
> blood or marriage, is central. The two kinds of
> modifiers are united in their functions; one
> protects the integrity of the closest blood
> relatives. The other places relatives in cali-
> brated degrees of distance if they are blood
> relatives, but either 'in' or 'out' if they are
> relatives by marriage.[165]

More importantly, the oppositions demonstrate Plato's
means of organizing a text by creating structures whose
symbols of opposition promote interpretations that may be
syllogistically examined.

Schneider thus creates as structures the kinship
categories of "relative by marriage" and "relative by
blood" to use their linguistic symbols as the means of
discovering the premises needed to support his concluding
proposition concerning the symbolic values of his initial
concluding proposition: "the cultural universe of
relatives in American kinship is constructed of elements
from two major cultural orders, the order of nature and
the order of law."[166] Moreover, the result for Schneider
is the same as it is for Plato: Schneider's conclusion, as
well as his authority is proven "most completely."

What must be remembered here, however, is that like Plato and Geertz, Schneider is the creator of both the discursive universe in which American kinship appears and the rules by which it is examined. Thus, it is only through Schneider's interpretation of a system of symbols that a truthful examination of American kinship can be established. In other words, only Schneider the ethnographer can answer his own question regarding the opposing natures of relatives by blood and relatives by marriage in America. In addition, Schneider, as the creator of the discursive universe whose context actuates this portrait of American kinship, becomes the single guide capable of leading the reader to Truth. In his discussion of the cultural meaning of "blood relation," Schneider states:

> The blood relationship . . . is formulated in concrete, biogenetic terms. Conception follows a single act of sexual intercourse between a man, as genitor, and a woman, as genetrix. At conception, one-half of the biogenetic substance of which the child is made is contributed by the genetrix, and one-half by the genitor. Thus each person has 100 per cent of this material, but 50 per cent comes from his mother and 50 per cent from his father at the time of his conception and thereby is his 'by birth.'[167]

Nonetheless, Schneider notes that "it does not follow that

every fact of nature as established by science will auto-
matically and unquestioningly be accepted or assimilated
as part of the nature of nature."[168] As a result, bioge-
netic explanations of American kinship, as well as any
other competing explanations, play no part in an explana-
tion of American kinship; only Schneider can reveal the
way to Truth. Once the reader accepts the warrant sub-
stantiating this method, Schneider's further oppositions,
which highlight the "relative by marriage,"[169] the "natu-
ral substance,"[170] and the "order of law,"[171] manipulate
the reader's acceptance of Schneider's conclusions.

The American family is treated in a like manner, for
it is used as a source of opposed symbols whose interpre-
tations form the premises needed to support the proposi-
tion that sexual intercourse represents the means of
defining and differentiating the members of the family and
their appropriate conduct. Schneider defines this cultural
unit as containing a "husband and wife who are the mother
and father of their child or children."[172] Opposed to
this unit are the married couple without children and a
married but separated couple whose offspring live with one
parent. Such linguistic symbols stemming from the family
as "husband," "wife," "daughter," and "son" imply the void
separating them from such linguistic symbols stemming from
the opposing structures as "childless couple," "broken
home," and "motherless child." Thus, Americans are deemed

"family" when adults engage in sexual intercourse (husband and wife), when the offspring resulting from that intercourse represent the combined genetic information of the adults (daughter and son), and when these individuals "live together as a natural unit . . . [which reflects] the laws of nature."[173]

Moreover, these same symbolic relationships act as the means of discovering the premises needed to support the proposition that "natural law" determines the family members' senses of appropriate conduct. According to Schneider the "laws of nature" reveal the rules by which American family conduct is measured:

> In one of its fundamental senses, then,
> nature . . . constitute[s] the family, and the
> natural roles of husband, wife, father, mother,
> and child define the members of the family. This
> is the sense in which Americans see a family when
> animals mate and rear their young in a place
> which they occupy and protect. . . .[174]

And, once again, linguistic symbols are used to imply the opposition used to differentiate codes of conduct. Schneider uses the terms "conjugal love" and "cognatic love" as symbols of the "natural law" whose rules govern American family conduct as well as symbols of sexual intercourse through extension of the term "making love." The "kiss" embodies these symbols:

> The kiss is an expression of love. The direct
> kiss on the lips is erotic, and this can be a
> euphemism for sexual intercourse in certain
> contexts. But the kiss on the brow or cheek is a
> cognatic statement. Where . . . husband and wife
> may kiss on the lips, parents and children kiss
> on the brow or cheek. . . .[175]

Conduct, however, extends beyond the family boundary;
nonetheless, Schneider extends his symbolic interpreta-
tions by opposing the concepts of "home" and "work,"
noting that "the standards which apply to [work] simply do
not apply to [the home]. There is not technical job
description for a husband or a wife in which an output of
some product like clean diapers or an earning capacity of
so much per week can be set for a spouse."[176] The symbol-
ic terms implying this opposition are "love" and "money,"
and when used again as a means of forming a syllogism
result in premises supporting the causatively-linked
propositions that American kinship is a system of symbols,
that sexual intercourse defines American family
membership, and that natural law defines the American
senses of appropriate conduct in familial situations:

> the family in American kinship as a paradigm for
> how members of the family should conduct them-
> selves is essentially a very simple one. A
> system of a small number of symbols defines and

differentiates the members of the family. These
same symbols also define and differentiate the
kinds of relationships--that is, the codes for
conduct--which members of the family should have
with each other.[177]

The remainder of Part One develops one final opposi-
tion between American notions of family and friends to
complete both the portrait of the American as relative so
that the depiction of the American relative as a person
may be developed in Part Two and the authoritative timbre
of Schneider's methodology. Both friendship and family,
according to Schneider, are symbolized by his translation
of love as an "enduring, diffuse solidarity" characterized
by its nonconfined goals and behavior and by its "suppor-
tive, helpful, and cooperative" nature.[178] Yet, just as
the gap between work and home is implied by the opposed
symbols of love and money, the split between family and
friend is implied by the linguistic symbols of "blood" or
"marriage" and "performance." As Schneider observes,

