The Influence of Real Change On The Emergence of Real Democracy in Latin America

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Background

Since it became independent from Spain in the early 1800s, Latin America has experienced tremendous political change. The 1950s, for example, witnessed a wave of democracies throughout the region. Nevertheless, many of these governments were later replaced by authoritarian regimes during the following two decades. Presently, many Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay are attempting to consolidate democracy again. Moreover, political liberalization efforts are occurring in Mexico, while many of the countries in Central America including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have recently elected civilian presidents (Karl 1991).

One of the most prevalent questions in political science research today is whether democracy will be successfully consolidated or if authoritarianism will return to Latin America. Much of the research on this topic offers explanations for democratic success or failure and predicts the future of democratic transition or consolidation by analyzing economic, cultural, social, or external factors (Rustow 1970, Huntington 1984, Karl 1991). For example, Lipset (1959) suggested a correlation between economic development and democratization. This single-indicator approach, however, fails to produce a coherent explanation

of democratization, since historically many of the countries predicted to become democratic eventually shifted to authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, this approach fails to consider the long term effects of authoritarianism on a society; and thus, the elements of the democratic transition process necessary for a successful transition are also ignored.

Thesis

This thesis posits that real change must occur throughout a society that has previously experienced authoritarianism in order for a real democracy to consolidate. Linz (1964) defines authoritarianism as a political system

> with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization...; and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (297)

In other words, authoritarianism fosters a very narrow power distribution with few political actors who decide the rules of the game; whereas, democracy encourages a more equal, dispersed distribution of power over several actors throughout society with formally-defined rules. Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992) define a consolidated democracy as

> a regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in which all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game. (3)

Therefore, the notable differences in organizational structure and power dispersion between authoritarianism and democracy requires that real change, particularly, a change to open up society, is vital to the successful consolidation of democracy (Linz 1964, Collier 1979). Therefore, the greater the real change from authoritarianism, the greater the likelihood that a real democracy will be consolidated.

Real change is necessary at every level of society: the elites, the masses, and the organizational institutions of the society. Elites are persons who are able to substantially affect national political outcomes regularly due to their strategic positions in powerful organizations (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992). Such persons include those with powerful or strategic economic, political, or professional resources.

However, to assume that the development of a democratic political system is only a matter for elites is to disregard the point of representation and to avoid the link between mass public and elites.

> Leaders and followers cannot be examined in isolation, but must be grasped through the construction of organized social and political relationships, and through the day-to-day struggle whereby issues are framed and legitimating arguments advanced in concrete societies and social groups. (Levine 1988, p. 388)

Therefore, the masses are vital in a democracy. They can utilize power and influence due, in large part, to their numbers; nevertheless, in order to make demands successfully

on the government, the masses must organize themselves effectively (Levine 1988). Special interests groups and grassroots organizations are potential vehicles which can promote and protect the interests of the masses.

In addition, institutions, such as the military, must come under civilian rule as confidence in the democratic system is allowed and maintained. For example, the military as an institution must be excluded from the political realm of society in order to secure democracy as a system and to diminish the possibility of a military coup or a return to authoritarianism. Moreover, certain authoritarian practices, such as human rights violations, must be abandoned by the new democratic government in order to show clearly the break from authoritarianism.

Therefore, it is the purpose of this thesis to explore the political change that must occur in a society undergoing democratic transition from authoritarianism. Due to limited time and space, only political factors will be evaluated in this project. However, this is not to discount the importance of economic variables. Perhaps, one of the primary responsibilities of government is a more equal distribution of scarce economic resources. Furthermore, Lipset's research (1959) did show a correlation between economic conditions of a state and the successful transition to democracy. These findings should not be dismissed as irrelevant. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, only political variables will be considered.

Research Design

In order to evaluate how real change leads to the consolidation of an enduring democracy, four time periods or data points, are considered. Time period **A** is the time of authoritarianism in the country of study; time period **T** is the period during which the transition to democracy occurs; time period **D** begins with the first, successful transition of power between democratically elected presidents, and time period **S** begins with the first successful succession of democratic presidents. (See **Table I-A.**) Each of these time periods is necessary to comparatively evaluate the degree and type of change that occurs during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in each case study. The amount of change then allows a direct evaluation of the future prospects of successful democratic consolidation.

The independent variable, **real change,** is evaluated in terms of **elite settlement, mass mobilization, and a definite break of legitimacy.** Elite settlements, as defined by Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992), are "rare events in which warring elite factions...reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements." As stated earlier, the power distribution under authoritarianism is centralized and repressive. In order to consolidate a democracy, the power distribution among elites must be more decentralized, and elites must be more accepting of conflicting views. Therefore, elite settlements are vital to the success of democratization

because they establish a process of institutionalizing conflict, so that competing interests and concerns are not only tolerated, but also expressed and considered. In other words, elite settlements serve as a non-violent medium for resolving conflict among those who have the power and resources to affect substantially the process of democratization.

Three characteristics of elite settlements--the speed of the transition, the participation of old leaders, and the inclusion of parties during the period of transition--have a positive impact on democratization. For each case of study, elite settlements will be evaluated in terms of these three characteristics. The greater each characteristic is present in the elite settlements, the greater the real change from authoritarianism and thus the greater the likelihood that a real democracy, not a pseudo-democracy, will be established. Data concerning elite settlement are obtained from Current History and several other books and journal articles discussing the period of transition in each case of study.

Secondly, **mass mobilization** is vital to democracy because it is only through their organization that the masses can make demands on government. The formation of new ideas and new organizations is necessary to voice interests, concerns, and to formulate solutions and compromises (Alves 1988, Mainwaring 1988). The indicator of mass mobilization is the change in voter turnout as a percentage of registered voters in national elections, including presidential and

legislative. Voter turnout data from the period of authoritarianism are compared to voter turnout data after the first democratic presidential election. If an increase in the percentage of voter turnout is seen through this time period, then an increase in mobilization by the masses is occurring. Voter turnout data are collected from Facts on File as well a other texts and journal articles.

A **definite break of legitimacy** approaches real change from the point of view of the institutional operation of society. The necessity for the rules of the new political game to be established and agreed upon is as important as the rejection of the old, authoritarian rules (Stepan 1978). This way the transition government reduces the chances that authoritarianism will be considered a viable option in the future. The first indicator of a definite break of legitimacy is a recognition of human rights violations attributed to the former authoritarian leaders. Articles in Current History, the New York Times Index, and various texts are sources of such information.

The second indicator of a break of legitimacy is a decrease in government expenditures on the military. A decrease in government expenditures on the military shows a change in priorities among government officials away from the military, thereby decreasing the military's legitimacy. Data from the period of authoritarianism are compared to data after the first elected democratic president. The

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides such data.

The measures of the dependent variable, **real democracy,** are the **degree of uncertainty, guaranteed freedoms, and the institutionalization of crisis management.** Przeworski (1991) provides the precedent for the first measurement of real democracy in his book Democracy and the Market. He presents the concept of uncertainty of outcomes in a democracy as the situation when political actors know what is possible in the established institutional framework, what may be likely, and how to win or lose, but they do not know beforehand which particular outcome will result. Therefore, if elites become more cooperative with and more accepting of other elites (as is measured in the independent variable elite settlement), then it follows that a more equal distribution of political power will result and therefore a **degree of uncertainty** in the political sphere, such that participants know what the rules of the game are and possibly who is likely to win, but they do not know who will win until after the fact. Van Hanen's Index of Competition will be used to calculate the degree of uncertainty (Van Hanen 1992). Moreover, Gastil's "Checklist for Political Rights" from the Statistical Abstract for Latin America (SALA) will be used as an index of degree of uncertainty. This checklist includes such questions as "Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation",

"Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power", and "Multiple political parties" (Gastil 1989, p.9).

Secondly, if the masses are mobilized, then they can make demands on government, the least of which is their basic human rights and **guaranteed freedoms** (Gastil 1985). Guaranteed freedoms are vital to a democracy because they allow expression of ideas and opinions without fear of violence. Communication and expression are important in a democracy because they provide an outlet for people to express their grievances and to make demands on their government which can, through legislation, provide a more equal, fair society. Therefore, this study uses Gastil's "Checklist for Civil Rights", collected from the SALA, which gives an overall number for such variables as "media/literature free of political censorship", "Open public discussion", "Freedom of assembly and demonstration", "Freedom from unjustified political terror or imprisonment", "Personal and Social Rights", and "Socioeconomic rights" (Gastil 1989, p.17).

The last measurement of real democracy is the **institutionalization of crisis management** (Levine 1978). This measure is important because it provides evidence of a commitment to the new rules of the democracy and a rejection of old, authoritarian rules. Therefore, a definite break of legitimacy evaluates the evidence of a formal change of rules. In other words, an evaluation considering not only if new democratic procedures--rules of the game--have been

agreed upon, but if they have remained in place over time (Rustow 1970). The institutionalization of crisis management measures the commitment to these new rules through the comparison of crisis management in each country. Various crises will be evaluated in each country to see if the rules of the game endure in light of corruption, harsh economic times, and other social crises. All data on the crises are collected from the New York Times.

Specific Case Studies

The criteria for selecting specific cases to study include the four data points previously discussed: the period of authoritarianism (time period A), a period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy (time period T), the term of the first elected democratic president (time period D), and the first succession of democratic power (time period S). Therefore, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are the case studies selected for this project because they have experienced all four data points in approximately the same historical context. The next section offers a historical background for the three cases, to place them in comparative perspective.

Political History of Each Country

Argentina (See Table I-B.)

The Conservative party, composed largely of wealthy agro-exporter elites, dominated Argentine politics until

1916. During this time Britain financed the construction of much of Argentina's industrial infrastructure, such as railroads, harbors, and utilities (Argentina 1990). When the Radicals took control through a democratic election in 1916, they successfully distributed more power to the nation's middle class and previously excluded elite. However, with the Great Depression, elites and armed forces feared that the radicals could not effectively preserve the traditional order, so in 1930, Radical rule fell to the Argentine armed forces who allowed the conservatives to regain power (McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

The leadership of the conservatives during the next few years eventually led to the rise of populism in Argentina. First of all, the Conservatives rigged the next two elections, not allowing Radical leaders to take power (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Furthermore, much of the working class was alienated and suppressed as the harsh, militant conservatives sought to preserve their old order. Simultaneously, a rising sense of nationalism grew among the masses as they began to feel more subordinate to the British while the Argentine agro-exporters fought to maintain their profitable agrarian market in Britain. Lastly, Argentina's populist leader, General Juan Domingo Peron, quickly gained massive support when he was jailed by incumbent leaders in order to prohibit his participation in elections (Wynia 1990). Therefore, through their attempts to maintain the old

order, the conservatives contributed to their overthrow in 1943 by a nationalist military coup led, in part, by Peron.

At this time, a brief introduction of Latin American Populism is necessary to understand the impact of Peron and other populist leaders. Populism in Latin America differs from the populism of North American politics (Wynia 1990). Latin American populism received most of its support from an urban constituency in the midst of early industrialization during the 1930s and 1960s. The leaders of Populism challenged the elites' monopoly of government, encouraged increased enfranchisement, and put domestic conservatives and foreign investors on their defense. As a political force, populism was greatly based on personal leadership, and thus the populism of Peron in Argentina was quite different than the populism of Vargas in Brazil.

Peron was elected to power in 1946 through his exploitation of nationalist sentiment, working class suppression, and his own suppression by the conservatives (Argentina 1990). He ruled for ten years after World War II, leading the populist movement in Argentina. He was a nationalist who pushed industrialization and modest social reform; however, he adapted the rules of the game to his needs. He maintained much of his popularity by attacking the oligarchy; thus, he relied solely on the urban and rural working classes for support and nationalist economics to sustain that support (Waisman 1989). Peron admired Mussolini's Fascist ideology including nationalism and

strong leadership; nevertheless, Peron's regime was built on his personal instincts to accomplish short-term gain, not an enduring coherent ideology. His regime was not run by political parties, but by small groups of people recruited by him from the military, labor leaders, and young officials (Wynia 1990). Replacing the Constitution of 1853, the Peronists wrote a new Constitution in 1949 (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). However, through his combative and authoritarian style, Peron lost support of rural and industrial entrepreneurs. Peron was re-elected in 1952, but the military ousted him in 1955 and he fled to Spain.

The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by fluctuation between military and civilian administrations. There were presidential elections in 1958 and 1963, but the Peronist party was banned in both elections (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Arturo Frondizi of the Radical Party won the presidency in 1958, but a military coup overthrew him in 1962 due in large part to the economic crisis characterized by rampant inflation. In 1963, Arturo Illia of the Radical Party won the presidency with 25% of the vote (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Again, the military overthrew Illia and established a military authoritative government from 1966-1973.

General Juan Carlos Ongania immediately closed the legislature, banned all elections, and led as a technocrat, not a politician (Snow and Wynia 1990). He did reduce inflation, but only through very harsh austerity measures. Demonstrations against the severe repression began in May of

1969 which eventually led to Ongania's downfall. In 1973, however, after the failure of Ongania's military government, general elections were held for the first time in 10 years (Argentina 1990). A Loyalist to the Peronist party won, placing Peron, who had been exiled in Spain, back in office with his wife Isabel as vice president. On July 1, 1974, Peron died and his wife became the first woman president in the Western Hemisphere (Argentina 1990). However, Isabel was not prepared to lead the chaotic economy and fragmenting Peronist party.

Another military coup on March 24, 1976 removed Mrs. Peron due to economic and political turmoil of the time (Wynia 1990). Until December 10, 1983, power was formally executed by the armed forces through a military president and a three-man junta composed of three service commanders (Argentina 1990). They set aside the Peronist constitution of 1949 and attempted to elect a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, but the assembly became deadlocked; therefore, the Constitution of 1853 was reinstated.

Violent repression under General Jorge Videla characterized this time from 1976-1983, otherwise known as the "Dirty War" (Waisman 1990). Videla unleashed intelligence and counter-insurgency units in order to inhibit a revolution. However, between 9,000 and 30,000 citizens were kidnapped, tortured, and killed (Ranis 1986). General Roberto Viola succeeded Videla in March of 1981 and

failed to maintain the economy; therefore, in order to gain support, he suddenly initiated a military conflict between Argentina and Great Britain over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. He counted on support from international organizations and other countries, but that support did not exist (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). In June 1982, the military lost not only the war with Britain, but also, its legitimacy in Argentina. After large riots and demonstrations for democracy, the Argentine military announced elections for October of 1983. Finally, in December of 1983, the military ceded power one month early due to the eruption of domestic political and social chaos (Cavarozzi 1992).

Raul Alfonsin, a member of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) took power in 1983. Then, in May 1989, Carlos Saul Menem, the Peronist candidate was elected to take over the presidency in December 1989, but with a rapidly deteriorating economy, Alfonsin resigned leaving Menem to the presidency six months early in July (Wynia 1990). The transfer of power was the first between democratically elected presidents in over 60 years.

Brazil (See Table I-C.)

Brazil's colonial period ended when the Portuguese royal family, having fled from Napoleon's army, established the seat of government. Dom Pedro II ruled from 1831 to 1889 when a federal republic was established (Brazil 1990).

From 1889 to 1930, the government was a constitutional democracy with limited franchise and weak central power, but strong state power. Two states, Sao Paulo, and Minas Gerias ran Brazilian politics through corrupt, powerful political machines (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Therefore, when Washington Luis of Sao Paulo, broke the political tradition by choosing another candidate from Sao Paulo instead of the nominee from Minas Gerias, Getulio Vargas, this era ended and the era of Vargas' populism began.

Populism preceded military authoritarianism in all three countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru (although in Peru there was not just one populist leader as in Argentina and Brazil). Both Vargas in Brazil and Peron in Argentina created a new type of leadership. It was manipulative in style, nationalist in sentiment, and massive in appeal with radical rhetoric, but moderate behavior (Wynia 1990). Both wanted political power for the sake of having power, not for reconstructing the nation. They both feared the radicalization of the working class, but absorbed the masses instead of repressing them.

Vargas was much more content as an authoritarian than as a liberal democrat. He suppressed a constitutionalist revolt in Sao Paulo in 1932 and appointed a constituent assembly in 1933 which established the second republican constitution as Congress elected him president for a four-year term (Wynia 1990). Vargas used the communist and fascist movements to gain support as he played the two off

of each other. In 1937, he persuaded the military to overthrow the constitutional regime and appoint him the leader of his "Estado Novo" indefinitely. The Estado Novo joined two 19th century Brazilian traditions, the paternalistic central authority and the dependence of private economic groups on the Brazilian government. He drew greatly on the need for firm national leadership that encouraged development.

The 1940s brought great demands for the restoration of democracy. Therefore, Vargas adapted to the new political reality and organized the Brazilian Labor Party in 1943 (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). However, the military forced Vargas to resign after creating a Populist movement drawing heavily on organized labor. So Vargas sat out of the 1945 presidential election, but was elected in 1950 with 49% of the popular vote (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Military officers accused him of corruption as he used patronage to gain support and to help his supporters. As a 72 year old man, he would not resign, but after the mysterious assassination of an anti-Vargas military officer, Vargas walked into his office and shot himself (Wynia 1990).

From 1955 to 1960, President Juscelino Kubitshcek, who was elected with the support of the Vargas coalition, stabilized and progressed the economy, built the capital of Brasilia, and instilled high expectations throughout Brazil (Wynia 1990). Therefore, when Janio Quadros came in 1960 wanting to end all patronage without the cooperation of the

ruling coalition, he alienated himself and powerful political, labor, military, and industrial officials. In 1961, he took a chance by resigning his position, hoping that the masses would rise to his support, but they did not (Wynia 1990).

