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THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Learning Lessons from Its Past to Shape Its Future

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This report is based on a longer and more historically detailed study prepared for the Richard Lounsbery Foundation. The report summarizes the historical and analytical findings of that study and presents recommendations regarding the future operation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). We hope that, in both cases, we have added to the literature on intelligence and have raised issues for discussion that can help in the on-going debate and analysis of the intelligence community and in strengthening the intelligence advice provided the president.

The authors wish to express their appreciation to the Richard Lounsbery Foundation for its support of this project. In particular, we wish to acknowledge the role of Ambassador David Abshire whose vision and support were instrumental in initiating the study. The views and recommendations expressed in this report, however, do not reflect the views or beliefs of the Richard Lounsbery Foundation, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, or the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation. We wish to acknowledge the contribution of the 2006 Masters Program in International Affairs (MPIA) Capstone Team at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. The authors take full responsibility for the strengths and weaknesses of the report.

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Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IOB	Intelligence Oversight Board
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PBCFIA	President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
PFIAB	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PIAB	President's Intelligence Advisory Board
PNIB	President's National Intelligence Board
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
USIB	United States Intelligence Board

Introduction

The precursor to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA), was established by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1956 to provide the president with nonpartisan evaluation of the role and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action operations, and intelligence analysis. Over the years, the Board has evolved in terms of both structure and membership to reflect the needs of the times and preferences of each president. In some instances, the Board has played a central role in advising the president and the intelligence community on crucial issues of substance or procedure and has made a significant contribution to the country's national security. In other instances, the Board has been ignored and treated as a dumping ground for rewarding political cronies. In the Carter Administration, it was never even reconstituted. Needless to say, in those instances, the Board made little contribution to helping presidents get the best intelligence they could.

Clearly, it is in the interest of future presidents, not to speak of the nation, to make the best possible use of the PFIAB for two reasons. The PFIAB is now a political fact of life. Presidents have little latitude to abolish or ignore the Board. President Carter tried the former and paid a political price for doing so in the 1980 election. President George H.W. Bush initially ignored the Reagan Board after taking office in 1989, but by 1990 found that he had to reorganize the Board and involve it in at least some intelligence-related deliberations.

Beyond such political considerations, there is a second reason for thinking hard about how the Board can best assist the president in managing the intelligence community. An independent advisory panel made up of experts from a broad range of backgrounds can offer the president a unique and valuable perspective on intelligence issues. As we show in this report, the PFIAB has, with a few notable exceptions, studied almost every important intelligence issue and problem since the Eisenhower Administration. Moreover, the Board has made important recommendations – the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Science and Technology – that have clearly affected the intelligence community. At times the Board's recommendations have been important factors in intelligence-related policy decisions. Finally, while the Board has not consistently lived up to its potential as an intelligence advisory body for presidents in the past, this great potential is enough to warrant thinking hard about how it might be better realized in the future.

In the past few years, the U.S. government has established new centers and other organizations with an eye to enhance presidential coordination and oversight of intelligence. The recent creation of the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the culmination of this trend. The new DNI and his broad responsibilities were mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush on December 17, 2004. This is the most far-reaching reorganization of American intelligence since the legislation that created the CIA in 1947. In this new environment created largely by the 9/11 tragedy it is particularly important to have a clear understanding of the role of the PFIAB, one of the smallest, most secretive, least well-known, but potentially most influential parts of the U.S. intelligence community

This study undertakes such an analysis with the aim of providing a guideline for strengthening the role of the PFIAB in the years to come. The aim of our analysis is to determine what have been the strengths and weaknesses of the PFIAB in the past and to identify a productive role for the PFIAB in this new environment. Given the current intelligence needs of the country, such an examination is paramount. It will help to clarify the role of the PFIAB and shed light on the interrelationship of various intelligence components. Most importantly, it will provide recommendations for future presidents to redefine, and possibly augment, the role of the Board, thereby helping to improve the performance of the U.S. intelligence community.

Why Study the PFIAB?

In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, the efficiency of U.S. intelligence came under intense scrutiny, with a particular focus on the resources, methods, and coordination – or, more fittingly, lack thereof – among various intelligence agencies. The outcome was threefold: the Patriot Act, with its various domestic

features aimed at tightening any security loopholes; the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, whose goal is to protect the nation; and the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, the various intelligence agencies reorganized their own organizations and revamped procedures to be more effective in their missions.

The goal of this series of changes was to present to the president and national security decision-makers the best intelligence possible. While these changes were still taking place, the George W. Bush Administration went to war in Iraq in 2003 on the assumption that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction and meaningful links with al Qaeda. The discovery that neither of these was the case raised the issues of how, why, and when intelligence has been used, or failed to be used, by those who make the ultimate decision on the use of intelligence.

The one institution that is not blinded by preconceived ideas or institutional links and that can be of great use in thinking through these issues is the PFIAB. The Board can be useful in helping the president steer U.S. intelligence in the right direction in its exploitation of new technology, adoption of new methods of analysis, and reorganizations to deal with the new intelligence environment the United States faces.

To date, no detailed analysis of the PFIAB has been conducted primarily because there is very little information publicly available about the activities of the Board over the years. There are only a handful of studies of the Board – two by the Congressional Research Service and one by the Hale Foundation (a private association of retired intelligence professionals) – and none contain much specific information about what issues the Board addressed, how it operated, and what impact it had on policy.[1] Moreover, while there is a large and generally very good literature on the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, it contains only the sketchiest of accounts of the PFIAB's role.[2] It is fair to say that the Board is one of the least-known components of the U.S. intelligence community.

Why has there been so little discussion of the PFIAB in the otherwise voluminous literature on the American intelligence community? One possibility is that the Board has not been an important player in the major intelligence issues since its inception. For example, the Church Committee staff's comprehensive "History of the Central Intelligence Agency" devoted only a few pages to the Board, remarking in passing upon its "impotence."[3] We reject this explanation because, as we will show in the following pages, the Board has been at the center of many of the most important intelligence decisions of the past fifty years.

Instead, we believe that the lack of discussion of the PFIAB is the result of two other factors. First, the Board has historically had access to the most highly classified intelligence from the entire intelligence community and has dealt with some of the most sensitive, substantive, and procedural issues the community has faced. Given that, it is not surprising that very few of its deliberations and recommendations would be declassified, even after almost fifty years. Second, in addition to the sensitivity of the issues it considered, the Board also falls under the purview of executive privilege, and, as such, its records are exempt from mandatory declassification along with those of other high-level presidential advisory bodies. The historical records of the PFIAB are held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), exempt from normal declassification procedures and not open to the public, despite the fact that contemporary records from other parts of the intelligence community and the National Security Council (NSC) have long since been made available to scholars. The PFIAB is little known not because it has been irrelevant, but rather because its secrets have been hidden behind two seals: secrecy and executive privilege.

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[1] Congressional Research Service, Report 96-619F, *Intelligence Oversight in the White House: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Intelligence Oversight Board*, by H. Andrew Boerstling and Richard A. Best (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1996); Congressional Research Service, Report 75-225F, *The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (1955-1975)* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1975); The Hale Foundation, *The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)* (Washington, D.C.: The Hale Foundation, Inc., 1981).

[2] For example, see Jeffery Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), 287 & 307.

[3] Anne Karalakas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency" in *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* ed. William M. Leary, (Birmingham, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), 74.

Some current and former PFIAB personnel have gone to great lengths to maintain the shroud of secrecy surrounding the Board. Long-term Board member and Chair Leo Cherne repeatedly emphasized to his fellow Board members that the PFIAB was special, in part, because it was the one part of the U.S. government that never leaked, and he regularly refused to cooperate with investigations of the PFIAB by other parts of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight committees.[4]

When scholars do try to conduct detailed investigations of the PFIAB, they have often encountered active opposition from some PFIAB members and staffs. For example, when we approached a number of former PFIAB chairs regarding this project, one not only refused to cooperate, but also actively discouraged others from participating in the project.[5] Fortunately, this effort did not succeed, though it did make other PFIAB chairs, former members, and executive staffers hesitant about being interviewed on the record.

Given these serious obstacles, readers may wonder how we were able to proceed at all with this study beyond the very sketchy accounts available in the two Congressional Research Service reports and the Hale Foundation pamphlet? Despite the cult of secrecy among Board chairs, members, and staff, there is actually a substantial amount of information available in the public domain about the Board's activities. This is true not only of the period before the Reagan Administration, but also today. Press coverage of the PFIAB's activities has been continuous.[6] But sometimes the Board has made public, or at least semi-public, important insights into its activities. Under President Clinton, the Board was charged with a major study of security lapses at the nation's nuclear laboratories, and its findings were publicly released by the administration.[7] Additionally, there is a wealth of other open-source materials available that sheds light on the Board's activities. These include declassified PFIAB reports and PFIAB-related material in other government publications like the Department of State's historical series *Foreign Relations of the United States* and various CIA historical publications. Finally, memoirs of presidents and other high-level governmental officials contain important information about the activities of the Board.

Even though the records of the PFIAB proper remain classified under the twin seals of secrecy and executive privilege, we have managed to amass a significant amount of primary source material from various archives containing records of organizations that worked closely with the Board. Research team members went to presidential archives from Eisenhower through Clinton (with the exception of the Reagan archives, which we determined had no declassified materials on the PFIAB available) and consulted records of other parts of the executive office of the president including the NSC, the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, and the White House Counsel which contain much material relevant to the PFIAB's activities. Team members have also visited other archives including the National Archives and Records Administration (CIA's CREST on-line documents), MIT Library Archives (Thomas J. Killian Papers), National Security Archives (George Washington University), and Boston University (Leo Cherne Papers) and found much additional material relating to the Board's activities.

Finally, former PFIAB members have not always been reticent about discussing their experiences with the Board. Then PFIAB Chair Warren Rudman gave extensive public comments about the Board in a seminar he participated in at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government.[8] Other former PFIAB

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[4] Leo Cherne, Memorandum entitled "A PFIAB Valedictory," September 21, 1988; Leo Cherne, Memorandum for the Record, August 3, 1983; PFIAB (July-December 1983); Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; Howard Gottlieb Archival Research Center (HGARC), Boston University.

[5] Warren Rudman, former PFIAB Chair, letter to Roman Popadiuk, March 8, 2006.

[6] Most recently, see "Advisory Panel Convinced Bush to Oust Goss," *The Sunday Capital* (Annapolis)*,* May 7, 2006.

[7] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: A Special Investigative Panel, *Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999). The report is also available, as of October 17, 2007, at: http://cio.energy.gov/pfiab-doe.pdf.

[8] Warren Rudman, *Perspectives on National Security in the Twenty-First Century,* Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control at Harvard University (Boston), April 22, 2002.

chairs, members, staffers, as well as other members of the intelligence community who interacted with the Board, have cooperated in our project through extensive and detailed interviews. These interviews have made it possible to reconstruct in great detail the activities of the PFIAB, especially in recent years. For obvious reasons, most of these interviews were off the record. Without exception, all interviewees were told that this was to be an unclassified study.

Over the years, there have been a number of efforts from within the PFIAB to assess its role and function to better serve the president, but this study should also provide an important outside perspective on the Board and the issues it faces as it seeks to reorient itself to meet the challenges of the new security environment our country faces.[9] In addition to helping future presidents make the best possible use of the PFIAB, we think that this report will accomplish two further goals. It will provide the public with a better understanding of the history of the PFIAB and also with a fuller sense of the role of American intelligence in national security decision-making.

