

Conceptual Metaphor and Foreign Policy  
in the 1988 Presidential Campaign

Diane L. Robinson



University Undergraduate Fellow, 1988-89

Texas A&M University  
Department of Speech Communication

APPROVED

Fellows Advisor

Honors Director



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## Introduction

Conceptual metaphors are linguistic tools which shape our thinking. They consist of sets of metaphors which work together to help us interpret what we say and hear, and what we say and hear, in turn, affects our thought processes. As a result, conceptual metaphors are an integral part of how we think and describe our thoughts to others in an understandable way.

Metaphors are part of our everyday language but are so common that we often do not notice when and how often we use them. As Lakoff and Johnson have observed, "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (287). Through repeated usage, metaphors become accepted to the point that the two things being compared are so closely identified they are thought of as one and the same (Ivie, "Metaphor" 166).

Often, the "metaphors which are most important to our thinking involve the creation rather than the discovery of likeness" (Miller 160-162). Thus, perceptions of reality are constructed in our speech through these underlying metaphors. By identifying underlying metaphors, we can examine their values and reveal their limits and potentialities for characterizing reality functionally (Ivie, "Metaphor" 167). We can discover how these metaphors have affected our thought processes and speech.

Conceptual metaphors form an important network surrounding an ideograph, or master symbol, which serves as the "relatively stable center of a universe of discourse" (Ivie, "Ideology" 34). These patterns of conceptual metaphors are what "arguments are built upon, and audiences are persuaded within" (Ivie, "Ideology" 31). Networks of metaphors work together to establish and reinforce the likenesses created. They serve to make a difficult or foreign concept understandable to an audience. Rhetors can sway an audience by using metaphors which support a given position. These metaphors may act upon the conscious or unconscious mind of the listener.

Politicians recognize the importance of metaphor. As Senator Bill Bradley said, "What you strive for is a metaphor that works" (Howe 88). Such metaphors establish a common ground between the electorate and the politician by making the politician's ideas understandable (Howe 88). The audience is invited to identify with the politician's interpretation of reality which has been created through metaphor (Ivie, "Metaphor" 166). In doing this, "candidates must remain sufficiently orthodox and ambiguous on the issues to earn the support of a majority among the multitude of competing interest groups" (Ivie, "Speaking 'Common Sense'" 39-40).

The Cold War has been a dominant factor in United States foreign policy for the last 45 years. One prominent feature of the Cold War is the rhetoric involved to sustain it. The same sets of metaphors have been used time and time again since the

Cold War began. Many of them, for example sports metaphors such as the "arms race," are so common that we no longer consciously recognize them as metaphors. Examples of ideographs include the fragility and femininity of freedom and the savagery of communism. Communism is often referred to in terms of barbarianism, animals, and darkness. Freedom is talked about in terms such as "a fledgling, a flickering flame, a dream, an experiment, tyranny's prey, or a precious commodity for which great sacrifices must be made" (Ivie, "Ideology" 33).

The Cold War, in short, has been dominated by confrontationist rhetoric. For some, this is problematic in the nuclear age since what we say and hear shapes what we do and constrains our thinking. We might even create the self-fulfilling prophecy of talking ourselves into a nuclear war. A rhetoric of conversion and competition, for instance, which invites thinking in a win/lose mode, preempts a rhetorical possibility of peaceful coexistence.

This confrontationist thinking and speaking has been described as the Red Fascist rhetorical vision, which "essentially portrays the struggle between good and evil" (Cragan 52). In this mode of thinking, evil is anything which opposes freedom and capitalism, including both communism and fascism. These two very different political systems are perceived similarly as enemies to all that is considered good. Although Red Fascism has been the dominant mode of thinking throughout the Cold War, John Cragan argued in 1981 that it was on the wane. He



wrote that "with the Nixon Administration, we have the formal end of the Cold War rhetorical vision" (66).

This paper examines the rhetoric of the Cold War, as reflected in the speeches of the two primary candidates in the 1988 Presidential election, for the purpose of determining the extent to which Cragan's assessment is correct. The candidates' campaign speeches are analyzed for signs of new alternatives to the Red Fascist or confrontationist rhetorical vision that has marked the Cold War since the Truman Doctrine speech of March 12, 1947.

### Methods and Materials

Examining foreign policy rhetoric in a campaign is useful because the candidates attempt to attract voters by speaking as "mainstream" as possible. This should indicate what kind of rhetoric is perceived as the most acceptable to the electorate. The campaign also makes a convenient time to study foreign policy rhetoric because of the sheer volume of material generated. The primary sources of materials I used were speech texts provided by the campaign headquarters of each candidate.