> although one may choose a spouse . . . there is
> nevertheless a fundamental difference between the
> two. A spouse is . . . for the long run, and the
> quality of the loyalty (or love) is enduring and
> without qualification of time or place or con-
> text. To pick a spouse and shed a spouse for
> purely utilitarian [i.e., performance-based]

purposes is not considered proper. . . .[179]

Part Two of Schneider's essay continues the use of Plato's oppositional methodology as both a means of organizing text and as a means of dealing with the symbolic nature of the American relative as a person. For the oppositional form to maintain its coherence, Part Two must oppose Part One. Thus, Schneider states that "the relative as a person is quite different from the distinctive features which define the person as a relative."[180] Where the "person as a relative" is developed out of Schneider's translation of items into symbolic forms and his interpretation of those forms as opposed meanings (e.g., "family" vs "friend," "blood" vs "law," and "conjugal" vs "cognatic"), the description of the "relative as a person" emerges from Schneider's opposed interpretations of the person as a "concrete" and as an "abstract" construction. More specifically, sex-roles and age attributes, as well as "occupational, religious, [and] political"[181] characteristics, are linked with linguistic symbols whose interpretations imply the opposition between themselves and the symbols tethered to such abstract attributes as the person's function within "a group of persons, consisting of the husband and wife and their children living together in a home of their own."[182]

When Schneider views this paradigm's symbols as items capable of revealing the opposition between themselves and

the symbols associated with the "person as relative," he forms the concluding proposition that the earlier opposition of "blood" and "marriage" described in Part One take on the additional attribute of "distance," a characteristic capable of generating symbols which imply an opposition with the abstract and concrete features of the "relative as a person." According to Schneider, distance is both the "measure of the degree to which two persons share common biogenetic substance . . . [and the] statement of the magnitude of the claim on diffuse, enduring solidarity."[183] The symbolic interpretations of the linguistic seeds sown by these concepts are revealed in the American notions concerning the items included in family genealogies and the manner in which death affects the placement of genealogical information. For example, Schneider notes that one of his informants "firmly asserted that her sister was not a relative because she had not seen her or spoken to her for some years."[184] Further, death similarly appears to create a distinction that affects the relative's status as a person:

> . . . with almost every informant there was always something special about the dead ones, some remark, some comment, and almost invariably, if the person being listed was dead, this fact was spontaneously stated. Further, there seemed to be a clear tendency for the dead to be omitted

entirely in the very early phases of the collec-
tion of the genealogy. . . .[185]

In other words, the greater the distance, measured as
either the amount of shared genetic material or as the
amount of love shared between the family member and the
relative in question, the greater the probability is that
the relative is not considered as a person.

The importance of this opposition between the "person
as relative" and the "relative as person" to Schneider's
authoritative stance cannot be understated, for it brings
to bear on American culture the power of Schneider's
authority as inherited from Plato through Clifford Geertz.
The rhetoric of contrast Schneider uses as the metaphori-
cal link between his culture as symbol systems theory and
the Americans reduces them to examples illustrating the
revelations attained from Schneider's removed stance and
the resultant truth of his theory. Thus, the linguistic
symbols generated by each portion of the opposition repre-
sent a system of rules which govern the kinship notions of
Americans. These rules, in turn, form the final causal
link between Schneider's symbol systems theory and the
Americans. More importantly, the rules strengthen and
broaden the ideology and hegemony of Plato's guiding
finger, for through his method of using structures to
generate symbols of oppositions which are syllogistically
examined to produce premises incorporating concepts and

definitions, the Truth of a proposition is attained. As a
result, the images on Derrida's postcard continue their
transformation; in one sense, Schneider's reliance on
Plato's method of organizing and creating text and author-
ity allows Socrates's face to look more and more like
Schneider's. In another sense, Schneider's reliance on
Plato's method of organizing and creating text and author-
ity allows Plato's face to look more and more like
Schneider, while Socrates takes on distinctly American
features.

One further framework of oppositions involving the
rule governing in-laws and kinship terms must be examined
before the Americans are completely reduced to the objects
of symbolic manipulation. Schneider begins with the
questions, "What is an uncle? Can a mother's sister's
husband be an uncle and if so, what kind, and if not, why
not?"[186] More specifically, the rule constraining the use
of the linguistic items representing the dichotomy of
blood and marriage forms the proposition for which
Schneider seeks supporting premises. He therefore begins
his search with the observation that there seem to be

> two distinct classes of relatives by marriage;
> each is related in a different way. The
> first . . . is Ego's own husband or wife. These
> relatives are distinguished by basic kinship
> terms. The second class consists of the mother,

father, brother, and sister of Ego's own spouse,
along with the spouse of Ego's brother, sister,
son, or daughter. All of these take derivative
terms and the in-law modifier.[187]

