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
MARXISM AND NIETZSCHEANISM: TO A RUTHLESS CRITICISM OF ALL THINGS  
EXISTING (and then some . . .)

A SENIOR HONORS THESIS IN PHILOSOPHY

BY

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, written over a horizontal line. The signature is difficult to decipher but appears to be "Robert M. Hutchins".

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## INTRODUCTION

What is the relationship between two of the most influential thinkers in philosophy: Karl Marx and Freidrich Nietzsche?

It seems that the most pervasive opinion concerning their relationship focuses upon their differences. Between Nietzsche the 'Radical Aristocrat' and Marx the 'Socialist.'

One will find however, that a close analysis of these terms reveals the lack of substance to their claim. The terms "Socialist" and "Radical Aristocrat" are ambiguous in both conception and usage. But this ambiguity has not been given its full due in general criticism. Further, in many cases these terms when used to describe Marx and Nietzsche are used falsely.

I will go out on a limb here and claim directly that Nietzsche is not in favor of a Radical Aristocracy in any base meaning of the phrase. What is generally understood by this phrase is that Nietzsche desires to save an elite from the crude masses of democracy above whom this elite would rule as a hawk among lambs. In this conception, one is drawn to images of Feudal samurai riding through a countryside dotted with peasant villages. Indeed, this is the conception that many derive from Nietzsche. After all,

is he not the proclaimer of the Overman? Does he not proclaim pity and morality to be things that must be overcome? Indeed, this is all true, but the conception so derived is false. Nietzsche would say that it is the result of poor reading.

First off, one must not conflate the master character described by Nietzsche with the *Übermensch*. The two are separate, critically so. The Greek hero idolized by Nietzsche is a figure of the past, and Nietzsche does not dwell on anachronisms. If that hero appears often in his works, it is as a balance, a counter position to the Christian morality that Nietzsche wishes to oppose. Do not think that Nietzsche wishes simply to replace modernity with the classical ideal---far from it! Yes, Nietzsche is a confirmed anti-liberal, yes he is anti-Christian, yes he desires to depose the claim that all men are created equal, but this does not mean that he desires to place some men upon a high pedestal and bring the rest of mankind to its knees. No, man is something that must be overcome. That is, man as a type, mankind itself, must be overcome. And the rare exception, the noble elite, is but a pointer to something higher and is still himself human-all-too-human.

Marx, unlike Nietzsche does not suffer from rampant misreading. He is indeed a Socialist. What remains to be

seen however, is what type of socialist he is. What do we mean, what does Marx mean by the concept---socialist?

One must not become confused and suppose that Marx unilaterally supports the domination of the few by the many. The tyranny of the majority. It is simply not the case that Marxist democracy---communism---desires the subsuming of the individual into the communality. Or rather, it is the case, only paradoxically; for at the same time, communism is the turning of the community utterly to the services of the individual. It must be clear that at a first reading, this paradox---the community exists to serve the individual and the individual exists to serve the community---sounds like non-sense. One or the other, reason demands. This is where Marx, like Nietzsche gets us. The rationality, the logic that we use to analyze Marxist claims (and Nietzschean claims for that matter) simply is not sufficient. We find ourselves in the unenviable situation that Newtonian Physics found itself in when it endeavored to describe quantum phenomena---the concepts do not fit. Indeed, they are often amazingly ill-suited to the job. And it is precisely for this reason that the Marxist position is unclear. In short, he is speaking a different language than are we. But in the manner of Heisenberg, he has made do in a manner that will allow us to get the point, only if we are aware of the situation.

This circuitous route seems to have danced neatly around the question: What is the nature of Marxist socialism? What is the nature of the Nietzschean Aristocratic Radicalism? Very well, then, let me answer---Marxist socialism is the same as Nietzschean Aristocratic Radicalism. This, of course, is a radical claim, but it is the claim that I will attempt to carry out herein.

It has been said that both Marx and Nietzsche spoke a different language and therefore are ripe for misreading and apparent incongruity. Let us begin then with an attempt to ferret out the nature of these new languages and let them be our clue in this labyrinth

## CHAPTER 1

## NIETZSCHE'S LANGUAGE

Throughout his works, Nietzsche complained of the modern disease of "poor reading." He proposed that one of the drawbacks of teaching everybody to read was that this resulted in an overall decline in the art of reading---that reading today means to read badly. With this in mind, we must understand Nietzsche's varied experiments of style not as the capricious whims of a half-mad villain, nor as the attempts of a half-baked philosopher to appear profound; instead, we must understand these experiments as a conscious attempt to rediscover the art of writing well, indeed to create a new art of writing. And if Nietzsche bids us read him slowly, this is because he is aware that if we are to read him, we must deepen in ourselves art of reading. If we are going to read Nietzsche, really read him, then we are going to have to learn to read well. And at this point, he has won half the battle. Nietzsche himself knew well that powerful ideas must of necessity require a new language. If we come to be conversant in this language, then we are half-way to the ideas. Zarathustra, the epitome of Nietzschean style-philosophy, has been called a mixture of poetry and philosophy. This is not the case, Zarathustra is in its

entirety, Nietzschean philosophy. It is what might be called the language of a deeper philosophy.

It has been tradition to consider Nietzsche's thought within the trinity of the Will-to-Power, the Übermensch and the Eternal Return. There is much to be said for this tradition; indeed, these aspects are crucial to Nietzsche. All-too-often, however, it has been argued that one or the other aspect was superior and that Nietzsche could be understood primarily as the teacher of the Will-to-Power, the Übermensch or the Eternal Return. This is a false conception and one borne of poor reading. To discuss Nietzsche, one must consider not only all three of these aspects but the many other aspects that pulse and writhe throughout his writings. The attempt to reduce Nietzsche to a body of a few easily communicated ideas has the herd mentality written all over it. Indeed when dealing with Nietzsche, the words themselves cannot be taken simply at face value what is much more crucial is the rhythm.

The central object of this section is to understand the fruits of Nietzsche's labors. That is, we desire to see where Nietzsche points, what does Nietzsche call for? In order to do this, we must digest his concepts of the Will-to-Power, the Übermensch and the Eternal Return. But this alone will not suffice. The study of Nietzsche is comparable to Biology: Let us break him down into his organs



and tissues, but we must do this only that we can understand the whole with a greater---rationality.

## CHAPTER 2

## THE PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL

If one is to begin assigning labels to Nietzsche, perhaps the most fitting is that of psychologist. For every idea, every morality, every politics is observed by Nietzsche to be the idea, the morality, the politics of a man; and if we are to understand their essence, we must understand his. We must know the psychology behind the idea.

Nietzschean psychology is a psychology of drives, of wills. Phenomena in itself possess meaning only inasmuch as a particular value has been assigned to those phenomena by a particular will. The struggle of meaning is the struggle of evaluation. The struggle of evaluation is the struggle of wills.

By will we must not read here the desires of a human ego. For indeed this ego itself is the product and the plaything of the wills and not the other way around.

Instead, the will can be understood only as the power of evaluation, the ability to bestow values to phenomena. We need not bring this concept of the will to such heights of abstraction that the air becomes thin and we become confused for lack thereof. Nietzsche himself as a rule brings the idea of the will down to us in its concrete form. Let us consider the example of the starving man:

The starving man can be considered as driven by the will to eat, by the hunger drive, and it is this drive that imposes its values upon phenomena. That which nourishes the hunger drive is called good and that which prevents its nourishment is called bad. In this way, the will to eat has established its table of values. If a man is wholly dominated by his hunger at the expense of his other drives (as in this case of the starving man) we can see that he will see the world through the eyes of hunger. The various drives can be understood to operate in a similar manner.

Nietzsche conceives the evaluated world as the product of the myriad struggles of wills. Each moment, the relationships between the drives alter and the balance shifts. It is this shifting that moves man this way or that throughout the world.

"do I have to add that when we are awake, our drives do nothing but interpret nervous stimuli and, according to their requirements, posit 'causes?' that there is no essential difference between waking and dreaming? that when we compare very different stages of culture we even find that freedom of waking interpretation in the one is in no way inferior to the freedom exercised in the other while dreaming? that our moral judgments and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired language for designating certain nervous stimuli? that all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text?---Take some trifling experience. Suppose we were in the market place one day and we noticed someone laughing at us as we went by: this event will signify this or that to us according to whether this or that drive happens at that moment to be at its height in us---and it will be a quite different event according to the kind of person we are. (D s119)"

We can see in this psychology the first glimmerings of Nietzsche's greater conception. We have said that will

evaluates. The will to eat evaluates that which nourishes it as good and that which prevents its nourishment as bad. If we generalize this to the working of will, then we can see that the will itself operates according to a rule: will esteems that which serves its health and despises that which harms it. That which is despised or esteemed much change according to the will involved (hence Nietzsche's half-jest--man does not seek pleasure and avoid pain, only the Englishman does) but the rule of esteeming and despising is the general rule of the will. This rule is the Will To Power (or as we shall see, an aspect of the will to power).

The will to power is the moving principle behind the wills. It is this way that we can say that "the world is 'will to power' and nothing else (BGE 238)," for all life is a motion and conflict of wills and the will to power is the rule to this motion.

We can diagnose a particular psychology according to its will to power, simply by observing that which it esteems and that which it despises. Indeed, we can extend the scope of our investigation and diagnose whole bodies of thought, intellectual movements, political theories, laws. In the end, we find that we can diagnose the will to power of an entire age according to its evaluations.

But to what end? When a physician diagnoses a patient, he can observe the symptoms and proclaim that his patient is healthy or that he is sick. And this is the value of any

diagnosis---that we may know our condition and thereby make haste to remedy our illness if we are indeed ill.

For Nietzsche, psychology and physiology are inter-related. If we are possessed of a poor digestion then we shall generate the psychology of poor digestion. If we are physically sick, then we shall have the psychology of the sick---the morality of the sick. Every psychological diagnosis is therefore also a medical diagnosis. Our judgement of the will to power of our lends us the knowledge: is this the psychology of the healthy or of the sick?

For Nietzsche, the diagnosis of modern morality is the diagnosis of the ascetic ideal---that ideal of philosophers and priests that finds in denial of the senses, of sensuousness the highest virtue. Nietzsche saw in the modern Christian tables of values symptoms of idealist philosophy and ascetic religion: the psychology of the ascetic ideal. He then posed the next question: if the ascetic ideal underlies the modern consciousness, then what is the meaning of the ascetic ideal?

## CHAPTER 3

## THE MEANING OF THE ASCETIC IDEAL

The ascetic ideal has its roots in the spirit of resentment. Resentment is the desire for revenge---frustrated. In the sick man, for example, who suffers from his illness but has no one to blame for his suffering, no one upon which to wreak revenge, or the weak man who cannot claim vengeance against he who has made offense, the desire for revenge cannot be expelled from the body and remains within, festering. Resentment is impotent revenge turned venomous.

If we keep close to the question: is the ascetic ideal the evaluation of the healthy or of the sick, we can quickly determine that since for the strong and healthy, revenge is quickly satisfied, it is only in the weak and sick we can find the spirit of resentment at full flower. And since the ascetic ideal has its roots planted firmly in the spirit of resentment, the ascetic ideal must therefore be a symptom of some sickness. But what kind of sickness, and how does the ascetic ideal relate to this sickness?

Nietzsche recognizes (as does any physician) that the healthy must be protected from the sick. For even if the healthy are terrible and violent, the fear of one healthy man for the other is no danger. (G 558). But of the sick

man, there is no fear. For the sick man, there grown in the breast of man only nausea, pity for man.

In the heart of the man of resentment, there is a great hatred of man---his own rancor causes him to turn his evil eye upon all of humanity, indeed upon all of life itself. (G 563 J)

It is these men of resentment, the sick, that pose a great threat to the healthy and thereby to humanity. (G 560)

If the healthy themselves become infected, then man himself would become sick---of himself. This great nausea of man, this great weariness of man then ushers in the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism.