My analysis of these campaign speeches follows a procedure set forth by Robert L. Ivie in his recent article, "Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War 'Idealists'" (167-8). Following Ivie's method, I have discovered the most important organizing metaphors used by each candidate, and have analyzed the coherence, consistency, and completeness of their metaphorical systems. This procedure involves, first, examining

rhetorical artifacts in context in order to develop a sense of the whole. This step includes reviewing many speeches by the candidates as well as the events surrounding those speeches and consulting prior scholarship. The next step involves reading each text closely several times in order to identify and mark the speaker's principal metaphors. Once these vehicles have been marked, they are organized into groups of vehicles with closely related meanings. At this point, overriding metaphors can be noted, and all of the metaphors within that group are analyzed to examine how they work together. Finally, the various sets of vehicles, each representing a metaphorical concept, are analyzed for patterns of usage between and among one another as a system of discourse. This involves rereading the speeches to note when and how the metaphorical concepts are actually used together. This step provides an opportunity to determine how the concepts work as a system. Following these steps, I have described and compared the metaphors used by the two candidates in their campaign rhetoric on foreign policy. To the extent that the candidates reflect political culture, my findings provide a rough map of the current American mindset about foreign policy and the Soviet Union.

#### The Rhetoric of Earlier Candidates

Both candidates in this election had a tough act to follow in Ronald Reagan. Reagan, one of the most popular presidents in recent years, had the advantage of an actor's training in playing a role and dealing with the public. The metaphors he used were

widely accepted by the public and can be traced back to the beginning of the Cold War and Harry Truman.

Reagan and the Republican right wing had historically invested the Soviet Union with demonic qualities. And while some of the harsher rhetoric of Reagan's past was moderated during the campaign [of 1980], he did present a foreign policy not unlike the Cold War perspective of the 1950s. One had the impression of the United States locked in a never-ending struggle with the Soviet anti-Christ. (Plotkin 58)

Because of the basic premise of Soviet savagery, Reagan's rhetoric of peace through strength makes sense to the American electorate (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 6).

In addition, Reagan's image as that of a swaggering cowboy may have enhanced his peace through strength rhetoric. Walter Fisher points to Reagan's "heroic aura," appealing to a certain ego of being able to prevail over any hazard (307). This ties in with the compelling myth of the Western hero, based on such righteous qualities as honesty, innocence, and sincerity (Ivie, "Speaking 'Common Sense'" 45). In "The Rhetoric of the American Western Myth," Janice Rushing states that the cowboy myth is "the most enduring and characteristic American myth," which "pits the legendary cowboy hero against the forces of savagery" (15-16).

Reagan's critics have been unable to discover an acceptable alternative for the image he presents of a heroic, but besieged, nation (Ivie, "Speaking 'Common Sense'" 41). In 1984, Democrats recognized their foreign policy vulnerability, but Walter Mondale sounded unconvincing when he tried to talk tougher than Ronald Reagan (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 1). During his short-lived bid for

the Presidency, Gary Hart attempted to formulate a new rhetoric. In a series of lectures delivered at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service in June, 1986, he attempted to articulate a "foreign policy framework for the 21st century" (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 2). He faced the problem of redefining "the Soviet challenge as something other than godless savagery and to do so without reversing the image at America's expense" (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 6). Hart spoke in terms of "managing" and "adapting" to "changing times"--in other words, foreign policy as a business (Ivie, "The Ideology" 32).

While Hart received credit for this new rhetoric, a similar rhetoric had been used before the Cold War era. Its origins were in the Progressive Era which inspired American liberalism before and during the New Deal of the 1930s (Wander 351). In the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, exponents of the business rhetoric tradition "articulated America's managerial role in the early stages of Vietnam. . . . This approach had had considerable appeal in domestic politics" (Wander 351). Hart resurrected the business metaphor, which appealed to a capitalistic, pragmatic society that "understands the need to adapt to market forces and other circumstances, to manage resources, remain flexible, provide leadership, and form partnerships in order to compete successfully" (Ivie "The Dark Side" 8).

Rather than confrontation, Hart's business metaphor was one of competition with the Soviet Union, and Americans generally felt confident of a competitive advantage over the communists

(Ivie, "The Dark Side" 10). However, problems existed in this rhetoric of business, as Ivie has pointed out. Hart never explicitly acknowledged his business rhetoric or addressed the inconsistencies it had with the traditional, idealistic rhetoric involved in speaking about foreign policy. This rhetoric was so pragmatic that it seemed to be trivializing the role of the President. There were other negative implications as well. There were "overtones of amoral opportunism," a bottom-line approach to the "traditional ideals of freedom and human rights" (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 11). In addition to these problems, there was a negative association with the narcissism of the yuppies, who were closely associated with business and management. In short, Hart's business metaphor stressed management over labor (Ivie, "The Dark Side" 12). Americans would not settle for a manager as a President. They preferred a leader. These are many of the same problems which plagued Michael Dukakis.

