(12). Hill gives four page numbers in his edition where evidence to support this statement may be found.

In light of this the editors’ charge that my book is an “influential source” of the statement in question is untenable. First of all, as the statements from Sabine and Hill indicate, I did not invent the statement in question; second, even if the statement is not true the editors’ citation of my book as the “influential source” of the statement is disingenuous. To suggest that a statement in my book could be more influential than Hill’s paperback edition decries credulity. If the editors were unaware of Hill’s statement but chose to cite my statement they are guilty of an even more damning fault. Hill, the former Master of Balliol College, Oxford, author of many prize-winning books, is one of the most influential scholars in the English-speaking world. My scholarly credentials pale in comparison to his. It appears that the editors did not dare cite him as a flawed commentator on Winstanley’s biography but saw no problem in citing my book as the source of the statement in question.

Finally, something must be said in reference to the cost of this two volume edition of Winstanley’s works. Few potential Winstanley scholars are willing or able to fork-out $325 for the two volume set. Presumably they will have to rely on library copies. That is a sad commentary on the state of academic publishing.


This volume contains eight papers delivered at the 2006 conference “The Use of Censorship from the Age of Reason to the Enlightenment,” held in Copenhagen under the auspices of the Classicisme & Lumières research network. The essays begin chronologically with censorship practices in England during the 1630s and end with a discussion of the publication history of the Encyclopédie. The essays discuss the impact of censorship on authors and ideas, the institutions and practices of censorship, and the theories of censorship proposed by Enlightenment figures. Two major themes run through the essays.
The first is the notion of a “moderate” Enlightenment and its opposition to a more “radical” one. In this, the volume builds on the themes introduced by Jonathan Israel in his *Radical Enlightenment* (2001). The various authors are not afraid to contest Israel’s ideas and in some cases find them wanting. The second theme is that of the practical impact of censorship on the behavior of authors.

Mogens Laerke introduces the volume with a discussion of the history of censorship in Europe. The essay is thoughtful and informative and situates the volume well in historical and literary attempts to describe censorship in the Early Modern period.

In the first section, “Censoring the Enlightenment,” three authors discuss particular cases of censorship. In “Suppress or Refute?: Reactions to Spinoza in Germany around 1700,” Manfred Walther argues that an examination of attempts to prevent the spread of Spinoza’s ideas reveals that German intellectuals fought a war on two fronts. While they wished to censor dangerous ideas, they were reluctant to take actions that narrowed the range of moderate inquiry into theological and scientific matters. Radical ideas were not only dangerous for their content, but also from the way in which religious fanatics could use them to stifle the progress of legitimate enquiry.

In “Pierre Bayle and Censorship,” Hubert Bost demonstrates that while Bayle did exercise a kind of self-censorship, he never seemed to moderate his philosophy out of a fear of his own persecution and in fact refused to abandon his ideas, even when ordered to do so by the Consistory. Bost shows this in order to refute arguments that Bayle shows in his work the kind of Straussian esoteric/exoteric strategy attributed to Bayle by Gianluca Mori (*Bayle philosophe*, Paris, 1999). Bayle’s refusal, in fact, to pursue such a strategy given the radicalism of his ideas and the real threat of punishment leads Bost to doubt that a Straussian analysis is appropriate for the study of the late seventeenth-century thinkers.

In “French Royal Censorship and the Battle to Suppress the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d’Alembert, 1751-1759,” Jonathan Israel uses the publication history of the *Encyclopédie* to argue that there was a clandestine, radical agenda behind Diderot’s editorial strategy. In showing this, he attacks Robert Darnton’s argument that the project’s agenda was “acknowledged openly” (*The Business of Enlightenment*, 1990).
Cambridge, MA, 1979, 9). Israel concludes that to make any sense at all of the massive struggle necessary to halt the legal publication of the *Encyclopédie* one must understand that that “the *Encyclopédie* was a philosophical engine of war directed not just at Christianity but also against the providential Deism of Voltaire, Turgot [et al.]” (73), and that to understand why this was, one must “differentiate clearly between moderate and radical [strains of the Enlightenment]” (68). He also concludes, like Walther above, that moderates and radicals were involved in a “three-cornered contest,” fighting each other and against “the Counter-Enlightenment of the dévots and Jansenists” (74).

The second section of the book, “Institutions and Practices of Censorship,” contains essays in which the authors discuss censorship practices and how these practices impacted the content of political and philosophical works. The first, Tue Andersen Nexø’s “Between Lies and Real Books,” examines censorship during the era of the English Civil War and comes to the conclusion that Jürgen Habermas’s model of the Public Sphere does not adequately describe the birth of a print-mediated public sphere in England. England of 1639-1642 still had severe censorship laws on the books, but they were only arbitrarily and haphazardly applied. This led to a situation in which authors had to hide their identities to avoid punishment while adopting authoritative identities to gain credibility. The outcome was a free speech situation in which the quality of information was very poor and undermined rather than facilitating and rational for discussion.

