

Setting the Boundary Conditions for Democratic Peace

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In the arena of international politics there is a curious phenomenon called democratic peace. This is the historical trend that countries of a democratic regime rarely use force against fellow democracies. Explanations have been offered in a number of studies which include the normative, structural, and political incentive models. Each of these demonstrate certain characteristics of democratic regimes that facilitate nonviolent interactions when confronted with a conflict involving another democracy.

Democratic peace has been forwarded through three major explanatory theories. All of these, despite their differences, seem to focus around two premises of proof: that (a) democracies have rarely come to arms against each other, and (b) that democratic regimes are just as war prone as the nondemocratic regimes (Maoz and Abdolali, 31). In other words, democracies are equally as likely to get involved in conflicts as non-democracies, just not with each other.

Currently, these theories assume that democratic peace is a stable effect that has been proven empirically. This essay sets out to illustrate that when certain variables, or dimensions, are altered, this effect begins to break down. The variables that will be investigated in this study belong in two issue areas: the economic and the strategic. These dimensions will be manipulated into core and peripheral conditions that will help to pinpoint the exact situations in each that lead to a deterioration of democratic peace. In other words, both economic and strategic threats to the democratic regime will include core versus periphery variables that will distinguish the threshold, if any, where democratic peace fails.

Specifically, this study is interested in changing the effect within the political incentive model. As will be illustrated later, Mintz and Geva established the lack of political incentives and benefits involved in a conflict between two democracies as a cause of democratic peace. With the introduction of certain industry-specific economic

incentives and intensified strategic threats, however, will we see a breakdown in the theory? In the light of economic and strategic survival, will these 'democratic norms' that facilitate peace be put at the wayside? These questions will be approached in an experimental design with eight separate manipulations. The manipulations are in respect to three variables: regime type, dimension (economic and strategic), and locus (core and periphery).

Democratic Peace: Normative Causes

The normative model of democratic peace (Maoz and Russett, 3) suggests that the phenomenon can be explained through the political and social norms developed and adapted within democratic regimes. This is progressed through the following set of assumptions.

1. "States externalize...the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions" (ibid., 3).
2. "The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and non democratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than the former" (ibid.. 4).

The first assumption implies not only that a democracy has certain unique political and social norms developed to "characterize their domestic political processes," but that the state will apply such norms to the international scene when dealing with foreign states, thus externalizing. These norms, as defined by Maoz and Russett, include political competition through peaceful means, the art of compromise, and peacefully regulated transfer of power. Despite the "winner take all" scenarios in American politics (national elections), the rights of the loser are guaranteed (ibid,p. 4). The nondemocratic regimes experience almost exact opposite norms of behavior. For instance, theirs is the elimination of the loser in political competition, violence and coercion are the methods of achieving political decisions, and transfer of power is

generally violent and unregulated (ibid., 4). When these peace-loving, compromising democracies enter the anarchic realm of international politics they bring with them these norms of behavior. Political processes involving specifically democracies, then, can obviously be seen as peaceful. Since, however, the world is not exclusively democratic, there are political interactions involving both democratic and nondemocratic actors. The case of conflict arising in such an interaction brings us to the second assumption.

The highest value of a state is the endurance of survival as implied by the second assumption of Maoz and Russett. This is pursued above all else. In the face of a threat to a state's survival due to "their application of domestically developed political norms" (ibid., 4), a state will alter their norms to that established by the rival. It continues that democratic norms are highly susceptible to exploitation by that of nondemocratic regimes. Thus, when conflict arises with a non democracy, the democracy alters norms to that of violence and forceful interaction to ensure its own survival and success. This is a phenomenon that only occurs in the presence of threatening, nondemocratic norms. When faced with a conflict with a fellow democracy, the interaction is peacefully resolved in the light that neither state feels as if their domestically developed political norms are being threatened.

Democratic Peace: Structural Causes

The phenomenon of democratic peace has also been explained by Maoz and Russett (1991) through structural causes. This has been advanced through the following assumptions:

1. "International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action." (Maoz and Russett, 6)

2. "Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies." (ibid., 7)

Inherent within the first assumption is the implication that the leaders of democratic regimes are answerable to the constituency. These leaders depend upon the people and public approval for legitimacy in the actions they take throughout all realms of politics. This authority by legitimacy is unique to democratic regimes. Since the general public is hesitant to sacrifice human lives and economic costs that are frequently associated with conflict, these people must be convinced that the ends justifies the means. Thus, this reduces the number of goals that can be presented to democratic societies for involvement in conflict. In non democracies, the only support needed for international actions is from those participants in the regime that lend to the authority of leader (military, controlling party, etc.) Therefore, there is no concern for public opinion. When initiating into use of force scenarios, there is no limiting factors inhibiting the actions of the regime once the support of the key groups is secured (Maoz and Russett, 7).

