THE QUESTION CONCERNING HEIDEGGER:
TECHNOLOGY AND BEING, A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING

A Thesis

by

JAMES MICHAEL TAYLOR

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

August 2006

Major Subject: Philosophy
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The primary goal of this thesis is to show that Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology stems directly from his ontology. Specifically that his notion of technology, as the enframing destining spirit of this age, is a revelation of being itself as technology in this age. The thesis begins with an introduction that sets up the major points and briefly summarizes each of the chapters. Chapter I primarily deals with the question of what motivates Heidegger to reflect philosophically on technology. This idea is also broadened to include the basic experiences and concepts that might cause anyone to reflect on technology. The historical, scientific, metaphysical, practical, personal, and spiritual are the motivational forces that drive someone to philosophize about technology. This is shown through an analysis of selected works from Iain Thomson, Don Ihde, W.P.S. Dias, and Hubert Dreyfus. The chapter ends with a return to the notion of being. Chapter II mainly deals with a textual analysis of the introduction to Being and Time, and The Question Concerning Technology. The idea of being is examined in detail, and a workable notion of being is extracted from the text. Then Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is explained using the QCT. These ideas are put together and it is shown that technology is being as the destining of this present age. Yet technology
poses a danger to being, and indeed to humanity. The third chapter examines the alternatives to this danger in the form of Heidegger’s saving power, as discussed in his essay *The Turning*. The lesser dangers of technology are also reconsidered, as the truth of Heidegger’s answer comes to light. The truth of the saving power is that releasement towards a new destining will surmount the danger of technology. Yet this reveals that being takes a care for humanity, and this opens up the path for the unconcealing of God’s active power in the world of technology. Ultimately, only God can save humanity from the danger of technology, but He will only be revealed through the new destining revealing of being.
DEDICATION

For Professor Kappelman, for inspiring me to think
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an exploration of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, its connection and placement to his project on being, and how that philosophy opens up a comportment towards the technological problems of society. This comportment in turn reveals a path, a way, to see an original interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of God already operating in the world of technology. Among the key themes considered will be how Heidegger’s philosophy of technology addresses the problems of technology, the philosophical and historical motivations behind his project, and how this project reveals the possibility of God’s appearance. The key works addressed include the introduction to Being and Time, The Question Concerning Technology, and The Turning. These works will be analyzed to see how they denote the concept of being, and how that concept is crucial to understanding Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. For Heidegger, technology threatens humanity in a unique physical and psychological manner, but it also reveals something about human physicality and psychology. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology reveals not only the danger inherent in the technical, but also how this danger can be surmounted. The danger threatening humanity is not something that can simply be overcome, rather the strength of Heidegger’s words sounds forth in the turning towards the possibility of God.

This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style.
The first chapter of this thesis will deal primarily with a need to understand the motivation for turning to Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Yet here we will also look at this idea broadly as we seek to understand the motivating force behind the philosophy of technology itself. The discussion in the first chapter will focus on several different motivating forces behind the philosophy of technology, and specifically Heidegger’s philosophy. These different forces are here represented by select secondary sources from Iain Thomson, Don Ihde, W.P.S. Dias, and Hubert Dreyfus. The discussion begins with Thomson’s study of the historical metaphysical influences on Heidegger’s work. Thomson references Nietzsche and Kant to show their motivating force behind Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. In contrast to Thomson, Don Ihde takes a historical scientific approach. Ihde sees Heidegger as influenced by the prevailing scientific thought of his day, and sees his philosophy of technology as a reaction to the new science of quantum physics. Ihde argues for a philosophical failure and is not convinced that Heidegger’s philosophy adequately deals with the problems of particular technologies. To that end W.P.S. Dias, an engineer, points out precisely what are the problems of particular technologies. For Dias, the motivating force is practical experience with technologies themselves. Thus he sets about classifying four kinds of dangerous technologies that call for philosophical reflection.

It is in Hubert Dreyfus that the motivations for a philosophy of technology are revealed as personal, philosophical and spiritual. Dreyfus deals with the connection between technology and being, as he attempts to explain Heidegger’s conception of God. The first chapter ends having covered all the motivations for this study, but without
adequately dealing with the need for a god. If this original understanding of Heidegger’s God is to be grasped then his philosophy of technology must be taken up anew, beginning with the understanding of being.

The second chapter begins with a textual analysis of Heidegger’s notion of being, as it is outlined in the introduction to *Being and Time*, and in the secondary literature. This notion of being will in turn be applied to the *Question Concerning Technology* in an effort to show forth being in technology, as the primary aim and true agenda of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Namely, that the essence of technology is the enframing and the enframing is being itself, as it is destined in this present age. The second chapter will conclude by explaining the supreme danger that Heidegger saw in technology, and point the way to the saving power in the third chapter.

The third chapter will begin with a textual analysis of *The Turning*. Specifically this analysis will reiterate the significance of understanding the true danger of the essence of technology. The analysis will introduce the idea of the saving power as contrasting with the danger that Heidegger puts forward in the *QCT*. This in turn will lead to a discussion of the notion of turning as a comportment towards remaining open and patient. This comportment is a possible answer to the supreme danger of the enframing. Finally the third chapter will contain a concluding discussion of the significance of Heidegger’s solution in light of the problems of particular technologies. The concluding discussion will invoke the closing lines of the *Turning* as revealing a path for understanding an original concept of Heidegger’s. It shows how the surmounting power of a new destining of being is already active even in the face of
threatening technologies. The danger is being surmounted by the saving power, as a new
destining of being is revealing itself. Yet all this leads to a revelation of the possibility of
God’s unveiling. An original understanding of Heidegger’s God might be unconcealed
in that God’s will reveals the essence of being in each age. Then it may be that God acts
to surmount the danger of technology by revealing a new destining of being. Yet this
revelation of God still remains only possible in the works of Heidegger, and indeed it
does not yet exist as fully revealed in this age. Though the enframing is surmounted in
the very revealing of it as the enframing, it is still not destroyed. Rather it may be
changed even now, but this is still a changing that must be waited on. Patience for the
revealing of being is the proposed answer to the problems of technology, as Heidegger’s
God may be all that can save us.
CHAPTER II

WHAT CALLS FOR QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY?

2.1 Introduction

To begin this study of Heidegger it is necessary to ask several questions. The primary question is what motivates one to study Heidegger’s philosophy of technology? Still, this question can be restructured in such a way as to reveal a mystery deeper than the author’s motivations. The question could be asked, what calls for philosophical reflection on the topic or idea of technology itself? Surely when the question is asked in that way, it is already assumed that technology is an idea that yields itself up for the work of the philosopher. There is something within the nature of technology that allows it to be questioned and sought after as idea. If technology is nothing more than machines and human devices then a philosophy of technology must refine itself into many philosophies of technology. If there is a fundamental thread that connects all things technological then perhaps a philosophy of technology can be motivated.

That a philosophy of technology is not only possible, but also necessary is one of the key points of Heidegger’s works on the subject. A good analysis would turn to The Question Concerning Technology and The Turning as the two major works on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. These are notable works from Heidegger’s late period, and they provide the grounds for establishing Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Heidegger’s work on this subject seems to be motivated by a pursuit of the understanding of being. The root of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology lies in his ontology, and in the question of being. This thesis will also give an analysis of the
concept of being as Heidegger gives it in the introduction to his work *Being and Time*. Some scholars have even put forth the idea that the question of being is Heidegger’s lifelong project.¹ The relationship of Heidegger’s ontology to his philosophy of technology is one of the notions at stake in understanding the motivations for this philosophical inquiry.

In order to adequately motivate a philosophy of technology then perhaps it will be best to approach the problem from several angles. The first question that one considers, when determining what calls for a philosophy of technology, is the historical question. What motivated Heidegger himself, as a man living in a certain day and age, to reflect on technology as an issue of philosophical inquiry? If one understands the influences that caused Heidegger to write on technology, then perhaps one can the significance of the issue. Iain Thomson and Don Ihde consider the historical question very well in their writings. Thomson attempts to understand the philosophical influences behind Heidegger’s works, and the world in which he lived. He concludes that Heidegger is motivated by an understanding of the historical influence of Nietzsche’s metaphysics, and the resulting ontotheological construction of the world. Thomson understands the philosophy of technology itself as being motivated by Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Indeed it is the force that motivates the technological construction of the world, as well as the study of that construction.² Don Ihde paints a very different picture of Heidegger’s motivations. Ihde sees Heidegger as being historically influenced by the


prevailing scientific thought of his day. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is less of a response to technology itself, than it is to a certain interpretive scientific mindset that Heidegger picks up during his education. Ihde argues that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is motivated as a reaction to the new brand of science he saw developing at the time Heidegger wrote. Ihde also picks up on the pure novelty of certain aspects of Heidegger’s thought. Though he may have been simply motivated, Heidegger still managed to foresee the reality of a blending of science and technology in technoscience. Ihde further argues that Heidegger would have done better to create a philosophy that could deal with various forms of technology.3

The general motivation for a philosophy of technology can be seen as a practical response to such technologies. Although it was perhaps not his strongest motivation, Heidegger was quite aware of the influence of technologies in creating his philosophy of technology. The question can be phrased in this manner, “What about technologies themselves motivates philosophical reflection on technology itself?” It is the work of engineer W.P.S. Dias that provides elaboration on this question. Dias writes from the practical standpoint of a man who is a technician by trade, and he sees four different dangers inherent in all technologies. Dias writes about the effects of physically hazardous, unjust, sociologically damaging, and psychologically destructive technologies. He finds those four areas to be the main areas of concern that tend to motivate questions about technology. Technology, in its many forms, elicits certain

dangers and hazards that cause humanity to reflect on its nature. Dias is convinced that Heidegger was particularly motivated by the psychological and sociological threats of certain technologies.\(^4\) However, the strongest factors that motivated Heidegger, and also the author of this thesis, remain unaddressed.

One must now return to the question of the relation of being to technology, and consider its philosophical and spiritual motivations. The answer to the question of how being relates to technology is that being is technology; or rather that technology can be identified with being. Technology is the aspect of being that exists as the fundamental destiny of this modern age. The significance of this lies in what Heidegger describes so well in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. “The question is: Is being a mere word and its meaning a vapor, or does what is designated by the word ‘being’ hold within it the historical destiny of the west?”\(^5\) It is Hubert Dreyfus who takes up the question of Heidegger’s personal philosophical motivations.\(^6\) Dreyfus delves into the connection between being and technology; ultimately deciding that being is technology. Dreyfus understands that the nature of being as historical destining is something that is sociologically created. He concludes that humanity may usurp the power of technology by creating a new destining. Dreyfus interprets Heidegger’s search for a god in light of this revelation. Yet if being holds the spiritual destiny of the west and being is


technology, then an understanding of technology may yield a greater spiritual revelation than the one that Dreyfus puts forth.

The aim of this first chapter is to answer the two-fold question, “Why does Heidegger give a philosophy of technology, and what calls one to reflect on technology philosophically?” The answer to that question is found through a study of four secondary sources that lay the foundation for this thesis. Thomson and Ihde deal with the historical, scientific influences that motivate this study. Dias deals with the practical, technological influences that motivate this study. Finally, Dreyfus deals with the personal, philosophical, and spiritual motivations behind this thesis. Ultimately the spiritual motivation is one in search of a god that only being can reveal. Yet this thesis first turns to the historical motivations put forward in Iain Thomson’s work.

2.2 Historical Metaphysical

Thomson’s understanding of ontotheology is the central idea behind his work on the subject of Heidegger and technology. This term refers to a peculiar philosophical practice unique to metaphysics. “We have thus seen that the peculiar ‘double grounding’ that metaphysics attempts would ontologically anchor its understanding of the being of entities in a basic entity and theologically derive it from (and so justify it by appeal to) a supreme entity.”