Problems in the rule's consistency of control over
usage of in-law terms to describe distanced people (e.g.,
the spouse's mother's brother's wife, the father's broth-
ers's son's wife, and the mother's sister's husband's
brother and sister) by informants are solved, first, by
invoking the power of a new category of "alternate terms
and usages" and second by invoking the power of the previ-
ously supported proposition which translates "love" as a
"relationship of enduring, diffuse solidarity." Noting
there are "more kinship terms and terms for kinsmen than
there are kinds of kinsmen,"[188] Schneider includes in this
division such examples as those formed by semantic shifts
("old lady" for "mother" and "old man" for "father"),
shortenings ("pop" for "papa" and "ma" for "mom"), diminu-
tives ("sonny" for son" and "sissy" for "sister"), and
zero forms (an unfilled linguistic slot--e.g., not using
any form of address).[189] Choices, then, are made
according to considerations of formality, authority, and
the distinction between who is being spoken to and who is
being spoken about. In addition, the stronger the sense
of "enduring, diffuse solidarity," the more likely the use
of some kinship term will occur. In other words, the

premises used to develop the syllogism concluding with the proposition that a rule or set of rules governs American use of kinship terms derive from the oppositions implied by the linguistic symbols generated from the concepts of "blood" and "marriage" as developed in Part One. The picture developed of American kinship is thus one of a people dominated by the actions of rules imposed from Schneider's removed stance. As Schneider himself notes, "the uncertainties, inconsistencies, and ambiguities [as well as their opposites] are not in the system [described by the informants] itself. Neither are they in the minds of the natives who act within its jurisdiction. Instead, they are in the mind of the observer. . . ."[190] As a result, the portrayal leads to an empowerment of Schneider's symbolic systems theory. The conclusion to Part Two of the text examines the effects of this empowerment as determined by the theory.

Schneider notes in the Introduction of <u>American Kin-ship</u> that the

> cultural level of observation can be distinguished from all others; that cultural units and constructs can be described independently of all other levels of observation; and that the culture so isolated can be examined to see what its core symbols are; how meaning is systematically elaborated throughout it differentiated

parts; and how the parts a differentiated and articulated as cultural units.[191]

In other words, culture is divided into "types" of observations whose interpretations, when opposed to each other as they are in Schneider's methodology, creates an apparent "ontological difference" between the ethnographer's and the informants' perspectives.[192] Schneider's focus on these "types," therefore, mirrors Plato's use of the differentiated notions of body and soul: both men make use of textualized examples, empowered by arguments previously set forth, to form a "tether" connecting results with the demonstrated examples. Cebes's response to Plato's lesson is, "I follow and agree perfectly."[193] Schneider's reader is placed in the same position as Cebes. As a result, Schneider's earlier rhetoric of opposition becomes in the conclusion a rhetoric of actualization with both the Americans and the reader controlled by the power of a previously developed theory.

According to Schneider, American culture shows its members as adopting contradictory comprehensions of their relationship with nature, an opposition dependent on whether these constituents are acting within familial or extrafamilial contexts. When functioning in the former, nature is seen as a mirror of the family: "What is out there in nature, say the definitions of American culture, is what kinship is."[194] Yet, when functioning in the

latter context, nature is seen as something to be con-
quered: "In American culture man's fate [outside of the
family] is seen as one which follows the injunction,
Master Nature! His science and technology and much of his
life is devoted to that task."[195] By translating this
opposition into a symbolic system and interpreting the
linguistic symbols as implying the split between these
"types," Schneider depicts American kinship as a symbolic
arena within which conflicting views of nature provide
icons for American life. The association between American
kinship and models of living, therefore, illustrates the
truth obtained through Schneider's methodology. By link-
ing American definitions of what life should be with his
model of American kinship, the emotional power of "dif-
fuse, enduring solidarity" is connotedly emphasized in
Wallace's theory, leading both the Americans and the
reader to maintain the truth of American kinship according
to the determinations of Schneider. Thus, Schneider is
able to conclude:

> [Americans] need to learn what they like to think
> are their instincts. And so a model is needed, a
> model to live by.
>
> What better model than sexual intercourse
> and its attendant psychobiological elements?
> These biological facts are transformed by the
> attribution of meaning into cultural constructs

and they then constitute a model for commitment,
for the passionate attachment which is one side
of trust, and for the unreasoning and unreasona-
ble set of conditions which alone make 'solidari-
ty' really solidary, and make it both enduring
and diffuse.[196]

Vinigi L. Grottanelli continues the dominative nature
of textual opposition as a means of constructing textual
authority begun by Plato and maintained by Geertz and
Schneider in his treatment of Nzema culture. For like his
predecessors, Grottanelli devises a framework based on
opposed concepts and definitions to construct a "true"
picture of Nzema life. More specifically, Grottanelli's
examination of "the fundamental problems of life and death
as experienced, judged, and solved by men and women of a
little known nation of West African farmers and
fishermen"[197] allows him to treat his actual concern:
forming support for his claim that handling witchcraft as
a symbolic system which represents witchcraft as "allego-
ries of social and moral subversion"[198] is significantly
more "truthful" than competing explanations. Such a
treatment of witchcraft avoids the mire of "naive popular
belief and Western-inspired skepticism."[199] Like Geertz,
Schneider, and Plato Grottanelli displaces competing
ethnographic strategies in order to create an ethnography
whose rules support a proposition that the conflicts

between cultures competing for dominance result in social and moral oppositions which find their voices in linguistic symbols of witchcraft. As a result, Grottanelli's text echoes his predecessors' means of analyzing propositions by developing premises which support a proposition. Moreover, by using Nzema culture, he provides himself with a corpus of data from which to view the consequences of his theory as it concerns both the Nzema and the body of knowledge from which competing theories explaining cultural contact and conflict derive. Thus, Grottanelli joins Schneider, Geertz, and Socrates as a target of Plato's commanding finger.