We can see that the great tide of the sick poses a threat to the healthy, and therefore life as it is the sick who carry in them the will to nothingness, the will to negate life. It is in this fact that the ascetic ideal and its herald the ascetic priest find their sustenance.

The ascetic priest is uncanny---he is both sick and healthy. It is this strange quality that makes him the paradoxical tool of life. The priest is sick and therefore profoundly related to the sick; they understand each other.

But the priest is also healthy.

"But he must also be strong, master of himself even more than others, with his will to power intact, so as to be both trusted and feared by the sick, so as to be their support, resistance, prop, compulsion, taskmaster, tyrant and god. (G 562)"

The strength of the priest is the strength of the spirit, of cunning. (G562.2)

The priest walks among the strong as one of them, perhaps as the greatest of them.

The great usefulness of the priest is to be found in his leadership of the sick. The value of the priestly instinct is that he "alters the direction of resentment. (G563)"

As we have said, resentment is revenge turned sour through lack of an outlet. The suffering must find someone to blame for his pain.

"'I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: 'Quite so, my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it---you alone are to blame for yourself!'"---This is brazen and false enough: but one thing at least is achieved by it, the direction of *resentment is altered.*(G 564"

It has been the attempt of the instinct of life to use the ascetic priest to render the sick for a time harmless, to turn their dangerous resentment back upon themselves and by means of intoxicants to deaden and numb the pain of their existence. This indeed is the ascetic ideal.

For a long time, this provisional "safeguarding of the more healthily constituted (G 564)" has been a success. For a long time, all that was required was a distance, a chasm between the healthy and the sick. "And it was much! very much! (G565)" If this has been the success of the ascetic ideal, then we must examine it more closely, for in this ideal, Nietzsche discovers a grave defect.

"It goes without saying that a medication of this kind, a mere affect medication, cannot possibly bring about a real cure of sickness in a physiological sense. (G 564)" The



ascetic priest is no physician. He combats the evidence of the suffering, not the cause, not the real sickness. The history of the ascetic priest has been a dangerous game of consolation.

"The alleviation of suffering, consolation of every kind--here lies [the ascetic priests] genius; how inventively he has gone about his task of consolation, how boldly and unscrupulously he has selected the means for it! Christianity in particular may be called a great treasure house of means of consolation: it offers such a collection of refreshments, palliatives, and narcotics; it risks so much that is dangerous and audacious; it has displayed such refinement and subtlety, in guessing what stimulant affects will overcome, at least for a time, the deep depression, the leaden exhaustion, the black melancholy of the physiologically inhibited. For we may generalize: the main concern of all great religions has been to fight a certain weariness and heaviness grown to epidemic proportions. (G 566)"

Such a method cannot heal the sick; indeed its methods only stave off the effects of sickness for a time and, worse, the sick, untreated, grow even more ill. The ascetic ideal has been a great "buying of time" on the part of life against the will to nothingness--nihilism; but each day, the stakes become greater, the intoxicants more potent, the game more dangerous.

We have asked the question, "What is the meaning of the ascetic ideal?" and we have discovered that the ascetic ideal is a tool by means of which the ascetic priest has bound and controlled the spirit of resentment. How has it done this? By creating in the sufferer as reason for his suffering, a guilty party--himself. This has been a powerful ideal. Indeed it has been the most powerful ideal. As has been said, the diagnosis of modern evaluations shows

that our values are the values of the ascetic ideal.

Because the ascetic ideal evaluates, we can determine that it is a will. Indeed, it is a monstrous, powerful will.

What is the meaning of the power of this ideal?

"The ascetic ideal has a goal---this goal is so universal that all the other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretations (and has there ever been a system of interpretation more thoroughly thought through?); it submits to no power, it believes in its own predominance over every other power, in its absolute superiority of rank over every other power---it believes that no power exists on earth that does not first have to have a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as a tool of the ascetic ideal, as a way and a means to its goal, to one goal.---and where is the match to this closed system of will, goal and interpretation? Why has it not found its match?--- Where is the other 'one goal'? (G 582)"

## CHAPTER 4

## SCIENCE AND THE ASCETIC IDEAL

We have seen that the ascetic ideal has been no more than a stopgap measure, and a dangerous one at that. It continually defers its own resolution while continually building up the pressure behind its answer. We have been asked, "Where is the other to the ascetic ideal?" In answer to this, we might propose that science is the answer. If religion and idealistic philosophy, Christianity in particular, have been the representatives of the ascetic ideal, then surely science has been their most stalwart opponent. Indeed, science has already conquered the ascetic ideal in all important respects.

"Modern science which, as a genuine philosophy of reality, clearly believes in itself alone, clearly possesses the courage for itself and the will to itself, and has up to now survived well enough without God, the beyond and the virtues of denial. (G 582)"

To this, Nietzsche has but one response:  
 "[Science] is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather *the latest and noblest form of it.* (G 583)"

To paraphrase, 'all the most strict nay-sayers of science, the skeptics and pale atheists who in all seriousness and faith believe that they are the opponents of the ascetic ideal are in fact its most spiritualized product, the front-line troops of the ascetic ideal.' Why? Because they still have faith in truth.

"This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation---I have already indicated it: on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly, on the same

belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized). (G589)"

In science, through the development of science, the ascetic ideal has merely reached its most spiritualized mode. Science is not contrary to the ascetic idea, but as its will to truth, science is the center about which the ascetic ideal has for so long orbited. The belief in God and the afterworld was never the essence of the ascetic ideal---it was the True: the form of forms. The seeming destruction of the ascetic ideal by the will to truth has been the uncovering of the kernel of that ideal through history. And with this discovery comes the final test of the ascetic ideal, the question of the will to truth.

"All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of 'self-overcoming' in the nature of life---the lawgiver himself eventually receives the call: 'patere legem quam ipse, tulisti.' In this way, Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish, too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself; this will happen, however, when it poses the question 'what is the meaning of all will to truth?' (G 597)"

What, then is the meaning of the ascetic ideal?  
 "Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human *animal*, had no meaning so far. His existence on earth contained no goal at; 'why man at all?'---was a question without answer; the will for man and earth was lacking; behind every great human destiny there sounded as a refrain a yet greater 'in vain!' This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something was *lacking*, that man was surrounded by a fearful *void*---he did not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he *suffered* from the problem of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal: but his problem was *not* suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, "*why* do I suffer?"

"Man, the bravest of all animals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not repudiate suffering as such, he *desires* it, he even seeks it out, provided that he is shown a *meaning* for it, a *purpose* of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, *not* suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far---and the *ascetic ideal offered man meaning!* It was the only meaning offered so far; any meaning is better than none at all; the ascetic ideal was in every sense the '*faute de mieux*' *par excellence* so far. In it, suffering was *interpreted*; the tremendous void seemed to have been filled; the door was closed to any kind of suicidal nihilism. This interpretation---there is no doubt of it---brought fresh suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive suffering: it placed all suffering under the perspective of *guilt*.

"But all this notwithstanding---man was *saved* thereby, he possessed a meaning, he was henceforth no longer like a leaf in the wind, a plaything of nonsense---'the sense-less'---he could now *will* something; no matter at first to what end, why, with what he willed: *the will itself was saved*.

"We can no longer conceal from ourselves *what* is expressed by all that willing which has taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself---all this means---let us dare to grasp it---*a will to nothingness*, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a *will!* . . . And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man would rather will *nothingness* than *not* will.---(G 598-9)"

In summary, we see that the ascetic ideal is a will, a will to nothingness in the face of what is even more abhorrent: not willing. We see further that the self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal has led to modern science and now to the question of even that modern science---to the question of the value of the will to truth. In our evaluation of the ascetic ideal, we must give it proper accord: in the long history of man, that ideal has held man back from his deepest abysses. But we are now at the moment

of the overcoming of the ascetic ideal. Our discussion of Nietzsche now moves on to the next question: what shall be the other to the ascetic ideal? What, if anything, can man will in the face of the ever-present 'in vain'?

## CHAPTER 5

## THE OVERMAN

"I teach you the Overman. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? (Z 12)"

Our diagnosis tells us that the modern tables of values reveal them to be expressions of the ascetic ideal. Our analysis of the ascetic ideal has led us to its secret--- that its will to truth has quietly been overcoming it. We have discovered that man's historical intoxication is beginning to wear off and that he must now come face to face with himself. We have, with Nietzsche asked the question, what is to be the other to the ascetic ideal? Let us, with Nietzsche, begin our search with the amazing fact of life: that life must always overcome itself.

"And life itself confided this secret to me: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that which must always overcome itself. (Z 115)"

If the ascetic ideal has thus far been the expression of the will opposed to life, then perhaps the will in affirmation of life is its other. This means that we must will along with life, self-overcoming. We must become self-overcomers. As we follow this path to the peaks of high mountains, we will draw ever closer to . . . the Overman.

Who is the Overman? I will contend that the Overman is first the positing of a type and then the working through of this type to its conclusions. To begin, the Overman is man

consciously affirming life, affirming the self-overcoming aspect of life:

"And life confided this secret to me: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am *that which must always overcome itself.*'"

That is, willing the will to power. For the will to power is "the unexhausted procreative will of life. (Z 114)" (Herein we discover the second aspect of the will to power--that which evaluates, that which commands must become the "judge, the avenger, and the victim of its own law. (Z 114)" The will to power, therefore, wills its own self-overcoming. Or, the will to power *is* the will to self-overcoming). The Overman therefore wills the will to power; or, his will is the will to power. This point is crucial, but still unclear; let us examine it in more detail.

The Overman is man consciously affirming life; this means that in the Overman, the spirit (formerly life-denying) becomes a life affirming power. The development of the Overman, then, is the development of the spirit. And the development of the spirit is of three metamorphoses---the camel, the lion and the child.

The camel we have seen---his is the spirit that loads the weight of mankind's suffering on his back and who carries this heavy load into deserts. The camel is the hermit singing and humming in the forest who has not yet heard that God is dead.

The lion spirit is the No-saying spirit, the spirit of critique, of revaluation, the purveyor of the Gay Science, the mountain climber, the spirit of truthfulness-even



carrying this burden to the peaks of truth itself. The lion spirit carries the banner: "willing liberates." The lion spirit is the overcomer---the beginning of the answer to the ascetic ideal. "Creation---that is the great redemption from suffering and life's growing light. (Z 87)" Instead of clinging to the ascetic ideal and the ancient will that was its grand creator ("what the people believe to be good and evil, that betrays to me an ancient will to power. (Z 113)"), man must will his own overcoming and become a creator---this will give a meaning to his life.

It is in this lion spirit that is often situated the essence of the Übermensch. And we will to some extent assent---in the Overman there is much of the lion spirit. And, yes, this lion spirit, this breaker of values, is one who has begun to overcome man. But, and this is the key, he is not yet the Overman. The lion spirit is, like man, a going on the way towards the Overman. But has this overcomer not gone over man? Has he not cut himself off from the herd and the rabble? Is this not precisely the Overman? No. The lion spirit, the champion of the will as creator has not yet overcome one final hurdle. Let us listen to Zarathustra.

"Will---that is the name of the liberator and joy-bringer; thus I taught you, my friends. But now learn this too: the will itself is still a prisoner. Willing liberates; but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? 'It was'---that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time's

covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy. (Z 139)"

It is here that Nietzsche locates the cause of suffering and the spirit of revenge that is bound to conquer even the overcomer:

"This indeed alone is what revenge is: the will's ill will against time and its 'it was.' (Z 140)"

That the will cannot abolish that which has happened plagues even the strong of will. Time and its 'it was' makes the will itself prisoner and this is the source of revenge. This folly of the will, taking wings and acquiring spirit becomes the spirit of revenge.

