

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN URBAN CHINA,
1993 AND 2002

A Dissertation

by

DIQING LOU

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2008

Major Subject: Political Science

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Approved by:

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ABSTRACT

Political Participation and Transformation in Urban China,

1993 and 2002. (May 2008)

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My dissertation examines political participation in non-democratic countries. Specifically, it looks into China's urban political participation in the past decade and examines how Chinese urban citizens are mobilized to participate in politics when an authoritarian regime has been experiencing dramatic economic change. The theoretic question of this dissertation is the evolvement of state-society relations during the economic development and how the change of the state-society relationship is reflected in individual behavior. I found that while the social context such as the workplace served as fundamental grassroots institution to mobilize citizens' political participation in the early 1990s, China's urban political participation has shifted to lean more and more on individual resources.

Political participation in non-democratic regimes is a unique and rapidly developing field in the studies of political behavior. Scholars studying citizens' political participation in USSR and China have long noted that political participation in an authoritarian regime is mobilized and controlled by the state and citizens are organized

by the state to participate in politics to provide for regime legitimacy. In the dissertation I tested this paradigm within the context of China's economic development.

The data I employ are the 1993 China's Social Mobility and Social Change Survey and the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey. Both data sets contain highly congruent batteries of questions on citizens' political behavior and political attitudes that provide the basis of comparison across time. The data sets were collected across China in 1993 and 2002 respectively representing the population of adult residents (excluding Tibet).

The comparison of urban political participation in the past decade exhibited a general and measurable decline of citizens' participation in the economic reform. I found Chinese citizens' political participation has shifted largely from the pattern of "grassroots-state-mobilization" to "individual-voluntary-mobilization" during the economic reform. I argue that this is largely resulted from the change of state-society relations as individual citizens are granted with more autonomy in political liberalization and become less dependent on the state for economic sources.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother Shuhua Sun, and to the memories of my father Mingyuan Lou and my grandma Huixin Xu.

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My chair Professor Jon Bond supervised my dissertation research. Professor Bond is a great mentor who always makes his time available to his students, guided the direction of this study with patience and professional dedication, and serves a role model for his students as what is expected of a good scholar, a good teacher and a good colleague. Professor Matthew Hoddie has worked with me since the beginning and I have benefited from his advice for this research, his guidance for my professional development, and his patience to work me through the graduate program. Professor Alex Pacek helped with the theoretical design and methodological development of this research, reached to me when I needed help, and has been a constant source of encouragement. Professor Harland Prechel has been a supportive mentor to me with faithful help, and he is my intellectual inspiration for the qualitative chapter on the transformation of the work units in China. Last but certainly not the least, Professor Tianjian Shi is a renowned scholar in Comparative Politics and Chinese Politics, who

mentored me and worked with me on the research design and empirical analysis of this research, and who has been patient in helping me with my career. The data sets employed in this research also originate from his work in mass survey research in China.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about political participation in the non-democracies and it aims to explore the determinants that motivate citizens' participation in non-democratic settings. Specifically, the dissertation employs the case of China and attempts to identify the motivating factors for China's urban political participation.

My main argument in the dissertation is that in non-democratic countries, social context can be at least as important as individual characteristics in determining political participation, if not even more significant. I argue that the single most important predictor to determine China's urban political participation is the workplace that the individual is immersed within. At the end of the study, I shall discuss the likely significance that such findings may suggest about China's democratic prospect in light of China's current economic reforms.

Study of Political Participation in Democracies and Non-Democracies

Political participation has been a central topic in political studies since the behavioral revolution that occurred in the 1960s. As political studies diverted their attention from traditional political theorizing toward human behavior, the question of individual citizens' political participation has remained one of the most important topics in the study of politics.

This dissertation follows the style of *American Political Science Review*.

Indeed, citizens' political participation occupies a critical place in modern political studies, especially in the study of democratic systems for good and almost apparent reasons. After all, an active and responsive citizenry is critical for the healthy and successful operation of democracy. At a minimum, democracy is a form of government that governs with the consent of the governed, and gives citizens the opportunity to participate in making policy. Without the engagement of its citizenry, any democracy is subject to the danger of collapse or tyranny. Thus, to monitor and assess citizenry's political participation can be an important and critical task of the political studies of modern democracy.

As theory and methodological development enabled systematic research of human behavior, more and more scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of political participation, mostly in democratic systems. Scholars of political behavior have been trying to disentangle the puzzles such as what citizens do in order to attain their political goals in the current political system, and why some people opt to stay out of the political process while some others strive to engage in politics. In the last few decades, there has emerged a remarkable number of scholarly works that shed light upon these questions and upon political participation in general (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Scholozman and Brady 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Oilver 2001). These works have been concerned with various aspects of citizens' political participation, and have greatly deepened our understanding of forms and quality of political participation within the current political system as well as the democracy itself. These studies

illuminate the disparities of political participation among the citizenry and have directed the social efforts to motivate and engage people with political life in a more equal fashion.

Although the study of political participation remains one of the most important and one of the most fruitful subfields in political science research, it has been mostly confined to the study of democracies. Indeed, for long it was generally accepted by the political science discipline that participation mainly existed in democratic countries. Although participation has been a heated and well-researched field, little political participation research had been done for the citizenry in non-democratic regimes.

Since the early 1970s, scholarly attention has increased in the political participation in the non-democratic regimes, such as the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Political research has raised the general question in the study of political participation: can there be meaningful political participation in non-democratic regimes, and has there actually been political participation in non-democratic regimes?

The answer to these questions has been a "yes". During the last three decades, participation scholars have found that there indeed is meaningful and actual political participation in the non-democratic regimes (e.g. Friedgut 1979; Hahn 1987; Millar 1987; Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1998; Tong 2003). These political behavior scholars who dared to ask the question about the possible existence of political participation in non-democratic countries have found that citizens in non-democratic settings are indeed engaged with political affairs in an effective and comprehensive way. Townsend (1967) in his study of political participation found that popular political participation was well available in the newly established China. Little (1976) compared the political participation in the U.S. with the participation in the USSR, and noted the

widespread forms of participation in the Soviet politics¹. In Friedgut's (1979) study of political participation of USSR, the author examined citizens' political participation in the Soviet Union and compared them with the U.S. participation.

As the contemporary participation studies confirmed the existence of civil engagement in non-democratic societies, scholars started to further examine the motivational mechanisms through which citizens are engaged in politics.

Bahry and Silver (1990) looked into political participation in the Soviet Union and reported that political participation was prevalent in Soviet Union before the democratization of the country. Bahry and Silver pointed out that not only were citizens able to participate in the non-democratic countries, but the battery of their participation is complex and far from being uni-dimensional. Partially inspired by Bahry and Silver's work, Shi (1997) looked into political participation in Beijing on the eve of the 1989 democratic movement and found there were various meaningful types of political participation in China. After conducting interviews with around one thousand Beijing residents, Shi concluded that citizenry of the non-democratic countries, such as China, were able to participate in politics meaningfully and to attain their sociopolitical goals through various means and channels.

Bahry and Silver's research and Shi's study are among a collection of important political behavior studies that are devoted to the question of the mechanisms of political

¹ Townsend defines political participation as follows: "political participation includes all those activities through which the individual consciously becomes involved in attempts to give a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs, excluding activities of an occupational or compulsory nature" (4). According to Little, mass political participation is the "involvement of individual citizens in collective political activities related to the functions performed by the formal institutions of the political system" (454). Both Townsend and Little argued that mobilized political participation should be counted toward meaningful political participation in non-democratic countries, and "both the American and Soviet political systems are participant systems" (Little, 455). This definition of political participation has raised drawn critiques in later studies of political participation in non-democracies, as whether or not mobilized political acts should be counted toward meaningful political participation remains controversial in some scholarly debates.

participation within non-democratic settings since the early 1990s (Jennings 1997; Shi 1998; Chen and Yang 1999; Tong 2003; Chen 2004). Not only have these works further confirmed the existence of political participation in non-democratic settings, but they also have provided invaluable insights and knowledge that deepened our understanding of political participation in non-democratic nations. A majority of these works have tried to address various aspects of the following key question of political participation within non-democracies: if political participation in non-democracies is as real and meaningful as political participation in democracies, are the determinants of political participation in non-democracies the same as the determinants of political participation in democracies? That is, if political participation does exist in non-democracies, how are we to explain it?

Two Approaches in Studying Political Participation

Before we move on to explain political participation in non-democracies, let us briefly review the explanation and prediction of political participation in the current political studies in general.

So far the study of political participation has evolved along two fundamentally different theoretical lines. The first line is to reduce the political participation to the individual level, which attempts to explain the different levels of citizens' participation with different individual characteristics, such as one's income, education, gender and age. The other approach is to explain the difference in political participation from the sociopolitical context that goes beyond the individual level. The first school is generally regarded as methodological individualism, while the other is referred to as the social entity or social context school (Durkeim 1965; Watkins 1973; Kincaid 1986).

Both schools of methodological individualism and social contexts are derived from the powerful intellectual roots of sociopolitical philosophy. The methodological individualism, as argued by Karl Popper (1962) and Friedrich Hayek (1952), insist that as most sociopolitical phenomena can ultimately be reduced at the individual level, most sociopolitical phenomena should be explained at the individual level, and the individual-level social theory should suffice to explain social phenomena. The social entity school, supported by important figures such as Comte (1851) and Durkheim (1965), points out that there are independent social institutions and social forces that exist beyond the individual level, which are as capable and powerful to explain social phenomena as the individual traits.

Although the methodological individualism and social entities schools ignited heated debates in social science in late 1950s and early 1980s, both have contributed tremendously to the development of social science inquiry. This is certainly true for the field of political participation studies.

The current studies of political participation, especially the studies of political participation in democracies, which are relatively more advanced than the participation research of other systems, have greatly benefited from both of these two theoretical lines. One school of contemporary political participation study has focused heavily on the individual level. That is, scholars and their works on political behavior insist that political participation should and could be comprehensively disentangled by examining diverse characteristics at the individual level, such as individuals' age, education, income, citizens' partisanship and psychological engagement in politics. The other political participation research branch maintains that political behavior can hardly be fully

explained by individual differences, and political participation can be better explained from the perspective of social entities, such as social organizations and social forces.

Following these lines of inquiries, there have been two major types of theoretical explanations for political participation, particularly for the political participation in democratic settings. One is to examine and explain citizens' political participation at the individual level, and the difference of citizens' political participation is attributed to citizens' different income, education, life-stage, partisanship and citizens' varied interest and psychological engagement in politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes et al. 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Clark and Clark 1986; Schlozman et al. 1995; Brady, Verba and Schlotzman 1995; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997). For example, classics of participation studies in democracies by Almond and Verba (1963), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and Brady, Verba and Schlotzman (1995) have all long noted the importance of individual socioeconomic status, such as education, income and individual civic engagement, in motivating citizens to participate in political affairs. Also, studies by Campbell et al. (1960), Verba and Nie (1970) and Verba, Burns and Schlozman (1997) also have pointed out the critical linkage between citizens' political participation and individual partisanship, political interest, political knowledge and efficacy in politics. Other type of explanation asserts that the differences in the level of individual citizens' political participation results from the social organizations and social institutions that citizens are immersed within every day. Such line of theory seeks to explain individual citizens' political participation difference with the everyday surrounding context, such as the family background, the workplace, neighborhood and one's socializing groups such as churches and civil organizations, etc.

The differences in these social contexts are believed to contribute to the different level of individuals' acts of political participation (Huckfeldt 1979; Almond and Verba 1989; Kenny 1992; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Oliver 2001). Huckfeldt (1979) argued that social contexts are important connecting ties between individual social status and political participation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) points out that mobilization plays a critical role in shaping people's voting behavior and emphasizes the importance of social networks in engaging citizens into politics, as the organizational memberships provide critical networking opportunities to involve individuals into political affairs. Oliver (1999) argued that the socioeconomic characteristics of citizens' immediate environment affect citizens' political participation in various ways.

Both types of political participation research, political individualism and social contexts have achieved remarkable fruits in studying political participation and have significantly contributed to the current understanding of political participation. It is found that political participation, especially political participation in democracies, can be explained both at the individual level, i.e. explained by individuals' characteristics such as income, education, age and political interest, and by social contexts and environment that the individual is immersed within, such as the family background and the workplace.

The study of political participation in the non-democratic countries has made an important contribution by confirming and identifying various forms of citizens' political participation in non-democracies. Yet, compared to the contemporary study of political participation in democracies, there is still a gap remaining concerning the motivational mechanisms of citizens' political participation in non-democracies, especially the influence of social context. That is, most of the current participation studies of non-

democratic settings, such as P. R. China, have placed the major emphasis upon the explanation of political participation at the individual level instead of the contextual level. A large amount of current political participation studies in non-democracies have mainly attempted to analyze the participation differences by examining the individual differences, such as education, income, age, membership of the Communist Party and interest in political, etc. (Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; Jennings 1998; Tong 2003; Chen 2004). Although the influence of social context has been a major theoretical stream in explaining political participation in democracies, few political studies so far have done extensive research on the social contexts as major sources contributing to the participation disparities in non-democracies.

The major goal of this dissertation is thus to explain political participation in non-democracies from the social contextual perspective, which, hopefully, shall contribute to the general understanding of the mobilizing system and determinants of citizens' political participation in non-democratic settings. Specifically, it employs the case of contemporary urban China and tries to identify the major factors that motivate citizens to engage in political affairs from the social contextual level.

The Practical Dimension of This Dissertation

Besides the theoretical purpose that this dissertation aims to serve as providing the contextual understanding of political participation in non-democracies, there is also the practical goal that this study strives to attain.

One critical social contextual factor that we shall examine in this study is the workplace in China's urban setting. Currently Chinese urban workplaces are going through significant structural changes under the new policies initiated in Chinese

economic reforms. So are the social contexts that urban Chinese citizens are experiencing every day. Before China's economic reform in the late 1970s, most Chinese citizens worked for the government organizations and state-owned enterprises, and the national economy was mainly a state economy. Ever since China launched massive economic reforms in the early 1980s, more and more private and foreign enterprises had taken off in urban China. With favored economic policies, private and foreign enterprises are developing steadily and state enterprises have dropped from its dominant place to barely half in recent years.² Given the rapidly changing scenario of China's urban workplaces, if, as we hypothesize, social contexts such as the workplace, should have a significant effect upon China's urban political participation, the structural changes of the workplaces may result in a deep impact on Chinese citizens' political participation, China's urban political development and China's democratic prospect sequentially.

Thus, one of the major goals of this study is that through studying the case of China's urban political participation under the influence of social context, especially the influence of the workplace, it attempts to analyze the changing trend of the political participation in China's urban areas in the economic reforms. By studying the social contextual influence on China's participation, we shall discuss the practical implication of our finding and we shall boldly discuss and predict the democratic prospect that China may be faced with. We shall argue that China's accelerating economic reforms have been tearing down important social institutions that are critical to mobilize citizens' political participation, and thus jeopardize the quality of China's political participation at least in the urban areas.

² Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China.

Another practical political concern that we have in this dissertation is in the changes of Chinese urban political participation in the past decade, and how the changes in citizens' political participation are deeply rooted in and reflect the change of state-society relations in urban China. From 1993 to 2002, China has been experiencing rapid economic development, which has brought important and fundamental sociopolitical changes to Chinese society. In this dissertation, we will be investigating what the similarities are between citizens' political participation in 1993 and 2002, and what are the differences, and what these similarities and differences mean for Chinese urban political behavior, and how the continuities and changes reflect the possible changes in the state-society relationship that Chinese regime has been facing during the economic takeoff.

Data Sets

There are two data sets that we shall be employing in this dissertation. One is the 1993 Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change Survey and the other 2002 Asian Barometer.

The 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change data set was collected by the Social Survey Center of People's University in Beijing across China in August 1993. The data set is designed to be representative of the adult population over 18 years old in China, residing in family households at the time, excluding those living in

the Tibetan Autonomous region.³ A Stratification multistage area sampling procedure was employed to select the sample.⁴

This Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change survey is a comprehensive and well-suited data set that collected both the detailed political behavior information and a battery of demographic information of all the adult respondents. Also, the survey is conducted across all the provinces of China except for Tibet, and the population is sampled to well represent the country. The data set has both rural and urban information on file, and in this dissertation I shall focus upon the urban section of the data set. The total sample of the urban population is 1,070.

The other data set that we shall use in this study is the Asian Barometer Survey, specifically the Mainland China section. Currently the data set is stored in the Asian Barometer Survey Project Office in the National Taiwan University and is available to the public for academic research upon individual request.⁵

The Asian Barometer conducts an over 150-question survey across eight Asian regions, which are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and Mainland China. The survey is composed of series questions concerning both political attitudes and political behavior of the individual respondent. Compared to the 1993 data set, the 2002 Asian Barometer is a cross-national survey data set emphasizing on the individuals' political attitude and perception. However, the data set does include

³ A large proportion of Tibetan do not speak Chinese. Also, at the time of the survey, the transportation in Tibet was difficult due to inefficient railroad and highway system.

⁴ The primary sampling units (PSUs) selected eighty-five cities, and the secondly sampling units were districts (qu) or streets (jiedao), and the third stage of sampling units were committees (juweihui). Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

⁵ The data set was collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2000-2004), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely responsible for the data distribution, and I appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned.

questions of citizens' political participation, and contains most of the interested independent variables in our study.

The Mainland China Asian Barometer data come from the survey conducted in China between March 2002 and August 2002 in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey excluding those residing in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.⁶ A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.⁷

The 1993 Survey and 2002 Asian Barometer consisted of batteries of questions gauging citizens' political behavior, social context and citizens' individual characteristics, such as income, education, social status and political interest, which enabled us to compare citizens' political participation and investigate the participation motivation across time.

Organization

Before we set out the whole research, we would like to briefly map out the basic organization of this study for clarity and guiding purposes.

Chapter II shall be devoted to the existent literature of the political participation studies in both democratic and non-democratic settings. We shall look into the major theories and methods that have been employed to study political participation in all settings, and our emphasis shall be placed upon the current works of social contexts and

⁶ The Tibet Autonomous region was excluded in the 2002 survey due to similar reasons as in the 1993 data.

⁷ The Primary Sampling Units are sixty-seven cities in the urban area, and the secondary sampling units were districts and streets, and the third stage of selection was community or neighborhood committees. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. A total of 496 sampling units were selected.

its relationship upon political participation as well as current political participation study in non-democratic settings, especially in China.

Chapter III shall be the theory and proposition section of the study. Based upon the existent studies reviewed in Chapter II, we shall lay down our own theories and propositions concerning the relationship between political participation and social context. In this chapter we shall also discuss the definition of political participation as well as social context, and what relationships we expect to find between political participation and social context, especially the workplace.

Chapter IV is the first empirical section, in which we shall discuss the data set, dependent and independent variables and the measurements and methodologies that we shall employ in this study. We shall also set out the key participation forms of our interest. Preliminary statistical analysis is to be conducted in this chapter.

Chapter V is the major empirical chapter, in which we shall conduct all the empirical tests that are related to theories and propositions and analyze the statistical results. This chapter shall provide us with the major empirical evidence of the theories that are raised in Chapter III.

Chapter VI is a chapter dedicated to Chinese politics. As we acknowledged here, this dissertation exploring the social contextual influence on China's political participation does not only have the theoretical importance, but also carries deep practical significance. In this chapter, we shall devote our discussion into the practical implication of this research and talk about how this dissertation may concern itself with China's urban politics and China's democratic prospect within the economic reforms.

The last chapter, Chapter VII, is the concluding chapter, in which we shall review the major theories and empirical findings of this research and summarize what are learned concerning the contextual influence on political participation in non-democracies in general and the relationship between the workplace and China's political participation in particular. In addition, we shall acknowledge the limitations and drawbacks of this study and point out the directions that future researches may like to explore.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the established theories and long-standing approaches in the study of political participation in democracies and non-democracies with the emphasis on the latter. The major methods and research fruits in the research of political participation provide guidance and direction for the rest of the study. At the same time, we shall also identify theoretical gaps in existing political participation research, which would be the starting point of the theory building of this dissertation.

The literature review is arranged along two theoretical lines, the methodological individualism and social contextual perspectives. We shall look into the political studies in democracies from both individual and contextual perspectives, and examine the individualistic study of political participation in non-democratic settings such as the former Soviet Union and contemporary China. The focus of the literature review is on how context such as the workplace affects political participation in democratic settings, to use as a theoretical basis for analyzing the social contextual influence on political participation in non-democracies. In this chapter we shall examine both the fruits and gaps in the current social contextual studies of political participation in non-democracies, especially Chinese urban political participation. Finally, we shall briefly preview the theoretical arguments to be raised in Chapter III as to advance understanding of how the social context affects participation in non-democracies.

Political Participation in Democracies

Political participation is one of the most important and widely researched fields in the study of political science. Research on political participation in democracies has a long history and has produced remarkable fruits at both theoretical and empirical levels.

Political participation was an important topic in political philosophers' concerns of the interactions between the state and the society. As early as Aristotle's era, political scientists were arguing that an effective and genuinely democratic government depends on citizens' participation in the decision making process of the state. In *Social Contracts & Discourse* Rousseau ([1762] 1950) argued that the government should be considered as the trustee from the public, and citizen's participation into the public decision making is not only important but also necessary to sustain the normal functioning of the democracy. These thoughts have been emphasized in the modern political theory literature and it has been widely acknowledged that an active citizenry is critical to the survival and eventual success of a democracy (Dewey 1927; Dahl 1956, 1970; Pateman 1970; Thompson 1970).

In the early writings, political participation has largely been a topic of abstract political thought. Since the behavioral revolution in the 1950s, political scientists have been looking closely into how citizens participate in politics and what explains their political behavior. The study of participation in democratic societies accelerated rapidly in the last few decades, and political scholars have explored widely the contents, variations, significance and motivational mechanisms of citizens' political participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba, Sidney and Norman 1972; Sidney, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlotzman 1995; Oliver 2001). These works have explored a wide range of topics in

political participation, which have contributed greatly to our understanding political participation for both democratic and non-democratic settings. While a complete review of the studies of democratic political participation is beyond the scope of this dissertation, here I will closely examine what previous research has found about the motivational mechanisms of citizens' political participation in democracies.

The literature has advanced four models of citizens' political participation in democracies—the socioeconomic model, the demographic model, the psychological engagement model, and the social-contextual model.

Socioeconomic factors have long been noted in the political participation research as important motivational factors in affecting citizens' participation level (Almond and Verba 1963; Nie, Powell and Prewitt 1969; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Barnes and Kasse 1979; Dalton 1988; Conway 1991). Back to Verba and Nie's (1972) research of political participation in the United States, socioeconomic resources (i.e., education and income) have been found to affect citizens' civic orientations, such as concern for politics, information and feelings of efficacy, which motivate citizens to participation in politics. In Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) seminal research of participation in the states, the authors pointed out how different socioeconomic status may affect citizens' political interests and actual participation level, as citizens who are well-educated and well-to-do are more likely to participate into politics when holding other variables constant, and the education turns out to be particularly important. Wolfinger and Rosenstone argue that education increases the moral pressure to vote, and education helps "impart information about policies and cognate fields and about a variety of skills, some of which facilitate political learning" (18). Also, as an extension of the socioeconomic resource model,

Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) reported that socioeconomic factors are among the most important variables that motivate citizens to participate in politics, when socioeconomic factors such as income and education bestow individuals with more resources and civic skills to enable their political participation. In the research of political participation in democracies, socioeconomic resources are one of the most consistent findings across time and numerous studies of political participation in democratic setting have noted that socioeconomic resources are critical predictors of citizens' political participation.

Besides socioeconomic factors, general demographic factors such as gender, age and race are also found to be critical variables in influencing citizens' participation level. There has been a vast amount of literature reporting that women generally participate less well-off than men (Campbell et. al.1964; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes and Kasse 1979; Baxter and Lansing 1983; Christy 1987; Scholzman, Burns and Verba 1994). Campbell et al.'s (1960) study of American political behavior in the 1950s found that women participate less than their male counterparts, and attributed the gender difference to the socialization process or "vestigial sex roles" (484). Verba and Nie (1972) further reported that the difference of political engagement between men and women are not limited to behavior, but also are reflected in other dimensions such as political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy as well as membership in social organizations. Scholzman, Burns and Verba (1994) and Verba et. al. (1995) explored the gaps between male and female political participation and attributed such differences toward the different levels of political resources distributed among men and women.⁸

⁸ In the recent studies of participation, political scientists found the gap between different gender groups is becoming small as women are slightly less politically active than men. The gender gap is roughly similar in

Besides gender, age is also an important factor in explaining political participation. By employing the cross-national survey data, Nie, Verba and Kim (1974) have noted that political participation peaked in the middle age and remained at a relative low level for both young and old age groups.⁹ Also, after controlling for education, income and gender, following political researches have widely noted the prominent age influence in affecting political participation (Jennings 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings and Markus 1988). The age influence is generally interpreted as the “life-cycle” experience, as the young adults tend to be more apathetic toward politics and the level of political interests increases among the middle-aged and then rapidly declines among the old and the physically infirm. While the “twilight years” decline occurs to women roughly in their fifties and sixties, men’s voting does not substantially decrease until the threshold of their seventies and eighties. Besides the “life-cycle” effect, generational effect is another dimension of the influence of age, which argues that birth cohorts share similar community of experiences in similar socioeconomic environment, which would give this generation, or birth cohort, distinctive experience and attitude toward politics and political participation (Nie, Verba and Kim 1974; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Jennings and Zhang 2007).¹⁰

It is also worth noting there is a wide range of political participation literature concerning the role of race and ethnicity in predicting the level of political participation. Races and ethnicities have been widely acknowledged in the participation research to have an indispensable and independent influence in affecting political participation

magnitude to the difference in activity between Anglo-Whites and African-Americans, and it is considerably narrower than that separating the rich and poor (Verba et. al. 1995, 254).

⁹ Gender differences in participation levels across different sociopolitical settings were also acknowledged in this article.

¹⁰ In order to differentiate the life-cycle influence and generation influence, it demands times series data sets, which goes beyond the availability of the data sets employed in the dissertation.

(Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Miller et al. 1981; Dawson, Brown and Allen 1990; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1993; Hero and Campbell 1996; Leighly and Vedlitz 1999). One prominent characteristic of ethnic participation, participation of African-Americans particularly, is the development of “self-awareness”, and this group consciousness may substitute for higher social status and provides an alternative model to impel citizens into political participation (Marx 1967; Aberbach and Walker 1970; Verba and Nie 1972). Historically, ethnic minorities were documented to participate less than Anglo-Whites, such as voter turn out; however, participation in the past few decades found higher level of political participation in African-Americans after controlling of socioeconomic status (Olsen 1970; Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Verba et. al. 1995). This finding has been attributed to blacks’ sense of racial identity and generally greater community consciousness. For example, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) reported the black empowerment, as indicated by control of the mayor’s office, enhanced the political participation of the blacks by increasing their sense of political trust and efficacy. Although previous studies have not systemically traced the linkage between participation and ethnic minorities in Communist China, I would include ethnicity as a control variable in this study.

Besides the sociological and demographic factors in accounting for citizens’ political participation, participation studies also use psychological engagement model. Psychological engagement generally denotes citizens’ attention, perception and mental capabilities that may facilitate or obstruct them from participating into politics. Controlling for socioeconomic and demographic explanations, previous research finds that the level of citizens’ political participation is significantly affected by citizens’ attention devoted into politics, their abilities to process political information and their

perceptions about political systems and political process and their capabilities to engage with political affairs effectively (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Abramson and Aldrich 1982). Citizens' psychological engagement with politics is generally assessed through a battery of questions pertaining to citizens' general interest in politics, their knowledge about politics and current affairs as well as their perceptions about participating into politics (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Conway 1991; Dalton 1988). Among various psychological engagement factors included in the current research of political participation, citizens' political interest and political efficacy have been found to be most consistently correlated with the participation level (Teixeira 1992).

Although socioeconomic, demographic and psychological engagement models occupy important places in the political participation studies; they are far from exhausting the scholarly explanations of participation. During the last three decades, political scientists have been vexed by the paradox of American voter turnout that with the education and income levels increasing among American citizens, the overall voter turnout had remained low. One of the most important insights into this question is that the decline of the political participation level resulted from the decrease of the social mobilization, that is, the social contacts that are necessary to involve individuals into political affairs. Putnam (1995, 2000) has argued that the decline of American political participation in the last few decades is directly related to the decline of connection of individual citizens with their community and society.

Indeed, because all politics are local and all political decisions are local decisions, the addition of social context theoretical models is a major advance in accounting for the motivational mechanisms of citizens' political participation. This model posits that

participation is a response to the contextual cues and political opportunities structured by the social environment. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995, 3) argue: “Politics in a democracy revolves around the decision of individual citizens, but individual citizens make their choice at particular time and places, located in multiple environments operating at a variety of levels.” Individual citizens are innately part of the broad sociopolitical context. Besides their own socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement, individuals’ decisions and acts of civic participation nevertheless result in part from the motivation and opportunities that the environment provides within which they are immersed.

In *Who Votes?* Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that the registration law and regulation makes an important impact on citizens’ voting and political participation. Powell (1986) in his examination of American voter turnout cross-nationally found that American party system and registration laws severely inhibits voter turnout, and he argued that party systems and electoral laws play a prominent role in determining the level of voter turnout. Through studying voter-turnout levels across 19 democracies, Jackman (1987) found that political institutions and electoral laws have the direct and significant effect on the voter turnout, and the presence of competitive electoral districts and unicameralism shall stimulate voter turnout. Mitchell and Wlezien (1995) in their study of the restrictive laws on registration and turnout in presidential and nonpresidential election years from 1972 and 1982 found that restrictive laws on registration had significant influence on voter registration and voting turnout. Campbell (2003) in her case study of the social welfare program and political participation of senior citizens, found

that while participatory inputs influence policy outputs, public policy would also be influencing participation in the political process.

Some scholars also argue that intermediation of contextual influence provides important and distinctive perspective to the study on political participation, which argues media environment and interpersonal networks are critically important to affect citizens' decisions of political participation.¹¹ Lazarsfeld et. al. (1944) employed a panel study of presidential voting decisions and argued that personal influence was more pervasive and less in selective than the formal media in affecting citizens' voting decision, and "politics gets through personal contacts than in any other way" (152). Berelson et. al. (1954) studied the formation of public opinion in a presidential campaign and found that social institutions and socioeconomic status had important intermediation influence on citizens' opinion and decision in voting. Gunther et. al.'s (2007) studied citizens' voting behavior comparatively and argued that politicization and information cleavage would influence citizens' voting decisions through "a set of complex multistage processes characterized by intervening social, economic and cultural factors" (322).

Studies of the institutions and participation were further broadened to economic and political contexts, and researchers found that socioeconomic institutions are important in determining the participation level (Powell and Whitten 1993; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Cox et al. 1998).

In his examination of neighborhood, Huckfeldt (1979) argued that social contexts are important connecting ties between individual social status and political participation. Kenny (1992) continued the contextual study and confirmed that both individually and

¹¹ The research design of the intermediation school usually employs panel study to capture the dynamics of citizens' voting behavior, which is limited by the scope of this study due to data availability.

socially based participating acts are affected by citizens' immediate social environment. In his often cited work, Putman (1995) argued that the decline of citizens' political participation is directly related to the decrease of citizens' involvement in the community and drop of the "networks of civil engagement". Oliver (1999) also argued that the socioeconomic characteristics of citizens' immediate environment affect citizens' political participation, as "local politics are more contentious in economically diverse cities with more groups pursuing contradictory policy goals", which stimulates citizens' interest in politics and sequentially leads to higher political participation level (191).