Like Schneider, Grottanelli begins his rhetoric of opposition with a reverberation of Plato's method of using symbolically implied oppositions as a means of discovering premises needed to support a proposition. Within the realm of medical care, Grottanelli observes that the Nzema, as do all people, "strive to ascertain the basic, real, and truly decisive causes of their ailments and misfortunes."[200] Traditionally, in cases of common illnesses, the ailing individual consults an herbalist (ninsinli), who prescribes the necessary cure. If this treatment is unsuccessful, the next source of relief is the string oracle (adunyi), who uses "seven twined fiber strings or leather straps, each marked by an attached tiny symbol and defined by a corresponding name . . . [to]

provide an unfailing response"[201] from a guiding spirit. The "response" identifies the components needed to effect the cure. If, however, the problem is serious or if an explanation of a death or calamity affecting the community is needed, the petitioners will consult the fetish gods themselves through the fetish priest or priestess. Contact with the gods is established via a dance held at the priest or priestess's lodgings. During the dance, the gods enter the priest or priestess's body and disclose the truth of the matter. There are, nonetheless, competing health-care paradigms, based on either Western medical knowledge or on healing methodologies imported by settlers from other African nations. Thus, ill, grieving, or distressed Nzema can choose among "five different solutions [to their problems]. Two are traditional, two are relatively new but incorporating traditional elements, and one is what Westerners would term 'scientific.'"[202] When the prescribed cures, however, do not work, when the cures offered by competing healing paradigms conflict, when prescriptions are unobtainable because of the failure of the intermediaries to understand or contact the gods, or when explanations of death or community disasters do not satisfy emotionally the society's members, linguistic symbols implying the oppositions between the sources of the solutions develop. These symbols are interpreted by Grottanelli as representations of witchcraft and lead him

to note that his use of these processes of translation and
interpretation follow the "professional and academic
conventions . . . in anthropological studies":

> The raw data assembled in the course of field
> research are later reexamined, evaluated, and
> compared not for the sake of their ephemeral
> significance but in the attempt to discover and
> establish the underlying general structures; in
> other words, those data are . . . considered
> meaningful only insofar as they lead to a series
> of connected statements assumed to be valid
> within certain limits of time for the whole
> society studied.[203]

As it did for Schneider, Grottanelli's adoption of
this method creates a domain outside of the subject of his
discussion; in Grottanelli's case the domain centers on
the proposition that a culture's inability to cure or
satisfactorily explain disease, death, or calamity mani-
fests itself in moral and social unrest as allegorized by
symbols of witchcraft. Reference to the general "truth"
of this proposition as seen in Ghanian culture, as well as
the development of curative cults in Mali, Burkina Faso,
and Liberia, forces the reader to accept this warrant,
thus empowering Grottanelli's introductory textual struc-
ture. The case studies making up the remainder of the
text function both to lead the reader to Grottanelli's

premises and form the causitive relationship between his
portrayal of the Nzema and his rhetoric of opposition
through the dominance of the witchcraft symbol hypothesis.
As a result, Grottanelli remains secure in Plato's sense
of textual authority.

Like Plato's, Geertz's, and Schneider's use of opposi-
tions within contexts governed by the syllogisms which
conclude with propositions, Grottanelli's case studies
form the contexts for his oppositions between systems of
healing and explaining death and misfortune. Thus, they
also provide him with a means of controlling his investi-
gation: the case studies guide the reader through a series
of events dominated by the moral and social stresses
created when Grottanelli's Nzema are caught in the chasms
separating his symbol systems. As a result, the reader
must acknowledge the truth of Grottanelli's depiction.
For example, the initial case study, from whence Grotta-
nelli's book takes its name, focuses on the death of a
seventeen-year-old Twea boy. During a fishing trip, the
boy, following established custom, "plunged from the canoe
behind the net, making as much noise as he could, to
prevent the fish from escaping seaward."[204] Because the
men aboard the canoe and on the beach knew the boy had
performed successfully this same duty on previous occa-
sions and knew the boy was a strong swimmer, no one wor-
ried about him until he had been missing for twenty-four

hours.

Three days later and at a point far from where he disappeared, the boy's body was discovered after it had been washed ashore. Grottanelli notes that deaths from drownings, lightning strikes, snake bites, suicide, child-birth, and robberies require funeral ceremonies character-ized by "simplified obsequies and burial . . . not in the common cemeteries but near [the victim's] place of death."[205] Nonetheless, the Twea requested and obtained from the town elders and chief--although they were reluc-tant to grant the request--permission to hold a regular funeral, a petition based largely on a debate on the causes of the death which, uncharacteristically, began prior to the funeral. According to popular opinion, the boy's death was due to witchcraft that had plagued this particular group of Twea. His half-brother, however, the older relative with whom the boy lived and who was a Catholic and a believer in Western medical practices, saw the boy's death as simply an accident:

> Perhaps in the place where he dived there was a strong current or whirlpool, or possibly some big fish trying to escape the net knocked him down. [Indeed,] why suspect witchcraft, even if such a thing exists, when the natural explanation of a death by drowning is so simple?[206]

Nevertheless, the petition for the regular funeral had

to come from someone in the boy's matrilineal side who be-lieved in the witchcraft explanation, and Grottanelli's subsequent investigation led him to the boy's biological mother, who lived in the Ivory Coast with the boy's step-father. After the funeral, she consulted a local string oracle who, "for once . . . agreed with the modern-minded . . . Christian church attendants in giving a response of 'death by natural causes'."[207] Although she came away from the oracle satisfied her son was not the target of a witch's curse, the local populace was still convinced that witchcraft caused the boy's death, and they directed their suspicions at an old Twea woman who, when she was young had killed a large python that had troubled the village for years. According to the story,

> any normal woman would have been frightened to
> death and would have screamed in fear. But [the
> woman] waited calmly until the huge snake twisted
> around her thighs and reached her waist; then she
> slashed at the monster with her cutlass with all
> her strength several times and killed it.[208]

In other words, only a witch could have performed such a feat, and among the Nzema it is a well-known fact that when witches perform their magic, a toll is exacted upon the witch's next of kin. Since the old woman was in the dead boy's matrilineal line, he fell into that category.