"The spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the subject of man's best reflection; and where there was suffering, one always wanted punishment too. (Z 140)"

And it is here, at the frustration of the will, at the portal of the immovable rock that is the past, that is history, we find the final step unto the Overman.

"I led you away from these fables when I taught you, 'The will is a creator.' All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident---until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it.' Until the creative will says to it, 'But this I willed it; thus I shall will it.'

"But has the will yet spoken thus? And when will that happen? Has the will been unharnessed yet from its own folly? Has the will yet become his own redeemer and joy-bringer? Has he unlearned the spirit of revenge and all gnashing of teeth? And who taught him reconciliation with time and something higher than any reconciliation? For that will which is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation; but how shall this be brought about? Who could teach him also to will backwards? (Z 141)"

## CHAPTER 6

## THE ETERNAL RETURN

"All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming. (G 597)"

Self-overcoming. So it was for the ascetic ideal and so it has now become for the lion spirit and his will. Driven by the will as liberator, by the Gay Science, the lion spirit has climbed his way to his own destiny---he has climbed high mountains. The lion spirit has moved great stones and broken many tablets, but he has now arrived at a stone that his mighty will cannot move. He has come to the end of his journey. The lion spirit must now begin his self-overcoming. The will must judge itself.

"Not long ago I walked gloomily through the deadly pallor of dusk---gloomy and hard, with lips pressed together. Not only one sun had set for me. A path that ascended defiantly through stones, malicious, lonely, not cheered by herb or shrub---a mountain path crunched under the defiance of my foot. Striding silently over the mocking clatter of pebbles, crushing the rock that made it slip, my foot forced its way upward. Upward---defying the spirit that drew it downward toward the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil and archenemy. Upward---although he sat on me, half dwarf, half mole, lame, making lame, dripping lead into my ear, leaden thoughts into my brain. (Z 156)"

What are these leaden thoughts? Precisely this: that the will cannot will backwards. That the great abyss the climber attempts to avoid is at the top of his climb as well. The will itself is the birthplace of the spirit of revenge.

"Because there is suffering in those who will, inasmuch as they cannot will backwards, willing itself and all life were supposed to be--a punishment. And now cloud upon cloud rolled over the spirit, until eventually madness preached, 'Everything passes away; therefore everything deserves to pass away. And this too is justice, this law of time that it must devour its children.' (Z 140)"

Let us put our ear up to the lips of the spirit of gravity and hear for ourselves his leaden words:

"'Things are ordered morally according to justice and punishment. Alas, where is redemption from the flux of things and from the punishment called existence?'

"'Can there be redemption if there is eternal justice? Alas, the stone *It was* cannot be moved: all punishments must be eternal too.'

"'No deed can be annihilated: how could it be undone by punishment? This, this is what is eternal in the punishment called existence, that existence must eternally become deed and guilt again. Unless the will should at last redeem himself, and willing should become not willing.' (Z 140-1)"

The agony of the overcomer! To discover that his mighty will is itself the organ of suffering and revenge. Worse still, that the will can redeem itself only in its own annihilation---in not willing. Leaden thoughts indeed!

It is at this moment that the lion spirit teeters at his deepest abyss. It is at this moment that courage must speak or forever hold its tongue. "This courage finally bade me stand still and speak: "Dwarf! It is you or I! (Z 157)" The lion spirit, the overcomer must come to terms with the eternal return.

On the face of it, the eternal return is a simple doctrine.

"Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of times, and all things with us. You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn over again and again so that it may run down and run

out again; and all these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is smallest; and we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is smallest. (Z 220)"

Superficially, this doctrine can be understood: "All that is straight lies, all truth is crooked; time itself is a circle. (Z 158)" But let us not, like the spirit of gravity, make things too easy for ourselves. We have heard the name of the eternal return---let us now examine the meaning of the eternal return.

First, the eternal return is Zarathustra's most abysmal thought, "All is the same, nothing is worth while, knowledge chokes . . . alas, man recurs eternally! The small man recurs eternally! (Z 219)" This is the nausea of the will when it first realizes the eternal return. It is the nausea of the overcomer who realizes "Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man. (Z 219)"

Second, the eternal return is Zarathustra's destiny. It is the eternal return that allows the will to will backwards. If time is a circle, then every yesterday is also a tomorrow, every 'it was' is also an 'it shall be.' For the great of will, therefore, every 'it was' can become a 'thus I will it!'

As a consequence of the eternal return, every great will---every will that wills the eternal recurrence of the same---wills itself. Indeed it is the great will, the will to power that in this manner wills itself. Through its own self-overcoming, the will to power wills backwards, wills

itself. This is the third and final aspect of the will to power.

The eternal return is the criterion and the consequence of the Übermensch. And we shall say that the will to power is therefore the will of the Übermensch and that the Übermensch is the will of the will to power! Why is this? Because of the dual aspect of the recurrence. For man, the eternal recurrence is Zarathustra's most abysmal thought. Indeed, for the higher man, for the overcomer, the recurrence is the most abysmal thought: the eternal return of the small man! Abyss!

It is only for the Overman, man who has overcome himself that the return is the great liberator. And therefore only the Overman can will the eternal return. And as the eternal return is the spirit of overcoming in that which is---the stream of becoming and therefore the will to power, only the Übermensch can will the will to power.

It is to the Übermensch that Nietzsche points. The Übermensch is the child of the will to power, the child of the eternal return. Clearly, in this there are many consequences that remain to be uncovered. But we can feel assured now that we speak a similar dialect to Nietzsche. Let us then let sleeping consequences lie and leave the Overman for a moment . . .

## CHAPTER 7

## MARX'S LANGUAGE

It would be a mistake to presume that the starting point for Marx was the poor conditions of the working class. If one assumes that Marx was moved by the plight of the proletariat and therefore formed socialist theory for their eventual emancipation, one would be placing the cart before the horse. Marx's actual starting point was engagement with Hegel and the Hegelian Dialectic. Marx deemed necessary "the settling of accounts with the Hegelian dialectic and with Hegelian philosophy as a whole. (M 68)" It was this 'settling of accounts' and the problems thereby raised that led directly to Marx's subsequent critique of political economy, analysis of Capitalism and subsequent resolution in Communism. If we are to come to terms with Marx's language, then we must follow him on this journey. We shall begin with Marx's philosophical criticism of Hegel, continue with Marx's discussion of the nature of estranged labor and Marx's theory of history and economy before concluding this section in a discussion of the communist man.

## CHAPTER 8

## HEGEL AND THE DIALECTIC

"Because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation from the point of view of the positive relation inherent in it as the true and only positive, and from the negative relation of it as the only true act and self-realizing act of all being, he has only found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; and this historical process is not yet the *real* history of man---of man as a given subject, but only man's *act of genesis*-the *story* of man's *origin*. (M 108)"

It is not within the scope of this discussion to delve into the details of Hegelian philosophy other than to say in short that in it Hegel concerned himself with the alienation of the subject from the object, of the in-itself from the for-itself. And that he proposed to remedy this alienation philosophically via the dialectic. In essence, Hegel proposed that the object, the objective world, was nothing more than the alienated essence of the subject and that history has been the process of absolute subjectivity coming to consciousness of this alienation as its own alienated self-essence and thereby negating it. At the pinnacle of history, lay Hegel's Phenomenology which made clear the nullity of the object and thereby removed alienation. In layman's terms this means that the world outside of my consciousness is simply my consciousness alienated from itself and that the seeming apartness between my consciousness and others is merely the product of residual alienation of a greater consciousness. Knowing this fact, I



am one with this greater consciousness and outside of alienation.

Marx criticizes Hegel on the grounds that Hegel's system does not engage the real alienation of man but rather is merely an abstract formalism which thereby engages and overcomes the abstractions of alienation---abstractly. In Hegel, it is "not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in opposition to himself, but the fact that he objectifies himself in distinction from and in opposition to abstract thinking that is the posited essence of the estrangement and the thinking to be superseded. (M 111)"

Hegel posits the essence of man as self-consciousness. All estrangement of the human essence is therefore nothing but the estrangement of self-consciousness. Because of this assumption, Hegel proceeds in his philosophy to address objectivity itself as a problem---as the problem---and confirms absolute subjectivity as the final solution. For Marx, this is doubly unsatisfactory. First, because it is an empty solution.

"Hegel, having posited man as equivalent to self-consciousness, the estranged object---the estranged essential reality of man---is nothing but consciousness, the thought of estrangement merely---estrangement's abstract and therefore empty and unreal expression, negation. The annulment of the alienation is therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty annulment of that empty abstraction---the negation of the negation. (M 122)"

and second, precisely because of its emptiness, it results in real life not as the annulment of alienation but as the conformation thereof:

"In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the conformation of the true essence, effected precisely through negation of the pseudo-essence. With him the negation of the negation is the conformation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial; or it is the denial of this pseudo-essence as an objective being dwelling outside of man and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject.

"A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation---denial and affirmation---are bound together. (M 119)"

Marx cannot, however, be simply satisfied with a contradiction of Hegel's assumption that man's essence is self-consciousness and that therefore alienation can be overcome abstractly. (Although he does of course do exactly this: "Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man inhaling and exhaling all the forces of nature, establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by his externalization, it is not the act of positing that is the subject in this process: it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something objective . (M 115)" In short, "Man is directly a natural being. (M 115)") But Marx need not be so satisfied, for in his analysis, he discovers that Hegel himself, through the logic of the dialectic, undermines himself.

"Hegel's positive achievement here, in his speculative logic, is that the *determinate concepts*, the universal *fixed-thought forms* in their independence vis-à-vis nature and mind are a necessary result of the general estrangement of the human essence and therefore of human thought, and that Hegel has therefore brought these together and presented them as moments of the abstraction

process. For example, superseded Being is Essence, superseded Essence is Concept, the Concept superseded is . . . the Absolute Idea. But what, then, is the Absolute Idea? It superseded its own self again, if it does not want to traverse once more from the beginning the whole act of abstraction, and to acquiesce in being a totality of abstractions or in being the self-comprehending abstraction. But abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it must abandon itself---abandon abstraction---and so it arrives at an entity which is its exact contrary---at *nature*. Thus, the entire *Logic* is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself; that the Absolute Idea is nothing in itself; that only *Nature* is something. (M 122)"

Marx recognizes in Hegel, then, not the overcoming of alienation through philosophy, but the ultimate extent of abstract thought coming to full consciousness of its own emptiness.

"The man estranged from himself is also the thinker estranged from his essence---that is, from the natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore fixed mental shapes or ghosts dwelling outside nature and man. Hegel has locked up all these fixed mental forms together in his *Logic*, laying hold of each of them first as negation---that is, as an *alienation* of *human* thought---and then as negation of negation---that is, as a superseding of this alienation, as a *real* expression of human thought. But as even this still takes place within the confines of estrangement, this negation of the negation is in part the restoring of these fixed forms in their estrangement; in part a stopping-short at the last act---the act of self-reference in alienation---as the true mode of being of these fixed mental forms. This means that what Hegel does is to put in place of these fixed abstractions the act of abstraction that revolves in its own circle. In so doing, he has the merit, in the first place, of having indicated the source of all these inappropriate concepts which, as originally presented, belonged to disparate philosophies; of having brought them together; and of having created the entire compass of abstraction exhaustively set up as the object of criticism, instead of some specific abstraction. And in part, to the extent that this abstraction apprehend itself and experiences an infinite weariness with itself, (!) there makes its appearance in Hegel, in the form of the resolution to recognize Nature as the essential being and to go over to intuition, the abandonment of abstract thought---the abandonment of thought revolving solely

within the orbit of thought, of thought devoid of eyes, of teeth, of ears, of everything. (M 123-4)"

Marx recognizes, therefore that Hegel himself exposes the inherent weakness of the philosophical project. Hegel, in wrapping the whole of abstraction up in one neat package, allows us to recognize that abstraction revolving about itself, that is, abstraction concerning itself with abstraction, is a wholly empty and sterile affair. Indeed, when abstraction finally grows weary of itself an attempt to intuit nature (so as to give itself an object) succeeds only in intuiting nature itself as abstract and thenceforth absorbs even this into itself. Coming to rest, finally, upon a wearisome nothingness.