Leaders of democracies, then, find themselves inhibited when they become involved in international conflict. To launch its policy, an administration must first justify the actions to the general public, which, by the way, is extremely diverse, and then gain its approval. Because of the complexity involved in approaching such policies, the leaders of democracies often are reluctant to use force. From a practical level, the time element of a democracy to approve the use of force is greatly increased due to such complexity. Thus, when two democracies find themselves in an extremely conflictual situation, the "complexity of the joint mobilization process is such that by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have long found a nonmilitary solution to the conflict." (ibid., 7) However, in the case that a conflict between a democracy and

a nondemocracy is at hand, the situational time element is driven by the lack of constraints seen in the latter (ibid., 8). In other words, when such a scenario presents itself, the quick actions of the nondemocracy force the democracy into an emergency. Normal political mobilization processes are then circumvented and the democracy finds itself being hurled into conflict at an unusually fast rate. The economic and/or strategic dimension of this theory may provide the "emergency" situation causing this effect. We are suggesting that a democracy not only will feel threatened by a military action taken by target nation, but economic and strategic threats, as well. Therefore, democracies are more likely to get involved in escalated conflicts with one another under manipulations of the boundary conditions.

Democratic Peace: Political Incentive Explanations

The political incentive explanation for democratic peace, as advanced by Mintz and Geva (1993), suggests a different approach to the tendency for democracies to avoid conflict with one another. In contrast to other explanations, this theory does not focus on the structural or normative characteristics of a democracy as the foundation for democratic peace. Rather, the lack of potential political benefits and incentives in using force against a fellow democracy explains the phenomenon (Mintz and Geva, 486). The use of force against a fellow democracy is viewed by the public as a failure of foreign policy (Mintz and Geva, 489). They hypothesized:

...that the public is unfavorable to the use of force against a democracy as contrasted with its use against a nondemocratic country, when all other conditions are held constant. In addition, the public will consider the use of force against a democracy as more of a failure of foreign policy than when use of force is being applied... against a nondemocratic regime (Mintz and Geva, 490).

In the light that leaders are seeking public approval for their actions, the use of force against a democracy is less likely to be undertaken. Hence, democracies would have a

tendency to avoid conflict with each other because of anticipated political costs. Mintz and Geva (1993) experimentally supported their findings and concluded that such a hypothesis is a valid and legitimate explanation for democratic peace.

All of these explanations for democratic peace can be boiled down to normative foundations. The development and utilization of democratic norms in the international arena of politics is foundationally the primary cause of democratic peace. In a democracy, where conflicts are resolved peacefully, compromise is the dominant form of interaction between opponents. The 'inhibitor' of the structural cause is seen as the political mobilization process to rally support for the use of force option. The option to use force is theoretically in opposition to the domestically developed norms of political competition. Where there is peaceful transfer of power, the option to use force against a fellow democracy takes time to mobilize for support. Essentially, the justification would be to show that the situation at hand is an exception and must be treated as such. Thus, due to the developed norms of society, the inhibitor of the structural cause of democratic peace is created. Hence, the essence of the structural cause is rooted in the normative explanation.

The political incentive model also gets its justification from normative reasons. Why is it that using force against a democracy is considered a failure of foreign policy? The lack of potential benefits and incentives when escalating conflict with fellow democracies stems from the attitude of the demos that the use of force is a last resort option especially concerning states of shared values and similar political alignment. This attitude is a product of democratic, peace-loving norms. The use of force against a democracy is in total violation of such norms, hence the perception of policy failure.

In summation, the normative explanation of democratic peace seems to be the foundational cause of such a phenomenon. The other models are valid, but derive their effects as a product of the norms unique to a democratic regime. Are these norms

stable in light of other variables? Maoz and Russett (1991) tested for such influences as wealth, economic growth, contiguity, common alliance bonds, and political stability to illustrate that democratic peace was not spurious. Their results yielded the conclusion that such influences were not involved, or in the case of political stability, at such a minute level to be of no significance. There was no test, however, for the presence of economic or strategic military threats to the survival of the democratic state.¹ For instance, if a state stands to lose economically by not using force, or if it stands to gain by doing so, or a combination thereof, will the probability of escalated conflict with other democratic regimes increase? Are democratic norms stable in the presence of "economic threats", and will the use of force in such a scenario continue to be viewed as a failure of policy? The theory of economic liberalism will be looked at for its explanation of the cause of international peace. This can be used to develop the hypothesis of 'economic norms', as opposed to the democratic norms of conflict resolution, dominating foreign policy in conflict, with a disregard of regime type. These 'economic norms' are those that dictate a regime acting in the best interest of its economy. In addition, can a similar argument be made for the strategic dimension? This study intends to set the boundary conditions for democratic peace in the strategic, as well as the economic dimensions. For instance, I hypothesize there are situations or conditions for strategic threats that will increase the propensity to use force against another democracy. A series of experiments will use hypothetical scenarios of strategic and economic threats. As seen later, these threats will be broken into core and peripheral manipulations, where some threats will inherently carry a higher priority over others.