Succeeding Quadros in 1961, Joao Goulart broke two very important rules of Brazilian politics at the time: 1) never mobilize the masses against their masters and 2) never redistribute (Wynia 1990). Goulart was distrusted by the military and by the United States government. He tried to implement land reform, nationalize oil refineries, allow illiterates to vote, and support the enlisted men who complained about their treatment. Therefore, the military staged a coup and chose as president Army Marshal Humberto Castello Branco, who was elected by the National Congress on April 11, 1964 (Brazil 1990).

There are basically three time periods during Brazil's latest endurance of authoritarianism (Roett 1984). The first, from 1964-1969, involved establishing the foundations, laws, and the reorganization within the executive branch. The period 1969-1973 was extremely repressive, but was also the time of the Brazilian economic "miracle." The last time period, from 1974-1983 was the abertura or "decompression" period.

The first time period opened with Castello Branco's eliminating rules without replacing them, closing all existing political parties, denying labor unions the right

to protest or strike, and using technocrats with clear rules, but no clear ideals to lead (Roett 1984). An authoritarian charter, taking the place of the 1934 constitution giving greater power to the executive, was issued in 1967.

Later, Branco created two new political parties, the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) to assure legislature complied with president's wishes and to give the appearance of representing diverse interests (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). He also established the Institutional Acts of 1964 which gave the president as much power as he wanted and stripped all civil rights from the masses (Wynia 1990). Despite Branco's holding regular elections and allowing the legislature and civilian courts to operate, none of these institutions had any effect on the political life of the country due to the severe repression by the National Intelligence Service which was established in 1969 in order to suppress counter-insurgency movements. Nevertheless, the church, the only irremovable force in much of Latin America, began to protest the brutal, violent operation of the National Intelligence Service (Bruneau 1992).

By 1973, the economic miracle ended, and the sectors that had benefited the most from this period of growth began withdrawing their support from the military government (Mainwaring 1986). General Ernesto Geisel, president from 1974-1979, implemented the aperture or "opening" in which he

lifted press censorship, established the abertura calendar, and annulled the Institutional Act #5 which gave the president the right to deny anyone of his/her civil rights, to censor the press, and to close Congress. In addition to these political reforms, Geisel implemented a new industrial policy which further destroyed the system of alliances supporting the military government, especially the support form the industrial sector of Brazilian society (Cardoso 1976). In an attempt to maintain support for the military government, General Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-1985) tried to establish new electoral laws that would appease the military and others without alienating the opposition. This was an impossible task. The Brazilian Democratic Movement had a base across all social classes in Brazilian society, and thus they demanded the eviction of the military which was represented in the Social Democratic Party formerly known as ARENA (Mainwaring 1986).

Finally, in January 1985, the electoral college picked Tancredo Neves from the Brazilian Democratic Movement party (PMDB), but he died a month later, so acting vice-president, Senator Jose Sarney became president. The irony of Sarney's becoming president is that until just a few weeks before, Sarney had been a member of the Social Democratic Party, the reformed ARENA (Pang and Jarnagin 1987).

A new constitution was written and established in 1988, abolishing the authoritarian charter of 1967. Finally in 1989, Brazil witnessed its first popularly elected

presidential election in 29 years. In 1989 Fernando Collor de Mello won 53% of the vote when he began his term (Brazil 1990).

Peru (See Table I-D.)

Peruvian independence from Spain was claimed on July 28, 1821, but Spain did not recognize its independence until 1879 (Peru 1987). Peru's longest period of civilian rule, although it was fragmented, was from 1895 to 1919. During this time, ideas of renovation, innovation, and economic development evolved. Therefore, much of the government's expenditures were invested in communications, education, and health care, which were all previously financed by taxes on exports, revenues from new foreign investments, and new foreign loans (Palmer 1990). However, the Civilista party, although reasonably well organized, suffered periodic internal divisions which made such reforms and investments very difficult to implement. Other parties such as the Liberal, the Democratic, and the Conservative, were personalistic and rose and fell with the fortunes of their individual leaders (McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

Therefore, Peruvian populism was instituted from 1919-1968 by both military and civilian leaders struggling for power: civilian President Augusto B. Leguia (1908-1912; 1919-1930) and military President General Manuel Odria (1948-1956) (McClintock 1989). Both were characterized by efforts to discourage the development of political

organization and to encourage loyalty to the person of the president through patronage. In Peru, as in Argentina and Brazil, populism rallied massive support for certain charismatic leaders. However, this support took place in a political vacuum and failed to provide long-term stability when the populist leaders were no longer in power. As a result, such massive support for the individual did not equal massive support for the democratic system.

Nevertheless, Peru's first mass-based political party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), was founded in Mexico by an exiled student leader, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in 1924 (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). APRA had a fairly complete and coherent ideology, and its base was so strong that it usually determined the outcome of all open elections after 1931. However, the military forbade APRA from ever ruling directly (McClintock 1989).

Between 1956 and 1982, APRA became a center conservative party in order to gain greater political power. When APRA won open election in 1962, the party made a pact with its archenemy General Manual Odria to rule together (McClintock 1989). Because of this, the military intervened and ran the country for a year before elections were held again. Popular Action's (AP) candidate Fernando Belaunde Terry won and carried out many important reforms, such as new agricultural programs, expanded education, and the re-institution of municipal elections. Nevertheless, harsh economic times in 1967-1968 resulted in a loss of support

from both the masses and the military and led to a bloodless coup on October 3, 1969 (McClintock 1989).

This coup initiated the most recent period of military rule (1968-1980). The "Docenio", twelve year military rule, installed General Juan Velasco Alvarado of the Popular Action Party (AP) as president. Once in power, the military claimed to be revolutionary, but was actually more reformist (Gorman 1982). Changes under the military authority included a rapid expansion of state control, a diversification in its international relations, and a large scale agrarian program. After 1970, the military allowed neighborhood organizations, worker communities, and cooperatives to proliferate. However, all established political parties and unions were perceived as being disruptive forces and many decrees before 1975 sought to suppress these groups. Therefore, the military's new political system perceived social and political realities in a whole, organized, and functional government.

The military operated on the two assumptions of continued economic growth with improved distribution, and the willingness of economic elites to accept incentives to redirect their wealth to begin new productive activities (Palmer 1990). However, economic growth did not continue, but instead, halted after 1974. The people in power failed to consult openly and as equals with the citizens, the presumed beneficiaries of all the reforms. Consequently, a coup in 1975 led by General Francisco Morales Bermudez

Cerruti resulted in the abandonment of all reform initiatives, except agrarian reform (McClintock 1989). By 1977, the economic and political pressures were so great that the military regime decided to initiate a transition to civilian rule.

The year 1979 witnessed the establishment of a new constitution which formally provided for the May 1980 elections when President Belaunde Terry was returned to office by an impressive plurality (McClintock 1989). However, inflation continued to worsen and violence intensified as the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas infiltrated Peruvian society. This particular guerrilla organization advocates a peasant-based republic based greatly on Maoist ideology. President Belaunde did not pay much attention to the Sendero Luminoso, so that by the end of his term 6,000 people were killed as the guerrillas tried to ignite their revolution and the military tried to distinguish it (Palmer 1990).

In 1985, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), finally won the presidential election bringing Alan Garcia Perez to office. The transfer of power from Belaunde to Garcia on July 28, 1985 was Peru's first exchange of power from one democratically elected leader to a another in 40 years (Palmer 1990). Garcia was a forcefully, nationalistic leader, but by 1988 the economy had plummeted as did his popularity rating. In 1990, an independent candidate, President Alberto Fujimori was elected.

Summary

To conclude, it is obvious that these three countries have faced several years of civilian-military conflict. Argentina's history claims five military coups overthrowing civilian leaders. Two of these coups resulted in military leadership for an extended period of time (1930-1946 and 1976-1983). Brazil's history of military intervention began in 1930 with a military-civilian insurrection, followed in 1945 with the forced resignation of Getulio Vargas and in 1964 with a military overthrow of Goulart which led to about twenty-five years of authoritarianism. Peru has experienced military intervention in government throughout its history; however, the military was solely in power for a year in 1962 and a long period of authoritarianism from 1968-1980. Moreover, populism with its nationalistic, mass-based character and dependency on individual leadership style, such as Peron in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Leguia and Odria in Peru, was present in all three cases of study. Furthermore, authoritarianism followed the populist rule in each country.

Also, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, each began their transition to democracy at approximately the same time. For the purposes of this paper, a transition begins when the authoritarian government formally announces that presidential elections will be held. Therefore, Argentina's transition began in 1982; Brazil's transition began in 1983,

and Peru's transition began in 1978. As well, each country established a civilian president at about the same time: Argentina in 1983, Brazil in 1985, and Peru in 1980.

Following Chapters

This first chapter has presented the theory of this thesis and provided the reader with a historical background of the three case studies. Chapter 2 presents the measures and data of the independent variable, real change, while Chapter 3 presents the measures and data for the dependent variable, real democracy. Finally, Chapter 4 evaluates the results of this study and its findings to the significance of the likelihood of democratic endurance.

Table I-A: Time Periods A, T, S & D Defined

Time Period A

Period of

Authoritarianism

Time Period T

Period of

Transition to

Democracy

Time Period D

Term of First

Democratic President

Time Period S

Term of Second

Democratic President

Table I-B: Historical Background: Argentina

1973	Loyalist to Peronist party wins election, placing General Juan Domingo Peron in presidency for second time
July 1974	President Peron dies and his wife, Isabel becomes the first woman president in the Western Hemisphere
March 24, 1976	Military coup overthrows Mrs. Peron and installs a military president, General Jorge Videla and a three man junta to rule Argentina until December 10, 1983
1976-1983	General Jorge Videla violently suppresses Argentina in the "Dirty War"
March 1981	General Roberto Viola succeeded General Videla and initiated war with Great Britain over Malvinas/Falkland Islands
June 1982	Argentine military lost Malvinas/Falkland War
October 1983	Argentina holds presidential elections in which Raul Alfonsin of the Radical Party wins
May 1989	Carlos Saul Menem, a Peronist, wins the Argentina's second presidential election since authoritarianism
July 1989	President Menem takes over Argentine presidency six months early after Alfonsin resigns

Table I-C: Historical Background: Brazil

1961	Joao Goulart elected President of Brazil and attempts to implement reforms which threaten elite
April 11, 1964	Brazilian military overthrows Goulart and Army Marshal Humberto Castello Branco becomes President of Brazil
1964-1969	First stage of Brazilian authoritarianism, reorganization and establishment of new laws
1969-1973	Second stage of Brazilian authoritarianism, very repressive & also time of "economic miracle"
1974	General Ernesto Geisel becomes second authoritarian president of Brazil
1974-1983	Third Stage of Brazilian authoritarianism, abertura or "decompression"
1979	General Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo becomes third authoritarian President of Brazil
January 1985	Brazil's electoral college chooses Tancredo Neves from Brazilian Democratic Movement party as president
February 1985	Tancredo Neves dies and Vice-President Jose Sarney becomes Brazil's president
1988	Brazil writes new constitution
1989	Brazil holds first presidential election 29 years in which Fernando Collor de Mello wins 53% of the vote

Table I-D: Historical Background: Peru

1966	Fernando Belaunde Terry of Popular Action party is elected President of Brazil and he carries out many reforms
October 3, 1969	Military coup overthrows Belaunde and "Docenio" begins with the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado who attempts to implement several reforms
1975	Military coup led by General Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerruti halts all reform efforts in Peru
1977	Peru's military authoritarian government announces transition to democracy
1979	Peru establishes new constitution
May 1980	Peru holds first democratic elections since beginning of authoritarianism, Belaunde Terry returned to office for second time
1980	Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group begins violent activities
July 25, 1989	Peru elects Alan Garcia Perez of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance to the presidency
1990	President Alberto Fujimori, an independent candidate, elected in Peru

CHAPTER 2: The Extent of Real Change

Introduction: In Which Countries Has Real Change Occurred?

In this chapter, the measures of the independent variable real change are evaluated. Real change is measured at three different levels: the elites, the masses, and the institutions. Therefore, the three measures of real change are elite settlement, mass mobilization, and a definite break of legitimacy. After each measure is explained and analyzed for each country, a rank order of each measure is determined in order to compare the amount of real change per measure in each country. Finally, in the conclusion of this chapter, an overall rank order of the real change that has occurred in each country is given.

ELITE SETTLEMENT-- Why is elite settlement important to real change?

In order to establish and consolidate a real democracy, the elites, the principal decision makers in a society, must decide that democracy is the desired form of government because they, as elites, have the power and the resources to influence "national political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992). The first measure of elite settlement is the speed of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The transition begins with the formal announcement that presidential elections will be held and it ends on the actual day of the election. (See **Table II-A.**) According to Burton, Gunther and Higley

(1992), the faster the transition, the more likely that there will be a consolidation of real democracy. The second measure of elite settlement is the participation of old leaders in the transition process. The experience and wisdom of older elites will increase the likelihood of compromise and negotiation, so that an elite settlement may be reached more easily and more quickly, thus leading to a greater likelihood of real democracy (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992). Lastly, the inclusion of parties from all points of the political spectrum, Left to Right, is important in the consolidation of real democracy. If all groups are allowed to participate in the political process, then the likelihood of democracy is much greater than if some groups are excluded. This is explained by the fact that if the interests and demands of all groups are being considered in the establishment of the new form of government, then it is more likely that disagreements between disparate groups will be settled in a peaceful manner through the democratic institutions rather than through a violent coup.

Argentina

Elite Behavior Prior to Authoritarianism

Between 1973 and 1976, Argentina's political party system was dominated by two political parties, the Radicals (UCR) and the Peronists, which were each distrustful of the other and internally factionalized (McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

In an attempt to create a new party system in the early 1970s, both party leaders signed an accord, La Hora del pueblo; nevertheless, the distrust between the two parties greatly weakened the effectiveness of this agreement (Cavarozzi 1992). After the death of President Peron in 1974, the internal factionalization of the Peronist party and its inability to effectively lead the country under the weak leadership of Isabel Peron resulted in a military coup (Wynia 1990).

Elite Behavior Under Authoritarianism

Under the new military government led by General Jorge Videla (1976-1981), an extremely closed, hierarchical government was established in which very little elite interaction was allowed. The main goal of Videla's government was to purify Argentine society by eradicating all guerrilla organizations and the political Left in what came to be know as the "Dirty War" (Waisman 1989). Moreover, all political parties were banned while unions, the electoral system and professional associations were severely repressed (Cavarozzi 1992). Also, the constitution was dismissed and civilian were excluded from high positions in the state. Lastly, the military shifted its support to the agrarian elite of the far Right away from the more moderate industrial elite, thus concentrating power in the hands of a much more centralized group than before authoritarianism (McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

However, beginning in March of 1981 when General Roberto Viola succeeded General Videla as planned, the power and legitimacy of the military's government began to falter. First of all, the economy deteriorated with the world recession of 1981 and an exponentially increasing foreign debt (Wynia 1990). Secondly, in May of 1981 the organization of the Multipartidaria Front, a coalition of opposition parties, signaled a growth in the opposition to the military regime (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). Despite Viola's attempts to improve the economy and liberalize relations with other civilian leaders, the military hard-liners, under the constitutional norms of the Process of National Reorganization, overthrew President Viola and replaced him with Army Commander Leopoldo Galtieri at the end of 1981 (Beltran 1987). Finally, in a desperate attempt to halt the growth of the opposition and turn attention away from the worsening economy, Lieutenant General Galtieri suddenly invaded the Malvinas/Falkland islands on April 1, 1982, initiating an international conflict with Great Britain that actually resulted in a more rapid dissolution of the military's power (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). In other words, in a desperate attempt to gain legitimacy and support, the military chose to appeal to nationalistic militarism that resulted in an embarrassing defeat and the absolute loss of legitimacy for the military as a political actor and as a professional institution.

In order to save any remaining power, the deeply divided military ordered the retirement of Galtieri and replaced the entire junta with President Bignone. Ironically, the military's plan of distracting the opposition was partially successful because there had been little opposition to the invasion of the Malvinas; and thus, no major political parties emerged capable of immediately assuming power despite the military's lack of legitimacy (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). Therefore, due to the opposition's lack of organization and demand for an immediate return to civilian rule, the period from June to September of 1982 was relatively passive between the military and its opposition (Viola and Mainwaring 1985).

Elite Behavior During the Transition

However, from September to December 1982, large demonstrations for human rights and democracy and against the current government erupted resulting in a rapid downward spiral of military control. Thus, the Argentine democratic transition began in February of 1983 when, in an attempt to respond to the opposition and to save any lasting legitimacy, President Bignone announced that elections would be held in October. These elections would be the first since the military came to power in 1976. The military also tried to pass an Amnesty Law that would prohibit the punishment of military leaders for any role in torture, killings or corruption during the authoritative regime; nevertheless, when President Alfonsin took power in 1983 no

such law was honored (Viola and Mainwaring 1985; Cavarozzi 1992). Lastly, despite the military's attempt to create a party that would represent it in the upcoming elections, the military failed due to its total loss of control and legitimacy.

Therefore, the traditional parties, the Peronists and the Radicals, returned to the political scene. However, due to the military's delegitimization and the opposition's organization and ability to make demands for change, both major parties were more equal and more legitimate than they had been before the coup in 1976. Therefore, after the Radical Party's victory in the election of October 1983, the military opted for a quicker transfer of power due to their total loss of control of Argentine social, economic, and political control. At last, in December 1983, one month early, President Alfonsin of the Radical Party took power of the Executive branch while the Peronists controlled half of the provincial governments and a plurality in the Senate.

Evaluation of the Indices of Elite Settlement: Argentina

Speed of the Transition

Argentina's democratic transition lasted only 10 months, from the announcement of elections in February 1983 to Alfonsin's taking power in December 1983. (See **Table II-B.**) The circumstances of the transition in Argentina, with economic chaos and extreme human rights abuses resulted in a grave lack of legitimacy and respect for the military;

therefore, the military had little political power with which to negotiate or control the process of the transition. Finally, through a very fast transition, the military was virtually displaced from the political realm in Argentina.