The Platonic oppositional strategy underlying this

case study is unmistakable. The request for the regular rather than the brief funeral ceremony and the reluctance of the town elders and chief to grant the request reveal the various levels of friction between the populace, the town's political administration, and the two belief systems--Christianity and traditional--along with the systems' ideologies which infuse their cures and explanations of death. The townspeople's discussion of the boy's excellent condition prior to his death and his abilities as a swimmer provide the linguistic symbols whose denotations of witchcraft and conotations of the oppositions stemming from the social and moral frictions described above provide Grottanelli with the premises needed to support his proposition concerning the allegorical relationship between witchcraft and moral and social turbulence. As a result, Grottanelli's narrative regarding the Nzema boy's death forms the causal link between Grottanelli's theory and the Nzema and strengthens the hegemony residing in Plato's guiding finger. The images on Derrida's postcard, therefore, once again blur as Plato's countenance takes on characteristics of Grottanelli's visage and Socrates takes on distinctly Nzema features.

The rest of the case studies provided by Grottanelli are structured in the same way, for each focuses on a particular source of social or moral friction as a means

of setting up the oppositions needed to provide the prem-
ises supporting Grottanelli's allegorical theory. In "A
Wife's Curse," Grottanelli describes the context for his
observations as, once again, the death of a young man:
" . . . the sudden death of a strong and healthy young
person naturally comes as a shock to his relatives and
friends, urging them to find an explanation."[209] In this
case, the man divorced his first wife following the death
of their baby and a series of highly emotional arguments.
Soon after the divorce, the man took a new wife, a woman
with two children from a previous marriage that also ended
in divorce. Not long after their wedding, however, his
former parents-in-law met with him to persuade him of
their daughter's continued feelings of love for him:
". . . they assured him [his former wife] still loved him
dearly. They brought palm wine and 'illicit gin' to
pacify him . . . ; they pleaded for more than an hour;
they assured him that their daughter had promised she
would never again quarrel with him."[210] The man's anger
thus assauged, he agreed to remarry his former wife, and,
following the ceremonies, the three of them settled in the
Ivory Coast.

Life for the threesome was, at first, apparently
pleasant. Grottanelli notes that the wives were approxi-
mately the same age, had the same possessions, and shared
equally the bed of the husband. Thus, there was no

stimulus for jealousy. Troubles began, however, with the resumption of quarrels between the man and his first wife. According to Grottanelli,

> [the man] ordered [the second wife] to go and call [the first wife] who had just gone to visit a female neighbor in the village. As it became clear a few minutes later, the young man wanted to have intercourse with [the first wife] then and there. When she got home and was told why she was being summoned, [the first wife] flatly refused to comply. . . . . A violent quarrel followed, insults were exchanged, and to settle the matter [the husband] gave his first wife a good beating.[211]

In return, the first wife took one of her husband's cloths to a nearby stream where several neighbors saw her throw it into the water. The next day, the husband retrieved his cloth from where it had washed ashore and, as soon as it was dry, put it on. Grottanelli's informants on this case study commented on the foolish behavior of the husband regarding the wearing of the cloth:

> This was no doubt a serious imprudence on [the husband's] part. Even if he preferred not to believe that his wife had acted with evil intentions (that is, that the casting of the garment had been accompanied by a curse against him and

> an appeal to the stream deity), to be on the safe
> side he should have consulted a fetish
> priest . . . on the matter. Better still, he
> should not have retrieved the cloth himself, but
> rather obliged [his first wife] to do so and at
> the same time to withdraw the curse.[212]

Indeed, several days following his wearing the cloth, the husband became ill. The local herbalist's prescription failed to cure the husband's diarrhea and vomiting, his "strange gestures," or his convulsive shivers. Two hours later, the man was dead.

Following the arrival of his relatives from Ghana, the man's body was buried in his town's cemetery. Once again, the funeral offered the townspeople the opportunity to discuss the potential causes of the man's death. Since one explanation involved the first wife's curse, the relatives, angry over the possibility that she had cursed her husband, posthumously divorced the man and his first wife, an act that

> formally condemn[ed the first wife's] past behav-
> ior as a wife [and assured] that she would in no
> case be inherited as a wife by [the husband's]
> heirs and successors; indeed, it create[d] an
> obstacle to her ever remarrying a [man from the
> same tribe] in the future.[213]

Despite the fact that a number of the townspeople

suspected the first wife poisoned her husband, the man's relatives consulted a local fetish priestess who attempted to free the man's soul from its imprisonment by the stream god. For some reason, her effort was unsuccessful.

About one month after the husband's funeral, his second wife became ill and exhibited the same symptoms as her deceased husband did prior to his death. Her mother took her to a priestess of a curative cult imported from Ghana, and the priestess, after consulting with her gods, discovered she was being attacked by the same stream god who had imprisoned her husband's soul at the behest of the first wife. After following the directions of the priestess, however, the second wife showed few signs of improving. A Christian uncle, therefore, took her to a Catholic hospital where, after enduring the injections given her by the Sisters, her condition began to improve, and she began to make plans to resume caring for her children and to remarry. Nothing, apparently, was known of the first wife's situation following the second wife's return to health except for her fear that her dead husband's relatives would try to poison her or "curse her by giving her to some fetish god."[214]

Once again, the Platonic strategy of using structures generating oppositional symbols as a means of developing premises representing and supporting Grottanelli's allegorical theory is clearly at work in this case study. The

friction generated by the violent arguments between the husband and his first wife, both before his taking a second wife and afterwards, disrupts the peace of the village, in turn causing friction to develop between the townspeople and this particular family. Grottanelli notes that these arguments often bothered the neighbors to the extent that when "alerted by the noise of the dispute and by the [first wife's] shrill cries, [the neighbors would come] out of their huts and [spy on the combatants]."[215] This stress, when combined with that generated by the competing belief systems making up the Nzema traditional religion, Christianity, and the curative cult imported from Ghana, reveals itself in the linguistic symbols denoting witchcraft created by the people caught up in the social and moral tumult occasioned by a healthy man's death and the failure of traditional and quasitraditional methods of curing illness and explaining death.