The social organization is another important contextual factor that may mediate citizens' political participation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) stressed the importance of social networks in engaging citizens into politics, as the organizational memberships provide important networking opportunities to involve individuals into political affairs—"membership in organizations causes people to be targeted by political leaders for mobilization" (83). By examining the political participation by African Americans, Harris (1994) argues that the black church membership serves as the both organizational mobilization mechanism and the psychological motivational effect for African American citizens to participate into politics.

Family background of individual citizens also provides important environmental cues that motivate or inhibit political participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argue that parents' education has a significant effect on children's education achievement and income levels. In addition, parental education has a moderately strong direct effect on vocabulary skills and political interest and information. In his inspiring works of young people's political participation, Plutzer (2002) argues that political behavior is deeply

rooted in one's youth, and participation is a behavioral "habit" that citizens developed since they were young, as citizens' family background, the political orientation and political behavior of one's parents would significantly help to form individuals' own participation habits. Parents' education help promote offspring political knowledge; also, parental political involvement can provide both behavior to model and campaign relevant information that children rarely get from formal schooling (43).¹²

Another important context is workplace. Workplaces are long theorized to exert a positive influence to stimulate individual citizens' political participation. Previous studies found that workplaces provide important contextual cues to boost political participation, as citizens' experiences at work have a strong direct effect on their attitudes and behaviors outside the workplace. (Elden 1981; Greenberg, Grumberg and Daniel 1996; Mutz and Mondak 2006).

In their seminal study *Who Votes?*, Wolfinger and Rosenstone' (1980) devote an entire chapter to the question of how workplaces and employment types might affect citizens' political socialization process and their political participation. They found a higher rate of voter turnout among employees in the public sector than employees of other sectors after controlling income, education, gender and other demographic factors. They argue that the government employees are a particular social group who are more likely to perceive the relative immediacy to elections, and employment in the public sector is more likely to improve citizens' political consciousness and political alertness and stimulates their political participation. Bennett and Orzechowski (1983) examined the

¹² Sociological literature has long documented the significant effect of the family background on the social stratification, psychological orientations and behavioral patterns the individuals (Wilson 1959; Kohn 1977; Belsky, Lerner and Spanier 1984; Riley, Foner and Waring 1987; Ballantine 1989), and family background has generally been held as an important link of individuals' socialization process.

voting behavior of 1964 through 1978 general elections and found that voter participation rates for public employees are approximately 18 percent higher than the general public.

In his study of the effect of workplace on citizens' political participation, Greenberg (1986) confirmed the significant association between workplace participation and participation outside the workplaces. Specifically, he found that employees who participate in workplace democracies are more likely to be involved in voting and various community and campaign works outside the workplace. Also, Johnson and Libecap (1991) examined the voting behavior of public employees in the 1984 and 1986 national elections, and found that when controlling socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, government employees as a group are more likely to vote than private sector employees, and they attributed this higher voting rate to both the coercion from machine politics and low cost of being "politically alerted" (140). With the 1996 data of American National Election Studies, Corey and Garand (2002) found that government employees have more exposure to political information, and government employees have higher levels of political interest, political knowledge, support for the government and political efficacy. The vote turnout of government employees is significantly higher than other social groups. Thus, the authors concluded that the government employment has an independent and significant effect upon citizens' political participation.

From these studies of social contexts and citizens' political participation, we may gain an understanding of the significance of social contexts in shaping and affecting citizens' political participation, at least in democratic settings. Other than the socioeconomic resources, exogenous demographic factors and the psychological engagement, social contexts, such as the workplace and family background that surround

individuals in the everyday environment shall have an independent and indispensable influence on citizens' overall participation. The philosophies, approaches, and fruits of the social contextual studies not only have remarkably increased our knowledge of political participation in democracies, but they also have shed important light upon the political participation studies in general, especially the participation studies in non-democracies.

Political Participation in Non-Democracies

The topic of this dissertation is the mobilization mechanisms of political participation in non-democracies; specifically, I am interested in urban political participation in China and how the social contexts may be influencing the variety and intensity of Chinese urban political participation.

Theories and research on the causes of political participation focus primarily on democracies. The study of citizens' political participation in non-democratic systems is relatively recent. Not until late 1960s did political scientists start to devote their attention to political participation of non-democratic societies. The questions of whether political participation occurs outside democracies and, if so, what forms it takes have remained important puzzles for political scholars. Research on political participation in non-democracies has proved to be a challenging yet worthy field of study. Since the 1970s, political scholars have made remarkable progress in discovering and analyzing political participation in non-democratic countries. These researches shed light on the state-society relationships of the non-democracies and on political behavior in general (Hough 1976; Little 1976; Friedgut 1979; Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; O'Brien and Li 2001).

Inkeles and Bauer's (1959) research on the political life of the Soviet citizens found that individuals in the Soviet Union were active in pursuing interests in the public arena, although their enthusiasm was more focused on one's personal wellbeing rather than political ideals and principles. Townsend (1967) in his study of political participation also found evidence that popular political participation was available in the newly established China. Townsend observed various forms of Chinese citizens' political participation at both the state and local levels. He argued that small group activities are important forms of citizenry participation, and there are close interactions between the local cadres and the mass public through citizens' participation.

Little (1976) compared the political participation in the U.S. with the participation in the USSR, and noted the widespread forms of participation in the Soviet politics. According to Little, Soviet citizens took part in various types of political participation, such as actively working for a party or candidates during elections, attending political meetings or rallies, and complaining to the local and state government officials. The author concluded the "mass political participation can exist in political systems [that are] of widely varied characteristics" (455). Friedgut's (1979) also compared political participation in the Soviet Union and the U.S. He analyzed the ideological roots of the political system of the USSR, and examined closely the existent political institutions. Specifically, he looked into participation at the local level, such as the voting and participation in the unofficial political organizations and argued that the participation of the Soviet citizens at the local level was both meaningful and nuanced. Shi (1997) examined political participation of Chinese urban citizens and found that within the setting of Communist society, citizens do participate in politics and actively pursue their

interests. Actually, due to relatively scarce resources of the communist China, citizens are highly active in their participation. Shi differentiates Chinese urban political participation into more than a dozen forms, including voting, campaign activities, appeals, and boycotts, etc. Through interviews and surveys in rural China, O'Brien and Li (2006) examined the rightful resistance and policy based resistance engaged in the rural China, as peasants and farmers use the rhetoric and commitments of the central government to try to fight misconduct by local officials, open up clogged channels of participation and push back the frontiers of the permissible. These participatory activities with Chinese characteristics are examined in studies exemplified in O'Brien and Li's earlier works.¹³

With expanding research on political participation in non-democracies, not only have the political scholars confirmed the existence of meaningful participation in non-democratic systems, but they also started to explore the motivational mechanisms of non-democratic political participation. If there are real and significant levels of political participation in non-democratic systems, how is the participation distributed among the citizenry of non-democratic states. In other word, given the forms of political participation in non-democratic systems that we are aware of, who are the citizens that participate more and who are the ones that participate less, what factors determine the different levels of participation among the citizenry, and what are the general motivational mechanisms in non-democratic societies.

The studies of political participation in non-democracies have focused mainly on the individual socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement. Systemic study

¹³ O'Brien and Li (1995) reported that lodging complaints is a common and potentially effective way for Chinese villagers to defy grassroots leaders; O'Brien (1996) argues that rightful resistance employs rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic powerful, and it hinges on locating and exploiting divisions among the powerful; with interview and survey analysis, O'Brien and Li (1996) examined policy based resistance in rural China and argued that policy-based resisters were well informed, regarding cadres to be equals and assert political and legal claims.

of the social contextual perspective has been rare. In the following part of the review, I shall look into the current research on the mechanism of political participation in non-democracies, identifying both the fruits and discrepancies in the literature. I will begin with a review of the major studies focusing on the individualistic characteristics in accounting for the non-democratic participation, such as the socioeconomic resources and psychological engagements. Next I will look at the currently available participation studies from the social contextual perspective.

In examining participation in Chinese local industrial firms, Tang (1993) found that socioeconomic development has an important and mixed impact on citizens' political participation, as male workers and workers with lower income are less likely to demand instrumental participation and managerial participation. In *Political Participation in Beijing*, Shi (1997) clarifies various types of political participation, and seeks to discover the motivational mechanism of Chinese participation. He found that socioeconomic resources and demographic factors, such as the education, economic status and being middle-aged, all significantly contribute to urban political participation. Shi (1998) also examined the variable "age" (generation) in accounting for the differences in both resources to participate into politics (education) and actual political behavior. Based on 1990 survey data of mainland Chinese adult residents, Shi found that the generational factor, that is the age, plays an important role in explaining the differences into both the elements of citizens' political participation and actual political behavior. Shi found that citizens' participation level rise along the age and decline with infirmity. In Jennings's (1997) study of citizens' political participation in Chinese countryside, the author explored the determinants of citizens' political participation in the countryside. Jennings

(1998) analysis of data from four-county survey conducted in 1990 found conventional resources that significantly enhance participation include the year of schooling and having a second vocation (for both status significance and material benefits) and engagement factors, including party membership and political efficacy, also have a significant positive effect. Jennings (1998) especially investigated the gender differences in political participation in rural China, and reported a persistent and strong gender gap in political participation in the rural areas. Jennings emphasized that women profit enormously from having a second occupation and considerably more so than do men, which “clearly moves her out of a traditional role” (964). In Tong’s (2003) study of citizens’ political participation in contemporary China, the author is particularly interested in the role of gender in Chinese participation. By employing the survey data of 1994, Tong found that the gender difference is persistently and negatively correlated with citizens’ political participation and psychological political engagement. At the same time, Tong also found socioeconomic resources, measured by occupational prestige and education achievement, are positively correlated with citizens’ political participation.

In Bahry and Silver’s (1990) work to explain the Soviet political participation on the eve of the Gorbachev’s era, the authors introduce a “more complex” model to account for citizens’ political participation by incorporating individual attitudes into the model. Controlling personal resources and demographic variables, such as education, earnings, age, gender, the major influence on citizens’ participation was psychological engagement, such as citizens’ interests in politics, efficacy to participate into politics, citizens’ faith in other people (which is measured to account for the possibility that individuals citizens trust and expect other citizens to co-participate in politics), and citizens’ satisfaction of

the political regime. Analysis of interview data with more than two thousand Soviet emigrants indicates that citizens' attitudes are significantly correlated with diverse types of citizens' participation.

In McAllister and White (1994) study of citizens' political participation in the post-communist Russia (which was right after Soviet's transition to the market economy), the authors tried to explain different levels of participation. The authors found that the political engagement—citizens' interest in politics, efficacy, and support for the political regime—are the most significant predictors of citizens' political participation. At the same time, McAllister and White reported that citizens' resources such as employment status and economic well-being contributed to the political participation level as well. While emphasizing on citizens' psychological engagement, Chen (2004) in his study of *Popular Political Support in Urban China* explored the relationship between citizens' political participation level and the psychological political engagement. Employing the longitudinal survey data of China, Chen reported that beyond individual resources, such as income, education and age, Chinese urban citizens' psychological engagement—i.e., political interest and support for the political regime—plays an important role in predicting citizens' political participation.

As the literature above indicated, in the current study of political participation in non-democratic settings, influential works accounting for the motivational mechanisms of citizens' political engagement have focused largely on the factors at the individual level, such as the individual socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement. Indeed, as these studies have rightly noted, both personal resources and psychological engagement are important predictors in accounting for participation in non-democracies.

Through studying the influence of individual characteristics in citizens' participation in non-democracies, we have gained important insights concerning how citizens engage in political affairs and connect with states in non-democratic societies.

Although the emphasis on individualistic characteristics to explain participation in non-democracies has contributed a great deal to our understanding, few studies have paid attention to how the social context may contribute to explain political participation in non-democracies. Yet, social context was an important variable in the early theories and writings of political participation in non-democracies.

In studying and theorizing the state-society relationship in non-democracies, political scholars have long been noting the existence of the strong state control and the totalitarian type of mobilization of citizens' political participation in non-democracies (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966). In these studies, citizens were portrayed as being manipulated or coerced into excessive support of the policies of the self-appointed leaders who are impervious to public opinion (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 161). In his study of the Soviet politics, Allardt (1961) noted the "totalitarian populist" nature of the Soviet society and political participation, as on the one hand, the communist Soviet Union had strict state control and all-inclusive ideologies to guide local institutions and forms of political participation, and on the other hand, these local institutions tended to mobilize the local residents to a large extent. Allardt argued that with all the state mobilization of the Soviet citizens' activities, the citizens remained in the local social frameworks and were organized and supervised by the regime.

In the later studies of the political participation in non-democracies, such as the Soviet Union and P. R. China, political scholars further confirmed the importance of the

institutions and bureaucracies in accounting for citizens' political participation (Townsend 1967; Hough 1977; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). In his study of the Soviet Union Society and citizens' political behavior, Hough (1977) noted the "institutional pluralism" political structure in the communist USSR. That is, instead of going through any interest groups, citizens' interests were articulated through the formalized institutional channels, and citizens needed to contact the leader or the trade union in the unit, or go to the higher authorities in order to pursue their interest.

Indeed, in studying the nature of political participation and the state-society relations in non-democracies, political scientists have not totally ignored the possible influence of the sociopolitical institutions in affecting and mobilizing citizens' political participation. In this study of the Chinese urban political participation and the social contexts, we should also gain more understanding of the important sociopolitical context in the contemporary China. Among all the diverse accounts of the contemporary Chinese urban politics, the workplace has been widely regarded as the most prominent institution in the current urban China.

As the most important and widespread formal sociopolitical institution in the contemporary urban China, previous studies have acknowledged the significance of the workplace in China's urban life. In Whyte and Parish's (1984) early study of the urban life in contemporary China, the authors noted the widespread functions that the workplaces served. These not only include economic benefits and interests, such as housing and health-insurance, or social welfares such as clinics and nurseries, but also significant political powers, such as convening employees for hear public decrees and herding citizens to attend political studies. Walder's (1986) influential book, *Work and*

Authority in Chinese Industry, also noted the key role of the workplace in Chinese political systems. He asserted that the workplace is the most important sociopolitical cornerstone in the Communist China, and workplaces, especially state institutions and enterprises, have a strong control over the sociopolitical life of Chinese citizens. State institutions and enterprises exercise this control by holding regular political studies, keeping records of employees' political performance, and transforming citizens' political performance into economic gains. Shi's (1997) study of political participation in Beijing also noted the importance of political institutions especially the workplace context in Chinese urban politics. He noted that Chinese government policies are controlled within the workplaces and workplaces are in charge of distributing both material and non-material resources to individual citizens. Suggesting that working units are the "fundamental link" between the Communist state and the society, Lieberthal (2004) pointed out that work units are important sociopolitical organizations of Chinese society, which are "engaged in purely political tasks" (184). When economic reforms significantly altered the work unit system by encouraging the development of collective, joint-venture and privately owned enterprises, the author lamented the economic reforms are "eroding the fundamental link the Maoist system created to handle the relationship between the state and society" (185). Saich (2004) also noted that the work unit is the "defining system for urban organization" and "a system to ensure social and political control" (Saich 2004).

We may see from the above studies and from my own over-twenty-year experiences living in the P.R. China, workplaces indeed occupied the central focus in citizens' life in the contemporary urban China. Despite the critical significance that

workplaces carry in Chinese urban political life, few studies of political participation have systemically analyzed how the workplace might be affecting Chinese urban political participation. The main research question of this dissertation is to study the relationships between workplace and political participation in urban China. This analysis should shed light on our understanding of the social contexts and the political participation in non-democracies in general.

Besides the theoretical significance of pursuing this research question, there is also important practical value in studying the influence of workplaces on Chinese urban political participation. Through the study of the role of workplace in mobilizing citizens' political participation in urban China, we may hopefully gain a better understanding of political participation and state-society relationship in contemporary China within the context of current economic reform and development.

Although of critical importance in Chinese urban life, the configuration of Chinese workplaces has been changing rapidly during the recent two decades. Before China's economic reform in late 1970s, most Chinese citizens worked for the government organizations or state-owned enterprises, and the national economy was mainly a state economy. Ever since China initiated massive economic reforms in the early 1980s, more and more private and foreign enterprises have taken off in urban China, and the emphasis of the national economy has shifted from retaining the homogeneity of state economy to achieving effective and rapid economic development. With favorable economic policies, private and foreign enterprises are developing steadily in urban China, and these non-state enterprises have begun to provide considerable employment opportunities to Chinese citizens. With a rejuvenated economy and more liberal economic policies,

collective enterprises that once constituted a relatively small percentage in the national economy have gained tremendous momentum and now account for a much larger part of the national economy. At the same time, state enterprises, which used to be the major component of the national economy now have dropped to about 50%, and the employment scale of the state enterprises and state economy has also diminished significantly.¹⁴ This dramatic change of the composition of work unit types would have a profound impact on Chinese urban political participation, if this study were to find different work units should have different mobilization effects on citizens' participation. It would have implications on the changed political participation, how individual citizens connect with the state and how the democratization is going to fare that some scholars have found to be fugitively burgeoning in China now.¹⁵

¹⁴ Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China.

¹⁵ In recent studies of Chinese politics, scholars such as Bruce J. Dickson (2003), John Kennedy (2002), Kevin O'Brien and Li Lijiang (2001), Jie Chen and Yang Zhong (1999) have found the burgeoning of grassroots democracy in China at both urban and rural settings.

CHAPTER III

THEORY AND PROPOSITION

This chapter presents the theories and propositions of how social contexts, specifically the workplace that individual citizens belong to are able to affect the intensity and variety of citizens' political participation. First I will examine the fundamental concepts of the theory, which are political participation, social contexts and the workplace. Second, I will elaborate on the proposed theory as why social contexts may affect the modes and intensity of China's urban political participation, and the possible theoretical challenge that the theory may encounter. Finally, the chapter concludes with the discussion of the independent variables.

Definition of Key Concepts

Political Participation

Citizens' political participation channeled in the existent political institutions has been one of the most researched fields in political studies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Powell and Whitten 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Hill and Leighley 1999; Corey and Garand 2002). Political participation denotes the "activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or actions they take" (Nie and Vera 1975). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) pointed out that political participation is the "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing the government action" (38). Political participation encompasses several types of behavior, including

voting, official contact, campaign work, or protest (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Shi 1997).

Political action that is consistent with established rules and norms of the existent political system traditionally is called conventional political participation or compliant political participation. In this dissertation, conventional political participation in urban China includes congressional voting, voting in the workplace, campaigning, contacting one's leader directly, etc.

Political participation is not one-dimensional. "The citizenry is not simply divided into more or less active citizens; rather there are "different types of activists engaging in different acts, with different motives, and different consequences" (Verba and Nie 1972). Verba and Nie (1972) argued that participation is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon, and there are four dimensions in political participation, which are the type of influence, the scope of the outcome, the amount of conflict and amount of initiative. According to these four dimensions, American political participation is explicated into the following modes: voting, campaigning activity, cooperative activity and contacting. Kaase and Marsh (1979) argued that when the normal communication channels become blocked, citizens with particular demands will choose to organize themselves outside established political institution and engage in unconventional political actions to articulate their interest, the "behavior that does not correspond to the norms of law and customs that regulate political participation under a particular regime" (41). Kasse and Marsh suggest that political nonconformity entails the willingness to risk official retribution and public sanction that sets the participants from those who are active in conventional activities and passive conformists. Although both conventional and unconventional political participation

include several types of activity with varying costs, in general, conventional participation is a less costly way for citizens to influence government action.

Also, in another well-known study of political participation in the former Soviet Union, Bahry and Silver (1990) found that citizens' political participation includes unconventional and compliant political activities. They find that unconventional political behavior is related to people's social background and political orientations, such as being less satisfied with their material life and being highly interested in politics. They found compliant political behavior is related to individuals' attitude and values, such as stronger sense of personal influence, greater interest in politics¹⁶ and support for more civil liberties. At the same time, Shi's (1997) study of political participation in China found that citizens may engage in "unconventional" political participation, such as carrying work slowdowns, taking part in strikes, etc. In Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) study of civic political engagement in American politics, the authors also included unconventional political acts, such as the protest, along with vote, campaign work and being affiliated with political organizations, as one type of the "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing the government action" (38).

This dissertation analyzes conventional political participation and unconventional political participation, both of which involve a variety of activities.

In this dissertation, I analyze unconventional political participation, such as political behavior strictly outside the established political systems (i.e. writing to the newspaper), or political behavior that seeks to circumvent established political systems (i.e., asking help from officials' friends). In Chapter IV I report the results of factor

¹⁶ Bahry and Silver (1990) argued that individuals' interest in politics is likely to motivate individuals' participation in both cooperative and unconventional participation by increasing citizens' psychological engagement with politics (827). The proposition was supported in the empirical analysis.

analyses to group different types of political participation and map out the distribution of each political participation type.

Social Context

One central concept in this dissertation is the social context, through which citizens are mobilized or obstructed to participate into political affairs. The word “context” has a number of connotations. In this study the concept “context” is defined as the sociopolitical environment that individual citizens are surrounded with and within which they are engaged in the politics with actual behaviors. Here the sociopolitical environment not only includes broad sociopolitical institutions such as the regime types and electoral systems, but it also denotes everyday sociopolitical settings that individual citizens that are immersed within such as the neighborhood, social organizations, workplaces and the family background. In this dissertation the social contexts of primary interest are the workplace that the individual belongs to and family background.

Workplace

Previous studies (Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Johnson and Libecap 1991; Corey and Garand 2002), measured work place as a dichotomous variable, i.e. the public sector versus the private sector. Workplace types in urban China are very different and much more complex than the workplace of interest in the above studies. Shi’s study of *Political Participation in Beijing* categorizes Chinese workplaces into four distinctive categories: state organizations, state enterprises, collective enterprises and private/collective enterprises. In his research of citizens’ congressional voting behavior and types of workplaces that the citizens belong to, this categorization of workplace contributes significantly toward the empirical analysis. In this study, I categorize different

types of the workplaces according to their connection with the state, as whether the state policies are to be effectively applied to the workplace and to what extent the workplaces is subject to the state control.

I identify five fundamentally different types of workplaces in urban China: (1) government organizations, (2) state institutes, (3) state enterprises, (4) collective enterprises, and (5) private/foreign enterprises. There are two major criteria to differentiate the urban work units. The first is the payment and salaries—where the employees get their salaries and welfare. The employees may be paid by the government, by the domestic enterprises they serve, or by foreign enterprises. The second is how closely the work unit is connected with the state. We examine whether the work unit is the state itself, or work units function to support the major causes espoused by the state, such as technology, environment and education, or they are financially tied to the state and constitutes the state economy. Unlike Shi's categorization, this dissertation differentiates the government organizations and the state institutes as two distinctive workplace types. The reason for the differentiation of the government organizations and state institutions is that the government organizations mostly serve as party organs and local governments, which represents the government itself; the state institutes are institutes set up by the state to improve social affairs, which do not represent the state directly. I define work places in urban China as follows:

1. Government Organizations (Dang Zheng Ji Guan)

Citizens who work for government organizations generally work for the Communist party or the city government itself. These government organizations are limbers in formulating, implementing governmental policies and realizing

CCP's rule over the state. The government organizations are financially dependent upon the state. Examples of the government organizations include the State Council, Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party, People's Congress, city governments, CCP Committees in cities, the courts, Securities, etc. Basically, government organizations function as the party organs or the local city governments itself under the CCP's leadership.

2. State Institutions (*Shi Ye Dan Wei*)

State institutions are state bureaus and agencies in charge of specific state affairs, such as the education, cultural affairs, public hygiene, scientific research, etc., which belong to the state but do not represent the government. State institutions are responsible for a certain aspect of state's work within the realm of the nation or cities, and they are set up by the state and financially depend upon the state. Examples of the work units that belong to state institutions include: national/city education committees, national/city sports affairs agencies, national/city agriculture and forestry committees, national/city libraries, national/city cultural agencies, national/city publication agencies, etc. State institutions are funded by the state, in charge of a specific aspect of the state affairs and aiming at improving a particular aspect of societal services. They are not as closely related to the ruling party as the governmental organizations.

3. State Enterprises (*Guo Ying Qi Ye*)

The state enterprise is one of the most important work unit types, which constitute the biggest proportion of all work units in urban China. State enterprises used to constitute over 90% of the national economy in the 1950s and 1960s, and now its

proportion is still around over 50% of China's GDP after the economic reform.¹⁷

In other words, state enterprises were and still remain as pillars of Chinese national economy. Although the scale of state enterprises can be either large or small, a large percentage of state enterprise has an employment over thousands. State policies are well applied to state enterprises, and state enterprises are subject to state economic control and regulations, especially before the economic reform. Examples of state enterprises include: Beijing Steel Company, Tianjin First Contecture Production Unit, National Petroleum and Chemical Cooperation, Dalian Fishing Cooperation, China Telecom, China Overseas Transportation, etc.

4. Collective Enterprises (*Ji Ti Qi Ye*)

Collective enterprises are defined as an important component of the national economy in China's Constitution. They belong to the public namely and they are responsible for their own economic well-being. Collective enterprises are not dependent upon the state financially, neither are they subject to state economic control and regulation. A considerable amount of collective enterprises were fruits of the socialist reforms in the 1950s, which transformed the privately owned or foreign enterprises to the publicly owned enterprises. Some collective enterprises have developed into large-scale and well-known enterprises in China nowadays, such as the Haier Electronics. State economy policies are applied to collective enterprises and employees in collective enterprises usually expect similar economic and social treatments as compared to the employees in state enterprises. Examples of collective enterprises include: Haier Electronics, Three-Deer Milk,

¹⁷ Sources: 2003 National Statistical Yearbook of China.

small-scale electronic producers, dairy producers, small-scale chemical products producers, mechanical products producers, etc.

5. Private and Foreign Enterprise (Si Ying Qi Ye & Wai Zi Yi Ye)

Private and foreign enterprises were rooted in China after the economic reforms starting in the 1980s. As the emphasis of China's economy shifted from guarding its communist purity to achieving economic development, more and more private and foreign enterprises were established in China. The socioeconomic connection between the state and private/foreign enterprises is limited. Private and foreign enterprises are financially on their own, and their performance and operating mechanism are not subject to the state control. State laws still apply to private and foreign enterprises for sure, while state policies' influence on the private and foreign enterprise is constrained. It is not unusual that the private/foreign enterprises and state enterprises share different tax rates in the same province. Also the economic treatments of the private/foreign enterprises employees may vary remarkably from one to another according to the economic well-being and policies of each individual company. Examples of private and foreign enterprises include: Nokia Mobile Company, City Bank, Siemens Electronics, private chemical, mechanical enterprises in the coastal areas of China.

Propositions

This section presents a theory to explain why social contexts, such as the workplace and family' influence the variety and intensity of citizens' political participation in urban China. The central argument of this dissertation is that Chinese workplaces have an independent and distinctive contextual influence on the modes and

intensity of China's urban political participation. This argument mainly consists of two tenets: (1) the workplace provides important and distinctive environment to motivate citizens to participate in politics. As the workplace distances or draws nearer to the state, the participation behavior changes accordingly. This is a direct effect. (2) how closely the workplace is connected to the state provide important context that may shape different *relationships* between participation and other mobilization factors, such as the resources, psychological engagement and political organizational. This is an interactive effect.

Workplace Type & Citizens' Political Participation

As Shue (1988) argued, leaning about the society and politics is not a study of a mere mechanism or system, but rather a *process* (italics by author). "The establishment of certain kinds of institutions in a social environment with certain prevailing attitudes may promote the development of certain new forms of organization, which in turn may undercut some formerly held beliefs and encourage de facto work routines..." (26).

According to Shue, intricate social intertexture forms political life, and to study the state and politics, it demands close examination of the content and fabrics of social intertexture and context. In this proposition, I theorize that different types of the workplace should exert a direct influence upon the modes and intensity of citizens' participation in urban China. Specifically, I hypothesize that the more closely the workplace is connected to the state, the more likely the employees are going to be engaged in participation encouraged by the state and less likely in participation discouraged by the state.

This proposition is based upon two arguments. First, Chinese urban workplaces provide important socioeconomic control over individual citizens, and citizens rely heavily upon the workplace for both economic and sociopolitical resources. Thus,

individual citizens who belong to the workplaces that are closely connected with the state are more likely to develop the political attitude and political behavior in accordance with the state's requirements than citizens in workplaces that are not so closely connected to government.

As the literature review indicated, the workplace is one of the most important environments in determining citizens' sociopolitical life in urban China. Not only are citizens economically dependent on the workplaces for income, pension, medical insurance, they are also subject to various sociopolitical restrictions and privileges in connection with the workplace, such as the admission to the Communist Party or Youth League as an access to upgraded economic and political status, keeping a permanent profile of one's previous working and political performance, obtaining permits to change jobs, get married or have one than one child. In sum, workplaces provide most important economic and sociopolitical resources to individual citizens and apply critical restrictions on them as well, which may significantly affect citizens' attitudes and political behavior. As Crowley (1994) and Fish (1995) argue in their studies of Russian political participation, workers' heavy dependency upon the workplaces may dampen their open opposition to the polity and keep them docile in the everyday political life. Similarly, for the employees who belong to a workplace that is more closely connected with the state and more likely to be subject to the state control, citizens are more likely to develop an attitude and political behavioral pattern that are in accordance with the state's requirement and command, given the strong dependency that the individual citizens experience in the workplace context. That is, individuals who are working for institutions that are closely connected with the state are hypothesized to be likely to develop attitudes

inclined toward the state, and more likely to engage in political behaviors encouraged by the state and less likely in behavior that is discouraged by the state.

Second, the workplaces that are closely connected to the state are more likely to provide a sociopolitical environment that resembles the sociopolitical environment outside the workplace—the state power structure, and citizens belonging to the type of the workplace that are closely connected to the state are more likely to engage in the political behavior encouraged by the state.

As the above workplace concept prescribes, the more closely the workplace is attached with the state, the more likely the state policies are to be applied to the workplaces, and the more likely the workplace is going to be subject to state control and consequentially resembles the power structure of the state politics. As Greenberg (1986) argued, employees in the enterprises that resemble the sociopolitical structure outside the workplaces are more likely to be engaged with conventional political participation encouraged by the state, such as voting, campaigning and community work. In this study, I also hypothesize that the workplaces that are more closely related the state and resemble the power structure of the state politics are more likely to provide a sociopolitical environment that is conducive to the pro-government political behavior, especially regarding the political participation that is prevalent both inside and outside the workplaces context, such as voting.

Political Organization inside the Workplace and Political Participation

Besides the influence of different workplace types, I argue that the political organization inside the workplace also exerts important influence on the variety and intensity of citizens' political participation outside the workplace. Specifically, the more

rigorous the political organizational structure is inside the workplace, the more likely employees are going to engage in the conventional political participation—especially the participation acts that are channeled through the political organizations, and less likely to engage in the participation discouraged by the state and workplace.

As the most important grassroots sociopolitical organizations in urban China, workplaces shoulder the responsibilities to see citizens behave in a politically correct or at least political acceptable way. The political organization inside the workplace provides the organizational structure for the employees to get in contact with the political authority and exerts pressure on the employees to comply with the political code set by the state. One important task engaged by the political organization is to hold the political study inside the workplace on a regular basis, and the availability of the political study in the workplace directly reflects the rigor of the political organization (Walder 1986, 1991).