How the PFIAB Works

The PFIAB is housed in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building on the White House grounds. It operates on a part-time basis and, traditionally, has met approximately every other month for two to three days. The current Board now meets on a monthly basis. While the Boards have regularly scheduled meetings, they have also set up ad hoc sessions as needed and have created subcommittees to deal with various issues. The Board generally reports to the president through the NSC advisor but does meet with the president on occasion.

The Board has a chair and an executive director appointed by the president and, traditionally, has had a permanent executive staff of three to four members. Here, too, the current Board is different. President George W. Bush's PFIAB staff has grown to eight to ten members in his second term. The staff, mainly intelligence experts detailed to the Board from various government agencies, serves as the institutional memory across administrations. These agencies absorb the salaries of those individuals since the PFIAB has no independent budget. Most expenses are administrative, such as travel and office upkeep.

PFIAB membership has fluctuated between six and twenty-one individuals appointed by the president. The vetting process, however, usually involves the White House Office of Presidential Personnel. Various members of the PFIAB, mostly the chair, have made recommendations on appointments. Members of the Board have been drawn from business, science, academia, the military, past practitioners in the fields of international and security affairs, and politicians. Through the Nixon presidency, there was a degree of expertise and continuity as many Board members served across administrations. PFIAB members receive no salary; their compensation is limited to a per diem for the days they meet.

Members take an oath not to divulge classified information that they obtain through their service nor are they allowed to discuss their deliberations on the subjects they review. Their access is unlimited; they can access the intelligence information from all sixteen agencies of the American intelligence community – including the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the DIA, and the National Security Agency (NSA). Throughout the years there has not been any security leak on the part of the members, although there were accusations that the PFIAB leaked to the media the results of the 1976 Team B outside experts' analysis of the Soviet threat. Each Board has access to the resources of the government for expert advice. Boards have also consulted with non-government experts, some of whom have served as paid consultants. In addition, Board members have traveled overseas as part of their fact-finding and investigations. PFIAB members also have the latitude to pursue areas of their own expertise. Leo Cherne, a former chair and an economist, spent extra time and effort dealing with various government agencies on economic intelligence.

[9] Anne L. Armstrong to Leo Cherne, Washington, D.C., September 20, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 1/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; HGARC; Seymour Weiss to Anne Armstrong, Bethesda, MD, September 27, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections: HGARC; Leo Cherne to Anne Armstrong, New York, NY, October 10, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; HGARC; Robert F. Six to Anne L. Armstrong, Los Angeles, CA, October 22, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; HGARC.

The PFIAB has been largely bipartisan, including Democrats and Republicans, and its members have usually shunned overt partisan politics while members. Eisenhower's original Board, for example, was bipartisan and included notable Democrats such as former Virginia Governor and Congressman Colgate Darden, David K.E. Bruce, and Joseph P. Kennedy. There have, however, been some clear exceptions to the general rule. For example, Clark Clifford served as an advisor to President Johnson's 1964 campaign and even helped to draft State of the Union speeches while he was the PFIAB's chair. Anne Armstrong, chair during Reagan's presidency and a close associate of then Vice President Bush, served as the Texas representative of the 1988 Bush for President campaign during her tenure on the PFIAB.

The functioning of the Board depends not only upon the president's direct interest but also on the personal relationship he has with its members, particularly the chair. Each president issues a new executive order, or adopts the existing executive order of his predecessor, authorizing the creation of the Board and listing its mandate. However, each of the mandates has remained basically consistent with the early orders dictated by Eisenhower and Kennedy.

In establishing the Board, Eisenhower was quite explicit regarding its scope and particular function. Eisenhower instructed the Board to examine the gamut of foreign intelligence activities throughout the government but with a particular focus on the CIA. The Board's mandate included evaluating intelligence, personnel, research, funds, security, and the effectiveness of specific activities. Subsequent presidents, in setting up their PFIABs, usually gave a broad generic mandate to review intelligence. President Nixon, however, added a specific charge. A few days after issuing an executive order creating his PFIAB, Nixon tasked it to provide a yearly report on the nuclear threat that the Soviet Union posed.

While the PFIAB is responsible to the president, it does have enough leeway to initiate studies and to respond to concerns expressed by government agencies. Nonetheless, the PFIAB faces the typical bureaucratic problem: opposition by agencies who feel their areas of jurisdiction are being infringed upon. For example, in 1968 the Department of Defense (DOD) opposed a PFIAB proposal to reinstitute an NSC panel to deal with Soviet strategic capabilities. The secretary of defense at the time was Clark Clifford, a former chair of the PFIAB, underscoring the old cliché of "where you sit is where you stand." The PFIAB view, however, was eventually adopted when DOD created the Office of Net Assessment in 1973.

Lessons from the PFIAB's Past

What remains is to determine whether the PFIAB has been able to provide presidents with the type of advice from which they, American intelligence, and the nation can benefit. Board defenders hold that the PFIAB has played and can continue to play a useful role both for the president and for the overall intelligence community. In this view, the PFIAB is uniquely positioned. On the one hand, it has access to all the top secrets of the government; on the other hand, it has direct access without any filters to the president, the ultimate decision-maker. Thus, the PFIAB can serve as an amalgam of whistleblower, conceptual thinker, advisor, sounding board, or any other role the president envisages. These roles are enhanced by the fact that the Board is unfettered by any bureaucratic links, oversight from other agencies, and limits as to its agenda. Properly configured, the Board has expertise unavailable within the rest of the intelligence community. In short, the Board is positioned to be a powerful and effective tool that supports the president's efforts to implement policies, change organizations, and manage the operations of the intelligence community.

Critics maintain that the Board is duplicative, often populated by individuals who lack real expertise, highly politicized with many political appointees who lack the time and resources to consider issues in real depth, and critically dependent upon the president's commitment to use it. At best, in this view, the PFIAB appears to function merely as a channel for the intelligence community to voice its concerns and to advance its own agendas. In this view, the recommendations that emanate out of the Board are rubber-stamped reports initiated more by the intelligence community rather than by the Board itself. Several NSC advisors we interviewed could not remember anything substantive coming out of the PFIAB nor had any remarkable recollection of their interaction with the Board. It should also be noted that over the years, while various commissions have praised the PFIAB, they have also recommended numerous steps to further enhance its role. Ironically, these recommendations have also raised questions about whether the Board is

actually fulfilling its mission and living up to its potential or whether, in fact, it may be an institution looking for a clearer role.

The key challenge we face is to determine whether the Board has successfully fulfilled its mandate. Presidential statements and evaluations of the PFIAB serve as one indicator of success. However, presidents usually do not make such evaluations, at least not publicly. Evaluations from other senior officials such as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), national security advisor, and secretaries of state and defense are also helpful. Another method of measuring success is to examine the nature and breadth of issues and problems studied by a PFIAB, the Board's recommendations to the president, and the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented. Much of the information about issues studied is available in unclassified form, but specific recommendations and their subsequent implementation are often still classified. Nonetheless, enough unclassified information is available through a variety of open sources to enable us to make a basic evaluation as to whether or not the PFIAB of a specific president was successful.

Using those criteria and evidence, we are able to conclude that each PFIAB has been generally successful in fulfilling its mandate under a president's executive order. We illustrate this conclusion in the following discussions of each president's PFIAB. Of course, it is impossible to speculate what would have happened if there were no PFIABs. Each president could have used existing agencies or appointed ad hoc outside advisory bodies to provide studies and recommendations, but there is no way of knowing if such studies would have produced recommendations as thorough, objective, and non-partisan as those generally provided by the Board. We have enough evidence to conclude that the PFIAB has provided valuable advice and recommendations on sensitive issues, including intelligence failures, to each president except for President Carter who did not have a PFIAB. Many of these recommendations have been implemented by the presidents.

Historical Overview of the PFIAB

The history of the PFIAB can be divided into two phases with the Carter years serving as a dividing point. The early PFIABs fit the mold of a disciplined professional advisory board. This period included the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations. During these years the Board's membership was small, averaging about eight to ten members. Board members were prominent individuals, many with substantial U.S. government experience and with certain managerial or technical skills that were relevant to intelligence matters. These early Boards, reflecting the intensifying technological race between East and West and the growing sophistication of intelligence collection, tended to focus upon science and technology issues and their roles in intelligence. The Boards also met on a fairly regular basis with the president. This was important both for the Board's own standing within the intelligence community as well as for maintaining the president's focus and interest in the Board's activities.

The Eisenhower and Kennedy years were instrumental in the development of the PFIAB. During these administrations much of the groundwork was laid for the future functioning of the PFIAB. It was involved in numerous studies, most notably the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These two studies established the precedent for using the PFIAB as an investigative body to study the causes of past intelligence and policy failures, thus moving it away from any future policy-making role.

The Reagan Administration revived the PFIAB following its disestablishment under the Carter Administration, thus ushering in the second historical phase of the Board. Indeed, the Reagan team made Carter's failure to reconstitute the PFIAB a campaign theme, holding it up as emblematic of the intelligence and foreign policy failures of the Carter presidency. This, however, turned out to be more of a political ploy, aimed at questioning Carter's ability to conduct foreign policy and not necessarily an indication of Reagan's support of the PFIAB. In fact, Reagan did not establish his own Board until October of 1981, almost a year into his first administration. And once he did, he appointed as members a large number of individuals with little intelligence-related experience. This action set a precedent for future presidents. Indeed, after Reagan, subsequent presidents would either reduce their use of the Board (George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush during his first term) or further politicize it (Clinton).

There are three broad areas that the PFIAB has addressed over the years. First, the Board has long concerned itself with the impact of new technologies or innovative modes of organization on the collection and analysis of intelligence. Second, the Board has also tried to analyze political developments, such as the famous Team B study of Soviet Cold War intentions. Finally, upon occasion the Board has served as an instrument of crisis management, whether undertaking a critical postmortem after the Bay of Pigs debacle or bringing to the president's attention a major failure of leadership in the intelligence community as it reportedly did in the case of DCI Porter Goss. In the following pages we examine the role of the PFIAB in each administration.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

It is ironic that the first PFIAB, called the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA), was primarily created by President Eisenhower in January 1956 to head off an effort led by Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) to mandate congressional oversight of the CIA and American intelligence. The effort to impose congressional oversight of American intelligence failed at the time thanks to lobbying efforts by the Senate's ruling inner club with help from the DCI. Congressional oversight would eventually be established in the mid-1970s by both the House and the Senate. By then, the PFIAB had become well established as an advisory board to advise presidents on strategic and policy issues facing the CIA and the American intelligence community.

Eisenhower created the Board by issuing Executive Order 10656. Its initial membership was limited to eight. They included leading or former businessmen, military officers, diplomats, politicians, and educators. But Eisenhower also appointed to the Board some of the same leading scientists and engineers whom he had previously tapped to work closely with the CIA and the private sector in the development of the highly successful U-2 reconnaissance platform. Such a combination of expertise became a model for efforts to stimulate new technology to enhance the performance of American intelligence. There were no blatant cases of political cronyism in these appointments as there were in some future Boards, particularly the first Reagan Board. The small number of Board members would become another characteristic of future successful Boards, also in contrast to the large number of members on the unwieldy first Reagan Board.