¹ Our economic variable is distinctive from the "wealth" variable tested by Maoz and Russett because it has no regard for the economical standing of the democracy in question. Whereas "wealth" is a measure of the economical prowess of the nation being tested, our variable is external - deriving from an incentive originating outside the nation's purse.

Dual Distinctions

It is appropriate to introduce the duality of the dimensions that are possibly threatening democratic peace. In this particular piece of research, I have theorized that a dimension's effect will vary according to the scope of its hedonic relevance. In the first experiment that I conducted the dual economy is illustrated; that is, the distinction between the large ('core') and the smaller ('periphery') sectors in the national economy (Gilpin 1987). Oster (1978) described the U.S. economy as composed of ' a core of powerful, concentrated, unionized, capital-intensive, technologically progressive industries, and a periphery marked by the absence of these features.' Core firms are huge firms, employing thousands of workers with a diversified set of products. They 'employ different technologies and operate on quite a different scale while shaping the market for their products rather than responding to the market' (Mintz and Russett, 1992). The periphery, on the other hand, are much smaller, family run firms, employing a few workers and producing only one or a limited range of products. They have a simple organizational structure and most of the time can only react to how the market is shaping the economy. Thus, core firms have much greater economic and political pull, and far greater control over the inputs and demand for their products.

In the United States it is easy to see the distinction between the core and peripheral economies. However, in light of the diversity of entities involved in the U.S. market, it is hard to pin down a core 'industry', that is, one particular entity that stands as the largest contributor to the economy of the United States. In Mintz and Russett (1992), the core industry sector of Israel's economy was identified as being composed of three separate firms. These entities employ a major proportion of the people, contribute the largest share of the country's GNP, and some are in close alliance with the major political parties. In the United States, such distinction between entities is difficult to distinguish. This study has designated the energy industry as one of the core sectors of the American economy. A disruption in the petroleum and subsequent

energy supplies to the United States is an illustration of a threat to the 'core interests' of the American markets. This was demonstrated during the Ford Administration, when actions by OPEC created chaos in the American markets.

In addition, this distinction of effects must be extended into other dimensions. When experimenting with the strategic dimension of democratic peace, we have separated the scenarios into the extremity of their effects. For example, as with the distinction of dual economies discussed above, a variable can be classified as having a 'core' versus a 'peripheral' set of conditions in the strategic/military sphere. In the experiment reported below, the core manipulation of the strategic dimension involves the trade of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to enemies of the United States by another nation. The peripheral variable merely alters the arms trade to conventional weaponry as opposed to mass destruction devices. It can be seen that while both of these scenarios present a strategic threat to the democracy under investigation, the core variable carries a far higher priority because of the severity of the threat involved. That is how the 'core'/'peripheral' distinction is made in the strategic dimension based on the severity of the threat.

Economic Liberalism

Alternative theories for the explanation of international peace include of economic liberalism. This is the premise that the stability of peace is mainly a function of international economic considerations. "The key to achieving peace is establishment of an international economic system that fosters prosperity for all states. The taproot of stability, according to this theory, is the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order that allows free economic exchange between states. Such an order works to dampen conflict and enhance political cooperation..." (Mearsheimer, 42). This process of cooperation works in three ways. States are more economically satisfied and therefore tend to be more peaceful. Such an economic order fosters economic

interdependence among states (Mearsheimer, 43). If states are interdependent, then they are mutually vulnerable. This vulnerability discourages cheating or aggressive behavior in the marketplace, resulting in peaceful cooperation. This argument is furthered with the third premise of the neo-Kantian theory:

The free market policies associated with the democratic states lead to a cooperative international division of labor and to trade based on comparative advantage. Democratic states thus acquire mutual economic advantages that give them an incentive to avoid policies that cause their democratic trading partners to break mutual economic linkages (Doyle 1993; James and Mitchell 1994).

Finally, with such cooperation, the development of political "superstates" will emerge. These are international regimes that are so powerful that they assume an independent life of their own (Mearsheimer, 44).