"Nature as nature---that is to say, in so far as it is still sensuously distinguished from that secret sense hidden within it---nature isolated, distinguished from these abstractions, is nothing---a nothing proving itself to be nothing---is devoid of sense, or has only the sense of being an externality which has to be annulled. (M 124)"

Marx then surmises that the flaw in Hegel's reasoning is that Hegel posits objectivity as such to be the enemy to be overcome. Against this, Marx recognizes that objectivity, to have and be an object, is a perfectly natural state while Hegel's goal of absolute subjectivity is nonsense:

"A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being and plays no part in the system of nature . . . an unobjective being is a nullity---an unbeing . . . But a non-objective being is an unreal, nonsensical thing---something merely thought of (merely imagined, that is)---a creature of abstraction. (M 116)"

Man himself exists in a state of estrangement. Abstract thinking as a whole is a product of this estrangement, and is therefore incapable by its own means of overcoming it

(indeed abstraction---the Dialectic---tends to preserve estrangement in the world). The Hegelian dialectic demonstrates this emptiness of abstraction in and of itself comprehensively. Man is a natural being and as such naturally possesses real, objects. Man's estrangement does not arise from the mere fact of objectivity but from the particular fact of his determinate relation to the object. The answer to alienation, therefore, is to be sought, not in abstract thinking, but in man's real relations to his objects.

## CHAPTER 9

## MYSELF THE STRANGER; ESTRANGED LABOR

Marx analysis proceeds from the actual economic fact that the more wealth a worker produces, the poorer he becomes. That is, that the more efficient and productive a worker is the less valuable he, as a worker or group of workers, becomes. This phenomenon shows that the worker and his labor are considered independent entities, that they are not one and the same. The object of work, the produce, is seen as something alien to the worker himself. More, the object of labor is something that is in the world, material apart from the laborer himself. A laborer puts himself (via his labor) into that which he produces, but the product is alien to him. The worker becomes estranged from the object of his labor and thence, as labor itself is nothing more than the process of action towards its object, from his labor itself. Worse, notice the play of the words "objectification of labor;" these can mean both the estrangement of the worker from his labor and also the objectification of the laborer himself. Labor, and laborers, are made into a commodity. In this way, the very act of labor itself becomes alien to the laborer. His actions are not his own but are at the services of an other. Indeed, because the worker is a worker and to be a worker is

to work, the alienation of the laborer from his activity is the alienation of the laborer from himself.

Marx now jumps to the idea of man as a species being, as mankind. Man is conscious and further, he is conscious of the fact that there are others out there who are, like him, conscious. In estranging man from nature and himself, estranged labor estranges man from mankind. It is the nature of consciousness that it makes life itself its object, this is what distinguishes man from animal. For man to live as a man is to be conscious of living. The life of mankind is the productive life, the life of doing, of working. It is the doing of things in the world apart from merely those necessary for utilitarian subsistence that is what differs mankind from the animals. This propensity shows itself in man's creation of beauty and novelty. However, estranged labor, makes work appear to man merely as a means of satisfying his subsistence, his existence. Man is the animal that is conscious of what it does and is therefore the doing animal and yet, doing, for labor estranged from its object is merely the means of living, of physical existence---like the animal. In this way, estranged labor alienates man from mankind, from the nature of man itself. Estranged labor takes man's advantage of consciousness and makes it his disadvantage. Estranged labor makes it "so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life-activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. (M 76)"

Estranged labor makes it possible for one to say, "existence precedes essence."

Marx thus outlines alienation: alienation from the self, from the other man, from the nature of man, and from nature in general as the result of the estrangement of labor. It is here now very important to note that Marx does not make the claim that the existentialist or the modern realist author does: that this triple set of alienation is a fact of reality, that alienation is a necessity of life. Rather, Marx rather explicitly points out that his analysis starts from merely a fact of political economy.

Private Property, or the appropriation of the Other.

"Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, or the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.(M 79)"

Just as the worker is alienated from his labor, just as he faces his own product as a loss, as the prostitution of his being in the service of another in order to provide the means of existence; so does he transfer his production to another. Just as he makes not-his-own the object of his labor does he confer to the stranger that very object which is not his own. Private property is then both the result of the estrangement of labor and the symptom of it. Private property is both the product of alienated labor and the means by which labor alienates itself. Wages, of course, are but a necessary consequence of labors estrangement; for in the service of the wage, the work of the laborer is not



an end in itself but a means to the end of subsistence. A socialism, therefore, which wishes only to make all wages equal or more equal is no better than the capitalism that it presumes to combat. "Wages are a direct consequence of estranged labor, and estranged labor is the direct cause of private property. The downfall of the one aspect must therefore mean the downfall of the other. (M 80)"

If we are then to overcome the estrangement of labor, we must bring about the downfall of private property. However, private property is not simply the material possessions of individuals, it is a social concept with strong roots in the psyche of our society. We cannot simply overthrow private property through legislative fiat then: the head may be off but the body can live on without it (this we quite clearly saw in the Soviet Union). We must instead come to understand the very roots of estranged labor. We must discover "how does man come to alienate his labor? How is this estrangement rooted in the nature of human development?"

Marx then began a close investigation of political economy and of the historical development of human economic relations. The general result of which he summarized as:  
 In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production that correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual

life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (M 4) "

Here we can identify both the Marxist theory of ideas (which becomes an extension of his relationship to Hegel) and the Marxist theory of history.

## CHAPTER 10

## MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORY

The material conditions in which we find ourselves—that is, the tools that determine our capacity to engage in exchange with Others (whether this be communicative exchange with Grandma in Wisconsin or agricultural exchange with the native soil), determine our intellectual make-up. This in itself is not a particularly difficult conception. Our conceptions of space, time, humanity et cetera will be formed according to our own (remember, this is a social "us", not a personal "us") situation. For example, my conceptual understanding of space and time if I am in a culture whose most rapid means of transport is jogging will be determinably different from my understanding of space and time in our modern culture of Trains, planes, automobiles and telecommunications.

In short, the realm of human ideas is determined by its material conditions. However, it is also the case that humans change their material conditions by means of labor through the medium of tools. Tools are, by and large, products of the realm of human ideas. That is, I may use a rock as a hammer. The rock is given to me by nature but it is my idea that transforms it into a hammer, and thus a tool.

"A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the

construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. (M 344-5)"

What we enter into therefore is a dynamic relationship between what I shall call the realms of reality and ideas. Further, the realm of ideas can change without interference from reality and reality can change without human involvement (seasonal variation is an example). We have, then, in the Marxist conception, a process as follows:

Man finds himself in certain material conditions which generate in him a certain set of intellectual assumptions. Through intellectual endeavor, man envisions new applications of nature in the form of tools and through his labor, alters his material conditions. Additionally, the realm of ideas has engaged in a little development of its own. Theories have been propounded and conclusions drawn, new assumptions have been made and social institutions have been created based upon this intellectual substructure. All is well and good in the world of man (at least for those who have been best served by the social institutions). However, change is on the way---the development of nature through human labor (tools) has fundamentally altered the material conditions. For Marx, the most basic material condition is that of production (both in the meaning of procreation and the meaning of material products) since this underlies the material existence of man. Hence, when the material conditions pertaining to production have been fundamentally

altered there follows a revolutionary change in consciousness. Man simply is not in the same world any longer, and the old assumptions are revealed for what they are---empty often foolish assumptions. However, it must be noted that this revolutionary change in consciousness is not exactly as abrupt as the word revolutionary might imply. Intellectual conceptions have a certain abstract malleability and therefore maintain a certain inertia. Words, conceptions, even social institutions will carry over from one moment into the next, but these conceptions will either be icons of reminiscence or will be so changed as to no longer reflect their heritage in anything but name. For example, the development of the word "God" across historical usage. Thus flows the process of human history.

Developments in this theme can be seen in the works of Kuhn who documents these paradigmatic shifts. In this light, it is important to note that while a change in material conditions will lead to a change in consciousness, such a change in material conditions is not necessary for a change in consciousness. Because the world of ideas has a dynamic of its own, radical shifts can occur completely within the realm of ideas---this can be seen in the shift from Newton to Einstein for example.

This leads us to the methodology of revolutionary change. In short, how do these changes occur? Quite simply, they occur because they are inherent in the dynamic. As we have seen, material conditions are the basis for

ideas. But ideas can result in changes in material conditions thereby undermining their own substratum. The idea that developed the automated machine undercut the entire material basis out of which it had originally sprung. No longer did man find himself in a subsistence Feudal culture, but in a commodity Capitalist one---and this transition had the ultimate effect of undermining the entire intellectual framework within which the automated machine had first been developed.

Major shifts limited to the realm of ideas occur in a similar manner. Certain assumptions about the world are made. Conclusions are drawn from those assumptions which bring into question the assumptions themselves (clearly not all of the assumptions, only a limited number at a time). This conflict leads to the overthrow of the old assumptions and their replacement with new ones more compatible with the conclusions (a rather odd situation indeed) this in turn leads to a radical change in the realm of concepts. Again, the shift from Newton to Einstein is telling. Conclusions stemming from the Newtonian framework (namely the constancy of the speed of light and the equality of inertial mass and gravitational mass) came into conflict with assumptions within that framework (namely the formula for relative velocities and the theories of gravitational attraction and inertia) and this led to an overturning of the old assumptions and their replacement with a new set, creating a new physics.

Further, the inertia of existing theoretical structures (the reactionary nature of institutions qua institution) generates a complex dynamic. Conclusions are interpreted to fit in with the existing paradigm, alternate theories are considered heresy, Kings execute revolutionary burghers et cetera. All of this does not stop revolutionary change, it simply prevents the schism from being a clean cut.

What is most important, however, is that throughout all of this, there have been a certain number of recurrent themes. It was these that Marx sought. He recognized all too well that the theories of Political Economy were informed purely within their particular historical moment and therefore were fundamentally contingent. Marx sought a theory of Economics that could survive at least their petty historicalism. Further, Marx realized that the all consuming philosophies of the time (namely Hegel's dialectic) were also historically contingent. Indeed, the Hegelian Dialectic, Experimental Science, Political Liberalism and Capitalistic Economics were all historically contingent theories (they also represent the final evolution of their historical disciplines). Marx found his answer: the division of labor and class struggle, culminating in the estrangement of man from his species being. Each historical phase in the development of production has in common these things. Herein Marx found his theory. The theory of division of labor, class struggle and estranged

man was the theory of history. And the answers to history lay in the absolution of these recurrent themes.

In light of his theory of history, Marx found most interesting and most original the fact that "The existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production. (M 220)" The importance of this discovery is that it recognizes that the existence of classes is contingent. Therefore, in the case of a particular phase in the development of production wherein class structure did not exist, alienated man (as the historical product of class conflict and the division of labor) also would not exist.

We have seen that intellectual structures are conditioned by material conditions. This being the case, we can recognize in Hegelian philosophy the abstraction of a particular set of material conditions---namely capitalism. But we must here remember that Hegelian philosophy was not merely an abstraction, but the culmination of abstract thought. The dialectic contained within it the whole of abstraction. This leads us to a startling conclusion: the dialectic therefore must reflect not only a particular material condition, but the whole of abstraction generating material conditions. We immediately recognize that this can be possible only if the particular material conditions that give rise to Hegelian philosophy are at the same time the culmination of all historical (class driven) conditions. In other words, capitalism must be the final evolution of



private property (Q), containing within itself the whole of alienated history.