The PBCFIA produced forty-two separate recommendations for the president and the DCI before Eisenhower left office. The president approved thirty-three of the recommendations, and while most of the Board's agendas are still classified, it is possible to identify some significant achievements. Twenty-two of the Board's recommendations were aimed at trying to get the DCI to exercise greater management of the intelligence community. This would be a common thread of future Boards and most future presidents as well. Subsequent DCIs, such as John McCone, embraced efforts to increase the DCI's role as manager of the intelligence community. But Eisenhower's DCI, Allen Dulles, with his collegial style of management resisted this effort. An example of an intelligence community initiative established just before Eisenhower left office was the new joint CIA-Military National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). It remained a very successful intelligence community operation until the late 1990s. The PBCFIA also recommended creating a new unified United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Yet, as we have seen under other presidents, the actual role and effectiveness of the DCI as intelligence community manager would depend as much on the attitude of the president, his national security advisor, and others, such as the secretaries of state and defense, as well as to the wording of executive orders.

In our view, the PBCFIA was successful under Eisenhower because of his deep knowledge and experience with intelligence during the Second World War and his support of the work of the DCI, the intelligence community, as well as the PBCFIA. The fact that Eisenhower's Board was small and competent and that its chair, Dr. James Killian, had Eisenhower's full confidence were also important reasons for success. Although the success of future Boards cannot be mandated or legislated, success can be achieved based on example. The Eisenhower Board remains as an example of an effective Board and a model for future Boards.

John F. Kennedy

The failure of the CIA Bay of Pigs covert action operation in April 1961 acted as a catalyst for President Kennedy's decision to re-establish the Board which he did by Executive Order 10938 on May 4, 1961. The language of the order was very similar to the executive order issued by Eisenhower, but Kennedy's order re-named the Board the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It also differed in another respect: Kennedy's order said the Board members should be appointed by the president from "among persons outside Government and on the basis of ability, experience, and knowledge of matters relating to the national defense and security." Kennedy's order also stipulated that the Board should, in its advisory duties, conduct a "continuing review and assessment of all functions of CIA" and other agencies in the intelligence community. This language authorized the PFIAB to review American intelligence activities without having to wait for presidential direction and requests.

Notwithstanding the stipulation in the executive order that members be selected from outside government, Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor as a military representative of the president with a joint appointment to the PFIAB. Taylor soon left the PFIAB but was subsequently reappointed to concurrent PFIAB and other government duties by President Johnson. Because the PFIAB and the executive order creating it are initiatives of the president, there is no real accountability if or when the president decides to violate it by making such concurrent appointments. Our report, however, highlights the problems that such appointments can create, particularly within the government bureaucracy which views itself being circumvented by the close personal relationship individual officials may enjoy with the president. This problem was clearly evident during the Johnson Administration when PFIAB Chair Clark Clifford simultaneously served in a number of political roles as well.

While the Bay of Pigs certainly provided a catalyst for quickly bringing the PFIAB into being, Kennedy clearly intended all along for the PFIAB to act as a key advisor on intelligence matters, especially regarding oversight of the intelligence community and covert action. Indeed, issues involving covert action were discussed at twenty-one of the twenty-five PFIAB meetings during Kennedy's presidency. This is not surprising given that the administration was deeply involved in numerous covert action programs around the world at the time, including efforts to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Kennedy also wanted scientific talent to strengthen the gathering of hard intelligence and desired that the Board serve as the president's watchdog over the government's foreign intelligence activities.

It is understandable that intelligence shortcomings in the Bay of Pigs failure spurred Kennedy's interest in receiving continuing advice from the PFIAB, particularly on covert action. But Kennedy also commissioned a separate study of the Bay of Pigs operation by General Maxwell Taylor. Another example of having more than one study conducted of intelligence failures occurred in 1985 when President Reagan commissioned a separate study of the Soviet technical penetration of the new American embassy in Moscow, in addition to the PFIAB's review of this same counterintelligence failure.

Kennedy, like Eisenhower, kept his PFIAB small, appointing only seven members initially. He reappointed Killian as chair and added two military officers (James Doolittle and Maxwell Taylor), three corporate leaders, and an academic with WWII intelligence experience in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Three of these men – Killian, Doolittle, and William Langer – had previously served on the Eisenhower Board.

The PFIAB made recommendations to strengthen the role of the DCI as chief intelligence officer of the United States, which pleased the new DCI John McCone who wanted to exercise real management of the intelligence community. With the backing of the president and support from PFIAB recommendations, McCone and the Board achieved significant results by harnessing the power of American science and technology in support of American intelligence needs. McCone established a Directorate of Research in the CIA which became the Directorate of Science and Technology in 1963, and the DIA was created in 1961, also as a result of PFIAB urging. The PFIAB also recommended a new agreement be reached between the DCI and the secretary of defense to improve the operation of the important NRO.

The PFIAB played no role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the defining event of the Cold War. This lack of involvement would also become an enduring characteristic of future Boards which simply do not

meet often enough to play a role in managing an ongoing crisis. However, in one of the most important reports ever issued by any PFIAB, the Board reviewed the Cuban Missile Crisis and determined that there had been insufficient clandestine agent intelligence collection operations in Cuba. The Board also criticized the lack of U-2 flights over Cuba in the six weeks prior to discovering the SS-4 missiles. While the PFIAB concluded that it could not establish the existence of a policy that prevented overflying areas of Cuba where surface-to-air missiles were present, it reported that the CIA and others did believe that such a restriction prevailed. We know now from a memoir written by Dino Brugioni, a senior NPIC official, that this restriction was in fact imposed by senior policy officials at the White House. But according to the Board, the way intelligence indicators were improperly analyzed and reported during the Soviet build-up may well be "the most serious flaw in our intelligence system." The result was a failed Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that wrongly predicted that the Soviets would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. Once the offensive missiles were discovered, however, the PFIAB said the intelligence community performed in an outstanding fashion.

The Kennedy PFIAB was successful in fulfilling the role for which it was created. In many respects, it followed the example of the Eisenhower Board. Both presidents had a strong interest in and understanding of intelligence. Kennedy followed Eisenhower's example by appointing a small Board with highly competent members without blatant political cronyism, even reappointing Eisenhower's chair. In the end, Kennedy's PFIAB submitted a total of 170 recommendations to the president, of which the president approved 125, disapproved 2, and deferred action on 43. The sheer number and wide range of serious intelligence issues and problems that were involved clearly suggest that Kennedy's PFIAB was productive and successful.

Lyndon B. Johnson

After Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson chose to extend Kennedy's Executive Order 10938 as the authorizing document for the PFIAB and to keep the same membership. Clark Clifford was then the chair of the eight member Board, having succeeded Killian in April 1963. Johnson was not as intimately associated with the Board as Kennedy. He attended fewer PFIAB meetings during his presidency than Kennedy, who met with the Board at least twelve times. Johnson preferred a low profile Board that would not set off "explosions in the intelligence field, and any resignations in heat by any members of the Intelligence Community."[10] Johnson relied more on individual Board members whom he would send on missions to different parts of the world. Chair Clifford met Johnson one-on-one to discuss intelligence and domestic political matters for which the president sought his advice. In effect, he was a political advisor as well as PFIAB chair, even participating in Johnson's successful election campaign in 1964 and drafting State of the Union speeches.

In his capacity as PFIAB chair, Clifford traveled to Vietnam in 1965 to communicate to personnel in the field that the president needed improved intelligence reporting on the situation in Southeast Asia. Sixteen recommendations were subsequently made and assigned to various government agencies, but Clifford later admitted that these recommendations did not have much effect. The government bureaucracy evidently resented his intrusion into the traditional roles performed by the secretary of state, the DCI, and the secretary of defense. Despite this setback, the breadth of the issues studied by the Johnson PFIAB was impressive. For example, the Board reviewed the audio penetration of the American embassy in Moscow, the routing and analysis of intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the Soviet penetration of NSA through recruitment of a courier, Sergeant Jack Dunlap. The Board also studied the Israeli attack on USS *Liberty* in June 1967, the North Korean capture of USS *Pueblo* in January 1968, the quality of intelligence leading up to the Tet Offensive in January 1968, the quality of intelligence prior to the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Soviet and Chinese science and technology developments.

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[10] Memorandum for the File, Board Meeting, October 1-2, 1964, JFK Assassination Record Review Board, PFIAB CD-ROM, P 1.

PFIAB recommendations led to the creation of the Defense Attaché system in 1964. As previously noted, the Directorate of Science and Technology was created by the DCI within the CIA at the urging of the PFIAB. In response to several PFIAB reports and recommendations, the intelligence community began to plan and develop a computer-based system for managing, storing, and disseminating intelligence information. In August 1965, an agreement was finalized on the future management of the NRO which outlined the different responsibilities of the secretary of defense and the DCI. The Board also made recommendations to improve intelligence reporting on the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese leadership, and the plans and intentions of the People's Republic of China in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. Finally, the Board suggested measures to improve U.S. counterintelligence.

The close relationship between President Johnson and PFIAB Chair Clark Clifford was probably one reason why the Board took on as many issues as it did and why so many PFIAB recommendations were implemented. Although the Board primarily submitted its reports and communications via the national security advisor, Clifford's access enabled him to go directly to the president. In 1965, Johnson also concurrently appointed Maxwell Taylor to the PFIAB and as his special consultant to the president on Vietnam. The Board's close relationship with key officials of the U.S. intelligence community also helped advance its work. On the downside, while Johnson utilized the PFIAB, he met with it less often than did Eisenhower or Kennedy, and thus began a disconnect between the president and the Board that became worse with future presidents. Johnson also blurred the institutional role of the PFIAB, relying more on his personal contacts with many of his individual PFIAB appointees than with the Board as a whole.

Richard M. Nixon

President Nixon issued his Executive Order 11460 on March 20, 1969. It superseded Kennedy's order, which Johnson had continued. It generally tasked the PFIAB to advise the president on the overall intelligence effort, to conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence activities, and to report to the president its findings and make recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the foreign intelligence effort. It also directed the DCI and all department heads to cooperate with the Board. Separately, one key innovation was to task the Board to provide an annual independent assessment of the Soviet nuclear threat as a supplement to the regular assessments made by the intelligence community. This latter requirement is not surprising given Nixon's service as vice president under Eisenhower during the bomber and missile gap scares of the late 1950s.

According to Wheaton Byers, the PFIAB executive secretary from 1973 to 1977, Nixon was initially very engaged with the Board and seemed to value its advice.[11] In the beginning, Nixon kept the PFIAB small, with ten members. Six of them, including General Taylor as chair, were holdovers from the Johnson Board. Newcomers included Nelson Rockefeller, Admiral George Anderson, Dr. Franklin Murphy and attorney Franklin Lincoln. When Taylor resigned in April 1970, Nixon named Admiral Anderson as the new chair and long-time advisor and former Texas Governor John B. Connally to fill Taylor's vacancy. Other appointments included noted nuclear physicist Dr. Edward Teller. Thus, the Nixon Board had a diversity of members in line with previous PFIABs.