The political study is a compulsory meeting imposed on the employees of the workplace that aims at infusing the employees with political information and knowledge that is compliant with CCP's ideology and current political campaign. In political study sessions, employees are made to know the party's stand on contemporary salient domestic and international issues and what the party aims to achieve in the next stage, which usually requires the compliance and cooperation from the citizens. Exemplars of these political study topics include the campaign raised by the CCP across the nation against Fa Lun Gong or corruption among high-ranking government officials, and the Party's stand in the highly salient domestic and foreign policy related issues, such as the Tiananmen Square demonstration or heated territory disputes with neighbor countries.

The availability of the political study reflects the rigor of the political organization inside the workplace. Although political study sessions are compulsory for the employees to attend and employees are required to be present in order to being viewed as “good” citizens, not every workplace holds the political study session regularly. The tighter the political organization inside the workplace, the more regular is the political study going to be held within the workplaces, and in this study I propose that whether or not the political study is held regularly in the workplace reflects the strength and resilience of the organization inside the workplace.

Specifically, I argue that the tighter the political organization inside the workplace, that is, as the political study is held in the workplace on a more regular basis, the more likely the individual citizens are going to participate into political acts that are in compliance with the state’s requirements and the individual citizens are less likely to engage in the political acts that are inhibited by the state.

For the relationship between the workplace’s connection with the state and the political organization, I found that the more closely the workplace is connected with the state, the more rigorous the political organization is going to be inside the workplace. The following table, Tale 1, illustrates the frequency of political study sessions held within different types of the workplaces regarding their connection with the state.

Table 1. Political Study by Workplace Type

Political Study according to Workplace Type	Percentage of Regular Political Study
Government Organizations	.9375
hState Institutions	.8343
State Enterprises	.5512
Collective Enterprises	.3636
Private/Foreign Enterprises	.2244

(Data Source: 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change)

Different Workplace Context & Political Participation

In this proposition, I argue that different types of the workplaces provide different sociopolitical contexts for the individual citizens to participate in politics. Besides the direct influence of the workplace type and the political organization pressure inside the workplace on citizens' political behavior, I hypothesize that the relationship of between the psychological engagement, socioeconomic resources and political organizational pressure and individual citizens' political behavior vary from one type of the workplace to another due to the different contexts provided by different workplaces.

Specifically, I expect that in the workplaces that are closely connected with the state, the influence of psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources on individual citizens' participation will be weaker than in workplaces that are more remotely connected with the state. Because the power structure of workplaces most closely connected with the state resembles the state power structure, citizens who work in this context are likely to have the knowledge and resources necessary to participate regardless of their psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources. That is, the close connection between the workplace and the state will overcome the effects of

citizens' personal characteristics. In workplaces that are not closely connected with the state, psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources will have a stronger effect on participation because citizens' that score high on these variables are more likely to have the knowledge and resources required for participation than are citizens that score lower on such resources. In other word, participation of citizens who work in the context of workplaces that are only distantly connected to the state is more likely to be based on the volunteerism out of one's own personal resources instead of the structural political mobilization.

In order the test this hypothesis, instead of maintaining the five categories of the work units, I shall differentiate the work units into two fundamental types—the state organizations and non-state organizations. The state work units includes the governmental organizations, state institutions and state owned enterprises, while the non-state organizations consists of the rest of work units types.

Possible Challenge & Empirical Check

Above I elaborated on the major theories and propositions regarding the relationship between the workplace and citizens' political participation in urban China. Before I move on to the discussion of the influence of family background on individual citizens' political participation, I shall briefly examine the theoretical challenge that may be raised regarding the proposed relationship.

Besides the major theoretical models in participation studies regarding citizens' socioeconomic resources, psychological engagement and the social contextual influence, in the last decade political scholars have been addressing the possible influence of individual resources—time, money and civic skills—in motivating citizens to participate

in politics. Following this individual resources perspective, the hypothesis regarding the relationship between workplaces and citizens' political participation may experience the theoretical challenge that the workplace's influence on individual citizens' political participation is not merely "contextual", but rather it is through influencing the resources of individual citizens, such as time, money and required civic skills that the workplace is able to affect citizens' political participation. Before I respond to this theoretical challenge, I may need to briefly review the original resources model.

The resource model first proposed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady in the mid-1990s was intended to bridge the causal linkage between socioeconomic factors and citizens' political participation. Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) argue that the major components of the resource model are money, time and civic skills that are the direct determinants of political participation of individual citizens. The emphasis of the individual resources model is civic skills, and the authors argue that through the stratification of social status (income and education) and the mediation of non-political organizations, civic skills and resources are distributed unevenly among individuals, which sequentially leads to uneven political participation. It is worth noting that although the resource model serves as an important missing link between socioeconomic factors and political participation, after all it is closely concerned with the socioeconomic and demographic model and intends to bridge this particular aspect of the participation study. Indeed, as Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) acknowledged when introducing the resource model, there are three fundamental components in determining citizens' political participation: the individual resources, psychological engagement and mobilization networks.

Nevertheless, the resources model raises important challenges to the theory regarding the contextual mobilization influence of citizens' political participation, which should be seriously considered.

As Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) noted, citizens must be equipped with concrete resources (in contrast to the abstract resources such as the social status) such as time, money and civic skills in order to be able to participate into politics. In order to differentiate the influence of the workplace as being the social contextual effect or the influence on the individual resources factors, I shall conduct a correlation analysis between the workplace and individual resources, especially regarding the money and civic skills.¹⁸

The empirical analysis is to be conducted in the following chapter. If the empirical result indicates a high correlation between citizens' workplace environment and participation resources, it may be contended that the workplace exerts influence most at the individual level rather than at the contextual level; if the correlation is weak or even does not exist, the contextual influence argument would be maintained.

Independent Variables

Socioeconomic Resources

1. Position in the workplace

I theorize that the positions held by citizens in the workplace may have a considerable impact on citizens' political participation. For a high position holder, one is more likely to shoulder responsibilities inside the workplace, and thus more likely to be well

¹⁸ As the original data set did not collect information of individual citizens' political skills such as the ability to make speeches or write letters effectively, in this study I shall mainly use the educational level as the surrogate variable to measure citizens' civic skills.

connected at various levels inside the workplace and more politically informed. Thus, I speculate the higher position holders are more likely to participate in conventional political acts because of political empowerment and political security. On the other hand, high position holders tend to hold higher stake within the current political system and they are less likely to act against it by engaging with unconventional political behavior.

2. Socioeconomic status (Income and education)

As previous studies upon political participation indicate, socioeconomic status has a resilient influence upon both citizens' resources and capabilities to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Hill & Leighley 1999; Oliver 2001). While the income disparity in urban China during Mao's reign was minor, it becomes increasingly substantial since the economic reform. In this study I add income and education variables as independent variables, and I speculate a positive relationship between social status and conventional political behavior due to the advantaged social position and more resources that income and education provide, and a negative relationship with unconventional political behavior due to the increased stake.

3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status

Besides the objective measurement of the effect of citizens' education and income in motivating citizens to participate in politics, I also include the citizens' self-perceived socioeconomic status. I expect that the perception of one's socioeconomic status, or comparative socioeconomic status, can be as important if not more important than the actual socioeconomic status (education and income) that a citizen is equipped with. A positive self-regard with one's socioeconomic wellbeing may help the citizen feel more competent in participating in politics and gives one a perceived or real larger economic

stake in the current political system. I speculate that the positive self-regard of socioeconomic status may motivate one to participate more in the conventional political acts while refraining them from participating in unconventional acts.

4. Gender

Literature of political participation studies has long noted the difference of gender in motivating citizens to participate in politics due to the culture and resource factors (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et. al. 1995; Jennings 1997; Tong 2003). It is found that females tend to participate less in various forms of political participation. In Shi's (1997) study of citizens' political participation in Beijing, the author also notes a less prominent role of women. In this study, I shall include gender as the control variable and speculate women tend to participate in politics less regardless of the participation types.

5. Age

Life cycle effect is theorized and empirically found as an important factor for citizens' political thoughts and behavior. Young adults tend to be the most apathetic of politics and the level of political interests increases among the middle-aged and then rapidly declines within the old or retired (Converse and Niemi, 1971; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Bennet 1986; Jennings 1997). In this dissertation, I hypothesize that middle-aged people are more attentive to politics and public affairs than younger and older people, and the middle-aged more likely to participate in politics of both kinds.

6. Marital status

Marital status is theorized and empirically found to have an important effect upon citizens' political participation level (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Johnson and Libecap 1991; Shi 1997). In this study I shall control for marital status and I speculate

that being married increases the likelihood of people to participate in conventional politics by associating citizens into adult roles, and being married may discourage citizens to engage in unconventional politics by increasing the actual or perceived cost for citizens to participate unconventionally.

7. Ethnic background

Existent studies of political participation have long noted that ethnicity is one of the most important factors in determining citizens' political participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Corey and Garand 2002). Also, scholars in comparative politics acknowledged that to effectively manage ethnic relations is a leading and salient issue in the non-democratic countries (Kuper and Smith 1969; Rothchild 1986; Byman 2002). Research by sinologists describing national minorities argues that ethnic minorities are given differential treatment in the social realms and economic realms and are marginalized on the geographic and social horizons of power in China (Gladney 1991; 2004). "Whereas most minority regions and districts have minority leaders, the real source of power is in the Communist Party, reflecting China's active watch over the so-called autonomous areas" (Gladney 2004, 19). As the ethnic minority groups are likely to be a marginalize group in the society, I hypothesize that belonging to the majority Han will boost the likelihood of citizens to participate in politics disregarding the type, as the Han enjoys the dominant ethnic status in Chinese society.

8. Family background

The influence of family background is well acknowledged in the participation studies as critical context that may help shape citizens' political behavioral pattern by brooding political interest, supplying political information and forming early participatory habit

(Verba, Scholozman and Brady 1995; Plutzer 2002). Also, previous sociological literature, especially the works exploring family relations in the democratic societies, indicates the most accurate measurement of the socioeconomic status of one's family is the socioeconomic status of the father. I shall also employ father's socioeconomic status to explore the social contextual influence of one's family background, specifically, father's education level and membership in the Communist Party.

Psychological Engagement

1. Party membership

The Chinese Communist Party membership is found to have a significant influence on citizens' political participation in China, due to the political status, information and protection that party membership offers (Walder 1996; Shi 1997, 1998). In this dissertation, the party membership variable is included in the analysis. I expect it will positively affect state-encouraged political participation and negatively affect state-discouraged acts.

2. Political interest, political knowledge and political efficacy

In the current participation studies within different regime types, one's psychological engagement into politics, such as political interests, political knowledge and political efficacy have widely been acknowledged as important factors to motivate participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Finkel 1985; Bahry and Silver 1990; Verba, Scholozman and Brady 1995; Shi 1997, 1998; Corey and Garand 2002).

Previous participation literature indicates there are two basic types of political efficacy: the internal political efficacy and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the perception on one's competence to understand and participate into politics,

and external efficacy denotes one's belief about the responsiveness of governmental authorities to demands made by citizens (Finkel 1985; Craig et. al. 1990; Niemi et. al. 1991). In this dissertation, I expect that political interests, knowledge and efficacy will have a positive effect on citizens' virtual political participation of both kinds in urban China except for the external political efficacy on unconventional political participation.

3. Government attitude

By political attitude, I mean how much people identify with the traditional value and regular functioning of the government, and I propose that the more citizens identify with the fundamental values and regular functioning of the government, the more likely they are going to support the government, take part in acts called upon by the government, and the less likely going to act against the government.

4. Faith in people

Based upon previous participation studies (Almond and Verba 1963; Bahary and Silver 1990), individuals who have more faith in other people are more likely to be engaged more in cooperative political activities, as they are more likely to be able to cooperate and count on others' support. Interpersonal trust may also motivate individuals to engage into unconventional political acts, since the ability to trust others reduces the perceived cost of being unconventional (Bahry and Silver 1987).

In the following table, Table 2, I proposed the hypothetical relationships between different types of political participation and independent variables.

Table 2. Proposed Relationship between Participation and Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Conventional Political Participation	Unconventional Political Participation
Position in the Workplace	+	-
Socioeconomic status (income and education)	+	-
Self-perceived socioeconomic status	+	-
Gender (female)	-	-
Age	parabolic	parabolic
Marital status	+	-
Ethnicity background (Han)	+	+
Family background (father's education and CCP membership)	+	-
Party membership	+	-
Political Interest	+	+
Political Knowledge	+	+
Internal Political Efficacy	+	+
External Political Efficacy	+	-
Government attitude	+	-
Faith in people	+	+

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS I

Chapter IV introduces the two data sets used in the analysis, the 1993 Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change Survey and the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey.¹⁹ After presenting the measurements of the dependent and independent variables, I discuss the models and methodologies that I employ in the study, and the hypotheses to be tested and the methodologies.

1993 Data Set

The 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change was collected in August 1993 by the Social Survey Center at People's University in Beijing across China. The data set is designed to be representative of the adult population over 18 years old in China, residing in family households at the time, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous region.²⁰

A stratified multistage area sampling procedure was employed to select the sample. The primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected eighty-five cities, and the secondly sampling units were districts (qu) or streets (jiedao), and the third stages were

¹⁹ While the data collected in the 1993 and 2002 data sets contain information on both urban and rural China, the data employed in the empirical analysis focus on the urban section. There is a division along the rural and urban Chinese studies for long, which probably originates from the vastly different socioeconomic conditions existent in rural and urban China, such as residents' employment type, village lineage, migration and residents' way of living. These differences are real and substantial, which is regarded as one of the main reasons that lead to the general division between the rural and urban Chinese studies theoretically and empirically. Even in the 2000s, the majority of Chinese population still resides in rural areas, who makes everyday living as peasants as the major occupation, and in urban China, to be employed by a certain type of workplace, or a certain type of work unit, is how most urban residents make a living. Acknowledging the above differences, this study aims to discover on how social context, specifically the work units, would influence citizens' political participation in urban China, and the empirical data analysis of this study focuses on the urban part of China along with the discussion of implications.

²⁰ A large proportion of Tibetans do not speak Chinese. Also, at the time of survey, transportation in Tibet was difficult due to inefficient railroad and highway system.

committees (juweihui). Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. This one-and-a-half-hour survey recorded Chinese citizens' political participation, political attitudes and beliefs along with the demographic information such as residence, region, education, income, work and family background. Although the data set has both rural and urban information on file, I focus on the urban section of the data set, as the work unit as a social structure is the major grassroots socioeconomic institution in urban China, and is mainly restricted to the urban part of China as well. The total sample of the urban population is 1,070.

Dependent Variables

As elaborated in the theory section, I intend to differentiate political participation into two categories: conventional and unconventional political participation. Before I delve into solving the puzzle of grouping different type of political participation into conventional and unconventional groups, I conducted a factor analysis and principal component analysis to analyze the statistical components of dependent variables.²¹

The analysis of the structure of participation starts with the initial Factor Matrix of the sixteen participatory acts in the 1993 data set. Table 3 presents the result of the factor analysis of the dependent variables and reports the extracted first four factors. The numbers of each column are the factor loadings of each participation variable on that component.

²¹ The missing values in the data sets are treated as missing in the factor analysis above. I also imputed the missing value with the Amelia program and conducted factor analysis on the Amelia data sets. The results of the Amelia analysis are reported in the Appendix B, and the results are congruent with results of the factor analysis above.

Table 3. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix (Un-rotated) of the Participatory Acts in 1993

Participation Variables	Factor Loadings				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.19	-0.34	0.41	0.18	0.17
2. Voting in the work unit	0.2	-0.34	0.41	0.16	0.04
3. Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.5	-0.34	0.32	-0.05	-0.02
4. Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.61	-0.17	-0.17	-0.23	0.31
5. Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.58	-0.19	-0.21	-0.23	0.22
6. Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.46	-0.39	0.26	0.02	-0.24
7. Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.62	-0.2	-0.19	-0.12	-0.21
8. Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.56	-0.19	-0.2	-0.14	-0.3
9. Express to the leaders directly	0.38	0.33	-0.05	0.24	-0.1
10. Ask other leaders to intervene	0.32	0.55	0.01	0.1	-0.13
11. Complain through hierarchy	0.51	0.28	-0.14	0.32	0.11
12. Complain through workers' union	0.44	0.07	-0.14	0.32	0.15
13. Ask others to persuade the leader	0.3	0.52	0.18	0.05	-0.12
14. Wrote to government offices	0.3	0.22	-0.03	0.22	0.09
15. Help from official's friends	0.25	0.59	0.27	-0.32	0.04
16. Gifts and dinner	0.17	0.52	0.3	-0.29	0.1
Variance Proportion	0.46	0.33	0.14	0.11	0.07
Eigenvalue	2.93	2.09	0.89	0.71	0.46

The first factor represents the single best summary of the linear relationships exhibited in the data, and every dependent variable exhibits a positive and measurable association with this composite variable. I interpret that this first factor represents the prime “activeness” component as a common dimension among the dependent variables (Verba and Nie 1987; Shi 1997). Verba and Nie argued that political participation can be considered simultaneously as both a multidimensional and a unidimensional phenomenon, and it is unidimensional because there is a common component—the “propensity of political activity” across all participatory acts in a society. The factor analysis indicates that the activity dimension explains 17 to 62 percent of the variance in each of the acts and accounts for almost half (46 percent) of the total variance among the sixteen

variables, which represents the single most important component in the 1993 dependent variables.

The second factor reveals the multidimensionality among the dependent variables, as the latent variable differentiates the voting and campaigning and participation inside the work unit. For voting and campaigning, this latent factor explains 17 to 39 of the variance in each act, and 22 to 59 of the rest participation mode except for complaining through the trade union. Be noted these first two components have explained almost 80 percent of all the participation modes documented in the 1993 data set.

Along the second latent variable, the four types of acts score particularly high, which are (1) ask other leaders to intervene (2) ask others to persuade the leader (3) help from officials' friends (4) gifts and dinner. We group these acts as "official contacting". Among the electoral participation, the analysis further reveals the distinctive type of voting behavior as revealed in the analysis.

The third and fourth components with lesser eigenvalues (.89 and .71) are not as clear and heavy-weighted as the first two dimensions. The third factor appears to separate the voting behavior with the rest of the campaigning and non-electoral participation acts. Also, we group the attending briefing meetings in congressional elections and work units elections together, as the participation is closely related to the voting behavior. The fourth factor different has a lesser eigenvalue of .71 that distinguishes the participation acts that involves considerable risk. According to the fourth latent factor, we group the complaining through hierarchy and complaining through workers' union as the complaining behavior. Finally, along latent factor 4, we group "express to the leaders"

and “wrote to the government” together with official contacting.²² The grouping of the initial factor analysis is reported in the following Table 4.

Table 4. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix

		Naming the Factor	
		Factor 2: Electoral Participation V. Work Unit Participation	Loading ²³
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	-0.34
	2	Voting in the work unit	-0.34
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	-0.34
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	-0.17
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	-0.19
	6	Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	-0.39
	7	Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	-0.2
	8	Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	-0.19
Participation through the work unit	9	Express to the leaders directly	0.33
	10	Ask other leaders to intervene	0.55
	11	Complain through hierarchy	0.28
	12	Complain through workers' union	0.07
	13	Ask others to persuade the leader	0.52
	14	Wrote to government offices	0.22
	15	Help from official's friends	0.59
	16	Gifts and dinner	0.52
		Factor 3: Voting	Loading
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.41
	2	Voting in the work unit	0.41
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.32
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	-0.17
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	-0.21
	6	Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.26
	7	Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	-0.19
	8	Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	-0.2

²² This finding of the five modes of political participation is largely congruent with the finding in Verba, Nie and Kim's study. Corresponding to their four major modes of participation—voting, campaigning, communal activity (contact government for general social outcome) and particularized contact (contact government for one's particular interest), the participation modes found in urban China in this study are voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment, complaining, official contact respectively. As Verba, Nie and Kim acknowledged in their 1987 study, there has been “similar (participation) structure across heterogeneous set of nations” (54). This important finding of the existence of similar structure of political participation across different nations provides this study with an empirical ground to construct comparable models to analyze the political acts.

²³ Although some of the extracted engenvales are less than 1, they are still employed to support differentiating different modes of political participation. The employment of the eigenvalues that are less than 1 are cited in previous study of the analysis of political participation (*Participation in America* by Verba and Nie (1972)).

Table 4. Continued

		Factor 4: Complaining	Loading
Participation through the work unit	9	Express to the leaders directly	0.47
	10	Ask other leaders to intervene	0.38
	11	Complain through hierarchy	0.65
	12	Complain through workers' union	0.52
	13	Ask others to persuade the leader	0.28
	14	Wrote to government offices	0.42
	15	Help from official's friends	0.06
	16	Gifts and dinner	0.04

While setting out to frame the participation modes in conventional and unconventional types, the empirical factors analysis exposes the more subtle and less fixed dimensions among the participation acts in urban China in the early 1990s. The foremost finding of the factor analysis is that the commonality or unidimensionality underscores various participation modes. The first activeness component accounts for almost half of all the variable variances, and the second major division among participation acts is electoral and non-electoral participation. At the same time, we see from the analysis that voting is highlighted when compared with the rest electoral participation, with the latter requiring more personal initiatives from the participants.

In short, different from grouping China's urban political participation into conventional and unconventional categories, the empirical analysis reveals that first of all the political participation in urban China share the unidimensionality as active political acts in the non-democratic regime. Secondly, the most important delineation among the political acts is the difference between electoral and non-electoral activities, especially the voting. Finally, official contacting and complaining turn out to be important types of political participation as well.

To further explore the variable structure in the initiative factor analysis, I rotated the initial factors. The result is reported in the Table 5.

Table 5. Rotated Matrix for the Participatory Acts in 1993

Participation Variables	Rotated Factor Loadings				
	1	2	3	4	5
Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.08	-0.08	0.62	0.00	0.02
Voting in the work unit	0.01	-0.06	0.62	-0.02	-0.11
Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.25	0.02	0.16	0.04	-0.07
Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.69	0.06	0.04	0.13	-0.21
Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.66	0.01	0.03	0.08	-0.27
Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.07	-0.07	0.14	0.04	-0.25
Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.30	0.00	0.06	0.13	-0.64
Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.24	-0.01	0.02	0.07	-0.67
Express to the leaders directly	0.01	0.20	-0.04	0.47	-0.15
Ask other leaders to intervene	-0.04	0.43	-0.10	0.38	-0.13
Complain through hierarchy	0.17	0.14	-0.03	0.65	-0.10
Complain through workers' union	0.22	-0.03	0.07	0.52	-0.09
Ask others to persuade the leader	-0.06	0.49	0.00	0.28	-0.06
Wrote to government offices	0.05	0.14	0.04	0.42	-0.06
Help from official's friends	0.06	0.76	-0.06	0.06	-0.01
Gifts and dinner	0.03	0.70	-0.02	0.04	0.06

The first loaded component of rotated factor analysis confirms the distinctiveness of campaign behavior, especially for the candidates recruitment in the electoral participation. The second factor highlights the official contacting. Along the third component, voting once again stood out as a specific genre of political participation, and the complaining behaviors score the highest along the factor four. In the confirmatory rotated component analysis, the result complements to the initial factor analysis, and it confirms the voting behavior as the specific type of participation. The rotated factor analysis also sets aside the acts of official contacting.

Table 6. Principal Component Analysis of the Participatory Acts in 1993

Participation Variables	Eigenvector				
	1	2	3	4	5
Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.11	-0.26	0.62	0.25	0.20
Voting in the work unit	0.12	-0.26	0.62	0.22	0.02
Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.28	-0.25	0.27	-0.08	-0.06
Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.34	-0.14	-0.16	-0.24	0.42
Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.33	-0.15	-0.20	-0.26	0.30
Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.26	-0.28	0.22	-0.03	-0.34
Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.35	-0.15	-0.18	-0.17	-0.22
Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.32	-0.15	-0.20	-0.21	-0.36
Express to the leaders directly	0.25	0.23	-0.06	0.26	-0.29
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.21	0.38	0.03	0.05	-0.24
Complain through hierarchy	0.31	0.18	-0.16	0.34	0.15
Complain through workers' union	0.28	0.03	-0.17	0.40	0.22
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.19	0.35	0.22	0.01	-0.23
Wrote to government offices	0.20	0.16	-0.03	0.33	0.23
Help from official's friends	0.15	0.38	0.29	-0.35	0.13
Gifts and dinner	0.11	0.35	0.33	-0.33	0.24
Variance Proportion	0.22	0.17	0.09	0.08	0.06
Engenvalue	3.50	2.68	1.48	1.34	1.03

Finally, I conducted the principal component analysis with the participation acts in order to obtain further information of the structure of dependent variables. The result is reported in Table 6.

The analysis result once again confirms that the most important component that associated with the dependent variables is the common activeness component. Secondly, the principal component score underlines a clear distinction between electoral and non-

electoral participation acts, and voting behavior is once again set aside as a specific form of participation.²⁴

According to the empirical testing of the dependent variables, I revised our initial categorization of participation acts as conventional and unconventional types and found that the unidimensionality across the political acts is the most important underlining characteristic of the array of participation in urban China in 1993. Secondly, the major difference among the participation acts is between electoral and non-electoral participation, while the voting is certainly a special participation form that requires lower level of cost. Finally, official contacting and complaining are distinguished as special type political acts.

According to the analysis above, I differentiate citizens' political participation in the 1993 data set into the following groups, and the distribution of political participation is reported in Table 7 and Figure 1.

1. Voting
 - a. Voting in the 1992 PC Election
 - b. Voting in the work unit
2. Campaigning
 - a. Attended campaign meeting for the candidate in the 1992 PC election
 - b. Attended campaign meeting for the candidate in the work unit
3. Candidate Recruitment
 - a. Nominated a candidate on your own initiative in the 1992 PC election

²⁴ I performed the factor analysis on the individual imputed data sets generated by the *Amelia* program as well. The results of the *Amelia* generated data sets also confirmed the results of the analyses above.

- b. Recommended a candidate when solicited opinions in the 1992 PC election
 - c. Nominated someone as a candidate on your own initiative in the work unit
 - d. Recommended as a candidate when solicited opinions in the work unit
4. Complaining through Political Organizations
- a. Complained to the higher authorities through the bureaucratic hierarchy
 - b. Complained through the trade union
5. Official Contacting
- a. Sought help from the official's friends
 - b. Sent gifts or invited leader to dinner
 - c. Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene
 - d. Sought help from those who could persuade the leader
 - e. Expressed opinions directly to the leader
 - f. Wrote letter to appropriate government office

Figure 1. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 1993




Table 7. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China 1993²⁵

Political Participation Types	Never/No	Occasionally	Sometimes	Often/Yes
Voting in the 1992 PC Election	18.17			81.83
Voting in the work unit	10.07			89.93
Attending meetings that brief candidates	48.26	15.57	25.87	10.3
Nominating the candidate oneself	88.62	4.31	5.75	1.32
Recommend candidates when asked	89.22	4.07	5.51	1.2
Attend election meetings	36.59	14.67	33.9	14.84
Nominate candidates in work units	68.13	10.96	17.2	3.71
Recommend candidates when asked	71.75	10.62	15.01	2.87
Express to the leaders directly	37.75	20.67	31.54	10.04
Ask other leaders to intervene	74.67	10.27	13.38	1.67
Complained through hierarchy	78.02	8	12.07	1.91
Complained through workers' union	89.73	4.54	4.9	0.84
ask others to persuade the leader	79.09	8.48	11.47	0.96
Wrote to government offices	91.88	3.58	4.06	0.48
Help from official's friends	91.64	4.78	3.46	0.12
Gifts and dinner	92.95	4.18	2.87	0

Independent Variables

The independent variables include the following: (1) social contexts—workplace type and political organization; (2) socioeconomic resources—position in the workplace, socioeconomic status, self-perceived socioeconomic status, gender, age, marital status, ethnicity and father’s educational level and father’s party membership; (3) psychological engagement— party membership, political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy

²⁵ Please note that the political participations types with variations less than 5% are not included in the actual empirical analysis due to the small amount of variations. These small-variance participation types include demonstration/sit in with 0.36% of variation, suing in court 1.79%, harassing leaders 1.77%, etc.

(internal political efficacy & external political efficacy), one's attitude toward the government and faith in other people.

Social Contexts

1. Workplace type

The workplace type is the key independent variable in this dissertation. As I elaborated in Chapter III there are five types of the workplaces in urban China in accordance with their connection with the state. I measured the workplace variable both as the ordinal variable from 1 to 5 in their connection with the state, and the binary variable for each specific type of the work unit. Also, in order to measure the different contextual influence the workplaces, I combined government organizations, state institutions and state enterprises as the state workplace and the rest of the work units as the non-state workplace.

2. Political organization inside the workplace

The variable of political organization is measured by the availability of the political study inside the workplace.

Socioeconomic Resources

1. Position in the workplace

V126: What is your profession?

I coded this variable according to the given answer (please refer to Appendix A).

Specifically, the position variable are coded in the following scheme: senior professionals and private enterprises' owners hold the highest position 4, professionals and managers in the work units hold the secondary position 3, white-collar workers and staff hold the lower position 2, Manual workers hold the lowest 1, and unemployed and housewives are 0.

2. Socioeconomic status

1) Income

Previous research indicates that the household income level is a better indicator of one's overall socioeconomic status than the individual income level (Bahry and Silver 1990; McAllister and White 1994). In this dissertation, I shall use the reported household income level as the socioeconomic status indicator, which is measured by the actual number of dollars of the respondents' total household earns.

V164: [For urban residents] what was your family's total income last month? (Including salaries, bonuses, various subsidies, allowances, retirement pensions, living expense grants, alimony, second jobs, and from other income sources?)

2) Education

The education variable is measured as an ordinal variable, with 6 being the highest degree level and 1 being the lowest. 1 is the elementary school graduate, 2 lower middle school graduate, 3 upper middle school, vocational school, or technical school graduate, 4 evening college TV college, correspondence college graduate, 5 fulltime college or technical college graduate, 6 graduate school degree.

3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status

V27: Compared to other families, which category do you feel your family's economic situation fits in? —Lower, lower middle, middle, upper-middle, upper

V28: What do you feel is your family's social position now? —Lower, lower middle, middle, upper-middle, upper.

4. Gender: dichotomous variable, and the male is coded as 1 and female as 0.

5. Age

I theorize that participation will be highest during middle-age, as political participation is usually weak in one's early age and declines with the infirmities of old age. In order to capture the parabolic effect of age, I will include two age variables in the model. One is the respondent's natural age, and the other is the age squared. If the natural age is positively correlated with the dependent variable with significance while the age square is negative correlated with the dependent variable with significance, the curvilinear age effect should be supported.

6. Marital status

Dichotomous variable. Marital status is theorized and empirically found to have an important effect upon citizens' political participation level (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Johnson and Libecap 1991; Shi 1997). Being married while without being divorced, separated or widowed is coded as 1 and the rest 0.

7. Ethnic background

Dichotomous variable. The Han ethnic group is coded as 1 and the rest 0.

8. Family background

In this study I shall employ the measurement of father's education level and membership in the Communist Party to measure family background. Fathers' education is measured as the same as the variable education.

Psychological Engagement

1. Party membership

Party membership is a dichotomous variable. The communist party member is coded as "1" and the rest "0".

2. Political interest

Political interest is measured by the frequency of citizens gathering information in daily life via TV and newspaper, the two most prevailing media of political information in China's urban setting.