Thomson holds that ontotheology is precisely what Heidegger is criticizing when he criticizes traditional metaphysics. The idea that a single entity becomes the grounding for all entities, thereby deifying that entity, is the definition of

ontotheology in this context. According to Thomson, Heidegger understands that this deification has taken a new form based on the writings of Nietzsche:

Heidegger holds Nietzsche’s ‘unthought’ metaphysics responsible for our nihilistic ‘technological’ understanding of the being of entities and its devastating historical consequences…First, that Nietzsche understands the being of entities ontotheologically, as eternally recurring will-to-power (that is, in short, as sheer ‘will-to-will’), forces coming together and breaking apart with no end other than the self-augmentation by which these underlying forces perpetuate themselves.8

The idea is that Nietzsche had a peculiar metaphysics in his writings. Nietzsche’s metaphysics reduced the being of entities and categorized them all under the super-entity of the will-to-power. The problem is that this gives entities no rich metaphysical understanding of themselves, but rather a mere impetus to self-augment. “Second, that it is precisely this ontologically reductive understanding of the being of entities that encourages us late moderns implicitly to understand, and so generally to treat, all the entities with which we deal, ourselves included, as intrinsically meaningless Bestand, mere ‘resources’”9 For Thomson, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is a direct reaction to the effects of Nietzschean metaphysics on the world. It is the understanding of the purpose of entities as simply will-to-self-augmentation that moves humanity to treat all entities as mere resources.10 A big idea for Thomson is that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is motivated by his understanding of metaphysics as

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8 Ibid., 44.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
ontotheological, as reductive. This is the main influence on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, according to Thomson.

However, Nietzsche is not the only significant influence on Heidegger’s work. Though Nietzsche was perhaps the key influence on the world Heidegger lived in, Kant was a strong influence on Heidegger’s philosophy itself:

Heidegger, as I understand him, is a great critical heir of the German idealist tradition. His ontological critique of ‘enframing’ builds on the Kantian idea that we implicitly participate in the making-intelligible of our worlds, but maintains that lenses inherited from metaphysics mediate our sense of reality. In effect Heidegger historicizes Kant’s ‘discursivity thesis.’

The phenomenological idea at stake is the same one that is threatened by Nietzsche’s works. If we make our world intelligible and understandable then we must take responsibility for its construction. Though if we receive our sense of the real from our metaphysics, then we create the world in light of an already present structure. It then seems quite true that metaphysics is responsible for the state of our world, and certainly for the state of our technological world. “We can thus interpret Heidegger’s understanding of the ontotheological structure of Western metaphysics, (‘the history that we are’) as advancing a doctrine of ontological holism. For by giving shape to our historical understanding of ‘what is’, metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, ourselves included.” Western metaphysics is not merely the recounting of the ideas of isolated individuals. Rather it is in some way responsible for projecting and creating the world in which humanity must live. This

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11 Ibid., 54.

12 Ibid., 55.
projection is the result of a need to absolutize experience in search of meaning and purpose. That is not to say that life is basically meaningless, but that meaning itself is determined by the overriding metaphysics of the age.

The significance of Thomson’s contributions is that he points out some of the key influences on Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger was writing as a reaction to Nietzsche, and Heidegger was also writing from an informed German Idealist standpoint. In light of Thomson’s comments, one of the motivating forces behind Heidegger’s philosophy is historical. Heidegger is simply putting forth the order of his ideas as they were created by his own implicit metaphysics. His metaphysics is a historical result of all metaphysicians, though Nietzsche and Kant are the central figures. Thomson also puts forth the critical idea that the era of technological enframing is the result of metaphysics. It is the end of the philosophical need to absolutize the world, and thereby impute meaning to it. The era of enframing is the ironic result of a metaphysical system that attempts to deny metaphysics. In so doing, the system that it unwittingly creates is a system that effectually denies meaning to the world itself. Still, this historical picture may not be complete. According to Don Ihde the motivation behind a philosophy of technology is historical and scientific, rather than being historical and metaphysical.

2.3 Historical Scientific

For Ihde, the most significant aspect of Heidegger’s writing on technology is the historical and ontological priority of technology over science. Ihde sees this move as a groundbreaking leap in the philosophy of science and he works to uncover Heidegger’s meaning in this move. Ihde’s work, rather than containing a detailed analysis of
Heidegger’s writings on Technology, contains instead a historical analysis of
Heidegger’s place in writing about technology and science. The idea behind this is that
Heidegger’s philosophy of science and his philosophy of technology merged into the
same entity with the creation of his philosophy of technoscience. Ihde first divides up
Heidegger’s writings on “technoscience” into distinct periods:

First there is the period around Being and Time (1927) which includes the Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, and stretches to the Kant work of 1929; second there is the richer period in the mid thirties with What is a Thing?, the Beiträge, and the famous “World as Picture” texts, and the period of the mid –fifties, after the War and de-Nazification with “The Question Concerning Technology,” “Science and Reflection,” and related texts (Ihde, 374).

The significance of these divisions is that Ihde is quite familiar with Heidegger’s work, and he is also familiar with any underlying project throughout it. The project that Ihde is focused on here is the development of Heidegger’s theory of technoscience.

Ihde puts forth the notion that philosophical science in the early twentieth century was the key motivating force behind Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. “There are three strands which bear examination: First, the emergent philosophies of science at the beginning of the 20th century which forefronted mathematization, in particular mathematical physics…Second there was the powerful contemporary movement of Logical Positivism, and Logical Empiricism…and, third, there is Husserl” (Ihde, 375). These are the movements and thinkers that Ihde believes most characterized and influenced Heidegger’s notions of his philosophy of science. These influences gave rise to Heidegger’s notion of technoscience as seen in his philosophy of technology. Ihde goes into great detail regarding the facts about these movements and their influence on Heidegger, but his summary will suffice for the purposes of this thesis:
What has emerged at this point with respect to Heidegger’s implicit philosophy of science is largely reflective of the main trends of the time…(a) Physics, particularly mathematical physics, remains the paradigm science for Heidegger; (b) physics is viewed as measuring – and following Husserl – a reductive science; (c) it is theoretical in form, and it is experimental only in a secondary sense because the theoretical cast calls for experiment to achieve exactness in measurement; (d) its epistemology is ‘objectivist’ in that it must make its objects stand before it as representations (Ihde, 377).

Ihde concludes by stating that the only Heideggerian twist on this notion of science is that Heidegger views science as aprioristic. In other words, science projects its already present structure onto nature, and only understands nature through this structure. The same can be said of technology and mathematics (Ihde, 377-378). Ihde’s comments mirror Thomson’s notions about the projective nature of metaphysics. Despite his confidence Heidegger’s philosophy of science underwent a significant critique from the new science of the mid twentieth century.

This new science, quantum and nuclear physics, posed a significant challenge to Heidegger’s notions of science on both an intellectual and political level. Ihde expounds on some of Heidegger’s writings that show his understanding of this new physics in its historical context. “I read this in two ways: first it shows that Heidegger was aware of the classical/new physics controversy cast in its racist contest; and second he uses it to firmly maintain his continuist position concerning the projective and aprioristic views of science” (Ihde, 379). Ihde makes a point of showing how Heidegger’s philosophy of science eventually grew to incorporate and understand this new turn in physics. Heidegger came to understand this change in physics as mirroring the changes in the destining of being as a new epoch (Ihde, 380).
Yet for Ihde the most startling turn for Heidegger comes in *The Question Concerning Technology*, since it is there that Heidegger reverses a common relation regarding science and technology. “Heidegger argues that the ‘standard view’ that modern technology arises from and is an application of early modern science is wrong; it is rather the inverse…” (Ihde, 380). It is this inversion that Ihde terms technoscience, and it has two strong implications for Heidegger’s philosophy of science:

The first is more concrete in that Heidegger sees that physics and its instruments might also be understood inversely… The second implication, however, is more abstract – it is only by turning Technology [capitalized] into a ‘metaphysics’ that it becomes possible for Heidegger to claim that science itself is subsumed into Technology (Ihde, 385).

What Heidegger is after, according to Ihde, is an understanding of technology as metaphysics and as a mode of revealing of being. This revelation is perhaps one of Ihde’s keenest insights even though Ihde saw this move as something of a loss. Ihde concludes that Heidegger’s thinking may be prescient, “but also deeply flawed… In short the elevation to technology with the capital ‘T’ emasculates Heidegger’s philosophy of technology from making any nuanced conclusions about particular technologies” (Ihde, 386). Although he was motivated by a strong philosophy of science Heidegger is ultimately making a metaphysical move.

If technology is absolutized then it looks like Heidegger is guilty of the very ontotheology Thomson claims that he is criticizing. Ihde sees this as a loss of philosophical richness, since technologies are too widely varied to be taken as a single entity. Both Ihde and Thomson focus on the historical influences on Heidegger’s work, in order to show the motivations for a philosophy of technology. Though Ihde is
complimentary of Heidegger’s foresight he is disappointed in Heidegger’s seeming inability to say anything about individual technologies. An alternative is seen in W.P.S. Dias who claims that Heidegger’s philosophy not only addresses individual technologies, but also that it might be motivated by them as well.

2.4 Practical Technologies

Dias makes no secret of the fact that he is writing from a perspective that is at least pro-engineering, if not pro-technology. However, Dias still makes the effort to understand Heidegger’s position on the subject before he passes judgment. To that end he gives a fair and textually accurate interpretation of *The Question Concerning Technology*. Dias offers an interpretation of Heidegger’s supposed fear of technology, and the cure for the apparent problem of technology:

> Among the many aspects of Being questioned by Heidegger were those of science and modern technology, which he thought reduced everything (including man) to the level of a mere ‘resource’. In his later writing, he was preoccupied with poetry, which he considered to be an antidote to modern technology (Dias, 390).

Dias puts forth the idea that Heidegger’s ultimate answer to these dangers is a turn to art, as a separate mode of revealing.

Yet Dias finds this abstract understanding of technology inadequate to genuinely raise strong philosophical questions. Indeed, what motivates Dias to turn to a philosophy of technology is an attempt to become a better engineer:

> Given the pervasive and significant impact of technology on our lives and society, it would do well for engineers too to engage in such questioning as an integral part of their practice, since they are agents of technology. This would also result in more balanced critiques of technology. Currently critics of technology tend to be largely philosophers or environmentalist, both of whom are sometimes unrealistic in their rejection of technology (Dias, 392).
Dias may not be entirely certain about what motivates Heidegger to turn to a philosophy of technology, but as an engineer he seems to be motivated by technology itself. Dias is not convinced that technology is a purely metaphysical entity, and rather than absolutize it, he lays out four different types of dangerous technologies.

These four categories are the ones that Dias considers to have the most sinister effect on humanity. In addition they are best understood as placeholders for actual technological devices, rather than purely abstract metaphysical entities. Dias is convinced that these four categories are the motivating forces behind any philosophy of technology. “The first level is that of dangerous or hazardous technology. The prime example of this is nuclear technology…” (Dias, 392-393). The nuclear weapon is surely the most striking example of such a machine. Nuclear power itself bears out historical examples of catastrophe in the failure at Chernobyl, and the intentional destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Dias understands that certain types of technology pose a direct and obvious threat to human existence, and that this threat must be eliminated by the cessation of production, and use of these technologies (Dias, 392-393). “The second level is one that is not necessarily dangerous for the entire human race, but where technology promotes injustice” (Dias, 393). The idea here is that the benefits of certain technological advances are only available to either their producers, or those economically gifted enough to afford them. Either way technological growth defines and deepens class differences in societies. A computer is as ubiquitous as a television in many homes in the west, but it is also only available to those who can afford it. However
Dias also holds that technological advances are responsible for bringing prosperity and wealth to the previously poor and un-prosperous (Dias, 393).