Once the Watergate scandal broke, the president and his staff not surprisingly lost interest in independent advisory boards. On November 9, 1972, four members and the executive secretary of the PFIAB submitted their resignations. Replacements continued to represent persons from a mixture of backgrounds, including the private sector, a nuclear weapons expert, a noted economist, former Congresswoman and U.S. Ambassador Clare Booth Luce, and future Secretary of State George Shultz. Shultz's appointment in 1974 brought the Board to a total of twelve.

The Nixon Board met two days every other month, in line with previous PFIABs. They met a total of thirty-five times during Nixon's presidency. Nixon himself met with the Board eight times in his office, though it is unclear how often National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with the Board. A majority of the Board's correspondence and memoranda went to Kissinger who then passed it on to the

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[11] Phone interview with authors, May 8, 2006.

president or other interested parties. Kissinger wrote to DCI Richard Helms and the secretaries of state and defense stating that the PFIAB would review any major change in intelligence community programs and capabilities. But, according to Wheaton Byers, Kissinger kept the Board at arm's length because it was a threat to his own power. He said that Kissinger often attempted to minimize the Board's influence. There were several times, however, when General Taylor and Admiral Anderson wrote directly to the president. Although most of the reports and recommendations from the PFIAB are still classified, open source material does indicate many of the topics studied by the PFIAB. These issues included the Soviet threat, information handling, economic intelligence, and human intelligence.

Individuals or small groups of PFIAB members often traveled abroad on behalf of the president. Nelson Rockefeller traveled to Latin America and conveyed observations and recommendations; four other members, including Admiral Anderson, made a fact-finding trip in 1970 to Southeast Asia. Their only known recommendation was to better publicize a program to assist American prisoners of war who had escaped or were released.

Nixon's PFIAB divided itself into a series of panels composed of members with special knowledge or experience in a particular field. There was an information handling panel, a naval panel which had the task of advising the president on how to achieve his goal of keeping the U.S. Navy second-to-none, a technical panel which addressed topics such as nuclear weapons and intelligence collection, a China panel, and a science panel. This arrangement helped to keep members interested in meetings and topics covered.

Notwithstanding the rapid turnover at the DCI level and the growing Watergate scandal, PFIAB Chair Admiral Anderson believed that the Board still had a strong relationship with the intelligence community. Records indicate that the DCI and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) attended a number of PFIAB meetings, often to give briefings or answer questions. It appears that the intelligence community respected the Board and took its requests seriously. Thus, even though the president had less interest and time to devote to intelligence and there was lack of leadership continuity at the DCI level, the PFIAB was able to continue to function because of a continuing cooperative relationship with the CIA and the intelligence community. The PFIAB acquired much of the information on which it based its assessment and recommendations from an annual CIA report which the Board requested. This report was a summary of the past year's events. It included changes in the CIA's mission or operating environment, major successes and failures over the past twelve months, and agency plans for the future.

The PFIAB made a total of seventy recommendations during Nixon's presidency which included that the government centralize its handling of intelligence information under the DCI, that the president oppose 1972 legislation that would require keeping Congress better informed of intelligence issues, that better economic intelligence should be collected by foreign service officers and the CIA, that the CIA should recruit operations officers with more linguistic and ethnic diversity and leave officers in foreign countries longer than a two-year assignment, and that the CIA recommendation to use an electro-optical imaging system in American spy satellites be adopted instead of the DOD proposal to continue using film cameras. The president approved the CIA imaging system recommendation after Edwin Land, president of Polaroid and a PFIAB member, supported it.

The Nixon PFIAB started out on a path similar to previous Boards. It continued to study important issues and convey useful recommendations, even when Watergate began to affect the president and his administration. Still, it appears that the majority of the studies and recommendations were made before the president had to face the full force of the Watergate scandal. Subsequently, there were indications that Nixon sought to politicize the PFIAB by asking its members to speak out publicly on security issues. Fortunately, the members refused as it would have certainly called into question the Board's integrity.

Gerald R. Ford

Gerald Ford took office after Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. He continued Nixon's Executive Order 11460 as the mandate for his PFIAB. He came to depend heavily upon the Board as allegations of intelligence improprieties became widespread. Senator Frank Church (R-ID) led the investigation in the Senate and Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY) paralleled the effort in the House. These efforts eventually led to

the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in May 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in July 1977. These committees would henceforth provide oversight of all U.S. intelligence activities and agencies. There is some irony in this. President Eisenhower initially created his Board to head off congressional oversight of the CIA and the intelligence community.

Still, it is remarkable that in the midst of scandal, the PFIAB and its mission as a private advisory body to the president survived intact. It is also interesting that while the House and the Senate created permanent committees to conduct continuing and rigorous oversight of the intelligence community, they chose not to challenge the established advisory role of the PFIAB.

In the face of congressional investigations, President Ford finally issued Executive Order 11905 on February 18, 1976, which redefined intelligence operations, banned assassinations, and increased oversight activities. This order included the creation of the new Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) which was charged with investigating the legality of intelligence community activities. The IOB under Ford was not a part of the PFIAB, although its three members could also be members of the Board. The executive order kept the duties of the PFIAB the same as under President Nixon. It was to continue as a part-time advisory body of private citizens, responsive to the president alone. It was not to have a watchdog function which was the job of the new IOB.

The initial Ford Board retained eleven Nixon members and then grew to a total of seventeen with new appointments even though Admiral Anderson told White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld that he thought the ideal Board should be limited to twelve members. The Board met two days every other month. There was no barrier to the chair or a member individually meeting with the president if necessary, but full Board meetings with him were rare. The Board considered topics assigned by the president and continued to initiate other projects on its own. Panels continued to play an important part in the Board's activities.

Archival research produced no specific PFIAB recommendations, no final reports, and no documentation of implementation of recommendations because all of these documents remain classified. But we do know the nature and scope of the issues studied by the Board. These issues included the quality of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the role of economic intelligence, the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) in learning the intentions of foreign governments and leaders, the rise of international terrorism, the use of telecommunications for intelligence purposes, postmortem investigations, and projecting future technological needs.

In contrast to previous Boards, the Ford PFIAB focused less on technology and its intelligence uses and more on the analysis of foreign states' intentions and various political and economic issues. This gradual shift was marked by the Team A – Team B exercise of 1976-1977. As a result of the PFIAB dissatisfaction with the quality of a specific NIE on the Soviet Union, newly appointed DCI George H.W. Bush agreed in May 1976 to a competitive analysis of Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions.

Under this experiment, the Board and the CIA agreed to create a CIA team (A) and a team of non-government experts (B) to examine the Soviet threat in three areas: low altitude air defense, ICBM accuracy, and overall Soviet strategic objectives. Team B took a hard-line stance on the USSR's intentions and capabilities and concluded that the CIA had consistently underestimated Soviet capabilities and objectives.

The Team B portion of the exercise undermined CIA morale as it seemed to many in the intelligence community to be a blatantly political exercise. Indeed, the leaks of the Team B analysis angered DCI Bush, and accusations flew that the PFIAB was the source of the leaks. The DCI later told an NSC meeting that the competitive analysis seemed like a good idea at the time, but that he did not think it would go public. As a result he felt that he had been "had" and recommended that the competitive analysis program not be institutionalized. No doubt, this experience colored Bush's view of the PFIAB and most likely increased his reluctance to form the Board early in his own presidential term.

The broad scope of the issues studied by the PFIAB is further illustrated by the questions that the Board answered for the president in its annual year-end report meeting held October 7-8, 1976. These questions included identifying future major intelligence requirements of policy makers out to 1985, determining what the intelligence community needed to do to respond to policy maker requirements,

proposing what major conceptual and technological innovations were likely to emerge or might be invented during this period, prioritizing what research and development (R & D) efforts the United States needed to pursue given current intelligence needs and requirements, identifying regions of instability, and pushing to expand open diplomatic and scientific collection of information. In addition, the Board advised the president on whether he should claim executive privilege in the case of AT&T cooperation with the NSA and the FBI in domestic surveillance operations. The Board also reviewed the operation by the Glomar Explorer expedition to salvage a sunken Soviet Golf-II class submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Finally, the Board studied improving HUMINT and concluded that identifying necessary reforms was too large a task for it to undertake effectively.

Outgoing DCI Bush offered his assessment of the PFIAB during the Ford Administration in a letter he wrote to Cherne dated January 17, 1977. In it, he expressed his appreciation for the work done by the PFIAB and endorsed its continuation. Bush concluded that "we wrestled with new problems and new threats to our ability to fulfill our mission. The Board's contribution to these activities, through its advice to me and its recommendations to the President, has been significant."[12]

Jimmy Carter

President Carter abolished the PFIAB with his Executive Order 11984 on May 4, 1977, but he decided that the IOB would be retained with new members. A number of factors apparently influenced this decision. Carter's DCI, Stansfield Turner, explained that if Carter had kept the PFIAB, its membership would have had to be completely changed as Turner thought the Ford Board was too right wing and would not work well with a Democrat president. To replace the Ford members completely would have been too cumbersome a task.

Carter did not have strong feelings on the matter. According to Turner, the president left the decision to him as the new DCI. Turner did not believe he needed a Board that might interfere in his domain. Furthermore, the CIA scandals of the 1970s had led to the creation of the Senate and House intelligence committees. Turner said that he saw no need for the PFIAB since he had both the SSCI and the HPSCI overseeing him. The Carter Administration, therefore, concluded that there was sufficient oversight and that the PFIAB was just another bureaucratic layer. In addition, Carter believed that the overhauled NSC could handle the tasks of the PFIAB.[13] Of course, this reflects a misunderstanding of the PFIAB as it was never intended to oversee the DCI. The PFIAB was a part-time advisory body to the president, and it was to the president, and not the DCI, that the Board reported. A Carter White House transition study project noted that if the president decided later that he needed such a Board, it could be reconstituted quickly.

Indeed, in the wake of the Iranian take-over of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, the Carter Administration explored the possibility of re-establishing the Board as an independent entity to examine the chain of events that had led to the hostage ordeal. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly approached former Ford PFIAB Chair Leo Cherne late in the Carter Administration about reconstituting the PFIAB after the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran. Carter's change of heart about the PFIAB was motivated by the desire to deflect congressional action after the failed rescue operation. In the end, Carter decided to postpone any action until after the 1980 election. In any case, Cherne declined and Carter was defeated in 1980 by Ronald Reagan.

Ronald Reagan

President Reagan re-established the PFIAB by Executive Order 12331 on October 20, 1981. During the presidential campaign in an effort to portray Carter's foreign policy as weak, Reagan had criticized Carter for not having a PFIAB. Reagan's attack appears to have been more a political ploy than a serious policy position given that it took Reagan almost a year in office before he created his PFIAB.

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[12] Letter from DCI Bush to Leo Cherne, January 17, 1977, Folder "PFIAB Termination (1)", Box 6, Leo Cherne Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.

[13] Turner interview, June 2, 2006.

Part of the delay was the result of an internal debate over who should serve as chair of the Board: Leo Cherne or Anne Armstrong. Cherne was a long-time member who well understood the PFIAB's role. Armstrong, a stalwart of Republican politics, was regarded as a novice to the world of intelligence. Armstrong eventually became chair and Cherne served as the vice chair.