Participation of Old Leaders

In Argentina, the traditional parties, the Radicals and the Peronists, were reinstated. When Alfonsin of the Radical party won the presidency in 1983, Former President Isabel Peron who was living in Spain returned to Argentina for Alfonsin's inauguration and was warmly welcomed by him (Wynia 1985). Therefore, a new stage for relations between the previously warring parties was established. Also, Alfonsin staffed most of his entire Cabinet with Radical party "historicos", politicians over the age of 50 who had signed up early in Alfonsin's campaign for the presidential nomination (Wynia 1987). Therefore, many older leaders were active in the Argentine democratization process.

Inclusion of Parties

It is obvious that military elites dominated the authoritarian regime excluding almost all other actors. However, due to the rapid collapse of military power and legitimacy, not only did a diversity of civilian elites dominate Argentine politics, but also a polarization between the defeated military and the old political parties, the Radicals and the Peronists developed. Therefore, unlike the pre-authoritarian period, a true bipartisan system with an equal opportunity to hold power and to be legitimate was

established in Argentina with the elections in 1983. Moreover, the Radical defeat of Peronists gave democracy its best chance ever by invalidating the Peronists' claim to being the nation's only legitimate majority party (Snow and Wynia 1990).

The new democracy allowed many people who had been jailed and tortured to return from exile. Ironically, the once left-leaning young Radicals strongly supported Alfonsin despite his more right domestic policies. Lastly, Marxist parties have had a long tradition in Argentina, but often are severely divided, as shown in the 1983 elections in which four Marxist presidential candidates ran. Moreover, during the administrations of Juan and Isabel Peron and the military, many leftists politicians, intellectuals, and union leaders were exiled or killed, resulting in a real leftist movement when the transition occurred in 1982.

Brazil

Elite Behavior Prior to Authoritarianism

Party politics in Brazil before the 1964 military coup operated in a weak multiparty system that included three major parties that had all been organized under the auspices of President Vargas around 1945: the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and the National Democratic Union (UDN). Also, several smaller parties emerged between 1945-1964 so that a relatively broad range of the political spectrum was represented in the party

system (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Therefore, the alliances between the parties had a great impact on election results. For example, the PSD and the PDB, especially between 1946-1964, often cooperated and formed coalitions to ensure the election of their candidate, while the UDN maintained an organized opposition (Roett 1984).

However, the Brazilian political system became completely polarized due to the development of two contrasting views on Brazil's course of development (Wynia 1990). One side, the reformers, complained that Brazilian society was too traditional because privilege prevailed over hard labor. On the other side, the conservatives advocated strong leadership and the use of the state's power to promote the nation's development. Goulart sided with reformers of the left by attempting to implement a modest land reform, nationalize some private oil refineries, give illiterates the right to vote, and most offensive to the military, to support enlisted men when they protested their treatment by commanding officers (Wynia 1990). At this point, the conservative elites felt threatened and began warning that the communists were taking over and urging the military to intervene. Finally, on March 31, 1964, the military who perceived legislative paralysis and leftist infiltration overthrew Goulart who fled to Uruguay (Wynia 1990).

Elite Behavior Under Authoritarianism

Initially, the military, under the leadership of President Garrastazu Medici (1964-1969), severely limited elite interactions and established a closed political system. For example, all political; parties were abolished and all leftist organizations were severely repressed. The largest labor confederation, the General Workers Command (CGT) was abolished while the Catholic church and the Order of Brazilian lawyers (OAB) were alienated from government by torture or other means (Wiarda 1990). Interestingly, the industrial bourgeoisie were not excluded from the system of alliances after 1964, but the emergence of a new state of affairs redefined the role of the private sector in the system of dominant alliances (Cardoso 1986).

After the left was effectively decimated, moderate officers in the military wanted to make the authoritarian regime appear more legitimate, especially to the most prominent members of society. Therefore, in order to assure that the legislature complied with presidential wishes while giving the appearance of representing diverse middle and upper class interests, the government created two new parties in December 1965: the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), the military party; and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the opposition party (Wynia 1990). Until 1973, however, the MDB found it very difficult to campaign within the government's strict rules (Skidmore 1988). For example, the military passed several institutional acts

which strictly prohibited any opposition to the authoritarian regime (Skidmore 1988).

In addition, Brazil's economy experienced the "economic miracle" from 1967-1973 in which rapid industrialization and modernized rural areas contributed greatly to the power and legitimacy of the military regime (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). As a result, the demands that the military give up power were muted as long as the economy was doing well. However, the oil shock of 1973 meant the end of the economic miracle. With the economy faltering, the military leaders realized that they would have to establish legitimacy by some other means.

Beginning in 1974, President Ernesto Geisel chose to begin a very controlled process of "decompression: using "casuismos" or arbitrary and individualized measures aimed at ensuring predominance of ARENA in very restricted and controlled elections for congress (Munck 1992, Bruneau 1992). The MDB as an opposition party to the government's ARENA, decided to participate in the 1974 controlled elections in order to attain some level of legitimacy. By winning a landslide victory, the MDB became an effective opposition force and had legitimized elections as a means by which the population could express dissent (Munck 1992).

However, in April 1977 and November 1981, many different controls on electoral processes were instituted in order to ensure ARENA's dominance. Moreover, in November 1979, under President Joao Baptista Figueiredo's "abertura"

or opening, the two party system with ARENA and MDB was abolished and a multiparty system created with five parties: the Democratic Worker's party (PDT), the Brazilian Workers Party (PTB), and the Democratic Social Party (PDS - the military's new party). Therefore, despite the allowance of greater elite interaction, the constant flux in the rules of the game resulted in a plethora of opposition parties, none of which were powerful enough to challenge the military's control. Moreover, that many of these parties were descendants of the pre-authoritarian parties did not deny that they were "essentially" new political organizations with new coalitions of Brazilian leaders as well as many leaders from a new generation (McDonald and Ruhl 1989).

Elite Behavior During the Transition

Nevertheless, by 1982 the opposition, now called the PMDB due to a merger of the MDB and PT, was able to combine mass mobilization and accommodation in order to undermine confidence within the government and the PDS. In late 1983 after about 9 years of the military's controlled opening, a new regime erosion began as divisions within the PDS grew (Munck 1992). Although the initial beginnings of the transition in Brazil began in 1974, the military had legitimacy and power to change the rules of the political game until 1982 when state governors were elected directly and the opposition won 10 out of 22 positions. In addition, the private sector's industrial elites, despite their shelter by the authoritarian state during its most

repressive years (1964-1976), began to urge liberalization as they perceived the new economic policies of President Geisel (1974-1979) to be harmful to their interests (Cardoso 1986). Therefore, the Geisel government's industrialization policy unsettled the system of alliances that sustained the authoritarian military regime (Cardoso 1986).

In July 1983, a liberal faction in the PDS won over 30% of the votes in the election of the Executive of the PDS. The debate over wage policy amidst a severe repression that began in 1980 and reached a low point in 1983, as well as President Figueiredo's announcement that he would not choose a successor led to a gradual erosion of the government's ability to manage the political and economic situation in Brazil. Therefore, tensions escalated as did the pressure for direct elections (Mainwaring 1986).

In mid-1984, many PDS governors announced their support for direct presidential elections after massive public demonstrations and visible disintegration of the regimes ability to control them (Mainwaring 1986). The success of the direct election campaign gave the opposition a rejuvenated confidence. Therefore, Aureliano Chaves the PDS head of the Chamber of Deputies, led a movement to negotiate a way out in order to prevent future political crises (Mainwaring 1986). Factions in the military began to insult each other publicly.

By April 25, 1984, the date to vote on an amendment to re-establish direct elections for president, Figueiredo had

mustered enough support to defeat the amendment. As a result the three candidates for president, none of which were supported by a coalition of factions in the military, led to the defection of many in support of Tancredo Neves. The Liberal Front was formed in order to organize support for Neves. Aureliano Chaves, an old political rival of Neves, withdrew his candidacy and began to work openly for Neves (Mainwaring 1986). Meanwhile, Neves constructed a broader network of support for members of the electoral college to the public at large, as well as persuading the military not to intervene. He was very successful at this and won 480 to 180 electoral votes. Therefore, in mid-1985, military rule formally ended when Tancredo Neves of the PMDB won the election.

Evaluation of the Indices for Elite Settlement: Brazil

Speed of the Transition

The transition in Brazil lasted from July 1983 to July 1985, a total of 24 months. In comparison to the Argentine military, the Brazilian military maintained strong control of the transition process. Unlike the Argentine military, the economic policy and insurgency policy of the Brazilian military was more successful with the economic miracle in the early 70s and the decreased suppression after 1974. Therefore, the military did not have to flee in retreat; but instead, it was able to insure itself certain concessions, protection, and power in future political decisions. Even a

week before the electoral college was to select the first democratic president in Brazil since 1964, the army's highest commanders decided to remove the most conservative and reactionary generals from a troop command. In response, Tancredo Neves met with the army minister to reassure him that no Argentine-style retribution against the generals would occur (Pang and Jarnagin 1985). Therefore, the military and the opposition candidate had struck a workable deal that would provide for a a peaceful transfer of power, but a democracy in which the military maintained much of its political power.

Participation of Old Leaders

The first democratic president in Brazil after the military reign of power was Tancredo Neves who died at the age of 75 after undergoing emergency surgery on the eve of his inauguration. Neves served as a leading negotiator in the transfer of power from authoritarianism to democracy. Ironically, Vice-President Jose Sarney, who had been president of the PDS became Brazil's next democratic president. Therefore, several older leaders were involved in the transition process.

Inclusion of Parties

The Brazilian transition resulted in the establishment of a multiparty system including the Worker's Party (PT), the PMDB, and the PDS. The Worker's Party (PT) the most militant leftist party, boycotted the electoral college of 1984. Moreover, the PDS, the party most closely associated

with the military, lost much of its support after the transition. Even though there were four underground Communist and Marxist parties, each was content with the status quo candidates of the PMDB, Tancredo Neves and Jose Sarney (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Therefore, no Communist or Marxist candidate ran in the 1984 elections. However, the fact that these Communist and Marxist parties were "underground" signifies a lack of inclusion of parties who represent the left side of the political spectrum, despite Brazil's multi-party system.

Peru

Elite Behavior Prior to Authoritarianism

Distrust, alienation, and refusal to compromise characterized Peruvian party politics between APRA (the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), AP (Accion Popular) and UNI (National Odriist Union) before the military coup of 1968. APRA was founded in Peru in 1956 with a strong populist appeal, reformist ideology and organizational capacity. It was popular in the north and sought accommodations and compromise to attain more political power. The AP also had strong reformist appeal and was popular in the south. Therefore, between the AP and APRA, they absorbed almost all new popular movements.

Belaunde de Terry of Accion Popular won the presidential election in 1963, and thus, brought a strong reformist element to the political agenda. However, during

his term as president, a virtual legislative deadlock occurred when a UNI-APRA coalition blocked many of Belaunde's attempted reforms in agriculture, education, and politics (McClintock 1989). Therefore, the political deadlock, a badly handled deal with International Petroleum Company (IPC, a subsidiary of Standard Oil) and an eroding economy which began in 1967 led to the military coup on October 3, 1968. Ironically, the military overthrew Belaunde's government because it had failed in its plans to carry out reform, not because it had succeeded (Palmer 1990).

Elite Behavior Under Authoritarianism

Therefore, when the military took over, it pursued four different areas of reform aimed at national development and political stability. These reforms were 1) social justice which combined well-being and Catholic teaching to emphasize collectivity, not individuality, 2) an assertion of Peruvian national independence from foreign political and economic control, 3) national development and 4) true progressive participation. Basically, the military wanted to depoliticize Peruvian society. There were two phases to the Docenio, the twelve year military rule. The first phase, the Reform Phase was led by Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). The second phase, the Reactionary phase was led by Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-1980).

Under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the military was determined to end the power of the

oligarchs and the influence of the United States. Therefore, the military immediately increased the economic role of the Peruvian state by nationalizing IPC and implementing an ambitious agrarian reform (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). Moreover, no electoral calendar was specified for nine years because the military viewed the government as a mediator of disputes within or among sectors in Peruvian society, it perceived established political parties and unions as disruptive forces, and thus passed many decrees before 1975 to marginalize such organizations, but not to outlaw or expel them (McClintock 1989, Palmer 1990). In addition, the military established SINAMOS, the National System to Support Social Mobilization (McClintock 1989). However, SINAMOS never gained institutional autonomy as it was always an instrument of the military, never a player in the decision-making process with the military.

After 1973, the regime faltered due to the country's intensifying economic problems, Velasco's becoming ill and the increasing factionalization within the military. As a result, a more conservative, General Francisco Morales Bermudez overthrew Velasco. He dismantled SINAMOS and discontinued or changed many of Velasco's previous policies, but the economy and social condition worsened. On July 19, 1977, virtually the entire nation was shut down in a general strike. Other strikes were held in May 1978 and a teachers' union strike lasted through much of 1978 and 1979

(McClintock 1989). Beginning in the 1978 elections, a leftward political trend became evident.

Elite Behavior During the Transition

With the pressure for change intensifying and the military's own demoralization and factionalization, Morales Bermudez announced a transition to democracy on July 28, 1977. In 1978, elections for a Constituent Assembly were held. One hundred "constuyentes" were chosen from a variety of political parties: AP, APRA, Izquierda Unida (United Left), Partido Popular Cristiano, and other smaller parties. On May 18, 1980, presidential elections resulted in the re-election of Accion Popular's Belaunde Terry. A candidate representing APRA also ran, but he was not popular or charismatic, and the Marxist Left was divided into more than five factions which disabled its ability to promote a single candidate (McClintock 1989).

Evaluation of the Indices for Elite Settlement: Peru

Speed of the Transition

The transition in Peru lasted from July 28, 1977 to May 18, 1980, twenty-two months. This is a comparatively long transition, being only two months shorter than Brazil's and 12 months longer than Argentina's. During the Peruvian transition, a new constitution was written under the auspices of the military still in power. However, the military lost much of its legitimacy and confidence in its ability to rule effectively. Moreover, the military's

increasing factionalization only worsened its ability to rule the nation. Therefore, the military maintained more power during the transition period than Argentina, but after the presidential elections of 1980, the military was more out of power than the military in Brazil after its presidential elections in 1985.

Participation of Old Leaders

The fact that Belaunde Terry, who had been president before the military coup in 1968, won the presidency in 1980 illustrates a definite presence of old leaders in the transition process. Moreover, a major effort was made by both President General Morales Bermudez and by Haya de la Torre to settle disputes between the military and APRA (McClintock 1989). This attempt was successful, therefore increasing the likelihood that old divisions between old factions would not erupt as violently in the future.

Inclusion of Parties

The four major parties--Accion Popular, APRA, Izquierda Unida, and Partido Popular Cristiano--participated in the 1978 constituent Assembly elections and in the 1980 presidential elections (McClintock 1989). Therefore, inclusion of parties from disparate points on the political spectrum was very great in Peru. Before the February 1980 deadline for party registration, the fragmented Peruvian left, which had polled 36 percent of the vote in 1978, tried to form a united front, but due to doctrinal differences and narrow, partisan ambition, none of the leftist groups

ultimately entered the presidential race (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). As a result, there were a total of 15 candidates in the 1980 presidential elections (Werlich 1981).

Summary: In which country did the greatest amount of Elite Settlement occur?

To measure elite settlement in each case of study, three indices have been used: the speed of the transition, the presence of the old leaders, and the inclusion of parties. First of all, due to the duration of each county's transition, the rank order for speed of the transition places Argentina first with the fastest transition, Peru second, and Brazil third with the slowest transition. (See **Table II-G.**)

Secondly, with respect to the participation of old leaders, Brazil's transition may have never ended had it not been for the wise political maneuvering of Tancredo Neves and the willingness to compromise of the 13 four-star generals of the army command. Therefore, the knowledge and experience of Brazil's old leaders played a key role in elite settlement. In Peru, old divisions were resolved by the old leaders, such as President General Morales Bermudez and by Haya de la Torre. Moreover, when Belaunde Terry, who had been working as a professor in the United States during the Docenio, discovered that the military had called for a transition to democracy, he returned to Peru and immediately began forming a political party. Because the Peruvian

transition did not result from a total lack of legitimacy like in Argentina, the role of these old leaders was vital to successful democratization in Peru. Therefore, Peru is ranked a close second behind Brazil. Finally, Argentina's Alfonsin appointed "historicos" to fill his entire Cabinet; therefore, several old leaders in opposition to the military were active in Argentina's attempts to consolidate a democracy. However, the sudden and almost total loss of the military's legitimacy, opened the door for almost any group, young or old, to take power. Therefore, Argentina is ranked third.

The third measure involves the inclusion of parties in the democratic transition. During Peru's presidential elections in 1980, parties representing disparate points of the political spectrum were allowed to participate. Therefore, Peru is ranked first in inclusion. Brazil falls second in inclusion of parties as it had four underground communists parties which were not allowed to participate in politics. However, the Brazilian system did allow many other parties to form and to participate. Argentina managed to establish a true by-partisan system, but because the political left had virtually been decimated by the two previous regimes led by the Peronists and the military, no demand or acceptance of Leftist parties was apparent.

To give an over-all ranking of elite settlement in each country, it seems that the greatest elite settlement took place in Brazil where old leaders were forced to negotiate

and compromise in order to make democratization possible. In Peru, a great amount of elite settlement also had to occur in order that old divisions could be resolved and a new democracy installed. Lastly, very little elite settlement took place in Argentina, as the military had no choice, but to hand over its power.

MASS MOBILIZATION--Why is mass mobilization important to real change?