These first two modes of influence stem from what Dias terms the environmental critique of technology, and the last two stem from what he calls the philosophical critique. “We come now to the third level and with it to the less obvious influences of technology; this is the sociological influence of technology, mainly through its manifestations, whether artifacts or systems” (Dias, 393). Dias references the transportation and communication systems that technologies are responsible for. On the one hand these technologies facilitate the ability of everyone in society to travel and communicate. Yet the sense of community is often lost due to the availability of community. Transportation technologies can turn family and friends into available family and friends at the end of a plane ride or car drive. This might serve to create societies of very disparate, individualistic people, who would rather communicate over the phone than in person (Dias, 393). “The deepest level is the psychological influence of technology” (Dias, 393). Dias calls this influence a “technological attitude”, where technique is valued over understanding, and means are valued over ends. Also interesting is how inventions such as the clock and computer changed how people are valued (Dias, 393). The most striking example one might think of is the cell phone. The cell phone can make a person always available to anyone and everyone who can dial their number. Indeed, there seems to be something about a ringing phone that demands that it be answered. The cell phone has an immediacy that requires other things to be paused, or delayed, so that the cell phone can be dealt with. One is always waiting for it
to ring and demand its use. Thus solitude is impossible and reflection is available to interruption without warning or notice.

Dias concludes his work by pointing out the ethical considerations of Heidegger’s work. “Heidegger described our interaction with the world as one of “care”…Engineering Ethics has also be treated as an ethic of care” (Dias, 394). Were he to end there, Dias might be advocating a Heideggerian method of engineering, but in fact Dias has more to say. “It is pertinent to point out two warnings at this stage. This first is to ensure that questioning technology does not lead to jettisoning all of it, as is sometimes espoused by anti-technologists” (Dias, 395). It is not clear that Dias understands just what technology is a revealing of, namely being, if he considers the possibility of jettisoning it. Although it seems clear that Dias is quite optimistic and hopeful concerning the future of technological growth and expansion. Heidegger viewed neither of these as unreservedly optimistic. “Furthermore, his existentialist philosophy is at the core nihilistic, for he said that there was no ultimate ground for our being; and it is not clear that ethics can be founded on such nihilism” (Dias, 395). The accusation of nihilism may come from a misapprehension of Heidegger’s project concerning being. Dias is convinced that a philosophy of technology can be motivated by the abuse of certain technological devices. It seems that even technologies can motivate the philosophy of technology. However, while he avoids the ontotheological accusation, Dias is sure that Heidegger’s core philosophy is nihilistic. This closes him off to understanding the deeper motivations that Heidegger and others may have for a
philosophy of technology. It is Hubert Dreyfus who understands all too well the deep personal philosophical motivations that drive Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

2.5 Personal, Philosophical, and Spiritual

In a work on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology Dreyfus begins with a section he entitles, “What Heidegger is not Saying” (Dreyfus, 53). In this section Dreyfus admits that Heidegger can be understood as anti-technology, and that there are several passages in his works where Heidegger makes anti-technological statements. “Such statements suggest that Heidegger is a Luddite who would like to return from the exploitation of the earth, consumerism, and mass media to the world of the pre-Socratic Greeks or the good old *Schwartzwald* peasants” (Dreyfus, 54). Dreyfus also admits that this is a gross oversimplification of Heidegger’s work, and that there is something more complex going on here.

Dreyfus sees Heidegger as realizing that technology is a far more pervasive threat than mere machine technology would seem to indicate. Thus, his philosophy of technology is motivated by more than mere technologies themselves. The very metaphysical move that Ihde criticizes in Heidegger is what Dreyfus sees as the most helpful step in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Dreyfus phrases the condition that Heidegger has uncovered in these terms, “The threat is not a *problem* for which there can be a *solution* but an ontological *condition* from which we can be *saved*. Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies” (Dreyfus, 54). Dreyfus understands that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is motivated by his greater metaphysical
project, the project of being. “The danger, then, is not the destruction of nature or culture but a restriction in our way of thinking – a leveling of our understanding of being” (Dreyfus, 55). The danger of technology is its limiting of the revealing of being itself.

Dreyfus then attempts a definition of being that sets the tone for his work. “In sum the social practices containing an understanding of what it is to be a human self, those containing an interpretation of what it is to be a thing, and those defining society fit together. They add up to an understanding of Being” (Dreyfus, 55). It is this understanding of being that defines the world for the beings in it, and Dreyfus references the Heideggerian concept of “clearing” to make this point. Dreyfus’ notion of being seems to mirror Thomson’s notion of metaphysics as the driving human force that projects the world up in the way that it is. If so, Dreyfus’ Heidegger seems to be another ontotheologist, as he absolutizes being as the supreme entity. However the key idea at work is that Heidegger turns to a philosophy of technology as a result of his ontology. The motivating force for Heidegger can be seen in the personal philosophic force that drives much of his work, the pursuit of an understanding of being.

Once he has defined Heidegger’s notion of being, Dreyfus applies it in the question of the essence of technology, or what is “the technological understanding of being” (Dreyfus, 53)? Dreyfus explains that Heidegger draws a difference between classical and modern technology, and that the essence of modern technology is being asked after in the question. “The essence of modern technology, Heidegger tells us, is to seek more and more flexibility and efficiency simply for its own sake” (Dreyfus, 56). To
apply this concept to Dreyfus’ notion of being means that the human self, things, and the rules of society all work towards the end of pure efficiency.

Dreyfus is not content to leave the matter here and he turns next to what humans can do about this danger. Dreyfus admits that Heidegger does not seek to abandon all forms of technology, but rather he seeks to form a new understanding of technology itself. Dreyfus calls for a disassociation of the technological understanding of being from technological devices. This disassociation can only be achieved by understanding technology as “our latest understanding of being” (Dreyfus, 57). This conclusion in turn causes Dreyfus to raise two options for responding to his new understanding of being. The first is simply to realize this technological understanding of being as the destining of our age. That is to accept “the mystery of the gift of understandings of being,” which Dreyfus refers to as “releasement”, again using Heidegger’s terms (Dreyfus, 58-59). Yet Dreyfus finds this realization to be insufficient, for it will only be a realization if it is a realization in our practices as well:

Mere openness to technology, it seems, leaves out much that Heidegger finds essential to human being: embedded-ness in nature, nearness or localness, shared meaningful differences such as noble and ignoble, justice and injustice, salvation and damnation, mature and immature –to name those that have played important roles in our history (Dreyfus, 59).

There seems to be a motivating force at work that goes beyond the apparent need to understand the philosophical connection between being and technology. If releasement is insufficient to defeat the specter of threatening technology, then what can save humanity from this danger? Dreyfus is not surprised that such releasement seems to leave out a consideration of the shared meaningful differences of salvation and damnation. Perhaps
it is the necessity of salvation that leads Dreyfus to his understanding of Heidegger’s need for a god. “The need for a new centeredness is reflected in Heidegger’s famous remark in his last interview: ‘Only a god can save us now.’ But what does this mean” (Dreyfus, 59)?

Dreyfus is not convinced that Heidegger merely wanted a realization of the technological understanding of being. Instead, the new practices that make up a new understanding of being are the only real option that humanity can consider. This is the second choice for a response to Dreyfus’ new understanding of being. If the understanding of being is merely the destining of our age, as made up by the practices of society, then surely a new understanding of being can be created from new practices. This is how Dreyfus answers Heidegger’s quest for a god. When one searches for the spiritual motivating force behind a philosophy of technology, one is seeking to understand how being can reveal a god. Dreyfus gives a seemingly humanistic interpretation of Heidegger’s words. “Such a new object or event that grounded a new understanding of reality Heidegger would call a new god. This is why he holds that ‘only another god can save us’” (Dreyfus, 60). Dreyfus holds that the translation “another” is a fitting match for the German word, and explains that this new god came in the form of the original American Musical festival at Woodstock. Such a shift of cultural paradigms is what Dreyfus advocates that could bring about a new destining. The best part is that festival was a particular human activity, and though it failed to be greatly revolutionary, the spirit of the event is precisely what Dreyfus takes the new god to be. This new god certainly may fit within the Nietzschean concern of what must replace the dead God in
his aphorism *The Madman*. The Madman is a great game and a marvelous spectacle. Is this notion of a new god finally the thing that Heidegger is seeking?

The force behind a philosophy of technology is wrapped up in the two-fold search for understanding Heidegger’s motivations as well the deeper philosophical motivations at work. Thomson seems to be convinced that this search is brought on by the influence of western metaphysics as it created the technological world in which we live. For Heidegger this search was brought about as a reaction to Nietzsche and Kant, and a quest to escape ontotheology. Yet, Ihde counters that Heidegger is also caught up in this ontotheology, and that he was led to his search by a certain philosophy of science that he ascribed to. It is technologies themselves that still seek for a nuanced philosophy that can appreciate their individual natures. Such a philosophical approach is the one that Dias takes as he seeks a philosophy of technology motivated by technologies themselves. This motivation in turn fails to see the deeper philosophical search for being that Heidegger was after. Though Dreyfus finds the understanding of being as Heidegger’s primary motivation, he is mystified by the need for a god. Dreyfus sees the spiritual destiny of the west as resting in the human activities that create grand new games for humanity to play. Throughout this study it may become apparent that releasement towards being will reveal the appearance of a God already at work in the present technological world. Thus, the motivating force behind a philosophy of technology must first find its grounding in an understanding of being. This thesis now

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turns to the end of seeking to understand Heidegger’s God through an understanding of being in technology.
CHAPTER III

BEING AND THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In order to understand being in technology one must first grasp the main idea that is in question. The idea in question is in fact a question itself, and that question is “what is the meaning of being?” If being is a question then certainly much of what being is remains unknown. This may be the case for Heidegger, and it is this need to understand the question of the meaning of being that some say caused him to write *Being and Time*. Theodore Kisiel characterizes the aim of *Being and Time* in these terms:

Accordingly the full sense of the human situation, already caught up in being in such a way that it is already questioned in its being and so put in quest of the sense of its being, will have to be worked out in order to prepare the basis for understanding the temporality already implicit in the question of the sense of being. The very sense of sense will have to be worked out to define at least the temporality of my being, and hopefully of being itself.14

The human seeks to understand its essence, and in doing so it must understand its seeking as temporal. Only then will the human understand its essence, and begin to know that essence as revealing being. Some say that it is the understanding of being as being that makes up Heidegger’s lifelong philosophical project. Dorothea Frede explains that for Heidegger being is not simply his greatest idea but it is also his greatest pursuit. “What can probably be claimed with more justification is that for most great minds there has been one question that guided their thinking or research. This certainly applies to Martin Heidegger, and the question that fascinated him throughout his long philosophic

life can be stated simply: what is the meaning of being?"\(^{15}\) This frank assessment is reiterated in the work of Taylor Carman, who writes, “The central theme of Heidegger’s philosophy is the question concerning the meaning (Sinn) of being (Sein).”\(^{16}\) This question is present at the beginning in Being and Time and it remains a critical part of Heidegger’s work even on into his later period with Introduction to Metaphysics, and even the Question Concerning Technology. The question of the meaning of being is central to Heidegger’s project, and it also seems that being is a very significant idea for his understanding of technology. The question of being informs and fills out the question of technology. It would seem that the meaning of being must be explored before any attempt to understand technology can be successful. To that end this chapter has two simple purposes, to explore the meaning of the question of being and to interpret the question of technology in light of that exploration.

3.2 Being

An ideal place to begin the exploration of being as a question, concept, or idea is in the introduction to Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger begins the book with a brief preface that outlines the fundamental problem with being:

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word being? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely.\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\) Frede, 42.

