the jury returned verdicts of “Not Guilty” three times. Jeffries refused to accept this verdict and “in a great fury and a transport of rage,” he threatened the jurors with “attaint of treason” (86-7) unless they returned a Guilty verdict. Alice Lisle was granted the request of beheading instead of burning, but as Wharam points out, the alleged traitors she had sheltered had not been tried or convicted of treason at the time of her conviction—so technically, the basis for her conviction did not exist.

Alan Wharam, born in 1928, was educated at Christ’s College, Cambridge. He is a retired barrister and was a professor at Leeds College of Commerce and Leeds Polytechnic Law School before his retirement in 1988. His other works include *The Treason Trials, 1794* (1992) and *Murder in the Tower: And Other Tales from the State Trials* (2001).


It is commonplace to assume that the language of subjective natural rights is a key innovation of the seventeenth-century theorists Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke. Another feature of the familiar picture of their theorizing is that there is something distinctly modern about their natural jurisprudence. Allegedly, our modern languages of human rights and individualist politics are grounded in a tradition which stretches back to their “masterpieces.” Their major works are important and should be studied, it is often assumed, because they provided the foundations of modern political theory and because their ideas can still be conscripted into our own contemporary debates about rights, freedom, toleration, and the relation between individuals and political communities.

It is best to suspend any doubt about the historical validity of this commonly accepted picture if one wishes to enjoy Ross Harrison’s examination of “the great works of Hobbes and Locke” (1). Hobbes and Locke are Harrison’s main players, but Grotius and Pufendorf also enter the stage. The preamble to his analysis of these pioneers’ thought is a rapid and impressionistic sketch (chapter 1) of the sixteenth-century strains and political problems
posed by religion and religious warfare. There follow three chapters which focus on Hobbes, one chapter on Grotius and Pufendorf, and three chapters on Locke. Finally, in the concluding chapter Harrison takes stands on issues which are continuous with our contemporary political philosophy, and reflects on how modern political philosophers should read the texts of their early-modern forerunners. The whole study follows an admirably clear plan and is written with real ingenuity. Typically, Harrison begins with the basic building blocks of a system of politics and then pushes the thinker’s ideas as deep as they can go; a particularly pleasing aspect of Harrison’s work is that the reader has a sense of a gradual unfolding of the implications of the thinker’s key claims. Indeed, this work poses few problems to the reader willing to endorse its starting-point, the paradigmatic understanding of the trajectory from Grotius to Locke.

The leitmotiv running through Harrison’s work is that the seventeenth century “was a deeply sceptical age,” a century of “the scepticism that erodes the possibility of objective moral truth,” as well as a century which began with warfare and conflict, with fear, “danger, things falling apart” in a confessionally fragmented Europe (38, 41, 50, and 265). It is against the backcloth of doubt and turmoil that Harrison sets the works of Hobbes and Locke, who “wrote amidst confusion, and so faced the real and pressing question of why and how there could be order” (5). Hobbes’s *Leviathan* emerged out of a moral chaos, aspiring towards conceptual clarity and order. Its aim was to rebut Montaigne and Charron’s sceptical claims and present a new account of natural law, meant to be indubitable and to hold true across religious divides. Subsequently, after Hobbes’s clear-headed attempt to construct a naturalistic, non-confessional model of politics, Locke’s answer to the sceptic—in particular, to the problem of why people are obliged to keep their agreements—brought God back into political theorising. After Hobbes’s uncompromising statism, Locke’s efforts also reintroduced the possibility of political disobedience. This difference Harrison explains by referring to the authors’ divergent practical milieux: After the Peace of Westphalia and the Restoration of Charles II “we have consolidation and systematisation” (135), resulting in a diminishing of concern with the doubt and turmoil which had acted as a stimulant to Hobbes’s theonsing. Whilst the *Leviathan* had been written as “a plea for unity, strong government” in a context where the “political world had fallen apart,” Locke’s theory of resistance emanated from a context
where a strong, absolutist government seemed to be taking England in the wrong direction and where things could be allowed to fall apart temporarily (169).