Certain aspects can be used to support the theory of economic norms and democratic peace. The application of economic liberalism democratic peace involves the resulting conflict in the case of these policies being abandoned. The resolution of this conflict is of special interest to this study. The question is simply, "How would these conflicts be resolved?" The fact that free economic exchange leads to political cooperation and a dampening of conflict has historical legitimacy. In cases where there is a curtailing of such economic policies, there is commonly a conflict of some sort as a result. This scenario also inhibits political cooperation. In a case where such exchange is threatened or denied where it had existed previously, is it common that a populace justify using force as a resolution? In a democracy where peaceful norms prevail, when the economic status quo is threatened do the people ignore the traditional democratic behaviors in light of economic norms? This essay argues that in the presence of external economic incentives, there will be a reduced sensitivity to regime type of the target when considering the use of force option. When the economic order set up in the economic liberalism theory is threatened, a democracy is

more likely to override traditional norms for the adoption of new behaviors that secure economic stability.

Modeling Strategic Threats

Sakurai, in his study evaluating the importance of accurately modeling strategic threats in complex multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems, gives insight into the decision making strategies behind leaders evaluating international conflicts. It is required to establish the multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems that facilitate these results. These situations are those in which there are multiple decision makers who "typically have differing but not necessarily antithetical preferences about the final outcome (Sakurai, 74). His study revealed that strategic threats may be "important factors for the accurate descriptive representation" of decision making (Ibid., 90).

When applied to the above theories of democratic peace and economic liberalism, the strategic dimension may also stand to find itself outside the effect of democratic peace. In searching for the conflicts that force a political leader to revert to the use of force, strategic threats play a large role in the development of those decisions. Several historical conflicts have been fought against nondemocracies for strategic reasons. Lack of conflict between democracies on strategic issues can be justified in that democracies usually fail to strategically threaten other democracies because of structural and normative reasons.

In summation, the hypothesis of this study is that external economic incentives and strategic threats give rise to certain competitive norms that dismiss previous peaceful norms held in a democratic regime. In other words, when a state stands to gain economically through the use of force or lose through not using force there might be a reduction in the sensitivity to regime type in consideration of the force option. Also, if a state is found in strategic danger the propensity to use force would increase regardless of the regime of the aggressor. In addition, the propensity of the *favorable*

acceptance of the use of force against a democracy with economic incentives or strategic implications will be more equal to that of its use against nondemocracies.

Research Design

The design of our experiments was a three-factor between-groups design with the first factor being regime type of the aggressor, the second was the dimension (economic or strategic) where within lay the threat, and the third factor was the distinction between a core and a peripheral locus of effect. A situation was presented in a counterfactual scenario outlining the specific manipulations of the three factors mentioned above. Following the scenario were questions designed to define the subject's opinion of three policy options (discussed later), the subject's perception of the aggressor, and their choice of policy in the crisis.

The Economic Dimension : Core vs. Periphery Economic Incentives

In the first experiment, we were expanding upon Trusty and Minch's original study investigating whether or not economic incentives with no distinction as to the locus of effect would weaken the phenomenon of democratic peace. We arranged an experiment involving a hypothetical crisis. The options of action to resolve the crisis included the use of force as well as blockade and isolationism. The experiment was designed similarly to Mintz and Geva (1993), however, with alterations.

Previously, it was hypothesized by Trusty that external economic incentives would weaken democratic peace. It was found, however, that such a variable did not reduce sensitivity to regime type, but did affect certain perceptions of the target nation. These changes in perceptions served to indicate that if the right sector of the economy were threatened, we might have a significant result. Therefore, we are investigating whether changes in the 'core' industry versus those in a more peripheral sector would break down the inhibitions of democratic nations when involved in conflict with one another.

In this experiment we were investigating whether subjects would be more likely to use force against another democracy if there was a strain on the core or periphery economy. The initial scenario was the same for the democratic regime with the strain placed on the core economy. The situations of democratic regime with a periphery economy, nondemocratic with a core economy and nondemocratic with a periphery economy were uniquely designed to express such characteristics.

The scenario outlined that one state, Jacobo, had invaded its island neighbor, Mahashi. The target nation was now in control of the world's largest petroleum deposits. In the core economy variable, it was established that the globe's major source of petroleum was being exploited by an unreasonable and self serving nation. Justified by grudges held against Mahashi, the country of Jacobo invaded and seized control of the Mahashian wells. The invasion of Mahashi and acquired control over the wells allowed Jacobo to double the price of petroleum and cause inflationary trends throughout the United States. This variable was introduced with both the democratic and nondemocratic regime types of the aggressor. In contrast, for the periphery economic test, it was described that Mahashi was the number one exporter of consumer electronic goods. The Jacobo invasion gave them control of 78% of the world's electronics market. As in the core scenario, Jacobo proceeded to double the exporting tariffs of these goods, causing inflation throughout the United States.