Dialectical philosophy and capitalism are therefore analogs. One the sum of estranged thought ("The philosophic mind is nothing but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self-estrangement---i.e. comprehending itself abstractly. Logic is alienated thinking. (M 110)"), the other the sum of estranged labor. In Hegel, we recognize as his positive achievement that he saw the following:

"The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being (i.e. as a human being), is only possible by his really bringing out of himself all the powers that are his as the species man---something which in turn is only possible through the totality of man's actions. as the result of history---is only possible by man's treating these general powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement. (M 112)"

If capitalism and the dialectic are reflections of each-other then we can surmise that abstract thinking and labor in its estranged form are the dual aspects of the powers of the human species developed through history---that is, his powers of consciousness and production. If, then we discover in Hegel, the culmination of estranged thinking and the undermining of abstract thinking through its own logic, we can expect equally that estranged labor become culminated in capitalism will undermine itself by its own internal logic as well. This clearly is the project of Capital, an attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the workings of estranged labor and the capitalist form of estranged labor in particular in order to demonstrate that capitalism is

indeed the comprehensive form of private property (I use the terms estranged labor and private property interchangeably here in order to attune the ear to this Marxist discovery: that estranged labor and private property are interchangeable terms). And to therefore realize the final truth of capitalism:

"Capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation. (M 438)"

Through its own natural development, the capitalist mode of production undermines itself.

Thus, Marx's analysis of capitalism, like his analysis of the dialectic, demonstrates that this formation of estrangement stands as the final moment in the progression of the estrangement of the human essence. Both, by their own logic, lead to their own dissolution and to the movement of man beyond estrangement---to communism.

"Communism as the positive transcendence of private property or human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being ---a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. (M 84)"

It is interesting here to note that: the realm of ideas is the realm of tools and the dialectic is the ultimate expression of the realm of ideas. It is precisely the dialectic that has made possible our moving beyond the realm of ideas into the scientific analysis of material conditions. Further, it is only as we become conscious of--that is, bring to reason the nature of---capitalism that we become capable of overcoming alienation. If we note, with

Marx, that "Division of labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor appears. (M 159)" then we can surmise that the most central nature of alienation is that between mental and physical labor---the estrangement between the realm of ideas and the realm of reality. If, in addition, we recognize that true consciousness (man no longer estranged from his self-essence) has been the final result of the process of history (which, of course, has been the development of the division of labor), then we can conclude that much as feudalism was destroyed by a tool created in the process of its ideology so too, has division of labor in general been destroyed by a tool created in the process of its ideology---consciousness, natural science understood in the broadest sense. In other words, we saw how the feudal consciousness, although conditioned by feudal material conditions and therefore essentially conservative towards those conditions, nevertheless created a tool (the automated machine) that altered feudal material conditions and therefore undermined the feudal consciousness---undermined that which made it possible. In this same manner, the whole of history can also be seen as a single process---the process of human self-estrangement---the form of this process taking the shape of an alienation between the realm of ideas and the realm of reality. Within the consciousness generated by this process, here recognized as the whole of abstract thinking, there is generated a tool, namely science, which

in the end (as used by Marx) undermines the material conditions that made it possible. What does this imply? That through Marxism, the realm of ideas and the realm of reality, understood as separate (the essential expression of alienation) must now be seen as in unity.

"Thinking and being are thus no doubt distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other. (M 86)"

We are now prepared to say that we have become conversant in the Marxist language, as well as the Nietzschean. We can now understand how certain concepts, certain words as used by Marx and Nietzsche might sound strange to our ears. The seeming paradox in Marx between individuality and communality is no paradox to Marx and only seems one to us because of our fundamentally estranged understanding of these concepts. (We will discuss the particulars of this 'paradox' in a moment.)

We can now recognize that the surface tension between Marxist and Nietzschean rhetoric can not be taken as a true reflection of their relation. Indeed we are now aware of the dangers of taking either thinker too shallowly, lest we misread him completely. And yet, for all this, it is still far from clear how we can make the claim that the two thinkers point to the same thing: that the Communist man and the Übermensch are the same.

Very well, then let us address that question and dive once again into the depths.

## CHAPTER 11

## THE COMMUNIST MAN

Communism is, first and foremost, a consistent naturalism.

"Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both. We see also how only naturalism is capable of comprehending the act of world history. (M 115)"

Communism is the simultaneous naturalism of man and humanism of nature (simultaneous because these are the same thing). It is within communism that man stands in relation to himself humanly (or which is the same thing, man stands in relation to nature humanly, as man is *human* nature). It is through communism that man is affirmed, affirms himself as nature and nature is affirmed, affirms itself as man.

To apprehend humanly, means to apprehend with nuance, with a sense beyond the merely crude and useful.

"The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract being as food; it could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened man in need has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. (M 89)"

For Marx, man is a species being. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and his

consciousness. It is this that distinguishes man from the animal (which simply is its life activity).

"It is just because of this conscious life activity that man is a species being and it is only because he is a species being that he is a conscious being, i.e. his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is activity free activity. (M 76)"

"In creating an objective world by his practical activity, in working-up inorganic nature, man proves himself to be a conscious species being, i. e. as a being that treats the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself as a species being. (M 76)" What this means is that in contrast to the animal, "Man produces universally . . . man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom . . . man reproduces the whole of nature . . . man freely confronts his product . . . man knows how to produce in accordance with the standards of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty. (M 76)"

It is precisely this eye for beauty of form, this sense for the richness of the objective being, that is meant by 'human apprehension.' In other words, to apprehend humanly, to appropriate humanly, is not to consume the object merely to gratify animal need (i.e. to satisfy the requirements of sheer existence), but to consume the object as a human need--as material for the creative working-up of man.

It must be understood that as object can only be an object of human need if there is a human power, a human sense, capable of such gratification. Thus, music serves no human need for the unmusical ear. Human need exists only as a social phenomenon--it is a need that does not arise from the animal in man, but directly from mans species-being.

That is, man's species being is conscious life activity, conscious working-up of nature. But as nature worked not according to natural need, but, for example, according to the laws of beauty, satisfies no natural desire (and therefore cannot be the object of crude sense), the cultivation, the historical-social cultivation of the richness of subjective human sensibility is necessary to make this worked-up nature the object of human consciousness as human life activity. Hence, the cultivated ear is capable on enjoying music, not merely as noise, but as the life activity of man---of human labor. What is more, the cultivated mind is capable of enjoying a thing according to its symbolic character (as part of human symbolic meaning) rather than merely its crude utility.

When we say, then, that in communism, man stands in relation to himself humanly and that the whole of nature stands in relation to man humanly, we are saying that in communism, man becomes conscious of man as human life activity and man becomes conscious of nature as human life activity.

"On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers---human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers--- that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object. (M 88)" (notice that the manner in which objects become his objects is dependent upon their essential character and the nature of the human power corresponding to it. The object is a different object for the human ear than it is for the eye.)

We have said that the cultivation of human sense has been a social, historical phenomenon. We can now realize that:

"All history is the preparation for "man" to become the object of sensuous consciousness, and for the needs of "man as man" to become natural, sensuous needs. History itself is a real part of natural history---of nature's coming to be man. (M91)" Thus, we recognize that "the objectification of the human essence both in its theoretical and practical aspects is required to make man's sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance. (M 89)"

Communism recognizes that as human consciousness reflects human material conditions, human material conditions are "The open book of man's essential powers, the exposure to the senses of human psychology. (M 89)" By means of this recognition, communism makes human psychology the object of natural science.

This makes possible the consequence that natural science will

"lose its abstractly material---or rather, its idealistic---tendency, and will become the basis of human science, as it has already become the basis of actual human life, albeit in an estranged form. (M 90)" "Natural science will in time subsume under itself the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume under itself natural science: there will be one science. (M 91)"

Finally, through the scientific analysis of this open book of human psychology, communism makes clear the true human problem: private property.

"In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species life, his real species objectivity, and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature is taken from him. (M 76-7)"

Private property, estranged labor, makes it so that man's life-activity, his essential being, is a mere means to



his existence. Private property makes life itself appear only as a means to life (and this, as we have seen, is crude sense).

The Communist man, then, as the result of a positive transcendence of private property, human estrangement, is the heir to the history of estranged man---the positive reality of man. In the Communist man, the object is no longer alien in the sense that in the object, in his objectivity, the Communist man affirms himself. Nature and man have become the affirmation of mans essential objective powers.

If this is the Communist man, then the next (and more difficult) question is: what is the nature of the Overman?

## CHAPTER 12

### THE OVERMAN

"One day, life confided a secret to Zarathustra:  
'Behold,' it said, 'I am that which must always overcome  
itself. (Z 115)"

In Nietzsche's consideration , the history of man began  
with an "ineluctable disaster-the conquering and subjection  
of one tribe of men by another, more hostile one.

"A conqueror and master race which, organized for war and  
with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its  
terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously  
superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. (G  
522)"

With this, we find ourselves in possession of two types  
of man---the conquerors, the masters and the conquered, the  
slaves. Where this dichotomy survived and formed itself  
into a continuing condition, was born the first state. In  
this state, we discover a will, the inaugural will of the  
community. For it is the will of the masters and that alone  
that creates and maintains the state. Willing evaluates,  
willing establishes values. In the state, therefore, we  
have the beginning of communal values, the values of the  
community---the morality of mores.

"Among barbarous peoples there exists a species of  
customs whose purpose appears to be custom in general:  
minute and fundamentally superfluous stipulations which,  
however, keep continuously in the consciousness the  
constant proximity of custom, the perpetual compulsion to  
practice customs: so as to strengthen the mighty  
proposition with which civilization begins: any custom is  
better than no custom. (D 15)"

The community provides men with many advantages "Oh what advantages! We sometimes underrate them today. (G 507)" but it also imposes its communal will upon the members of the community.

In enjoying the benefits of community, one has pledged oneself to the community. Individual actions which harm the community (harming the neighbor, for example) are proscribed---and woe unto the lawbreaker!

"The lawbreaker is a debtor who has not merely failed to make good the advantages and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually attacked his creditor: therefore he is not only deprived henceforth of all these advantages and benefits, as is fair---he is also reminded what these benefits are really worth. (G 507)"

This leap into the community, this being bound by the communal will, was a fundamental change for the animal called man. It was the origin of the bad conscience.

"I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced---that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed walls of society and peace. The situation that faced sea animals when they were compelled to become land animals or perish was the same as that which faced these semi-animals, well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure: suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and 'suspended.' From now on they had to walk on their feet and 'bear themselves' whereas hitherto they had been borne by the water: a dreadful heaviness lay upon them. They felt unable to cope with the simplest undertakings; in this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, reckoning, inferring, co-ordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their 'consciousness,' their weakest and most fallible organ! I believe there has never been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort---and at the same time the old instinct had not ceased to make their usual demands! Only it was hardly or rarely possible to humor them: as a rule they had to seek new and, as it were, subterranean gratifications.

"All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward---this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his 'soul.' The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. Those fearful bulwarks with which the political organization protected itself against the old instincts of freedom---punishments belong among these bulwarks---brought about all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction---all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the 'bad conscience.' (G 520-1)"

"Thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself---the result of a forcible sundering from his animal past, as it were, a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and terribleness had rested hitherto. (G 521)"

The bad conscience is the grave illness of which we have previously spoken---man's suffering of man. As such, on the one hand, it is the father of nihilism, of doing nothing.

