SOLVING SLAVERY IN SUDAN:
SOLVING A SOCIAL PROBLEM THROUGH NATION BUILDING

A Senior Honors Thesis
by
Brandon Krueger

Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs
& Academic Scholarships
Texas A&M University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE
RESEARCH FELLOWS

April 2006

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Approved as to style and content by:

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Major: English
ABSTRACT

Solving Slavery in Sudan:
Solving a Social Problem Through Nation Building (April 2006)

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Almost unique in the world, chattel slavery persists in Sudan into the 21st century. The U.N. and various NGOs have provided evidence that slavery exists in modern Sudan and that the government has done little, if anything, to stop it. The efforts of NGOs to stop slavery have largely failed, and perhaps even fueled the slave trade by paying to free slaves, which created a market for them. This thesis examines the complex history of Sudan that led to 2006, analyzes modern abolishment efforts to discover why they have failed, and develops a solution based on a Nations’ “Hierarchy of Needs” that can be applied in Sudan and is practical on political, economic, and cultural levels. My history analysis hinged on a review of academic texts, government documents, credible journalism, and slave testimonials. Recurring patterns in that history were identified and explained so as to provide a basis of issues, which the solution must address. I adapted Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to define three
necessities, Security, Sovereignty, and Economy, and two sustaining needs, Identity and Adaptation. Each need is reliant on its predecessors in the Hierarchy and when employed together, will successfully build Sudan into an economic and diplomatic partner of the world. The establishment of security and peace in Sudan are fundamental to cutting off slave trading routes and establishing Sudan’s sovereignty and subsequent improved diplomatic relations. The Sudanese government can then use these improved diplomatic relations to help diversify their economy through foreign investment and international trade based on improving labor standards for export quotas, which will reduce slave markets through moral spillover from industry leaders who were forced to improve labor standards to stay in business. Economic growth fosters a national identity that provides the impetus for Sudan to undergo a moral reform that may lead to a final crackdown on slavery. The resultant solution can be applied to Sudan in 2006 or at any point in Sudan’s progress in the future, but will be most effective if applied to establishing security in Darfur and built from that peace.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been written without the initial push from Dr. Finnie Coleman to look at the root causes of the conflict in Sudan and his willingness to serve as my advisor, despite taking a position at the University of New Mexico and having to assist at a distance of nearly 800 miles. I owe further thanks to my parents for never discouraging me to study English and travel abroad to feed my interest in international affairs and instead always providing support and encouragement. Perhaps more than anyone, though, I owe thanks to those around me who encouraged and indulged me while I wrote this thesis and brought them my new ideas.

The Academy for Future International Leaders did a great deal to prepare me for the multifaceted issues this thesis deals with and my classmates were some of my greatest assets. Two of those classmates, Ryan and Aaron, were always willing to talk international relations and Beau was instantly encouraging upon hearing I planned to work on solving slavery in Sudan with his offer to travel with me to Sudan to do primary research because he was raised in Africa. I didn’t get to go to Sudan, but Beau’s encouragement meant a lot. I also owe a great deal of thanks to Lindsay for always offering encouragement, telling me that I was skilled enough to tackle this ambitious topic and for her patience while I worked on it. Finally, I owe thanks to Horacio for never acting like a suggestion or idea was too ambitious. When I started thinking about trying to go to Sudan, Horacio responded without hesitation, saying I could handle it and I should go. I’m still not as sure as he was about going to Sudan, but the full support of me in everything involved in this thesis was invaluable.
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MAP OF SUDAN IN 2000

INTRODUCTION

Slavery exists in the 21st century. It exists in Asia, Europe, Africa, and the United States. Slavery in Sudan is distinct from slavery in all other parts of the world outside of Mauritania because it is chattel slavery. In Sudan, people are bought and sold to be used like beasts of burden in the particular type of slavery not found in the U.S. since the Civil War.

The history of slavery in Sudan spans thousands of years to nearly 3000 B.C. and has operated with few interruptions over the course of that period. The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to provide a precise history of Sudan—for that, P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly’s *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* is a fine work—nor is it to chronicle the existence of slavery in the 21st century for which Jok Madut Jok’s *War and Slavery in Sudan* is appropriate. Instead, this thesis uses portions of each of these disciplines to answer the question of how to realistically solve slavery in Sudan after 5000 years of its existence.

The answer to the question is complex and interdisciplinary. It requires an understanding of the history of Sudan to understand how the situation currently facing the country came to be and to provide a glimpse of understanding into the Sudanese mindset as it was expressed through history. To step outside of history or the political realities of modern Sudan would be to render the solution useless because it can never be implemented. Therefore, this thesis briefly examines through an extensive literature

This thesis follows the style and format of the *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*.
review relying heavily on the work of Holt, Daly, Helen Metz, and Mohammad Hassan Fadlalla, the history of Sudan to understand the situation in which a solution to slavery must be created. Furthermore, the literature review included an examination the history of slavery to understand the resilience and methods behind slavery’s persistence in Sudan for the purpose of creating a solution that negates the fundamental reasons for slavery’s survival in Sudan. Finally, the literature review also included an examination of modern abolishment efforts in Sudan, which were subsequently analyzed for their effectiveness. This analysis provides a clear picture of why the abolishment efforts have thus far failed to produce a workable solution to solving slavery in Sudan.

The solution to slavery in Sudan in this thesis utilizes all the historical and current political information on the country to create a plan for stopping the violence that has enveloped the country for over twenty years and building it into a nation capable of cracking down on the slave trade and eliminating it. The solution proposed will accomplish this by implementing measures that have already been applied with success elsewhere under reasonably similar circumstances to those facing Sudan. This precedent of success in similar circumstances validates the solution’s practicality in applying these measures in Sudan. A logical argument for the synthesis of these heretofore disparate components of nation building in Sudan will be outlined in detail, creating a practical, workable solution to solving slavery in Sudan.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUDAN
The Cush and Meroitae: ca. 2180 B.C. to 642 A.D.

The slave trade in the Sudan began as early as 2180 B.C., which was propagated with Egypt along with ivory, incense, and stones used for jewelry and weapons in exchange for grain from Egypt. These slaves served in Egypt as domestic servants, soldiers, and concubines of very much value. The supplier of these slaves in present day Sudan was the Cushite people, who were later annexed by Egypt in circa 1550-1525 B.C. as a province governed by a viceroy (Metz “Cush”). The resultant cultural spillover led to the Egyptian Coptic language to be spoken, the adoption of Egyptian deities, and Egyptian-style temple building throughout Cush. The eventual collapse of Egypt’s New Kingdom in the eleventh century B.C. led to renewed independence in Cush (Metz “Cush”).

An invasion from Egypt in 590 B.C. forced the Cushite rulers to move their court to a safer location in Meroe, near the Nile’s sixth cataract. Here, the Cushite kingdom became the Meroitic kingdom and flourished independent of Egypt, which was ruled by Persians, Greeks, and Romans in this period. At its strongest point, from 300-200 B.C., the Meroitic kingdom had a well developed irrigation system, which allowed for higher density populations than would be possible in the modern state, and a centralized political system that extended from the third cataract in the north to a city near present day Khartoum in the south (Metz “Meroe”). By 350 A.D., however, the kingdom’s power had declined to the point that it became a buffer state for Roman-controlled Egypt and was formally ended by an Axumite army from modern Ethiopia, which destroyed the kingdom’s capital city.
Nubia, al-Muqurra, and ‘Alwa: 639-1500

The Muslim Arab conquest of Egypt from 639 to 641 brought a new threat to what had been a secure northern border for the three kingdoms that comprised what is now modern Sudan. From north to south, these three kingdoms were the Nubian, the Makoritae, and Alodaei kingdoms, and despite the distinction between them, Egypt referred to all people in the kingdoms as Nubians. In 651, the new Arab governor of Egypt, ‘Abdallah ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Sarh, led a military force to lay siege to the Makoritae capital of Dongola and the new border threat emerged (Holt 13).

The governor’s military campaign met resistance from the Nubians and fell victim to poor communication from Egypt, as it stalled to a halt in its attempt to advance into the Makoritae kingdom. Over a period of years, a largely Christian Sudan, which was converted by Christian missionaries, was infiltrated by Arab Egyptians, which apparently allowed for a diplomatic solution, as ‘Abdallah ibn Sa’d’s expedition concluded with a treaty between Egypt and the Makoritae, or al-Murqurra in Arabic. The treaty provided Egypt with a legal trade agreement called a baqt, after the ancient Greek term, pakton, which meant each party upheld established obligations in exchange for payments (Holt 14). As P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly assert in A History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, the revival of a Greek term for this agreement suggests this was also a revival of an older trade agreement between the two countries. Under the terms of the baqt, Egypt would send provisions to Nubia annually in exchange for a shipment of slaves, usually numbering 360 persons (Holt 14).
The ninth century saw a migration from al-Muqurra to al-Ma’din, or the Land of Mines, in the quest for precious metals and jewels. This land was not controlled by Egypt or Nubia, but it was Arab controlled. The most prominent of these Arab rulers was ‘Abdallah al-‘Umari, who purchased slave laborers and sought to conquer the mines in the last 25 years of the ninth century (Holt 14). He played off both Arab and tribal strife to establish his dominance and even defeated an Egyptian force sent to depose him. Tribal assassins eventually killed him, but his success shows not only the expansion of Arab control into Nubia, but a glimpse into the region’s economic model via al’Umari’s utilization of slave-laborers at al-Ma’din (Holt 15).

In 969, the Fatimid Caliphate conquered Egypt and promptly sent Ibn Sulaym al-Aswani to Dongola with the purpose of reestablishing trade relations with Nubia after the conquest and to attempt to convert the Nubian king to Islam (Holt 15). The former directive met some success with the reestablishment of the slave trade, but the second directive was purely Fatimid propaganda and failed, perhaps predictably, because of the Nubian king’s and his people’s adherence to Christianity. The value of Ibn Sulaym’s expedition, however, was not its end result as much as that it provided perhaps the most complete and accurate account of the Nubian kingdom from that period.

Ibn Sulaym showed that the penetration of Arabs from the north was not complete in Nubia by 969. Maris was the northernmost Nubian province Ibn Sulaym passed through to get to al-Muqurra. Northern Maris was open to Muslims, as Ibn Sulaym found Muslim landowners, traders, intermarriage with non-Muslims, and conversion to Islam (Holt 16). Beyond this northern area, however, were two Nubian
fortresses, Ibrim and Bajrash, which regulated further Muslim movement into al-Muqurra. Bajrash was under the direct control of the governor, who controlled trade upstream and provided Muslims with slaves in exchange for provisions. His control of trade was stringent to the extent that at Taqwi, just south of the modern northern border of Sudan, boats headed south were stopped and required to obtain the governor’s permission to continue. Violators received the death penalty.

Ibn Sulaym obtained permission to pass beyond Taqwi and found the rare opportunity for an Egyptian to see Batn al-Hajar, a region which was effectively cutoff from Muslim influence. In Batn al-Hajar, Ibn Sulaym found that there was no Muslim currency used because there were no Muslim merchants as a result of strict border control from the governor under the king’s power. The cordoned-off region provided the Nubians with a staging ground for raids on southern Egypt, with whom they remained occasionally hostile. Within this isolated region, Ibn Sulaym found that trade existed with some success on the local level with the market trading primarily slaves, livestock, iron, and grain (Holt 16).