The idea to reestablish the Board had support from several key individuals in his new administration including Reagan's first National Security Advisor Richard Allen and William Casey who was Reagan's campaign manager and subsequently his first DCI. The PFIAB was authorized to review all American intelligence organizations and was required to report at least twice a year on its findings. Reagan's executive order also specified which agencies and persons could request input from the PFIAB; these included the CIA and the DCI.

Reagan initially appointed nineteen persons to his PFIAB, many more than the usual ten to twelve of previous Boards. It was apparent that this Board would be more political than previous PFIABs, but it did have some members with extensive experience in intelligence and national security. These included former Nixon and Ford PFIAB members such as Cherne. Political appointees included Alfred Bloomingdale, Frank Borman, and Tom Moorer who had little experience with, or substantive knowledge of, intelligence. The Board expanded its membership considerably, reaching twenty-one members at one point and, thus, making the Board unwieldy. Compounding this problem was the fact that many appointees did not possess any obvious qualifications for membership. Indeed, under Reagan, membership on the Board was initially treated as a political plum which Reagan gave friends and loyal political supporters.

Despite this inauspicious beginning, Armstrong eventually proved to be an effective chair. At one point, she threatened to resign if a certain purely political appointment was made. Ultimately, the individual was not appointed. Armstrong extended her influence to be able to influence the appointments of other members and had a say in up to six of them. Armstrong thought that the initial Board was too large and used her access to convince Reagan and National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane to reduce the size of the Board from twenty-one members down to ten. The eleven members cut received their termination letters on November 1, 1985, in what was referred to as the "Halloween Massacre." Two weeks later, new appointments brought the total back up to fourteen. The new members were more qualified than some earlier appointments, and the Board was leaner and more effective after the reduction. In January 1988, Reagan issued Executive Order 12624 which authorized expansion of the Board to sixteen members, the number it remained at for the rest of his presidency. Most members were prominent individuals with a wide variety of experience that contributed to the PFIAB's advisory role. There remained, however, several who apparently were appointed primarily by virtue of their friendship with the president. According to CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates, Armstrong did a good job of managing such a large two-tiered Board of experts and political appointees.[14]

There are conflicting opinions about DCI Casey's attitude toward the PFIAB. Some thought that Casey's secretive nature would lead him to try to keep the Board, along with everyone else, uninformed about CIA activities. But according to Gates, Casey embraced the Board. Casey supported the Board's reestablishment and also had friends on the Board, such as his long-term collaborator Vice Chair Cherne. From time to time, Casey may have had a "mind your own business" attitude, but this was his view of anyone who tried to interfere with his activities as DCI.

The Board met every other month for two days at the White House. The Board also traveled and held meetings and briefings in locations such as the Strategic Air Command and Silicon Valley. The DCI routinely briefed the PFIAB at every meeting. Usually the PFIAB raised issues to be studied, but occasionally the president and the national security advisor would assign them. DCI Casey also regularly consulted with the Board about issues he thought it should pursue.

President Reagan never attended a formal meeting of the PFIAB. On numerous occasions, however, individual Board members did meet with the president in the White House to discuss their studies and their recommendations. According to records kept by Cherne, during his first term, Reagan met perhaps more frequently with PFIAB members but for shorter periods of time than some of his predecessors.

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[14] Gates interview, April 12, 2006.

Vice President Bush attended at least one meeting of the Board in 1984. Normally, the PFIAB would send its written reports to the NSC for review by the national security advisor, before going to the president.

Armstrong established a set of subcommittees, and under her leadership, the PFIAB itself initiated many of the investigations and studies it undertook. One such issue was the discovery in 1985 that the new American embassy under construction in Moscow was full of listening devices placed by Soviet construction workers. In its 1987 report, the PFIAB recommended spending $79 million to use advanced technology to purge the new embassy of these devices. It also recommended transferring embassy security from the State Department to a new agency reporting to the secretary of state. Reagan, however, appointed a second outside panel of experts headed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to study the problem, and they recommended destroying the top three floors of the new embassy and rebuilding them while constructing a brand new six-story building to house sensitive operations. Ultimately, the Reagan Administration implemented neither recommendation. The Clinton Administration later decided to follow the advice of the Schlesinger panel to destroy and rebuild the bugged floors.

The PFIAB also investigated the 1985 defection and re-defection of Soviet KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko. In its 1987 report, the Board criticized the CIA's handling of the defection. Also in 1985, nine U.S. individuals were arrested for conducting espionage against the United States. Six had been espionage agents working for the Soviet Union, one had spied for Communist China, one had been an agent for Israel, and another had provided information to the Ghanaian government. Finally, the Board examined the defection to the Soviet Union of CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. In all these cases, the PFIAB made recommendations for improving procedures at the CIA and the FBI.

The Board also dealt with numerous issues of economic intelligence. Under Cherne's guidance, the adequacy of intelligence on the issue of strategic resources was the primary focus of the Board's investigation. The Board likewise looked at the intelligence side of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the possible military applications of the space shuttle, concluding that it had very little potential for military uses. The Board also spent considerable time and effort assessing other issues, including the state of the Soviet economy, the legitimacy of new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, Soviet plans and intentions concerning the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), assessment of Soviet fears that the U.S. was planning a nuclear first strike against the USSR, the security of U.S. government communications in Washington, D.C., leaks of classified information, the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, the need for super computers in the U.S. government, the military's lack of tactical intelligence during the invasion of Grenada in 1983, and the counterintelligence problem of Cuban double agents.

Most of the actual PFIAB reports and recommendations remain classified. However, from the unclassified information accessible and from the wide array of intelligence issues that the Board studied, the Reagan PFIAB was clearly a success after the reorganization of the Board in the second term. According to the assessment of senior officials we interviewed, from the reports and recommendations available and from the number and variety of issues tackled, clearly the PFIAB performed an important function. No other advisory panel in the government had such a wide variety of independent, objective, non-bureaucratic, and mostly non-partisan expertise which it could apply to the intelligence problems that surfaced during the Reagan presidency.

George H.W. Bush

President George H.W. Bush was not favorably disposed towards the PFIAB. Thus, the Board lay dormant for the first eighteen months of his presidency. Bush made no changes to the Reagan-appointed Board, issued no new executive order, and the staff continued its work only on projects launched during the Reagan Administration. There is no evidence of meetings or any new taskings. Subsequently, Bush trimmed the Board's membership to six but still did not regard it as a major part of his intelligence or national security policy team.

Some of Bush's apparently negative attitude toward the PFIAB can be attributed to his experiences as DCI under President Ford. As DCI, Bush had agreed to the PFIAB idea of outside experts known as Team B analyzing Soviet military capabilities, but the leaking of the study to the press angered him. As vice

president, Bush also saw what he regarded as meddling by the Board in the START negotiations. Bush, who preferred to work with a small group of trusted individuals, may also have regarded the PFIAB as a threat to the secrecy that is possible when working with a small trusted group. To prevent leaks in his own administration, Bush was prone to omit the Board from important discussions. In addition, Bush's own experience in foreign affairs, his close relationship with his Secretary of State James Baker, and his reliance on National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft made reliance on an outside advisory board unnecessary. A former cabinet official, reflecting upon his long service in various positions in a number of different administrations, told us that he thought the PFIAB was not of much use except as a place to appoint people as a political reward. He said that he did not know of a single example of the PFIAB doing anything that improved U.S. intelligence. He further said that there were already too many overlapping organizations in American intelligence. Other senior members of President Bush's new administration also were skeptical of the Board.

Much like Eisenhower, though, Bush may have been forced to reconstitute the Board because of pressure from Congress. Senator David Boren (D-OK), in particular, as chair of the Senate intelligence committee, sought to exercise greater congressional oversight of intelligence. Putting the PFIAB in place signaled the administration's willingness to monitor itself. One former member recalls that Senator Boren told President Bush that the SSCI would push for legislation requiring a PFIAB if Bush did not appoint one himself. Former PFIAB Chair Anne Armstrong and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft also reportedly helped to persuade the president not to abolish it. Former DCI Gates recalls that Bush was told it was important to keep the Board, but to reconstitute it along the Eisenhower model of only four to six members, and heavily skewed toward individuals with scientific and technical backgrounds. Using the existing Reagan executive order, in June 1990 President Bush restructured the Board by reducing it to six members who were experts in science, intelligence, and foreign policy issues. Of the fifteen members of the Reagan Board, only one remained after the restructuring. In addition to keeping the membership small, Bush reduced the scope of the Board's work.

After the first Gulf War, this new Board undertook an influential study of the uses of intelligence in battlefield conditions which helped to strengthen the cooperation of the intelligence agencies and helped to more clearly identify intelligence needs. Still, on significant issues such as reform of the CIA and the intelligence community, President Bush chose not to use the PFIAB, but to rely instead upon his NSC and the DCI. It is striking how many intelligence issues were reviewed during the administration by entities other than the PFIAB. For instance, an agenda for intelligence reform was drafted by Robert Gates while he was deputy national security advisor and implemented by him when he became DCI with apparently no PFIAB input.[15]

William J. Clinton

President Clinton issued a new Executive Order 12863 which authorized a PFIAB membership of up to sixteen persons. He reportedly wanted an expanded Board, in excess of the number previously thought to be manageable by earlier presidents and Board chairs, to help accommodate the placement of political appointments such as Zoe Baird, his failed nominee for attorney general. PFIAB members were also limited to serving two-year terms, presumably to insure that there would be regular vacancies to use as a political reward.

Clinton also made the IOB a standing committee of the PFIAB. All IOB members would be PFIAB members, and the chair of the IOB would be selected by the PFIAB chair. Thus, even the IOB would be run by people politically loyal to President Clinton. One example was John Shelby Bryan, a wealthy Board member from 1999-2001. Throughout the 1990s, Bryan acted as one of the chief fund-raisers for Clinton's presidential campaigns.

Under Clinton, the PFIAB met every six weeks, completing much of its work outside of formal meetings. From 1993 to 2001, the Board reportedly produced eighty-five reports at the request of the president or National Security Advisors Anthony Lake or Samuel Berger.

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[15] Douglas F. Garthoff, *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1946-2005* (Washington, DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 196-203.

Under Clinton the PFIAB conducted a study of the security breaches at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. After the case of Taiwan-born nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee, accused of stealing secrets from the lab for China, was publicized in the media in 1999, Clinton asked the PFIAB to investigate security at the nation's national laboratories. This investigation uncovered a twenty-year history of security and counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories. The PFIAB report identified numerous causes for chronic security and counterintelligence problems and was highly critical of the government's security measures at the weapons lab. In the end, the PFIAB DOE report restructured the national nuclear strategy, safeguard protocols, nonproliferation, and research and development efforts.

Moreover, under Clinton the IOB also conducted a public investigation of CIA activities in Guatemala regarding alleged CIA involvement in the 1990 death of an American citizen and the disappearance of a Guatemalan guerrilla leader in 1992. The IOB also requested the CIA inspector general to investigate all clandestine assets in Guatemala since 1984 for alleged human rights abuses. The IOB found no indication that U.S. government officials were involved in or knew about the disappearance, torture, or death of U.S. or Guatemalan citizens. But the review changed the intelligence community's asset validation system and the manner in which the CIA handled liaison services with suspected human rights abuses.

Unlike previous PFIAB investigations, the DOE and Guatemala reports were published in unclassified format. In the view of a former congressional staffer, the reason Clinton wanted both of these investigations to be conducted in public was to show how the problems involved pre-dated his administration. In so doing, Clinton hoped to inoculate himself from any possible negative political backlash based on these incidents.