But,

"on the other hand, the existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, so profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered . . . From now on, man is included among the most unexpected and exciting lucky throws in the dice game of Heraclitus' 'great child,' be he called Zeus or chance; he gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as if whit him something were announcing and preparing itself, as if man were not a goal but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise.---(g 521)"

Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that the bad conscience did not arise first in the masters, but in the slaves. After all, the masters (even in society) still had the slaves upon whom to vent their natural instincts. But the animal drives in the slave were wholly frustrated, and for

that reason, in him the bad conscience (and its nihilism) was most completely developed.

Against the nihilism of the bad conscience, of man's suffering of man, arose the ascetic ideal. With his anesthetics and stimulants, the ascetic priest managed for a time to separate the slaves and their resentment from the masters.

If the story of the ascetic ideal and of bad conscience had come to its end at this point, we would be able to read Nietzsche as a common élitist. "Maintain the separation, keep the slave in his subjugation!" Would be the Nietzschean creed and we could be done with him. However, the story of the acetic ideal continues . . .

by means of the ascetic ideal, the priest walked among the masters. And walking among them as the most fearsome beast of prey, with the weapon of cunning rather than that of mere force, the ascetic priest brought down the masters and their morality of strength (the original morality of mores). The ascetic priest, usurping the title of master (and yet remaining in his most basic instincts a slave) brought the slave morality to the fore and made it the morality of the community---the slave morality, morality of weakness, of selflessness, of passivity. In so doing, the priest brought the instincts of the master himself into conflict with the communal will and thereby insinuated in him the bad conscience. Henceforth, the master type of man

would be a rare and individual occurrence-and even he would be in the end, human-all-too-human.

We can see now the significance of the lion spirit. He is not merely the realization of the ascetic ideal overcoming itself, but also the overcoming of slave morality. The lion spirit must break the tables of slave values. The life denying morality of the slave, and prepare the coming of the life-affirming Overman.

It must be seen, however, that the Overman is not simply a return to the master. For the master is half-beast, more animal than man and is in himself---uninteresting. The Overman is not the return to the master, but the self-overcoming of the master, through the mediation of the bad conscience. The Overman does not overcome nihilism through a return to some pre-historical condition. Rather, the Overman is the result of the turning of the bad conscience against the life denying instincts of man.

"Man has all too long had an 'evil eye' for his natural inclinations, so that they have finally become inseparable from his 'bad conscience.' An attempt at the reverse would in itself be possible---but who is strong enough for it?---that is, to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs counter to sense, instinct, nature, animal, in short all ideals hitherto, which are one and all hostile to life and ideals which slander the world. To whom should one turn today with such hopes and demands? (G 531)"

In the Overman, the bad conscience is turned against nihilism---it becomes a life-affirming power.

How is this to be done? Let us observe the growth of the tree of the bad conscience in order to discover the

fruits that might be picked from its branches by the Overman.

Nietzsche diagnoses the case of the bad conscience (which is the same as the case of the community) as the attempt by nature to "breed an animal with the right to make promises. (G 493)" This he determines to be the real problem regarding man:

"The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently calculable. The tremendous labor of that which I have called the 'morality of mores'---the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labor, finds in this its meaning, its great justification, notwithstanding the tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of the morality of mores and the social straight jacket, man was actually made calculable. (G 495)"

The morality of mores, the bad conscience, the great mass of socially inflicted pain in history has existed in order to imprint upon man a memory---a real memory of the will.

"So that the original 'I will,' 'I shall do this' and the actual discharge of the will, its act, a world of strange new things, circumstances, even acts of the will may be interposed without breaking this long chain of will. (G 494)"

And what, finally, lies at the end of this long road, this road of history?

"If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral (for 'autonomous' and 'moral' are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the right to make

promises---and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion. (G 495)"

The history of the bad conscience has impressed in man the ability and the right to make promises. The owner of this right, the sovereign individual, is as such not yet the Overman, for, as has been said, the Overman is he who is capable of affirming the eternal return---he who wills the will to power. We can see, however, that precisely this sovereign individual is he who can become the Overman. If the sovereign individual wills the eternal return, if he freely wills the will to power, then he has made a promise. He has willed life. He has become the Overman.

"It is here and nowhere else that one must make a start to comprehend what Zarathustra wants: this type of man that he conceives, conceives reality as it is, being strong enough to do so; this type is not estranged (!) or removed from reality but is reality itself and exemplifies all that is terrible and questionable in it--only in that way can man attain greatness. (EH 787)"



## CHAPTER 13

### THE OVERMAN AND THE COMMUNIST MAN

Already, we begin to see how the Communist man and the Overman are the same: both sit at the end of human historical development, as the final fruit of the long human labor; both are the final justification of history---and know themselves to be so; both exist in unity with reality, no longer estranged from it; both have overcome the estrangement of man from man (understood in the Nietzschean sense as resentment against man).

"Certainly," it will be said, "the Übermensch and the Communist man look similar on the surface. They are both, after all, equally presented as alternatives to modern man. As such, they must in some superficial manner resemble each other. But can it be said that in the final analysis they are the same? Rather the opposite, the Overman, the sovereign individual freely willing the eternal return and the Communist man, the actualized species being of man, part and parcel of the community---these two contradict one another! The one is without community, he desires conflict, he denies equality; the other is the community, where all men are equal, where all men live in peace! Such a conflation of the herd instinct par excellence with the bourgeois hero figure is---ridiculous"

But this argument, too, does not go deep enough. For while it is clear that Nietzsche opposes socialism, it is equally clear that Marx himself held in low regard many *kinds* of socialism as well.

"Communism is: In its first form only a generalization of [the relationship between self-estrangement and private property] . . . the category of laborer is not done away with, but extended to all men . . . The thoughts of every piece of private property---inherent in each piece as such---are at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce to a common level . . . The crude communism is only the consummation of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum . . . The community is only the community of labor, and an equality of wages paid out by the communal capital---the community as the universal capitalist . . . the first positive annulment of private property---crude communism---is thus merely one form in which the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the positive community, comes to the surface. (M 83-4)"

Both Marx and Nietzsche agree on the nature of crude communism. They agree in condemning it. This crude communism is the socialism that Nietzsche abhors. What Nietzsche found repugnant in socialism was its reflection of slave morality. The socialist herd longed for a great levelling of man, for an end to strife between wills, for a quiet drifting towards nothingness. Marxist communism is of another sort entirely. Marx recognizes in the socialism vilified by Nietzsche the ultimate extent of private property. Marx's proposed communism stands in direct opposition to this universal capitalist.

On the other hand, Nietzsche himself is no capitalist. He, like Marx, condemns the conditions of the proletariat and he, like Marx, finds a general increase of wages (the

bourgeois solution to the problem of the proletariat)---even an equality of wages to be an empty consolation.

Nietzsche, ". . . and I can think of no better news I could give to our factory slaves: provided, that is, that they do not feel it in general to be a disgrace to be thus used, and used up, as a part of a machine and as it were as a stopgap to fill a hole in human inventiveness! To the devil with the belief that higher payment could lift from them the essence of their condition---I mean their impersonal enslavement! . . . To the devil with setting a price on oneself for which one ceases to be a person and becomes a part of a machine! (D 206)"

Marx, "A forcing up of wages (disregarding all other difficulties, including the fact that it would only be by force, too, that the higher wages, being an anomaly, could be maintained) would therefore be nothing but better payment for the slave, and would not conquer either for the worker or for labor their human status and dignity. (M 80)"

It seems, once again, that we cannot take our characterizations of Nietzsche and Marx lightly. If we are to understand their positive conceptions of the Overman and the Communist man, then we can not rest simply upon their negative critiques of the herd and the bourgeois. Perhaps we can reach a closer understanding of these two enigma by observing the states of society that they have been projected into.

The Nietzschean society: "It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it---letting those who harm it go unpunished. 'What are my parasites to me?' it might say. 'May they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!' (G 508)"

The Marxist: "Let us now picture ourselves, by way of change, a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labor-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labor-power of the community. (M 326)"

We here have both the Nietzschean and the Marxist visions of a future condition of society, each bearing the distinctive stamp of its author. On the one hand, a society so rich that the individual no longer need obey its laws, a society which no longer forcibly subordinates individual will to its own. On the other a society in which individuals are free and yet choose to labor in common for the good of the community. In each case, the following society is proposed: a community whose most fundamental will affirms the diversity of wills of its individual members (a conclusion in the Nietzschean case, a supposition in the Marxist) but one in which a sufficient number of members actively will the community for the community to prosper (a supposition for Nietzsche, a conclusion for Marx). The Nietzschean and the Marxist communities are flip sides of one another---not in contradiction but in complementarity. The one can exist only if the other also equally exist. In short, they are the same society. (A society composed of autonomous individuals freely choosing to place themselves into community? How unfortunately Rousseau! Not at all, the state for Rousseau requires that the individual freely subordinate his will to that of the community. The will of the Nietzschean\Marxist community is precisely that the individual not subordinate his will. Whatever activity that the individual chooses to engage in---social or anti-social---is considered communal activity.)

Immediately the retort will leap to quivering lips, "But this is not the world of the Communist man! In communism all men are equal, there is no will separate from that of the community. There is the will of the community and that is all!" This is the voice of crude communism speaking, the voice of socialism that Nietzsche loathes. We have said that Marxist communism is another type entirely. How so?

Man is the creating animal. The species being of man is that he work up nature "according to the standards of every species (M 76)." If communism is man no longer estranged from his species being, then accordingly, in communism man must behave according to his species being: to create freely, to work-up nature in a myriad of ways. To assume a community is to assume a common goal. The goal of the communist community is man's species being which is man's producing freely. So it is precisely the case that it be the will of the community that each man will freely.

"Social activity and social consumption exist by no means *only* in the form of some *directly* communal activity and *directly communal* consumption, although *communal* activity and *communal* consumption will occur wherever such a *direct* expression of sociality stems from the true character of the activity's content and is adequate to the nature of consumption.

"But again, when I am active *scientifically*, etc.,--- when I am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others---then I am *social*, because I am active as a *man*. (M 86)"

"Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being) is just as much a totality---the ideal totality---the subjective existence of thought and experienced society present for itself. (M 86)"

The varied wills of men, willing as men, is synonymous with the will of the whole.

Notice that this is the true withering-away of the state, a far-cry from a supposed communism with a democratic state since the rule of a democracy is the rule of the majority and therefore the communal will simply becomes the will of the majority (imposed, of course, upon the minority). And let us here do away with a misconception: the credo "from each according to his ability to each according to his need" in no way supposes that the needs and abilities of men are equal. Instead it implicitly recognizes the determined inequality of different individuals needs and abilities. And recommends that it is precisely the exercise of these differences that makes up a truly *human* existence.

From a different quarter comes the reply, "Well, then, this is certainly not compatible with the *Übermensch*. For Nietzsche, anarchy is as abhorrent as socialism, someone must rule. This ruler is the Overman: he must dominate and control, his is the will to be master. He would not freely choose to labor for the good of the community, rather would he enslave those weaker than he---ruling over them as a new, and greater nobility." Let us examine this more closely.

The Overman is the result of man's conscious will to his self-overcoming. The Overman must be capable of willing the eternal return. We have seen that the eternal return

enables the will to will backwards---and therefore becomes the solution to the frustration of the will. In our discussion, we recognized that for man the eternal return is the most abysmal thought. Man, the small man, the higher man, has become weary of man---this is the bad conscience, the birthplace of the Overman. Man cannot will the eternal return for this would be the eternal return of man, of his nausea. Man can, however will the Overman.

While the eternal recurrence means for man that 'all is in vain,' for the Overman it is the eternal return of the Overman. The eternal recurrence of the same is his self-affirmation. While for man, it is his negation. In the Overman, we realize the undergoing of man, not at the hand of some tyrannical Overman, by his own will. We have said it already---man wills his own self-overcoming and in so doing points to the Overman.