\(^{16}\) Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
Being remains a mystery, but it has settled itself into western thought so well as a mystery that its elusive nature is no longer a proper cause for reflection. In light of that mystery Heidegger states that the primary goal of his treatise is to “work out the question of the meaning of Being”\(^\text{18}\). To understand being as being is to understand it as a question, not of being itself, but of the meaning of being. “The first page of *Being and Time* makes it clear that Heidegger’s basic question was not about being, but about the *meaning* of being, *der Sinn von Sein*. The distinction between being and the meaning of being is utterly crucial…it is the clue to distinguishing Heidegger’s thought from both traditional metaphysics, and Husserlian phenomenology.”\(^\text{19}\) The significance of Heidegger’s starting place is that he is first and foremost inquiring. He is asking a question and it is not a question after being itself, but after the meaning of being. According to the quote from Sheehan, this is the most crucial point of Heidegger’s discussion. Now, if Heidegger is inquiring after the meaning of being and not being itself, then what precisely is Heidegger not inquiring after?

In the first main division of the introduction to *Being and Time* Heidegger sets forth what he is in fact not searching after with regards to the meaning of being. He puts forth some of the history of the concept and deals with several ways in which being is either forgotten or misunderstood. Being is universal in scope, but not simply the greatest category of understanding. It is elusive to define, but that only makes the

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

question of meaning more pertinent. Finally it is self evident in everyday life, and yet it remains a most puzzling mystery. Frede characterizes the problem in these terms, “What needs an explanation is, rather, why this dim understanding was never fully developed before, and a good deal of Heidegger’s originality consists in his explanation of what he calls our ‘forgetfulness’ of Being.”20 Heidegger concludes his discussion of the metaphysical shortcomings of past efforts as he grapples with the meaning of being. Rather than wiping away past follies he intends to build on these latent conceptions of being, and expand upon their shortcomings.

If this common understanding of being is to be realized as anything other than vague and common, then being itself must come into a greater light. “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being – that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail.”21 The meaning of being initially comes to light as that which determines entities as entities. It is Taylor Carman who describes this revelation as “the closest thing to a definition of being in Being and Time.”22 Carman’s take on precisely what Heidegger means by being is informed by his sense of the main critique of Heidegger’s elusive definitions. Some critics maintain that Heidegger’s failure is a simple grammatical conflation, and that being has several meanings depending on its

20 Frede, 57.
21 Ibid., 25-26.
22 Carman, 15.
usage. Carman rushes to Heidegger’s defense with his own unique take on Heidegger’s philosophy of the meaning of being.

Heidegger does not assume that there is just one meaning. Indeed one of the central tenets of Being and Time is precisely that being, in whichever grammatical form, means something fundamentally different for different kinds of entities – existenz or ‘being in the world’ (In-der-Welt-sein) for human beings, ‘availability’ (Zuhandenheit) for things defined by their use, and ‘occurrentness’ (Vorhandenheit) for objects, properties, and relations. The only unity Heidegger claims for the meaning of being has to do with its general intelligibility in terms of some temporal framework, or ‘horizon.’

Carman adequately paints the picture of the diverse meanings of being that Heidegger allows. Being is not the ultimate universal, and as such there is some variation between how being reveals itself to humans, or to things. This point alone will become incredibly significant for Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. If being does not exist as the ultimate, then perhaps there is something that goes beyond being itself. The vision of the spiritual may yet appear beyond the realm of being.

Being must be thought of in its own way and on its own terms if being itself is to be reached. “In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and ‘Being’ means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated.” The question of the meaning of being may be asking about the entities that are, that is to say, the entities that exist and have being. Here Heidegger gives a fuller definition of what being is. “Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in

\[\text{\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 13.}\]

presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in *Dasein*; in the ‘there is’.

Being *qua* being remains that which is, as it is presently, really, truthfully, in being there, and there being. It is the condition and grounds in terms of which all beings appear.

The question of the meaning of being is formulated in *Being and Time* through Heidegger’s analytic of *Dasein*. Yet since this thesis is an explication of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, then this work must be abbreviated. In light of this abbreviation the secondary literature can be especially enlightening in an attempt to explain *Dasein* and its significance for being. Taylor Carman provides the following insight when he draws upon the ideas that Heidegger advances in *Being and Time*.

“The being is the intelligibility, or more precisely the condition of the intelligibility of entities as entities. Furthermore that intelligibility has two aspects: ‘Every entity can, as an entity, be examined in a twofold question: what it is and whether it is’ (*GP* 123).”

This twofold question is the one that Heidegger applies to *Dasein* in his search for the meaning of being. Since being is that which makes understanding possible, then being is in some ways already understood. Being is the revelation of the revelation; it is the reality that grounds reality. Yet being does not exist as fundamentally static. As much as being changes its revelation for different entities, its revelation changes for different ages as well. It becomes incumbent to speak of what being is for this present age, and how that relates to modern technology.

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25 Ibid.

26 Carman, 15.
If being is that which provides the conditions in virtue of which beings appear, then being certainly also provides the conditions for the appearance of entities in our own age. In this age it seems that technologies define the entities of this world. Technology is the destining of being in this age, for all humanity and the world. This point is introduced and explicated in Heidegger’s best-known work on technology, *The Question Concerning Technology*. For Heidegger, technology is not merely airplanes and skyscrapers, but rather it is being itself. Technology determines the conditions in light of which beings appear in this modern age. It reveals all entities as resources, and as either useful or useless. This chapter must now turn to a textual analysis of Heidegger’s *Question Concerning Technology*. The first step will examine first the nature of the question that the title implies, that is “what is technology?” Technology will be examined not merely as instrument, the common understanding, but in its essence as the enframing. The enframing is the essence of technology and it determines all entities as resources, as standing reserve. The outcome of this revelation is that technology reveals itself as a threatening mode of being. While it reigns as the mode of revealing beings in this age it threatens humanity and also all other modes of revealing. The enframing threatens humanity in that it deceives them into thinking they are masters of technology, and by its use, the masters of the earth. Then while being cannot be mastered it is humanity that finds itself mastered, by technology, as the primary agent of the enframing. Although the greatest threat that technology poses lies in its denial of the truth of being itself. The enframing threatens to subvert any other mode of revealing, even the mode of revealing being itself as being. Heidegger calls this threat the supreme
danger of technology. Being, as the condition of the intelligibility of entities seems to be perverted into the technological enframing that threatens to undermine being itself. Even in light of this danger there remains a hope in the form of a saving power. This chapter now turns to the opening of the *Question Concerning Technology*, as it seeks to formulate and understand this question in light of its relation to being.

### 3.3 The Question

Heidegger begins the *Question Concerning Technology* by explaining that the project he is undertaking is one of questioning. The method of questioning in this work follows the same structure for questioning that Heidegger outlined for being in *Being and Time*. In the beginning Heidegger points out two things: *that* he is questioning and *what* he is questioning:

> Questioning builds a way…The way is one of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning technology and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds.

First it is significant that the structure of the questioning follows the same pattern as in *Being and Time*. Technology is what is asked about. The essence of technology is what is being interrogated, and a free relationship to experience technology in its own bounds is what is sought. Heidegger has laid out his plan and he proceeds directly into his work.

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Initially he must ensure that technology is not confused with the essence of technology. What is being asked about is the essence of technology, rather than its aspects. Heidegger explains that technology is commonly thought to be something neutral, and this is the worst way in which one can misapprehend it (QCT, 311-312). In similar fashion to Being and Time Heidegger explains “essence” before he tackles the way in which the essence of technology is misunderstood. “According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is…The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology” (QCT, 312). What technology is, in essence, is commonly thought of as a means to an end and something that is a particularly human activity. It is not naturally occurring in the world, but instead it is a human artifice. Heidegger maintains that this instrumental definition is accurate to describe technology in general and also modern technology. Though modern technology seems to be more complex, as surely as a plane is more complex than a wheel, it still remains instrumental by definition and practice. Yet here Heidegger reveals the crack in this finely crafted façade. “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means…The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control. But suppose now that technology were no mere means: how would it stand with the will to master it” (QCT, 313)? Just suppose that technology is not merely instrumental, wouldn’t this make our desire to master it somewhat complicated?
Heidegger asserts the crucial distinction between the correct and the true. It is correct that technology is instrumental, but this does not yet get at technology’s true essence. Ronald Godzinksi Jr. explains that this distinction applies as much to modern technology as to technology in general. “According to Heidegger, technology is distinct from what we do with tools, instruments, equipment, or the way of thinking about those things. Likewise, modern technology is not reducible to technological artifacts, devices, or the techniques that produce those things.” The essence of technology remains captured only in the realm of the true. It is this sense of truth that reveals the answers to the new set of questions Heidegger raises next. “We must ask: What is the instrumental itself? Within what do such things as means and end belong” (QCT, 313)? As to the second question Heidegger answers almost immediately that the realm of means and ends is causality. Yet the answer to the first question must be delayed until the answer to the second question is fully understood. To that end Heidegger delves into an explanation of Aristotelian causality.

Heidegger gives an explanation of Aristotle’s four causes while explaining the role each plays in a thorough explanation of causality. Heidegger explains that this step is critical to understanding instrumentality, and with it the essence of technology (QCT, 314). “The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else” (QCT, 314). The four causes are properly unified as causality. Heidegger gives the example of a silversmith constructing a silver chalice in

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order to explain this unity. The causes do not create from nothing so much as they bring forth, and unify, what is in some sense already there:

These let what is not yet present arrive into presencing. Accordingly they are unifiedly governed by a bringing that brings what presences into appearance…The modes of occasioning, the four causes, are at play, then, within bringing-forth. Through bringing-forth the growing things of nature as well as what ever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to their appearance (QCT, 317).

The four causes bring something forth out of concealment into unconcealment, and this carries some very significant ideas for Heidegger. What is brought forth into unconcealment was not previously present, but was previously being. What Heidegger has put forward is the way in which something is shown to be true. “The Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas. We say ‘truth’ and usually understand it as correctness of representation” (QCT, 318). The quest for understanding the proper realm of instrumentality has led us to truth through causality. This is very relevant since the definition of technology as instrumentality was only correct, but it did not hit at the true essence of technology. Yet if the path to truth is this revealing bringing-forth out of concealment into unconcealment, then perhaps the essence of technology must be unconcealed.

It is at this point in the essay that Heidegger steers his discussion of revealing back towards relevance for the question of technology itself. “Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing… Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing” (QCT, 318). Heidegger’s method of questioning, now follows on in this way. What is
being asked is the question concerning technology, what is being interrogated is the concept of technology as means, and what is being pursued is the essence of technology itself.

Heidegger properly returns to language itself for a further inquiry into the essence of technology. He studies the etymology of the Greek word *techne* and points out two significant ideas:

One is that *techne* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. *Techne* belongs to bringing-forth, to *poiesis*; it is something poetic. The other thing that we should observe with regard to techne is even more important. From earliest times until Plato the word *techne* is linked with the word *episteme* (QCT, 318).

The meaning of the Greek word that technology is based on, *techne*, is closely linked with the concepts of making and knowing. This making involves not only technical construction, but art and poetry as well. Heidegger properly understands art as a revealing, as that which unconceals the concealed truth. Catherine Botha explains this significance in these terms. “For the Greeks, *technē* meant a revelation of something, an uncovering or a bringing-forth (Heidegger, 1993:319). According to Heidegger the word *technē*, then, means a mode of knowing.”30 The most proper sense of understanding *techne* is in its link to *episteme*. “Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the terms of the four modes of occasioning…It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that *techne* is a bringing forth” (QCT, 319). The four modes of occasioning refer to the four modes of causality,

and indeed all causality is a bringing forth of what was previously concealed. All manufacturing is more properly understood as a revealing, and what is being revealed is the truth, the *aletheia*. Thus the essence of technology is that technology is a revealing. It is that which reveals and unconceals the true essence of an entity.