Finally, several of the key players on the Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community — Les Aspin, Warren Rudman, Lew Allen, Zoe Baird, Stephen Friedman, Robert Hermann — were PFIAB members. The commission was set up by Congress in 1994 in an effort to review the American intelligence community in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Among its key findings, the commission encouraged closer cooperation among the various components of the intelligence community and deflected growing sentiment in Congress to disband the CIA in the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames spy scandal. This panel was one of the most public and closely watched Board activities in its entire history. While PFIAB member Maurice Sonnenberg lamented that "Clinton didn't listen to the PFIAB," Vice President Al Gore, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, and DCI John Deutch did.[16] So it is fair to say that the PFIAB — via Aspin-Brown — had some influence on the Clinton Administration during the mid-1990s.

Clinton's Board was a hybrid political-expert creation, according to a former Clinton-era senior official we interviewed. The public nature of the Guatemalan and National Laboratory security investigations suggests that Clinton, while concerned with substantive matters covered in the investigations, was just as interested in using his PFIAB as political cover for dealing with sensitive political issues. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it took congressional intervention – in the form of the Aspin-Brown Commission – to get Clinton's PFIAB involved with substantive intelligence reform issues.

George W. Bush

President George W. Bush did not issue a new executive order reconstituting the PFIAB upon taking office, but rather he relied upon Clinton's Executive Order 12863. He did, however, amend that executive order twice. President Bush's May 14, 2003, amendment in Executive Order 13301 simply expanded the maximum possible membership of the IOB from four under Clinton to five. On April 13, 2005, Bush further amended the basic Clinton executive order with Executive Order 13376 which replaced all references to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with the new title Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

During Bush's first term, the PFIAB met only once with the president at its initial formal meeting. The Board's chair, former national security advisor to the first President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, was

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[16] Loch K. Johnson, "The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission," *Studies in Intelligence,* 48, no. 3 (accessed October 22, 2006).

removed as chair at the start of the second term, likely the result of his public questioning of the administration's Iraq strategy.

In Bush's second term, the PFIAB took on a new life, largely due to the major effort at intelligence reorganization that took place. The new DNI John Negroponte met at least once with the Board and made it a habit to have periodic informal conversations with Board Chair Stephen Friedman. The staff grew from the customary three to four to approximately eight to ten, and the Board now reportedly meets on a monthly basis. The chair also now briefs the president verbally on a monthly basis. The Board has been interested in intelligence community-wide issues, with a particular focus on human intelligence, in an effort to help meet the president's goal of increasing this capability by fifty percent. The Board has also been studying the administrative structure of the intelligence community.

Former Secretary of Commerce and PFIAB member Don Evans reportedly played a key role in having CIA Director Porter Goss removed. A consensus developed on the Board regarding what was perceived as the poor performance of Goss. Goss's brief tenure was marked by declining morale and bad management. Evans, a close personal friend of Bush, brought these concerns to the president's attention. While the personal relationship Evans enjoyed with Bush undoubtedly was a key factor in the success of his intervention, Evans would not have had the opportunity nor the credibility to weigh in on this issue if he were not associated with the PFIAB. Clearly, the Goss case reaffirmed the importance of both the PFIAB and of members' personal relationships with the president.

In the final year of his presidency, Bush issued an executive order on February 29, 2008, establishing a reorganized PFIAB. In it, he renamed the Board for the first time since the Kennedy Administration. The newly christened President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) has an upper limit of sixteen members and takes into account the importance of domestic intelligence with regard to the new threat environment. Members of the PIAB cannot be currently employed with the federal government and, as has been traditional, receive no compensation save for per diem and travel expenses. The IOB remains in existence. The president appoints the executive director of the PIAB who can, at the president's desire, serve in the same capacity on the IOB. The new order also directs the PIAB to report its findings to the president and other appropriate intelligence community members (such as the DNI) twice a year and directs the DNI and other department heads to render any necessary information and assistance to the PIAB.

In our preliminary judgment, the George W. Bush Administration's record with the PFIAB is mixed. In the first term, it appears that as the result of the disagreement between PFIAB Chair Brent Scowcroft and the president and other senior officials over the wisdom of the 2003 Iraq war, the PFIAB was hardly consulted at all. How much this under-utilization of the Board contributed to the intelligence failures of the time is uncertain, but one can argue with hindsight that had the Board been more actively involved in advising the Bush Administration about intelligence issues, some of the policy failures could have been avoided. Conversely, there is much evidence that in Bush's second term, the PFIAB has played a much more active role in advising President Bush on a wide variety of issues concerning the ongoing reform of the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war. This follows a general pattern we have seen of some presidents belatedly discovering that the PFIAB is an important source of intelligence advice.

Recommendations

In our judgment, the PFIAB's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. The weaknesses themselves, moreover, can easily be rectified to structure a more effective Board. The PFIAB is a unique presidential asset that, if properly utilized, could help to identify and meet the intelligence challenges that future presidents will invariably encounter. The president needs to have a body that he can rely on to provide advice and guidance on intelligence issues, aside from the intelligence community or the congressional oversight committees.

Only the PFIAB can get the attention of the president, has good access to the president, can leverage the president's authority against the rest of the federal bureaucracy, can operate in a confidential manner outside the glare of public scrutiny, and does not have any institutional interests to protect.

The fact that each president since Eisenhower, save Carter, has created a PFIAB underscores the value that most administrations attribute to such an independent intelligence advisory body. Even Carter belatedly realized the need for such an organization at the end of his administration. Various studies, beginning with the 1975 Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission), have also highlighted the value of the PFIAB and its important role as an independent source of advice for the president on intelligence issues. The Boards have provided useful reports and analyses on topics ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the security leaks at Los Alamos that have helped identify weak procedures or methods in the intelligence community.

In our view, the PFIAB has been least effective when it was involved in resource issues or in ongoing day-to-day operational or crisis issues, such as the first bombing of the World Trade Center. Conversely, the PFIAB has been at its best when it looks ahead, anticipating future technological trends or political developments. The PFIAB should be able to take the initiative and send suggestions to the president and the NSC for the improvement of intelligence policies or activities. It also should be able to provide early warnings, serving in the words of one senior official we interviewed as "a canary in the coal mine" for the president and the intelligence community.

Have all the recommendations of the Boards been accepted or taken into account? The obvious answer is no. Nevertheless, the PFIAB has served not only as an in-house think tank but also as a kitchen cabinet. In this role, the PFIAB serves to lay the groundwork for serious discussion of various issues. For example, in 1976 the Board examined the problem of international terrorism. The topics it examined – non-state and state actors, possible theft of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests – foreshadowed many of the issues that burst onto the national agenda in the wake of 9/11.

Future administrations can take a number of steps to strengthen the PFIAB. Our specific recommendations derive from two sources: the views expressed by those officials, past and present, who were involved with the PFIAB and our own analysis of the historical record of the Board's contributions. Our recommendations are offered with an eye toward strengthening the role of intelligence and to help future presidents use the PFIAB more effectively.

There are seven areas in which the PFIAB can be helpful:
- It can help determine whether intelligence is being used properly.
- It can help ensure that the intelligence collection and assessment process is devoid of any bureaucratic pressures or interests.
- It can ascertain whether or not tasking of the intelligence community is proper and being carried out effectively.
- It can assess whether or not the intelligence community is properly organized.
- It can review past intelligence issues to learn lessons from successes and failures.
- It can identify potential challenges facing the United States, laying the groundwork for intelligence community planning.
- Finally, it can help policy makers think about the implications for intelligence collection and analysis of new technologies and modes of organization employed outside the intelligence community.

Our specific recommendations to help the PFIAB live up to its full potential are divided into three categories: the internal organization of the PFIAB, how the PFIAB should interact with the greater intelligence community, and finally, the role of the president and White House in helping the PFIAB carry out its intended role.

Organizational

Name

One of the problems that the PFIAB faces involves the name of the organization. With the changing nature of intelligence in the wake of 9/11, the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence has become blurred. For instance, the Bush Administration's domestic phone tapping is viewed as a foreign

intelligence activity but also has domestic legal repercussions. In that environment, the adjective "foreign" probably needed to be changed, as the Bush Administration has recently done by removing it from the official title of the Board. Another shortcoming the Board faces is its designation as an "advisory" board. The term "advisory" is limiting, suggesting the non-binding nature of the Board's work and recommendations. While the Board ought not to be given decision-making or operational authority which would undermine the nature of the Board, its position needs to be strengthened vis-à-vis the rest of the intelligence community. It is our recommendation that the Board be renamed the *President's National Intelligence Board (PNIB)*.

Members

The president needs to resist the temptation to make appointments to the Board simply as a payoff to political supporters. Historically, the most successful Boards have contained scientists and other technical specialists (Edwin Land and William O. Baker), general foreign affairs specialists (William Hyland and Henry Kissinger), experts from outside government in business and academia (Stephen Friedman and William Langer), and distinguished political figures (Clare Booth Luce and Anne Armstrong). Members of the Board should have a wide range or mix of backgrounds, but there must be several with extensive in-depth knowledge of the American intelligence community. Other members should have extensive technical and scientific, academic, foreign policy, or military backgrounds. Two to three members of the Board should be career intelligence officers (Admiral Bobby Inman and General Lew Allen).

A particularly important position on the Board is the chair. The president needs to select a chair in whom he has confidence and trust. Ideally, the chair should live in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to provide ready access to the president and the intelligence community. Not only should the chair be an expert in intelligence matters, but he or she should also have the flexibility to participate in the regular bi-monthly meetings of the full Board. The PFIAB can be most effective if it has an activist chair – someone who organizes effectively, demonstrates leadership ability, knows how to run a meeting, commands respect, and speaks with authority. An executive secretary should be appointed who understands intelligence and who can work well with persons in the intelligence community.

Five specific recommendations should be considered:
- Two-year term limits should be established with no reappointments. The term limit is to ensure a rotation of members, thus guaranteeing that the Board will also have a fresh outlook or approach.
- Thought should be given to providing the members of the Senate intelligence committee with courtesy notification of prospective appointments to the Board. Knowing that the Congress is watching more closely may help prevent the PFIAB from becoming a political dumping ground for the president's friends and political supporters who have no other qualifications for membership. The Senate notification process will also raise the visibility and importance of the PFIAB in the eyes of the administration, the intelligence community, and the public. Such a step ensures that candidates have the requisite qualifications for service and can pass the scrutiny of the Senate and public. Senate notifications can be arranged in a manner that would not undermine presidential prerogatives or executive privilege. The Senate intelligence committee can meet with appointees, but this would not be equivalent to Senate confirmation. Another possible approach might involve the administration providing the names of prospective Board members to the committee in a courtesy written communication.
- A procedure needs to be established that defines criteria for selection in order to protect the selection process as much as possible from political needs and cronyism. Certain standards should always be adhered to: the Board should be bipartisan and reflect certain expertise in the six areas of technology, defense, national security, intelligence, management, and economics; members should also be drawn from the private sector and the ranks of past practitioners. This diversity will guarantee a good cross section of bipartisan experts.
- Membership should be fixed. In the first years of existence, the PFIAB appears to have operated efficiently with eight members. PFIAB membership has ranged from a low of six

in George H.W. Bush's Administration to a high of twenty-one under Ronald Reagan. The Board should not exceed ten members. Ten is large enough to ensure broad expertise on the Board but small enough to keep it manageable. A larger Board becomes unwieldy, preventing careful examination of issues. A smaller Board facilitates a certain comfort level among the members that can aid in the Board's functioning.