Upon reaching Dongola, Ibn Sulaym quickly discovered he would not convert the Nubian king, but he was allowed to lead a prayer for a Muslim religious feast. Ibn Sulaym counted sixty Muslims at this prayer service and since his party contained a fair number of the sixty, lamented that it was a small Muslim population, as could be expected with the northern governor’s restriction of southward Muslim movement at Taqwi (Holt 16). Ibn Sulaym was more successful at reestablishing the slave trade for Egypt, as much of the Egyptian army was comprised of both black and white slave
soldiers for hundreds of years. This trade continued until 1169 when Saladin expelled these soldiers to Upper Egypt after a revolt (Holt 17).

By 1268, the al-Muqurra kingdom began to falter with a series of power seizures and rivalries reciprocated with political instability in Egypt, which interrupted the slave-trading baqt between the two countries. Egypt requested that the baqt be reestablished and took the offensive in 1275 to reestablish it by expanding Egyptian influence southward. Egypt successfully attacked al-Muqurra, deposed its king in Dongola, and established a puppet king who took an oath to the Egyptian sultan as his overlord. This marked the first time in 600 years of Muslim rule of Egypt that a Muslim force had penetrated so deep into Nubia (Holt 19). Under Egyptian control, Nubia came under Muslim rule and protection, which meant that Christians living within the kingdom became dhimmis, who had to pay tribute to their rulers for their protection. Fortresses in Nubia were forced to surrender their revenue to the Egyptian Sultan and the security of al-Muqurra as a land from which the Nubians could launch raids on Egypt was at an end (Holt 19).

While little is known of al-Muqurra after their fall to Egypt because the government slowly withered away and there was no entity with which Egypt could pursue the baqt, the successful Egyptian power seizure spurred in part to resume the slave trading agreement suggests that the slave trade resumed. Indeed, by the fourteenth century, al-Muqurra ceased to exist in any recognizable form, as Arab clans settled into nomadic lifestyles on its former lands. Nubians lacked any power to stop the nomads
and were eventually neutralized by intermarriage and marriage alliances, whereby terminating Nubian control over the land (Holt 20).

The history of the southern portion of modern Sudan is much less well-documented than al-Muqurra due to its isolation from Egypt. The kingdom of ‘Alwa, also chronicled by Ibn Sulaym in his visit to Soba, the capital, which was predominantly Christian with a Muslim suburb. He found that the king could enslave anyone for any offense, but was not disliked and was even revered (Holt 20). ‘Alwa’s decline remains largely unknown, but Holt and Daly explain that with the dissolution of al-Muqurra, there was nothing to stop Muslims from migrating southward into ‘Alwa and neutralizing its rulers through marriage, as happened in al-Muqurra. Christianity, however, persisted in this southern region and was documented by a Portuguese embassy to Ethiopia from 1520-26, which cited 150 churches in ‘Alwa. This large number was soon to decline, though, as Christian Nubians took on Arab protectors while Nubia entered into an age of instability largely lost to history from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century (Holt 21).
The Funj and Keira: 1500-1820

The Funj kingdom, whose origin is in dispute, was established from 1504-05 in what had been the ‘Alwa kingdom in southern Sudan. One of its leaders, ‘Amara Dunqas, founded the al-Saltana al-Zarqa, or the Black Sultanate, in Sennar, which became the Funj capital (Metz “The Funj”). The Funj people were cattle nomads and Sennar did not see a permanent settlement there until as late as 1616 when a mosque was founded in the city. Nevertheless, by the mid-sixteenth century the Funj controlled states and tribal districts from the third cataract to the rainforests in southern Sudan. The states under the sultan’s control paid taxes and tribute and supplied soldiers who established for the pagan Funj a military barrier between Muslims in northern Sudan, Abyssinians in the east, and non-Muslim blacks in the south (Metz “The Funj”). A conversion to Islam by Dunqas occurred very early in the sultanate and religion within it became somewhat of a mixture between Islam and the pagan traditions already established within it.

The Funj economy depended largely on the slave trade. In addition to serving as a commodity, slaves were seen as a solution in the mid-seventeenth century to the problem of depending on vassal states for soldiers (Metz “The Funj”). A consolidation of the government to a centralized authority from 1642-81 saw the slave army grow before the dynasty was overthrown in 1718 by the warrior elite who had been disempowered by the use of slave soldiers (Metz “The Funj”). A series of successively less powerful rulers reduced the Funj sultanate to powerlessness by the early eighteenth century.
Meanwhile, while the Funj rose to power in the south, the Keira clan rose to power in what is now Darfur. The Keira rose to power out of the powerful Daju and Tunjur tribes, established its capital at al-Fashir in northern Jabal Marra, and quickly expanded throughout modern Darfur (Holt 31).

The first Keira ruler was Sulayman who declared Islam the sultanate’s official religion in 1596. Widespread conversion began during the reign of Ahmad Bukr from 1682-1722 as he imported Islamic teachers, built mosques, and required his subjects to convert to Islam. Bukr also expanded the sultanate to border with the Zaghawa nomads in the north, the Musabba’at to the east, and Wadai in the west (Holt 32). These three bordering powers prevented further expansion via their resistance to Bukr, but the south had no such opposition.

South of Darfur, black Africans were enslaved by the sultanate as the primary trading commodity with the Zaghawa and Egyptians to the north. The sultanate established taxes on exported slaves and took for itself a portion of the slaves brought into Darfur. Certain domestic slaves achieved places of prominence in the sultanate, which led to periodic unrest with the traditional aristocracy through the eighteenth century (Holt 32). Nevertheless, while the Funj fell into disarray in the south, the Keira remained at the height of their power in the late eighteenth century and saw the first efforts to establish trade agreements with Ottoman-controlled Egypt (Holt 35).

Upon ascension to the throne in 1785, ‘Abd al-Rahman sent a present to the Ottoman sultan in an effort to establish political goodwill. He sent three female slaves three eunuchs and while the Ottoman sultan had not heard of al-Rahman, he returned an
ornamented saber, a diamond ring, and a fur cloak (Holt 36). Furthermore, in 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte was in Egypt and he too received a letter from al-Rahman. Bonaparte replied in economic terms and asked the sultan to send 2,000 black slaves over sixteen years old to form an army. This effort came to nothing and the remainder of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century featured a series of Sufi Muslim reform teachers who came to Darfur and purged Islam there of its ancient pagan traditions (Holt 36). This religious reform absorbed Darfur until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1820.
Formation of Al-Turkiyya: 1820-1825

In 1805, Muhammad Ali was appointed by the Ottomans to regain control of what had been a recently chaotic Egypt. By 1811, Ali purged revolutionary Mamluks from Egypt, who in turn setup their own state in Dongola, from which they administered a slave trade and took blacks as slave soldiers to bolster their numbers. In 1820, Ali sent 4,000 troops to purge Sudan of Mamluks and reclaim it for Egypt (Metz “The Turkiyah”).

Muhammad Ali had risen to power on the backs of 10,000 Albanian troops supplied by the Ottomans, but by 1820 these troops proved to be insubordinate and dangerous. Ali reasoned that the task of reconquering the Sudan and its gold mines was the perfect task for such an army restless for action. More importantly, however, discovering gold mines would make Ali independently wealthy and grant him independence from the Ottoman sultan (Holt 42).

The expedition, led by Isma’il Pasha, began on July 20, 1820 from Aswan and advanced southward via boats on the flooded Nile. The force met little resistance as it overpowered its foes with firearms and took the powerless Funj kingdom at Sennar. Ali’s force quickly moved west to Kordofan where it again overpowered its opposition with firearms (Holt 43). Darfur, still farther west, was not to be subdued, however, and remained outside of Ali’s complete control in its remote regions (Holt 44).

By 1821, Isma’il Pasha established a government in Sennar with his brother and were urged by Muhammad Ali Pasha to send slaves northward. Several expeditions southward brought 30,000 slaves to Egypt in 1822 for training and introduction into the
Egyptian army. This force, however, was decimated by the harsh climate and disease in Egypt and could only be used at outposts in the Sudan itself (Metz “The Turkiyah”).

The new government in Sennar became known as al-Turkiyya and slowly gained local acceptance by offering tax exemptions for tribal and religious leaders while Egyptian soldiers and Sudanese slave soldiers manned forts in Khartoum, al-Ubayyid, and Kassala to maintain military control (Metz “The Turkiyah”). Sudan was divided into provinces that were further divided to the tribal level, which led to tribal leaders and sheikhs assuming administrative duties and the establishment of provincial administrative centers. Isma’il Pash planned to levy taxes were on owners of slaves, cows, sheep and donkeys at such a rate that Holt and Daly believe the taxes’ actual intent was confiscation of property (47). Holt and Daly explain that since taxes could be paid in slaves instead of cash, the al-Turkiyya could send slave laborers to Egypt to serve in Muhammad Ali’s much sought after slave army. Not surprisingly, such a plan was not well received by the Sudanese whose property was to be seized and Isma’il was killed in an October or November 1822 uprising.

The revolt lacked unity and leadership, which allowed for a brutal but swift suppression by the Defterdar of Darfur who pledged his loyalty to Isma’il after being conquered by him. The Defterdar conquered and massacred a great many of the rebellious factions and by January 1824 was informed by Muhammad Ali that his mission was complete. The Defterdar quickly sent all prisoners of war to Cairo and awaited his successor, whose arrival allowed the Defterdar to himself travel to Cairo (Holt 46).
In 1824, the new governor-general moved his government to strategically important Khartoum, found at the intersection of the Blue and White Nile, but maintained his military headquarters at Wad Medani (Holt 50). He sustained military control with a force comprised of Sudanese slave soldiers trained in European warfare in Aswan as well as free soldiers who served under their tribal chiefs.
Stabilization of Al-Turkiyya: 1825-1863

After rising to power in 1826, the governor-general, Ali Khurshid Agha, took up residence in Khartoum shortly thereafter and quickly began to develop its population. It grew tremendously and his policy of taking a portion of each locality’s slaves for the slave army grew the military in accordance (Holt 53). Permanent houses were built in the city and commerce was encouraged under the protection of Khurshid himself, who resisted Muhammad Ali’s attempts to exploit the Khartoum economy (Holt 54).

The next two decades saw two crises over taxation as the new government attempted to establish land taxes and in the process rescinded agreements made with it in a previous administration granting certain groups immunity from taxation (Holt 57). Nevertheless, these crises were handled without much incident and by the 1850s, the government set about reforming the legal system amid weak government appointments by Muhammad Ali (Hold 60).

The legal reform relegated Sharia judges to settling small personal matters and established a secular court as the supreme legal body (Metz “The Turkiyah”). Concurrently, the government undertook a mosque-building initiative and began to staff courts and schools with judges and teachers educated at al-Azhar University in Cairo (Metz “The Turkiyah”). Perhaps most significantly, though, was the opening of the White Nile in 1839 to Egyptian, European, and al-Turkiyya traders and by the 1850s European traders were prevalent enough in the pursuit of ivory that a popular backlash against them limited the success of Christian missionaries in the region. The malcontent occurred as southern tribes failed to cooperate with European demands for ivory, leading
to forcible seizure of the ivory by the traders and the establishment of fortified positions. At these positions, trader communities developed and a slave trade was soon established to undertake the everyday work within the community. This slave trade also augmented the main slave trade out of Khartoum as it sent slaves north to Egypt. European intervention in the White Nile, however, was short lived as the wealth was made at other points on the ivory and slave trade supply chain and the river was abandoned by Europeans by 1863 (Holt 63).
Khedive Isma’il and al-Turkiyya: 1863-1882

Khedive Isma’il formed the most powerful influence of Egypt on the Sudan during Ottoman-Egyptian rule from 1863-1879 (Holt 65). Backed by Great Britain, he sought to assert British and Egyptian supremacy by empowering the British as provincial governors while also promoting stability by allowing the Sudanese to hold more powerful government positions. Under British pressure from London, Khedive Isma’il also undertook the immense task of curbing slavery in the Sudan.

