Voting Systems and Election Reform: What Do Election Officials Think?

Texas A&M University
in coordination with the
Congressional Research Service

May 2005

Voting Systems and Election Reform: What Do Election Officials Think?

This report was prepared by:

Research Team:
Jennifer Gray
Marshall Gray
Joshua Hodges
Jeff Jewell
Marcia Larson
Ryan Mitchell
Erin Murello
Steve Murello
Alice Reeves
Julie Siddique

Faculty Advisors:
Dr. Donald P. Moynihan
Dr. Carol Silva

May 2005

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Acknowledgements

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Table of Contents

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

List of Tables and Figures

Chapter Nine: Future Research

Executive Summary

Since the 2000 presidential election, the issue of election administration has garnered attention from elected officials and the general public. Concerns about the efficiency and reliability of older election technologies such as lever machines and punch-card ballots prompted Congress to pass the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002. HAVA offered resources for implementing newer voting systems to meet certain requirements, prompting several jurisdictions to adopt either optical scan or Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) technologies. But concerns have also arisen about the security and transparency of DRE machines.

The key administrative actors at the heart of the implementation process are local election officials (LEOs). These officials are generally charged with overseeing, managing, and sometimes choosing election technologies. A basic limitation in the debate about election administration was the absence of hard data about the views of LEOs. The purpose of this report is to remedy this drawback by collecting and analyzing the perspectives of election officials on a variety of key issues. A research team from The George Bush School of Government and Public Service, sponsored by the Congressional Research Service, administered a survey to a sample of LEOs across the United States between November 2004 and March 2005. The survey received a 40% response rate, with 1,512 responses.

A number of findings emerge from the research and we highlight some of the key results here. One finding is evidence of a strong status quo preference among respondents. Most respondents think their current system works reasonably well and there is no urgent need for change. They report high levels of satisfaction with their systems' performance in the 2004 election, regardless of the specific voting system in use. Generally, respondents are more likely to be supportive of the voting system technology they currently use than any other voting system technology. This may be because they have more information about the quality and operation of that voting system, or are simply reluctant to change from the system they think has served them well. LEOs who are older and have less comfort with technology are less supportive of HAVA requirements.

DRE and optical scan technologies are the voting systems most used by respondents, at 17.1% and 49.5%, respectively. The individual provisions in HAVA are most easily met using DRE systems. Optical scan systems meet several of the requirements as well; however, they do not meet the disability requirements. Nevertheless, the data suggests that while respondents might prefer their current balloting system, they accept that the next system their jurisdiction will adopt will be a DRE or optical scan system. For those who are likely to replace older technologies with newer ones, we still see evidence of the status quo preference. LEOs tend to prefer what they perceive as the modern equivalent of their old system: those using punch cards are more likely to upgrade to optical scan systems, while those using lever machines strongly prefer DREs.

Both DRE and optical scan users think that their systems rank well on a variety of voting system criteria, although non-users tend to be significantly more skeptical of the benefits of these systems. Respondents who use DRE and optical scan systems are pleased with their performance and indicated they have adequate information to assess whether or not they are a good choice for their jurisdiction. Those respondents who have no experience with DRE or optical scan systems are more cautious about their use and express a need for more information about the technologies before deciding to adopt them. This data is also suggestive of a status quo preference, suggesting

that once respondents adopt a newer voting system, no matter what their level of experience with technology is, they are likely to gain confidence in the system.

One of the particular issues raised by HAVA that deserves attention is access for disabled voters. All voters do not have the same access to polling places because of many variables, ranging from physical handicaps, to inadequate transportation to the polling site, to possible discrimination. Advocacy groups for the disabled and civil rights groups lobby for the rights of these voters. These groups have had an influence on the content of HAVA, which requires that all polling places be equipped with at least one machine that can be accessed by a person with a disability by January 1, 2006. LEOs also perceive the influence of these groups at the local level. Respondents report that these groups have more influence in the decision making process than other non-governmental actors. LEOs are supportive of the goal of disabled access but are somewhat concerned about implementation difficulties.

HAVA's disability requirements could explain why half of all new voting machines purchased in respondents' jurisdictions in the last three years were DREs. For those likely to change systems in the next five years, 41.5% of respondents replied that they will change one of their voting machines at each polling place to enable disabled access. Many LEOs, especially from smaller jurisdictions, commented that complying with the disabled access requirement is expensive and questioned the benefits relative to costs. The data suggests, however, that DREs are a means by which jurisdictions are fulfilling the requirement for disability access. HAVA legislation requirements coupled with the presence of advocates for the disabled and civil rights groups have improved and are expected to continue to improve accessibility for disabled voters.

Voting system vendors represent a necessary dynamic to the election administration process: they are the private companies who provide the actual voting technology and are therefore a necessary partner in the process of election administration. As voting systems have faced criticism, some of the providers of these systems have been criticized also, leading to calls for increasing oversight of vendors and reducing their level of influence on LEOs. LEOs do not feel, however, that additional oversight is necessary. LEOs report having a high degree of trust in voting system vendors and confidence in the quality of services they provide. An interesting contrast to this high level of trust is that the same respondents suggest that vendors have a low level of influence on the voting system selection process.

Given that so many jurisdictions are choosing new systems, it is critical to understand who influences the decision making process. The survey data suggest a decision making process that is usually collaborative but dominated by public officials at the state and local level. Respondents feel that they have the most amount of influence in the voting system decision process, although state level and local elected officials are also highly influential. Some LEOs say that they have complete autonomy over the decision making process, while others have seen their influence replaced by state level officials. But for most respondents, the decision to select a new system was a collaborative process. Many other actors are involved in the information gathering, evaluation, and recommendation stages of the process. LEOs receive the information to make these decisions predominantly from other elected and non-elected election officials at the local and state level. This reliance could be in the form of advice about the quality of a voting system or clarification regarding regulatory guidelines.

The process may be collaborative, but there is a clear preference among respondents for the involvement of local actors. Respondents are in favor of local autonomy and particularly resistant to additional influence or regulations imposed by federal officials. LEOs welcome federal assistance in the form of the additional funding provided by HAVA but are less welcoming of HAVA requirements. Respondents want federal funds but do not want the federal influence or constraints that follow it. This tendency is consistent in other areas of inter-governmental relations and one which the designers of HAVA must be aware of.

HAVA represents the most ambitious federal involvement in election administration to date and a major implementation challenge for LEOs. Respondents were asked their opinions of HAVA requirements and how difficult these provisions will be to implement. The requirement for provisional voting and the creation of the Election Assistance Commission were the two aspects of HAVA that garnered the least amount of support. The requirements for provisional voting and disability access were viewed as the two aspects of HAVA that are the most difficult to implement. Despite some implementation concerns, LEOs were generally supportive of the individual provisions of HAVA. When asked about the overall impact of HAVA on election administration, however, respondents were neutral. This result is puzzling: LEOs agree with the specific provisions of HAVA but are not supportive of the legislation as a whole. There are a couple of possible reasons for this seemingly contradictory position. First, many respondents are not yet familiar with HAVA. Those who are more familiar with it tend to be more supportive. Second, HAVA has to overcome the suspicion of LEOs who are suspicious of federal involvement. Respondents who believe that the federal government is too involved in elections tend to be more critical of HAVA. HAVA is also a direct challenge to the status quo preference. HAVA represents nothing if not change, and LEOs that agree with the specific goals of HAVA may still feel antipathy towards the legislation that requires them to move from election systems they trust and regard as working well.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER
ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, escalating concerns about the efficiency and reliability of election technologies has resulted in a nationwide dialogue among local election officials (LEOs), state governments and legislatures, the U.S. Congress, academics, advocacy groups, and citizens on how to improve election administration and safeguard the most fundamental of democratic rights, the right to vote. Concerns have arisen about the legitimacy of particular elections and about specific election systems currently in use in jurisdictions across the country. Apprehension about the reliability and security of election systems came to the public spotlight during the 2000 presidential elections, particularly with respect to the controversies surrounding punch card ballots in Florida.

The difficulties in Florida resulted in national attention to the issue of election administration and situated decision making about election systems at the center of current public policy debate. In response to the widespread concern, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. One of the provisions of HAVA offered federal funding to state and local jurisdictions to replace older election technologies, such as punch cards and lever machines, with newer technologies, such as optical scan machines and direct recording electronic systems (DREs). HAVA authorized a total of $3.6 billion over a four year period. In 2003, Congress appropriated $2.16 billion; in 2004, Congress appropriated $1.04 billion; and in 2005 the Administration requested an addition $645 million to continue the modernization efforts.[1] Since the passage of HAVA, newer election technologies, especially DREs, have also been criticized for perceived weaknesses in security and transparency.

In light of widespread concerns about election technologies, federal incentives to upgrade election systems, jurisdictional cost constraints, and the choices in election technologies, LEOs are in the middle of a complex and contentious decision making process and are responsible for setting the course for future election administration. Despite election officials' critical responsibilities in elections policy-making, there is a scarcity of available information about election officials'

---

[1] Kevin Coleman and Eric Fischer, *"Elections Reform: Overview and Issues."* CRS Report RS20898, (4 February 2005, 5).

13

perspectives. Recognizing this gap in current research, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) sponsored a research team from The George Bush School of Government and Public Service to investigate the viewpoints of LEOs.

The research team crafted and administered a comprehensive survey of LEOs from across the nation. For the purpose of this study, LEOs are defined as any full-time or part-time officials responsible for the management, implementation, and/or oversight of the voting process in a specific jurisdiction. LEOs may be civil servants, politically appointed, or locally elected. A database of previously collected LEO information from the Election Reform Information Project, a non-partisan organization that offers news and analysis concerning election reform, was verified and updated by the research team through internet and telephone research. In order to minimize the over-representation of jurisdictions with higher numbers of election officials, the team randomly sampled 150 LEOs from states with more than 150 total LEOs and surveyed all LEOs in states with less than 150 total LEOs.

The survey consisted of 64 questions and solicited LEOs' perspectives on specific election systems and technologies, the factors that LEOs consider in determining the appropriate election systems for their specific jurisdictions, the influence of vendors and federal, state, and local officials on the decision making process, the impact of HAVA on state and local jurisdictions, and other topics. The team utilized both web-based and paper surveys to solicit LEOs' perspectives. This report includes a detailed analysis of the responses and comments that LEOs provided in these surveys. The overarching goal of this research has been to capture a snapshot of this key moment in elections policy evolution from the perspective of LEOs and to provide that information to CRS to assist policy-makers in the area of elections systems and technology.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Chapter Two: Policy Background
This chapter offers a policy context for understanding election administration, discussing the Florida 2000 presidential election, and the passage and aftermath of the Help America Vote Act. Chapter two draws on existing analyses of different voting systems to identify some of the main research questions that a survey of LEOs can help answer.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Chapter three is a description of how the survey tool was prepared and administered. This includes a discussion of university research study certification, survey development, sample data collection procedures and protocols, methods and techniques of survey administration, attempts to increase the response rate of those surveyed, and data clean up and analysis.

Chapter Four: The Status Quo - Election Officials and Voting Systems

Chapter four describes the roles of LEOs and their views of different voting systems. The discussion provides a description of respondents' demographic and professional data. The chapter continues to explain respondents' experience and perceptions of the voting systems currently in use, as well as awareness and views of voting systems that are not currently in use in their jurisdictions. Information is presented from jurisdictions that purchased new voting systems in the last three years, including the voting systems most often purchased and most often replaced. Finally, we examine the views of LEOs who suggested that their jurisdiction intends to acquire a new voting system within the next five years.

Chapter Five: The Role of Vendors

Private vendors provide election systems to jurisdictions and the role of vendors is essential in the election administration process. This chapter outlines desirable characteristics of vendors, the type and level of interaction that vendors have with LEOs, LEOs' perceptions of vendors, and perceptions about election officials' oversight of vendors' activities.

Chapter Six: The Decision Making Process

The discussion in chapter six focuses on the decision making process involved in selecting voting systems. The chapter analyzes the use of direct and indirect sources of information, highlights the variety of actors involved and their degree of participation, and examines the other factors considered in the decision making process.

Chapter Seven: The Help America Vote Act

Chapter seven begins with a discussion about the degree of awareness that LEOs have of HAVA legislation. The chapter also examines the effects of particular components of HAVA legislation, including the provision of federal funding to states, the creation of the Election Assistance

Commission, the requirement to provide access to disabled voters, and the requirement to administer provisional voting methods. The chapter concludes with a discussion concerning LEOs' impressions about the amount of improvement HAVA legislation has had on the election administration process.

Chapter Eight: Direct Recording Electronic and Optical Scan Technologies

Chapter eight comparatively analyzes the use of the two main alternatives for jurisdictions adopting new voting systems: DREs and optical scan technology. General attitudes towards DREs and optical scan technology are examined, as well as the use of voter verifiable paper ballots on DRE machines. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the degree of understanding and perceptions about DRE versus optical scan technologies.

Chapter Nine: Future Research

The conclusion of the report offers suggestions for future research within the topic of election administration. Future research topics are recommended based on the subjects introduced by respondents in open-ended text responses to the survey and the changing policy background.

Appendices

The appendices include documents that were important in the survey administration and data collection processes, such as the survey questionnaire, the aggregate results for each question, and open-ended comments provided by LEOs.

CHAPTER TWO

POLICY BACKGROUND

The decentralized nature of the American electoral process implies that many decisions about voting systems and election administration are made at the local government level. Election administration requires the coordination and integration of numerous people, processes, and technology in jurisdictions across the country[2]. As such, one might assume that much would already be known about the public officials charged with ensuring the integrity and smooth operation of a process that rests at the heart of American democracy. The decision making processes of those local officials charged with administering elections, however, are often overlooked in academic studies. The purpose of this study was to solicit the views from a sample of the nation's election officials at the local level.

This chapter examines the policy background and the existing literature on election systems to inform our understanding of the views of election officials. The first section of the chapter discusses the diversity of election administration in the United States and the complexities that arise from this. The second section offers some explanation as to how the situation in Florida during the election of 2000 offered a unique policy window on election reform. The third and fourth sections further discuss the current state of election technology in the United States, issues associated with electronic voting technology, and how HAVA is expected to fix some problems with the electoral process. The last section examines the gaps in current research of election administration.

THE DIVERSITY OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The selection of candidates for political office lies at the heart of the democratic process, and in the 2000 election more than 110 million Americans cast votes for their preferred candidates. State and particularly local governments have historically overseen the administration of elections with the federal and state governments offering guidance in the form of a broad framework of laws and

---

[2] General Accounting Office, "Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals," GAO-02-90 (2001, 6)

regulations.[3] This has led to numerous differences in the processes that guide those involved in the election process.

Election administration in the United States is an intergovernmental responsibility.[4] In making decisions about election administration and systems, local election officials face different constraints and institutional arrangements depending on their state. The Election Reform Information Project's research found a diverse set of "power-sharing arrangements ranging from elections run entirely by state agencies to decentralized elections where not one but several local authorities conduct elections with little or no state involvement."[5] Variations exist not only among states, but also between counties, cities, and towns. These differences imply that the number of actors involved and their respective levels of influence in the decision making process vary according to the state's stipulated structure for election administration.

Determining where responsibility rests for the administration of elections varies across the country because there is no nationally standardized set of procedures for administrators to follow in conducting elections in their jurisdictions. Depending on the structure of election administration in the state, many can be involved in the decision making process.[6] The extent of responsibility for selection, training, and funding at the local level is a function of the degree of decentralization in a state. Some argue that extensive local control over elections allows for fair elections because this decentralization makes it "virtually impossible to rig an election while allowing for innovation in hundreds if not thousands of laboratories of democracy around the country."[7] Others assert that unless administrative officials develop a system that clearly delineates and articulates the roles and expectations of each actor in the process, a decentralized system increases security concerns.

The decentralized American system means that local election administrators often choose voting technologies. Funding differences and other factors lead to inequalities across jurisdictions, which affect the selection and administration of voting technology. Researchers have shown that cross-

---

[3] Ibid
[4] Charles Wise, "Election Administration in Crisis: An Early Look at Lessons from Bush versus Gore," *Public Administration Review* 61, No. 2 (2001): 131-139.
[5] Electionline.org, "Working Together?" [http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/working.together.pdf], (September 2002).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid, pg. 3

jurisdictional differences do matter but have had a hard time explaining why. Ansolabehere and Stewart's analysis demonstrated that variation in the residual vote (the number of uncounted, unmarked, and spoiled ballots) across counties was explained by county controls, and not due to demographics or political factors.[8] They offer the explanation that this effect is "substantially the result of local institutions of electoral administration. . .[but] why county matters for the rate of uncounted and spoiled ballots is, as yet, unexplained".[9] Other research also refutes the intuitive notion that the reliability of voting equipment is a function of a jurisdiction's economic status or demographics.[10]

Elections in the United State have always been administered by the states, resulting in 51 systems of election administration and making the implementation of any national electoral reforms an inherently complex task. Prior to problems with election administration during the 2000 presidential election in Florida, there was little public disquiet about the diversity of election systems. But Florida's very public travails with their election prompted Congress to reform how elections are run.

THE 2000 ELECTION AS A CATALYST FOR REFORM

The problematic aspects of recounts and voting system failure became apparent as the presidential candidates battled to win Florida in 2000.[11] The drawn out recount process proved extremely contentious. Some of the voting technologies in the state had done a relatively poor job of reflecting the voters' intentions. During the Florida recount, officials discarded many votes because they could not ascertain the preferences marked on the ballot, either because a voter selected two candidates or did not punch through the card entirely. Some of the blame was shifted toward the individual voters, but the voting systems in place also drew criticism. While punch-card ballots were particularly problematic, there were problems with other voting systems as well, especially central count optical scan systems. A lack of clear legal standards forced election officials and judges to

---

[8] Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart III. "Residual Votes Attributable to Technology."
[http://web.mit.edu/cstewart/www/papers/residual_vote.pdf], (7 April 2004, 26).
[9] Ibid, pg. 26
[10] Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf, "Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 35, No. 3 (2002): 541-548.
[11] Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. "Voting: What Is, What Could Be."
[http://www.vote.caltech.edu/reports/2001report], (9 April 2005).

make judgments on what would or would not be counted.[12] As a result, there was increased acceptance of the idea that the technology a person casts their vote with could have an impact on the chances of that vote being counted accurately. The obvious public policy questions that emerged related to how often these problems occur, what election systems are most problematic, and what can be done about it.

The difficulties encountered with resolving a disputed election and accurately accounting for the true preferences of voters offered what Baumgartner and Jones refer to as a focusing event in the policy process.[13] Election reform, centered on the proposition that current election processes and technology may not be free of lapses in integrity and legitimacy, moved to the top of the policy agenda. Florida also highlighted the importance of a not widely known or recognized group of public servants. Moynihan notes the impact of electoral problems in Florida:

- "First, it brought to the forefront a previously obscure but powerful group of administrators: election board officials at the state and local level. Second, Florida highlighted the role that existing voting technology plays in shaping the number of votes counted and, in particular, problems associated with punch-card machines. A third effect was the creation of mandates for electoral reform."[14]

Afterwards, numerous states commissioned political and official studies that looked to scrutinize the effectiveness of the voting process. The public was not aware of the scope of these problems before the presidential election in 2000, and most researchers were unsure how widespread and often these failures occurred.

---

[12] ibid.

[13] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[14] Donald P. Moynihan, "Building Secure Elections: E-Voting, Security, and Systems Theory," *Public Administration Review* 64, No. 5 (2004): 515-528, pg. 516.

VOTING TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The United States currently uses five different technologies – paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, central and precinct-count optical scans, and direct recording electronic (DRE) systems – and has experimented with the prospect of internet voting on a very limited scale. Definitions of the different voting systems are provided in Appendix H of this report. Each of the technologies "has advantages and disadvantages with respect to error rates, cost, speed, recounts, accessibility to disabled persons, and other characteristics."[15] What the public and elected officials discovered about the impact of voting technologies on the number of uncounted ballots was supported by existing studies of elections. There exist numerous reports that discuss and quantify the extent to which voting technologies affect the number of uncounted ballots due to either technological failures or confusing ballot designs.[16]

Several studies have found that punch card machines produced higher incidences of uncounted votes, which are made when a person under votes (no selection made), over votes (too many selections made), or somehow makes their ballot illegible.[17] The problems with punch card machines were not unknown to election administrators before Florida 2000, and the shift away from these machines in numerous jurisdictions across the country represents recognition of the problems associated with these technologies.[18] Massachusetts, for example, replaced punch card machines after a highly contested U.S. house seat in 1986.[19]

[15] Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A. Fischer, *"Elections Reform: Overview and Issues."* CRS Report RS20898, (4 February 2005, 2).

[16] Knack and Kropf 2003 op. cit.; David C. Kimball, "Voting Methods Two Years After Florida," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3, 2003; David C. Kimball, Chris T. Owens, and Katherine McAndrew, "Who's Afraid of an Undervote?," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, November 2001; Caltech/MIT Voting Project 2001 op. cit.; Susan King Roth, "Disenfranchised by Design: Voting Systems and the Election Process," *Information Design Journal* 9, No. 1 (1998): 1-8.; Stephen M. Nichols and Gregory A. Strizek, "Electronic Voting Machines and Ballot Roll-Off," *American Politics Quarterly* 23, No. 3 (1995): 300–318.

[17] Caltech/MIT Voting Project 2001 op. cit.; Henry E. Brady, Michael C. Herron, Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Kenneth W. Shotts, and Jonathan N. Wand, "The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida," *American Political Science Review* 95, No. 4. (2001): 793-810; R. Darcy and Anne Schneider, "Confusing Ballots, Roll-Off and the Black Vote," *Western Political Quarterly,* 42, No. 3 (1989): 347-364.

[18] Knock and Kropf 2003 op. cit.

[19] Caltech/MIT 2001 op. cit.

One example of how voting technology design matters relates to the effects of the physical design of the technology on people's ability to cast votes. Susan King Roth's research focuses on the human interaction with voting equipment and a person's perception of the voting experience. A hypothesis that more "effective information design could improve the usability of voting systems" spurred a series of papers that looked to study "the effect of ballot interface design on voting behavior and a subsequent evaluation of provisional voting processes."[20] Her studies "identified design problems related to the display height of text, organization of information on the ballot, legibility, and correspondence between voters' intentions and recorded selections."[21] She argues that the ballot interface design should consider "human factors and anthropometric data," but that these problems are the result of a more complex system that begins on the technology company's drawing board:

- "Problems identified can be traced to a sequence of interconnected factors: the failure to apply effective design principles at the system development stage; the lack of comprehensive federal guidelines related to system usability; and unfamiliarity with information design and usability issues at the local administrative level where systems are evaluated and purchase approved."[22]

She also claims that government contracts are absent of any mechanism to encourage voting technology suppliers to incorporate user feedback into the development of new technologies. The integrity of the vote process depends on the recorded votes actually reflecting the voter's intent and there are numerous challenges in ensuring that election jurisdictions meet this requirement.

To try to quantify the extent of voting technology failures, a joint research group from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), conducted the most comprehensive analysis that measured the relative performance of voting technologies in the United States. This project looks to assess the magnitude of the types of problems Florida revealed in 2000, understand their root causes, and develop a framework for how these problems can be solved in the future. Specifically, the report assesses whether election systems explain a statistically significant amount of variation in the residual vote. The Caltech/MIT

---

[20] Roth 1998 op. cit, pg. 1
[21] Ibid, pgs. 7-8.
[22] Ibid, pg. 8

researchers found that in elections between 1988 and 2000, traditional paper ballots produced the lowest rates of residual votes, followed by optically scanned ballots, mechanical lever machines, direct recording electronic machines, and punch cards.[23] However, DREs became more effective over time and by 2004 DREs were equal or better than optical scan machines.

NEW POLICIES AND NEW CONTROVERSIES

At the federal level, the result of the focus on election systems was the passage of HAVA in October of 2002. HAVA provided the impetus for states, counties, and cities to replace voting equipment and specifically targeted the replacement of punch card and lever machines but also outlined some broader reforms to election administration. The act required states to come up with plans for how to spend federal disbursements to buy new machines and make other improvements, and some states passed their own legislation mandating a particular type of technology. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and established requirements for voting and voter-registration systems.[24] Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA specifically requires that jurisdictions provide at least one voting device that accommodates the needs of disabled individuals and their right to vote in privacy.[25] Taken together, these reforms presented states with numerous challenges in deciding how to replace older voting technology. To help meet these requirements, Congress authorized approximately $3 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2005 to assist jurisdictions comply with the legislated requirements.[26] Though it does not specify any particular type of voting technology, HAVA does outline broad requirements that jurisdictions must meet. These stipulations, in turn, influence the types of technology an election official will select, and tend to favor the adoption of DRE machines.[27]

HAVA aimed to reduce many of the problems associated with older voting systems by standardizing particular requirements and encouraging newer, more technologically advanced systems. But newer technologies, in particular DREs, themselves became the target of criticism. DREs appeared to offer clear advantages over older systems, especially in the light of problems in Florida. DREs

---

[23] Caltech/MIT 2001 op. cit.
[24] Coleman and Fischer 2004 op. cit.
[25] see "Facts About Electronic Voting," [http://www.votersunite.org/info/ElectronicVotingInBrief.pdf]
[26] HAVA Public Law 107-252. [http://www.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt]
[27] Coleman and Fischer 2004 op. cit.

promised to reduce the number of persons involved in the administration and simplify the process. The machines could display the ballot, store the vote, and generate the tally with a high degree of accuracy, removing the need for troublesome recounts. Jurisdictions may adopt DREs as their primary voting system for a number of reasons that include the promise of faster and more accurate vote tallying; the ability to alert a voter that he or she under or over voted; increased accessibility for disabled voters; the ability to program ballots in multiple languages; and decreased costs associated with precincts obtaining and securing paper ballots.[28] An improved interface promised that more people will be able to cast their votes in accordance with their true intentions. One study found that DREs reduce the incidence of voided ballots among minority users. Tomz and Houweling found that the difference in the number of voided ballots for African-American and white citizens depends critically on the voting equipment people use.[29] DRE and lever machines cut the discrepancy by a factor of ten, nearly eliminating the difference between black and white invalidation rates.

Not surprisingly, then, many officials viewed electronic voting machines as the answer to electoral problems. These systems were supposed to restore voter confidence, but the proliferation and use of these technologies has not been without controversy. Some experts have expressed hesitation about the efficacy of the security measures employed in DREs. Recent analyses of these systems have identified security concerns associated with their use. These criticisms have come chiefly from information technology specialists who argue that all systems that rely on technology will eventually fail and that security of such systems should be built with such failure in mind.

One specific criticism of DREs is that the software they run on is proprietary and not accessible to the public. This criticism grew when a copy of the software for Diebold voting systems became available over the internet and a team of computer security specialists from Rice University and Johns Hopkins University performed an analysis of the source code. They concluded that this code was far below minimal security standards applied in most other contexts.[30] They argued that the

---

[28] David Evans and Nathanel Paul, "Election Security: Perception and Reality," *IEEE Security and Privacy* 2, No. 1 (2004): 24-31; Moynihan 2004 op. cit.
[29] Robert P. Van Houweling and Michael Tomz, "How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?" *American Journal of Political Science* 47, No. 1 (2003): 46-60.
[30] Tadayoshi Kohno, Aviel D. Rubin, Adam Stubblefield, and Dan S. Wallach, *Analysis of an Electronic Voting System,* IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2004.

machines using this particular source code are vulnerable to insider and outsider threats, and that this machine is "unsuitable for use in a general election."[31]

Concerns and recommendations for how to improve DREs implicitly argue that more transparency is needed in the development and operation of these machines. Transparency is fundamental to the integrity of elections. DREs challenge the transparency of the process because they perform the crucial tasks of recording and tallying in a way that presumes trust in the reliability of the machine. Some have suggested that DREs undergo more rigorous certification procedures in order to increase confidence that bugs in the software do not exist. Another proposed alternative to the current approach is to allow wider access to the software, an approach akin to the open-source model employed by the Australian government when introducing DREs there. Since voters are unable to verify the soundness of the security system, vendors are asking for much more trust on behalf of these individuals. Incidents in recent years, however, have prompted growing distrust in DREs.

The implementation of electronic voting technology has ignited a debate on the tradeoffs between convenience and other advantages, versus the potential risks associated with widespread or localized failure. The manufacturers of DREs claim they offer more rapid and accurate vote counting, but some studies find they are riddled with usability and systemic problems (Bederson et al. 2003).[32]

Another criticism of DREs is that the absence of voter verified paper ballots creates auditing concerns. A proposed remedy to this problem, adopted in the state of California, was to require DREs to provide a voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB).[33] VVPBs are also known as voter verified paper audit trails or VVPATs. Some election officials and DRE vendors have argued that VVPBs are unnecessary and in fact cited the additional cost and inclusion of paper ballots as undesirable. But there is no comprehensive assessment of how election officials feel about the relative virtues or

---

[31] Ibid, pg. 1

[32] Owen G. Abbe, Benjamin B. Bederson, Fred Conrad, Peter L. Francia, Paul S. Herrnson, Bongshin Lee, Richard G. Niemi, Robert M. Sherman, Michael Traugott, "Early Appraisals of Electronic Voting," [http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/voting/reports/EarlyAppraisalsOfElectronicVoting.pdf].

[33] Jonathan Bannet, David W. Price, Algis Rudys, Justin Singer, and Dan S. Wallach, "Hack-a-Vote: Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems," *IEEE Security & Privacy* 2, No. 1 (2004): 32-37.
Rebecca Mercuri, "A Better Ballot Box: New Electronic Voting Systems Pose Risks as Well as Solutions," *IEEE Spectrum* 39, No. 10 (2002): 46-50.

problems with VVPBs. Modern DRE manufacturers, however, attempt to alleviate these concerns by implementing better design and programming standards.

Others have argued that the security of DREs can be improved through improved technology. For instance, Rivest offers the suggestion that electronic voting technology will offer improvements over paper-based technologies, as long as cryptographic techniques are strengthened.[34] But again, there is no comprehensive assessment as to whether election officials share this view.

FILLING A RESEARCH GAP: THE VIEWS OF LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS

Election administration and local election officials are at a policy crossroads. An area of public administration that had rarely seen public attention found itself in the public spotlight, resulting in dramatic policy change in a field where incremental adjustment is the norm. Given the policy context of election administration, it would be helpful to policymakers and researchers to understand a number of policy questions. This report seeks to answer at least some of those questions.

A basic problem with our knowledge about election administration is that it does not include hard data about the perspectives of officials who administer elections. Systematic evaluations of local election officials' decision making processes are sparse. Trying to understand the reasons jurisdictions select particular voting systems, outside of federal or state requirements, is difficult because the literature is currently devoid of these local administrators as a subject group. Researchers, then, cannot truly understand why local election officials purchase or how they evaluate the effectiveness of voting machines. Though their constraints may be known and understood, there is little to no research studying the effect these constraints have on the decision making process. For instance, given the criticism of DREs and the relative advantages of optical scan election systems, we might ask why election officials are adopting DREs? One explanation is that election officials are strongly influenced by the advice of election system vendors, and discount criticisms of DREs from academics and computer security specialists. Another explanation is that

---

[34] Ronald L. Rivest, "Electronic Voting," [http://www.site.uottawa.ca/~malassaf/TA/Rivest-ElectronicVoting.pdf].

election officials are simply anxious to collect federal resources provided by HAVA. Examining the relative strength of these hypotheses requires understanding the views of election officials.

A second area of concern is understanding the implementation of HAVA. This chapter has discussed the highly decentralized nature of election administration in the United States. HAVA represents an effort to introduce more uniformity to the voting system, but relies on state and local officials to implement these guidelines. As with any intergovernmental policy, much will depend on the views of local officials of HAVA and its requirements. Will it be seen as overly intrusive or a necessary intervention? It is also possible that local officials will welcome HAVA financial support, but are wary about HAVA requirements that they are expected to meet. Again, answering these questions calls for a comprehensive analysis of local election official opinion.

This report seeks to remedy the absence of the views of local election officials on these questions and others. For instance, what criteria do local officials see as important in a voting system? Do they consider certain systems better able to meet those criteria? Are local election officials supportive of reforms such as open source software for new voting systems, and VVPBs for DREs? The answers that our respondents provide are not intended to be a final and definitive guide to election administration policy, but do provide valuable insights among those given the responsibility of ensuring that the apparatus of democracy works as intended.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER

THREE

Methodology

This chapter describes the techniques of data collection and analysis used in this report. The chapter will discuss the development and administration of the survey as well as data collection procedures and protocols. The chapter will also address the methods and techniques of survey administration, attempts to increase the response rate of those surveyed, and the data analysis process.

IRB CERTIFICATION

This research was undertaken at Texas A&M University which requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for all university-sponsored research studies that involve human subjects. Since this project included survey research, IRB required that all research team members acquire certification. Over the course of two semesters, the research team consisted of 10 graduate students who are completing their final year of a two-year Masters of Public Service and Administration. The research team was advised by two Bush School faculty with interest in issues of science and technology policy, public administration, and citizen participation: Dr. Donald P. Moynihan and Dr. Carol Silva. IRB approval was granted in October 2004 for this project.

SURVEY DEVELOPMENT

The research team began the survey development process by seeking to design a survey that would consider the diversity of LEOs in terms of location, access to technology, education, experience, and personal interest, but ask specific questions to provide an overview of the views of LEOs on key policy and management aspects of election administration.

During the preliminary planning stages of the project, representatives from the CRS and the Bush School identified major topic areas for the survey of LEOs that served as a launching point for the research team's subsequent discussions. After several meetings, the research team and faculty advisors developed a more extensive list of topic areas and submitted the list to CRS representatives for consideration. In September of 2004, CRS representatives Kevin Coleman and Eric Fischer

visited Texas A&M University, to discuss the range of survey topics. The meeting resulted in final edits and improvements of the topic list.

Guided by the final topic list, team members generated a first draft of survey questions. The initial survey questions were substantially revised through numerous rounds of comments and review from a number of faculty at the Bush School, the research team and members of the CRS. The final survey questionnaire resulted in 64 questions plus follow-up questions within eight sections: Voting System, The Decision Making Process, Sources of Information, Role of Vendors, Help America Vote Act, Direct Recording Electronic Technology, Optical Scan Technology, and Individual Information. A copy of all of the survey questions can be found in Appendix A.

EVALUATION AND FOCUS GROUP

Research team members formatted the survey text for both electronic and paper administration. The internet version of the survey employed a software called Perseus and was tested extensively by research team members. When team members were confident that there were no software issues, 25 LEOs were selected by a random sample to receive an invitation to participate in a focus group. Additional questions at the conclusion of the survey asked how well respondents could view, comprehend, and answer each question. The focus group survey did not suggest any major changes needed to be made to the survey.

SAMPLING

Election Reform Information Project Data

At the request of CRS officials, the Election Reform Information Project, a non-partisan organization that offers news and analysis concerning election reform, provided their database of LEOs from all fifty states to the research team. The database included the LEO's name, physical mailing address, phone and fax numbers, official position title, and an email address if one was available. The research team used this database as a starting point and conducted independent research to confirm and expand the dataset.

Sampling Procedure

The research team was aware of significant differences in the numbers of LEOs in jurisdictions across the fifty states. Since each state organizes its elections differently, there is no consistency in the number of LEOs with respect to population or geographic size. As such, states have from 3 to 1,859 LEOs. Ten states have more than 150 LEOs; three states (Michigan, Wisconsin, and New York) have more than 1000. The number of LEOs per state is not necessarily driven by population size, since some states have a strong tradition of decentralizing election decisions to the township level. The large number of LEOs in these ten states presented a challenge in the collection of their respective contact information. A purely random sample of LEOs would mean that a handful of states with high number of LEOs would dominate the statistical analysis.

To keep the data collection process consistent with resource constraints and to reduce the dominance of states with large populations of election official, the team decided to split the states into categories of large (more than 150 LEOs) and small states (fewer than 150 LEOs). The research team conducted a census for small states, i.e. sampled all LEOs, and randomly sampled 150 LEOs from the large states. Since our analysis is not weighted according to size of election official population, this sampling strategy has the effect of increasing the influence of smaller states relative to their actual number of LEOs while ensuring that a relatively high number of individuals are sampled from the states with more election officials.

Completing the Sampling Pool

The database from the Election Reform Information Project provided basic contact information for many LEOs and an excellent starting point for the research team. There were, however, a number of limitations with the database. The data had been collected two to three years previously and were somewhat outdated due to turnover. In some cases data were incomplete, e.g., the name and address of an election official might be present, but his or her email or telephone details might not. The research team spent a good deal of time verifying the information in the database and supplementing it with new or missing information. The team utilized the internet and telephone contact with officials at the state and local level in order to conduct their research. Three research team members served as the primary group of data collectors. The team also hired three other Bush

School students to work simultaneously with research team members. The grant from CRS included an allocation for data research, and the team used these funds to pay its employees for their work. The group managed their progress by taking note of the total number of officials within a state and, once all contact information had been collected and verified, removed the state from this list.

When conducting internet research, team members found that the availability of information varied by state. Some states maintain current websites devoted to providing contact information for LEOs. Other states required the team to engage in more creative ways of finding the necessary information. There were often county websites that provided an appropriate starting point, but if contact information for local officials still proved elusive, the team contacted an authority at the state level. Sometimes, LEOs informed the group that they were not the appropriate person to take the survey. When this happened, the team asked these persons if they had any involvement in the decision making process. When it was unclear who was considered to be an election official, or when it appeared that duties overlapped in a jurisdiction, the team defaulted to the Election Reform Information Project's original data. There were no instances where a public official's contact information could not be obtained.

Initially, the team used a script whenever contacting officials by phone. As the group became more accustomed to people's reactions, the team moved away from using the script and engaged in a more conversational manner. This method seemed to yield better results whenever information was requested. After offering a short explanation of the project, officials were generally willing to share their email addresses with the group. If the election official declined the request for his/her email address, he/she received a paper survey instead. Those that did not wish to participate in the survey were removed from the list of officials receiving a survey and were considered non-respondents. Updating and verifying the database took approximately 436.5 hours to complete.

DATA COLLECTION AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES

The sample was divided into two groups: those potential respondents with email addresses and those without. Since internet surveys were more cost-efficient, this was the default mode of contact for anyone with an email address. A survey conducted entirely on the internet, however, would have skewed the survey toward jurisdictions with higher rates of internet access. Paper surveys were used

for the population without internet access. As discussed below, we also sent a paper survey to all respondents who failed to respond to repeated requests to complete an internet survey. Each respondent was assigned a series of numbers known as their unique identifier for confidentiality and tracking purposes. These numbers were generated randomly.

Internet Survey

The research team sent potential respondents with email addresses a link to the full survey. The email consisted of an introduction to the survey project and the link. The team sent the first email wave on November 29, 2004 to 3,151 potential respondents. Of the first wave, 89 emails came back due to invalid address, full mail boxes, or spam blocker software. The team researched, collected, and re-sent these returned emails on December 20, 2004.

As respondents submitted their responses to the survey electronically, the research team tracked them with their unique identifier so they would not be sent another email in subsequent attempts. The team sent three more waves of email survey invitations on December 20, 2004, January 12, 2005 and February 14, 2005 to those respondents who had not previously replied.

Paper Survey

The remaining sample consisted of potential respondents who did not have a working email address, whose email address could not be found, or who did not want to give out their email address. The number of people who met one of the above criteria totaled 835. Again for tracking purposes, the people who required a paper survey had a 'P' added to the beginning of their unique identifier. Consistent with the recommendations of Dillman[35], each paper respondent received an introductory letter prior to receiving the full survey. The letter was sent on December 1, 2004. It explained the project and informed respondents that they would be receiving a paper copy of the survey. The letter also provided the potential respondent with a unique internet address he or she could access if they would prefer to fill out the survey on-line.

---

[35] Don Dillman. *Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method.* 2nd Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2000).

On December 8, 2004, approximately one week later, a packet was sent to the paper respondents including a cover letter, a full paper survey with a unique identifier, and a stamped addressed return envelope. Similar to the internet submissions, the team tracked the paper respondents so that those who responded would not be solicited in subsequent attempts. The team sent another wave of paper survey invitations to those respondents who had not replied on February 18, 2005. All team members participated in assembling the survey packets.

After each completed paper survey was returned, they were entered into an electronic dataset. This involved accessing the survey website with the paper respondent's unique identifier and completing the survey exactly as the respondent had done. Each team member maintained a thorough survey entry log, including the name of the person entering the survey, the unique identifier of the particular survey, and the entry date and time.

Telephone Request

The team assessed the combined email and paper response rate in early January. Consistent with conventional wisdom regarding large-scale research efforts, the research team sought to reach a target response rate of 40%. Since the response rate was not at this level, the team decided that further encouragement of the potential respondents was necessary. The list of potential respondents was divided among the team members, and each team member personally telephoned non-respondents to encourage them to participate in the survey. This effort fulfilled two goals:

1) To encourage non-respondents to fill out and submit the survey. (Some respondents who initially received an emailed survey requested a paper copy instead. On the other hand, those who received a paper copy of the survey received the opportunity to fill out the survey over the internet.)
2) To determine if any potential respondent was 'ineligible' to respond to the survey.

Ineligible Respondents

All forms of communication to LEOs provided the phone number and email address of faculty supervisor Dr. Donald Moynihan. If a potential respondent informed the research team that he or

she did not perform the duties of an election official (meaning that the official stated they were not involved in purchasing, evaluating, recommending, managing or otherwise involved in election systems) or that he or she no longer held the position, that person was removed from the sample as ineligible, decreasing the sample size. The team also researched the eligibility of respondents while collecting addresses for the mid-February 2005 paper mailing. If it could be determined that a person no longer held the position of an election official, the team classified the person as an ineligible respondent and removed him or her from the sample.

Throughout the survey and response process, the research team received emails, letters, and phone calls from potential respondents requesting to be removed from the sample. If the team could determine the ineligibility of the person, the team removed the person's name from the sample. Otherwise, the team merely removed the name from the contact list of possible respondents but still counted the person as part of the sample for purposes of calculating the response rate.

Final Response Attempt and Response Rate

The final attempt to increase the survey response rate involved sending a paper survey to all potential internet respondents who had not yet submitted their completed survey. Because the paper surveys elicited a much higher rate of response, and because the telephone contact strategy did not increase the response rate quickly enough, the team elected to send a paper survey to those who had previously received only emails. A final mailing of paper surveys was sent to 2,072 potential respondents on February 21, 2005.

The final paper survey helped to increase the response rate dramatically. Prior to sending out the survey, the overall response rate was about 28.2%. The final response rate for the dataset provided to the CRS is 40.0%. This reflects a total of 1,512 respondents. The response rate for those who only received the paper survey was 40.8% and the response rate for the internet survey was 28.0%. The response rate for those who were originally invited to take the internet survey, but either requested a paper survey or received one in the last mailing was 16.2%. The analysis chapters presented here rely on all responses received by March 11, 2005, after which the research team devoted its time to analysis. At that point a total of 1,431 election officials had responded, yielding a response rate of 37.9%.

As suggested by the numbers above, the research team found that the response rate for paper surveys was higher than that of internet surveys. The internet survey approach offers some clear advantages. It is inexpensive relative to paper surveys. The main costs involve time and resources devoted to collecting emails and creating a working and secure online survey. Once these costs are invested, follow-up emails have almost negligible costs. The research team found, however, that after the initial rounds of follow-up there was a dramatic drop-off in response to the internet survey. One caution is that the response rate does not include automatic email blockers that did not tell us that the survey invitation had been deleted, and so we are likely underestimating the response rate among those who received the survey, although we have no way of knowing at what rate. The paper survey was more expensive than the internet approach. It also relied on verifying contact information. In addition, there were significant mailing and postage costs associated with each paper follow-up. The paper surveys, however, netted a higher initial response rate and follow-up response rate.

DATA CLEAN UP AND ANALYSIS

The team performed a significant data clean up operation on the final database in order to ensure that the data would conform to the necessary standards of the statistical package. For example, team members had to recode non-responses from zero (the internet system default standard) to -99. With the exception of a large number of recoded non-responses, the vast majority of the data remained unchanged.

Next, the team had to code respondents' written responses to open-ended questions. The team could not use these responses without first categorizing them in ways that would make patterns and trends apparent. The categories were originally developed by the team, in consultation with faculty advisors, based on an examination of the first 600 responses. The responses to open-ended questions were examined, and the basis for placing a comment in one category versus another category was extensively discussed. This process was completed by two team members to ensure consistency in the interpretation for the final dataset.

Once the data clean up process was complete, a third team member reviewed the data set for reliability and accuracy. The research team then used a software package designed for statistical analysis, called SPSS, to analyze the data.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER FOUR

The Status Quo: Election Officials and Voting Systems

This chapter discusses respondents' demographic and professional information and their views on specific election technologies currently in use in their respective jurisdictions as well as voting systems with which respondents have had minimal personal experience. Furthermore, this chapter examines recent trends in current voting system decision making.

WHO ARE OUR RESPONDENTS?

Prior to detailed analysis of the substantive issues of election administration covered in the survey, it is important to discuss the characteristics of the respondents and consider any possible implications of those characteristics on the survey results. Therefore, data analysis begins with a discussion of respondents' demographic information.

Respondents included 1,431 LEOs representing all regions of the country: 33.3% from the South, 33.1% from the Midwest, 21.5% from the Northeast, 11.1% from the West. While this breakdown suggests an under-representation of LEOs from the West, such a conclusion is misleading since the sample of LEOs from the West was much smaller than the other regions. Response rates of LEOs suggest relative consistency between regions. The response rates are: 38.5% for the South, 40.8% for the Midwest, 31.6% for the Northeast, 39.5% for the West.

Nearly three-fourths of respondents, 74.9%, are female. This apparent overrepresentation of women suggests two possibilities. First, it indicates that there may be an overrepresentation of women in election administration professions. Anecdotal data from researchers suggest that this is a likely explanation; however, there is no study to confirm this assertion. Second, the finding suggests that women may have been more likely to complete and submit this survey.

Respondents' ages range from 24 to 89 years, with an average age of 53 and a median age of 53. Almost 70% of respondents are between 45 and 65 years of age.

The race and ethnicity of respondents is fairly homogenous. The majority of respondents, 94.3%, are white. Hispanics account for 1.8%, Native American/Alaskan account for 1%, blacks account for 0.8%, and Asians account for 0.1%. This suggests that comparative to their proportion in the overall population, whites are significantly over-represented in election administration.

Education level of respondents vary from completion of some high school coursework to graduate degrees, though the majority of respondents, 60.3%, do not report having a college degree. Respondents' length of service as an election administrator ranged from 1 to 50 years, with an average of 11 years and a median of ten years. This finding suggests that average respondents have a fair amount of experience in their roles as election administrators. More than three-fourths of respondents, 77.2%, earn less than $60,000 per year and 53.2% earn between $20,000 and $60,000.

FIGURE 4.1: Age distribution of respondents

40

FIGURE 4.2: Education distribution of respondents

FIGURE 4.3: Respondents' length of service as election official

FIGURE 4.4: Salary distribution of respondents

PROFESSIONAL DATA ON RESPONDENTS

About 64.5% of respondents were elected officials, 33.7% were appointed, and 1.8% reported to have been neither elected nor appointed. The majority of respondents, 65.9%, reported full-time responsibilities as election administrator. Respondents reported involvement in key aspects of election administration: 82.3% reported responsibilities in management, 70.1% in purchasing, and 71.3% in evaluating and recommending technologies as part of their regular professional responsibilities.

The majority of respondents were confident in their professional training. About 81.5% reported having had "good" or "excellent" training. About 53.2% of respondents reported involvement and membership with state-level professional organizations. Only 13.8% reported membership in the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks and 13.6% reported membership in the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers. About 11.7% of respondents reported membership with The Election Center. No other organizations claimed more than 10% of respondents.

VOTING SYSTEM USE AND SATISFACTION

Several voting systems are currently in use in local jurisdictions across the United States. Figure 4.5 describes the percentages of voting systems in use by respondents' jurisdictions. Nearly half of all respondents, 49.9%, are currently using optical scan technology in their respective jurisdictions: precinct-count optical scan usage is 27.5% and central-count optical scan usage is 22.4%. Furthermore, DRE usage is 17.1%, paper usage 15.5%, lever machine usage 10.1%, and punch card usage is 7.4%.

Election Data Services, an independent organization, collected voting system data on the 2004 elections and reported similar nationwide usage percentages. Their data reports optical scan usage is 45.5%, DRE usage is 21.5%, paper usage is 9.6%, lever machine usage is 8.7%, and punch card usage is 9.8%. Although there are some discrepancies, these numbers are more or less consistent with the results of the survey. It is important to note that measuring nationwide usage of different voting systems is difficult due to rapid changes in systems. In such an environment, usage measurements from one year are likely to be outdated by the next year.

FIGURE 4.5: Current usage of voting systems

Irrespective of the current system in use, the majority of respondents reported high levels of satisfaction with the voting system in their jurisdictions. On a scale of zero (not very satisfied) to ten (extremely satisfied), the mean response was an 8.7. A significant majority of respondents, 85.4%, selected eight or higher. Respondents with precinct-count optical scan systems and DREs, on average, were the most satisfied with their current systems (see Figure 4.6).

Furthermore, the majority of respondents reported that their voting system performed very well in the 2004 presidential election. On a scale ranging from zero (not well at all) to ten (extremely well), the mean response was a 9.4. An overwhelming majority of respondents, 86.2%, reported excellent performance by choosing a nine or higher (see Figure 4.7). Respondents with DREs, precinct-count optical scan systems, and paper ballots, on average, reported the highest level of performance by their current systems in the 2000 election.

These findings reflect respondents' general confidence in the systems currently used in their jurisdictions, as well as, perhaps, a status quo preference and a professional protectiveness regarding the performance of their current systems. The findings also reflect a shift towards DRE and optical scan technology, perhaps as means to fulfill some of the provisions of HAVA.

FIGURE 4.6: Degree of satisfaction of voting systems by users

FIGURE 4.7: Performance of voting system in November 2004 election

Chart: Bar chart titled "Percent" (y-axis, 0 to 70) versus "How well did the main voting system work in November 2004?" (x-axis, categories: Not Well at All, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Extremely Well). Values approximately: Not Well at All ≈ 0, 1 ≈ 0, 2 ≈ 0, 3 ≈ 0.5, 4 ≈ 0.3, 5 ≈ 1.3, 6 ≈ 1, 7 ≈ 2.3, 8 ≈ 9, 9 ≈ 25.5, Extremely Well ≈ 61.

Voting System Perceptions of Non-Users

Given that respondents generally report a high degree of support for the voting systems currently used in their jurisdictions, the research team was interested in examining respondents' relative degree of support for other available voting systems. To achieve this, the research team analyzed the mean support for each voting system while excluding that voting system's users. For example, when punch card users are excluded from the analysis, we found that the mean support for punch card systems was 2.2. Figure 4.8 illustrates these findings. In general, optical scan technology received the most support among respondents.

FIGURE 4.8: Degree of support for other voting systems

Interestingly, the general trend in support of optical scan held even among LEOs not currently using the technology in their jurisdictions. The mean of support for precinct-count optical scan was 4.7 and for central-count optical scan was 4.6, still higher than the means of all the other options. DREs were also popular, though less than optical scan. Another interesting finding was that punch card ballot voting systems actually received less support than internet voting, a largely untried voting technology.

RECENTLY PURCHASED VOTING SYSTEMS

Since the controversies surrounding "hanging chads" in the 2000 presidential elections in Florida, punch card voting systems have been heavily criticized in the media. There have been national efforts, such as HAVA, encouraging jurisdictions using punch card voting systems to replace those systems with other alternatives. How successful were these efforts in convincing punch card users to switch systems? The following hypothesis tests whether punch card systems were the most likely to be replaced in the last three years.

Hypothesis 4.1: Punch cards were the voting system most likely to be adopted in the last three years.

About 17.1% of respondents report having acquired a new voting system within the last three years. The survey asked these respondents about their previous voting systems. Prior voting systems were most likely to have been paper systems (37.2%), lever machines (20.8%) and punch cards (16.1%). The most likely explanation is that punch cards were already the least used system, and therefore there were fewer of them to replace than other, more common forms of older elections systems.

HAVA requirements for disability access have encouraged LEOs to adopt newer technologies, particularly DRE or optical scan systems. The surveys show that LEOs have been choosing between the two systems at almost equal rates. Approximately, 50.2% of respondents report choosing a DRE system in jurisdictions which have adopted a new system in the last three years. Another 38.7% chose precinct-count optical scan and 11.1% chose central-count optical scan.

When asked about specific factors that influenced the acquisition of a new system in the last three years, respondents ranked state and federal requirements and funding as most important. In fact, respondents reported that, on average, the federal government funded 64.4% of the cost of acquiring a new system. About 23.6% of respondents reported that federal funds covered 100% of the cost of acquiring a new system. Table 4.1 shows the mean values of the factors considered in new system acquisition.

TABLE 4.1: Factors important in the adoption of new systems in the past three years

Factor	Mean value (0 = Not at All Important; 10 = Extremely Important)
State requirements	8.3
HAVA requirements	7.6
HAVA funding	7.1
State funding	7.1
Other	6.4
Concern about age or condition of former system	4.9
Concern about speed of former system	4.7
Publicity from the Florida 2000 election	4.5
Local requirements	4.4
Concern about reliability of former system	4.2
Concern about accuracy of former system	3.7
Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction	3.1
Concern about costs of former system	3.0
Media or public pressure to change system	3.0

MOTIVATIONS FOR ACQUIRING A NEW SYSTEM
IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

Considering the rapid changes in election administration and systems across the country, it seems likely that many jurisdictions will be acquiring new systems in the next five years. On a scale from zero (not very likely) to ten (extremely likely), 40% of respondents selected a six or higher indicating the likelihood of acquiring a new system in the next five years and about 27.4% of respondents selected a nine or ten, indicating that such an acquisition is extremely likely.

Given the current uncertainty in election systems it may seem reasonable to assume that some LEOs would choose to lease systems. This does not appear to be the case. About 53.8% of respondents who may acquire a new system in the next five years plan to purchase new systems and only 2.8% plan to lease. The remaining respondents are uncertain of how they will acquire new systems. The current trends suggest that the systems most likely to be adopted overall are DREs (53%), precinct-count optical scans (31.3%), and central-count optical scans (13.4%). About 61.5% of respondents do not foresee changes in early-voting systems and 65% do not foresee changes in absentee voting systems.

A key issue raised by HAVA was the rights of disabled voters and HAVA requirements to accommodate these voters. HAVA requirements seem to encourage the adoption of DREs. It would be reasonable to assume that the requirements would prompt either the addition of a single DRE machine or a complete change of system to DRE. The following hypothesis reflects this assumption.

Hypothesis 4.2: Most jurisdictions (more than 50%) that do not currently use DREs plan to change only one new voting system per polling place to meet the HAVA requirement to accommodate voters with disabilities.

The survey findings suggest a bipolar distribution among LEOs on how best to meet the HAVA requirements for disabled voters. About 53.5% of respondents expect changing all machines while 41.5% expect to change only one machine. Very few respondents, less than 5%, expected changing more than one but fewer than all. For the majority of respondents, disabled access requirements will be dealt with as part of a broader move to new voting machines, presumably DREs. For others, it appears that they are maintaining their existing system, or choosing optical scan systems, but purchasing a single DRE to satisfy disability requirements.

Table 4.1 showed a pattern of external state and federal requirements and funding as being the primary reasons that new systems were adopted in the last three years. This pattern of external influence appears to be the same among respondents who expect a new system in the next five years. Table 4.2 shows the relative importance of factors in adopting a new system.

TABLE 4.2: Factors important in the adoption of a new voting system in the next five years

Factor	Mean value (0 = Not at All Important; 10 = Extremely Important)
HAVA requirements	9.3
HAVA funding	9.2
State requirements	9.1
State funding	8.6
Local requirements	5.8
Other	5.6
Concern about age or condition of former system	5.1
Publicity from the Florida 2000 election	4.7
Concern about speed of former system	4.1
Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction	4.0
Concern about costs of former system	3.9
Concern about reliability of former system	3.8
Media or public pressure to change system	3.6
Concern about accuracy of former system	3.5

Considering the status quo preference of election administrators, it seems reasonable to assume that the adoption of new systems will be shaped by previous technology in place. When election administrators must select a new voting system, it seems likely they would choose a system they view as most similar to the current system. Therefore, those jurisdictions with punch card and paper systems are likely to prefer what is the modern equivalent, optical scan technology, since it uses paper ballots, and lever system users are likely to prefer the modern equivalent to paperless systems, the DRE.

Hypothesis 4.3: Election officials who have experience with paper voting systems prefer paper ballot systems. Those with experience with paperless voting systems prefer paperless voting systems for future adoption.

The survey data suggests that LEOs currently using punch cards are more likely to prefer optical scan machines to any other systems while the LEOs currently using lever machines are more likely to prefer DREs to any other systems. This finding reinforces the conventional wisdom that election

officials who are accustomed to paper voting systems prefer paper voting systems and those who are not accustomed to paper prefer paperless systems.

FIGURE 4.9: System likely to be adopted by current lever machine users

FIGURE 4.10: System likely to be adopted by current punch card users

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM CHAPTER FOUR

- Nearly half of all respondents, 49.9%, are currently using optical scan technology in their respective jurisdictions.

- Respondents generally exhibit a high level of confidence and a status quo preference for the systems currently used in their jurisdictions.

- Optical scan technology received the most support among respondents, even those not currently using optical scan systems.

- Given HAVA legislation and federal incentives, respondents acknowledge that DRE and optical scan systems are the main alternatives when new election systems are being adopted.

- In order to accommodate disabled voters, most jurisdictions plan to completely replace their current system with DREs and fewer than half plan to add one DRE per polling location.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER FIVE

The Role of Vendors

Voting system vendors provide information about voting systems, recommendations for upgrades, servicing, and actual voting systems to LEOs. Examining the relationship between vendors and LEOs may aid in understanding vendor influence on LEOs and on the adoption of voting technologies. This chapter will describe respondents' perceptions of vendor characteristics, roles, influence on the selection of new voting systems, and oversight.

DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF VENDORS

To determine the most desirable characteristics of voting system vendors according to respondents, the survey asked, "How important are the following characteristics when choosing a voting system vendor?" Respondents ranked twelve characteristics of voting system vendors on a scale of zero (not important) to ten (extremely important). Table 5.1 displays the mean values for each characteristic.

TABLE 5.1: Mean values of vendor characteristics by level of importance

Characteristic	Mean value (0 = Not Important at All; 10 = Extremely Important)
Availability to answer questions and perform maintenance	9.5
Reliability of vendor	9.4
Quality of voting systems represented	9.4
Reputation of vendor	9.3
Trustworthiness of vendor	9.3
Regular check-ups and maintenance of current system	9.3
Type of voting systems represented	8.9
Cost of Services	8.8
Previous experience with vendor	8.7
Availability of registration and ballot preparation services	8.5
Recommendation of state and local government officials	8.3
The vendor offers a wide range of available voting systems	6.2

As one might expect, the perceived quality of the voting system represented was ranked among the most important characteristics with a mean value of 9.5. There was no statistically significant difference, however, between that characteristic and respondents ranking of reliability of vendor. The characteristic with the highest mean value, availability to answer questions and perform maintenance, had a mean of 9.5. Eight of the other nine characteristics were rated as very important, signified by mean values between 8.3 and 9.3. Respondents rated the vendor's offering of a variety of options as less important, with a mean value of 6.2. It is possible that this lower rating is due to the fact that many voting system vendors represent only a limited number of voting systems, and it is difficult to find a vendor who represents a wide variety.

THE ACTUAL ROLE AND PERCEPTIONS OF VENDORS

How much do LEOs actually interact with vendors? About 76.1% of respondents reported some interaction with their vendor in the last four years. Does this interaction convert into trust toward the vendor? We asked LEOs, "Based on your interactions with the vendor who supplied your main voting system, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?" The respondents answered on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly disagree). Table 5.2 displays all of the mean values.

TABLE 5.2: Interaction with current voting system vendor

Statement	Mean value (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)
I am familiar and comfortable with my voting system vendor	6.3
My vendor is responsive to my questions or concerns regarding my current voting system	6.2
My vendor provides high quality goods and services	6.2
The recommendations of my vendor can be trusted	6.1
My vendor provides regular check-ups and maintenance of my current voting system	5.9
The recommendations of my vendor are clearly in the public interest	5.8
Too many aspects of election administration are provided by vendors	3.4
Most vendors are willing to sacrifice voting system security for greater profits	3.1

LEOs do appear to trust their vendors. In addition, they are familiar and comfortable with them, find them responsive, and believe they provide high quality goods and services. All of these responses drew a mean of greater than six on the seven point scale. With slightly lower means, LEOs agree that vendors provide regular maintenance and believe that the recommendations of vendors are clearly in the public interest. The last two statements in Table 5.2 are negatively framed, and in both cases at least 48% of respondents rated one, two, or three, which signals disagreement with these statements. For the two negatively framed, more than 20% of the respondents rated a four, signaling neutrality. Therefore, it is clear that while most respondents responded positively about their voting system vendors, they are somewhat less positive of vendors when it comes to trade-offs with profits or the extent to which vendors provide aspects of election administration.

One explanation of the relationship between vendors and LEOs is that vendors are able to use their position, expertise, and personal relationship with LEOs to shape LEO decisions about election technologies. Vendors appear to enjoy strong relationships with LEOs, and it seems reasonable that such trust and interaction would give vendors a privileged role in the decision process.

How influential are vendors according to LEOs? Two questions from the survey help answer this question. First, the level of influence by vendors on the selection of a new voting system will be discussed in chapter six as having a mean value of 5.3 on a scale ranging from zero (no influence) to ten (large amount of influence). Second, it will be reported in chapter six that respondents are fairly neutral in regard to the statement "Vendors have too great an influence on the process" with a mean value of 3.8 on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly disagree). More than one-third of all respondents gave a rating of four, demonstrating neither agreement nor disagreement with this statement. Considering these two findings, respondents believe that voting system vendors have some influence, but much less than other actors, and there is no consensus on whether or not they have too much influence on the process. This appears to contradict the argument that vendors are key actors in shaping the selection of new systems. However, there are two possible caveats to the findings. The first is that the respondents may be reluctant to admit that any non-governmental actor, especially vendors, exerts a large degree of influence on election administration. Second, if vendors have long-term relationships with LEOs, they may not need to exert influence to be selected as voting system provider, and can assume that they will be continue to be asked to provide new voting systems as needed. In this way they may not have actively

influenced the selection process because they do not need to. Once selected, they are a key partner in system provision.

OVERSIGHT OF VENDORS

Any private-public contract relationship demands a minimal level of oversight. The survey asked respondents, "When thinking about the relationship between election officials and vendors, how would you describe the level of oversight by the following actors?" Respondents were asked to rate the level of oversight by local, state, and federal government actors on a scale ranging from zero (not enough oversight) to ten (too much oversight). For the purpose of this discussion, "adequate" is defined as a rating of four, five or six. Respondents rated the federal government with a mean value of 6.5; the state government with a mean value of 6.0; and local government with a mean value of 5.1. According to our definition, respondents believe that state and local government election officials exercise adequate levels of vendor oversight. The federal government election officials, however, exercise more than adequate levels of vendor oversight.

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM CHAPTER FIVE

- The most important characteristic of a voting system vendor is availability to answer questions and perform maintenance.

- LEOs trust and have confidence in their vendors.

- LEOs do not perceive vendors as being highly influential in decisions to select new systems.

- Finally, survey data suggests that respondents believe they exercise adequate oversight over voting system vendors, with a mean value of 5.1, almost exactly between the ratings of too much and too little oversight.

The Decision Making Process

LEOs across the country participate in a complex process each time they make decisions affecting the voting procedures of their jurisdictions. With many interested parties, officials must navigate toward a decision that will best meet the needs and demands of all. Who do LEOs rely on as they make decisions? And what factors affect the decision making process the most? An understanding of this process is important because currently there is little information, other than anecdotal, about how these decisions are made. The survey included several questions related to the sources of information utilized by LEOs as well as questions focusing on the decision process itself. This chapter discusses respondents' answers to those questions.

DIRECT SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS

Respondents were asked to rate their reliance on twelve possible sources of information. The question provided a scale ranging from zero (no reliance) to ten (great deal of reliance). Table 6.1 lists each of the direct sources of information and its mean value in order to compare the relative importance of each of the sources. As discussed in the previous chapter, one source of information of particular interest is vendors. A criticism of election administration is that private vendors wield too much influence, and that LEOs rely on vendors as their primary source of information.