The question at stake is whether or not modern technology, based on exact science, can also be said to be a revealing. Heidegger maintains that modern technology is indeed just such a revealing, but it is a revealing of a unique kind:

> And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of *poiesis*. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such (*QCT*, 320).

Even modern technology reveals what a thing is, but its revelation takes place through a kind of violence. The main difference between ancient and modern technology lies in how modern technology reveals the world as resource. Heidegger explains that this act of challenging can be called a setting-upon nature. “This setting-upon that challenges the energies of nature is an expediting, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always directed from the beginning towards furthering something else, i.e. toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense” (*QCT*, 321). Modern technology reveals the world as resource, and it also sets upon the entities in the world in order to extract those resources. These resources have no inherent purpose, but rather they only exist to further the process of resource gathering and storage.

The example that Heidegger uses is that of coal, but perhaps gasoline is a more immediate example in this age. In Heidegger’s terms oil is set upon and extracted from
the ground; not for its own sake, but only so it can be refined into petroleum. Petroleum is not refined for its own sake, but only so it can be stored as gasoline. Gasoline is stored up in order to be pumped into vehicles, and vehicles store gasoline in their tanks so that they might burn it for transportation. Transportation serves the purpose of getting people to and from their jobs, even jobs like working at an oil refinery. “Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew” (QCT, 322). Modern technology reveals the entities in the world as resources, and indeed it will only allow them to exist as resources.

Modern technology reveals the being of all entities as purely functional. Heidegger has a particular phrase for the revealing of entities as resources. He calls it the standing-reserve, Bestand (QCT, 322). The logical response might be this: “Surely this is simply a human action driven by human will?” The question is almost as defensive as it is reflexive and this is a puzzle that Heidegger turns his attention to:

Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this revealing that orders happen…yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing–reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing (QCT, 323-324).

The urge to count humanity amongst the standing reserve is strong, but they participate in the ordering of the world in such a way as to resist this. Although they drive the ordering, they are not its authors. The essence of modern technology extends even
beyond the human will to master it. The pertinent question can now be seen as, “What is the true essence of modern technology, and how can this relate to humanity?”

3.4 Enframing

In order to explain the essence of modern technology as a mode of revealing that challenges forth, Heidegger will have to make a new use of a common German word. Heidegger first explains that what brings man into a relation with the world, such that he is ordering it as standing reserve, is best understood as a gathering. “That original gathering from which unfold the ways in which we have feelings of one kind or another we name Gemüt [disposition]” (QCT, 324). The gathering is that which motivates the being of entities in one-way or another. It is that which is responsible for how entities are as they are, in the way that they are. It is not an all-encompassing concept, and indeed there are different gatherings for different entities. The gathering is best understood as the work or act of the revelation of the being of entities. The gathering that Heidegger is most concerned with here is the kind of gathering that is responsible for how humanity orders the standing reserve. “We now name the challenging claim that gathers man with a view to ordering the self-revealing as standing –reserve: Ge-stell [enframing]” (QCT, 324). His next move is to explain that he is using the German word for skeleton or frame, Gestell, in a thoroughly new context in this essay. He makes his apologies to the German language while explaining that this is a philosophical practice dating back to Plato’s revolutionary use of eidos as idea (QCT, 325).

Heidegger’s use of this word enframing warrants a definition, and it is one which he is willing to provide. “Enframing means the gathering together of the setting-upon
that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve. Enframing means the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological” (*QCT*, 325)

The enframing is not machines and it is not technological, it is rather the true essence of technology. The enframing is the gathering that reveals the being of man, in this technological age, as the being who orders the entities of the world as standing reserve. It is what reveals the being of man as orderer, and in turn reveals the other entities of the world as ordered. Enframing is the mode of revealing that holds sway, that is to say it is the mode that is chief and unassailable in the essence of modern technology. It is also significant to point out that the enframing reveals itself as truth, as *aletheia* (*QCT*, 326).

“As Godzinski points out, the truth of the enframing is that things exist as standing-reserve. This may seem to be abhorrent, but it is nonetheless a revealing of the being of entities in the way that they truly are. The nature of truth was elaborated in a lecture that Heidegger gave in the early 1920’s. The lecture was entitled “Being-Here and Being-True”, and Theodore Kisiel elaborates on this Heideggerian notion of truth as unconcealment while commenting on that essay:

> If truth is a disclosive letting-see-and-be-seen, we then have a threefold sense of truth here: a) disclosure of a being by way of prevalent views of it, which include something already seen in them; b) disclosive entry into hitherto unknown domains of being; c) constant struggle with the chatter which gives itself out to be disclosive and knowing. In all three cases disclosure is a human affair, a basic comportment of Dasein.”32

31 Godzinski, 3.

32 Kisiel, 285.
Kisiel shows that truth is always related to humanity, and thus the truth of the essence of technology must also be related. The three ways of disclosing also mirror Heidegger’s notion of questioning, and therefore truth is also shown to be a disclosure that takes place through questions. The question of the essence of technology must now be viewed in light of its relation to humanity.

Heidegger explains that the purpose of this line of questioning has been to discover not only the essence of modern technology, but also its significance and relation for humanity. Since the essence of modern technology is the enframing, then what remains to be asked is how does this relate to humanity? “It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of the machine. It is the way in which the actual reveals itself as standing reserve. Again we ask: Does such revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But neither does it happen exclusively in man, or definitively through man” (*QCT*, 329). The unique aspect of our relationship to the enframing is that humanity is always already under the sway of the enframing. It is the revealing force of our world and we cannot separate ourselves from it.

The enframing not only reveals our world, through us, as standing reserve, but it also reveals history itself in the same way. Heidegger explains that the enframing sends humanity on the way of revealing entities as standing reserve in the form of a destining, *Geschick*. “It is from this destining that the essence of all history [*Geschichte*] is determined” (*QCT*, 329). This destining is what the enframing is as much as it is also what the enframing does. The destining sets upon man, and it challenges him to reveal everything in every way as standing reserve. This is even true of history, since the
destining reveals history as something chronological, to be contained in records for
future study or use. The enframing drives humanity, and it motivates humanity to act and
challenge forth the world as standing reserve.

It is in the notion of destining that Heidegger finds some hope. “But that
destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he
belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who
simply obeys” (QCT, 330). The destining is powerful, but it is not strictly determinate.
Even as it sends man on his way, it also frees him up to certain possibilities. Albert
Borgmann explains destiny in simple terms when he writes, “Destiny is neither an
inevitable fate that descends on humanity, as Heidegger claims, nor the result of human
willing. Disclosure of destiny and human freedom are one and the same.”33 Humanity is
destined but also free, and before this idea can become too confusing Heidegger explains
freedom. “Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing
shimmers the veil that hides the essential occurrence of all truth and lets the veil appear
as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a
revealing on its way” (QCT, 330).

Destining is always a destining of revealing truth, of revealing the way in which
things actually are. The enframing as the destining of the age of technology is a
revelation of being itself. The enframing holds sway in such a manner as to destine
humanity to reveal all entities as standing reserve. Botha explains just what the destining

33 Albert Borgmann, “Technology,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and
of technology is revealing. “In this context technology is neither neutral nor instrumental. It signifies, for Heidegger, a particular mode of disclosure. In other words it reveals Being in a particular way.”

The enframing as the destining of the age of technology is a revelation of being itself. The enframing holds sway in such a manner as to destine humanity to reveal all entities as standing reserve. The enframing is the revelation of the being of entities, since that the entities are, and what the entities are, is unconcealed as standing reserve. Yet the enframing itself, as the destining of this age, is also being itself as it is transformed in this present age. “Being, Heidegger found, changes through history and from the ground up, beginning in pre-Socratic Greece, it passed through various epochs to take its present shape as the framework of technology.”

Every revelation of what is concealed is a revelation of what is being concealed, that is to say of what an entity is being. The unconcealment of any entity as standing-reserve reveals that entity as functional, as being in the sense that Carman denoted with the term *Zuhandenheit*. In the technological age any entity is being available as resource for use and that is how its being is revealed under the revealing sway of the enframing.

Yet what reveals the being of an entity, is Being itself. That is why Heidegger first chose the path to being through *Dasein*, and why in turn he chose the path to the essence of technology through *instrumentum*, the common understanding of the essence.

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34 Botha, 159.

35 Borgmann, 420.

36 Carman, 15.
of technology. The enframing as the mode of revelation and the destining power of this age, is being itself as the destining power of this age. To understand this is to understand precisely why the enframing is significant. “[W]hen we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim” *(QCT*, 330-331). To encounter the enframing as the enframing, to recognize it as such, is to recognize being itself, and that is no small achievement. Despite the joy of this revelation, this understanding of being also brings to light the greatest threat that the enframing poses.

The threat of the enframing is not simply machines that threaten life or health, but something far more sinister:

The essence of technology lies in enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis *(QCT*, 331).

The enframing destines humanity in such a way that the only revealing of truth open to them is the ordering of the entities in the world as standing reserve. This way of revealing opens up only its singular path; while at the same time closing off all other avenues of revealing:

The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger. In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger, that man may misconstrue the unconcealed and misinterpret it…The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger *(QCT*, 331).

The threat is a danger, and it is what Heidegger construes as “the danger.” The threat of misinterpretation of the being of an entity, due to the notion that one is taken up with the
destining of the age, has always been the threat in any mode of revealing. It is far too simple to let oneself be carried away in the spirit of an age, and in so thinking to be absorbed into that spirit.

However just as modern technology is different from ancient technology, the enframing is a revealing that is different from all other modes of revealing as well. “Yet when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme danger” (QCT, 332). The enframing has a special danger associated with it in the sense that it transcends all other modes of revealing as the supreme danger. Heidegger explains that this is the case for two very chilling reasons. If every entity makes an appearance as only standing reserve then man himself will come to be ordered as standing reserve. Botha further explains this threat when she says, “The horror of the technological age is that human beings are also seen as raw material. Thus the ‘question concerning technology’ is ultimately a question about human dignity.”37 It is not only our dignity that is at stake, but in a unique way our humanity itself:

Meanwhile, man precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters himself (QCT, 332).

Humanity never truly encounters its own essence, since it only ever encounters its false essence as the solipsistic lord of the standing reserve. The further threat of the enframing as the supreme danger is that it limits entirely what modes of being that may be revealed by and to humanity. With the enframing, the spirit of the age is not just nearsighted, it is

37 Botha, 160.
almost blind. Only as standing reserve can the being of any entity be revealed, and this
denies any other mode of revealing. Even beyond this it denies revealing itself, since it
will not reveal any mode of revelation as a mode of revelation, but only as a resource to
be used.

Thus, Heidegger explains that the danger of technology is not from the machines
of war, or from any destruction that it creates. “The rule of enframing threatens man with
the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and
hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus where the enframing reigns,
there is a danger in the highest sense. It is in the face of the great threat of the enframing
that Heidegger sees fit to quote some lines of poetry from Friedrich Hölderlin. “But
where danger is, grows the saving power also” (QCT, 332). In the face of danger
Heidegger alludes to hope in the form of a saving power. This discussion now comes to
the saving power, and the end of chapter II. Though Heidegger does make many key
points regarding this power in what remains of the QCT, he makes a far more eloquent
case in his work The Turning. The time has now come to address the saving power, and
its significance for being as it appears in The Turning.
CHAPTER IV
THE TURNING AFTER THE SPIRITUAL

4.1 Introduction

In many ways The Turning is a complimentary essay to the Question Concerning Technology. It was originally written at about the same time as the first draft of the QCT, and it elaborates on a key point made near the end of QCT. If it can be said that the Question reveals the danger, then the Turning reveals the saving power. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, The Turning will be examined in detail.