British influence in Egypt spurred by a British public distaste for slavery led to Khedive Isma’il’s efforts to eliminate the practice. A British plan was developed for Isma’il by the Royal Geographic Society in April 1864, which stated that in order to better combat slavery, Egypt should extend its boundaries to the equator so as to have more direct control over the Sudan, allowing it to suppress slave traffic (Mowafi 61). Reda Mowafi indicates in *Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts in Egypt and the Sudan 1820-1882* that Isma’il shared this British idealism to cut the slave supply in the Sudan, although perhaps not for the same motives. He believed that reducing slavery would be possible if the upper Nile, or southern Sudan, was opened to legitimate trade.

In March 1865, Isma’il ordered that all White Nile traffic be checked to discover slave trafficking. In his own proposal to combat slavery, Isma’il planned to free all slaves found at the checkpoints, to cease the importation of firearms to Sudan in order to limit the military power of slave traders, to tax boats leaving Khartoum’s port, and to require a permit for boats to continue north beyond Khartoum (Mowafi 62-63). Predictably, this proposal was resented by traders, but it nevertheless forced the
withdrawal of slave traders from the south to Darfur, which remained out of the control of Egypt. In its new location and eventually back in southern Sudan as well, the slave trade continued unabated, spurring Isma’il to consider annexing the region.

In 1874, British Governor General of Sudan’s southern Equatorial Province, Charles G. Gordon undertook the task of flushing out slavery from Sudan. He declared a government monopoly on ivory and restricted entrance into the southern Sudanese territory he controlled, which intentionally included traders and paralyzed the economy. To combat this problem, Gordon developed infrastructure by building roads through the south and strictly surveyed them, which again succeeded in driving away slavery for a short time. He also opened relations with Uganda for trade purposes to develop legitimate commerce, although he failed to see these relations to fruition (Mowafi 74-75).

In what became an increasingly unstable region under Khedive Isma’il in the 1870s, Gordon set to suppress several revolts throughout the country and engaged in Darfur shortly after his southern expedition (Holt 70). An unstable situation in Darfur had allowed Egypt to seize the region and divide it into four parts, but rivalries and instability remained. With the newfound authority afforded him by Egyptian control of Darfur, Gordon freed all slaves in the region and imposed a tax on its citizens. Revolt quickly ensued in 1877.

A British convention on August 4, 1877 set to deal with the problem of slavery in Egypt and an increasingly violent Sudan. The convention established guidelines for its gradual termination, decreeing that slave traffic would be prohibited within seven years,
the sale and purchase of slaves would cease by 1889, and violators would be imprisoned (Mowafi 83). Egypt and Britain signed, agreeing to the terms of the convention, but worry remained about enforcing it in the Sudan. Gordon was sent to do just that.

Gordon accepted the task only after requiring that he become Governor General of the entire Sudan in 1877. He moved to establish absolute military and civil jurisdiction over the entire country and went to Darfur to crush the revolt. He quickly realized force would not be a suitable means to end the revolt and attempted a diplomatic solution. This effort met with some success and by July 1878, Gordon had seized 697 slave traders and coincided with a violent suppression by British troops (Mowafi 87). The methods succeeded in suppressing slavery, but it also crippled the economy by curbing one of its primary industries and led to resentment among the Sudanese who were insulted by Gordon’s use of British troops to suppress them. In 1880, dissatisfied with Khedive’s pressured abdication by the British and French in favor of his son in 1877 and dissatisfaction with the situation in Darfur, Gordon resigned and slavery resumed (Mowafi 89). The resentment, however, continued to fester until the Mahdist revolution in 1881-82.
The Mahdist Revolution: 1882-1885

The Mahdist Revolution finds its roots in the vacuum of leadership in the Sudan with the nearly simultaneous deposition of Khedive Isma’il in favor of his malleable son and the resignation of Governor General Gordon. Both were powerful leaders with powerful personalities that allowed for the preservation of some stability in the Sudan as unrest grew toward the end of their reigns. Their successors operated with much less success.

Gordon’s successors were isolated from Egypt by political turmoil in Cairo and neglected to continue Gordon’s policies in the Sudan. In the absence of Gordon’s authoritarianism, slavery returned, although not to its previous levels, the military was in disarray, and taxes were levied indiscriminately (Holt 78). It was in this atmosphere that the religious leader Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdallah declared himself the Mahdi, a divine leader chosen by God to fill the earth with justice and equity. The role of the Mahdi in Islam was to overthrow a corrupt regime in favor of a righteous theocracy and had been invoked to establish the Fatimid dynasty and the Almohads in Moorish Spain (Holt 77).

Egypt recognized the danger Muhammad Ahmad posed to its authority in the Sudan, but failed to quell his influence and burgeoning power. An expedition in August 1881 to capture Muhammad Ahmad was foiled when the Mahdi’s forces’ resisted, despite being overmatched by Egyptian firearms, and served to fuel the Mahdi’s support. Several more failed attempts to capture Muhammad Ahmad in conjunction with a higher profile for the Mahdi led to widespread support that enabled him in 1882 to undertake an
offensive characterized as a jihad, or holy war, against Kordofan. The conflict began with minor uprisings in different parts of the province, forcing the government troops to spread themselves thin to crush each revolt. With the al-Turkiyya forces drawn thin, the Mahdi moved his forces in and while they often did not defeat their enemy, they did force them to retreat to more fortified locations. These locations were in turn attacked and conquered by the Mahdi’s forces and by 1883 the Mahdi controlled a great deal of Sudan with the notable exception of Khartoum (Holt 80).

In 1884, Charles Gordon was reappointed as Governor General and given the task of retaking the fallen territories, which he quickly realized would not be possible with his present forces. He requested reinforcements from Egypt and after much vacillation by British Prime Minister William Gladstone, a relief force was sent to aid Gordon. The force, however, arrived two days after Khartoum had fallen on January 28, 1885. Gordon was dead, his severed head delivered to the Mahdi (Metz “The Mahdiyah”).

With Gordon dead and British influence minimized by the revolution, the slave trade continued as the Mahdi focused on religious reform instead of abolition. The Mahdi established his theocratic capital in Omdurmann in western Sudan, but his plans to expand the movement came to an end with his death on June 22, 1885. Before his death, Muhammad Ahmad invoked several reforms to Islam, including adding to Islam’s creed, the shahada, a sentence asserting his status as the divinely appointed Mahdi. He also replaced the hajj with service in the jihad while almsgiving, or zakat, served as a tax paid to his regime (Metz “The Mahdiyah”). After his death, his theocracy remained
under the control of his three deputies, which he deemed caliphs to model the Prophet Muhammad’s deputies.
The Mahdiyah: 1885-1895

The Mahdiyah period begins nearly two decades of political instability and economic chaos that allowed for the continuation of slavery without any significant governmental interference. The coups and economic missteps by the government are trends that continued through the next hundred years of Sudanese history and the events from 1885-1895 lie at the root of the political and economic issues Sudan faces in the 21st century. The country’s inability to provide enduring stability in these hundred years is fundamental to understanding why slavery continued to exist while the government struggled to maintain control of the country and took little interest in abolition.

The instability began immediately after the Mahdi’s death when his three caliphs fell into rivalry and drew support from each of their native regions. These three groups were religious idealists, led by Khalifa Ali ibn Muhammad Hilu, the Ashraf who were of the Mahdi’s tribe, led by Khalifa Muhammad Sharif ibn Hamid, and Baqqari, led by Khalifa Abdallahi ibn Muhammad (Holt 86). When the Mahdi died, only Abdallahi had a significant military presence in Omdurman, making the selection of either of the other two leaders problematic at best. After frustrated deliberation at a council following the Mahdi’s death over the logistical problems in making the Mahdi’s logical heir, Muhammad Sharif, the state’s new leader, Abdallahi was deemed the state’s new ruler in 1881 (Holt 87).

Abdallahi’s reign was initially challenged by the Ashraf who held the chief positions in most provinces. They planned to send the governor of Darfur, Muhammad Khalid, to march on Omdurman and depose the new sovereign. Abdallahi moved to
seize a proposed staging ground for the hostile soldiers and to interrupt communications between the Ashraf and Muhammad Khalid before Baqqari forces confronted the rival forces in April 1886. Muhammad Khalid surrendered without resistance and within six years, the Mahdi’s family and many of his followers were removed from their positions of power.

With Abdallahi now unchallenged, he ran the Mahdiyah like a military camp for the preservation of the jihad ideology. Sharia, Islamic law, was imposed with equal weight to the Mahdi’s alterations to traditional Islam and Khalifa supporters were sent to govern over each province (Metz “The Khalifa”). Internationally, Abdallahi extended the jihad to Ethiopia in 1887 after rejecting the Ethiopian king’s offer to establish an alliance with Europe. A 60,000 man force successfully invaded Ethiopia in that same year and refused to negotiate a peace agreement. This led the Ethiopians to launch a failed offensive in 1889 that led to the death of their king and an Ethiopian retreat (Metz “The Khalifa”).

Ethiopia, however, was the last victory in the Khalifa’s pursuit of the jihad as he became embroiled in the same domestic problems that Gordon and the al-Turkiyya faced previously. In 1889, Abdallahi sent his best general to invade Egypt, but was repelled by British-led Egyptian forces. Mahdiyah forces were again defeated in the Belgian colony of Equatoria and in 1893 by Italian forces in Eritrea, which forced the Khalifa to withdraw from Ethiopia (Metz “The Khalifa”). His public support also withdrew with these defeats and by 1895 the Mahdiyah was quite vulnerable to outside attack.
Just as important as the Mahdiyah’s political failure was its imposition of Sharia and the establishment of a jihadist state. Political infighting would remain almost constant in the next century of Sudanese history, but religion, specifically the imposition of Sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state, would become points of contention that fueled the enduring civil wars Sudan faced at the end of the 20th century into the 21st century. It was the resistance to these policies from the South and Darfur that maintained the country’s instability and repeatedly made it vulnerable to coups, while providing it little opportunity to address the issue of slavery.
British-Egyptian Rule: 1895-1914

With the appointment of Herbert Kitchener in 1892 as the commander of the Egyptian army came preparations to overthrow and retake what was becoming an increasingly weak Mahdist state in the Sudan. The initiative came from the fear of French or Belgian interference in the Sudan at the expense of the British and its Egyptian colony, which depended heavily on the Nile. This latter concern led to British plans to build a dam on the Nile in Aswan and further necessitated control of the river in order to do so (Metz “Reconquest of Sudan”). By 1895, a force of British and Egyptian soldiers set out to re-conquer the Sudan.

The Nile Expeditionary Force boasted 25,800 men and was funded by Egypt in its journey south. Most personnel were Egyptian with 8,600 British and six battalions of troops recruited in southern Sudan. In March 1896, these forces attacked and captured Dongola and by September of that year, the entire province was under Egyptian control (Metz “Reconquest of Sudan”). Following this victory, Kitchener built a railroad across the Nubian Desert, following the Nile from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamad so as to facilitate further advances into the Mahdiyah.

Disintegrating Mahdist armies hampered by a lack of food and poor leadership facilitated a relatively simple advance by the British and Egyptian forces. On April 8, 1898 Kitchener attacked the Sudanese army, killing 3,000 and wounding another 4,000 while the British and Egyptians sustained only 81 dead and 487 wounded. Kitchener’s seizure of Omdurman was met with more resistance, but the British-Egyptian force was
once again victorious, killing 11,000 Sudanese and wounding 16,000 while sustaining only 49 dead and 382 wounded themselves (Holt 96).