Hypothesis 6.1: The major source of information on voting systems for state and local officials is voting system vendors.

TABLE 6.1: Respondents reliance on different sources of information

Source of Information	Mean value (0 = No Reliance; 10 = A Great Deal of Reliance)
State election officials	8.1
Other election officials in different jurisdiction	7.3
Other election officials within your jurisdiction	6.8
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	6.1
Advocates for the disabled	6.0
Professional associations	5.8
Vendors	5.8
Independent experts	5.0
Public interest or advocacy groups	4.3
Civil rights groups	4.0
Media	3.2
Political parties	3.1

The information sources can be categorized into three groups for easy examination: The first category is election officials at all levels of government, the second category is issue groups, and the third category is outside experts.

Election officials at all levels of government are the primary source of information for LEOs. Respondents identified state election officials as the number one source of information. The second and third rated sources of information were other election officials within the jurisdiction and other election officials in different jurisdictions. It appears that respondents rely a great deal on other election officials - their peers - and other government officials.

Respondents reported lower levels of reliance on the issue groups. The advocates for the disabled were rated the highest with a 6.0 on the ten point scale while civil rights groups were rated 4.0. Moreover, public interest or advocacy groups were ranked as the ninth most relied-on source and political parties ranked twelfth. The implication is that the respondents tend to rely on advocates for the disabled more than any other issue group.

One possible explanation is that respondents view advocates for the disabled as in greater need for representation when a new voting system is chosen to make sure that they are able to use the system without significant problems. Furthermore, disabled groups have been active in public policy and

helped shape HAVA legislation. This will be reflected below in the discussion regarding factors considered in the decision making process.

Outside experts are the last category within the different sources of information. Professional associations, vendors, and independent experts were rated higher than the media as a source of information.

It appears that the above hypothesis is incorrect. Vendors have a mean score of 5.8 which is just slightly above the half-way point of the scale. It ranks below six other sources of information. This data shows that respondents seem to depend on other types of information sources more than vendors. A statistical examination shows that this disparity between the different variables cannot be attributed to statistical variance alone; rather respondents rely upon these sources of information at different levels.

ACTORS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

There are several actors and interested parties in the decision making process. To evaluate the relative influence of different actors, the survey asked respondents, "If your jurisdiction were going to be making decisions on the adoption of voting systems in the near future, what best describes the amount of influence the following actors would have?" The scale provided ranged from a rating of zero (no influence) to ten (a large amount of influence). Table 6.2 describes the average amount of influence each actor had in the decision making process.

TABLE 6.2: Average amount of influence by actors in the decision making process

Actor	Mean value (0 = No Influence; 10 = A Large Amount of Influence)
My own influence	7.3
State level, elected officials	7.1
Local level, elected officials	6.5
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	6.4
Voters	6.3
Advocates for the disabled	6.0
State-level, non-elected officials	5.5
Vendors	5.3
Courts	5.1
Local-level, non-elected officials	4.5
Other public interest or advocacy groups	4.4
Civil Rights Groups	4.2
Professional associations (e.g. NASS, NASED)	4.2
Independent experts	4.1
Other	4.1
Political parties	3.3
Media	3.0

According to respondents, while federal and state level elected and non-elected officials do have a higher than average influence in the decision making process, it is ultimately the LEOs themselves who have the largest amount of influence. Based on Table 6.2, respondents reported that their own influence was the most important with a mean value of 7.3, followed by state level elected officials who received a mean value of 7.1. The actors with the least amount of influence are the media, with a mean value of 2.9 and political parties with a mean value of 3.3.

While chapter four shows that federal and state influence prompts change in election systems, the finding that LEOs feel they themselves are the most important influence in the decision making process necessitates a follow-up analysis question: What is the nature of LEO involvement? Responses to the open-ended prompt, "Please describe the nature of your input in the voting system decision making process in the space below," revealed three trends in LEO involvement in the decision making process. These responses were coded into primary decision maker, assistant/partial decision maker, and minor/no decision making ability categories.

The responses indicating a high level of involvement, coded into the primary decision maker category, suggest that some respondents have the ultimate say when making decisions with regard to voting systems. For example, one respondent replied that "Ultimately it is my decision and my budget for purchase of a voting system." Another sampled LEO said that, "I will research all aspects of voting equipment and request input from everyone concerned or affected by election equipment changes, but ultimately the final decision is mine to make as long as it is made within the laws and the County finances." Responses of this nature accounted for 16.9% of the coded responses.

The most common trend was a joint effort between LEOs and other officials. These responses, coded into the assistant/partial decision maker category, accounted for 51.3% of the responses. These respondents appear to work in a cooperative fashion with election boards, Secretaries of State, and other election officials when it comes to making decisions regarding the voting systems in their jurisdictions. Some of these respondents described their involvement in the following statements:

- I have gathered information about the vendors and systems offered, arranged for demonstrations for the final decision makers. I have also worked closely with the vendors to determine the differences in offerings and how each vendor's product would work with our current needs.

- It is my responsibility to gather information and make recommendation to the governing body which will provide some funding. Additionally, I participate with the statewide group researching options and making recommendations for HAVA funded equipment.

- I research the voting systems, set up demonstrations for my commissioners and county commissioners. In the final decision, I give my pro and con views on all systems considered. Since I will be responsible for the success or failure of the voting process, I want to be the one who selects the type of system best suited for my jurisdiction.

- The Commissioners will budget the funds for whatever equipment I "strongly" recommend. I will have done my research thoroughly and evaluate the need for the expenditure prior to recommending any change.

As noted above, the third trend in responses was coded into the minor/no decision making ability category. Accounting for 31.7% of responses to the open-ended prompt, comments in this category reveal that some respondents' do not have any involvement in the decision making process. This reflects the fact that some states have centralized the decision making about election systems.

One respondent stated, "If the reference is to choosing the system, I had no input. In Georgia, this decision was made at the state level – for the entire state, in order that we would be uniform. I like the idea of uniformity. It is has worked well in Georgia." Other LEOs felt that federal involvement had reduced their autonomy. Another LEO surveyed responded:

- As a result of HAVA, the hand count system we have always used will be replaced by some sort of optical scan ballots. Since the state will be providing the funding for the equipment, the type and numbers we receive will be largely be dependent on how the state decides to best spend the HAVA money.

The relationship between the level of influence of the election official and the official's perceived rating of success of the decision making process is interesting because it may show whether LEOs are partial towards their own involvement. In order to analyze this relationship, the team cross-tabulated the responses to questions about level of involvement in the decision process with perception of the success of the decision process. Table 6.3 represents the respondents' perceived levels of success of the decision making process compared to the self-reported level of influence by respondents. The average response ratings for each question were divided into three categories: low (a mean value of 0 – 3), medium (a mean value of 4 – 6), and high (a mean value of 7 – 10).

TABLE 6.3: Perceived success of decision making process compared
to respondent's influence

		Degree of Decision Making Process Success			
		Low	Medium	High	Total
Respondents' Perceived Level of Influence	Low	9.0%	14.4%	76.6%	100%
	Medium	4.3%	14.9%	80.7%	100%
	High	2.4%	7.7%	89.9%	100%

This cross-tabulation suggests that the amount of influence only slightly affects the perceived level of success of the decision making process. Over 76% of those with a low amount of influence felt the decision making process had achieved a high level of success. About 80.7% of those with a medium amount of influence and 89.9% with a high level of influence also felt that they had achieved a high level of success. The statistical information gathered does not illustrate a significant relationship between these two variables. Regardless of the level of influence exerted, a clear majority of respondents felt the decision making process was successful.

In addition to level of influence, we also asked respondents about whether specific actors should have more or less influence in the decision making process. Respondents answered this question on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) for each statement. Table 6.4 provides the mean values for the average amount of agreement for each actor.

TABLE 6.4: Mean values of agreement for level of actors' influence
in the decision making process

Statement	Mean value (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)
Local level, elected officials should have greater influence	5.1
The federal government has too great an influence on the process	4.8
The public should have greater influence	4.3
Public interest groups/Civil rights groups/Advocates for the disabled have too great an influence on the process	4.2
Members of the media have too great an influence on the process	4.0
State level, elected officials should have greater influence	4.0
Political parties have too great an influence on the process	4.0
Vendors have too great an influence on the process	3.8
Independent experts should have greater influence	3.2
Professional associations should have greater influence	3.2
State level, non-elected officials should have greater influence	3.0
Low level, non-elected officials should have greater influence	3.0

There was limited variation in the responses given to this question. However, four statements have a mean value of greater than 4.0 while only one statement has a mean value less than 3.0. These responses offer a number of insights. First, local officials feel that they should have greater control over the decision making process and that the federal government has too much influence. Additionally the mean values illustrate that respondents do not strongly agree that any particular group should have a greater influence on the decision making process. For example, respondents appear to believe that public interest, civil rights and disability advocacy groups have too much influence. However, respondents agree that the public should have more influence on the decision making process.

VOTING SYSTEM FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

What factors are important for LEOs when assessing a voting system? We asked LEOs, "When considering the quality of voting systems, how important are the following attributes?" Respondents were given a list of attributes and asked to rate each on the degree of importance during the decision making process. The scale provided ranged from one (not at all important) to seven (extremely important). Table 6.5 provides the mean values for the average amount of importance in the decision making process of different attributes of voting systems.

TABLE 6.5: Mean values of level of importance of different voting system attributes

Attribute	Mean value for Ideal Voting System (1 = Not at All Important; 7 = Extremely Important)	Mean value for Current Voting System (1 = Poor; 7 = Excellent)	Difference of Means
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	6.4	4.4	-2.0***
Possibility of voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	6.5	5.2	-1.3***
Machine error	6.7	5.6	-1.1***
Ability for use in multiple languages	4.4	3.7	-0.7***
Maintenance costs	6.4	5.7	-0.7***
Reliability	6.8	6.3	-0.5***
Acquisition costs	6.2	5.7	-0.5***
Ease of use by voters	6.8	6.3	-0.4***
Accuracy in vote counting	6.9	6.5	-0.4***
Security	6.8	6.4	-0.4***
Storage requirements	5.9	5.5	-0.4***
Ease of use by poll workers	6.5	6.1	-0.4***
Physical size	5.8	5.4	-0.4***
Impact on different socioeconomic groups	4.5	4.3	-0.1*
Speed in vote counting	5.9	5.9	-0.0

* Statistically significant to a p-value ≤ .05
*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

It is clear that there are many factors that are important to respondents when they make decisions about voting systems. The three attributes with the highest averages are "Accuracy in vote counting" with a mean value of 6.9, "Reliability" with a mean value of 6.8, and "Security" with a mean value of 6.8. The two attributes with the lowest mean values were "Ability for use in multiple languages" with a mean value of 4.4 and "Impact on different socioeconomic groups" with a mean value of 4.5.

A similar question included in the survey asked, "How would you rate the current main voting system in your jurisdiction on the following characteristics?" The mean values for the attributes of the current system are also listed in Table 6.5. The range of the scale is the same, but the wording of the scale is slightly different, as it ranges from one (poor) to seven (excellent). Similar to the responses for the previous question, the characteristics with the highest ratings included "Accuracy in vote counting" with a mean value of 6.5 and "Security" with a mean value of 6.4. Again, the two

characteristics with the lowest mean values were "Ability for use in multiple languages" with a mean value of 3.7 and "Impact on different socioeconomic groups" with a mean value of 4.3.

If we assume that the first question represents the ideal system, the second question represents the current system, and the scales correspond to the same degree of agreement, then when we compare the means of the two responses, we notice four things. First, the mean evaluations for aspects of the current system consistently lag behind the respondent's description of the ideal system. Second, these differences in means are considerably significant, with the exception of impact on different socioeconomic groups, which is moderately significant, and speed in vote-counting, which is not significant. There is therefore a perceived performance gap between current systems and ideal systems. Chapter four discussed the strong status quo preference among election officials. In general, they think their systems have worked well, especially during the 2004 election. However, the results of Table 6.5 suggest that while LEOs rate most aspects of their current system highly, they recognize that their current system is not ideal and could be improved.

The third point is that if there is room for improvement in the eyes of LEOs, it is marginal for most aspects of voting systems. In addition, respondents seem to have addressed their top priorities when choosing voting systems. For example, "Accuracy in Vote Counting" is rated as the most important aspect of an ideal system, but the gap that exists between ideal and current systems is only 0.4. While this is a statistically significant difference, it is a relatively small gap compared to over half of the other characteristics.

The fourth insight comes from examining the larger performance gap that exists between an ideal system and the current system in the areas of access for the disabled, possibility of voter error, and machine error. These gaps reflect the priorities of HAVA. More tellingly, the issues of disabled access and reducing under-voting or over-voting are also two of the clearest competitive advantages of DRE machines (the question of machine error and DREs remains a contentious one). This helps explain the popularity of DRE systems. In two of the three areas where LEOs are most concerned about gaps between their current system and their ideal system, DREs hold an uncontested advantage.

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM CHAPTER SIX

- LEOs mostly rely on other election officials as sources of information in the decision process.

- LEOs consider themselves to have the most influence in the decision process.

- The decision process for selecting new systems is viewed as successful by LEOs.

- LEOs are wary of additional federal involvement in the decision process.

- LEOs rate various aspects of current voting systems highly, but lower than what they would like in an ideal system.

- The perceived performance gap between ideal and current systems is most marked for disabled access, voter error and machine error.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER

SEVEN

The Help America Vote Act

Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, which established federal requirements for administering elections at the state and local level. A central element of HAVA was the provision of $3.86 billion dollars for state and local election authorities to update voting equipment and to improve the voting process generally. HAVA also included provisions concerning how military personnel and oversees citizens, people with disabilities, first-time voters and voters who use provisional ballots can cast their votes. The bill also moved the Office of Election Administration at the Federal Election Commission to the newly established Election Assistance Commission that is responsible for providing funding to states, developing voluntary voting systems standards, conducting studies, and serving as a resource for state and local officials as they carry out the new HAVA provisions.

Given that HAVA required major changes in election administration, a chief concern of this survey was respondents' views on HAVA and its implementation. The survey asked questions concerning respondents' familiarity with the provisions of HAVA, its perceived advantages and disadvantages, the implementation of HAVA requirements, and an evaluation of how successful HAVA has been in improving the election processes in local jurisdictions. The data from the survey suggests that HAVA has received a mixed reception by the respondents; however, when asked about the individual provisions within HAVA, the respondents appear to be more satisfied with how specific provisions have affected their jurisdiction. In fact, most of the individual requirements of HAVA are viewed as improvements to the election process. This chapter will discuss in detail the respondents' answers to questions regarding HAVA and establish conclusions regarding its achievements within the local election process.

LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS' FAMILIARITY WITH HAVA

Respondents report a very high overall knowledge of HAVA. The survey asked, "How familiar are you with HAVA requirements?" On a scale ranging from zero (not familiar at all) to ten (extremely familiar), nearly two-thirds of respondents answered with a score above seven and a mean value of

7.6.   Almost 90% reported a score above the mid-range value of five in terms of their familiarity with the legislation; 3.8% of respondents reported having absolutely no knowledge of HAVA. Given respondents' confidence in their familiarity with HAVA and its provisions, their perspective on the role of HAVA in election administration is particularly interesting and relevant.

FIGURE 7.1: LEOs' familiarity with HAVA legislation

INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS OF HAVA

Provision of federal funds

The funds provided by HAVA are contingent on the ability of each state to meet certain application requirements. In a repeated theme of intergovernmental relations, researchers often see that local government officials welcome federal funding but are less welcoming of federal mandates or constraints on their discretion. The following hypothesis introduces this relationship:

Hypothesis 7.1: In the case of HAVA, local government officials are more likely to welcome federal funding, but are less like to be receptive to federal mandates or constraints of their discretion.

70

The survey results suggest only some support for this hypothesis. As expected, federal funding that could be used for the purchase of new election technology was the most popular aspect of HAVA; however, with the exception of provisional voting and to a lesser extent the creation of the Election Assistance Commission, most aspects of HAVA are seen as relevant and positive contributions to the administration of elections. Table 7.1 illustrates the mean values to the following question: "What do you regard as the advantages and disadvantages of HAVA?" Respondents answered using a scale ranging from one (disadvantage) to seven (advantage).

TABLE 7.1: Mean values for HAVA characteristics

Characteristic	Mean value (1 = Disadvantage; 7 = Advantage)
Provision of federal funds to states	6.1
Facilitating participation for military or overseas voters	5.8
Provision of information for voters	5.6
Requirements for voter error correction	5.6
Process for certification of voting systems	5.6
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	5.5
Codification of voting system standards in law	5.4
State matching requirements for federal funds	5.4
Requirements for centralized voter registration	5.3
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	5.2
Creation of the Election Assistance Commission	5.0
Other	4.3
Requirement for provisional voting	4.2

The provision of federal funds to states was the most popular advantage with a mean value of 6.14. A relatively low standard deviation of 1.3 suggests almost uniform agreement of the positive aspects that will accrue to localities from these funds. Well over half of the respondents gave provision of federal funds to states the highest marks possible, and 75% gave it ratings in the top two categories. This is not especially surprising given that it provides greater resources to local election officials.

FIGURE 7.2: Provision of federal funds to states

Though not rated as positively as the provision of federal funds, the state matching requirement for federal funds received a mean value of 5.4, and it too had a relatively small standard deviation of 1.7. This again reflects a large amount of consensus around the average. Over half of all respondents regarded the state matching requirement for federal funds as a significant advantage of HAVA, with a rating of 6 or higher.

Despite receiving the highest mean value, there was criticism regarding the distribution of federal funds. In responses to the open-ended text question, "Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?" five percent of respondents listed a federal funding issue as a complaint. Perhaps the most frequent concern among respondents was that the federal government has been slow in delivering the funds to states, and states to localities. An official in Nebraska and strong supporter of the distribution of federal funds voiced the concerns of many when she requested that the federal government "provide the funds to the states that were originally promised."

Another common concern is that the federal government will put up the funds to pay for the initial systems outlays, but the localities will not be able to afford the ongoing operating costs. "When every dollar counts, you not only have to think of the initial cost, but also the money it will cost to maintain, etc. these new machines," an official from Illinois commented. Issues regarding unfunded mandates, concerns about misuse of resources, and restriction on how the money is used were also addressed in respondent comments.

Creation of Election Assistance Commission

The creation of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was chiefly seen as an advantage, but lacked the level of support of other aspects of HAVA. Respondents gave the "Creation of the Election Assistance Commission" a mean value of 5.0 in terms of being an advantage of HAVA (see Table 7.1). While there is, in general, positive support for the EAC, only 14.6% of respondents feel like the creation of the commission is a disadvantage by giving it a rating of one, two, or three.

FIGURE 7.3: Creation of the Election Assistance Commission

Access for the disabled

Respondents report widespread support for disability requirements. Respondents list the requirements for disabled access to voting systems as an advantage of HAVA with a moderately high mean value of 5.5 out of 7. The high level of support for enhancing access for voters with disabilities was particularly interesting given that these requirements were considered the most difficult to implement. The survey asked, "How difficult are the following HAVA requirements to implement?" and asked respondents to rank requirements on a scale ranging from zero (not difficult at all) to ten (extremely difficult). The mean values are displayed in Table 7.2. The requirements for disabled access to voting systems received the highest score with a mean value of 6.0 out of 10.

TABLE 7.2: Degree of difficulty of implementation of HAVA requirements

Requirement	Mean value (0 = Not Difficult at All; 10 = Extremely Difficult)
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	6.0
Requirement for provisional voting	5.5
Requirements for centralized voter registration	5.1
Process for certification of voting systems	4.8
Other	4.8
Requirements for voter error correction	4.6
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	4.5
Facilitating participation for military or overseas voting	4.4
Provision of information for voters	3.9

The high level of support for enhancing the access of voters with disabilities is consistent with many of the respondents' views reported earlier. In Table 6.5, the ease of access for disabled or blind voters as an important attribute of the quality of an election system received a mean score of 6.4 on a 7 point scale. The importance of voting systems requirements for the disabled and the role HAVA plays in implementation may be linked to the fact that advocates for the disabled were listed as the second most influential group outside of public officials when making decisions about the adoption of a new system (see Table 6.2).

Despite the high level of support, the additional requirements for voting access for persons with disabilities were not entirely uncontroversial. In an open-ended text when asked, "Are there any

ways that HAVA can be improved?" almost 3% of respondents mentioned some form of problem or issue with disability user requirements. Though there was general agreement on the positive aspects of the disability access requirement, there appears to be concern surrounding key compliance issues. Foremost among these issues is the apparent financial and labor burden placed on lower population and lower resource jurisdictions when purchasing and maintaining technologies that allow people with disabilities to vote independently. A Vermont election official states this case very clearly: "The stipulation that every polling place have a voting machine for blind/visually-impaired voters is absurd. In very small jurisdictions the expense is prohibitive and the need is miniscule."

In the open-ended text, many respondents proposed exemptions from disability requirements for jurisdictions with smaller population levels, extensions of 2006 deadlines for disability compliance, and that mandates of disability access voting machines are placed at the county instead of the precinct level. Other respondents expressed concerns that the new requirements are not cost-effective in general. Given the financial impact of disability compliance for small jurisdictions, the needs of persons with disabilities, and a redress of both groups' concerns makes this topic area one that might benefit from more discussion and more research.

Provisional ballot voting

Provisional voting was the issue which raised the ire of the most respondents. As shown in Table 7.1, when asked whether the requirement for provisional voting was an advantage or disadvantage of HAVA, respondents responded with a mean value of 4.2 and produced a frequency curve with an interesting bimodal distribution. On a seven point scale, the two poles, one for disadvantage and seven for advantage, were the most popular responses reflecting a polarized view of provisional ballots among election administrators. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4.

FIGURE 7.4: HAVA requirement for provisional voting

There are several possible reasons why the requirement for provisional voting shows such a mixed response. First, from the respondents' perspective the requirement for provisional voting appears to be relatively difficult to implement. Provisional voting received the second highest difficulty score of all of the HAVA components sampled with a mean value of 5.5 on a scale ranging from zero (not difficult at all) to ten (extremely difficult) (see Table 7.2). The distribution also has a relatively high standard deviation of 3.2. The high standard deviation suggests a large variance in perceptions of the difficulty of implementing provisional balloting requirements.

In addition to some respondents' perceptions of provisional voting being difficult to administer and interpret, other respondents expressed concern that provisional votes are rarely counted. An election official from Texas says: "There is a lot of paper work that has to be done for provisional voting, and then their vote doesn't even count most of the time." There is also the belief that provisional voting puts too much of the burden of correcting voter error on local election officials. "If the voter didn't make an effort to verify or update their registration before thirty days prior to the election then they should not be allowed to vote in that election. We are after all not their babysitters; some of the responsibility has to fall on the voter!!" says a Michigan voting official.

Other HAVA provisions

A large number of HAVA provisions drew the same basic response from respondents: strong support for the requirement and a moderate to low degree of difficulty in implementation. Among these were the requirements for voter-error correction, provision of information for voters, facilitating participation for military or overseas voters, requirements for centralized voter registration, and identification requirements for certain first-time voters as displayed in Table 7.3.

TABLE 7.3: Comparison of other HAVA provisions

Requirement	Mean Value of Advantages of HAVA (1 = Disadvantage; 7 = Advantage)	Mean Value of Difficulty to Implement (0 = Not Difficult at All; 10 = Extremely Difficult)
Requirements for voter-error correction	5.6	4.6
Provision of information for voters	5.6	3.9
Requirements for centralized voter registration	5.3	5.1
Facilitating participation for military or overseas voters	5.8	4.4
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	5.2	4.5
Codification of Voting Systems Standards into Law	5.4	n/a

The requirement for facilitating military and overseas voting received the highest level of support as reflect by its mean of 5.8. The provision of information for voters, which appears to require little additional resources and effort from what was previously being done, is regarded as the easiest to implement.

The two most controversial requirements were for centralized voter registration systems and the identification requirements for first-time voters. This is reflected not only in their larger standard deviations, suggesting less of a consensus on the issue, but also in their lower mean values compared to the rest of the group. Additionally, there were a number of responses elicited through the open-ended question asking if there were improvements that could be made to HAVA. Four percent of these responses described either voter identification or registration concerns. Despite their concerns regarding voter identification and voter registration requirements, respondents do not come to a consensus on a solution to these problems.

Respondents disagree on the usefulness of identification of voters. When asked how HAVA could be improved, a Massachusetts official responded that "It [HAVA] should realize that IDs should be required. It is expected in other secure settings." In contrast, a Kansas official stated "I don't believe it is necessary to have first time voters show identification, because we have known them since they were born in my jurisdiction." Nor is their agreement on whether standards for proper identification should be set at the national, state, or local level. Advocating tolerance of a more decentralized approach, an official from Virginia asks that HAVA "allow more flexibility when states have other, different, ID requirements." A Mississippi official stated that HAVA should require a "voter ID for all, instead of 1st time voters so there would be uniformity in rules."

Though there is some support for a centralized voter registration system, any consensus remains elusive. There is no agreement among respondents whether centralization should occur at the state or national level. An official from Arkansas advocated a federal solution, responding that "the only thing missing is a National Voter Registration System that election officials can cross check for people who are registered in other jurisdictions." A Florida election official stated similarly that the "Only solution is a federal database. Too Orwellian?? The statewide database is difficult to create and administer." Different views exist, however. A Pennsylvania election official requested that lawmakers "make statewide registration a decentralized system." Nevertheless, with a mean value of 5.3 on a seven point scale where seven is an advantage, there does appear to be support in the general direction of centralization of registration systems.

Overall impression of HAVA

Respondents' impressions of HAVA's overall effects on the administration of elections appear to be modest and mixed. LEOs were asked, "Do you think HAVA is resulting in improvements in the election process in your jurisdiction?" and responded on a scale ranging from zero (no improvement) to ten (major improvement). Respondents rated the legislation with a mean value of 5.0. Approximately 59% of respondents placed the HAVA's impact of improving the voting process in the mid-range scores of three to seven. Fourteen percent of respondents placed HAVA in the bottom two categories, while 7% place it in the top two categories. Figure 7.5 displays these percentages.

FIGURE 7.5: HAVA improvements on the election process

In general, the open-ended responses regarding ways to improve HAVA suggest a more negative perception among respondents. Few respondents reported being clearly in favor or opposed to HAVA on the whole. Less than 1% or respondents were categorized as strongly supportive of HAVA, whereas four times as many were categorized as unsupportive. Some of this result is undoubtedly due to the phrasing of the question which asked how HAVA could be improved and the fact that those with the most intense negative feelings were more likely to respond. Based on these findings, it seems fair to suggest that a conclusive verdict has not been reached.

A simple regression was performed to determine the characteristics of the respondents who were most supportive of HAVA (see Table 7.4). The dependent variable was respondents' answers to the question, "Do you think HAVA is resulting in improvements in the election process in your jurisdiction?" The model explains approximately 16% of the variation in opinions and finds that only five factors have any influence. The results suggest that younger, non-college-educated officials, those more receptive to technology and a federal role in the election process, and officials most familiar with HAVA are more likely to support the legislation. The influence that an

individual's beliefs in new technology appear to have regarding HAVA is particularly interesting. Chapter 4 provided evidence of respondents' strong preferences for their current technology in administering elections. HAVA requirements with respect to error correction and disability access appear to be an important contributing factor to respondents' modest reception of HAVA on the whole.

TABLE 7.4: Effects which contribute to an election official's belief that HAVA is improving things

Explanatory Factor	Standardized β	P value
Constant		0.00
Age	-.116	0.00
Belief that the benefits of new technologies greatly outweigh the risks	.214	0.00
Belief that the federal government has too much oversight over election process	-.253	0.00
Familiarity with HAVA	.112	0.00
College Graduate or more education	-.072	0.04
N=912, Adjusted R-squared=.162 , F-value=12.72		

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM CHAPTER SEVEN

- Although LEOs have a positive impression of most of the provisions of the Help America Vote Act, the act as a whole is perceived negatively. Nonetheless, respondents generally agree that HAVA requirements will improve election administration.

- The requirements for provisional ballots show a polarized response with some respondents feeling they were a major enhancement to the previous system, whereas others are concerned about their difficulty of implementation and usefulness.

- While there is general support for the requirements to assist persons with disabilities to independently vote, there are reservations among small communities about the value relative to cost of these new technologies.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Direct Recording Electronic and Optical Scan Technologies

This chapter examines respondents' perceptions of two voting systems: Direct Recording Electronic machines (DREs) and optical scan technologies. These technologies comprise a significant portion of the voting systems in use throughout the United States and are the primary options that LEOs adopting news systems must choose between. Whether the goal is to meet disability access requirements, provide ballots in multiple languages, or increase the accuracy of the vote-counting process, DREs and optical scan systems can help jurisdictions and LEOs meet HAVA objectives more easily than some of the other systems. This chapter will first assess general descriptive statistics with respect to these systems' prevalence and usage among respondents. It will then present an analysis that compares these two technologies as a group relative to other voting systems.

DRE TECHNOLOGY

Almost 20% of respondents use or have used DRE voting technology to administer elections: 17.1% of respondents currently use DRE technology and 2.6% indicate having used DRE machines in the past. In order to accurately reflect the collective perceptions of those respondents with DRE experience, the research team included anyone who is currently or who had previously used DRE technology. This results in a sample size of 263 for this portion of the analysis.

As chapter four suggests, respondents tend to be satisfied with the system they are currently using. One possible reason for this tendency is that familiarity may foster confidence. Another factor may be that once an investment has been made, LEOs are reluctant to see difficulties as shortcomings. We were interested in finding out whether or not these more general results are consistent with those from users of DREs, particularly given that this system has received quite a bit of public criticism. This leads us to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.1: Election officials who have used or are currently using DRE voting technology are mostly satisfied with that technology.

We first analyzed the overall satisfaction of DRE users with their voting systems. Figure 8.1 shows the results. On a scale of zero (extremely dissatisfied) to ten (extremely satisfied), 91.6% rated their satisfaction at an eight or above, with 51.2% indicating they were extremely satisfied with DRE voting systems. Very few respondents, 1.0%, indicated dissatisfaction with DREs.

FIGURE 8.1: Satisfaction with DRE technology

The survey also asked respondents who use or have used DRE technology about specific concerns that have been raised regarding the technology. We were particularly interested in this because DREs have been subject to very public criticism about their level of security. The results shown above, however, suggest that respondents are quite satisfied with their DREs. How does this satisfaction vary with regard to specific aspects of the DRE technology – particularly security issues? This question is reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.2: Election officials using DREs will show support for this technology when asked about security, accuracy, and reliability concerns raised about the technology.

Respondents were asked, "To what extent do you agree with the following statements?" and gave responses using a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Table 8.1 outlines the results for both DRE users and non-users. Given the strong level of satisfaction of

DRE users with their voting technology, it is not surprising that the same users strongly agree with the statements in favor of DRE technology and strongly disagree with statements which cast a negative light on DREs. In contrast, non-DRE users in the sample are fairly undecided regarding their evaluation of these statements which is evidenced by mean values for this group hovering around 4.0. A comparison of means test indicates the difference between DRE users and non-users is statistically significant for all of the responses. Interestingly, 36.9% of non-DRE users chose not to give their opinion to these statements in their response. This leaves us with an average sample size of 227 DRE users and 736 non-DRE users.

TABLE 8.1: Strength of support for aspects of DRE technology by DRE users and non-DRE users

Statement	Mean for DRE Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Mean for Non-DRE Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
I understand how DREs operate	6.2	4.0	2.2***
I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction	6.2	3.8	2.4***
Any security concerns about DREs can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	6.0	4.6	1.4***
The public should have greater trust in DREs	6.0	4.1	1.9***
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate	5.9	4.7	1.2***
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate	5.5	4.1	1.4***
I follow news regarding DREs in the media	5.4	4.5	0.9***
The media reports too many criticisms of DREs	5.4	4.2	1.2***
DRE software should be available for public inspection	3.7	4.3	-0.6***
DRE software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	2.4	4.2	-1.8***
DRE software is vulnerable to being hacked	2.4	4.2	-1.8***
DREs are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	2.1	4.2	-2.1***

*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

DRE users express a strong confidence in their own ability to assess DREs in the quality of certification procedures and in the security of DREs. They seem to believe that media criticism of DREs is overstated and that the public should have higher confidence in DREs.

To determine if a difference exists between DRE users and non-users regarding characteristics of DRE voting systems, another hypothesis was proposed:

Hypothesis 8.3: Respondents currently using or having used DREs will rate DREs more favorably than non-users of DREs.

To assess the attitudes of DRE users, respondents were asked to rate on a scale ranging from one (poor) to seven (excellent) the current main voting system in their jurisdictions on a number of characteristics (see Table 8.2). We should note that for this analysis respondents who currently use DREs (average n=222) were compared to those who do not currently use DREs (average n=571). Use of DRE technology in a previous system was not taken into consideration.

TABLE 8.2: Respondents' performance ratings of DRE technology on various characteristics

Characteristic	Mean for DRE Users (1 = Poor; 7 = Excellent)	Mean for Non-DRE Users (1 = Poor; 7 = Excellent)	Difference of Means
Accuracy in vote counting	6.8	5.3	1.5[***]
Security	6.6	4.9	1.7[***]
Ease of use by voters	6.6	5.0	1.6[***]
Speed in vote counting	6.5	5.7	0.8[***]
Reliability	6.5	4.9	1.6[***]
Ease of use by poll workers	6.3	4.6	1.7[***]
Machine error	6.0	4.8	1.2[***]
Possibility of voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	5.9	5.1	0.8[***]
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	5.7	5.6	0.1
Acquisition costs	5.5	3.6	1.9[***]
Storage requirements	5.5	4.2	1.3[***]
Maintenance costs	5.4	3.8	1.6[***]
Physical size	5.4	4.5	0.9[***]
Impact on different socioeconomic groups	5.2	4.6	0.6[***]
Ability for use in multiple languages	4.6	5.5	-0.9[***]

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

The DRE users surveyed responded in a generally favorable manner for each of the questions. It is interesting to note that DRE users did not strongly agree with the statement regarding "ability for use in multiple languages."

Although an average of 52.6% of non-DRE user respondents failed to rate DREs on these characteristics, those who responded demonstrated generally favorable ratings for DRE technology. Acquisition costs, maintenance costs, physical size, and storage requirements were exception with mean values of 4.5 or below. Interestingly, non-DRE users rated the technology's ability to be used for multiple languages higher than DRE users with mean values of 5.5 and 4.6, respectively. This discrepancy suggests that even though DREs are able to be programmed for multiple languages, it may be difficult to implement or has not been used very much among the respondents. As noted in Table 8.2, the difference between the means of DRE users and non-users is statistically significant for all characteristics other than the ease of access for the disabled or blind.

We were also interested in looking at whether or not a difference exists between the understanding of DRE users and non-DRE users about DRE technology, as stated in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.4: Non-DRE users understand less about the operation of DRE technology and feel they have less adequate information regarding DREs as compared to those who are currently using DRE voting technology.

We examined how non-DRE users compared to DRE users in their understanding of the technology and whether or not they felt they had enough information about DRE technology to recommend its use in their jurisdiction. Respondents who use DREs currently or have used DREs in the past were compared to non-users of DREs in their responses to these two statements: "I understand how DREs operate" and "I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction." Table 8.3 shows the resulting means and comparison of means tests. On average, DRE users rated their understanding of the underlying technology 2.22 points higher than their non-DRE user counterparts. With respect to adequate information, DRE users rated themselves 2.33 points higher than their non-DRE counterparts. The difference in means for both questions is highly statistically significant. This suggests that the conventional wisdom is correct in that people who have not been exposed to this technology are not comfortable

with their understanding of these types of voting systems and do not feel comfortable assessing its appropriateness for their jurisdictions.

TABLE 8.3: Respondent answers regarding understanding of technology

Statement	Mean for DRE Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Mean for Non-DRE Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
I understand how DREs operate	6.2	3.9	2.3[***]
I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction	6.2	3.8	2.4[***]

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

DREs AND VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOTS

One of the major points of debate with regard to DRE technology is whether or not voter verifiable paper ballots (VVPBs), also known as voter verified paper audit trails (VVPATs), should be a requirement. VVPBs are intended to allow the voter to verify that their vote was recorded accurately by printing a paper record of the ballot which the voter may then inspect but not remove from the polling station. VVPBs are intended to add a layer of redundancy to the system and provide a paper backup should a recount prove necessary. Many proponents of DRE machines argue that VVPBs are unnecessary, costly, and may add a potential security weakness through the addition of paper ballots.

In order to analyze the prevailing views among the respondents, the survey asked respondents who use DRE voting systems, "Do you have a voter-verifiable paper ballot?" and, if not, "Are you planning to add one?" The data indicate that 85.4% of the sampled DRE users do not currently have VVPBs. Of those that do not have VVPBs, 90.8% indicate they do not intend to add VVPBs in the future. Given the significant portion of respondents that do not use VVPBs, another hypothesis was examined:

Hypothesis 8.5: Most DRE users disagree with the need for VVPBs; however, respondents not using DRE technology are more likely to be in favor of VVPBs.

86

For this question, 247 DRE respondents and 895 non-DRE respondents answered the following question: "Do you agree or disagree that DREs should print voter-verifiable paper ballots?" Respondents answered on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Of the respondents, 70.4% indicated they disagree that VVPBs should be required with a mean value of 2.52. In contrast, 67.8% of non-DRE respondents agreed with the use of VVPBs. Of these, 39.1% strongly agreed with the need for VVPBs. The mean value for non-DRE respondents was 5.17. The difference between the means for DRE users and non-users is statistically significant (p-value ≤ .001). Figure 8.2 provides the distribution of both DRE users and non-users.

FIGURE 8.2: Respondents' support of VVPBs

Users of DREs were clearly opposed to the addition of VVPBs. Non-users generally thought they were a good idea. This finding underlines the theme that users of a system express a high degree of confidence in the system. While both users and non-users support DREs, non-users are much more willing to consider security improvements.

In order to better understand why respondents were against VVPBs, the research team asked both DRE users and non-users who ranked their agreement with VVPBs as 3 or below to check one or

more reasons why they opposed their use. Table 8.4 outlines which reasons respondents cited for disagreeing with VVPBs.

TABLE 8.4: Reasons for not wanting VVPBs

Concerns	Percent Responding
Risk voters' privacy	74.4%
Possibility of printer failure	60.8%
Cost of paper receipts	54.5%
Size of paper ballots	36.4%
Risk of tampering	35.2%
Other (coded from write-in "other" category)	9.9%
Unsure of usefulness/Unnecessary (coded from write-in "other" category)	8.8%
Will slow process time (coded from write-in "other" category)	4.3%
ADA/Persons with disabilities concerns (coded from write-in "other" category)	1.7%
Difficulty in retrofitting (coded from write-in "other" category)	0.9%
Redundancy (coded from write-in "other" category)	0.6%

The main objections were potential risks to citizen privacy, cost, and the possibility of printer failure. Worries about tampering with votes or the need for a high number of paper ballots of an unwieldy size due to a high number of elected positions being contested were secondary concerns.

For the remaining 688 respondents who agreed that VVPBs should be used (four or above), the research team analyzed the respondents' willingness to pay for this additional technology by asking, "If a DRE costs approximately $3,000, how much more would be appropriate for vendors to charge per DRE to add the capacity to print paper receipts?" Most of the respondents were not willing to pay more than $300 per machine for this enhancement. Figure 8.3 provides this distribution.

FIGURE 8.3: Respondents' willingness to pay for VVPBs

As indicated by the distribution, even among respondents who support VVPBs, there is a reluctance to devote a great deal of resources for them. If VVPBs cannot be included as part of the DRE package or as a relatively low cost addition, then support for VVPBs declines dramatically.

OPTICAL SCAN TECHNOLOGY

Optical scan is the second technology examined in this chapter. Chapter four reported that 49.9% of respondents currently use optical scan technology. Table 8.5 summarizes the division between central-count and precinct-count systems.

TABLE 8.5: Optical scan respondents by type of system

Period of use	Central-count (number / percent of respondents)	Precinct-count (number / percent of respondents)
Currently use	313 / 22.4%	383 / 27.5%
Have used in past	124 / 8.7%	45 / 3.1%

To analyze the level of satisfaction among respondents who use optical scan technology, the survey asked, "How satisfied are you with the performance of your optical scan voting technology?" On a scale ranging from zero (not at all satisfied) to ten (extremely satisfied), the mean value of satisfaction was 9.1. The research team found that 92.1% rated their satisfaction at an eight or

above, with 49.9% of those indicating they were extremely satisfied with optical scan voting systems. Figure 8.4 outlines the distribution of responses. Central-count and precinct-count machines were analyzed individually with no appreciable differences from the distribution as a whole.

FIGURE 8.4: Satisfaction with optical scan voting technology by users

The survey also asked respondents who use or have used optical scan technology about specific concerns that have been raised in the media and in public discussion about security issues associated with optical scan voting technologies. However, the responses shown above suggest that respondents are very satisfied with their optical scan voting systems. Does this satisfaction vary with regard to specific aspects of this technology such as security? This question is reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.6: Election officials using optical scans will show support for this technology when asked about security, accuracy or reliability concerns raised about the technology.

To better understand respondents' views and concerns about optical scan technology, the survey asked the following question: "To what extent do you agree with the following statements?" Respondents gave responses using a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Table 8.6 outlines the results for optical scan users and non-users.

TABLE 8.6: Strength of support for aspects of optical scan technology by optical scan users

Statement	Mean for Optical Scan Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Mean for Non-Optical Scan Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
I understand how optical scan voting systems operate	6.5	4.2	2.3***
I have adequate information on optical scan voting systems to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction	6.5	4.3	2.2***
Any security concerns about optical scan voting systems can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	6.1	4.9	1.2***
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate	5.9	4.9	1.0***
The public should have greater trust in optical scan voting systems	5.8	4.6	1.2***
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate	5.5	4.5	1.0***
I follow news regarding optical scan voting systems in the media	5.1	4.2	0.9***
Optical scan voting system software should be available for public inspection	4.6	4.3	0.3*
The media reports too many criticisms of optical scan voting systems	3.8	3.8	0.0
Optical scan voting system software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	2.5	3.5	-1.0***
Optical scan voting systems are vulnerable to being hacked	2.3	3.4	-1.1***
Optical scan voting systems are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	2.2	3.2	-1.0***

* Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .05
*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

Optical scan users express confidence in their understanding of the underlying technology of these systems. In addition, they feel certification procedures are adequate and security procedures are underestimated.

Non-users are less sure about the characteristics of optical scan technology. Non-users feel, however, that the perceived security risks of these systems may be overestimated. When comparing

the means between the two groups, the only difference that was not statistically significant was the response to the media reporting criticisms of the technology.

To determine if a difference exists between optical scan users and non-users regarding characteristics of optical scan voting systems, another hypothesis was proposed:

Hypothesis 8.7: Respondents currently using or having used optical scan voting systems will highly rate their system on a number of characteristics while those jurisdictions that don't use optical scans will show less support for the technology.

When asked about several attributes associated with their voting systems, respondents using optical scans rated many of the characteristics quite favorably overall. Table 8.7 outlines the responses for these questions. Again, for this portion of the analysis, only current optical scan users were compared to those respondents who are not currently using optical scan voting systems.

TABLE 8.7: Respondents' performance ratings of optical scan technology on various characteristics

Characteristic	Mean for Optical Scan Users (1 = Poor; 7 = Excellent)	Mean for Non-Optical Scan Users (1 = Poor; 7 = Excellent)	Difference of Means
Acquisition costs	5.6	4.6	1.0***
Maintenance costs	5.5	4.5	1.0***
Physical size	5.5	4.6	0.9***
Storage requirements	5.5	4.6	0.9***
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	4.1	3.7	0.4*
Possibility of voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	5.2	4.4	0.8***
Machine error	5.8	4.7	1.1***
Reliability	6.3	5.1	1.2***
Security	6.4	5.3	1.1***
Accuracy in vote counting	6.5	5.2	1.3***
Speed in vote counting	6.2	5.0	1.2***
Ability for use in multiple languages	3.7	4.4	-0.7***
Impact on different socioeconomic groups	4.4	4.2	0.2
Ease of use by poll workers	6.1	5.2	0.9***
Ease of use by voters	6.4	5.2	1.2***

* Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .05
*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

Again, with few exceptions, the results are not similar to the results seen by DRE users and non users. Respondents using optical scan voting systems decisively agree with all of the statements with the exception of the "Ease of access for the disabled or blind," "Ability for use in multiple languages," and "Impact on different socioeconomic groups."

With regard to non-optical scan users, an average of 330 respondents, or 39.1%, provided answers to the questions regarding these characteristics. Most rated these characteristics between four and five with the exception of "Ease of use for the disabled or blind" which had a mean value of 3.7. When comparing the means of the two groups, all were determined as statistically significant with the exception of "Impact on different socioeconomic groups."

We then compared central-count and precinct-count users to see if any of their responses varied. Interestingly, these two groups showed a statistically significant difference on seven of the characteristics. The results are summarized in Table 8.8.

TABLE 8.8: Central-count vs. precinct-count responses to characteristics

Characteristic	Central-count Mean (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Precinct-count Mean (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
Ease of use by voters	6.1	6.5	-0.4[***]
Ease of use by poll workers	6.0	6.3	-0.3[**]
Speed in vote counting	5.9	6.5	-0.6[***]
Possibility of voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	4.6	5.7	-1.1[***]
Impact on different socio-demographic groups	4.2	4.5	-0.3[*]
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	3.8	4.2	-0.4[**]
Ability for use in multiple languages	3.5	3.9	-0.4[*]

[*] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .05
[**] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .01
[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

It appears that respondents who use central-count optical scans are less sure of some of the functional aspects of optical scan technology such as the ease of access for the disabled, the speed in vote counting, and the ability for use in multiple languages. They also rate central-count optical scan voting systems less highly than the precinct count machines with regard to the general ease of use for both poll workers and voters.

We also wanted to know if there are differences in understanding of optical scan technologies by users and non-users. We proposed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.8: Non-optical scan users understand less about the operation of optical scan technology and feel they have less adequate information regarding optical scan voting systems as compared to those who are currently using optical scan voting technology.

We examined how non-optical scan users compared to optical scan users with regard to their understanding and whether or not they felt they had enough information about optical scan technology in order to recommend its use in their jurisdiction. Similar to the DRE portion of the analysis, a comparison of means test was run in order to determine if a significant difference existed between the groups. User of optical scan technology reported their understanding of optical scan technology an average of 2.33 points higher than non-users. In addition, optical scan users showed on average a higher level of agreement that they have adequate information about optical scan technology (an average of 2.27 points higher) than their non-optical scan counterparts. Table 8.9 outlines these findings.

TABLE 8.9: Optical scan vs. understanding of technology

Statement	Mean for Optical Scan Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Mean for Non-Optical Scan Users (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
I understand how optical scan voting systems operate	6.5	4.2	2.3***
I have adequate information on optical scan voting systems to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction	6.5	4.3	2.2***

*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

DRE VS. OPTICAL SCAN VS. NON-USER PERCEPTIONS

Given that the DRE and optical scan technologies are likely to be the primary alternatives for election officials, it is worth examining how users compare specific characteristics, such as certification, security, and public perceptions of the systems. Responses of DREs users, optical scan users, and those who do not use either voting system were analyzed.

Because respondents who use DREs and optical scans strongly favor these technologies, certification procedures will likely be judged as adequate by these individuals. It follows that non-users (those who use neither DREs or optical scans) who tend to be less supportive of technology-based voting systems, would feel that certification procedures are less than adequate.

In order to address this question, respondents were asked, "To what extent do you agree with the following statements?" Their responses to the statements "I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate" and "I consider state certification procedures to be adequate" were compared. Respondents answered on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Table 8.10 outlines the findings.

TABLE 8.10: DRE/optical scan user perceptions regarding certification procedures vs. non-user perceptions

Statement	DRE / Optical Scan Respondents Mean (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Non-DRE / Non-Optical Scan Respondents Mean (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
I consider certification procedures (for DRE voting systems) by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate	4.6	4.0	0.6***
I consider state certification procedures (for DRE voting systems) to be adequate	5.2	4.4	0.8***
I consider certification procedures (for optical scan voting systems) by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate	5.4	4.3	1.1***
I consider state certification procedures (for optical scan voting systems) to be adequate	5.9	4.7	1.2***

*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

Those respondents who use DRE and optical scan voting systems are more supportive of the certification procedures than non-users. In addition, both populations showed a preference for state certification procedures over NASED procedures for both technologies. When the means are compared between the groups and between NASED and state procedures within each group, all differences were found to be statistically significant. The findings seem to indicate that respondents

are more comfortable with certification that is taking place closer to their jurisdictions at the state level.

As we have seen, DRE and optical scan respondents tend to strongly favor their own technologies. Because of the familiarity these election officials have with technology, the question remains as to whether their comfort with their own technology extends to other types of election technologies. We address this question in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8.9: DRE users see their technology as more secure than optical scan voting systems; optical scan users see optical scan technology as more secure than DRE voting systems, and; non-DRE and non-optical scan users are less confidant with the security of either DRE or optical scan systems.

Respondents were asked to show their level of agreement with a series of statements on a scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) for DRE and optical scan voting systems. These questions were analyzed to show how respondents who have been exposed to the more technical voting systems rated both systems. Further analysis was undertaken to understand how non-technical respondents ranked these systems. Responses pertaining to security are outlined in Tables 8.11 through 8.14.

Table 8.11 indicates that DRE users generally support both DRE and optical scan voting systems. When comparing the difference in means, however, only the statements regarding tampering and security procedures were shown to be statistically significantly different. This indicates that DRE users in general feel the same about their system's resistance to viruses and hacking as they do about optical scan voting systems.

We discovered that of those respondents currently using DRE technology (or have used it some time in the past) almost half of these respondents have had prior experience with optical scan technology. The respondents having both DRE and optical scan experience were removed and the analysis on the security questions was rerun (see Table 8.12). Not only was there a general shift in the mean results compared to Table 8.11, but also, the difference in the means for the statement about viruses became statistically significant. This shift seems to indicate that users with a broader understanding of technology feel more comfortable than users with experience in only one technology-based voting system.

TABLE 8.11: Mean values of the impressions of security in voting systems of all DRE respondents

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
System software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	2.4	2.6	-0.2
System software is vulnerable to being hacked	2.4	2.6	-0.2
Voting system is more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	2.0	2.6	-0.6[***]
Any security concerns about voting system can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	6.0	5.6	0.4[***]

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

TABLE 8.12: Mean values of the impressions of security in voting systems of DRE respondents without optical scan experience

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
System software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	2.6	3.0	-0.4[*]
System software is vulnerable to being hacked	2.6	2.8	-0.2
Voting system is more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	2.3	2.7	-0.4[*]
Any security concerns about voting system can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	5.6	5.3	0.3[*]

[*] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .05

TABLE 8.13: Mean values of the impressions of security in voting systems of optical scan respondents

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
System software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	3.9	2.9	1.0[***]
System software is vulnerable to being hacked	3.9	2.3	1.6[***]
Voting system is more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	3.8	2.2	1.6[***]
Any security concerns about voting system can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	4.9	6.1	-1.2[***]

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

TABLE 8.14: Mean values of the impressions of security in voting systems of non-user respondents

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
System software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software	4.2	3.5	0.7[***]
System software is vulnerable to being hacked	4.1	3.5	0.6[***]
Voting system is more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems	4.1	3.3	0.8[***]
Any security concerns about voting system can be adequately addressed by good security procedures	4.7	4.8	-0.1

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

In contrast, Table 8.13 shows that optical scan users clearly favored optical scan technology over DRE systems with regard to security. This is indicated by all of the difference in mean results being statistically significant. The research team compared the results of optical scan users with DRE experience to those without DRE experience and found that the results general trends in Table 8.13 represented these groups as well. Non-users, as shown in Table 8.14, also demonstrated differing

opinions between DRE and optical scan technology. The one exception is that non-user respondents felt that both DRE and optical scan security concerns can be adequately addressed with the proper procedures.

Finally, we examined how respondents felt about open-source software and voting technologies. Open source software refers to code that would be available for public view and inspection. Based on the strength of support for technology indicated by DRE and optical scan users, the research team hypothesized the following:

Hypothesis 8.10: DRE and optical scan users are more likely to agree that open-source software should not be used; however, non-users would be more likely to see open-source software as appropriate.

Tables 8.15, 8.16, and 8.17 outline DRE and optical scan users' views on open source software.

TABLE 8.15: Mean values of DRE respondents' views on using open-source software for voting systems

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
Voting system software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	3.6	3.5	0.1

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

TABLE 8.16: Mean values of optical scan respondents' views on using open-source software for voting systems

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
Voting system software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	4.1	4.5	-0.4[***]

[***] Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

TABLE 8.17: Mean values of non-user respondents' views on using open-source software for voting systems

Statement	DRE Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Optical Scan Systems (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)	Difference of Means
Voting system software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	4.4	4.4	-0.0

*** Statistically significant to at least a p-value ≤ .001

Again, DRE users indicated a preference to not use open-source software on either DRE or optical scan voting systems. DRE respondents also did not show a preference for one technology over the other (shown by the lack of a statistically significant difference of means). Respondents who use optical scans, however, indicated a slight preference for open-source software in both DRE and optical scan voting systems. Surprisingly, 43.9% of optical scan users indicated they strongly agree that open-source software should be used. Respondents who do not use DRE or optical scan technology confirmed a slight preference for open-source software on both voting system technologies but showed no difference between the two technologies. Because the mean values were between 4.1 and 4.5 for optical scan users and non-users, it appears that these users may not have enough information to adequately determine whether an open-source software approach is appropriate.

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM CHAPTER EIGHT

- DRE and optical scan users are generally very satisfied with their systems in terms of security, reliability, and other factors.

- Most DRE users disagree with the use of VVPBs, while most non-users feel they are appropriate.

CHAPTER NINE

Future Research

This report provides a description of respondents' beliefs and attitudes at a crucial point in time. At present, many LEOs have just selected new systems or are considering doing so. Because LEOs are at a crossroads, redistributing a similar survey tool to LEOs in the future to see how their perspectives change (or stay the same) would be a worthwhile endeavor. This would build on the work accomplished with the survey used here. Furthermore, it would result in capturing time series data that follows the progression of the impact of HAVA across multiple election cycles. A similar snapshot of LEOs in the future would contribute significantly to our knowledge of the field of election administration. HAVA legislation will continue to affect the election administration process and the beliefs and attitudes of LEOs. As we think about the possibility of pursuing similar research in the future, we also consider other questions that should be relevant for any scholar working in this field.

SURVEY OF STATE ELECTION DIRECTORS

In addition to the local election official survey, the research team surveyed state level election directors. The survey sent to state election directors was similar, but not identical, to that sent to local election officials (Appendix E). Of the fifty email survey invitations sent to state election directors, eleven directors completed and submitted the survey. The research team sent one email follow-up reminder to this group. The research team determined that a 22% response rate was not high enough to constitute a significant sample and did not analyze the data. The research team will submit a copy of the survey and the data set to the Congressional Research Service for future research endeavors. Because a portion of State Election Directors in the data set have been responsive to this survey tool, the research team strongly urges another attempt at the distribution of the survey.

The opinions of state election directors are important because each state administers elections in a manner that will best fulfill HAVA regulations. HAVA provides direct financial assistance to each state which must then distribute those monies for the purposes of improving election technologies at the local level. Officials at the state level have strong influence in how HAVA money is

distributed. Including these officials would have shed additional light on inter-governmental relations.

The responses provided by local election officials in the open-ended text questions of the survey are direct evidence that the relationships between state and local level election administrators varies from local autonomy to state control. A sampled LEO from Georgia said, "By law, the entire State of Georgia uses the same equipment. We are not given any chance for input." Other responses focused specifically on HAVA funding: "As a result of HAVA, the hand count system we have always used will be replaced by some sort of optical scan ballots. Since the State will be providing the funding for the equipment, the type and numbers we receive will be largely dependent on how the State decides to best spend the HAVA money."

Other responses to the open-ended question signified a workable partnership between the two entities. One sampled LEO stated that, "Our Association of County Officials have representatives that are working with State Election Officials to select a system for the entire state." Another surveyed LEO commented that, "The state election division highly regards the input from the people who actually put on the elections both for counties and municipalities. As such, we work closely on what we see needs to be improved upon and make many suggestions which they act upon as necessary and as the law allows."

Finally, some local election officials indicate that they have complete autonomy over what type of voting system is used in their jurisdiction as long as it complies with HAVA legislation. A sampled LEO from Michigan commented that, "The State of Michigan receives communication from the Federal Government, who communicates to the County, who communicates with me regarding concerns, acquisitions of equipment and requirements. I then go to the Township Board (5 elected members total) and explain requirements and personal choice. The Board then asks questions and agrees where necessary." Another surveyed LEO stated that, "My office is in charge of administration of elections in the County. My input will be the final decision with any or all election issues."

A relationship between state and local level officials is inevitable as the state bears the responsibility for local jurisdictions' HAVA compliance. The responses to this survey introduced the sentiments

of local elections, whose feelings are often influenced by officials at the state level. The next step is to fully assess the attitudes of state level decision makers.

JURISDICTION SIZE AND ACCESS FOR DISABLED VOTERS

One of the issues that became clear in responses to the open-ended text questions was that many smaller jurisdictions felt that there were major differences between administrating a small versus a large jurisdiction, differences that the requirements of HAVA fail to recognize. "We would very much like to keep things the way they are. We are a very small County and this is the most cost efficient and practical way for us. The HAVA act will cost the County thousands of dollars with no one using it. In this size community we know our residents. There needs to be some options in the HAVA act." Another concern raised by a LEO was "To have handicap voting at central polling and have touch screens at that polling place only. Our county is large in size but small in population. The handicapped can vote absentee from their homes or at central polling. They can vote at any polling place with help."

This second comment above introduces another opportunity for future research: the HAVA requirement to provide access for voters with disabilities at each voting facility. Disability advocates often disagree with need assessments for several reasons. First, there are many "hidden" disabled who would not necessarily be known to administrators even in small jurisdictions. Second, we are a mobile and aging society so even if there are no disabled in a community now, that doesn't mean there won't be. Third, many individuals not be classified as disabled voters would benefit from a disability feature. For example, many mobile people use wheelchair ramps to roll a suitcase. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to make annual payments to eligible state and local governments to ensure that the polling places are equipped with handicapped accessible voting booths. As reported in chapter eight, respondents support the disability access requirements, but some in small jurisdictions voiced the opinion that this requirement should take into consideration the size and/or disabled population within a jurisdiction. Purchasing equipment in order to comply with HAVA disability access regulations is more feasible in large communities. Small communities still have to comply with the law, but more flexible conditions could be investigated for jurisdictions with smaller populations. These concerns of respondents are best conveyed in their own words, including,

- In Kentucky, I believe we have the best process for election tally for several years. The federal government has passed laws forcing us to go backwards instead of forward. I think there should be a common sense approach when looking at voting for the disabled. Benefit v. Cost.

A similar response was, "Yes. Why force all this "big time city" stuff on us rural counties. We DO NOT have a great number of blind & disabled, and the ones we have get along very fine. Neighbors just help out around here." Another sampled LEO had a similar observation, "The requirement for handicapped accessible equipment in every precinct across America is complete overkill for much of rural American and is without common sense or true assessment of need, has no consideration of voter population density and available resources."

CHARACTERIZATION OF AN ELECTION OFFICIAL

To create an accurate picture of the average sampled LEO, questions regarding the nature of their duties as an election administrator and limited personal information were incorporated into the survey. Chapter four thoroughly outlines the characteristics of the respondents, but analysis of those survey questions and their responses has prompted the research team to suggest two additional avenues of further research regarding the job descriptions and experience of election administrators at the local level.

One area of possible further investigation is how many hours per week are spent by LEO on elections and what is the nature of their duties other than election administration? The survey included a question that asked, "On average how many hours per week do you spend on election duties?" The analysis section of this report did not include a discussion of the responses to this question because the research team determined that a mean value or any type of representation of the responses received could not be representative. This is because many respondents who responded on paper provided an answer but added a stipulation to that number such as "during election time only" or "during the week of elections." Because those analyzing the data could not determine what frame of reference the respondent maintained when considering that question (ie: hours worked during a typical week or hours worked during election time) the data could not be considered valid. Clearly the amount of time spent on election duties during the weeks surrounding a federal election is greater than the time spent on elections during non-election times of the year.

An accurate representation of the amount of time spent on election administration by a LEO would require that the sample be asked the question and given a distinctive frame of reference, such as, "On average how many hours per week do you spend on election duties during the month prior to and following an election?" or "On average how many hours per week do you spend on election duties during the election?" and "On average how many hours per week do you spend on elections the rest of the year?"

A second area to be investigated to garner a clearer picture of the duties of LEOs is to consider what other tasks he or she is responsible for beside election administration. Particularly during telephone conversations with respondents during the course of the project, it became clear that many respondents had other duties, including the responsibilities of county, town, or city clerk, county or city tax assessor/collector, circuit clerk. Some LEOs maintain other employment in the public or private sector. An item of interest could be how a LEO balances other job responsibilities against election administration, how these duties are prioritized, and how level of professionalism affects LEO attitudes.

TRAINING FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS

The survey of LEOs concluded with a question regarding the degree of training the sampled LEO received. The respondents characterized their training as "excellent", "good", "adequate", or "poor." Chapter four reported that 81.5% of those surveyed characterized their training as "excellent" or "good." A subsequent open-ended question in the survey asked, "What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?" Members of the research team coded the responses provided into ten categories: hands-on or on the job training, cross training with other election officials, state level training, local level training, Election Center training, project management training, technical/system/vendor training, legal or regulations training, personnel/management/poll worker training, and other general training. Figure 9.1 shows the frequency of these responses.

One LEO explained that, "The State of Michigan conducts election training classes and a test for certification. There is a difference between training those of us in the rural areas and those in high populated areas. The classes are geared only to the highly populated areas." Another LEO said, "I think state government should offer training to all new incoming county clerks and election authorities sometime during their first year. I also think that as new laws are implemented the State

and their attorneys should have continued training for election authorities and their staff." A different LEO proposed, "Training has always consisted of teaching the laws. I would like to see some mock training exercises in which we are provided a test election from beginning to end. This would provide training in organizing, running and completing an election." The creation of new federal requirements and the promulgation of new and more sophisticated election technologies bring training for local election officials to the forefront. Without the necessary legal and technical knowledge to run an election, election administrators and poll workers find themselves with a significant disadvantage before a single ballot is cast.

This evidence begins to uncover an issue that election officials perceive as important, but more systematic research would build on the findings here.

FIGURE 9.1: Coded training improvement responses

Provisional Voting

HAVA outlines new requirements regarding the use of provisional voting for voters whose names do not appear on the official list of registered voters. These voters must be allowed to cast a provisional ballot, the ballot must be validated and counted if it is deemed legal by the local election administration, and the voter must be notified if the ballot was counted or not. If the voter's registration cannot be verified, the voter must be informed as to why the ballot was not counted. When asked about ways that HAVA can be improved, some LEOs responded with strong feelings about provisional voting, as reported in chapter seven. While some respondents expressed support, many noted that the provisional ballot system is difficult to implement and administer, and that it places a significant burden on those conducting the election. One said:

> If provisional voting is to continue a national standard defining jurisdiction must be set. This national standard MUST define the jurisdiction as PRECINCT. The purpose of provisional voting is not to create convenience voting for people who are too lazy to go to their home precinct or too irresponsible to know where it is that they should vote. It was established to prevent legitimately registered voters from being disenfranchised due to errors in the voter registration records.

Another LEO expressed a concern about provisional voting's time burden, "We do not agree with the provisional voting requirement. This has hampered getting results in a timely manner for big elections." There are future research possibilities with respect to the state of provisional voting. Obviously it is a concern of some respondents, and consideration might be given to further explorations of new regulations that could simplify or standardize the process.

Centralized Voter Registration

The process for voter registration is determined by each state. Some states allow Election Day voter registration while others require that voters register weeks before each election. As reported in chapter eight, HAVA legislation requires that states create a centralized voter registration system. This voter registration system must be computerized and assign a unique identifier to every legally registered voter in the state. Each individual voter must be in the voter registration system before Election Day and first time voters who register by mail must present identification in order to cast a

ballot in any federal election. This change in operations will not modify the registration procedures in all states, but will require some election administrations to change their voter registration processes completely.