In the regime type variable, the students were either exposed to the democratic or nondemocratic condition. In the democratic condition, the subjects were told that the invading country had done so as a result of a democratic decision with the majority support of its parliament and people. The nondemocratic condition outlined the invasion as originating from a dictator with military backing. It was clear that the decision to invade was made with the understanding that there was no need for public support.

The scenarios (in all cases) ended with the outline of three possible policy options of the democratic response. It was expressed that all of these alternatives were being considered by the President, his cabinet, and the National Security Council.

The options were:

1The "use of force" - in the immediate vicinity of the area of conflict was a United States naval force that could intervene quickly. The force of the fleet was significantly larger than that of the aggressor's total military power. Such an intervention by the U.S. could force compliance.

2The "blockade"- The naval force could be used to blockade the invader in support of international sanction designed to force him to comply to demands of the international community.

3"Isolationism"- No military action could be taken by the United States, due to the more pressing economic problems at home.

The Strategic Dimension : Core vs. Peripheral Strategic Threats

When attempting to set the boundary conditions for democratic peace it is possible there are several other dimensions to be explored beyond the economic. The second purpose of this study was to investigate the strategic dimension that would instigate the use of force on a democracy by another. As with the economic dimension this variable was distinguished into core and peripheral effects. The core and peripheral manipulations were applied across both regime types to ensure internal validity.

In the core scenario, the country of Bandar was trading nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to nondemocratic enemies of the United States. Bandar had been experiencing economic crunches and saw the lucrative trade of weapons proliferation as the solution. The United States and its allies strongly discouraged Bandar from taking such action, going so far as to condemn the trade agreements. Despite the international pressures, the trade continued and Bandar moved to defend its shipments.

The peripheral scenario outlined a similar situation of weapons trade by Bandar to the enemies of the United States. Instead of the agreements including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, however, it was the transfer of conventional weapons. This variable would perhaps continue to maintain its strategic threat, but reduce its severity. Introducing a lower priority threat gives time to the United States and its allies to work out diplomatic solutions, hopefully discouraging the use of force. As with the core scenario, Bandar was refusing to halt its arms trade with the third world, and was in fact moving to defend its weapon shipments. The questions following both types of scenarios were nearly identical to the economic tests. The subjects were presented with three possible forms of action: use of force, blockade, and isolationism. The questions asked for approval ratings of these options and for their perceptions of Bandar.

In both core and peripheral scenarios the regime type of Bandar was manipulated to either democratic or nondemocratic. In the democratic regime manipulation the Prime Minister and Parliament of Bandar had democratically arrived at the decision to enter the arms trade agreements, and to defend it against the United States and its allies. The nondemocratic case had the dictator of Bandar arriving at the same decisions single handedly. The dictator did, however, have the approval of the military. This granted his legitimacy to maintenance of power in a nondemocracy.

Experimental Procedure

The experiment was administered to undergraduate students from Texas A&M University. The total size of the subject pool numbered 196. The students participated in the normal classroom environment where they were presented a booklet designed for the study of political attitude formation. After reading the scenario in the first two to four pages of the packet, they were instructed to complete a questionnaire. Following the three alternatives for policy options, the subjects were asked a series of questions

designed to interpret their attitudes and perceptions regarding the crisis. For example, they were asked how they perceived the aggressor, its similarity to the United States, and the effectiveness of each of the outlined policy options. The questions were constructed to include the following measures:

- 1 10-point approval rating scales of the three options (use of force, blockade, and isolationism);
- 2 The questions pertaining to the perceived differences of the target nation compared to the United States when framed in different regime types with altering economic incentives were measured by bipolar scales of 10 points; and
- 3 Questions regarding perceptions of aggressiveness and various other attributes of the target nation were measured on the same 10-point bipolar scales.

Following the experiment, subjects were debriefed as to the concepts and intentions of the study.

The Experiments

Regime Sensitivity - Internal Validity

To assess the internal validity of the experiments, the first investigation made was the subjects' sensitivity to the regime manipulations. This effect was observed at a significant level in the one-way analysis of variance (Figure 1.A). In all cases where the aggressor was defined as nondemocratic, the students identified that nation as such. In other words, in all manipulations of the dimension and locus variables, the nondemocratic target nation was seen as significantly dictatorial ($M=8.07$). The subject responses in the democratic conditions did not indicate perceptions that were as definitive, but the effect was still present. Despite that regime orientation was not as defined in all manipulations of the democratic conditions ($M=6.79$), what is important is that the democratic targets were seen as more democratic than the nondemocratic ones. These results were significant ($F=15.35, p>.0001$) in strengthening the theory of democratic peace, while also supporting the internal validity of these experiments.