For the Overman, there is no relationship of Overman versus man, no master-slave dichotomy. The Overman wills himself (one can say as an individual, or as a type but this distinction has no meaning for the Overman; after all, his will is the will to power, he is the meaning of the earth and the earth is his meaning.) hence, for the Overman, there is nothing but Overman. If in willing the eternal return, the Overman must will man, he does so in the same manner that he wills the ape, the microbe, the whole of nature.

And he wills the whole of nature, the whole of becoming, as himself.

The Overman has no use for enslavement, to make someone slave would reduce him to mere master and for the Overman, such a reduction of rank would be unthinkable. Recall that the Overman is an 'overfull cup,' that his is the 'gift-giving virtue.' The Overman does not have a need for those who would give to him, rather, he needs those who can take--as the sun needs those for whom it can shine.

At first, this appears to conflict with Nietzsche's constant emphasis of rank and nobility.

"Every enhancement of the type 'man' has so far been the work of an aristocratic society---and it will be so again and again---a society that believes in a long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other. (BGE 391)"

This implies that the society of the Overman would be a society of the greatest aristocratic tendency---with a long ladder of rank and in need of some form of slavery. Indeed, Nietzsche emphasizes the need for exploitation in society, "'Exploitation' does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it is the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will to life. (BGE 259)"

The nobility, therefore, can be understood as requiring so extent of exploitation as a fundamental expression of their will to power. How is this?

"The essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy is that it experiences itself not as a function (whether of the monarchy or of the commonwealth) but as their meaning and highest justification---that it therefore accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake, must be reduced



and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments. (BGE 392)"

If this is the case, how are we to reconcile it with our proposed nature of the Overman? With the Communist man? Or is it irreconcilable?

But this is the nature of the aristocracy, not of the Overman---and every enhancement of the type 'man' has been the work of an aristocratic nature, but the Overman is not an enhancement of the type man, but his self-overcoming. Herein we find our answer.

The Overman is the meaning not of the monarchy or of the commonwealth, but of the earth. As such, he is the heir of the greatest of all exploitations---the history of society, the bad conscience. This has already been said. And indeed, it is precisely the nature of the Overman to affirm his own coming to being---through the self-exploitation of man, through the bad conscience---with a good conscience: in a thoroughly aristocratic manner. In this manner, we can say, once again, that the Overman is not an expression of the master (the aristocrat) only of a greater magnitude, but the expression of the self-overcoming of the aristocrat---and therefore the self overcoming of aristocratic valuations. In short, order of rank and exploitation are no longer of any use to the Overman for they are tools to the enhancement of the type 'man' and he is of another 'type' entirely.

This is not to say that in the world of the Overman, rank and distance would disappear. To the contrary! They would flourish, but as expressions of becoming, not of being. We have said that certain wills are nourished by certain phenomena and not by others. This implies that under definite conditions, a specific schema of wills exists that is most effectively nourished by those conditions (not most efficiently, most effectively, it may very well be the case that the most effective configuration would be inefficient). This particular schema would establish the order of rank of values for those particular conditions. However, as conditions change, so too do the wills that establish order of rank.

In man, the inertia of the will was to attempt to maintain a particular set of conditions. In man, the will was a will to being, a will to the ideal. (We recall that the meaning of the ascetic ideal was that it *preserved* the type man). Hence with man, the tendency was to a rigid order of rank---the caste system for example. His will is a will to self-preservation. This will to self-preservation is a symptom of distress.

"The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress. (GS 291)"

In the Overman, the will is the will to power---the will to self-overcoming, to becoming. Hence with the Overman, the tendency will be towards a fluidity in rank. The Overman is of 'great health.' His is not a condition of

distress, thus his will is not one of self-preservation, of being, but one of becoming.

To use an analogy, let us imagine a group of men engaged in a task, say building a house. Within the confines of this particular task, there is a definite order of rank between the men---skilled carpenters shall be of higher rank than unskilled carpenters. If the task were to change perhaps to the sculpting of a statue, then we would expect the order of rank to change as well---master sculptors would now assume higher rank.

In man, with his instinct towards self-preservation, we would observe the attempt to maintain a particular set of conditions (a particular activity---house building) beyond the natural inclinations of the condition itself. For example, we might see the creation of planned obsolescence in houses or rampant fads in house styles which would mandate a continual construction of houses and therefore a continuance of the carpenter's high rank. Indeed, the activity of 'carpenter' itself would achieve a being and would entail a certain rank. One would become 'a carpenter' not merely in deed but in essence and would thereby assume the rank of the carpenter.

In the Overman, with his instinct towards becoming, the caste system would be anathema. One would do what one can in a particular circumstance, and rank would be assigned according to determinate capacity in that circumstance. And

we would observe a rapid shift of order of rank, each in accordance with a change in tasks. In this way, the greatest possible number of wills could receive the greatest possible nourishment.

(We can already see how close this is to Marx's own vision:

"For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. (M 160)")

This raises the question: how shall the Overman relate to the Overman? For if noble valuations are unworthy of him, what then shall be his valuations?

We shall find our answer in the analysis of "the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor" wherein "one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself against another. (G 506)"

If we study this relation between buyer and seller, we discover that this relationship, "the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor, which is as old as the idea of 'legal subjects' and in turn points back to the

fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic. (G 499)" is the origin of the concept of justice.

And with justice, we find that in human relations, "'everything has its price; all things can be paid for'--the oldest and naïvest moral cannon of justice, the beginning of all 'good-naturedness,' all 'fairness,' all 'good will,' all 'objectivity' on earth. Justice on this elementary level is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with on another, to reach an 'understanding' by means of a settlement---and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves [this latter to become rule of law] (G 507)"

We can see here the origin of rank: those who can pay and those who can't. Those with whom one shares equal debt and indebtedness are of the same rank. Herein also we find the nature of rights and duties,

"Our duties---are the rights of others over us. How have they acquired such rights? By taking us to be capable of contracting and requiting, by positing us as similar and equal to them, and as a consequence entrusting us with something, educating, reproving, supporting us. We fulfill our duty---that is to say: we justify the idea of our power on the basis of which all these things were bestowed upon us, we give back in the measure in which we have been given to. (D s112)"

We can see, then, that in the relations of nobility, duty and right---based upon equality of powers and ability to repay debts---are the foundations of rank. Those who can (and do, "We truthful ones," as the Greek nobility called itself) satisfy their duties are precisely the noble, the good. Those who cannot, the weak, the cowardly, the petty are precisely the base, the bad. The valuations of the nobility are precisely the valuations of justice.

In a situation of debt, one could expect the noble to repay his debt---this is the criterion of nobility---and if

he were to fail, an equitable settlement could be reached (and this, as has been noted, is justice among those of equal power). A man of base character, however, one must compel to repay his debt; and if he is incapable of discharging his debt, repayment will be made to the creditor in the form of pleasure---the cruel pleasure of inflicting pain upon the debtor (and this is the nature of justice between those of unequal power---enforced by those of greater power, the nobility).

If we are to understand the Overman as the self-overcoming of man (or nobility, as the Overman is the overcoming of man as a noble) then we can predict that the valuations of the Overman will consist of the self-overcoming of the valuations of the noble: of justice.

"The justice which began with, "everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged," ends by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does everything good on earth, by *overcoming itself*. This self-overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful name it has given itself---mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his---beyond the law. (G 509)"

How is this type of valuation to be the valuation of a society and not lead to anarchy (again something Nietzsche abhors)?

We know that it is just the case that the Overman is the "sovereign individual (Z 495)." Anarchy is the revenge of the slave against the master---no-one rules. The Overman, however, is master of himself. He is no slave, he has no spirit of resentment against the master---he is himself a

master. So, who shall rule? In the case of the Overman, everyone rules and everyone obeys (that is, everyone rules himself and everyone obeys himself)---it is precisely the opposite of anarchy.

Remember that the Overman is the sovereign individual, this means that he has undertaken the burden of commanding himself---that he has become the judge, the avenger, and the victim of his own law.

"Is a state of affairs unthinkable in which the malefactor calls himself to account and publicly dictates his own punishment, in the proud feeling that he is thus honoring the law which he himself had made, that by punishing himself he is exercising his power, the power of the lawgiver; he may have committed an offense, but by voluntarily accepting punishment, he raises himself above his own offense, he does not only obliterate his offense through freeheartedness, greatness and imperturbability, he performs a public service as well.--Such would be the criminal of a possible future, who, to be sure, also presupposes a future lawgiving--one founded on the idea 'I submit only to the law which I myself have given, in great things and in small.' (D s187)"

If this is the relation of the Overman to himself---as lawgiver, and we know that the relation of the Overman to the other is not one of revenge or desire for punishment, how can we characterize the relationship of the Overman to the other?

It seems clear that as the Overman is understood as the overcoming of man in a manner that affirms life, the relation to the other for the Overman should be one of affirmation. This does not mean that the relationship between Overman and Overman would be one of passivity and tranquility, but that it would be one wholly lacking in

ressentiment. The Overman is not dominated by the will to existence (we shall leave that to the Darwinists), but the will to power and therefore does not seek in the other the preservation of his power, but its squandering.

"A living thing desires above all to vent its strength--- life as such is will to power---self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it. (BGE 211)"

As such, the Overman sees in the other (and is for the other) a means to self-overcoming, to an expression of his power. Hence Nietzsche's call for great enemies who you do not despise but hate (and therefore love) and friends who do not give you solace, but challenge. The other, for the Overman, is an opportunity for affirming himself.

We have come to see clearly, then that our conception of society is fully congruous with the Communist man and the Overman. In this, we see then that Marx's conception of future society and Nietzsche's are necessary conditions of one-another. Fully, then, the Overman and the Communist man are merely considerations of the same man from differing points of view. A man who exists by virtue of humanity consciously overcoming itself (or by estranged man consciously appropriating his fully developed essential powers) and who affirms himself and the totality of his powers in reality. A man who is the fruit of history and the meaning of the earth.



## CHAPTER 14

### NIETZSCHEANISM AS COMMUNISM

Both Nietzsche and Marx make a claim to science, and this is the secret of their similarities. One can recognize both in their analyses and conclusions the consequence of ruthlessly and honestly subjecting everything existing to a scientific analysis.

Nietzsche viewed the philosophical systems of men to be symptoms of their psychological condition.

"Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir. (BGE 203)"

That is, the philosophical-moral ramblings of men, preserved upon our tables of values are the sensuous reflections of our most inner psychology. Diagnosing these symptoms, Nietzsche can make a claim to science for his psychology of the will equal to that of physiology or archeology. Indeed, Nietzsche proclaims that when psychologists sail beyond morality and moral prejudices, "psychology shall again be recognized again as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and preparation the other sciences exist. (BGE 222)"

In much the same manner, Marx recognizes in economy, "The open book of man's essential powers, the exposure to the senses of human psychology. (M 89)" By means of this

recognition, communism makes human psychology the object of natural science.

What we see in both Marx and Nietzsche, then, is the bringing of man and his psychology under the examination of natural science. Although each thinker starts with a different aspect, a different symptom, both proceed according to the same methodology: science.

(Science understood radically, of course, as both Nietzsche and Marx critique the science of modern men: 'the spiritualized essence of the ascetic ideal' on the one hand 'abstractly material or idealistic' on the other. Wherever science serves idealism or the will to truth, we can expect Nietzsche and Marx to criticize it. In them, however, science becomes radical, it undermines the will to truth and is a tool of becoming. It is in this sense that both make a claim to science).

The analysis of human psychology provided by these two disparate starting points results in strikingly similar diagnoses: History as *human* history begins with the violent subjugation of one tribe of people by another---the master-slave relationship. This history itself is both violent and bloody, but is (as seen from the modern standpoint) necessary for the cultivation in man of his spirit---of his essential human powers. At the end of history, and as its product, stands the *Übermensch* (the Communist man) who can come about only through a conscious effort, that is, who is

the consequence of consciousness conscious of its own powers and nature.