Chapter seven reports that respondents do not consider requirements for centralized voter registration systems to be an advantage of HAVA, but many of the open-ended text responses to the survey question about how HAVA can be improved suggest that respondents are supportive of voter registration uniformity and the voter identification requirement for voters who register by mail and have not previously voted in the jurisdiction. Clearly this creates an administrative burden for some, but others voice that it will help the integrity of elections: "Voter registration ID requirements should be more uniformly applied. Include new voting system R&D to the duties of the EAC." Two other respondents recognized possible future improvements to the voter registration system, including "With the implementation of a statewide voter registration system no later than 2006, vote-by-mail will stand as the most efficient, highest participation, error free and secure voting system in the world," and "The central registration system in place in Minnesota provides for a swift verification of new voters and can be further improved with e-access to identification information such as state drivers license files." To another respondent, the requirement is simply an issue of voter responsibility: "I feel state wide voter registration should be a must. I disagree with registration and same day voting. Some responsibility needs to fall on voter." Because centralized voter registration and identification requirements for certain voters are now federally mandated, a future research possibility lies in how the voting process could be modified with this new accountability mechanism. Perhaps new advances in voter registration and identification will quell identification or security concerns in regards to off-site or internet voting.

APPENDIX

A

Local Election Official
Survey Questionnaire

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Texas A & M University

Survey of Election Technology and Risk Evaluation among Election Officials

Texas A&M University
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress

Survey of Election Technology and Risk Evaluation among Election Officials

---

Our Promise to You

Should you choose to continue and participate in this survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential and research records will be stored securely. Texas A & M University will not release information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give away the lists of randomly generated email addresses used in our research. No identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.

Why Your Participation Matters

The purpose of this survey is to solicit the views of election officials on the important topic of voting technology; we hope you view the survey as an opportunity to provide much-needed information on this public policy issue. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in the debate. This survey concentrates on the voting issues that face election officials across the country. Your mailing address was selected at random from a database of officials who participate in election processes. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated. You may have received notice about this survey through the National Association of State Election Directors list serve.

Who is Conducting this Study and Why

Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This research study has been reviewed by the IRB - Human Subjects in Research, Texas A & M University. For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the IRB through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of VP for Research at (979) 845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

Instructions

The survey is voluntary and it will take 20-40 minutes to complete. You are free to refuse to answer any of the questions or to withdraw from the survey at any point. Please do not have anyone else fill out this survey for you, because your experiences and observations are essential to the research. If you would prefer to complete the survey online, please access the survey via the following URL: https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=<URL>. If not, please complete the enclosed survey and return it in the postage paid envelope to: Texas A&M University, TAMU 4220, College Station, Texas, 77843, Attention: Dr. Don Moynihan.

Should you have any questions regarding our research you can contact the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at (979) 845-1540 or dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Voting System

1. Would you consider yourself to be an election official?   ___ Yes   ___ No

2. Are you responsible for any of the following aspects of election technology? Check all that apply:
         ____ Purchasing   ____ Evaluation & Recommending   ____ Managing   ____ Other _____

3. Do you have a full or part time position as an election official?   ____ Full time   ____ Part time

4. On average how many hours per week do you spend on election duties?   _____ Hours

5. What is the nature of your position?
         ____ Elected   ____ Appointed   ____ Other _____

6. Many questions in this survey refer to "your jurisdiction." As an election official and for the purposes of answering these questions, do you consider your jurisdiction to be:
         ____ County   ____ Town   ____ Township   ____ Borough   ____ Other _____

7. What is the current main voting system, by this we mean the kind of voting system that most voters in your jurisdiction cast their votes with? For voting system definitions, please see the Glossary on page 12.
Choose one:

____ Lever machine	____ Precinct count optical scan
____ Punch card ballot	____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot	____ Internet voting
____ Central count optical scan	____ Other _____

8. In general how satisfied are you with the performance of the current voting system? Circle one:

Extremely Satisfied   Not Very Satisfied
      10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1

9. In addition to the main voting system, do you have any other kinds of voting systems in your jurisdiction? Check all that apply:

____ None, only one system is in use	____ Precinct count optical scan
____ Lever machines	____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
____ Punch card ballot	____ Internet voting
____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot	____ Other _____
____ Central count optical scan	

10. How long has your jurisdiction been using the kind of voting system that you indicated above as being the main voting system?
         _____ years (round to the nearest year)

Please answer 10a and 10b, if your main voting system has been in place for 3 years or less:

10a. How important were the following factors in prompting the adoption of a new system? Circle your most preferred response for each factor:

	Extremely Important									Not at All Important
HAVA requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
HAVA funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Publicity from the Florida 2000 Election	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media or public pressure to change the system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about costs of previous system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about reliability of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about accuracy of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about speed of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about age or condition of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

10b. What percentage of funding did the following levels of government provide for the new voting system? Indicate your best estimate for each category:
         Federal _____ %   State _____ %   County _____ %   Municipal _____ %

11. What was the main voting system in place immediately prior to the current system? Choose one:

_____ Lever machine   _____ Precinct count optical scan
_____ Punch card ballot   _____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
_____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot   _____ Other
_____ Central count optical scan   _____ Don't Know

12. How likely is it that you will change the main voting system currently in place in the next five years? Circle one:

Extremely Likely   Not Likely at All
10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0

Please answer questions 12a through 12f, if you answered question 12 with 6 or greater:

12a. Will your jurisdiction lease or purchase the new system? _____ Lease _____ Purchase _____ Don't know

12b. What type of system do you think is most likely to be adopted? Choose one:

_____ Lever machine   _____ Precinct count optical scan
_____ Punch card ballot   _____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
_____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot   _____ Other _____
_____ Central count optical scan

12c. Is it likely your jurisdiction will change its early voting system? ____ Yes ____ No

12d. Is it likely your jurisdiction will change its absentee voting system? ____ Yes ____ No

12e. Which of the following statements best reflects how voting at polling places is likely to change? Choose one:

____ My jurisdiction will change only one new voting machine per polling place to accommodate voters with disabilities.
____ My jurisdiction will change about one quarter of the voting machines in all polling places.
____ My jurisdiction will change about one half of the voting machines in all polling places.
____ My jurisdiction will change about three quarters of the voting machines in all polling places.
____ My jurisdiction will change all of the voting machines in all polling places.

12f. How important are the following factors in the adoption of a new system? Circle your most preferred response for each factor:

	Extremely Important									Not at All Important
HAVA requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
HAVA funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Publicity from the 2000 Election	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media or public pressure to change the system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about costs of previous system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about reliability of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about accuracy of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about speed of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about age or condition of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

13. What type of early voting system(s) do you have in place? Check all that apply:

____ No early voting system in place   ____ Central count optical scan
____ Hand-counted ballots   ____ Precinct count optical scan
____ Lever machine   ____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
____ Punch card ballot   ____ Other _____

14. What type of absentee voting system(s) do you have in place? Check all that apply:

____ Hand-counted ballots   ____ Precinct count optical scan
____ Lever machine   ____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
____ Punch card ballot   ____ Other _____
____ Central count optical scan

The Decision Making Process

15. If your jurisdiction were going to be making decisions on the adoption of voting systems in the near future, what best describes the amount of influence the following actors would have? Circle your most preferred response for each actor:

	A Large Amount of Influence									No Influence	
My own influence	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State level, non-elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local level, non-elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State level, elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local level, elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Professional associations (e.g. NASS, NASED)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Independent experts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Political parties	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Courts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors (A voting system vendor is the company or representative though which the voting system is purchased or leased)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Civil Rights Groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Advocates for the disabled	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Public interest or advocacy groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

16. Please describe the nature of your input in the voting system decision-making process in the space below:

17. In general, how successful was the decision making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place? Circle one:

Very Successful									Not Successful at All		
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	

18. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the decision-making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place? Circle your most preferred response for each statement:

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
Members of the media have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State level, elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Local level, elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Independent experts should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Professional associations should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The federal government has too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Low level, non-elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State level, non-elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Political parties have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Vendors have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Public interest groups/civil rights groups/advocates for the disabled have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

19. What could be done to improve the decision making process for selecting voting systems?

20. When considering the quality of voting systems, how important are the following attributes? Circle your most preferred response for each attribute:

	Extremely Important					Not at all important	
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

21. How would you rate the current main voting system in your jurisdiction on the following characteristics? Circle your most preferred response for each characteristic:

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Please answer Question 22 if your current main voting system is NOT a DRE:

22. How would you rate DREs on the following characteristics? Circle your most preferred response for each characteristic:

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Please answer Question 23 if your current main voting system is NOT an optical scan:

23. How would you rate optical scan on the following characteristics? Circle your most preferred response for each characteristic:

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Sources of Information

24. To what extent do you rely on the following sources of information about voting systems? Circle your most preferred response for each source:

	A Great Deal of Reliance									No Reliance	
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other election officials within your jurisdiction	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other election officials in different jurisdictions	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Professional associations	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Independent experts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Political parties	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State election officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Civil rights groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Advocates for the disabled	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Public interest or advocacy groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

25. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Circle your most preferred response for each statement:

	Strongly Agree					Strongly Disagree	
The use of new information technologies can dramatically improve government services.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Government should move cautiously when adopting new technology.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The benefits of new technologies greatly outweigh the risks.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Overall, e-government has a positive effect on the way the government operates.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
When it comes to new technologies, I think it is best to wait until all the bugs have been worked out.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

26. How do you feel about the use of the following types of voting systems for elections in the United States? Circle your most preferred response for each type:

	Strongly Support						Strongly Oppose
Lever machine	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Punch card ballot	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Paper (hand-counted) ballot	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Central count optical scan	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Precinct count optical scan	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Internet voting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Other _____	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

27. Overall, in the 2004 November elections, how well did the main voting system in your jurisdiction perform? Circle one:

Extremely Well									Not Well at All	
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

28. Please provide any additional comments you wish to make here about the performance of the main voting system in the November 2004 election in your jurisdiction:

Role of Vendors

29. How important are the following characteristics when choosing a voting system vendor? Circle your most preferred response for each characteristic:

	Extremely Important								Not Important at All	
The vendor offers a wide range of available voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Trustworthiness of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Reliability of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Cost of services	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Availability to answer questions and perform maintenance	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Regular check-ups and maintenance of current system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Availability of registration and ballot-preparation services	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Quality of voting systems represented	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Type of voting systems represented	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Reputation of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Previous experience with vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Recommendation of state and local government officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

30. When thinking about the relationship between election officials and vendors, how would you describe the level of oversight by the following actors? Circle your most preferred response for each actor:

	Too much Oversight								Not Enough Oversight	
Federal government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

31. In the last four years have you had any interaction with the vendor who supplied your main voting system?   _____ Yes   _____ No

Please answer Question 31a only if you answered YES to Question 31:

31a. Based on your interactions with the vendor who supplied your main voting system, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? Circle your most preferred response for each statement:

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
I am familiar and comfortable with my voting system vendor.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
My vendor provides high quality goods and services.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
My vendor is responsive to my question or concerns regarding my current system.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
My vendor provides regular check-ups and maintenance of my current system.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The recommendations of my vendor can be trusted.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The recommendations of my vendor are clearly in the public interest.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Most vendors are willing to sacrifice voting system security for greater profits.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Too many aspects of election administration are provided by vendors	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Congress recently passed the Help American Vote Act (HAVA), which provides federal funds to states in order to implement new voting system requirements.

32. How familiar are you with HAVA requirements? Circle one:

Extremely Familiar									Not Familiar at All	
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

If you answered zero to Question 32, please begin again on Question 37.

33. What do you regard as the advantages and disadvantages of HAVA? Circle your most preferred response for each characteristic:

	Advantage						Disadvantage
Provision of federal funds to states	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State matching requirement for federal funds	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Creation of the Election Assistance Commission	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for voter-error correction	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Provision of information for voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Codification of voting system standards in law	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Process for certification of voting systems	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for centralized voter registration	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirement for provisional voting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Facilitating participation for military or over-seas voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Other _____	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

34. How difficult are the following HAVA requirements to implement? Circle your most preferred response for each requirement:

	Extremely Difficult									Not Difficult at All	
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirements for voter-error corrections	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Provision of information for voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Process for certification of voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirements for centralized voter registration	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirement for provisional voting	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Facilitating participation for military or over-seas voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

35. Do you think HAVA is resulting in improvements in the election process in your jurisdiction? Circle one:

Major Improvement									No Improvement	
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

36. Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technology

37. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Circle your most preferred response for each statement:

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
I understand how DREs operate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software is vulnerable to being hacked.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater trust in DREs.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I follow news regarding DREs in the media.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DREs are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The media reports too many criticisms of DREs.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Any security concerns about DREs can be adequately addressed by good security procedures.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

38. Do you agree or disagree that DREs should print voter-verifiable paper ballots, by which we mean paper receipts that voters can verify but not remove from the polling station? Circle one:

Strongly Agree   Strongly Disagree
7   6   5   4   3   2   1

Please answer Question 38a only if you answered 3 or below on Question 38:

38a. Why do you disagree? Check all that apply:
_____ Cost of paper receipts   _____ Risk of tampering
_____ Possibility of printer failure   _____ Risk voters' privacy
_____ Size of paper ballots   _____ Other _____

Please answer Question 38b only if you answered 4 or above on Question 38:

38b. If a DRE costs approximately $3,000, how much more would be appropriate for vendors to charge per DRE to add the capacity to print paper receipts? Choose one:
_____ No more   _____ Between $1201 and $1500
_____ Between $1 and $300   _____ Between $1501 and $1800
_____ Between $301 and $600   _____ Between $1801 and $2100
_____ Between $601 and $900   _____ More than $2101
_____ Between $901 and $1200

If DRE is NOT your current main voting system, please begin again on Question 41

39. How satisfied are you with the performance of your DRE technology? Circle one:
Extremely Satisfied   Not at All Satisfied
10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0

40. Do you have a voter-verifiable paper ballot?   _____ Yes   _____ No

Please answer Question 40a only if you answered NO to Question 40:

40a. Are you planning to add one?   _____ Yes   _____ No

Optical Scan Technology

41. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Circle your most preferred response for each statement:

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
I understand how optical scan voting systems operate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I have adequate information on optical scan voting systems to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems software are vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems are vulnerable to being hacked.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater trust in optical scan voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I follow news regarding optical scan voting systems in the media.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The media reports too many criticisms of optical scan voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Any security concerns about optical scan voting systems can be adequately addressed by good security procedures.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Please answer Question 42 only if optical scan is your current main voting system:

42. How satisfied are you with the performance of your optical scan voting technology? Circle one:

Extremely Satisfied								Not at All Satisfied		
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

Individual Information

43. How old are you?   _____ Years

44. Are you male or female?   _____ Male   _____ Female

45. Do you consider yourself . . . ? Choose one:
_____ White non-Hispanic   _____ Asian or Pacific Islander
_____ Hispanic   _____ Native American or Alaskan native
_____ Black/African American   _____ Other _____
_____ Mixed racial background

46. What is the highest level of education you have completed or the highest degree you have received? Choose one:
_____ Completed some high school   _____ College graduate
_____ High school graduate or equivalent   _____ Completed some graduate school, but no degree
_____ Completed some college, but no degree   _____ Completed graduate school

47. On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arrange from strong liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following categories best describes your views? Choose one:
_____ Strongly liberal   _____ Slightly conservative
_____ Liberal   _____ Conservative
_____ Slightly liberal   _____ Strongly conservative
_____ Middle of the road

48. Please select your salary range. Choose one:
_____ Less than $10,000   _____ $60,000 to $69,999
_____ $10,000 to $19,999   _____ $70,000 to $79,999
_____ $20,000 to $29,999   _____ $80,000 to $99,999
_____ $30,000 to $39,999   _____ $100,000 to $120,000
_____ $40,000 to $49,999   _____ More than $120,000
_____ $50,000 to $59,999

49. How long have you served in your current capacity in election administration?   _____ Years   _____Not applicable

50. How would you characterize your training as an election official? Choose one:
        ____ Excellent - my training did an excellent job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
        ____ Good - my training did a good job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
        ____ Adequate - my training did an adequate job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
        ____ Poor - my training did a poor job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections

51. What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?

52. Are you a member of any of the following professional elections organizations? Check all that apply:
        ____ National Association of State Election Directors
        ____ National Association of Secretaries of State
        ____ National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks
        ____ The Election Center
        ____ International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers
        ____ State-level organizations
        ____ Other _____

GLOSSARY

Levers: Voter pulls lever next to candidates name; machine records and tallies record.

Punch cards: Voter uses computer readable card to mark vote by punching hole into numbered boxes, indicated by a ballot booklet, or directly onto a ballot card. Computerized tabulation machine reads votes by identifying holes in the ballot. Includes VotoMatic and DataVote.

Paper: Voter marks preference next to printed list of options; ballot dropped into sealed box and manually counted.

Central count optical scan: Voter marks computer readable paper ballot; computerized tabulation machine tallies vote at a central location.

Precinct count optical scan: Voter marks computer readable paper ballot; computerized tabulation machine tallies vote at precinct location.

DRE (Direct Recording Electronic): Voters select candidate listed on a computer screen by directly touching the screen or button. Votes tabulated on computer.

Internet voting: Voters select candidate through a secure and secret electronic ballot; ballot is transmitted to election officials using the internet.

Thank you for completing the survey!

Please place the completed survey booklet in the prepaid addressed envelope and mail it back to our central data collection facility. If the envelope has been misplaced, please forward the completed survey to:

Texas A&M University
TAMU 4220
College Station, Texas 77843
Attention: Dr. Don Moynihan

APPENDIX

B

Local Election Official
Survey Aggregate Results

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Q1. Would you consider yourself to be an election official?

	1 = Yes	2 = No	Missing
Number	1393	29	9
Percent	97.3	2.0	0.6

Q2. Are you responsible for any of the following aspects of election technology?

Q2_1. Purchasing

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	428	1003
Percent	29.9	70.1

Q2_2. Evaluation & Recommending

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	411	1020
Percent	28.7	71.3

Q2_3. Managing

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	253	1178
Percent	17.7	82.3

Q2_C4. Training/Education

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1418	13
Percent	99.1	0.9

Q2_C5. Hiring/Recruiting

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q2_C6. Operating/Programming

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1415	16
Percent	98.9	1.1

Q2_C7. Maintenance

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1424	7
Percent	99.5	0.5

Q2_C8. Other/General

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1366	65
Percent	95.5	4.5

Q3. Do you have a full or part time position as an election official?

	1 = Full-time	2 = Part-time	Missing
Number	917	475	39
Percent	64.1	33.2	2.7

Q4. On average how many hours per week do you spend on election duties?

Number of Hours	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	16	1.1		
1	87	6.1		
2	76	5.3		
3	37	2.6		
4	40	2.8		
5	65	4.5		
6	10	0.7		
7	5	0.3		
8	39	2.7		
9	3	0.2		
10	115	8.0		
12	8	0.6		
14	3	0.2		
15	52	3.6		
16	3	0.2		
17	1	0.1		
18	2	0.1		
19	2	0.1		
20	91	6.4		
21	1	0.1	20.59	16.748
22	1	0.1		
24	7	0.5		
25	42	2.9		
30	77	5.4		
32	2	0.1		
34	1	0.1		
35	36	2.5		
36	2	0.1		
37	5	0.3		
38	5	0.3		
40	211	14.7		
45	13	0.9		
48	4	0.3		
50	35	2.4		
55	4	0.3		
60	13	0.9		
65	1	0.1		
70	2	0.1		
100	2	0.1		
Missing	312	21.8		

126

Q5. What is the nature of your position?

	1 = Elected	2 = Non-Elected / Appointed	3 = Other / Unknown	Missing
Number	912	476	26	17
Percent	63.7	33.3	1.8	1.2

Q6. Many questions in this survey refer to "your jurisdiction." As an election official and for the purposes of answering these questions, do you consider your jurisdiction to be:

	1 = County	2 = City / Town / Village	3 = Township	4 = Borough	5 = Other	Missing
Number	991	356	61	1	6	16
Percent	69.3	24.9	4.3	0.1	0.4	1.1

Q7. What is the current main voting system? By this we mean the kind of voting system that most voters in your jurisdiction cast their votes with?

	1 = Lever machine	2 = Punch card ballot	3 = Paper (hand-counted) ballot	4 = Central count optical scan
Number	141	103	216	313
Percent	9.9	7.2	15.1	21.9

	5 = Precinct count optical scan	6 = DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)	Missing
Number	383	239	36
Percent	26.8	16.7	2.5

Q8. In general how satisfied are you with the performance of the current voting system?

	Not Very Satisfied									Extremely Satisfied				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	1	4	3	4	16	50	38	88	285	371	541	30	8.71	1.520
Percent	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	1.1	3.5	2.7	6.1	19.9	25.9	37.8	2.1		

Q9. In addition to the main voting system, do you have any other kinds of voting systems in your jurisdiction?

Q9_1. None, only one system is in use

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	477	954
Percent	33.3	66.7

Q9_2. Lever machines

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1426	5
Percent	99.7	0.3

Q9_3. Punch card ballot

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1425	6
Percent	99.6	0.4

Q9_4. Paper (hand-counted) ballot

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1248	183
Percent	87.2	12.8

Q9_5. Central count optical scan

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1307	124
Percent	91.3	8.7

Q9_6. Precinct count optical scan

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1386	45
Percent	96.9	3.1

Q9_7. DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1394	37
Percent	97.4	2.6

Q9_8. Internet voting

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1427	4
Percent	99.7	0.3

Q9_C9. Mail

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1429	2
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q9_C10. Other

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1426	5
Percent	99.7	0.3

Q10. How long has your jurisdiction been using the kind of voting system that you indicated above as being the main voting system?

Number of Years	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	3	0.2	26.34	40.145
1	102	7.1		
2	71	5.0		
3	52	3.6		
4	50	3.5		
5	43	3.0		
6	49	3.4		
7	44	3.1		
8	72	5.0		
9	31	2.2		
10	108	7.5		
11	24	1.7		
12	80	5.6		
13	29	2.0		
14	31	2.2		
15	67	4.7		
16	20	1.4		
17	17	1.2		
18	27	1.9		
19	6	0.4		
20	47	3.3		
22	3	0.2		
23	2	0.1		
24	6	0.4		
25	21	1.5		
26	8	0.6		
27	3	0.2		
28	12	0.8		
29	3	0.2		
30	44	3.1		
31	1	0.1		
32	2	0.1		
33	1	0.1		
34	3	0.2		
35	6	0.4		
36	1	0.1		
37	1	0.1		
40	27	1.9		
42	1	0.1		
45	4	0.3		
47	1	0.1		
50	43	3.0		
54	1	0.1		
57	1	0.1		
60	10	0.7		
70	5	0.3		
75	6	0.4		
80	4	0.3		
84	1	0.1		
85	2	0.1		
86	2	0.1		
88	1	0.1		
90	4	0.3		
94	2	0.1		
95	2	0.1		
96	2	0.1		
97	1	0.1		
98	1	0.1		
100	64	4.5		
104	1	0.1		

105	2	0.1
110	2	0.1
112	1	0.1
113	1	0.1
114	2	0.1
115	2	0.1
119	1	0.1
120	2	0.1
122	1	0.1
125	1	0.1
126	1	0.1
130	3	0.2
133	1	0.1
134	1	0.1
138	1	0.1
150	7	0.5
173	1	0.1
180	2	0.1
185	1	0.1
188	1	0.1
190	1	0.1
195	1	0.1
196	1	0.1
200	9	0.6
219	1	0.1
220	1	0.1
222	1	0.1
223	1	0.1
225	3	0.2
232	1	0.1
242	1	0.1
243	1	0.1
250	1	0.1
300	1	0.1
Missing	97	6.8

Please answer 10a and 10b, if your main voting system has been in place for 3 years or less:

Q10a. How important were the following factors in prompting the adoption of a new system?

Q10a_A_1. HAVA requirements

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	28	5	4	6	3	17	5	10	29	38	130	1156	7.64	3.356
Percent	2.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	1.2	0.3	0.7	2.0	2.7	9.1	80.8		

Q10a_A_2. HAVA funding

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	39	5	7	6	3	17	6	8	16	33	122	1169	7.14	3.767
Percent	2.7	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.2	1.2	0.4	0.6	1.1	2.3	8.5	81.7		

Q10a_A_3. Publicity from the Florida 2000 election

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	58	24	18	12	11	27	11	25	20	18	33	1174	4.54	3.647
Percent	4.1	1.7	1.3	0.8	0.8	1.9	0.8	1.7	1.4	1.3	2.3	82.0		

Q10a_A_4. State requirements

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	17	5	4	2	4	16	4	10	14	35	163	1157	8.27	2.982
Percent	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.4	11.4	80.9		

Q10a_A_5. State funding

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	41	9	6	4	3	20	4	4	19	32	132	1157	7.14	3.822
Percent	2.9	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	1.4	0.3	0.3	1.3	2.2	9.2	80.9		

Q10a_A_6. Local requirements

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	71	19	19	10	5	31	15	17	22	17	34	1171	4.38	3.728
Percent	5.0	1.3	1.3	0.7	0.3	2.2	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.2	2.4	81.8		

Q10a_A_7. Media or public pressure to change the system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	86	26	24	13	15	43	14	11	16	5	6	1172	3.02	2.963
Percent	6.0	1.8	1.7	0.9	1.0	3.0	1.0	0.8	1.1	0.3	0.4	81.9		

Q10a_A_8. Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	98	28	21	10	5	22	9	16	17	8	19	1178	3.14	3.498
Percent	6.8	2.0	1.5	0.7	0.3	1.5	0.6	1.1	1.2	0.6	1.3	82.3		

Q10a_A_9. Concern about costs of previous systsm

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	99	24	24	20	4	23	14	16	13	6	17	1171	3.03	3.325
Percent	6.9	1.7	1.7	1.4	0.3	1.6	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.4	1.2	81.8		

Q10a_A_10. Concern about reliability of former system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	74	23	25	12	8	24	8	16	17	18	38	1168	4.18	3.801
Percent	5.2	1.6	1.7	0.8	0.6	1.7	0.6	1.1	1.2	1.3	2.7	81.6		

Q10a_A_11. Concern about accuracy of former system

	Not At All Important									**Extremely Important**					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	83	23	24	15	8	24	13	12	14	15	30	1170	3.74	3.665
Percent	5.8	1.6	1.7	1.0	0.6	1.7	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.0	2.1	81.8		

Q10a_A_12. Concern about speed of former system

	Not At All Important									**Extremely Important**					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	68	21	18	10	9	16	14	18	22	16	50	1169	4.71	3.922
Percent	4.8	1.5	1.3	0.7	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.1	3.5	81.7		

Q10a_A_13. Concern about age or condition of former system

	Not At All Important									**Extremely Important**					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	70	14	21	10	7	23	13	14	19	22	54	1164	4.85	3.948
Percent	4.9	1.0	1.5	0.7	0.5	1.6	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	3.8	81.3		

Q10a_A_14. Other

	Not At All Important									**Extremely Important**					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	10	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	5	17	1395	6.44	4.494
Percent	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	1.2	97.5		

10b. What percentage of funding did the following levels of government provide for the new voting system? Indicate your best estimate for each category:

Q10b_1. Federal

	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	24	1.7		
5	1	0.1		
15	3	0.2		
17	1	0.1		
18	1	0.1		
20	1	0.1		
25	5	0.3		
30	2	0.1		
33	1	0.1		
42	2	0.1		
50	10	0.7		
56	1	0.1		
57	3	0.2		
60	2	0.1		
66	1	0.1	64.37	38.636
67	1	0.1		
70	2	0.1		
75	2	0.1		
80	6	0.4		
85	3	0.2		
90	5	0.3		
91	1	0.1		
92	1	0.1		
95	25	1.7		
96	1	0.1		
97	1	0.1		
99	1	0.1		
100	33	2.3		
Missing	1291	90.2		

Q10b_2. State

	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	29	2.0		
1	1	0.1		
2	6	0.4		
3	6	0.4		
4	1	0.1		
5	9	0.6		
8	1	0.1		
10	2	0.1		
11	1	0.1		
20	1	0.1		
25	1	0.1		
33	1	0.1		
40	3	0.2		
41	1	0.1		
47	1	0.1	52.47	42.230
50	14	1.0		
54	1	0.1		
55	1	0.1		
60	2	0.1		
63	1	0.1		
70	3	0.2		
75	8	0.6		
80	5	0.3		
87	1	0.1		
90	5	0.3		
95	2	0.1		
100	48	3.4		
Missing	1276	89.2		

Q10b_3. County

	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	11	0.8		
1	1	0.1		
2	8	0.6		
3	6	0.4		
4	1	0.1		
5	10	0.7		
8	1	0.1		
9	1	0.1		
10	7	0.5		
13	1	0.1		
15	2	0.1		
20	10	0.7		
25	9	0.6		
29	1	0.1		
30	3	0.2		
33	2	0.1		
37	1	0.1	44.80	38.771
40	3	0.2		
43	2	0.1		
50	16	1.1		
58	2	0.1		
60	2	0.1		
70	1	0.1		
75	2	0.1		
80	1	0.1		
82	1	0.1		
85	1	0.1		
89	1	0.1		
90	1	0.1		
92	1	0.1		
95	1	0.1		
100	36	2.5		
Missing	1285	89.8		

Q10b_4. Municipal

	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
0	32	2.2		
1	1	0.1		
5	1	0.1		
10	3	0.2		
20	2	0.1		
25	2	0.1		
30	1	0.1	39.42	46.088
44	1	0.1		
60	1	0.1		
75	1	0.1		
85	1	0.1		
100	23	1.6		
Missing	1362	95.2		

Q11. What was the main voting system in place immediately prior to the current system?

	0 = None / Only System Ever Used	1 = Lever machine	2 = Punch card ballot	3 = Paper (hand-counted) ballot	4 = Central count optical scan
Number	99	285	220	509	82
Percent	6.9	19.9	15.4	35.6	5.7

	5 = Precinct count optical scan	6 = DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)	7 = Do Not Know	Missing
Number	43	13	117	63
Percent	3.0	0.9	8.2	4.4

Q12. How likely is it that you will change the main voting system currently in place in the next five years?

	Not At All Likely									Extremely Likely				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	298	205	107	75	48	89	45	54	74	71	304	61	4.53	3.953
Percent	20.8	14.3	7.5	5.2	3.4	6.2	3.1	3.8	5.2	5.0	21.2	4.3		

Please answer questions 12a through 12f, if you answered question 12 with 6 or greater:

Q12a. Will your jurisdiction lease or purchase the new system?

	1 = Lease	2 = Purchase	3 = Do Not Know	Missing
Number	16	307	248	860
Percent	1.1	21.5	17.3	60.1

Q12b. What type of system do you think is most likely to be adopted?

	1 = Lever machine	2 = Punch card ballot	3 = Paper (hand-counted) ballot	4 = Central count optical scan
Number	5	2	4	64
Percent	0.3	0.1	0.3	4.5

	5 = Precinct count optical scan	6 = DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)	Missing
Number	150	254	952
Percent	10.5	17.7	66.5

Q12c. Is it likely your jurisdiction will change its early voting system?

	1 = Yes	2 = No	Missing
Number	202	322	907
Percent	14.1	22.5	63.4

Q12d. Is it likely your jurisdiction will change its absentee voting system?

	1 = Yes	2 = No	Missing
Number	191	355	885
Percent	13.3	24.8	61.8

Q12e. Which of the following statements best reflects how voting at polling places is likely to change?

	1 = Change one per polling place	2 = Change one quarter per polling place	3 = Change one half per polling place
Number	214	7	15
Percent	15.0	0.5	1.0

	4 = Change three quarters per polling place	5 = Change all machines	Missing
Number	4	276	915
Percent	0.3	19.3	63.9

Q12f. How important are the following factors in the adoption of a new system?

Q12f_A_1. HAVA requirements

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	3	1	2	2	0	11	8	18	39	86	378	883	9.32	1.455
Percent	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.6	1.3	2.7	6.0	26.4	61.7		

Q12f _A_2. HAVA funding

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	5	4	5	1	2	10	7	13	46	69	383	886	9.22	1.751
Percent	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.5	0.9	3.2	4.8	26.8	61.9		

Q12f _A_3. Publicity from the Florida 2000 election

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	86	44	39	31	28	76	36	34	41	29	61	926	4.67	3.402
Percent	6.0	3.1	2.7	2.2	2.0	5.3	2.5	2.4	2.9	2.0	4.3	64.7		

Q12f _A_4. State requirements

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	12	3	3	2	3	10	7	21	40	68	369	893	9.09	2.010
Percent	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.5	1.5	2.8	4.8	25.8	62.4		

Q12f _A_5. State funding

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	25	5	6	2	11	27	6	14	47	61	338	889	8.56	2.654
Percent	1.7	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.8	1.9	0.4	1.0	3.3	4.3	23.6	62.1		

Q12f _A_6. Local requirements

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	89	22	21	22	16	60	26	33	44	37	132	929	5.75	3.747
Percent	6.2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.1	4.2	1.8	2.3	3.1	2.6	9.2	64.9		

Q12f _A_7. Media or public pressure to change the system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	126	45	49	33	40	101	27	27	28	11	24	920	3.56	3.001
Percent	8.8	3.1	3.4	2.3	2.8	7.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	0.8	1.7	64.3		

Q12f _A_8. Perception of a success or failure in a nearby jurisdiction

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	120	46	38	35	24	80	31	29	43	21	34	930	3.96	3.293
Percent	8.4	3.2	2.7	2.4	1.7	5.6	2.2	2.0	3.0	1.5	2.4	65.0		

Q12f _A_9. Concern about costs of previous systsm

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	136	46	42	32	38	65	31	19	29	23	51	919	3.85	3.430
Percent	9.5	3.2	2.9	2.2	2.7	4.5	2.2	1.3	2.0	1.6	3.6	64.2		

Q12f _A_10. Concern about reliability of former system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	143	61	34	30	29	55	30	23	20	27	58	921	3.79	3.559
Percent	10.0	4.3	2.4	2.1	2.0	3.8	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.9	4.1	64.4		

Q12f _A_11. Concern about accuracy of former system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	152	65	41	29	24	57	29	20	20	20	50	924	3.49	3.458
Percent	10.6	4.5	2.9	2.0	1.7	4.0	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	3.5	64.6		

Q12f _A_12. Concern about speed of former system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	134	54	24	31	29	61	28	30	34	31	53	922	4.08	3.556
Percent	9.4	3.8	1.7	2.2	2.0	4.3	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.2	3.7	64.4		

Q12f _A_13. Concern about age or condition of former system

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	101	42	24	26	24	56	28	27	54	49	81	919	5.05	3.693
Percent	7.1	2.9	1.7	1.8	1.7	3.9	2.0	1.9	3.8	3.4	5.7	64.2		

Q12f _A_14. Other

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				Std.
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Dev.**
Number	13	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	15	1395	5.56	4.619
Percent	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.0	97.5		

Q13. What type of early voting system(s) do you have in place?

Q13_1. No early voting system in place

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	827	604
Percent	57.8	42.2

Q13_2. Hand-counted ballots

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1244	187
Percent	86.9	13.1

Q13_3. Lever machine

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1403	28
Percent	98.0	2.0

Q13_4. Punch card ballot

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1386	45
Percent	96.9	3.1

Q13_5. Central count optical scan

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1185	246
Percent	82.8	17.2

Q13_6. Precinct count optical scan

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1299	132
Percent	90.8	9.2

Q13_7. DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1284	147
Percent	89.7	10.3

Q13_C8. Mail

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1423	8
Percent	99.4	0.6

Q13_C9. Internet

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1431	0
Percent	100.0	0.0

Q13_C10. Multiple/Other

	0 = No	**1 = Yes**
Number	1420	11
Percent	99.2	0.8

Q14. What type of absentee voting system(s) do you have in place?

Q14_1. Hand-counted ballots

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	973	458
Percent	68.0	32.0

Q14_2. Lever machine

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q14_3. Punch card ballot

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1326	105
Percent	92.7	7.3

Q14_4. Central count optical scan

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	930	501
Percent	65.0	35.0

Q14_5. Precinct count optical scan

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1106	325
Percent	77.3	22.7

Q14_6. DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1322	109
Percent	92.4	7.6

Q14_C7. Mail

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1420	11
Percent	99.2	0.8

Q14_C8. Internet

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1430	1
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q14_C9. Optical scan (level unknown)

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1417	14
Percent	99.0	1.0

Q14_C10. Multiple/Other

	0 = No	1 = Yes
Number	1423	8
Percent	99.4	0.6

Q15. If your jurisdiction were going to be making decisions on the adoption of voting systems in the near future, what best describes the amount of influence the following actors would have?

Q15_ A_1. My own influence

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	55	27	32	37	21	119	73	128	254	202	307	176	7.28	2.756
Percent	3.8	1.9	2.2	2.6	1.5	8.3	5.1	8.9	177	14.1	21.5	12.3		

Q15_ A_2. State level, non-elected officials

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	145	66	62	71	55	149	96	124	145	100	155	263	5.50	3.294
Percent	10.1	4.6	4.3	5.0	3.8	10.4	6.7	8.7	10.1	7.0	10.8	18.4		

Q15_ A_3. Local level, non-elected officials

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	200	88	94	77	72	184	105	93	117	70	61	270	4.45	3.144
Percent	14.0	6.1	6.6	5.4	5.0	12.9	7.3	6.5	8.2	4.9	4.3	18.9		

Q15_ A_4. State level, elected officials

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	64	32	34	40	32	87	94	112	210	163	323	240	7.14	2.935
Percent	4.5	2.2	2.4	2.8	2.2	6.1	6.6	7.8	14.7	11.4	22.6	16.8		

Q15_ A_5. Local level, elected officials

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	98	39	42	41	46	137	96	140	213	149	210	220	6.45	3.057
Percent	6.8	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.2	9.6	6.7	9.8	14.9	10.4	14.7	15.4		

Q15_ A_6. Professional associations (e.g. NASS, NASED)

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	239	80	80	71	57	170	106	106	92	49	52	329	4.18	3.163
Percent	16.7	5.6	5.6	5.0	4.0	11.9	7.4	7.4	6.4	3.4	3.6	23.0		

Q15_ A_7. Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	94	47	42	43	40	124	106	131	185	129	233	257	6.44	3.122
Percent	6.6	3.3	2.9	3.0	2.8	8.7	7.4	9.2	12.9	9.0	16.3	18.0		

Q15_ A_8. Media

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	318	151	139	93	79	150	85	69	43	18	14	272	2.94	2.719
Percent	22.2	10.6	9.7	6.5	5.5	10.5	5.9	4.8	3.0	1.3	1.0	19.0		

Q15_ A_9. Independent experts

	Not At All Important									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	202	107	90	98	96	184	113	99	98	51	24	269	4.08	2.917
Percent	14.1	7.5	6.3	8.8	6.7	12.9	7.9	6.9	6.8	3.6	1.7	18.8		

Q15_ A_10. Political parties

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	286	148	108	75	95	165	90	79	66	31	18	270	3.34	2.880
Percent	20.0	10.3	7.5	5.2	6.6	11.5	6.3	5.5	4.6	2.2	1.3	18.9		

Q15_ A_11. Voters

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	100	47	49	44	44	138	108	142	200	143	183	233	6.26	3.078
Percent	7.0	3.3	3.4	3.1	3.1	9.6	7.5	9.9	14.0	10.0	12.8	16.3		

Q15_ A_12. Courts

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	206	87	69	48	46	129	91	71	120	92	169	303	5.07	3.593
Percent	14.4	6.1	4.8	3.4	3.2	9.0	6.4	5.0	8.4	6.4	11.8	21.2		

Q15_ A_13. Vendors

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	128	71	64	72	61	175	131	144	168	74	80	263	5.26	3.012
Percent	8.9	5.0	4.5	5.0	4.3	12.2	9.2	10.1	11.7	5.2	5.6	18.4		

Q15_A_14. Civil rights groups

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	215	98	87	75	62	199	115	110	94	54	44	278	4.23	3.058
Percent	15.0	6.8	6.1	5.2	4.3	13.9	8.0	7.7	6.6	3.8	3.1	19.4		

Q15_A_15. Advocates for the disabled

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	94	47	33	52	52	157	131	173	186	132	118	256	6.06	2.905
Percent	6.6	3.3	2.3	3.6	3.6	11.0	9.2	12.1	13.0	9.2	8.2	17.9		

Q15_A_16. Other public interest or advocacy groups

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	176	87	79	72	79	193	122	116	94	58	40	315	4.44	2.978
Percent	12.3	6.1	5.5	5.0	5.5	13.5	8.5	8.1	6.6	4.1	2.8	22.0		

Q15_A_17. Other

	Not At All Important										Extremely Important			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	43	11	3	3	1	4	4	2	7	6	24	1323	4.06	4.286
Percent	3.0	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.4	1.7	92.5		

Q16. Please describe the nature of your input in the voting system decision-making process in the space below.

Q16_C1. Individual was

	1 = Primary Decision Maker	2 = Assistant / Partial Decision Maker	3 = Minor / No Decision Making Ability	Missing
Number	122	361	212	736
Percent	8.5	25.2	14.8	51.4

Q16_C2. Research/Testing/Recommendation/Advise

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	978	453
Percent	68.3	31.7

Q16_C3. Budget/Cost analyst

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1360	71
Percent	95.0	5.0

Q16_C4. Election committee member – state

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1409	22
Percent	98.5	1.5

Q16_C5. Election committee member - local

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1397	34
Percent	97.6	2.4

Q17. In general, how successful was the decision making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place?

	Not At All Successful										Very Successful			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	27	3	4	5	6	53	52	76	170	256	509	270	8.54	2.067
Percent	1.9	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	3.7	3.6	5.3	11.9	17.9	35.6	18.9		

Q18. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the decision-making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place?

Q18_A_1. The media have too great an influence on the process

	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	203	128	112	266	141	107	202	272	3.99	2.044
Percent	14.2	8.9	7.8	18.6	9.9	7.5	14.1	19.0		

Q18_A_2. State level, elected officials should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	175	127	138	279	152	124	152	284	3.95	1.922
Percent	12.2	8.9	9.6	19.5	10.6	8.7	10.6	19.8		

Q18_A_3. Local level, elected officials should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	98	58	68	187	152	232	365	271	5.06	1.912
Percent	6.8	4.1	4.8	13.1	10.6	16.2	25.5	18.9		

Q18_A_4. Independent experts should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	234	147	199	329	147	46	26	303	3.22	1.569
Percent	16.4	10.3	13.9	23.0	10.3	3.2	1.8	21.2		

Q18_A_5. Professional associations should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	230	185	184	260	145	61	38	328	3.22	1.664
Percent	16.1	12.9	12.9	18.2	10.1	4.3	2.7	22.9		

Q18_A_6. The federal government has too great an influence on the process

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	69	58	101	283	175	181	279	285	4.83	1.767
Percent	4.8	4.1	7.1	19.8	12.2	12.6	19.5	19.9		

Q18_A_7. Low level, non-elected officials should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	284	226	162	258	93	53	42	313	2.98	1.677
Percent	19.8	15.8	11.3	18.0	6.5	3.7	2.9	21.9		

Q18_A_8. State level, non-elected officials should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	273	216	158	271	107	52	40	314	3.03	1.670
Percent	19.1	15.1	11.0	18.9	7.5	3.6	2.8	21.9		

Q18_A_9. Political parties have too great an influence on the process

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	155	129	111	339	146	111	138	302	3.95	1.848
Percent	10.8	9.0	7.8	23.7	10.2	7.8	9.6	21.1		

Q18_A_10. The public should have greater influence

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	110	97	93	335	216	147	142	291	4.28	1.744
Percent	7.7	6.8	6.5	23.4	15.1	10.3	9.9	20.3		

Q18_A_11. Vendors have too great an influence on the process

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	135	110	165	386	178	90	67	300	3.80	1.606
Percent	9.4	7.7	11.5	27.0	12.4	6.3	4.7	21.0		

Q18_A_12. Public interest groups/civil rights groups/advocates for the disabled have too great an influence on the process

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	103	87	161	356	166	118	136	304	4.15	1.705
Percent	7.2	6.1	11.3	24.9	11.6	8.2	9.5	21.2		

Q19. What could be done to improve the decision making process for selecting voting systems?

Q19_C1. Individual

	1 = Advocates increased local control or decreased state/national control	**2 = Advocates increased state/national control or decreased local control**	**Missing**
Number	223	34	257
Percent	15.6	2.4	82.0

Q19_C2. Satisfied/No change

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1380	51
Percent	96.4	3.6

Q19_C3. Financial matters (costs/funding)

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1357	74
Percent	94.8	5.2

Q19_C4. Political matters

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1402	29
Percent	98.0	2.0

Q19_C5. Mandates/Compliance

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1372	59
Percent	95.9	4.1

Q19_C6. Certification/Standards

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1380	51
Percent	96.4	3.6

Q19_C7. Research/Testing/Technical issues

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	**1 = Individual Addressed Issue**
Number	1363	68
Percent	95.2	4.8

Q19_C8. Documentation

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1430	1
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q19_C9. Informational issues

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1410	21
Percent	98.5	1.5

Q19_C10. Low understanding of public/media

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1410	21
Percent	98.5	1.5

Q19_C11. Advocates increased national/statewide standards

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1385	46
Percent	96.8	3.2

Q19_C12. Increased role for vendors/public

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1393	38
Percent	97.3	2.7

Q19_C13. Decreased role for voters/public

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q19_C14. Increased role for media

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1429	2
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q19_C15. Decreased role for media

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1423	8
Percent	99.4	0.6

Q19_C16. Increased role for outside election related individuals (experts, professionals, technicians, vendors)

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1385	46
Percent	96.8	3.2

Q19_C17. Decreased role for outside election related individuals (experts, professionals, technicians, vendors)

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1414	17
Percent	98.8	1.2

Q19_C18. Increased role for other interested groups

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1419	12
Percent	99.2	0.8

Q19_C19. Decreased role for other interested groups

	0 = Individual Did Not Mention Issue	1 = Individual Addressed Issue
Number	1415	16
Percent	98.9	1.1

Q20. When considering the quality of voting systems, how important are the following attributes?

Q20_A_1. Acquisition costs

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	5	6	14	66	196	308	737	99	6.24	1.050
Percent	0.3	0.4	1.0	4.6	13.7	21.5	51.5	6.9		

Q20_A_2. Maintenance costs

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	1	2	12	44	164	345	771	92	6.35	0.911
Percent	0.1	0.1	0.8	3.1	11.5	24.1	53.9	6.4		

Q20_A_3. Physical size

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	8	19	42	160	283	304	509	106	5.75	1.297
Percent	0.6	1.3	2.9	11.2	19.8	21.2	35.6	7.4		

Q20_A_4. Storage requirements

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	8	16	42	139	239	343	543	101	5.85	1.269
Percent	0.6	1.1	2.9	9.7	16.7	24.0	37.9	7.1		

Q20_A_5. Ease of access for the disabled or blind

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	2	8	7	57	129	321	806	101	6.38	0.957
Percent	0.1	0.6	0.5	4.0	9.0	22.4	56.3	7.1		

Q20_A_6. Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	4	10	7	42	101	265	894	108	6.47	0.948
Percent	0.3	0.7	0.5	2.9	7.1	18.5	62.5	7.5		

Q20_A_7. Machine error

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	5	1	14	46	200	1050	115	6.72	0.647
Percent	0.0	0.3	0.1	1.0	3.2	14.0	73.4	8.0		

Q20_A_8. Reliability

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	0	2	0	4	14	167	1152	92	6.84	0.452
Percent	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	1.0	11.7	80.5	6.4		

Q20_A_9. Security

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	2	0	0	8	23	166	1138	94	6.81	0.516
Percent	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.6	11.6	79.5	6.6		

Q20_A_10. Accuracy in vote counting

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	0	1	0	4	11	109	1211	95	6.89	0.385
Percent	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.8	7.6	84.6	6.6		

Q20_A_11. Speed in vote counting

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	18	5	27	90	291	339	555	106	5.92	1.220
Percent	1.3	0.3	1.9	6.3	20.3	23.7	38.8	7.4		

Q20_A_12. Ability for use in multiple languages

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	153	108	132	235	272	197	208	126	4.37	1.897
Percent	10.7	7.5	9.2	16.4	19.0	13.8	14.5	8.8		

Q20_A_13. Impact on different socio-demographic groups

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	124	99	118	250	253	210	200	177	4.47	1.842
Percent	8.7	6.9	8.2	17.5	17.7	14.7	14.0	12.4		

Q20_A_14. Ease of use by poll workers

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	12	5	4	26	83	308	906	87	6.51	0.932
Percent	0.8	0.3	0.3	1.8	5.8	21.5	63.3	6.1		

Q20_A_15. Ease of use by voters

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	3	3	0	7	26	202	1101	89	6.77	0.599
Percent	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.8	14.1	76.9	6.2		

Q21. How would you rate the current main voting system in your jurisdiction on the following characteristics?

Q21_A_1. Acquisition costs

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	10	10	35	143	313	292	468	160	5.74	1.253
Percent	0.7	0.7	2.4	10.0	21.9	20.4	32.7	11.2		

Q21_A_2. Maintenance costs

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	20	12	58	160	285	277	479	140	5.65	1.382
Percent	1.4	0.8	4.1	11.2	19.9	19.4	33.5	9.8		

Q21_A_3. Physical size

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	49	35	82	175	249	248	457	136	5.40	1.637
Percent	3.4	2.4	5.7	12.2	17.4	17.3	31.9	9.5		

Q21_A_4. Storage requirements

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	40	37	76	188	233	257	473	127	5.45	1.602
Percent	2.8	2.6	5.3	13.1	16.3	18.0	33.1	8.9		

Q21_A_5. Ease of access for the disabled or blind

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	156	127	136	203	191	167	292	159	4.43	2.043
Percent	10.9	8.9	9.5	14.2	13.3	11.7	20.4	11.1		

Q21_A_6. Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	99	93	64	145	145	230	473	182	5.18	1.982
Percent	6.9	6.5	4.5	10.1	10.1	16.1	33.1	12.7		

Q21_A_7. Machine error

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	89	52	39	73	117	305	522	234	5.57	1.856
Percent	6.2	3.6	2.7	5.1	8.2	21.3	36.5	16.4		

Q21_A_8. Reliability

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	8	5	16	38	129	373	733	129	6.32	1.001
Percent	0.6	0.3	1.1	2.7	9.0	26.1	51.2	9.0		

Q21_A_9. Security

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	5	5	11	44	99	347	781	139	6.40	0.945
Percent	0.3	0.3	0.8	3.1	6.9	24.2	54.6	9.7		

Q21_A_10. Accuracy in vote counting

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	6	2	8	32	90	338	845	110	6.48	0.878
Percent	0.4	0.1	0.6	2.2	6.3	23.6	59.0	7.7		

Q21_A_11. Speed in vote counting

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	27	34	35	96	179	314	613	133	5.90	1.442
Percent	1.9	2.4	2.4	9.7	12.5	21.9	42.8	9.3		

Q21_A_12. Ability for use in multiple languages

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	335	110	124	191	98	118	202	253	3.65	2.225
Percent	23.4	7.7	8.7	13.3	6.8	8.2	14.1	17.7		

Q21_A_13. Impact on different socio-demographic groups

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	140	87	112	270	138	146	218	320	4.34	1.963
Percent	9.8	6.1	7.8	18.9	9.6	10.2	15.2	22.4		

Q21_A_14. Ease of use by poll workers

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	13	9	29	67	166	370	637	140	6.12	1.176
Percent	0.9	0.6	2.0	4.7	11.6	25.9	44.5	9.8		

Q21_A_15. Ease of use by voters

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	10	7	19	33	117	349	754	142	6.34	1.038
Percent	0.7	0.5	1.3	2.3	8.2	24.4	52.7	9.9		

Please answer Question 22 if your current main voting system is NOT a DRE:
Q22. How would you rate DREs on the following characteristics?

Q22_A_1. Acquisition costs

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	113	79	89	133	89	50	45	833	3.56	1.831
Percent	7.9	5.5	6.2	9.3	6.2	3.5	3.1	58.2		

Q22_A_2. Maintenance costs

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	72	76	76	152	80	62	48	865	3.83	1.771
Percent	5.0	5.3	5.3	10.6	5.6	4.3	3.4	60.4		

Q22_A_3. Physical size

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	58	30	54	153	102	102	88	844	4.48	1.783
Percent	4.1	2.1	3.8	10.7	7.1	7.1	6.1	59.0		

Q22_A_4. Storage requirements

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	69	49	64	155	88	94	71	841	4.20	1.824
Percent	4.8	3.4	4.5	10.8	6.1	6.6	5.0	58.8		

Q22_A_5. Ease of access for the disabled or blind

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	25	8	23	81	90	160	210	834	5.55	1.567
Percent	1.7	0.6	1.6	5.7	6.3	11.2	14.7	58.3		

Q22_A_6. Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	41	30	31	103	71	122	183	850	5.12	1.856
Percent	2.9	2.1	2.2	7.2	5.0	8.5	12.8	59.4		

Q22_A_7. Machine error

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	43	27	51	128	91	112	114	865	4.75	1.782
Percent	3.0	1.9	3.6	8.9	6.4	7.8	8.0	60.4		

Q22_A_8. Reliability

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	43	26	30	128	97	114	129	864	4.88	1.780
Percent	3.0	1.8	2.1	8.9	6.8	8.0	9.0	60.4		

Q22_A_9. Security

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	58	23	25	117	87	113	143	865	4.88	1.895
Percent	4.1	1.6	1.7	8.2	6.1	7.9	10.0	60.4		

Q22_A_10. Accuracy in vote counting

| | **Poor** | | | | | | **Excellent** | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	33	16	23	113	86	113	183	864	5.25	1.727
Percent	2.3	1.1	1.6	7.9	6.0	7.9	12.8	60.4		

Q22_A_11. Speed in vote counting

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	21	8	12	84	76	149	223	858	5.66	1.525
Percent	1.5	0.6	0.8	5.9	5.3	10.4	15.6	60.0		

Q22_A_12. Ability for use in multiple languages

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	32	14	17	89	63	135	215	866	5.48	1.715
Percent	2.2	1.0	1.2	6.2	4.4	9.4	15.0	60.5		

Q22_A_13. Impact on different socio-demographic groups

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	40	19	40	173	82	88	87	902	4.61	1.684
Percent	2.8	1.3	2.8	12.1	5.7	6.1	6.1	63.0		

Q22_A_14. Ease of use by poll workers

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	42	43	44	147	103	91	105	856	4.60	1.771
Percent	2.9	3.0	3.1	10.3	7.2	6.4	7.3	59.8		

Q22_A_15. Ease of use by voters

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	36	27	45	111	104	113	143	852	4.95	1.762
Percent	2.5	1.9	3.1	7.8	7.3	7.9	10.	59.5		

Please answer Question 23 if your current main voting system is NOT an optical scan:
Q23. How would you rate optical scan on the following characteristics?

Q23_A_1. Acquisition costs

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	18	24	38	75	80	62	51	1083	4.62	1.653
Percent	1.3	1.7	2.7	5.2	5.6	4.3	3.6	75.7		

Q23_A_2. Maintenance costs

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	27	25	44	74	68	57	56	1080	4.50	1.773
Percent	1.9	1.7	3.1	5.2	4.8	4.0	3.9	75.5		

Q23_A_3. Physical size

	Poor						**Excellent**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	23	25	35	81	61	67	60	1079	4.63	1.748
Percent	1.6	1.7	2.4	5.7	4.3	4.7	4.2	75.4		

Q23_A_4. Storage requirements

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	23	23	42	82	61	63	60	1077	4.59	1.741
Percent	1.6	1.6	2.9	5.7	4.3	4.4	4.2	75.3		

Q23_A_5. Ease of access for the disabled or blind

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	71	39	33	73	45	37	39	1094	3.74	2.004
Percent	5.0	2.7	2.3	5.1	3.1	2.6	2.7	76.5		

Q23_A_6. Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	38	35	35	68	43	64	60	1088	4.38	1.954
Percent	2.7	2.4	2.4	4.8	3.0	4.5	4.2	76.0		

Q23_A_7. Machine error

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	23	21	24	72	62	78	61	1090	4.78	1.741
Percent	1.6	1.5	1.7	5.0	4.3	5.5	4.3	76.2		

Q23_A_8. Reliability

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	15	10	23	59	71	87	81	1085	5.16	1.600
Percent	1.0	0.7	1.3	4.1	5.0	6.1	5.7	75.8		

Q23_A_9. Security

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	15	11	22	48	55	95	96	1089	5.30	1.646
Percent	1.0	0.8	1.5	3.4	3.8	6.6	6.7	76.1		

Q23_A_10. Accuracy in vote counting

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	18	12	17	55	57	86	101	1085	5.26	1.690
Percent	1.3	0.8	1.2	3.8	4.0	6.0	7.1	75.8		

Q23_A_11. Speed in vote counting

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	20	12	24	67	54	82	87	1085	5.07	1.719
Percent	1.4	0.8	1.7	4.7	3.8	5.7	6.1	75.8		

Q23_A_12. Ability for use in multiple languages

	Poor						Excellent			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	39	21	32	69	56	49	48	1117	4.34	1.887
Percent	2.7	1.5	2.2	4.8	3.9	3.4	3.4	78.1		

Q23_A_13. Impact on different socio-demographic groups

| | Poor | | | | | | Excellent | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	21	20	37	104	58	34	26	1131	4.21	1.552
Percent	1.5	1.4	2.6	7.3	4.1	2.4	1.8	79.0		

Q23_A_14. Ease of use by poll workers

| | Poor | | | | | | Excellent | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	12	11	21	59	63	85	88	1092	5.23	1.588
Percent	0.8	0.8	1.5	4.1	4.4	5.9	6.1	76.3		

Q23_A_15. Ease of use by voters

| | Poor | | | | | | Excellent | | | |
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	12	12	21	61	53	80	100	1092	5.27	1.631
Percent	0.8	0.8	1.5	4.3	3.7	5.6	7.0	76.3		

Sources of Information

Q24. To what extent do you rely on the following sources of information about voting systems?

Q24_A_1. Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission

| | No Reliance | | | | | | | | | | A Great Deal of Reliance | | | |
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	96	43	45	62	57	139	131	140	165	125	168	260	6.09	3.035
Percent	6.7	3.0	3.1	4.3	4.0	9.7	9.2	9.8	11.5	8.7	11.7	18.2		

Q24_A_2. Other election officials within your jurisdiction

| | No Reliance | | | | | | | | | | A Great Deal of Reliance | | | |
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	111	40	38	45	33	74	79	109	178	197	286	241	6.76	3.267
Percent	7.8	2.8	2.7	3.1	2.3	5.2	5.5	7.6	12.4	13.8	20.0	16.8		

Q24_A_3. Other election officials in different jurisdictions

| | No Reliance | | | | | | | | | | A Great Deal of Reliance | | | |
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	47	26	29	35	22	92	84	153	225	226	271	221	7.32	2.670
Percent	3.3	1.8	2.0	2.4	1.5	6.4	5.9	10.7	15.7	15.8	18.9	15.4		

Q24_A_4. Media

| | No Reliance | | | | | | | | | | A Great Deal of Reliance | | | |
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	274	107	112	149	108	155	122	73	30	21	13	267	3.25	2.634
Percent	19.1	7.5	7.8	10.4	7.5	10.8	8.5	5.1	2.1	1.5	0.9	18.7		

Q24_A_5. Professional associations

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	126	45	56	49	75	133	131	135	158	139	131	253	5.79	3.125
Percent	8.8	3.1	3.9	3.4	5.2	9.3	9.2	9.4	11.0	9.7	9.2	17.7		

Q24_A_6. Independent experts

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	159	54	83	71	85	168	139	151	117	88	58	258	4.95	3.008
Percent	11.1	3.8	5.8	5.0	5.9	11.7	9.7	10.6	8.2	6.1	4.1	18.0		

Q24_A_7. Political parties

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	304	122	123	121	100	156	102	58	41	26	12	266	3.10	2.695
Percent	21.2	8.5	8.6	8.5	7.0	10.9	7.1	4.1	2.9	1.8	0.8	18.6		

Q24_A_8. State election officials

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	42	12	12	23	18	77	62	93	177	247	475	193	8.06	2.503
Percent	2.9	0.8	0.8	1.6	1.3	5.4	4.3	6.5	12.4	17.3	33.2	13.5		

Q24_A_9. Civil rights groups

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	241	84	91	88	81	184	136	93	84	44	31	274	3.99	2.969
Percent	16.8	5.9	6.4	6.1	5.7	12.9	9.5	6.5	5.9	3.1	2.2	19.1		

Q24_A_10. Advocates for the disabled

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	111	34	55	44	62	169	136	122	166	153	131	248	5.96	3.022
Percent	7.8	2.4	3.8	3.1	4.3	11.8	9.5	8.5	11.6	10.7	9.2	17.3		

Q24_A_11. Other public interest or advocacy groups

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	206	72	95	75	79	189	139	111	94	63	33	275	4.33	2.984
Percent	14.4	5.0	6.6	5.2	5.5	13.2	9.7	7.8	6.6	4.4	2.3	19.2		

Q24_A_12. Vendors

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	96	45	49	75	67	175	154	157	152	111	111	239	5.75	2.891
Percent	6.7	3.1	3.4	5.2	4.7	12.2	10.8	11.0	10.6	7.8	7.8	16.7		

Q24_A_13. Other

	No Reliance									A Great Deal of Reliance				
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	26	6	2	2	2	3	7	6	4	6	16	1351	4.61	4.095
Percent	1.8	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	1.1	94.4		

Q25. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Q25_A_1. The use of new information technologies can dramatically improve government services

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	26	20	57	214	346	311	303	154	5.33	1.377
Percent	1.8	1.4	4.0	15.0	24.2	21.7	21.2	10.8		

Q25_A_2. Government should move cautiously when adopting new technology

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	7	16	33	106	269	335	529	136	5.88	1.222
Percent	0.5	1.1	2.3	7.4	18.8	23.4	37.0	9.5		

Q25_A_3. The benefits of new technologies greatly outweigh the risks

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	75	101	141	380	321	166	84	163	4.27	1.505
Percent	5.2	7.1	9.9	26.6	22.4	11.6	5.9	11.4		

Q25_A_4. Overall, e-government has a positive effect on the way the government operates

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	33	54	88	341	331	233	110	241	4.70	1.382
Percent	2.3	3.8	6.1	23.8	23.1	16.3	7.7	16.8		

Q25_A_5. When it comes to new technologies, I think it is best to wait until all the bugs have been worked out

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	18	32	62	190	250	295	446	138	5.55	1.448
Percent	1.3	2.2	4.3	13.3	17.5	20.6	31.2	9.6		

Q26. How do you feel about the use of the following types of voting systems for elections in the United States?

Q26_A_1. Lever machine

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	407	152	148	205	74	66	101	278	2.99	1.974
Percent	28.4	10.6	10.3	14.3	5.2	4.6	7.1	19.4		

Q26_A_2. Punch card ballot

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	560	163	123	146	67	49	62	261	2.48	1.834
Percent	39.1	11.4	8.6	10.2	4.7	3.4	4.3	18.2		

Q26_A_3. Paper (hand-counted) ballot

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	384	136	139	207	122	69	149	225	3.29	2.091
Percent	26.8	9.5	9.7	14.5	8.5	4.8	10.4	15.7		

Q26_A_4. Central count optical scan

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	96	49	79	197	184	243	329	254	5.01	1.855
Percent	6.7	3.4	5.5	13.8	12.9	17.0	23.0	17.7		

Q26_A_5. Precinct count optical scan

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	89	44	59	163	133	270	418	255	5.29	1.860
Percent	6.2	3.1	4.1	11.4	9.3	18.9	29.2	17.8		

Q26_A_6. DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	125	63	71	225	149	231	307	260	4.82	1.961
Percent	8.7	4.4	5.0	15.7	10.4	16.1	21.5	18.2		

Q26_A_7. Internet voting

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	615	171	110	165	70	52	31	217	2.33	1.697
Percent	43.0	11.9	7.7	11.5	4.9	3.6	2.2	15.2		

Q26_A_8. Other

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	20	3	3	5	3	2	20	1375	3.96	2.649
Percent	1.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	1.4	96.1		

Q27. Overall, in the 2004 November elections, how well did the main voting system in your jurisdiction perform?

	Not Well at All									Extremely Well			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	1	1	4	2	16	12	30	123	346	830	66	9.36	1.076
Percent	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	1.1	0.8	2.1	8.6	24.2	58.0	4.6		

Q28. Please provide any additional comments you wish to make here about the performance of the main voting system in the November 2004 election in your jurisdiction:

Q28_C1. Other comments coded – November 2004 election

	1 = Significant problems reported	2 = Moderate problems reported	3 = Satisfied/No or minor problems reported	Miss.
Number	28	44	290	1069
Percent	2.0	3.1	20.3	74.7

Role of Vendors

Q29. How important are the following characteristics when choosing a voting system vendor?