Economic friction, coupled with the friction between Christianity with its representative hospitals, the quasi-traditional curative cult imported from Ghana, and the traditional Nzema religion, provides the starting point for Grottanelli's use of Plato's oppositional method of finding premises which lead to an a priori conclusion in "A Clear Diagnosis." In this case, a fifty-year-old, Catholic Twea fisherman who was plagued by a hernia was driven by relatives to a Christian hospital following a

fishing trip made unsuccessful by his condition and at-
tempts by his wife to ease his discomfort through the use
of a red pepper enema. Unfortunately, the hospital's
water supply had been disrupted, and although the attend-
ing doctor said the man needed an immediate operation,
there was nothing he could do because of the problems with
the water supply. As the man's condition appeared to be
deteriorating, the doctor arranged for an ambulance to
take the fisherman and his relatives to another hospital
where his hernia was repaired but where he died during the
course of the surgery.

The fisherman's wife showed little interest in finding
the reason for her husband's death, stating "she had had
enough of married life and of continuous child-
bearing . . . [and] would be content with continuing to
live in her late husband's compound" and that any further
investigation of her husband's death should properly be
carried out by "the [matrilineal] lineage of the deceased
person, not her."[216] However, some of the fisherman's
relatives did consult with a Ghanian curative cult's
Twelve Apostles priestess who gained her divine
information by casting cowrie shells. According to the
priestess,

> long ago [the fisherman] had a quarrel with a
> neighbor over a coconut plantation. This person
> 'gave' [the fisherman] to a god dwelling . . .

where the contended plantation was located. The
god expected to be pacified by [the fisherman's]
kinsfolk with some offering. But they failed to
do so, and he lost his patience at last, impri-
soning [the fisherman's soul] in his bush domain,
and causing [the fisherman] to die. The . . .
god was now still holding the soul in captivity
which made it imperative for the dead man's
lineage people to perform the customary rite for
the [soul's] deliverance.[217]

The fisherman's full brother supported the priestess's
claims, saying that he had actually seen the god when he
had gone to the family farms located in the same area and
that the god had caused him to become sick with the same
symptoms his deceased brother exhibited. The only reason
he was still alive was that he obtained a powerful medi-
cine from a fetish god priestess that had restored his
health.

After hearing the Twelve Apostles priestess's explana-
tion of his brother's death and after his own problems
with the stream god's anger, the fisherman's brother
agreed to have the cleansing rite performed. On the ap-
pointed day, however, he discovered a sheep was needed for
the rite to be consummated correctly, and none of the
local members of the lineage had either a sheep or the
money to purchase one. Thus, the cleansing rite never

took place, the fisherman's soul was never released, and the lineage remained open to further punishment by a stream god whose anger was envoked by a curse resulting from an economic conflict that had flared up during the dead fisherman's youth.

Grottanelli's oppositions derive here from the Nzema's distrust of things Western, the conflict between the competing belief systems of Christianity, traditional Nzema religion, and the imported Twelve Apostles curative cult as they seek adherents, the discord amongst people competing in a small-scale agricultural economy, and the emotional tumult felt by a family whose financial situation prevents them from escaping the wrath of a god. The Christian hospital personnel's explanation of a man's death during a relatively simple surgery does not satisfy the fisherman's non-Christian matrilineal relatives' emotional needs. When the further emotional frustrations derived from the relative successes of traditional Nzema religious practices and the Twelve Apostles cult and from economic and financial burdens are brought to bear, the linguistic symbols implying these oppositions are framed in terms of witchcraft. More importantly, through the rhetorical tether connecting the Nzema to Grottanelli's dominating proposition, the premises leading to Grottanelli's concluding witchcraft allegory develop, and the truthful and thus authoritative nature of his perspective

on both Nzema culture and ethnography firms up. In addition, the final sense of the relationship between Platonic method and Interpretive/Translative ethnography affirms itself: without the knowledge obtainable through Plato's syllogistic examination of a conclusion in order to find the premises needed to support that conclusion, Interpretive/Translative ethnography could not function.

It seems, then, that in these ethnographies representative of the Interpretive/Translative genre, the Platonic approach as typified by the "Phaedo" influences text as much as ethnology's field methods do. Moreover, it seems that textual authority in Interpretive/Translative ethnographies once again appears to be comprised of more than the ethnographer's actual presence within the studied culture. Indeed, it appears that textual authority in the Interpretive/Translative ethnographies is the reapplication of the hegemony of Plato's Socrates and is thus supportive of Jacques Derrida's comment that "'Platonism' . . . sets up the whole of Western metaphysics."[218] The strength of this dominative sense of authority is seen on two levels. First, the Interpretive/Translative ethnographer, as was true for the Realist ethnographers, must rely on an objectifying rhetoric to develop textual authority. From the analysis performed in the preceding pages, this sense of authority appears to be based on the use of the rhetoric of opposition exemplified in the

"Phaedo." More specifically, textual authority develops in
this process through a syllogistic investigation of oppo-
sitions which, when seen as the linguistic products of a
textualized structure, lead to the premises needed to
support that proposition. In addition, this syllogistic
investigation of symbols allows the development of a
domain outside of the studied culture. It is from this
perspective that the ethnographer objectivizes the members
of the culture, reducing them to data used to discover the
premises needed to substantiate the desired conclusion.
Moreover, it is from this perspective that the ethnogra-
pher can control the direction of the text and thus main-
tain the guise of the single guide capable of leading the
reader to truth. Finally, as the heirs of Plato's guiding
finger, the writers of ethnographies in the Interpretive/
Translative genre follow a line of causal reasoning that
allows theory to manipulate the data obtained from the
targeted culture.