This resolution of history in the Overman is not to be understood as purely abstract, the knowledge of which provides us with a salve for our pain in being part of the process. Abstract thinking is a product of the process, indeed and not the whole of it. In Nietzschean terms, the spirit is a product of history---the greater spiritualization of man. The attempt of the spirit to destroy its physiological counterpart (the body, the world) and to presume that it alone is reality (ego, the world of Forms)---this is the ascetic ideal taken to its nihilistic extreme. Thus one finds that a Nietzschean discussion of the dialectic arrives at the same conclusion as does Marx: the dialectic is nihilism discovering itself as such. (See Deleuze; Nietzsche and Philosophy)

The resolution of history as bad conscience (estrangement) is not a resolution to be found in the mind, it is a revolution---in every facet of real life, from economics to morality.

If either Marx or Nietzsche is correct in his diagnosis of human psychology, then it is to be expected that a scientific analysis of any aspect of that psychology would develop along similar lines: a ruthless criticism of the world as seen through that aspect ending in a resolution pointing to some aspect of the Communist world.

Nietzsche's method is Marx's method, there is nothing more than the particular phenomenon under investigation separating them. Morality instead of economy. This difference in perspective does not pit the two analyses against one another, it makes them complements in the greater project. Critique of economy is not more fundamental than critique of morality nor vice-versa. This is because critique of economy is critique of morality:

"Communism abolishes all eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience. (M 489)"

And a critique of morality is a critique of economy since morality is the realm of 'ought', its critique includes a critique of: 'how ought man relate to the other man materially?'"

Each critique considered separately is in itself fundamental, precisely because it includes implicitly the critique made by the other. We see, therefore, in Nietzsche the following consideration of economy:

"Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy---as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly 'adapted' gears; as an ever growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.

"In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed---the production of a synthetic, summarizing, justifying man for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his *higher form of being*. (WTP 464)"

Both morality and economy co-exist as real expressions of human psychology.

If both Nietzsche and Marx contain implicitly within each other the criticism of the other, and if this criticism leads to the same point (the Overman), then what is the value of both critiques? Could we not simply have done with private property or abolish all morality and thereby move on? Unfortunately, no.

As we have seen in Marx, a critique of morality without a change in material conditions is a work of madness. It will be entirely outside conventional (and unconventional) consciousness and therefore doomed to failure. (Hence Nietzsche's realization that he was a posthumous writer). At the same time, however, we can see that merely abolishing private property politically is no solution (we have plentiful historical demonstration). This is because private property as an institution is wrapped tightly within the web of modern consciousness and the simple abolition of same without the simultaneous overcoming of the other institutions of modern consciousness can be effected only through sheer power and will revert once that power is removed. In other words, private property is supported by the whole of modern values. Its abolition will be considered alien and will be opposed so long as those values remain. Hence the need for the lion spirit, the overcomer who in climbing mountains breaks the old tablets. Both

Nietzsche and Marx, and perhaps not them alone, are necessary in order to break the old institutions and to overcome history.

In Nietzsche and Marx, we find the application of science to the human psyche in the realm of economy and the realm of morality. We have here a vital starting point. But it is only a starting point, there are many experiments yet to be made. As Zarathustra said, "*I teach you the Overman. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? (Z 12)*" The Overman and the Communist man exist as a choice, a conscious decision on the part of man to overcome himself.

What this philosophy calls for then is the conscious continuation of the Marxist\Nietzschean project---the ruthless criticism of all things existing. We must write the genealogy of science, of language, of art and in so doing clear the weeds of modern consciousness while at the same time sowing the seeds of the Overman.

The question might be asked, "If the Marxist critique is accurate, if Nietzsche is correct, then why not simply become the Overman; why just prepare for him?" Ah, but this is precisely the bitter pill in Nietzsche. The Overman is a high mountain peak. While in Nietzsche and Marx we may come to see him, this is still a far cry from being him; just as seeing a mountain peak is not the same as climbing to its top.

While we have been given a goal, and to a good extent have been shown the way to that goal, we have not yet fully reached that goal. In Nietzsche's terms, we are all still human-all-too-human. Even the best among us. We are not to become the Overman, we are to become the fathers and the grandfathers of the Overman. We must be careful to remember the case of Hegel: the Overman, the communist man, is not merely the result of a change in consciousness. He is a change in reality, in the real relations between men, between man and himself and between man and nature. As such, he is not something one can simply become---he must be created.

It is to be remembered that the ascetic ideal has so far been the only will that has given meaning to man's existence. Nietzsche proposes to replace the ascetic ideal with the ideal of the overcomer. The meaning of man shall be that he creates the overman. The ideal of the overcomer, then is the other to the ascetic ideal. And as the ascetic ideal was merely a painkiller, an opiate which did not cure the disease but only masked the symptoms, the ideal of the overcomer is a cure. The ideal of the overcomer not only gives a meaning to human existence (thereby easing the pain of that existence) but also creates a new type of being for whom existence needs no meaning, for whom suffering itself is a tool and a necessary part of life. This being clearly is the Overman, the possessor of great health. Great health

does not preclude sickness, instead it thrives even in sickness, seeing in sickness a means to a greater health.

As men, we do not possess this great health. This is why we require a meaning outside of ourselves---be this meaning the ascetic ideal, or the Overman. But as men we are laborers and therefore are capable of creating beyond ourselves. The self-creation of man through his historical labor is the creation of the Overman.

When Marx spoke of the distinction between the architect and the hive-building bee, he said that,

"What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. (M 344-5)"

The task given mankind by both Marx and Nietzsche is that of architect: the architect of the Overman. We have the Overman already in our imagination, what remains is the labor process through which he shall become a reality.



## CHAPTER 15

### EPILOGUE

Considering the great influence of both Marx and Nietzsche upon current philosophy, one might expect that their relationship as outlined herein would have ramifications on contemporary debate.

Two key movements on the contemporary scene are critical theory and post-modernism\post-structuralism. Because the former has its roots in Marx and the latter in Nietzsche, the discussion of this essay is particularly relevant.

By analyzing the relationship between Marx and Nietzsche, we have uncovered their larger project. In so doing, we have recognized their methodology (the historical-scientific method) as just that---a methodology, a means to an end and not an end in itself. It is proposed that one can usefully understand the methods of critical theory and post-modernism\post-structuralism as refined versions of Marxist\Nietzschean methodology. They therefore must be seen as means and not as ends in themselves. What is required is a vital content, a context within which these tools can find effective (i.e. practical) meaning. The vision of the Overman or the real overcoming of modern man is just this context.

Current strategies (particularly post-structuralism) have been criticized as 'sterile,' as lacking any positive content. I would argue that this is because they have thus far been dramatically one-sided: pure criticism. This is because they have seized upon only one aspect of the historical-scientific method and exploited that aspect with a vengeance.

In the Marxist-Nietzschean approach, the historical-scientific method is a diagnostic tool: criticism is used to expose particular symptoms to diagnosis, which then provide for a prognosis and a prescription. In light of this method, one could consider much of current philosophy as poor medicine. Let us consider an example.

Thomas Kuhn's account of the structure of scientific revolutions can be seen as a post-structuralist model. Although Kuhn is not explicitly post-structuralist, his analysis is sufficiently related to post-structural strategies to be used as a starting point. (For a more explicit example, one can turn to Foucault's analysis of power which can be similarly accounted for.)

Basic to Kuhn's theory of the scientific enterprise is the distinction between normal science and revolutionary science. Normal science is characterized by the routine verification of the dominant theory of a historical period. Normal science takes place within the boundaries of a paradigm.

"By choosing [the term paradigm], I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice--- examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together---provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. (K 10)"

A paradigm defines the methods to be used, the problems to be investigated, the assumptions made. In short, a paradigm defines scientific truth. Because of this, dominant paradigms are inherently conservative. They tend to interpret all information in accordance with their assumptions. Because of this, scientists cannot normally or consciously refute a paradigm. The paradigm defines what is valid, it therefore cannot be invalidated.

However, paradigms are overturned. The process of rejecting a dominant paradigm begins as the paradigm is verified. As scientists expound the implications of the dominant paradigm, incongruities arise, these are called anomalies. (The incongruity in classical mechanics between the speed of light as constant and relativity between frames of motion is an example). Initially, these anomalies are ignored or are interpreted away, but eventually, they lead to rival paradigms which attempt to resolve the apparent incongruity. Eventually, if the anomaly is not accounted for in the old paradigm, a new paradigm arises focuses around the old anomaly. (Einsteinian physics centered around special relativity).

The implication is that scientific truth is contingent upon paradigm. And as paradigm changes, certain truths

might become invalidated and certain impossibilities become accepted. To a great extent, this is a sweeping critique of Truth (big "T"). If even the methodology of research and the very questions that can be asked are conditioned by paradigm, how can one hope for scientific Truth?

If science is therefore robbed of its claims to Truth, then does this imply the end of science? For indeed, it has been the aim of science to secure certainty through the experimental method. (Indeed, it has been the aim to secure the Platonic end (the coming to know the Forms) experimentally.)

If we translate this question into Nietzschean terms, we quickly realize that this is the same dilemma that faced us with the demise of the ascetic ideal. Thus far, science has been the tool of the ascetic ideal. Kuhn's analysis has revealed to us the dynamic of science and in so doing has undercut the idealistic (ascetic) claims of science. If we are to 'save' science, then we must provide for another will, for a replacement for the goals of the ascetic ideal.

We have seen that Nietzsche's replacement, his other to the ascetic ideal was the creativity of the will and finally the Overman as the product of that will's self-overcoming. In this light, what would be the shape of a new science?

We might envision a new science bereft of the absolute character of paradigm. Given a scientific self-consciousness of the emptiness of Truth claims, we would

discern that the real meaning of science is its power to empower man. That is, its making nature accessible to human powers. Because our goal is to expand the powers of man, and because we recognize the creation and development of paradigms as the primary means of scientific development, we might foresee a great multiplicity of paradigms coexisting simultaneously. Paradigm would no longer be seen as an absolutizing force attempting to explain everything, but as a necessary structure utilized for its explanatory power in a certain context. Experimentation would be made both within paradigms and between paradigms---experimentation with paradigm. (Perhaps we already see this in the camp of quantum mechanics where relativity, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are each accepted as explanatory strategies in particular situations.)

As this example demonstrates, our analysis of Marx and Nietzsche allows current philosophy to go beyond mere criticism. Critique now is seen as a tool of overcoming and creation. Overcoming old (and in the case of modernity, intellectually absolutist---the dialectic, political liberalism, etc.) structures, and creating a new reality.

From this perspective, the so-called Critical theory-post-modernist debate reveals itself to be two sides of the same coin arguing against one-another. The post-modern world is the realization of the praxis of critical theory. If the former seems neo-conservative, this is because it

appears at the end of liberalism's self-overcoming. (In Dewey's terminology, as the "factual implication of the concept of liberty in society (Liberalism and Social Action, 48)"---as the insertion of liberty as the real foundation of social interaction). If the latter appears absolutist with its "meta-narratives", this is because it is the necessary playing-out of a game that was started long ago (the Enlightenment, or earlier . . .) and which 'playing-out' engenders the *possibility* of a real post-modernism. Just as Nietzsche is complementary and necessary to Marx, so is critical theory necessary and complementary to post-modernism.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BGE: *Beyond Good and Evil* in Basic Writings

D: Daybreak

G: *Genealogy of Morals* in Basic Writings

GS: The Gay Science

K: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

M: The Marx-Engels Reader

WTP: The Will to Power

Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra

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