Republican George Bush had an inherent advantage over Democrat Michael Dukakis because he inherited the metaphors used by Reagan. He continued Reagan's themes of "peace and prosperity" and "peace through strength" and pledged to continue Reagan's agenda. In addition, he took partial credit for the arms negotiation advances with the Soviets, while simultaneously putting forth a confrontationist rhetoric. By continuing Reagan's familiar and accepted themes, Bush virtually had a lock on the rhetoric most acceptable to the American mainstream.

Dukakis, on the other hand, struggled to create his own rhetoric, as Ivie and Ritter noted. He found the challenge of advancing a position different from that of Bush without appearing to be "soft" on communism a rhetorical problem which had plagued earlier Democratic presidential candidates. Ultimately, Dukakis failed to solve the problem that had defeated his Democratic predecessors in the 1980s. It is interesting to note that there was little substantive difference in foreign policies between the candidates. Even House Speaker Jim Wright "noted the absence of any significant clash on foreign policy issues" (Apple 1).

#### The Rhetoric of George Bush

In George Bush's words, "the Cold War isn't over yet." This certainly was evident in his campaign rhetoric. I will discuss the major metaphors George Bush favored in the order of their frequency of use. These metaphors appeared in the sources obtained from the Republican National organization, including foreign policy statements, his statement "On the Issues," his remarks to the G.I. Forum in Corpus Christi, Texas on August 4, 1988, and his remarks to the Johnston, Polk City and Urbandale Chambers of Commerce in Johnston, Iowa on January 7, 1988.

The most important conceptual metaphor in George Bush's rhetoric was that of progress. Progress was a logical choice, since Bush was trying to tie in with the successes of Ronald Reagan in foreign policy, particularly the negotiating advances with the Soviet Union and the summits with Mikhail Gorbachev. He

said it was the "beginning of a whole new chapter in East-West relations," that America was at the "door of a new century," and that East-West relations were moving "toward greater stability" and "toward a more stable balance." The conceptual metaphor of progress was also used in building terms, such as breaking "new ground. . . on a new track," "laying the groundwork for future negotiations" and for the "foundations of policy" we can "build on." The metaphor of moving, particularly stepping, was also emphasized. He spoke of the INF treaty as a "major step forward." Bush talked of taking "bold steps for peace," "major steps forward," and spoke about the "first step," the "next step," and "step by cautious step." He used the metaphor negatively only rarely, such as when he talked about "impediments."

One of the most traditional Cold War conceptual metaphors has been that of the strength and barbarianism of communism and the fragility of freedom. Bush used these metaphors freely. He talked about their "stockpiles of terror" in their nuclear weapons, and their "substantial advantage in conventional and chemical weapons." Bush warned about "Soviet imperialism in our hemisphere" and often spoke about Soviet "aggression." He stated that they were a "growing threat," and warned of the "spread" of their weapons into the Third World. To fight them, Bush said that we must "beat back the misinformation put out by the Soviets," "break down the Soviet's wall of secrecy," and not allow the "steel door" to "slam shut again." He warned, using

animal terms, that we must not be "stampeded into unwise concessions." Closely aligned with this strength of communism metaphor is the fragility of freedom. He speaks of a "risky" and "dangerous world" in which we could face "the permanent crippling of American might." That would put us in a "weak negotiating position."

Morality played a large rhetorical role in Bush's campaign rhetoric, as it did during the Reagan years. He was quoted in the Christian Science Monitor as saying that "I'm a man who sees life in terms of missions" (Bonafede 3). In quoting Harry Truman and John Kennedy he said that their words were "ringing affirmations of America's mission." He quoted Lincoln as saying that this nation is "the last, best hope of mankind," a "refuge to the tired, hungry and oppressed." He spoke of the Moscow summit, where the INF treaty was signed, as a "victory of will and determination" and as based on "moral determination and hard work." Again and again he spoke of "will," "courage," and "determination." He talked about our "moral obligation" and "moral authority of freedom." He even said that "it would be wrong--even immoral--to turn our backs on technology that could reduce the risk of annihilation." He spoke of the United States as the "freest, the fairest, the most generous nation the world has ever known" and said "we must be vigilant . . . we must stand up for the values that define us as a nation."

Bush used another common Cold War metaphor when he spoke in light and dark terms. He spoke of "a beacon of freedom shining



around the world," "the light of freedom burning brightly," and "a powerful, shining light of hope." In contrast, he also talked about "the dark shadow of Communism spread across Eastern Europe and Asia" and the threat of nuclear attack "overshadowing this arms control agenda."