The second measure, mass mobilization, is measured in terms of change in the percentage of voter turnout from Time Period A, the period of authoritarianism to Time Period D, the first democratic presidency. The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of total registered voters by the number of actual voters per election. If an increase in voter turnout is seen in Time Period B versus Time Period A, then an increase in mass mobilization is occurring, and thus the democracy is more inclusive, i.e. not just a government of the elites. (See **Table II-C.**)

Argentina

Under the authoritarian government (1973-1983), elections were not even held. Therefore, mass mobilization was at its lowest possible point of 0% voter turnout. However at the beginning of Time period D with the election of President Raul Alfonsin, voter turnout jumps to 85.9%, resulting in a definite increase in mass mobilization. Interestingly, voter turnout remains in the mid-80 percentile even for legislative elections.

Brazil

The military took power in Brazil in 1964. From 1966 to 1978, the military chose the president and then the Congress confirmed him. Therefore, only elections for the legislature were held between 1966 and 1985. Beginning in 1974, a gradual increase in voter turnout occurred as Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo implemented the abertura. Voter turnout increased a few percentage points from 1966 to 1985.

Nevertheless, when the military decided to step down and allow civilians to take power in 1985, the same institutional process was followed, wherein the president was elected by an electoral college rather than by the masses, resulting in a 0% voter turnout for the 1985 presidential election. Therefore, it is not until the 1989 presidential election (Time Period S) when Fernando Collor de Mello is popularly elected that we find evidence of a substantial increase in mass mobilization with a 97% voter turnout.

Peru

The Peruvian military, similar to the Brazilian military, did not hold presidential or legislative elections during its rule from 1963-1978. Finally in 1978, legislative elections resulted in an 84% voter turnout. However, when President Fernando Belaunde Terry was re-elected in 1980, only 71% of registered voters turned out for the election, but this was the first election in which

illiterates could vote. In contrast, in the 1985 presidential elections, 91% of the registered voters turned out to vote, therefore showing a greater increase, but lower absolute value than Brazil.

Summary: In which country did the greatest amount of Mass Mobilization occur?

In Argentina, evidence of a large, immediate increase in mass mobilization occurred in both legislative and presidential elections. Moreover, in comparison to Argentine, an equal increase in mass mobilization in Peruvian legislative elections occurred while a more delayed, less dramatic increase in mass mobilization occurred in Peru's presidential elections. Finally, very little increase in mass mobilization occurred in Brazil between Time Period A and D, but a substantial increase in voter turnout for presidential elections occurred after the transition was completed. Therefore, the ranking for mass mobilization shows Argentina first, Peru second, and Brazil third.

DEFINITE BREAK OF LEGITIMACY-- Why is a definite break of legitimacy important to real change?

In order to measure a definite break of legitimacy, first, the number and severity of human rights violations are reported for Time Period A. In contrast, for Time Period D, the new democratic government's active investigation, trying, and prosecution of former

authoritarian leaders for such crimes are analyzed. If formal action against the behavior of the former military government is made, then a clear break of legitimacy has occurred because the rules for the political game have been formally changed and agreed upon by the new democracy. However, if the new democratic government does not take an active stance against past authoritarian practices, then a definite break of legitimacy has not occurred.

A second measure of a definite break of legitimacy is the comparison of average military expenditure during Time Periods A and D. The greater the decrease in military expenditure from Time Period A to time Period D , then the greater the likelihood that a definite break in the power and legitimacy of the military has occurred.

Human Rights Violations

Argentina: Time Period A

Under the Process of National Reorganization and the Doctrine of National Security, the military began an all-out war, the "Dirty War", against any subversion in Argentina. The Argentine military used pervasive and arbitrary violence in an attempt to exterminate the Left. General Jorge Videla, a military man, not a politician, unleashed the three armed services; thus, intelligence and counter-insurgency units unleashed a war on the clandestine revolutionary movements, such as the Montoneros, which had been terrorizing the country with kidnappings and bombings for over three years

(Wynia 1990). In over 280 clandestine prisons, the military tortured and killed over 10,000 people out of a population of 27 million between 1976-1978 without any record of their deaths (Viola and Mainwaring 1985). (See **Table II-D.**) Moreover, the military did not kidnap or kill persons from a specific group, but across the class spectrum. Therefore, the entire Argentine population, not just a particular group or area, were victims of the cruel and inhumane practices of the authoritarian government. In protest, representing all different classes and backgrounds, the Mothers of la Plaza de Mayo marched in the central plaza of Buenos Aires in order to make public the military government's action (Munck 1992).

Argentina: Time Period D

Despite the military's attempts to pass and legitimize an Amnesty law, they were never successful. Moreover, from the beginning of Alfonsin's administration, he clearly made it a point to protect civil liberties and human rights. However, he moved slowly because he feared that an immediate attack on the military may cause them to attempt to regain power. He initially asked the military to form a council of 20 retired officers to investigate and to court martial human rights offenders during the authoritarian regime, but they objected, defending the actions of the military as acts against terrorism. Therefore, Alfonsin began civil prosecutions of members of the juntas that had governed between 1976-1983 (Wynia 1985).

Alfonsin also appointed a 12-member commission, the National Commission on Disappeared. The 50,000 page report documented the disappearance of 8,800 people, many of whom had been tortured in one of the secret prisons by over 1,200 police and military personnel who had participated directly in the repression (Wynia 1985).

When these findings became official, many of the authoritarian official were not only tried, but also convicted of several offenses. For example, nine of the commanders-in-chief of the three service branches during 1976-1982 were accused of murder, illegal detention, torture, robbery, kidnapping, rape, perjury, and preparation of false documentation for surviving children (Ranis 1986). Five of them were convicted of various crimes, including General Jorge Videla (1976-1981), who was sentenced to life imprisonment (Wynia 1990).

A right-wing backlash to the trials and convictions of former leaders and military soldiers followed these decisions. A 60 day state of siege on October 25, 1985 was imposed due to right-wing violence as part of a campaign demanding amnesty for the junta chiefs on trial (Ranis 1986). Also, during Easter week in 1987, a few officers staged a mini-revolt to illustrate their lack of acceptance for the prosecution of lower ranked officers. Therefore, in order to compromise and to find an end to the eternal problem of justice for previous human rights violations, Alfonsin limited all future trials to officers who were at

the rank of colonel and above when the crimes were committed (Wynia 1990).

Brazil: Time Period A

Until 1974, the military government in Brazil was extremely violent and repressive. During the first week after the coup, over 7,000 people were arrested (House Foreign Affairs Hearings, October 5, 1973, p. 897). Castelo Branco declared the National Security Act on March 14, 1967. This act established strict press laws which forbade all negative press against the military government. During Costa e Silva's government when opposition protests grew, violent repression was enforced. On December 13, 1968, Costa e Silva signed Institutional Act No. 5 which placed virtually all power in the hands of the military. Therefore, congress was suspended and many Brazilian who were considered subversive were arrested. From December 1968 to October 1969, an estimated 521 people lost their political rights.

On October 7, 1969, General Emilio Garrastazu Medici became Brazil's next president after the incapacitation of Costa e Silva. On December 11, 1971, Medici signed a new law on Human Rights which provided for the secrecy of all meetings and decisions of the council for the Defense of the Rights of Man.

The Central Commission of the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil in September 1969, voiced concerns over jailings and prison tortures. Several incidents between church official and the government erupted tensions and protest. Moreover, a report released in September 1972 by Amnesty International stated that over 1,000 Brazilians were tortured over the previous three year period.

Brazil: Time Period D

However, the violation of human rights in Brazil did less to delegitimize the military regime than in Argentina. This was true for two reasons. One, the political crimes of the Brazilian military affected relatively small sectors in the middle class and the intellectual dissidents who were less visible. Secondly, the extended length of the Brazilian transition, also diminished the salience of previous human rights issues. Therefore, the Brazilian people, as a whole, were more adversely affected in their political rights than their human rights (Stepan 1989).

Moreover, Tancredo Neves in order to gain support from powerful military leaders met with the army minister and reassured him that there would not be an Argentine-style retribution (revanchismo) against the generals. He even asked the minister to join his cabinet, if he won the election (Pang and Jarnagin 1985). In response, the Minister of the Army answered that the military intended to firmly support the abertura policy of President Figueiredo, which was further consolidated with the election of the

future president of the Republic. Therefore, the military and the opposition candidate had struck a deal, opening the door for civilian rule while closing the door for retaliation against previous human rights violations.

Peru: Time Period A

"Respect for individual human rights has been increasingly emphasized in Peru in recent years" (Senate and House Joint Committee Print, February 8, 1979, p. 324). Moreover, the Peruvian authoritarian government was not repressive in comparison to either Argentina or Brazil as there were no patterns of torture or disappearances, but numerous political leaders and intellectuals were deported (McClintock 1989).

Peru: Time Period D

Actually, human rights violations severely worsened under democracy, as the Belaunde government implemented a militant counterinsurgency campaigning against guerrilla movements such as the Sendero Luminoso. In fact, some analysts did not classify Peru as a democracy because of its egregious human rights violations during the Belaunde government (McClintock 1989). Therefore, not only was there no need for retaliation against the former military government for human rights violations, but the new democratic government practiced more authoritative practices than the authoritarian government had.

Change in Military Expenditure (See **Table II-F.**)

Argentina

During Time Period A, Argentina spent an average of 4.21% on its military. A large increase in the percentage occurred just before and during the Malvinas/Falklands war. During Time Period D a decrease in this percentage to 3.67% resulted in a total average decrease of 0.54.

Brazil

During Brazil's authoritarian government an average 1.19% of the GNP was spent on the military. When the new democracy takes over, only a 0.05 decrease is seen.

Peru

Peru's case proves a true anomaly as the military government spent 5.43% of its GNP on the military, even less than the democratic government spent during Time Period D. Therefore, a negative change is seen in Peru's case where more money is spent on the military when the Belaunde government begins its counterinsurgency program.

Summary: In which country did the most Definite Break of Legitimacy occur?

Only in Argentina is there both a relatively large decrease in military expenditure and formal action taken against the violent crimes of the military. Moreover, many Argentines believed that the military government was responsible for the unstable economy and the excessive violence in the war against terrorism and national

insurgency (Ranis 1986). Therefore, a definite break of legitimacy is seen in Argentina. In Brazil, despite the fact that the human rights violations during Brazil's authoritarian government were not as pervasive as those in Argentina, no action was taken to prosecute human rights offenders. In addition, only a small decrease in military expenditure is seen. As a result, no definite break of legitimacy was seen in Brazil. However, in Peru, negative change takes place as human rights violations and the amount of government expenditure on the military are greater under democracy than under authoritarianism. Therefore, the rank order for a Definite Break of Legitimacy places Argentina first, Brazil second, and Peru third.

CONCLUSION: Did Real Change Occur?

The rankings for Elite Settlement resulted in Brazil's taking first place, Peru second, and Argentina third. Moreover, mass mobilization, shows clearly that Argentina experienced the greatest real change. It also ranked Peru in second and Brazil in third place. A definite break of legitimacy also resulted in Argentina's taking first place. Due to the powerful hand of the military and the very long transition in Brazil, a definite break of legitimacy between the military and the democratic government was never seen. Instead, a very gradual, controlled change finally resulted in a democratic form of government. Finally, Peru is the anomaly in this case. However, the authoritarian government

was also an anomaly as it did not try to maintain the status quo, as the militaries in Argentina and Brazil; but instead, the Peruvian military attempted reform and change. Granted that a definite break of legitimacy was seen between Time Period A and D in Peru, the change was negative. Negative change signifies that the so-called democratic government implemented more authoritarian practices than the military.

In conclusion, Argentina experienced the most real change. Brazil experienced a slow, gradual change, that only recently may be seen as a democracy free of the military's hand. Lastly, Peru's case is a case of negative real change such that the authoritarian and democratic government did not act in the pre-defined authoritarian or democratic way. Therefore, we can conclude, that Argentina has the greatest likelihood, Brazil has the second highest likelihood, and Peru the least likelihood of consolidating a real democracy. Chapter 3 will analyze the established democracy in each case to test whether each is a real democracy or not.

Table II-A: Time Periods A, T, and D

	Time Period A	Time Period T	Time Period D
Argentina	March 1976	February 1982	October 1982
Brazil	April 1964	January 1985	December 1989
Peru	October 1968	May 1980	April 1985

Table II-B: Length of the Transition

	Dates	Total Months
Argentina	February 1983--December 1983	10
Brazil	July 1983--July 1985	24
Peru	July 1978--May 1990	22

Table II-C: Percentage of Voter Turnout During Time Period A and Time Period D

	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
Time Period A	0% (1973-1983)	77% (1966 L)	0% (1963-1978)
		81% (1974 L)	84% (1978 L)
		82% (1978 L)	
		83% (1982 L)	
Time Period D	85.9% (1983 P)	0% (1985 P)	71% (1980 P)
	84% (1985 L)	85% (1986 L)	
	86% (1987 L)		
Time Period S	* (1989 P)	97% (1989 P)	91% (1985 P)

L = Legislative Election **P** = Presidential Election

Sources: Democratizing Brazil by Alfred Stepan. Enrique C. Ochoa's article, The Rapid Expansion of Voter Participation in Latin America, in Statistical Abstract for Latin America. Facts on File. Cynthia McClintock's article, "Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic: in Democracy in Developing Countries by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Table II-D: Extent of Human Rights Violations During Time Period A

Country	Years	Average Population	Disappearances	Deaths
Argentina	1976-1978	26.91 million	8,000	9,000-30,000 (estimated)
Brazil	1969-1973	95.10 million	--	1,000 (estimated)
Peru	1968-1980	14.91 million	none (several deported)	none

Table II-E: Change In Government Expenditure on the Military From Time Period A to Time Period D

Year	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
1976	2.4 (A)	1.3 (A)	5.0 (A)
1977	2.4	1.1	7.3
1978	2.7	0.9	5.5
1979	2.5	0.8	3.9
1980	6.4	1.3	5.3
1981	7.1	1.3	6.0
1982	6.0	1.6	8.5
1983	4.6 (D)	1.2	8.1
1984	4.5	1.2	5.6
1984	3.5	1.1 (D)	6.4
1986	3.7	1.2	6.6
1987	3.4	1.1	5.0
1988	3.0	1.1	2.5
1989	3.0	1.2	3.0

*all data including and after 1980 are taken from 1991 edition of SIPRI whereas all data before 1980 are taken from 1986 SIPRI

(A) Time Period A **(D)** Time Period D begins

Source: SIPRI 1986,1991. New York: Oxford University Press.

Table II-F: Average Change in Military Expenditure

	Average Expenditure on the Military During		Average Change in Expenditure on the Military
	Time Period A	Time Period D	D - A
Argentina	4.21	3.67	0.54
Brazil	1.19	1.14	0.05
Peru	5.43	5.7	-0.27

Table II-G: Rank Order of Each Country for Each Measure

MEASURE	RANKED POSITION		
	1	2	3
ELITE SETTLEMENT			
Speed of the Transition:	Argentina	Peru	Brazil
Participation of Old Leaders:	Brazil	Peru	Argentina
Inclusion of Parties:	Peru	Brazil	Argentina
MASS MOBILIZATION			
Voter Turnout:	Argentina	Peru	Brazil
DEFINITE BREAK OF LEGITIMACY			
Human Rights Violations:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
Change in Government Expenditure:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru

CHAPTER 3: The Emergence of Real Democracy

Introduction: In which countries is the emergence of real democracy most evident?

In this chapter, the measures of real democracy, the dependent variable, are evaluated. Real democracy is measured at the same three levels as real change: the elites, the masses, and the institutions. The three measures of real democracy are a **degree of uncertainty**, **guaranteed freedoms**, and the **institutionalization of crisis management**. Moreover, data for each measure are recorded for Time Period S, the term of the second democratic government after authoritarianism. (See **Table III-A.**) After each measure is explained and analyzed for each country, a relative rank order of each measure is determined to compare the amount of real change per measure in each country. Finally, the conclusion gives an overall rank order of the degree of real democracy in each country.

DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY-- Why is the degree of uncertainty important to real democracy?

One measure of a real democracy is a political system based on fairness and equality such that no single party or group controls the rules of the system during elections or the passing of legislation. In a real democratic political system, the rules of the game are decided and agreed upon so that all political actors in the established institutional

framework know what is possible, what may be likely, and how to win or lose, but they do not know beforehand which particular outcome will result (Przeworski 1991). Therefore, if the elites agree on a settlement of the rules of the game, then it follows that a degree of uncertainty in the system will follow because no one group will control all of the power, but in fact power will be shared.

In order to measure this concept of uncertainty, Van Hanen's Index of Competition is used to specifically measure the degree of uncertainty among different political parties in each case of study (Van Hanen 1992). In order to calculate this index, the percentage of votes for the second place party is subtracted from the winning party in the presidential election initiating Time Period S, the second, democratic presidential term. (See **Table III-B.**) The lower the number, the greater the competition between parties, and the greater the likelihood that a fair and equal political system is established.

Secondly, in order to measure the degree of uncertainty throughout the political system, Gastil's "Checklist for Political Rights" will also be used as an index of the degree of uncertainty (See **Table III-C.**) This checklist assigns an overall rating to each country after considering such questions as "Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation", "Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power", and "Multiple political parties" (Gastil 1989, p.9). The lower the

average, the greater likelihood that political rights are being protected in the political system.

Van Hanen's Index of Competition (See **Table III-B.**)

Argentina

The winning party in the 1989 presidential elections was Frejupo, the formal name for the Peronists and their allies. Carlos Saul Menem won the election with 47.36% of the vote. Meanwhile, Eduardo Cesar Angeloz of the UCR party won 32.48% to put him and his party in second place. Therefore, after subtracting the lower percentage from the higher, the Index of Competition in Argentina is 14.88.

Brazil

Fernando Collor de Mello of the National Reconstruction Party (PRN) won the presidential election in 1989 with 53.03% of the votes. In second place fell Luiz Inacio de Silva of the socialist Worker's Party (PT) with 46.97%. Therefore, the difference between these two percentages leads to an Index of Competition of 6.06.