With the Mahdiyah defeated, the British set to determine the Sudan’s status as a state. Considering its troubled past history as a province of Egypt and annexing it as a colony seemed unfeasible because it was Egypt who laid claim to the land and to seize it as a separate colony for Great Britain would politically weaken the Egyptian state. Thus, Sudan became a condominium under both Egyptian and British control.

Nevertheless, a British governor general was to rule the Sudan with almost complete autonomy from Egypt. The first of these was Kitchener, who assumed power in 1899.

Within a year Kitchener was called to South Africa and Sir Reginald Wingate assumed his duties until 1917 (Holt 102). Wingate succeeded in suppressing any remaining Mahdist prophets in the early years of his governance, but problems with the south remained. Communication was poor with the region cut off from the north by dense vegetation on the Nile, which rendered it impassable, and necessitated almost constant vegetation clearing expeditions. With the south largely isolated from the north, Wingate sought to exclude Muslim influence from it for fear of spreading malcontent similar to the Mahdist revolt. He accomplished this by allowing Christian missionaries the freedom to educate and proselytize with a separate local military present to maintain security without the influence of Islam (Holt 108). The isolation of the South developed quite a separate state and ideology from the North, a development that would prove to be difficult the resolve in reestablishing a unified state in the coming decades. Meanwhile,
Wingate focused on establishing Sudan’s borders, its northern administration, and its northern economy.

The Condominium’s territory was not extended to all that of the former Egyptian territory and in March 1899, an agreement between the British and French was reached that allowed Darfur independence and established British control in much of the country. A border with Eritrea was established between 1898 and 1902, another with Ethiopia in 1902, a border with the Congo Free State in 1906, and Uganda by 1913 (Holt 104).

With borders in place, Wingate created a government that was divided into civil, legal, and financial departments. The country itself was divided into provinces which were each headed by a governor who were responsible to all three of the departments for their various functions. High level officials were overwhelmingly British while lower level officials were Egyptian and later educated Sudanese. Islam was allowed and even encouraged in the Northern provinces for fear of suppressing it creating a revival of the jihad rebellion. Christian missionaries were denied from working in the north for this same reason. Similar consideration for the local situation was paid with the introduction of the Sudan Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which were both based on Indian law, but allowed for influence from Sharia and tribal laws (Holt 107).

Wingate’s economic building centered on light taxation and the economy experienced steady growth under his administration. He also improved the country’s infrastructure by extending the railroad built by Kitchener and opening it to civilian use. Slavery, however, remained a large part of the economy despite slave market closures in Ottoman and British territories. The practice was outlawed under the Condominium, but
slavery within Sudan persisted because of a lack of agricultural laborers and perhaps more importantly, a lack of money to pay the laborers. Efforts were made to establish a maximum wage for laborers and to recruit more laborers from West Africans passing through on the hajj, but slavery was to persist well into the future (Holt 109).
Revolt: 1914-24

The outbreak of World War I failed to directly affect the Sudan, but in 1916, British problems stemming from the war effort were exacerbated by an attack from Darfur. The conflict was quickly put down and the region annexed, but Wingate soon began to worry about popular support for the Ottoman Empire who was allied against the British. He relaxed restrictions on likely Ottoman supporters to gain their favor and while tensions continued to build during the war, the economy boomed and conflict was avoided until 1920.

Wingate was made high commissioner of Egypt in December 1916 and within three years witnessed the Egyptian revolt (Holt 111). While the effects of the revolt did not seem to overtly affect the populous of the Sudan, the Egyptian instability failed to allow the British to capitalize on the brief economic boom and fulfill their abolitionist agenda established under Gordon’s rule. In fact, the elimination of slavery seemed to become quite secondary or even irrelevant in comparison to the establishment of a working state in the Sudan. To further complicate this nation-building goal, the Egyptian revolt spurred a sense of nationalism among the Sudanese that promised more instability in the coming years.

A Sudanese political group emerged in 1920 and began publishing documents that promoted what would become a widespread anti-British sentiment. Calls were made for self determination two years later, which garnered popular support from pro-Egyptian and disgruntled Sudanese, but British officials refused to acknowledge any failures on the part of its administration that could have led to these negative attitudes.
On November 19, 1924, the tensions came to a head with the fatal shooting of Sudan’s Governor General, Sir Lee Stack, in Cairo (Holt 115).

Stack’s successor, Sir Edmund Allenby, quickly demanded that Sudan be cleared of Egyptian military units. This evacuation went rather poorly, as Sudanese soldiers were caught between their British superiors who told them to clear Egyptians from their ranks and the Egyptian king who refused to comply with this demand. Fighting ensued as Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers resisted, but the purge was ultimately successful.
Sudanese Nationalism: 1924-1956

The purge of Egyptian soldiers and soon after Egyptian civilians from the Sudan served to quell calls for self-determination, but by the 1930s, the call returned. Calls were made by educated Sudanese to limit the governor general’s authority, but to do so required an amendment to the Condominium agreement between Britain and Egypt over the governance of the Sudan that neither were willing to grant. In 1936, a treaty was formed between the British and Egyptians to determine a rightful spokesman for the Sudan, which resulted in the Graduates’ General Congress in 1938 (Holt 124). The Congress, however, did not silence dissenters, including the Mahdi’s son, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, who called for complete independence from Egypt and Britain as World War II approached.

After short-lived threats to Sudan from Eritrea and possible German control of the Nile, Sudan remained uninvolved in the Second World War and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman continued his cries for independence. In 1940, he seized control of the Congress and issued twelve demands to the British, centering on self-determination. The British response was harsh, declaring that the Congress was to deal exclusively with domestic affairs in the Sudan. By April 1946, the Sudanese government stated outright a desire to determine for itself its relations with Britain and Egypt, followed by a report issued on March 31, 1947 calling for a legislative assembly to represent the entire Sudan (Holt 129). Logically, this report led to a reconsideration of the southern portion of the country’s isolation.
Southern Sudan had been deliberately treated as separate from the north economically, and more importantly, politically. The southern economy was truly hampered by a closed door policy, barring northern traders from southern ports, and found itself very much stagnant by 1947. Politically, the region operated differently from the north. It had utilized tribal governance to ill effect and a return to direct, centralized rule seemed necessary. The report of 1947 allowed for such rule as the British welcomed the inclusion of the south into the Sudanese legislature, but concerns about the south’s readiness to participate in such a government did not go unnoticed (Holt 131). In the final agreement for the legislature, provisions were made to safeguard the interests of the south by continuing to develop them educationally and politically to the level already achieved by the north. This agreement for a representative legislature, however, failed to address the issue of the Sudan’s sovereignty and by 1952 the issue had been complicated by Egypt with its unilateral Constitution for the Sudan, which was heartily rejected by Britain and the Sudan. A new and serious international debate about self-determination had been born and on January 1, 1956, Sudan adopted a declaration of independence and requested that foreign troops be withdrawn (Holt 141).

The ensuing half-century of Sudanese history as an independent state would continue to focus on the same nation-building issues the British addressed with limited success. The failure to establish a stable government capable of building the economy continued to put these issues at the forefront of each successive government’s agenda with similar results. These abortive efforts at nation-building would continue to take precedence over any legislation or concerted effort to eliminate slavery in Sudan.
Military Government: 1956-1969

The Sudan’s new government began with what could be called an inauspicious start that was to characterize the regime throughout its contentious and divisive reign. Within eighteen days of the New Year’s declaration of independence, the prime minister’s party was defeated in parliament over a budget vote and while he remained in power, he was forced to form a coalition government. By July 5th, a new prime minister, Abdallah Khalil was sworn in to preside over a coalition parliament after a split in the incumbent party, and a period of sectarian conflict began (Holt 146).

With the election of Khalil came the empowerment of the most powerful among the various Sudanese sects and the coalition government could find little to agree on. Nevertheless, during this period the country was diplomatically recognized as a sovereign state, granted membership to the United Nations and world monetary institutions, and succeeded in irrigating more land with the hopes of furthering the development of Sudanese agriculture. Poor cotton prices in 1957 and 1958, however, crippled the economy as the government would not allow the sale of the crop below a certain minimum price.

By 1958, the economic strain and political infighting in the coalition government had led to each member of the coalition to explore the possibility of forming coalitions with rival parties at the expense of its current coalition partner. A bloodless military coup by Major-General Ibrahim Abboud on November 17, 1958 rendered all the political conflict meaningless as his military assumed governmental duties, claiming in a radio address that the military had no choice but to save the country from political
infighting (Holt 148). Abboud became prime minister, purged the parliament of its political parties, and formed a thirteen member Supreme Council of the Armed Forces who afforded Abboud with all legislative, judicial, and executive powers. A military occupation by two commanders not included in the Council in March 1959 caused Abboud to dissolve the Council in favor a new one, including these two commanders (Holt 150).

With the new Council in place, Abboud set to deal with the issue of Nile usage in light of Egypt’s desire to construct the Aswan High Dam. He negotiated an allotment for Nile use with Egypt and the right to use Sudan’s share of the river in whatever manner they wished (Holt 150). More problematically, however, was the forced removal of the people of Wadi Halfa for the construction of the dam. This relocation spurred widespread demonstrations in opposition to the move and proved to be the catalyst for general opposition to the regime. Opposition crystallized on November 29, 1960 when the leaders of the disenfranchised political parties petitioned for a return to civilian governance. Abboud responded to his opposition by suppressing the political parties through imprisonment and cracking down on demonstrations (Holt 151).

Economically, Abboud’s administration fared better than his predecessor’s insofar as he did away with the minimum cotton price rule and succeeded in establishing trade agreements with the USSR, the U.S., and various European states. In October 1962, Abboud unveiled a plan to develop the economy and infrastructure over the next ten years (Holt 153). The project proved overly ambitious as much of the Sudanese
economy remained vulnerable to global agricultural price fluctuations and confidence in Abboud again began to wane.

Most problematic to Abboud’s administration was its dealings with southern Sudan. As southern representatives in Khartoum were increasingly inconsequential to the political process under Abboud’s political system, which placed southern politicians in northern positions and northern politicians in southern positions, widespread distrust emerged between the two regions. The point of education became a particular point of confrontation. Until 1957, missionaries had run the majority of southern schools with government assistance, but beginning in this year, schools were nationalized and Arabic, instead of English, became the official language of instruction (Holt 154). Abboud further divided the region by speeding up programs to make the region more resemble the north’s Islamic and Arab influences through the building of Islamic centers and the expulsion of foreign missionaries from the south in February 1964. Refugee flight to Ethiopia and Uganda ensued, causing the U.N. to issue refugee aid to assist the two countries’ support for what were 60,000 refugees in Uganda alone (Holt 155).

The creation of a guerilla force, called Anya Nya, and its ensuing attack on northern forces proved to be a strong rallying point for the southern opposition, despite the attack’s failure. In September 1964, Abboud sent a commission to determine the source of unrest in the south. The commission encouraged meetings with students and teachers, which quickly led to the articulation of the sentiment that no resolution was possible so long as the military regime remained in power. Further meetings were banned and in an attempt to enforce this ban on October 22nd, a student was fatally shot,
leading to 30,000 people turning out for the funeral (Holt 155). The crowd could not be dispersed by the military and police and following more organized political opposition from political parties and southern professionals, Abboud dissolved his government four days later.

With the dissolution of the government, Abboud temporarily defused what was becoming an increasingly divisive situation with the South. The situation he helped create with his attempts at islamicizing the South and the outbreak of sectarian conflict played an overwhelming role in the eruption of civil war within twenty years and that war’s dominance in Sudanese politics. The roots of the expression of Southern discontent that led to a civil war that included slave raids and a great many deaths over the next forty years can be found perhaps most succinctly within this Abboud administration.
Civilian Administration: 1964-1969

Among the primary opposition to Abboud’s regime had been the Professionals’ Front comprised of students, teachers, and lawyers, the United National Front (UNF) comprised of former politicians and army officers, and the Sudan African National Union (SANU), a southern political organization led by William Deng. Following the dissolution of Abboud’s government the two fronts opened negotiations with Abboud’s military leadership to form a Transitional Government on October 30, 1964 (Holt 156). Following elections that forced his government from power, Abboud retired entirely from the government on November 14th and civilian leadership took hold of what was to become no greater a stable state than the one they inherited and certainly no more capable of combating slavery.