Q29_A_1. The vendor offers a wide range of available voting systems

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	77	32	46	50	59	179	151	138	191	98	161	249	6.17	2.836
Percent	5.4	2.2	3.2	3.5	4.1	12.5	10.6	9.6	13.3	6.8	11.3	17.4		

Q29_A_2. Trustworthiness of vendor

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	8	5	1	3	18	19	28	104	233	821	191	9.33	1.383
Percent	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.3	1.3	2.0	7.3	16.3	57.4	13.3		

Q29_A_3. Reliability of vendor

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	7	4	1	2	15	8	23	93	224	868	186	9.43	1.262
Percent	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	1.0	0.6	1.6	6.5	15.7	60.7	13.0		

Q29_A_4. Cost of services

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	7	1	4	1	6	37	42	88	221	242	590	192	8.83	1.585
Percent	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	2.6	2.9	6.1	15.4	16.9	41.2	13.4		

Q29_A_5. Availability to answer questions and perform maintenance

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	5	3	1	3	10	7	14	89	241	870	188	9.49	1.137
Percent	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.5	1.0	6.2	16.8	60.8	13.1		

Q29_A_6. Regular check-ups and maintenance of current system

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	7	6	3	4	19	16	30	121	242	786	197	9.27	1.410
Percent	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.3	1.3	1.1	2.1	8.5	16.9	54.9	13.8		

Q29_A_7. Availability of registration and ballot-preparation services

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	27	12	15	16	14	54	40	66	123	237	618	209	8.52	2.319
Percent	1.9	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	3.8	2.8	4.6	8.6	16.6	43.2	14.6		

Q29_A_8. Quality of voting systems represented

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	0	6	3	0	4	18	9	22	84	237	843	205	9.42	1.244
Percent	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.3	1.3	0.6	1.5	5.9	16.6	58.9	14.3		

Q29_A_9. Type of voting systems represented

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	9	3	6	3	8	54	47	50	141	234	645	231	8.87	1.774
Percent	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.6	3.8	3.3	3.5	9.9	16.4	45.1	16.1		

Q29_A_10. Reputation of vendor

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	6	1	3	0	6	19	9	33	102	245	805	202	9.34	1.316
Percent	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	1.3	0.6	2.3	7.1	17.1	56.3	14.1		

Q29_A_11. Previous experience with vendor

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	16	6	9	11	5	53	38	69	134	233	634	223	8.74	1.993
Percent	1.1	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.3	3.7	2.7	4.8	9.4	16.3	44.3	15.6		

Q29_A_12. Recommendation of state and local government officials

	Not Important at All									Extremely Important				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	20	8	16	13	22	81	59	80	193	237	485	217	8.25	2.237
Percent	1.4	0.6	1.1	0.9	1.5	5.7	4.1	5.6	13.5	16.6	33.9	15.2		

Q30. When thinking about the relationship between election officials and vendors, how would you describe the level of oversight by the following actors?

Q30_A_1. Federal government

	Not Enough Oversight									Too Much Oversight				
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	8	15	17	35	46	311	174	145	148	83	157	292	6.54	2.179
Percent	0.6	1.0	1.2	2.4	3.2	21.7	12.2	10.1	10.3	5.8	11.0	20.4		

Q30_A_2. State government

	Not Enough Oversight									Too Much Oversight				
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	10	18	21	44	56	403	213	120	121	69	70	286	5.97	1.986
Percent	0.7	1.3	1.5	3.1	3.9	28.2	14.9	8.4	8.5	4.8	4.9	20.0		

Q30_A_3. Local government

	Not Enough Oversight									Too Much Oversight				
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	34	36	45	69	88	469	187	84	49	20	40	310	5.10	1.997
Percent	2.4	2.5	3.1	4.8	6.1	32.8	13.1	5.9	3.4	1.4	2.8	21.7		

Q31. In the last four years have you had any interaction with the vendor who supplied your main voting system?

Please answer Question 31a only if you answered YES to Question 31:

Q31a. Based on your interactions with the vendor who supplied your main voting system, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q31a_A_1. I am familiar and comfortable with my voting system vendor

	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	2	6	9	45	124	275	524	446	6.25	1.004
Percent	0.1	0.4	0.6	3.1	8.7	19.2	36.6	31.2		

Q31a_A_2. My vendor provides high quality goods and services

	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	3	6	16	47	122	307	480	450	6.181	1.046
Percent	0.2	0.4	1.1	3.3	8.5	21.5	33.5	31.4		

Q31a_A_3. My vendor is responsive to my question or concerns regarding my current system

	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	5	6	19	42	111	283	512	453	6.22	1.079
Percent	0.3	0.4	1.3	2.9	7.8	19.8	35.8	31.7		

Q31a_A_4. My vendor provides regular check-ups and maintenance of my current system

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	23	22	35	62	115	218	477	479	5.93	1.478
Percent	1.6	1.5	2.4	4.3	8.0	15.2	33.3	33.5		

Q31a_A_5. The recommendations of my vendor can be trusted

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	3	10	14	64	136	281	456	467	6.10	1.116
Percent	0.2	0.7	1.0	4.5	9.5	19.6	31.9	32.6		

Q31a_A_6. The recommendations of my vendor are clearly in the public interest

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	11	16	32	116	137	244	385	490	5.79	1.369
Percent	0.8	1.1	2.2	8.1	9.6	17.1	26.9	34.2		

Q31a_A_7. Most willing vendors are willing to sacrifice voting system security for greater profits

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	204	204	134	187	80	49	47	526	3.08	1.733
Percent	14.3	14.3	9.4	13.1	5.6	3.4	3.3	36.8		

Q31a_A_8. Too many aspects of election administration are provided by vendors

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	121	153	154	261	118	49	28	547	3.41	1.546
Percent	8.5	10.7	10.8	18.2	8.2	3.4	2.0	38.2		

Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Congress recently passed the Help American Vote Act (HAVA), which provides federal funds to states in order to implement new voting system requirements.

Q32. How familiar are you with HAVA requirements?

	Not Familiar at All										Extremely Familiar			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	52	12	7	14	12	89	108	185	351	245	290	66	7.63	2.321
Percent	3.6	0.8	0.5	1.0	0.8	6.2	7.5	12.9	24.5	17.1	20.3	4.6		

If you answered zero to Question 32, please begin again on Question 37.

Q33. What do you regard as the advantages and disadvantages of HAVA?

Q33_A_1. Provision of federal funds to states

	Disadvantage						Advantage			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	22	10	14	71	150	282	657	225	6.14	1.256
Percent	1.5	0.7	1.0	5.0	10.5	19.7	45.9	15.7		

Q33_A_2. State matching requirement for federal funds

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	50	43	57	164	202	268	389	258	5.37	1.662
Percent	3.5	3.0	4.0	11.5	14.1	18.7	27.2	18.0		

Q33_A_3. Creation of the Election Assistance Commission

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	39	47	80	256	271	223	216	299	4.95	1.547
Percent	2.7	3.3	5.6	17.9	18.9	15.6	15.1	20.9		

Q33_A_4. Requirements for disabled access to voting systems

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	36	38	59	160	207	294	399	238	5.47	1.572
Percent	2.5	2.7	4.1	11.2	14.5	20.5	27.9	16.6		

Q33_A_5. Requirements for voter-error correction

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	30	22	47	156	183	306	430	257	5.62	1.487
Percent	2.1	1.5	3.3	10.9	12.8	21.4	30.0	18.0		

Q33_A_6. Provision for information for voters

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	14	14	35	182	232	299	391	264	5.63	1.335
Percent	1.0	1.0	2.4	12.7	16.2	20.9	27.3	18.4		

Q33_A_7. Codification of voting system standards in law

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	18	24	45	207	211	299	307	320	5.42	1.413
Percent	1.3	1.7	3.1	14.5	14.7	20.9	21.5	22.4		

Q33_A_8. Process for certification of voting systems

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	15	21	43	167	212	312	377	284	5.60	1.377
Percent	1.0	1.5	3.0	11.7	14.8	21.8	26.3	19.8		

Q33_A_9. Requirements for centralized voter registration

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	50	63	46	180	173	276	371	272	5.31	1.709
Percent	3.5	4.4	3.2	12.6	12.1	19.3	25.9	19.0		

Q33_A_10. Requirement for provisional voting

	Disadvantage					**Advantage**				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	209	112	89	191	166	178	218	268	4.20	2.117
Percent	14.6	7.8	6.2	13.3	11.6	12.4	15.2	18.7		

Q33_A_11. Facilitating participation for military or overseas voters

	Disadvantage						**Advantage**				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	20	26	31	127	181	301	488	257	5.79	1.407
Percent	1.4	1.8	2.2	8.9	12.6	21.0	34.1	18.0		

Q33_A_12. Identification requirements for certain first-time voters

	Disadvantage						**Advantage**				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	82	54	58	180	168	236	383	270	5.19	1.842
Percent	5.7	3.8	4.1	12.6	11.7	16.5	26.8	18.6		

Q33_A_13. Other

	Disadvantage						**Advantage**				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	19	5	2	11	10	11	20	1353	4.29	2.336
Percent	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.4	94.5		

Q34. How difficult are the following HAVA requirements to implement? Circle your most preferred response for each requirement:

Q34_A_1. Requirements for disabled access to voting systems

	Not Difficult at All										**Extremely Difficult**			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	65	78	84	78	57	129	101	133	185	139	155	227	5.96	3.064
Percent	4.5	5.5	5.9	5.5	4.0	9.0	7.1	9.3	12.9	9.7	10.8	15.9		

Q34_A_2. Requirements for voter-error corrections

	Not Difficult at All										**Extremely Difficult**			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	107	123	104	126	75	170	101	105	113	64	55	288	4.58	2.943
Percent	7.5	8.6	7.3	8.8	5.2	11.9	7.1	7.3	7.9	4.5	3.8	20.1		

Q34_A_3. Provision of information for voters

	Not Difficult at All										**Extremely Difficult**			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	117	147	148	149	98	183	101	72	87	25	32	272	3.92	2.683
Percent	8.2	10.3	10.3	10.4	6.8	12.8	7.1	5.0	6.1	1.7	2.2	19.0		

Q34_A_4. Process for certification of voting systems

	Not Difficult at All										**Extremely Difficult**			
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	74	99	96	109	77	207	114	78	105	54	63	355	4.78	2.824
Percent	5.2	6.9	6.7	7.6	5.4	14.5	8.0	5.5	7.3	3.8	4.4	24.8		

Q34_A_5. Requirements for centralized voter registration

	Not Difficult at All										Extremely Difficult			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	104	82	89	78	67	180	124	115	109	66	109	308	5.14	3.047
Percent	7.3	5.7	6.2	5.5	4.7	12.6	8.7	8.0	7.6	4.6	7.6	21.5		

Q34_A_6. Requirement for provisional voting

	Not Difficult at All										Extremely Difficult			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	96	81	93	82	59	152	101	91	129	89	174	284	5.51	3.238
Percent	6.7	5.7	6.5	5.7	4.1	10.3	7.1	6.4	9.0	6.2	12.2	19.8		

Q34_A_7. Facilitating participation for military or overseas voters

	Not Difficult at All										Extremely Difficult			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	105	124	138	104	89	188	116	105	100	41	52	269	4.41	2.838
Percent	7.3	8.7	9.6	7.3	6.2	13.1	8.1	7.3	7.0	2.9	3.6	18.8		

Q34_A_8. Identification requirements for certain first-time voters

	Not Difficult at All										Extremely Difficult			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	125	107	133	109	81	158	109	112	100	52	71	274	4.52	2.992
Percent	8.7	7.5	9.3	7.6	5.7	11.0	7.6	7.8	7.0	3.6	5.0	19.1		

Q34_A_9. Other

	Not Difficult at All										Extremely Difficult			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	10	4	3	4	2	9	1	4	5	2	8	1379	4.75	3.569
Percent	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.6	96.4		

Q35. Do you think HAVA is resulting in improvements in the election process in your jurisdiction?

	No Improvemen										Major Improvement			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	91	87	92	98	81	214	173	161	129	49	47	209	4.96	2.700
Percent	6.4	6.1	6.4	6.8	5.7	15.0	12.1	11.3	9.0	3.4	3.3	14.6		

Q36. Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?

Q36_C1. Individual was

	1 = Pro-HAVA	2 = Anti-HAVA	Miss.
Number	9	59	1363
Percent	0.6	4.1	95.2

Q36_C2. Voter ID/Registration issue

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1372	59
Percent	95.9	4.1

Q36_C3. Elimination of EAC

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1429	2
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q36_C4. Issues with federal funding

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1360	71
Percent	95.0	5.0

Q36_C5. Political issues

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1422	9
Percent	99.4	0.6

Q36_C6. Extend deadlines

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1411	20
Percent	98.6	1.4

Q36_C7. Interpretation issues (multiple ways of/difficulty)

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1407	24
Percent	98.3	1.7

Q36_C8. Federal/Local control issues

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1392	39
Percent	97.3	2.7

Q36_C9. Voter/General education issue

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1411	20
Percent	98.6	1.4

Q36_C10. Worker/Personnel/Training issue

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1421	10
Percent	99.3	0.7

Q36_C11. ADA compliance issue

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1394	37
Percent	97.4	2.6

Q36_C12. Provisional ballot issue

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1379	52
Percent	96.4	3.6

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technology

Q37. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q37_A_1. I understand how DREs operate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	165	80	75	170	222	178	219	320	4.46	2.028
Percent	11.5	5.6	5.2	11.9	15.5	12.4	15.3	22.5		

Q37_A_2. I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	163	87	92	174	177	164	208	366	4.35	2.052
Percent	11.4	6.1	6.4	12.2	12.4	11.5	14.5	25.6		

Q37_A_3. I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	74	72	92	258	195	137	121	482	4.39	1.697
Percent	5.2	5.0	6.4	18.0	13.6	9.6	8.5	33.6		

Q37_A_4. I consider state certification procedures to be adequate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	52	50	62	180	199	221	214	453	4.99	1.689
Percent	3.6	3.5	4.3	12.6	13.9	15.4	15.0	31.7		

Q37_A_5. DRE software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	143	131	112	258	97	87	102	501	3.76	1.865
Percent	10.0	9.2	7.8	18.0	6.8	6.1	7.1	35.0		

Q37_A_6. DRE software is vulnerable to being hacked

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	153	126	121	242	88	91	108	502	3.74	1.904
Percent	10.7	8.8	8.5	16.9	6.1	6.4	7.5	35.1		

Q37_A_7. The public should have greater trust in DREs

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	70	75	98	225	155	150	170	488	4.54	1.797
Percent	4.9	5.2	6.8	15.7	10.8	10.5	11.9	34.5		

Q37_A_8. I follow news regarding DREs in the media

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	71	70	75	181	169	203	185	477	4.74	1.810
Percent	5.0	4.9	5.2	12.6	11.8	14.2	12.9	33.4		

Q37_A_9. DREs are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	169	128	114	231	103	74	104	508	3.66	1.913
Percent	11.8	8.9	8.0	16.1	7.2	5.2	7.3	35.5		

Q37_A_10. The media reports too many criticisms of DREs

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	56	77	91	262	159	108	169	509	4.51	1.736
Percent	3.9	5.4	6.4	18.3	11.1	7.5	11.8	35.5		

Q37_A_11. Any security concerns about DREs can be adequately addressed by good security procedures

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	48	46	64	214	161	196	203	499	4.92	1.689
Percent	3.4	3.2	4.5	15.0	11.3	13.7	14.2	34.8		

Q37_A_12. DRE software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach)

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	119	102	82	221	124	124	149	510	4.19	1.947
Percent	8.3	7.1	5.7	15.4	8.7	8.7	10.4	35.6		

Q38. Do you agree or disagree that DREs should print voter-verifiable paper ballots, by which we mean paper receipts that voters can verify but not remove from the polling station?

	Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Miss.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number	207	75	70	142	134	150	364	289	4.60	2.261
Percent	14.5	5.2	4.9	9.9	9.4	10.5	25.4	20.5		

Please answer Question 38a only if you answered 3 or below on Question 38:

Q38a. Why do you disagree?

Q38a_1. Cost of paper receipts

	0 = No/Unchecked	**1 = Yes**
Number	1237	194
Percent	86.4	13.6

Q38a_2. Possibility of printer failure

	0 = No/Unchecked	**1 = Yes**
Number	1212	219
Percent	84.7	15.3

Q38a_3. Size of paper ballots

	0 = No/Unchecked	**1 = Yes**
Number	1299	132
Percent	90.8	9.2

Q38a_4. Risk of tampering

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1305	126
Percent	91.2	8.8

Q38a_5. Risk voter's privacy

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1166	265
Percent	81.5	18.5

Q38a_C6. Will slow process time

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1415	16
Percent	98.9	1.1

Q38a_C7. Difficulty in retrofitting

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q38a_C8. Redundancy

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1429	2
Percent	99.9	0.1

Q38a_C9. ADA/Persons with disabilities concerns

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1425	6
Percent	99.6	0.4

Q38a_C10. Unsure of usefulness/Unnecessary

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1399	32
Percent	97.8	2.2

Q38a_C11. Other

	0 = No/Unchecked	1 = Yes
Number	1396	35
Percent	97.6	2.4

Please answer Question 38b only if you answered 4 or above on Question 38:

Q38b. If a DRE costs approximately $3,000, how much more would be appropriate for vendors to charge per DRE to add the capacity to print paper receipts?

	1 = No More	2 = Between $1 and $300	3 = Between $301 and $600	4 = Between $601 and $900	5 = Between $901 and $1200
Number	266	179	130	46	46
Percent	18.6	12.5	9.1	3.2	3.2

	6 = Between $1201 and $1500	7 = Between $1501 and $1800	8 = Between $1801 and $2100	More than $2101	Missing
Number	7	3	3	8	743
Percent	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.6	51.9

If DRE is NOT your current main voting system, please begin again on Question 41

Q39. How satisfied are you with the performance of your DRE technology?

	Not Satisfied at all								Extremely Satisfied					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	0	4	1	2	1	2	5	9	31	53	104	1219	8.87	1.840
Percent	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.6	2.2	3.7	7.3	85.2		

Q40. Do you have a voter-verifiable paper ballot?

	1 = Yes	**2 = No**	**Missing**
Number	42	186	1203
Percent	2.9	13.0	84.1

Please answer Question 40a only if you answered NO to Question 40:

Q40a. Are you planning to add one?

	1 = Yes	**2 = No**	**Missing**
Number	15	150	1266
Percent	1.0	10.5	88.5

Optical Scan Technology

Q41. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Q41_A_1. I understand how optical scan voting systems operate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	84	32	28	81	108	257	581	260	5.73	1.800
Percent	5.9	2.2	2.0	5.7	7.5	18.0	40.6	18.2		

Q41_A_2. I have adequate information on optical scan voting systems to assess whether they are a good choice for my jurisdiction

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	75	29	31	78	107	259	557	295	5.74	1.761
Percent	5.2	2.0	2.2	5.5	7.5	18.1	38.9	20.6		

Q41_A_3. I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	42	24	52	237	187	242	231	416	5.12	1.565
Percent	2.9	1.7	3.6	16.6	13.1	16.9	16.1	29.1		

Q41_A_4. I consider state certification procedures to be adequate

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	28	11	39	157	183	275	363	375	5.59	1.451
Percent	2.0	0.8	2.7	11.0	12.8	19.2	25.4	26.2		

Q41_A_5. Optical scan voting system software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software

	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	287	237	169	200	68	37	31	402	2.77	1.599
Percent	20.1	16.6	11.8	14.0	4.8	2.6	2.2	28.1		

Q41_A_6. Optical scan voting systems are vulnerable to being hacked

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	326	250	137	188	63	30	29	408	2.63	1.591
Percent	22.8	17.5	9.6	13.1	4.4	2.1	2.0	28.5		

Q41_A_7. The public should have greater trust in optical scan voting systems

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	33	23	43	181	171	255	321	404	5.42	1.545
Percent	2.3	1.6	3.0	12.6	11.9	17.8	22.4	28.2		

Q41_A_8. I follow news regarding optical scan voting systems in the media

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	76	76	80	189	162	198	241	409	4.80	1.860
Percent	5.3	5.3	5.6	13.2	11.3	13.8	16.8	28.6		

Q41_A_9. Optical scan voting systems are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	356	240	155	175	49	20	20	416	2.47	1.489
Percent	24.9	16.8	10.8	12.2	3.4	1.4	1.4	29.1		

Q41_A_10. The media reports too many criticisms of optical scan voting systems

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	110	125	153	314	109	67	97	456	3.80	1.711
Percent	7.7	8.7	10.7	21.9	7.6	4.7	6.8	31.9		

Q41_A_11. Any security concerns about optical scan voting systems can be adequately addressed by good security procedures

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	16	12	38	141	142	282	374	426	5.71	1.386
Percent	1.1	0.8	2.7	9.9	9.9	19.7	26.1	29.8		

Q41_A_12. Optical scan software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach)

| | **Strongly Disagree** | | | | | | **Strongly Agree** | | | |
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	124	74	76	231	120	142	222	442	4.48	1.999
Percent	8.7	5.2	5.3	16.1	8.4	9.9	15.5	30.9		

Please answer Question 42 only if optical scan is your current main voting system:

Q42. How satisfied are you with the performance of your optical scan voting technology?

| | **Not Satisfied at all** | | | | | | | | | | **Extremely Satisfied** | | | |
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**Miss.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Number	2	1	1	1	3	7	11	27	85	189	324	780	9.11	1.305
Percent	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.9	5.9	13.2	22.6	54.5		

Individual Information
(section begins on next page)

Q43. How old are you?

Age	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
24	4	0.3		
25	2	0.1		
27	2	0.1		
28	2	0.1		
29	3	0.2		
30	3	0.2		
31	7	0.5		
32	5	0.3		
33	8	0.6		
34	6	0.4		
35	14	1.0		
36	7	0.5		
37	10	0.7		
38	23	1.6		
39	16	1.1		
40	17	1.2		
41	26	1.8		
42	25	1.7		
43	21	1.5		
44	30	2.1		
45	42	2.9		
46	25	1.7		
47	41	2.9		
48	42	2.9		
49	36	2.5		
50	57	4.0		
51	52	3.6		
52	65	4.5		
53	60	4.2		
54	45	3.1		
55	49	3.4	52.97	9.590
56	63	4.4		
57	68	4.8		
58	54	3.8		
59	36	2.5		
60	57	4.0		
61	36	2.5		
62	45	3.1		
63	25	1.7		
64	23	1.6		
65	18	1.3		
66	24	1.7		
67	10	0.7		
68	14	1.0		
69	8	0.6		
70	7	0.5		
71	7	0.5		
72	6	0.4		
73	4	0.3		
74	4	0.3		
75	5	0.3		
76	3	0.2		
77	5	0.3		
78	1	0.1		
79	1	0.1		
80	2	0.1		
82	1	0.1		
84	1	0.1		
85	1	0.1		
89	1	0.1		
Missing	156	10.9		

Q44. Are you male or female?

	1 = Male	2 = Female	Missing
Number	339	1012	80
Percent	23.7	70.7	5.6

Q45. Do you consider yourself . . . ?

	1 = White non-Hispanic	2 = Hispanic	3 = Black / African-American	4 = Asian or Pacific Islander
Number	1263	24	12	2
Percent	88.3	1.7	0.8	0.1

	5 = Native American or Alaskan Native	6 = Mixed Racial Background	7 = Other	Missing
Number	13	3	22	92
Percent	0.9	0.2	1.5	6.4

Q46. What is the highest level of education you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

	1 = Completed some high school	2 = High school graduate or equivalent	3 = Completed some college, but no degree	4 = College graduate
Number	25	262	522	345
Percent	1.7	18.3	36.5	24.1

	5 = Completed some graduate school, but no degree	6 = Completed graduate school	Missing
Number	78	109	90
Percent	5.5	7.6	6.3

Q47. On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strong liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following categories best describes your views?

	1 = Strongly liberal	2 = Liberal	3 = Slightly liberal	4 = Middle of the road
Number	16	78	109	419
Percent	1.1	5.5	7.6	29.3

	5 = Slightly conservative	6 = Conservative	7 = Strongly conservative	Missing
Number	246	331	56	176
Percent	17.2	23.1	3.9	12.3

Q48. Please select your salary range.

	1 = Less than $10,000	2 = $10,000 to $19,999	3 = $20,000 to $29,999	4 = $30,000 to $39,999	5 = $40,000 to $49,999
Number	54	69	179	290	244
Percent	3.8	4.8	12.5	20.3	17.1

	6 = $50,000 to $59,999	7 = $60,000 to $69,999	8 = $70,000 to $79,999	9 = $80,000 to $99,999	10 = $100,000 to $120,000
Number	135	113	71	67	26
Percent	9.4	7.9	5.0	4.7	1.8

	11 = More than $120,000	Missing
Number	9	174
Percent	0.6	12.2

Q49. How long have you served in your current capacity in election administration?

Number of Years	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
1	49	3.4		
2	98	6.8		
3	71	5.0		
4	87	6.1		
5	75	5.2		
6	84	5.9		
7	43	3.0		
8	65	4.5		
9	32	2.2		
10	84	5.9		
11	42	2.9		
12	67	4.7		
13	37	2.6		
14	39	2.7		
15	47	3.3		
16	38	2.7		
17	24	1.7		
18	54	3.8		
19	24	1.7		
20	49	3.4		
21	18	1.3		
22	32	2.2	11.94	8.641
23	12	0.8		
24	11	0.8		
25	24	1.7		
26	12	0.8		
27	9	0.6		
28	15	1.0		
29	8	0.6		
30	24	1.7		
31	12	0.8		
32	4	0.3		
33	3	0.2		
34	5	0.3		
35	7	0.5		
36	5	0.3		
39	1	0.1		
40	3	0.2		
42	1	0.1		
43	1	0.1		
44	1	0.1		
50	1	0.1		
Missing	103	7.9		

Q50. How would you characterize your training as an election official? Choose one:

	1 = Excellent	2 = Good	3 = Adequate	4 = Poor	Missing
Number	501	580	194	51	105
Percent	35.0	40.5	13.6	3.6	7.3

Q51. What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?

Q51_C1. Hands-on/On-the-job

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1378	53
Percent	96.3	3.7

Q51_C2. Cross-training with other election officials/Conferences

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1380	51
Percent	96.4	3.6

Q51_C3. State level training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1357	74
Percent	94.8	5.2

Q51_C4. Local level training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1422	9
Percent	99.4	.0.6

Q51_C5. Election Center training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1413	18
Percent	98.7	1.3

Q51_C6. Project management

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q51_C7. Technical/System/Vendor training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1535	78
Percent	94.5	5.5

Q51_C8. Legal/Regulations training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1346	85
Percent	94.1	5.9

Q51_C9. Personnel/Management/Poll worker training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1400	31
Percent	97.8	2.2

Q51_C10. General/Unspecified training

	0 = Individual did not address issue	1 = Individual addressed issue
Number	1351	80
Percent	94.4	5.6

Q52. Are you a member of any of the following professional elections organizations?

Q52_1. National Association of State Election Directors

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1414	17
Percent	98.8	1.2

Q52_2. National Association of Secretaries of State

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1428	3
Percent	99.8	0.2

Q52_3. National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials, and Clerks

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1234	197
Percent	86.2	13.8

Q52_4. The Election Center

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1263	168
Percent	88.3	11.7

Q52_5. International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials, and Treasurers

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1237	194
Percent	86.4	13.6

Q52_6. State-level organizations

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	669	762
Percent	46.8	53.2

Q52_7. Other

	0 = Not a member/ Non-response	1 = Member
Number	1295	136
Percent	90.5	9.5

APPENDIX
C

Local Election Official Survey
Open-Ended Question Responses

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

178   **QUESTION 16:** Please describe the nature of your input in the voting system decision-making process in the space below:

220   **QUESTION 19:**   What could be done to improve the decision making process for selecting voting systems?

245   **QUESTION 28:**   Please provide any additional comments you wish to make here about the performance of the main voting system in the November 2004 election in your jurisdiction:

265   **QUESTION 36:** Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?

281   **QUESTION 51:** What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?

The State Election Commission selected the system to be implemented on a statewide basis. All counties had input into the established criteria.

I recommended the system to the county commission and they purchased it.

I can only offer suggestions from seeing machines in use.

I will make the final recommendation to our County Commission on any new purchases.

The State of Wisconsin is testing several systems right now, to get our SRVS system online by 2006. Yes we were granted an extension to comply with HAVA.

It will be my decision

If the County is required to pay for and/or pay to maintain a new system, I would make the recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners. If the State pays for all of it, then my role would be to participate in selecting vendors and recommending a system based on the County IT needs.

I participated with my elections manager in the development of the RFP, the evaluation of the RFP, the selection process, the funding package, visits to other jurisdictions, acceptance testing and preparation of the contract to purchase.

It would be my decision along with my election supervisor and subject to fiscal approval from the board of commissioners.

As an elected official, I represent the voters of [County Name] County. My input would be a synthesis of constituent thoughts and my experience as an administrator of elections.

I make the final decision along with my Board of Supervisors. The Board is not involved with my research

Determined which system and secured approval to purchase from county governing body.

I am one of five members of the township board for which the vendor ran a demo of the acuvote machine. We were impressed with the paper trail and the ease in which the process worked. The board voted on the purchase of this system.

The State of Alaska has selected the optical scan method and the political subdivisions generally share the equipment. The current system was purchased with a great amount of input from the municipalities and I anticipate the same would occur. If we were to purchase rather than borrow, I expect we would use similar equipment, and I would have major input.

I choose the system.

Researched the possibilities, tested, wrote specifications, reviewed bids, recommended to County Commissioners.

I appointed an advisory committee and arranged for them to thorouroughly stdy laws and requirements and to vet available technology. Their recommendations were what I expected and I followed them.

Discussions with state officials regarding the types of equipment they are planning to purchase

The system must be user friendly and must be error free in tabulation.

I served on an Election Transition Team for the State of Alaska in 1996 that advocated going away from the punch card system to an optical scan system My community was one of the first in local government to purchase the system. I have trained extensively on the system and have caused my staff to be trained also. I am responsible for developing the budget for my departments and divisions. The local governing body looks to me for my input on voting systems. I recently served on the Lt Governors team to look at implementing the HAVA Act in Alaska.

We will issue an RFP and a committee will evaluate responses using predetermined criteria and I will be a member of that committee

I will recommend the best system after seeing all the major participants in the market place.

I make recommendations to the governing body. The governing body approves funding levels and authorizes purchase. Generally, our county elects to use the same system used by the state of Alaska.

As I am responsible for most elections held within the county, the governing board graciously acts on my recommendations in most instances.

Decided by the State, except for early voting system used.

I conduct research of election systems and purchase equipment within budgetary constraints set by my City Council. All equipment has to meet guidelines set by the Secretary of State

As a former member of the Electoral Board, former chief precinct official, I had a huge impact on the decision to purchase and the type of system we chose. Our County Board left the decision to the Board as we are the experts in election matters.

Discussion with co-workers to reach consensus

Our three municipalities were part of a state wide pilot project.I am involed in every part of the decision making process.

I would make the recommendation for any change to the Selectboard and then it would be presented to the Town to vote on

CT voting systems are specified in State Statute

what people are thinking now adays.

Our local governing body would look to the local Electoral Board and me for advice, confident that we had performed the necessary research to make an informed recommendation.

To suggest to the Board Members.

I will follow the laws and direction of the Secretary of the State for Conn.

I was part of a Statewide committee to look at all available systems, in 2002.

As the Voter Registrar, I receive input from various sources and make the final decisions on voting systems. Decisions are based on the reliability of the equipment and ease of use to voters. I am also one of about a half-dozen people statewide who have participated in annual State Board of Elections machine certifications and testing, so am familiar with the pros and cons of all equipment certified in the state.

The only full-time elections worker in our City. So most decision making falls to me by default.

The Deputy and I are the people who know the Election process and what the equipment has to be able to do for us and what it will take to learn & work and the laws that govern.

As Town Clerk, I serve as the Department Manager, and I would make the recommendation to the Board of Selectmen (elected officials), Town Manager, and Procurement Officer.

Connecticut Sec of State & Legislature will have primary input and influence by determining type of equipment used through regulations and legislation. I would be able to lobby the state legislature members from my town as to legislation. At local level, I would advise the local administration as to the best choice of equipment and quantity of equipment to purchase. As of today, 11/30/2004, there is no formal role or requirement. I was on a state task force to help implement HAVA in Connecticut. It may be reactivated to assist in choosing and certifying DRE and other systems when a final decision is made as to the continued use of lever voting machines.

Past experiences and voter comments are very important and will be relayed to the Town Board who ultimately makes the decision on spending any $.

Committee of county auditors and secretary of state office

Work with the SOS and other election officals on valuating voting equipment. All equipment must be certified by the SOS.

I recommend. My County Commissioners decide.

As election officials we polled the vendors and made a decision with Election Board and other county officials. At this point we lease our equipment and services.

It will depend upon surplus monies for our county whether or not we will even be able to comply with HAVA requirements

Elected Official responsible for Elections in a County. Primary decision maker

I would be the final say on any system purchased. I would also be the one researching a new system and presenting it to the County Board for funding. They would pretty much depend on my opininon for this decision.

After researching all types of voting equipment, along with the Board of Elections, we could make a decision on what our county would chose as new voting equipment.

I will choose the system that is cost efficient, reliable, will be around for a while, and the voters in my jurisdiction want to use.

I am the Commissioner of Elections for my County. The Board of Supervisors has the statutory responsibility for the purchase of a voting system but will rely heavily on my reccomendation.

I supply the needed information to our County Board, who will make the decision to purchase a new voting system.

I receive information from our County Clerk and the Townships association, I make the recommendation to my local municipality based on infomration I recieve. They usually follow my lead.

I am the city clerk so am bound by state statutes regarding my election duties. I order ballots, arrange for election inspector training, publish notices, handle absentee ballots, etc. I can request voting equipment but budget restraints will affect the outcome of the request.

Local level election administrators can provide information on the practical equipment usage to the selection process.

Decision maker along with staff input. HAVA consideration regarding conformity to law.

I have already purchased a new 650 central ballot counter from ES&S that we will use for the first time in 2006. I chose the counter and recommended the purchase to my commissioners.

Our Association of County Officials have representatives that are working with State Election Officials to select a system for the entire state.

The fact that I serve as Superintendent of Elections and I am responsible for the conducting of the election, I feel that my input is valuable.

Myself along with a co-director or computer consultant our staff and the board will look at several voting systems once some are approved in the State of Missouri to determine what will work best to meet the HAVA requirements for voters with disabilities and work best with our current voting system. We will meet with several vendors regarding what system use to supplement what is missing for disablity requirements in HAVA or we will consider replacing the entire voting system if that works best in our county. We will also see how the systems we are interested in work in other counties similar in populations to ours.

Reconnendation of which state authorized vendor and system to purchase, to represenrative town meeting.

to verify information, conduct public demonstrations of equipment being looked at. to confirm system is approved by both the EAC and our State Board of Elections.

Since I am on site most of the day, the Village Board would probably listen to my advice

I have gathered information about the vendors and systems offered, arranged for demonstrations for the final decision makers. I have also worked closely with the vendors to determine the differences in offerings and how each vendor's product would work with our current needs.

I will be working with the Secretary of State to meet the HAVA requirements and the State will mandate to our county the type of touch screen machine we will use in 2006.

As Circuit Clerk I am a member of the election comission and a member of the appointed Board, Absentee election mgr.

We would very much like to keep things the way they are. We are a very small County and this is the most cost efficent and practial way for us. The HAVA act will cost the County thousands of dollars with no one using it. In this size community we know our residents. There needs to be some options in the HAVA act.

It is my responsibility to gather information and make recommendation to the governing body which will provide some funding. Additionally, I participate with the statewide group researching options and making recommendations for HAVA funded equipment.

I hope my input will be of the utmost.

The Election process is completely and totally up to me in my County. I do what the Secretary of State requires by law. The decision is totally my responsibility.

As head election administrator of the County I have the responsibility of recommending to the County Board the voting system that will be HAVA compliant, economical and make the most sense for our County's population.

The decision will be made by the Secretary of the State and the State Legislature

I am the Administrator of Elections for this county and I will be evaluating machines prior to the Election Commission for this county. The purchase will ultimately be their decision, but I believe that they will rely heavily on my input.

The State of South Dakota will be making the decision for all the counties in the State. All Auditors will have input into this process.

I will reccomend which system to purchase.

As county clerk/election officer, I try to follow the mandates as dictated by the powers-that-be. But it seems that there is no consideration as to what actually works for us is taken into account. Small counties, say under 10,000 - 15,000 should be given an exemption and not have to purchase the DRE's. (The fed's have done this before with other mandates, such as solid waste landfills. Small counties in our part of the country were given an exemption due to arid conditions and the distance to the groundwater tables.) So they DO make exceptions. Our SOS & the feds are dictating to us that we must have the voting machines into place by next year, and my commissioners are vehemently against this, and tell me that they will NOT budget for the purchase of additional voting equipment other than what is being provided, supposedly, by the grant. They have been around long enough to know how that usually works too. (It's being purchased for us, oh, no, wait, we just ran out of money, you're going to have to buy that yourself, and you have nothing to say about it.,,, Our opti-scan works perfectly for our small county. The problem is not only with election equipment that has probably been bought from somebody's brother-in-law or a business that has connections to,(or owned by or interest in) by someone in the political arena, and they will make another fortune off the dumb taxpayer. We have too many biased, unscruplous election and elected officials that are in this for personal gain. Not for the betterment of the process, ease of voting, or fairness. (Do I sound skeptical) That's where the clean-up needs to start. I had to listen to one individual that was appointed by Mr Bush to the federal election commission following the 2000 fiacso, and the man was an IDIOT. No wonder we can't get anything right, if that callibur of individual is telling those of us who already know our jobs, what to do. Our whole voting system has gone to hell. (Can you tell that I am also just a little discouraged, or rather disgusted with the new and improved election process?) I do want to respond to

181

question 12. Why do we have to fix something that is not broke? I run good, clean elections, and have for over 12 years. I will start my forth term as county clerk in January, and I'd bet I know more about how to properly conduct an election that some of those so-called experts telling us what to do. I don't want somebody who cannot run a clean election, (such as the federal election commissioner, who was formerly the election commissioner from a large city in Missouri, and had a mess at his 2000 election) telling me what to do. I have gotten way off track, but I never pass up an opportunity to vent.

I will recommend to jurisdictions the type of machine to purchase based on the state requirements.

This office has earned the trust of voters and of the local political parties in the administration of elections using the central count optical scan system for the past 10 years. Voters like the ability to recount ballots containing the voters' original marks. Outside of that, they would look to this office for a recommendation of central count versus precinct count. I recommended precinct count to reduce the number of overvotes at the precincts.

The ND Auditor's Association played a large part in evaluating the equipment chosen and developing voter education.

Since I am the Election Authority for the County the decision was mine to change to the optical scan system back in march of 2000

Why change when the system works well?

The Clerk is the cheif election officer who is solely the decision maker; however, the budgeting control is the control of the county commissioners, so it is our policy for both of these elected groups to cooperate in the decision making process. Of course any State or Federal mandates must be addressed in the process.

The county clerk is responsible for all voting systems and would recommend to the fiscal court any system to be purchased

NE HAVA Commission, HAVA Advisory Committee,

I want something easy to use for the voters and workers on election day and something reliable as far as working, accuracy and repairing.

The Judge and Commissioners have said they know nothing about this and I need to find what the county needs.

I have been involved with the State certification process and am familiar with all of teh viting machines the State has certified.

As Town Clerk, I run the elections. If I were not satisfied that the system is reliable, tamper-proof, and verifiable, I would propose to the Selectmen and to the Town Meeting that we invest in a better system.

Examined each system approved for use in the State,with members of the Electoral Board and together, we made the decision to purchase.

As County Clerk, I will be able to have input with the County Commissioners. I believe we will all be open minded and consider all aspects presented and all agree as to what will be best for our small county.

20 years as local clerk

Reviewed all certified systems to determine which were most economical and functionally appropriate for your locality. Presented analysis and recommendation to Electoral Board for their review

As clerk of the town I would recomend to the Town Board what should be purchased and why i recommend it.

We could choose from 3 companies that the Secretary of State's Office certified. The Election Supervisor and I reviewed the 3 machines capabilities and viewed them at workshops and other presentation formats We interviewed other jurisdiction using the systems. Then, contacted our #1 choice for a personal presentation.

final decision maker

The current system was in place before I was elected nine years ago.

Our State is currently working on putting a system in place that is state-wide. I do have some input. I voted for persons on the selection committee.

6 years ago when we purchased the DRE's I had substantial influence, however we see no need to change.

All of the counties in Utah have agreed to go with the same system. The Lt Gov has put together a committee to look at and recommend a new system. I am not on that committee, but will follow their direction.

I am the only person who knows or cares about the election process. This will be my problem as I have tried to impress on county commissioners what will be needed and what it will cost with no sucess. THIS IS MY PROBLEM EVIDENTLY!!

I researched voting equipment certified by State; appointed a committee made up of representatives from the community (i.e. disability and civil rights advocates, political, election workers, technology experts, election staff)to analyze and test the certified equipment and make recommendations. I made the final recommendation to board of county commissioners.

I have reviewed several types of optical scan systems, as well as discussed the opportunities with election judges, civic organizations and other election authorities throughout the state.

I am the one who has studied the new system and have kept up with the technology.

Was chair of the committee appointed by the Commissioners Court to review all available certified systems in the State of Texas at the time of purchase.

We will examine and attend demonstrations of all voting systems currently certified by the state and weigh the pros & cons of each system against what will work for our county. Technical support offered by the vendor, the training offered and our ability to program our own elections and produce our own ballots will be considered. Ease of operation for the precinct officials and reliability (track record) of the systems will be factored in. We also want a system that allows us to thoroughly test all aspects of the programming. We will choos the system that will meet our requirements.

Work closely with the secretary of state's office in providing information and input about what we need/want for election.

I research the products then I provide a recommendation to Commissioners Court.

The ounty Board relies on my input as to voter convenience and reliability of the system.

I would have to do all the researching on the various types of equipment and give the board my recommendations.

Will make the decision on type and make of Equipment

Will make the final decision along with the County Commission

We try to find a satisfactory point between pratical (cost-effective) and most up to date equipment possible. Always looking for what will be the easiest for the public to use.

I currently sit on a board to come up with criteria for ada accessible machines for Kansas. As Election Officer it is my duty to decide which machines will be used locally

Chair committee that will meet Dec 13 to determine upgrades of central count station, addition of precinct counters in larger precincts, purchase/lease of DRE's and consolidation of two smaller precincts. Committee consists of Chief Deputy, 2 Commissioners, Democratic Party Chair, Republican Party Chair, Tax Assessor-Collector-Voter Registrar and Chair

Missouri law gives authority to Secretary of State to certify equipment after it meets FEC standards so my purchase is limited to those systems. Statutes n this state grants me the sole authority to make the decision on the purchase. Case law requires county to pay for my decision

We are invited to state meetings and allowed to voice our opinions on the systems presented. The state officials make the final decision

As chairman of the county board of elections we would make a rcommendation to the fiscal court and they would purchase the election equipment.They would have the option of purchasing what we suggested or getting another system.

Research all systems available; determine which is most compatable to voting population for ease of understanding and marking the ballot; obtain a system that uses the same ballot and same method of voting for all phases of the vote process; prepare a Request for Proposals, advertise for bids, and, in conjunction with the governing body of the jurisdiction, arrive at a system that meets the needs of our county.

I advocated for our town to purchase a scanning system for counting votes locally. I am on the state HAVA Committee and have helped pick a vendor for NH state-wide voter checklist from the RFP prep to evaluating the program and tailoring it to NH needs and laws.

Budget and advise to the Commissioners.

Commissioners' Court usually approves my recomendations.

Most all decision making is being left up to me. The cost factor is the only thing my Commissioners Court is looking at.

central count optical scan was in place when I came into office in 1999. It is a very good and acurate system. We have never had any major problems. It makes election night run smooth.

My elected supervisor takes my input very seriously and I have his 100% support of my decisions

I would recommend systems based on what I am told we need to have in place, mainly HAVA laws, to our Board of County Commissioners. They in turn, approve or deny my recommendations.

I will recommend a system to our county's governing authority.

Recomendation to Commissioners Court

I have had a lot of input. I have carefully considered HAVA and watched and listened to the debate on a paper trail. If I were to buy new machines, I would want them to have a paper trail.

My input is based on needs of the county and compliance with the state and federal government.

The State of Michigan receives communication from the Federal Government, who communicates to the County, who communicates with me regarding concerns, acquisitions of equipment and requirements. I then go to the Township Board (5 elected members total) and explain requirements and personal choice. The Board then asks questions and agrees where necessary.

My boss, the county clerk-recorder would ask me for my input as his assistant. But he would make the final decision.

I represent the state's [county identifier] county and have [voter's indentifier] registered votes. [Sentence removed because of identification concerns]. My input will consist of talking to elected officials, voters, disabled groups and taking an active role on the committee charged with researching the matter.

little or no input at the local level

Kansas is being directed by the Secretary of State via the Federal Election Commission and Guidelines from both the State and Federal.

Experience in recording and counting votes, administration of the electoral process, familiarity with the various vendors and their credibility, positive and negative comments from my contemporaries in the elections arena, ease of use of different systems, and the best product for the best money which will preserve the integrity and credibility of the process.

All voting equipment used in the State of Virginia has to be certified by the State Board of Elections; that is my foremost influence. After that, we (local Electoral Board & myself), review & take in suggestions from other groups.

I am the Chef Election Official in my County. I will be the one to recommend any change in the system used.

I AM THE RESPONSIBLE PARTY

I am the elected Town Clerk. My opinions and advise are highly acknowledged by the Voters and the Town Board.

Reviewing equipment options and recommending to local Selectmen

I work for the Election Commissioners, which have a greater impact on the decicion to purchase a new system. My input is important to them. The County Commission will fund the system, if they agree with the Election Commission's recommendation. This process must be a community effort from all concerns, elected and non elected officials.

Recommended to County Board and local boards and councils to move to precinct counters to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Recommended County Board authorize grants from the county election budget for towns and cities to purchase ES&S M100 counters. Which were successful.   City of [City name] still used Optech IIIP equipment precinct counters.

Operation Cost evaluation, voter education, rules and procedures, gatherine data for final purchase

Each municipality in county uses same type of voting system and County Clerk coordinates ordering of ballots, supplies, etc.

I study, inspect and make a recommendation to commissioners court. They usually approve my requests.

Research, viewing demonstrations, testing, recommendations to board of county commissioners for budget, final decision on purchase and implementation

I serve as absentee election manager and also as one of three of the County's Election Officials.

I would make the final decision for the my jurisdiction. We are not anticipating any changes in the near future with the exception of the State possible requiring us to have a DRE to meet HAVA requirements for the disabled.

I administer the election process and have significant input into the election decisions. However, on any matters involving purchases and budget, a board of county commissioners has the final authority.

As I am the County Election Officer, my opinion has a lot of bearing on what is purchased.

I ultimately make the decision after weighing all the information from a broad range of sources.

I think the commissioners' court realizes that since I am the election official for the co., I have the best grasp on election law as well as what will work best with our current optical scan system as well as for the voters we have here in this county.

I research the voting systems, set up demonstrations for my commissioners and county commissioners. In the final decision, I give my pro and con views on all systems considered. Since I will be responsible for the success or failure of the voting process, I want to be the one who selects the type of system best suited for my jurisdiction.

I'll be doing the research and bidding process.

My input will be to show cost effect. Everyone is please with our current machines.

my commissioners court has confidence in me to make the decision that is best for the county

I, as Town Clerk and the Registrar of Voters will decide what type of electronic system will be used in our town as long as the Secretary of the State has given us the go ahead.

We are required to convert our current DRE to one with voter verifiable paper trail. Myself and my staff will sellect the modification and recommend it to the Board of Supervisors. This is a modification of our existing equipment or a change out.

We are a rural, small town with only about [number] voters. I have served in my position as elected Town Clerk for over 15 years. Part of that job is presiding officer for all elections. The voters and the other election officials in town like the way I run the elections and are very supportive of my ideas for changes and/or improvements. I have served on a state-level committee for HAVA compliance in my state. I regularly attend educational seminars to keep abreast of election law changes and scrupulously apply the law to the conduct of elections in my jurisdiction. Some changes are made by our open Town Meeting and some are decisions made by a Board of elected officials. Both bodies have accepted and supported my recommendations in the past. I am considering the possibility of getting a voting system where the voters mark a paper ballot which is then scanned by an optical scanner. I understand that the scanners are available from the Elections Division in our Secretary of State's office at no cost but the cost of programming the scanner for each election is of concern to me.

I am able to relay voting experiences, situations, or needs that would impact the voting system decision-making process. This may include experiences with poll workers and the voter alike as well as equipment performance.

Adhered to the Secretary of State requirements

Study issue, vendors, other counties, laws, funding issues, meet with task force and vendors and others, determine best system based on input from numerous sources and make recommendation to commissioners court.

I present options to the governing board and they decide.

Our County government has asked for our input about the systems. They then pass that information on to the State level. They do seem to listen to us because we are the ones using/working with the equipment. Because of the HAVA Act(you may know this) we as well as all other states must have a unified voting system now. Before it was up to the local jurisdictions to choose their system.

Director/Deputy working year-round on voting-County responsible for all elections. Expect to be the final decision maker.

By law, the entire State of Georgia uses the same equipment. We are not given any chance for input.

The commissioners court will rely upon me to research the DRE'S and decicde what would be best for our county financially and also from the voters aspect.

We have not picked a new system, but our Secretary of State is reviewing some now.

1. For the past 7 years viewed many demonstrations of various voting equipment.   2. Did comparison research of various voting systems   3. Contacted localities using a variety of voting systems in order to obtain a prospective as to actual use in the field   4. Arranged for local demonstrations by vendors   5. Made presentation to Board of Supervisors regarding equipment recommended by the Electoral Board and available funding.

township clerks and county clerk decide county wide one system

I attend every demonstration of voting systems that have been approved by the Secretary of State. I report to my Board who requests demonstrations at our locations. We consider the requirements of the state, the accuracy of the vote, the ease of voting for the voter, the ease of set up and demonstration for the poll worker, the cost for the taxpayer, the efficiency of reports.

I usually screen the systems and establish a wish list. I   usually try to narrow the choices to a few.

County Election Comm selects the voting system.

I'm not sure of the question. I'm the one who will determine the type of system we purchase.

I can only pass on to the Secretary of State any suggestion I   might have.

It is part of my job to follow laws and research what would be best for our town (population [number]) and present to other local officals.

I would provide my input to our 12-member Council of County Commissioners and the media for discussion and consideration.

I will be responsible for the final decision in my jurisdicition.

Appointed Election official with extensive technical and practical experience. Input provided via the Clerk's Association and the Secretary of State's office meetings.

I am the election authority in my jurisdiction and will be the main person to make the decision as to what direction this county will pursue

I am the highest election official so my opinion would be important in making a decision.

It is a decision that is primarily mine. As an elective official I consider four criteria crucial: accuracy; ease of use by the voters; recountability of every voters vote; & ease of use by election workers during the election.

Statutes state that the board of county commissioners actually purchase the equipment. This is a throwback to the "old days" when supervisors of elections were part-time, and more likely to be quiet unassuming women who deferred to the male commissioners. As I have purchased two systems in my 16 years here, in each case the commissioners accepted my recommendation and did exactly what I wanted them to do. In both cases I also had a 6-person citizens advisory board, with diverse representation to insure public buy-in.

I would report to the Town Board what is required and they would make the final decision.

A joint decision by the Board of County Cmmissioners and myself.

As election officials, we are contanly asked how to improve the system, how to make it's use easier, and how to streamline the state and federal requirements as they apply to our methnods of voting.

Our Commissioners approve whatever I propose because I give them as much information as I can. When I changed from central count to in precinct counters I had the vendor give a presentation. We are gradually moving to DREs and since they are with the same company using the same softwear it was an easy decision. It has all worked very well. November was the smoothest election we have had in over 10 years as well as the largest turnout. And we had no outside help.

final recommendation given to commissioners

I am the only person in our jurisdiction that has any background, knowledge or concern about the type of system usaed here so my influence would be a major factor in what system is pirchased.

Our voting system was state-ordered in 2000.

Overseeing purchase of machine strips and preparation of machines for election or refurundum

County Clerk in charge of all county, state and federal elections for this County.

The units were here when I was hired.e.

My office budgets for the voting machines. I will play a major role in this decision.

Leadership in collaborative effort

the auditors of North Dakota along with the Secretary of State of ND usually makes the decisions.

I investigated voting systems and made the recommendation based on my findings to our local board of supervisors.

My office is the only one that is in touch with the voting system (SOS, County Commissioners, machine distributors, etc)

final decision is mine, but I seek input from other staff members and other users nationwide

Budgets for purchasing are through the approval of the Board of Supervisors and this would be a collaboration with them.

We would determine our crederial we will use when we have our demo's by each vendor, when as them to come after they have submited the preposal from the RFP. Then we will give each a rating score and determine how they come from those destinated rater's

The system that is acquired has to be HAVA compliant and easy to use.

County commissioners would normally follow my recommendation if financially acceptable.

Chief Voting Official regarding all aspects of voting except voter registration

With the last system change we had a committee with these people who assisted us in the decision making process.

Recommendations to the Secretary of State Office.

Primary decision is up to me

I would review and report my findings to the other local officials.

I worked closely with our county commissioners. Looked at many systems thenmade a recommendation to the whole board.

Interim Election Supervisor, managing, evaluating, training, recommendations

Research, Review and Evaluate systems and make recommendation to the the Board of choice

State elected officials seek our local opinions and then weight those opinions against research done on state level.

The voting system in this County will depend on the cost, infrastructure feasibility, vendor support and my recommendation.

Should Chair the Committee for selection; it will be a Commissioners Court decision.

The state election division highly regards the input from the people who actually "put on" the elections both for counties and municipalities. As such, we work closely on what we see needs to be improved upon and make many suggestions which they act upon as necessary and as the law allows.

Reviewing options available and making recommendations to County Commissioners

North Dakota State has already made a state wide decision on what type of voting machines the whole state will be using by 2006. the imput to this decision was made by various parties as a joint effort.

I was one of eight who evaluated and selected the new voting equipment.

I will have seen all systems available and will make the recommendation to the County Commissioners.

The Election Commossioners listen to the reccomendations that I have. During our Early Voting process, a lot of the problems that might occur on Election Day occurs during that time. We sort of get an idea as to what is going to happen.

I will make the final decision.

I served on the North Dakota HAVA steerign committee

Part of the voting machine selection committee that will actually be selecting the machine

Being the supervisor of election for the City, the City Council would most likely follow my recommedation for instituting a voting system.

Georgia has state wide uniform DRE machines in all counties.   The Sec. Of State makes final decisions. I only saw several   displays from several companies. We have Diebold state wide.

To be informed about the laws and to be knowledgeable about the equipment.

Looking at voting systems and giving my opinion to my Chief   Clerk and County Commissioners. We will actually talk about   all the systems we view, and hopefully agree on what's best for our voters, based on accuracy, reliability and cost.

While my board makes the actual informed decision, they rely heavily on my judgment as Director and my years of experience with day-to-day and election-to-election concern for functionality.

The local Electoral Board normally makes this decision and allows me to provide my opinion.

I was present during the testing of all types of voting equipment. Testing was done by [University Name], [City Name], Ga.

We have no choise but to upgrade by 2006

Primary decision maker

After a thorough evaluation process, I would make the final recomendation to the Board of County Commissioners

I am responsible for the purchase, maintenance & upkeep of the voting equipment

My input will be on the local level, I am the chief election official in my town.

As chief election official, my input is crucial to designing   and implementing an election system.

I make the recommendation in my budget request that goes through an approval process, beginning with the Town Manager, to the Finance Committee and is finally voted at Town Meeting.

I had been requesting a new voting system for a number of years. In 1995, at the request of the Mayor, I drafted a memo describing why a new system was needed. Based on that memo, the Mayor decided that a new system was warranted. He then asked that I evaluate state-approved systems to determine what type of system the city should purchase. After evaluating the systems, I wrote another memo describing and rating systems on a variety of factors including ease of use by voters, ease of use by poll workers, accuracy of results, cost, storage, etc. Based on that memo, the Mayor and City Council arranged a demonstration of optical scanning systems. The public was invited to participate in the demonstration, as well as representatives of the Disabilities Commission. Since everyone was satisfied with the system, bid specifications were drawn up and circulated to approved vendors, and the bid awarded to the low-bidder.

I made the decision but the County Commissioners had to agree with me. The reason I selected the optical scan system was that [County Name] County had used this system for 10 years with good success.

I will have the vendors come to a workshop with Commissioners Court & the Election Commission (County Judge, Tax Assessor, County Clerk, Democrat & Republican Chairs)to present their product. I will point out pros & cons of each voting system that I see. I will make a recommendation to the court of which system I prefer and they will vote on my recommendation in the next Commissioners Court meeting.

I review any voting systems and see if they will work within our environment, and then make a recommendation to the governing body for approval.

The Clerk with the assistance of County Election Board, County Council decide what company to go with, it is a federal law which demands that ADA accessible machines to be purchased by 2006 for each polling place.

Knowledge of voting and presenting of machinery to the county commissioners.

My input would be whether we allow the secretary of state's office to select a DRE vendor or whether the county should make that selection.

Served on the State HAVA Committee in preparing our goals, definitions and needs.

using my past experience with voting machines, and knowing the concerns of my judges, and voters

as part of the Town Clerks Association in Ct my voice wuld be heard throught that organization

I OVER SEE THE ELECTIONS. I AM ALL THERE IS.

I review the systems and recommend to our local electoral board whether to request a demonstration. Together we will decide on a system to purchase.

By virtue of my elected position as Circuit Clerk, I serve on the appoining board and oversee absentee voting. That is my only participation in the voting process.

I am in charge of 34 precincts within the County. No decisions are made without my input.

I have reviewed all systems available to us (3) and made recommendations to the board which they most likely go along with.

I have to write the grants to try and secure the money for a new system. My election deputy has a great deal of input because she is the one that actually uses the system on a daily basis.

I recommend the system and budget for payment on approval of purchasing.

Reseach current literature; interface with vendors, state officials, and recognized experts; make a recommendation based on information gathered from all entities mentioned.

As [County Name] County Audidtor/Elections Administrator, my duties include budgeting for and conducting elections and advising the County Board in election matters. System changes are driven by HAVA and the type of systems that are certified in Minnesota, will be determined by the Secretary of State.

Evaluated the various systems submitted bids

i have no input

I usually let the Commissioner's know what kind of voting systems I'm interested in.

Task Force for Elections - Georgia

I advise the Board of Supervisors and do the leg work needed.

I viewed the Unilect touch screen system when it was demonstrated to theElectoral Board, who then made a Presentation to the Board of Supervisors. I had no furthur input.

As County Clerk and Registrar of Voters - I run the elections from preparations beginning in January to culmination following the General Election in November.

This question is too unrealistic. We are not about to change vendors. We picked our touchscreen machines prior to 2002 from the same vendor who supplies our other full face ballot DRE machines. Once you pick a vendor, you are "married" to him and you can't change unless you have millions of dollars laying around.

Convene task force of local officials to review and make recommendations on the type of system to be adopted.

Discussed with other officials using different systems.Checking out systems thouroughly and recommending to Commissioners.

I think the voting system needs to be dependable, accurate, and user friendly for the voters, especially the elderly and handicapped.

Research and report to Commissioners for a final decision

HAVA requirements are what will depend on the equipment I have to purchase in the upcoming years.

I would research and recommend to county board for final decision.

Was voted on at the Town Meeting.

I, as Circuit Clerk, only sat on appointing and canvassing board. I declined to be the absentee manager. Mrs. [Name] sat as absentee manager by appointment from presiding Circuit Judge. Mrs [Name] only serves this position and is not employed in any other office in the courthouse.

Since I am the clerk treasurer of my municipality I do all the investigating of systems. I would prepare a cost and performance analysis for my town board to make their decision. Since I work with the system all the time and they do not, they trust my suggestions.

None, decided by Election Board Commissioners

Was already in place when I was elected and I saw no reason to change

I recommend the selection and purchase of the system to the Board of Commissioners for their adoption.

Our county all has the same system, so municipalities opinions are all gathered in making a decision, but then the county makes final decision

My influence was paramount in the intial conversion from the old system. It will continue to have significant impact though with a slightly different and somewhat more polarized and political 'cast of characters' than before. The decision will be configured differnet also because we all now live within the context of a post '9/11 and post 'Florida' reality. Also the funding will be differently applied because of the HAVA Legislation requirements.

With the current officials, I am able to make decision based upon budget. Budget approval comes from Commissioner and if I did proper budget preparation and received approval, I do not have to go back for approval at time of purchase.

As Director I will make recommendations to my Board to test various types of equipment. Board will test. An RFP is then prepared by the County. Board makes decision and we seek funding from County Commissioners. County commissioners can only fund but have no say on the type of equipment.

Ultimately it is my decision and my budget for purchase of a voting system.

I BELIEVE THIS IS A FLAWED SYSTEM THAT MAKES IT EXTEMELY EASY FOR A PERSON TO VOTE IN DIFFERENT PLACES. DON'T MAKE THINGS SO CONFUSING AND DIFFICULT. ABSENTEE VOTING SHOULD BE MADE FOR PEOPLE WHO ABSOLUTELY CAN NOT MAKE IT TO VOTE ON VOTING DAY. PEOPLE USE IT BECAUSE THEY ARE JUST TOO LAZY.

Provide evaluation and process guidance to local electoral board based on experience. Provide info based on reasearch.

The local three person appointed Electoral Board make the final decision with my (as General Registrar) suggestions.

The County looks to me for recommendations as the Election Superintendent.

I am not sure how to answer this question. Our voting population is approximately [Number] - we are a very small county and completely satisfied with our hand counted paper ballots. We will consider voting machines when and if directed by the State Board.

At a local level for the central count, or precinct counters

I left the decision making to my election supervisor. Whatever system she wanted was fine with me.

191

I would be expected to address the issues related to ease of programming, testing, and use by precinct officials. I believe my opinion would be of importance to the board that would make the decision.

I would need to research and contact other clerks who are using the system the Town would be looking at purchasing and offer my findings to the Council.

key player in evaluating and selecting

Advisor to Citizens Evaluation Committee appointed by the County Commission. County Commission makes final decision.

In the absence of a mandate from the Secretary of State, the feds or courts, mine is the final decision.

This is being done on a State level not a local level

Selected vendor with Electoral Board, secured funding and purchased machines

Waiting for State to endorse system

I gather all information & present needs and possibilities to my Board of Selectmen. Together we come to consensus & decision. They are the fiscal agents. If a large expenditure is necessary we must put the item on the Town Warrant & bring the issue to Annual Town meeting. The Town votes to adopt our fiscal budget as proposed or with amendments.

One of three election officials in charge of elections.

If the reference is to choosing the system, I had no input. In Georgia, this decision was made at the state level -- for the entire state, in order that we would be uniform. I like the idea of uniformity. It has worked well in Georgia.

I gather information from vendors that is available at state and regional gatherings and will pull together an advisory group from the community to help with the decision

Will require a voter-verifiable, machine countable paper trail.

Since I am the County Clerk and Chairman of the County Board of Elections, I am responsible for all election duties in my county.

Town Clerk, member of Vermont Clerk's Association

I take part in the research/ "comparison shopping" and help the Clerk with her final decision. I also prepare the information that will be presented to the County Board for approval.

As election commissioner for my county I am charged with the responsiblity of meeting the requirements as set out by law but also to complete the work in a efficient, timely manner and cost effective. I make my decisions based off of these factors.

COUNTY CLERK, ELECTION ATHORITY, REVIEWING OPTIONS AND PRESENTING THEM BASED ON FINANCES TO THE COUNTY COMMISSION

Make recommendations to our Electoral Board

One of 4 appointed officials to make decision.

The local board and elected officials would request and listen to my input - I would have a lot of influence.

Let the public and Board know what the Federal and State are mandating.

Once the standards have been set, the State will let us know which machines are certified. If there is more than one choice to be made, I will inform my board which machine I think would be best for our needs and that we could afford.