Quite a bit has been said about the nature of being and the supreme threat posed by the essence of technology as enframing. The enframing is being as it is revealed in this age, or as it is destined, and this sheds light on the supreme danger of the enframing. The danger is that being itself might be entirely closed off from humanity, and that it may only be revealed in the form of the enframing. It is in The Turning that Heidegger outlines the answer to this problem in the form of a saving power. “Even though both essays touch on similar themes, the primary point where both essays converge can be found in Heidegger’s treatment of enframing [Gestell].”38 The turn in the Turning is the revelation that the danger and the saving power are one and the same. This chapter will proceed to analyze the saving power, attempt to explain Heidegger’s answer to the dangers of technology, and examine an original interpretation of Heidegger’s idea of God.

38 Godzinksi, 5.
4.2 Turning

To that end this chapter now opens with beginning of the *Turning*, and the reassessment of the supreme danger. The *Turning* opens with a redefinition of the enframing, and a reintroduction of the danger that the enframing poses. “The essence of Enframing is that setting-upon gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its own coming to presence with oblivion. This entrapping disguises itself, in that it develops into the setting in order of everything that presences as standing-reserve…” Godzinksi represents this as a dual move. “He (Heidegger) maintains that a double movement of concealment can be observed within the overall movement of enframing.” The enframing conceals its true nature as being, by revealing itself as that which orders the standing reserve. It also conceals its nature as the ordering of the standing reserve by revealing itself as technology, that is as the instrument and tool of humanity. Heidegger explains that the supreme danger is the concealing and disguising of being in the form of the dual concealment of the enframing. The enframing only reveals itself as *instrumentum*, the tool for humanity’s mastery over the earth. “But in truth, it is the coming to presence of man that is now being ordered forth to lend a hand to the coming to presence of technology” (Turn, 37). It seems that humanity is utterly lost, deceived by the very forces they believe themselves to control. Yet Heidegger does not take this as

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40 Godzinksi, 5.
an opportunity for pessimism, for it is in this realization that he makes a new discovery about being.

The enframing has a certain temporal quality to it, and the greater realization that this yields is that being has this same quality:

If Enframing is a destining of the coming to presence of Being itself, then we may venture to suppose that Enframing, as one among Being’s modes of coming to presence changes….That which has the character of destining moves, in itself, at any given time, toward a special moment that sends it into another destining, in which, however, it is not simply submerged and lost (Turn, 37).

Heidegger returns to the notion of destining as he seeks to explain the temporal aspect of the enframing. Man’s coming to presence is being ordered to cause technology to come to presence. Technology as the enframing is also coming to presence in the form of the destining of being in this age, but each destining is always moving towards a new destining. The enframing is coming, but it is also going into the veil of history to join every destining of being that has come before. This realization gives the hope that the enframing is changing and it is changing into something else.

It is not destroyed by what it is changing into, since that does not fit the nature of destining. “But destining is essentially destining of Being, indeed in such a way that Being itself takes place so as to adapt itself, and ever comes to presence as a destining and, accordingly changes in the manner of a destining” (Turn, 38). Since every destining is a destining of being itself, history is not a tale of the obliteration of all past destinies. It is important for Heidegger to point out that the destining of being is not constantly dying, but rather it is growing and changing. What is changing is the revelation of being in a certain age, rather than being itself. It is important for Heidegger to preserve the
oneness of being. “For what gives destining its character as destining is that it takes place so as suitably to adapt itself to the ordaining that is ever one” (Turn, 37). There is something strange at work in the flux and stability of being, but it is not one or the other, it is both. This realization of the permanence of being illuminates a feature of the enframing as well, namely its indestructible nature.

The situation now appears to be more dire, for if the enframing cannot be destroyed, then how can any other destining of being ever come to hold sway? While it is true that every destining of being is always on the way to a new destining, the supreme danger of the enframing seems to act against this. Since the danger is that being will forever be concealed, this creates the result that being is revealed only as the enframing. “If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger within Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mastered…” (Turn, 37). The enframing is being, and unless humanity is the master of being they cannot master the enframing. So it seems that humanity is still being delivered over to the enframing. Out of this understanding of the enframing Heidegger returns to a consideration of humanity’s essence and its connection to being.

Humanity will understand its essence when that essence is revealed in Humanity’s coming to presence. Our coming to presence is deeply connected with the coming to presence of being, and a new destining of being cannot come to pass, “without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man” (Turn, 39). This is vital, for as much as humanity is being ordered by the enframing we may still defeat the enframing through a deeper connection to being. Heidegger points out that this defeat will not be an act of
overcoming, but of surmounting. In the German, technology will not be *überwunden*, but rather it will be *verwunden*. This *verwunden* surmounting will bring a new destining of being that restores being into truth. This truth will not be the dual concealment of the enframing, but rather an authentic concealment of being itself as itself. “This restoring surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief or pain” (*Turn*, 39). Heidegger’s analogy is stunning in what it reveals about the vital role of humanity in the changing destiny of the ages. When one ends the grieving process for a lost loved one, the dead still remain dead. The loss still exists, but grief ends when that loss becomes incorporated into a life as part of the whole of that life. The loss is no longer sharp or acute, and it is no longer actively felt. In some ways it always remains present, transformed from that which brings pain into that which gives strength.

In a similar way this surmounting process is what humanity is involved in doing with and for being. “Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology. But man is used here in his essence that *corresponds* to that surmounting” (*Turn*, 39). Humanity is essential to the surmounting of the destining of being as the enframing, but it would be wrong to say that humanity is instrumental in this surmounting. It is not “use” in the way that the enframing uses standing-reserve, but instead it is cooperation. Before this surmounting takes place humanity must become open to the true essence of technology as being. “However, in order that man in his essence may become attentive to the essence of technology, and in order that there may be founded an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their essence, modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of
the space proper to his essence” (*Turn*, 39). This is what Heidegger means by humanity being used in the surmounting of the enframing. We must cooperate with the enframing in the bringing about of a new destining, and thereby in the coming to presence of being. Humanity cooperates by seeking the coming to presence of the essence of humanity, and in the revealing of the essence of humanity there happens place the revealing of a freeing destining of being. “Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything essential within the destining now holding sway” (*Turn*, 39-40). Heidegger has returned to the path of *Dasein*, as he is seeking to understand the surmounting of the enframing.

Heidegger is concerned with understanding the essence of humanity and its connection to the essence of being. Before the essence of humanity can be grasped the essence of being must be questioned. So Heidegger has come to that most troubling of questions that must always precede any project, the question concerning action. “All this we can do only if, before considering the question that is seemingly always the most immediate one and the only urgent one, What shall we do? We ponder this: *How must we think*” (*Turn*, 37)? The realization is that the act of thinking is action, and it is the action that must be taken if the essence of humanity is to be understood. In addition one realizes that questioning about being cannot begin until thinking is questioned. This very act of questioning thinking reveals the correspondence that is needed for humanity’s coming to presence with the coming to presence of being. John Caputo explains that the move of correspondence is the move of cooperation. “The ‘great being’ of man lies in his cooperation with Being in bringing Being into its truth. *Dasein* cooperates with
Being by letting Being be.”41 This correspondence, that is a cooperation, is yielded through the veil of language:

Language is the primal dimension within which man’s essence is first able to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being. *This primal corresponding*, expressly carried out *is thinking*. Through thinking we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to pass the restorative surmounting of the destining of Being, the surmounting of Enframing (*Turn*, 41).

It is thinking that is the act of surmounting, and it is in thinking that the way to surmount the enframing is revealed in a turning.

The advent of the turning is now revealed and the enframing as the danger is turned in upon itself into the saving power. The enframing first appears as the danger in that it turns away from the truth of being and conceals that truth into oblivion. The danger reveals itself in the dual concealment of its true nature: first as instrument and second as enframing. The possibility of the surmounting this danger lies in the unconcealing of the dual concealment of the enframing. “In the coming to presence of the danger there *conceals* itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in –turn homeward– into whatever is” (*Turn*, 41). This turning of the danger into that which actually safeguards the coming to presence of being initially seems quite elusive. How is it that the danger, in concealing itself, is actually safeguarding being itself, and in so doing making way for the surmounting of the enframing?

Heidegger says that this surmounting can only happen after the danger is revealed, and this revelation is a destining of being that remains in doubt. It is this unknown factor that shows humanity for what they are in their correspondence to being. “[B]ecause his essence is to be the one who waits, the one who attends upon the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it” (Turn, 42). Humanity is the safe keeper of being, and it is in thinking that they guard the concealed truth of being. Godzinksi explains that this act of concealment, as native to the enframing and being itself, is needed before any revelation can happen. “Being conceals itself in order to presence. Similarly nothing would be able to come to presence without this concealment. In the process of presencing or coming to be, things necessarily conceal themselves.”

The safeguarding action is one of concealing being into its truth. This act requires patience, in that being is concealed and guarded, so that it might also be revealed. The essence of humanity is tied to shepherding being, and waiting patiently upon being to reveal itself. Thus humanity waits patiently for the danger to be unconcealed as the danger.

This is where the turning takes place at last, for it is in this unconcealment of the danger as danger that the saving power is revealed. Heidegger quotes Hölderlin as he explains the turning revealing of the saving power in the danger:

Where the danger is as the danger, there the saving power is already thriving also. The latter does not appear incidentally. The saving power is not secondary to the danger. The self-same danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power. The danger is the saving power, inasmuch as it brings the saving power

42 Godzinksi, 5.
out of its – the danger’s – concealed essence that is ever susceptible of turning (Turn, 42).

The turning takes place when the truth of being is safeguarded and the surmounting of the enframing happens. The turning begins when the danger is revealed as danger, but this also has the most curious effect. When the danger is so revealed it is not the danger at all, for it is thusly revealed as the saving power. The saving power is the unconcealment of the enframing as that which threatens to conceal being itself into oblivion. This saving is that power that brings being back out of the concealment of the enframing and into its own authentic truth. Against this saving the supreme danger is that being will be concealed in the dual concealment of the enframing, and that its coming to presence will be denied:

When accordingly, the danger is as the danger, then the entrapping that is the way Being itself entraps its truth with oblivion comes expressly to pass. When this entrapping-with-oblivion does come expressly to pass, then oblivion as such turns in and abides…With such in-turning, the oblivion relating to Being’s safekeeping is no longer the oblivion of Being; but rather, turning in thus, it turns about into the safekeeping of Being….world comes to pass. That world comes to pass as world, that the thing things, this is the distant advent of the coming to presence of Being itself (Turn, 43).

This is the turning, the surmounting of the enframing, and the coming to presence of being as being. The world itself comes to pass in this turning, and the power of the enframing is surmounted into a new destining of being. When the enframing is revealed as the danger it becomes the saving power. In that move it reveals, not the standing reserve, but being itself. It reveals the truth that the enframing is the destining of being in this age. In that revelation the enframing reaches the apex of its power and it becomes surmounted by an as yet concealed destining of being. Patricia Johnson summarizes this
move in the following manner. “We recognize that in the course of human history, the way in which Being has been understood has changed…This change in frameworks is experienced as something given, not something manufactured or achieved. This understanding is the saving power.”

Now if this is when the turning comes to pass, there is still the question of how the turning comes to pass. What causes the danger to be revealed as the danger? Surely if the enframing is being itself concealing itself into oblivion, then humanity would remain forever ignorant of it. How then does the turning come to pass?

Heidegger wants to make it clear that the turning comes to pass on its own, and is only revealed through what he calls insight.

When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen only without mediation. For Being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by anything, nor does it itself bring anything about…Sheerly, out of its own essence of concealedness, Being brings itself to pass into its epoch. Therefore we must pay heed (Turn, 44).

