SEVENTEENTH–CENTURY NEWS

(www.adamsmyth.clara.net) provides an Index of Poetry in Printed Miscellanies, 1640 to 1682, where one can search the 4,639 titles. “Delight” scores fifty-two hits, “profit” four hits; but Smyth’s book is just as rewarding in each respect.

Katherine Gillespie. Domesticity and Dissent in the Seventeenth Century: English Women’s Writing and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xii + 272 pp. $60.00. Review by JEROME S. DEES, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY.

In this ambitious book, Katherine Gillespie has two broad aims. She seeks first to convince us that a small group of sectarian women writers “rightfully deserve to be included in ‘genealogies’ of liberal political theory” (13). But perhaps more controversially she wishes at the same time to rescue early modern political thought itself from the contention of “postmodern academic feminists” that liberal theory deriving from Locke’s Two Treatises of Government and its precursors is in fact a “blighted masculinist system” grounded in and perpetuating the continued subjection of women. Here she sets herself against such feminist scholars as Carole Pateman (whose The Sexual Contract: Aspects of Patriarchal Liberalism [1987] she finds seminal), Zillah Eisenstein, Catherine MacKinnon, Seyla Benhabib, and others. For these historians of political thought, a woman’s desire for “civil equality”—to be recognized as an individual—can never be fulfilled since, in Pateman’s words, “the ‘individual’ is a patriarchal category” (27). This is an error that Gillespie hopes to rectify through her elucidation of “an alternative source of political ideas” (25). To this end, her main claim is that the writings of Katherine Chidley, Anna Trapnel, Elizabeth Poole, Sarah Wight, Anne Wentworth, and Mary Cary “emerge rewardingly as a modest but nonetheless important body of heteronomous, multigenre, performative, aspirational, allusive, reliogmythological, exclamatory, and antinomian liberalism that intentionally critiqued its political world” (14). Gillespie’s argument cuts across three otherwise distinct disciplines: history, political philosophy, and literary criticism; and as this quotation suggests, her argument rests on a significant prior assumption: that effective political thinking may be accomplished outside the formal constraints of a systematically argued treatise. She argues her case strenuously and with a great deal of scholarly tact. While I am sympathetic to her aims and premises, the weighti-
ness of her claims seem too heavy for the slender columns of evidence supporting them. I suspect that this book will find its most sympathetic readers among feminist literary scholars, its most resistant among students of political thought.

Her argument is deployed over four long chapters that group the six women (pairing Chidney and Trapnel, as well as Wight and Wentworth) so as to elucidate in each chapter one of the principal tenets of liberal thought—the separation of church from state; government as contract; the sovereignty of the individual; and the free market. A brief, though heavily annotated, Introduction offers a reading of Milton's 1637 *A Maske Presented at Ludlow Castle* as "narrating the 'birth' of the possessive individual," i.e. a "baseline 'self' which one defines and possesses in defiance of all attempts by others to describe, prescribe, and circumscribe it on *their* terms" (2). This reading permits her to see the Lady, Sabrina, and the Attendant Spirit as variable "prototypes" of her sectarian writers and the men that they are closely associated with. She can then later draw analogies between the two sets of characters on the assumption that such comparison clarifies or solidifies the point she is making. I began to find this strategy distracting rather than helpful, and wondered why she adopted it.

Gillespie's dense and heavily referenced first chapter, "Born of the Mother's Seed: Liberalism, Feminism, and Religious Separatism," requires careful attention, since there she not only enunciates the complex set of assumptions and definitions on which will hinge the success or failure of her subsequent argument, but also reveals the rhetorical strategy which she will employ throughout: that of disclosing dichotomous habits of thought in the critics she opposes—e.g. Christopher Hill's notion of "two revolutions"—and then proceeding, not necessarily to mediate, but rather, as she puts it on page 53, to "ensnarl." Care is demanded because in addition to the complexity of her concepts, her sentences are themselves often so ensnared as to admit understanding only after several re-readings; I sometimes wondered whether her clotted syntax was not actually a product of her scrupulous acknowledgment of the scholars with whom she is in dialogue. This is a problem throughout the book: see, for example, pages 5, 6, 43, 48, 65, 130, 191, 222, and 234.

Since all of Gillespie's texts convey expressions of deeply held religious conviction, her argument invites at almost every turn the demurrals that, in Patricia Crawford's words, "the really radical political ideas expressed by
women owe more to their religious beliefs than to political theory about patriarchalism” (qtd. on 49). To her credit, Gillespie is continuously sensitive to this charge, and seeks to counter it when necessary from her initial premise that it doesn’t have to look like a treatise to do political work.

Chapter 2, “A Hammer in Her Hand: Katherine Chidley and Anna Trapnel Separate Church from State,” seeks to convince us, in part by a nuanced engagement with Habermas’s theory of a “public sphere,” that these women “began the process of building a ‘feminist theory of state’ which...rested on a necessary separation of a private sphere of individual and group-based self-determination from a public sphere of patriarchal domination” (66). In particular, she finds in Habermas a “third way” for understanding the “complex and ‘liminal’ space that Trapnel narrates into being” (93). However, not only will some readers find the four main sections of this chapter repetitive, but in the case of Chidley in particular they may get a strong whiff of special pleading in Gillespie’s effort to defend her from the common charge that her arguments are not “woman centered”; at one point Gillespie must concede weakly that “while she does not mention women per se, her arguments have a decidedly antipatriarchal thrust” (83).