The Transitional Government allowed for the return of political parties banned under Abboud and from April to May 1965, four northern parties were elected into Parliament. The twenty representatives for the south were almost entirely northern merchants. A coalition government was formed under the leadership of the Umma Party and the National Unionist Party (NUP), who won the most election votes, with Umma’s Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub as the Prime Minister (Holt 159). The ensuing four years were dominated by persistent southern discontent and growing divisions among political parties, which promised to undermine any lasting stability in the country.

July 8, 1965 marked the first of many atrocities committed by both northern troops and southern groups bent on revenge. On July 8th, northern troops sent to crush the budding southern rebellion, attacked Juba, a southern city, leaving large portions
burned and hundreds of its citizens dead. The government responded with an earlier claim that lawlessness must eliminated before it could bring about constitutional reform. Recognizing the brutal nature this return to order under Mahgoub promised, SANU appealed to the United Nations to intervene, which they did not do, and tens of thousands fled from the south to neighboring countries to escape the violence (Holt 160). Meanwhile, southern resistance became more formidable and in rather short order, the government lost control of the entire region with the exception of major cities and fortified posts.

Competing southern political groups including SANU and the southern separatist group, Anya Nya exacerbated the growing violence by promoting competing ideologies. William Deng’s SANU, an organization largely in exile following Abboud’s regime, advocated a solution that would preserve the Sudanese federal state while Anya Nya took up arms supplied from Congo to violently work for southern independence. Later, a branch of the SANU in exile joined a new separatist group called the Azanian Liberation Front (ALF), but the Anya Nya failed to give their support and the competing groups served to undermine the cause for independence. The fatal ambush of Deng in May 1968 effectively eliminated any remaining charismatic leadership for the southern cause (Holt 161).

Political rivalry afflicted the north as well with a struggle over the premiership between Prime Minister Maghoub and permanent President Ismail al-Azhari, ending in July 1966 with a vote of no confidence in Maghoub and the collapse of the coalition government (Holt 161). Maghoub quickly allied himself with Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was
the leader of the Umma party but had been too young to become prime minister when Maghoub came to power. Now of age, Sadiq rallied Umma support and forged NUP allies to become Prime Minister on July 27th. Sadiq’s term in office lasted only for ten months, but he immediately set to form a permanent constitution, holding elections in the war-torn south so as to create the constituency necessary to form the constitution. The southern elections received a predictably low voter turnout, but garnered enough representatives to allow Sadiq to form a Constitutional Draft Committee. The SANU and Southern Front refused to participate in the Committee, which allowed for only seven southern representatives among 42 total (Holt 162). Despite this lack of support from southern politicians, Sadiq envisioned a visionary government with a president, a southern vice president, and southern provincial autonomy. Any effectiveness the Committee could have promised, however, was undermined in May 1967 when al-Azhari, who had allied with Sadiq to form a second coalition, broke with the Prime Minister and again forced a collapse of the government (Holt 162). This collapse solidified what had been budding rifts in the Umma party and effectively destroyed its ability to stand alone as a political party. Maghoub returned to preside over what was left of the split political parties in Parliament until 1968 when general elections were held.

The 1968 election was marked by the number of political factions running for office. While the divided Umma party split 66 seats among the two factions, the new Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won a majority, the SANU won fifteen seats, the Southern Front won ten seats, and independent parties claimed twenty seats (Holt 162).
A shaky coalition was formed between the DUP and the branch of the Umma party at odds with Sadiq with Maghoub as the Prime Minister and al-Azhari again as president. The coalition, doomed by too many disparate parties within it, fell apart in April 1969 with a recently reconciled Umma party ousting Maghoub from power only to have the military return to power in May 1969 amid widespread dissatisfaction with the civilian Parliament (Holt 165).

On May 25, 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri led a group of officers in his third coup attempt against the government after failed efforts in 1957 and 1966. This coup, however, met little resistance and Nimeiri began a swift purge of civilian leadership. The Transitional Constitution the civilian government had operated under was eliminated, media was censored, political parties outlawed, and al-Azhari and Mahgoub were both arrested. Nimeiri renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and, to replace the dissolved civilian government, established the Revolutionary Command Council. The ten person Council consisted of nine military officers and former Chief Justice Babikr Awadallah who had participated in the coup and also served as the Prime Minister (Holt 166).

Eager to move away from a military dictatorship, Awadallah formed a 21 member cabinet of which only three members, including Nimeiri, were military. Nine members, however, were communists and by November 1969 Awadallah had proposed to pursue communist assistance and was promptly demoted to Foreign Minister (Metz “Revolutionary Command Council”). Nimeiri succeeded Awadallah as Prime Minister and was quickly forced to encounter a violent challenge to his authority from the Umma party in March 1970. Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi led the Umma party, also known as the Ansar, and warned Nimeiri that a journey into Ansar-controlled lands on Aba Island would be quite dangerous. Heedless of the warning, Nimeiri made the journey and launched an air raid on the island on March 27th, which spurred tremendous, yet fruitless resistance from the Ansar. In the end over 12,000 of the Ansar were killed,
including the Imam himself (Holt 167). The assertion of power simultaneously warned other rival groups against challenging Nimeiri’s authority and alienated others with his brutality.

With his power consolidated, Nimeiri sought to purge the Sudan of communism through imprisonment of its top officials and a grassroots call for his people to destroy the movement. In February 1971, Nimeiri broke off all relations with the communist faction within the Sudan, assuming his government could stand without their support. A July 19, 1971 coup appeared to prove otherwise. The coup successfully deposed and imprisoned Nimeiri before forming an overtly communist administration (Metz “Revolutionary Command Council”). The fallout was swift and effective with both Libya and Egypt actively providing support to resist the new government. Nimeiri was quickly restored to power, the coup leaders executed along with other prominent communists, a socialist platform developed, and an election making Nimeiri a six-year president was conducted (Holt 169).

Nimeiri’s support from crushing two attempted coups failed to solve the problem he inherited in the south. With Nimeiri’s recognition that he must confront the issue, Joseph Lagu of the Anya Nya united the south’s many factions under the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and opened negotiations with Nimeiri. The negotiations conducted in secret at Addis Ababa in February 1972 resulted in a March 3rd agreement entitled the *Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces*, or more commonly known as the Addis Ababa Accords. The agreement stipulated that the south’s three provinces were to be united under an autonomous administration. The
region was to be governed by a president appointed by Nimeiri with the input of an
elected Southern Regional Assembly. The region would remain autonomous with the
exception of during wartime, in foreign affairs, defense, economic and educational
planning, and currency. In addition, Anya Nya forces were integrated into the south’s
military, amnesty was established for southern refugees to return and English was
recognized as the south’s official language to be taught in schools and used in
government (Holt 170). While the accords were not universally accepted by Lagu’s
southern followers, he agreed to them and a cease fire was established on March 27,
1972 with the signing of the treaty.

Abel Alier was appointed the region’s first president, but quickly lost support
amid slow social and economic revitalization. Corruption and Dinka favoritism were
also perceived in his administration and by 1978 poor election results led to Alier’s
resignation. Lagu became president but was forced to make concessions with Alier’s
still powerful government supporters. This arrangement allowed for corruption to
persist and in February 1980, Nimeiri removed Lagu from power and organized
elections in an attempt to reestablish order (Holt 171).

Alier was reelected only to be removed from power by Nimeiri in October 1981
due to continuing effectiveness. Nimeiri also proposed a redivision of the south that was
opposed by Alier’s supporters. With Alier out of power, however, Nimeiri held new
elections, which resulted in supporters of the redivision policy coming to power. In June
1983, Nimeiri enacted his policy and divided the region into its three original provinces
from before the Addis Ababa Accords (Holt 172).
The southern division proved to be a flash point for southern discontent. Spurred by decreasing economic developmental support from the Khartoum government and pursuant economic stagnation, southerners returned to open hostility toward Nimeiri’s government when Sharia was applied to the entire country in September 1983 (Metz “National Reconciliation”). Any hope Nimeiri harbored for lasting stability under his policies was undermined by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), both led by John Garang, which became the north’s most potent southern enemy. Proving to be both skilled and disciplined, the SPLA won several victories against ill-equipped government forces stationed in the south and began an expansion of control that would encompass most of the region by 1986. The SPLM also insisted on Nimeiri’s removal from office and worked to bring about his downfall.

Meanwhile, Nimeiri’s economic failures resulted in debt so severe, the country failed to qualify for International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans and current agreements with the organizations were terminated. Without this aid, the situation worsened and by 1984 through 1985, famine led to riots in Khartoum and strikes around the country. Nimeiri declared a state of emergency and instituted a terror campaign where minor offenses were met with punishments as severe as amputations and execution, which he misguided justified under Sharia (Holt 179). In March 1985, Nimeiri left the country for Washington, D.C. and in his absence, the military disallowed Nimeiri to return. A Transitional Military Council assumed control on April 6th and general rejoicing greeted the overthrow of what had become a corrupt and severely
violent ruler, although the Transitional Military Council would continue to pursue nation-building over abolition and slavery continued (Holt 179).

When the elation over Jaafar Nimeiri’s overthrow passed, military leaders began to be treated with suspicion. John Garang called for a return to civilian rule, but no civilian group commanded enough constituents to assume control. In the absence of civilian leaders, the military formed the fifteen member Transitional Military Council on April 9, 1985 (Metz “The Transitional Military Council”). The council was led by Siwar al-Dahab, who also functioned as the head of state and the legislative body. Al-Dahab quickly dismissed Parliament, the constitution, and regional assemblies while promising the resolve the southern discontent, which would presumably reduce the slave trade. His auspicious start, however, was quickly overshadowed by his inability to resolve the country’s economic problems or restore peace to the south.

Al-Dahab’s efforts at easing the Sudan’s economic hardship were particularly mismanaged. He refused IMF assistance and lost a $6 billion 25 year investment from the United States through poor use of the initial $2.3 billion investment. Large-scale currency production and rapidly fluctuating prices led to soaring inflation and resultant famine. The famine claimed over 400,000 lives throughout the country (Metz “The Transitional Military Council”). Complicating the matter further were the extensive resources being diverted to contend with southern hostilities.

Relations between al-Dahab and the SPLM were contentious over the continuing insistence of the Khartoum government to utilize Sharia throughout the country. While most points proved to be negotiable, Sharia seemed to be the breaking point. The sides persisted in the negotiations, however, and by March 1986 an agreement was reached.
The Koka Dam Declaration, as it was entitled, stipulated that Sudan be free from all forms of discrimination, Sharia be repealed, and a constitutional conference opened. The decision on Sharia, however, would be left to the civilian government who succeeded al-Dahab in April 1986 (Metz “The Transitional Military Council”).

The elections of April 1986 returned the Umma party to power under the leadership of Sadiq al-Mahdi. The Umma party failed to win a decisive majority, however, and was forced to form a coalition with the DUP. The National Islamic Front (NIF), under the leadership of Hasan al-Turabi, formed the opposition to the coalition and won a significant 51 seats, compared with Umma’s 100 (Holt 182). Within a year, Sadiq, disappointed in its failure, dissolved the government and replaced it with largely the same members, solving little.