Peru

Because Peru held its first presidential election in 1980, enough time has passed since then to allow two more presidential elections. Therefore, two Indices of Competition will be calculated and averaged for Peru. First of all, in 1985, Alan Garcia Perez of APRA won the election with 45.74% while Dr. Alfonso Barrantes Lingan of the left wing United Left (IU, Izquierda Unida) fell second with only

21.3% of the vote. The Index of Competition for 1985 is thus 24.44.

In 1990, the Index decreased only slightly as Alberto Keinya Fujimori of Cambio '90 won the presidency with 56.53% of the vote. Mario Vargas Llosa of the Democratic Front (Fredemo) won 33.92%. Therefore, the Index of Competition for Peru in 1990 is 22.61. The average Index of Competition for Peru is 28.27.

Ranking of Political Rights (See Table III-C.)

Including its last four years of democracy (Time Period S), Argentina's average for Political Rights is 1.5. Brazil, using the last four years as Time Period S, has an average of 1.0 for its Political Rights. Lastly, Peru receives a 2.75 after considering the last 8 years of Time Period S.

Summary: How do the countries rank overall in the degree of uncertainty?

Because Brazil's Index of Competition and its Average Ranking of Political Rights are the lowest of the three countries, it is ranked first in the Degree of Uncertainty. Secondly, because Argentina's Index of Competition and its Average Ranking of Political Rights fall second, it is the second highest ranked country. Finally, Peru's Index of Competition and Average of Political Rights are the worst of the three countries; therefore, it is ranked in third place.

GUARANTEED FREEDOMS-- Why are guaranteed freedoms important to real change?

In a real democracy, the masses have rights and guaranteed freedoms that they often demand through mobilization. Therefore, if real change, the independent variable, occurred, then it follows that the masses will demand guaranteed freedoms in the new democracy.

Gastil (1989, p.17) provides a second overall rating entitled "Checklist for Civil Rights". By comparing the overall rating given to each case study--Argentina, Brazil, and Peru--the level of freedoms allowed to the masses in each country can be determined. Therefore, an average of the annual ratings according to Gastil is calculated for each country so that a comparison of the three may be derived.

Ranking of Guaranteed Freedoms (See Table III-D.)

The Average Ranking of Civil Rights in Argentina during Time Period S (the last four years) is 2.5. In Brazil during Time Period S, the Average Ranking of Civil Rights is 3. In Peru, the Average Ranking of Civil Rights is also 3 over the last eight years.

Summary: How do the countries rank overall in guaranteed freedoms?

Argentina with an Average Ranking of 2.5 is the first country in Guaranteed Freedoms. However, Brazil and Peru have equal averages at 3. Because Peru has greatly

suppressed its guaranteed freedoms in the last two years, it will fall behind Brazil. Therefore, the rank order for the countries according to Guaranteed Freedoms, is Argentina, Brazil, and Peru.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The last measure of real democracy is the institutionalization of crisis management. This measure evaluates evidence of a commitment to the new rules of the democracy and a rejection of the old authoritarian rules by analyzing various crises that the new democracy must face. For each country, three crises will be analyzed and evaluated in terms of a numerical ranking. (See **Table III-E.**)

As explained in Chapter 1, the contrast between a democratic and an authoritarian government involves the extent to which other political players besides those in power are allowed to participate in the game. More specifically, authoritarian governments exclude the opposition and mandate new policies, whereas democratic governments negotiate with and include the opposition in a forum for legislating new policies. Therefore, the numerical ranking for this measure is designed to illustrate various degrees of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, depending on the perspective. After evaluating all crises, an overall ranking of the three countries will be given in the summary.

To insure a relative base from which to compare crises among the three case studies, three basic categories of crises have been defined. For each country, an economic crisis, a corruption crisis, and a domestic uprising crisis were chosen on the basis of their threat to the current democracy. (Due to the overwhelming influence of the guerrilla insurgency in Peru, the guerrilla crisis, instead of a corruption crisis, is used for Peru.) Moreover, the following analysis of each crisis is divided into sections of Background, Management, and Adherence to Democratic Procedure to present the crises in a clear and concise manner. The Background section includes 1) the history of the crisis, 2) the nature of the crisis at the time of analysis, and 3) an interpretation of any necessary action to be done. The Management section includes 4) the government's identification of the causes of the crisis and 5) the government's action and policy on the crisis. Finally, the Adherence to Democratic Procedures in the context of each crisis is analyzed and a ranking of 1 through 4 is assigned.

Argentina

Economic Crisis

Background

1. What is the history of the economic crisis?

Beginning with the first presidency of Peron, the Argentine government has subsidized almost everything in the public and private sectors (Christian 1989c). The first

Peronist government also established a precedent for satisfying labor demands by insisting that business pay increasingly higher wages. As a result, the government was forced to pacify industry by allowing overcharges on public works contracts and enforcing policies to protect domestic industry (Passell 1989b).

However, the squandering activities of the Argentine government reached an impasse as the central bank neared bankruptcy. Moreover, inflation persisted despite attempts by President Alfonsin (1983-1989) of the Radical Civil Union to stabilize Argentina's economy through his Austral Plan which promised to raise taxes, to curtail subsidies, to avoid financing budget deficits by simply printing more money, and to implement a temporary freeze on wages, prices and exchange rates (Passell 1989a).

Initially, the shock treatment on prices decreased inflation, but President Alfonsin failed to curb wage increases for public employees or to sell inefficient state enterprises. Thus, in May 1989, the inflation rate approached 38%, which is the psychological inflation barrier that provided the Argentine military a major impetus to overthrow the last Peronist president, Isabel Peron, in March 1976 (Brooke 1989a). As inflation increased uncontrollably in June 1989, the worst riots in over a decade over food prices erupted. Thus, President Alfonsin decided to step down five months early and to allow

President Carlos Menem to take power (Brook 1989a; Passell 1989a).

However, the past record of Mr. Menem, a Peronist, revealed that as governor of the poor province of La Rioja he did not implement capitalist, free-market policies; but instead, he increased public sector employment from 11,874 to 26,000 during his term (Brooke 1989a). Therefore, with failed policies from the past and an overbearing reliance on the public sector, the economic situation in Argentina appeared quite gloomy as Mr. Menem took power.

2. What was the crisis like under President Menem?

In July of 1989, Carlos Saul Menem began his term as the president of Argentina. Salaries had lost 40%-60% of their purchasing power in May 1989 and the budget deficit had swollen to equal about 15 percent of the gross national product (Brooke 1989a). Moreover, many Argentines sought citizenship in the Old World (mainly Spain and Italy) to find a stable economy and a land of opportunity (Brooke 1989b).

3. What did President Menem need to do?

Because traditional Peronist economic policy has included generous social programs, fixed exchange rates and subsidies to expand industrial and agricultural exports, President Menem will have to break with the traditional party platform. His biggest challenge is to control his

special constituency, the trade unions, in order to avoid massive wage hikes which have destabilized every economic program over the past 45 years (Brooke 1989a). Secondly, President Menem had to muster support for new programs or legislation as his party, the Peronists, did not have a majority in Congress until December when the newly-elected Congressmen took over (Brooke 1989d). In summary, political and social costs are inherent in the reforms President Menem must implement. However, because the expectations of the middle class are relatively low, it will be easier to satisfy them and to call for sacrifices in terms of a better future (Passell 1989b).

Management of the Crisis

4. What did President Menem identify as the crux of the crisis?

Some private economists have identified the public sector deficit as the root cause of Argentina's chronic high inflation. To this effect, Mr. Menem planned to send Congress legislation to allow the executive branch to privatize state-owned companies, simplify the tax system, and give the central bank greater independence to set monetary policy (Argentine Business 1989). President Menem also planned to devalue the currency, the austral, and privatize the 13 biggest state-owned businesses which lost $2.5 billion in 1988 (Passell 1989a).

5. What did President Menem do about the crisis?

When President Menem took office on July 8, 1989, in the midst of Argentina's worst economic crisis, he promised tough economic reforms that would run counter to the Peronist political movement's tradition of populism, state beneficence and economic nationalism. The essence of his first anti-inflation plan relied on industrial production for internal consumption to revive the economy, rather than diversification and expansion of exports (Christian 1989b).

Therefore, he began by making several surprising appointments which resulted in a more business-like approach than the traditional Peronist hostility to capitalists (Brooke 1989d). In a pact with several business executives, President Menem froze prices for 90 days, resulting in dissension within the new government (Argentine Leader 1989). Simultaneously, all workers were given a one-time payment to help ease the pain of inflation (Christian 1989a). Congress also adopted legislation under which the government would sell all or parts of the national telephone company, oil company, and railroad stock (Christian 1989d). Simultaneously, the government surprisingly turned to outside advisers from the IMF to help it draft a new tax law.

Good news came in August 1989 when the inflation rate dropped to 37.9 percent (Christian 1989d). However, the government set a guideline of 15 percent for wage increases for the period from October through the end of the year,

thus provoking labor leaders who had already begun demanding new wage increases. By November 1989, President Menem found himself entangled in a growing dispute with organized labor, the traditional backbone of the Peronist party (Christian 1989e). In order to avoid greater conflict, the Argentine Government called for the cooperation of business, labor and the political leaders in a social pact to help the country conquer the economic crisis (Argentine Leader 1989).

With inflation persisting through the turn of the New Year, Argentina witnessed new military restiveness, conflict within the ruling Justicialist party, and the splitting of the General Labor Confederation into two groups (Christian 1989f). Therefore, President Menem replaced most of his economic advisers and ended the pact with leading business leaders as they disputed over how to collect taxes and whether or not to free the exchange rate and lower tariffs (Christian 1989f). A new anti-inflation program was instituted which attempted to force down the prices of goods and the dollar by limiting the amount of australs in circulation and a promise not to print any more australs until hard currency reserves rose (Christian 1990b). Unfortunately, inflation continued to soar, provoking criticism of the latest stabilization plan.

In December 1989, for the first time since giving up power in 1983, the commanders of all three military branches warned separately that the economic crisis put democracy at risk, but that they continued to support the civilian

Government (Christian 1990a). Moreover, the Argentine people were mostly concerned about stabilizing the economy, not overthrowing the government. In essence, Argentina was beginning to see institutions function regardless of the person in the position. By March 1991, the economy was stable with inflation running at about 2 percent a month.

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

The ability of President Menem to manage Argentina's economic crisis reflects his willingness to include several disparate sectors in society and to act flexibly, not according to strict party lines. Moreover, Mr. Menem did not allow one group, such as labor, to be so powerful as to make him a puppet; instead, he took a stand in an attempt to aid the economic crisis. However, his stand was not isolationist or dictatorial, but rather, inclusive of business, labor, foreign agencies, and various socio-economic sectors in Argentine society. He permitted protests, marches, and strikes as a means of expressing conflict rather than military action and escalating violence, as is often the case under authoritarianism. Therefore, Mr. Menem's management of the economic crisis receives a 2 because an inclusive, but informal, democratic approach was applied.

Yomagate

Background

1. What is the history of the corruption crisis?

Corruption, particularly involving payoffs and kickbacks between government officials and private companies, is a long-standing problem in Argentina. In short," Yomagate" was a scandal involving President Menem's in-laws (the Yoma family) and some of his closest advisers (Nash 1991a). Yomagate began in November when a native Panamanian was caught in a huge drug raid in Spain's International Airport. The incarcerated man told the Spanish police that some of the highest aides to Mr. Menem were involved in a drug and money laundering scheme (Nash 1991a). A few weeks passed with little proof, until a 28-year-old Lebanese, Khalil Hussein Dib, who used to chauffeur Miss Amira Yoma, the President's sister-in-law and secretary, began telling of Miss Yoma's involvement in the scandal as well (Christian 1990c).

2. What was the crisis like under President Menem?

Several of Menem's in-laws and former political aides have been indicted in the case. Charges were brought against Amira Yoma; her ex-husband, Ibrahim al-Ibrahim; and Mario Caserta, head of Argentina's Water Commission. There was little to link Mr. Menem with the scandal, other than the fact that the suspected offenders were his in-laws, but it was a huge political embarrassment, especially as he

tried to stabilize the economy and to find international support (Nash 1991a). As well, Yomagate fostered public sentiment of mistrust and doubt in the moral and ethical standards of the nation's civilian leaders. Lastly, Yomagate could have been especially harmful to the President's support for economic reform as Argentines suffered many hardships in light of soaring inflation and strict stabilization programs.

The scandal also involved the weakness of Argentina's court system and the degree of real press freedom and public accountability in Argentina's relatively new democracy (Nash 1991a). Problems with the court system included the facts that there were no oral trials, but only written documents and long procedures, so that judges were greatly overburdened by investigations and prosecutions (Nash 1991b). Lawyers also stated that the Argentine judiciary was politically vulnerable, particularly given the popularity and dominance of President Menem and his Peronists. Therefore, the scandal became a tangle of charges, counter charges and unsubstantiated accusations.

However, Yomagate also marked an opportunity to exorcize a history of corruption, payoffs, and kickbacks, especially in light of the public's increased knowledge of Yomagate relative to previous scandals (Nash 1991a). Moreover, public opinion claimed that the economy and Mr. Menem's significant achievements in stabilizing inflation were the most important concerns (Nash 1991a).

3. What did President Menem need to do?

Mr. Menem was not formally accused or charged of corruption, but it was vital that he emerge as the hero, the one who purged corruption from government. Many say the scandal did not hurt Mr. Menem's rating, but if he were charged or labeled guilty by the public, then public support for his economic achievements would have dwindled.

Therefore, it was very important for Mr. Menem to deal with the accused violators in a fair, just, and effective manner, despite the fact that they were his in-laws. Purging the government of all corruption and corrupters would be the most effective stance in order to show that corruption would no longer be tolerated in Argentina.

Management of the Crisis

4. What did President Menem identify as the crux of the crisis?

It does not seem that President Menem did much to identify the crux of the problem, as the accused had already been discovered. However, he did use the corruption crisis as an opportunity to show his support of a government free of corruption. As a result, Mr. Menem allowed the democratic processes to take control and to oust the offenders. By putting his faith in Argentina's democracy, President Menem could strengthen his own power and

popularity, as well as the establishment of a real democracy.

5. What did President Menem do about the crisis?

Initially, Mr. Menem defended those accused, most of whom were his in-laws and/or high governmental officials. After a substantial amount of evidence was gathered against the accused, he quickly cut off his support and asked for them to resign his Government. In effect, he punished the offenders and maintained public support for his government.

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

Despite the languishing of over a dozen cases in the Argentine court system, at least democracy was given a chance to successfully eliminate corruption in the government. Mr. Menem's handling of Yomagate followed every formal democratic procedure. He in no way interfered in defense of the accused, but instead allowed the judicial system to handle the cases. Therefore, this example of crisis management deserves a 1.

Attempted Military Coup

Background

1). What is the history of the military crisis?

Former President Raul Alfonsin, the first president of Argentina after the military's authoritarian government, found himself between, on one side, human rights advocates

who wanted the former military leaders tried and convicted for previous offenses and, on the other side, the military, which of course opposed the trials. Mr. Alfonsin, in order to establish some sort of reconciliation with Argentina's brutal "Dirty War", decided that trials should be held, and thus, allowed the conviction and imprisonment of many military officers.

In October 1989, only a few months after President Menem began his term, he attempted to end divisions in Argentine society over the previous military government by issuing 277 pardons (200 Military 1989). Although Mr. Menem did not pardon every officer convicted during Alfonsin's administration, his pardons did include Leopoldo Galtieri, a former President and army commander, 39 officers charged with human rights abuses and 164 officers accused in connection with three rebellions, of which army Colonel Ali Seineldin, who was also pardoned, led against the Alfonsin government (Christian 1989c). Furthermore, two former guerrilla leaders, both members of the Montoneros guerrilla organization returned to Argentina after Menem's pardons were issued.

2) What was the crisis like under President Menem?

On the morning of December 3, 1990, Menem faced his first military rebellion as soldiers who were known as the "carapintadas", or painted faces, and who were loyal to Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin, who had been pardoned by

President Menem in October 1989, masterminded an attempt to take control of the Argentine army (200 Military 1989). The rebels took over army headquarters in Buenos Aires and four other installations and demanded the replacement of the current army chief of staff. In all, twenty-one people were killed and 200 wounded in the uprising. A spokesman for the rebels claimed the rebellion was not to overthrow the Government, but to force changes in the army command and to win better treatment for the military (Christian 1990e). Unlike the three rebellions that President Alfonsin faced, this one was bloody and quickly ended by loyalist army troops (Christian 1990e).

3) What did President Menem need to do?

If the military threat was not resolved, then the chances of more violence were substantially increased. Therefore, it was vital that Mr. Menem establish, not only that the democratic system be used to voice complaints and to make demands on government for change, but also that violent rebellions were no longer the method of change in Argentina.

<u>Management of the Crisis</u>

4) What did President Menem identify as the crux of the crisis?

Despite the fact that President Menem was attempting to mend divisions in Argentine society when he pardoned nearly

300 officers, it seems that he was also creating a potentially very dangerous situation for himself. The timing of the insurgency was especially stressful for President Menem as he had been awaiting the visit of President Bush, who was expected to visit Argentina just a few days after the rebellion took place (Christian 1990e). Moreover, trying to enhance Argentine development and economic stability, Argentina's Economy Minister feared that many businesses would reconsider locating in Argentina (Christian 1990e).

5) What did President Menem do?

The army said the rebels took over five different sites in a coordinated action beginning at 3:30 am. President Menem arrived at the presidential palace from his suburban residence by helicopter at 5am, and signed a martial law decree by 7am. Otherwise, he treated the event like an internal army problem, leaving all plans to the Army Chief of Staff, General Martin Bonnet to issue the ultimatums and communiqué (Christian 1990e). Many worried that the rebellion was a regression for the struggling Argentine nation, but President Menem stated that they would emerge ahead as they fought with strong determination to end the rebellion (Christian 1990f). Two days later, Menem lifted the state of siege and welcomed visiting President George Bush. Although the return to normalcy was quick, strong

tensions still remained between the military and the government (Wynia 1991).