The turning happens in its own time as being has destined itself to turn. No human hand can force it, and no natural will can bend it. The turning happens through its own devices, and though the correspondence of humanity is needed for surmounting, it is not within our control. The revelation of the essence of humanity happens in the same way that the essence of technology is revealed, through the changing destining of being. That is why humanity only corresponds in its essence to the essence of being.

43 Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, On Heidegger (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000), 81.
What Heidegger is attempting to make clear is that the turning happens suddenly, and it is revealed in the same way that it happens. Heidegger uses the words *Einblick*, and *Einblitz* to explain this process. “The in-turning [*Einkehr*] that is the lightning flash of the truth of Being is the entering flashing glance – insight [*Einblick*]…When oblivion turns about, when world as the safekeeping of the coming to presence of Being turns in, then there comes to pass the in-flashing [*Einblitz*]…” (*Turn*, 45). The idea is that being makes its appearance known very loudly but also very quickly. Being discloses itself in the flash, but even the sight to behold the flash belongs to being as well. This flashing light of being also reveals the essence of humanity. “Insight into that which is – thus do we name the sudden flash of the truth of Being into truth less Being. When insight comes disclosingly to pass, then men are the ones who are struck in their essence by the flashing of Being. In insight, men are the one who are caught sight of” (*Turn*, 47). When the lightning flash of being reveals itself, what it is revealing is the truth of *Dasein*. It is revealing the essence of humanity corresponding to the essence of being. Humanity is revealed and being itself opens up the world to humanity.

4.3 Dangers

There now reigns in this philosophy of technology the most peculiar passivity to the myriad dangers of technology. It still seems necessary to question this turning that Heidegger has presented to the danger of technology. In this modern age Heidegger seems correct in his assessment of the world as technological. Everywhere, and in every way, machines and technology direct the course of our human existence. It now
It is no secret to anyone that technological devices are extremely prevalent in the western world. It would seem strange to go through the day without encountering some technological device. Despite that, it is not so strange to go through a day without encountering any natural object. In general our clothes, food, water, and even our recycled air are all technologies. We live in a world where many of the things we interact with on a daily basis are artificial. Sometimes it seems that the only non-technological devices in our world are ourselves.

In the face of a technological world the four areas of technological influence and interference that Dias outlined in chapter I spring readily to mind (Dias, 392). In his first category he outlined machines that may do us direct and irreversible physical harm. The nuclear weapon remains one of the most striking example of such a machine. Dias’ second category is that of the tendency of technology to promote injustice (Dias, 393). An insidious use of machines and resources seems to reveal the polarization of classes based on technology. New class structures are being established around the technologically savvy, and the technologically ignorant. Dias’ third category is that technology has profound sociological impacts (Dias, 393). One need only look at the highway system in America to understand the impact technology can have on how society is formed. An authentic sense of community can be lost when community becomes another resource to be accessed on the end of a long drive. Despite these examples the most troubling category is Dias’ last, that of the psychological (Dias, 393).
Technology changes humanity itself from the inside out. Devices like the digital clock have altered our perceptions of time. Life can be divided out into discrete, separable, and infinitely reducible segments.

In the face of the problems that technologies create does Heidegger’s solution really help? How can a passive waiting for a turning deliver humanity from the threat of nuclear weapons, the constant pull of a cell phone, or the distancing nature of transportational technology? Some critics have reached the conclusion that it can’t. In fact much of the criticism of Heidegger’s answer to the danger of technology hinges on the distinction between technology itself, and the particular technologies.

Andrew Feenberg is more than adequate as a representative of one main criticism of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Feenberg posits that a certain defeatist spirit is motivating Heidegger’s answer. Apparently Heidegger has dismissed any sense of a solution calling for action in light of certain failures of his age. “[T]here was a time in his life when Heidegger was not so fatalistic, when he held out the hope of a radical change. Unfortunately this hope was linked with Nazism, the failure of which Heidegger himself eventually recognized.”44 Feenberg puts forth the notion that this failure caused Heidegger to adopt a fatalistic and inactive philosophy of technology. He claims that Heidegger’s final solution is weakened by this attitude of fatalism, and by an inability to deal with particular technologies. “Even if the ‘mode of revealing’ were to shift away from the technological enframing, it seems as though we would still be using the same

devices...he did not apply his thought to actual devices, just to our attitude toward them and toward nature." For Feenberg, Heidegger does not go far enough. Though Heidegger’s philosophy of technology may be interesting, it does not adequately deal with the problems at hand.

Feenberg is almost convinced that even if the new destining of being were to come; humanity would continue to challenge forth the world as standing reserve. Since much of Feenberg’s critique of Heidegger concerns the distinction between technological devices and technology itself, Feenberg seems to agree with Ihde’s criticism. That is, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is weakened by its inapplicability, and its abstract metaphysical nature (Ihde, 385). Rather than viewing this move as sinister, in an act of sympathy Feenberg sees only defeat in Heidegger’s writings. “It seems to me that Heidegger was himself far more deeply touched by modern nihilism than Thomson is willing to concede, far more so than Dreyfus. Nothing in his world escaped the enframing sufficiently to constitute a new ‘god.” Feenberg gives a rather bleak assessment of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It seems that he is arguing that Heidegger’s proposed solution cannot succeed, and perhaps it was never meant to. No turning ever seems to have taken place for Heidegger, and perhaps no turning ever will as long as technology is still in use.

Before one can determine if Heidegger had an adequate answer to these accusations a new problem has arisen. The question raised is, “can a turning ever take

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45 Ibid., 445-446.

46 Ibid, 446.
place, or does the enframing hold an unassailable sway?” The essence of being is concealed into oblivion by the enframing, and it does not seem as though any turning is possible. Despite this Heidegger seems to hold out hope that the saving power has not been defeated, and it may be closer than ever if one is able to see the in-flashing of being. Being may reveal that a new destining of revealing already surmounts the enframing. If one has the insight to see what is already available in Heidegger’s words then the turning may be revealed. Perhaps the meaning of the surmounting can be displayed in the understanding of one of the simplest of Heidegger’s words, nach.

4.4 Revealing the Power

The title of The Question Concerning Technology, is an English translation of the original German title “Die Frage nach der Technik”. A very rough translation of the German might read like this, “The question that is being asked after the technical.” Such a translation does not encapsulate the theme of the essay, and it ignores many deep Heideggerian concerns. The common translation in English-Heideggerian scholarship, The Question Concerning Technology, is quite adequate. It seems that humanity is the questioner, but the technical is not what is being interrogated. Rather the essay is about the technical itself, technology itself, but not merely as a substance. The question concerns technology and indeed, it is a concern for technology, perhaps in the same way that Dasein is concerned for being. Yet if the meaning of the arrival of Heidegger’s turning is to be understood, then perhaps it can be illuminated in that rough translation.


48 Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
If the question can be understood as an “asking after” technology, then perhaps being itself may become illuminated. Please be aware that this is not an attempt to reinterpret or misinterpret Heidegger. It is an effort to show the strength of the German language in revealing the truth of Heidegger’s words. The critical word for this understanding is the simple German preposition nach.

As it is simply translated the word nach means after.\(^4\) This sense of after is the one often used in expressing the time, such as a quarter after two. A simpler meaning might be something like sequence, that which follows after. It is a word of transition, and to understand it in this way reveals the saving power present in the very title of Heidegger’s essay. In this light the question in the title is the question that comes after technology, and it is the question that follows upon technology. What is the nature of the question itself? The question must be that which Heidegger elaborates within the essay, “We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is” (QCT, 312).

Technology, in its essence, is the enframing, the dual concealment of being in the guise of that which challenges forth the world into standing reserve. The title now becomes the question that is being asked after technology has been revealed for what it is. This fits the notion of Heideggerian questioning quite well, as technology is being asked about, but it cannot be asked until it is in some way known.\(^5\)

If the question about what technology is, is being asked after one knows the answer, then this might mean one of two things. Either the answer is the common

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\(^4\) Completely Revised Edition 1995 Langenscheidt’s New College German Dictionary, German-English, s.v. “nach”

\(^5\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 24-25.
answer, that technology is instrumentum, or it is something else entirely. The very work of *QCT* reveals that the answer is in fact not instrument but enframing. If this is the question that is being asked after technology is known to be the enframing, then here is the turning itself expressed already in Heidegger’s title. “When the danger *is* as the danger, with the turning about of oblivion, the safekeeping of being comes to pass; world comes to pass” (*Turn*, 43). When the danger of the enframing is revealed for what it is, then the turning comes to pass. If the enframing holds true sway then all is revealed as standing reserve. Yet if the question is being asked, then it means something powerful, that the turning is already happening. Without the turning, being would remain hidden, and the question asking after technology would only yield the instrumental answer.

If the turning has happened then the question that follows technology is the question that is motivated by the enframing itself. It is brought to light by the revelation of the danger as the danger, and thus it can only come to be asked after technology is truly revealed. The dual concealment is no longer entirely at work, and the enframing has been revealed through the cracks in its facade. The power of this translational understanding is that it can reveal the truth of the turning in the asking of the question. The question no longer is “can the turning be at all?” but “how can the turning be here already active in our world?”

The mystery of the turning already active in the world is contained in the mystery of the revelation of being itself. Being is not mediated, and if Heidegger’s words are to convey meaning then being as both technology and deliverance from technology must
move to reveal itself. “When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen only without mediation. For Being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by anything else nor does it itself bring anything about” (Turn, 44). Being is not caused, nor does it produce effects, rather it is. The turning is not affected by being; it exists already present in being along with the enframing. Yet how can humanity behold this revelation?

Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the insight by which he himself is beheld, renounces human self-will and projects himself toward that insight, away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight. In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], that he, within the safeguarded element of world, may, as the mortal, look out toward the divine. Otherwise not; for the god also is – when he is – a being and stands as a being within being and its coming to presence, which brings itself to pass out of the worlding of world (Turn, 47).

This is the mystery of the turning, that in humanity’s renouncement of will and action the turning comes to pass. When the turning passes and humanity is freed into its essence, then humanity is given to understand its place in the world. In the words that Heidegger has written above, that is a place where mortal, finite, humanity looks out towards the divine, to God. What is the meaning of God’s appearance for Heidegger? Is this being in another form, a return to Christianity, or something else entirely? It seems certain even now that if being leads humanity to God, then it leads us on a path that has yet to be understood fully.

4.5 God

The question of how the turning can take place has now become embroiled in the question of God, and its meaning for Heidegger. In reference to the power of the enframing, and the danger of this age, Heidegger made a now famous statement in an interview. “Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a
sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in the time of foundering (Untergang); for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder.\textsuperscript{51} While Dreyfus gave his humanistic interpretation of this statement in chapter I, he is not the only voice on the subject. Dreyfus thinks that Heidegger’s god is a new human practice that will impart meaning to the world. This does not seem to entirely grasp the total releasement of human self-will that Heidegger expresses in the end of the turning. Perhaps an understanding of this releasement could focus what Heidegger means in speaking of God.

In the words of Botha, Heidegger is simply promoting patience as the expression of a reopening of humanity to thinking. He speaks of god not in some strict religious sense, but only to illustrate a need to appreciate the unknown. “No all-powerful entity will redeem us. The moral, redemptive god is as dead for Heidegger as for Nietzsche…He advocates a ‘god-less’ thinking which abandons a metaphysically constructed God, a God that can be known as an object that subjects evaluate.”\textsuperscript{52} Botha seems convinced that Heidegger is not looking for the \textit{deus ex machina}, but rather he is seeking a new way of thinking. This way of thinking is the respect for the unknown, and it is Botha’s understanding of the answer that Heidegger gives to the question of technology. To be released from human self will means to be released from the need for action, and into the mystery of the revealing truth that comes from thinking. Botha’s


\textsuperscript{52} Botha, 165-166.
understanding of Heidegger’s move is much more traditionally philosophical, and the solution to the problem of technology comes in the form of quiet reflection. The turning will be realized when humanity sits down and thinks about it. Thomson echoes this sentiment in his own writings:

Heidegger’s resacralization of the simple ‘thing’ reminds us that the conditioned has roots in the unconditioned, the secular in the sacred, and thus suggest that we should adopt a very different attitude toward our world, a Grundstimmung much more reflective and thankful than the thorough-going instrumental reasoning characteristic of our technological mode of revealing.53

This shares many of Heidegger’s sympathies on questioning and thinking. It is in thinking that the realization of the turning flashes before the eyes of the thinker.