Chapter 3, “Cure for a Diseased Head: Divorce and Contract in the Prophecies of Elizabeth Poole,” is most heavily invested in the analogy with *Comus* established in the Introduction. Here Gillespie contends that both Milton and the Separatists “grounded their rationale for a contractual model of social and political relations within the individual (even female) propensity for contingency, miscalculation, and the consequential need for reassessment and revision” (125). It is here that Gillespie, drawing upon her considerable skills in rhetorical analysis, is forced to wrestle most strenuously against Pateman’s claim that republican contract theory is, in effect, a masculinist plot to disenfranchise women from entering into contract. It was in this chapter that I was perhaps most conscious of a certain slippage from “seems” to “is,” in addition to the more ubiquitous need to explain away arguments counter to her own by means of a sometimes strained interpretation of the writers’ metaphorical language and Biblical allusion.

In Chapter 4, “The Unquenchable Smoking Flax: Sarah Wight, Anne Wentworth, and the ‘Rise’ of the Sovereign Individual,” Gillespie argues that sectarian women writers “actually forged the model of the subject that feminists actively seek to displace—that of the ‘sovereign’ or ‘abstract’ individual”
The argument is complex and resistant to easy summary, but its main thrust is that these women “drew upon a separatist concept of the sovereign self” as a way to counter the ideological belief “that female subjectivity was embodied and hence discontinuous and fragmented”: the writings of Wight and Wentworth are “pioneering articulations of the subject as an end unto herself” (171). In opposing postmodern feminist political theorists, she draws upon (and at times modifies) Althusser’s theory of “interpellation,” using it to underline the oddity that present-day feminist political theorists espouse an argument exactly counter to those of feminist literary scholars who have now for two decades been discovering a genuine female “self” in the writings of Anne Clifford, Aemilia Lanyer, Elizabeth Cary, and Mary Wroth.

I found myself most thoroughly engaged with, and convinced by, the argument of Chapter 5, “Improving God’s Estate: Pastoral Servitude and the Free Market in the Writings of Mary Cary.” Though the chapter is beset by many of the same murky sentences and paucity of evidence found in earlier ones, still I become convinced that, with her claim that Cary’s writings “insist that various forms of grass-roots communication, voluntary association, and persuasion through free preaching should supercede statism as the means by which revolutionary change was to come about” (216), she had successfully answered those who call Cary a socialist, and hence a totalitarian. Most appealing in this chapter was her demonstration that for Cary the implementation of the Fifth Monarchy, “rather than resulting in the violent destruction of the nonsaint, in actuality represents the time in which God will be most actively saving people through Grace” (225). For the most part, unlike earlier chapters where the point was gained via some rather tortuous interpretation of the quoted text, here her well-chosen passages unambiguously support their claims.

Given her ambitious aims and truly impressive amount of research (both primary and secondary)—though I wished continually for a complete Works Cited rather than the repetitious footnotes at the ends of chapters—many will find it easy to discount those features at which I’ve carped. They will see, for example, that she carefully situates each writer in her historical moment and material circumstances, as also that she is an attentive and sensitive reader. If on occasion they feel that her “political” conclusions are not necessarily the only or best ones to derive from what are essentially “religious” texts, they may ascribe it to the nature of argumentation. At the very least, they will
admit, as I do, that she has opened the way to what should be continuing and fruitful dialogue.


This interesting and eclectic book traces the trope of violation through a wide variety of sources. “Violation” is meant in a very broad sense: it includes rape and personal assault, but also adultery, torture, and symbolic emasculation. Further, crimes against property (including women) are a violation, and, ultimately, Stuart absolutism is the greatest violation of all. She quotes William Hakewell claiming with alarm that the king’s “pleasure cannot be bounded by law” and explains that his choice of “pleasure” rather than “will” is significant: “Hakewell chose the less subtle of the two terms to make his point that the king’s impositions amounted to a seizure or ravishment of subjects’ property against their will—a violation” (181). Throughout the book Burk examines the discursive interplay between personal, social, and political violation, the vocabulary of which she perceives as an abiding rhetorical resource for writers in various genres.

Burk’s foundational texts are Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments*—commonly known as the “Book of Martyrs” (first edition 1563) and Bale’s *Epistle Exhortatory* (1544). The latter savages the Catholic leaning bishops of England for their desire for wealth and pleasure; this is symptomatic of their ultimate allegiance to the heresies and oppressions of the papacy. The former book, and particularly its woodcuts by John Daye, dramatizes the perverse cruelty of the hierarchy and in particular Bishop Bonner. Burks sees a combination of horror and titillation in these works; that is, while we are supposed to sympathize with martyrs we nonetheless may feel “a vicarious thrill”; “While the text and the woodcuts construct rules for readership that make such an act decidedly transgressive, the illustrations do not and perhaps cannot exclude the prurient gaze” (69). Some readers may think Burks is straining her gaze in some cases. Many of the woodcuts the book reproduces just look like torture to me without any sexual charge whatsoever, but her strong reading of other woodcuts does reveal a pornographic and perverse violence.