Game metaphors were used by Bush, though not as frequently. He spoke of "competition," the need "to compete and grow" to "win the world competition," and the need of verification techniques "to prevent cheating." The body was occasionally used as a metaphor, particularly in talking about defense. He said that "the defense of Western Europe is at the very heart of our defense strategy" and that the Ground Wave Emergency Network is "the nerve system of our deterrent capability."

Finally, Bush relied upon some of the business metaphors mentioned earlier. He talked about the Soviet "monopoly" on intermediate range missiles and that "they want a monopoly on strategic defense." Bush warned us against voices which "counsel us never to bargain" or which tell us to "deal at any price." He also drew upon business metaphors in saying we must "spend wisely," "streamline," and make sure dollars are "well spent" to prevent a "ripoff of the American taxpayer."

George Bush's major metaphors worked together in many different ways. The most significant metaphors were those of progress and in dealing with the strength and barbarianism of communism. His missionary/morality metaphor tied in closely to these: because they are a savage, pagan enemy, we must work to

convert the Soviets to our way--the Godly way. We attributed the progress we made to our lofty aims and morals. The light/dark metaphor reinforced this theme. Darkness traditionally has been associated with evil, which in this case applies specifically to the Soviet barbarians. The game and business metaphors were linked to one another as well as to the primary metaphors. The Soviets were described as being prone to cheat, which goes against American morality and ethics. The Soviets were also implied to be unscrupulous businessmen wanting to create a "monopoly." In American society, cheating and monopolies both are perceived to hinder progress and to be immoral.

Bush linked these metaphors together in speeches. His metaphors worked to support each other. He often used two similar metaphors together, as when he used two images from the ideograph of progress. In talking about the INF treaty he said that it was "one that breaks new ground on verification and puts us on a new track toward a more stable and enduring deterrence." More importantly for overall coherence, Bush used complementary metaphors together frequently. In his statement on arms control Bush contrasted Soviet aggression with American morality and values. He said:

From my days at the U.N. and the C.I.A. to the White House, I have observed that the Soviets test every President and push every agreement to its limits and beyond. We must be vigilant, and we must be tough, and we must stand up for the values that define us as a nation.

Bush also compared them indirectly when he stated that "we must maintain a deterrent to aggression." This implied that we were the moral force while the Soviets were the likely aggressors. Bush often used the morality metaphor with that of progress. One recurring example was a statement about the INF treaty, which "is something we can build on, and it is a victory of will and determination." The morality metaphor was also used with the light/dark metaphor. He stated several times that "we are still the best hope of mankind, the refuge to the tired, the hungry, and oppressed. We are still, and must continue to be, a bastion of democracy and a beacon of freedom shining around the world." In the following representative example, Bush used the progress metaphor, the Soviet aggression metaphor, and the light/dark metaphor together:

They are the foundations of policy which helped build Europe over 40 years of peace and a level of prosperity unrivaled in human history; which held back the Communist advance and kept the light of freedom burning brightly in the world.

As these examples illustrate, George Bush's metaphors worked together to form a relatively coherent, understandable system which was consistent with the Cold War vision and easily accepted by the American people. This was a vital key in his success in the campaign.

#### The Rhetoric of Michael Dukakis

Once again, I discuss the metaphors in the order of their frequency in Dukakis' texts, texts that include "Mike Dukakis on the Issues," "An American Strategy: Foreign Policy in the 1990s"

delivered at St. John's University in New York on April 8, 1988, "NATO: Building on Strength" given at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on June 14, 1988, "Leadership For a New Era of American Greatness" delivered in New York on August 11, 1988, "American Leadership in a Changing World" given in Philadelphia on September 12, 1988, and "A Strong and Secure America" given at Georgetown University in Washington D.C. on September 14, 1988.

The business metaphor by far was the most prevalent conceptual metaphor in Dukakis' rhetoric. In his paper "On the Issues" he stated that:

We can have the forces we need, at a price we can afford, if we are willing to make some tough choices about how we invest our resources and how we manage those resources to get a dollar's worth of security for every defense dollar we spend.

He spoke about "managing," giving people "authority," "reward," and holding them "accountable." He emphasized "priorities," "resources," and "informed judgment" in making a "coordinated plan." Dukakis stressed the need for "sound planning and tough management." As he talked about being at a "crossroads," he discussed the "challenge" of making "tough choices," "setting priorities," and "planning." He often used investment terms such as "investing in the Conventional Defense Initiative," the need to "invest together," "investing" in new programs and new technologies, and the Soviets need to "invest their limited capital in reforming their economy, rather than building up their military." The planning metaphor also came into play as Dukakis talked about "planning, training and

research and development," and "recruiting and retaining skilled people." Dukakis often spoke in a metaphor of thrift, saying we need "to find a sensible, affordable way to maintain the effectiveness." He talked about the "cost of freedom," and said of the defense budget that "our nation can't afford it . . . our economy can't sustain it." He decried the "Republican triad of waste, duplication and fraud," and warned about "squandering" opportunities for peace. He said that a President must "know how to negotiate and drive a hard bargain" and asserted that the people "are looking for leadership that is competent."