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

Despite President Menem's attempt to heal divisions in Argentina, he set up a potentially threatening situation for himself and his government by pardoning so many military officers, especially, General Seineldin. Nevertheless, President Menem's attempts to heal Argentine society of its painful past and his decision to place loyal military officials in charge of this crisis exhibit a willingness to share power and control. His immediate, inclusive action in this crisis exemplifies his ability to delegate power to other sectors of Argentine society and thus to operate within democratic means. Therefore, management of the coup earns a ranking of 2.

Brazil

Economic Crisis

Background

1. What is the history of the economic crisis?

In 1985, Brazil had a "historical memory" of 10 years of annual inflation greater than 100 percent. The cause of Brazil's rampant inflation appeared to be a combination of factors, such as habitual monthly increases in prices and wages, the central bank's inability to gain control over the monetary system, and tax evasion. Moreover, Brazil's 1988

Constitution initiated a mandatory federal revenue-sharing system with the states, but the states refused to assume the federal role in education, public transportation and health care, while adding 800,000 people to their payroll between 1982 and 1988. To avoid failures of insolvent state banks, state governors then put pressure on the federal Government to cover the losses (Brooke 1990g).

In March of 1990, President Collor proposed an economic package to help stabilize Brazil's economy. The anti-inflation program froze prices for 30 days, froze most bank deposits for 18 months, and created a new currency, the cruzeiro (Brooke 1990c). One of the measures of the economic package was a freeze on savings accounts greater than $1,200 (which included only about 10% of Brazil's population) as a way to achieve a moratorium on Brazil's internal debt (Brook 1990b). With the freeze, Mr. Collor blocked about $85 billion or 25 percent of Brazil's GDP (Brooke 1990b).

2. What was the crisis like under President Collor?

As a result of President Collor's economic plan, the extreme scarcity of Brazil's currency, the cruzeiro, caused prices to fall in some cases below the controlled levels. Three days after the implementation of the plan, exchange rates drastically fell, so that prices rose only 7.87% in May (Brazil Court 1990). However, these tough measures resulted in a political backlash. Civil service unions vowed to fight the privatization of Brazil's 188 state companies

(Brooke 1990a). Brazil's most powerful socialist party, the Workers Party, issued a "General Alert to the Nation" saying that the government may become authoritarian and totalitarian. (Brooke 1990c). Many Brazilian lawyers also charged that civil liberties were violated by Collor's anti-inflation plan as judges began freeing business executives (Brooke 1990c). Moreover, the Supreme Court trimmed the powers of the presidency by restricting President Collor's ability to control wage increases. The Minister of Economics, Zelia Cardoso de Mello, claimed she would undertake intensive discussions with politicians, businessmen, and labor officials to try to persuade them of a need to control wage increases, but that she would implement stiff measures inducing a recession if they did not cooperate (Brazil Court 1990).

3. What did President Collor need to do?

A recession seemed inevitable with President Collor's plan; however, its severity and length depended on government action. Signs of an impending recession were everywhere as the automobile, capital goods, construction and machine tools industries were virtually paralyzed. Labor unions claimed that almost a million workers either lost their jobs, received a cut in pay, or were placed on a collective holiday (Brazil Congress 1990). Therefore, Mr. Collor had to find some way to jump-start the economy as well as to earn the support, and not further alienate, the

various sectors of society, such as business and labor, who were being negatively affected by his economic plan.

Management of the Crisis

4. What did President Collor identify as the crux of the crisis?

Government officials stated that the recession was difficult, but a necessary step to gain control of inflation. However, business leaders claimed that President Collor's plan was designed and applied in authoritarian isolation without including or consulting them (Brooke 1990g). It seems that President Collor solely focused on inflation without considering the political ramifications and potential economic hardships spurred by such a draconian anti-inflation plan.

5. What did President Collor do?

Finally developing a little sensitivity to his duty as a statesman, Mr. Collor withdrew two decrees that caused great controversy, including one that provided for jail without bail for economic crimes (Brooke 1990c). In an effort to combat inflation by using competition to make goods less expensive and to end some monopolies in Brazilian industry, Brazil's Government decided to open the nation's economy by phasing out tariffs as high as 105% (Brooke 1990d). Mr. Collor also decisively cut military expenditures (from 6 percent to 2.2 percent of the budget)

for the first time since the military took power in 1964 (Brooke 1990e). Moreover, the President refused to raise salaries for the military despite Brazil's three military ministers discussing demands with Minister of Economics (Brooke 1990e). As a result, the sharpest recession in a decade stifled Brazil's gross national product in 1990 by 4.3 percent (Brooke 1991a). Foreign investment in Brazil also decreased from a high of $1.9 billion in 1981 to $400 million in 1990 (Brooke 1991a).

With persistent inflation even in February 1991, the Government was still struggling to find stability (Brooke 1991a). The Government announced sharp increases in public utility charges and the abolition of a series of instruments that Brazilian have long used to keep pace with inflation, including daily interest-bearing savings accounts know as "overnight" accounts (Brooke 1991a). Finally, President Collor made some attempt to include disgruntled groups in his policy decisions as he met with two socialist Governors-elect who had spoken out against his policies (Brooke 1991a). Nevertheless, despite a Federal wage and price freeze over the weekend, many businesses ignored it and inflation began increasing again (Brazil Resisting 1991).

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

President Collor's approach to the economic crisis did not include any attempt to empathize or ease the hardship

that other groups in Brazil, such as labor, the military, and opposition groups, had to endure. Therefore, in effect, he isolated himself by not including these groups in negotiations until support for his reform policies had dwindled. Consequently, the management of this crisis earns a 3.

Corruption Allegations Against President Collor de Mello

Background

1) What is the history of the corruption crisis?

Brazil's President officially earns about $32,000 a year; nevertheless, corruption runs rampant. Three years ago, Fernando Collor de Mello rose from one of Brazil's smallest and poorest states, to the presidency on one issue: an unfailing commitment to root out corruption (Brooke 1992g). Despite this commitment, Mr. Collor, after two-and-a-half years in office, was accused of money laundering and corruption. Over the last forty years, Brazilian Presidents have been removed from office by suicide, by resignation, by military coup, and by a stroke, but impeachment had never been tried until the corruption allegations against President Collor (Brooke 1992e).

2) What was the crisis like under President Collor?

In May of 1992, a special commission of inquiry was formed to analyze allegations of corruption made by Pedro Collor de Mello against his elder brother, President

Fernando Collor de Mello and Paulo Cesar Farias, the President's campaign treasurer. According to congressional testimony and press revelations, Mr. Collor's former campaign manager extorted millions of dollars, over $23 million, in bribes and fixed bidding practices to pay the President's household bills and to buy a partnership in an airline and a national television network (Brook 1992c).

Part of the money was reportedly used to finance the President's extravagant personal life: credit card charges for his wife, a beach-front apartment for a girlfriend, and a staff of domestic servants for his private estate (Brooke 1992b). Rosane Collor, the President's wife, was indicted on charges of embezzling $500,000 from a state charity over which she presided. She apparently channeled most of the money to nonexistent projects run by family members in her rural hometown (Brooke 1992f). Also, congressional investigators charged that bank statements proved that allies of Mr. Collor avoided having their deposits frozen on March 15, 1990. Several of Collor's allies and employees removed all or most of their funds, the day before the freeze.

In reaction to the entire scandal, Brazilians protested in large, public "anti-corruption" rallies. Business leaders feared that if Mr. Collor stayed in power, economic paralysis and political turmoil would erupt. Nevertheless, Mr. Collor repeatedly vowed that he would not resign before his term ended, in March 1995. However, in August 1992, the

President found himself dangerously isolated as demonstrators demanded his resignation. Still unable to maintain the loyalty of bureaucrats, President Collor also faced the problem of losing control of Brazil's huge federal bureaucracy which was crucial to the President's plan to win congressional loyalties through political patronage (Brooke 1992j). On September 1, 1992, after Mr. Collor claimed he would not resign, two Brazilian organizations, the Brazilian Bar Association and Press Association, formally asked Brazil's Congress to impeach President Collor (Brooke 1992g).

3) What did President Collor need to do?

President Collor had to maintain the support of as many allies in Congress as possible if he were not to be impeached. Nevertheless, because the democratic system with its judicial procedures is taking over, Mr. Collor must wait to hear the Congressional verdict.

Management of the Crisis

4) What did President Collor define as the crux of the crisis?

President Collor denied his involvement in any money laundering scheme despite overwhelming evidence in support of his involvement. However, he knew that the only way to stay in office was by the support, through a vote against impeachment, in Congress. Therefore, he had to find some

method of gaining political support while simultaneously encouraging the stabilization and growth of the economy.

5) What did President Collor do?

President Collor de Mello on May 26, 1992, ordered the Ministers of Justice and Economics to open a police inquiry to reveal the full truth and examine the false allegations of any corruption on his part. From this investigation, the president faced impeachment on August 25, 1992 for his alleged involvement. In order to avoid impeachment, President Fernando Collor de Mello began a political spending campaign that bankers feared would destroy an accord on Brazil's foreign debt and increase inflation. The Minister of Economics, Marcilio Marques Moreira (who replaced Ms. Cardoso) refused to print and to spend money for the pet projects of congressmen (Brooke 1992j).

President Collor, on the defense to journalists and members of Congress began using street fighter's vocabulary and a television commentator's polished delivery in order to protect his future political life, the consolidation of democracy and the economic modernization of Brazil (Brooke 1992i). Mr. Collor also submitted a 60-page defense to Congress denying any wrongdoing and complaining of the media's perseverance to "smear the honor the President of the Republic". In one last effort to maintain economic stability, all of President Collor's cabinet ministers signed a document committing them to stay at their posts

until the political crisis was resolved (Brooke 1992e). The Presidency also issued a statement signed by the ministers of the army, navy, and air force, asserting, "The military ministers have repeatedly affirmed that they do not interfere in political affairs" (Brooke 1992f).

Finally on August 30, 1992, President Collor admitted that he made "mistakes", but he refused to resign and predicted that he would survive a congressional vote on impeachment (Brooke 1992h). In his speech, Mr. Collor derided the congressional inquiry as "political theater" used "to try to trick public opinion" (Brooke 1992h). Nevertheless, the constitutional process followed every procedure required of the Congress. First of all, an initial vote for or against impeachment had to be tallied. Secondly, because this first vote was in favor of impeaching President Collor, the chamber had to reconvene within one month to vote on whether or not to request an impeachment trial in the Senate. When the President failed to muster the support of one-third of the deputies, he was automatically suspended from his duties for 180 days. Itamar Franco, the Vice-President became acting president, and a trial began in the Senate. If the Senate did not reach a verdict within six months, the President would return to office.

At last, on September 29, 1992, Brazil's House impeached Collor in the lower house of the Brazilian congress by 441 to 38, clearing the way for a trial on the corruption charges (Brooke 1992k). Mr. Collor received the

news "with great indignation", but he planned to allow the transfer of power to the Vice President" as quickly as possible. The President also asked his ministers, who submitted their resignations, to remain in office until Mr. Franco chose a new Cabinet. The impeachment was the first time in Brazil's 103 year republican history that a President had been replaced by constitutional means other that by election.

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

The apparent commitment to democratic procedures came in a country that until 1985 was run as a military dictatorship (Brooke 1992i). The President of the Chamber of Deputies stated his satisfaction that such a deep crisis was resolved entirely with constitutional norms (Brooke 1992i). As for Mr. Collor, he is unlikely to return to public office in the decade. Therefore, due to the Brazilian Government's commitment to democratic, constitutional means of managing the corruption crisis, a ranking of 1 is assigned.

Brazilian Squatters

Background

1) What is the history of the crisis?

As the military withdrew from power in the 1980s, Brazil's landless organized and conflicts over land, especially in the fertile rolling hills of Rio Grande do

Sul, erupted. Land occupations occur almost daily in Brazil as landless peasants till vacant plots illegally. Millions of other landless Brazilians moved to the Amazon in military designed colonization schemes, immigrated to Argentina, or ended up in the slums of Brazils coastal cities (Brook 1990f).

Mr. Collor and virtually all his predecessors took office promising major land-distribution programs. Mr. Collor promised to distribute 500,000 family plots during his five-year term. But, as is often the case with land redistribution programs, his immediate predecessor, Jose Sarney promised to find plots for 1.4 million people, and settled only 115,000 (Brooke 1990f). Land distribution plans invariably fall short of their initial goals as the government lacks the money to buy the land from its owners. Moreover, immigration to the Brazilian rain forest only results in greater deforestation of this invaluable region. For example, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the deforestation of millions of acres of rain forest (Brooke 1990f).

During the 25 years of military rule preceding President Collor de Mello's democratically elected term, landless peasants were violently suppressed from seeking land on which to settle. Many immigrated to Paraguay and Argentina while others went to the Amazon or slums of Brazil's coastal cities. In 1983, however, with an opening to democracy, the Landless Rural Workers Movement was

created and led by Mr. Darci Maschio. Its motto was "Occupy, Resist, Produce."

2) What was the crisis like under President Collor?

On Aug. 8, 1990, in Porto Alegre, about 70 people were hospitalized after violent contests between military policemen and peasants arose. Property invasions swept Brazil on March 19, 1991, as at least 10 occupations within four days resulted in an estimated 5,000 poor families settling new homes in vacant city lots or half-finished housing complexes (Brooke 1991b). Invasions also took place in Rio Grande do Sul, but the most spectacular case occurred in western Rio as thousands of residents of the Rio das Pedras slum took over 982 apartments in an abandoned condominium development valued at $100 million.

Setting off the invasions was the inauguration of Leonel Brizola, a 69 year-old Socialist, as governor of Rio de Janeiro State a week before. The dwellers gambled that Mr. Brizola would not use the police to enforce evictions (Brooke 1991b). As a Socialist governor of Rio de Janeiro State, Leonel Brizola did not use police force, but instead, supported and encouraged the invaders. Such support has resulted in conflict between the state and the failed developer of the condominiums.

Mr. Brizola attacked Ronald Levinsohn, the Brazilian developer of the failed condominium complex. Mr. Levinsohn replied that the condominiums were now owned by his

company's liquidator, the Central Bank. To indemnify the Central Bank, he said, Rio would have to pay $100 million--enough to build 10,000 low-income houses (Brooke 1991b). In Rio, newspapers called for immediate police action to control the invasions as some neighborhoods and developers hired shotgun-carrying guards to defend vacant lots and half-finished apartment buildings. Also opposing the takeovers was the Democratic Rural Union, a national farmers and ranchers association. Moreover, landowners protested that private property should be protected in a democracy.

3) What did President Collor need to do?

Mr. Collor had to negotiate some sort of compromise. On one side, he was trying to establish a democracy where property rights were based on individual ownership and title to land, but on the other side, millions of impoverished Brazilians living in extreme poverty needed homes.

<u>Management of the Crisis</u>

4) What did President Collor identify as the crux of the crisis?

President Collor, who was simultaneously struggling to gain stability in the economy, did not agree with land seizures without reimbursement. Therefore, he viewed the actions of the landless as undemocratic. However, he also

understood the plight of the poor and knew that something had to be done about their standard of living.

5) What did President Collor do?

President Collor was opposed to seizing land without reimbursing its owners and stated that he would not bow to the pressure of land seizures, but that he had little power to stop them (Brooke 1990f). Although he promised land reform and redistribution, the Brazilian government had very little in the way of liquid assets, thus prohibiting Mr. Collor's ability to follow through with his promise.

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

At least a compromise to protect the poor, the rain forest, and the property rights of the land owner was being sought, instead of massive suppression in reaction to the squatters. The army was not sent in and very little violence was reported. Therefore, although the government found itself in an extremely tough position, it did not act authoritarian, but instead, it searched for a solution among all groups involved. Therefore, the management of this crisis earns a 2.

Peru

Economic Crisis

Background

1) What is the history of the economic crisis?

Not only did President Belaunde Terry (1980-1985), the first democratic president after authoritarianism in Peru, preside over the near collapse of the economy, an upsurge of cocaine trafficking and guerrilla warfare accompanied by human rights abuses, but he also left Peruvians without any hope of ever solving their problems (Riding 1985b). Then, Mr. Alan Garcia of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) became President in 1985. The election of Mr. Garcia was extraordinary because it was the first time since its founding in 1924 that APRA was allowed to govern Peru (Riding 1985a). At the beginning of Mr. Garcia's term, all popular attention was concentrated less on the newly democratic system than on the raging popularity of Mr. Garcia, himself (Riding 1985a). The root of such popularity for Mr. Garcia lay in the disappointment of the preceding president, Mr. Belaunde Terry.

On August 1, 1985, Garcia's Government announced emergency economic measures, including a currency devaluation intended to increase government revenue and curtail inflation (Peru Adopts 1985). Also, the measures called for sharp increases in the prices of many basic items, including gasoline, food products, as well as increased wages for the lowest paid workers (Peru Adopts

1985). The increases were followed by a freeze on prices and wages (Riding 1986b). Therefore, the first 15 months of Garcia's presidency witnessed a revival of Peru's economy.

On December 6, 1986, the price freeze imposed in August 1985 was replaced by a series of controls (Peru Ends 1986). Moreover, about two-hundred basic products, including rice, sugar, gasoline, bread, milk and fertilizers, remained under strict Government control but were allowed to rise three or four times during the next year (Peru Ends 1986). Overall, the Peruvian economy grew by about 8 percent in both 1986 and 1987; the annual inflation rate was halved to around 50 percent; and Peru escaped serious reprisals for its unwillingness to pay foreign creditors (Riding 1988a).

2) What was the crisis like under President Garcia?

Initially, sensing that the young Social Democrat, President Garcia, was inspired more by idealism than ideology, the United Left coalition, the country's second political force, and the conservative private sector supported Garcia's economic policies. No less significantly, the armed forces, which governed Peru from 1968 to 1980 also accepted the reassertion of civilian control over the military (Riding 1985b).