- The president should avoid appointing members who also concurrently have other management or staff jobs in the president's administration. Appointing individuals to the PFIAB who have concurrent jobs inside the government has led the PFIAB to become involved in ongoing day-to-day operational or crisis issues and situations. Avoiding such involvement was a recommendation made to us by virtually every former official whom we interviewed. If the chair or other Board members concurrently serve in other government positions, there exists a risk that those members would view intelligence issues through the lens of the political interests of the administration. It might also lead them to represent the bureaucratic interests of some department or agency and thereby tarnish the public's image of the Board as an independent advisory body.

These five points should be institutionalized in the next president's PFIAB, thus establishing a precedent to which future presidents will be expected to adhere.

Organization

Part of the problem the PFIAB faces is that its membership is part-time and cannot devote its full attention to issues. Currently, it meets for two days every month. Policy formation and crisis management, however, take place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In addition, while it is important to have highly qualified, expert members, this criterion carries with it some risks. Highly qualified members usually lead active and busy public lives that, along with the limited number of Board meetings, further truncate the amount of time that they can devote to Board business. It may be advisable, therefore, to create an executive committee consisting of the chair and two other members that can assemble as quickly as necessary.

The Board should continue to use small panels to focus on specific issues. These panels could be composed of members, staff, or outside consultants depending on the issue being studied or reviewed. This organization will allow the Board to stay current with pressing issues. In extraordinary circumstances, the Board must have the ability to shift into a full-time mode, if only with a few Board members, staffers, and consultants working on a panel devoted to studying a critical and timely intelligence issue. In addition, the chair or members of the PFIAB, at the discretion of the president, should be included in any NSC meetings, not to assume an operational role in crisis management, but rather to help the Board better understand the nature and dynamics of future such crises. In this manner, the PFIAB will have direct knowledge of a situation, and the advisory role of the Board and the chair, in particular, can be more effective and timely.

Finally, the PFIAB should create a permanent Science Committee that can focus on application of science and technology to intelligence needs. Such a body could provide guidance to efforts like the CIA-backed not-for-profit firm In-Q-Tel that invests in companies that may provide future technologies of use to the intelligence community. This proposed Science Committee should have experts assigned to it from various government agencies who can meet on a regular basis to monitor technological changes in both intelligence collection and analysis. The committee should also issue a report regarding the progress of science in the field of intelligence. This report would be shared with the intelligence community. Technology is an important part of intelligence, but the current approach is too often ad hoc and prevents a detailed long-range examination.

Staff

The Board's staff has been insufficient. An executive director and two or three staffers do not give the PFIAB the resources to stay fully current with events and to maintain a sufficient database. The current Bush Administration's PFIAB staff of eight to ten is a step in the right direction. While the PFIAB can

draw on the personnel and resources of other agencies, this is a poor substitute for a permanent staff that can enhance the Board's institutional memory and independence from bureaucratic influences. The PFIAB needs to have a core of employees hired by and working solely for the PFIAB. The Board also needs to have an independent budget. About half of the PFIAB's staff should be career intelligence, homeland security, or law enforcement officers. We agree with one former chair's recommendation that these staffers ought to leave their home agencies and NOT return after PFIAB assignment. Additionally, outside consultants remain an important talent pool to draw upon to provide needed expertise for specific studies or reviews.

Orientation Training

In addition to appointing knowledgeable members, new members need some form of systematic orientation. Newly appointed members already receive briefings about the intelligence community and the role of the PFIAB. These briefings are conducted by the PFIAB staff and members of the various intelligence agencies. A more formal introduction may be necessary. This introduction should include briefings regarding legal issues, activities of past Boards, and site visits. An introduction to the greater intelligence community, as well as formal functional and geographic briefings on world issues, would also help new members become more productive members of the president's team.

IOB

The IOB should be abolished. Given the oversight roles of the statutory inspectors general and the House and Senate intelligence committees, the IOB is duplicative. Moreover, since IOB members have been members of the PFIAB, there may be temptation to draw the PFIAB into backward looking assessments and operational matters. Eliminating the IOB will help strengthen the PFIAB.

Functional

Feedback

The work of the Board can be enhanced by establishing a more formal follow-up procedure. The PFIAB has demonstrated that it can produce helpful studies and recommendations. A shortcoming in this process is the lack of consistent feedback. The Board has no regular way of gauging the impact of its reports. A mechanism needs to be put in place whereby members or the president can be briefed regarding the impact of any report the Board issues. This can be done either by a regular inter-agency review process or through an individual report by the agency in question.

Annual Report

The PFIAB should issue its own annual report on intelligence. The report would examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence community and suggest future goals. The Board is in a good position to play this critical role. It has no institutional or bureaucratic turf to protect. Thus, it provides an excellent means for an effective review of intelligence-related legislation, proposed intelligence directives, and other new initiatives in the intelligence community. In addition, the proposed PFIAB annual report ought to look ahead to identify key trends in technology or new modes of organization that might affect intelligence collection and analysis in the years to come.

Community Use

The Board also can serve as a sounding board for estimating the usefulness of potential initiatives by individual intelligence agencies. The PFIAB should take the pulse of the intelligence community in order to warn the White House of impending problems or issues. It may be beneficial for these agencies to submit their plans to the Board for an impartial review before implementation. To fulfill that role, the PFIAB must maintain extensive informal contact with the components of the intelligence community, such as the CIA and the DIA. In the words of one former senior official we spoke with, the PFIAB needs to be "a knowledgeable pain in the ass."

Role of the President and the White House

Timing

The president should name a Board early, possibly even during the transition phase of a new administration, to underscore for the intelligence community the importance the president attaches to the Board. It will also put in place a functioning body that can help frame and assess the president's policy options. It may be beneficial for the president–elect to meet with the PFIAB to learn about the intelligence issues that he will be facing. The chair of the PFIAB should have regular contact with the president-elect's transition team, just as regular foreign policy bureaucracies do. The chair may be retained in an advisory or ex-officio position for a few months to help a new Board adjust.

The President

The attitude of the president towards the PFIAB and intelligence is critical. The extent to which the president really understands and is interested in national intelligence is an important factor in the success of the Board. One former executive director emphasized that unless the president understands intelligence, its import, and the role the Board can play, the Board will not be effective. Indeed, the administration that needs the PFIAB the most is often an administration least likely to want it.

The fact that the PFIAB's authority flows from the president makes it important for the Board to have access to the president. As another former executive director reminded us, "Other government officials believe you have power based upon your relationship with the president." To show his support, the president should meet with the Board early in the administration, even if only ceremonially. The chair of the PFIAB should meet with the president every month for updates and feedback. The next president might even consider institutionalizing PFIAB meetings with the Board in the enabling executive order to guarantee that attention would be given to the PFIAB at the highest levels, thereby reinforcing the Board's authority and effectiveness within the intelligence community.

NSC Advisor

The relationship with national security advisors has not always been satisfactory. The meetings, according to one former national security advisor were a "necessary duty," which occasionally degenerated into some individual members lecturing on what U.S. foreign policy should be – an issue outside the Board's domain. There is also an inherent conflict between the Board and the NSC because the Board does not deal with operations; its role is analytical, focusing on examining what may have gone wrong, or prescriptive, suggesting how something in the intelligence community can be strengthened. The NSC staff is action driven. There is a need to deal with crises immediately. Accordingly, most national security advisors did not attach much importance to dealing with the Board. A president and national security advisor constantly face issues that warrant immediate policy attention and deal with agencies that can exercise direct influence and/or support in dealing with such issues. In this environment, the PFIAB appears irrelevant because it is not geared towards real-time action. It could, therefore, be dismissed as a useless drain on the time and resources of the White House staff. Thus, it behooves future administrations to establish a more formal link between the PFIAB and the NSC so that the national security advisor can benefit from the members' views regarding developing initiatives. While these meetings occur now, we believe that there should be mandated monthly meetings with the national security advisor and regular meetings between the PFIAB and the NSC Intelligence Directorate.

The president may also consider having the PFIAB chair attend relevant NSC, cabinet, and White House meetings with members of Congress. As an outside observer, the chair can bring a unique perspective to these proceedings. According to a former national security advisor, simply having to meet regularly with the PFIAB and its staff kept the NSC and its staff sharp and alert. Care needs to be taken, however, that any such meetings be limited to conceptual discussions in order to keep the PFIAB separated from policy and operations.

Finally, the Board must also be able to initiate the study or review of issues itself. It is important that the Board, including its staff, have good working relationships with the NSC and its staff, but in the end the PFIAB must retain its independence as a presidential advisory board.

Commission

One of the strengths – but also a potential weakness – is that the PFIAB is subject to the whims of each president. To help institutionalize these recommendations, the next president should consider setting up an independent panel to study the effectiveness of the PFIAB and to make recommended changes. Admittedly, such changes might fit that particular president's view of intelligence and the role of the PFIAB, but not necessarily his successors. The recommendations of the panel, if accepted, can then be issued as an executive order. The prestige of the panel and the executive order should then serve as a template for future presidents in structuring their own PFIABs. In this manner, a uniform structure regarding membership, selection, and meetings can be put in place that will guide all future PFIABs.

Intelligence Studies

One of the ironies of the various scholarly and governmental assessments of the U.S. intelligence community over the years is that no in-depth study of the role of the PFIAB has been undertaken. The PFIAB has historically resisted, and even thwarted such efforts, defending, wrongly in our view, an overly broad and expansive definition of executive privilege that isolates the Board even from other executive branch agencies. This mindset contributes to the inability of the intelligence community to fully realize that the PFIAB can be a serious partner in intelligence work. Any future studies of the intelligence community need to incorporate an analysis of the PFIAB. Such in-house studies will help identify what the rest of the intelligence community seeks from the PFIAB. For this to happen, the PFIAB will have to fully cooperate in such efforts.

Conclusion

The mandate for the Board is set if and when the president issues or reissues a pertinent executive order which empowers the PFIAB as a part-time intelligence advisory body to initiate studies on its own and to respond to presidential requests. The executive order does not prevent or hinder the president in any way from turning to the national security advisor, secretaries of state and defense, the DNI, or any other component of the intelligence community for studies and recommendations. The value added of the PFIAB, however, is that it functions outside the political, managerial, and bureaucratic world of an administration. Such a perspective has been, and will continue to be, in our view, invaluable to presidents as they formulate and implement intelligence policies.

PFIAB Membership List

PFIAB MEMBERSHIP LIST

The year columns span 1953–1975, grouped by administration: **Eisenhower** (1953–1960), **Kennedy** (1961–1963), **Johnson** (1964–1968), **Nixon** (1969–1973), **Ford** (1974–1975). The shaded bars indicate service, labeled "Member" or "Chair."