The Virginia State Board of ElectionCommonwealth regulates and approves the usage of voting systems and equipmnet. Therefore, I am involved in all aspects of analyzing the voting systems (software, hardware, costs, etc.), selection, seeking local approval, Department of Justice approval, and all aspects of purchasing a voting system.

I work with the elected officials and help set up the balloting locale.

21st Centruty Voting Commission   Office of Georgia Election Officials Association

I have scheduled demonstrations of machines for my Electoral Board and have sat in on all meetings with my Board, my County Administrator and adjacent County personnel who attended.

I have the final say.

Do the survey for handicapped accessibility of the polling site.

There has been no decision to change the local voting system. Any change will come at the requirement of the state or federal government. I control the set up of the polling place and how it is manned.

My three member electoral board has the official authority to decide what equipment is purchased. However, their role is more oversight in my jurisdiction resulting in me having a great deal of influence in which equipment is purchased. The county governing body must approve funds to purchase equipment so both the electoral board and the general registrar are at their mercy when requesting funds. The integrity of elections process hinges on what funding the county governing body whishes to approve despite the professional opinion of the electoral board or the general registrar.

my final decision

I am the sole person in charge of the elections, the elected officials have made no indication that they will change anything in the near future, there have been paper ballots for the last 80 years since the incorporation of the Village

The county recorder and I would be the person to make the recommendation to the county board if we were to purchase our own system. The chances of our changing our voting system is not likely.

I have reviewed a number of voting systems along with the Electoral Board and have expressed my opinion to them.

As a result of HAVA, the hand count system we have always used will be replaced by some sort of optical scan ballots. Since the State will be providing the funding for the equipment, the type and numbers we receive will be largely be dependent on how the State decides to best spend the HAVA money.

A member of our Board served on the state selection panel for the system that was adopted in SC

Our system was selected because the company presented the best customer service by having an agent in this state, our purchase was piggybacked off another county RFP and both counties recieved a $5,000 discount per tabulation machine. This was the only system certified by our state at the time of purchase. It was totally my decision but the options were limited.

The decision was made by my staff, myself and a poll of the election judges who will be overseeing the use of the new equipment.

Responsible for helping draft bids and RFP's.

Meetings were held where we were asked our opinions about what we needed the system to do for us.

Have vendors demonstrate equipment, price estimates, voters test machines, media

A voting member of the Clerk's Association in the local County.

As a member of the HAVA State Plan Commission, I have some input, and as a pilot county for the precinct scanners, I have some input.

Responsible for the assessment of the accuracy of the voting system and would be responsible for evaluating other systems and requesting necessary bugetary appropriations.

I am Town Clerk and Registrar of Voters for a small town. All functions are performed by me and my staff. We make recommendations to the Board of Selectmen.

None, the system was purchased by the state.

State and Federal mandated

recommended electronic voting based on problems with ol lever machines.

As the Election Officer, I would make recommendations to the County Commissioners who are responsible for the financing of the equipment.

I have appointed a task force to look at equipment who will report their findings. I will make a recommendation to our board of supervisors, who will make a decision, most likely based on my recommendation.

We would like to have our voting system, user friendly in everyway possible

I am the Town Clerk, and it would be my responsibility to make sure voting is done fairly and accurately.

The type of system that our county will purchase before the HAVA   mandated datae of 01/01/06 will depend on what system PA will   certify. That will not happen until fall of 05.

As Commissioner of Elections, I will work closely with my Elections Manager to determine what system we will recommend after the certification process has been finalized at the federal and state levels. We will make a recommendation to the Board of Supervisors, which must approve funding.

I would make recommendations to the Board and give them the necessary information to make that decision.

I will make a recommendation to our Board of Supervisors

Statutorily responsible for purchase, maintenance and operation.

I requested a study on voting systems, was one of several people to review the study, reviewed the Request for Proposals, and assisted in the ranking of vendors.

I am the town Clerk/Treasurer of [City Name] Vermont. I do all the review and pricing of required machinery, etc. We happened to already have had in place AccuVote that is required by State/HAVA.

Review vendors   Recommend compliant systems

Because I am the one who ultimately conducts the Election it is important that I understand what type of equipment is being considered for use as I will be the one to train those individuals running the equipment. Cost to the County is also a factor that I look at.

I have an input based on research and discussion with the Elected Registrar and his Staff. The Elected Registrar makes the final decision.

These decisions will be made at the State level, not the local level.

Sole authority

advisory recommendation to Commissioners

The decision would be made by the County Commissioners and they would be guided by my recommendations.

Recommend to the board of county commissioners what to purchase.

We have been looking for new voting equipment for about 5 years and have looked at just about every system available.

Memberof Secretary of State's advisory board for implementation   of HAVA.

COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW

I AM THE LEAD ELECTION SUPERVISOR

Member of State Planning Team - Board Member of Utah Association of Counties

No decision has been made as of yet

Evaluate systems and make recommendation

I research and recommend the system to the County Commission

State Election Equipment all of State of Georgia

I am on state committees that helped determine the equipment that we have chosen state wide and our local entity has relied on my judgement. Our Secretary of State and Auditor's Association have an excellent working relationshsip and between the two entities we jointly decide what is best for our voters, as well as us.

I advise the county commissioners on what works in our county and what doesn't. I attend all voting conferences held before elections to keep up on the new laws & etc. I work with the election process day in and day out during election time so I know first hand what would work in our county for us.

Just to make suggestions

All local clerks will vote for one system, then the County clerk will make the final decision.

HAVA (Help America Vote Act) mandates what type(s) of voting systems can be used. Making a choice from this limited field is fairly simple; we want a system that will successfully "supplement" our existing system.

I would give the Electoral Board my thoughts, experience as a REgistrar, and ideas of all voting systems currently being used.

I studied the sytems and made a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners for purchase - per statute

To try out the equipment and let the Committee know what I think.

Based on the fact that the type of equipment impacts greatly on how elections are run, Town Clerk's in conjunction with our Associations have worked consistently to remain as much involved as they are allowed to help decide what procedures and equipment will be used in our elections.

Purchasingh equipment & supplies

The Board of Elections input would be very valuable in the decision making process to upgrade our current voting system. This office is responsible for mailing out absentee ballots and tabulating election results, therfore we have first hand experience in dealing with any problems the current system   may have. I have found the Optech System we currently use to be very accurate. The memory packs retain all voting information and the machine tape provides a paper trail in the event of a recount. Although HAVA provides that all precincts have one touch tone screen by 2006 there have been a lot of problems associated with these machines and many communities   faced lawsuits because of an inability to provide a paper trail during recounta. I think the Optech system has worked very well for our city.

I will be the final decision maker in what system is purchased for the County. The State will make the decision as to what system they wish to place in the County.

Non whatsoever

As an election official, I base it on cost, need and requirements as set forth in law. I handle the budget that funds this equipment if not state funded.

I will be the front person on this decision

I will be bringing in vendors to display their systems to my Commissioner Court and then they will decide what they want.

Make final recommendations

I am the County Clerk and work closest with the election judges, clerks and voters. Therefore, I see and hear of any problems with or suggestions to improve the voting system.

The Electoral Board and I cooperate with the County Officials, depends on finance, etc.

We will know when the time comes and the reasons for change. We use old paper ballots and for this small town they work well. WE don't lose ANY votes.

18 YEARS EXPERIENCE WITH A SYSTEM THAT WORKS WELL--PAPER BALLOTS COUNTED BY HAND--TOWN POP [Number]

Issue RFP, evaluate, and purchase in accordance to federal and state laws

Attended demonstrations of many touch screen voting systems. Talked to each vendor extensivly. Read all materials regarding the different systems. Tested equipment in elections. Held a a meet/greet/test for City Councilors. Held a mock election for the Chamber of Commerce.

i will lead the way.

I will be responsible for contacting vendors, setting meetings with commissioners,officials, and etc. I'm sure   I will be quized as to the system that I prefer.

My election commission members have appointed me to do the research and make a recommendation to the county commission and they will support it. I have been researching the different systems for over 2 years now, because we will have to change in '05.

I am an election commissioner. I assume our commission would sign off on any decision.

very impressed when first introduced and usedMV 464 we lease and purchased one per year for early voting then countywide

Review, questions, demonstrations, evaluating, and making recommendation to the board members. The Director and Deputy Director and staff had input for a new system but the punch card was done prior to any of us working at the board office.

Attended meetings to preview possible machines, then gave my opinion.

Providing background data and recommendations to our Board of Commissioners on the type of system to be purchased.

Overall guidance for the selection process, but no actual influence or vote in the selection process.

Technical advisor to Board of Elections

review all voting systems and recommend

Appointed to GA's 21st Century Vote Commission, which selected GA's new system. Member of GA's Election Task Force, which works closely with the SOS in election reform. Former President of the Georgia Elec. Offic. Assoc.

I will submit factual information to the Board for their review in the decision of the purchase of voting equipment.

When viewing and testing the voting machines currently in use, it is important to see how each functions and relay this to my board for consideration. And the market price.We have [Number] precincts, and just for those [Number] it will cost almost One Hundred Thousand Dollars.

The Registrars of Voters actually purchase/lease the machines. I do have input but the final decision is theirs.

As I am the director of elections for our county, my opinion matters a lot.

I am a town clerk and all voting materials and machines are budgeted through my office.

As County Election Officer I would need to make the decision and present it to the Board of County Commissioners for their approval of the purchase

Providing information on demonstrations and testing.

I was involved with the local board members during the entire process and was able to ask questions and make suggestions during the process.

It would have to be a system that myself and staff are comfortable working with and one that has been proven to be reliable and easy to operate by the public. Also should be one that we can program in house.

Very little. State of RI Board of Elections and Secretary of State's Office make the decisions. Our elections in RI are managed on the State level, not local level. (Referred to as "Title 17)

All parties would listen to my recommendation.

Report my thoughts/concerns to the Board of Elections

I prepared the RFP and presented the Board of County Commissioners with the bids. I was happy with ES&S as my former counting center.

Local elected offical

It would depend upon the current Board of Elections members and the county coss.

I can recommend a system.

I am the sole election authority in my county thus I make all final decisions and use other authorities for valuable information.

evaluate & recommend purchase to governing body

Recommend systems and analyse the cost/efficiency ratio

Whatever the state recommends as acceptable

I have full responsibility provided sufficient funding is mavailable. Then county commissioners approve my recommendation and funds.

I make all decisions regarding the type of voting system used. The County Commissioners must approve the funds for purchasing new equipment. They are very cooperative and usually authorize my purchases unless it's an unusual burden on the taxpayers.

Write the request for proposals, assemble evaluation team, schedule public hearings, maintain public relations, track funding

Selection of vendors for product review and testing   Preparation of Request For Proposals   Recommendation for purchase to Board of Elections and County Commissioners

I always put the voters of my county first.

Because we were a punch card county and the DRE systems had still not been certified in my state, that left the optic scan type of balloting possible. I asked for demonstrations as well as bids from two types of systems that had been certified in my state and also sought observations and recommendations from present users of the systems demonstrated. My research and observations as well as seeking the bids were solely my responsiblity and made my decision based on the above.

Must comply with Federal and State mandates. Florida has only 3 certified vendors for voting equipment.

North Dakota Secretary of State held meetings where all counties were informed of available options. All county auditor's were in the decision making

As election superintendent I can only recommend. Funding is a major role which comes under the heading of the COunty governing authority. The state purchased our new equipment thru the State Funding and Hava funding. Otherwise, Voting equipment here in my county has not changes in over 30 years. We were due for a change. And the voters loved the new equipment was quick to learn the new system. I have had very little negative comments on our new system.

It was between the Director, Deputy Director and Board Members

Researched voting systems, tracked the state certification process for voting systems, scheduled demonstrations that involved elected officials, public, disabled community, election officals,etc., participated in the selection process, negotiated a voting machine contract on behalf of the Electoral Board when their selection was made, and worked with the Financial Department for my jurisdiction through the purchasing process.

We work one on one with the vendor and will comply with state regulations by 2006

Evaluation and recommendation of the type for this jurisdiction to purchase.

I had coosen to go with the optical scan system after problems with a punch card optical scan system that did not work well for [County Name] County in 2000. Since this was a punch cards sytem we still fell into the catagory of full funding from HAVA for the optical scan system. The board of supervisors went with my recommendations after research on voting systems on the market.

Town Clerk, Chief Election Official, it would be my recommendation to the BOS for all equipment necessary to ensure the proper balloting procedures be carried out in the most efficient and cost effective manner necessary to comply with current Election laws and Federal laws overlooking elections.

It has always been the decision of the County Clerk. The county commissioners fund the purchase, but do not get involved in the decision.

As Town Clerk, I have no control over machines used. the two Registars of Voters in the Town control this area of the election process.

I assist the Electoral Board in researching and selecting the DRE to meet the HAVA requirements.

My position is Supervisor of Elections within the County. I would be restricted by money available. County Commissioners are aware of the possibilities and would be consulted. However, I am the one who would decide what vendor to use for our county.

I will make my recommendation to the County Clerk, who will then make his recommendation to the County Board who will then make the final decision.

State chooses what kind of system, I help pick the vendor.

The Secretary of State for Nebraska will be making the decisions about the new voting system - I feel I have very little input

I do not have much say in the purchase of new voting machines, I can suggest to the Town Board, but it is their decision.

Mine is the final decision

I assist the local elected officials in making the decision

With the current system, we tested four different systems, and made the recommendation with county board of elections to county commissioners to purchase. Had surveyed other users for recommendation. Was State approved.

I am the town manager and I am responsible for the budget of the town. Any new system that would be put in place would strongly be supported by me.

We have been mandated by the Secretary of State's Office to implement optical scan voting devices by Novemver 2005. The choice of vendor must be made by February 2005. We have a choice of 2 vendors at this point.

I give input to the elected state secretary of state even though that person currently listens to no one. At the end of the day, local options can only be selected within the range of those systems ultimately certified for use by the state.

Our moving to a new system is ONLY due to Federal & State laws mandating us to do so. BUT since we must move forward, I have the authority to recomend the vendor, the State chose the system.

Will most likely be done on the state level

None. It will be determined by HAVA and State Election Officials and mandated to the local communities.

explain how the process works and would make the decision accordingly

Presented to Board of Commissioners. They approve or dis-approve

We had the company to held an election in one of our precincts before we purchased our voting system.

I researched the two available/authorized dealers in Mass. Had presentations on both, weighed functions, ease of use and cost of system - chose a system. Asked Town Meeting for funding of that system.

I am the City Clerk in charge of the implementation and operations of election within the municipality. Upon my recommendation to the seven member elected City Council new optical scan machine were purchase in July 2004

Since this office would be responsible for the use and storage of any voting system in place, we would need to make those who are responsible for making the ultimate decision what advantages or disadvantages each voting system possesses and how, in our opinion, the voters of the county would accept or reject its use.

I don't know at this time however, I believe that I, along with other members of our office will be checking out all voting systems and making recommendations.

It will be my decision to purchase a system as provided by the Secretary of State

We had no choice. It was mandated by the State Election Board.

Our officials went to other counties and observed our current system before we decided to implement the same system.

As Chairman of the Board of Elections I am in charge of the election process in [County Name] County. Except for the mandate from the Ga Secretary of State to implement our current system, the decision as to the voting-system to use is the board's responsibility with the approval of the county commissioners.

Requested funds through the budgetary process to purchase existing machines.

i will assisst the board of supervisors relating to easy of use of system, cost and recommendation of all factor above

We are a vote by mail state, we would upgrade our current system as technology improves or if the machine begins to not function efficiently.

The State of Montana Secretary of State approves the voting manchines which can be used in Montana. Because the County voted with hand counted paper ballots I wanted to advance the technology of the process but still have to voter comfortable using a ne process, therefore I felt the optical scan precinct counters were the most user friendly but would make it easier and quicker for the election judges.

As a Town Clerk, I would be directly affected as to how the vote total is achieved. Also, we are responsible for the actual creation of the ballot itself, ballot strips, sample ballots, etc., and the layout might be affected depending on the type of voting used. At this point, CT has gone out for an RFP for electronic voting machines, with a voter verified receipt. The goal is for November 2005 municipal election will have at least one electronic machine in every district.

AS Supervisor of Elections I would be responsible for recommending a system for purchase and implementation. The Board of County Commissioners would vote to accept the recommendation and fund the purchase.

It will be totally at my discretion with the funding to be provided by HAVA and the County Board

I was elected and took office in 2003. I have only conducted one election. I do not have enough experience or knowledge to have any input.

I put together information + present to County Board

Correspondence to local and state officials

As chairman of our county electoin commision. I feel I needed to look at all systems I could and make my decision after doing so

Higly recommended scanner w/ paper trail

I would reccommend to the Board of Select persons a new voting system. They in turn would make a reccomendation to the townspeople to approve at town meeting

As being clerk and having to work with voting machines + admenstating elections. I had a lot of input into who we purchased from.

I am municipal clerk

Presenting systems to county board of comissioners for approval for purchase

I am chairman of a 3 person county election comm. Jointly, we approve all aspects of the county-city-school elections, subject to state/federal laws.

The State of Connecticut Election Division is the decision making Department. This fall they will be suppling all towns one electronic voting machine per district.This is also in conjunction with the Registrar of Voters and Town Clerks Input.

From a day to day basics, working with voting procedures.

I am the elected Election Official for this County. It is my duty to oversee all aspects of the elections. My duties include following all state and federal laws in conducting elections. I also have a duty to the local voters to manage all elections efficiently while staying financially feasible. I will research all aspects of voting equipment and request input from everyone concerned or affected by election equipment changes, but ultimately the final decision is mine to make as long as it is made within the laws and the County finances.

The system must be reliable. The system must be easy for the voter to use. The system must give he voter confidence in giving accurate results. The ballots must be able to be recounted, if necessary. Licensing fees for hardware and software must be reasonable and predictable. Availability for maintenance, parts, software must be more than adequate. The system must be able to adapt to changes in technology and new election laws. The system must perform simple accuracy tests. Reports and data must be readily available, easy to accumulate and report, and various reports must agree with one another. Software for programming ballot styles and/ or programming election night reports must adapt to changing needs at nominal costs.

Town clerk handles elections

I feel like I had a great influence in the purchase of these machines, however, the final say is the board members of the [County Name] County Board of Elections.

None whatsoever. The state implemented this system all on its own.

Review and recommend

The state has picked the type of voting system we are to have-   we will only have a choice in the vendor we choose.

I choose the system based on input from different vendors, demonstrations of different machines and the amount of funding I would receive from the HAVA funds

I made my recommendations on our current voting system based on the need to update, funding available, ease of use for voters and dependability of the system for accuracy. (And it's the only system that has been approved by the State of Illinois for use - other than punch card.)

Letter of recommendation/required a competative bid.

In our State, the County Board of Supervisors have final authority on which type to buy, however, as the Auditor and Commissioner of Elections, they give much weight to my recommendation.

I research the system and the Co Fisical Court takes the recommendations of the Co Clerk (me). The Fiscal Court purchases the system.

They make these decisions at the state level.

I will gather info from the voting machine company that my state election office has approved. Then the local election commission and myself will decide which system best fit our needs.

The state alone will decide.

No input at all, this town has used level machines since the 1940'2 with little or no problems.

Hand-counted system. Only [Number] residents in this town. Will not be changing unless laws require so.

run the machine/explain

Only input will be to adhere to federal & state requirements.

The county commission will follow my lead based upon: $Price, Operability, compliance to HAVA

This is never my final decision - however. I am always available for input.

Our suggestions are well respected by our state leaders - They welcome our input.

I feel the lever machines are very accurate

I am the village clerk - all info flows through me to council with my recommendations

As clerk for the town of [City Name] I had very little input with the decison making process for a voting system for our town. The only choice I and the town board had to make was to chose between paper ballots and optical scan. The county board of supervisors, and clerk of [County Name] County, WI made the decision to purchase Acuvote for countywide use with towns, villages and cities to pay the cost of individual units. The county purchased the central tabulating unit. Each precinct sends results by modem.

I am a town clerk, these decisions would be made by the Registrars of Voters and the Secretary of State's office

As Deputy City Clerk, I am responsible for most aspects of the voting hardware and software, so the City Clerk does consider my input to a great degree.

I make the final decision

Lousiana Secretary of State purchases & owns election equipment

We're told the state wants voting machines by Jan. 2006

As town clerk, I am also the supervisor of elections and have to make sure all machines are tested, maintained and running properly for each election

Will use what is provide

On a committee to implement HAVA (HAVA American Vote Act) at state level

Township clerks in this county, along with county clerk, make decisions together.

As a clerk responsible for elections, I will make recommendations to the township board concerning the types of systems and equipment available and associated costs.

Georgia mandated DREs for all counties. We really don't have a choice

I'm also the warden and if I felt the current system was inadequate, then I would confer with the selectmen to update.

My office is in charge of administration of elections in the County. My input will be the final decision with any or all election issues

I will make any decisions for voting systems. I must ask for funding from the Board of County Commissioners, but if I have a need for equipment, I have never been turned down.

Our new voting system was State mandated by the SOS

I viewed demonstrations of several vendors and decided which was easiest for the poll workers and the voters. Was left up to us by Board of Supervisors, because of knowledge of what was needed and useful.

I would be instructed to research approved methods and present to select men at a local level. If the state mandates a particular piece of equipment then I would have no influence.

I favor the lever voting machines. They are dependable, will work if power fails and are the least tamper proof system available. I would suggest they be made of lighter weight materials.

I surveryed possible systems that had been approved by NSAID and the State Board of Elections for use in VA. I organized the Local Elec. to become part of the decision making process and together we approached out City Council who made the final decision on the equipment purchased and advanced the funds necessary to buy. Voters and advocacy groups were asked to evaluate the equipment before the request went to City Council.

Someone who knows the voters of the County and what will work in a rural area.

County Board usually takes my advice or recommendation

Our very small town approx. [Number] voters functions just fine. Of course if state or federal laws deems other methods, we would comply

I fell this would be made at the state level. I'm sure there would be some input from different groups of interest, but I think the final decision would be the State Election Board

Count the votes

I am the clerk's apointee to the state committee who is looking into new machines

As the elected official and election supervisor, my influence is a large part of the final decision which will be based on financial avalibility

None

I am a state elected official, (circuit clerk of the courts) at the county level. Our association of state wide circuit clerks is a strong association. However our duties include being one of three election officials in our own county. We as an association make reccomentations to the Sec. of State. Who is the state election offial. Clerks also handle the absentee voting of each county

The system was here when I was elected 5 years ago. It works great - 0% problems. I would look to state officials for advice if a new system was necessary

CEO of Elections for county.

Town Clerk in charge of operations & setup for elections in conjunction with moderator.

I would be the one doing the research into a new system and the purchase would be made at my recommendation.

None, the Secretary of State made the decision.

Recommendation to fiscal court. Fiscal court would have final say.

Equipment was purchased by sec of state, approved and funded by general assembly - no decisions at county level.

I work with judge + commissioners on decisions that are best for our county + voters

Federal government is implementing this program HAVA Helping all Americans to vote equally

Elected City Clerk

I was not a part of the process to select our current system

We are wainting for the state legislature to make a decision on new machines & who will have control of the process

I am an elected City Clerk and I am very impressed with our optical scan units. They have proved 99% accurate on municipal recounts five times we have recounts. The City seems very pleased with them.

I'm County Election Commissioner for Republican Party. All three of us will have an impact on any new system of voting.

I would be actively involved in evaluating and purchasing the equipment

joint decision with all counties

Attend meetings/demonstrations and discuss systems with the Electoral Board. They listen but have the final determination.

I am a newly elected Town Clerk that has only been part of the 2004 election process. I am new at this and would take the adivice of the BCA in Town

As the head election official in the County I will make the final decision as to the type of equipment purchased.

The state of Ohio has decided(Secretary of State) has decided that the state will use the Opitical Scan System. We have no problem with this selection

I am ultimately responsible for the elections in my jurisdiction. That responsibility derives from the state constitution.

As the secretary to the Election Board, we invited vendors, other counties, our Commissioners and Council members and a blind couple to view voting machines. After the demo, our Council selected the Commissioners and myself to narrow the vendor list down to 2. We did that and then after another demo before the Council and Commissioners narrowed it down to one vendor. We have proceeded with that vendor to purchase DRE machines for the polling places and Optiscan for absentee.

Current paper ballot system has been in place from beginning, now, due to Federal Law, State of NE is implementing new system. State is in control, but has sought County Election Official input.

I am the director of the County department that administers elections and we are the owners and managers of all election equipment in the County.

Discussion with selectmen about what is good for the town.

I have total control concerning the type system used in my election jurisdiction.

We do whatever the Secretary of State tells us to.

Have discussions with Election Administrator and Board of County Commissioners regarding purchasing of equipment.

The County Clerks in Idaho are working with the Secretary of State to decide what system to use. I am also a member of the State Committee for HAVA.

Registrar of Voters

I do what I'm told to do by the State Government.

The decision will be made by local elected officials based on approvals from the Secretary of the state.

The decision of what company to purchase the "Second Chance Voting Equipment" from is largely my responsibility. Of course, it will have to go out for bids.

It is my decision on determining what voting system will be utilized. My decision will be based on equipment that is compliant with all applicable laws/regulations.

After reviewing all systems, I would recommend the one I felt would best fit our needs. My Commissioners would make the final decision.

county clerk

We have already purchased our voting system. We formed a review committee that reviewed all the vendors. We then had an open house for the public and advocates to vote on which selection they preferred.

I will have influence on the type of system that is bid and on the purchase recommendation.

I'm responcible for the elections in [County Name] County, so most all of the decisions are mine. We do share the equipment with the School and the City, so when it comes to purchasing new we'll decide together. Since the federal elections are done by the County, we make sure we have the most up to date and efficient equipment possible.

Each county is currently responsible for their own system. That system is purchased usually 100% by the County Clerk.

30 years of experience in the election process

I normally make recommendations to the county commissioners who are the responsible party. In the past they have accepted my recommendations based on my research and that of other counties. The state recommendations do come into play.

I am in charge of running all state and federal and local elections.

Research all options, make recommendation to County Board of Supervisors.

I recommend purchases of this kind to the Town Board for approval.

I serve ex officio supervisor of all primary, general and special elections for all state, county, city, school, hospital, fire, cemetery, water, sewer, port, park & rec, and PUDs. As such, I am very involved in the decision-making process in [County Name] County.

I make the recommendation to the Town Board

Currently I am the only one that knows how to run the optical scan so my input is very important to the process.

Vendors presented information at a vendor fair. County Auditors were asked for their recommendations. The federal requirement for electronic voting machines will be in place for the 2006 elections. The State of South Dakota will choose one type of machine for the whole state.

As Chairman of the Board of Elections and County Clerk, I recommend to the Fiscal Court what needs to be changed in voting procedures or purchases that need to be made.

[Sentenced Removed for Identifiable Information] We purchased a product called ELEX. Our exit polling during the 1st election held with these machines indicated as follows: 85% great, 13% OK, 2% didn't like them. Our judges loved the DRE's because it made their job easier. Our candidates loved the DRE's because we got results for them quicker. We offset the cost of the DRE's because by saving on the cost of paper ballots and we eliminated the cost of the counting crews that counted the paper ballots in our [Number] precincts. This translates into at least 24 election workers we did not have to pay. A win, win situation.

input only as an eleceted official.

Recommendations   Joint with registrar of voters after guidelines from S.O.T.S. recieved

I attend all demonstrations and along with county clerk will help determine which machines will be purchased.

No Input -- Small Town -- Cost is No. 1 Deterent.

The state Elections Board makes that decision.

I put together the entire election process from gathering ballot clerks, All the paper work pre election, the day of, & post election. It would be my job to seek criteria on voting machines & recommend choices for budgeting.

Since I am responsible for the voting process, I am the person responsible for printing, setting, placing machines. I am where the "buck stops". T and the fiscal court, who pay for the voting system, have the final say.

I am the Election Administrator for [County Name] County, Montana. Mostly dollars dictate the the type of system we have. Our county is very rural, we only have approximately [Number] voters. I don't see that the county will ever change from the paper ballot count, however HAVA will force the DRE

The selectman take my recommendations.

Member of County Election Commission responsible for operation & maintenance; responsible for operation of election.

I will have the opportunity to set up and view all available voting systems with the assistance of my co-worker. We will be the only ones with that knowledge.

Town Clerk -- oversee all aspics of elections

Prior to 2004 I made the decision on what kind of products we used. We spent $170,000 of Township money to buy our PBC in 2000. Our PBC are the most cost effective, accurate and user frendly counters. After 2004 the State made the decision and choose Optical scan which are much more expenseive to operate and have just as many issues as other systems. We will be also using DRE for challanged voters. We will be operating two systems which is where the inspectors will have more difficulty. The issue facing the election community is not equipment, rather what we expect from election inspectors and how complicated election have become. We have no imput.

The State Board of Elections mandates to all local boards

Little input. We had a choice of one of two systems both Optical Scan Precinct Count. We like what we have, DRE and we are forced to go backward.

I am the chief election official -- I will do the research and know my voters very well, so I will make the correct decision on their behalf.

My Parish alone would have very little impact but out, state association would & should have considerable impact.

I have no impact. It is decided by the state election board in conjunction with the state legislature who provides the funds.

Have had none at this point. I'm a newly elected township clerk.

None -- Policy set by Secretary of State

I would reccomend the system and decide when to recommend. We have to pick from vendors allowed by secretary of state. Either the Selectmen or the voters would have the final say.

Very little. Small township

As township clerk, reommend any changes to township election commission that would make recommendation to township board. Township board makes final decisions & approprates funding.

I will be the sole decision maker.

We follow county clerks recommendation

Very little, county makes decision

I have at maximum [Number] voters

I have authority to choose system for our municipality. We have a cooperation agreement w/ state Division of Elections to use their equipment for local elections, so it makes sense to save money by doing so, get their guidance and follow their lead.

Local governments know how to best carry out elections for their area and population and what is wanted by local voters.

The State Election Board officials will make the decision on what type of system the counties will use.

The Secretary of the State's Office would purchase a machine for us now, but we would have the expense of programming. There is a lot of distrust of machines . . .

Consulted with county comissioners, explained HAVA requirements, demonstrated optical scan equipment, explained I liked that there was a paper ballot in case of a contest.

Opinion based upon experience.

With a population of [Number] people, hand paper ballots have worked very well for us.

I belong to our county clerk's association. This group chose a committee to search out different optical scan voting machines. On their recommendation our entire county chose the same optical scan machine.

[County Name] County elected officials feel like we have no choice or input concerning implementation of HAVA laws. We have the purest most accurate form of voting system. We are a very small county with probably no chance of growing larger. The cost (even with funding) is ridiculous. There should be waivers for smaller counties.

Expressing opinions at county level meetings on elections. The County prints ballots, counts ballots, and will be the seat of registration.

I will work with the election commission to seek the best system for the voters of our county.

I am in charge of organizing the process used by this county to purchase new voting machines.

I would do my research and present it to my select board as a recommendation. We are a small town. Paper ballots work for us and are accurate!

If we were to change to another type of voting, I am the administrative assistant to the board of selectmen and as such, we have to work together on decisions. Few from the public sector could have input also as we are a small town.

Our systems are state owned and selected. As a past regional coordinator, I can help on the selection of systems if I have the time to devote.

Small town paper ballots work well.

As county election supt. I really have no input in the type of system we would use, this is done on state level

I receive the bids and analyze the features - recommend to fiscal court

We will choose systems.

I am superintendent of elections.

The election superintendent is responsible that all things are ready for election day.

I can state my case to the selectmen or to the citizens at town meeting.

Voting Machines are the way

I collect the information on different systems then make recomendations to the County Commissioners who have to appove the purchase.

Having vendors some and demonstrate DRE's to county judge, commissioners, party chairs, local city and school officers so that a decision be reached as to what vendor we purchase from.

I promote idea for modernization-not for financial savings.

We really don't need the new system it will cause a lot of precincts to one polling place.

Not much - our registrar of voters are who take care of running the elections and the voting machines!

I would ask for voting system that would be helpful to our elderly and uneducated citizens of [County Name] County. Any system that is easy to use would guarantee a large voter turn-out at the polls

I am the Town Clerk - The Town Board makes final purchasing decisions.

Research, choose, & purchase

County Auditors have worked closely with the Secretary of State and a state HAVA coordinator to provide uniform equipment in every polling location in the state

The system we have now was purchased by the State of GA under the influence of the Secretary of State making GA the 1st state to have one voting system used statewide. As superintendent of Elections we were able to see a demonstration at the election conference from different vendors.

None   Regulated by State

I will present different options to my board and give my opinion, as well as the opinion of election workers and town residents.

I have researched nearby towns and contacted vendors along with speaking with selectmen and town manager leads me to believe the hand counting of ballots will remain in place unless federally mandated to change.

As the Town Clerk in [City, State], I am in charge of all ballots (ordering, etc.), setting up of machines, swearing in of Election Day officials, mechanics and storing of machines. I work hand in hand with the Registrars of Voters and the First Selectman of the Town.

Spoke with vendors, attended demonstrations, spoke with other communities using the equipment already. Recommended to Town Manager the equipment I thought was best

It has to be also by the County Commissioners and their attorney and County Council and their attorney

All townships will make a decision County-wide as to which voting system to use

Only those with personal experience should have any influence

I serve on 3 member commission. We will give our recommendation to state and county officials as to which system we prefer.

My local board will allow me alot of leeway, & unless legislation makes a law to change, we will so with what I think.

Since I'm the person in charge, and see how effectively our paper ballots work, it would take a lot of convincing to show me a better way for our town.

decision made by the town board

the state authorizes systems. We choose from the authorized list.

As Town Clerk I have seen and used demonstrator machines at conferences. I can and will make reccommendations to town officials if state mandate to change comes through.

The voting system was already in place when I came on board. It is a very efficient and clear way of voting in our town.

currently hold city clerk position, would recommend to council if needed

I'm responsible for recommending the best voting equipment available at an equitable price.

As town clerk my input would be very respected.

[County] county all went with Accuvote System reccommended by [county] county clerk

Chairman Co. Board of Elections

I AM A TOWNSHIP CLERK AND HAVE RAN ELECTIONS FOR 32 YRS. I STARTED WITH LEVER MACHINES, SWITCHED TO PUNCH CARD AND THEN OPTI SCAN WE ARE USING NOW.

None- it was decided @ the county level a few years ago- now state mandated

I am the registrar for out county and assist the parties + election commission iwth all elections. I would hope they would listen to me and what I say considering I am the one who deals with it.

I had full control in choosing the OptiEasle

recommendation on equipment purchase

Correctness; Easy to understand; quick for voters; forgivable - easy to correct errors

All persons who are in charge of each county election board will be consulted.

Small town most questions not appropriate

Chairman of Election Commission

I have very little input as to the type system we will use.

The County Election Commission can make recommended changes to the quorum count. As yet, we do not feel we have found another system that would improve our current system or reduce costs to the county.

I receive training and coordinate the elections in our township of [Number] population

I make the recommendation to the Board of Supervisors as to the system and the financing of that system.

I only make requests at the State's recommendation.

Possibly obtain quotes

The state or federal laws tell us what our options are. I make all local decisions within the law.

State Election Board does the deciding on the voting system

Supervisory and active participant

Ease of testing, preparation + setup   Security of vote, ability to recount votes   Easy voter usage

I will review pertinent information along with registrars of voters and make recommendation.

As a Town Clerk-Not much influence!

Would consider all information and try to make the best choice with the information available.

Basically the town board + County Board of Elections make most of the decisions with Democratic + Republican parties input regarding election inspections. I try to work closely with all involved making sure machines are in good repair.

County wide decision

I believe the 1st select man in our town has a great deal of respect for me as Town Clerk and for my opinion regarding elections, machines and materials and the whole process.

Chairman, county election commission - state will decide which system(s) will be approved for use

I would investigate & view the different systems and make recommendations for purchase &/or lease.

Being a clerk of court all we do is make recommendations to the secretary of state

State level will decide

Recomend type of machines to be used

If the people that want all these changes had to deal with the elections they would change their minds. They have no idea what goes on in our side of dealing with elections.

I WILL BE THE ULTIMATE INFLUENCE AFTER CONSULTING WITH MANY PEOPLE.

I am the chief election official, for this reason I have the most power in the decision making process because I work with the equipment.

It is up to the board of selectment per state statute.

It is my responsibility to research the voting system options, evaluate their cost and effectiveness and to make a recommendation to the local Board of Elections as to what system appears to best meet our needs and objectives.

I would be the person making the decision on the voting system.

primary decision maker

I am responsible for all voting machines in my county and I will always use the most dependable, accurate and easiest machines. The machines I now have, I have never had any major problems.

I am the Election Official, so my recommmendation will have significant influence.

I will be establishing a committee to do a needs assessment for voting equipment and to provide strong recommendations to the County Board for funding, purchase, and maintenance. My position as chief elections officer provides a significant amount of influence on the decisions made by the county.

Bid, evaluate, recommend to County Election Commission

upon approval by my county commission, I will have to select the type of system we use and find financial support for it.

At this time very minimal due to state mandate. Previously I developed information, sought the support of the City Election Board and then made a recommendation to the governing body.

Researched the systems, made recommendations to our board members. They have the final say.

my recommendation, along with that of the three members of my electoral board, was presented to and accepted by county board of supervisors. i took the machine out to about 20 locations for the public to have a chance to try....very successful....

The final decision will rest with me. I will consider both federal and state equipment standards and the impact any changes have on the voters.

I would propose an article to be voted on at town meeting allowing the use of vote tabulating machines. The town resident would vote yes or no.

A system approved by the state and on which will fulfill requirements. We are still a paper ballot county and have not chosen a new system.

The Clerk makes recommendations on what is deemed the best equipment for the county.

Voice needs, concerns, opinions,

manage polling places

very little input as above

As presiding officer my input would be to learn as much as possible to help the elected officials try to improve our system and to make sure the citizens in my town have the right to vote on any issue that may be presented at a special or regular duly warned meeting. My responsibility would be to follow federal and state guidelines as closely as possible.

At this time, there are no plans to change the system as long as it meets HAVA requirements.

Our County Commissioners expect me to do the research and prepare a finding report with my recommendation

Observe new voting systems. Recommend to commissioners court which systems I think would be right for our county.

Evaluation, recommendation, implementation

I am the elected county clerk and secretary of the three member county election board. The county commissioners are responsible for the purchase or lease for any new equipment and will be very involved in the selection. We recently conducted a public forum and all the certifed vendors of election system in Indiana were invited. We opened this to the public and had over 150 in attendance. We still have not made a final decision and are very upset that we have to discontinue the use of punch card machines. They have always worked very well.

Locally, I am the person most informed of our voting system, so I feel my input would play a major role in the decision-making process.

I feel like I would have to make the final decision of what type and if any new voting equipment would be added to our county.

I was part of a RFP team which selected the voting system.

Review, evaluate, recommend, one of 7 votes on purchase.

I will not be making any of the discussion about buying any election equipment. I use all the elections and get it ready for the elections.

Unfortunately, as County Clerk and the person conducting the elections, other officials i.e. County Judge and some Commissioners don't really care. I would like to get election judges and workers involved in vendors demonstrations because they will be working with the machines.

I have worked in the County Clerk's office for 30 years, and for the most part, have had very successful elections. I like the optical scan because it works.

I would be the one to do the research on different systems and present them to the town officials and the public. After finding out what the state requires.

I apply for budget expenses regarding elections

The Auditors office would recommend to the County Board

Everybody asks us.

I will present the Selectboard with information gathered at workshops,from other clerks and Sec'y of State. They will make the final decision.

I recommend to the Board of County Commissioners.

In this state, the town clerk is usually also the chief election officer. The office maintains, and oversees all voting activity. The clerk's knowledge of state and local election law, the needs of the community, the use and maintenance requirements and the level of achievable funding would suggest significant input from the clerk.

member of Town Clerks Assoc. Assoc. has some influence. Often task forces are put together to address major changes and decisions. The task forces usually include election officials/town clerks

evaluate and recommend for purchase

I convened a team that made recommendations to me, and then I ultimately made a recommendation to the Board of Supervisors.

I would research products and recommend to my Board of Electons, who would in turn research my choices and recommend to the County Commissioners

I would conduct the research and make the final recommendation to our Election Commission and City Council.

It was my job to research all the available voting systems, by talking to other users, vendors, and voters; to attend demonstrations and elections in other jurisdictions, to determine which type of voting system I felt best meets the needs of my jurisdiction, and report back to my board as to my preference

I write and program all elections as well as regular mainainence on our equipment. I feel my input would be very valuable because I am familiar with the products, technically.

Local Election Officials have a large nput into the process.

I have been involved with the Secretary of State for the new DRE machines that HAVA is requiring.

As a Connecticut Town Clerk, I am responsible for all the lever machine and absentee ballot supplies. My input would be reliability, paper-trail, and cost.

After finding that alternative systems cost more to operate and many have technical problems, The selectboard agreed with me that our system would be unchanged.

Voicing my opinion on type of machine, cost of machines, voter's ability to use and understand, etc.

State clerks assn. exec. board member -   State clerk assn. legislative chair -   input to local legislative council

We have no choise. The Federal government has said we must have voting machines. When our state deside on what machine we must use.

Looked and tested 4 different machines.   Flet the Votronic (DRE) was the top of the line and convinced county government to purchase

I am the County Clerk and cheif election official for [County Name] County

I would research and work with vendor on selection of new equipment. The Minnesota Secretary of State has been reviewing different equipment and would likely look at statewide recommendations for certain type of equipment for uniformity of election process and transmittal to state of election returns.

My decision is the basis for any new system - following state & federal guidelines

Sec. of State - input on the type of electronic voting machines we like, trying them out, etc.

Responsible for gathering information, evaluating systems and making the final decision.

ALL COUNTIES GAVE INPUT AS TO WHAT FEATURES WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE INCORPORATED IN THE NEW SYSTEM.

With the HAVA the State dictates the type of voting equipment to be used (now standardzed by law). The same company does the programming for it's machines. I choose the ballot printer.

Since I am the chief election official, responsibility falls on me to take best guidance possible and go from there. Missouri Secretary of State would have influence to a large extent.

Federal government, state government + local government

None, state mandated + purchased

I would actually be the one to take evaluations from the state, etc. + convince the Select Board + voters on the best way to go.

I research all products and present pros @ cons of each

I make recommendation to county commissioners. They set the budgets.

1) Evaluate approved systems 2) Recommend purchase 3) Budget accordingly

Review and selection committee appointed

I don't feel that my input on the new voting system will matter in their decision.

I am the chief election official for the Town of [City]. However, in Connecticut the Registrar of voters purchases the voting machines.

State mandated change

Upon investigation of different types of machines, recommending the best one for our town to Finance Ctm., Board of Selectman and Voters

The ultimate decusion on purchasing equipment is by our County Commissioners with my input. Price directly effects purchases due to limited funding.

the state is suppose to be picking out a machine for all of us to use.

It will be my ultimate decision on what equipment will be purchased.

I have no input. My Boards makes the decisions.

I propose. Town votes.

I am the county Registrar

I will meet with Local Election Commission for final decision.

I, being the Clerk have complete and full responsibility for conducting th eElections in our county, Therefore, when purchasing My Fiscal Court would do as I recommended.

I WOULD BE THE ONE DECIDING WHAT TYPE OF SYSTEM TO BUY.

As warden for all elections my input on part electures would carry alot of weight

Complete input. The state of _____ has changed secretary of states. The county clerks have no idea what is going to happen now with the voting system.

We are going to a state-wide voter registration system. The Sec. of State has several clerks on the committee to help make decisions. I am not on that committee.

None - it was totally a Secretary of State decision based upon a recommendation from the 21st Century Vote Commission

I would bring the state recommendations before the select board for consideration.

I am the chief election official of the county in charge of all election functions/procedures, from certifying candidates on the ballots to training election judges to counting votes.

The decision is made entirely by the Secretary of the State. She hasn't sought my input in any way - she has involved the elected registrars to a small degree.

County auditor runs all election has a knowledge of what is needed for processing votes correct.

Our new voting system was based on the decision of myself, council members, commissioners, and party members.

none - state decision

Always been paper ballot

I would make recomendations to the five County Board members for final approval.

County Clerk - Election Office

As General Registrar, I helped the Electoral Board gather information on the various machines available, attended demonstrations, etc. and was a part of the decision making process.

About DREs. The general population in our county feels frustrated that we are being coherced to fund machines that will not be totally appreciated for the purpose intended. We have so few disables voters, and many of our voters are elderly, and will not want to use a DRE. We will probably have to consolidate many of our voting precincts.

recommend & purchase

Being the only election authority for the county, I'm the only person who has studied and observed the systems on teh market. In Illinois, any system used must have received state certification first. Other than paper ballots and punch-card ballots, the only certified system is teh optical scan.

If it was up to me, we would stay with punchcard. This is a huge (many millions) waste of taxpayers money. Florida 2000 was teh "straw that broke the camels back."

I would make the recommendation along with supporting information as to the necessity of needing a new system to the County Board of Supervisors. The purchase of a new system is contingent upon their approval. The current system is in place because of the federal requirement of HAVA.

Made final decision on which system was purchased.

To make accessibility and privacy very secure. And to make voting smoothly for workers and voters.

We like the current system in place.

It is my decision which type of technology to purchase as long as it meets federal/state requirements.

Work with county clerk on defining needs

I have 1 vote in 4. My electorial board has the responsibility right now for changing + maintaining our voting machines

We must recommend a system to the County government

Because I'm the one responsible, the fiscal Ct. looks to me to advise them

I brought the optical scan system to the township board for approval with my recommendation. I felt that it was the most economical purchase and the best program available when the initial purchase was made four years ago. This decision to change to optical scan was made before any state mandates.

Establish # of machines required; schedule vendor demonstrations; obtain all price and contract quotes and information; correspond with VASBE regarding purchasing procedures and state system requirements; pass all info. onto locality E.B. for final determination.

I'm a county officials with minimal influence on the recently mandated changes. Bulk of cost is assumed by State with Federal Funding.

I made the suggestion and had it demonstrated and they voted yes.

5 Public Meetings   Vendor Showcase   2 More Public Meetings After Showcase.

the state administrator makes final decision

Our state is uniformed in voting systems. The decision was made by SOS w/some input of election officials.

I am town clerk and presiding officer therefore I conduct the election and have quite a say in how it is fun but I take all the issues in to account before making a decision. We are a small town of [number] people with only [number] registered voters.

I will make a recommendation to the County Board as to which system I would like to have.

Our township is very small, so to HAVA we are changing to optec machines to comply with Law and become uniform with the rest of the country

The nature of my input is to provide information on how our current system works and what DRE will be compatible with our central count optical scan system so that we may have one system as a whole that is HAVA compliant.

In the past, total decision making was mine, getting approval from the County Commissioners for funding was necessary. (County Commissioners have always cooperated.)

Chief election official for [County Name] Co.

head of elections makes recommendations to Board of County Comissioneres who have ultimate responsibility for decisions

I will decide which voting system to purchase.

Since I am the el. off. I will be making the final decision. I will be the one who looks at the eqmt. A lot will depend on what the state comes up with also.

Gather data on current sustems on the market by attending seminar and talking with other counties in our state, as well as state office staff, legislators, local officials, etc.   Compile information for election commission & when time comes set up dat for representatives from companies to demonstrate machine to election commission, poll workers and voters. We solicite input from all involved in the process.

I am the Chief Election Officer for the County

As an elected official I would have the final selection on a voting system. As the county commissioners have control over my budget, they would have to approve the purchase. As a small county ([number] pop) we can't afford a new system w/o some federal funding.

I am the elected official and will have a lot of influence on the purchase of voting system.

Since I am the VR and the county clerk that conducts county elections, my deputy and I have been attending the vendor show cases demonstrating the various systems. We will report to comm. court and they will also attend some of the demonstrations. I hope then an informed decision can be made by the court.

The County Commission will depend on my recommendation.

Much Influence, but money concerns may force us to retain same system.

I'm the one responsible for deciding county voting systems and have a direct involvement with decisions made on a state level.

As county clerk, our state association's opinion is very important to the Sec. of State. We all work very closely.

As Co. Cl. I have viewed systems and have been asked my opinion.

Since I am the election official, I value recommendations regarding machines. As they were given to us free of charge, I didn't need any authority for funding.

Involved in the entire process - from writing the specifications to deciding on a vendor

We are a small town ([number] residents). Paper ballots will be used here for a long time to come. It works extremely well for us.

depending on Federal requirements and state and federal funding, our microvote machines are very efficient and Kentucky has a great system.

I am the circuit clerk (a Black in the area) The election officals overlook my opinion.

Required by state law to reommend type of voting equipment to be purchased to county election commission.

I decide and present to the Town Manager & Town Council for approval.

The elected Sec of State will make the selection of the appropriate machine for the state. It will be up to me to decide wheterh to replace all the lever machines with the recommended DRE from the Sec of State or wheterh to just use one in each polling district. In addition, the optical scan could be used more extensively if we decided to replace level machines, but still may need one DRE per district.

Clerk -- recommend syste purchase to village board

Our state makes the decision on the purchase

will recommend to commisioners court

I make recommenations to a committee. The committee makes recommendations to the governing board and the governing board makes the final decision.

Personal experience

It's all up to me.

The Commissioners will budget the funds for whatever equipment I "strongly" recommend. I will have done my research thoroughly and evaluate the need for the expenditure prior to recommending any change.

I am the County Auditor so the final decision was mine.

I would evaluate it and give an opinion along with all the other 39 canvassing clerks.

Please take in consideration the general population of the county. We are a county of less than [number] residents. The paper ballot would be better than voting machines. Most of the voters are over the age of 70.

State mandate

Now under state/federal mandate

When we are ready to choose the HAVA req. equipment I will have the responsibility of putting together a group to review and make recomm. to the mayor.

The final decision will be mine.

I would be recommending to the Board that purchase the equiment what to purchase.

only as a taxpayer/voter in the town

No new system is being consider - town to small

I will change as needed/mandated

This will depend on the standards set by the Federal Election Commission. Not sure of the amount of input I will have at this time.

I am on a 6-member committee who is going to make the decision

No input - state mandated

MY JOB!

State of NE is looking at a system for all of the state.

My commission would depend on me to gather information on teh cost and most efficiency of equipment being approved by State officials.

Recommendation as an ex-officio member of election board.

The decision to remain with paper handcounted ballots is mine. We will be getting voting devices for handicapped voters, but decision on type is Sec. of State, purchasing with HAVA funds.

Since my term is up 12-31-05, I will not be using the new system. However, I want to pick something that will be easy for the voters to understand and use.

main decision maker

I would investigate the equipment itself and contact other counties that may have this system in place to see how they like it.

It will be minimal, as I was just elected in November and have not been the clerk for long. I will trust the opinions of the state, other county clerks and the clerks association.

I initiate any purchase to replace voting systems.   I have reponsibility to make the final decision.

Provide the law, certifications required by the state election commission, and accessability for voters. Administrator makes recommendations in our county but does not actually have a vote on the purchase.

I am very happy with the voting machines we currently have; however our county clerk is very unhappy with the ballot vendor. Hope to be a large influence on newly appointed county clerk.

My staff and I would decide on the voting system along with any requirements from federal or state election officials.

I will make a recommendation to Bd of CC

rely on the Secretary of State Office

We run elections here on the local level - my input is very much expected as we use it from programming to recounts.

Make all necessary contacts and provide all information needed

As elected official, I would consult county election board and after discussion, deliberation, and research we would present our recommendations to county council and commissioners.

As chief election officer for my county, we will assist in making a decision on which machine is selected.

We have had the same vendor for 24 years and their equipment has worked well for this county. I advised our County Board to stay with same vendor and optical scan.

I am chief election official for my county.

I will make recommendations to the Board of Supervisors who, within guidelines set by the state, will ultimately decide the equipment to be purchased.

Develop the requirements & specs necessary for our county in a voting system. Make sure we have a partnership with a vendor to give our citizens the best and most accurate product.

The Secratary of State and governmental officials would make the decision and the State would tell us, on a county level, that what they have chosen will be what we will use.

Make recomendations to Co. Board After reviewing systems proposed.

At this point we have never changed voting system and don't believe we will in near future

I feel my Commissioners & County Executive would value my input in the decision making.

I am the Town Clerk for [city name]. It is my responsibility to be sure the voting machine operates accurately.

manage the process, accumulate data - my expertise with machines purchase machines

As election commissioner/supervisor I make recommendations to Town Meeting on purchase of voting machines that have already been approved by the Secretary of State.

[County Name] County Clerk

as county clerk I am asked to part of the decision making process I am also responsible for issuing absentee ballots and the design of the ballot

The Secretary of State's office will be in charge of changing our current system.

Will make final decision and budget for voting system

In Vermont election rules or regulations come by way of the Secretary at State Office. We do what they say we have to do. Any change would be cleared by that Office first.

I would be ask what I thought was best

We chose the Vendore type. SOS came back & told us we were going with Optical Scan

The county citizens will be the users and point of service provider so their input is critical. If the local leaders believe in the system it improves the trust of the outcome of the election results.

will assist Registrar of Voters in choosing machine. Influence funding agency for 100% conversion.

I'm absentee election manager and 1 of a 3 person bd of election supervisors in charge of county voting.

Reviewed Rfp and made recommendation

Local Governments had little or no influence in obtaining our current voting system. System type was decided by state. Local had minimal input on vendor.

The Secretary of State of Ohio mandated that all 88 counties in Ohio select a precinct count optical scan voting system by Feb 9, 2005.

With the state secretary of state as main election official i have direction for changes required to comply with HAVA. I have always attempted to follow election law.

Report any new system updates to village board members.

1 of 6 directory in state

As a team the Moderator, Supervisors of the checklist, and Myself the Clerk work together

We are being converted to a mandated state wide voting system.

As election authority for the county my recommendation on what voting system to purchase would be the main criteria used by the county commission for the purchase of a new voting system.

I have no input

We would listen to the opinions of Federal and State officials, people/voters that the new equipment would affect and research venders.

We will be purchasing a central count optic scan in replacing our punch card voting system, and at least 1 DRE. We are also implementing all mail ballots in [County Name] County. We wil be in compliance with Federal Law replacing punch card voting.

ABOLUTELY NOTHING

As Town Clerk, I have no influence in those decisions.

I will review the available systems that will make us HAVA compaliant and recommend my selection to the Board of Supervisors for budget consideration

I am the county clerk-I handle elections for this county.

Myself as the chairman of the County Board of Elections, along with the remaining mmembers of the Board of Elections have the final syay on what type of system our county uses.

As absentee election manager and a member of the county canvassing board, I would recommend the type and would prefer.

County government and manner in which it works.

I am going to have to evaluate the system and make recommendations to the court.

I recommend the purchase of equiptment in concert with federal requirements.

1) Determine the amount we have to make a purchase with 2) Look for a tried and true system that meets our needs that we can afford 3) Determine if other counties our size are satisfied with the system 4) Recommend a system to the County Commissioner which includes a demonstration with political parties, commissioners, and the invited public watching. 5) Commissioner decides.

Did research and made recommendation on which system to purchase.

I'm chairman of the local election commission

To aid and assist the election commissioners, and suggestions to the Board of Supervisors as to what machines would best accomidate voters of the county, and the elderly citizens, and the best in making sure our elections are fair.

I have ask vendors to display equiment. Our small county will be guided by reliable vendors.

Q19. What could be done to improve the decision making process for selecting voting systems?

DE-politicize it -- have a task force put together to look at all systems and evaluate. People need to understand all the nuances of the election process before making decisions regarding which system best fits a particular jurisdiction.

To allow someone in power examine the type of system to be sure it will hold up and do the things needed.

Make them uniform

Find a way to remove politics from the process!

Change the testing of the software and hardware to meet more rigorous standards in a much more open process with the particpation of multiple review entities. Maximize interest groups participation in the testing process and the setting of standards to there is more up front acceptance of the technology being developed for voting and vote tablulation.

It would be helpful to have a "Consumer Reports" type of reference. Independent testing that talked about rates of error in reading, user-friendliness, cost, cost of maintenance, reliability, vendor reputation, etc. Then a small county like ours could weigh the factors against cost. Even though there are funds to purchase the system, there are none for maintenance, for instance.

Those actually in charge of performing the required work and are held accountable for its success and failure should be free to chose the best tools available from their perspective.

Our township made its own decision but the state a few years later due to the HAVA decided that the optic scan systems were acceptable. We had purchased the system before required. In fact a good portion of our small county had switched over to the acuvote system because it is a great system and has a paper trail. Upon two recounts so far, I can also say that the system is very reliable. Amazingly so!

Reduce the purchase cost and operational expenses.

Election officials should be much more responsible about learning and understanding technology. Educate the public and solicit their input in an organized way. Ignore vendors' claims and rely on independent experts! For the love of Pete, give up the notion that the vendor is your friend, you ninnies!

34 years is a long time and I have no idea what process was used back then

Get the vendors out of the process

I was not the elected official at the time the current voting system was chosen, so do not have first-hand knowledge of the process followed at that time.

The Federal Government should set some national standards and all machines need to meet those standards, as part of HAVA.

Keep the media from half reporting of the truth. Treat the system as a voter has access to a machine. A voter does not have a week and a srewdriver to examine a voting machine!

Use common sense

Utilize more election day workers in the process. People making decisions for the most part have never been at the polls at 5 am and worked through to 10 pm. We have i voting place and we had 4,300 people come through this november. 87% turnout

new people on the election commitee.

To let the Boards make their own decisions along with the Secretary of State. Keep the other elected officials out of the process because they do not know enought about the voting systems. They are being influenced by outside groups.

Continued input from the people who actually do the voting process and train poll workers.

More accurate reporting by media, and less importance given to "independent experts" who have no idea on what is involved with voting systems and security. (As an example, all DREs certified in VA, as in most of the country, have the capability to produce a paper audit printout of all the stored ballot images if needed. Because of unfactual media reports, most people do not know this and the "paper receipt" fiasco has become an issue)

The Federal Govt. should be HANDS OFF.

Put laws in place as to what the equipment has to be able to do for us and let the Boards go with it.

Accurate information without the political hoopla -- remove the politicians and political parties from the process.

The Federal Government acted in a "panic" when they passed HAVA. There should have been more time allowed to upgrade voting systems. Many of the problems with DREs, real or imagined, could have been resolved if several more years were allowed to develop solutions to voting system problems. Full implementation of HAVA should be delayed to 2008.

If something works why fix it. Current system works great and now feds want more HAVA restrictions and this is more costs to the local units of government and will cause more problems than the existing system. If someone needs help they can get it now with voter assistance or voting absentee, why get new machines which will require training and staff to assist at the polls in addition to the existing poll workers.

worked well in ND

Clear lines of authority. Unambiguous rules for decision-making.

Vendors should present doumentation of State's Certification of approval, prior to offering voting options to the county.

Counties will not have a choice, the State will purchase one machine per precinct with HAVA monies

Have a federal agency do more of the research....and encourage more uniformity among states, with more federal funding....?

Have an uniform voting system in the State.

Only one system should be used in the United States.

Education of the voters of options.

Increase voter participation in the process and bring more grant dollars from the federal and state level to help pay for new voting systems.

I would suggest finding what works in very small communities and duplicating. More grass roots input. Also deligation of local Clerk duties during election process would have a negative impact on integrity of election.

Federal and state mandates without the accompanying money to help municipalities comply affects the decision making process. Budgeting occurs once a year. Reliance on the promises of money from the federal budget

Statewide guidance.

Broaden the base of decision makers.

I think that voting systems are made available too soon. We need to be sure that everything works before they are used in elections.

Involve the voter more.

I think more local elected and non elected officeial along with professionals should have a greater infuluence on the selection process.

The federal government should fund any mandated changes to present system.

do not rush into anything.

The Elected Clerks in Idaho have an association that is working with the Secretary of State's office in the decision making process of new voting systems for us. We have three types of voting systems currently and those of us that use paper ballots are not willing to give them up, but we are willing to enhance the voting process with touch screens, if the money is provided to fund the purchase, storage, and maintenance.

No mandates from the State of Minnesota or the Federal level. Our current system has worked and is working great. Let the people that do the work make the decisions. Thanks.

Set reasonable deadlines nationwide to allow jurisdictions time for adequate research and to allow vendors time to develop and produce worthy equipment. Recognize that voting equipment is a long-term investment of significant impact to local budgets and should be acquired thoughtfully.

I feel the state election officials and local election officials working together should be allowed to decide for that particular state without influence from outside "groups". Election Officials are the ones INVOLVED and know what needs to be inplace and how it should work.

Take the responsibility out of the Texas County Clerks hands and create the position of elections administrator.

Mandated machines for the disabled IN EACH POLLING PLACE is not economical or wise spending of government funds. We can accomodate their needs in a more economical way.

Listen to every body. We have 3,000 voters in our county. Why on earth do we need 8 DRE machines, plus programming costs! Who is going to pay for all this un-necessary electronic stuff?

Certainly no company or vendor is capably of the nation-wide support for one voting sysyem. Principles need to be mandated but election systems do not need to be mandated. Too many eggs in one baskets is a recpe for scrambled eggs with a lot of broken shells.

Get rid of the federal election commission, make election officers/election commissioners personally responsible for deliberate and biased decisions and errors. Let those of us know what we are doing run our own show. Leave us alone, let us do our jobs and get out of the taxpayers pockets. We are perfectly satisfied with our opti-scan.

In Minnesota, the Secretary of State Office has all the power for selection. It should be more locally based.

Remove the partisan political goals.

North Dakota's Secretary of State conducted a technology seminar with three national vendors, who presented their equimpent and all 53 county auditor's evaluated them.

Make sure any choice has a paper trail.

A better statewide education process needs to exist in the election officials. Very little formal training is done.

each jurisdication should be responsible for selecting systems that best handle the election process for them taking into account all requirements of law both state and federal concerning disability access. great weight should be given to the integrity of the voting process, without confidence in the results the results mean little. Voting systems should be user friendly but should above all the votes should be secure, voter's have a responsiblity to learn how to vote as well as how to register and where they vote at, the system cannot assume all the responsiblities for the voters. Voting is really a very simple process; but it requires some amount of responsiblity of the voter.

Federal funds should provided as promised to make states compliant.

I believe that cost should be evaluated as some of our Counties cannot afford what the Federal Government is handing down to but in the first place and to maintaint the system. Our State Election Official does very well working with the federal guidelines, and County Auditors to make it all work well and easy together.

FEC make their report available earlier and the media to stop attacking every option open to us.

Our local election board is worried that they will receive criticism for buying whatever voting system. It is a large purchase and we're stuck with whatever system we buy good or bad.

Maine and some other states have done a good job in requiring paper trails for all electronic voting machines. The rest of the country should follow suit.

Let the people who actually use them (pollworkers, and the public)try them out before buying.

The State supply the machines they want us to use. Have everyone use exactly the same system.

Consortium of local officials that have experience i.e. first hand at the polling places 3-5 years

Talk to the clerk associations for the input of the people who use the system (the clerks)

The federal blanket decisions were a reaction to the Florida problem. Florida's problems were not the method but their policies and procedures were poor. The Florida problems would not have happened in Washington State. Our Sec of State's office has the power over the counties. They audit our process closely; they conduct Logic and Accuracy tests before each election; and are readily available with their expert advice. I objected to the federal government for lumping all of us punch card users with the problems of Florida. The Optical Scan system is not the answer to eliminatingthe punch card

testing, testing, and more testing

It would be good if nationwide we all used the same system.

The chief election official in the states should make those decisions

HAVA should allow more time for the developement and testing of new voting equipment that meets all of the HAVA requirements, before giveng us a deadline to have the new equipment.

It should be left to the jurisdiction that has to pay for it to decide what works best for least cost. Paper ballots are cost-effective and hard to tamper with,machines are very expensive and obsolete as soon as purchased. In a small (cash   and population size) county, paper is by far the easiest best choice. But outside forces have mandated machines by 2006. We have a large elderly population,large number of uneducated non-   computer users, all of whom are suspicious of voting machines.

Require testing and certification by independent testing lab of all software as well as hardware.

Better standards

After study and seeing the products work and pracrice the persons who work with the equipment daily should have the final say,

People making the decision should know their jurisdiction, the voters, and factor such as population, distance of polling place from county seats, etc. All these should be factored in. It is important to us that we be able to program the system and have a thorough knowledge of the software required. The more independent we are from companies that supply election printing, vendors who program, certify and deliver the machines, etc., the better off we are. We find the more factors we have control over in an election, the better our election is apt to be.

Make the official to use the system a non elected position. Allow the official that is to use the equipment make the determiniation.