The new government aimed to apply Sharia only to Muslims, change the national flag and anthem, and consolidate the Islamic banking system. It did not address the continuing civil war, famine, slavery, or the failing economy. Perhaps predictably, the government was dissolved again in August 1987 and nine months of negotiations about the composition of a new coalition government. This contentious period moved Sadiq closer to the NIF, but was unable to form a coalition because of al-Turabi’s insistence that a new government lift the state of emergency that had been imposed in July 1987 and that senior members of the government resign from office. After significant delays as a result of al-Turabi’s demands, Sadiq formed a coalition on May 15, 1988 with Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and various other southern parties, but this coalition was to meet the same fate as its predecessors (Metz “Sadiq al-Mahdi”).
In November 1988, the SPLM and DUP agreed on a plan to end the Civil War, which included a cease-fire, the opening of a constitution convention, the state of emergency was ended, and the end of Sharia in the south (Metz “Sadiq al-Mahdi”). Despite Sadiq’s personal approval of the plan, the DUP and NIF failed to support it, leading to another dissolution of the government in February 1989. The new government was led by Sadiq again, but with the NIF as his primary partner and al-Turabi as his deputy prime minister. This development, however, led Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali to demand with the backing of 150 senior military officers that the government be made more representative and that a plan be outlaid to end the civil war (Metz “Sadiq al-Mahdi”). Sadiq responded by again dissolving the government and formed a coalition without the NIF, including the Umma, DUP, and southern parties. The new government adopted the peace protocols on November 1988, but increasing effectiveness of the SPLA, combined with Sadiq’s continued failure to rebuild the economy and end the famine led to a coup by Colonel Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir on June 30, 1989 (Metz “Sadiq al-Mahdi”). Under al-Turabi’s guidance, al-Bashir proved to be a dictator incapable of solving the Sudan’s plethora of problems on his own.
Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front: 1989-2006

Omar al-Bashir’s rise to power was greeted with the guarded enthusiasm his predecessors’ seizure of power were, but the popular feeling seemed to be that the regime would again be a transitory one. Al-Bashir, however, proved to be perhaps the most resilient ruler of the Sudan in modern times, becoming the longest tenured ruler since independence, but he also proved to be among the most brutal and uncompromising. Under al-Bashir’s regime, the civil war blossomed along with slavery as it continued in the south and expanded to Darfur on a large scale. Understanding the many facets of the regime is essential to understanding the political and economic situation that allows for slavery to exist in Sudan in the 21st century.

After his successful seizure of power, al-Bashir banned political parties under penalty of ten years imprisonment, eliminated the free press, and dissolved Parliament while assuming the posts of chief of state, prime minister, commander in chief of the armed forces, and the minister of defense. He quickly purged officials from the old regime and by 1990 it is estimated that al-Bashir had dismissed 20,000 officials and 50,000 civil servants (Yongo-Bure 9).

Hasan al-Turabi became al-Bashir’s mentor and oversaw the implementation of Sharia in 1991. According to the journalist Rory Nugent’s repeated interviews with al-Turabi in 1994, he was the true power in Sudan, not al-Bashir, but his power came quietly in the form of religious sermons and quiet orders to politicians.

Nugent’s interviews with al-Turabi are particularly enlightening as al-Turabi explains, “We’re only the beginning of Islam’s march. Soon many nations will become
one. And God’s voice will thunder…Sudan is merely the staging area for the worldwide expansion of fundamentalist Islam” (Nugent 101). These ideological statements seem indicative of a mastermind behind al-Bashir’s regime and indeed The Economist and the Sudan Tribune, a French based forum for global press coverage on Sudan, contain multiple articles suggesting just this. New Perspectives Quarterly even goes so far as to call al-Turabi “The Second Khomeini of the Islamic Awakening,” after Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini (Imam 59).

Al-Turabi’s influence extended beyond his government to other extremists and extremist groups, including Abu Nidal, al-Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Carlos the Jackal, and the Red Hand, among others who were his guests in the 1990s. Osama bin Laden was also among his guests in the 1990s, but this was largely before the formation of al-Qaeda as a global terrorist network. Indeed, al-Turabi claims that bin Laden “was not building on a deep organizational experience or engaged in sophisticated activist planning…he lacked an international organization network” (Imam 61). All the extremists, however, seemed to be united by a desire to establish Sharia and Islamist states and while al-Turabi has not commented on what his relationship was with them directly, the fact that he had a relationship with so many organizations speaks to his power in the movement.

In 1993, al-Bashir appointed himself president and did away with the prime minister office, which gave him executive and legislative power. With this newfound power, al-Bashir began with new vigor to implement al-Turabi’s strict Wahhabi Sharia, which draws similarities to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It was characterized as
cruel in every aspect by *The Economist*, which claimed Sharia was being enforced “in a nation almost one-third of whose people are not Muslims, but Christians or animists” (“Islam’s Star” 43).

Sudan’s Sharia outlaws alcohol, Western films, and nightclubs. According to Joshua Hammer in *The New Republic*, “state-run TV airs little but Islamic conferences and footage of government soldiers in southern Sudan. About the only entertainment that the NIF permits is soccer” (Hammer 14). The result, according to Rory Nugent was “cops from the morals squad prowl the streets, on patrol for bared legs and midriffs, rock music, and other banned signifiers of Western pop culture. Being caught with a bottle of beer, for instance earns a six-month jail term; the second offense merits another six months in the cooler, plus twenty lashes” (Nugent 101).

Al-Bashir’s brand of Sharia extends to commerce as well, with a paramilitary touch. All Sudanese office employees are forced to volunteer for the Popular Defense Force, an Islamic paramilitary group, and train for two hours a day in fatigues. The penalty for not participating is losing their jobs. It also affects commerce in a more traditional sense with a bank chairman and leading member of the NIF saying, “We want the roots to grow deep and change the manner of the people. We want to rebuild the culture according to Islamic principles” (Hammer 14).

The result, in concert with the loss of international aid due to the harboring of terrorists, has largely been economic stagnation followed by mass starvation necessitating international assistance on several occasions, but the government denies these problems exist. In 1994, al-Turabi “claimed the economy was booming and said
the cutoff of aid was good because it rid the country of Western dependence” (Hammer 14). Furthermore, after the loss of World Bank funding and the imposition of U.N. sanctions, al-Bashir claimed Sudan had entered “a new stage. We have learned to rely on ourselves” (“Omar al-Bashir” 29).

With Sharia firmly in place, al-Bashir conducted an election in 1996, which he won handily. Three years later, he declared a state of emergency, allowing him to consolidate more power through the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly. This led to a break with al-Turabi, whom al-Bashir stripped of his post as Speaker of the National Assembly that had been formed in 1996. The offense seems to have been al-Turabi introducing a measure to have the president dismissed from power if necessary and a desire to see the Prime Minister position return. Al-Bashir won a second election in 2000 after replacing al-Turabi loyalists in the cabinet with his own loyalists, although the election was boycotted by the SPLA controlled South. Al-Bashir reinstated the National Assembly in 2001, although the state of emergency remains in effect. This same year also saw the arrest of al-Turabi because it is believed that he was willing to make concessions with the SPLA, with whom al-Bashir’s government was still fighting. After a brief release in 2003, al-Turabi was put under house arrest in 2004 until June 30, 2005. During this time, al-Turabi has maintained involvement in the western region of Darfur through one of his protégés who leads the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel force in the region. He is currently in opposition to al-Bashir and there is widespread speculation his influence will rattle the country’s political structure.
The Civil War under Omar al-Bashir: 1989-2006

Since Omar al-Bashir rose to power in 1989, Amir Idris claims in his *Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race, and Formational Identities* that “racist policies have been dramatically increased in Sudan. The Islamic regime has pursued a *jihad* against the South and the civil war has escalated” (127). This escalation created increasing instability in the South and, as will be discussed in two chapters, coincided with an expansion of the slave trade.

Utilizing a racist paradigm, al-Bashir expelled Southerners from Northern cities, including roughly 750,000 from the Khartoum area. Fractions among the SPLA in 1991, including accusations of human rights abuses by Garang, led to Northern successes that resulted in the displacement of four million and the deaths of thousands more. Al-Bashir’s Northern forces have also been accused of their own human rights violations. Idris explains that “government forces…routinely steal women and children. Some women and girls are kept as wives, others are shipped north, where they perform forced labor on farms or are exported to other Arab countries…Arab soldiers are encouraged to rape the Southern women they capture” (*Sudan’s* 130). Idris elaborates, saying this second war has destroyed the social and economic structure of Sudan: “The only unchanging reality was that civilians remained targets” (*Sudan’s* 130).

It is al-Bashir’s government who undertook this method of war. While there may not have been an incriminating telegram with which to prove his guilt, they are his military troops, as commander in chief, which have performed these human rights violations. Furthermore, it is al-Bashir who claims that oil revenues, among the few
sources of revenue the government has had during the war, will help him win the war. With this added oil revenue, arms imports have increased dramatically, as have Government bombings of civilians in the South (“Omar al-Bashir” 29). The result of this campaign to date has been the death of two million civilians.

A turn of events toward peace emerged in 2004 with the appointment of John Garang as Vice President to al-Bashir. The meaningful terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on January 9, 2005 are as follows:

- Oil revenues will be shared on a 50-50 basis
- Civil service jobs will be split 70-30 in favor of the government
- A 39,000-strong army comprising troops from both sides will be formed
- The south will be autonomous for six years, after which there will be a referendum on whether it wants to remain within the union or go its own way
- Sharia law will remain in force only in the north; the south is also demanding that Khartoum should not be subject to Sharia law even though it is practiced in the north
- John Garang to be vice-president responsible for the south (Versi)

Unfortunately, Garang was killed in a plane crash shortly after the peace agreement was signed, leaving a leadership vacuum in the south. Nevertheless, if a press release by the Embassy of Sudan on March 14, 2006 claiming that the Southern government has received nearly 50% of oil revenue from 2005, $718 million, is any indication, the terms seem to continue to hold promise for both parties as increased.
Further evidence that the terms will be adhered to in Garang’s absence is that the Embassy also disclosed that a payment of $80 million will be made in the near future to round out the full 50% of oil revenue from 2005 and a second payment of $72 million will be made for the revenue generated in January 2006. Equally promising is an increased investment interest from Turkey, China, Malaysia, India, and Kenya for the South’s suddenly peaceful oil fields that were unexplored as the civil war raged on. Increased revenue incurred through this foreign direct investment and the sale of more oil hold promise that the economic portion of the CPA will be honored, which garners hope that the peace will remain permanent.
Genocide in Darfur: 1986-2006

After a fact finding visit to Darfur, on September 9, 2004, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the systematic killing in the region constituted genocide. According to the State Department report on the situation in Darfur, the conflict finds its roots in 1986 when Prime Minister Mahdi armed Arab tribes to fight the SPLA. One of these tribes became involved in a dispute in Darfur over ancient land and water rights. The conflict, significantly not involving religious differences as both parties are predominantly Muslim, resulted in the death of 3,000 and the enslavement of many more. With al-Bashir’s rise to power, non-Arab militias were disarmed while Arabs were permitted to retain their weapons.

In February 2003, a group called the Darfur Liberation Front attacked government forces, demanding a power sharing arrangement. The group changed its name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) the next month and has continued to resist government forces. The State Department documents that NGOs and the press have claimed that al-Bashir’s government has supplied militias to attack the people of Darfur. Furthermore, the report claims:

Refugee accounts corroborated by US and other independent reporting suggest that Khartoum has continued to provide direct support for advancing Jingaweil. Aerial bombardment and attacks on civilians reportedly have occurred widely throughout the region; respondents named more than 100 locations that
experienced such bombardment. (United States “Documenting”)

Jingaweit, traditionally spelled Janjaweed and also known as the Arabic word for someone engaged in jihad, mujahideen, are Arab militias. The United Nations claims that these government backed militias have violently affected 2.2 million of Darfur’s 6 million residents. Typical attacks include armed militiamen riding on horseback into villages, shooting or stabbing males, and abducting or raping women. Al-Bashir’s government claims it cannot control the Janjaweed violence, but this is to ignore the claims that his government supplies the forces with arms and declined to disarm them when he disarmed non-Arabs in the region.