Like Bush, Dukakis used a metaphor of progress and building, but he used fewer forms of that ideograph. He quoted John Kennedy about "moving on the road to peace." He spoke of moving as taking "a series of specific steps," "interim steps," and "beginning the march." He said that he wanted to "build an America that is militarily and economically strong" and to "build on the tradition" and "build on the progress." He stated the importance of "building a full employment, low-inflation economy."

The game metaphor also surfaced in the rhetoric of Michael Dukakis. He spoke of "strategy," of "challenge," and of "competition with the Soviet Union." He warned against settling for "second place or second best" and said that he wanted to "beat our foreign competitors." In addition, he decried the Republican "smoke and mirrors," "fiscal house of cards," and "teeter-tottering on the edge of financial disaster."

Dukakis used a very different rhetoric of morality than Bush did. While Bush focused on our "moral obligation" and "mission" to spread freedom, Dukakis emphasized "the principles and the decency and the values of the American people." Attacking Bush's view of morality, Dukakis said that "there is a fundamental difference between using force in self-defense and using force to impose our will on others. One is consistent with our values and the other is not." In return, Bush gleefully quoted Dukakis in a 1971 speech in which he asked "who gives [the United States] the authority--moral or otherwise--to seek to impose our will on other nations and other peoples without genuine discussion and collective judgment in a forum like the U.N.?" Dukakis spoke of our "values" and "principles." He said that "we must be true to our values" and spoke about restoring "common sense and principle and respect for American values."

Dukakis also utilized the traditional metaphor of Soviet savagery and freedom's fragility, but to a lesser extent than Bush. He talked about the "enormous advantage" of the Warsaw Pact "in tanks and heavy artillery--the weapons that pose the greatest threat of an offensive strike." He said that "they're copying our technology, even stealing it." He called nations that would use poison gas "dumb" and "savage." He also warned of "the dangers we face."

There were other metaphors Dukakis used, but they were not prevalent or particularly significant. He used a nature metaphor when he spoke of "currents" and Americans as "catalysts" of

change. He described America as a "breadbasket" and an "arsenal" and talked about the prevention of nuclear war as a "centerpiece."

The business metaphor was the central one for Michael Dukakis, and the other metaphors tied in with it to a certain extent. The game metaphor was clearly linked with business. In one speech, Dukakis said, "Because we need a President who knows how to make tough decisions. A President who will call the shots. Assemble a team. Work with Congress. Replace officials who need to be replaced. And take the heat when things go wrong." The metaphors could be that of either a businessman or a football coach. Dukakis' version of morality was different than that of George Bush, but it tied in with his business metaphor nicely. He talked about decency, values, and principles, which are all hallmarks of traditional American business ethics. Dukakis combined his metaphors of games and morality when he said that:

The next President of the United States must have a strategy to reverse the nuclear arms race, to strengthen our conventional military forces, to revitalize our alliances and bring back a foreign policy that reflects the principles and the decency and the values of the American people. (original emphasis)

His version of morality was not that of conversion, which was appropriate since he did not emphasize the savagery of the Soviet Union.

While Dukakis combined different forms of the business metaphor, he did not successfully work it in with his other

metaphors consistently throughout his speeches. Thus, his words often sounded incongruous. In one of the instances in which he did use the savagery of the Soviet Union metaphor, he said that "the Warsaw Pact has an enormous advantage in tanks and heavy artillery--the weapons that pose the greatest threat of an offensive strike." In the same speech he spoke of "the dangers we face" but then went on to say that "the next President is going to have to make some very tough choices about where our resources should go." After building up the threat of the Soviet Union through the savagery metaphors, he seemed to be saying the United States did not have the resources to counter this threat and defend America. The traditional Cold War metaphor of Soviet savagery did not lend itself to the business metaphor, yet Dukakis fell back on that traditional rhetoric. This had the opposite effect from what Dukakis intended.

#### Comparison

George Bush used a much safer and more traditional rhetoric in the Presidential campaign of 1988 than did Michael Dukakis. Bush stressed the progress of the Reagan administration, the relative strength of Communism and fragility of freedom, and the moral authority of freedom. He could easily and legitimately borrow the rhetoric of Reagan and of the Cold War era. In addition, his rhetorical system was more complete, since his metaphors worked together closely.