Every state is different as well as every jurisdiction within that state has different needs. There is not a one-size fits all voting system.

USE OF COMMON SENSE BY THOSE MANDATING THE USE OF CERTAIN VOTING MACHINES

Solicit input from all groups

With us being a smaller county we understand better what as a county we need and can afford. With too many outside voices that don't understand our situation trying to dictate what we need. County level officals need to retain the final say in what equipment they use, as long as it meets the mandated requirments.

Perhaps a state-wide election division such as Secretary of State's office to administer elections etc and suggest a plastic code id for each voter so registrations would be effective

This has not been done here since 1993 and there was only one choice available to me if I wanted to move off punch card. Don't think I can fairly answer the above questions because of that. Anticipated process for 2005 advisory group of political party leaders, IT experts, disability, military and civil rights reps. As always we will have high media coverage in this community

if it works don't mess with it, if there have been problems obviously improvements should be made.

Reliable independent testing of the systems, free of influence from government, independent groups, political parties, and financial gain. It would be nice to have a source that is not being influenced by outside interests in order to arrive at a system compatable and useable by all voters. Uniformity would be wonderful! However, the big issue is the technology itself. The voter will learn the system presented to them if it is not too complicated. The counting equipment and associated technology is not as mechanically dependable as it should and could be considering our knowledge and ability today. Equipment failure seems to be the greatest plague on the election counting process today and I believe the vendors get away with this because the market is limited. With the numerous new federal regulations, we are being forced to purchase and use voting systems that are not soundly constructed for extensive election night use; or being forced to look at direct recording which leaves a trail in the system even if not on paper at this time. Again, it would be beneficial to have a reliable untainted source for information, including software and hardware components that are affordable by the majority of jurisdictions.

Leave the politics out of it and let the boards decide as they are the ones working with it.

We need vendors that can provide machines that can be used by the handicapped...one machine that addresses all the handicaps and that is hard to find. We have decided what we need; still looking for a system that addresses our needs. I feel NH has brought in all the stake holders to help make the decisions

Should strictly be a local decision process.

The State needs to fund any new system that is purchased then the County Clerks would not have to settle for what they can afford but what is the best system for the disabled voters.

Allow each jurisdiction to make the decision that best suits their voters and their budgets.

Make sure the ones having to use and account for have a say.

The election process needs to be understood better by everyone. Voters want instant results and accurate results. You can't have both. The media in my opinion is responsible for the misinformation. They don't understand the election process and thus write stories which makes everyone question all voting systems.

Better educate the public. Having a system that can be hand counted at a later time is more important than a lot of other concerns. The ability of the voters' votes being accurately accounted for should be most important.

Voters, elected officials and members of the media need to realize that jurisdications across the country and even throughout individual states are vastly different and have very different needs. Understanding that these vast differences exist would be a great step toward improving the decision making process.

encourage input at the local level from those who will be involved in the election process.

Allow the local officials to vote as they see fit.   The paper ballots are not a problem in [County name] KS and the cost is just right!

Require vendors to report all problems for the past decade in which thier machines were involved. Require companies to have stable financial backgrounds and adequate personnel to supportl their product. Create enterstate workgroups to address the issues of vote counting to ensure that voting systems are typically generic across jurisdictions. Slowly integrate changes in the process with moritoriums imposed 120 days prior to any election so that adminsitrators are not implementing new laws and regulations and can concentrate on the job at hand. Do not allow software changes within 90 days of any election, unless it is an emergency and then only with state approval and full disclosure to all parties. Concentrate on proven technology and fully test any new "bells and whistles".

Allow counties under a certain population to be exempt from the provision for adopting the DREs.

Our system has been in place for 185 years. For this reason I did not answer the previous two questions.

Several approved systems should be made by the state elected office. Secretary of State. Local officials choose from those approved by the Secretary of State.

Vendor demonstrations, education and knowledge about the systems available today. The public and the media should take a more objective view of the systems availble. Defining what is best for your jurisdiction. The stability of the companies seeking to do business in your jurisdiction. Insure that vendor meets the requirements of HAVA and the state or local governments. Invlove your community in the decision making process. Establish standards.

Accuracy, Security, Voter user friendly, operation cost

Have state certify voting system to meet criteria established by Wisconsin State Elections Board.

Not enough study went into HAVA before demanding implementation. We are penalizing the majority with the perceived needs of a few.

more unbiased, independent testing agencies; greater R&D by vendors to address verification issues; less fear mongering by uninformed interest groups

This was difficult for me to answer as we purchased our central count optical scan system 10 years ago without any outside influence. We used to have punch card ballots and our voters were voting on the papers listing the candidate and measures instead of the punch card so we determined it was time to go to optical scan so they could properly vote on paper!! We had no outside input except from other Oregon Counties who had already purchased optical scan equipment.   My conflict is in the way outsiders have input on the system today.

Mmore funding, without strings attached, for local officials to use in implementing election systems they feel best meet their needs.

The local election officers know what works and what doesn't work in their jurisdiction. The federal bunch is attempting to tell all of us, whether small or large, what works best in Washington. What works there doesn't necessarily work in small counties.

A list of desired outcomes needs to be created and each system needs to be assessed against the list. Is there a paper trail? Can it continue to work if the power fails? Are the directions easy to follow; for the voter, for the election worker?

Taking the Federal Govt. out of the equation. We know our state and especially our county the best, therefore we know what our needs are and how best to acquire them.

Ask the election officials. The people that work with the machines and elections.

the State should make recommendations as to what systems they would support and the towns should then weigh in on what is necessary for them, each town and city is different and has different needs, the process should be overseen by the state, but looked at on an individual basis. If the towns cannot decide - then - the state should come in to make a decision.

Canvass what works successfully at the precinct level and install the same system statewide, make it consistent.

The Federal and State testing of equipment should be more stringent.

These questions do not really apply to my jurisdiction as we vote on local issues and budgets in an open Town Meeting. Local officers and, of course, state and federal officials are elected by the voters hand-marking Australian ballots which are then counted by hand. This system has been in place for at least many decades. I do not have any idea how the system was adopted.

All too often, as was the case here, the board of commissioners made a decision based on a meeting with the vendor. I feel perhaps, more research should have been performed or sources should have been consulted. Perhaps more tests or "multiple practice elections" to test results consistency results. I think statewide guidelines should be established to help establish an acceptable voting system(s) for the state. I understand this process is under construction at this time.

By 2006 I understand that all of Colorado will be on the same system and it will be conected with SOS. I feel that when all of Colorado is on the same system it will be better

Local input

Wether they be elected or non-elected officials working for any level of government they should be involved if they are people who work primarily in the election processes. After all they are the ones that will have to know how to operated the equipment and maintain it and train voters how to use it.

Allow the ones that work with the system daily to decide the most accurate and reliable systems.

Include some of the local election officials in the process. We are the ones who deal with the process daily and the ones who hear the opinions of the voter on a regular basis.

I think the election officials and voters should be more involved sice the officials knows what will work and what want. The voters are the ones who have to actually use the voting system. But I strongly agree that we would need voters who are willing to educate themselves about the voting process.

let local and county clerks decide the systems uesd

County election officials know what system their county has used in the past, and most county have had public demonstrations on many systems. Our County of [number] would not necessarily want or need the same voting systems as [City name]. I recommend the local election officials decide what is best for their locality.

We need more options for voting systems.

Some knowledge of future federal and state regulations.

Information only. Leave the media, profit organizations, and those with a political agenda out of it.

Using all interested parties; election officials, citizens, public interest groups, state and federal officals, and technologly professionals.

Leave the decision up to the Counties conducting Elections. They know what their County needs to accommodate a voter. Not the State or Federal Government. If the State or Federal Government wants to dictate to the Counties what to use, then they should be the ones to purchase and maintain those machines. Not pass the burden on to any County that is already struggling. The State and Federal Government needs to take care of their own affairs and leave the Counties alone to take care of thier own. Our machine works just fine and from what I hear, the DRE's have more problems than what we use now (Optical Scan). Which I might add is very minimal.

Involvement of more local election administrators in the state's certification process of technologies available.

Public expects a "perfect" system and there isn't and will never be a perfect system because people are involved, those that run the system and those that vote.

Create a commission that certifies vote tabulation equipment according to requirements developed by each state. The commission would certify all equipment that meet the individual state requiements on a state by state basis. E.g. DRE's that produce a paper receipt might be required in some states and not in others.

gather input from from experienced users of successful voting systems

More independent private or public research is critically needed. The current system too dependent upon vendor generated data. Inaddition states need to establish benchmarks or statistical goals to consistently measure performance of voting systems used at the local level such as the residual vote rates &, voter registration and turnout percentage figures, and other data so the public can analyze the how effectiveness of their election administrators.

The election official should have ultimate responsibility, but should be clearly independent of any special interest. He or she should use best business practices and rely on independent experts if not sufficiently experienced.

Factual information would be helpful, not just media information that may or may not be true.

Listen to the elected local governments and what is actually needed.

The special interest groups have too much effect on selecting of voting system. The decision should rest on the BCC and the election official with the Election official having the greater input.

Our state purchased the system for all of it's counties. The state has also been reimbursed fro it's purchase by the federal government due our high standards and adaptibilty. The decision to purchase the new system was made with the help of all participants--voters, vendors, law-makers, and election officials. I see very little need for improvement.

Decisions should be made by the administration who work with the machines.

local decision - one size does fir all

I think the only people who should be involved in the process are those you have knowledge in the areas and those who use the systems.

Greater input by county officials.

not to pressure change but to let time prove the newer systems and towns and cities could update as older machine need replacement. Mandates are uncalled for.

No time requirment to have in place by 2006. Counties should be able to consider, investigate and make decision without pressure to have in place at a certain time. Technology changes all the time... No paper trail now, but could be in furture.

Equipment decisions will be made at the State level

Consider that nothing is ever perfect, and that ilfe is never going to be fair to everyone

leave it at the local level - they know their communities best

Determine what is appropriate for the size jurisdiction involved.

Work with groups within your county, and let different people who will be using the voting systems, have their opportunity to express their opinion. Have Mock elections for people to try it out

Shouild ask people using system before selecting any new voting system

As stated use a committee with as many different groups as possible.

Allow the Counties to make the decisions, without being forced into something the election officials do not want. Have a good interface with the SoS Office at the capital.

They should be tested and we should know they work and produce the correct results.

State, Federal, Media, Public, Special Interest Groups, Political parties should involve Superviors more in the decision making process. We put on elections, they don't.

I feel our system is great and do not feel I am qualified to   answer what should be done to improve the decision making process since this was done all over Georgia by our Secretary of State, the Honorable [Name]. Said system being highly successful.

Take the politics out of it. Talk to local officials who oversee elections and get their feedback

A little common sense would be nice.

Diminish the hysteria. Have more comprehensive vendor pressentations. Statements that there are not legal or financial conflicts of interest.

Improve the system to allow voters the ability to cast a vote similar to the way ATM's check for security when taking money from your banking account, at any location in the state. If you are 50 miles away from home on election day or 500.

Just let us purchase what we see fit to use.

We feel we made an informed decission

Make it as non-biased, non-partisan and objective as possible

I like the whole state having the same equipment,so the only   decision is which type to use. The Sec. of State presents her request to the legislature after reviewing all imput.

I feel that more input should come from local election officials that are actually on the front line conducting the elections and not from "people" that consider themselves experts yet have never worked in an election.

I feel that it's important that the people who have to work   with the "system" have a voice in how the "system" works. Therefore, I advocate county election personnel be involved in   letting vendors know what we need to do our jobs for the voters. I realize that needs vary, by county, but in general,   we all are striving for clean, fair, accurate elections.

Let the elections officials do their jobs. We know elections.

Price - they are way to expensive

Listen to people who actually run elections and have the experience.

I believe each jurisdiction should be able to decide what their needs are based on population. In our state the needs vary by region, population & various other factors.

More trials.

Include the election officials who work with the machines in the policy making process on the federal level.

I was not here during the selection of the current voting system.

The Federal government and advocates for the disabled do not take into consideration the expense of the county and the tax payor's burden when sometimes making these new laws to help a very few number of people. Especially when anyone with a handicap can absentee by mail or by assistance.

The certification of equipment could be quicker.

The purchase of voting machines should be kept at the local level.

Having more DRE certified for use and tested

Recruit and allow much more participation and input from those professionals with reputable election experience snd because of the trend, MIS background or,some working knowledge

I HAVE NO IDEA. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PAPER BALLOTS. THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION.

Have it uniform across the state instead of each locality's decision. What qualifies me to make this decision based upon demonstrations and salesmen talk?

Leave decisions to local level officials.

make laws that vendors and voting machine companies cannot contribute to political candidates.

Provide the funding source for purchase.

Eliminate politics from the process.

Listen more to the people who actually use the system (i.e. election staff and voters)

have sample machines set up at polling places-everything should be in english.

Ensure that common systems are used in any state. Local decision making should be left in the hands of state wide resources - even though I am a local election director

Getting people interested (the voter).

If the state could be more consistant in what paperwork is required to make puchase. and would share what paperwork is sent them instead of several from SBE requesting the same thing.

Nevada was extremely succesful with Sequoia DRE & Verivote printers. The voters were confident in the security, ease of use, and paper ballot copy stored anonymously in each machine. Other states should follow suit. However, I strongly recommend tons of training for election boards, pollworkers, IT personnel prior to implementing the new machines. If election officials are well trained they can tackle anything which comes up and exude confidence to the voters.

Not sure - the method we have used meets our needs.

Election officials who acutally conduct elections know best what works; maybe more input from them

Really no decision if Federal mandated to improve or change. Otherwise we are a small enough county that we will continue to use paper ballots.

Let local elecion officials make local decisions

show it to the public and let them vote on it.

Well I rely upon others experiences and my county recommendations, since we all try to work together. So what we are doing now is working fine.

Plenty of review on different systems, looking at them at work, speaking with those who use them.

Local Election Administrators should know how to improve the process to make it more efficient.

That those wishing to have a role in influencing the decision have some hands-on experience with voting systems and the entire "in the trenches" process of elections.

Our system works great.

Congress should not 'politisize' the process any more than it is. The federal role should be to help protect constitutional rights, access, fairness, etc.; not get into the detail of administration of local elections procedures. It should be a fairer and more balanced and enlightened "partnership" between the Feds. the states and the locals.

The process has to be complex and unique for each state and locale. Each process can be reviewed to improve with stakeholder input.

After the 2000 election, the media, elected officials and advocacy groups, including black box voting, have far too much to say about the equipment. Election officials have a much better understanding of the process, what to look for in the programming of the equipment, testing for accuracy of the equipment, etc. Since we are the ones ultimately responsible for the equipment, we should have the greatest influence.

More hands-on trials by voters (users) of various systems.

KEEP IT SIMPLE.

Trial period where election officials could evaluate potential equipment.

I think the EAC and the NC State Board of Elections will handle the situation to our satisfaction, but I also think the county voters should have as much participation in the decisions as those listed above

Allow all State-level Election officials and Election Administrators (or those who actually work and know election process) only, make the decisions, which would be based on experience and knowledge of the process and the laws.

recognize that election officials are professionals

Local election officials should make final selection.

The person or persons who are responsible for using the system (at all stages) should be the ones who make the decision.

Truth in the media would help.

I really haven't given it much thought. What's being done now in Georgia works.

I was not involved in the decision making process for the voting system we now use.

More options should be made available (both choice of vendors and machines)

Our process is acceptable.

Statewide purchase of 1 voting system

Feel comfortable that information from state officials is complete and adequate. The state already approves which machines can be purchased, up front ratings would be helpful

Give them more time to come up with a better solution. The disabled and optical voting machines have not yet caught up with technology. Or should I say that the machines are fine but the technology for the ballots have not caught up yet.

I think that the standards for the voting systems should be the same for everyone.

Leave it at the local level.

Multi-partisan commissions including advocacy groups and election officials like the 21st Century Voting Commission

Better information could have been given to the Localities making the decision instead of throwing them to the Suppliers withouts guidance.

Use reasonable solutions with flexibilities as one size does not fit all.

More communication.

I think HAVA requirements are overkill for a voting population as small as ours.

I have no problem with the current process in Virginia.

as long as humans are involved, there will be mistakes make...I feel problems have been addressed as they come up

The EAC should complete and update the standards regularly.

The number of different choices should have been limited at the state level.

Perhaps more attention should be paid to how many voters will actually use some of the expensive, specialized equipment that is required. At what point does the cost of the DRE or similar equipment and its maintenance receive more weight than the five or six voters that may use it?

State requirements could be relaxed or expanded.

It seems it is going pretty well, let's not upset the applecart.

Follow state procurement codes and purchase a system in a fair manner. The system is for the voters and they should receive a reliable and valuable system. I suggest the RFP or bid process.

The Federal Government should have to run some elections first hand before changing laws they have no knowledge about.

information from independent experts broadly distributed to election officials.

Uniformity within states moving toward Federal uniformity. The State of Maine is one of the best states in this area, but other examples I have seen are poor.

Input from the voters, poll workers, election officials, civil rights groups, advocates for the disabled (local and state).

satisfied with current system

Give more influence in the early stages of the decision making to those who are conducting the election process.   Fed's should fully fund federal mandates

When the law says it's a local decision, as it does in Iowa, the state should stay out of it and not threaten to withhold HAVA funding if we decide to get a system that the Sec.of State doesn't personally approve of, as long as it's HAVA compliant.

Officals need to know what machines are HAVA approved so we may make our decision.

I was not here when the decision was made to obtain the current voting system.

I was not employed by the county when the last system   was purchased and put in place.

The federal government should either move faster on determining what systems are acceptable, or the 2006 deadline for compliance should be moved back.

Prevent federal regulatory officials from throwing the baby out with the bath water. Properly trained workers and routine maintainence equals "good punch-card elections."

More studies on the DRE election system

Accomodation of handicapped should only be required at a central voting spot; for example, the courthouse.   Having an "unaided blind person accomodation" at each and every precinct is much too expensive.   Would recommend allowance of a 'central count optical scan system.

Because the local Elected Official knows what works best in thier County and is aware of the County budget, I feel they should play a major role in deciding which voting system equipment is considered. The State doesn't always factor in budgets of individual Counties when making mandates. I feel the State and Federal Government have good intentions, however, they aren't the individuals conducting the elections.

Develope the laws based on system and procedure improvement and not on pressures from special interest groups such the disabled and ethnic advocates.

keep it professional, non-political

Let the election officials who have actual hands on local experience should be the ones to make the decisions.

Surveys of this type should have been sent out before HAVA.

Long term use of the equipment should be reviewed and not just buy the current popular type of equipment.

Let the people who actually conduct elections have more say about what will work for them. Stop trying to solve Florida and Ohio's problems in my county.

MANDATE REQUIREMENTS -HAND-COUNTABLE PAPER TRAIL ETC.

The amount of funding available in a small county government may determine the type of voting sytem purchased.

The last questions I could not answer I was not in this office at that time.

We had a very good process in selecting election equipment, for the first time the entire state will be on the same system, because both the counties and the state agreed on the process.

All entities involved need to work together, but the decisions should be left up to the State/local election experts.

Do what works in South Dakota not Florida

Everyone who needs to make these decisions, should run one election to see the entire process

Decide which system will work best for your jurisdiction and then begin the process of finding a reputable vendor with a solid product, whom you can count on and work with. Simple.

Vendors should be able to tell a small locality what system would work the best for them...not having to guess, with the costs of running these new computerized machines

Mandating election officials to follow the same rules and regulations governing elections to the letter of the law.

We are happy with this system

Survey election officials who are actually in the field on Election Day and who are responsible for tally results to determine which voting systems are the most accurate.

Get some equipment certified so we can begin the analysis of what will meet our needs and availability of equipment.

Include more local election officials in the process

Let each jurisdiction pick the system that best suits them, rather than the Federal Govt. telling us that the smaller, rural counties have to have meet the same requirements as Miami, FL for example. In rural Nebraska Counties, we can have as low as 100 people voting at a precinct or as high as 1000. Nothing though like you see in Miami, Washington, New York, etc.

Allowing the counties to decide if any changes need to be made to their current voting system. In my County, we really do not have but a few individuals with disabilities and now we are being forced to spend all this money when they vote by mail and there have been no complaints. It's really the smaller counties that are going to take a blow on this new requirement.

National standards

Keep in mind that smaller counties have less funds to be used for implementing major changes than larger counties. Also, that having to have voting machines AND paper ballots   in order to give the voters a choice of voting systems may be a good idea, but also doubles the expense of holding elections in small counties. Especially where the majority of the population is retirement age or above and refuse to use voting machines.

Better technology

ASK THE PEOPLE OF THE JURISDICTION

People that don't understand the electoral process in Virginia and are not experts on a particular type of voting system should keep their opinions to themselves...in other words, have set guidelines and let election officials make the decisions.

small groups one on one with a vendor. they should set up and election from beginning to end an explain everything they are doing and why.

I personally think the supervisor of elections in each state should choose the system and each county should have   the same system.

The EAC should put together a non-partisan division of their department that grades all types of voting systems in regard to different characteristics, etc., just like consumer reports. This would have to be apolitical and be a one-stop shop for election officials across the country to be able to access this information. As an election official researching the right system for my county's voters, it has been extremely hard to sift through all the little controversies having to do with voting systems and having to sift through the vendors sales pitches and biases toward their own systems. Their doesn't seem to be any place for us (election officials)to get an objective opinion on these different types of voting systems.

The desire for new systems should be determined by voters as a ballot item and voted by the people who will use the system.

Listen to the people who have to use them, the local election officials

More consideration should be given to the costs that are having to be born by the local governing authorities in terms of maintenance and warranty of new equipment. Provisions must be made that these types of expenses be placed at the State and/or Federal level.

I feel we need to have a unified system throughout the U.S. so there would not be any doubt with elections. A comprehensve study needs to be done to find the best machine for the job.

Let the state take over the county election offices. There fore the cost of putting new voting machines in place will fall to the state. If the state has the right to decide what we use then the state should pick up the cost. Smaller counties can't afford this extra cost.

It should be left to the individual cities or towns

Be sure to get alot of input from the local County Election Officials, because we are the ones on the front line and have to answer to voters.

The State Board of Elections should qualify vendors making sure those vendors follow their agreements (promises) with a process in place to appeal when users have issues with the vendors that cannot be resolved.

Request more imput and trials by the public prior to purchase.

Expedited selection process. It takes too long to choose the finalist. Elected Secretary of State should let other non-elected members do more of the work.

Consult with those who have to use the system from the ground up.

Each judirsdiction should have the final say because they know their constituets best.

National voting system standards, revised HAVA implementation timelines

I believe there should be a statewide selection process with hardware and software owned by the state, maintained by the state and election officials trained by the state -- similar to the HAVA requirement for statewide voter registration data bases.

More voter awareness programs, more vendors

Depend more upon the users (elected officials) of the equipment rather than special interest groups. Require that all systems provide a paper trail for auditing purposes following the election and require that any system purchased in a state be certified by that state as well as national certification.

North Dakota has done the best job possible

Since we have new equipment that was purchased and provided by the state and federal government this is a hard question to answer. We had very little input other than we had some of our elected officials served on a board which went around the state and held public hearings and answered questions. I think the voter maybe should have had more input maybe thru a referendum. It is had been up to the county commissioners we would have never received new voting equipment. We are a small community approximately [number] registered voters. The Election Process did not take precedent over providing road, street, bridges, health and proving public safety which was there main concern.

Uniformity in the election process across the United States

most discussion on the implementation and success of voting equipment should be left to the Town Clerks, they are the ones that use and rate the equipment..we can discuss success and failure stories and judge for ourselves what is the most proficient system for the number of precincts and voting population of your town.

I was not hee 50 years ago!

The State Board should provide factual information obtained from independent sources on the various systems. The vendors could easily hide flaws in the systems and I'm not familiar with the computer lingo etc., to know what to look for when choosing a system and what features are better than others.

EAC and state certification requirements.

Pick what is cost effective and the best for the majority instead of the majority having to pay high costs for a small majority.

Leave it to the local boards of elections to select what best fills the needs of their voters. There is no way the same system should be required for all states, or counties within a state. In small counties, one central handicap accessible machine for blind and hearing impaired should be amble.

Election officials should have more input as we are the ones working with the systems

I firmly believe in having local govt equipment plans at the county level that have the input of all city/township local jurisdictions within the county and provide options based on available resources within the precinct, ranging from precinct level equipment to no equipment with mail balloting option. I think local plans are essential to providing the right level of service in rural America based on financial and people resources as well as available precinct facilities with consideration of voter population density.

Every jurisdiction is different;therefore, needs & resources vary. But if government intends to mandate the change, THEY SHOULD FULLY FUND THE PROGRAM.

It works fine in this small town. I don't know how it is done elsewhere - however, I do think more vendors should be authorized by the state for those of us in MASS

In order to bring about universal conformity and promote efficiency, Federal and State Governments should be largely in charge of such decisions.

Unfortunately, I was not involved in the decision making process when our current voting system was adopted. It was before my time in this office. But, by what I have seen and worked with this current system, it was a good decision however it was obtained.

State should make up it's mind on the voting systems early enough for local jurisdictions to make more intelligent and thoughtful decisions.

They need to consult with those who have to actually do the work. Those who make all the decisions have probably never worked on our end. They don't know a lot of the ropes.

wHEN CHOOSING A VOTING SYSTEM, ALL OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS NEEDS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, NOT JUST THE MAJORITY OF VOTERS.

Allow each state to select a state wide system not one mandated by the federal govt.

Speak to the public officials on the local level who have work with these new voting systems, and discover flaws and problems so they may be corrected immediately. Standardize the voter systems, so you don't have butterfly ballots in one county on Florida and scanned ballots in another part of Florida. In CT, we all use a standardized ballot format, only the candidates change in each town.

More input form local elected officials

In Illinois there are only two main vendors, thus only two types of machines readily available to choose from.

Let the people who work on it on daily basis have a greater amount of input

More public input

Honestly on all levels

Surveys for all registered voters mailed out, ot tsn in a local newspaper, for those interested to fill out to get everyone's opinion.

People are generally uneducated about modern voting technology - especially older persons. We need more demonstrations (practical) of voting systems

More Interest

The total benefits to special interests groups should be compared to the total costs of the changes and should not be so extreme as the present DRE machine requirements that it discriminates the majority to help the minorities. The cost of buying and maintaining DRE's for every precinct far outways the benefits. A few centrally located DRE's would have been much more beneficial and cost affective. Decisions such as this should not be made by special interest groups or by the pressure they inflict but instead their input should be considered but then the Federal Elected Officials should also take considerable input from local election officials and then make a decision while cosidering the financial aspects first and formost.

Standards for hardware & software security; Standards for hardware & software integrity; flexible reporting software; ease of storage & maintenance .

Let experienced election administrators make the decisions for they do the work.

In North Carolina the process for choosing a vendor is a typically easy process.

It would be nice if they would get some imput from the people who actually handle the elections.

State Board approves all voting machines

Boards of Elections should make the selection of the system best suited for their jurisdiction.

have public hearings before purchasing any new equipment.

Be sure that local people see to process of conducting and election are highly involved.

More input from local elected officials.

Nationalize it.

Federal government shouldn't take so long in making a decision about the money for new equipment.

Let local officials that actually handle the elections,have a part in decisions.

Make it more local. State set general standards not mandate how achieved

That all systems are standard within a state.

Determine the best solution on an independent basis & not a one size fits all application

Have all counties use same system throughout its state. Oklahoma's system used in all 47 counties is about the best there is.

Get the people to decide

Leave decision making to local municipalities

Local officials should have more influence

This process should be left up to professional people in the election system who have studied HAVA + know the needs. Let them coordinate + communicate the needs to vendors

Our county wide system works great. All counties should use the same system.

It should be done at the local level with the town clerk/warden/selectmen/council working together

I think the process works good the way it is.

We have few choices as we have to have a method approved by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

In Virginia the elected local officials who collect and expend tax payers money make the decision and these are the persons most directly responsible to voters......so the process works well.

Anyone involved should become educated on the pros and cons of a voting system and understand that a paper record is essential for verification

Consulting individuals who actually have knowledge and understanding about election process

Get rid of HAVA!

more federal and state funding

Personally - one accurate, dependable method should be chosen by fed. officials and used nationwide.

Local input

Perhaps involvement of independent experts and publication of trial use reports as to accuracy.

Allow local elections officials to have imput into the choice of different systems, and respect their opinions

Local level to have charge of their own needs . State + federal create problems in the election process - all states - counties have differences - adoption of election process should be left up to the county itself. Legislation has made a mess of things - to many unnecessary mandates.

Proper funding - adequate funding

I feel that the local townships should have influence in the systme instead of the county state making the decisions!

Let local government make their own decisions

Consider size of town.

Each County is responsable for buying all of whatever type of elections main voting systems. In the poorer county's it is hard to move forward with new and better systems. The State and Federal Government should help them with much needed upgrades for better systems.

Listen to the election officials that actually carry out the process.

Opening demos up for the public and disabled citizens to give their input. Use that imput to make your decision on the voting machines you purchase.

Provide for local control

Allow the Election Authorities that actually do the work and understand the system have greater control.

Cost needs to be taken into account. We have a very small population, less than [number] people. Hand counting is not a big issue, but going to scanners,& computerized, will be a substantial cost to the county. The S.O.S. will purchase our first machines, but no promise, that it won't be a cost to the county after that.

present alternatives

Set government standards early enough so vendors can update the product to meet standards. Decisions should be made by people who understand the voting process and how everything relates to the jurisdiction. There is more involved than just saying, "This looks nice" or "This seems to work ok". Each jurisdiction needs something that will work for them and meet their needs. The decision making should be made by people who do the actual elections and understand the needs of the jurisdiction involved.

state wide voting system

keep everyone informed through the media or public speaking

More Standards

Allowing each county to pick the system best suited to their needs. We are a small northern county and do not need the same system at the large metro county.

I was not here when the decision to purchase our optical scan central count sysem was made. I dont't feel qualified to answer these questions.

I don't have a problem with the current process.

State elections board (these are not elected officials) should evaluate all available systems to make sure they meed certain standards, certify one or more systems for use in the state, and allow local elected officials to determine

The process in [County Name] County serves our county well.

Whoever makes the choice should pay for it.

staying with one that does not require a large amount of voter education and one that is adaptible to the future needs.

Local jurisdictions should not have to purchase a voting machine if there is no request/need. Some precincts are so small as to make the requirement for machines very inefficient. Precinct workers are going to be more difficult to find since, for the most part, they are unfamiliar with the technology.

I believe that on the state level, our Secretary of State's office does a good job in qualifying vendor's systems. They have strict guidelines that I believe will eliminate any of the problems seen in other states.

more involvement between the elected official and the vendor and the SOS.

Federally mandated paper backed-up machines; a standardized machine for all states.

A central place where all the information is available & models can be viewed & tested. & info from towns & cities experiences are available.

We are happy with our voting system. It is absolutely accurate. No machines to make mistakes.

Explore more ways to use internet and telephone voting.

create simpler better systems, offer more than 1 or 2 choices

The EAC to set standards more quickly

We are happy with paper ballots, we have no problems.

While well intended, it is to important and complicated for now election personnel not to have more imput into the decision. There is to much detail the general public and media is unaware. You wouldn't ask you plumber if you needed surgery!

The legislators and those making the decisions should do some background checking and not take the loud voices at their word.

We need a state standard.

Survey Election Officials.

Lower the cost of programming the counting machines.

Take into consideration the size & population the voting system will be serving

More election inspectors should have input in the process. They are the hands on parties who run the election sites.

Keep it local.

It works well.

Small counties with less population be considered on a different basis as our county is under [number] population.

Listen to the clerks.

Leave decisions to towns and states.

Input from all county election supts.

The people who actually work with the election process should be considered.

We have good exposure at our town clerk conferences.

The process in our state worked very well.

Have local elected officials in charge of elections explain pros + cons of the system they use

Enclude the people involved with making elections happen - election superintendents, registrars and workers

Check with the election official to see how they think things should be run.

Let local officials have more influence. Federal and State Government should give guidelines to follow and let local officials select type of system best suited for their jurisdiction

allow what works to be left alone.

keep that which serves the purpose

Ask the person running the elections what works and doesn't work!

Research on different systems and word of mouth

HAVING REPUTABLE VENDORS DEMONSTRATE THEIR PRODUCTS AFTER THEY CERTIFY THAT THEY ARE RELIABLE.

get input from those who are in charge of running the elections- local clerks

Oklahoma has an excellent system in place and an excellent system for selecting a new system

[Unknown word] the people who deal with it on a daily basis in all aspects of the process

It should be left up to those who run the elections. We know what works and what doesn't.

Ask Local Clerks!

I like our system and process of decision making. Decisions are often arrived at by County Election Board Secretarys serving on a Task Force.

Base it on population of that jurisdiction in our case-township. The key is training not a new machine. Paper works for us.

Stability of requirements at both Federal and State level. Removal of certification of systems from political process.

Let the people who run the elections make the decisions.

More demos; more advice

Ask the people who have to prepare the machines for voting and who educate the voters

Work together all braches-government local & state & fed. for the agreement of the type of voting system that works for everyone. must consider sizes of counties.

Election inspectors and election machine custodians should look at and discuss different voting machines + have a say in selecting a system

Local election Officials & Poll worker should have the most imput on needs

Go directly to the people who have to use them. And to the people who have to direct the process.

HAVA mandates too much change in too short a time frame - more use & evaluation prior to implementation would help

Leave the decision making up to the voters

Allow all counties to have say.

more money funded

If it isn't broke don't fix it

Have electronic systems certified in Pennsylvania NOW!!!

States could improve the selection process by establishing more stringent and more applicable performance standards for voting equipment, by centralizing the RFP process and by using the technical expertise avaliable through their state university systems to support the system evaluation process.

Communication.

Guaranteed funding to all jurisdictions

Voting equipment standards should be developed as soon as possible.

More research should be done on the local level to see what best works in each community.

I believe Michigan used a good process in determining the mandated voting system.

Make sure that the cost of programming and maintaining the systems are acceptable for small towns. Advocates for the disabled shouldn't force towns to use voting machines.

Not mandating the non-use of particular certified voting equipment by the Federal Government. It should be up to each county to make that decision.

SIZE OF COUNTIES UNDER 3,000 VOTERS

I would not have locked the state into one system overall,

Do not force counties to change their system if they are pleased with what they have and it works for them.

I believe since the local authority has to fund any voting system and election long-term, they should have the most say in what is done within their jurisdiction.

The location and size of the county. We are being forced to invest alot of money in equipment that will have very little if no use us small couties. I would agree to a centrally located handicap accessible machine, but not one in every pricinct.

Allow those who are responsible for actually counducting elections have the greateast input.

Have the HAVA money go directly to the counties rather than the state because they are the governments body that is having to pay for all the changes with election equipment.

Mandating the same process for all counties is wrong. What is good for one county is not necessarily good for [County Name] County (pop. [Number]). We as election officials know our voters better than the Federal Government does.

A panel of Election Officials should be involved.

On one hand I think the federal government should be more involved so that all states have the same voting rules, training, and equipment for a federal election. On the other hand politics should not enter into it! Perhaps private companies with or a group of non-political people should make the decisions. I believe our state is doing a great job as to our choices in voting systems.

Consideration should be given to local jurisdictions and the needs in their counties

Take it away from politicians and vendor-related lobbyists. After all, we are the ones conducting the elections at the local level (where the voters are) so we know what the voters want.

Our system works well.

more information from counties that havwe the system

Be practical in a budget sense, obtain a system that will last and be user friendly.

Allow individual juristdictions to determine for themselves what system best meets the needs of their voters; then provide funding for them to purchase and maintain the system. A committee in Washington with no election experience has no idea what works best in my county.

The simpliest and fairest way would be to form focus groups. There should be a group from each of the following areas; voters, political parties, civil rights, elected officials, technicians. etc. All information should be compiled and studied to determine what is in the best interest for the jusicdiction. It would also be helpful to contact locations that use the type of equipment being considered for any reports on problems. etc.

Assure decision-makers and voters that the system is reliable, 100% accurate, and that all votes will be counted. The software (and hardware) must be tamper-proof.

Take the politics out of the system. Buy system on its ability, merits, cost...not on which group thinks it is the best for their party or candidate

Have vendors make leasing a more cost effective option!

Fed + State gov. should quit making laws that are impossible to implement. They have no idea what is involved at the ground level.

Let the entities determine what will work for them. After all, we are the onces in close contact with the voters and tax payers.

It would be beneficial to have various elected officials (county board, city, township officials) groups see demonstrations from the vendors on proposed equipment   for their input on ease of use.

Vermont is unique in that elections are managed by each of the 246 municipalities, not by county government. Town populations vary from a few hundered to the hundreds of thousands meaning that each municipalities needs vary. Having a law that allows for a range of technology (based on need) would be useful.

Nothing, owrks fine as is

Allow election experts to drive the change

consider the cost   " " equipment counties already have

Listen to Election Officials

Overall performance and reliability along with a reputable vendor

Listen more to Election Board personnell.

More training

LET THE PEOPLE WHO KNOW ABOUT ELECTIONS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL DECIDE WHAT SYSTEM TO US.

More flexibility in the number of DREs that should be required for the disabled in the rural areas.

Talk to the people who run elections.

Counsult and listen to the election authorities who actually conduct the elections.

Use people that actually administer the elections in their communities.

I think ours was very professional and logical. I do not believe it could have been any better.

Determine the actual problems that exist within our own jurisdictions - do not try to solve problems of other jurisdictions!

Explore how we can update and build a lever type machine.

More input from local users

Leaving the Federal Goverment completely out of the process and letting the State and local goverments decide.

Send money

Let the general population have a say-so.

Too Late Now

Too many groups and persons who do not know or take into consideration the whole picture of elections when trying to force and sometimes managing approval of enforcement of some procedures and laws making it very difficult, confusing and extremely stressful to run elections.

States should make decisions on approving choices of systems quickly.

clerk input

Ask the voters and the election workers.

Let small villages ([number] voters) to keep things as they are.

In Kentucky, I believe we have the best process for election tally for several years. The federal government has passed laws forcing us to go backwards instead of forward. I think there should be a common sense approach when looking at voting for the disabled. Benefit V. Cost.

The only reason that I am pleased with the state mandates is that a portion of my cost paid out of the General Fund of the Township will be reimbursed to me. Other than that I think local clerks know best what is good for their voters. As long as their are good choices that keep us on par with emerging technology, I have no issues.

Encourage more public (voter) input.

Let the people that works with the systems decide

Let the local election official have the decision making authority because, he/she has the local knowledge as to which system would work best in their jurisdiction.

Cost for our Township is a big factor. Funding should be available.

Guaranteed, with financial penalties, for ineffective support following purchase of equipment.

Allow the people who actually conduct the elections have input.

Don't compare all systems to one states inadequate training, laws & equip. We never had any probelsm with our punch card, except minor. Why did the whole US have to change Because of one state? The federal gov. did not fully fund its mandate & our county was put into financial straits to pay for a new system.

Common sence - stop putting so much money and emphasis on ADA problems. There is an easier way, have the diabled vote by mail.

Systems for Colorado are good. Each county has authority to select their own system according to need and money availiable and population.

Let the elected officials make the decision.

Each county should be looked at on its own merits. This county has not had any problems in the past 14 years.

SINCE HAVA IS A MANDATE, CERTIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DONE MUCH MORE TIMELY. DEADLINES MAY BE HARD TO MEET WITH THE SLOW PROCESSES AT FEDERAL LEVEL.

Provide 2-3 choices and let the local official make the decision on which sustem is best suited for their jurisdiction.

I am very pleased with our optical scan ballots. I do think we need the DREs for people with disabilities.

follow current KY guidelines

The protcol based in each county...

Have the full cost of machines/system picked up by the state. No cost to the towns.

Each of the above groups are usually concerned with a particular aspect of the voting system and may not be familiar with the overall process. Election officials should have the greatest influence on the selestion of voting equipment. If an election official has much experience, they will consider the input of the above groups in making their decision. Oversight by state division of elections on ballot set up should be required.

Local level elected officials should have greater influences, with input from the pulic (pilot programs to test machines). It is preferable however, to have uniformity through out the state as we currently have with some flexibility given to local officials to avhieve the best balance of voting systems.

Before changing systems -- check with local election officials to see if their current system works!

more local control

consumer's union- testing reliability

Have the Fed. Gov. leave us alone. Our current system works fine.

Additional funding to purchase equipment

National process

Keep local control

Each community should decide. OR large blocks (i.e. the whole state/county?) should purchase the same type of equipment so that price is lowered and everyone is working with the same equipment.

Get more users involved in the process. Have more choices

More input from voters - less from media and vendors

All machine should have requirements set in place - Consumer Report. Type breakdowns - HAVA Requirement (Blind, Hearing, Easy to Reach); Weight (5-10, 11-20)

I believe local election officials know what works best for their jurisdiction. They know the needs of their voters, etc.

We are an extremely small county and have done just fine with paper ballots for over 100 years. They are consistently effective, and we have never had a large problem verifying our voters or voter counts. I believe those of us who have this kind of "almost perfect" system in place should be left alone to conduct our elections as we see fit.

Develp national standards to evaluate vendor software and hardware similar to a "consumer reports" evaluation. Effectiveness of vendor solutions difficult to evaluate before purchasing even if it is certified in the state because there aren't apples to apples standards available to evaluate against.

Congress should allow more time for manufacturers to catch up with the demands. Research and development is needed at the front end.

Let the people running the elections decide. Make sure funding is affordable and available.

Remove county boards from decision making.

Ask the people that work with elections daily not people - that have no idea of whats involved in running an election.

Allow options for equipment purchase that will meet state requirements and that we can receive bulk-rate pricing on, rather that having a single option forced upon us from the state level.

let each county make its own decision

The rules are made for large constituencies without regard for the problems they may cause for small constituencies. Promises for funding are not kept but the rules remain in place.

All Parties involved should gather together to make decision.

general public is not informed- they listen to too many conspiracy theories

Decisions should be made based on reality. If Florida screws up, smack Florida's hand and make them do things right. Leave those that ARE doing it right alone to do their jobs.

Consider the size of the county affected by any new voting systems.

do testing first to find one that really works so each vote is counted accurately with paper trail for recounting.

Get the federal gov't out of it!

244

centralized process across state without political decisions for state election officials

Accurate determination of LOCAL need versus costs & on-going expense - ability of local govt to absorb costs.

Let the professionally trained election officials have a greater role in evaluating voting systems.

small communities are having no problem running an effective election, and we have to absorb all of the problems of larger communities.

Get more input from local election officials who will be directly responsible if the system has a problem on election day!

Consistency in voting equipment and electin standards in the United States.

review the whole process at the most BASIC level such as what is required of the township clerk.

The public should have greater influence.

Currently safisfied

The majority of the above listed were greatly involved in our locality's decision making process

Only officials that have experience working with the voting process + makers of the equipment along with legal advisors should make this decision

State election officials have more knowledge of actual workings of counties and stay up with technology so if a better system becomes available, they would know how that would apply at the voting places.

Allow counties to do what is best for them within limits. HAVA causes a great, unnecessary expense for everyone.

population bracket the requirements- small rural counties are nowhere like the large urban counties and one size doesn't fit all and can't afford it.

First, decide what the mandates are that we expect to get from the vendors and tell them this is the only type of system we will use. (we control them). Otherwise, let the democratic system work.

consult with the people who actually handle elections.

The Federal Government rushed into HAVA. Provisional voting and disability voting is too complicated for the average poll administer.

To continue study all voting devices in every state, and choose the best to have fair elections when choosing voting systems

Q28. Please provide any additional comments you wish to make here about the performance of the main voting system in the November 2004 election in your jurisdiction:

As the first time using a DRE system from a punch card system, the transistion was very good. Demonstrations before and at the polling place was essential to the process. Voter education is the key to a smooth transition.

They work well, votes are tallied really quickly and they are easily stored.

As I have stated before, the State of Wisconsin does not have a Statewide Voter Registration System yet. We got an extension from the Feds until Jan. 2006 to be online.

I strongly support voting by mail.

My observation is that Optical scan systems have more problems with accurate reading than punchcard systems, but are easier for voters to use. I conclude the problem is with the reader therefore. Our punchcard system performed during the General Election very well, and observers were satisfied with the recount, too. I think punchcard got a "bad rap" in 2000, when the real problem was Florida's (and others') lack of good procedures.

It is very easy to use. When the polls close the results are available within one minute. There is about one hour of paperwork to complete and we are done. In the past the lever machines and paper absentee ballots kept us working into the wee hours of the morning. In 1992 I worked 22 straight hours to complete the election. That is just not necessary anymore.

Almost flawless.

Election night we did have one machine that went down. We have a total of four machines so we were fine. We had an 84% turnout in our county. The state finished at 85%. Oregon votes by mail.

The voting system used performed very well.

Residual rate for President was 1.1%

The entire process, from the voter to the poll workers, to the processing of the ballots was excellent. My jurisdiction had an 80% voter turnout, with 1/3 of that number voting absentee (primarily due to a change in requirements for absentee voting)

We used DRE and the public very much liked the system and commented on how easy it was to use.

Easy for voters to use; quick results after the pollw closed. No problems!

With the exception of a paper jam on one machine before the opening of polls (which was corrected before polls opened), all machines performed flawlessly. Even with 2 lengthy questions on the ballot, there were no delays. Voters expressed an overwhelmingly positive feedback on the new voting systems (although first used in May for a city council election, this was the first November election use). Officers of election found them easy to use from open of polls to close.

Five precincts, 5 voting machines -- all went smoothly, with no glitches during the day, and an 86% voter turnout.

No problems. Everything went smoothly. No equipment problems. See no need to make any changes.

The number of votes cast in this county agreed 100% with the number of ballots scanned (minus the provisional which did not qualify).

We believe that our system is very adaquate. The system works as well as the users will allow it to.

paper ballots were used

WE had several hand count write-in races to do...so we had to manually go through the ballots and in that way check the accuracy of the optical scan....it was right on the money every time.

Our optical scan worked perfect, after a state recount totals only changed by 12 votes.

Punch Card works very well here.

Precinct Count Optical Scan is an excellent sytstem, the only problem with our machines is they are mechanical and are showing some signs of age.

Over voting and voter intent is the main concern I have with central count. If we had optical scan with results sent to county we could have avoided some of the over votes, I believe.

I like it very much especially with the technical support from diebold.

Our system worked very well. It performed exactly as expected and caused no problems on election day. Our poll workers were overwhelmed with the number of voters though.

Most of the comments received in my office regarding changing to a new system have to do with the familiarity with the current system. Those who vote are comfortable with knowing the system works, they are apprehensive about a change in the manner in which they will vote in the future.

Paper ballots have worked very well for us and we are hoping to continue their use.

It was done in a very timley manner with no problems. This voting system works very good. No changes need to be made. Thanks

Our counting equipment performed perfectly at the highest voter turnout in the county's history. Recounts verified vote totals. Any election-day delays were due to poll workers processing the large numbers of voters.

I wish it were faster.

Worked just fine. After 20 years we have all the bugs worked out and it runs like a fine tuned engine.

Punch Card voting has been the scapegoat of the Federal Government and the Media since the Nov. 2000 election. To any election official worth his or her salt, the problem was obviously bad (and I mean terrible) administration, not bad machines. It reminds me of the children's story "The Emperor Who Wore No Clothes".

We have used paper ballots since the county was formed. They have worked for 90+ years.

HAVA has tried to fix a perceived problem nation-wide that does not exist.

My opti-scan experienced some problems with an error message we could not identify, but that is the first time we have had any problems with it in 10 years. It has been an extremely reliable machine.

I feel the optical scan system is one of the best ways to count votes. You always have an easily readable paper trail in the event you have a re-count situation.

Main voting systems for a county with a very high average age need to be addressed in a different manner than urban population areas.

performance was very good. does not allow overvotes, alerts voter to the fact of an undervote and provides a secure paper backup system.

One of our scanners was running slow and we took longer than usual to count.

The lever machines in our area worked well but are cumbersome to transport. We did have machines where the public counters failed but over all they worked well and the voters have confidence in them. We have had public concern about the touch screen voting systems and the chance of tampering that could go undetected by people without a computer science degree.

It works well as long as a strict balance is maintained among election clerks and counters between Democrats, Republicans, Greens, etc.

The Winvote system by Advanced Voting Solutions performed flawlessly in this election.

Since we had 4 recounts in the primary election, paper ballot was the best choice for our county. This way a paper trail was easy to follow. DRE machines would be difficult to use for a recount. We had 3 candidates lose by anywhere 1 vote to 5 votes during the primary and these candidates would have not been satisfied with the recount if the DRE machines were used. Old fashioned paper ballots were the way to go!

Problems occured because voters made mistakes (did not see issues and did not vote or misused write-in feature) Machine functioned perfectly.

the optic scan worked just perfect.

Our punch card system worked extremely well. We clean our machines before each election. We test our machines before each election. Our opening boards have strict procedures to duplicate or enhance a ballot, if necessary.

No glitches were encountered so I consider that an excellent performance

We had no major problems.

Our new machines performed well. The poll workers and voters were very complimentary on the ease of use.

I had one problem with a machine, but I got it to begin working. Other than that, everything went fine.

Candidates & media wanted results as soon as possible for media reporting and candidate victory parties.

We use a Electionice voting systems from Harp Inc. For the past six years we have utilized this equipment and have never regretted our decisioin. Their equipment is by far the most acurate and easy equipment I've seen out there.

After a recount for a school bond election all the recints counted out exactly. The only vote difference that was found was one advanced vote that was filled in in pencil.

Polling place operartions were excellant - because people are not tied to a limited number of machines at the poll we had little or no wait times. For counting our aged equipment and very high turnout caused delays and disturbing errors (that were caught in the normal checking procedures but disturbing none the less. Turnout exceeded previous record by 25% - not enough counters, old pc consolidating vote totals caused problems.

The system is extremely reliable and accurate, the main draw back is that you have to rely on the voters to vote quickly or it can be a slow process.

The Optech Ballot is basically a paper ballot and is easy for the voter to use and understand. The central count equipment is very mechanically undependable. We had numerous euipment failures and ballots jams which cause initial slow tabulation, in addition to recounting and tabulating each precinct where a mechanical failure occurs in order to arrive at the same count at least twice. These mechanical failures are time consuming and frustrating. In defense of the system, it counts very accurately in spite of the mechanical problems that plague it throughout counting. But again, we double and triple count for verification of accuracy. I am sure most large jurisdictions do not have the time and luxury of such proofing and checking.

Our Optical Scan machines were programmed to prevent over-votes. System worked very well.

Feel very confident with the performance of our machine. The only problem is the extreme expense to program.

Went well without any problems. I left the courthouse at 11:15pm after all votes were tabulated and all reports printed out.

The manual count that the state has us to do always balances with the scanner. I feel it is a very accurate system.

Considering our machines are 16 years old, they were wonderful.

We used optical scan for early voting and absentee. We "rented" the scanners from a vendor. So, cost, storage, etc., in the above questions did not apply to my office. I think things went well in our jurisdiction. People complained of long lines for early voting but again I go back to what I stated early - we either can have instant results, service or accuracy. Accuracy is more important. Too many people in this county do not have a clue of what is involved in doing elections. We hear it all the time from our poll workers.

This election was extremely busy. I had more absentee ballot requests than my whole 8 years in office. With the new machine, everything went VERY smooth, the voters really liked the system, and the election workers appreciated the machine's capabilities.

the DRE machines have been extremely well received by our elderly voters who cite ease of use as their primary asset

[County Name] County KS is a small rural county and have used paper ballots since the inception of the County in [Year]. Why try to "fix" something that is not "broke" for us!

These machines are time tested with reliability, ruggedness, and accuracy. Although the machines are aging and have size constraints, their accuracy is unquestioned.

our currrent system is reliable, but it is limited when it comes to ballot size, use of currently technology, access by the disabled, and fast count. Its strong point, the system is reliable when operating within its limits.

Both M100 and Optech IIIP equipment worked very well. We had one recount and it came out very well.

Due to rules and regulations that secure the process and voter education, the voters are comfortable with punch card voting. Voters knowing that there is a paper trail if vital to any system. We had a few incidents where the voter punched in error and requested a second ballot.

We used the DRE's for early voting (we also offered paper ballots to be counted on Optec 4. We used Eagles (Optec3) for voting day. Then, with Unity software pulled everything together on election nite. We are probably the only site in Texas that consolidates all three types of tallying votes with one software package.

We had record numbers of voters and very few minor problems with any of our equipment. The equipment is now 10-11 years old but has been very reliable.

Our Optical Scan system worked very well for our [number] voters. We feel it is simple, secure and satisfactory for our small county.

Why change something that works?

Our DRE system worked very well.

Due to the system still being new to the election workers, there are a few procedural issues that need to be addressed. Very few equipment failure occured, although we had a couple of instances, but nothing that could not be corrected. We have no DREs at this point in time.

Very good DRE Early Voting Optical Scans

DRE well received by the public.

Our system was quickly counted, very efficient and reliable.   we depend on its security features.

The machine was accurate and performed the way it was suppose to.

In my opinion, the Optical Scan works very well and is more dependable than the DRE's that were mandated by the Federal Government. Overall, I would recommend the Optical Scan over a DRE.

Our optical scan equipment consistently jams in the read head in processing absentee ballots, I believe, due to the folds in the ballots sent & received through the U.S. Mail.

Any system works as well as those that run it, use it and those that critique it. Since voting involves people it will never run perfect in everyones minds because it is all opionion and opinions differ from person to person. And the person in charge of the election is usually blamed for all errors. I beleive the best voting system must have a paper trail that is can easily determine a paper trail vote.

With the implementation of a statewide voter registration system no later than 2006, vote-by-mail will stand as the most efficient, highest participation, error free and secure voting system in the world.

It seems to perform fairly flawlessly. Most problems with it seem to be with the printing and cut of the ballot rather than with the scanning equipment of the machine.

My goal is a residual vote rate of less that two tenths of one percent in presidential elections, which has been accomplished.

Minimum minor problems, easily resolved, well-trained poll workers and staff made our system shine!

The voters loved it, our workers love it, and we had results from 100% of our precincts by 9:45 PM. It was and has always been great

We had to change out one machine that was not working. It was no problem as we had extras.   We had several DREs quit but all we had to do was turn them off then on again and they continued to work.

We are using lever machines which performed excellent. No machine issues. It is not broke - don't fix it! Forcing all towns and cities to move forward will not allow the electronic systems to prove themselves. Time will tell if they are working or not.

There was problem counting the advances votes, but after calling my vendors and attaining their expertise, we had no more problems

when you take ownership of all aspects of your election it works much better

Reliable and voters of this small rural county are extremely satisfied with our system.

Become better versed in using the election reporting manager that we used to report results. AND have a paper explaining the election night process to observsor's

Not the system but the auxillary equiment was very poor

We had no problems with our system

Punch Cards are extremely reliable and user friendly. Our voters are perfectly happy with them and do not like the Federal Government mandating that we change to another system.

Since my county is all paper ballot and hand count several of these quesions are not applicable here. Being all paper and hand has its benefits and drawbacks--time and accuracy are the most important issues here.

No system is perfect and no voter is perfect. I have a great deal of confidence in our DRE system.

Accurate count with more than 90% of registered voters actually voting in person or by absentee ballot.

Our DRE machines were wonderful - No problems. Do not accumulate totals at precincts. Totals are accumulated when Precinct Managers bring in memory cards and tapes at the main center for tabulating votes. Optical Scan is used only for Absentee paper ballots and Provisional Ballots. The November Elections were the first time we used DRE machines for Absentee and Advanced Voting. Worked very well, most votes ever cast before an election!

Our central count optical scan worked wonderful. It was the all the law changes that confuse the poll workers and make the process so difficult.

Voters liked it very well. Difficult to program, easy to get to 95% - and difficult to get the final 100% votes in and cleared.

Our system does not allow for over-votes. As far as under-votes go, some voters choose not to vote for all offices and you can't prevent the voter from choosing to do so.

We had no problems.

Using the ES&S 3P-Eagles is the best thing for us. The returns are as quick as the local election boards, depending   on the number of write-ins, and we are usually home by mid-night, even this past November election night.

Central tabulate works extremely well for our size of jurisdiction. It is reliable, user-friendly, affordable and allows for accurate recounts.

Direct Electronic voting worked very well for us. We experienced very few problems with our equipment. We did not use this system for advanced and absentee voting. This also worked well. Our lines were not nearly as long as the counties using the DRE's for advanced voting.

Our Over votes have decreased dramatically after converting from a central count to a precinct based op scan system

For the size of our jurisdiction, the optical scan system is perfect.

85% of the registered voters turned out and we had the count and everything returned to Town Clerk's office within one hour of the close of the polls.

In need of faster vote counting

Not effective for multiple Referendum questions also on the ballot.

The ability of a large number of infrequent and/or first-time voters and poll workers to use the system with little or no difficulty confirmed our beliefs about ease of use. As usual, I was mildly disappointed in the speed of the tabulation. (Memory cards were retrieved from the precinct and uploaded to a central computer. Then adjustments were made for hand-counted ballots. The central tallying software is not particularly user friendly, but the vendor assures us that modifications will be made prior to the next election.) Speed is probably a more important factor for local elections, where our results alone determine the final outcome.

It is very accurate and serves our county well. We had a recount and most totals per percinct were the same only 4 numbers changed which, to me, is outstanding.

We had no problems with the machines or with the vote count. And our results were in and counted by 9:00 p.m.

We use Optical Scan with counting at a central site. We love the equipment and have never had a problem.

We have had our voting system for about 10 years and have hardly had any problems over the years. We love it.

Considering that we, one of the [County discription] counties in Arizona, had to make the transition from Punch Cards to the new scanned ballot voting system in record time, overall the 2004 election cycle, Primary-Septermber and the General-November, went extemely well. I attribute this success to our voters, Poll Workers and a great team of well trained Troublshooters.

My machine has alway proven to be dependable, in fact I have a great deal of concern about replacing my current system when it's not broke.

The lever machines perform well. We have never had a recount that ended up with a large margin of difference over the original count. I would reccomend the lever machines over any other new technology available.

there is no need to move away from punch cards. this was all created by the media and nervous politicians who do not know how elections operate.

I feel that the technician that came out prior to the primary screwed up our machine.

Our machine performed very well; humans made the mistakes.

The hand count paper ballot has functioned very well in [County Name] County for over 100 years. This method is slow to count and does not address the latest hand-i-cap issues, but it has provided a century of cost effective elections for a responsable and informed electorate.

Our poll workers and voters found the voting system to be very user friendly. The blind voters who were able to cast their ballot independently for the first time were estatic.

Exit surveys within our county showed excellent satisfaction with the use of our DREs. We have hundreds of completed survey forms with positive comments about the equipment and process. I believe we need to continue to upgrade our poll workers and increase the use of technology in the election process. Our goal was to decrease number of poll workers by 40% through the use of technology and to have 30% of all poll workers to be students. We accomplished each of these goals in 2004 through a variety of programs.

I was very pleased with the system we used November 2004. We counted paper ballots by hand at the 9 polling places, but hope to have a central absentee district in place by Nov 05.

Voters love the Sequoia DRE machines with attached Verivote printers. Election Board officials are able to read the results cartridges through secure software and determine election results quicker with absolute accuracy and absolute security with Sequoia DRE machines.

Our lever operated machines all worked with no problems.

The optical scanner system is user friendly to the voters and very accurate for counting. I have never had a major problem since the maching was purchased.

With the size of our jurisdiction I have looked into different systems, but for the money we will be staying paper for the majority. Handicap isn't an issue in our county

Military and oversea ballots should come from the States

THIS SURVEY IS BEING COMPLETED BY CIRCUIT CLERK WITH INPUT FROM PROBATE JUDGE WHO IS THE CHIEF ELECTION MANAGER FOR COUNTY

I like our ES&S central count system. It has baeen very reliable and far superior to our previous antiquated punch card system. The vender experience, expertise and overall system support has in our case been critical to or over all success. I would never consider punch card voting again. I like the idea of central count because of the administrative 'contrl' it affords our elections administrator. It is most 'user friendly' for both our poll workers and the voters. It is my contention that the 'paper ballot feel' to the optical scaon ballot over the last decade has become very highly accepted by my jurisdiction's voters,with very few 'mis marked' or seemingly 'confused' ballots turning up on election night. I am sold on central count and it's 'straight ahead' configuration for a number of reaasons. It's only short coming I believe is with its limitations as per the disabled (especially those with sight impairments). However with an integrated DRE system that prints a blank ballot 'upon demand' at the poll (and then is counted exactly like other optical scan ballots) addresses that issue satisfactorily

Our optical scan machines worked perfectly with the option if any problems to hand count.

Out of [number] voters in our jurisdiction, [number] voted. We had all results posted by 10:40 p.m. In a recount, the only vote changes were the result of the mismarked ballots that had to be hand counted.

Machine maintenance by vendors is very important, but not always of the caliber that is required.

We have 25 precincts and 295 DRE voting machines. We had no machine failures during the November election. I have nothing but praise for the DRE voting machines.

this county did not have any major problems - counting went well at the precinct level and canvass and recounts were conducted without problems

Positive feedback from voters: easy to use; eliminates overvotes.

The voters like it; the media like it; I like it. We obtained the central count optical scan on our own initiative, when we could afford it and after testing several types. In my opinion that is the way things should be done. Not on a mandate from anyone else, federal, state, media, courts or whatever.

We used three experienced and competent teams consisting of 8 people each. The counting process moved smoothly and quickly. I feel confident our results were accurate. By now you may realize we are a small town. [Number] voters on our checklist with an 80%+ turnout.

The DRE machines worked very well with our voters. Even the older voters like using them. Voting is quick on the touch screens. We especially like the review screen at the end of the ballot process. It gives the voters confidence that their choices were the ones recorded.

There was a large amount of absentee voters (over 60% of those voting voted absentee). The folded ballots present a problem in the tabulator and wrap around the reader. Thus, it is necessary to remove the ballot manually. Additionally, the folded ballot does not alway end up in the correct location in the ballot box (i.e. ballots that have write-in votes or the machine could not read were not always in the location that should have been).

the machines we use is 1951 to 1957 models. they are old and worn out. they need to be replaced but the county can not afford to purchase new machines.

The lever machines used by my locality are old and are not as reliable as a voting system should be.

We still have the lever machines, it is hard to give opinions on machines we have only read and heard about. The old lever machines are reliable and accurate - the are too big, too hard to store and replacement parts will be harder to get as time goes by

You should do what Georgia did.

We had a 69% turn out with short lines and few errors.

The system did fine and all votes were counted.

Voters need to take some responsibility and know how to cast their ballot in the manner proscribed.

conted [number] plus and home two hours after the polls closed

our voting is done in March annually and the last one went well

Because of the high volume of voters we had problems with our ballot boxes sorting write-in votes.

We would not be replacing our lever machines if it were not required by HAVA.

It is most reliable and user friendly, just big and bulky and hard to store.

We had an unusual malfunction on election night which delayed our counting process for over 2 hours.

When we had an automatic recount for a countywide race, the ideal procedure to scan the ballots through the respective precinct scanner used on election day was not used due to the inconvenience of pulling all scanners out of storage. The votes cast was therefore inconsistent with election day.

In our [number] precincts, there was not one single machine problem. The AccuVotes have performed flawlessly for 10 years, and have been proven over and over in recounts.

Washington State "enjoyed" a state-wide machine recount and an additional state-wide hand recount. Punch card counties were both more accurate and more timely.

We used the optical scan central count for November only because the Secretary of State decertified our DRE used in the Primary.

It performed as advertised.

There is no e-conspiracy! Academics who think so should coach a little league team or volunteer for civic service--get a life!

For our small rural county the optical scan is the best type of voting machine that we could use.

THE SYSTEM WORKED QUITE WELL.

Equipment is outdated and it is difficult to obtain parts.

It's very hard to imagine improving on the system whereby a voter marks a paper ballot with a #2pencil.

I think provisional ballots are a bit silly. It seems to me if a person wants to cast his or her vote they could go to the trouble to register and keep up with changes that need to be made to keep there cards current. Once again, this is from the small county view.

Both our election workers and the voters like the precinct scanners!

Still some bugs that need to be worked out as far as programming/ballots preparation etc which don't directly affect the hardware issues.

It worked extremely well. Couldn't have been better

Reliable, accurate, and user friendly, just as we expect and demand.

current system purchased before I came into office.

Had trouble with the ballots where the folds are, and the machines had trouble reading the ballots where the folds were

We have very few problems with our Accuvote machine. It was more human error than anything else. We always rent an extra machine just in case there is a malfuntion with a machine.

