Holy War as an allegory that “transcribes a spiritual and ontological experience which offers no closure or certainty beyond the sheer fact, or otherwise, of faith” (143). John Bunyan and the Language of Conviction concludes with an Afterword that briefly summarizes the author’s objectives.

Lynch deserves credit for her attentive readings of an impressive number of Bunyan’s writings; considering the relative brevity of this book, there is remarkable breadth of coverage. According to the Works Cited section, 32 of Bunyan’s 60 published titles are listed. The chapter summaries above only give a meager sampling of the dense, detailed analyses provided. Furthermore, Bunyan scholars will likely appreciate several interesting tangential questions that invite further attention. For example, Lynch proposes that Philip Stubbes’s Anatomie of Abuses (1583) is a pastoral dialogue that influenced Bunyan’s allegorical narratives, noting specifically that its “dialogic form and profoundly judgemental tone ... anticipate Mr. Badman in too many ways for a coincidental connection” (108). Another intriguing problem that Lynch presents is whether or not Mr. Badman belongs in the category of judgment literature; she concludes that “it would be misleading to suggest that the work is composed within this genre” (107). Finally, the topic in Chapter 5 and statements like “spiritual violence, at some unspecified level, is not just admirable but desirable” (148) remind this reader of Sharon Achinstein’s chapter on violence in Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge, 2003), a book that most likely was either inaccessible or appeared during the final stages of Lynch’s research. Most notably, Achinstein observes that “the persistent strain of violence that bleeds through [Bunyan’s] writings” (102) has received little critical attention, and Lynch’s essay on “Godly Violence” is an opportunistic effort toward filling that gap.


Geoffrey Vaughan’s work on Thomas Hobbes’s Behemoth, or The Long Parliament is concise, rich and provocative. The topic of political education is an area of growing contemporary concern. Thinkers as diverse as John Rawls, Amy Gutmann, William Galston, and Peter Berkowitz each recognize
that a liberal or democratic society must be held together by some commonly held opinions, a shared public ethos. Vaughan's book brings to our attention one of the founders of our modern politics and succeeds in reminding us that Hobbes is a challenging thinker for our time. The work is well conceived and comprehensive in its use of the scholarly literature (though the harshness of his criticisms of other scholars is sometimes off-putting). Vaughan makes good use of Hobbes's multiple texts and demonstrates sensitivity to changes in Hobbes's presentation over time. The central chapter offers clear and helpful accounts of Hobbes's negative version of the golden rule, the proper place of fear in the state of nature and in civil society, and a precise account of Hobbes's minimalist public Christianity. The conclusion—in which Vaughan suggests comparisons of Hobbes's political education to twentieth century proposals for democratic education in America—is very good for raising questions about the nature and limits of our liberalism. Hobbes may understand the limits of political culture better than we do.

Vaughan contends that most previous scholarship has failed to recognize the extent of Hobbes's concern with political action. Given his attention to the practical political problem of his time it is odd that Hobbes is not more open about explicitly political or constitutional solutions, as Vaughan notes. Instead, Vaughan argues, Hobbes proposes a political education to produce peace, stability, and loyalty. Vaughan goes even further, arguing that Hobbes subordinates philosophy to these political ends. Philosophy is justified by its utility and not by the activity of study for its own sake (13, 32).

*Behemoth* is about the education of the character known as “B,” who is turned toward a specifically political concern and an acceptance of the Hobbesian view of human nature (82, 95-6, 99, 116, 125-6, 132-3). Vaughan is quite insistent on this approach to the text, and properly so. Readers who do not pay close attention to the education of Glaucon in Plato's *Republic* will really miss the point of that dialogue, and Vaughan demonstrates that Hobbes's work must be approached with the same care. What does the reader gain from reading Hobbes's book? Vaughan's work is selective and focused; he does not attempt a comprehensive commentary. Instead, he suggests that the reader witnesses the “process of education” (117). Hobbes offers *Behemoth* as a model of a “method of instruction” through dialogue, an example of “consensus without violence,” and a case of “someone being instructed ‘towards Loyalty and Justice’” (117, 115, 122).
Vaughan emphasizes the need to develop in citizens proper political opinions, opinions that contribute to stability. This project of shaping public opinion requires rather an admittedly constrained view of political education. This is certainly not a liberal education; it is not an education in science and philosophy, or cause and effect (38). It is rather an education more like indoctrination. Vaughan is aware that such political education is a form of persuasion, not learning (41, 86).

The political education is necessary because of a particular failure of philosophic reason. The problem Vaughan’s Hobbes finds with reason is itself unusual. The difficulty Vaughan identifies is the “problem, or even the impossibility” that people will all reason to the same conclusion (39). Describing the problem in this way suggests not only that science and philosophy have trouble communicating their understanding to the masses (a prominent theme in *Leviathan*) but that philosophy itself is subject to considerable error, that reason itself is an uncertain guide. If reason fails in the way Vaughan describes then Hobbes faces a much larger challenge than readers typically recognize.