Michael Dukakis took a rhetorical risk in his speeches. His master metaphor of business was not as conventional as Bush's



image of progress, fragility, and savagery. Dukakis' comparison of foreign policy to a business adventure experienced problems similar to those encountered by Gary Hart. While polls showed "a growing view that American security is as much a question of economics as military strength," and that the public was starting to view losing to Japan economically as a danger as great as the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the American public was not ready to view their President as a mere manager (Salkowski 3). Americans were idealistic about their President and about their role in the world, and the pragmatic business metaphor did not tie in with the established, accepted ideal, nor did it have enough appeal to define the Cold War in radically different terms. In addition, Dukakis' system of metaphors was not as complete and refined as the system used by Bush. The lack of coherence detracted from the overall message. Finally, Dukakis' metaphors lacked the dramatic appeal of those used by Bush. His metaphor of business was not visual and exciting. Cold War rhetoric has been based on a dramatic situation; that of our noble, Godly nation defending the world against the evil spread of Communism. The business metaphor lacked powerful images and popular appeal.

Michael Dukakis attempted to use a new system of conceptual metaphors but the Red Fascist version, the old standard, held fast. Although he tried to talk about foreign policy as a business, he fell back on the traditional Cold War organizing metaphors. The Red Fascist mindset was too entrenched in the

American mindset to stray too far from it. From this analysis, it would not be valid to conclude that the Red Fascist model died with the Nixon Administration. It played a predominant role not only in the rhetoric of the Ronald Reagan administration but also in the campaign of his successor, George Bush.

#### Missed Opportunities?

Michael Dukakis clearly was unable to find an acceptable alternative to the Cold War rhetoric used by George Bush. Since that has been the pattern of the Democratic candidates for the last several campaigns, certain questions arise: Did the Democrats miss rhetorical opportunities? Was Dukakis' lack of success due to an ineptness in his campaign and poor speechwriting, or was there truly no alternative available? To answer these questions I examined essays by leading theorists.

Foreign policy theorists have attempted to establish a new rhetoric for U.S.-Soviet relations. One such theorist is Richard Ullman, who has attempted to describe the relationship in terms of estrangement. Unfortunately, his system lacks cohesiveness and support as a possible alternative to Cold War rhetoric. Ullman does advance valid points, however, in his assessment of the effects of Cold War rhetoric to date. He notes that the focus of our concern has consistently been the Soviet Union since it is the only nation with the perceived ability to destroy American society (280). He states that Washington's preoccupation with Moscow has touched, "even contaminated," most international relationships and policies (281). Ullman also

recognizes the necessity of traditional Cold War rhetoric for political survival, as evidenced by the political demise of figures who attempted to conceptualize an "American world role emphasizing drastically lower levels of armament and cooperation with perceived adversaries" (290). Examples he uses include Henry Wallace in 1948, George McGovern in 1972, and Jesse Jackson in 1984 (290). He argues that the attempt of the Carter administration to turn attention to foreign policy issues other than the Soviet Union "provided a graphic demonstration that the relationship with Moscow colors all others, and that American policymakers must manage it before they can achieve their other foreign policy objectives" (281).

In discussing the metaphor of estrangement, Ullman writes that relations among states are shaped either by trust, loyalty, and obligation, or by suspicion, contempt, and hatred (279). He also says that the roots of estrangement are "in a shallow soil of misperceptions and stereotypical views of the world" (280). He states that estrangement grows out of disappointment, which stems from the failure of at least one of the partners to live up to expectations (287).

Ullman writes that while "the United States is not really estranged from the Soviet Union," the U.S.-Soviet foreign relations, particularly as practiced by the Reagan administration, led to estrangement between rich and poor nations, among industrialized democracies, and of "many governments from the entire idea of international cooperation"

(299). Ullman himself highlights several faults of this rhetoric of estrangement. He realizes that Americans are untroubled by estrangement, since the costs are tolerable, the consequences not catastrophic, and the effects of the Cold War and of the arms race are not directly felt (284).

Ullman's goal in this essay is to describe the problem that exists between the superpowers rather than to provide an alternative rhetoric. His solution is to reduce the exaggerated threat of the Soviet Union. He concludes that "a drastic de-escalation of the U.S.-Soviet conflict" is necessary to "liberate American policymakers to search for cooperative solutions," but he does not attempt to employ the estrangement metaphor in achieving such an aim (305). In Ullman's opinion, the American definition of security in the context of the Cold War is total security. Clearly this is impossible in an inherently hostile world. This provides incentive to search for those metaphors which have led us to this untenable definition of security. The exaggeration of ideology and perceived threat are a part of the traditional Cold War metaphors. One example of this phenomenon is the use of comparisons which make freedom seem fragile, as discussed by Ivie in "The Ideology of Freedom's 'Fragility' in American Foreign Policy Argument." Freedom is often discussed as an act of procreation, an experiment, a flickering flame, the hunter's prey, and a heroic struggle. By discussing freedom in these terms it seems extremely vulnerable.