V10: Did you have a chance to watch TV news last week? —no, once or twice, a few times, nearly every day

V11: Did you read the news in a newspaper last week? —no, once or twice, a few times, nearly every day

3. Political knowledge

Political knowledge is measured by the political information that citizens possess. In the data set, political knowledge is measured by the following question.

V19: do you know who the chairman of the People's Congress is?

4. Political efficacy

As I argued in Chapter III, political efficacy is differentiated into the internal political efficacy and external political efficacy.

(1) Political efficacy toward the work unit

A. Internal political efficacy

V61n: I have excellent relations above and below, so I know exactly what's going on in my locality/unit—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

B. External political efficacy

V61p: People in our work unit have many effective ways to influence the leaders' decisions—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

(2) Political efficacy toward the government

A. Internal political efficacy

V81o: I consider myself very capable in participating in politics—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

B. External political efficacy

V81i: In our country, people have many ways effectively to influence the government's decisions—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

5. Government attitude

With government attitude, I intend to gauge how much the respondents identify with the traditional value and daily functioning of the government.

V43d: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: I should trust and obey the government, for in the last analysis it serves our interests—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

6. Faith in people

By faith in people, I denote the presumed level of trust of citizens into others (Bahry and Silver 1987). It is measured with a dichotomous variable.

V59: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? —most people can be trusted or can't be too careful in dealing with people.

Hypotheses

After refining our understanding of the dependent and independent variables in this study, I test the following hypotheses regarding the influence of socioeconomic context especially the workplace on the variety and intensity of citizens' political participation.

H1: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in voting, campaigning, candidate recruitment and official contacting.

H2: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the less likely the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in complaining.

H3: The more intense the political organization is in the workplace, the more likely the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment and official contacting.

H4: The more intense the political organization is in the workplace, the less likely the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in campaigning.

H5: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely the citizens will participate in politics through the mobilization of political organizations, and the less likely to participate out of personal socioeconomic resources; on the other hand, the more distant the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely citizens participate into politics out of their own resources instead of through the political organization.

H6: The contextual mobilization effect of the workplace that are close to the state is going to be stronger as compared to the influence of workplace that are distant to the state.

H7: One's father's CCP membership and education achievement are likely to facilitate individual citizens to participate in politics.

2002 Data Set

The other data set that I use in this study is the Asian Barometer Survey, specifically the Mainland China section. Currently the data set is stored in the Asian Barometer Survey Project Office in the National Taiwan University and is available to the public for academic research upon individual request.²⁶ For more information about the data set, please refer to the website of www.asiaborometer.com.

The Asian Barometer conducts an over 150-question survey across eight Asian regions, which are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and Mainland China. The survey is composed of series questions concerning both political attitudes and political behavior of the individual respondent. Compared to the 1993 data set, the 2002 Asian Barometer is a cross-national survey data set emphasizing on the individuals' political attitude and perception. However, the data set does include batteries of citizens' political participation questions, and contains most of the interested independent variables in our study.

The Mainland China Asian Barometer data come from the survey conducted in China between March 2002 and August 2002 in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey excluding those residing in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.²⁷ A stratified

²⁶ The data set was collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2000-2004), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely responsible for the data distribution, and I appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned.

²⁷ The Tibet Autonomous region was excluded in the survey the following reasons: first, many Tibetans do not speak Chinese; second, transportation in Tibet is extremely difficult since there is no railroad and the highway system is not well developed, and thirdly, it is difficult to find qualified interviewers who can

multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.²⁸

Dependent Variables

Following the analysis for the dependent variables in the 1993 analysis, I am going to conduct the empirical testing for the participation variables²⁹ as reported in Table 8 and Table 9.

Table 8. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix (Unrotated) of the Participatory Acts in 2002

Participation Variable	Factor Loadings				Uniqueness
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	
Voting in the PC Election	0.32	0.24	0.32	0.04	0.74
Voting in the work unit	0.23	0.36	0.28	0.00	0.73
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.41	0.33	0.09	0.03	0.71
Nominate candidates in work units	0.46	0.29	-0.33	0.03	0.60
Recommend candidates when asked	0.48	0.32	-0.29	-0.05	0.58
Express to the leaders directly	0.55	-0.20	0.12	-0.09	0.63
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.43	-0.18	0.05	-0.26	0.71
Complain through hierarchy	0.54	-0.31	0.05	0.12	0.60
Complained through workers' union	0.43	-0.17	0.00	0.15	0.77
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.33	-0.25	-0.05	-0.15	0.81
Wrote to government offices	0.32	-0.22	-0.05	0.23	0.80
Variance Proportion	0.83	0.34	0.17	0.08	
Eigenvalue	1.93	0.80	0.41	0.19	

work there effectively. It should be noted that the Tibet Autonomous Region was excluded in the 1993 Social Mobility and Social Change data set due to similar reasons.

²⁸ The Primary Sampling Units are sixty-seven cities in the urban area, and the secondary sampling units were districts and streets, and the third stage of selection was community or neighborhood committees. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. A total of 496 sampling units were selected.

²⁹ I also conducted the factor analysis on the data sets produced by Amelia and reported the result in the Appendix B.

Table 9. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix

Naming the Factor			
Factor 2: Electoral Participation V. Work Unit Participation			Loading
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.24
	2	Voting in the work unit	0.36
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.33
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.29
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.32
Participation through the work unit	6	Express to the leaders directly	-0.20
	7	Ask other leaders to intervene	-0.18
	8	Complain through hierarchy	-0.31
	9	Complain through workers' union	-0.17
	10	Ask others to persuade the leader	-0.25
	11	Wrote to government offices	-0.22
Factor 3: Voting			Loading
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.32
	2	Voting in the work unit	0.28
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.09
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	-0.33
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	-0.29

The result of the initial factor analysis of the 2002 dependent variable is largely congruent with the 1993 dependent variable analysis. The first loaded factor represents the activeness of the political participation in urban China, and the dependent variable are all positively and measurably associated with the composite variable. The factor analysis indicates that the activity dimension explains 23 to 55 percent of the variance in each act and accounts for a significant 83 percent of the total variance. The second latent factor distinguished the electoral participation from the non-electoral participation, and the third latent variable highlights the voting behavior.

To further explore the variable structure in the initiative factor analysis, I conduct the rotated analysis of the initial factors. The result is reported in Table 10 and Table 11.

Table 10. Rotated Matrix for the Participatory Acts in 2002

Participation Variable	Rotated Factor Loadings				Uniqueness
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	
Voting in the PC Election	0.13	0.10	0.49	0.02	0.74
Voting in the work unit	-0.02	0.14	0.49	0.02	0.73
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.11	0.35	0.39	0.02	0.71
Nominate candidates in work units	0.12	0.62	0.07	-0.01	0.60
Recommend candidates when asked	0.10	0.62	0.12	0.08	0.58
Express to the leaders directly	0.51	0.14	0.15	0.25	0.63
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.36	0.12	0.06	0.38	0.71
Complain through hierarchy	0.62	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.60
Complained through workers' union	0.46	0.15	0.05	-0.02	0.77
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.34	0.09	-0.08	0.25	0.81
Wrote to government offices	0.42	0.10	-0.04	-0.12	0.80
Variance Proportion	0.57	0.43	0.30	0.13	

Table 11. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix

		Rotated Factor 1: Official Contacting	Loading
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.13
	2	Voting in the work unit	-0.02
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.11
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.12
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.10
Participation through the work unit	6	Express to the leaders directly	0.51
	7	Ask other leaders to intervene	0.36
	8	Complain through hierarchy	0.62
	9	Complain through workers' union	0.46
	10	Ask others to persuade the leader	0.34
	11	Wrote to government offices	0.42
		Rotated Factor 2: Campaigning & Candidate Recruitment	Loading
Electoral Participation (Voting & Campaigning)	1	Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.10
	2	Voting in the work unit	0.14
	3	Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.35
	4	Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.62
	5	Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.62

The rotated factor analysis again confirms the distinction between the electoral and non-electoral participation acts, with the first rotated factor strongly pertaining to the non-electoral political participation. The second and third rotated factor highlights the specific type of electoral participation acts. So far the empirical testing of the 2002 dependent variables has largely loaded on similar if not identical factors as in the 1993 empirical analysis. The foremost characteristic of the dependent variables is the activeness across the array of participation acts, and the most noticeable distinction among the dependent variables is between the electoral and non-electoral participation. Voting is set apart as a special form of electoral behavior as compared to campaigning and candidate recruitment, which requires considerable participants' initiatives. Finally, official contacting stands out as an important mode of participation.

Table 12. Principal Component Analysis of the Participatory Acts in 2002

Participation Variable	Eigenvector			
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4
Voting in the PC Election	0.24	0.32	0.49	0.10
Voting in the work unit	0.17	0.46	0.39	-0.01
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.30	0.39	0.04	0.04
Nominate candidates in work units	0.32	0.27	-0.55	0.04
Recommend candidates when asked	0.33	0.29	-0.48	-0.11
Express to the leaders directly	0.39	-0.19	0.19	-0.13
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.32	-0.19	0.11	-0.55
Complain through hierarchy	0.38	-0.31	0.11	0.20
Complained through workers' union	0.32	-0.19	0.03	0.31
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.25	-0.31	-0.04	-0.41
Wrote to government offices	0.24	-0.26	-0.06	0.59
Variance Proportion	0.25	0.14	0.11	0.09
Eigenvalue	2.70	1.58	1.17	1.02

Finally, I conducted the principal component analysis of the dependent variables in 2002 as reported in Table 12, and the PCA analysis confirms our tentative conclusions above.

The first loaded component is the activeness among the dependent variables with the eigenvalue of 2.70. The analysis result shows that the activity dimension explains about 17 to 39 percentage of variance of each participation act, which overall explains about 25 percentage of the total variance among the dependent variables.

The second loaded component sets electoral and non-electoral participation apart, and the component explains about 14 percentage of the total variance across the variables. The third component distinguished the voting behavior with other campaign acts, including nominating candidates and recommending candidates.

Like the 1993 political participation, the political acts in urban China in 2002 still exhibit strong unidimensionality and the major distinction of the political acts is between electoral and non-electoral activities. According to the factor analysis result above I have differentiated the participation of 2002 in the following categories.


The distribution of the 2002 participation is reported in Table 13 and Figure 2.

1. Voting
 - a. Voting in the PC Election
 - b. Voting in the work unit
2. Campaigning
 - a. Attended campaign meeting or briefing meeting for the candidate
3. Candidate Recruitment
 - a. Nominated someone as a candidate on your own initiative

- b. Recommended someone as a candidate when the leaders solicited opinions
4. Complaining through Political Organizations
 - a. Expressed opinions directly to the leader
 - b. Complained to the higher authorities through the bureaucratic hierarchy
 - c. Complaining through the workers' union
 5. Official Contacting
 - a. Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene
 - b. Sought help from those who could persuade the leader
 - c. Wrote to government offices

Table 13. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 2002

Political Participation Types	Never/No	Occasionally	Sometimes	Often/Yes
Voting in the 2002 PC Election	47.85			52.15
Voting in the work unit	19.03			80.97
Attending meetings that brief candidates	41.51	14.62	27.73	16.13
Nominating the candidate oneself	79.5	6.89	11.93	1.68
Recommend candidates when asked	77.07	8.77	11.97	2.19
Express to the leaders directly	64.09	13.8	16.39	5.72
Ask other leaders to intervene	88.72	5.49	4.84	0.95
Complained through hierarchy	88.03	5.01	5.66	1.3
Complained through workers' union	94.33	2.36	2.78	0.53
Ask others to persuade the leader	88.6	6.32	4.25	0.83
Wrote to the Government Offices	95.36	2.23	1.7	0.71

Figure 2. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 2002³⁰**Table 14. Comparison of Political Acts Distribution in Urban China of 1993 to 2002**

Political Participation Types		Never/No	Occasionally	Sometimes	Often/Yes	Chi^2
Voting in the PC Election	'93	18.17			81.83	
	'02	47.85			52.15	.000
Voting in the work unit	'93	10.07			89.93	
	'02	19.03			80.97	.000
Attend election meetings	'93	36.59	14.67	33.9	14.84	
	'02	41.51	14.62	27.73	16.13	.120
Nominate candidates in work units	'93	68.13	10.96	17.2	3.71	
	'02	79.5	6.89	11.93	1.68	.000
Recommend candidates	'93	71.50	10.62	15.01	2.87	
	'02	77.07	8.77	11.97	2.19	.180
Express to the leaders directly	'93	37.75	20.67	31.54	10.04	
	'02	64.09	13.8	16.39	5.72	.000
Ask other leaders to intervene	'93	74.67	10.27	13.38	1.67	
	'02	88.72	5.49	4.84	0.95	.000
Complained through hierarchy	'93	78.02	8	12.07	1.91	
	'02	88.03	5.01	5.66	1.3	.000
Complained through workers' union	'93	89.73	4.54	4.9	0.84	
	'02	94.33	2.36	2.78	0.53	.000
Ask others to persuade the leader	'93	79.09	8.48	11.47	0.96	
	'02	88.6	6.32	4.25	0.83	.000
Wrote to government offices	'93	91.88	3.58	4.06	0.48	
	'02	95.36	2.23	1.7	0.71	.001
Help from official's friends	'93	91.64	4.78	3.46	0.12	
	'02	96.17	2.77	0.82	0.24	.000

³⁰ Please be noted that the political participations types with variations less than 5% are not included in the actual empirical analysis due to the small amount of variations. These small-variance participation include writing to the newspaper with variation less than 1.25%, or demonstration/strike/sit in less than .07%, etc.

Comparison of Political Participation in 1993 and 2002

Table 14 provides the comparison of the participation level of urban residents between the 1993 data and 2002 data. I found that compared to the year 1993, the 2002 data reveal a general decline of the level of political participation over the past decade: except for recommending candidates in the unit election, participation is lower in all modes (difference significant at the .01 level).

The table indicates that Chinese citizens are measurably less engaged with politics in most political acts in the urban setting. The decline in voting behavior in congressional elections is especially notable.

The decrease of overall political participation in the 2002 data is not a completely accidental phenomenon, and I speculate this change of the political participation level is closely related to the alteration of sociopolitical structure of Chinese society brought by the economic development that China has been experiencing in the last two decades. The change of sociopolitical structure changed the engagement between the state and society, which sequentially altered the pattern of individual citizens' political behavior.

As China started its economic reform in the early 1980s, the government initiated the reform to shift the national economy from "the state economy" to "market economy", and at the same time the role of the authoritarian government has gradually transferred from the major distributor of the economy toward the market regulator. Although this transition to the market economy and the shift of the government role has by no means completed, the process and fruits of the reform in the last two decades have nevertheless produced profound changes to Chinese economy, its sociopolitical structure and the state-society relationship.

Before the economic reforms, the Chinese government had acted as the major distributor of the economic necessities to the public, and except for very special cases most Chinese urban residents were heavily dependent upon the state for their monthly salary, housing, health benefits, pension, etc. The primary institution that controlled and distributed economic goods on behalf of the state was the work units that urban residents belonged, especially state organizations and state-owned enterprises. At the preliminary stage of the economic reform, Walder (1986) in his classic observation of the function and labor relationship in Chinese termed the economic dependence of the workers on the workplace as the reward of the authoritarian government to citizens who were loyal to the regimes. In practice, the regime's control over citizens extended far beyond the economic realm. Most state workplaces, such as government organizations and state-owned enterprises would hold weekly sessions of "political studies" to educate the workers on government policies and governmental stand on current issues. Workers were required to attend political study sessions as part of the evaluation of "performance" in the workplace, and it is not unusual that workers were asked to comment on the political issues and policies of the state and avow their allegiance to the party government. Political study provided a potent tool for the state to supervise and control urban citizens psychologically. Such political study sessions peaked in the Cultural Revolution as many state enterprises had four-hour political studies in the afternoon virtually every day, while the studies started to diminish in the workplace setting since the economic reform. Statistical analysis confirms that attending political study sessions is positively correlated with citizens' trust in the regime, and workers are required to attend the political studies the

causal relationship between political study and citizens' regime trust is likely to run from the former to latter.

In short, before the market economic and reform development, Chinese urban citizens depended heavily on the state while the state maintained a strong control over the public. The major institution that carries out this mission is the workplaces, through which citizens were to obtain their living material from the state and respond to the requests of the state. This scenario has been changing gradually since the market reform.

As the Chinese government renounced its role of major direct distributor in the economy, the market itself has slowly become the dispenser of economic resources to the public. Now citizens do not have to rely on the state as their sole resource of economic wellbeing and only economic opportunity. Unlike in the 1980s when most people would work for the same work unit from graduation till retirement, nowadays citizens can seek and get employment opportunities with one's own skills and experiences on the market. Moreover, the government slowly ceases to be the sole provider of many other essential economic goods. Through the reform, urban citizens' residential housing has completely been commercialized in the late 1990s, and before then the only way for most urban citizens to get housing for one's family is to wait for the workplace to allocate the housing. They would need to wait for the available house resources and to talk to the workplace leaders of their need and seniority to entitle for the apartment, although the housing was rarely guaranteed for every worker. Since the reform, the source of housing has turned from the workplace to the market and citizens only need to purchase the apartment on the market. In addition to housing, the health insurance and pension systems have also been reformed thoroughly, and the government established individual account

for every urban citizen to provide for their medical care and pension allowance. Chinese urban citizens would no longer expect the workplaces to provide this essential social care for them.

As the market replaces the government as the major distributor of economic resources, citizens' dependence on the state is reduced significantly and they are provided with more autonomy and liberty at the societal level. At the same time, the control of the government on individual citizens is also much weakened. Citizens depend less on the states for everyday living material and their bargaining and interactions with the state for socioeconomic resources decline sequentially as well. Instead of participating to compete for the low-end interests for oneself in the work unit, Chinese urban citizens are not compelled to participate in politics to guard one's interests anymore. Thus, Chinese urban citizens participate less in the workplace context in order to vie for low-end sociopolitical interests while they have gained more individual autonomy in the society.

From the analysis above we see that with the deepening of the economic reform in contemporary China, the economic reform itself has reached other areas of the Chinese society and changed the relationship between the state and society. Workplaces are no longer the vital economic and political grassroots institution in Chinese urban life and Chinese citizens are measurably less compelled to participate in politics in the workplaces.

Independent Variables

The independent variables included in the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey are the following: (1) social contexts—workplace type; (2) socioeconomic resources—position in the workplace, socioeconomic status, self-perceived socioeconomic status, gender, age,

marital status, ethnicity and family background; (3) psychological engagement—party membership, political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy (internal political efficacy & external political efficacy), one's attitude toward the government and faith in other people.

1. Workplaces types

The workplace the individual respondent reports to belong to: 5 representing government organizations, 4 for state institutions, 3 for state enterprises, 2 for collective enterprises and 1 for foreign/individual/private enterprises.

Please be noted that within this cross-national survey, the existence of the political study is not recoded.

Socioeconomic Resources

1. Position in the work unit

What is your position in the labor force?—Administration/management, clerical, farmer, manual worker, professional, sale, service or no work?

Consistent with the 1993 data set coding, administration/management is coded as 4, professional as 3, service/clerical/sale (office workers) as 2, manual worker and farmer (laborers) as 1, and no work and housewife as 0.

2. Socioeconomic resources

Socioeconomic resources are measured by education and income.

1) The income variable is measured by the actual monthly income by household.

“We would like to know your household on average is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, dividends and other income that come in before taxes and other deductions.”

2) Education is measured by the highest level of education achieved by the respondent, which is recorded in a ten-scale category: 0 no formal education, 1 incomplete primary/elementary, 2 complete primary/elementary, 3 incomplete secondary school, 4 complete secondary school, 5 incomplete high school, 6 complete high school, 7 some university or college, 8 with university or college degree, 9 post-graduate degree.

3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status

V23: As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today? Is it very good, good, so so, bad, very bad?

V24: People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of upper class, middle class or lower class. Where would you place your family on the following scale? —Upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, lower class.

4. Gender: the male is coded as 1 and female as 0.

5. Age: measured by the actual age of the respondent and the age squared.

6. Marital status: dichotomous variable, and being married is coded as 1.

7. Ethnic background

“Do you consider yourself as ...?” The Han ethnic group is coded as 1, and the rest 0.

8. Family background

The family background in the 2002 data is measured by Father’s education.

Psychological Engagement

1. Party membership: CCP membership is coded as 1, otherwise 0.

2. Political interest:

V14: “How interested would you say you are in politics”? —Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested.

3. Political knowledge

Political knowledge is measured by the political information that citizens possess. In the data set, political knowledge is measured by the following question.

V13C: do you know who the chairman of the People’s Congress is?

4. Political efficacy

1) Internal political efficacy

V58H: I think I have the ability to participate in politics—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

V74U: In the work unit I belong, I am able to influence the leaders’ decision effectively—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

2) External political efficacy

V58E: In our country, people have many ways to influence the governmental decision effectively—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

V74G: In the work unit I belong, people have many ways to influence the leaders’ decision effectively—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

5. Government attitude

With government attitude, I intend to gauge how much the respondents identify with the traditional value and daily functioning of the government.

V49J: The leaders of the government are like the leaders of one's family and I people should comply with the decision that they have reached— strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

6. Faith in people

V26C: Generally speaking, would you say that “most people can be trusted” or “you can't be too careful in dealing with people”?

Hypotheses

As I shall further examine empirically in Chapter VI, the functioning and status of China's work units have undergone profound changes during the last decade within the context of the ever-deepening economic reforms.

With the reduced role of workplace in China's socioeconomic as well as the political life, the control and dependence that Chinese urban citizens have been experiencing in the workplace setting have also been significantly reduced. The strong socioeconomic and political ties that used to exist between the urban residents and workplaces are also on the wane, and I propose that that the influence of workplace on China's urban political participation has sequentially been remarkably diminished.

Thus, I hypothesize that compared to 1993 the influence of the workplace on the variety and intensity of Chinese urban political participation in 2002 has declined.

Specifically, I hypothesize that the different types of the workplace should not provide discriminatory contexts to facilitate or discourage Chinese urban citizens to participate in politics. At the same time, while individual citizens are granted more autonomy at the societal level, I expect that individual factors, such as individual

socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement play an increasingly important role in facilitating citizens to participate in politics.

I shall first examine the retreating role of the workplace in China's urban sociopolitical life in the empirical analysis in Chapter V, and I will analyze the reducing role of the workplace in China's urban life in the case study of Chapter XI.

Model & Method

After previewing the data sets, variables and hypotheses to be tested, in this section I review the statistical model and methods I use to conduct the empirical analysis. I begin with a discussion of the mathematical models. Then I proceed to the statistical methods I use to conduct the analysis: the principal component analysis, the ordered Probit analysis, the missing survey data and the Amelia statistical program and the CLARIFY statistic program.

Models

Let X denotes the vector of all the independent variables except for the workplace type,³¹ and the following are the three models that I estimate:

1. Workplace as the ordinal variable

$$Participation = \beta_0 + \beta_1 workplace + \beta_2 X + \varepsilon$$

Where X = the 5 category workplace variable

2. Binary measurement of each type of the workplace

$$Participation = \beta_0 + \beta_1 govorg + \beta_2 stateinst + \beta_3 stateent + \beta_4 collectiveent + \beta_5 X + \varepsilon$$

³¹ That is, X = [Political organization, father's party membership, father's education, individual's party membership, position, income, education, self-regarded economic status, self-regarded social status, gender, age, age-squared, marital status, ethnic background, political interest, political knowledge, internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, government attitude, faith in others].

3. Contextual influence of the workplace

$$Participation = \beta_0 + \beta_1 stw * X + \beta_2 nonstw * X + \varepsilon$$

(Here STW for state-workplaces is a binary variable with 1 for government organizations, state institutions and state enterprises and NONSTW for non-state-workplaces is also a binary variable with 1 for collective enterprises and private enterprises).

Principal Component Analysis

One important methodological tool that I shall employ in the dissertation is the principal component analysis, with which I categorize different types of the political participation and create indexes for the participation categorization. The principal component analysis (PCA) is the statistical method that aims to reducing the dimensionality of the data that consists of a large number of interrelated variables while retaining as much as possible of the variation in the data (Jolliffe 2002). The produced first principal components illustrate the unified and significant dimensions that the variables have measured while attaining the maximal variation. At the same time, this method is used to produce indexes for the dimension-reduced variables represented by the principal components.

Principal component analysis has often been dealt with as a special case of factor analysis, as both of which aim to reduce the dimensionality of the measured variables (Girschick 1936; Jackson 1981). Although PCA has indeed been used extensively as part of the factor analysis, these two approaches are inherently different regarding their techniques to reduce of the dimensionality of the data. Factor analysis attempts to achieve a reduction of dimension by postulating a model relating the observed variables to a smaller number of hypothetical variables, while there is no such explicit model

underlying PCA that achieves the dimension reduction by transforming the observed variables into a new set of variables, the principal components, whilst retaining most of the variation of the variation in all of the original variables (Jolliffe 1986, 2002).

The principal component analysis can be applied to continuous, ordinal and dichotomous variables. In this study, I employ the PCA method to construct the indexes for the dependent participation types, which are either discrete or binary variables. “The basic objective of PCA to summarize most of the ‘variation’ that is present in the original set of variables, using a small number of derived variables, can be achieved regardless of the nature of the original variables” (Jolliffe 2002: 339).

As the principal component analysis can be applied for both discrete and binary variables, the produced principal components are no longer discrete or binary but rather continuous variables. Thus, in order to conduct statistical analysis on the produced principal components as the dependent variables, I can employ statistical tools designed for continuous variables, for example, the Ordinary Least Square regression model.

In this dissertation, I employ the principal component analysis to categorize different types of political participation and further produce the principal components as the indexes to represent the underlying concept that the original participation measured. The above table 1 and table 4 illustrate the result of the first-stage principal component analysis of different groups of the political participation.

Ordinary Least Squares & Ordered Probit Model

While the dependent variables in the regression analysis would be factor score of different modes of political participation, I used ordinary linear square regression (OLS) in the empirical analysis in Chapter V. The individual political participation would be

either binary variable such as voting or discrete variable such as writing to the government office. For voting, the individual political participation is coded as 0 or 1, and for participatory act such as writing to the government, the participation is recorded as never (no participation), occasionally, sometimes and often, and coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 accordingly. The missing values from individual participation are treated as missing and not deleted from the model. Instead, in the empirical analysis in Chapter V, I used the Amelia statistical package to impute the missing data in order to control the missing value issue as discussed as followed, and the dependent variables in the empirical analysis in the analysis in Chapter V again are the factor score of different modes of political participation.

For analyzing a specific type of political participation, as included in Appendix C of the study, the OLS is not appropriate since major dependent variables in this study are either discrete or binary variables,. Therefore, I use Probit and ordered Probit regression model, which explores the correlation between dependent and independent variables, and I also use the CLARIFY statistical package to interpret the results of the ordered Probit Model that I shall discuss later on.

Ordered Probit model is a methodological model that is widely used to analyze discrete and scaled dependent variables. Compared to the multinomial probit model, the ordered Probit model takes into account of the extra information implicit in the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, as the coding of the dependent variable in these cases, usually as 1, 2, 3, etc., reflects only a ranking, and the difference between a 1 and 2 should not be treated equivalent to the difference between a 2 and 3. Ordinary Least Square regression will err in an opposite direction, as most of the dependent variables in

this study are not continuous, which violate the basic assumptions of the OLS model. However, if I employ the ordered Probit model to regress dependent variables, potential statistical biases shall be alleviated, as the ordered Probit statistical model is especially designed to analyze the relationship between binary or discrete dependent variables and explanatory variables (Veall and Zimmermann 1996; Kennedy 1998; Greene 2001).

Please note for the ordered Probit model, the goodness-of-fit measure (pseudo- R^2) is different from the OLS model, which usually carries less significance (Veall and Zimmermann 1996; Kennedy 1998; Greene 2001). In order to verify the validity of the statistical results, I shall provide the results of the likelihood ratio test, which is designed to test the significance of blocks of coefficients.

Missing Values & the Amelia Statistical Program

Survey data analysis begins with a preliminary exploration to determine whether the data are suitable for meaningful statistical analysis. In the preliminary analysis, which is not reported in order to save space, I found that missing values is a problem. About one-third of the cases are lost in statistical analysis programs that employ the listwise deletion, which deletes both nonresponses and cases associated with nonresponses (King et. al. 2001), and this corresponds with our experiences of preliminary exploration with the 1993 data set. The number of observations for dependent variables is around six to eight hundred or so, but the total observations decline to four to five hundred in the listwise deletion analysis, which is about one third of the cases in average in the regression. The drop of the cases is not caused by any particular independent variable, but rather by the small amount of missing values in each single predictor.

Although the number of observations is sufficient for meaningful statistical analysis, I still consider that it is necessary to take a close look at the problem of missing value. In order to correct this problem, I employ the *Amelia* statistical program to generate the missing values in the current data sets with consideration of the variance or error terms. *Amelia*, developed by Gary King and his colleagues in 2001, is a way to impute missing values. The *Amelia* program is based upon previous rigorous missing data imputation algorithms and it does not require exceptional expertise on computational algorithms and can be run on with the assistance of commercial software, such as the *Stata*.

I first discuss the theoretical foundation of the algorithm of *Amelia*. There are three fundamental types of theorems regarding the nature of the missing data. First, the missing values are completely at random (MCAR) that cannot be predicted with the observed information. Second, the missing data may be missing at random (MAR) and the probability that a cell value is missing may depend on observed values of other variables. Third, the probability of the missing value is dependent on the unobserved value of the missing responses, and the missing is nonignorable (NI). The *Amelia* program is based on the second assumption that that observed data can be used to predict the missing data.

By assuming the data are MAR, I first form the observed data likelihood as the marginal densities of the observed data are normal, and then I create an imputed value of the missing data the way I would usually simulate from a regression.³² The computation

³² For example, Let D_{jk} denoted a simulated value for observation j and variable k , and let $D_{j,-k}$ denote the vector of values of all observed variables in row j . The coefficients β from a regression of on the variable in D_k can be directly calculated from elements of the vector mean μ and the off-diagonal elements.

algorithms is further assisted by the IP and EMis programs by allowing to take random draws from the generated imputation, as IP enables to draw random simulations from the multivariate normal observed data and EMis enhances small sample variances with a round of importance sampling.

The procedures of the Amelia program are the following. I input the data vector with both dependent and independent variables into the program, and Amelia will create m values for each missing cell in the data matrix and create m imputed data sets, across which the observed values are the same but the missing values are filled with different imputation to reflect the uncertainty of the missing data. Then I may apply standard statistical methods to the generated data sets. Finally with the Clarify package or the MI procedure that is developed along with Amelia, I am able to combine the statistical results of the imputed data sets automatically.³³

Normally the Amelia will generate five imputed data sets with five sets of generated values. I choose to double the imputed data sets from five to ten in order to increase the accuracy level of the variance across different data sets.

Although Amelia is a user friendly and statistically advanced program in recovering the missing data, we should be aware of its limitations. The algorithm of Amelia is based on the assumption that the variables in the matrix are jointly multivariate normal, which is approximation at best, as few survey data sets have variables that are all continuous and unbounded, much less multivariate normal, such as the categorical data. In order to retain the precision for the imputed Amelia data sets, in the statistical analysis

³³ The multiple imputation estimate of the parameter (“combined parameter”) is the average of the m separate estimates, and the variance of the point estimates is the average of the estimated variances from within each completed data sets plus the sample variance in the point estimates.