On the second level, the Interpretive/Translative
ethnographer replaces Plato as the wielder of the
controlling finger, forcing the receiver of the digit's
tip to become, like Socrates, the unknowing means to an
end. The studied culture, therefore, becomes the subject
of a scripted sense of time and history. In this fashion,
the Interpretive/Translative ethnographer "authorizes"
both the studied culture and the ethnographer's own

statements and descriptions.

Perceived in this fashion, Interpretive/Translative ethnographers' attempts to attain James Clifford's ideal of understanding "the overall course of . . . [ethnographic] research as an ongoing negotiation"[219] are as troublesome as the Platonic dialogues. Both are deceptive in that the truths obtained by their writers are based not so much on oppositions but on a technique that allows the writers to assign priority to one thing over another. In other words, by prioritizing symbolic systems and their translations and interpretations, these ethnographers reemphasize the "dichotomy . . . established between structures (the thinkable) and the event considered as the site of the irrational, the unthinkable, and that which doesn't and cannot enter into the mechanism and play of analysis."[220] Or, in the words of Steven Webster, the Interpretive/Translative ethnographers have "simply reproduce[d] in a superstructure the equilibrating timeless systems which had earlier been constructed in the foundations [of Realist ethnography]."[221] More important, however, is the fact that the hegemony and ideology in Plato's dialogues have been maintained throughout Interpretive/Translative ethnography despite its adherents' intentions attempts to avoid them. The continuing effects of this maintenance will be examined the the next chapter.

Notes

[1] Jacques Derrida, <u>The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond</u> trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1987) 22.

[2] See, for example, the eight primary characteristics of realist ethnography and the hindrances they create in realist ethnography in George Marcus's and Dick Cushman's "Ethnographies as Texts," <u>Annual Review of Anthropology</u> 11 (1982): 31-32; and Steven Webster's condemnation of realist ethnography's "positivist" nature in "Realism and Reification in the Ethnographic Genre," <u>Ethnic and Racial Studies</u> 6 (Spring 1986): 43.

[3] For an example of how the Interpretive/Translative approach to writing ethnography has been supported, see Clifford Geertz's <u>The Interpretation of Culture</u> (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 10; for an example of how the Interpretive/Translative approach to writing ethnography has been condemned for its maintainance of the "anthropological irony," see Steven Webster's "Dialogue and Fiction in Ethnography," <u>Dialectical Anthropology</u> 7 (1982): 95.

[4] Plato, "Phaedo" <u>The Collected Dialogues of Plato</u> trans. Hugh Tredennick, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963) 59b.

[5] Plato, "Phaedo" 102d.

[6] Plato, "Phaedo" 58c.

[7] Plato, "Phaedo" 58e-59b.

[8] Plato, "Phaedo" 64c.

[9] Plato, "Phaedo" 99d.

[10] Plato, "Phaedo" 100b.

[11] Plato, "Phaedo" 104c.

[12] Plato, "Phaedo" 105e.

[13] Plato, "Phaedo" 67e-68a.

[14] Plato, "Phaedo" 61a.

[15] Plato, "Phaedo" 66a.

[16] Plato, "Phaedo" 68b-c.

[17] Plato, "Phaedo" 68c.

[18] Plato, "Phaedo" 65c.

[19] Plato, "Phaedo" 65c.

[20] Plato, "Phaedo" 65e.

[21] Norman Gulley, _Plato's Theory of Knowledge_ (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962) 25.

[22] Jasper Neel, _Plato, Derrida, and Writing_ (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988) 43.

[23] Clifford Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1960) 7.

[24] Plato, "Phaedo" 59b-c.

[25] Plato, "Phaedo" 84c-d.

[26] Geertz, _The Interpretation of Culture_ 30.

[27] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 355.

[28] Harold Bloom, _The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry_ (Oxford UP, 1973) 29.

[29] Geertz, _The Interpretation of Culture_ 5.

[30] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 4-5.

[31] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 7.

[32] Plato, "Phaedo" 59c-d.

[33] Gulley 31.

[34] Plato, "Phaedo" 73c.

[35] Plato, "Phaedo" 74d-e.

[36] Plato, "Phaedo" 76d-e.

[37] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 5.

[38] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 6.

[39] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 6-7.

[40] Neel 14.

[41] Edward W. Said, <u>Orientalism</u> (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 222-24.

[42] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 11.

[43] Ernesto Grassi, <u>Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition</u> (University Park: The Pennsylvania State U.P., 1980) 20.

[44] Grassi 20.

[45] Plato, "Phaedo" 84a-b.

[46] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 14.

[47] Plato, "Phaedo" 88d.

[48] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 14.

[49] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 17.

[50] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 17.

[51] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 17.

[52] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 17.

[53] Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 17.

[54] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 18.

[55] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 19.

[56] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 22.

[57] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 24.

[58] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 26.

[59] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 28.

[60] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 28.

[61] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 28.

[62] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 29.

[63] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 29.

[64] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 31.

[65] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 33.

[66] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 38.

[67] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 39.

[68] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 42.

[69] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 42-43.

[70] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 51.

[71] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 61.

[72] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 72.

[73] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 75.

[74] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 76.

[75] Plato, "Phaedo" 97d.

[76] Plato, "Phaedo" 97c.

[77] Plato, "Phaedo" 98c-99e.

[78] Plato, "Phaedo" 100d.

[79] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 127.

[80] Geertz, _The Religion of Java_ 121.

[81] Geertz, The Religion of Java 121.

[82] Geertz, The Religion of Java 125-126.

[83] Geertz, The Religion of Java 127.

[84] Geertz, The Religion of Java 127.

[85] Geertz, The Religion of Java 129.

[86] Geertz, The Religion of Java 129.

[87] Geertz, The Religion of Java 130.