Readings of other theorists result in few useful metaphors, and no complete systems of metaphors from which Michael Dukakis could have drawn. Indeed, some theorists use rhetoric straight from the Cold War. Krauthammer, one such theorist, states that the Cold War could not end until the Soviet Union changed. He states that "if they reform to the point where they become much like us, or at least much unlike what they were, then the point of the Cold War is over" (14). Rhetoric such as this preempts the possibility of working with the Soviet Union as they are today. It draws on the missionary metaphor, in which only countries like the United States are "good." Old Cold War metaphors were also used in new ways to fit the current situation. For example, Paul Marantz wrote that "the skeptics believe that Gorbachev's current charm offensive differs little from past Soviet peace campaigns" (309). Such a statement draws on the metaphor of the strength and barbarianism of Communism. This makes the positive attributes of Gorbachev, which are seen by many as a hopeful sign, weapons to be used against the United States to further the aims of the Soviet Union. Statements such as these are further evidence that the Cold War is not over yet.

James Chase noted the importance of one prevailing Cold War metaphor. He wrote that "Americans remain most comfortable with a foreign policy imbued with a moral purpose. . . . Americans have preferred a policy based at least rhetorically in moral purpose rather than on narrow self interest" (25). Chase's statement highlights the importance of metaphors in the Cold War.

One theorist who appears to be making strides in articulating an alternative rhetoric is George Kennan. Kennan developed the U.S. policy of "containment" toward the Soviet Union in the 1940s in reaction to the "political threat of international communism under Stalin's control" (18). However, he believes that the threat is no longer a danger and that the "notion of containment is today irrelevant" (18). Kennan speaks of collaboration and cooperation with the Soviet Union. He also speaks about the "community of interests with the Soviets" (18). In Kennan's opinion, the United States should have relations with the Soviet Union as with any normal great power, and that it is in American interests that Gorbachev succeed in his liberalization program. Kennan acknowledges the Cold War sentiments of a large segment of the American population which has "the need to cultivate the idea of American innocence and virtue--which requires an opposite pole of evil" (18). He says that common problems of the United States and the Soviet Union should be stressed; problems such as "global environmental deterioration; the need to manage the revolution in electronic communication; North-South economic relationships; and the situations in the Near and Middle East" (18). His suggestion is that these problems are far more threatening than the Soviet Union. Kennan adds:

What worries me more than whether Gorbachev has changed the Soviet Union for the better is the American media's persistent dramatization of Cold War myths and stereotypes. The Soviets dropped the Cold War mentality. Now, it's up to us to do the same. (19)

While the words of George Kennan seem to hold promise for the end of Cold War rhetoric, he does not attempt to develop a complete system which could be used to replace the current metaphors. He does not address the problem of adjusting the American mindset to seeing the other dangers he mentions as being greater threats than the Soviet Union. There seems to be an opportunity to do this by making Gorbachev and his liberalization a positive factor in convincing the American public that the Soviet Union has indeed changed. The problem in this would arise if and when Gorbachev and perestroika fails. That would be a very real risk with the current divisiveness and instability within the Soviet regime. Any such move to make the perception of the Soviet Union one containing less threat would have to make it not be contingent on the success of Mikhail Gorbachev.

#### Other Options

Rhetoric and metaphor have had a definite role in perpetuating the Cold War. Those words led to very real consequences. More than 70% of the United States defense budget is geared "to the least likely--even if the most ominous--threat to security: full-scale Soviet aggression against the West" (Simes 21). As evidenced by the study of current theorists, however, a simple change in rhetoric would not stop the Cold War. To achieve a real change in the American mindset, there must be a start with action, using rhetoric to support it. This would certainly have to occur over a longer time span than one presidential campaign. This would be true for both the United

States and the Soviet Union. As Charles Marantz stated, "unless uplifting words are embodied in concrete deeds, the West will have good reason to remain skeptical" (311). A formula for action was postulated by Charles E. Osgood. He called it "Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction" or GRIT. This plan aims to "reduce and control international tension levels" and to "create an atmosphere of mutual trust within which negotiations of critical military and political issues can have a better chance of succeeding" (Osgood 25). The goal is not to substitute negotiation but rather to complement it. This plan calls for a nation to take small steps within its security limits to reduce tension and encourage reciprocating steps from another nation. Osgood proposes ten rules for such a procedure, which require nations to keep adequate nuclear and conventional capacity to respond to aggression. Also, unilateral initiatives must be graduated in risk depending upon the reciprocation from the other side, and those initiatives should be diversified in sphere of influence and geographical application (26). He also states that the initiatives must be publicly announced, executed, and verified regardless of reciprocation (Osgood 27-29).