I have calculated the predictors in the imputed data sets as the continuous variable rather than discrete variables.³⁴

First Difference & the CLARIFY Statistical Program

Finally, I will address the CLARIFY statistical method to improve the interpretation and presentation of our statistical results. The regression coefficients in the ordered Probit models are similar to the regression coefficients in the OLS models conceptually, however, the estimated coefficients in the Probit regression represent the change of log odds, instead of the change in lineal regressions, for one unit change in the independent variables. In order to compensate for this difference and to provide an intuitive understanding of the correlation between the dependent and independent variables, I employ the CLARIFY software to interpret the statistical results.

The CLARIFY software was developed by Gary King and his graduate student that aims to interpret and present statistical results by simulating the expected parameters with computer-intensive techniques (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 200). It is argued that simulation can take full advantage of the parameter estimates, convey statistical findings in a reader-friendly manner, and is able to achieve any desired degree of precision by increasing the number of simulations (Fair 1980; Tanner 1996; Stern 1997).

The CLARIFY program uses the logic of survey sampling to approximate complicated mathematical calculations, as simulation enables researchers to approximate the true expected value as estimating a feature of the population with a drawn sample. Specifically, I am able to approximate the statistical effect of the unit change of a particular independent variable in the ordered Probit model with the CLARIFY program by simulating the expected values of the dependent variables in accordance with the

³⁴ We still impute the dependent variables as ordinal variables in order to preserve the statistical model.

change of this independent variable, holding all other predictors at fixed values. For instance, the ordered Probit regression shows that the binary variable gender is statistically significant correlated with the participation type A at the .05 level with an estimated coefficient .3. In CLARIFY I can hold all other predictors at their mean values and simulate the expected value of the dependent variable A when the gender takes the value of 0 and 1. By doing so say 1000 times I am able to approximate the difference of the dependent variable A when the gender takes one unit of change, since a one unit change of the predictor cannot be directly shown with the estimated coefficient in the ordered Probit model. In the empirical analysis, I shall use the first difference to interpret the result generated by the ordered Probit regression model.

CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS II: THE ROLE OF WORKPLACE ON CHINESE POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION

This chapter reports the findings of the analysis of the role of the workplaces on citizens' participation in 1993 and 2002. In addition to measuring the direct effects of the work unit with individual variables of the work unit types and political organization, I also measure the work units as different contexts to gauge how the contexts affect the relations between the independent variables and political participation. As the previous discussion suggests, I expect less influence of the work unit on the daily political participation of Chinese urban citizens in 2002 than was the case in 1993.

As China's economic reform continues to deepen and develop, the state's role in the national economy and in the society both start to transform. In the national economy, the state is no longer the sole distributor of goods and services, but has assumed the role of market regulator. Among the important changes during this process is the decrease of the state-owned enterprises and the sprouting and rapid growth of the foreign, private and individual enterprises in Chinese economy.

Through economic reform, the state gradually relinquishes control over the national economy and the state is no longer the sole distributor of economic interests to Chinese urban citizens. Although state owned enterprises constituted nearly seventy percent of the national economy in early 1990s, its share in the economy dropped to less than 50% and its employment scale also diminished significantly by 2000.³⁵

³⁵ Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China.

While the percentage of state work units dropped considerably over the past decade, critical socioeconomic interests that were once distributed via the work units were no longer channeled through the work units. Important resources such as housing, pension, medical insurance are no longer available to the urban citizens via the setting of the work unit. Instead these important resources in citizens' daily life are now either distributed by the market, or through the state's social network established in the economic reform. In the early 1990s, it was still important for urban citizens to engage in political participation in the workplace to compete for these interests, but since the early 2000s, it has become less imperative for urban citizens to engage in various political acts through the workplace.

With the change of the status and function of the work unit, I expect the influence of work units will decrease substantially in predicting urban political participation. As elaborated in the previous theory chapter, I expect while the work unit plays a crucial role in motivating citizens' participation in the early 1990s, the influence of the work unit is going to decrease, if not entirely disappear in 2002. At the same time, I expect in 2002, instead of being motivated by the context of work units, China's urban participation is going to be increasingly motivated by individual resources and citizens' psychological engagement in politics along with the decreasing control from workplaces.

The following sections report results of the analysis of the different modes of political participation – voting, campaigning, candidate recruitment, complaining and official contacting in 1993 and 2002.³⁶ The dependent variables are the factor scores of

³⁶ Besides voting measured by 0 (no action) and 1 (vote), the original individual participatory act ranges from 0 (no action), 1 (occasionally participate), 2 (sometimes participate) and 3 (often participate).

participatory modes, and the missing values are imputed with the *Amelia* program.

Analyses of the original data are reported in the Appendix C.

I expect to find a decreased influence of workplaces in motivating citizens' participation from 1993 to 2002, and increased importance of individual resources, such as education and income in China's urban political participation.

Voting

The first mode of participation that I will examine is voting. Table 15 shows the direct effects of workplace on voting in 1993 and 2002.

In this analysis workplace is measured as an ordinal variable that indicates how close or distant a workplace is from the state. Party organizations are essentially part of government and are closest to the state. Other types of workplace, such as state owned enterprises and collective enterprises are progressively more distant, while private and foreign enterprises are the most distant and independent of the state.

In addition, the “political organization” variable indicates whether the respondent participated in political studies held within the workplace. We see that both indicators of workplace played an important role in mobilizing citizens to vote in 1993. Citizens in workplaces closer to the state were significantly more likely to vote than those in workplaces more distant. Furthermore, political studies in the work unit increased voting behavior by a significant extent.³⁷ By 2002, workplace had no significant affect on voting, and political organization studies had disappeared from the workplace setting.³⁸ The workplace factor and resources variables such as marital status and being middle-aged were shown to be correlated with voting in 1993, while the psychological variables such as the party membership and internal political efficacy were correlated with the voting in 2002. As the theory expected, while the workplace is no longer significant in predicting citizens’ voting behavior, psychological engagement became increasingly salient in predicting voting behavior in 2002. Although the findings are not especially strong, they are consistent with my theoretical prediction.

³⁷ In the original analysis, the ordered-probit regression analysis unambiguously revealed that political organization is the most important variable that predicted voting in congressional elections and elections in work units. The original analyses are reported in the Appendix C.

³⁸ To compare the influence of different types of work units and how they may affect the voting behavior of Chinese urban citizens, I entered a dummy variable for each type of workplace, and recorded the result of the analysis in the Appendix D (private and foreign enterprises as the omitted category).

Table 15. Analysis of the Mode of Voting

Independent Variables	Voting (1993)	Substantive Effect	Voting (2002)	Substantive Effect
Workplace	.09* (.05)	0.08	.07 (.04)	
Political Organization	.38*** (.09)	0.19	/	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>				
Position in the Workplace	-.01 (.05)		.04 (.05)	
Income×10(-4)	-.07 (.06)		.03 (.02)	
Education	-.05 (.05)		.03 (.03)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.002 (.05)		-.004 (.05)	
Self-regarded Social Status	-.02 (.06)		.06 (.05)	
Male	-.05 (.08)		-.02 (.07)	
Age	.04** (.02)	0.62	.06*** (.01)	0.88
Age-squared×10(-4)	-4.4** (1.8)	-0.66	-.06*** (.01)	-.86
Marital Status	.23** (.10)	0.09	.09 (.16)	
Ethnic Background (Han)	.22 (.21)		-.14 (.16)	
Father's Education	-.04 (.03)		-.0003 (.007)	
Father's Party Membership	-.06 (.10)		/	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>				
Party Membership	.001 (.11)		.19** (.09)	0.07
Political Interest	.09** (.04)	0.12	.06 (.05)	
Political Knowledge	-.004 (.09)		.07 (.08)	
Internal Political Efficacy	.04 (.09)		.12** (.06)	0.06
External Political Efficacy	-.02 (.08)		.09 (.06)	
Government Attitude	.03 (.10)		-.008 (.07)	
Faith in People	.06 (.09)		.04 (.07)	
constant	-1.7 (.61)		-2.63*** (.42)	
Number of observations	1070		1754	

Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation.

* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

In the 1993 analysis, I found different types of workplaces exert distinctive influence on urban voting behavior. Although working in government organizations—the workplace closest to the state—had no significant effect on voting, citizens who worked in state institutions, state enterprises, and collective enterprises were significantly more likely to engage in voting than those employed in foreign and private enterprises. The effects of each workplace are similar. Political organizations also have a similar effect on voting. Besides the party organization, the result supports the hypothesis that the context of workplace is going to affect how citizens engage in political participation in urban China. In 2002, none of the workplace variables are statistically significant in predicting voting as predicted by the theory. Party membership and internal political efficacy had no effect in 1993, but these variables are strong predictors of voting in 2002. Among socioeconomic resources, only age affects voting, with similar effects in 1993 and 2002.

After testing for the distinctive influence of different types of work units and influence of political organization inside the workplace, I further set out to test for the interactive influence of the work unit type and political organization inside the work unit as reported in Table 16. With the analysis, I intend to test and gauge how political organizations would have different effects in different types of the work units. I expect within different types of the work units, political organizations should exercise different political influence on citizens' political participation. Instead of still including different types of work units for controlling purposes, I include interactive variables of the political organization and the five different work units to illustrate different effect of political organization on citizens' voting behavior in different types of the work unit.

Table 16. Analysis of the Mode of Voting for Interactive Influence in Work Units

Table 16. Voting (1993)

Independent Variables	Voting (1993)	Substantive Effect
Interactive Party Organization (political organization * party organization)	.35 (.23)	
Interactive State institutions (political organization * state institutions)	.43*** (.14)	0.15
Interactive State Enterprises (political organization * state enterprises)	.47*** (.11)	0.21
Interactive Collective Enterprises (political organization * collective enterprises)	.46* (.19)	0.11
Interactive Private Enterprises (political organization * private enterprises)	.08 (.29)	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>		
Position in the Workplace	-.02 (.05)	
Income×10(-4)	-0.11* (0.06)	-.08
Education	-.01 (.04)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.003 (.06)	
Self-regarded Social Status	-.02 (.06)	
Male	-.06 (.09)	
Age	.05** (.02)	0.78
Age-squared×10(-4)	-4.75** (1.9)	-0.71
Marital Status	.25** (.11)	0.1
Ethnic Background (Han)	.22 (.22)	
Father's Party Membership	-.08 (.10)	
Father's Education	-.04 (.03)	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>		
Party Membership	.04 (.13)	
Political Interest	.07 (.04)	
Political Knowledge	.001 (.10)	
Internal Political Efficacy	.05 (.11)	
External Political Efficacy	-.02 (.09)	
Government Attitude	.04 (.10)	
Faith in People	.09 (.08)	
constant	-1.71** (.70)	
Number of observations	1070	

Note: Δ effect is the effect of the change of dichotomous variable or one standard deviation of other independent variable on participation.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

The analysis of the interactive influence of work unit and political study inside the work unit confirms the analysis result of the influence of different types of the work units on citizens' voting behavior. While political organizations inside government organizations—the workplace closest to the state—had no significant effect on voting, political organization in state institutions, state enterprises, and collective enterprises was significantly more likely to motivate citizens' voting than those in foreign and private enterprises. The interactive effects of political organization in each workplace type are similar. The result of the interactive influence model shows that in different types of the work units, the political organization would exert different influence on citizens' voting.³⁹

Campaigning

The second mode of participation is campaigning. The results reported in table 3 show that in 1993, while workplace does not affect campaigning activity, political organization is positively correlated with citizens' campaigning behavior. However, the influence of political organization disappeared in the 2002 analysis.

In the 1993 analysis, several socioeconomic resources influence campaigning behavior. Citizens' position held in the workplace such as being the supervisor or in management within the workplace is a strong positive predictor of campaigning behavior, and self-regarded economic status is positively correlated with campaigning behavior. These effects of socioeconomic variables are not significant in 2002. Psychological engagement factors, however, influence campaigning behavior in both 1993 and 2002.

³⁹ I also conducted the analyses of interactive effects of the rest modes of political participation and the results have not been significant. The findings of the interactive model are confirmatory to the influence of the work unit types.

Table 17. Analysis of the Mode of Campaigning

Table 17. Campaigning

Independent Variables	Campaigning (1993)	Substantive Effect	Campaigning (2002)	Substantive Effect
Workplace	.01 (.06)		.07 (.05)	
Political Organization	.29*** (.09)	0.15	/	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>				
Position in the Workplace	.11** (.05)	0.11	-.008 (.04)	
Income×10(-4)	-.06 (.06)		.04 (.03)	
Education	-.01 (.05)		-.05 (.04)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.12** (.06)	0.1	-.07 (.06)	
Self-regarded Social Status	.01 (.07)		.03 (.05)	
Male	-.19** (.09)	-.10	-.01 (.08)	
Age	.02 (.02)		.02 (.01)	
Age-squared×10(-4)	-.57 (1.84)		-.03 (.01)	
Marital Status	-.05 (.11)		-.02 (.24)	
Ethnic Background (Han)	-.26 (.20)		.03 (.26)	
Father's Education	-.06** (.03)	-.1	-.0004 (.01)	
Father's Party Membership	.08 (.10)		/	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>				
Party Membership	.36*** (.12)	0.14	.52*** (.11)	0.2
Political Interest	.08* (.04)	0.11	.21*** (.06)	0.17
Political Knowledge	.12 (.09)		.24** (.09)	0.11
Internal Political Efficacy	.18** (.09)	0.08	.34*** (.09)	0.18
External Political Efficacy	.04 (.07)		.06 (.07)	
Government Attitude	.47*** (.09)	0.2	.11 (.07)	
Faith in People	.06 (.09)		.19** (.09)	0.09
constant	-2.94*** (.59)		-1.65*** (.48)	
Number of observations	1070		1754	

Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation.

* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

While the importance of workplace decreased in the decade before 2002,⁴⁰ the attributes of individual urban citizens, particularly one's psychological engagement factors, such as party membership, political knowledge, internal political efficacy become more salient to motivate citizens' to participate in politics in 2002 than in 1993.⁴¹

Candidate Recruitment

A third mode of participation is candidate recruitment. The results reported in table 4 are similar to those for campaigning. Closeness of the work unit to the state has no direct effect on candidate recruitment, but political organization inside the workplace has a significant effect on candidate recruitment in 1993 but not in 2002. Psychological engagement indicators (i.e., party membership and internal political efficacy) have significant affects on candidate recruitment in both 1993 and 2002. Except for position in the workplace, socioeconomic variables have a small and sometimes negative affect on candidate recruitment. A higher status position in the workplace significantly increases the probability of engaging in candidate recruitment behavior. Overall, the analysis of the mode of candidate recruitment shows that while the workplace is less significant in affecting citizens' political participation in 2002, the psychological engagement factors have a similar affect on candidate recruitment in both 1993 and 2002.

⁴⁰ I also conducted the statistical analysis on campaigning and other modes of political participation, including each type of work unit as a dichotomous variable, most of the workplace variables were not significant in either 1993 or 2002.

⁴¹ In the statistical analysis of the campaigning behavior in original data analysis, I also found that the household income is positively correlated with their campaigning behavior. I reported the results of the original ordered-probit analysis of campaigning behavior in the Appendix C.

Table 18. Analysis of the Mode of Candidate Recruitment

Table 18. Candidate Recruitment

Independent Variables	Candidate Recruitment (1993)	Substantive Effect	Candidate Recruitment (2002)	Substantive Effect
Workplace	.08 (.07)		-.08** (.04)	-.08
Political Organization	.23* (.12)	0.12	/	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>				
Position in the Workplace	.17*** (.06)	0.16	.12** (.05)	0.13
Income×10(-4)	-.02 (.09)		.03 (.02)	
Education	.008 (.05)		-.05 (.04)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.08 (.07)		.03 (.06)	
Self-regarded Social Status	.11* (.07)	0.09	.05 (.06)	
Male	-.08 (.10)		.02 (.09)	
Age	-.02 (.02)		.04* (.02)	0.59
Age-squared×10(-4)	2.66 (2.05)		-0.0008	
Marital Status	.14 (.14)		-.07 (.17)	
Ethnic Background (Han)	-.26 (.25)		-0.0589	
Father's Education	-.04 (.03)		.02** (.008)	0.009
Father's Party Membership	-.26** (.13)	-0.11	/	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>				
Party Membership	.81*** (.14)	0.32	.48*** (.11)	0.19
Political Interest	-.01 (.05)		.23*** (.04)	0.18
Political Knowledge	.15 (.12)		-.10 (.14)	
Internal Political Efficacy	.51*** (.11)	0.24	.36*** (.10)	0.19
External Political Efficacy	-.01 (.1)		.15 (.10)	
Government Attitude	.1 (.11)		.08 (.09)	
Faith in People	-.09 (.10)		.007 (.09)	
constant	-2.01*** (.74)		-1.99*** (.68)	
Number of observations	1070		1754	

Note: substantive effect is the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation.

* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

The major difference that I found between the 1993 and 2002 analysis is the role of workplace in explaining the political participation of candidate recruitment. I found that while in 1993, besides the political organization, the types of the workplaces are not significantly correlated with recruitment behavior, the workplace type is negatively related to candidate recruitment in 2002. To further explore the influence of individual type of work units, I ran the analyses again with the work unit as dichotomous variable. However, the analysis fails to show that any work unit type is significant in predicting the behaviors of candidate recruitment.⁴²

Complaining

The fourth mode of participation is complaining. The findings shown in table 5 are similar to those for campaigning and candidate recruitment. Workplace has no direct effect and political organization has a significant effect on complaining in 1993, but not in 2002.

When comparing the results of 1993 and 2002, the workplace context exerts a prominent influence on the complaining through political organizations inside the workplace in 1993, and citizens' party membership is the strongest predictor of the complaining behavior in 1993. In the 2002 analysis, while the resources factors such as being male and middle-aged played a similar role in both 1993 and 2002 analysis, psychological engagement factors of individual citizens, such as one's political interest, internal political efficacy and external political efficacy have started to become prominent

⁴² In the ordered-probit model performed on the original data set, the analysis result shows that besides psychological engagement factors—the party membership, political interest and internal political efficacy, the household income of individual citizens exhibited strong correlation with the dependent variable. The result of the analysis is recorded in the Appendix C.

in effectively predicting citizens' complaining behavior as theory predicts. Citizens who trust in their capacity to participate in politics and believe in the responsiveness of political institutions are much more likely to engage in complaining in 2002 than in 1993.

Table 19. Analysis of the Mode of Complaining

Table 19. Complaining

Independent Variables	Complaining (1993)	Substantive Effect	Complaining (2002)	Substantive Effect
Workplace	-.0003 (.05)	0.1	.004 (.03)	
Political Organization	.20** (.09)		/	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>				
Position in the Workplace	.008 (.05)		-.02 (.03)	
Income×10(-4)	-.006 (.07)		-.02 (.02)	
Education	-.02 (.04)		.006 (.03)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.04 (.05)		-.12** (.05)	-.10
Self-regarded Social Status	.04 (.05)		.06 (.05)	
Male	.13* (.08)	0.07	.14** (.07)	0.13
Age	.04** (.02)	0.62	.04*** (.01)	0.59
Age-squared×10(-4)	-4.1** (.17)	-.62	-.04*** (.01)	-0.57
Marital Status	-.15 (.11)		-.04 (.13)	
Ethnic Background (Han)	-.40** (.18)	-.08	-.13 (.15)	
Father's Education	.03 (.03)		.008 (.008)	
Father's Party Membership	.02 (.11)		/	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>				
Party Membership	.46*** (.11)	0.18	.26*** (.09)	0.1
Political Interest	-.03 (.04)		.15*** (.04)	0.12
Political Knowledge	-.01 (.08)		-.05 (.08)	
Internal Political Efficacy	.07 (.08)		.16** (.07)	0.08
External Political Efficacy	.06 (.09)		.13** (.06)	0.07
Government Attitude	-0.0153		-.07 (.06)	
Faith in People	-.11 (.09)		-.07 (.07)	
constant	-.64 (.60)		-1.71*** (.43)	
Number of observations	1070		1754	

Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

One notable additional finding of the 2002 analysis is the importance of self-regarded economic status in predicting the behavior of complaining. I found for urban citizens who are likely to perceive themselves better off in economic wellbeing are less likely to engage in complaining, when holding other variables constant. This variable had no effect on other modes of participation in either 1993 or 2002. I suggest that the rationale behind this finding may be that citizens' with privileged economic status are less likely to complain out of possible fear that there might be retaliation and they would be losing more of their perceived advantage.⁴³

In addition, in the 1993 analysis, the ethnicity variable turned out to be critical in predicting complaining behavior. The ethnic minorities are about 40 percent more likely to engage in complaining as a means to solve the problems in their daily lives. This phenomenon did not repeat in the 2002 analysis, as the ethnic issues and differential treatment of minorities may have become a less salient issue in China in recent years.

Official Contacting

The last mode of participation is official contacting, which is one of the most important modes of political participation in urban China. Workplace variables have no effect on this mode of participation, and a limited number of socioeconomic and psychological engagement variables are shown to affect official contacting behavior.

⁴³ Similarly, the 2002 ordered-probit analysis of the original data reports that citizens' household income is negatively correlated with the complaining through bureaucracy, which result is reported in the Appendix C.

Table 20. Analysis of the Mode of Official Contacting

Table 20. Official Contacting

Independent Variables	Official Contacting (1993)	Substantive Effect	Official Contacting (2002)	Substantive Effect
Workplace	-.04 (.08)		.008 (.03)	
Political Organization	-.12 (.15)		/	
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>				
Position in the Workplace	.03 (.07)		-.005 (.03)	
Income×10(-4)	-.04 (.09)		.003 (.02)	
Education	.14** (.06)	0.16	.02 (.03)	
Self-regarded Economic Status	.08 (.07)		-.01 (.04)	
Self-regarded Social Status	.08 (.07)		.01 (.04)	
Male	.08 (.11)		.04 (.06)	
Age	.02 (.02)		.03** (.01)	0.44
Age-squared×10(-4)	-2.67 (2.18)		-.03** (.01)	-.43
Marital Status	-.06 (.14)		-.12 (.13)	
Ethnic Background (Han)	-.28 (.25)		.01 (.14)	
Father's Education	-.004 (.04)		.006 (.007)	
Father's Party Membership	-.02 (.13)		/	
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>				
Party Membership	.26* (.16)	0.1	.05 (.08)	
Political Interest	.05 (.05)		.21*** (.04)	0.17
Political Knowledge	-0.22* (.12)	-.11	.06 (.07)	
Internal Political Efficacy	-.01 (.11)		.11* (.06)	0.06
External Political Efficacy	.17 (.11)		.10 (.06)	
Government Attitude	-.45*** (.12)	-.19	.11* (.06)	0.06
Faith in People	-.11 (.10)		-.06 (.06)	
constant	.29 (.74)		-1.98*** (.42)	
Number of observations	1070		1754	

Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation.

* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

In 2002, being middle-aged becomes an important variable to predict official contacting. Psychological engagement factors such as political interest, internal political efficacy and citizens' belief in the government are also positively correlated with contacting officials in 2002. In 1993, education is found to be positively correlated with official contacting, and in 2002 analysis, I found that the education is at least significantly

and positively related to one of the individual types of participation of official contacting, the writing to government offices, as more education seems to better enable individual citizens to participate in writing to government offices.⁴⁴

Finally, both the 1993 and 2002 analyses show that the workplaces are not significant in explaining official contacting. I argue that the obscurity of contextual and resources factors in predicting official contacting is attributed to the prevalence of the acts of leader contacting inside the urban workplaces. While the functions and status of the work units have been going through dramatic changes in the past decade, for employees who belong to the work unit, contacting one's leader directly is still one of the most important if not the foremost means to solve one's problems encountered in the everyday life.

Contextual Analysis

The analysis to this point has looked at the direct effects of workplace on various modes of participation. I now turn to the analysis of workplace as a context to examine if different types of workplaces affect the relationships between socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement on the various modes of participation.

In order to discover the contextual influence of the 1993 political participation, I evaluated the influence of workplaces in the following model. Following the categorization of the workplaces in Chapter IV, I differentiated the urban workplaces into two categories: one is the state work unit, which include governmental organizations, state institutions and state enterprises, and the other the non-state work unit, which includes collective enterprises, foreign enterprises, private enterprises and individual

⁴⁴ The result of the original ordered probit model is recorded in the Appendix C, along with the table that reports the influence of education on writing to government offices based on Clarify analysis.

enterprises. The criterion for this categorization is economic dependency and the sources of finance: the state work units are financially dependent on the state, and the non-state work units are financially independent and on their own.

The dependent variables are the factor scores of various types of political participation, and the independent variables are political organization inside the work unit, socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement factors. The data employed in the analysis are the data sets produced by the Amelia program.⁴⁵

The contextual analysis for 1993 reported in table 7 reveals that political organization inside the workplace is positively and significantly correlated with voting both in the state workplaces and non-state workplaces in 1993. While being married remains an important indicator for citizens' voting inside the workplace, being internally efficacious motivates citizens to participate in voting in non-state work units. In the 2002 analysis, being middle-aged and party membership tend to motivate to vote, few variables were significant in predicting citizens' voting behavior. Overall the state work units in 2002 were shown to provide citizens a more structured environment that motivated citizens' voting behavior.

⁴⁵ This analysis differentiates the work unit into two categories, the state work unit and non state work units. In order to accommodate the imputed continuous data of work unit variable, I coded the work unit variable to converge to the integer that is closest to itself.

Table 21. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Voting

Table 21. Contextual Analysis of Voting

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PCA Score for 1993 Voting				PCA Score for 2002 Voting			
	State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit		State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit	
	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect
Political Organization	.33*** (.11)	0.17	.37* (.21)	0.1				
<u>Socioeconomic Resources</u>								
Position								
Income $\times 10(-4)$								
Education								
Self-regarded Economic Status								
Self-regarded Social Status								
Male								
Age					.06*** (.02)	1.5	.05* (.03)	1.1
Age-squared $\times 10(-4)$					-.06*** (.02)	-.98	-.04 (.03)	
Marital Status	.30** (.13)	0.15	-.16 (.23)					
Ethnic Background								
Father's Education								
Father's Party Membership								
<u>Psychological Engagement</u>								
Party Membership					.22* (.11)	0.08	.17 (.19)	
Political Interest								
Political Knowledge								
Internal Political Efficacy	.10 (.10)		.31* (.17)	0.31				
External Political Efficacy								
Government Attitude								
Faith in People								
State Units Intercept			.51 (1.54)				-.16 (.91)	
_cut1/ constant			-1.93 (1.24)				-2.38 (.73)	
Number of observations			1070				1754	

Note 1: Analyses include all variables listed and significant coefficients and their counterparts in the other context are recorded. Note

2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Table 22. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Campaigning

Table 22. Contextual Analysis of Campaigning

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PCA Score for 1993 Campaigning				PCA Score for 2002 Campaigning			
	State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit		State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit	
	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect
Political Organization	.26** (.11)	0.13	.39* (.22)	0.11				
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>								
Position	.13* (.06)	0.14	.08 (.10)					
Income \times 10(-4)								
Education								
Self-regarded Economic Status	.12* (.07)	0.16	.10 (.12)					
Self-regarded Social Status								
Male								
Age					.03* (.02)	0.74	.005 (.03)	
Age-squared \times 10(-4)					-.03* (.02)	-.62	-.01 (.03)	
Marital Status								
Ethnic Background								
Father's Education	-.06* (.03)	-.10	-.04 (.06)					
Father's Party Membership								
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>								
Party Membership	.36*** (.13)	0.13	.24 (.38)		.55*** (.13)	0.2	.62*** (.21)	0.1
Political Interest	.08* (.05)	0.11	.07 (.08)		.23*** (.08)	0.31	.23*** (.09)	0.27
Political Knowledge					.22* (.11)	0.11	.27** (.13)	0.11
Internal Political Efficacy								
External Political Efficacy					.15* (.08)	0.17	.03 (.11)	
Government Attitude	.51*** (.11)	0.71	.28 (.25)					
Faith in People					.22** (.09)	0.1	.21 (.14)	
State Units Intercept								
_cut1/ constant								
Number of observations								

Note 1: Analyses include all variables listed and significant coefficients and their counterparts in the other context are recorded. Note

2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

The contextual analysis of the mode of campaigning is reported in table 8. While political study is significantly correlated with both campaigning in the state work units and non-state work units in 1993, position, citizens' self-perception of economic status, political interest, party membership and government attitude are significantly correlated with the campaigning behavior only within the state work units. Father's education is negatively correlated with campaigning behavior in the workplace. Overall, the state work units provided a more structured environment for citizens' campaigning behavior. Among the independent variables, political organization inside the work unit, party membership and belief in government are especially salient.

In the 2002 analysis, while being middle-aged is particularly important in predicting campaigning in the state work units, the psychological engagement factors are dominant in predicting citizens' campaigning behavior, especially in the state work units. Party membership, political interest, political knowledge, external political efficacy and interpersonal trust are significantly correlated with campaigning in the state work units, and party membership, political interest and political knowledge are important in non state workplaces.

Overall, the campaigning in non-state work units is less predictable and less structured in 1993 and 2002.

For analysis of the mode of candidate recruitment (see table 9), political organization is especially important in predicting candidate recruitment in non-state work units, and both party membership and internal political efficacy are positively and significantly correlated with candidate recruitment in the 1993 analysis. The analysis reveals that psychological engagement factors are prominent predictors of citizens' behavior in candidate recruitment across 1993 and 2002, and psychological engagement such as party membership, political interest, political efficacy become increasingly important in 2002. The analysis also shows that besides psychological engagement factors, socioeconomic resources especially the position inside the workplace are exhibited close connections with the behaviors in candidate recruitment. The analysis of the candidate recruitment behavior exhibits certain consistencies especially in the importance of psychological engagement factors in analyses between 1993 and 2002.