A second crisis has emerged in the region: hunger. The Washington Post cites a United Nations report “on conditions in the village of Kailek in western Darfur accus[ing] local government officials of ordering ‘a policy of forced starvation’ by insisting that the villagers faced no problems, even as militias prevented food deliveries. Nine children in the area reportedly died of malnutrition every day” (Wax). The prevention centers on the granting of travel permits to aid workers. To travel outside of Khartoum, foreigners require travel permits, which are entirely government controlled, and are the tool used to stop humanitarian aid in a particularly brutal form of warfare.

The result of the al-Bashir government’s hold on the citizens and refugees of Darfur through forced famine is a sense of fear that paralyzes even those capable of moving. The predominant worry seems to be that no one is sure where a safe haven may be. Refugee camps just inside the Chadian border have been known to be raided
infrequently by the Janjaweed and rapes and other violence thus continue even there. The death toll from this conflict has been estimated as high as 400,000, although the British Parliament estimates the number to be 300,000, and the United Nations at 180,000 people. A great many of those deaths are attributed to starvation.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 was directed specifically at resolving the civil war between the north and south and does not extend to the Darfur conflict. According to Alsadig Almahadi, the leader of the outlawed Umma party, who considers Darfur a political stronghold, the CPA is being used in negotiations with the al-Bashir regime as a model for a peaceful resolution. In negotiations Almahadi is open to involving neighboring countries in the resolution that he stipulates must also include the opening of a constitutional conference that will lead to self-rule for Darfur. A cease fire was established in 2004, but it has been reportedly violated by both the Janjaweed and the SLA as heretofore fruitless negotiation attempts continue.

A positive and promising development beyond the cease fire has been a July 5, 2005 resolution by the African Union (A.U.), to which Sudan was a signing party, which declared several principles that must be adhered to in resolving the conflict in Darfur. The resolution calls for no discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, or culture, a free press, an independent judiciary under which all citizens have equal rights, a transparent government, and a federal government with local division of power. The resolution also calls for the safe return of refugees to their homeland, traditional tribal considerations in land and natural resource rights, and, much like the CPA, equal revenue sharing among all parts of Sudan.
Following the resolution, an A.U. force was deployed on a peacekeeping mission in Darfur with forces from Nigeria and Rwanda. The force has been plagued by insufficient materiel support and while the U.S. Department of State declared in March 2006 that the force provided “initial stabilization and reducing large-scale organized violence,” President George W. Bush declared in February 2006 that “the effort was noble, but it didn't achieve the objective” (Casey; Bush). Bush called for more troops under the U.N. through NATO stewardship and on March 10, 2006, the A.U. decided to allow a U.N. operation overtake their peacekeeping mission. This transfer of power, however, has not come easily. Sudan has neglected to support a U.N. force, saying that the intervention of a non-African force would only exacerbate the situation, likening it to that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the effort to form a U.N. force has been stagnant to the point that the A.U. elected to extend its mission six months to September 2006 while the force was formed and talks continued to persuade Sudan to accept the U.N. peacekeepers. The result has been a standstill as A.U. troops have seen no increase in materiel support and Janjaweed violence continues.
Slavery under Omar al-Bashir: 1989-2006

In concordance with both the Darfur conflict and the North-South Civil War, there has been slavery. Christian Solidarity International, a human rights organization specializing in human freedom, concluded after a fact finding trip to the Northern city of Bahr El Ghazal in 1999 that “the institution of chattel slavery continues on a large scale in NIF-controlled areas of Sudan, especially southern Darfur and southern Kordofan” (Christian Solidarity International). In a 1996 report the United Nations concluded that “the total passivity of the Government after having received information for years regarding the situation can only be interpreted as tacit political approval and support of the institution of slavery and the slave trade” (Gaspar).

The United Nations’ claim directly blames al-Bashir, albeit without mentioning his name. In essence, it claims that al-Bashir’s government approves of slavery in Sudan. The pattern of taking slaves traditionally begins with the attacking of a village. In the South it was by government troops and in Darfur it is by the government-backed Janjaweed militias, but both forces kill the men and capture women and children. They are then brought to Khartoum and sold or forced to perform forced labor for their captors. The slave narratives of some of the slaves have been gruesome:

I was enslaved five years ago during a raid on my village, Agok. I tried to run away from the soldiers, but they caught me and threw me to the ground. I struggled to get away, so they held down my hands and feet and cut my
throat and chest with a knife. As I grew faint, one of them named Mohammed raped me then and there (Hentoff).

More empirical information on the prevalence of slavery in Sudan provides a much clearer picture of its prevalence in the country. A Rift Valley Institute project, entitled “Sudan Abductee Database”, was an eighteen month field investigation throughout southern Sudan meant to determine the extent of slave abductions from 1983-2002. The study provided full names for as many people as it could record within almost exclusively SPLA controlled areas. While the study is admittedly incomplete because of its restriction to SPLA areas, its findings nevertheless provide an empirical figure to the problem of slavery in Sudan. The study found through interviews with tribal chiefs and other local leaders that over 12,000 people were violently abducted from 1983-2002 in over 2,000 slave raids. Only 700 of those abducted have returned to the south with the remaining still missing. The Rift Valley Institute continues to update its study as it finds more information and cannot definitively state how many abductees were made slaves until the data is complete, but they do make the conclusion that “those abducted have frequently been subject to one or more of the following: gross physical abuse, denial of freedom of movement, rape, forced labour without pay and assault on personal identity (renaming, for example, or involuntary circumcision)” (Rift Valley Institute).

The United States Department of State (DOS) conducted a similar study in conjunction with several NGOs, entitled “Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan,” to provide a clearer picture of the slavery situation in the country. The report
acknowledges that many of the relationships it found in the north between a northerner and southerner, including debt bondage and adoption, may be exploitative, but do not fit the Department’s definition of slavery. The report, however, did find “evidence of exploitative and abusive relationships that, in some cases, do meet the definition of slavery as contained in international conventions, which Sudan has signed.” (Slavery 9). These findings, the Department of State disclosed, were consistent with similar findings by “other credible agencies and organizations” (Slavery 10). The report also found evidence of violent abductions by the Janjaweed for the purpose of forced unpaid labor, forced confinement, forced relocation, forced religious conversion, and denial of the right to speak native languages. The enslaved are generally relocated to southern Darfur and western Kordofan, but some are sold to owners in other, unspecified locations.

The DOS report also concludes that the modern slavery is markedly different from prior slavery in Sudan insofar as it is conducted as part of a “counter-insurgence strategy pursued by successive governments in Khartoum” (Slavery 10). The report once again echoes other credible sources in concluding that the raids are conducted by government-armed militias in SPLA-controlled areas. Despite this practice, the Khartoum government has acknowledged the reality of abductions in Sudan with the 1999 creation of the Committee for the Elimination of the Abduction of Women and Children and passed laws outlawing slavery. The law is based on the definition of slavery established at the 1926 Slavery Convention in Geneva as part of the League of Nations and at the United Nations Supplement Convention on the Abolition of Slavery in 1956. The 1926 definition defined slavery as “the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (League of Nations). In 1956, the definition was expanded to include debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and child exploitation for labor. Articles 162 through 165 of Sudan’s Criminal Code sufficiently define and outlaw slavery, but in 2004 the court prosecuted no trafficking in persons cases, preferring leniency for those who willingly release their slaves to the CEAWC. This policy seems reasonable, but only if traffickers and owners do not replenish their supplies of slaves and the arrangement of 2004 fails to ensure this will not occur.

In spite of slavery being outlawed and credible reports of its existence from several independent groups, the problem of slavery continues with a treatment from al-Bashir’s government similar to its response to the starvation in Darfur. Al-Bashir’s government has obstructed, in concert with the SPLA, efforts from independent organizations to determine the extent of slavery in Sudan, failed to acknowledge its own responsibility in the slave trade by supporting the Janjaweed slave raiders, and has gone as far as to cast doubt on the possibility that slavery exists at all in Sudan. On its embassy’s website in December 2005, the home page featured a 2002 article touting the failure of slave redemption to stop slavery, calling slavery a “corrupt racket operated by leaders of Southern Sudan’s rebel army” (Muhammad). While this claim that slave redemption purchases freed people for profit by the sellers has been widely regarded as factual, it is significant that after three years this article containing no references to actual slaves remains on the embassy’s website. Another article posted on the site covers a debate of slavery in the Sudan, largely denying its existence. A man identified
as Dr. Farouk of the Umma party states that “there is no slavery in Sudan,” but to dispel
the notion that the statement was in defense of the al-Bashir regime, he claimed “I’m
praying to Allah every day in my five times and more that, the next morning this regime
is not there in Sudan” (Muhammad “Sudanese”). Other panelists went on to say that the
slave myth, as they characterized it, was fueled by greed over oil wealth and evidence of
slavery was staged by organizations opposed both to the government and its formal
opposition.

Slavery denial in Sudan was echoed by a Sudanese research assistant at Texas
A&M University who chose to remain anonymous. When asked about the slave trade,
the student claimed it was a large-scale misunderstanding. Having been raised in both
the north and south as the child of a government official, the student claimed to have
intimate knowledge of both northern and southern cultures. The student claimed that in
southern Sudan, when a family cannot care for their children, the children are given to
another family. The children work with the adopted family in their largely agrarian
work without pay in exchange for food, clothing, and general care as a member of the
family. Contrary to the “Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan” report, the
student claimed this was characterized by Western NGOs as slavery because the children
worked for people other than their parents without pay, when the system was actually an
informal adoption program.

When confronted with information about NGO, DOS, and U.N. reports and slave
autobiographies chronicling their servitude, the student echoed the Sudanese government
and claimed it was fueled by greed. She stated that people in southern Sudan are largely
destitute and see claiming themselves as slaves as a way out because NGOs would, until recently, purchase their freedom and allow them to move to another country, whereby escaping their poverty without actually having been slaves. When asked about the photographs of brutal slave treatment, including large gash wounds about the neck and chest, rape, and beatings, the student replied only that while she had no knowledge of military actions during the civil war, she thought it possible these accusations were true because atrocities were quite likely in war.

The prospect that hundreds, if not thousands, of people who claim they are former slaves are party to a hoax that has wrongly caught al-Bashir’s government in the crosshairs of international human rights groups seems unlikely in the face of credible contrary evidence. NGO, DOS, and United Nations documents chronicling strikingly similar slave narratives gathered through an enduring presence in the country that all led to the same conclusion: slavery persists without interference from the government. More valuable than providing a picture of modern slavery in Sudan is the illustration of this perspective on slavery in the country. It is perhaps most difficult to recognize and rectify a problem if the situation is such that reliable contrary evidence fails to allow for the existence of slavery in this student’s mind. Even more valuable, is that her perspective seems very much in line with that of the al-Bashir government’s and speaks very strongly in explaining why slavery has not been abolished and instead has grown under al-Bashir’s regime. Quite simply, this perspective fails to recognize slavery’s existence and consequently would not provoke any efforts to eliminate a problem that does not exist.
Abolition Efforts: 1989-2006

Modern efforts to end slavery in Sudan have centered largely on three methods: a publicity campaign, slave repatriation, and slave redemption.