Name	Tenure Start	Tenure End	Role (bar position)
Dr. James Killian	11-Jan-56	1-Mar-58	Chair (1956–1958)
	1-Mar-58	Jan-60	Member (1958–1960)
	4-May-61	23-Apr-63	Chair (1961–1963)
Benjamin Fairless	11-Jan-56	28-Oct-59	Member (1956–1959)
Joseph P. Kennedy	11-Jan-56	22-Sep-56	(1956)
Adm. Richard L. Conolly	11-Jan-56	20-Jan-61	Member (1956–1961)
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle	11-Jan-56	20-Jan-61	Member (1956–1961)
	4-May-61	22-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	Aug-64	
Gen. John E. Hull	11-Jan-56	1-Mar-58	Member (1956–1958)
	1-Mar-58	20-Jan-61	Chair (1958–1961)
Robert A. Lovett	11-Jan-56	20-Jan-61	Member (1956–1961)
Edward L. Ryerson	11-Jan-56	20-Jan-61	Member (1956–1961)
David K.E. Bruce	6-Aug-56	20-May-57	
Colgate Darden	19-Jul-57	20-Jan-61	Member (1957–1961)
William O. Baker	30-Oct-59	20-Jan-61	Member (1959–1961)
	4-May-61	4-May-77	Member (1961–1977)
William L. Langer	4-May-61	22-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	1969	Member (1963–1969)
Robert D. Murphy	4-May-61	22-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	1969	Member (1963–1969)
	20-Mar-69	9-Nov-72	Member (1969–1972)
	11-Mar-76	4-May-77	
Edwin H. Land	4-May-61	22-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	1969	Member (1963–1969)
	20-Mar-69	4-May-77	Member (1969–1977)
Gen. Maxwell Taylor	4-May-61	26-Jun-61	
	10-Aug-65	19-Mar-69	Member (1965–1969)
	20-Mar-69	9-Apr-70	Chair (1969–1970)
Clark Clifford	16-May-61	23-Apr-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Apr-63	23-Nov-63	Chair (1963)
	23-Nov-63	23-Feb-68	Chair (1963–1968)
Gordon Gray	16-May-61	22-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	1969	Member (1963–1969)
	20-Mar-69	4-May-77	Member (1969–1977)
Franklin Pace	17-Jul-61	23-Nov-63	Member (1961–1963)
	23-Nov-63	1969	Member (1963–1969)
	20-Mar-69	9-Nov-72	Member (1969–1972)
Adm. John H. Sides	10-Aug-65	1968	Member (1965–1968)
Nelson Rockefeller	20-Mar-69	19-Dec-74	Member (1969–1974)
Adm. George Anderson	20-Mar-69	30-Apr-70	
	1-May-70	5-May-77	Chair (1970–1977)
Franklin Murphy	20-Mar-69	9-Nov-72	Member (1969–1972)
Franklin B. Lincoln	20-Mar-69	9-Nov-72	Member (1969–1972)
John B. Connally	1-May-70	11-Feb-71	
	12-Jun-72	19-Jan-75	Member (1972–1975)
	11-Mar	4-May-77	
Edward Teller	22-Jul-71	4-May-77	Member (1971–1977)
Clare Booth Luce	28-Jun-73	4-May-77	Member (1973–1977)
Robert Galvin	28-Jun-73	4-May-77	Member (1973–1977)
Dr. John S. Foster	28-Jun-73	4-May-77	Member (1973–1977)
Dr. Leo Cherne	28-Jun-73	4-May-77	Member (1973–1977)
	20-Oct-81	16-Jun-90	
Dr. George Shultz	4-Jul-74	Mar-76	Member (1974–1976)
Stephen Ailes	11-Mar-76	5-May-77	
Leslie C. Arends	11-Mar-76	5-May-77	
William Casey	3-Mar-76	4-May-77	
Lyman L. Lemnitzer	11-Mar-76	4-May-77	
Edward B. Williams	11-Mar-76	4-May-77	
	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Anne L. Armstrong	20-Oct-81	16-Jun-90	
David M. Abshire	20-Oct-81	30-Mar-83	
Seymour Weiss	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Leon Jaworski	20-Oct-81	9-Dec-82	
Paul Seabury	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Frank Borman	20-Oct-81	Nov-82	
H. Ross Perot	20-Oct-81	13-Mar-85	
W. Glenn Campbell	20-Oct-81	16-Jun-90	
	1981	1990	
Alfred S. Bloomingdale	20-Oct-81	20-Aug-82	
Joe M. Rodgers	20-Oct-81	9-Jul-85	
Robert F. Six	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Peter O'Donnell	20-Oct-81	1-Nov-85	
Martin Anderson	4-Feb-82	1-Nov-85	

	976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
			Carter						Reagan						G. H. W. Bush						Clinton								G. W. Bush				
IOB Chair																																	
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	Tenure		Eisenhower								Kennedy			Johnson					Nixon					Ford		
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	197
Alan Greenspan	23-Dec-82	1-Nov-85																								
Eugene V. D. Rostow	14-Jan-83	1-Nov-85																								
Harrison H. Schmidt	19-Aug-83	1-Nov-85																								
Albert D. Wheelon	19-Aug-83	1-Jul-88																								
Gen. Robert H. Barrow	6-Jan-84	1-Nov-85																								
Henry Kissinger	2-Mar-84	22-Jan-90																								
Howard H. Baker	15-Aug-85	Mar-87																								
	Aug-88	16-Jun-90																								
William F. Smith	28-Feb-85	16-Jun-90																								
Jeane D. Kirkpatrick	15-Nov-85	16-Jun-90																								
Albert J. Wohlstetter	15-Nov-85	16-Jun-90																								
James Q. Wilson	15-Nov-85	16-Jun-90																								
Bernard Schriever	15-Nov-85	16-Jun-90																								
John G. Tower	Nov-87	16-Jun-90																								
	16-Jun-90	5-Apr-91																								
Caspar W. Weinberger	Feb-88	16-Jun-90																								
Zbigniew Brzezinski	Mar-88	Jan-89																								
Gordon C. Luce	Mar-88	Jan-89																								
John M. Deutch	16-Jul-90	20-Jan-93																								
Gen. Lew Allen	16-Jul-90	20-Jan-93																								
	1993	1999																								
William Perry	16-Jul-90	20-Jan-93																								
William Hyland	16-Jul-90	20-Jan-93																								
Adm. Bobby Ray Inman	16-Jul-90	5-Apr-91																								
	6-Apr-91	20-Jan-93																								
Adm. William J. Crowe	1993	1994																								
Les Aspin	1994	21-May-95																								
Thomas S. Foley	1996	1997																								
Warren B. Rudman	1993	1995																								
	1995	1998																								
	1995	1996																								
	1997	2001																								
Ann Z. Caracristi	1993	2001																								
Anthony S. Harrington	1993	2000																								
	1997	2000																								
	1994	2000																								
Robert J. Hermann	1993	2001																								
Dr. Sydney Drell	1993	2001																								
Zoe Baird	1993	2001																								
Cresencio S. Arcos	1999	2003																								
James Hamilton	1995	1997																								
Thomas F. Eagleton	1992	2000																								
Elmo R. Zumwalt	1996	2000																								
Stanley S. Shuman	1995	2001																								
Harold W. Pote	1993	1996																								
Maurice Sonneberg	1992	2000																								
Stephen Friedman	1999	Present																								
	2005	Present																								
Lois D. Rice	1993	2001																								
John S. Bryan	1999	2001																								
Richard L. Bloch	1996	1998																								
Gen. Brent Scowcroft	1-Oct-01	Feb-05																								
James S. Barksdale	1-Oct-01	Present																								
Robert A. Day	1-Oct-01	20-Dec-05																								
Alfred Lerner	1-Oct-01	23-Oct-02																								
Ray L. Hunt	1-Oct-01	Present																								
Rita E. Hauser	1-Oct-01	2004																								
Adm. David E. Jeremiah	1-Oct-01	Present																								
Arnold L. Kanter	1-Oct-01	20-Dec-05																								
James C. Langdon	1-Oct-01	24-Feb-05																								
	25-Feb-05	20-Dec-05																								
Marie E. Pate-Cornell	1-Oct-01	Present																								
John H. Streicker	1-Oct-01	20-Dec-05																								
Peter B. Wilson	1-Oct-01	20-Dec-05																								
Philip D. Zelikow	1-Oct-01	2003																								
William R. Brody	5-Sep-02	20-Dec-05																								
Charles S. Robb	19-Dec-05	Present																								
Arthur B. Culvahouse	20-Dec-05	Present																								
William O. DeWitt	20-Dec-05	Present																								
Adm. James O. Ellis	20-Dec-05	Present																								
Donald L. Evans	20-Dec-05	Present																								
Martin C. Faga	20-Dec-05	Present																								
Lee H. Hamilton	20-Dec-05	Present																								
John L. Morrison	20-Dec-05	Present																								
Denis A. Bovin	5-Sep-06	Present																								
Martin S. Feldstein	5-Sep-06	Present																								

	Carter				Reagan								G. H. W. Bush				Clinton								G. W. Bush							
1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
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Authors

Kenneth Michael Absher is a graduate of Phillips Exeter Academy and Princeton University. He retired after a 31-year career with the CIA's National Clandestine Service, having served as Chief of Station in two field assignments, Chief of Base in two others, and four tours at CIA headquarters. He was awarded the Medal for Civilian Service in Vietnam, certificate for Exceptional Service Under Conditions of Hazard or Hardship, four meritorious unit citations, three superior performance awards, and was twice awarded the CIA Medal of Merit. Since his retirement from CIA in 1993, Mr. Absher has taught at the University of Texas at San Antonio and the National Defense Intelligence College in Washington D.C. He was a consultant to the Aspin-Brown Commission and to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence study Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. He served for two years on the Joint Terrorism Task Force in San Antonio, Texas. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed him to three accountability review boards to investigate terrorist attacks in Iraq that killed eleven U.S. Mission personnel and wounded ten others. In the summer of 2006 he participated in the CIA and DNI analysis of North Korean missile tests with the Pacific Command in Hawaii. He is currently a Fellow with the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Michael Desch is the founding Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and is the first holder of the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is the author of *When the Third World Matters: Latin American and U.S. Grand Strategy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), co-editor of *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment* (Albany: State University Press, 1998), editor of *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), and has published numerous scholarly and policy articles. He has worked on the staff of a U.S. senator, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, and in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service.

Roman Popadiuk has been the Executive Director of the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation since January 1999. He served as the first U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine in 1992-1993. He was Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs under President George H.W. Bush, the same position he held towards the end of President Reagan's Administration. From 1995 through 1998, Dr. Popadiuk served as International Affairs Advisor and senior civilian on the staff of the Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. A retired member of the career Senior Foreign Service, he has received a number of awards, including the State Department's Superior Honor Award and the Meritorious Honor Award. He currently serves as the Chair of the Executive Committee of the U.S.-China Relations Conference at Texas A&M University.

The Richard Lounsbery Foundation

The Richard Lounsbery Foundation, based in Washington, D.C., aims to enhance national strengths in science and technology through support of programs in the following areas: science and technology components of key U.S. policy issues; elementary and secondary science and math education; historical studies and contemporary assessments of key trends in the physical and biomedical sciences; and start-up assistance for establishing the infrastructure of research projects. Among international initiatives, the Foundation has a long-standing priority in Franco-American scientific cooperation. The Foundation generally provides seed money or partial support and aims to achieve high impact by funding novel projects and forward-looking leaders.

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