However, a real turning point in Garcia's economic success was a surge of three-digit inflation that spurred the President to nationalize banks on July 28, 1987, and thus, alarmed the urban middle classes who saw it as a step

toward socialism (Riding 1987c). The move to nationalize private banks was intended to halt capital flight resulting from a policy of maintaining a fixed exchange rate at a time of growing inflation (Riding 1988c). However, President Garcia was eventually brought to a compromise over the bank nationalization so that only the largest banks were brought under 51 percent employee control. After the nationalization of banks, the fact that Mr. Garcia operated without any strong ideological commitment, which initially earned support, eventually left all sectors of society on the defensive and less likely to trust the government's policies for investment, savings, and other vital aspects of a capitalist system (Riding 1987c).

With the economy on the slide, new speculation about a potential military coup increased, despite the fact that the military seemed reluctant to take over the chaotic situation in Peru (Riding 1987c). Moreover, the entire controversy revived the conservative political parties. In the following weeks after the nationalization of the banks, thousands of people participated in three huge demonstrations. In addition, Mr. Garcia also lost some power over his own party after this move, as he had isolated its leaders when his own popularity was thriving (Riding 1987c). In 1988 with a near deleted currency reserve and a heavy dependency on maintaining a demand-led consumption boom, the Government was close to bankruptcy and annual

inflation was above 200 percent while real wages were tumbling (Riding 1988a).

3) What did President Garcia need to do?

President Garcia had to find some way to include, instead of alienating, his political and economic colleagues, as well as the public at large. His love of power and the ability to use it left him with all of the responsibility and accountability as well. Therefore, Mr. Garcia had to develop a definite policy with the aid of colleagues from disparate sectors of society in order to save not only his own political career, but belief and trust in democracy as well.

Management of the Crisis

4) What did President Garcia identify as the crux of the crisis?

President Garcia obviously identified inflation as a key problem. He sought policies to diminish inflation, but when inflation soared again in 1988, he blamed a lack of control in the economy. Therefore, Mr. Garcia implemented policies based on more control, regardless of the effect on private sector entrepreneurs and other important sectors of Argentine society.

5) What did President Garcia do?

Basically, President Garcia was at the center of the economic crisis because he primed a boom in consumer spending in 1986 and 1987 by printing new money and using up reserves of hard currency. The anti-inflation program announced on September 7, 1988 doubled basic food prices, devalued the national currency for most Peruvian exports, increased the monthly minimum wage, and quintupled the price of gasoline (Inflation 1988). However, the policies of Garcia's government alienated both local business officials and foreign creditors, leaving itself with few supporters in a desperate time (Riding 1988d).

As a result of Peru's economic crisis, rumors began to circulate that Garcia was going to resign and that the armed forces were planning a coup. Apparently, Mr. Garcia debated stepping down in September 1988, but decided not to, despite the fact that his government had lost all of its credibility (Riding 1988c). Calls for his resignation came from business groups as well as opposition parties. Moreover, an independent legislature begged the president to form an emergency cabinet if he were to complete his term, but the President ignored all proposals (Riding 1988e). He also dismissed one of his closest allies, General Shed who had served as head of the President's military household for two years. Apparently, the four-star general believed a coup was under way and began mobilizing senior army officers to prevent it, when he was ousted for questioning the loyalty

of the army high command (Riding 1988c). Also, Economy Minister, Abel Salinas, resigned to protest Mr. Garcia's veto of his economic program. As a consequence, the President named a party aide, Carlos Rivas Davila, as his successor which meant that only Mr. Garcia would continue to run the economy (Riding 1988e).

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

Because Peru's formal democratic government remained in place and an authoritarian government did not take over or was not declared, a 3 instead of a 4 is given to Peru's economic crisis. Nevertheless, the management of the economic crisis in Peru, definitely deserves a 3 since President Garcia refused to include even the advice of his own aides in his economic policies. Mr. Garcia also successfully alienated just about every sector in society from his policies, and thus was left with no supporters.

Sendero Luminoso

Background

1) What is the history of the guerrilla crisis?

In the mid-1960s, Peru's Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) originated as a radical student organization founded by a Marxist philosophy professor who denounced any ideological deviations from the original writings of Karl Marx (Riding 1988b). The movement worked for several years among Indian mountain communities before starting its

Maoist-style campaign, which advocated an agrarian revolution based strictly on the largely Indian, peasant population of Peru (Riding 1988b). Many believed that the main short-range objective of the Shining Path was to goad the military into overthrowing the Government, thus increasing the Shining Path's popular appeal while gaining supporters for its ultimate goal of a total revolution.

Under Peru's Constitution, the Shining Path could have organized as a legal political party if it renounced violence. However, on May 17, 1980, the Shining Path instigated a series of violent activities that began with the burning of ballot boxes in the town of Chuschi on the eve of Peru's first national elections in 17 years. The government responded to the escalation of violence by decreeing several emergency zones (EMA) to restore order.

2) What was the crisis like under President Garcia?

When Mr. Garcia took office in July 1985, he was determined to reassert civilian control over the armed forces (Riding 1986b). However, President Garcia needed the military as an ally because he was relying on the military to fight the Shining Path, which had expanded its activities to Lima and other urban areas. Nevertheless, more bombings, assassinations, and acts of sabotage by the Shining Path contributed to the tensions between the Garcia Government and senior military commanders who wanted a freer hand in dealing with terrorism. Upon limiting military expenditures

and tightening controls on human rights abuses, President Garcia further strained his alliance with the military.

Unfortunately, 1987 marked the beginning of an even deeper activity by the guerrillas as they assassinated, bombed, and also infiltrated labor groups and neighborhood associations in the slums that surrounded Lima (Riding 1987b). Moreover, the movement's terrorism in 1988 began to infiltrate major universities, trade unions, and leftist political parties (Riding 1988b). President Garcia, meanwhile, wavered between combating the guerrillas through military actions and/or through investment in the impoverished Andean communities that served as their breeding ground, but the Shining Path nonetheless continued to grow (Riding 1987b).

The central government soon found itself on the defensive to both international complaints of human rights abuses and the military's complaints that it lacked the necessary supplies and power to effectively fight the guerrillas. Because the armed forces who feared being charged with human rights abuses reduced their patrols, the guerrillas entered new regions and returned to states they had left. As a result, the Shining Path appeared to be weakening Peru's new democracy and exacerbating long latent racial and class tensions (Riding 1988b).

On January 15, 1989 rumors of an imminent military coup were reported as military commanders complained bitterly about low salaries, but the military decided to allow Mr.

Garcia to finish his term in July 1990 (Brooke 1989c). In addition, the guerrillas won outright control of Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, the source of almost half of the cocaine consumed in the United States and of electric power for seven million inhabitants (Brooke 1989c). Furthermore, in October 1989, one of the Shining Path's biggest terror campaigns was an effort to disrupt Peru's municipal and presidential elections (Treaster 1989a). The guerrillas transformed the elections, in which nine million Peruvians were eligible to vote, from an issue of local concern to a national demonstration of strength and a challenge of the Government's ability to protect the people and to exercise the fundamentals of democracy (Treaster 1989b).

3) What did President Garcia need to do?

Mr. Garcia needed to decide who were his allies. In order to fight the guerrillas, since they refuse to negotiate, Mr. Garcia needed to unify his support by calling on the help of the military and other sectors of society in an all-out effort to defeat the insurgency of the Shining Path.

<u>Management of the Crisis</u>

4). What did President Garcia identify as the crux of the crisis?

Under pressure from human rights organizations, President Garcia viewed the military as being too harsh in

its handling of the guerrillas. Moreover, President Alan Garcia argued that the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla movement was the result of the Government's having neglected impoverished Indian communities for over a generation (Riding 1986b). President Garcia determined that extreme poverty, especially in the regions of concentrated guerrilla insurgency was contributing to the popularity of the Sendero Luminoso.

5) What did President Garcia do?

Upon taking office, President Garcia stepped up public investment in the Andean sierras, formed a peace commission to negotiate with the rebels, and even risked a confrontation with the armed forces by punishing officers blamed for several massacres of alleged guerrilla sympathizers (Riding 1986b). In defiance of the Peace Commission, the Shining Path continued its violent attacks in Lima, so that by June 1986, the peace commission appeared on the verge of resigning (Christian 1986).

In the beginning of February 1986, President Alan Garcia imposed a state of emergency and a curfew in Lima and in the neighboring port city of Callao (Emergency 1986). Mr. Garcia said the armed forces would be in charge of internal security with the power to enforce the emergency decree, which suspended a wide range of constitutional rights, including constitutional rights of assembly, movement, and the inviolability of private property

(Emergency 1986). It was the first time since 1978 that the Government had placed Lima, a city of 5 million people, under a curfew.

Nevertheless, the failure to resolve the guerrilla problem resulted in rumors of potential military coups to overthrow President Garcia's government. In response, Mr. Garcia quickly reinforced civilian authority over the military by mocking these rumors (Riding 1986a). Mr. Garcia also sought symbolic ways of demonstrating that the armed forces were subordinate to him. For example, at military ceremonies he wore the presidential sash and carried the baton of Commander in Chief (Riding 1987a). Moreover, President Garcia decided to create a Defense Ministry to replace the existing War, Navy and Air Force Ministries (Riding 1987a). This further contributed to the tensions between the military and the government.

The Garcia government found itself increasingly trapped between pressure for tougher action from the army and complaints about human-rights violations as Mr. Garcia was forced to acknowledge that the military may have used excessive force in retaking three prisons where guerrilla riots erupted. Tensions between the President and the military continued to grow as an estimated 95 police officers and higher-ranking officials were arrested on suspicion of taking part in the killing of approximately 230 prisoners (Reports 1986).

Therefore, the Garcia administration chose a new tactic to deal with at least one facet of the guerrilla problem. It proposed setting up special tribunals in which guerrillas jailed for violent acts would be tried by a corps of judges (Riding 1986b). However, the problem of imprisoning guerrillas for terrorism was illustrated in the previous suppression of riots provoked by the indoctrination, planning, and training of prisoners by incarcerated guerrillas. The government also continued to focus public spending on the urban and rural poor due to the belief that it could neutralize the guerrilla message.

When the guerrillas threatened to attack any Peruvian found voting in the national election of 1989, the Peruvian Government closed the polls an hour earlier than usual to insure that voters and poll workers were not caught out after sunset. Moreover, it imposed a 7pm curfew for the weekend in the mountain and jungle regions where guerrillas were the strongest (Treaster 1989b). By 1990, as a result of the guerrilla war, 20,000 people had been killed.

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

President Garcia's ambivalent, but exclusive, management of the guerrilla problem in Peru, leaves this example of crisis management with a 3. Granted that Mr. Garcia did not revert to authoritarianism, the fact remains that he excluded important sectors in his ambivalent approach to the guerrilla problem. In effect, the President

relied on the military to fight the guerrillas and then threatened their position and power in implementing his demands. This approach resulted in conflict and tension between the Government and the military who should have been working together to put an end to the violence of the insurgent's war.

Military-Civilian Coup

Background

1) What is the history of the crisis?

Alberto Fujimori was a political novice, engineer and former university dean who came from political obscurity to defeat Mr. Vargas Llosa and took office as President of Peru in July of 1989. He faced a nation traumatized by political terrorism, fiscal insolvency, galloping inflation and a drought that threatened the water and power supply (Christian 1989a). Many attributed at least part of the mess to Former President Garcia, as they asserted that he grossly mismanaged the economy and the fight against subversion (Christian 1989a).

2) What was the crisis like under President Fujimori?

Upon taking office, Mr. Fujimori took drastic steps to control inflation and to try to heal Peru's shattered economy, where more than half the people live in poverty. He removed price controls and subsidies, lowered trade barriers, began selling off state business and sharply

reducing government spending (Brooke 1992a). He settled long-standing disputes with three companies from the United States, the country where half of Peru's foreign investment originated. Nevertheless, since 1990, when the Government shifted to a free-market economic program, five million additional Peruvians were pushed into extreme poverty (Brooke 1992a). Therefore, Mr. Fujimori's leftist opponents contended that by cutting social spending, the President was aiding the Shining Path in its recruitment efforts (Peru's Leader 1992).

Reflecting the insurgents' spread and the government's attempt to counter this spread by sending troops to each region as deemed necessary, one-half of Peru's population of 22 million lived under states of siege by 1992 (Brooke 1992a). By mid-1992, nearly 25,000 people died in the political violence (Peru's Leader 1992). President Alberto Fujimori appealed to the Sendero Luminoso to open talks aimed at ending its insurgency, but the appeals received little interest (Christian 1990d). The task of fighting a war of counterterror fell to Peru's army, a 120,000 member force whose traditions and strategic plans were out of date, whose supplies were limited, and whose salaries were low (Brooke 1992a). Fearful of rumored coups, President Fujimori further weakened counterinsurgency efforts by repeatedly shuffling generals and refusing to appoint a single executive to direct the war full time (Brooke 1992a).

However, with mayoral elections scheduled for the fall of 1992, it was clear that Peruvians were bracing for a violent year, mindful that the Shining Path squads murdered 44 elected officials and caused elections to be annulled in almost 498 jurisdictions (Brooke 1992a). Therefore, the situation, President Fujimori faced upon his inauguration, had reached an even more intense crisis level than the two previous presidents had faced.

3) What did President Fujimori need to do?

In order to stay in power, it was vital that President Fujimori maintain the loyalty of the military. He also had to avoid opposition from the legal leftist parties that could have caused him difficulties in the society as a whole and in congress in particular, where his party, Cambio 90, was only the third-largest block (Christian 1989a). Furthermore, it was vital that Mr. Fujimori find a way to disperse the profits of a free-market system to the increased number of extremely poor Peruvians.

Management of the Crisis

4). What did President Fujimori identify as the crux of the crisis?

Peru was suffering severe economic and political insurgency crises at the onset of President Fujimori's term as President. In his attempts to implement reforms, Mr. Fujimori contended that congress hindered his economic

reforms and that the corrupt judiciary impeded the fight against terrorism (Nash 1992a). Therefore, Mr. Fujimori recognized the crises at hand, but felt that due to the other two democratic branches of government, that he could not promote change.

5). What did President Fujimori do?

On April 5, 1992, President Fujimori dissolved Congress, took control of the judiciary and suspended the constitution (Nash 1992a). He also ordered the roundup of more politicians, labor leaders, and journalists (Nash 1992a; Brooke 1992a). President Fujimori called the changes "the starting point of an authentic transformation to assure a legitimate and effective democracy, which will permit all Peruvians to participate in building a more just, more developed and more respected Peru" (Peru's Leader 1992). He further defended his actions by proclaiming that a corrupt justice system and a demoralized under-equipped army were hindering the war against the guerrillas (Brooke 1992a).

Moreover, President Fujimori said that Peru could not wait the three years it would take Congress to carry out the legislative changes he sought. However, because the President illegally dissolved the Congress according to the constitution, a secret meeting of the Peruvian Congress voted to impeach President Fujimori and to name Carlos Garcia-Garcia as Peru's new head of state. However, Mr. Fujimori declared the Congress invalid and Garcia, fearing

for his safety, sought refuge in the Argentine Embassy (Nash 1992b).

Adherence to Democratic Procedure

Fujimori's impatience with the guerrilla insurgency, the economy, and Congress provoked his declaration of authoritarianism. It is obvious in this crisis that because Peru's government resorted to authoritarianism that the management of the is crisis is ranked a 4. Therefore, the likelihood of establishing a real democracy in Peru diminished when President Fujimori dissolved the Congress and the Judiciary.

Summary: How do the countries rank overall in the institutionalization of crisis management?

Due to the system of ranking the institutionalization of crisis management, the lower the average of all three crises for each country, then the more democratic method of managing crises that has been institutionalized. (See **Table III-F.**) Argentina ranks first among the three countries in its institutionalization of crisis management as its policies concerning the economic chaos, corruption, and coup attempt illustrated a real dedication to working with democratic means to solve the nation's problems. Argentina received a 2, 1, and 2, on each of its crises, respectively; therefore, its average institutionalization of crisis management is 1.7. Brazil ranks a very close second as it attempted to solve its economic crisis, the impeachment of

its president, and the plight of the poor invading the property of the rich. Brazil has an average of 2.0 after receiving a ranking of 3, 1, and 2 on each of its crises, respectively. In third place, Peru overthrew its democracy due to the president's impatience with democratic means to fight the Shining Path guerrilla group, to control inflationary chaos, and to rid the government of corruption. As a result, Peru is ranked with a 3, 3, and 4 for each of its crises and thus has an average of 3.3. Therefore, an overall ranking of the three countries would place Argentina first, Brazil second, and Peru third.

CONCLUSION: In which country is real democracy most evident?

An evaluation of **Table III-G**, reveals that Argentina ranked first in both Guaranteed Freedoms and the Institutionalization of Crisis Management, while Brazil ranked first in the Degree of Uncertainty. Because Argentina ranked first in two measures and Brazil ranked first in only one measure, Argentina is ranked first overall for real democracy. In second place for real democracy is Brazil. Unfortunately, Peru ranked last in every measure of real democracy. Therefore, the overall ranking of the three countries for the dependent variable, real democracy, finds Argentina, Brazil, and Peru in first, second, and third places respectively. Chapter 4 will conclude this study by looking at first of all, the likelihood of democracy in the

future for each country, and secondly, an overall evaluation of the theory, measures, and conclusions of this study.