Wiep van Bunger, in “Censorship of Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic,” argues against traditional views that the Dutch Republic functioned as a haven for radical philosophers because of its lax censorship regime. He demonstrates that the local government and local church bodies were sporadically effective in pursuing and arranging for punishment of authors who violated the idiosyncratic norms of their local communities. The lack of a strong central censorship system allowed for each local area to pursue its own “initiatives against radical philosophy and its implications for the reformed creed” (111). While Dutch censorship was much more sporadic than that of other Continental states, it was nonetheless vigorously practiced. More surprisingly, van Bunger comes to the conclusion that censorship in the Dutch Republic continued to
function on theological grounds (114), despite the Dutch Republic’s reputation for religious tolerance.

In the third section of the book, the attitudes toward censorship of three major Enlightenment authors are described. Colas Duflo, in “Diderot and the Publicizing of Censorship,” explores the rhetorical strategies Diderot used to show how ineffective and counterproductive official attempts to suppress written works would always be. Using Diderot’s discussion of censorship in his *Lettre sur le commerce de la librarie* and tactics Diderot used elsewhere to creatively evade censorship, Duflo comes to the conclusion that attempts to censor unwelcome opinions that have the perverse effect of fostering “active, interpretive reading which seeks to complete, create links, detect irony beneath the most harmless remark, … and so forth” (122). The only way in which to actually combat pernicious ideas, Duflo’s Diderot tells us, is a kind of ridicule familiar to the readers of *The Spectator* or Voltaire’s satires—but for Diderot the place in France for this kind of ridicule would have to be in the theatre (134).

In Tristan Dagron’s scintillating “Toland and the Censorship of Atheism,” Dagron asks how Toland could argue that “atheism is both morally and politically superior to superstition” when he wished to deny it “the official tolerance that he grants superstition” (139). Dagron argues that Toland held a notion of “true religion” that “was not considered from the view-point of its possible truth” (139). This true religion was grounded in experience, but since the life experience of each person relied so heavily on the prejudices of those around him/her, Toland thought it impossible to ever find a religious “truth” that could be divorced from such prejudices. Nevertheless, insofar as there was no attempt to force adherence to a set of beliefs that could not be verified through common experience (what he called “mysteries” or “superstitions”), multiple faiths had to be tolerated. Atheism, however, struck at the roots of the community by denying any truth, however practical, to these common prejudices, without which no society of ordinary men could flourish. While superstition and atheism were both enemies of true religion, the former could be tolerated in a plural society, while the latter could not.

In the final essay, “G.W. Leibniz: Moderation and Censorship,” Laerke argues that Leibniz’s notions regarding censorship arose
from his ideas concerning the need for moderation in philosophizing. According to Laerke, Leibniz argued that only certain kinds of thinkers might need to be censored, among them atheists, enthusiasts and Libertines. What these groups had in common was not a set of beliefs (for how could enthusiasts and atheists share beliefs?), but a lack of moderation in their ideas. They were guilty of “asserting these principles with more certainty than they objectively have … while rejecting those of others violently” (178). Immoderate behavior removed one from a proper scholarly conversation, and it was the duty of the state to intervene to prevent immoderate ideas from harming a society. But Leibniz was consistent in his reasoning when it came to suppressing dangerous ideas. Leibniz worried that a lack of moderation in repression would be worse than simply allowing the ideas to flourish, and Laerke gives several convincing examples from Leibniz’s *opus* to support his claims.

This is an impressive collection of essays. While none of them qualify as earth-shattering in importance, combined they give the reader a sufficient overview of recent work in a variety of national traditions considering the practices and theories of censorship and of recent work on the early Enlightenment.


The six chapters of *New World Gold* attest to an ambitious, prescient and impressively executed research project, in which Elvira Vilches combined the analytical tools of a cultural critic and an economic historian. At its heart is a question that vexed seventeenth-century Spanish poets, moralists and theologians: how could the Spanish Monarchy control the gold and silver of the Americas yet rule over so many impoverished subjects in its Iberian heartlands and be itself subject to foreign creditors? This “Indies paradox” was most famously voiced by the Baroque poet Francisco de Quevedo in a satire built on the refrain, “Poderoso caballero es don Dinero,” (*don* Money is a powerful gentleman). Its best known stanza traces Sir