Hobbes’s solution to this problem is to employ historical lessons, or more precisely poetized or fictionalized historical lessons, as the means to shape stable and useful political opinions. Hobbesian history is a kind of fable and an exercise in political rhetoric (83-5). Perhaps the paradigmatic example is Hobbes’s own history of the state of nature (54-7). What Hobbes found valuable in history was “its power to instruct without the reader knowing that he or she is being instructed” (81). History’s “secret influence” comes through its inclusion of “an interpretive assumption,” an implicit account of cause and effect, or of human nature (90). For example, *Behemoth* includes an implicit teaching that humans are motivated by private interests, and that therefore public actions should be suspect. The chief lesson is to distrust the motives of others and especially of the ambitious who threaten political stability. (Why this lesson of distrust does not also extend to the monarch or sovereign is not clear.) History thus serves as a palatable introduction to human nature, one that does not require deep reflection or self-knowledge to grasp (128-9). Because it is apparently removed from present circumstances and present passions, historical stories may receive a hearing that more overtly political speeches could not.

Several suggestions emerge for Vaughan’s analysis. It is strange that Hobbes
seems so little concerned for the shaping of customs and habits, a topic that has occupied political educators since Aristotle. Given the comparative oddity of Hobbes’s emphasis on history as an instrument of political instruction, more extended comparisons to thinkers like Locke and Rousseau with their emphasis on breeding and deliberately regulated experiences would be very helpful. Similarly, given Hobbes’s emphasis on the proper use of a fabulous history it would be of much interest to read a more extended comparison to the similar approaches of Machiavelli and Francis Bacon. Some comparison of Hobbes’s use of dialogue to that of Plato—for example, as Socrates describes the ethic of dialogue in *Gorgias*—would also be a benefit to readers.

It is odd, too, given the critique of reason that Vaughan finds in Hobbes that the teaching of a poetic or fabulous history does not suffer from the same dangers. Are the lessons of Thucydides’ history, or the lessons of poetry, really so clear? Vaughan himself notes that Hobbes’s “interpretation of history” is not “straightforward” but rather contains “ambiguity” (118). As Vaughan points out, Hobbes recognized a certain danger in using history in this way (83). Moreover, readers may wish Vaughan had been a little more direct about just how someone who chooses to employ Hobbes’s program might tell good fictional history from bad. Truth, understood as getting the facts right, is clearly not the test of a good history. A good history will make a true presentation of human nature (91). But Vaughan also suggests that we do not really attain knowledge of human nature through the reading of history (83). In *Leviathan* Hobbes’s method involves a kind of self-reflection; the picture of human nature is derived from one’s knowledge of oneself (33). So the way to knowledge still lies through natural investigations, a kind of natural philosophy. Now that topic lies beyond the scope of Vaughan’s work, and yet it seems an unavoidable issue. How else does one know what to teach?

Vaughan’s single-minded emphasis on political education, to the exclusion of philosophic education, brings us finally to a very large question about the relative weight that Hobbes puts on political life and activity over the philosophic life. Vaughan claims that politics became Hobbes’s chief concern. Vaughan is aware that the “political education” he finds in Hobbes is not education properly understood (86). One wonders what place is left for philosophy. Vaughan acknowledges that “[p]hilosophic education may be appropriate for some” though on its own terms it is not an effective gover-
nor of political opinion (90). A fuller account of the place of that philosophic education and its relation to politics seems quite important. Vaughan quotes De Cive at length, in which Hobbes remarks that he “took up Philosophy for intellectual enjoyment,” until the political turmoil of his country became too threatening. At that point he put aside philosophy and turned his attention to the pressing practical needs of politics (14). But is peace an end in itself? It is at least plausible that Hobbes addresses those pressing political concerns so that he can reestablish an environment in which philosophers may pursue their intellectual enjoyments.

_Behemoth Teaches Leviathan_ will be of special interest to scholars interested in Hobbes and to those willing to reassess the necessity of political education, of the preservation of proper political opinion, even in a free society. Vaughan’s analysis is very suggestive, too, for other readers whose interests lie not directly with political education but with the way the stories we tell about our history shape our public political ethos.


Sarah Hutton’s *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher* traces the life, philosophy, and intellectual development of Anne Conway using Conway’s own works and the relationships she had with leading intellectuals of her day. Hutton endeavors to use history and biography to understand Conway’s philosophy. While Hutton’s methodologies reveal significant information about Conway’s life, philosophy, and intellectual milieu, her employment of history and biography as analytical tools ultimately undermines her efforts to craft a full and successful story of Conway as a woman philosopher.

Hutton applies both biography and history in her quest to understand Anne Conway’s life and philosophy. Via biography, Hutton hopes to place Conway at the center of a circle of great thinkers. Hutton claims that Conway led this group and set its agenda. Hutton also utilizes “reconstructive archaeology,” which Hutton defines as “the history of her [Conway’s] philosophical activities . . . pieced together . . . from the intellectual circle she was fortunate enough to inhabit” (10). Thus, she considers Conway in relation to Henry