Table 23. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Candidate Recruitment

Table 23. Contextual Analysis of Candidate Recruitment

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PCA Score for 1993 Candidate Recruitment				PCA Score for 2002 Candidate Recruitment			
	State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit		State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit	
	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect
Political Organization	.21 (.14)		.41* (.24)	0.12				
<u>Socioeconomic Resources</u>								
Position	.21*** (.07)	0.06	.10 (.12)		.10* (.06)	0.13	.12 (.09)	
Income $\times 10^{-4}$								
Education								
Self-regarded Economic Status								
Self-regarded Social Status								
Male								
Age					.05* (.03)	1.23	.02 (.03)	
Age-squared $\times 10^{-4}$					-.05* (.03)	-1.03	-.02 (.04)	
Marital Status								
Ethnic Background								
Father's Education					.02** (.01)	0.09	.02 (.02)	
Father's Party Membership	-.30* (.14)	-.12	-.03 (.30)					
<u>Psychological Engagement</u>								
Party Membership	.83*** (.16)	0.31	.63* (.38)	0.08	.48*** (.12)	0.18	.53*** (.24)	0.08
Political Interest					.19*** (.06)	0.25	.24*** (.10)	0.28
Political Knowledge								
Internal Political Efficacy	.52*** (.13)	0.52	.50** (.22)	0.47	.16* (.08)	0.19	.07 (.15)	
External Political Efficacy					.21*** (.08)	0.24	.08 (.11)	
Government Attitude								
Faith in People								
State Units Intercept								
_cut1/ constant								
		-1.1 (1.64)						
		-.92 (1.49)						
Number of observations			1070				1754	

Note 1: Analyses include all variables listed and significant coefficients and their counterparts in the other context are recorded. Note

2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Table 24. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Complaining

Table 24. Contextual Analysis of Complaining

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PCA Score for 1993 Complaining				PCA Score for 2002 Complaining			
	State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit		State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit	
	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect
Political Organization	.18* (.11)	0.09	.24 (.18)					
<u>Socioeconomic Resources</u>								
Position								
Income $\times 10(-4)$								
Education								
Self-regarded Economic Status					-.12** (.06)	-.17	-.09 (.08)	
Self-regarded Social Status								
Male	.19** (.09)	0.09	.05 (.17)		.12 (.08)		.19* (.12)	0.07
Age	.05** (.02)	1.2	.04 (.03)		.03* (.02)	0.74	.08*** (.03)	1.65
Age-squared $\times 10(-4)$	-4.6** (2.1)	-.74	-3.4 (3.5)		-.03 (.02)		-.07*** (.03)	-.80
Marital Status								
Ethnic Background	-.47** (.20)	-.22	-.21 (.44)					
Father's Education								
Father's Party Membership								
<u>Psychological Engagement</u>								
Party Membership	.36*** (.12)	0.13	1.14*** (.38)	0.16	.26*** (.10)	0.1	.27 (.21)	
Political Interest					.14*** (.05)	0.19	.17** (.08)	0.2
Political Knowledge								
Internal Political Efficacy					.13 (.08)		.28** (.13)	0.3
External Political Efficacy					.07 (.08)		.26** (.12)	0.29
Government Attitude	-.16* (.09)	-.22	-.20 (.25)		-.01 (.07)		-.20** (.10)	-.24
Faith in People								
State Units Intercept		.0007 (1.5)				1.78* (.98)		
_cut1/ constant		-.66 (1.19)				-3.01*** (.83)		
Number of observations		1070				1754		

Note 1: Analyses include all variables listed and significant coefficients and their counterparts in the other context are recorded. Note

2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

For the mode of complaining, the 1993 analysis reveals political organization, being male, middle age effect and party membership are all significantly correlated with citizens' complaining in the state work units. At the same time, mistrust in the government and being ethnic minorities are going to encourage citizens to engage in complaining in state work units as well. Similar to the results in the multivariate analyses, I propose that when ethnic minorities experienced difficulties in daily life, they were more likely to resort to complaints. Complaining inside non-state work units is much less predictable, with only party membership is significantly correlated with citizens' complaining.

For the 2002 analysis of complaining, I found the perception of one's economic status, party membership, political interest and internal political efficacy are all significantly correlated with complaining behavior across state work units and non-state work units. Citizens with positive perception of their economic status are less likely to engage in complaining, and party membership and internal political efficacy are more likely to motivate citizens' complaining inside the work units. At the same time, state work units exhibit noticeable difference in motivating citizens complaining with the significant state work units intercept. Although less likely to motivate citizens to participate complaining overall, the non-state work units do provide more structured context in predicting citizens' participation in complaining, which is correlated with both socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement factors.

Table 25. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Official Contacting

Table 25. Contextual Analysis of Official Contacting

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PCA Score for 1993 Official Contacting				PCA Score for 2002 Official Contacting			
	State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit		State Work Unit		Non-state Work Unit	
	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect	β (s.e.)	Δ effect
Political Organization								
<u>Socioeconomic Resources</u>								
Position								
Income×10(-4)								
Education	.15** (.07)	0.23	.09 (.19)					
Self-regarded Economic Status								
Self-regarded Social Status								
Male								
Age					.01 (.02)		.07** (.03)	1.44
Age-squared×10(-4)					-.02 (.02)		-.07** (.03)	-.80
Marital Status								
Ethnic Background								
Father's Education								
Father's Party Membership								
<u>Psychological Engagement</u>								
Party Membership								
Political Interest					.17*** (.05)	0.23	.29*** (.07)	0.34
Political Knowledge								
Internal Political Efficacy								
External Political Efficacy								
Government Attitude	-.45** (.13)	-.63	-.40 (.31)		.15** (.07)	0.19	.004 (.10)	
Faith in People								
State Units Intercept							1.71** (.94)	
_cut1/ constant							-3.25*** (.79)	
Number of observations				1070				1754

Note 1: Analyses include all variables listed and significant coefficients and their counterparts in the other context are recorded. Note 2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

The last mode of behavior is official contacting. As official contacting is a prevalent political act, citizens' official contacting is only significantly correlated with independent variables of education and citizens' belief in government in the state work units and it is not correlated with any predictor in the non-state workplace. As leader contacting is a prevailing political act in urban China, different types of the workplaces tend to have less distinctive influence on official contacting, although education is shown to be an advantage in the state work units. I found the negative relationship between one's belief in government and the behavior in official contacting puzzling. I suggest that it might be related to the content of official contacting inside the work unit, and usually citizens contacted officials to solve their problems or venture grievance in their life.

In the 2002 analysis, few variables have a significant affect on official contacting. In state work units, official contacting is positively correlated with party membership and belief in government, and in non-state work units, being middle-aged and political interest are significantly correlated with citizens' official contacting. Also, the analysis indicates that citizens employed by state work units are more likely to engage in official contacting as revealed in the intercept of state work units.

The 1993 statistical result shows the state work units are more likely to provide a stable context for urban citizens to participate in acts of voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment, complaining and official contacting. Compared to participation in state work units, political participation in the state work unit is more regulated and structured in their relationship with the predictors, while political participation in non-state work unit is much less predictable. Back to our original question about the state's role in mobilizing citizens to participate in politics, the analysis shows that the state work

units and non-state work units tended to provide different contexts to facilitate citizens' political participation, and participation in state work units were more structured.

When we move from the 1993 contextual analysis to 2002 contextual analysis, I found the differences between state work units and non-state work units become more complex. The state work units and non-state work units become less distinctive in providing different contexts to motivate citizens to engage in different political acts, although there still remains difference between the two types of work units. While in voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment the state work units provided a slightly more structured context to motivate citizens to engage in these acts, for complaining and official contacting, the state work units are shown to provide a considerably more conducive environments and complaining and official contacting seemed to become more structured in non-state work units. Overall, the contextual analysis shows that political participation in 2002 tended to have much more similar relationships with predictors across different types of work units despite certain dissimilarities. Back to our question regarding the change of contexts of work units between 1993 and 2002, the empirical analysis yielded evidence that the state work units and non-state work units seemed to have nature that were similar to each other in motivating citizens' political participation despite nuanced differences. Moreover, in addition to the analysis of workplace context, psychological engagement factors in 2002 are found to become more and more important in motivating citizens' political participation in the recent decade, which is consistent with our theoretical expectation.

Workplace vs. Resources

For the mobilization effect of the workplace context, besides the theory addressed above as the workplace serves as an important mobilization context to engage citizens in political participation, there is a competing argument that the different contextual cues may lead to the change of the personal resources, which would sequentially lead to the different level of participation of individual citizens.

The resource model was proposed by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) in order to bridge the gap between socioeconomic resources and individual political participation. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) argued that although high socioeconomic status may predict citizens' political participation, it does not directly lead to citizens' participation. Rather, it is the individual resources, such as time, money, and civic skills (education attainment and civic abilities to make a speech, write a letter or preside a meeting) that will directly engage citizens with political participation. Applying the Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) argument to this analysis of participation in China, other than arguing the workplace directly mobilizes citizens into politics, an alternative resource interpretation may be raised that asserts the affect of workplace context on individuals' political participation is not achieved through the mobilization but rather by improving their personal resources, such as time, money and civic skills.

The socioeconomic resources are not the center of our research question, yet I have them included in the model for controlling purpose. From the statistical analysis in 1993, we see that the sociopolitical context, such as the workplace is shown to play an

important role in motivating citizens' political participation, while citizens' personal resources, such as income and education are not found so.⁴⁶

Unlike the developed western democracies, the political participation of Chinese urban citizens is not shown closely tied to the socioeconomic status of individual citizens in the statistical analysis. I contend that rather than through improving individual resources, the workplace in China is more likely to mobilize citizens into participation directly in 1993, which reveals the nature of China's urban political participation to a certain extent: China's urban political participation at the early stage of the reform is based less upon citizens' own volunteerism but more on the political organization that was structured around individual citizens, and citizens' participation was based less on their political knowledge or interest, but more on the established organizational paths existent in the society that are accessible to the citizens. Thus, China's urban political participation was not much reflected in citizens' educational achievement or merely economic wellbeing that are generally considered as more "resources." Rather, China's urban political participation at the early stage of the economic reform is more dependent on the socioeconomic organization citizens belong to and the access that citizens have to venture their political voice.

As Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) acknowledged in their account for individual resources and political participation, there are three fundamental determinants in structuring citizens' political participation—the individual resources, psychological engagement and mobilization networks. The empirical analysis suggests that the context

⁴⁶ As the original data set did not collect information of individual citizens' political skills such as the ability to make speeches or write letters effectively, in this study I mainly use the educational level as the surrogate variable to measure citizens' civic skills. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) also employed civic skill acts, educational experiences and language abilities as a compositional score to measure individuals' civic skills (279).

of workplace served as important mobilization network for citizens' political participation in China in 1993.

Discussion

In the 1993 analysis, the major context in which citizens are engaged in political participation was the workplace, and the political organization inside the workplace was a critical variable relating urban political participation with context. Both the work unit type and political organization are important factors that mobilized citizens to participate in politics, and different types of work units provided different social contexts that shaped the means of citizens' political participation as indicated by the analysis of work unit type and interactive effect of work unit and political organization inside the work unit.

The 2002 empirical analysis shows that the work unit is no longer an influential contextual factor that explains citizens engaging in political participation, and the state and non-state work units are becoming similar in providing contexts mobilizing citizens' political participation. Indeed, one of the side findings of the 2002 empirical analysis is that individual resources, particularly psychological engagement factors, turn out to be important predictors in determining political participation in urban China.

Before the late 1990s, Chinese urban work unit was the foremost sociopolitical institution in urban China in charge of the distribution of economic benefits and various other selective sociopolitical goods. The work units controlled the employees and subjected them to close supervision of the state by measures such as holding weekly political studies sessions, maintaining the written political profiles of each employee and dutifully engaging employees in political participation in support of the regime, such as voting in congressional elections.

When the work units were rid of the aforementioned critical political tasks and to function as independent economic entities, it is no longer the most important variable motivating urban citizens' participation. Consequently, the fundamental linkage between the state and society is quickly eroding away.

Pervious literature on political participation in USSR and China noted that the interests distributed through the political system are "low-end" interests, such as various economic goods, instead of the "high-end" interests, such as the right to compete for offices and political power or form public policy. While the mobilization mechanism of citizens' political participation has shifted in the economic reform, the political interests that the individual citizens have been competing for still remained at the low end in 2002. In other words, although the control of the state over the individual citizens has loosened during the economic reform and citizens are granted with more political liberty, the level that citizens are able to engage in politics is still at the low end and rather limited. Thus, as the sociopolitical resources available to the urban public are largely confined to mostly material interests, and as individual citizens are granted with certain freedom to choose whether or not to participate in politics, the analysis shows that a significant proportion of the urban public opted stay out of active participation after all.

The analysis shows that while citizens' political participation was subject to the mobilization of state-controlled sociopolitical organizations, political participation has been relatively equally distributed among the urban citizenry. One decade after 1993, the economic reform has largely dismantled previous sociopolitical institutions and lessened the control over individual citizens in political participation, and a substantial proportion of urban citizen did exercise this freedom and opted to refrain from political participation.

I argue that urban political participation in China has shifted from the model of state's dominance in political mobilization to a civic model that relies on individuals' resources.

CHAPTER VI

WORK UNITS AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

The central question of this study is to examine the influence of social context particularly the workplace on citizens' political participation in an authoritarian regime, and how the influence of the grassroots sociopolitical institution on citizens' political behavior has been evolving in the economic development. The empirical analyses presented in Chapter V exhibited that Chinese urban workplace assumed the vital status in mobilizing citizens' urban political participation in 1993, while in 2002 the influence was on a sharp decline and at the same time urban citizens' participation leaned heavily on individual resources, such as personal education and income.

While the analysis empirically demonstrated that the influence of workplace obscured in motivating citizens' political participation in 2002, the questions remain as why this was occurring and what changes that workplaces went through from 1993 to 2002 that made the work units less relevant in mobilizing and motivating citizens' political participation in urban China. In this chapter, we shall provide an in-depth qualitative analysis of the changes that Chinese urban units have gone through in the economic reforms for the last decade and examine why the functions and status of Chinese workplaces have changed in the daily life of China's urban areas.

Besides the theoretical concern on citizens' political behavior, this chapter is also interested in the state-society relationship in an authoritarian regime that is reflected in the political behavioral pattern of individual citizens. Particularly we are interested in how the state-society relationship shifts in the rapid economic development of the authoritarian regime. Previous political development literature has long noted that

economic development and growing national wealth would have a remarkable effect on the sociopolitical structure and political liberalization process in authoritarian regimes (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1989; Burkhart and Lewis-beck 1994). In this study, we would like to provide further and in-depth qualitative analysis of the evolving state-society relationship of a non-democratic regime in the context of rapid economic development.

Last but not the least, another theoretical contribution this chapter attempts to make is to address the state-society relationship from the perspective of “meso” level institutions. Within the context of economic reform, the social structure of the non-democratic regime may be undergoing profound transformations at the macro state’s level, meso institutional level and micro individuals’ level. These three levels of social structures are closely connected and deeply intertwined with one another. That is, the change of the relationship between the macro level state and meso level institutions is going to affect the behaviors of micro level of individual citizens, and at the same time the changes of the relationship between the macro level state and micro level individuals will be reflected at the changes at the meso level political institutions as well. As the state, sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are organically connected within one society, the decision-making at the state level that is implemented through middle level institutions will sequentially instill to the individual level. In this chapter, we would like to provide a closer examination of the change of the state-society relationship in urban China from the perspective of meso level grassroots sociopolitical institutions.

The pervious literature elaborating on the evolvement of the state-society relationship in the economic and political changes in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has largely placed the distinguishing political fault line between the state and civil

society (Weigle and Butterhead 1992; Arato 1990; Szelenyi 1988). As Zbigniew Rau (1991) noted, the state and civil society come to constitute “distinctive entities that have distinct domains outlined by firm boundaries” (4). By placing the political fault line between the state and society, the previous literature has not captured the complexity of the relationships among the state, institutions and individual citizens in the process of economic liberalization. While stressing on the direct interactions between the state and individual citizens, the previous literature hasn’t acknowledged the linkage between the state and individual citizens and explored how the evolving state-society relationship is to be reflected in the transformation of grassroots sociopolitical institutes. In this chapter, the theoretical concern of the qualitative analysis is on the transformation of meso level institutions in an authoritarian regime during the economic development. Our analysis reveals that the meso level sociopolitical change, that is, the transformation of grassroots political institutions play a critical role in demonstrating and facilitating the relationship shift between the macro level state and micro level individual citizens.

The analysis of this chapter is to be divided into three sections, in which we will address economic, political and social transformations of Chinese urban work units respectively. We will examine how the function and status of work units have evolved in China’s urban setting during the economic development in the past decades, and how the meso level transformation has been closely connected with the relationship adaptation between the macro level state and micro level individuals. Also, at the end of the analysis we would provide a number of theoretical reflections regarding the state-society relationship shift of an authoritarian regime in the economic development, as how the state, sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are concerned in the economic

reform and how they are interconnected with one another during the transformation process.

Economic Transformation

The first and foremost aspect that we shall address is the economic transformation that China's urban work units have been experiencing in the economic reform.

Although the work units are multi-functional sociopolitical institutions in urban China, the most important ties that the work units have with individual citizens and state is the economic connection. As Walder (1986) astutely examined in his analysis of Chinese urban work units, the communist state set up the concrete rewarding system to control and motivate individual citizens to adhere closely to the state ideological route and observe the party policies. With the economic resources mostly vested from the state, the work units were in charge of direct distribution of income, tenure, housing, pension, benefits and other economic resources to Chinese urban citizens, and this is especially true for the governmental organizations, state institutions and state owned enterprises.

“All workers are dependent on their enterprises for the satisfaction of their need. ... Two aspects for the employment relationship define the extent to which worker dependence. The first is the proportion of the workers' needs satisfied (or potentially satisfied) at the workplace. This involves, at a bare minimum, the money wage. But, in a variety of contemporary and historical setting, this has also involved the satisfaction of other social and economic needs: health insurance, medical care, pensions, housing, loans, and education” (Walder 1986, 14).

Tenure & Labor Relationship

Before the economic reform initiated in the mid-1980s, the work units in the urban setting were to provide life-long employment to their employees, and citizens were expected to remain in the same work unit or in the same work units system from graduation till retirement. Although citizens' transferring to other work units did occur, they were largely anomalies of the employment system instead of commonalities.

While the employees were expected to stay in the same work units since they started working and few would obtain the right to transfer to other unit, the work units were not able to fire the employees at discretion either. As Tang and Parish (2002) observed the labor relationship in the work unit before the reform: "Once one got a state job, it became an "iron rice bowl" (*tie fan wan*): no one could be laid off; though an employee's malfeasance was disciplined within the work unit, the employee could not be fired" (128). This tied employment relationship guaranteed citizens' lifetime employment against loss of labor mobility, and it also reaffirms the economic dependence of the employee on a particular work unit.

The raises and bonuses of individual citizens in the work unit depended heavily on their *biaoxian*, which can be roughly translated into "performance" but does not only include the employee's industrial performance at one's own position in the workplace, but also the supervisors' evaluation of the employee's political attitude and behaviors in the workplace (Walder 1986). This *biaoxian* was closely related to employees' economic remuneration from the workplace, and it was also concerned with employees' promotion opportunity and the prospect as whether one would be admitted into the Party, which was an important economic status boost on the floor. Thus, in order to obtain the selected

economic benefits from the workplace, the employee should perform industriously on their positions *and* exhibit “correct” social attitude and behaviors in the work unit.

Besides the tenured system and the review of employees’ *biaoxian*, some urban enterprises used to offer training for employee’s children in their own vocational-technical high schools and hire them after graduation or let the children of the worker inherited the job directly after the worker retired, which is known as the *dingti* practice (Korzec & Whyte 1981; Shirk 1981; Emerson 1983; Walder 1986; Dittmer & Lu 1996). The *dingti* practice used to be considered as the sanctioned benefit for the employees, which extended work units’ economic opportunities to the families of workers.

With the deepening of economic reform and the acceleration of economic development in Chinese society, few workers would expect to work for the same work unit ever since graduation. The *dingti* practice also has gradually disappeared in Chinese urban work units since the mid-1990s. Nowadays Chinese urban residents are able to seek employment on the market, and enterprises can hire productive employees at will and let off the unqualified ones. This change of labor contract in the workplace was not accidental but rather a truthful reflection of the relationship change between the state and individual citizen. Before the CCP government strived to achieve high-speed economic development, the party emphasized on economic equality and offered urban residents with essential economic goods to ensure a stable economic order. Guided by this ideology, Chinese urban work units carried out thorough economic control and provision to individual citizens through multi-aspects of labor relationship, until the relationship between the state and society started to liberalize in the 1990s.

Health Insurance & Pension

The liberalization trend of the economic connection between the state and citizens is also reflected in the benefit system set up in China's urban areas.

Before the economic reforms, the health insurance for Chinese urban residents was mainly a workplace-based system that provides medical treatment to urban dwellers. In the 1950s, the government organizations, state institutions, state enterprises and urban collectives enterprises participated in the public health insurance or the labor insurance in urban China, and the individual employees received free or subsidized medical treatment from their work units as part of their package of non-wage benefits. As the public sector expanded rapidly in China in the mid-1950s within the socialist reforms, this work units based health insurance virtually covered a majority of urban dwellers in the early 1960s (World Bank 1997).

Ever since the economic reform took off in urban China, more and more urban citizens started to work for the foreign, joint ventures and private enterprises, which fell out of the original health insurance plan that was mainly designed for the public sector. At the same time, many of the state enterprises and collective enterprises were not able to finance the health insurance of their employees as many of them were experiencing financial difficulties as facing increasingly open competition from the economic reform. Also, the rising costs of prescriptions and high technological treatment have been a mounting burden on the work units. Studies show a significant decline in the proportions of the urban population covered by health insurance from 52 per cent in 1993 to 39 percent in 1998 (Gao et. al. 2001).

In 1998, the CCP government founded the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and initiated the nationwide new health insurance program for the urban residents. Instead of basing the health insurance on a particular type of work unit, the 1998 health insurance program is based on the mutual funds set up by the urban residents and their employees, which include the public sector, state enterprises, collective enterprises, foreign invested enterprises, private enterprises, etc. The proposed health insurance program aimed to provide a non-discriminatory health benefit to the employed urban residents, and it also provides specific benefits terms to the retirees and laid-off workers (Duckett 2004). Although under the new health insurance program, the employees of the public sector, such as the government organizations and state institutions may pay a higher percentage of out-of-pocket co-payment, over the 1998 health insurance has successfully attempted to provide the health insurance to urban residents not based the type of the work unit, but rather to the entire urban residential body indiscriminately.

Before the late 1990s, the health insurance system was largely workplace based and urban resident had to depend on their work units to provide for their health benefits, which once again reaffirmed the focal status of workplaces in the everyday economic life of urban China. Ever since the insurance reform in 1998, the dependency of the urban citizens on their work units for health insurance was deduced significantly as the state set up the social safety net for the whole urban residential body, no matter the citizens are employed in the public sector or private sector or even whether they are employed or not. This changed functionality of the meso level workplace to provide for essential economic resource to urban citizens implied the changing and liberalizing relationship between the state and individual citizens.

Besides the health insurance, the urban citizens no longer depended on work units for their monthly pension as well.

Before the 1990s, it was the work units that were responsible for providing retirement pensions for their workers. After retirement, the worker received 100 percent salary if one began working before 1949 and 75 percent if one worked continuously for twenty years or more (Editorial Group, 1990). With the improved life expectancy and increased number of mature workers, the Chinese urban work units had started to have difficulty providing the full-amount of pension for the retired workers.

Faced with the poor welfare coverage based on the work unit system, the Ninth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development passed the program at the Eighth National People's Congress in 1996 that sets the agenda "to quicken the reform of the system of provisions for the aged, unemployment and medical insurance and form a multi-layered social security system combining social insurance, social assistance, social welfare, favorable treatment and compensation, social mutual aid and individual savings" (Liu 1996).

The new social welfare reform has three key objectives: 1) to establish a society-wide system of pension-fund mobilization and management which takes over from the enterprises; 2) to share the costs of pension insurance between individuals as well as the enterprises and the state, and 3) to shift the focus of this social welfare reform from the previous enterprise-based system to the society-based system (Ge 1996). In the program, commitment is made to include employees in the private sectors, such as employees in the foreign enterprises or private firms.

One of the most important trends of the [social welfare] reform program of the 1990s has been the growing separation of social welfare from its previous enterprise base. The overriding aim of “socializing” social welfare and the tentative establishment of separate social security, service and assistance systems which are not employee-exclusive and enterprises based is a major new dimension of both government reform and local initiatives (Croll 1999)

From the analysis above, we may see that while the pension and benefits system of the work units used to provide essential economic resources to the urban employees, the citizens’ dependence on the work units for these benefits have largely waned away late 1990s. Instead of ensuring the economic and social control on individual citizens throughout the work place, the state provided non-discriminatory safety net to provide health benefits and pension to every eligible citizen in the urban area. The previous economic dependency of individuals on the work units was largely relinquished. Instead Chinese state is building up the economic and social benefits’ ties with individual citizens indiscriminately on the basis of employment.

Housing Reform

Finally, before we move on to the discussion of the workplace transformation in political and social perspectives, we would like to further discuss the housing reform that has been going in China in the past decade with considerable public attention and debate.

The housing program was the most sensitive and important economic resource that the work units were able to distribute to their employees. Except for heritage, to wait for the housing assignment from the work place is the major if not the sole source for Chinese urban citizens to improve their living conditions.

In alignment with the state's egalitarian social policy, the workplaces were responsible to assign the housing arrangement to urban residents through employment, and urban citizens needed only to pay a small amount of nominal fee as the monthly rent for the public housing. The maintenance of the housing was free to the urban citizens and was taken care by the state housing bureaus. Although the citizens did not own the housing themselves, they were entitled to live in it once it was allocated to them and they were free to pass the housing to their children. In a forty city housing survey conducted by the Economic System Reform Institute of China in 1991, about 42 percent of the urban residents lived in publicly-owned housing inherited or assigned by the work unit, another 42 percent in work unit housing, 10 percent in private housing, 3 percent in rent and 4 percent in borrowed housing.

As the housing is a vital living material and is closely concerned with citizens' everyday life and family, and the work units being the major if not the sole source for urban citizens' housing before the 2000s, the dependence of the employees on the work units was ponderous in order to qualify for the housing option.

The assignment of the housing in the work unit is generally based on seniority, need, merit, *biaoxian* and policy considerations. While seniority in the workplace and need for the housing (three generation household or less than a certain number square fee per person), the *biaoxian* of the employee, such as one's political attitude and political behavior in the workplace was also important in determining whether one was eligible for the housing. Most importantly the priority option to the public housing was usually given to the cadres in the work unit, who were usually the position holders or party members in the workplace, and one needs to have had consistent good *biaoxian* for many years to be

able to be promoted to leadership positions or to be admitted into the Party. In short, if one needed to obtain timely and satisfactory housing for one's family, he or she had to wait for one's turn and had consistent good *biaoxian*—in both industrial performance and more importantly in sociopolitical attitude and behavior—in the work unit.

Since 1988, Chinese government has experimented the reform to privatize urban housing within a limited scope, although the pace of the housing reform was slow due to the construction cost going far beyond the means of average urban household at that time. With the quickened economic development, ten years later the government intensified its public campaign for housing marketization in 1988—by selling housing to employees at distressed prices and gradually raising rents to near market prices, urban residents were urged to purchase their own apartments from the market (China Daily, 1999 June).

While at the beginning of the housing reform campaign, urban citizens were able to purchase the housing from their work units (instead of being assigned to) with heavy subsidies, the housing market was privatized to a significantly degree in 2002. Instead of waiting for their work units to assign public housing, nowadays the major resources for Chinese urban public to obtain their own housing is to purchase commercial housing on the market. In a survey conducted by the National Statistical Bureau in 2000 in median-sized cities, urban citizens' monthly expense on housing has increased by over nine times as compared to 1994. While the problem entails that price of commercial apartment is still high in comparison with the income of average urban family, the housing reform did release the overwhelming control of workplaces over individual citizens, and housing resources are made readily available to the public through economic means.

From the analysis above, we may see that within the context of economic development in the past decade, the workplaces' status and functionality in the Chinese urban daily life have gone through important and dramatic changes. Previously, work units were the key sociopolitical institution in the urban area exercising strict state's control over urban citizens and were responsible to distribute essential living materials; nowadays Chinese urban work units have gradually and steadily shed off various multi-functionalities and started to establish the uni-dimensional employment relationship with individual citizens. From the changes that the work units went through, we may have more understanding of the evolving relationship between the state and individual citizens, as the strict control of the state over individual citizens in the workplace setting has been on the wane and the relationship between the state and individual citizens has become more detached and liberalized in the urban setting.

Political Transformation

Besides the economic transformation, workplaces have also gone through important transformation in the political perspective, and the political control of workplaces over individual citizens has continuously been weakened.

Political Study

Political study is one of the critical independent variables in our empirical analysis that describes the intensity of political organization inside the workplace and measures the control of the workplace environment over individual citizens. Following the empirical analysis, we would like to further elaborate on the influence and functionality of political studies and its evolvement in the work unit.

When addressing the political study in the workplace, Walder made the following notes: “The Party employs two institutionalized means of intelligence gather and record keeping to help in this task. ... The formal component is the system of regular group meetings in workshops. When workers take part in the political meetings, they are not just talking among themselves—they are talking directly to the party organization” (90).

From this note we may see that political studies was an important means for the state to tally the political attitudes and behaviors of individual employees with the party line and the political study exerts political control over the individual citizens.

Political studies were mandatory meetings for urban residents to study political issues, which were usually held in the workplace setting. Political studies peaked during the Cultural Revolution, as many of the work units were required to have political meetings to study Mao’s writings and class struggles every day. The ideological orientation and the frequency of the political study had declined ever since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, but the content of the political study was by no means less political. Political studies stipulated citizens’ duties, inculcated citizens of the Party’s standpoint on current issues and informed employees of “right” political attitude and political behavior. Many work units would have at least one political study session on the floor each week before the mid-1990s.

We still had political study three days a week for two hours to read editorials and documents... We had a campaign against factionalism about 1979 or so, against followers of the Gang of Four. There were several campaigns against corruption and waste. In 1983 they had the “spiritual pollution” campaign. It

was pretty serious. They interfered with the way you dressed, what you read and your lifestyle (One interviewee, in Walder 1986, 231).

The existence of political study in the workplace revealed the state's strict control and deep penetration at the micro individual level. The citizens were required to take part in the political studies in the workplaces, and it was considered as part of their "*biaoxian*" on the floor. With the acceleration of the economic reform and work units focusing on maximizing one's productivity in an open market, less and less workplaces still took time to have political studies. While in the 1993 Social Mobility and Social Change data set we still documented the existence of political study in the workplace, the political studies have largely been disappearing from the urban setting in the late 1990s.

Political studies was an important and strong tool for the state to control urban residents mentally and psychologically, as the urban citizens were required to be continuously exposed to political teachings and political information from the communist state on a regular basis. The revocation of the political studies system in the workplace provides good evidence indicating that the state has been withdrawing from the everyday life in urban China and granted individuals citizens more freedom in the ideological realm.

Individual Political Dossiers

Besides the political study, another important aspect of the political control exercised by the workplace on the employees is the political dossier for each individual citizen kept by the work unit.

The political dossier kept important and sensitive political information of each individual citizen in the urban area, which included but not restricted to employee's

ethnicity, family background, parents' political classification, one's historical political performance on important periods since 1949 (such as Great Leap Movement, Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square incidents), one's political performance in previous work units, one's political performance in college and up till in high school.

Each employee's political dossier is kept in the personnel department in the work unit, and one's supervisors and leaders in the work unit were the ones eligible and responsible to update employee's political dossier every year based on employees' political performance in the work unit. Only the work unit leaders and the staff of the personnel department could read the political dossiers, and employees themselves had no access to their own political dossiers. Employees had no rights to know the reviews they received every year not to mention the opportunity to appeal or change them.

Employees in the work units were acutely concerned with their performance reviews recorded in the political dossiers, as the political dossier would tag employees throughout their life. The political dossiers would affect employees' job assignment, promotion, career opportunities within the work unit, and if they were ever to transfer to another work unit, the new unit would read their files closely as formal reviews and recommendations from the former work unit.

Bad reviews in the political dossier can be detrimental and even fatal to the employee in the work unit. The work units in urban China had developed a comprehensive recording and punishing system for the dossier reviews. The bad reviews were classified into three categories: warning, minor misconduct and major misconduct. While the warning ticket was retrievable based on the employee's performance in the probation period, the minor misconduct and major misconduct tickets would permanently

stay in the employees' political dossiers. The misconduct tickets would have severe detrimental effect to the economic and political opportunities of the employee in the current work unit and tag the employee wherever one would go.

The work units were no courts to give citizens criminal citations, however, the work units did have the jurisdiction over individual citizens' political performance and were able to document employees' political transgressions and offenses in the work units that would affect the economic and social wellbeing of the citizen considerably. Through the political dossier system that was implemented at the work unit level, the communist state gained significant control over individual citizens to make sure their attitudes and behaviors comply with the state's requirements, and the state was also able to track the political performance of each individual citizen throughout one's lifetime.

