

argues that the new buildings of the Jacobean aristocracy were designed to court “public view” of their collections of luxury items like art (207). Levy Peck considers the intriguing case of John Tradescant. Originally, a collector for the influential George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham, he subsequently left Villiers’ employ, settled in South Lambeth, and created a museum, “The Ark,” where he “publicly displayed his natural history collections” (157). Here again, Levy Peck offers an argument in which a “public space” is created when a number of people, especially the “well-to-do,” come together to consume luxury items.

Her argument may be, however, that this “public” is created as much by subsequent events than it is by the space of the museum itself. In her discussion of “The Ark,” Levy Peck focuses much more on its afterlife than she does on the site of the museum itself. Not only does she detail how the collection itself formed the basis for the Ashmolean Museum, established in Oxford in 1677, but she also describes in detail the way this collection was represented in the 1656 publication, *Musaeum Tradescantianum*. In focusing on the latter, Levy Peck describes how Tradescant’s son “expand[ed] the audience for his father’s collection to include scientists, artisans, and the nation as a whole” (161). Given the intriguing relationship between the initial site as perhaps a proto-public sphere and the book itself as something that expanded this sphere, more explicit discussion of the relationship would be warranted.

In sum, Levy Peck demonstrates how luxury goods are at the center of crucial cultural shifts of the early modern period. Scholars of race, class, colonialism and social history, to name just a few areas, will find much of value in this work. In this, *Consuming Splendor* may promote the most valuable exchange of all.

David Loewenstein and John Marshall, eds. *Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. X + 318 pp. \$96.00. Review by EUGENE D. HILL, MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

“For there must be . . . heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest . . .” the Scripture asserts categorically, though

where King James cited here (with the Rheims) transliterates the Greek *haeresis* of I Corinthians 11.19, more recent Bibles give the safely insipid “factions.” Thereby hangs a tale, indeed many tales, not least in Elizabethan and Stuart England, as this valuable collection of a dozen articles by as many hands makes evident. Just what, after all, is a heresy? The strongest papers here exhibit seventeenth-century authors posing just that question.

The pieces may be divided into three rough groups: those exploring authors recognized or claimed in their day as heretics; pioneers of tolerationist thought who downplayed the role of heresy in their writings; and philosophers of heresy who offered synoptic accounts or phenomenological or genealogical definitions of the phenomenon of heresy.

Worthwhile contributions here explore in welcome breadth Anne Askew, the Anabaptists and their opponents, the so-called Family of Love, and Gerrard Winstanley. By way of contrast, the essay on *Paradise Lost* by John Rogers focuses on a brief passage early in Book Eleven (14–44), in which we are asked to locate the poet’s “curious amalgam of Arminianism, Socinianism and . . . Arianism” (204). This Polonian classification Rogers explains as follows: “the actual work that the Socinian Christ performed as priest stands in the starkest possible opposition to the work of Christ as represented by mainstream Trinitarian theologians. Christ’s priestly sacrifice, for example, has to be imagined as comprising two distinct actions, mactation and oblation.” The analysis continues: “What the Socinian Father accepts at the altar of the heavenly tabernacle, after the Resurrection and Ascension, is not Christ’s life, or his body, but his *offer*; he accepts Christ’s voluntarily undertaken act of oblation. And it is the freely willed gesture of the priestly offering that is the single most consequential act performed by the Socinian Christ, and the primary reason he merits his elevation to the Father’s right hand” (209). Not all readers will easily and happily follow Rogers’ invitation to view this distinction of priestly offices as vital to the passage in question, or to the epic as a whole.

The collection ends with a pair of worthwhile papers on late seventeenth-century tolerationist thought. John Marshall provides an exemplary account of the context in which Locke penned his three Letters on Toleration in the period 1685–89, reminding us of how alive virulent earlier views remained in those years. “For Beza, whose 1554 *De Haereticis* remained the subject of widespread discussion as late as the 1680s, liberty of conscience was a ‘diabolical doctrine.’ Edwards asserted that toleration was ‘a most

transcendent . . . and fundamentall evil'; as 'original sin ' was the 'most fundamentall sin, all sin: having the seed and spawn of all in it: So a Toleration hath all errors in it, and all evils.' And "Jurieu argued that toleration was itself 'a Socinian doctrine, the most dangerous of all those of that sect, since it was on the way to ruin Christianity and place all religions on the same plane,' holding that only Arminians and Socinians had supported universal religious toleration" (265-66). Marshall makes it clear how carefully Locke had to tread in arguing for generosity toward readily bruised consciences, as does N.H. Keble in an informed essay on Richard Baxter.