Harrison's study is an attempt to steer a middle course between the “Cambridge” contextual approach to the study of intellectual history and the idiom in which political philosophers sometimes work, extracting insights from the classic texts without a sense of time and place. Hence, on the one hand, Harrison distances the intentions of “the actual, historical, Locke” (244) from the anachronistic modern use of Locke's ideas by Robert Nozick and others; but, on the other hand, he concentrates his interpretative efforts on an analysis of the consistency and coherence of Locke's system. There appears to be no need for the modern commentator to recover the importance of works that are now gnawed by mice only. Even such authors as James I, Barclay, Hooker, and Filmer “are small part players, minor figures of only local significance” (170). Before reading Harrison's work, I assumed that the result of such an approach would be either historically flawed or entirely derivative of existing historical scholarship. It turns out that Harrison's account is partly historically flawed and partly derivative.

First, it is unclear to what extent “we have consolidation and systematisation” after 1648. Although it can now be said with hindsight that the religious frontiers established in 1648 were largely retained in early-modern Europe, another line of future development was suggested to Protestant contemporaries by France's campaigns and the persecution of Huguenots, by the duke of Savoy's decision to cease to tolerate Vaudois Protestants, and by the accessions, to the thrones of England and of the Palatinate, of the Roman Catholics James II and Philip William of Neuburg. It is not unimportant that Harrison believes mistakenly that Locke wrote the *Epistola de tolerantia* in 1689 (11), the year of its publication, and not in the winter of 1685-6. The poor grasp of historical specifics results in a failure to understand what Locke was doing when he was drafting the text.

Secondly, Harrison's account is formed by a process of derivation from the existing interpretations offered by historians who stress the significance of the sceptical impulse for Grotius's and Hobbes's theorising. Here I must especially single out the names of Knud Haakonsen and Richard Tuck. Recently, however, there has been a growing disposition among historians to stand back from, and to question the validity of, this interpretative tradition.
Harrison fails to engage with the scholarly debate over the emergence of “modern” natural jurisprudence, and makes no mention of the important works by such prominent scholars as Annabel Brett, Quentin Skinner, and Perez Zagorin, who challenged Haakonssen’s and Tuck’s views in their publications in 1997-2000.

Leaving these concerns of an historian aside, it is most worthwhile to work through philosophically with Harrison what assumptions and arguments are involved in the replies by “Hobbes” and “Locke” to moral and political scepticism. Even if seventeenth-century specialists might not agree with his overall interpretation, they could profit from examining the conceptual issues with him. The argument is sophisticated; the focus tightly maintained; and the prose lucid. In sum, to the historically-minded reader Harrison offers a confusion’s masterpiece.


In this edited volume, which brings together a remarkable array of scholars across disciplines, Gerald Sandy proposes to study the classical roots of early modern France. Opening his introduction with a reflection on Étienne Dolet's Commentarii Linguae Latinae (1536), focusing more specifically on Dolet's commonplace thematization of the shift from the middle ages to the early sixteenth century as a move away from a period dominated by ‘‘le Monstre d'Ignorance’’ to one dominated by an increasing interest in the study of letters (bonae litterae), Sandy highlights the ways in which the study of Greek and Latin (especially the former) participated in this cultural revolution. As expected, Guillaume Budé plays a prominent role in this volume. Indeed, as Sandy observes in “Guillaume Budé: Philologist and Polymath. A Preliminary Study,” France’s classical heritage is deeply indebted to “Budé’s incorrigible habit of unlocking the political, historical and cultural secrets of classical antiquity and putting them into the context of his own times as part of his campaign to hasten the demise of Medieval scholasticism and to gain for France her rightful place in the world of learning in western Europe” (105). Emblematizing the first wave of French humanism, Budé advocated the restoration, and return to, ancient texts. Budé not only continued to uphold the pertinence of