Table III-A: Time Period S (Second Democratic Government)

Argentina	May 1989	President Carlos Saul Menem
Brazil	March 1989	President Fernando Collor de Mello
Peru	July 1985	President Garcia
	April 1990	President Alberto Fujimori

Table III-B: Index of Competition (IC)

Country & Election Year	% vote for winning party	-	% vote for second party	= Index of Competition	
Brazil (1989)	53.03	-	46.97	= 6.06	[#1]
Argentina (1989)	47.36	-	32.48	= 14.88	[#2]
Peru (1985,	45.74	-	21.30	= 24.44	[#3]
1990)	56.53	-	33.92	= 22.61	

Table III-C: Ranking of Political Rights

(1+ = Best Score; 7- = Worst Score)

	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
			1980--2+
			1981--2
	1982--6		1982--2
	1983--3+		1983--2
Time	1984--2+		1984--2
	1985--2	1985--3	
Period	1986--2	1986--2+	
	1987--2	1987--2	
D	1988--2	1988--2	
Average Time Period D	**[#3]** 2.7	**[#2]** 2.25	**[#1]** 2.0
			1985--2
			1986--2
Time			1987--2
			1988--2
Period	1989--2	1989--2	1989--2
	1990--1	1990--2	1990--3
S	1991--1	1991--2	1991--3
	1992--2	1992--2	1992--6
Average Time Period S	**[#2]** 1.5	**[#1]** 1.0	**[#3]** 2.75

Table III-D: Ranking of Civil Rights

(1+ = Best Score; 7- = Worst Score)

	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
			1980--2+
			1981--2
	1982--5		1982--2
	1983--3+		1983--2
Time	1984--2+		1984--2
	1985--2	1985--2+	
Period	1986--1+	1986--2	
	1987--1	1987--2	
D	1988--1	1988--2	
Average Time Period D	**[#3]** 2.14	**[#2]** 2.0	**[#1]** 2.0
			1985--2
			1986--2
			1987--2
			1988--2
	1989--1	1989--3	1989--2
Time	1990--3	1990--3	1990--4
	1991--3	1991--3	1990--5
Period	1992--3	1992--3	1992--5
S			
Average Time Period S	**[#1]** 2.5		**[#2]** 3.0 **[#3]** 3.0

Table III-E: Crises Classification Guide for Behavior of National Government During Time Period S

1 -- The national government maintained formal democratic procedure throughout the crisis.

2 -- The national government operated in an informal democratic manner, but was inclusive of other parties, sectors of society, government officials, and/or advisers.

3 -- The national government operated in an exclusive, dictatorial, top-down manner, but maintained formal democratic institutions.

4 -- The national government resorted to authoritarianism and dissolved democratic institutions.

Table III-F: Crises Classification by Country

During Time Period S

Argentina :	Economic crisis	2
	Corruption crisis	1
	Coup crisis	2
Average:		1.67
Brazil :	Economic crisis	3
	Corruption crisis	1
	Squatter crisis	2
Average:		2.00
*Peru :	Economic crisis	3
	Guerrilla crisis	3
	Civilian-military coup crisis	4
Average:		3.33

Table III-G: Rank Order of Each Country for Each Measure of Real Democracy

MEASURE	RANKED POSITION		
	1	2	3
DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY			
Index of Competition:	Brazil	Argentina	Peru
Checklist of Political Rights:	Brazil	Argentina	Peru
GUARANTEED FREEDOMS			
Checklist of Civil Rights:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru

CHAPTER 4: The Influence of Real Change on

Real Democracy in Latin America

Introduction: What are the overall rankings for real change and real democracy in each country?

In Chapter 2, the measures of real change, the independent variable, were analyzed. **Elite settlement**, including the speed of the transition, the involvement of old leaders, and the inclusion of parties, lacked a clear result as there was a lack of consistency in the ranking of each country. If a simple average of each country's rank is calculated for all measures of elite settlement, then the rank order places Peru in first place, Brazil second, and Argentina third. To evaluate the amount of real change among the masses, the second measure, **Mass Mobilization**, clearly ranked Argentina first with the most real change, Peru second, and Brazil third. The last measure of real change, a **Definite Break of Legitimacy**, assessed the degree of real change in the formal institutions in each country. Measures used to determine institutional change included Concern for Human Rights Violations and a Change in Government Expenditure on the Military. The ranking for a Definite Break of Legitimacy placed Argentina first, Brazil second, and Peru in third place for not only the least real change, but also negative change. Therefore, Chapter 2 concluded with Argentina in first place for the most real change, Brazil in second place, and Peru in third place. (See **Table IV-A.**)

In Chapter 3, the measures of real democracy, the dependent variable, were evaluated. The **Degree of Uncertainty** analyzed the behavior of elites in the new democracy. The Index of Competition and the Checklist of Political Rights, ranked Brazil first, Argentina second, and Peru third. The second measure of real democracy, **Guaranteed Freedoms**, evaluated democracy among the masses. The Checklist of Civil Rights used to measure Guaranteed Freedoms concluded that Argentina was ranked first, Brazil second, and Peru third. The Institutionalization of Crisis Management, the third measure of real democracy, studied the commitment to real democracy in the institutional framework of each country. Once again, Argentina was ranked first, Brazil second, and Peru third. Therefore, the overall ranking for real democracy places Argentina in first place, Brazil in second place, and Peru in third place. (See **Table IV-A.**)

I. Was the theory that real change influences real democracy proven or disproved?

The ideal overall results to prove the theory applied in this study would show the same overall rank order for both real change and real democracy. After analyzing the conclusions for Chapters 2 and Chapter 3, it is obvious that the theory has been proven as the overall rank order for real change was Argentina, Brazil and Peru just as the overall rank order for real democracy was Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. (See **Table IV-A.**) In other words, the country

that experienced the most real change, Argentina, also established a real democracy; furthermore, the country that experienced the least real change, Peru, witnessed its democracy fall to authoritarianism once again. Therefore, it is concluded that real change in the process of democratization positively influences real democracy, and that the absence of real change in the transition negatively affects real democracy.

II. How can the theory be improved?

After evaluating the measure, Elite Settlement, under real change, it became apparent that rank ordering each country was a challenging task because there was no consistency in the rankings among the speed of the transition, the role of old leaders, and the inclusion of parties. This is due in part to the measures of elite settlement. For example, the speed of the transition does not seem to correlate with warring elites settling their differences. In fact it appears that the faster the transition, as is seen in Argentina, the lesser the amount of elite settlement.

In the case of Argentina, the military lost almost all of its legitimacy and could no longer effectively maintain control of the nation. Therefore, it had no power to make demands, not even to insure its own protection through an Amnesty law, which the incoming democratic government would abide by. As a result, it is difficult to say that

Argentina experienced the greatest elite settlement. Therefore, it may be that the slower the transition, the more time for elites to settle their differences and to negotiate compromises. It also may be that the speed, in terms of time, is not the important factor to democratization at all, but instead that elites do find some way to agree on the new rules of the game. In evaluating elite settlement as a measure of real change, it does not seem that the speed of the transition or the presence of old leaders has a great affect on real change. Instead, real change in the elites is evident by compromise among those actively participating in the transition, despite their age or the length of the transition. However, finding hard data for such a measure requires field work which unfortunately was not a viable option given the time and resource constraints of this particular study. Moreover, because elite settlement involves many secret negotiations and private meetings or phone calls, the data may not be available to a political scientist in the field.

Perhaps the best example of how field work may have given more accurate, valid results, is Mass Mobilization. In order to measure Mass Mobilization, the percentage of voter turnout over the number of registered voters was calculated longitudinally. Unfortunately, other sources of data concerning the masses were not available. Therefore, due to a lack of data, only voter turnout was used to measure Mass Mobilization.

One source that would provide insight into the perceived relationship between the masses and the political elites in the government as well as the democratic or authoritarian institutions would be public opinion polls. Questions concerning the level of active involvement in politically-related organizations and the perceived political efficacy, accessibility and effectiveness of making demands on government, of various individuals who belong to the masses would give a more in-depth view of real change from authoritarianism to democracy. The more politically involved and the more politically efficacious the masses feel under democracy as opposed to authoritarianism, the more likely real change among the masses occurred during the democratic transition.

A second source that would provide insight into the relationship between the masses and the government would be a registry of civic organizations. Therefore, instead of directly asking members of masses to describe or classify their involvement in politics, a comparison of registries during authoritarianism versus democracy would have given a simple numerical comparison of the number and possibly the types of organizations allowed under each type of government. The greater and more diverse the organizations under democracy when compared to authoritarianism, the greater the likelihood that real change occurred during the democratic transition in the masses. In effect, not only is the new democratic government allowing active participation

in politics, but it is also allowing diversity in political views and activities.

Due to the scarcity of data resources to measure a concept such as mass mobilization, anomalies in some results of this study require evaluation and explanation in order to improve the theory and its applications. Several of these anomalies appear to be country-specific, meaning that due to specific events in a particular country, the results did not turn out as expected. One example, is the placing of Peru in second place and Brazil in third place under Mass Mobilization. The results for this measure were calculated by an average of the percentage of registered voters in Time Period D. The discrepancy in rank between Brazil and Peru in Mass Mobilization may be explained in light of the fact that Brazil did not allow popular elections of its first democratic president after authoritarianism, but instead, negotiated an election by the popularly elected Congress. As a result Brazil's voter turnout for that year was 0%; whereas, Peru had 71% voter turnout. Therefore, it is important to understand the context in which the data is taken to understand and explain the true situation in each country.

The ranking system used in this study also created some problems in judging which country experienced real change or established a real democracy. The scale used was nominal and therefore forced each country in each measure to fit into divisions of first, second, or third place. However,

the use of this scale prohibited any sense of variation between the case studies. For example, ranking the countries under the role of old leaders in Elite Settlement was a challenging task because the data shows no real differences between Peru and Argentina, but because Peru's first democratic president after the authoritarian government was Belaunde Terry who had been president before authoritarianism, Peru was ranked before Argentina, which was led by President Alfonsin's cabinet almost full of "historicos". In effect, the ranking system used in this study allowed no sense of how different the amount or lack of real change or real democracy was between each country. Therefore, a ranking system more sensitive to variance would be more appropriate and might provide another level of support to the theory.

Nevertheless, three of the measures used in this study showed exactly identical results. A Definite Break of Legitimacy, Guaranteed Freedoms, and the Institutionalization of Crisis Management all ranked Argentina in first place, Brazil in second, and Peru in third. Therefore, a greater confidence in these measures has been established.

III. Can the theory be generalized?

First, because this theory analyzes real change from authoritarianism to democracy, the basic limitation of the theory is that a country must have experienced an

authoritarian government, a transition to democracy, and some brief duration of democracy. Without these three stages, data showing change through the various time periods will not be available.

Second, because the social structure in Latin America is basically a two-class system including the "haves" and the "have nots", it was fairly simply to categorize the modes of change in the process of democratization in this particular study (Wiarda and Kline 1990). More specifically, real change and real democracy were divided into change and democracy among the elites, the masses and the institutions which establish the guidelines of behavior in the political system. In effect, the organization of the research design for this particular study was straightforward and simple. However, to evaluate an entire nation in terms of elites and masses disregards important variations within each sector, as well as middle sectors that are difficult to define as elites or as part of the masses. For example, the roles of the church, the military, various professional and international organizations, and specific ethnic groups vary in every level of political analysis from the microcosm of a pueblo in the mountains to the macrocosm of the entire globe. Moreover, as Latin American and other lesser developed countries modernize, the groups within each country will more than likely become more and more complex. Therefore, defining comparable sectors

within a country may require more divisions than just the elites and the masses to get accurate, clear results.

In addition, complex variations of a society do not only exist within a country, but also, and perhaps even more so, between countries. This may be explained by differing beliefs concerning the determinants of status or class affiliation in each region or specific country. Therefore, if this theory were to be applied using cross-regional case studies (for example, nations from Africa, Asia, and Latin America), then even greater disparities in the structure of society for each of these different regions would further complicate classifying comparative sectors of a society. A simple division between the elites and the masses may not allow an effective comparison by which to analyze real change and real democracy, such that the results of a cross-regional study would be too general or vague to determine the relationship between real change and real democracy as well as what types of real change and in what sectors of society is real change most important.

Yet another concern of generalizing this theory is the various levels of power and political efficacy of individuals living in different cultures to participate in political and social processes. For example, if Country A due to its cultural or religious beliefs discourages the participation of women in politics, then women who are part of the masses may show an increase in mass mobilization, but in effect, the women are not participating at all. In

contrast, if Country B, which has high levels of female participation, is compared to Country A in a study using the real-change-to-real-democracy theory, then vague or inaccurate results may occur.

More specifically, if Country A and Country B show exactly the same amount of mass mobilization by whatever measure is being used, then Country B should be automatically ranked ahead of Country A because it allows the participation of women in its political system. The latter solution does not seem very accurate when trying to decide the future of democracy in a country. Therefore, not only does the existence of various groups within and between countries alter the generalization of this theory, but also, the unique influences of each group on the political system in which it operates. In summary, comparing case-studies across disparate regions requires an evaluation of what differences may give vague or inaccurate results.

IV. Looking to the Future: What is the significance of this study to the establishment of democracy throughout the world?

It has been the purpose of this study to find valid and reliable measures to evaluate the change that occurs in democratic transition. Because the science of politics (as do all sciences) applies a research design to thoroughly evaluate a particular question or problem, it was necessary to organize the change taking place in each country by some specific standard. In this case, the change taking place

during the process of democratization was categorized according to sectors of a political system: the elites, the masses, and the institutions of the political system. However, it is important to note that change among these sectors does not occur in isolation, but in effect, these sectors inter-relate by using their power through different means to make demands and to influence the other sectors. Nevertheless, to understand the power and influence that various groups yield on the political system, as well as on other groups, this study emphasizes, by its very design, the simultaneous cooperation and support that must occur between and among the elites, the masses, and the political institutions for a successful democratic transition, as well as for the endurance of democracy. The following is a discussion of the role of the elites, masses, and the institutions of a society. The aim of this discussion is to illustrate the inter-relatedness of these three groups and the necessity for cooperation, understanding, and compromise within and between these sectors during the process of democratization.

Elites, Masses, and Institutions Inter-related

In addition to the role that each group plays in a country experiencing democratization, the relationship between groups is vital to the transition from authoritarianism. Under an authoritarian government, the various groups in a nation have disparate levels of power,

such that one group, such as the military or the landed elite, is overwhelmingly dominant and powerful over other groups. In contrast, in a real democracy, all groups have more or less the same access to government that allows each group the ability to make demands on government and to have a say in proposing or criticizing legislation. However, it is the cooperation between groups in a democracy that is vital to its establishment.

Elites

To facilitate this cooperation and support, it is necessary that political elites of a new democracy learn to be inclusive, to share their power. In this sense, being inclusive or sharing does not mean giving up all power as in authoritarianism, but instead, it means to negotiate and compromise so that crises and political challenges may be resolved. In a democracy, no single individual or group may receive all that is asked for every time. Nevertheless, the democratic system provides a source of protection for elites through compromise. Despite the fact that one party may hold the presidency or the majority in a legislative body, all other parties are not oppressed or exiled, but in fact they have the power to continue to influence political outcomes. This political protection allows security and stability in a system that may be struggling to resolve an economic, social, or other crisis. Therefore, due to their role in the change of power from one party to another and the resolution of crises through legislation, the political

elites of a new democracy must learn to receive as well as to give within the democratic institutions they have established in order to secure the stability and the endurance of democracy in the future.

Masses

The masses under authoritarianism are usually violently repressed, discouraged (or forbidden) to organize, and basically ignored by the authoritarian regime. In contrast, the stabilization of a democracy in any country relies on the effective communication through various mediums between the masses and the political elites. The concept of representation holds the political elites responsive to the masses, and thus the communication and exchange between the masses and the elected officials allows demands to be made and often satisfied. However, in the event that too many constituents feel that their representative is not meeting enough of their demands, they may elect another representative. As a result, in a democracy it is to the benefit of both the representatives and the constituents to communicate with each other, not to ignore or to repress each other as under authoritarianism.

To effectively make demands and elect responsible leaders, it is the responsibility of the masses to be educated, active, and organized. Therefore, it is necessary in a democratic transition that, first, the masses have the freedom and ability to organize, and second, that the masses do organize themselves and make demands on the government.

As a result, it is not simply the elites allowing the masses to participate in politics, nor is it simply the masses organizing themselves, but rather a simultaneous process of cooperation, understanding, and compromise.

Institutions

The behavior of elites and of the masses must be guided by some sort of structure in order to guarantee equal opportunity and justice. The role of democratic institutions is to do just this. In effect, various democratic institutions (such as legislation, pacts, and procedural law) provide the stability and constancy in the complex society of a nation-state. Institutions do this by imposing rules by which all have agreed to function in the political system. Moreover, institutions allow an order of succession so that the entire political system is not dependent on a single individual, but rather an entire team of players. Therefore, it is vital that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy establish a commitment to a structure which may vary among different countries. Nevertheless, it is the commitment to the institutions by the elites, the masses, and any other group that permits the establishment of a real democracy versus a pseudo-democracy or authoritarianism.

CONCLUSION

The research on democratization thus far, although it has provided some insights and established some correlations, has simply analyzed one factor or one group void of the effects or roles of other groups or factors in the complex process of democratization. One of the most unique characteristics of this study when compared to other studies, is its multi-faceted approach, such that many variables and their relationships to each other are researched and analyzed. This study lays a foundation from which to encourage future projects to assimilate a more comprehensive and cohesive approach. In order to understand and possibly to facilitate democratization in other countries, it is necessary to analyze the factors that play a positive role in democracy. It is only after these factors are defined, that the process of analyzing how to bring them about can begin.

Table IV-A: Overall Ranking of All Countries for All Measures

REAL CHANGE	1	2	3
Elite Settlement:	Brazil	Peru	Argentina
Mass Mobilization:	Argentina	Peru	Brazil
Definite Break of Legitimacy:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
Overall Ranking:	**Argentina**	**Brazil**	**Peru**

REAL DEMOCRACY			
Degree of Uncertainty:	Brazil	Argentina	Peru
Guaranteed Freedoms:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
Institutionalization of Crisis Management:	Argentina	Brazil	Peru
Overall Ranking:	**Argentina**	**Brazil**	**Peru**

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