The political dossier system has been going through slow but important changes in the urban setting. Except for the party organizations and state institutions, most enterprises in the urban areas do not require citizens' political dossiers when admitting them in the unit anymore. In Dittmer and Lu's (1996) discussion of the reformed system of political dossier system, the authors noted that even among SOEs, there are two parallel personnel system in operation: some that still require a dossier to get in, others that do not.

From the political transformation that urban work units went through, we may gain more insights as how the communist state had been exercising strict control over the individual citizens and how the state had been regulating citizens' political attitude and behaviors. The state established systemic motivation and punishment mechanism to make sure that urban citizens would adopt the political ideology that the party state had been

advocating. The political study was to inculcate individual citizens on a regular basis of the “right” political standing according to the government, and the political dossier system allowed the state to track long term and meticulous political background and political history of each individual citizen, and the records would be directly connected with each citizen’s socioeconomic well being. From these practices carried out in the work units, we see that the state’s control over individual citizens through work units was thorough and forceful. The relinquished political study system and toned down emphasis on political dossiers provided important evidence of the state’s retreat from the civil life in urban China in the economic development, as individual citizens were under remarkable less command from the state in terms of “correct” political thoughts and “good” political behaviors. From the political transformation at the meso level, we are able to gain more insight into an increasingly liberalized state-society relationship that is emerging in urban China now.

Social Transformation

The final aspect of the work units’ transformation that we shall address is the societal connection between the urban work units and individual citizens.

The societal connection between the work units and individual citizens is the last but not the least tie between the state and individual citizens: the close supervision of workplaces over employees is concerned with private and vital aspects of employees’ everyday life, such as traveling, migration, marriage, family planning and children’s education, etc.

Since the founding of China in 1949, the governance in the urban area was directed by the communist ideology of equality of citizens, disregarding their

socioeconomic status. Following this ideological orientation, the hotels and accommodation facilities in the urban areas were provided with a nominal fee as long as business travelers could provide verifying document from their work units, which was called the “recommendation letter”. The recommendation system slowly died down in the early 1990s as China’s economic development made business travels more and more common among urban employees. However, for overseas traveling, urban citizens still had to provide the recommendation letters from their work units to the State Security Department to verify their official identity and obtain the passports. This practice has just been abdicated in China in 2002.

More importantly, urban citizens’ migration to other cities also had to be permitted and endorsed by the work unit. In order to regulate population distribution and movement, China set up the household registration (*Hukou*) system in 1951, which served as the monitoring and controlling mechanism of population migration, and urban citizens were required to register in the *Hukou* system to ensure legal residential status in the city.⁴⁷ *Hukou* system was concerned with many essential aspects of everyday urban life, such as citizens’ eligibility for public housing and food ration coupons, the rights for residents’ children to receive public education, etc., and in order to be able to register in *Hukou* in the migrated city, urban citizens must provide formal recommendation letters from both the previous work unit and the transferring work unit.

Also as part of the social control, Chinese urban citizens had to provide recommendation letters from their own work units in order to obtain marriage licenses.

⁴⁷ Source: Reference Material on the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 1956 (*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Cankao Zilao*). Volume I. Beijing: China’s People’s University.

As family planning was a fundamental policy in urban China and the state urged young urban residents to get married at least at one's mid-20s, the recommendation letters from the work units served as an important means for the work unit to supervise the marriage age of young Chinese. Many work units have concrete economic incentives and punishments to encourage employees to marry at least at their mid-twenties. Moreover, in order to obtain divorce, urban citizens also had to show the court recommendation letters from the work units. The involvement of the work units in the private lives of Chinese urban citizens of marriage and divorce was revoked in October 2003.⁴⁸

Indeed, the work units have been acting as the most important controlling institution in urban China to implement the family planning policies at the grassroots level. The family planning policy is advocated as one of the “fundamental state’s policies” to control rapid increase of an already gargantuan population, and the implementation of the family planning policy is mostly carried out in the context of work units—the most related and surely forceful institution in Chinese urban lives. The breach of family planning policy will incur serious punishments in the work unit, such as withdrawing one’s salaries and bonuses and delaying one’s promotion in the work unit. Severe violation may result in probation in the work unit or even being discharged from the unit. The following is an extracted regulation of the family planning policy of a provincial university in China, which was published on line in 2004:

- 1) “The family policy applies to every and each employee of the university.
- 2) ...The employees should get married at least three years older than the legal marriage age prescribed by the state; women who are to give birth must be

⁴⁸ Source: The Provisional Regulation for Marriage Registration in 2003. Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs.

at least 23 years old. For the employees who get married younger than the mandatory age, they will be deprived of “family planning” bonuses at the end of the year till reaching the mandatory age. For women who gave birth younger than 23, they will receive only partial salaries till 23 years old and they will have to conduct family planning studies in the unit.

- 3) ... Employees who get married at least three years older than the legal age will be awarded with an extra ten-day vacation. Female employees who give birth after 23 years old will be awarded with an extra fifteen-day vacation.
- 4) ... For the employees who have only one child, the child will receive monthly allowance of 10 RMB since his or her birth until fourteen years old.
- 5) ... Employees who violate the family planning policy will receive fines and be given misconduct tickets. For those who give births to more than one child without the state’s permission, they will be discharged from the work unit.”

As the examples and analysis above demonstrate, Chinese work unit infiltrated deeply into the lives of urban individual citizens up to the most private aspects. The work units had the authority over urban citizens’ traveling abroad, migration, household registration, getting married or divorced and their family planning practice, and this list is far from being exhaustive. Some of the practices such as traveling or marital registration were rescinded in the recent years, but some civil affairs in close connection with citizens’ everyday life still remain in the jurisdiction of work units.

This thorough and stringent control of work units over individual citizens does not only stand for the command of the work units over individual citizens alone, but it is also

part of the state's infiltration into the everyday life of Chinese citizens. Before the economic reform, the Chinese state is deeply infiltrated into nearly every aspect of individual urban citizens' lives through the workplace, from the provision of economic resources and housing to permission to travel and to get married. Through the work unit, the state is penetrated deeply into Chinese urban life with astringent control and close supervision. The close supervision that work units had over the citizens was guided by the ideological orientation endorsed by the state, which was conducted in accordance with the requirements of "social equality" and "ideological unification" advocated and ensured by the communist China. Before the deepening and stabilization of the economic reforms, Chinese state-society relationship had been tremendously close with the state dominating society in almost every civil aspect. With the same rational, the release of the work units' control over Chinese urban life in the recent years does not merely imply the changes of functionality and status of Chinese work units, but it also reflects the growing detachment between the state and society in urban China and the increasing liberalized state-society relationship within the context of China's economic reform and economic development in the past decades. The change of the status and functionality of workplaces started from the toning down of the communist ideology inside the CCP government since its economic reform. At the same time, China set up its market economy in the early 1990s, with the government gradually shifting its role from the market distributor to regulator. With the decreased priority of ideology in contemporary China, the state has devolved more freedom and civil rights to the society to fuel and accommodate economic growth.

Conclusion

Following the empirical analysis in the previous chapters, which indicated a decreasing significance of the work units in mobilizing Chinese urban political participation in the past decade, this chapter provides further qualitative analysis on the changing functionality and status of the work units in Chinese urban settings. Also, this chapter attempts to address the theoretical concern of the close sociopolitical interactions among the macro, meso and micro subjects within an authoritarian regime and how the changes of meso level social institutions could be related to the relationship evolution among the macro-level state and micro level individuals. Specifically, by examining evolving functionality and status of Chinese urban work units, this chapter attempts to shed light on the transforming state-society relationship that China is currently experiencing within the context of rapid economic development.

We succinctly examined and compared Chinese urban work units' economic, political and social functionalities and standing before the economic reform and in the early 2000. Evidences reveal that Chinese urban work units have been going through dramatic transformations in almost every aspect, and the provision and control of the work units to individual citizens were severely weakened and abated. These changes did not take place overnight, however, they were gradually made true in urban China in the past decade. The most important and substantial changes of the work units were taking place in the most recent years as the changes gradually collected its momentum in the past decade, which well coincides with the time span of our empirical analysis of 1993 to 2002.

Although the emphasis of our analysis is mainly placed on the transformation of Chinese urban work units, we are concerned with the evolving state-society relationship in urban China as well. As the key socioeconomic grassroots institutions in urban China, the work unit exerted astringent and strong control on individual employees on behalf of the state, and it provided essential economic and political goods for the Chinese urban residents in compliance with the communist ideology embraced by the regime. The changes work units have been going through in the economic development are dramatic and diverse, and these changes do not simply point to the altered functionality and status of workplaces alone: as the most important linkage and substantial sociopolitical institution between the communist state and individual citizens, the changes that happened to the workplace also implied the evolution of the relationships between the state and society. We believe that to examine the alteration in the relationship between the state and individual citizens, Chinese work units provided a critical perspective to enable the researchers to do so. From the initial control and high infiltration of the work units over individual citizens in the early stage of the reform, to the retreat and detachment in economic, political and social realms in the urban life at a later time, we see that the changes of the work units reveal the state's relationship in its connection with Chinese urban individual citizens has been continuously liberalizing in China's economic development.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation attempts to address the following questions: 1) the mechanism of individual citizens to participate in politics in an authoritarian regime, particularly the influence of social context on citizens' political behavior; 2) how the macro level state, meso level institutions and micro level individual citizens are interrelated with one another in the sociopolitical transformation, especially how the meso level institutions play a key role in connecting state and individual citizens in an authoritarian regime; 3) how the state-society relationship of an authoritarian regime shifts in the rapid economic development, as implied in the changes of citizens' political behaviors.

How citizens participate in politics in non-democratic regimes is an important and emerging question in political behavioral studies.

Political behavioral researches originate from the study of political participation in democracies, as inclusive and quality political participation from the public is an essential component of the healthy and sustainable democratic system. Since the political behavioral revolution took place in the 1960s, increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to citizens' political participation in democracies.

With the deepening of researches in political participation, there have been three theoretical paradigms to account for the mechanism of citizens' political participation in democratic societies. These three theoretical models address different and distinctive aspects of the motivating mechanisms of citizens' political behavior, which are citizens' socioeconomic resources, psychological engagement with politics and the social context that surround and influence individual citizens.

The current studies of political participation in democratic countries are closely connected to these three models to account for citizens' participation, and the empirical analyses on participation in democracies have long noted that individual socioeconomic resources (such as education and income), citizens' psychological engagement with political affairs (such as one's political knowledge and political interest), and the social environment of citizens' everyday life (such as the neighborhood and churches) play an important role in influencing and mobilizing citizens' political participation in the democratic system (Almond and Verba 1963; Campbell et. al.1964; Verba, Sidney and Norman 1972; Sidney, Nie and Kim 1978; Huckfeldt 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlotzman 1995).

In the past two decades, political behavioral scholars started to explore and examine the political participation in non-democratic countries. Foremost, the scholars attempted to find out whether there existed genuine and meaningful individual participation in politics in the non-democratic countries, and series of influential studies on political participation in the former Soviet Union and communist China had noted that there were non-trivial forms of political participation of individual citizens to vie for various sociopolitical interests in non-democratic systems (Little 1976; Hough 1976; Friedgut 1979; Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; O'Brien and Li 2001). The question of political participation in non-democratic systems still persists: if there is real and non-trivial political participation in an authoritarian regime, then what factors determine citizens' political participation in non-democratic countries? In other word, students of political behavioral studies are interested in who participate more in politics in non-democracies and what the motivational mechanism of citizens' participation is.

Building on the political participation researches in democratic countries, recent studies on individual participation in non-democratic countries found that individual resources such as citizens' education, income, gender and age, and individual psychological engagement in politics such as one's political interest and political efficacy, are important determining factors that will strongly affect the level and variety of citizens' participation in non-democratic countries (Bahry and Silver's 1990; McAllister and White 1994; Jennings 1997; Shi 1998; Tong 2003). These scholarly works built important cornerstones for studies of motivational mechanism of citizens' political participation in non-democratic regimes, and they also served to bridge the research and literature on citizens' political participation in democracies and non-democracies.

However, so far few studies on political participation in non-democracies have systematically explored the influence of social contexts in mobilizing and influencing participation in non-democracies, although that the influence of social contexts on political participation in democracies is a widely researched and remarkably fruitful field in political behavioral studies. Prominent scholarly works long noted that social contexts provide important socializing and mobilizing environments that affect opportunities and decisions of individual citizens to participate in politics (Huckfeldt 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Oliver 2001; Plutzer 2002; Mutz and Mondak 2006). Neighborhoods, families, churches, workplaces have all been found to have an important and non-negligible influence that affects individual citizens' political participation in political affairs.

The importance of social contexts particularly the significance of grassroots sociopolitical institutions in authoritarian regimes, was also well documented in the

theoretical studies on state-society relationship and political participation in non-democratic countries. Allardt (1961) noted the “totalitarian populist” nature of the Soviet society, as the Communist state had strict control and all-inclusive ideologies to guide local institutions and political participation forms, and local institutions tended to mobilize local residents to an extensive extent. Hough (1977) also noted the “institutional pluralism” political structure in the communist USSR, and instead of going through any interest groups, citizens’ interests were articulated through formalized institutional channels. Similarly, Walder (1986) pointed out that the work units were defining systems in urban China that ensured social and political control on the society and exerted significant influence on citizens’ political attitude and behavior. Social contexts, particularly the grassroots sociopolitical institutions were documented in theoretical literature to play an important role affecting and shaping citizens’ political behaviors in authoritarian regimes.

In this study, we attempt to empirically test this paradigm of social context and citizens’ political participation in non-democracies. The case we employed is contemporary China from 1993 to 2002, the urban areas particularly, and the social context that we focused on is the Chinese work units system.

We examined Chinese citizens’ political participation within and outside the work units, and the empirical analysis provided evidence pointing the workplaces exerted a significant effect in motivating and mobilizing citizens’ political participation in urban China in 1993, and the effect of the political organization inside the work unit was comparable to being a party member in encouraging citizens’ political participation. As

the previous literature noted, local sociopolitical institutions in the authoritarian regime channeled and mobilized citizens' political participation to a significant extent.

Why do local institutions in an authoritarian regime have such a strong influence on citizens' political participation in non-democratic countries? In the attempt to address this question, our analysis moves to the state-society relationship in non-democratic regimes.

Although the research on political behavior is a prominent and distinctive field in contemporary political studies, the question of individual political behavior is never an isolated phenomenon in the society. On the contrary, the behavioral pattern of individual citizens, as how citizens are engaged with sociopolitical affairs and how much citizens are engaged in politics, is always embedded in the political structure and state-society relationship of a particular society. In democratic nations, citizens are encouraged to participate in politics at various levels to compete for high and low political interests, ranging from the national offices or local school boards, and citizens in democracies are allowed for the freedom to choose to participate or not. In absence of close state's supervision on individual citizens, the grassroots sociopolitical environments, such as neighborhoods and churches, tend to facilitate citizens' opportunities and capabilities to engage in politics instead of enforcing citizens to do so. At the same time, with the emphasis on economic efficiency and protection of private resources, individual citizens with more resources are empirically known to be more active and influential in politics. In short, individual political behaviors in the democratic society is not only related to individuals' choices as whether one would participate or not, but also is closely connected with nature of the regime and the state-society relationship of the country.

This is also true for citizens' political participation in non-democratic regimes.

As the previous literature on communist and the empirical analysis of this study noted, local sociopolitical institutions exert critical influence in facilitating and mobilizing citizens' political participation in the authoritarian regime. The influence of the grassroots institutions on citizens' political behavior is not merely accidental but rather the outcome of astringent and comprehensive state's control on individuals citizens implemented through the local sociopolitical institutes.

The state of a communist regime has a comprehensive and close control over individual citizens in various aspects of citizens' everyday life, and one of the most important local institutions that help realize the state's control is the urban unit system. Work units, especially the work units before the late 1990s, were in charge of diverse interests and resources of citizens' everyday life. These included citizens' salaries, bonuses, health benefits, housing options, political dossiers, citizens' rights to travel, rights to migrate, family practice, etc. Given the heavy dependence of individual citizens on the work units, the socioeconomic well being of each employee was closely connected with their performance in the unit and their political attitudes and behaviors in the unit. With the resources and civil authority vested from the state, Chinese urban work units exerted close supervision over individual citizens in terms of industrious performance and political "*biaoxian*", and the workplace was found to carry a significant effect in mobilizing and determining citizens' political behavior within and outside the work unit. In sum, it was through the control of work units that state maintained close supervision over individual citizens, and it is with the state's infiltration into society that work units played a key role in mobilizing and motivating citizens' participation in urban China.

Previous studies on the transformation of state-society relationship in post-communist regimes have largely focused on the state and individual citizens, and the meso level sociopolitical institutions only received scarce attention. In this study, the focus of our analysis is chiefly on the grassroots sociopolitical institutions in the authoritarian regime, as the local institution provided key connection between the state and individual citizens. Through examining the meso level social institutions, we would be able to obtain further understanding about the relationship between the state and civil society of urban China.

Since the state, sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are closely interrelated in an authoritarian regime and the meso level political institutions provide critical context for the state to engage with individual citizens, the changes at the meso level institutions may also imply the relationship shift between the state and individual citizens. In the past twenty years, Chinese urban work units have gone through comprehensive and dramatic sociopolitical changes in the economic reform, which have significantly altered the relationship between work units and urban residents. Nowadays, Chinese urban citizens do not depend on their work units to reimburse their prepaid medical bills; retired employees do not depend on the work units for their monthly pension, and urban citizens do not need to wait for the unit to assign them housing option while all they need to do to improve their housing condition is to choose and purchase the apartment on the market. Chinese urban citizens do not have political studies to attend every Wednesday afternoon, and they do not have to worry about their political dossier if they ever intend to find the employment with national or foreign enterprises. Moreover, Chinese urban citizens do not need the endorsement and approval forms from their work

units to travel abroad or register for marriage. In short, Chinese urban units have shed off most its multi-functionalities up till 2000s, and work units started to establish relationships with individual citizens based on sole employment relationships. The urban work units are withdrawing from the daily life of Chinese urban residents overall.

The transformation that the work units have been experiencing in the past decade reflects an overall retreat of the state from Chinese urban life. Once again, the changes at the meso level institutions point to the relationship shift between the macro state and micro level individuals. Previously, the urban residents depended heavily on their work units for their everyday living material, and the urban employees would need to exhibit appropriate political attitudes and behaviors in the units to acquire everyday economic and social interests, such as to attend political studies and keep a clean “political history”. The state exercised close supervision and control over individual citizens through the work unit. However, with the economic, social and political dependency of individual citizens on workplaces decreasing sharply in the past decade, the control of the communist state on its citizens has also been disappearing gradually. Instead of maintaining its control over individual residents through the workplace, the state established individual account for every urban citizen for their health benefit and pension, disregarding their employment type or status. The state does not require that every urban citizen be tagged with the political dossier in order to get employed or be able to transfer to another unit. The state now permits individual citizens to sue the state if the state is considered to have violated individuals’ interests and rights. The state has withdrawn from the realms of urban individuals’ civil liberties, such as traveling overseas and

migration. While some civil affairs are still subject to the state's control, these controls are mainly resulted from domestic geographic concern rather than pure political concerns.

Since China decided to initiate its open-door policy and economic reform under the rule of Deng Xiaoping, China has been experiencing dramatic economic development in the past few decades. The economic achievement has changed China's status and role in the international world, but more importantly, Chinese economic development has significantly improved the living conditions of average Chinese citizens, the development also brought drastic changes to Chinese state-society relationship.

Since China started its economic reform in 1978, the country has enjoyed rapid development rate and accumulated tremendous national wealth. Compared to 1978, China's national GDP has increased by 12.1 times by 2000, and was ranked the 7th largest economy in the world. Taking into consideration of inflation factors, the average growth rate of the GDP has been about 9.5% from 1978 to 2000. Also, Chinese population under the poverty line has decreased from 250 million in 1978 to less than 30 million in 2000. The average yearly income of Chinese urban households has increased from 400 RMB (less than 50 US dollars) in 1978 to more than 10,000 RMB (more than 1,250 US dollars) in 2000. The foreign investments that flowed into China increased from 12.46 billions US dollars in 1983 to 506.46 billion dollars in 2000 (*Economic Daily*, 2006 June). In short, during its economic reform in the past two decades, China has been experiencing remarkable changes in the economic realm.

The economic development and accumulated national wealth are not isolated social phenomena, and their effect is to be rippled to other sociopolitical realms in the country. Political studies on economic development and transition of the regimes have

long noted that stable economic development is essential to the burgeoning, formation and stability of political liberalization and democracy. As Lipset (1959) argued that: “thus we have an interrelated cluster of economic development, Protestantism, monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy and democracy; men may argue as to whether any aspect of this cluster is primary, but the cluster of factors and forces hangs together” (59). Dahl (1989) also noted that the increasing economic benefits to the masses intensified public demand for democracy, as economic development spreads authority and democratic aspirations across a variety of people, which fosters political liberalization and democracy. Employing the pooled time series analysis of 131 nation-states from 1972 to 1989, Burkhart and Lewis-beck (1994) tested whether economic development causes democratic development, and they found that the nation’s economic development substantially improves its democratic prospect, with the causal arrow most probably running from economic development to democracy instead of vice versa. As argued in the previous literature, the national economic development is not an isolated social phenomenon, and rather it is closely tied to the changes of the sociopolitical structure within a nation. With stable, rapid and continuous economic development, the prospect of democratization or liberalization is significantly improving for the authoritarian regime. Although the key theoretical concern of this study is citizens’ political behavior within a non-democratic system, we found that citizens’ behavioral pattern is nevertheless closely associated with the state-society relationship of a particular nation. As Chinese urban citizens’ participation in politics was document to exhibit variations in both participation intensity and participation mechanism from 1993 to 2002, we are further interested in

whether and how the state-society relationship has been going through transformation in urban China.

Combining the quantitative and qualitative analyses addressed in the previous chapters, we conclude that Chinese state-society relationship is going through important and non-negligible liberalization during China's fast economic development in the past decades. This political liberalization was especially embodied in the withdrawal of the state's control from Chinese civil affairs and more freedom granted to Chinese urban citizens in economic, social and political realms.

To address how has Chinese state shifted its connection with the society and liberalized its attachment with individual citizens, we speculated the following linkages that may help us further understand the state-society relationship shift in contemporary China.

First, since the CCP government shifted its policy emphasis from adhering closely to the communist ideology to attaining rapid economic development, the communist ideology has been gradually toned down in China since the 1980s, which releases the control of the state over individual citizens.

In Mao's era, the Chinese state placed top priority in its political agenda to advocate the communist ideology within the country. Such zeal studying the communism and Mao's thoughts peaked during the Cultural Revolution, when the whole nation was required to focus on "class struggle" and condemn "capital routers" in the country. Urban employees were organized to study Mao's teachings and state's policy at the political study sessions several times a week. Economically, the state mainly focused on the purity of the "socialist economy" and economic equality among citizens. One famous saying in

the Cultural Revolution went that “the socialist weeds are better than capitalist seedlings”. After the Cultural Revolution finished in 1976, China recovered from its national fever to pursue utter communism and shifted policy priority to practical economic development. Economically, the national emphasis turned from economic equality to economic efficiency, and “some people in the nation are allowed to get rich first”. One saying of Mr. Deng Xiaoping that “communism is no poverty” was widely spread in the country. Along with upholding economic development as the national priority is the toning down of communist ideology. Chinese state started to encourage the establishment of private and foreign businesses in the country, which are regarded as healthy complement to the “socialist economy”. Political correctness is no longer the key element in judging whether or not a business interest is appropriate and acceptable, and political correctness was toned down in evaluating citizens’ performance. Urban residents were no longer constantly required to exhibit desired political attitudes and behaviors in order to ensure their socioeconomic interests in the work unit. In other word, as the communist China shifted its national priority from ideological correctness to economic development, the state relented its control over ideological unity and individual citizens were no longer required to tally their political attitude and behavior along with the state’s standing point. At the same time, urged by the need to maintain economic gains, the state granted more economic rights and sociopolitical rights to urban residents, such as permitting citizens to own their own businesses and encouraging citizens to establish personal properties. Instead of being subject to astringent political control from the state socially and mentally, Chinese urban citizens are granted with more civil rights and liberties than ever since the

founding of China, as the communist China decided to tone down its ideological control and strive for economic development full speed.

Second, in order to facilitate economic exchange and growth, China started to establish the market economy to replace the “planned economy” in the mid-1980s, and the role of the state shifted from the previous market distributor in the planning economy to the market regulator and market arbitrator. This further deduced the economic dependence of Chinese urban citizens on the state, and it propels the state to establish relationship with individual citizens within a legal frame.

Within the planned economy, the role of the communist state was responsible to dispense economic goods to the national population, and work units played the key role to distribute nationally regulated income, health benefits, pension, housing options to Chinese urban citizens. However, although the planning economy well ensured citizens’ economic security and equality, it severely impeded the accumulation of national wealth by suppressing open competition and individual economic incentives. As China initiated its economic reform in the 1980s, one important goal of the reform was to build up “socialist market economy” to facilitate economic exchanges and development.

Once being the source and distributor of the planned economy, Chinese government started to gradually adjust its role from the market distributor to market arbitrator by taking measures to privatize state’s owned enterprises, allowing the development of foreign enterprise and private enterprises, and supplying standard rules to regulate the performances and behaviors of state-owned, foreign, collective, private enterprises, etc. All in all, instead of assuming its control and responsibility of the economy, the state has

become an equal party in the market and shifted its role to market regulator to facilitate effective economic development.

While this change of the state's role has significantly boosted the economic opportunities of the nation institutionally, it has been detrimental to the state's authority in the market and further reduced the dependency of individual citizens on the state. For example, while previously Chinese urban citizens had to wait for their housing options in the work unit and their housing assignment heavily depended on their "appropriate" political attitude and behaviors, nowadays Chinese citizens no longer need to behave in accordance with the state's requirement to obtain everyday living essential, and they will purchase housing openly on the market as long as they can afford them. As the state shifted its role from resources distributor to market regulator, its control over individual citizens have also been severely reduced, and sequentially the civil society is allowed more freedom in the economic, social and political realms.

Finally, the rapid economic development China has been experiencing in the past decade leads to the emergence of new social cleavages in the society, and in order to maintain stable political configuration and long-term economic development, the state was obligated to respond and incorporate the voices and demands of the new social cleavages, which leads to further political liberalization in urban China.

As Chinese state shifted its policy priority from economic equality to economic efficiency, a considerable proportion of the population "became rich first" through raising up one's own businesses and working for foreign and private enterprises. While prior to the reform Chinese urban population was largely homogeneous in their economic status, now the economic disparities among urban residents become increasingly substantial.

This economic classification leads to the emergence of social cleavages in urban China. With China's economic reform accelerating in the past decade, new social cleavages have turned out to be a major characteristic of contemporary Chinese society.

In its effort to incorporate different political demands of various groups, Chinese state is liberalizing its relationship with the civil society in the past decade and grants generous political freedom to the emerging new social class in the recent years, such as allowing more freedom of expression at the grassroots level. Nowadays Chinese citizens may openly challenge many aspects of government policies, even CCP's basic developmental strategies included. One example is that when the CCP government introduced its tax reforms in 1993, prominent China scholars Angang Hu and Shaoguang Wang published their book challenging the particular reform measures chosen by the state, and in 1995 when the state indulged itself with the high growth rates and advocated the growth would eventually resolve all problems facing China, the two published another book challenging the rational of such state's policies.

In sum, during the economic reform and economic development in the past decades, Chinese state has chosen to and been compelled to release its control over the citizens and liberalize its relationship with society. This was exhibited in the empirical analysis of this study, and it was also documented in the survey data collected in urban China.

The following data were collected in 2002 summer as part of Asian Barometer Survey, and when asked of their impression of the government performances of the year 2001 as compared to 1979, the interviewed urban respondents gave responses presented below. The interview data clearly demonstrate that the majority residents felt the civil

liberties in the urban setting improved dramatically in China, such as religious freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of residence and freedom of association. At the same time, while an overwhelming majority of urban residents agreed on the positive economic development from 1979 to 2002, a substantial proportion of the citizens felt that economic inequality had deteriorated since 1979.

Table 26. Perception of Performance of the Current State as Compared to That of 1979

	Better	No Change	Worse	B-W
Civil Liberty				
Freedom of Expression	86.2% (1,350)	10.0% (157)	3.8% (59)	82.4%
Freedom of Residence	88.8% (1,373)	9.2% (142)	2.0% (32)	86.8%
Freedom of Religion	78.6% (1,043)	19.6% (260)	1.8% (24)	76.8%
Freedom of Association	74.5 (926)	21.6% (269)	3.9% (48)	70.6%
Economic Performance				
Economic Development	96.8% (1,620)	0.8% (14)	2.3% (39)	94.5%
Inequality	10.6% (175)	2.2% (36)	87.3% (1,445)	-76.7%
Social Order				
Public Security	32.7% (541)	4.3% (71)	63.0% (1040)	-30.3%

Source: 2002 Mainland China Survey

Note: Entries in parentheses are the number of observations.

Future Studies

Before closing the study, we would like to briefly address the areas that future researches might be interested to explore regarding political participation in non-democratic regimes and state-society relationship shift of the authoritarian regime.

First, future studies are demanded to explore the nature of citizens' political participation in the non-democratic regime during the economic development. As the

previous studies on the political participation in non-democracies noted that the stakes for the participation in non-democracies mainly concentrate on the low-end political interests, such as everyday living materials, and very few participation forms were able to reach the “high-end” political interests, such as policy formation and implementation. With the liberalizing state-society relationship that the authoritarian regime has been experiencing in economic development, future studies could be delved into inquiring whether the nature of political participation has shifted to the “high end” along with the altered sociopolitical structure. The question that the research would be asking is that along with the rapid economic development and liberalized state-society relationship, whether or not individual citizens of an authoritarian regime are able to gain higher level access into political affairs.

Moreover, future studies would be devoted to compare the political participation mechanisms in contemporary China to other types of the regimes and examine how individual resources may affect citizens’ choice and capabilities to participate in politics. As the empirical analysis of this study noted, citizens’ individual resources are playing an increasingly prominent role in mobilizing citizens’ political participation in contemporary urban China. Following this initial finding, future studies may be comparing the influence of individual resources on citizens’ political participation in contemporary China and in democratic countries. These studies would hopefully shed light on answering the question as whether and to what extent that individual resources may affect citizens’ opportunities to participate in politics across different types of political settings.