The system we currently use performed extemely well. I have not used the DRE system and cannot rate it. I have been informed of problems through other jurisdictions

This was a new state mandated tabulator machine. Did not work as well as our former tabulator machine.

My Optical Scan machine is over 20 years old and although the system works well, as with any old machine, there were a few glitches.

We have used paper ballots I guess forever it seems and I have yet to receive any complaints about a voter not having a right to privacy on voting. As a matter of fact, most of my voters are not shy in expressing how they will vote and sometimes will mark their ballot right in front of us after we direct them to the voting booth, especially the elderly. They come in knowing who they are going to vote for and they don't care who knows. We do our best to accomadate anyone and everyon that has a disability. You know the saying, "If it ain't broke, . . .

For our size county, paper ballots work just fine. The last few years we have been getting the returns and getting home between 8:15 and 9:00 p.m. We've had one re-count that I can remember and there were almost no changes. The changes that were small and did not affect the outcome of the race. While, in some instances, the intent of the voter is not clear, 99 percent of the time it is very clear.

Paper ballots work fine for small towns.

The DRE system worked well. We did have some lines because of 70% turnout. If that turnout was to be regular we would purchase more devices. We had the county's entire results reported to us within 45 minutes of poll closing.

first you must have rules and regulations. those rules must be followed. when you do this - you do not a florida. we have NEVER had a problem with punch card in the 25 years we have had the system.

Timely to count the paper ballots!!!

Punch card has a paper trail, corrections can be easily made,easy to understand and program.

this questionnaire should also be directed to the Registrars of Voters if it hasn't already been done.

We have only one voting system in place and we had no problems. Most problems experienced anywhere with any election is voter error.

Use ES&S Voting System (the "Eagle")optical scan.

The voters like a paper trail and being able to double check their vote before its cast. My system works well for the voters.

Have an Election System & Software central counter.   One orecinct has a precinct counter because of distance.

Our main voting system worked extremely well, however, just as important as the ballot counting system are internal controls that are implemented and followed precisely prior, during and following the election. As I have observed difficulties in elections in other states, lack of the internal controls has created more problems than the lack of an accurate ballot counting system.

The voters loved the new equipment. I was apprehensive. The public is more informed that they were at one time. THe paper work that goes into election with this election verses our old equipment was minimal.

Of the 300 AccuVote TS voting units used 11--2-04 only ONE unit had to be closed because of a problem. That problem was with the screen. The votes from that unit were taulated at the end of the day.

we currently use the optical scanning units, each year they are serviced and programmed to comply with new election laws...e.g. overvotes- will now be rejected and the voter will be issued a new ballot, where before all of the other races on the ballot would be counted and the particular vote that was in error would not be counted...also a complete "blank" ballot would also be rejected, or ballots that are in any other color than black.

We are still using the 50 yr old lever machines. They worked great, again! I don't know if they counted correct since there is no paper trail.

We have a precinct counter and it worked great. No problems at all.

Our machines required no maintance on election day. The ballot was 11 pages long, and if a voter undervoted they were allowed to review all ballots and make any changes they wanted to. There was no way to overvote. We had 73% of registered voters to vote, and other then having to waitat times we had absolutely no complaints.

Performance was impacted negatively from prior years due to upgrade to visible light read heads, which did not perform to the standards touted by the sales staff. Performance improved as we learned what the true capabilities were.

Ohio is primarily a punch card state. Punch card is a good system, NOT wracked with fraud because we have procedures and laws in place. There will always be election day mistakes by pollworkers & election officials but that is not FRAUD.

It works. Why force change?

The optical scan system works very well, it is clear on how to fill in the form - pencil and form. Feed it through. Only concern would be those that are blind and don't have an individual to assist.

It worked extremely well. We had no problems whatsoever and our results were reported in a very timely manner.

Lever Machines are very sturdy, maintain well, but I know that they are being fazed out due to being outdated, however they are very dependable.

It is an old piece of equpment that I have planned for a few years to replace. I chosen not replace due to HAVA and need for State to complete RFPs.

Our people loved it. They were very apprehensive at first, but in the end we recieved many phone calls and words of gratitude. They said it was much easier than they ever believed it would be and that the poll workers did a great job in helping them to understand it all.

Our state needs to remove the Presidential ballot, which allows unregistered voters to vote on Election Day. There should be a cutoff or same day voter registration, which would allow voters to go directly to the new polling place.

Generally, the optical scan system worked well with few machine problems. Voters like voting on the optical scan system. Major drawback is lack of ease for the blind voter.

Our lever voting machines did not experience any mechanical difficulties

The equiment is old. there are 2 machines on election night one was not working most of the night. Counting took much longer than necessary.

Given the fact that our totla county voting population is about [number], and we have 25 individual voting sites - our electinons are very well conducted + we experienced very little difficulty this year.

Our Central Count Optical Scanner system has had three hand count recounts of close races in the 13 years we have used it and each time the counts came out with the very same totals. It has been proven that it is very reliable. The only down fall that central count has is that there is very little second chance when we are counting votes that voter has made a mistake on, after voter has dropped their ballot in the ballot box. The cost to have precinct counters for second chance voting far outweights the benefit. The number of votes that are not counted because of voter error are low. The ballot has complete instructions along with several poster place in the polling place for instruction of how to vote your ballot and what to do if you make a mistake. I think the voter needs to accept some responsibility when voting and don't think we should spend tax payer money to help those who don't care about their responsibility or don't want the responsibility. I don't think central counters would eliminate many overvotes or undervotes anyway, because voters won't want to mess with it anymore then than now.

The ballots were trimmed too narrow and resulted in several "miss feeds" due to timing marks not lining up with scanner sensors.

Opening of the polls was difficult in 3 out of 5 precincts. One P.E.B. could not be accessed - it had checked out right, after being replaced, but did not work.

over-voting and under-voting are not machine problems, but human error. Most problems are human error or insufficient training of election judges, or the public just not knowing what the heck they are doing, nor do a lot of them care. This optical scan system worked extremely well.

Results after midnight

I think we have the best right now.

If all the US used machines like Kentuckys' there would not be so many problems.

We have no problems/concerns with the lever machines. It is HAVA/state requiring us to change.

Absentee ballotting overwhelmed the system.

In thirty-plus years we have never had a problem. If it isn't broke-why change it?

We had no problems no at all.

very very proud of Oklahoma's system. Beautiful

We use paper ballots with centeral tabulation at the county houses

Suberb!! Optech Scanner Eagle III with voter's paper ballot retained

Like having a paper back-up system

We use the precinct count scan machines. This leaves a paper trail so that we can perform recounts at the public's or candidate's request. It puts faith in the votes trust of the system, so that they don't think that internal illegal things can happen!

with a paper ballot system - it may take time, but there's no room for error!

optical scan is so easy to use by the voter, so easy to administer the election from my end, so easy for election judges to administer the election from the polling place. Can't imagine why any jurisdiction would use any other system.

We had our tallies by 9:30 pm. Went home without any problems.

Well trained election workers made easy and accurate work of our [number] paper (handcounted) ballots

The lever machine did not have a problem. An accurate count was made and the election process was carried out efficiently.

Our Election was smooth with no real problems. Sequoia Pacific AVC Advantage equipment has worked well in the past nine years for [City] and we intend to retrofit machines for use by the blind. We are very happy with our system and voter comments show they are as well.

The machine had problems, but the support staff was helpful and knew how to correct the problem.

Again because of our small size our system of hand counting paper ballots works well. Ballot should be in English only. After all to be well informed you need English in America. Methods of voting should be such that any sociodemographic group can use especially when the poll workers are polite and helpful.

The largest pricinct had more voters and took longer to count - younger pool workers would have finished much quicker. Old what's her name has always worked and committee members keep putting them on the list. They are great folks and work hard - however younger minds are more sharp in most cases.

100% Accurate

The system was good, the individual voting officials needed much more training to be efficient.

lack of paper trail - vote mistrust

We had no problems

The system we use - lever machine - has proven quite well, no main problems - seems to be accurate way to vote

I feel the county's reps should worry about something else. The town's are all doing fine so why fix something that isn't broke?

Our optical scan kept stopping because it was it had to much humidity building up in it.

We had no problems and no compliants

Our system worked perfectly.

The voting system proformed well. The problem is the voters themself, as a voter when you have waited in line to vote would you not take the added time to look at the ballot to see that there are no hanging chads and the ballot is voted the way I had intended? You know you can do that with a punch card sytem. If you punch the ballot right we can count it correctly. The problems with the voting sytem that we use is the voters do not take responsibility for the ballot.

Because my county has had the paper ballot system for many years, and because Federal law now mandates a centralized voter system which has resulted in my state's decision to institute some change to our system to comply with the HAVA regulations and at this time we do not know what that system will be, my response to most of the questions on this survey would not be of benefit to you.

My precinct count optical scan system worked extremly well and the voters were very pleased with the new system.

Hand Counting Works Well For Us

slow but efficent

We had no problems with our ballots or the counting machine.

Our Machine counted all ballots extremely accurately accept the ones that people filled out incorrectly and the ballot had to be enhanced or duplicated so the machine could read it correctly.

Our county uses Shouptronic 1242 voting machines. We have had very good results with these machines. The polls closed at 6:00 P.M. and our totals were turned in to State Board of Elections by 7:30 P.M.

We had not choice but to use paper ballots, which has worked for us for 95 years, however, since we used DRE's successfully for 4 years, I prefer that we return to them. Our court is in the process of making a decision on a new system and hopefully we will have one in time for the November Constitution Election

Lever Machine   one column hammed causing line 6b to not accept any more votes after 299. Estimate between 170 - 220 votes not counted.

paper ballots -- although slower to count provide a verifiable proof of votes, if need be

Our system performed faultlessly, but repair parts are becoming a problem

No problems with paper ballots!

We had no problems.   We are a small town, [number] voters. We use paper ballots and are happy with this.

Our system has worked very well for the past twelve years. We experienced none of the fallout witnessed in other states.

Very pleased with our Eagle III Optical Scan machine performance, as well as the paper trail that's created using this machine (very crucial).

It was slow.

My jurisdiction has a total of [number] eligible voters. We used paper ballots which were hand-counted. Paper balltos are easy to use and easy to count

Everything went smoothly. Optical scanners provide ease of voting and tallying, and provide a paper back up.

Our optical scan devices are easy to use, extremely accurate and have given good service.

There has never been a problem with the lever voting machines in my jurisdiction in seventeen years.

We had no problems and the vote count went very smoothly.

Have had problems w/ ES+S system from day 1.

We hand counted. We have no voting machines.

The new machines (DRE) made everything run smoother and cut the counting time in half.

Oklahoma did it right with voting machines.

Hand count was exhausting.

We have had very few problems with our lever machines aside from a few mechanical problems now and then and some storgage issues.

The election went really smooth.

We have used punch cards for 25 years and have had no major problems.

Accuvote extremely reliable. Used Optech prior to Accuvote and found Optech not as reliable. In my 18 years experience, I have found instances of error in hand counting, but never with Accuvote.

not enough registered voters voting

We have paper(hand-counted) ballots. The only drawback I could say was how long it took to count the ballots.

The lever machines are very reliable but out dated and the parts are nearly impossible to get now.

I think it is a lot of money to use only every year twice. And I think because of Florida to have to change systems. There is always going to be problems somewhere.

We have had very good results with the punch card system. Have not had any major problems. However, the public has some doubts. But, the voter must take some responsibility in the voting process.

Our system counted the record number of voters that we had in our jurisdiction. The only problem we had was if a voter could not understand why their was 8 candidates for president, instead of the 2 that they had heard about. Nothing about the system.

no problems with present system

I was required to have 18 booths. My Highway Dept. made an additional 12 booths. We doubled check in and out clerks, so no one had to wait more than 2 minutes to receive a ballot. In a normal election we have 6 or 8 sets of counters, 11/04 we had 16 sets of counters. Many people donated their time.

We had a power surge, which burned up power supply in two of our counters.

In small municipalities, paper ballots are all that is needed. Our jurisdiction has approx [number] eligible voters.

Excellent results and saves lots of hours counting ballots

MACHINE WORKED FINE. HAD SOME MINOR GLICHES BUT THESE ARE TO BE A NORM.

The voting system isn't the whole concept of an election- competant election workers is the true key-they have to know election laws as well as how to operate the voting system

system works excellently

Optical scan provides a great system. It does slow voting for blind & disabled.

everything went smoothly

We have the optical scan system statewide, in every county. We believe we have the best system.

Our paper ballot (hand counted) system performs well in our small rural county. We plan to stay with this system until funding is available (state and federal)

Paper ballot works for our township with a population of [number]; est. [number range] voters

was good to excellent

Our election staff is small, experienced, and dedicated. We do everything "by hand" - we're getting older and more tired and election day ends up a physical marathon.

We like our lever machine, have no problem with them Not in a hurry to go electronic!

Our lever machines have been very reliable for 70 or 80 years. Can't see changing to electronic technology now!

We like our system.

We maintain the voting machines with regular inspections by professionals. The election inspectors are schooled before each primary and general election. The lever machine is fool-proof

1 machine broke down - but was fixed

Our only difficulty seemed to be where our Question appeared regarding our Tow charter. It was so high that many people didn't notice it.

Oklahoma has the finest!

It is reliable and accurate. No one can tamper with it without leaving visual markings.

The voting system software is extremely complex. The central reporting system contained a bit limit in the precinct results fields that resulted in misreporting of absentee/early votes on election night.

Central count bottle necks to much in our size of a county when all the ballots have to come back to one location to be ran through one machine.

It is not as fool proof as many believe, but better than the alternatives. It was an improvement over previous systems and the alternative systems.

The voting machines worked rather well. It was ES&S tech support that was lacking.

PAPER BALLOTS ARE GREAT!!!FOR COUNTIES UNDER [number];MAYBE ONE   OR TWO DRE'S FOR THE WHOLE COUNTY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.BUT, MAKING A SMALL COUNTY SPEND $100,000.00 IS CRAZY!!!

We had Microvote then, it was user friendly, and mistake proof.

Hand counted ballots should be 100% accurate. This method can be very slow, but speed is not important (only to the media) when accuracy is the real issue in any vote or election.

counting slow

Everything went wonderful with the precinct count optical scan.

The contract to purchase our DRE voting system was signed on August 4, 2004. It was a great accomplishment for us to put into operation this system and to have the system perform at the highest level of ease and accuracy.

Out optical scan machine performed well, but it is expensive to program and service for each election

Otcial scanner is outdated and vendor will no longer support. I'm thing I want to move towards precinct optical scanner to cover the "second chance" clause in HAVA. I like the paper ballot, and know that we have to have the DRE for people with disabilities.

one machine blew a fuse early in the am (was not sure of what had happened), spare machine was in place within 5 minutes. Only problem all day.

had a programming error in early votig that had to be corrected

Optical scan works well.

We had a problem with document feeding, which was worked out with the aid of our vendor's support technician. We are completely confident of the reliability of our voting system.

We experienced minimal machine failure. The main problems we experienced were voters who were either un-informed or mis-informed about amendment questions and poll watchers that had no idea what their roles were.

We have paper ballots and hand count. Very efficient and rate of error is very low.

The performance is directly related to the expertise of the machine mechanics, and to the training of the polling place officials. Fortunately, ours are excellent.

The DRE system we have was wxcellant. We would love to upgrade our current system with the newer version for the hearing/sight impaired.

Paper works great. Pool workers are hard to find.

Had absolutely no problems. No way for any one to overvote and if undervoted, given opportunity to review, vote or leave un-voted if they chose.

We have had nothing but support for our voting system. Never a complaint or problem. Complicated or new devices scare voters off. We need to make it easier for everyone.

We have two central count machines which for this election worked well. In prior elections, one of these machines jams more than the other.

We have never had any problems with our punch card system, and I felt it was a waste of taxpayer dollars to have to go to a different system.

Diebold DREs are great!

precinct count optical scan machines are very reliable, accurate + easy to use by both the public and poll workers

Our system worked extremely well. We had only two problems first thing that morning. One was operator error and the second was an electrical problem with the building the precinct was located in. Otherwise every thing went perfectly on election day.

We did extremely well. All of our machines did outstanding.

Our optical scan machines performed well as usual.

Our lever machines work just fine. On every mandated recount, there has been 1 error in 28 years.

We had small problems with the feeder taking the ballots. This is not a large problem, but does take extra time.

We had no problems with our punch cards and would keep them if we could.

we use punch card

fast, accurate, efficient

Paper ballot (hand-counted) we had many counters and it went smoothly. We are a small town and this system still works for us.

I think we are throwing the baby out with the bath water - just because we have computers doesn't mean we should disregard what has worked well for 70 years.

We have to preform to recounts one by machine and one by hand count. we were the same on all three counts no changes. We use punch cards. The counties who used op scan had many changes.

The 3P-eagle precinct optical scan counter worked flawlessly and as I speak to the State of Iowa will discontinue its use. Horriable conclusion!!!!!!!!!

We had new machines and lots of new workers - in a big election. We had one machine break down - so I think all things considered - the election went well.

Our punch-card system has severed us well!

Our punchcard system works fine, the other systems also work but we need not spend the money just for the sake of change.

Punch card system worked well.

The cost of a new system would be foolish spending for us-- more than our entire year's budget.

We used borrowed optic scan devices and they jammed several times when ballots were fed in at an angle - need feeder deck with fences to line up long ballots - shorter reader area.

Nothing is wrong with the lever machines. I do not understand why we are being made to change to DREs

Optical Scan equipment ran very well. The only problem I could see was that the counter could not process the ballots fast enough. Thus it was slow getting each ballot through the scanner. I believe that the maximum number of ballots that can be counted during the election day would be somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000.

Voters are very comfortable with the lever machines used as far as their reliability, but their size and inaccessibility to blind and disabled voters is a definate shortcoming.

Voters' love it- as well as poll workers with the exception of weight of the machine. The DRE is very true to its count. There will always be over and under votes.

We are a small town with paper ballots no machines.

We are very small in size, so paper ballot has not been a problem- just time consuming.

We only have [number] voters- so paper ballots are fine for us

Time frame for setting up ballots and receiving the necessary software back timely makes for a stressful election.

We could not be happier.

Our system performed well. Vendor did not give us correct code for receiving vote count at end of the therefore we could not receive from precincts. Our vote machines performed well.

As stated previously the optical scan that I use has served this county very well.

ON OCCASION OUR BALLOT COUNTER MAY OVERHEAT DUE TO FRICTION. OTHERWISE, WE HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS WITH OUR PUNCH CARD SYSTEM.

We vote paper ballots & have a team of judges counting at each precinct & the intent of the voter can be identified.

Machine was accurate as in the past, only minor mechanical problem that had not been experienced in prior elections.

We use optical scan + it is very accurate + one has a paper backup if needed

The microvote machine in our county was great, & KY has the best system all around for all categories.

Voting in area in which the probate judge would enter a site in the middle of election procedures and go through the ballots in the machine. This is illegal and it should be a way that only the person (vendor) should be able to do this or a person with a certain code.

Presidential Ballots should be banned!!! Town Clerks Hate Them!!!

I wish our DRE could be made accessible for the blind voter to meet HAVA requirements. It does have a paper audit trail. We have used the system extensively in our schools. This would not be possible using optical scan because of the cost of ballots. Use of touchscreens would depend on whether or not we could purchase software for set-up.

I have had no major problems with our system. It works very well for us. We are a small town with 1 precinct and approx. [number] voters.

One lever machine (out of a total of sixteen machines town-wide) malfunctioned and failed to accurately count the votes for the state senate candidate. The counter broke and failed to advance beyond the number 19. It is estimated that over 300 votes were lost for this candidate but there was no indication that anything was amiss until the end of the night when the back of the machine was open.

Paper ballots work just fine here and we do not need DRE.

We like our paper ballot system. Wish we could still use it.

In my small county the paper ballot is excellent. I would have a hard time justifying the cost for another voting system to my voters.

Paper Ballots work well here in this county

We hardly ever have any problems with our ballots (paper). We have only had 2 recounts in almost 30 years.

Everything went very well.

I believe voting systems throughout the state should be very similar to each other.

We are less than [number]. Hand ballots work very well.

SIMPLE AND COST EFFECTIVE

Everything went well, we don't see why we have to consider anything else.

We have never had any problems with the punch card system and I was very upset when it was outlawed as of 1/1/2006!

Voting system, central op-scan, did great. Operator errors created one problem. Corrections needed: more training.

No problems on system, had to change due to the state has gone to a statewide system.

Main problems - 1. Voters not following instructions   2. voters did not tell officials or ask questions before entering their vote.

Worked extremely well for elections, however we had a recount election for Probate Judge and the final count differed by 2 votes. Folded ballots were possibly not counted correctly.

We had a manual recount with results almost identical to optical scan results

We had punch card in Nov 2004 - it has always worked well for us.

In the last 4 years - 2 elections - I have had a 2 different re-counts and the outcome was exactly the same - punch card is a wonderful system - it's the butterfly ballot that causes problems. I do not want to give up the punch card system.

Our central scanner performs extremely well for our small population county (~ [number] voters). However, the HAVA requirements for second-chance voting are making it obsolete.

Our county has DRE for EVIP. It performs extremely well also.

We were pushed into the new system to fast and were not familiar with all errors that would come up.

Very hard to judge use of other types of voting systems we have only used paper ballots for the past 200 years

We had a very heavy turnout. The machine ran well with no Jams for 12 hours.

Went from paper ballot to optical scan. Benefit has been quicker tabulation and ease of hiring precinct election officials.

IT was flawless!! We had many compliments

Our jurisdiction spends nearly 1/2 million dollars on information on the voting system and the ballot the voters will see in the precincts. Monies are spent on electronic and mail. It will be a mircle if voters ever read or head it. The mistakes made are by person who fail to read instructions provided and are the greate # of phone calls.

very slow and unorganized counting

The DRE system with paper trail was new with training starting in June for N September primary & Aug early voting. The learning & training curve was steep. We all performed well, including the machines, when the time frame was considered.

The punch card ballot system performed quite well as it had since 1977 in our county. It is low tech and inexpensive. Voter literacy is the main concern.

We had some mechanical difficulties with our central count machine on Election Day, but did get all our ballots counted.

Have used our voting machines for years

No problems

We are a town of [number] and [number] regestered voters. It is hard to answer most of the questions in this survey. We use printed paper ballots, which are hand counted. It is very effective for our size. As vendors, DRE, etc don't pertain to us we haven't entertained the thought of using anything other than the paper ballot.

I would continue to use punch card voting if it were not required to replace.

It went ok. Don't forget about the time needed to learn about a new system, the complicated testing requirements and possibility of problems during the election (ours jammed twice, one vote was counted twice because of a jam).

We are extremely satified with optical scan systems which allow us to use the same ballots at precinct as mail-out absentee ballots. With DRE systems it requres us to use tow seperate systems due to absentees

In our small county ([number]) voters, paper ballots are an easy, workable system. Our voters are not in favor of changing.

HAVA has created too much, too fast. Not enough input by smaller, local election officials. We run elections, where was our input?

It works very well for a county of [number] registered voters and does not need to be changed.

Our election for 2004 went extremely well, as we hoped it would, the central count optical scan has worked well in our county

We are only making a chg due to new federal guidelines

Q36. Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?

We need to readdress Motor Voter law to close loopholes -- I have often said they put the dam at the wrong end of the river in election reform by changing our election equipment -- we should have been focused on cleaning uyp the registration process.

I don't know yet.

As I've stated before the State of Wisconsin has until Jan 2006 to comply with HAVA.

Full funding as promised!

Currently HAVA is still underfunded.

Eliminate the dangers EAC represents by eliminating the EAC.

The provisional ballot is a bad. In the State of Michigan, we have developed the QVF (Qualified Voter File) in about 1996. It ties the driver license to the voter file. So if you move and change your drivers license like you are suppose to do, your voting place will also change and the new township, city or village will send you a new voter ID card. This system, although not perfect, is working well. If the person didn't change their address and goes to the wrong voting precinct...whose fault is it. The voter has to take the responsibility to get themself registered. The provisional ballot lets people vote when in fact their vote will most likely not count because they are in the wrong place. Each state has a different system for registering to vote so how can one provisional ballot work in every state?

Make nationwide standards that are party-neutral

Will be better able to answer this after all the HAVA improvments have been made.

The only thing missing is a National Voter Registration System that election officials can cross check for people who are registered in other jurisdictions. The HAVA Act was fairly easy for Alaska as this state already had many of the things noted in the act implemented for many years.

Do what they say. Remove the politics.

The basic understanding if someone does not follow directions, there is the possibility their vote will note counted. People need to take responsibility for their actions, and if they have questions they need to ask.

Better public information, ie the provisional ballot. Many people were lead to believe they could vote anywhere with a provisional ballot - not so in Virginia. State laws differ.

get rid of provisional voting

Full funding of HAVA requirements by Congress needed. Also greater supervision by the state elections agency to ensure uniformity of procedures used.

Voter ID requirement for all voters -- not just new voters.

teadline should have been a 2008 deadline for new voting systems.

Why new machines? We've been told we will receive no financial assistance. Will be more costs for training and additional poll workers. Think this is foolish re: machines, however uniform voting rules, registration, and counting is necessary.

Pretty comprehensive repeal would help. Specifically, eliminate provisionals' counting except for close elections, and make statewide registration a decentralized system.

We are a small county, the financial burden to our county has been and will continue to be a great concern. The hours required to implement and maintain our current responsibilities have increased greatly and the county is unable to finance the needed hours to complete these services sufficiently. Our county also does not have a significant number of voters that will be significantly influenced by the HAVA DRE requirements.

HAVA may be great for large counties but many of the areas are not applicable to a small county. Is the federal funding always going to be there? What about replacement costs of machines? My county will not be able to afford this unless we have one central voting place-how can you accomplish that and not forfeit the rights of the voters that will travel up to 30 miles to vote.

much fune tuning needed it is living legislation

Yes, provide the funds to the states that were originally promised.

Clarify rules, so that every state can no interpret them the way the want too.

HAVA funds should NOT have gone through the states. In Virginia the first thing that happened was the state people gave themselves a pay raise. The 2006 requirement for disabled-friendly machines should be extended at least 2 years.

Timelines for implementation may cause problems.

More funding and consistent direction from the Federal Level is needed.

Get rid of provisional voting. Voting is a responsibiity

Voter registration ID requirements should be more uniformly applied. Include new voting system R&D to the duties of the EAC.

Changing handicap requirements from each precinct to selected precincts for special voters

I realize that it is difficult to make laws that govern every jurisdiction so maybe some of the rules should have more options.

FUND THE MANDATES COMPLETELY. Fund the EAC so they can do teir job. Better clarification of centralized voter registration. When states are left to their own interpretaion the processes become cumbersome and do not work well. Too many states are not giving local jurisdictions enough to follow the federal mandates. Chief election officials have too much say in how the money is distributed and the amount that will be distributed to the local authorities.

Yes Very Much. Let the local precincts have some options on what to do. Who knows the people better than someone doing the work. We have precients with less than 30 voters and the requirements of HAVA are way out of line. Thanks for your help

Because of controversy and lack of certification of voting systems to date, the 2006 deadline regarding equipment must be reconsidered. Jurisdictions are being forced to gamble their limited HAVA dollars on equipment we HOPE will be certified in the future in order to meet the arbitrary deadline. Neither vendors, EAC or national associations can give us clear direction. This is nuts!

Make decisions that are economical and based on common sense. It is not economical to have a disability voting system in every one of our precincts or requiring optical scan ballots for the March township elections.

Yes. Why force all this "big time city" stuff on us rural counties. We DO NOT have a great number of blind & disabled, and the ones we have get along very fine. Neighbors just help out around here.

Yeah, get rid of it. Let the states run the election process, if they are competent. If not, follow the direction of the states that DO know how to conduct an election.

requirement for a machine in every precinct should be eliminated. Many small precincts cannot afford the machines and the maintenance in future years.

I agree with the ada requirements of HAVA - however I do not agree with the provisional voting aspects. Many people feel that because of provisional voting it is not necessary to be registered to vote. I feel that if a person wants to vote they should be responsible enough to get registered to vote like everyone else in the state. A certain amount of voter responsibility should be REQUIRED.

Better formal education process

HAVA means a less competent and secure system in Kentucky, with no improvements to the process on election day. Kentucky had one of the top three systems in the country and one of the three or a combination of these should have been promoted as a model. The Federal government has no authority to tell states how to elect its senators or electors.

The election process should be simplified. The process has been confusing for voters. I have called the bill the Help America not to Vote Act because if places more obstacles in the path of voting for voters.

We did not receive any funding from HAVA prior to the last election. We were told last year that each polling place would receive a touch screen voting machine for disabled voters. This did not happen. We did not miss it either; we are a small community and people help eachother when needed. I guess funding for the changes we need to make to our polling place would be welcome, plus, if we have to have touch screen machines, they need to be supplied to us as promised.

Provisional voting needs to be improved. I do not like the idea of people going through the motion to vote when their vote is not going to count and there is a lot of paper work that has to be done for provisional voting, and then their vote doesn't even count! most of the time....

Address administration of elections which is PEOPLE more than machines. Remove administration from partisan influence, require competence standards for all supervisors of elections

My state does an excellent job. We were doing most of the HAVA requirements in the past. Each state is an entity with their own characteristics and traditions. Just because one or two states made errors was no reason to change every state's system. An example. The lever based systems are one of the easiest to manipulate. Yet, because of Florida HAVA ruled punch cards as being such a poor system, everyone had to change.

Forget Provisional Voting. We need to spend our resources on voter education, proper registration, precinct location,etc.

GET RID OF PROVISONAL VOTING; IT'S USELESS!!

National standards whether or not a provisional ballot should count if voted at the wrong precinct. In Kansas, the ballot is counted and only that portion that the voter is not entitled to vote in invalidated.

Only require ID requirement for mail-in forms that have a post office box address.

The further governmental control gets from a local level, from the people it affects, the less effective and more complex it becomes.

We should require all voters to show ID so no one feels they are being targeted.

Clear explanation of rules for all states.

Either leave the States alone, or, when requested, give firm legal opinions on matters not clearly defined.

Certification of equipment should have been finished prior to the requirement for each jurisdiction to have some type of disabled voter equipment. It puts a rush on a lot of us. When every dollar counts, you not only have to think of the initial cost, but also the money it will cost to maintain, etc. these new machines.

eliminate requirement for every precinct to have disability machine. Can be handled on a county basis

Publish best practice for voter education (ie. issues, candidates, voting procedures)

In Kentucky the Provisional Balloting is a step backwards for us. By far the state as a whole as one the best elections systems in the country and most secure. Now we are being forced to issue ballots to people that may or may not be who they claim to be.

Require the states to have the state plan adopted by the stakeholders (states decided they were only advisory). Requuire dedtailed allocation formulas to locals in the state plan. Limit state voter file costs to acquisition

HAVA is and has been a terrible waste of taxpayer money in 80% to 90% of its programs and implementations. Direct money for proper equipment, testing, election judges schooling costs, and local election administrator publicity would have accomplished so much at so less cost. The majority of the HAVA community based orgainzation/institution grants paid for meals, travel, high salaries, indirect costs converted to cash for the grantee and did not accomplish any more than the normal free media coverage provided. HAVA became the new wave of how to spend federal taxpayer dollars on fluff without properly addressing or funding the nuts and bolts of the vehicle. Dependable technology and systems!   Every group and organization wanted on the band-wagon and saw an opportunity to obtain money for itself. I truly believe the intent of improving voting access, systems, availability,   and comitment to the process got lost in the MONEY. So many millions spent on so little actual improvement to the overall voting and counting systems. In the 50's and 60's it was Civil Defense and bomb shelters, next AIDS, Community Health   Programs, then The Bioterrism era along with HAVA. All have accomplished some social awareness and improvement without a doubt, but the dollars spent in relation to the improvement seem extremely high. Looking from the outside in, it appears most HAVA programs were very costly with minimal overall change, and were more concerned with currency than commitment or actual functional useable resources and technology. To paraphrase an old saying, 'It Got Lost in the Shuffle Somewehere.'

Reasonable deadlines for handicap voting machines. The technology is not up to fulfilling the requirements.

HAVA requirements on small populated counties is an extreme expense and DRE's probably will not be used by the public. Smaller populated counties should be exempt from HAVA.

Small Counties should have some consideration about the expense being imposed upon them to put a DRE in every polling place. It would be practical to have 1 main polling place in the county for disaled to vote.

Yes. Congress should define certain of the requirements. The ID issue for first time voters who vote by mail is stupid. Everyone should show an ID when they vote. If you look at the 50 state plans all of them are different. There are provisions in HAVA that are great but some are not. It can be improved by coming up with one law that applies to all states.

Yes, by helping the "local" (township) level of government to recognize and implement better facilities to the voters. This should be done without current mandates == instead by actually assisting the local official.

Too many to list here. HAVA was developed due to political reasons and not what is in the best interest of states and/or other jurisdictions.

[County Name] County already was reaching their local voters.   We do understand the larger areas cannot know their voters but they should do a process to help their area and just have the smaller areas take care of their own.   We already have special tables for those who are in wheelchairs and we already allow persons to be supported if they cannot read the paper ballot or need help with hearing.

That question is best addressed at the state level.

In my opinion, it is not an improvement at all in our small county.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALLER PLACES LIKE OURS SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS

More funding and more voter centralization between states

Continued financial support. No state and county mandates that result in financial stress

The HAVA act tends to conflict in some ways with the 1993 Motor Voter Act. It restricts in ways and cause more confusion as election officials and voters try to properly use the provisional ballot process. I think there are some neeeded changes in the law. Election officials should have greater imput if amendments are made.

Listen to County and Local Election Officials that administer the elections. I say again, "It should not be one decision for the whole country." We are too diversified for that.

HAVA's deadlines must be extended to give smaller counties the ability to comply. They simply do not have the money. And, when the requirements kick in to have a DRE in every precinct, you are going to see pure havock. The aged judges and workers cannot operate them and I question the integrity of the machines after being "hauled and bumped around" to get them to the polling location. My solution is to go to a centralized location or locations for two weeks of voting and do away with election day and the requirement that all precincts be open. This is a tremendous cost to the county and we are finding it harder and harder to get people to work with the added requirements put upon judges. It is simply too complicated to remember when you do it every other year. (primary and general)

Do not require a state-controlled centralized voter registration system - sharing of information would have been better.

Consider local ramnifications and cost of implementing HAVA requirements. Do HAVA benefits outweigh costs and disadvantages in certain local situations?

Not making it absolutely mandatory for this small county to go to the extreme measures for a handful of people that may or may not (probably not) use the DRE anyway.

If provisional voting is to continue a national standard defining jurisdiction must be set. This national standard MUST define the jurisdiction as PRECINCT. The purpose of provisional voting is not to create convenience voting for people who are too lazy to go to their home precinct or too   irresponsible to know where it is that they should vote. It was established to prevent legitimately registered voters from being disenfranchised due to errors in the voter registration records.

More security over voter registration. We should have voter registration cards and stronger id requirements to register to stop voter fraud.

The stipulation that every polling place have a voting machine for blind/visually-impaired voters in absurd. In very small jurisdictions the expense is prohibitive and the need is miniscule.

INSTEAD OF MAKING IT EASIER FOR THE VOTER IN A LOT OF WAYS IT HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT. EXAMPLE FIRST TIME VOTER TO SEND A COPY OF ID. WHAT REAL PROOF IT THAT THIS IS REALLY THAT PERSON? AND THEY DON'T SEND ANY ID SO THEIR VOTE DOES NOT COUNT WHAT A MESS!!!

Eliminate the requirement to send ballots through two federal elections for FPCA. Addresses change much too often. Nightmare to administer. All voters should require identification. Extend deadline for purchase of DRE's until bugs are worked out and paper verified requirements are finalized. Eliminate requirement to notify all provisional voters if their vote counted.

By offering a "no reason" Absent Voter process instead of early voting. The "Provisional Ballot" process has to be simplified, with central registration there should be no reason why the location of a voter's registration can not be determined the day of the election thereby iliminating the "provisional ballot process". If the voter didn't make an effort to verify or update their registration before 30 days prior to the election then they should not be allowed to vote in that election....we are after all not their babysitters.....some of the responsibility has to fall on the voter!!

Instead of the precinct requirements for diabled voters capabilities(blind independent voting),office should offer one system.per region, etc..the expense is extraordinary nationwide!

Yes, I think that the voters should be responsible for themselves in making sure they are registered to vote. I feel like the new HAVA requirements are enabling voters to be irresponsible since they know they can come in and vote a provisional ballot even though it does not count. It waste a lot of the voters time and also the poll workers time and all it does is get them registered to vote, when they could have registered to vote at the voter registar office which is much simpler than registering on election day.

1. Although the provisional ballot has merit, the media distorted the purpose and requirements to a degree that many unnecessary problems were created.   2. In order to register to vote in Virginia, a person is not required to produce any type of identification. Therefore, I think the use of the Voter Card, as a proof of residency, citizenship or identification at the voting precinct should not be permitted. Its purpose should be to inform the voter of their registration status and polling place.

Specifically detailing how to handle provisional ballots, establish centralized list of voters. Law is too vague in   certain areas. Should be more stringent.

Provisional voting is too time-consuming on election officials to verify the voter's eligibility.

I don't think the people in government who change laws have any idea what they are requesting. It seems politicians implement changes/laws without any knowledge. A "just do it" attitude.

It should realize that ID should be required,it is expected in other secure settings.

Simplify the process for provisional voting requiring voters take more REAL responsibility for their right to vote.

Either require everyone to provide ID or no one.

Terms such as jurisdiction, voting machine audit capability, should have benn defined.

Eliminate ID requirement for mail registrants. Clarify how UOCAVA voters request absentees other than FPCA's, to provide equal protection for all UOCAVA voters not just through FPCA's.

I don't forsee that to happen, not with the Federal Legislature.

to remember the program is to help people to vote not become a hinderance!

Could be improved by not requiring a DRE in each polling site. We have 13 polling sites in our County and maybe three blind people. It would make more sense, financially and for the ease of our pollworkers (training, hauling and storing equipment), for me to have one central machine for people to vote on in our office, if they need to vote that way.

accountability of Secretaries of States as to how monies are spent

I think jurisdiction that have none are very few disabled voters should have to option of having handicapp voting system at certain locations, not at all polling places

Making sure only valid voter can vote, ie Non-citizens voting

Additional funding for research of voting systems

Make SURE the funding is there to assist in these changes. Do away with the requirements on first time voters. It's fruitless.

Many - just ask the officials who participate in the   election process!

Need more standards set

Eliminate mandatory handicapped machine for each polling place- Too costly

Again common sense would help. Our state will require that all polling places have a DRE and precinct counter. We are a rural county and cannot afford this technology in every precinct. There needs to be some flexibility in the law and state election officials that are willing to work with us.

Need to ease strict guidelines on spending. Need to allow local officials more leeway for their own education plans.

Allow more flexibility when states have other, different, ID requirements

Voter ID for all instead of 1st time voters so there would be uniformity in rules.

ID all voters

We do not agree with the provisional voting requirement. This has hampered getting results in a timely manner for big elections.

Common sense with disablity access requirements.   Too much state control over HAVA funds and implementation. Too little direction from EAC on State-wide registration list requirements.

Allow election authorities to determine the amount & areas where the ADA compliant equipment is needed. I have areas where they will never be needed.

All States should adopt the same standards for conducting elections. HAVA is a good start, but I think the intent is lost when left to interpertation by individual states. For example the rules for registration in Ohio appear to be very different than those in CT.Looking from a distance it is difficult to understand why they experienced so many problems administering the election.

Stop adding provisions to make the system impossible to administer. We have more exceptions than rules so no one knows what to do and consequently does it wrong.

Increased and continued voter education.

More flexable with the deadlines imposed.

We don't need it.

Eliminate some of the numerous committees/commisions and sub-committees that are requiered, if memory serves me well, to date,some of these seats/positions have not been filled, inhibiting studies/recommndations and the allocation of funds.

make it easier on poll workers. increase of requirements cause more responsibility on them, and many are elderly.

Distribute promised funds.

To expensive for smaller jurisdictions to comply...

fund it or butt out.

No unfunded mandates.

Eliminate or improve provisional voting. Its implementation in our state is a farce.

Provisional voting should be eliminated because it delays final election results. The central registration system in place in Minnesota provides for a swift varification of new voters and can be further improved with e-access to identification information such as state drivers license files.

Mandate uniform application of Provisional Voting   Creation of nationwide voter registration database so all states can track duplicate registrations and voting.

try to inform the poor white, black and what ever other   trash there is better. nmake everyone republican. deport all the liberals!!!

It needs to be simplified and the provisional balloting needs to be more restrictive

Of course, everything can be improved.

Voting systems: require the capability to independently verify the vote totals.   Voter registration: eliminate provisional voting and authorize election day registration in federal elections.

By being repealed.

standardize voter id information to be required each election, not just first time voter

Require ID for all voters to alleviate the appearance of "discrimination".

Not sure moneys for voter education are well spent. Most of the materials go unread because the voters do not make the effort to read what is given. Use more of the education money on better voting systems.

More funding.

Yes, by having stricter guidelines for provisional ballots and they be the same in all the states. Everyone should be required to vote where they actually reside . So many from other states thought they could vote a provisional ballot just because they were either visiting or working in another state. Most of them thought their "provisional" ballot was automatically counted. There is a lot of misconception about the provisional ballot which creates much confusion on election day everywhere. First of all the media needs to give out the correct information, especially during a Federal Election and it should be consistant for all states. The state of Virginia has had a "Conditional Ballot" for years and worked the same as the "Provisional Ballot." So we only had to change the name.

too soon to tell

Yes, get rid of it before it swallows up every dime the State and especially local governments have in their budgets.   (Also, you misspelled improvement above)

The State made it very hard to get our monies. The State didn't need to be involved, it would have made it easier for the counties.

Remove provisional voting for all cases except unreported moves and doubt about registration status. Do not allow voting anywhere in the county which is a recipe for irregularities and errors. Voting is handled by precinct officials who work two or three days a year. It is too complicated and they make too many mistakes that can jeopardize an election. All the training in the world cannot correct this problem.

Need to review ID requirements, or allow states to make them compatible for existing state laws.

The do-gooders need to understand that the voter has certain responsibilities. The "system" cannot and should not treat the voter like an infant. In addition, they need to accept that some disabilities are a fact of life and not everyone is going to be able to do everything all be themselves. Even the most able person needs help sometimes. In effect HAVA needs to be scaled back.

Get the Feds to fully fund it.

The Provisional Ballot process needs some revision. With six provisional ballots, all were denied. It is a waste of time.

yes stop provisional voting. i think it is a waste of time and money. very few provisional ballots can be counted.

If the first time mail registrant does not have an ID, he should sign an affidavit before voting. To vote a provisional with no further requirement is a sham!

Let small gov't get by if can....unless a complaint is lodged.

Allow local level decision as to what we need and work with the Feds as to what is a reasonable accomodation.

Require local governing bodies to provide adequate funding and support of voter registration offices. Voter registration/election administration is traditionally the most under funded department in local government. Many election officials feel the handicapped accessible voting component could have been handled by simply having fewer accessible voting machines centrally located and not have them in each precinct. This would save funds and allow for one group of election officials to be extensively trained in the use of the accessibility components of the equipment resulting in better quality of services.

funded correctly and fairly

Yes. Provisional Voting. Funding. Uniformity across states. Better definition of requirements.

Most of the HAVA requirements were already in place in Virginia.

Perhaps easing the requirements placed on less densely populated rural areas where convenience to the voter should come into play. Combining precincts to reduce equipment costs could result in precints that are large in area but still relatively small in terms of the number of voters.

HAVA officials should be aware of what happens at the county level that impacts all the citizens and elections staff.

Probably, but we are not into use of our new equipment sufficiently to judge all of the factors.

Requirements for disabled access to voting system should have some relationship to disabled population per each voting precinct.

focus on recruiting and training a younger election force.

The purging voters process is a bit of an overkill for a small town like ours, but is understandable in larger communities.

Uniform requirements for provisional voting

Fully fund the program

I think the Government should have based more studies on polling site access in rural area's before implementing the access requirement. It is very difficult to find ADA compliant polling sites in rural area's.

The HAVA requirements and system dictates should not be driven 9as they are0 by the disabled requirements. We have very few requests for disabled aservices, but ust pay millions of dollars for a few disabled voters to vote "privately and independently". This element of the law isnot cost or service effective.

No Provisional Voting.

greater local flexibility

HAVE WAS A BIG WASTE OF TAXPAYER DOLLARS--IT'S A SHAME THAT   YOU COULDN'T HAVE CONTACTED LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS FOR MORE   INPUT BEFORE WASTING SO MUCH TIME, EFFORT AND MONEY.

Eliminate requirement that votes be counted at polling places.   Not require technology solutions to every problem. Allow for a system based on good-faith volunteers. Do not assume that 70 year old election workers can operate complicated voting systems. Do not assume people will wait in line for ten hours to get access to ten or twelve DREs at a polling place. Permit voters to make mistakes with their ballot, over voting or undervoting. Stop trying to cover for Kathryn Harris's political corruption by "reforming" our system of voting.

More MONEY

Help AMericans be informed voters

YES. It should have had the input of election administrators.

extending the time in which to implement the use of the mandatory DRE's so that we can better educate and compare the Certified DRE's.

The regulations need to be strigent regarding family of American Born citizens. We had a young woman call us from Canada. She never lived int he US, but her father had lived in our town. She was allowed to vote based on that fact.

273

Voter responsibility should also be stressed. When voters overseees wait until the last minute to request an absentee ballot or when voters choose to wait until Election Day to check on their voting status and become angry when asked to show ID it becomes frustrating to Election Officials. I also   feel there should be a nationwide coordinated system of mailing oversees and military ballots to ensure their prompt delivery.

Clearer information out to local officials

Base new requirements on size of jurisidiction. I don't believe small jurisdictions need to implement the same rules as big jurisdictions. It's a waste of $$

Yeah, by not forcing us to buy the new DRE's when we can't afford it.

People need to be responsible for getting registered and getting out to vote. The work should not be put on election officials.

You don't want to hear what I have to say regarding HAVA

put some teeth in the decisions made by eac. they have no authority. put people on that committee who have actually held an election. there has got to be a better way than provisional voting. some of the regulations in provisional voting are absolutely ridiculous.

100% Adequate Federal Funding with no state or local jurisdictions having to come up with the rest, especially if a jurisdiction is being forced to change systems.

Delay the required date of implementation of handicap voting requirements, which is now Jan. 1, 2006. California has no voting systems with certification that can be purchased to meet these requirements and time is running short.

YES. EXTEND THE TIME FOR IMPLEMENTATION. LET JURISDICTIONS DO IT WITHIN THEIR OWN TIME FRAME; ALLOW FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES.

Time will tell down the road for each Election

I don't believe it is necessary to have first time voters show identification, because we have known them since they were born in my jurisdiction.

do away with provisional ballots. Most who vote do not understand what the ballot is. They think that they can vote even if they are not registered.

Requiring everyone to show id. I feel there are too many chances for discrimination the way the federal law is written.

Help the counties administer the requirements financially and with voter awareness

They should continue to fund HAVA requirements as promised.

either require identification for all registrants or none. Separate requirements for some registrants, but not others, is extremely difficult to implement.

National standards for: 1)provisional ballots (tie registration to local jurisdiction vice native precinct); 2) for voter registration (e.g., when ex-felons can vote); 3) poll hours; 4) absentee ballot returns (postmark or end of election day)

The Federal Election Assistance Commission could be fully implemented and hold meetings -- actually DO something!

Uniform standards, more money given to counties and not the state.

In my state HAVA has been the direct result of the ability to implement a real time state centralized voter registration system. From the monies that HAVA is providing, I would like to see a requirement that a percentage of the total entitlement be required for "sustainability" of the system. As a county election official I look to the future and am concerned about the "maintenance bill" that we will incur as a reult of HAVA requirements. If there is money required to be placed in an "escrow"

account to assist with maintenance costs after the HAVA money goes away, the concept of Federal involvement and requirements in our local elections will be much more palatable.

VOTER ID - DO NOT REQUIRE QUALIFIED FIRST TIME VOTERS WITHOUT ID TO VOTE A PROVISIONAL BALLOT. THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SIGN AN AFFIRMATION (UNDER PENALTY OF PURGERY) AND VOTE ON THE VOTING EQUIPMENT. The Provisional Ballot provision, which in Virginia is a paper ballot, is a monsterous administrative burden. Voter ID has been required of ALL voters each election in Virginia for several years. Voters whose names are listed but who do not have proper ID have been able to sign a legal Affirmation of Identity (carrying a purgery penalty) and vote on the voting equipment. PROVISIONAL BALLOT INFORMATION - Provide accurate information nationwide that informs the voter that although they may request a Provisional Ballot at any polling place in the country and may be issued one by election officials fearful of being sued, at least in Virginia, that ballot will not count unless the voter meets the residency and other requirements and is properly registered in the jurisdiction and precinct where the Provisional Ballot is cast. In 2004 our jurisdiction had requests from hundreds of voters who do not live in our jurisdiction and are not registered in our jurisdiction that requested and sometimes demanded that they be given a Provisional Ballot. All of these voters were sure they had the right to vote a Provisiona Ballot ANYWHERE under Federal law. Virginia has had Provisional Ballots for years as a failsafe for voters whose registration may have slipped through the cracks. What we have under federal law is an abuse of the failsafe intent that is backed up with the threat of legal action. In order to avoid legal action, everyone who asks for a Provisional Ballot is provided one. REMOVE THE TWO FEDERAL ELECTION PROVISION ON THE UOCAVA VOTERS - Military voters move frequently and the requirement to automatically provide ballots through the second federal election has already created a huge problem in our area, which has [identifiable information]. A federal Form 76 received now would entitle voters to ballots through the 2008 Presidential Election. We could automatically be sending out thousands of absentee ballots in Nov. 2006 to addresses that are no longer valid since most duty assignments are 18-24 months. Since absentee ballots can not be forwarded, we could be talking about a huge futile effort for the staff of election's offices, especially those with large military instilations. Previously, our military voters have submitted Federal Form 76's in years in which they were interested in voting. In most cases that is Presidential Election years only.

Yes. Requiring first time voters who registered to vote by mail to show ID is great, but then letting the type of ID be the voter card that the Registrar issued is silly when the person didn't appear before the Registrar or provide any proof of residency. That makes no logical sense.

Get rid of it - just because one state had a problem in 2000, does not mean the feds need to step in and change the whole country!!

Be funded to actually be able to help counties with new requirements.

Allow for only 1 machine for central location for a blind or hard of hearing voter in small counties. Should not require a machine in each precinct. Makes it extremely expensive, when maybe there are only less than 20 or less voters in entire county requiring this type of machine.

People who are making all of the decisions are the ones that don't have to work with it every day. There are alot of things that need to be reviewed, and local election officials need to be the ones to provide the input not the elected officials.

The requirement for handicapped accessible equipment in every precinct across America is complete overkill for much of rural American and is without common sense or true assessment of need, has no consideration of voter population density and available resources.

For Congress to complete the full funding.

HAVA is very difficult to understand and follow. They should make it less confusing for the little jurisdictions.

Issues with the possibility of double voting - state to state. Only solution is federal database. Too Orwellian?? The statewide database is difficult to create and administer.

Fully fund the program, or drop the deadlines since the federal government did not abide by their portion of the deadlines.

Too many conflicting rules between federal + state

275

1. Recognize that a vote by paper ballot is not discriminatory   2. Proof of citizenship should be requred to register + photo id   3. Photo ID with residence should be shown at the polls   4. Cosideration for costs to small towns

Yes, by backing off

Paper Ballots Only

Fully funding by the Federal Government. If they want to make the decisions they need to pay for it all. Like I said before, the special interests groups had too much influence.

Stop provissional voting - we have 1 blind voter who votes early. Don't spend millions of dollars on equipment that will not be used.   I believe the solutions for problems were already adddressed by challange voting. And I believe the Golden Rule should be used for blind voters. If it were me - someone would have to bring me to vote. I would choose assistance. But 1 per county would be more than efficient.

More funds to to implement the requirements properly.

Voters need to accept more responsibility in making sure they are prepared for election day. We can't take care of everybody. HAVA is only HAVA, not the remedy for apathy and laziness.

Implement language limits for proper comunication at the polls. One standard.

The legislators need to understand that the diabled voter requirements are too costly for small counties. A county with [number] voters registered do not need a DRE in each precinct, if they are using optical scan machines.   Also, there should be some responsibilities on the voter to know how to vote, and not have this overvote provision on the machines. It is discriminatory for the absentee voter, who doesn't get the opportunity to correct an overvote. Of course they make the decision to vote absentee, but if they can't go to the polls they don't get that opportunity.   Absentee voting should be for those who truly cannot get to the polls.

They is always room for improvement.

Do not require all jurisdictions to meet every requirement of HAVA.

Decide on one system and have everyone use it.

It was moving too fast + making mandates on the timing to states when new machinery for the handicapped was not tested yet.

Eliminate it.

Add common sense to some of the regulations

DON NOT REQUIRE PAPER RECEIPT......Opens up the possibility of fraud for vote buying when the voter turns a receipt over in exchange for money with proof of a vote cast for a specific candidate.

Do away with provisional voting

Need to have central voting access on county level for disabled + handicap voters. No requirement for voting on local precinct - very very costly for equipment

Having people who have never participated in setting up an election or run an election is fundamentally wrong. They need to get people who understand how to do an election, rather that people who think their ideas are great, but in reality are very difficult to implement.

Better contact with local town officials

Provisional balloting is a mess. Ohio has had provisional balloting in place for several years. There needs to uniformity in this process.

More flexibility in meeting requirements for disability machines

They need more input from Election Authorities that actually implement the procedures mandated by HAVA.

Too much government

Our town has complied for 15 years, We are ready for most situations.

HAVA is poorly written. There can be many interpretations of many sections and no one will take responsibility and say what it should be. The Federal Government should make it clear when asked by State or Local officials. Provisional voting needs help. People now think they can pick any precinct and vote, whether it is in the correct jurisdiction or not. They try to vote in all jurisdictions and see how many times they can get away with it.

Election Official holding the elections to be more involved in the process of HAVA

HAVA is a very necessary voting assistance program, however in   small rural counties across the nation, common sense should prevail when considering the expense of some of the requirements. Disabled persons should be able to vote as normal persons except there are times when they simply cannot.   When there are absentee voting processes in place - or when in small counties there are only two or three persons that would use the new equipment - why should they have to be located in every precinct at a cost of $1500 to $5000 each? Please do not think I am being unsympathic to the disabled - I have a disabled daughter and a 30 year old friend who is in a wheel chair for the rest of his life.

Fund EAC earlier and more adequetly. Speed up the process for approval of new voting systems.   HAVA kept the same time lines and yet didn't fund anything for two years?--and now they expect us to meet the HAVA time lines at the state and county level.

develop a nation-wide stadardized machine & process

Small Towns do not have precincts, the voter reg card should reflect place for acct# (voter #) -- rules get too complicated -- paper work overload on voting is occuring these past few years.

Extend the deadline for total implementation

Provisional ballots are to complicated. Inspectors have an opportunity to make more errors. Voters must take some responsibility to get to the correct polling location or vote AV

As Oklahoma Law already has provisions in place for assistance to be given to blind or visually disabled voters and voters with physicial disabilities, and our current voting system and election system (totally unified state wide!), I feel that HAVA should allow those provisions to be accepted as ability for impaired voters to stand in place of machine replacement.

Resind provisional voting requirement.

More funding to small county governments.

Government funding everything. Counties are going to have a hard time paying for all of this. Not to mention keeping our judges, workers, etc.

Let military vote at their base and send results to secretary of state where thye live

I understand this happens nationwide: We found in Nov. that many young people at college had registered to vote with 2 groups: [state] Perg and Rock the Vote. These reg. forms were all turned in after the deadline and all these first-time voters had to be turned away at the polls. If a political party knew how most of a particular group (youth in this instance) were going to vote - what an impact on the outcome of an election could be achieved by disenfrancising these voters. All reg. forms probably should be numberd and all numbers accounted for prior to the cutoff date. We need to be very careful to whom we entrust this responsibility.

I think that provisional voting should be done away with. The voter needs to be responsible for making sure they are registerd to vote in the proper precinct and they are up to date on registrations list.

More local input

I would like to see a paper trail made so recounts will be accurate. Similar to bank ATM. You make a Deposit or withdrawl and get a paper receipt. The bank has a master record for deposits to checking/savings, etc. and you could go home and see the transactiion on your computer bank link.

Yes. Funding and information on the best voting system available.

THE SYSTEM NEEDS INPUT FROM PEOPLE WHO ACTUALLY WORK WITH ELECTIONS. IT'S OBVIOUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED THAT WAY. IT IS NOT ELECTION OFFICIAL NOR VOTER CONVENIENT. WE COULD DO WITHOUT IT. THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WORKED WELL.

If a jurisdictiion has a system that is working well, leave them alone and fix the munipalities that need fixing.

All states should have the same voting requirements & registration rules - no same day registration

Force States to certify voting systems NOW.   Re-work the whole concept of Provisional Balloting.

Instead of requiring every polling location to have a DRE voting machine have them at the major polling location. DRE machines will only increase the cost of elections for a small percentage of voters. Also with early voting more disabled voters can opt to absentee vote. With all the changes that have to be made to accomodate the HAVA requirements many voters are angry that they have to move from their polling location. Also the increased cost to make the improvements is also a burden to the county.

1. Eliminate ID requirement for by-mail applicants.   2. Clarify meaning of "jurisdiction."   3. Extend compliance deadlines.   4. Eliminate requirement for "manual audit capacity."   5. Eliminate restriction on "access to information about an individual provisional ballot." (This is public information.)   6. Simplify "Voting Information Requirements." Too complex to be useful at polling place.   7. Eliminate the "interactive" requirement for statewide databases. Also, secondary information, such as that entered into a database, cannot truely represent the "official" record. The "official" record, ultimately, must be the original transactions of the voters.

Yes, to numerous and time consuming to include here. More input from local election official before HAVA was adopted would help.

more funding to poor jurisdictions

We have provided for handicapped voters to have assistence from a person of their choice for many years. The requirement for blind voters to vote without assistance is unrealistic, especially from a cost-benefit viewpoint.

HAVA needs to back off of some of the deadlines, like accessibility, and second chance voting, mainly due to equipment standards which have not been finalized by EAC and the State of Missouri seems to be waiting on the EAC standards. Further independent testing needs to be performed on tabulating equipment to estabish error rates

More money from Federal Level. More time to implement.

There are several places in the HAVA law that contradict other places in the law. Clearly, there were no election officials involved when writing it.

If they continue with under/un-funded requirements, this county will cease to exist.

Establish unified I.D. requirements using either social security # OR driver's license. Nothing else will suffice. Be aware of the differences in state constitutions as they apply to unified requirements.

ID requirements for all voters

less restrictions on the way states can spend money to improve elections no moter voter that process is filled with problems

Allow more flexibility on the local level. Change the requirement that a single absentee application for a military voter is valid for 4 years. Military personnel move from one base to another so frequently that sometimes the address on the application received is no longer valid before it is even sent. Either require all voters to provide identification, nor none. Clarify provisional voting requirements.

The problem is not with HAVA, but with outdated, antiquated state election laws. Many of these laws are contradictory to other existing state laws.

Allow flexibility in requirements for machines in small, medium, large, extra large, towns. Strongly emphasize the training of officials.

Do away with most of the provisional voting. The wordking is to broad and allows people who haven't voted, attempted to voter or register in YEARS the right to vote provisionally, even if it doesn't count. Cost, time, voter's feelings toward the process all to great!!!!!

1. Evaluate what each state currently has + came up with a tailored (state) plan to meet common goals.   2. more funding to localities

To have handicap voting at central polling and have touch screens at that polling place only. Our county is large in size but small in population ([number] register voters). The handicap can vote absentee from their homes or at central polling. They can vote at any polling place with help.

Military and overseas voters applications for an absentee ballot are supposed to be retained through two federal elections. There is no provision for accounting for where the voter is currently residing. With these types of voters, it is unlikely that they would be in the same location 2 years from now. There was an case where a military person is now done with service, but because the county has the application they must continue to issue it, eventhough he has notified the elected official in person that he is no longer at the address or even in the military.

If the Federal Law is going to mandate a different voting system for their elections - they should pay for the entire system - not just a portion. Also, they should be responsible for ongoing costs of replacement and maintenance.

Repeal the entire act. anational system for voting only hurts us who are already doing a good job. Laws should only have ben enacted the would make Flordia like the rest of us.

HAVA is written by legilators, interest groups, and regulators who do not work hands on with election judeges, voter registration, or elected administration. They are RULERS.

More flexibility given to each jurisdiction on the # of DREs, etc.

That will be determined over time and implementation.

Don't Mandate changes where change is not needed!

They are not looking at successful elections only trying to fix unsuccessful elections!

Unnessary mandate in Iowa we know how to put on elections. Flordia should be the only state following the HAVA mandate.

send more money

Realize the impact on small rural counties. Requirements that are good for a larger County are not always good for [County Name of Small County] County.

Provisional ballots are a joke! If provisional ballots were set up to allow voters to vote because of a clerical error on the part of the election official that would be great. But that's not one of the 5 reasons a provisional ballot can be cast. One of the reasons is "voter whose name does not appear on the precinct roster and who has been verified as ineligible to vote." In that

case, a voter should not ever get to vote. The election board ends up throwing out the ballot, but the voter think their vote has been counted. It slows down the tally process the night of election and causes major confusion to the voter.

Yes it has to be. I don't know enough about it to tell you how.

Seems like you have covered all the bases

Considerations for smaller localities where HAVA mandates and current laws force unjustifiable expenses on the locality.

I feel state wide voter registration should be a must. I disagree with registration and same day voting. Some Responsibility needs to fall on voter.

Eliminate HAVA requirements!

Instructions and correspondence to the point, too many wasted words before you get to what the correspondence is about.

Look at Rural areas more. (Where someone has to drive 50 or so miles to vote. And a precinct is that far away.

Will work only if 100% funded.

Yes. Supply the money for all new machines and to make all the polling places handicap accessible.

Again I say, this county has had no problems why not leave the counties without problems alone!

more money to the counties!!

No. We had no problems in the first place. HAVA provided us w/ new machines free of change, which was great

more training to person involved with process

Extend deadlines for purchase of new equipment. No sense in buying equipment before final standards are set. It may not be possible for vendors to manufacture, deliver, and train nationwide by 2006 deadline.

mandates must be funded

Need to slow down implementation and allow each state to spend some time reviewing technology so that all election officials understand the issues with regard to security concerns and also to allow better technology to emerge.

If are going to require big outlays of money, pay for it all.

Do away with it

Same day voter

There's room for improvement with everything.

Provide all the necessary funds to make it possible.

HAVA has added an enormous amount of work for elected officials.

Problems in small jurisdictions are different than in large ones. Just finding a polling place with minimum services can be difficult in rural areas where the distance to the polling place is a factor. Many very small towns have limited paving and the polling place may not be a government building that is required to meet accessibility standards. Budget limitations can make it difficult to find ways to meet the accessibility standards. Unlike large jurisdictions, most rural counties have local elections tied into the statewide primary and general elections. Small Nebraska counties municpal and school elections that way. [City names] have separate city elections and various others in the two year cycle.

1) Eliminate EAC- Go with FEC if necessary   2) HAVA should not take away authority of the state and county to administer elections

Do not take away control from our state and local people. We make informed decisions for our voters who we deal w/daily and listen to their needs.

Would somebody please take an interest in how all the rules and regulations affect the people RUNNING the elections. Start at the most basic level and assign duties that make sense and are doable for each person. Get a hands on feel for how it should work.

I think HAVA requirements for voting machines is valuable for large counties, but not practical for small population counties.

junk it for small rural counties

HAVA should have been implemented by population. Little, rural counties do not have these kind of problems.

too much time for conversion on such a small qty of voters

Q51. What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?

I had no training. I was appointed as Clerk in Dec and just thrown into the election in the Spring. My County Clerk and a Clerk from another Town did help alot.

at least knowing what my responsibilities are would be a start

I had no training coming into the office. I have since attended numerous conferences, including the Election Center.

Hands-on operation of the different types of systems.

The State of Michigan conducts election training classes and a test for certification. There is a difference between training those of us in the rural areas and those in high populated areas. The classes are geared only to the highly populated areas.

Training in engineering of complex projects & use of project calendars.

Any additional training in the election process can only increase one's ability to run an election

Preparation of ballots, etc.