Perceptions of the Target Nation

The key results in this set of experiments rest in the perceptions of the target nation by the subjects. First of all, Figure 2 represents the impression of the target nation as bad to good on a ten point scale with respect to regime type and locus of effect ($F=5.36, p=.0217$). It can be seen that the democratic target in the core manipulations was seen as relatively *less bad* ($M=3.76$) than the nondemocratic target ($M=3.26$). The democratic target in the peripheral manipulations were seen as *more bad* ($M=2.98$) than the nondemocratic ($M=3.58$). These results are not significant. Secondly, Figure 3 illustrates the stable to unstable impression of the target nation ($F=15.298, p>.0001$). This figure shows the relationship between this impression and the dimension being tested. The results suggest that the impression of target involved in the strategic scenario as definitively more unstable ($M=6.907$) than the target in the economic tests ($M=5.636$).

Thirdly, the impression of the target nation as democratic to dictatorial in nature was seen in two separate effects. The first (Figure 1.A), as mentioned above, provides the internal validity of the experiments by maintaining the regime sensitivity of the subjects across variable manipulations. The second (Figure 1.B), illustrates a deeper relationship within this impression scale ($F=6.91, p=.0093$). It is seen here that in the economic dimension the nondemocratic target nation is seen as decidedly more dictatorial ($M=8.49$), than the democratic target ($M=6.00$). The strategic dimension is the notable test in that the democratic and nondemocratic targets are seen as nearly equivalent in their democratic/dictatorial rating ($M=7.56, 7.63$). The final significant

results involving target impressions is seen in Figure 4 ($F=4.27$, $p=.0403$) where the effect is between the similarity/dissimilarity the target has to the United States in respect to dimension and locus. These results illustrate in the strategic dimension that the target is seen as less similar in the core ($M=8.38$) than in the peripheral manipulations ($M=7.55$). The economic dimension saw a different relationship with the peripheral conditions seen as less similar ($M=7.72$) than the core ($M=7.27$).

The democratic/dictatorial perceptions of the aggressor are the key results in this set of experiments. It is very interesting to note the markedly dictatorial impression of target nations within the strategic dimension ($F=6.91$, $p=.0093$) across regime types. They suggest that the act of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction overpowers the distinction between the regime types of the adversary. This is key in that it suggests the success of future tests on the strategic boundaries of democratic peace. The perceptions as to the political orientation of the aggressor play a significant role in the approval of the use of force.

The Policy Options

In testing of both dimensions, manipulations of various economic incentives and strategic threats failed to produce significant results indicating an increased propensity to *use force* against democracies. In other words, within both economic and strategic tests, there was no significant results with respect to the three way interaction of variables and an increased propensity to use force against a democratic aggressor. The only result that was even close to significant with a ($p=.0906$) was the effect of regime type and locus of effect. In other words, this was the result of regime vs. core

and peripheral effects, with no consideration for dimension. What was seen was that the difference of means in the core condition across the regime manipulations was less ($M=6.24, 6.74$) than that of the peripheral scenarios ($M=6.75, 5.84$). Again, though, these results are not considered significant, but their possible implications will be discussed later.

The results of the blockade option were of interest, however, despite their lack of relation to the key results. It is here that inferences can be drawn as to how subjects prioritize threats to determine policy options. With a significance level of $p=.0006$ and an F score of 12.127, the results of tests in the strategic dimension indicate an increased propensity to initiate a blockade in the democratic condition where core interests are present (Figure 5.A). This increased propensity can be seen in the democratic condition with $M=8.00$, over the nondemocratic ($M=7.61$). The peripheral manipulation of the same experiment strengthens the internal validity of the test by maintaining the democratic peace phenomenon. In the peripheral tests the democratic condition saw a lower approval for blockade ($M=7.00$) than the dictatorial ($M=8.08$). The economic scenarios (Figure 5.B) were interesting in that they illustrated a higher approval of blockade for the democratic condition in the *peripheral* manipulation. Blockade was more popular ($M=8.64$) against democratic targets in the peripheral economic cases than against nondemocratic ($M=6.56$). The core manipulations, however, saw the opposite where the blockade was less popular for democratic targets than nondemocratic.

The isolationism results exhibited the opposite effect of the blockade option (Figures 6.A/B). Reason for that could be found in the preference of blockade vs. isolationism in strategic vs. economic threats, which will be discussed later in the paper. In contrast to blockade results, within the strategic tests there was a higher approval of isolationism for the democratic condition in the *peripheral* manipulation ($M=3.14, 1.96$). In addition, the same effect was seen in the *core* manipulation of the economic scenarios ($3.44, 1.77$). These results were significant ($F=11.52, p=.0008$).