Yet something still remains mysterious, and that is the move of being. If one arrives at the turning through reflection, what makes the turning arrive at all? How is it that one is even brought to reflect on the turning? The question of how the turning can take place appears again, and with an even greater urgency. If thinking is the path to understanding the turning, then what starts us upon that path? What makes the path available at all? The answer may be contained within the mystery of the connection between God and being.

The mystery of God and being is furthered by the connection that Heidegger draws for them in the end of The Turning. One of the concerns for many a thinker after Nietzsche regards the existence of God after his untimely death. Heidegger gives voice

to this concern at the end of *The Turning*, and in so doing sheds some light on the path that the turning takes:

> Whether the god lives or remains dead is not decided by the religiosity of men and even less by the theological aspirations of philosophy and natural science. Whether or not God is God comes disclosingly to pass from out of and within the constellation of Being. So long as we do not, through thinking, experience what is, we can never belong to what will be (*Turn*, 49).

This is a mysterious interplay of words and meaning near the very end of Heidegger’s essay, but it is an issue of some deep concern for him, and the author of this thesis.

One might make a classical theological move, and say that God is being. However, this would ignore many Heideggerian sympathies, and at best be a move of too much simplicity. John Caputo illustrates well the difference between being and God in an essay on Heidegger and Theology. “Thinking is directed toward being, not God. Being is not God but the event of manifestness, the happening of the truth of being, the coming to pass of the history of the epochal manifestations of being – from the early Greeks to the will to power.”

54 Caputo understands that the destining character of being is what makes it quite different from the Christian conception of God. Yet if being is not the same as God, then what is the god in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology? Caputo admits that this is the source of much debate and conflict for Heidegger. Though he says that when Heidegger talks of the gods, or of “The Fourfold” he is speaking of a poetical deity. “The Fourfold – earth and sky, mortals and gods – is a deeply Hölderlinian conception that Heidegger derived from his readings of Hölderlin’s poetizing of the

Greek world. So the god that emerges in Heidegger’s late writing is a profoundly poetic god. While Caputo is very sympathetic towards any Christian leanings Heidegger might have, he simply does not see their expressed presence in Heidegger’s writings on technology.

To be sure there are many sympathies which a Christian might share with Heidegger on the nature of technology and its danger for our world. However, Heidegger’s answer is not an overtly Christian one, and Heidegger does not seem to be advocating a turn to religion. What then has become of the turning and its connection to God and Being? How can the turning be happening and technologies still exist? How can the turning appear in this world at all? From whence comes the turning? It is this last question that now reveals an original and helpful way to understand God in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

If the supreme danger, as the enframing, can be said to hold sway over this world then the mystery of the truth of being may always be denied. If the enframing holds power, then the danger will forever be concealed. Yet it is in the revelation of the turning that the danger appears as danger, and is surmounted by the saving power that bears humanity home into its essence. This comes to pass when the danger is revealed as the danger within the quiet reflection of thinking. One may still ask what leads us to think, and what leads us to this understanding? It could be that being itself is revealing itself to us, but it does this in such a way as to reveal the enframing as being. If this cannot be mediated, and we cannot arrive at it through our own will, then we must wait for its

55 Ibid., 283.
appearance. We could not even see it unless when it flashed it also granted us the insight to view its flash (Turn, 47). Being reveals itself in a manner most mysterious. It creeps into our minds and causes us to ask the question concerning technology. It is not acting as an infiltrator, but it is already present within us. How can something that is present within us, reveals its nature to us, and bears a relationship of correspondence to us, be understood? The move towards the divine is astoundingly close.

Here lies the mystery, that being behaves or acts, yet it is not a substance or creature. This line of thinking and questioning opens up a new path for understanding God through being in Heidegger. Being is, and yet it is not anything at all that we can understand. Being also frees us, the mortals, to look out toward the divine, and contemplate the coming of the God. Perhaps Botha’s sympathies suit the situation best and Heidegger is calling for a respect for the unknown. Yet Dreyfus understood the change to be a radical altering of everything we once believed. Nietzsche wrote that God was dead in The Madman, and this has been understood to mean that people have lost faith in Him. For Heidegger, the being of God may come to be revealed out of the being of being. When will this come to pass, and in what destining will God be revealed at last? The destining is always unknown, and all that is certain is that each destining will be surmounted in turn. Perhaps this understanding of Heidegger may allow for the final destining of being to be a revealing of being as God himself. Perhaps if mankind is mortal then history might be too. Is it so inconceivable to think that if the enframing is being surmounted by the revelation of its being, then the new destining might be the

56 Nietzsche, 97.
last? Heidegger was not closed off to the possibility of God’s revelation as God, but he was convinced that it would come only through the revelation of being. Surely also the attitude of the turning applies here as well. One must wait in the spirit of releasement, and be patient for the appearing of being. “In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eigner], that he within the safeguarded element of the world, may, as the mortal look out toward the divine” (Turn, 47). It is a hard thing to grasp the power of patience, and of letting the mysterious remain unknown. However, if the truth of the turning can be understood, then the power of technology in this world is already breaking, and the coming of a new destining is at hand.

It may come to pass that this new understanding of Heidegger may show God revealed as already active in this world in causing humanity to correspond in its essence to the essence of being. It may be that God’s will causes the revelation of being, and the revelation of humanity’s essence as well. In light of this turning, the lesser dangers of technologies may come to pass away in much the same fashion as the supreme danger of technology itself. Thus while the danger reigns supreme, humanity may yet look out and behold the saving power in the revelation of God.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the primary aim of this thesis has been to show technology as the revelation of being in this age, in Heidegger’s philosophy. The thesis began with the question of “what motivates Heidegger or anyone to reflect philosophically on technology?” Through the works and words of Thomson, Ihde, Dias, and Dreyfus several influences were revealed.

Thomson points out that the historical metaphysical influence of Nietzsche has been instrumental in creating the current technological worldview of the west. The influence of Kant motivated Heidegger to view the world as a projection of human thought and ideas through metaphysics. Heidegger is also reacting against Nietzsche, and Heidegger is attempting to combat the nihilism of this age. Ihde sees Heidegger as motivated by the philosophy of science that he absorbed from Husserl and the logical positivists of the early twentieth century. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology seems to be years ahead of its time, as it shows technology’s precedence over science in technoscience. Ihde is ultimately frustrated by Heidegger’s supposed metaphysics, and Ihde claims that a more robust system would speak to the differences between technologies. It is Dias who finds the motivation for a philosophy of technology in technologies themselves. He divides all harmful technologies into four categories in an attempt to show a practical motivation for a philosophy of technology. The categories of the physically harmful, unjust, sociologically harmful, and psychologically harmful typify all manner of technological devices that cause even Heidegger to reflect on a
philosophy of technology. It is in the words of Dreyfus that Heidegger’s personal philosophical search for the understanding of being takes the forefront. Dreyfus explains that being, and its connection to technology, is the driving force behind Heidegger’s philosophy. Dreyfus also reveals a spiritual concern for the destiny of the west in Heidegger’s need for a god. Although he interprets this need as a sociological need for a new metaphysical grounding, Dreyfus opens up the path to revealing an original interpretation of Heidegger’s God through an understanding of being.

The second movement in this thesis dealt with the idea of being and technology in Heidegger’s works. Through the aid of Taylor Carman, Theodore Kisiel, and the analysis of the introduction to *Being and Time*, a satisfactory definition of being was produced. An understanding of being is best attained through the understanding of being for a particular being, *Dasein*. Being is that which gives *Dasein* its form, function, existence, frame, and place in which to be. It is not simply the absolute grounding for things, but is in some sense the grounds for understanding the absolute. Invariably this understanding of being will prove significant for Heidegger’s understanding of technology as the thesis turns to the *Question Concerning Technology*.

The *QCT* contains the bulk of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, and yet it begins as a question. At the heart of *QCT* is the question of “what is technology?” Heidegger points out that the common understanding of technology is as instrument. Despite this understanding the question of what technology is seeks the essence of technology, and the essence of technology is enframing. The enframing causes all entities, and particular beings to be revealed as resources for use. The enframing is the
destining of being in this age, since it is being that reveals entities for what they are. Technology is being itself as the force in this age that causes all things to be revealed as resource. Humanity is deceived into thinking that they are the masters of technology when it truly masters them, since being is beyond human mastery. The supreme danger of technology lies in that it denies every revelation of an entities being except for the revelation of that being as resource. That the being of all entities’ is limited in this way cuts off the revelation of being itself as being, and causes humanity to lose sight of its own essence. Yet in this danger there is a turning that takes place.

The final movement of the thesis begins with a discussion of Heidegger’s *The Turning* as it shows the path to answer the supreme danger of technology. While the enframing holds sway, it doubly conceals what it truly is. Technology conceals itself as instrument, and then conceals itself as the enframing, when its true identity is that of being itself as the destining of this age. The turning takes place when technology is revealed as being, and when it is so revealed the danger is surmounted by a saving power. Where technology is revealed as being, the danger of technology cutting off all revelations, except resource, is surmounted by the saving power that reveals being itself in technology. Though technology cannot be overcome by humanity it can be surmounted if humanity will cooperate with the enframing in revealing its true essence as being. In so doing humanity may once again uncover its true essence as the safe keepers of being.

Though Heidegger’s philosophy addresses the danger of technology, some skepticism still persists regarding the lesser dangers. The four harmful kinds of
technologies that Dias raised are raised again as a threat that does not seem to be dealt with. Andrew Feenberg is referenced in his critique of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Feenberg seems convinced that Heidegger is caught up in nihilism and that his turning cannot happen. Feenberg holds that humanity will continue to reveal all entities as resources despite any philosophical revelation Heidegger may have had. Despite these criticisms Heidegger’s philosophy still opens a path for a rich philosophical understanding of technology.

The thesis reveals the saving power as already active in the world through an analysis of the use of the German word nach. This word is drawn from the German title of QCT, Die Frage nach der Technik. This analysis reveals that the title could be read as the “Question that is Being Asked after the Technical.” This translation reveals that the question about technology is already being asked. The question could not have been asked unless technology was already revealed for what it truly is, as enframing and as being. Thus reflection on technology comes only after it is revealed as being. This cannot happen if the enframing holds an unassailable sway. It seems that the turning is already happening and that the enframing is already being revealed for what it is. The saving power reveals not only being but also humanity’s essence, and it frees humanity to look out towards God.

Finally, this thesis makes the move to understand Heidegger’s notion of God and the possible revelation of God through his philosophy of technology. This is an original understanding of Heidegger’s notion of God, and it opens up a new and helpful path to understanding Heidegger. The ideas at stake fly against the grain of Dreyfus’
understanding of Heidegger’s god, as well as Botha’s. It could be that it is the power of God, already active in this world that gives the enframing to be revealed as the enframing. Indeed the saving power might be thought of as a saving grace in the sense that it is a revelation of a salvific deity. It is this deity that takes a care for humanity and thus reveals itself through being. It seems that this Deity is not present in this world, and that is because the revelation of God is an event that has yet to take place. While being is turning and revealing itself in a new way, the hope of the author is that it may yet reveal itself as God in a final destining move.
WORKS CITED


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