Some form of refresher training before every election, is good. It makes you aware of potential problems.

Training to enable my construction of an election database

Better use of networking within the state and with other states on the administration aspects - sharing of forms, etc..

STATE TRAINING

In order for electins to run more efficiently, I feel the problem lies in cities and towns not being able to hire qualified election day poll workers. It's not rocket science, but it is precise and tedious work. If there were more adequate funding for poll workers to be trained, and perhaps, if a poll worker did not have to use a personal or vacation day from their regular job to work at the polls on election day, we would have more people willing to work on election day.

Will begin a new certification program administered by the Election Center within the next few days.

I would like to take classes with the Election Center

Continued update by the Sec. of the State for Conn.

More hands-on training; learning to train poll workers.

The Virginia State Board of Elections (SBE) and the Voter Registrar's Association of Virginia (VRAV) both hold annual training sessions for locality election officials. These sessions provide training on new procedures, but also provide an opportunity for officials to "network" with other officials from across the state and share experiences, which is invaluable (why re-invent the wheel when someone else can share their practices which work?) VRAV has had a certification program for Registrars for many years, and has just started a new certification program with the Election Center. The importance of adequately trained election officials can NOT be overstressed.

On the job actual experience I feel is the best training

Materials and state support to provide standardized training for poll workers. "Best Practices" information on recruiting poll workers who are not political workers, campaign workers and town committee members. Poor customer service and inadaquate knowledge of election law and practices are my greatest problem on election day.

Keep everyone informed ahead of time on what is happening. Don't wait until the last month before changes happen. Provide funding for poll worker training if there are major changes.

Meetings with Secretary of State and fellow election officials help to keep me current on election laws and proceedures. Our SOS stays very involved with County Election officials.

More legal training, and more training on PA's registration system (a nightmare system).

Election conferences are very beneficial. District training would be very helpful. Many officials come into office without any background of elections and could use the benefit of assisted training.

Am I to assume you are talking "paper ballots" now or machines? If it is machines-the training should be extensive

attending Election Center and other training sessions. These classes are cost prohibitive for me

more interaction with election officials from other states....to compare and learn from other methods of handling elections

North Carolina has an excellent on going training program for election directors & staff.

Training sessions that cover all aspects of the elecion cycle from beginning to end.

Election administration is too politicized. There needs to be an overhaul enhancement of professionalism and the subsequent education and training that comes from enhanced professionalism.

State requirements.

More practical, applicable training to assist with poll-worker and voter education at our local level.

Technical training, i.e. voting systems

Specific training seminars, interaction with other election officials, certification procedures , on going education

The HAVA has added more responsibilities and I would like to have more training on the regulations.

More indepth training on election laws.

I think state government should offer training to all new incoming county clerks and election authorities sometime during their first year. I also think that as new laws are implemented the State and their attorneys should have continued traing for election authorities and their staff.

A to Z manual

State or federal classes offered for election officials. Teaching about new laws, how legislation is passed, step by step procedures for each election, how to work with a vendor, how to get the most out of our vendor and voting system, how to train and work with poll workers, etc. Many professional organizations provide such classes (some are better than others) but they are costly and out of many election officials reach. Budgets are tight and most good classes are held a great distance from our state. These classes should be available to all eleciton officials. It would be good to have these classes held in each state (for state information) and in several regions across the country for federal information.

A workshop with a Moc Election

How to continue to train and keep poll workers.

Continue to update election laws.

More hands on situations.

1. How to better train poll workers.   2. How to negotiate with regard to local funding.   3. How to better educate voters.

Training of Board Workers. I feel I do not have adequate tools to educate them. They have a difficult time understanding all the new "rules".

more round table discussions between other County Clerks that run elections

Stop changing election systems and voter registration system every election.

More hands on training.

Learning how to implement, program and use whatever machines we are going to buy.

I am starting on my forth term as county clerk/election officer, but worked as deputy co clerk for 6 years prior to that. I did "on the job" training by the former co clerk, and learned from her.

Our SOS needs to develope poll worker training vidios.

On the job training is the best. Each election can be a different set of problems. Only time and experience can help you run the smoothest of elections.

n/a currently with system we have

All of my trainig was reading. I would like some organized classroom type of training for election laws.

Making us aware of all new changes and laws as before and you can be prepared for any problems that arise.

More workshops and election schools.

Most all experienced election officials are aware what is needed to do their job. The problem comes from private interest groups without experience in elections making changes without considering the complications brought about by these changes. I would consider a degree in Law as an enhancement to my ability to run elections, not just a course on election law. I already keep up with law changes and lobby at our state legislative sessions.

We receive adequate training each year from the State Board of Elections and our Association.

state training at the county level with hands on

Training and education is on-going. The Tennessee State Election Coordinator does an excellent job training; several meeting per year.

When I began as election commissioner, there was no formal training or procedure manuals. Since that time, the state has developed standards and training that do a good job. New election officials should be required to attend extensive training the first year.

More training on my new voting system

continueing education

Experience. I have worked in this office and been involved in elections for 24 years.

State level classes directed at my particular set of variables.

Seminars by the State Board of Elections without personal beliefs interfering

I still feel after 5 elections I don't understand enough about the election law. With each election, something happens that I have to research, and it helps with the learning process.

Vendor training for election equipment; State County Clerk/ Election Official sponsored training

Training by our voting machine vendors takes place before every election. A training by State Board of Elections once before federal elections could be of some use.

My training is sufficient, however, the elderly workers who only work once or twice a year are very hard to train. They just do not get how to handle all the new laws!

First - clarification on previous questions that are too vague: I don't trust any vendor and I believe every voting system has vulnerabilities.How to teach senior citizens - training pollworkers is most critical and diffucult part of the job. How to recruit a large one day workforce 4 to 5 times a year. Deep breathing exercises and other stress relief techniques

More interaction with election administrators from other States; a greater knowledge of the complete mail ballot election process for larger elections; updating on a continual basis of the newest software and hardware technology being developed and either on the market or proposed to be marketed within the near future. Wider base of knowledge in the overall variety of computer election technologies.

Our Secretary of State and the Attorney General get together and plan our training sessions. We have excellant manuals and videos to help understand the laws and the reasons why we need to do what we are required to do.

Less government intervention

Experience seems to be the best training. The state does a good job with election schools every year.

Funding to attend some federal election training classes would be nice.

Go back 5 years and start over.

I am a CERA graduate. Continuing with my CERA classes and attending lots of conferences, helps a lot.

security training from top to bottom -- from how to protect voters/pollworkers to ballot security measures.   an election course every year/every other year specific to my state.

a comprehensive 1 week program for all new officials

Local Training

State funding of all course work with the Elections Center. Adminsitrators must fund, throug the county, all education costs or use personal funds.

I have training in electronics and business managemnet and over 30 years of experience as an election official. To further enhance my skills, training in budget, human resource management and basic law is needed. The election industry is more technical than ever. Administrators must learn how to put togather a diverse group of employees to better serve the public.

After the 2-day training every even-numbered year, and knowing how to use the statutes and other resource materials to answer questions and direct callers, candidates and news media, I believe experience is the best teacher. I feel very prepared to train the Election Judges and Local Election Administrators (Cities, Townships and School District Staff).   In Minnesota we have been more fortunate than some other states that have not had statewide voter registration in place for a long time. Some of the HAVA requirements are already in place here.

MORE COMPUTER TRAINING

none, the secretary of state does a terrific job of updating the election officials across the state. This is something you have to do for yourself. Just dig it out of the election code.

continuing education as currently offered by The Election Center, IACREOT, etc

My training was "on-the-job"!!   Perhaps some required training would be good however, I don't know of any that is available.

Video training tapes designed to 'walk' the poll worker through a typical election day. Additional visual instruction materials designed to deal with the extraordinary situations. It would be helpful to have enough of these materials for each poll worker to take them home and study them and then be quizzed before election day to determine whether they are suitable as an election day worker.

more schools

A certification program with classes would benefit all election oficials and staff.

I regularly attend workshops to keep up with new law, brainstorm about runnning elections with other election officials in similary jurisdictions, and review existing law.

A written manuel that pertains to our county proceedured would have been a big help. I am in the process of writing one now so that when I retire they will have a guide to follow, I am also doing a pathway and proceedures manuel as to where everything in the computer is and what it is used for.

Continuing Education in Election Laws and Office Management

If our county could afford the membership, I understand the International association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers offer excellent additional training.

Yearly updates on new information and laws

Contact from my vendor

Not certain - I came from the private sector so my baptism by fire has been doused through state-provided training and networking with other administrators in this state.

There is always a need for additional training with regards to elections because new situations come up all the time as with any management job.

Having administered election in two states. It is very plain to see that election laws and work environments can very greatly from state to state, therefore, I believe each state should develop their own training program for election officials.

It's a little late for that. I am a former teacher and have developed a number of election training programs, as well as conducting training on local, state, and national level.

CERA Certification

Training are offered by the state with the assistance of its elections center at a State University, we yearly conferences and the state offices are availible for assistance. I see very little need for improvement.

I consider experience to be an excellent trainer.

Opportunities to attend seminars/classes on current elections issues.

Hands on and on the job training is the best kind of training.

must be specialized - not general

Summer institutes Certified, Election officials

Hands-on case management/problem solving

State schooling as a continuing series

public contact

Just more experience with elections.

To know more about the voting machines and the programs use to operate the machines.

Continuing education in ALL aspects of voter registration, elections, election laws, user group meetings on DRE's.

Continuing Education in all aspects of voting, changes, etc.

Language training

More time working hands on with the setup process and accuracy precedures so we don't rely on the vendor.

Use of access databases and other technology

Updates on election law changes.

I train annually at the Georgia Election Official Association and Voter Registrar Association of Georgia.

Better understanding of the SURE system and the use of it. I   don't feel as though I have a good handle on it as of yet. It   will probably take several years to be comfortable with it.

I feel my training is adequate. There are plenty of training outlets available. County does not allow me to go to all training that is available

Having seminars that actually were held by individuals that have held an election

Training by experienced peers and by experts in the field.

We have ample opportunitities for training

More instructions on the mechanics involved with administering elections rather than just an overview. Just how we whould do things not just what we should do. Give us the system. Then the instructors really know what we are facing and the problems we have to deal with. We have instructors who have never really done it themselves.

Standardized election officer training.

Actually watching other counties conduct elections. I think you can get great ideas from your colleagues and experience is the best teacher.

While I believe you can always learn something new, I think my experience with elections speaks for itself.

More statewide training

Some MIS understanding, hardware/software general pogramming. Have good working knowledge of programming candidates, offices, rotations and splits, feel I need more familiarity with the technical inner workings of the voting system.   f

I AM NOT SURE HOW TO IMPROVE THE TRAINING.   POSSIBLY YOU NEED TO LEARN AS YOU GO. SERVING AS AN ASSISTANT MIGHT HELP.

College Courses, or more intensive classroom study.

I am not the chief election official of our county. In the state of Alabama, the probate judge serves in that capacity.

Legislators who make law are the ones who need training.

I am dependent on my election deputy. I have numerous responsibilities and can't focus on just one part of my job totally.

Annual or semi-annual election schooling as Iowa is doing.

I had no training--just plunged right in. The staff I inherited, however, was excellent. Together we figured out how to divide up and complete the various tasks required to conduct well-run elections. Our state has certification process which is based on passing a 3-4 hour written test without the benefit of an election law book. Becoming certified is easy if one possesses excellent memorization skills. Not enough "What would you do if?" kinds of scenarios. I passed on my first try. For thos administratiors who pass the test, the state pays a portion of their salary (a little less than a third).

Training on DREs and Optical scan.

Nothing takes the place of going through the election process to prepare an election official. More interaction with other counties and states.

Continued training on the upcoming changes that will occur with CVR and our states new election mangament system

National Certifications run by local universities in conjunction with state certification boards

Continuing education

If Federal and State Governments would stop pushing more responsibilities on Voter Registrars or at least if the state or Fed would pay for Assistants Salary. I have limited funds for my part time help and other than her I am the only other one in the office. The Electoral Board is pretty worthless

As with any technology - refresher training prior to elections is essential for all election workers, including myself.

Small group training sessions with my peers; experience is the best teacher. State officials are helpful in keeping us up to speed on the legal aspects.

Continue on with advanced education offered by my professional organizations and our state and county depts.

I am not involved in running the election only in layout of the ballot and processing absentee's.

There is no substitute for on the job training when it comes to election administration.

More proactive blend of Federal, State, vender and local exerience based collaboration; Perhaps within a certification concept would be helpful for the future.

no oversight for new officials, need intense training before next election. Kansas has a new standardized annual training that is good.

Trouble-shooting of mechanical problems of voting systems.

I have 20 years experience in two states and several countries as an IFES consultant. Experience has trained me. Training in the peculiarities of Virginia Election Law might be helpful, though with 4 years here I've experienced many of them.

Technical training such as computer training.

Standard developed by the State that would require every election official to be certified. In addition, a requirement that every election official have continuing election education, i.e., so many hours annually.

updating on procedures

I took no training about elections. That's why I have an election supervisor.

Have set regulations and have them printed and sent to all Clerks prior to elections, and most all all update these regulations on a regular basis, so they are current.

Greater access to ongoing professional education.

no substitute for on-the-job training, which I had

Have completed a professional course of study sponsored by the Iowa Secretary of State's office and will be continuing with their continuing education program on election administration

more local election workshops

I would like more hands-on work with the server, doing database building, ballot building, report generating, memory card programming, etc.

Courses specifically designed for Registrars (our state assoc. is beginning these with the help of the Election Center).

We receive training from the Secretary of State's office that is very helpful in implementing changes and running successful elections.

training on new election laws as soon as soon as possible

all aspects of election administration

Virginia provides annual training for their registrars - it is very helpful

Since we have to do it and is only every other year....is hard to say what training would make it better. We do not get paid except that it is part of our job.

Our State keeps us abreast of changes and sets our precedures for those changes.

More specialized Computer Training would improve my abilities.

Better communication to town clerks from the Election board.

More budgetary freedom to attend educational conferences in and out of state with election officials from similar size jurisdictions to discuss issues facing wider election community.

coordinfgated trianing by nases

Continuing the CERA program through the Election Center. Also, more training in the legal aspects of election administration.

Small group sessions with similiar sized localities with similiar problems.

State level training helps refresh and is a good way to learn new things. Since I'm also a county clerk, register of deeds and clerk of the district court, it is hard to keep on top of all of the election requirements.

Any continued edu through complete HAVA implementation as of January 2006. Full networking with all Clerks in my state as we do in sharing our various issues of success and things that need improvement.

More in-depth advance training, and less learning "by the seat of one's pants".

Developing procedures to train election officials in the close-out of elections, developing audit procedures that can be easily accommodated by election officials at the polls.

The State of Maine does an excellent job training election officials and workers through the office of the Secretary of State along with the Maine Municipal Association. Both are very open to input from election officials.

Additional training on statewide voting system

more workshop opportunities & more legal seminars

Technology updates, election forums, Round table discussions, NIST conferences, EAC conference.

So much of running elections is on-the-job training. A good election administrator, must have good organizational skills and be able to see the big picture while still paying close attention to details. Planning is of the utmost importance. Also, training skills are needed for training pollworkers.

Training consists of on-the-job. There is no way to   train an individual for the complexities of being an   election official. All counties are different.

Current rules laws and regulations

When an newly elected official assumes an office they learn as they go. No one is there to offer hands on training as you normally find in other jobs. I feel every newly elected official should be offered hands on, step by step training.

I think our state (Ca.) and the Election Center have excellent training opportiunity. I belive completion of courses in election disciplines should be mandatory.

Understanding law   Public Financial Management   Public Administration training

More opportunities for networking and gathering new ideas from other election officials.

More detailed training at State seminars.

If electronic voting is going to be imposed upon us I suppose I am going to need a graduate degree in computer programming and maintenance.

LAW SCHOOL

Georgia has excellent required training

We will be obtaining continued training on the M100 optical scanners and will be going through a regiment of training on our new DRE's in 2005/2006

Better explanation of new laws and maybe leave the laws alone for more than one year just to see if they really work

Education in political science. Training on new equipment. Participation in other administrator's "best practices".

Election school training paid for by HAVA

Perhaps having a mock election during an off year and having   the state provide assistance.

The experience of conducting elections is the most valuable.   There are many aspects of running elections but I do think that the ability to trouble shoot your voting machines during an election is important.

continued training as the DRE's change in their capabilities and the technology changes to enhance the ease of voting.

We have excellent training workshops that allow us to run our elections well.

Nebraska has excellent training

Being that I am from a small county, I think if maybe we could observe the election process in a bigger county, it might give us some insight on election procedures.

Election code (s) are far too complex for persons with no legal training.

State of Iowa has instituted a state election administrators training school and issues certificates of completion.

Organized training for new Registrars and updates for veteran Registrars held by the State Board of Elections

good question! i have found thru the years that smaller groups are more effective. some folks are timid and will not ask questions in large training groups. i am the opposite. if the federal election commission had people to work with us when they put these new laws on us it might help. these people would need to be people who have worked and actually worked in elections. legislators need to be more informed before they vote on bills. the people who write these bills need to be more informed.

Yearly In-Service training conducted by representatives from the EAC in each state

CONTINUING EDUCATION ON HANDLING MEDIA AND OUTSIDE INTEREST GROUPS, NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW LAWS.

Refresher courses on state laws; Consolidated sources of information by election types

Availability of training on a National level. Sharing of information with other jurisdictions outside of home state. Clear, simple training on HAVA.

ALways have knowledge of new laws (Federal and State)

If my County could afford it, I would like to attend all training on elections, but they cannot.

Voting equipment user group meetings.

We attend any type of training available.

Emphasis on potential problems/problem people encountered during the election day.

I have experienced very little training.

Training should be held for election authorities at least once a year. This should be coordinated by the Secretary of State.

Training was mainly on-the-job. Lifetime experiences with communication, computers, supervision, managing complex processes contribute to "training."

On-the-job training is the only way to be prepared for the complexities. I was employed one month prior to an election and my predecessor spent only two weeks with me.

More seminars

An annual retreat as a refresher on operations and as well as reporting.

TO repeat the training over and over again. I always come away from our training knowing a little more about the process than I did before

The CERA National Election Administration Certification Program and a dialogue with other election administrators has been most helpful to me. However, it is almost impossible to provide training that can unravel the layers of federal and state laws that have been placed on elections in the past decade. FINAL COMMENTS - HAVA like NVRA will likely be another good intention legislation that in the long-run erodes the integrity of the process. Yes, NVRA made the process of registering more accessable, but at a very high price. Voter turn-out did not improve as expected, and most election administrators will tell you that the integrity of their voter registration records has been greatly compromised by their inability to perform NO VOTE purges. The NCOA process for purging voters has loop-holes through which you could fly a 747. After 10 years, we are bending under the weight of NVRA inflated voter registration rolls. The federal NVRA law has eroded the integrity of the voter registration process in the name of accessability. This... not DRE voting equipment is the real crisis in elections.

enhanced training at the State level

Town Clerk's Assoc. have classes twice a year in conjunction with the Sect. of States Office. All new election laws, policies and procedures are given to the town clerks for review and questions before implementation

The election laws continuously change thus training must be continuous. One interpretation of the law would help.

To be able to attend more conferences and workshops out of state like those given by the Election Center, etc. However, the county is not going to pay for travel of that nature. OUr job as election officials is not considered very important by county government.

Continued Washington State Certification. Create interstate certification program, much like the election center.

Experience is the best training.

Interact with the media better. They interfer with our jobs, misquote us and only look for the bad.

Continued training and repeat of training - You always seem to pick up something new when you go over something again. Our Secretary of State Office works well with the County Clerks

Classes of Election Administration should be offered in a Public Administration major.

Law changes should be more realistic. We need more power-point presentations, or videos for training our local personal.

Our entire office had quit, so there was no one here with any history or knowledge of how to run an election. We had to rely on seminars and other counties to get us through.

State level training needs to be more comprehensive as it has become more "hit and miss" under our present Sec of State, plus it needs to be conducted by people with a greater level of actual election experience.

There should be more comprehensive training for all election officials including: legal awareness,ramifications,litigation & the effects plus avoidance of litigation; election process and best practices updates from more than one source. We can all learn from one another to make it all work better.

Really the best training is each election. Every year I learn more and try to create more efficiency with the election process

New technology - hardware but mostly software

I think that it would be beneficial to have training sessions on a state level yearly.

Knowing how to upload to the state

I still am training both at the State level and local level.

Contest of Candidacy's (more knowledgeable)

Additional training with the Secretary of States office, and hava seminars as available

Constant attendance at election related conferences/workshops statewide and nationwide.

People doing training to have actual election experience

Keeping update with changes in election law

Technology - emerging techs + costs masses of explaing how to interpret - conflicting laws!

The Town Clerk and Registrar of Voters run an elections

To set in on the DRE process from ballot format thruogh election night reporting

Refresher courses

I don't know

Continued educational sessions with our State Association of County Clerks and Recorders

Iowa probably has the best training in the country.

regional meetings with other election officals to share informantion and ideas.

We get training from the state election board almost daily.

I feel that our state does a great job keeping us up to date on election law changes on state and federal levels.

Meetings - @ state or regional level for HAVA updates, etc. esp. ref. voting system requirements mandated by Federal Govt.

Continued training by state election officials.

Training sessions every two years before general elections by state trainers or instructors

more information on voting machines

County clerk provides training for elections at various times, usually once a year

school classes

Classes for newly elected officials

[Inputer Note - 1st word unknown] update as to new legislation, technology, etc.. as is now in place

Continuing education

With HAVA, we are all going to have to have continued education for efficient implementation. Our state provides that.

State Codes and regulations   Diebold training when upgrades are performed to keep updated on changes as they come

1) Annual training sessin 1-2 days - Run by state + input from National Reg. with on hands visuals. etc.

292

Periodic seminars

current state training is adequate

At this point no further training is needed. It is helpful to have the State Office (Sec of State) manned at election times and an 800 to call if questions arise

Election School

(statewide) Standardized video on provisional voting/HAVA to use to train election poll workers

Keeping up with election laws and requirements are the most important. I attend all training sessions with the Sec. of State

Our association has 2 training sessions each year

Election info could be given @ state town clerk conferences

40 Hour Classrome every election cycle.

Learning more about tallying votes, generally learn more about the entire system.

Hands on - [Inputer's note: unable to determine word] to play for commissions

DRE tranning - programing election - hands on training (what must be done to conduct election). More knowledge on the internet - how it works

The State helping more with County training.

Time more than training!!!

Seminars conducted by competent individuals on the rapidly changing election code and HAVA REQUIREMENTS.

Yearly meetings on upgrades and new laws

Election laws are always changing. Any training we can obtain is valuable.

comprehensive training about the varying types of election equipment being utilized and varying processes that are being utilized

more indepth of Federal laws and requirements

Provisional Ballot training and voter intent training.

Contined attendance at our Annual Election Administrators Conference

just becoming more familiar with all of the capabilities of the software that we are using.

Very much training and experience with voting machines when they become available due to the federal requirement for their use.

More detailed training on HAVA

The Texas Secretary of State's office provides good training at it's annual election school and by providing regional training for the election worker's. The best way to enhance election officials ability to run elections is to attend the training that is offered.

the conduct of elections, recalls and vacancy.

Mock Elections   less choices of ballots - same AB or vote @ poll.

I know our paper ballot system for our small town will change. It takes too long to count & do final talleys & close everything up. However, if we go to DRE there must be a paper trail & voter confidence in the system. People in this town like their paper ballots. They have proof!! Simplify!

State representatives having local seminars.

More of the same.

Training is an on-going process to stay acquainted with changes in the laws and technology.

Refresher Seminars on any and all HAVA updates, forms, etc. There is a lot to know & remember, especially when you don't run an election everyday.

A Basic 101 -- Primer of "How to Run an Election"

Greater trainning opportunities, especially utilzing online training

More trainning in actual working of machines   More training on statistics   More training on how to conduct possible mail election

One on one training - one to two hours.

Better explanations of federal election laws.

Workshops to explain changes, which our Secretary of State and Attorney General Office does do.

Updated training is in place.

I've been attending workshops. Workshops help out alot!

Working directly with other experienced clerks.

Too much on-the-job training, not adequately prepared

I try to attend all the educational seminars I can.

Understanding state statutes and federal statutes

new equipment training

I need computer training. I don't know anything about computers.

need to repeat training to refresh

If an election seminar could be held here in Texas like the one held by the Election Center in Philadelphia, PA, that covers elections extensively.

Training on site when purchasing.

Involved in ongoing education

I think our county would benefit better with a board of elections and registration anthat way an election adminstrator could be in charge and by it bring a full time position would have more time to learn and train

I don't know enough about what's available. I'm still learning on how to run certain aspects of elections.

Learn as you go per election. Each election offers different situations; each being a learning experience.

More training in machines and how they are set-up

refresher course

refresher courses

Keeping up with any changes in local and federal gov. (workshops)

No training, just some new counter(s)

I think ours is adequate.

I feel Michigan does a great job training its clerks- smooth elections is guided me but the Election workers are the front line to having a successful election day

Dealing with people on the phone.

Training on any new system adopted

Information on optical scan and DRE; Addl training for poll workers

a step by step procedure manual and a section on common problems with the resolutions

Further training to always be current on any law changes

We have on going training to address new laws and requiments   This has been adequate so far

I think that the State Board of Elections does a good job in training the staff of the Clerk's Office.

Continuing education on a yearly basis. Some of us do not have "photographic minds" or "Fort Knox Brains." that education would include more in-depth coverage of anything new or changed - it reinforces the things we need to know.

Election Inspectors-Do the Running

More knowledge of electronic voting systems

Not my responsibility. I help train, prepare ballots, issue ballots.

Personnel management. Voting system and ballot usability training.

More national training. Don't participate due to cost.

More complete testing for competency. More opportunity to "network" with other election administrators on practical issues.

programming for elections prep on dre's....

more programing training on our new machines

More Locally held training sessions. Keeping officials informed on changes in laws and procedures provided by state officials who have received training and information on these matters.

We do not have serious training.

The best training is hands on training!

Continued training on all law changes.

Continue election training when offered through the State

I have [number] voters who vote by paper ballots, and I don't think it feasible at this time for me to answer this survey due to their being many things that I dod not do for elections in my county

attendance of CERA certification by Election Center or other similar training. cost and time constraints have prevented that

testing being more about running elections

On-going to keep up with all of the changes.

First of all, my training is ongoing. I was not just given a crash course and told to go to it. I attend regular training programs at the state and regional level, and receive frequent updates as to rules, regulations, procedures and new technologies.

I really had no formal election training prior to accepting the position. I had technical training on DRE machines. I have attended many training classes. Some were of value, most were not. I feel that each county or jurisdiction should stay abreast of any changes or amendments to federal or state election laws. I would love interaction with other jusisdictions, statewide and nationwide. We could all benefit each other by our sharing experiences. I have learned more from reading, listening, and hands-on experience.

Myself as well as others in this office have taken numerous courses through the Election Center. They have proved very beneficial.

The staff in the Secretary of the State's Office do not have any idea of what actually goes on, on Election Day. They need more training.

Assisting with the operation of an election prior to running one would have been helpful.

My training was on the job. There is no real training for running elections. You can learn business management, personnel management, etc. But each election is different and there is no college who can train you to run an election for any given state. There are different laws for different states, county(s), city(s), etc.

Experience is invaluable for running elections. Training we currently receive is 2 full days with the Secretary of State's office every two years. There is a learning curve to re-familiarize yourself with the election process when you are dealing with the subject only every other year. Complex issues may be very unique and require County Attorney or Secretary of State advice. I don't know what type of training could address the vast knowledge of the election process that is required to successfully administrate an election with few errors.

Conferences - within state - and state Board of Elections

classes, or conferences directly dealing w/ elections

Hands on demonistrations

information from Secratary of State on projected changes

constant on-going training

Training on State Election Law- Durdon's

If we go to electronic machines, a lot of training will be needed.

Training has always consisted of teaching the laws. I would like to see some mock training exercises in which we are provided a test election from beginning to end. This would provide training in organizing, running and completing an election.

Extensive training requiring a test of passing grade for certification

any, of good quality

Being brought more up-to-date on HAVA

Continuing education courses offered by professional organizations, both state and national.

Continuing education is provided by the Secretary of State's office in our state. They are very helpful and always available to help.

Refresher courses/review prior to each election every 2 years -- already in place but inperative.

If machine changes are made we will need training and be made aware of any inconsistencies and problems associates with new technology.

Q&A Books -   Step by Step manuals   Reference material

Any new law requirements, etc.

Poll worker training

We have [number] legal voters. Not much of this survey applies. We will do the minimal of what HAVA requires The most voters we have had does not exceed [number] votes.

I BELIEVE THE HAVA REQUIREMENTS WILL MAKE SURE THAT I AM TRAINED SO THAT I MAY TRAIN ELECTION BOARD WORKERS. WHAT WAS THE CHOICE.

depends on what you are using!

The State Board of Elections offered training this past fall for registrars with less than 5 years experience. It was very helpful in getting ready for the election since it was the 1st Pres. Election for many of us.

more workshops.

Quarterly meetings/refresher type on many areas.

I would like to add also the Federal Post Card Applications used by Military Personnel are a joke. By law, we are to automatically send paper ballots to those military people for the next two elections. For example, [Name] in Hovember 2004 is in Japan, 2005 no election, 2006 and 2007 I automatically send his absentee ballot to Japan. Chances are he is no longer there. If the ballot does not get forwarded to him, or he home on election day, he cannot vote. I am not allowed to send another paper ballot to him. Another federal law whick makes no sense.

For my trainers to know what to do. They need training themselves. Training from the state board of elections is a joke. It neeeds to not be political.

group training

The state of Michigan regularly updates training for all elected clerks who run elections. Michigan has the best run elections in the country and should be a primary example for other states.

On-line tutorials addressing continuous problem areas; on-line refresher questionnaires.

Just like "no one is perfect" "no election is perfect." But the goal is to have everything ready for that one day. You have to rely on a lot of people to help youout. Thus, if someone fails you it still falls on your shoulders. Elections are certainly a challenge and unless you've walked in those shoes, you have no idea how stressful they are.

Conferences with the State Board of Elections of Illinois, my vendor and IACREOT

training directly to the complexities. More pollworker training. Database training.

Continue our state training classes- being involved as much as possible with all aspects of elections.

my training is sufficient for paper ballot

Further classes by MMA

If techonology changes in the elections office additional training will be necessary for me to have optimal knowledge of the equipment in my office.

Current training appears to be adequate.

More small meetings with state election officials.

For the most part, elected officials have little or no training for their jobs. It's on job training. Most elected officials have held responsible jobs. Politics has no proving ground study for the job.

More election training programs to help explain how DRE's work and more on the laws.

I would like additional training on the optical scanner. It has been some time since we had a refresher training.

HAVA

Hands on and conversations with other officials in same capacity.

Better funded & more specific to today's technologies.

Avaailabilty of improved technology, training, etc. at minimal expense to my jurisdiction.

CERA (Election Center)

A degree in Psychology to deal with all people and the crazy things they come up with!

Election center courses

Any and all trainings are most welcome

My training was "on the job" as a part-time employee

Continuous education programs for election officials would be great but the education programs conducted by the election center are too expensive for us to participate in.

Continued training on technologies and laws

It is not lack of training, as much as the time you spend. Clerks that do not have an election administrator, still have their full time county clerk duties to perform.

I don't understand the question. My training in election was reading the law and jumping in and doing the work.

videos, time-tables, reference books

I have worked in th Elections Office 10 years all together.

Kansas County Clerks already have continuing education courses in place

I need more years of experience because every election is different.

Review yearly

Continuing to attend State Training Seminars.

Learning how to use the DREs and their software

Continued education on the laws of elections and refresher classes on the basics

I felt my training was learning on the job. I did not get adequate training to feel confident on my decisions.

More required training for poll workers

Will need training on statewide voter reg. software and use of new equipment purchased under HAVA

More training from the state level

I think I just need more experience. I learn something new every day.

More personnel training (human resources), electronics, maybe computer science to enhance ability to understand programming in order to be confident to explain it.

Continuing education is key!

Networking with other countries

DRE training

Train the trainer.   Technical   General Training

Assistance in training poll workers. They work 2 elections in even numbered years, none in odd. We train them before each election but need additional help.

More workshops by Secretary of State's office.

More Schooling

up DATING ON NEW LAWS

Continue to attend professional organizations that relate to elections

More step by step instructions through each process of election to enhance and build on the knowledge already acquired.

Continue education on HAVA

The mondern public administrator is mora a contract manager and IT person. Contract law to heel in poor performing vendors and in light of the new partnership with the state, how to manage poor performance by the state

federal, centralize training

None, but perhaps I could offer some suggestions to the people that came up with HAVA.

Strong mentoring between novice and more experienced election official. Standardize and appropriate training for directors

We are a small jurisdiction. Elections Admin. is a small part of the over-all position. Centralized training (within 200 miles) is better. Need training each year on changes in the law & new procedures to accomplish new law requirements. Need annual training on changes to voting equip. in jurisdiction

Election personnel should be mandated to receive continuing education in all aspects of election administration. Many administrative positions across the nation require holding a certificate or degree in a particular field and election administration is growing in significance that this should be a future requirement to instill professionalism.

We have continuing education in Nebraska by Statute--should be mandatory everywhere!

O.J.T.

updates only

More vendor training on new equipment, more training sponsored by Secretary of State personnel.

Washington State requires certification of election administrators. Should be required in all sates.

No matter how good I was trained it would only last for my term of elected office. The newly elected township clerk has to start from scratch.

I think the Secretary of State does a wonderful job of training and support.

Other county clerks to put on election training

Probably a seminar by the Sec. of States' office

I chose adequate only because every election I conduct is different in some form or fashion and I am continually studying myself. Training is good-but there is never enough to cover all.

One on one-day to day observation of other voting systems and how they work-groups don't focus enough on details.

Continuing education videos, classes, online it doen't matter. However education should lead to a certification. We need a systematic comprehinsive method to train poll workers.

As a circuit county clerks, every year we are trained at the Mss. Judicial College, and Election Commisioners training through the Sect. of State Office for Election.

APPENDIX
D

Local Election Official
Survey Response Rate by State

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

State Code	State	Total Responses	Total Sampled	Response Rate
US Total		1431	3779	37.87%
AK	Alaska	5	11	45.45%
AL	Alabama	14	66	21.21%
AR	Arkansas	29	69	42.03%
AZ	Arizona	6	14	42.86%
CA	California	22	56	39.29%
CO	Colorado	23	63	36.51%
CT	Connecticut	63	148	42.57%
DE	Delaware	2	3	66.67%
FL	Florida	21	58	36.21%
GA	Georgia	53	139	38.13%
HI	Hawaii	0	4	0.00%
IA	Iowa	31	91	34.07%
ID	Idaho	16	44	36.36%
IL	Illinois	42	109	38.53%
IN	Indiana	29	79	36.71%
KS	Kansas	49	99	49.49%
KY	Kentucky	40	120	33.33%
LA	Louisiana	12	64	18.75%
MA	Massachusetts	52	141	36.88%
MD	Maryland	8	24	33.33%
ME	Maine	43	130	33.08%
MI	Michigan	51	135	37.78%
MN	Minnesota	31	86	36.05%
MO	Missouri	51	123	41.46%
MS	Mississippi	18	82	21.95%
MT	Montana	24	55	43.64%
NC	North Carolina	37	86	43.02%
ND	North Dakota	28	52	53.85%
NE	Nebraska	45	92	48.91%
NH	New Hampshire	42	142	29.58%

NJ	New Jersey	5	19	26.32%
NM	New Mexico	9	17	52.94%
NV	Nevada	6	17	35.29%
NY	New York	40	143	27.97%
OH	Ohio	31	83	37.35%
OK	Oklahoma	42	75	56.00%
OR	Oregon	15	34	44.12%
PA	Pennsylvania	14	63	22.22%
RI	Rhode Island	7	34	20.59%
SC	South Carolina	14	38	36.84%
SD	South Dakota	25	64	39.06%
TN	Tennessee	37	92	40.22%
TX	Texas	80	148	54.05%
UT	Utah	8	29	27.59%
VA	Virginia	57	132	43.18%
VT	Vermont	39	150	26.00%
WA	Washington	18	36	50.00%
WI	Wisconsin	61	150	40.67%
WV	West Virginia	15	47	31.91%
WY	Wyoming	7	23	30.43%
	Unknown	14		

APPENDIX

E

State Election Director
Survey Questionnaire

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Texas A & M University

Survey of Election Technology and Risk Evaluation among State Election Directors

Original Email Invitation

Hello _____,

This is an invitation to participate in a survey to solicit the views of state election directors on the important topic of voting technology. Graduate students from Texas A&M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on the voting issues that face state election directors and other election officials across the country.

You are receiving this email because you are a state election director from the state of _____ (enter state here). We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in this public policy discussion.

Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Please do not have anyone else fill out this survey for you. Your personal experiences and observations are essential to the research. You may have viewed a bulletin for this survey on the National Association of Secretaries of State website.

Should you choose to continue with this survey, please click the link below and you will be guided through the survey process.

<center>https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/state/?n=UserID</center>

If you encounter problems with this survey, please email the research team at votesurvey@gbs.tamu.edu or contact the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at (979) 845 1540 or dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Survey Agreement Page

The purpose of this survey is to solicit the views of state election directors on the important topic of voting technology; we hope you view the survey as an opportunity to provide much-needed information on this public policy issue. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in the debate. Researchers from Texas A&M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on the voting issues that face election officials across the country. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated. Please do not have anyone else fill out this survey for you, because your experiences and observations are essential to the research.

Should you choose to continue and participate in this survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential and research records will be stored securely. Texas A&M University will not release information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give away the lists of randomly generated email addresses used in our research. . No identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.

This research study has been reviewed by the IRB - Human Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University. For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the IRB through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of VP for Research at (979) 845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

By clicking the 'I agree' button below, you are giving your informed consent to complete the survey. Upon clicking the button, you will be directed to the survey questions. The survey is voluntary and it will take 20-40 minutes to complete the survey. You are free to refuse to answer any of the questions or to withdraw from the survey at any point. Should you have any questions regarding our research you can contact the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at (979) 845 1540 or dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu. Thank you for your cooperation.

Voting System

1. Would you consider yourself to be an election official? ___ Yes ___ No

2. Are you responsible for any of the following aspects of election technology? Check all that apply:
_____ Purchasing _____ Evaluation & Recommending _____ Managing _____ Other _____

3. What is the nature of your position?
_____ Elected _____ Appointed _____ Career civil servant _____ Other _____

4. In recent years there ahs been a great deal of discussion about the need for new voting systems across the country. Has your state changed at least 50% of its voting systems in the last four years?
_____ Yes
_____ No

If yes,
4a. Which were the main type of new systems adopted? (check all that apply)

_____ Lever machine   _____ Precinct count optical scan
_____ Punch card ballot   _____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
_____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot   _____ Internet voting
_____ Central count optical scan   _____ Other _____

4b. How likely is it that your state will change at least 50% of its voting systems in the next five years?

Extremely Likely   Not Likely at All
10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0

If 6 or above, go to question 5
4c. What type of system do you think is most likely to be adopted? (check all that apply)

_____ Lever machines   _____ Precinct count optical scan
_____ Punch card ballot   _____ DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)
_____ Paper (hand-counted) ballot   _____ Internet voting
_____ Central count optical scan   ____Other _____

5. How likely is it that your state will change at least 50% of its early voting system?

Extremely Likely   Not Likely at All
10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0

6. How likely is it that your state will change at least 50% of its absentee voting system?

Extremely Likely   Not Likely at All
10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1

7. How important are the following factors in the adoption of a new system?

	Extremely Important									Not at All Important
HAVA requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
HAVA funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Publicity from the 2000 Election	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State funding	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local requirements	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media or public pressure to change the system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Perception of a success or failure in a nearby state	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about costs of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about reliability of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about accuracy of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about speed of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Concern about age or condition of former system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

The Decision Making Process

8. If your state was going to be making decisions on the adoption of voting systems in the near future, what best describes the amount of influence the following actors would have?

	A Large Amount of Influence									No Influence	
My own influence	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local level, non-elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State level, elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local level, elected officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Professional associations (e.g. NASS, NASED)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Independent experts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Political parties	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Courts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors (A voting system vendor is the company or representative though which the voting system is purchased or leased)	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Civil Rights Groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Advocates for the disabled	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Public interest or advocacy groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

9. Please describe the nature of your input in the voting system decision-making process in the space below:

10. In general, how successful was the decision making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place in your state?

Very Successful								Not Successful at All		
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the decision-making process used to select the type of voting system currently in place?

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
The media have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State level, elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Local level, elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Independent experts should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Professional associations should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The federal government has too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Low level, non-elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State level, non-elected officials should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Political parties have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater influence.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Vendors have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Public interest groups/civil rights groups/advocates for the disabled have too great an influence on the process.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

12. What could be done to improve the decision making process for selecting voting systems?

Attributes of Voting Systems

13. When considering the quality of voting systems, how important are the following attributes?

	Extremely Important						Not at all important
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

14. How would you rank hand-counted paper ballots on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

15. How would you rank lever machines on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

16. How would you rank punch card ballots on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

17. How would you rank DREs on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

18. How would you rank optical scan on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

19. How would you rank internet voting on the following characteristics?

	Excellent						Poor
Acquisition costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Maintenance costs	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Physical size	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Storage requirements	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of access for the disabled or blind	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Possibility for voter error (through over-vote or under-vote)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Machine error	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Reliability	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Security	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Accuracy in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Speed in vote counting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ability for use in multiple languages	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Impact on different sociodemographic groups	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by poll workers	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Ease of use by voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Sources of Information

20. To what extent do you rely on the following sources of information about voting systems?

	A Great Deal of Reliance									No Reliance	
Federal Election Commission/Election Assistance Commission	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local election officials within your state	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State election officials in other states	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Media	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Professional associations	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Independent experts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Political parties	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State election officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Civil rights groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Advocates for the disabled	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Public interest or advocacy groups	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

21. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree				Strongly Disagree		
The use of new information technologies can dramatically improve government services.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Government should move cautiously when adopting new technology.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The benefits of new technologies greatly outweigh the risks.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Overall, e-government has a positive effect on the way the government operates.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
When it comes to new technologies, I think it is best to wait until all the bugs have been worked out.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

22. How do you feel about the use of the following types of voting systems for elections in the United States?

	Strongly Support						Strongly Oppose
Lever machine	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Punch card ballot	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Paper (hand-counted) ballot	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Central count optical scan	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Precinct count optical scan	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Internet voting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Other _____	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

23. Overall, in the 2004 November elections, how well did the main voting system in your state perform?

Extremely Well									Not Well at All	
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

24. Please provide any additional comments you wish to make here about the performance of the main voting system in the November 2004 election in your state:

Role of Vendors

25. How important are the following characteristics when choosing a voting system vendor?

	Extremely Important									Not Important at All	
The vendor offers a wide range of available voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Trustworthiness of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Reliability of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Cost of services	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Availability to answer questions and perform maintenance	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Regular check-ups and maintenance of current system	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Availability of registration and ballot-preparation services	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Quality of voting systems represented	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Type of voting systems represented	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Reputation of vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Previous experience with vendor	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Recommendation of state and local government officials	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

26. When thinking about the relationship between election officials and vendors, how would you describe the level of oversight by the following actors?

	Too much Oversight									Not Enough Oversight	
Federal government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
State government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Local government	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Congress recently passed the Help American Vote Act (HAVA), which provides federal funds to states in order to implement new voting system requirements.

27. How familiar are you with HAVA requirements?

Extremely Familiar									Not Familiar at All	
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

28. What do you regard as the advantages and disadvantages of HAVA?

	Advantage						Disadvantage
Provision of federal funds to states	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
State matching requirement for federal funds	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Creation of the Election Assistance Commission	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for voter-error correction	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Provision of information for voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Codification of voting system standards in law	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Process for certification of voting systems	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirements for centralized voter registration	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Requirement for provisional voting	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Facilitating participation for military or over-seas voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Other _____	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

29. How difficult are the following HAVA requirements to implement?

	Extremely Difficult									Not Difficult at All	
Requirements for disabled access to voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirements for voter-error corrections	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Provision of information for voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Process for certification of voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirements for centralized voter registration	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Requirement for provisional voting	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Facilitating participation for military or over-seas voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Identification requirements for certain first-time voters	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other _____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

30. Do you think HAVA is resulting in improvements in the election process in your state?

Major Improvement									No Improvement		
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

31. Are there any ways that HAVA can be improved?

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technology

32. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
I understand how DREs operate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I have adequate information on DREs to assess whether they are a good choice for my state.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software is vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software is vulnerable to being hacked.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater trust in DREs.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I follow news regarding DREs in the media.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DREs are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The media reports too many criticisms of DREs.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Any security concerns about DREs can be adequately addressed by good security procedures.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
DRE software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

33. Do you agree or disagree that DREs should print voter-verifiable paper ballots, by which we mean paper receipts that voters can verify but not remove from the polling station?

Strongly Agree					Strongly Disagree	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Please answer Question 33a only if you answered 3 or below on Question 32:

33a. Why do you disagree? Check all that apply:

_____ Cost of paper receipts	_____ Risk of tampering
_____ Possibility of printer failure	_____ Risk voters' privacy
_____ Size of paper ballots	_____ Other _____

Please answer Question 33b only if you answered 4 or above on Question 32:

33b. If a DRE costs approximately $3,000, how much more would be appropriate for vendors to charge per DRE to add the capacity to print paper receipts?

_____ No more	_____ Between $1201 and $1500
_____ Between $1 and $300	_____ Between $1501 and $1800
_____ Between $301 and $600	_____ Between $1801 and $2100
_____ Between $601 and $900	_____ More than $2101
_____ Between $901 and $1200	

Optical Scan Technology

34. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree
I understand how optical scan voting systems operate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I have adequate information on optical scan voting systems to assess whether they are a good choice for my state.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider certification procedures by the National Association of State Election Directors to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I consider state certification procedures to be adequate.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems software are vulnerable to viruses and other malicious software.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems are vulnerable to being hacked.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The public should have greater trust in optical scan voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
I follow news regarding optical scan voting systems in the media.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan voting systems are more vulnerable to tampering than other types of voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
The media reports too many criticisms of optical scan voting systems.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Any security concerns about optical scan voting systems can be adequately addressed by good security procedures.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Optical scan software should be available for public inspection (an open-source approach).	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Challenges in Running Elections

35. How serious of a problem are the following issues, if and when they occur?

	Extremely Serious									Not Serious at All	
Close elections where the outcome is difficult to determine	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Equipment failure	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Deliberate election fraud	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Unfair media coverage of election administration	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Inadequate resources to perform tasks	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors will act in an untrustworthy manner	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
A loss of control because of federal mandates	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Election recounts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
A loss of control because of local authority over voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other_____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

36. How likely are the following issues to occur?

	Extremely Likely										Not Likely at All
Close elections where the outcome is difficult to determine	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Equipment failure	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Deliberate election fraud	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Unfair media coverage of election administration	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Inadequate resources to perform tasks	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Vendors will act in an untrustworthy manner	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
A loss of control because of federal mandates	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Election recounts	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
A loss of control because of local authority over voting systems	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
Other_____	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

37. What are the biggest issues of challenges facing state-wide election officials today?

Individual Information

38. How old are you?   _____ Years

39. Are you male or female?   _____ Male   _____ Female

40. Do you consider yourself . . . ?
_____ White non-Hispanic   _____ Asian or Pacific Islander
_____ Hispanic   _____ Native American or Alaskan native
_____ Black/African American   _____ Other _____
_____ Mixed racial background

41. What is the highest level of education you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
_____ Completed some high school   _____ College graduate
_____ High school graduate or equivalent   _____ Completed some graduate school, but no degree
_____ Completed some college, but no degree   _____ Completed graduate school

42. On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arrange from strong liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following categories best describes your views? Choose one:
_____ Strongly liberal   _____ Slightly conservative
_____ Liberal   _____ Conservative
_____ Slightly liberal   _____ Strongly conservative
_____ Middle of the road

43. Please select your salary range. Choose one:
_____ Less than $10,000   _____ $60,000 to $69,999
_____ $10,000 to $19,999   _____ $70,000 to $79,999
_____ $20,000 to $29,999   _____ $80,000 to $99,999
_____ $30,000 to $39,999   _____ $100,000 to $120,000
_____ $40,000 to $49,999   _____ More than $120,000
_____ $50,000 to $59,999

44. How long have you served in your current capacity in election administration?   _____ Years   _____Not applicable

45. Please indicate the number of years of experience you have in *each* of the following settings (your best estimate will do):
Public sector _____
Private sector _____
Non-profit sector _____

46. How would you characterize your training as an election official?
_____ Excellent - my training did an excellent job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
_____ Good - my training did a good job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
_____ Adequate - my training did an adequate job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections
_____ Poor - my training did a poor job of preparing me for the complexities of running elections

47. What type of training would further enhance your ability to run elections?

48. Are you a member of any of the following professional elections organizations? Check all that apply:
  _____ National Association of State Election Directors
  _____ National Association of Secretaries of State
  _____ National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks
  _____ The Election Center
  _____ International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers
  _____ Other _____

GLOSSARY

Levers: Voter pulls lever next to candidates name; machine records and tallies record.

Punch cards: Voter uses computer readable card to mark vote by punching hole into numbered boxes, indicated by a ballot booklet, or directly onto a ballot card. Computerized tabulation machine reads votes by identifying holes in the ballot. Includes VotoMatic and DataVote.

Paper: Voter marks preference next to printed list of options; ballot dropped into sealed box and manually counted.

Central count optical scan: Voter marks computer readable paper ballot; computerized tabulation machine tallies vote at a central location.

Precinct count optical scan: Voter marks computer readable paper ballot; computerized tabulation machine tallies vote at precinct location.

DRE (Direct Recording Electronic): Voters select candidate listed on a computer screen by directly touching the screen or button. Votes tabulated on computer.

Internet voting: Voters select candidate through a secure and secret electronic ballot; ballot is transmitted to election officials using the internet.

Thank you for completing the survey!

Please place the completed survey booklet in the prepaid addressed envelope and mail it back to our central data collection facility. If the envelope has been misplaced, please forward the completed survey to:

Texas A&M University
TAMU 4220
College Station, Texas 77843
Attention: Dr. Don Moynihan

APPENDIX
F

Samples of Paper Mailings and Internet Invitations for Local Election Official Survey

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

December 8, 2004

<NAME>
<ADDRESS>
<CITY>, <STATE> <ZIP>

Subject: **Election Research by Texas A&M University and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress**

Dear <NAME>,

This is an invitation to participate in an academic survey to solicit the views of election officials on the important topic of voting technology. We hope you view the survey as an opportunity to provide much-needed information on this public policy issue. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in the debate. Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on the voting issues that face election officials across the country. Your mailing address was selected at random from a database of officials who participate in election processes. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated. Please do not have anyone else fill out this survey for you because your experiences and observations are essential to the research. You may have received notice about this survey through the National Association of State Election Directors list serve.

Should you choose to continue and participate in this survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential and research records will be stored securely. Texas A & M University will not release information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give away the lists of randomly generated email addresses used in our research. No identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.

This research study has been reviewed by the IRB - Human Subjects in Research, Texas A & M University. For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the IRB through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of VP for Research at (979) 845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

The survey is voluntary and it will take 20-40 minutes to complete. You are free to refuse to answer any of the questions or to withdraw from the survey at any point. If you would prefer to complete the survey online, please access the survey via the following URL:

https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=<URL>

If not, please complete the enclosed paper survey and return the completed survey in the postage paid envelope to: Texas A&M University, TAMU 4220, College Station, Texas, 77843, Attention: Dr. Don Moynihan.

Should you have any questions regarding our research you can contact the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at (979) 845-1540 or dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,
The Texas A&M University Election Research Team

February 10, 2005

Subject: **Election Research by Texas A&M University and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress**

Dear _____

     This is a follow-up invitation to participate in an academic survey that was mailed to you on Wednesday, December 8th. If you have already completed this survey, we thank you for your assistance. You will be removed from our mailing list as soon as possible. Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on voting issues facing election officials across the country. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in this public policy discussion. You received the original survey invitation because you are an election official whose address was selected at random from a database of election officials.

     Should you choose to participate in this survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential and research records will be stored securely. Texas A & M University will not release information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give away the lists of randomly generated email addresses used in our research. No identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.

     This research study has been reviewed by the IRB - Human Subjects in Research, Texas A & M University. For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the IRB through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of VP for Research at (979) 845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

     The survey will be mailed to you in 1 to 2 weeks. If you would prefer to complete the survey online, please access the survey via the following URL: https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=. The survey is voluntary and it will take 20-40 minutes to complete. You are free to refuse to answer any of the questions or to withdraw from the survey at any point.

     If you are not an election official or do not have any responsibilities that are associated with purchasing, evaluating, recommending, or managing election procedures or technologies, you are not eligible for this survey. If this applies to you, please contact us at votesurvey@integrity.tamu.edu and provide an explanation as to why you are not eligible to participate in this survey. Upon receipt of your email, we will remove you from our list and you will receive no further emails.

     Should you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact the research team at votesurvey@integrity.tamu.edu or the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at (979) 845-1540 or dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,
The Texas A&M University Election Research Team

Original Email Invitation

Hello _____,

       This is an invitation to participate in an academic survey to solicit the views of election officials on the important topic of voting technology. Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on voting issues facing election officials across the country. You may have received notice about this survey through the National Association of State Election Directors list serve.

You are receiving this email because you are an election official from the state of _____ (enter state here) whose email address was selected at random from a database of election officials. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in this public policy discussion.

Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Please do not have anyone else fill out this survey for you. Your personal experiences and observations are essential to the research.

To complete this survey, please click the link below and you will be guided through the survey process.

<div align="center">

https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=UserId

</div>

If you encounter problems with this survey, please email votesurvey@gbs.tamu.edu.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Follow-Up Email Invitation

Hello _____,

This is a follow-up invitation to participate in an academic survey that was emailed to you on Monday, November 29th. If you have already completed this survey, we thank you for your assistance. You will be removed from our email list as soon as possible.

Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on voting issues facing election officials across the country. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in this public policy discussion. You received the original email survey invitation because you are an election official whose email address was selected at random from a database of election officials.

Please consider completing this survey at your earliest convenience; your views are important in this public policy discussion. To complete this survey, please click the link below and you will be guided through the survey process.

<div align="center">

https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=UserId

</div>

If you do not have any responsibilities that are associated with purchasing, evaluating, recommending, or managing election procedures or technologies, you are not eligible for this survey, and if you let us know why you are not, we will remove you from our list and you will receive no further emails.

Should you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact the research team at votesurvey@integrity.tamu.edu or the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu.

Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX G

Samples of Telephone Scripts for Local Election Official Survey

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Telephone Script for Collection and Verification of Email Addresses

Hello. My name is _____. I'm calling from Texas A & M University.

I am part of a research team sponsored by the Congressional Research Service, studying electronic voting. Part of our research involves a survey that will be administered to election officials. We've been in contact with the staff at ElectionLine.Org and they've provided us with an extensive database of contact information for each state's election officials. However, there is some missing data and we're hoping that you might be able to provide contact information for the election officials in your area, so that we can fill in these holes. Would you be able to help me in finding these email addresses…..?
-------Answer Questions----- See below
Should you have any further questions regarding our research I can give you the telephone number of our director, Professor Moynihan. Any information you can provide can be either faxed or emailed to Jeff Jewell, our research coordinator. His fax number is 979-845-4155 and his email address is jewellj@tamu.edu.

Thanks so much for your time.

Suggested responses to various questions about the project:

1. You should mention in the opening remarks, that the information is for an academic survey, it is not commercial in nature. All information will be confidential, will be used for survey purposes only and will not be distributed to any third parties.

2. You should be prepared to answer at least some questions about the survey
- otherwise we risk losing people who never bother to follow up with me. You should have at least the following additional information included:
a) The process for administering the survey and collecting the data is subject to strict university internal review board requirements.
b) No individual will be matched to a specific response. The reporting of the data will be done in an aggregate fashion, making it impossible to identify individual respondents.
c) (if they ask about the Bush School): the Bush School is a strictly non-partisan public affairs school that trains graduate students to become public servants. It is a part of Texas A&M University, which is a public university, and is subject to all university guidelines.
d) (will we be able to see the results): survey results will be available to any survey respondent who is interested. These can be provided upon request, and we plan to place it on our website when the survey is complete. However, the reporting of the data will be done in an aggregate fashion, making it impossible to identify individual respondents.
e) (who are the CRS?) The Congressional Research Service is a nonpartisan research organization that provides reports to Congress on a range of policy issues.
f) (why surveying us?) In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about how elections should be run in this country. However, the voice of election officials has been left out of this discussion. Our goal is to present the views of election officials to policy-makers.
g) (what kinds of questions are they) the questions ask the respondent their opinion about different election systems, and the impact of the Help America Vote Act.
h) (that person no longer works here): could you provide me with the contact information for the person that is now in that position. We are only sampling a limited number of elected officials, so we are anxious to have a response from as many jurisdictions as possible.
i) (who will have access to the data) only researchers at Texas A&M who work directly on the project and the CRS. However, there will no individual identifiers attached to the survey data, and there will be no way of linking an individual to a set of responses. This complies with strict university internal review board research requirements.

Telephone Script for Improvement of response rate

Note: If answering machine, see Attachment 2 for procedure

Question 1a: Eligible Respondent Confirmation
We have not yet received a response from you, but would really like to. May I ask you a couple of very short questions about your job responsibilities?
Do you consider yourself to be an election official?

If individual answers 'no':
Continue to Question 1b

If individual answers 'yes':
Great. Your insights into election technologies and their use and risks would be very beneficial.
Continue to Question 2

Question 1b: Eligible Respondent Confirmation
Do you have any responsibilities that are associated with purchasing, evaluating, recommending, managing election procedures or technologies?

If individual answers 'yes':
Great. Your insights into election technologies and their use and risks would be very beneficial.

Continue to Question 2

If individual answers 'no':
Because you are not involved in these activities, then you are not an eligible respondent for our survey. We will remove your name and contact information from our sample. Thank you very much for your time. Have a good day.

Note in spreadsheet that the official should be excluded and explanation of why.
Terminate Call

Question 2: Receipt of Survey
Did you receive the survey that was originally sent to you on _____ (*see below*)?

If email, the original email invitation was sent on November 29th and three additional follow-up emails have been sent since that date. The most recent email was sent on Wednesday, January 12th.

If paper, the notification letter was sent on November 29th and the full survey document was mailed on December 7th.

If individual answers 'yes':
We're glad that you received it.

Continue to Question 3

If individual answers 'no' and is in the email sample:
May I confirm your email address to determine if we have an incorrect address and that is why you have not received our survey and notifications?

If 'yes', confirm email address and update as necessary.
Continue to Question 3.

If respondent raises concerns about giving email address mention:
"The emails are for the purposes of academic survey use only, will not be sold or shared with a third party. The research project meets all of the requirements of Texas A&M's Internal Review Board, and your response will be confidential."

Question 3: Completion of Survey

We are attempting to gather the views of officials who conduct the nation's elections. We believe that your experience and expertise should be represented in this public policy discussion. Because your views are important, we would very much like for you to complete our survey. Would you be willing to complete to complete it?

Additional encouragement: Is there anything we can do to assist you in completing the survey?

Additional information: The results of the survey will be provided to the Congressional Research Service, which advises Congress on policy issues. The data will also be made available to election officials.

If respondent says he/she is unsuitable in some way (too inexperienced, jurisdiction too small) reassure respondent that the survey results will work best if the full range of election officials are represented.

If YES, willing to complete the survey:

For Email Sample:

If email address is updated:
May I email you the survey at this address right now so that you can complete the survey online? The survey will arrive in your inbox from my email address which is
_____.

If 'yes', send survey immediately from your email using text in Attachment 1.

Thank you for your time and willingness to assist us in our study. You will receive the survey via email shortly. Have a good day.

Terminate Call

If email address is not updated and respondent does not want an email survey:
Would you be able to complete a survey if we mailed a hard copy to you?

If 'yes', confirm mailing address and move to paper list.

Thank you for your time and willingness to assist us in our study. You will receive a paper survey within the next week via regular mail. Have a good day.

Terminate Call

For Paper Sample:

If mailing address is correct:
May I send you another copy of the survey at the mailing address we have on record?

If 'yes', add official to spreadsheet/list of officials to receive a paper survey.
Thank you for your time and willingness to assist us in our study. You will receive a paper survey within the next week via regular mail. Have a good day.

Terminate Call
****
If 'no':
Is there anything we can do to assist you in completing the survey? Would you prefer to receive an online version of the survey?
Reiterate importance of survey for current and future discussions of voting system technologies. If 'yes', add official to spreadsheet/list of officials to receive a paper survey.

Thank you for your time. Have a good day.

Terminate Call

NO, not willing to complete the survey:

For our records, would you be willing to tell me why you would prefer to not complete the survey?
If needed, feel free to state this stronger as 'will you tell me why you would prefer to not complete the survey.
Record explanation in spreadsheet.

Thank you very much for your time. Have a good day.
Terminate Call

Note on faxing surveys: *If the official will only accept a faxed survey, then we are willing to fax the survey. However, DO NOT offer this as an option to the official. If faxing, collect the fax information and note in the explanation that this official should be moved to the paper sample group.*

Attachment 1: Email Text to send from personal email account to potential respondent
Note – Replace the red bold text below with the election official's unique ID.

Hello Enter Name Here

Thank you for speaking with me today and agreeing to complete this academic survey. Please feel free to contact me or the contact names at the end of this email if you have any questions or difficulties completing the survey.

Researchers from Texas A & M University are conducting this survey in conjunction with the Congressional Research Service, Congress' nonpartisan research agency at the Library of Congress. This survey concentrates on voting issues facing election officials across the country. We believe the views of the officials who conduct the nation's elections should be represented in this public policy discussion. You received the original email survey invitation because you are an election official whose email address was selected at random from a database of election officials.

Please consider completing this survey at your earliest convenience; your views are important in this public policy discussion. To complete this survey, please click the link below and you will be guided through the survey process. https://survey.gbs.tamu.edu/capstone/td/?n=**User_Id**.

Should you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact the research team at votesurvey@integrity.tamu.edu or the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at dmoynihan@neo.tamu.edu.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Attachment 2: Answering Machine Procedure/Script

I. If the telephone number reaches the answering machine of an individual (personal voicemail), leave the following message:

Hello. My name is _____ and I am calling from Texas A & M University with regard to an academic survey on election technology that was originally sent to you in November 2004 (Email)/December 2004 (Paper) <*If email, let them know that the latest email was sent on Wednesday, January 12th*>. We have not yet received a response to the survey from you and are very interested in your views on this important issue. If you have any questions or would like another copy of the survey,   please contact our research team at our email address 'votesurvey@integrity.tamu.edu' or the survey director, Dr. Don Moynihan, at 979-845-1540. We will also call you again in two to three days. Thank you for your time.

II. If the telephone number reaches the answering machine of an office (i.e. election office), please note the hours that the office is open in the calling spreadsheet. Call the official back at the stated hours. Do not leave a voice message.

APPENDIX
H

Glossary

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VOTING SYSTEMS

Paper Ballots: Voters mark their preferences on a printed list of options and drop their votes into sealed boxes. The votes are counted manually.

Punch Card Ballots: Voters mark their preferences by punching holes into numbered boxes on ballot cards. A computerized tabulation machine reads the cards by identifying the holes and then tallies the votes.

Lever Machines: Voters mark their preferences by pulling a lever located next to a chosen candidate's name. The voting machine records and tallies the votes.

Central-Count Optical Scan: Voters mark their preferences on a computer readable paper ballot. A computerized tabulation machine tallies the votes at a central location.

Precinct-Count Optical Scan: Voters mark their preferences on a computer readable paper ballot. A computerized tabulation machine tallies the votes at precinct location.

DRE (Direct Recording Electronic): Voters mark their preferences by finding their candidate on a computer screen and directly touching the screen or a specified button. The computer tabulates the votes.

Internet Voting: Voters mark their preferences through a secure electronic ballot which is then transmitted to LEOs over the internet.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CalTech: California Institute of Technology

CRS: Congressional Research Service

DRE: Direct Recording Electronic

EAC: Election Assistance Commission

HAVA: Help America Vote Act

LEO: Local election official

MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

VVPB: Voter verified paper ballot