Osgood cites "The Kennedy Experiment" as an example of calculated de-escalation between June and November 1963. In his speech at The American University on June 10, Kennedy announced that the United States was halting atmospheric nuclear testing. Soviet Premier Krushchev welcomed the initiative and ordered the



halt of strategic bomber production in response. It led to the signing of the test-ban treaty in August 1963 and to reductions in trade barriers (Osgood 30). While those actions led to a temporary reduction of Cold War hostilities, they certainly did not end the Cold War. Because it was a single set of actions without supporting rhetoric, there were no lasting implications.

There seem to be similar opportunities on both sides of the Iron Curtain today. Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, suggests that NATO seek parity in the levels of tanks and artillery in Europe. If the Soviets respond to an equal ceiling in those areas, Dean continues, NATO would then seek equal levels of fighter-bombers and tactical missions. These equal levels would be achieved by the side with more weapons lowering their numbers instead of the side with fewer weapons raising theirs (Chase 14). If this works, it would be an example of GRIT in action. Chase, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment, has also advocated scaling down Western Europe within security bounds.

Gorbachev has made similar proposals. In his speech to the United Nations on December 7, 1988, Gorbachev said:

Today I am able to inform you of the fact that the Soviet Union has decided to reduce its armed forces.

Over the next two years their strength will be reduced by 500,000 men, and substantial cuts will be made unilaterally, regardless of the talks on the mandate of the Vienna meeting.  
(235)

He also stated that "we shall maintain the country's defense capability at a level of reasonable and dependable sufficiency, so that no one is tempted to encroach upon the security of the USSR or its allies (Gorbachev 235). In addition, Marantz has noted Gorbachev's emphasis on cooperation to "avert the common dangers that we all face" (346). This seems to be a true example of GRIT and a real effort to reduce tensions.

Analysts are watching Gorbachev and his reforms. "From London to Tokyo, officials accustomed to confronting a growling and often menacing bear are at once tantalized and perplexed by Moscow's new approach" (Range 28). Some are giving him great credit for changing the worldwide atmosphere for the better, and for being less confrontational in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, Africa, and elsewhere (Apple 17). The Japan Times seems to herald the end of the Cold War when it states: "The winds of change are blowing, and we can say with confidence that what has lasted 40 years will not last another 40" (Range 29).

Some see positive ramifications for the United States in that American foreign policy could be liberated "from the straitjacket imposed by superpower hostility" (Simes 21). Simes advocates "an assertive and dynamically pragmatic foreign policy" to end the "single-minded obsession with the Soviet Union as a target or a partner" (21). There is little doubt that Gorbachev is motivated not by a utopian desire for world peace, but rather by a pragmatic desire for a stable economy. However, if Gorbachev's proposals are sincere and verifiable, it could be

evidence of GRIT working. This would influence politics here to a great extent. As one West European ambassador said, Gorbachev "has taken their favorite bone of contention out of Republican and Democratic mouths" (Apple 17).

Osgood first postulated his idea of GRIT in the early 1960s, but its potential has yet to be fully developed. It is seen only as possible action in ending the Cold War, but it has rhetorical possibilities as well. The policy of GRIT is well known by diplomats and is used by them every day. To this point, however, its rhetorical possibilities have been bypassed by political figures. GRIT could be a rhetoric of confidence building, as Ullman advocates. By speaking in terms of working towards relative security in small reciprocating steps, the rhetorical components could be utilized. A rhetoric of GRIT would have to work gradually to reduce the threat of the Soviet Union in the minds of the American people and their leaders, just as the action of GRIT works gradually. Because of the current lessening of tensions, this may be the time to begin to take advantage of the rhetorical possibilities of GRIT.

This transition rhetoric could also utilize the rhetoric of Kennan. As the perceived threat of the Soviet Union is gradually lowered, common problems of the United States and the Soviet Union could be stressed. By focusing on problems facing the entire world, such as the examples given by Kennan, the distrust and fear could be redirected into channels which could lead to more positive results.

While GRIT seems to be a legitimate road to the end of the Cold War, it alone would not have solved Michael Dukakis' rhetorical problems. A complete and cohesive rhetoric surrounding the action is necessary to support it. None of the rhetoric currently available has proven completely satisfying. A complete, sudden change in rhetoric is not a viable alternative since it would not be accepted by an American public comfortable with traditional Cold War metaphors. A rhetoric of transition is needed to gradually move public opinion and the American mindset. Rather than search for replacements for the dominant Cold War metaphors, a quest that is clearly impossible to complete, a more realistic goal is to find a transition rhetoric. Rhetoric is inherently conservative: it continually builds and develops on what has been said before. Because of this, a rhetor would have to use transitional organizing terms to move away from the traditional metaphors of the Cold War. This transition did not occur in the rhetoric of the 1988 Presidential candidates.

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