[88] Geertz, The Religion of Java 130.

[89] Geertz, The Religion of Java 132.

[90] Geertz, The Religion of Java 133.

[91] Geertz, The Religion of Java 136.

[92] Geertz, The Religion of Java 142.

[93] Geertz, The Religion of Java 143.

[94] Geertz, The Religion of Java 145.

[95] Geertz, The Religion of Java 146.

[96] Geertz, The Religion of Java 151.

[97] Geertz, The Religion of Java 155.

[98] Geertz, The Religion of Java 155.

[99] Geertz, The Religion of Java 167.

[100] Geertz, The Religion of Java 171.

[101] Geertz, The Religion of Java 171.

[102] Geertz, The Religion of Java 179.

[103] Geertz, The Religion of Java 178.

[104] Geertz, The Religion of Java 178.

[105] Geertz, The Religion of Java 179.

[106] Geertz, The Religion of Java 181.

[107] Geertz, The Religion of Java 181.

[108] Geertz, The Religion of Java 191.

[109] Plato, "Phaedo" 102a.

[110] Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic. (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 47.

[111] Geertz, The Religion of Java 215.

[112] Geertz, The Religion of Java 217.

[113] Geertz, The Religion of Java 216.

[114] Geertz, The Religion of Java 216.

[115] Geertz, The Religion of Java 218.

[116] Geertz, The Religion of Java 219.

[117] Geertz, The Religion of Java 228.

[118] Geertz, The Religion of Java 229.

[119] Geertz, The Religion of Java 231.

[120] Geertz, The Religion of Java 232.

[121] Geertz, The Religion of Java 233.

[122] Geertz, The Religion of Java 261.

[123] Geertz, The Religion of Java 268-269.

[124] Geertz, The Religion of Java 273.

[125] Geertz, The Religion of Java 269.

[126] Geertz, The Religion of Java 291.

[127] Geertz, The Religion of Java 292.

[128] Geertz, The Religion of Java 295.

[129] Geertz, The Religion of Java 310.

[130] Geertz, The Religion of Java 312-313.

[131] Geertz, The Religion of Java 313-314.

[132] Geertz, The Religion of Java 339.

[133] Geertz, The Religion of Java 339-340.

134 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 348.

135 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 349.

136 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 7.

137 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 355.

138 Plato, "Phaedo" 118.

139 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 355.

140 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 365.

141 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 376-377.

142 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 379.

143 Geertz, <u>The Religion of Java</u> 381.

144 Derrida 250-251.

145 Kenneth Burke, <u>Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method</u> (Berkeley: U of California P, 1966) 350.

146 Burke 367.

147 Plato, <u>Phaedo</u> 107b.

148 David M. Schneider, <u>American Kinship: A Cultural Account</u> (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980) 4.

149 Burke 360.

150 Burke 361.

151 Burke 161.

152 Schneider 5.

153 Plato, "Phaedo" 99d.

154 Plato, "Phaedo" 99e.

155 Plato, "Phaedo" 101d-e.

156 Gulley 40.

157 Schneider 6.

158 Schneider 7.

159 Schneider 9-10.

160 Schneider 10.

161 Schneider 11-12.

162 Plato, "Phaedo" 76b.

163 Plato, "Phaedo" 103c.

164 Schneider 16-17.

165 Schneider 23.

166 Schneider 27.

167 Schneider 23.

168 Schneider 24.

169 Schneider 25.

170 Schneider 26.

171 Schneider 27.

172 Schneider 33.

173 Schneider 34.

174 Schneider 35.

175 Schneider 39.

176 Schneider 47.

177 Schneider 51.

178 Schneider 52.

179 Schneider 53-54.

180 Schneider 59.

181 Schneider 60.

182 Schneider 60.

183 Schneider 65.

184 Schneider 70.

185 Schneider 69-70.

186 Schneider 77.

187 Schneider 77.

188 Schneider 83.

189 The linguistic items included here come from Schneider 83-84. The categories of word formation, however, come from Thomas Pyles and John Algeo, The Origins and Development of the English Language, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982) and Garland Cannon, Historical Change and English Word Formation: Recent Vocabulary (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).

190 Schneider 89.

191 Schneider 8.

192 The concept of the ontological difference as it develops from types is thoroughly discussed by Edward W. Said in his Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 259. Although Said's focus is on the social scientist living in "a culture . . . profoundly different from [his] own" (260), Schneider's removed stance allows him to view American culture from the same perspective and with the same results as Said's Orientalists.

193 Plato, "Phaedo" 105b.

194 Schneider 107.

195 Schneider 107.

196 Schneider 117.

197 Vinigi L. Grottanelli, The Python Killer: Stories

of <u>Nzema</u> <u>Life</u> (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1988) 1.

[198] Grottanelli 198.

[199] Grottanelli 196.

[200] Grottanelli 26.

[201] Grottanelli 27.

[202] Grottanelli 30.

[203] Grottanelli 31.

[204] Grottanelli 35.

[205] Grottanelli 199.

[206] Grottanelli 36.

[207] Grottanelli 40.

[208] Grottanelli 40.

[209] Grottanelli 42.

[210] Grottanelli 42-43.

[211] Grottanelli 43.

[212] Grottanelli 43-44.

[213] Grottanelli 47.

[214] Grottanelli 49.

[215] Grottanelli 43.

[216] Grottanelli 66.

[217] Grottanelli 68.

[218] Jacques Derrida, <u>Writing</u> <u>and</u> <u>Difference</u> trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 279.

[219] James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," <u>Representations</u> 1:2 (1983): 135.

[220] Michel Foucault, <u>Power/Knowledge</u>: <u>Selected</u>

Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) 113.

[221] Steven Webster, "Ethnography as Storytelling,"

<u>Dialectical</u> <u>Anthropology</u> 8 (1983) 188.