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APPENDIX A

Appendix A: Profession and Positions

Occupation	Position	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
unemployed	0	6	0.56	0.56
sci-tech staff	1	2	0.19	0.75
civil engineer	3	29	2.71	3.46
agric-forestry tech staff	2	4	0.37	3.83
sci-tech manager/staff	3	11	1.03	4.86
medical/health staff	2	28	2.62	7.48
economic/acctg staff	2	67	6.26	13.74
legal staff	2	6	0.56	14.3
teacher	3	61	5.7	20
cultural staff	2	2	0.19	20.19
student	0	11	1.03	21.21
military personnel	2	3	0.28	21.5
government office senior official	4	7	0.65	22.15
party/mass org senior official	4	9	0.84	22.99
enterprise/org senior official	4	11	1.03	24.02
orgztn basic official	2	12	1.12	25.14
pre-49 official/gentry	4	1	0.09	25.23
admin staff	2	33	3.08	28.32
political/security staff	2	29	2.71	31.03
post/telegraph staff	2	4	0.37	31.4
township cadre	3	6	0.56	31.96
village cadre	3	2	0.19	32.15
other office staff	2	10	0.93	33.08
sales clerk	2	43	4.02	37.1
purchasing/sales agent	2	27	2.52	39.63
individual ind/commerce	4	37	3.46	43.08
private enterprise owner	4	5	0.47	43.55
foreign/private enterprise mgr	3	1	0.09	43.64
other commercial staff	2	11	1.03	44.67
service worker	1	19	1.78	46.45
cook or kitchen staff	1	13	1.21	47.66
housewife	0	52	4.86	52.52

Occupation (Appendix A continued)

other service trades	1	33	3.08	55.61
state farm worker	1	5	0.47	56.07
agr/forestry laborer	1	12	1.12	57.2
part agr/part other	1	2	0.19	57.38
fishery laborer	1	4	0.37	57.76
agr sideline producer	1	1	0.09	57.85
tve cadre	2	3	0.28	58.13
tve worker	1	1	0.09	58.22
enterprise foreman	3	32	2.99	61.21
mine/salt/other worker	1	17	1.59	62.8
metal processing worker	1	12	1.12	63.93
chemical worker	1	10	0.93	64.86
rubber/plastics worker	1	7	0.65	65.51
textile/embroid/dye worker	1	22	2.06	67.57
leather worker	1	1	0.09	67.66
garment industry worker	1	17	1.59	69.25
food/drink worker	1	7	0.65	69.91
tobacco worker	1	2	0.19	70.09
wood/bamboo/hemp/other worker	1	11	1.03	71.12
tool/machinetool maker/operator	1	36	3.36	74.49
machinery/instrument maker	1	12	1.12	75.61
electrician	1	44	4.11	79.72
plumber/welder/metal worker	1	13	1.21	80.93
glass/ceramics/enamel worker	1	8	0.75	81.68
painter	1	6	0.56	82.24
other production worker/staff	1	81	7.57	89.81
construction worker	1	14	1.31	91.12
crane operator	1	6	0.56	91.68
loader	1	16	1.5	93.18
transport equip operator	1	41	3.83	97.01
inspector	3	24	2.24	99.25
not applicable or no answer	.	8	0.74	100

APPENDIX B

Table B-1. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993

Participation Variables	Factor Loadings				
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
1. Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.21	-0.27	0.3	0.04	0.05
2. Voting in the work unit	0.17	-0.26	0.29	0.13	0.19
3. Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.39	-0.35	0.31	0.06	-0.13
4. Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.55	-0.23	-0.04	-0.25	-0.23
5. Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.55	-0.22	-0.11	-0.24	-0.19
6. Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.39	-0.35	0.24	0.21	0.02
7. Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.56	-0.22	-0.17	-0.11	0.24
8. Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.51	-0.23	-0.22	-0.12	0.29
9. Express to the leaders directly	0.45	0.31	-0.12	0.19	0.03
10. Ask other leaders to intervene	0.39	0.46	-0.04	0.07	0.08
11. Complain through hierarchy	0.49	0.23	-0.14	0.21	-0.12
12. Complain through workers' union	0.39	0.06	-0.14	0.22	-0.12
13. Ask others to persuade the leader	0.34	0.49	0.15	-0.08	0.09
14. Wrote to government offices	0.3	0.21	0.02	0.19	-0.08
15. Help from official's friends	0.26	0.46	0.24	-0.2	0.04
16. Gifts and dinner	0.14	0.43	0.3	-0.2	-0.04
Variance Proportion	0.57	0.36	0.14	0.1	0.08
Eigenvalue	2.6	1.62	0.65	0.47	0.34

Table B-2. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993

Participation Variables	Eigenvector				
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5
1. Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.13	-0.24	0.42	0.12	0.12
2. Voting in the work unit	0.11	-0.23	0.41	0.25	0.41
3. Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.24	-0.28	0.30	0.06	-0.34
4. Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.33	-0.18	-0.06	-0.33	-0.34
5. Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.33	-0.17	-0.13	-0.32	-0.24
6. Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.24	-0.28	0.22	0.25	-0.07
7. Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.34	-0.17	-0.17	-0.22	0.34
8. Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.31	-0.18	-0.22	-0.24	0.43
9. Express to the leaders directly	0.29	0.23	-0.15	0.23	0.17
10. Ask other leaders to intervene	0.25	0.34	-0.03	0.07	0.22
11. Complain through hierarchy	0.31	0.17	-0.20	0.28	-0.16
12. Complain through workers' union	0.26	0.04	-0.24	0.34	-0.20
13. Ask others to persuade the leader	0.21	0.37	0.19	-0.12	0.15
14. Wrote to government offices	0.20	0.17	0.01	0.38	-0.17
15. Help from official's friends	0.17	0.35	0.32	-0.26	-0.02
16. Gifts and dinner	0.09	0.34	0.40	-0.26	-0.17
Variance Proportion	0.21	0.15	0.09	0.07	0.06
Eigenvalue	3.28	2.33	1.39	1.19	1.03

Table B-3. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993

Participation Variables	Factor Loadings				
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
1. Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.15	-0.27	0.30	0.21	0.00
2. Voting in the work unit	0.17	-0.30	0.26	0.17	0.08
3. Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.47	-0.34	0.31	0.07	-0.03
4. Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.58	-0.22	0.00	-0.25	-0.23
5. Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.59	-0.18	-0.07	-0.24	-0.21
6. Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.41	-0.35	0.17	0.13	0.11
7. Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.54	-0.20	-0.17	-0.11	0.26
8. Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.49	-0.15	-0.21	-0.19	0.27
9. Express to the leaders directly	0.44	0.35	-0.10	0.21	0.04
10. Ask other leaders to intervene	0.37	0.48	-0.04	0.09	0.09
11. Complain through hierarchy	0.49	0.21	-0.16	0.25	-0.14
12. Complain through workers' union	0.37	0.02	-0.15	0.18	-0.15
13. Ask others to persuade the leader	0.32	0.51	0.16	-0.03	0.13
14. Wrote to government offices	0.28	0.22	-0.08	0.18	-0.08
15. Help from official's friends	0.19	0.48	0.31	-0.18	0.00
16. Gifts and dinner	0.12	0.40	0.30	-0.20	-0.04
Variance Proportion	0.58	0.37	0.14	0.11	0.07
Eigenvalue	2.59	1.65	0.64	0.51	0.33

Table B-4. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993

Participation Variables	Eigenvector				
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5
1. Voting in the 1992 PC Election	0.10	-0.23	0.42	0.34	0.02
2. Voting in the work unit	0.11	-0.26	0.37	0.27	0.21
3. Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v.	0.28	-0.27	0.32	0.03	-0.10
4. Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v.	0.35	-0.16	-0.01	-0.29	-0.40
5. Recommend candidates when asked in c.v.	0.35	-0.14	-0.09	-0.29	-0.34
6. Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v.	0.25	-0.28	0.17	0.09	0.17
7. Nominate candidates in work units in w.v.	0.33	-0.16	-0.18	-0.21	0.37
8. Recommend candidates when asked in w.v.	0.30	-0.12	-0.22	-0.32	0.40
9. Express to the leaders directly	0.28	0.26	-0.11	0.26	0.18
10. Ask other leaders to intervene	0.24	0.36	-0.03	0.09	0.25
11. Complain through hierarchy	0.31	0.15	-0.20	0.34	-0.17
12. Complain through workers' union	0.24	0.01	-0.23	0.29	-0.30
13. Ask others to persuade the leader	0.20	0.38	0.21	-0.06	0.24
14. Wrote to government offices	0.19	0.18	-0.11	0.31	-0.17
15. Help from official's friends	0.12	0.37	0.39	-0.22	-0.07
16. Gifts and dinner	0.08	0.32	0.40	-0.26	-0.20
Variance Proportion	0.20	0.15	0.09	0.08	0.06
Eigenvalue	3.27	2.36	1.39	1.24	1.01

Table B-5 Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002

Participation Variable	Factor Loadings			
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4
Voting in the PC Election	0.28	0.30	0.27	0.07
Voting in the work unit	0.29	0.43	0.24	-0.01
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.42	0.38	0.14	-0.02
Nominate candidates in work units	0.40	0.30	-0.38	0.00
Recommend candidates when asked	0.47	0.34	-0.30	-0.06
Express to the leaders directly	0.52	-0.20	0.15	-0.05
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.49	-0.26	0.05	-0.21
Complain through hierarchy	0.55	-0.30	0.02	0.13
Complained through workers' union	0.43	-0.12	0.01	0.17
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.33	-0.28	-0.01	-0.20
Wrote to government offices	0.38	-0.28	-0.09	0.19
Variance Proportion	0.78	0.40	0.17	0.07
Eigenvalue	1.96	1.00	0.42	0.18

Table B-6. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002

Participation Variable	Eigenvector			
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4
Voting in the PC Election	0.21	0.34	0.44	-0.18
Voting in the work unit	0.21	0.45	0.33	0.05
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.30	0.39	0.16	0.08
Nominate candidates in work units	0.28	0.27	-0.60	0.01
Recommend candidates when asked	0.32	0.31	-0.47	0.12
Express to the leaders directly	0.37	-0.18	0.24	0.09
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.35	-0.25	0.10	0.43
Complain through hierarchy	0.38	-0.27	0.05	-0.24
Complained through workers' union	0.32	-0.12	0.02	-0.42
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.25	-0.30	0.01	0.55
Wrote to government offices	0.28	-0.29	-0.13	-0.47
Variance Proportion	0.25	0.16	0.11	0.09
Eigenvalue	2.72	1.77	1.17	0.98

Table B-7. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts in 2002

Participation Variable	Factor Loadings				Uniqueness
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	
Voting in the PC Election	0.30	0.28	0.33	0.02	0.72
Voting in the work unit	0.33	0.40	0.26	-0.02	0.67
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.44	0.31	0.12	-0.01	0.70
Nominate candidates in work units	0.43	0.33	-0.36	0.07	0.57
Recommend candidates when asked	0.49	0.39	-0.27	-0.04	0.53
Express to the leaders directly	0.50	-0.24	0.09	-0.08	0.68
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.50	-0.25	-0.04	-0.22	0.64
Complain through hierarchy	0.53	-0.34	0.03	0.13	0.58
Complained through workers' union	0.41	-0.16	0.08	0.16	0.77
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.34	-0.27	-0.03	-0.21	0.77
Wrote to government offices	0.37	-0.29	-0.05	0.21	0.73
Variance Proportion	0.77	0.39	0.16	0.07	
Eigenvalue	2.01	1.02	0.41	0.19	

Table B-8 Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002

Participation Variable	Eigenvector			
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4
Voting in the PC Election	0.22	0.32	0.53	0.02
Voting in the work unit	0.23	0.43	0.34	-0.06
Attend meetings that brief candidates	0.31	0.34	0.11	-0.05
Nominate candidates in work units	0.29	0.30	-0.58	0.14
Recommend candidates when asked	0.32	0.35	-0.43	-0.05
Express to the leaders directly	0.35	-0.22	0.16	-0.16
Ask other leaders to intervene	0.35	-0.23	-0.06	-0.43
Complain through hierarchy	0.37	-0.31	0.07	0.23
Complained through workers' union	0.31	-0.16	0.16	0.39
Ask others to persuade the leader	0.25	-0.28	-0.05	-0.55
Wrote to government offices	0.27	-0.29	-0.07	0.51
Variance Proportion	0.25	0.16	0.10	0.09
Eigenvalue	2.76	1.77	1.15	0.98

APPENDIX C

Appendix C-1: Original Analysis of Electoral Participation (2002)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables					
	Voting		Campaigning		Candidate Recruitment	
	Vote in Local Congressional Elections	Vote in the Work Unit Elections	Attended Campaign Meetings in Work Unit	Nominating Candidates in Work Unit	Recommending Candidate in Work Unit	PCA Campaigning and Candidate Recruitment
Workplace	.09** (.04)	-.04(.08)	.07 (.06)	-.11 (.07)	-.01 (.07)	-.04 (.07)
Father's Education	.005 (.01)	-.002 (.02)	.001 (.01)	.03 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>						
Position	.06 (.05)	.2** (.1)	.06 (.07)	.03 (.08)	.17** (.08)	.11 (.08)
Income×10(-3)	.05* (.03)	.17* (.1)	.08** (.04)	.05 (.04)	.07* (.04)	.1** (.04)
Education	.05 (.04)	-.03 (.09)	-.10 (.06)	-.01 (.07)	-.16** (.07)	-.10 (.07)
Self-regarded Economic Status	-.03 (.07)	-.02 (.12)	-.04 (.09)	.02 (.10)	-.02 (.10)	-.002 (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status	-.07 (.07)	.08 (.12)	-.08 (.09)	.09 (.11)	.06 (.11)	-.004 (.10)
Male	-.01 (.1)	-.03 (.18)	-.13 (.13)	-.04 (.16)	.08 (.16)	-.04 (.14)
Age	.11*** (.02)	.11** (.04)	.05 (.05)	.11* (.05)	.09** (.05)	.09** (.04)
Age-squared×10(-3)	-.1*** (.02)	-.11** (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-0.0055	-.1** (.05)	-.09** (.04)
Marital Status	-.04 (.22)	-.46 (.40)	-.03 (.3)	-.45(.37)	-0.2278	-.45 (.32)
Ethnic Background	-.004 (.22)	-.42 (.54)	-.13 (.32)	-.57 (.34)	-.39 (.34)	-0.224
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>						
Party Membership	.11 (.12)	.13 (.22)	.50*** (.15)	.51*** (.18)	.54*** (.18)	.66*** (.17)
Political Interest	.11* (.06)	.15 (.12)	.21** (.09)	.06 (.11)	.18* (.10)	.21** (.10)
Political Knowledge	.11 (.12)	-.30 (.23)	.09 (.16)	-.17 (.21)	-.27 (.20)	-.08 (.18)
Internal Political Efficacy	.20** (.09)	.22 (.17)	.35*** (.12)	.32** (.15)	.63*** (.14)	.61*** (.13)
External Political Efficacy	.02 (.07)	.14 (.17)	.06 (.12)	-.06 (.15)	-.29** (.14)	-.14 (.13)
Government Attitude	.03 (.08)	.01 (.14)	.14 (.11)	.16 (.13)	.06 (.13)	.14 (.11)
Faith in People	.13 (.09)	-.20 (.17)	.25** (.12)	-.03 (.15)	-.03 (.15)	.04 (.14)
_cut1/constant	-3.93*** (.68)	-0.2782	2.6 (1.01)	3.8 (1.4)	3.4 (1.3)	-3.1*** (1.1)
_cut2	/	/	3.1 (1.01)	4.1 (1.4)	3.8 (1.3)	/
_cut3	/	/	4.0 (1.02)	5.2 (1.4)	5.0 (1.3)	/
Number of observations	885	403	372	373	372	370
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared	-561.37438	-159.6056	-454.02431	-257.87376	-278.71675	0.2179
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F	~0	0.02	~0	0.0037	~0	~0

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Appendix C-2. Original Analysis of Non-Electoral Political Participation (2002)

	Dependent Variables					
	Complaining			Official Contacting		
	Expressed opinions directly to the leader	Complained through bureaucratic hierarchy	Complained through the trade union	Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene	Sought help from those who could persuade the leader	Wrote to Government Offices
Workplace	-.007 (.04)	-.03 (.06)	-.07 (.07)	.10** (.06)	-.07 (.05)	-.09 (.08)
Father's Education	.005 (.01)	.02* (.01)	.001 (.02)	.02* (.01)	-.004 (.01)	.004 (.02)
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>						
Position	.003 (.05)	-.007 (.06)	-0.0096	.06 (.06)	.03 (.06)	-.13 (.09)
Income×10(-4)	-.01 (.03)	-.10** (.05)	.01 (.05)	-.09 (.05)	-.02 (.04)	.04 (.05)
Education	-.03 (.04)	.006 (.05)	-.007 (.07)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.06)	.16** (.07)
Self-regarded Economic Status	-.13** (.06)	-.05 (.08)	-.09 (.10)	-.09 (.08)	.20** (.08)	-.01 (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status	-.01 (.06)	.09 (.08)	.001 (.09)	.08 (.08)	.04 (.08)	-.06 (.10)
Male	.22** (.09)	.16 (.12)	-.07 (.15)	-.19 (.12)	.05 (.12)	.12 (.16)
Age	.04* (.02)	.06* (.03)	.01 (.04)	.08** (.03)	.07** (.03)	.03 (.04)
Age-squared×10(-4)	-0.0008	-.05 (.03)	-.007 (.03)	-0.0024	-.08** (.03)	-.005 (.04)
Marital Status	.05 (.20)	-.18 (.27)	.31 (.39)	-.30 (.28)	-.52** (.24)	.17 (.48)
Ethnic Background	.16 (.22)	.26 (.31)	-.14 (.32)	.71** (.36)	.03 (.27)	-.34 (.34)
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>						
Party Membership	.09 (.10)	.21* (.13)	.24 (.16)	.12 (.13)	-.11 (.14)	-.07 (.18)
Political Interest	.19*** (.06)	.12 (.08)	.24** (.10)	.32*** (.08)	.22*** (.08)	.25** (.11)
Political Knowledge	.13 (.11)	.26 (.17)	.18 (.19)	.13 (.16)	.18 (.15)	.15 (.23)
Internal Political Efficacy	.13* (.08)	.13 (.11)	.27** (.13)	.17* (.10)	.04 (.11)	.02 (.15)
External Political Efficacy	.09 (.09)	.24** (.10)	.14 (.13)	.23** (.10)	.14 (.10)	.10 (.14)
Government Attitude	-.09 (.07)	-.08 (.10)	.02 (.12)	.16 (.10)	.18* (.10)	-.10 (.14)
Faith in People	-.04 (.09)	.08 (.12)	.03 (.14)	.08 (.11)	-.04 (.11)	-.03 (.16)
_cut1/ constant	2.0 (.62)	4.3 (.90)	3.2 (1.0)	6.0 (.94)	4.2 (.89)	3.5 (1.2)
_cut2	2.4 (.62)	4.6 (.90)	3.5 (1.0)	6.5 (.94)	4.7 (.89)	3.8 (1.2)
_cut3	3.3 (.63)	5.3 (.90)	4.3 (1.1)	7.4 (.96)	5.4 (.90)	4.3 (1.2)
Number of observations	891	891	889	890	891	891
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared	-943.54042	-429.1985	-266.42575	-423.88558	-430.18024	-218.22448
Prob > Chi 2 / Prob > F	~0	0.0004	0.1228	~0	0.004	0.0065

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Appendix C-3. Original Analysis of Electoral Participation (1993)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	Voting		Campaigning		Candidate Recruitment			
	Vote in Congressional Elections	Vote in Work Unit Elections	Attended Campaign Meetings in C. V.	Attended Campaign Meetings in W. V.	Nominating Candidate in C.V.	Recommending Candidate in C.V.	Nominating Candidates in W.V.	Recommending Candidate in W.V.
Workplace	.16* (.10)	.23 (.15)	.05 (.07)	-.11 (.09)	.05 (.11)	.04 (.10)	.21** (.10)	.15 (.10)
Political Organization	.31* (.16)	.49** (.25)	.11 (.13)	.27* (.14)	-.22 (.21)	.36 (.24)	.09 (.16)	.33* (.17)
Father's Party Membership	-.24 (.18)	-.37 (.23)	.19 (.13)	.15 (.14)	-.01 (.21)	-.40 (.25)	-.08 (.16)	-.37** (.17)
Father's Education	-0.004	-.06 (.07)	.08** (.04)	-.10** (.04)	-.15** (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-0.0045	-0.005
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>								
Position	-.12 (.10)	-.04 (.14)	.12 (.07)	.12 (.08)	.07 (.11)	.24** (.11)	.10 (.09)	.15 (.10)
Income×10(-4)	-1.33 (.92)	.89 (2.2)	-1.4 (0.84)	.22 (.92)	.19 (1.1)	.40 (1.1)	.9 (1.0)	.10 (1.2)
Education	-.08 (.08)	.05 (.14)	-0.02 (0.06)	.05 (.07)	-.05 (.09)	-.07 (.10)	-.03 (.08)	.04 (.08)
Self-regarded Economic Status	-0.0209	.09 (.15)	.22** (.08)	.17* (.09)	.19 (.12)	.12 (.12)	.28*** (.10)	.18* (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status	.10 (.11)	.05 (.16)	.08 (.08)	.01 (.08)	.18 (.12)	.14 (.12)	.05 (.10)	.09 (.10)
Male	-.09 (.16)	.04 (.24)	-.12 (.12)	-.1 (.13)	.006 (.19)	.25 (.21)	-.005 (.15)	.18 (.15)
Age	.09** (.04)	.03 (.10)	.03 (.03)	.04 (.04)	-.11** (.05)	-.07 (.05)	-.05 (.15)	-0.0032
Age-squared×10(-4)	-43.7472	1.56 (13.8)	-1.99 (3.62)	-3.6 (4.3)	11.8** (5.22)	7.83 (5.2)	6.67 (5.13)	10.4** (5.1)
Marital Status	-.05 (.23)	.33 (.31)	.17 (.17)	-.19 (.19)	.25 (.28)	.15 (.28)	.03 (.21)	.01 (.22)
Ethnic Background	.49 (.35)	-.33 (.55)	-.36 (.30)	-0.1595	-.56 (.43)	-.50 (.46)	-.24 (.32)	-.27 (.33)
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>								
Party Membership	-.036 (.23)	.24 (.39)	.25* (.15)	.27* (.16)	.81*** (.21)	.48** (.21)	.64*** (.18)	.55*** (.18)
Political Interest	.17** (.07)	-.09 (.10)	.02 (.05)	.07 (.06)	.03 (.09)	-.03 (.10)	-.08 (.06)	-.09 (.07)
Political Knowledge	-.13 (.17)	.07 (.24)	-.03 (.13)	.04 (.14)	.32 (.20)	.27 (.20)	-.05 (.16)	.07 (.16)
Internal Political Efficacy	.11 (.17)	.10 (.20)	.17 (.12)	.25** (.11)	.40** (.17)	.54*** (.18)	.28** (.12)	.27** (.13)
External Political Efficacy	.28* (.15)	-.28 (.21)	.17 (.11)	.01 (.11)	-.004 (.16)	.15 (.17)	.27** (.13)	.20 (.14)
Government Attitude	-0.08 (0.17)	.19 (.23)	.35*** (.13)	.40*** (.14)	.10 (.19)	.39* (.21)	-.15 (.15)	.07 (.16)
Faith in People	-.05 (.15)	.16 (.23)	.13 (.11)	.07 (.12)	-.05 (.17)	.07 (.18)	-.10 (.14)	.04 (.14)
_cut1/ constant	-1.97 (1.30)	-1.22 (2.25)	3.4 (.97)	2.7 (1.1)	.71 (1.4)	3.96 (1.4)	1.8 (1.2)	1.7 (1.2)
_cut2	/	/	3.8 (.97)	3.2 (1.1)	1.0 (1.4)	4.3 (1.4)	2.2 (1.2)	2.1 (1.2)
_cut3	/	/	4.9 (.98)	4.3 (1.1)	2.3 (1.4)	5.5 (1.5)	3.5 (1.2)	3.5 (1.2)
Number of observations	486	368	447	380	472	472	380	360
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared	-178.33	-89.695264	-509.9	-461.389	-198.506	-190.452	-334.088	-299.62403
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F	0.0001	0.0034	~0	~0	0.0001	~0	~0	~0

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.
 † P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Appendix C-4: Original Analysis of Non-Electoral Participation (1993)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	Complaining			Official Contacting				
	Complained through the bureaucratic hierarchy	Complained through the trade union	Expressed opinions directly to the leader	Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene	Sought help from those who could persuade the leader	Wrote letter to government offices	Seeking help from official's friends	Sent gifts or invited leader to dinner
Workplace	.12 (.08)	-.06 (.10)	.05** (.07)	.03 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.01 (.12)	-.06 (.11)	-.12 (.12)
Political Organization	.35** (.16)	.17 (.19)	.02 (.13)	.002 (.15)	-0.042	-.35† (.22)	-.02 (.20)	.06 (.23)
Father's Party Membership	-.001 (.16)	.17 (.19)	.18 (.12)	-.08 (.15)	-.001 (.15)	-.44 (.26)	.28 (.20)	-.16 (.22)
Father's Education	.02 (.05)	.03 (.05)	-.04 (.04)	-.007 (.04)	-.04 (.05)	.07* (.06)	.01 (.06)	-.02 (.07)
<i>Socioeconomic Resources</i>								
Position	-.05 (.09)	.04 (.11)	-.04 (.07)	-.03 (.08)	-.01 (.09)	.1 (.13)	-.11 (.12)	-.03 (.12)
Income×10(-4)	-.41 (.92)	1.6 (1.3)	-.74 (.73)	-.92 (.89)	.31 (.87)	-1.4 (1.3)	-1.40 (1.38)	-.64 (1.3)
Education	-.07 (.08)	.04 (.09)	.05 (.06)	.03 (.07)	.09 (.07)	.09 (.11)	.13* (.10)	.23** (.13)
Status	.08 (.09)	.15 (.10)	.10 (.07)	.20 (.09)	.10 (.09)	-.10 (.13)	.29** (.13)	.23* (.13)
Self-regarded Social Status	.12 (.09)	-.09 (.10)	-.03 (.07)	-.14 (.08)	.06 (.09)	.30** (.14)	.05 (.13)	-.11 (.13)
Male	.20 (.15)	.31* (.18)	.01 (.11)	.25 (.13)	.13 (.14)	.04 (.21)	.004 (.18)	.06 (.20)
Age	.05 (.04)	.11** (.05)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.04)	.03 (.04)	.09* (.05)	.03 (.05)	.16* (.08)
Age-squared×10(-4)	-2.7 (4.3)	-51.41	-1.71 (3.53)	-2.0 (4.2)	-2.7 (4.22)	-7.2 (5.6)	-2.8 (5.8)	-21.3** (10.6)
Marital Status	-.28 (.20)	-.5** (.21)	-.19 (.16)	.16 (.19)	-.23 (.18)	-.36 (.25)	-.53** (.23)	.24 (.30)
Ethnic Background	-.27 (.32)	.16 (.44)	.01 (.27)	.21 (.34)	-.27 (.31)	-.86** (.36)	-.06 (.42)	-0.2584
<i>Psychological Engagement</i>								
Party Membership	.28 (.17)	.30 (.20)	.07 (.14)	.15 (.16)	.10 (.18)	-.2 (.26)	-.07 (.25)	-.14 (.25)
Political Interest	-.08 (.06)	-.11 (.07)	-.008 (.05)	.04 (.06)	.03 (.06)	.08 (.09)	.08 (.08)	.08 (.09)
Political Knowledge	-.11 (.16)	.20* (.15)	-.1 (.12)	-.1 (.14)	-.36 (.15)	.11 (.22)	-.33 (.20)	-.32 (.21)
Internal Political Efficacy	.02 (.13)	.12 (.15)	.12 (.10)	.06 (.12)	.12 (.12)	.33** (.16)	-.15 (.16)	-.20 (.19)
External Political Efficacy	.24* (.13)	.20 (.15)	.07 (.10)	.20 (.12)	.16 (.12)	-.2 (.18)	.08 (.16)	.04 (.18)
Government Attitude	-.52** (.16)	-.03 (.17)	-.25** (.12)	-.47 (.14)	-.14 (.14)	-.04 (.21)	-.22 (.18)	-0.0756
Faith in People	.03 (.14)	-.15 (.16)	-.04 (.11)	.03 (.13)	.03 (.13)	-.16 (.20)	.24 (.17)	.10 (.19)
_cut1/ constant	1.6 (1.5)	4.3 (1.4)	.80 (.89)	.84 (1.1)	1.4 (1.1)	3.2 (1.6)	1.9 (1.4)	2.9 (2.0)
_cut2	2.0 (1.2)	4.7 (1.4)	1.4 (.90)	1.3 (1.1)	1.9 (1.1)	3.6 (1.6)	2.5 (1.4)	3.4 (2.0)
_cut3	3.1 (1.2)	5.5 (1.4)	2.5 (.90)	2.5 (1.1)	3.0 (1.1)	4.5 (1.6)	3.6 (1.5)	
Number of observations	457	457	457	457	457	457	457	457
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared	-325.6445	-222.4474	-585.22329	-384.94343	-360.88854	-149.80884	-168.73726	-140.46297
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F	0.0002	0.0981	0.0247	0.0738	0.4893	0.0133	0.1433	0.061


Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

Appendix C-5: Probability of 2002 Writing to Government Offices by Education

Quantity of Interest	Illiterate (s.e.)	Primary School (s.e.)	Middle School (s.e.)	High School (s.e.)	Evening College (s.e.)	College (s.e.)	Graduate School (s.e.)
Pr (wrote to government offices=0)	0.98 (.01)	0.98 (.009)	0.97 (.008)	0.96 (.008)	0.94 (.013)	0.92 (.025)	0.89 (.043)
Pr (wrote to government offices=1)	0.01 (.004)	0.01 (.004)	0.01 (.004)	0.02 (.005)	0.03 (.007)	0.03 (.010)	0.04 (.015)
Pr (wrote to government offices=2)	0.01 (.003)	0.01 (.004)	0.01 (.004)	0.02 (.005)	0.02 (.007)	0.03 (.013)	0.04 (.020)
Pr (wrote to government offices=3)	0.00 (.002)	0.00 (.002)	0.00 (.002)	0.01 (.003)	0.01 (.004)	0.02 (.008)	0.03 (.015)

Figure C-1: First Difference of the Influence of Education on Writing to Government Offices



APPENDIX D

Appendix D. Voting by Individual Work Unit Type

Independent Variables	Voting (1993)	Voting (2002)
Government Organizations	.29 (.25)	.09 (.19)
State institutions	.42** (.20)	.16 (.16)
State Enterprises	.42** (.18)	-.02 (.11)
Collective Enterprises	.40* (.20)	.13 (.15)
Political Organization	.40*** (.10)	/
Father's Party Membership	-.08 (.10)	/
Father's Education	-.04 (.03)	.0001 (.007)
<i><u>Socioeconomic Resources</u></i>		
Position in the Workplace	-.002 (.05)	.02 (.05)
Income $\times 10(-4)$	-0.11* (.06)	.02 (.02)
Education	-.03 (.04)	.03 (.03)
Self-regarded Economic Status	-.0005 (.06)	-.005 (.05)
Self-regarded Social Status	-.01 (.06)	.06 (.05)
Male	-.06 (.09)	-.02 (.07)
Age	.04** (.02)	.06*** (.02)
Age-squared $\times 10(-4)$	-4.56** (1.8)	-.06*** (.02)
Marital Status	.25** (.11)	.09 (.16)
Ethnic Background (Han)	.22 (.22)	-.14 (.16)
<i><u>Psychological Engagement</u></i>		
Party Membership	.03 (.12)	.22** (.09)
Political Interest	.06 (.04)	.06 (.05)
Political Knowledge	-.01 (.10)	.08 (.08)
Internal Political Efficacy	.06 (.11)	.13** (.06)
External Political Efficacy	-.02 (.09)	.09 (.06)
Government Attitude	.05 (.10)	.01 (.07)
Faith in People	.08 (.08)	.05 (.08)
constant	-1.99*** (.68)	-2.5*** (.40)
Number of observations	1070	1754

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.

† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01

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