In summation, the key results within the policy option tests rests within the blockade results ($F=12.127, p=.0006$). Such a high approval for the blockade across the manipulations of regime type is very interesting in that it suggests an inherent characteristic concerning the nature of the threats presented in the scenarios to suggest the use of a blockade option.

Perceptions of Policy Options

The final set of significant results obtained by these experiments involved certain perceptions of the policy options themselves. The first of these is seen in Figures 7.A/B, applying to the use of force if and only if a blockade initially fails. Illustrated in Figure 7.A is the three-way interaction between the strategic dimension, regime type, and locus of effect ($F=6.804, p=.0098$). In summation, the propensity to use force in the case of a failed blockade against democratic targets is higher ($M=6.48$) for core strategic conditions than for peripheral strategic conditions ($M=5.77$). The economic dimension (Figure 7.B) produced different results in that the statistics suggested a lower propensity to use force against democratic targets for core economic conditions ($M=6.57$) than for the peripheral ($M=7.68$).

The second significant result in this area of interest concerns the use of force as a result of an irresponsible decision making process. The interaction here is between dimension and locus of effect ($F=4.36, p=.0381$). As seen in Figure 8, the use of force is seen as considerably more irresponsible for core manipulations of the economic dimension ($M=3.57$) than for the core manipulations of the strategic dimension ($M=2.66$). The peripheral tests illustrate the opposite effect, with the economic seen as more irresponsible than the strategic dimension ($M=2.46, 2.96$).

The final observations that are on the verge of significance involve the interaction between regime type and dimension with respect to the use of force as expected action of the United States because of its superpower status ($F=3.76, p=.0541$). These statistics are illustrated in Figure 9. It is seen that the use of force is more expected of the United States against the nondemocratic targets in the strategic dimension ($M=5.12$) as opposed to the the democratic ($M=4.41$). In contrast, the economic dimension provides results suggesting that the use of force is more expected against democratic targets ($M=5.92$) than nondemocratic ($M=5.02$).

Discussion

The initial introduction of economic considerations into the theory of democratic peace was an attempt to illustrate that there are boundary conditions to the statement that 'democracies avoid clashes with one another.' If democratic norms are what keep democracies out of conflict with each other, are there any influences that undermine these norms? It was the purpose of these experiments to show, through theoretical analysis and empirical experimentation, that certain 'norms' will rise to overrule the peace-loving norms of democracies in the face of economic incentives. In addition, it was hypothesized that there are strategic threats, as well, that will buckle the phenomenon of democratic peace.

To begin, the internal validity of the study was upheld through the maintenance of regime sensitivity across variable manipulations. To continue on the perception of the target nation as democratic or dictatorial, there was a very interesting interaction between dimension and regime type. In summation, the results were significant in illustrating that the strategic dimension produced nearly equivalent ratings between democratic and nondemocratic targets. The economic dimension showed a definite difference, where the nondemocratic targets were rated as being considerably more dictatorial. When there are strategic threats being held against the United States, however, the subjects rated both democratic and nondemocratic targets as definitively dictatorial. This can be explained in the expectations of democratic regimes. It can be justified that a democracy engage in economic warfare for the benefit of its economy, but strategic/military threats seem to be reserved for nondemocracies only.

As for proof of the hypothesis of this study, there were no significant results suggesting an increased propensity to use force against democracies in either dimension and the variable loci. The results mentioned earlier that were on the verge of significance ($p=.0906$), were the interaction between regime type and locus. As seen above, the difference of means in the core condition across regime manipulations was less than the difference in the peripheral tests. What this suggests is that the introduction of economic and strategic threats decreased the view that the use of force against democracies is a failure of foreign policy, especially in the core conditions. The peripheral conditions continued to see a sizeable difference between the approval for the use of force against a democracy versus a nondemocracy. The experiments conducted earlier by Trusty and Minch illustrated such an effect for the core manipulation of the economic dimension. In the first set of experiments conducted these authors, they noted that with the introduction of a specific industry effect, the energy sector, there was found a significant relationship between the propensity to use force across regime type and economic variables. The subjects were much more

willing to use force against any nation, democratic or not, if they were confronted with a threat to our core economy. This is a significant find and improved the expectations of our experiment (Trusty and Minch, 18). This series of tests, however, neglected to show such results. Possible explanations could be found in the smaller sample size and a less diversified subject pool. There were, however, other significant statistics that were extremely interesting. The blockade option showed surprising popularity amongst the subjects in both dimension tests. Across variables there was a high approval rating for the blockade option, with the lowest mean being in the nondemocratic condition of the peripheral economic manipulation ($M=6.56$). In the strategic dimension, there was a higher approval for blockade in the core manipulation involving democratic targets than the peripheral variable of the same regime type. These results can easily be explained as the urgency suggested in the core scenarios. When there are nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons being transferred, subjects are more willing to use a blockade than when there are conventional weapons, for obvious reasons. As for why the peripheral conditions saw a higher rating than core in nondemocratic tests, only presumptions can be made. Possibly, in the case where nondemocratic targets are trading weapons of mass destruction, we would be less favorable to a blockade because of a higher tendency for the use of force in those scenarios. Again, this is only a presumption.