Some of the best pieces in Loewenstein and Marshall consider the curious genre of heresiography—"a neologism derived from Ephraim Pagitt's 1645 book of that title" (137), as Ann Hughes notes in her fine contribution entitled "Thomas Edwards's *Gangraena* and heresiological traditions." John Coffey (in the preceding piece, also of great merit) views Edwards' panoramic taxonomy of heresy as one of several "rambling hate lists" in which, "beneath the veneer of objectivity and precision, Edwards's method was pretty haphazard. He made no effort to grade his sects and heresies in order of seriousness, and implied that all of these movements belonged to a single demonic conspiracy against the kingdom of god" (111). Hughes assumes a more sympathetic stance: for her the constant breakdown of systematic arrangement betokens an historical moment and a stylistic choice: "The structure (or lack of structure) . . . parallels his account of the 'reality' of religious turmoil." "The organization of the text is always breaking down in the face of the pressures of his immediate situation, with the continued emergence of ever more horrifying errors. The very look" of the tome "was affected, as the last pages of each part resorted to a tiny type in order to incorporate information pouring in at the last moment" (150-51). Hughes takes this stance of overwhelmed chronicler very seriously, seeing it as vouching for the reliability of *Gangraena* as a historical source. Perhaps she's right, though a touch of Defoe-like posing may underlie the faux naïveté.

The two most sophisticated analyses of heresy in the period, not surprisingly, came from Milton and Hobbes. The former (in the words of John Coffey) "redefined the term so that it bore little resemblance to its traditional meaning." Indeed, "Milton defined it as a *subjective* attitude of blind submission to tradition rather than to scripture" Thus Milton's criterion "was *procedural* rather than *substantive*. Heresy was about theological method rather than

theological *content*. One might arrive at erroneous conclusions, but if those . . . were reached after an earnest endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the scriptures, and . . . could be backed up by a plausible biblical argument, one could not justly be called a heretic” (130-31).

Even more radical than this procedural reinterpretation was Hobbes’ genealogical one, adeptly expounded by J. A. I. Champion by way of a reading of Hobbes’ neglected *Historical Narration Concerning Heresie*, published posthumously in 1680 but evidently completed in 1668 and “published” in scribal form during the later years of Hobbes’ life in the mid-1670s” (224). I leave to my reader the pleasure of following Hobbes’ wickedly anti-clerical tracing of the term heresy from “private opinion” (228) among the ancient philosophers to sect then to creed, this last a tool for self-seeking prelates to enforce their interests by the most extreme means. As Coffey summarizes the development, “heresy was a device originally employed to denote diversity that had been turned into a powerful weapon of priestcraft” (232). There was of necessity no objective source of truth (or of its opposite): what mattered was what the civil sovereign prescribed.

Champion’s piece, the gem of a good set of articles, concludes with a discussion of Thomas Barlow’s unpublished “Animadversions on a MS. tract concerning Heresy” of 1676. Barlow takes issue precisely with the Hobbesian genealogy—no fool Barlow, who recognizes how much depends on what we take the necessity of *haereseis* to mean.

Giles Worsley. *Inigo Jones and the European Classicist Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. xi + 220 pp. + 218 illus. \$65.00. Review by ALLISON LEE PALMER, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA.

In this text on the English architect Inigo Jones, author Giles Worsley provides a needed re-evaluation of the topic of seventeenth-century classicism, which to date has been a little-studied area of European architectural history. Baroque architecture has for the most part been defined largely by the Roman architecture that coincided with the Counter-Reformation and that can be characterized as theatrical, monumental, ornate and sculptural. The Baroque is thought to transcend the more narrowly-defined Renaissance principles of Vitruvius to embrace a more eclectic style. Early scholars such as