More, Francis Mercury Van Helmont, Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, Robert Boyle, and many others. She also explores Conway’s philosophical ventures into medicine, kabbalism, Quakerism, and numerous other topics. An especially interesting aspect of Conway’s philosophical development concerned the effects that Conway’s chronic illness had on her philosophy and her association with leading medical philosophers of her day. For instance, Hutton points out that Conway was drawn to Quakerism because she equated their persecution and suffering with the physical and psychological torment she endured as a result of her medical condition.

However, Hutton’s use of biography and history results in mixed success. Virginia Woolf’s statement, “Women have served all these centuries as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size,” fits Hutton’s discussion of Conway and her intellectual associates. Due to the tremendous amount of information that Hutton provides about Conway’s largely male intellectual companions, Conway gets lost in the text. When Hutton remembers to bring Conway back into the analysis and shows the reader how Conway directly influenced a particular philosopher, her book shines.

The historical approach that Hutton employed also led to limited success. Hutton rightly acknowledges that “my study perhaps has more in common with recent work in the history of science than with the history of philosophy” (13). In her conclusion, Hutton compares her own analysis of Conway with Carolyn Merchant’s own examination. This comparison is a good start, but Hutton needed to do more to situate her work within the history of women in science and the history of gender and science. The reader of Anne Conway: A Female Philosopher will find a good, traditional history of Anne Conway’s intellectual world. The scholar looking for an analysis of Anne Conway and her philosophy in relation to the latest trends in the history of women in science and the history of gender and science will have to look elsewhere.

The subject of *Fashioning Adultery*, changing representations of adultery in England from 1660 through 1740, should be of interest to scholars from a variety of disciplines. The title, of course, alludes to the Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* and as such would seem to be situating itself in the field of early modern cultural studies that it inaugurated. Curiously, then, Turner refuses to enter into dialogue with a number of fields: literary criticism, cultural criticism, and the field of history of sexuality. Perhaps in part because he does not engage with their theory, Turner embraces a reductive late modern materialism that becomes the standard by which all cultural texts are implicitly measured.

Turner sometimes seems to want to develop a very different argument, one that is more constructionist in nature. He urges that “we [historians] need to revise our understanding of ‘representation’ and ‘reality’ as a dichotomous relationship” (204). He would seem to be turning away from the assumption that there is some underlying reality that that we use to ground our readings of cultural texts. Unfortunately, Turner cannot seem to follow through on this assertion, primarily because his language and methodology betrays him. Overall, his use of the language of social science asserts the existence of an external reality that can be uncovered with the correct tools. He thinks in terms of “evidence,” “case studies,” and “data.” The term “representation” used above, taken from literary criticism, asserts the existence of an external reality that must be represented. Finally, for Turner cultural texts are only a different type of evidence that can help the historian understand a more complex cultural reality: “What we are analyzing is a complex and interacting set of codes and meanings from which a cultural reality of infidelity is forged” (19, italics added).

Turner falls back on privileging a materialist reality, despite statements to the contrary. The book itself is seen as moving towards a “material actuality” (19); thus, he sees the first three chapters as offering analysis of “printed sources,” the last three of “descriptive material” (21-2). The first three do, indeed, focus on cultural representations of adultery in a number of genres, whereas the last three focus on accounts of murders of unfaithful spouses, accounts of church court trials for adultery, and accounts for criminal court proceedings. Turner considers the final two chapters as “more firmly grounded in material actuality and lived experience than the printed materials examined in previous chapters” (143).
My summary suggests a neat division, but in practice, Turner often privileges an objective material reality even in his readings of literary and cultural texts. In chapter two, he clearly values the advice columns in serial publications like the Athenian Mercury more than fictional texts because they are said to provide a glimpse into the real lives of a cross-section of the population. After he presents the value of this evidence, Turner revealingly worries, “Of course, given the anonymity of correspondents and the paucity of general data about readership, it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the queries, whether they were products of the editors’ imagination or genuinely sent in by readers” (65). For Turner, texts prove to be more valuable if they are “genuine” or “authentic,” where those qualities are judged by how closely the text may be taken to revealing the lived experiences of the population at large. Such a view, however, is odd coming from a scholar who elsewhere claims that historians need to pay more attention to literary texts.

Similarly, crime literature is seen to be valuable insofar as it offers us a glimpse into this underlying material reality. Turner is unable to consider the way that such texts create a specific cultural reality often in ways that underscore tensions in the culture because he is so committed to privileging an objective materialist reality. He takes issue with Frances Dolan’s perspicacious interpretation of the criminal literature of this period precisely because he sees it as abstracting itself from this reductively conceived material reality. To Dolan’s suggestion that such literature focuses on husbands murdering their wives because it explores the anxiety over patriarchal authority, heightened with the recent events of the Civil War and the Restoration, Turner asserts only that “The late seventeenth-century proliferation of crime writing, and the increasing pressure it placed on publishers to bring out more factually accurate and representative accounts of murder, may provide an alternative explanation. The fact that there were more pamphlets concerned with husbands murdering their wives may reflect, with a greater degree of accuracy, the ‘reality’ of spouse murder” (132). His response underscores some of the problems with a cultural criticism that is so wedded to a social science epistemology. Turner may be correct that this is all that is going on, but then, I believe that he would have to establish this, not with bald assertions, but with a closer consideration of the language of the text itself. This would involve, of course, a greater emphasis on interpretation and a greater self-consciousness about the interpretative assumptions made.
To conclude, I would simply add that his epistemology leads him to deny agency to historical actors, as the above quotation suggests. Actors are seen as caught up in larger and more important sociopolitical systems. Turner speaks in terms of “value systems” (14), “sexual systems” (14), or “systems of labeling” (29). In his reading of the first chapter, he argues that the pre-1660 church developed “a system of labeling that was deliberately inflexible and limited in scope, making no conceptual or linguistic distinction between different types of offence, or between casual sexual encounters and longer-term affairs” (28). Turner comes to this conclusion because he has arbitrarily limited his interpretation. He could have benefited from reading and engaging with literary and cultural criticism of the 1990s which discussed in depth issues of agency. Similarly, he could have benefited from engaging more directly with historians like Christopher Hill, David Underdown, and David Cressy, to name just three. Having limited himself to the consideration of (written) language and having conceived of language as abstract, dehumanizing “systems,” Turner need not consider the way that immorality could be defined by individuals within local communities. Through gossip, general opprobrium, and social rituals like charivari, the community could define for itself what it considered immoral and what behavior it might find excusable.


This carefully crafted and meticulously-written book assembles a wealth of visual and documentary evidence in support of its thesis that the Chigi Pope Alexander VII between 1655 and 1667 “opting to refashion Rome according to the architectural formulae of Eastern capital cities in antiquity ... hoped through his building program to reclaim the heritage of the Church as an institution and of Rome as an idea” (5). Habel’s visual evidence for the coordinated nature of Alexander’s building program comes from the putative resemblance of three major sites—the Quirinale, the Corso, and S. Pietro—to the palace, hippodrome, and temple of urban planning and development in the eastern Roman empire during late antiquity. Despite the documentary wealth, much of it from the Vatican Library and the Archivio di Stato of