The isolationism option yielded significant results that can only provide speculation. The graphs of the isolationism option, illustrating the three-way interaction between regime, dimension, and locus, have diametrical slopes to the blockade results. In other words, in the strategic dimension of the blockade option there was a higher approval for democratic, core manipulations than for democratic and peripheral. On the other hand, the strategic tests of the isolationism option suggest a lower approval for democratic, core variations than for democratic, peripheral. The possible explanation can be seen that a subject finds the options of blockade and isolationism

as presented in the experiments as mutually exclusive. Where a subject would rate a high approval for a cell (strategic, democratic, core) in the blockade option, they would subsequently give a lower approval for the same cell in the isolationism option. That would explain all effects seen in the isolationism interactions.

Besides the democratic--dictatorial impression of the target, there were significant results in the stable--unstable impression, as well. With no respect to regime or locus, targets in the strategic dimension were seen as considerably more unstable than those in the economic tests. This again can be explained in preformed expectations and assumptions on the part of the subjects. The statistics suggest that subjects view targets who engage in weapons trade as decidedly more unstable than those who seek to pirate the economy of other nations. This impression of the target in the strategic dimension can give rise to extended research in this field for the future. As mentioned earlier by Maoz and Russett, a democracy will adapt to the norms of its opponent when they differ. If the democracy perceives its opponent as relatively unstable merely because of the dimension where within lies the threat, then the tendency to adopt the opponent's norms would increase, thus increasing the likelihood for the conflict to escalate to the use of force. In other words, the perception of an unstable, and thus unpredictable, opponent introduces increased tension into the scenario. With increased tension, the conflict becomes incredibly more volatile with a higher probability of the use of force as a resolution. To heighten this possibility, there were significant results obtained in the perception of the target as similar--dissimilar to the United States. The core and peripheral manipulations of the strategic dimensions were both seen as considerably more dissimilar than the core condition of the economic tests. It can be furthered here that in addition to the target being seen as unstable in the strategic dimension, it is also seen as dissimilar to the United States. This, in turn, strengthens the possibility that the use of force option could be enacted

out of adoption of foreign norms. Further and more extensive testing on this subject would definitely be justified on these perceptions alone.

Conclusions

The evidence provided by this study introduce some interesting questions regarding the boundary consitions of democratic peace. Previously, the democratic norms that we tried to shake with the introduction of economic variables held when the incentives were generalized. However, upon making a distinction between what sectors of the economy were being affected, these norms started to break down. Only a threat to a major economic sector could carry enough hedonic relevance for the subjects to feel the use of force is necessary. In addition, the subjects were influenced in the way they perceived aggressors on the international scene. In some cases they seemed to sympathize with them, and in other, they condoned their behaviors. Perceptions of the target nation as seen in this last line of experiments offer insight as to the direction of future research of democratic peace. Results of the experiment suggest that the very acts of a nation will dictate how international actors perceive its regime type. If a nation engages in to proliferation of massively destructive weapons, then despite his true regime he is seen as nondemocratic, unstable, and relatively dissimilar. If these perceptions hold reliable, then there stands to be obtained some very significant results suggesting an increased propensity to use force against our fellow democracies in the strategic and economic dimensions. International conflicts are based upon our perceptions of the opponents intentions and actions. To be philosopical, it is not reality, but the *perception of reality* that often dictates our decisions. Therefore, the effect our variables had on these perceptions can very well suggest future relationships. These questions are extremely important because they outline the theatre in which international conflict occurs. If we can pinpoint the nature of conflict motivation, then we can reasonably avoid these situations.

Figure 1.A
Democratic--Dictatorial Impression of Target





Figure 1.B
Democratic--Dictatorial Impression of Target







Figure 4
Similar--Dissimilar Impression of Target




Figure 5.A
Approval of Blockade--Strategic




Figure 5.B
Approval of Blockade--Economic




Figure 6.A
Approval of Isolationism--Strategic





Figure 6.B
Approval of Isolationism--Economic







Figure 8
Use of Force As Irresponsible Action





Figure 9
Use of Force Expected Because Superpower



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