The publicity campaign against slavery is conducted most notably by the American Anti-Slavery Group (AASG), which can be used as an example of the method. Founded in 1994 to combat slavery worldwide, AASG has established a four point plan to eliminate slavery: awareness, advocacy, activism, and aid. To promote awareness, AASG publishes informational materials and maintain a website with evidence of slavery’s existence and opportunities to become an activist. Furthermore, AASG encourages former slaves to become activists against slavery, enabling AASG to conduct a speaking tour with former slaves as the headline speaker. The purpose of the speeches, of which there can be a fee attached, is to increase awareness that slavery exists with the added influence of a victim of slavery speaking about their experiences. AASG also holds separate public events including candle-light vigils, rallies, and conferences to attract media attention on slavery. Yet another part of the publicity campaign is AASG-organized trips for local American leaders to witness slave redemptions with the hope that it will provide an understanding and initiative for that leader to take action. Finally, AASG works to publicize information about corporations who invest in countries who harbor slavery to create a divestment campaign against those corporations.

More direct AASG efforts come in the form of partnering activists it generates with NGOs working directly to eliminate slavery abroad and provide support for liberated slaves. It also utilizes activists in continued publicity campaigns and
fundraisers to sustain current and future publicity efforts. All of the money and effort spent on these publicity campaigns has amounted to very little in the way of ending slavery in Sudan.

While former slaves affiliated with AASG have met with the President and garnered large audiences for their speeches, the fact remains that the United States has taken no action against slavery in Sudan outside of the publishing of its own reports on the situation of slavery in Sudan. Consequently, the question must be asked if generates only publicity and no action at the levels of government where change can be made toward relations with Sudan is: is the campaign effective? The large numbers of slaves still in Sudan with continuing Janjaweed raids to take more slaves suggests the answer is no.

Repatriation, a second method of slave abolition, is conducted by the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC). The CEAWC was founded in May 1999 after a United Nations Commission on Human Rights investigation in April 1999 chose to cease the use of the word slavery to describe the situation in Sudan in favor of “abduction” and “forced labor.” The change in semantics reversed the predominant Sudanese government policy of denying slavery’s existence in its country and promptly formed the CEAWC as a branch of the Ministry of Justice with the mandate to end abductions, return abductees to their homes, and the punish abductors or anyone harboring an abducted.

In February 2006, seven years after its founding, the Committee had the names and locations of more than 8,000 slaves in the north who have yet to be repatriated to the
south. This significant figure represents 73% of the approximately 11,000 abductees for which the Rift Valley Institute has no data because they remain in the north, although there is no guarantee that the CEAWC and Rift Valley Institute have identified the same individuals. It seems reasonable to assume some overlap between the two organizations simply because there are a finite amount of slaves and both groups researched the same topic. The U.S. Department of State praises the CEAWC’s efforts at repatriating slaves in the midst of civil war and genocide, recommending that to augment the Committee’s progress, the “government should work to end the violence in Darfur and bring to justice those responsible for abuses…and coordinate the movement of affected populations to their home areas in an organized and safe manner. It should also seek to strengthen its fledgling anti-trafficking public awareness campaign and demonstrate concrete enforcement of its existing relevant legal codes” (United States Trafficking). Thus far, any such campaign to assist the CEAWC has not been undertaken.

While the CEAWC has undeniably had a positive effect in combating slavery in Sudan through its release and repatriation of slaves, it remains incapable of completely eradicating slavery in Sudan without more governmental support. Necessary government support includes logistical support for the CEAWC to conduct their work in a war zone or ending the war in Darfur altogether and stricter enforcement of anti-slavery laws to keep slave traders and owners from returning to the trade. As a result of not having received this support, the CEAWC’s efforts have assisted in but not completely solved slavery in Sudan.
Slave redemption, the third popular abolition method, is now conducted almost exclusively by John Eibner of Christian Solidarity International (CSI). Since 1995, the idea of slave redemption was popular among NGOs with CSI and Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) as two of the largest redeemers. Slave redemption is the purchase of slaves by NGOs from slave owners who are subsequently set free. Since 1999, slave redemption has come under increasing scrutiny with allegations claiming that many redeemed slaves are not slaves at all, but willingly sold as part of a business plan where redeemers created the market for false slaves. A 2002 open letter from CSW summarizes the problem, claiming that no even “5% of the supposed ‘slaves’ had ever actually been slaves, and that they were coached in how to act, and stories to tell” (Christian). This claim was validated by the subsequent confession of one of the defrauders, which caused the SPLM to officially discourage slave redemption. Human Rights Watch cites the same argument before recounting a 1999 joint statement from the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) that said, “With all the good intentions in slave redemption, it does not end slavery” (“Slavery”).

In a May 15, 2002 60 Minutes II segment, John Eibner insists the claims that slave redemption is a hoax is false. He claims that those redeemers who call redemption a hoax are relying on unreliable sources who exploit their naiveté for profit. Eibner, however, believes himself to be above this deception and firmly feels his work redeems real slaves. A further argument in favor of CSI’s slave redemption is provided by AASG, which claims that “slavery in Sudan is not economic. It is a terror-weapon
revived in 1985 by the Northern government in its civil war against the South” (American). This statement may be partially true, but AASG goes on to say that “no one believes [redemption] is the solution to slavery in Sudan” (American). Thus, while the policy of slave redemption can be debated as helpful or harmful, that argument is largely irrelevant to solving slavery in Sudan because both sides agree that redemption is not the solution to slavery and the CEAWC is working successfully to liberate slaves for free.

A final type of plan has been proposed, but not enacted to solve slavery. This plan is to address slavery within the larger realm of the violent, political, and economic problems in Sudan. As the SCC and NSCC argued, “when the crises in Sudan are brought to an end, slavery will also come to an end” (Human Rights Watch “Slavery”). This is the most realistic abolition plan because slavery is only the symptom of deeper problems in Sudan. Slavery may be only partly economic, but economics play a role, and it may be partly based on racism and hate, but both play a role. Slavery persists in a government where unrest has been common for the better part of its modern history and to assume that slavery operates independently of that unrest is misguided. Instead, slavery can only be solved by addressing the fundamental crises facing Sudan and this is the type of solution this thesis will define.
SOLUTION
Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs

The Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs is an adaptation of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Like Maslow’s Hierarchy, this hierarchy suggests that nations must first satisfy all basic needs before satisfying higher needs. The basic needs, classified as necessities in the Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs, are Security, Sovereignty, and Economy while the higher needs, classified as sustaining needs, are Identity and Adaptation. In order to solve the problem of slavery in Sudan, a responsible and stable government must be
established. This stable government can be realized through the satisfaction of each level of the hierarchy in order to implement an anti-slavery campaign in the final level, Adaptation.

This solution to slavery in Sudan is not a call to depose the al-Bashir government. Recent history has shown through al-Bashir’s cooperation in the Collective Peace Agreement with southern insurgents that promises to end the civil war between the Khartoum government and the south, that al-Bashir is open to a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, after initial complaints about delays in oil revenue payments, al-Bashir sending over $700 million in oil revenues to the Southern government in 2006 signifies a commitment to honor the CPA. A second peace agreement between Sudan and Chad in February 2006 calling for a peacekeeping force to stop raids on the border of the two countries shared in the Darfur region. There has been a growing concern about raids by both countries into the territory of the other, which spilled over from the civil war in Darfur as refugees fled over the border into Chad. While the agreement did not specify where the peacekeeping force would come from, its signing signifies willingness, or accession to international pressure, for al-Bashir to pursue peace through diplomacy.

The value of al-Bashir’s willingness to forge peace with the South and Chad is that it suggests he may be willing to do so in relation to Darfur, which will allow for a possible campaign to end slavery in the region, as well as in the country in general. Fulfilling the hierarchy, however, will require more than optimism. Al-Bashir’s history in supplying equipment to the Janjaweed in Darfur and the often lawless history of the
region itself strongly suggest that al-Bashir is unwilling or unable to quell the violence in the region. This suggests an external force must have a role in stopping the genocide in Darfur to realize the Security level of the hierarchy. This level involves the establishment of reasonable safety for the Sudanese within their borders and the ability of Sudan to maintain its own borders. The external force that has assisted in establishing this Security is the African Union, but it has been largely ineffective. The United Nations is the next logical force to intervene, but China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has expressed reservations about deploying a U.N. force into Sudan.

In addition to the traditionally slow deployment of U.N. troops, the failure of U.N. forces in Rwanda suggests that establishing Security in Sudan may be out of reach of anything less than a fully committed U.N. force. As a result, minimal American logistical, intelligence, and perhaps Special Forces assistance to A.U. forces is required to establish Security in Sudan.

Adherence to peace agreements established will continue to require observance by an external body to provide an objective assessment of the situation independent from northern and southern political biases. As Sudan shows the desire and ability to maintain peace, this body can be withdrawn and Sudan can fulfill the Sovereignty level. This level requires international diplomatic recognition of Sudan and the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries that can lead to economic partnerships and growth.

Fulfilling the Economy level will require foreign investment and perhaps renewed IMF and World Bank aid to establish varied industry that can lead to a stable
economy on which peace can thrive and a sovereign government can begin once again to
operate without external influence. Expanding the economy beyond oil and agriculture
will allow Sudan to maintain economic growth despite fluctuations in oil prices and
environmental conditions that make agriculture rather unreliable. The Cambodia Plan,
which ties trade quotas to labor standards, can create a conscionable labor force for the
international community, placing Sudan at an advantage to its competitors with lower
labor standards.

With its necessities fulfilled, Sudan will be able to turn to the issue of satisfying
its sustaining needs by creating a national identity that spurs its citizens and its
government to look inward and adapt the government to provide the greatest good to the
greatest number of people. This Identity level of the hierarchy can be best characterized
as patriotism, which is perhaps the strongest unifier for a country because it allows
differences to be resolved in a peaceful manner that does not threaten the survival of the
nation. The reason for this is that the pride in the nation, national identity, and the good
of the whole outweigh any individual interest.

The final level, Adjustment, is the level at which internal reforms are carried out
through the legislature and judiciary. In Sudan, this level will include a campaign to end
the slave trade completely. While increased security can vastly reduce slave trafficking,
it will be through a Gordon-like campaign, monitoring, apprehending, and prosecuting
slave traders that slavery can be solved.
A more detailed explanation of each of the levels of the Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs follows with a detailed and practical account of the conditions necessary to satisfy each need in the Sudan, which will allow for a solution to slavery.
Security

The most basic need for any state is to provide its citizens with security. From ancient Egyptian states to the United States and through all successful governments in the Sudan, stability was afforded by an ability to protect that nation’s interests, which included its citizens, albeit historically not all its citizens. While some citizens were marginalized in the Sudan and other nations throughout history—an example is the impoverished who often lack a political voice even in modern states—the majority of citizens in long-term stable states have had their interests protected. Sudan has failed to provide this security to its citizens in Darfur and has allowed the deaths of over 100,000 people, even after providing security to its former violent southern opponent.

The persistence of Janjaweed violence and slave raids in Darfur and the State Department documented materiel support from the al-Bashir government strongly suggest that al-Bashir is unwilling or unable to stop the violence in the region, even if a peace agreement is signed. While stopping the supply of weapons and munitions to the Janjaweed would presumably not stop what Colin Powell characterized as genocide because such systematic killing is often fueled by hate ideology, as found in Rwanda and Kosovo, for example, it would force the militias to look for support outside of the government, which would make sustaining the raids more difficult. The Janjaweed could turn to arms dealers or other governments, but money would then be required for purchasing the arms and weapon trafficking is always subject to the uncertainties of an illicit trade. Al-Bashir, however, has given no indication that he is willing to limit the support of the Janjaweed, despite contradictorily supporting an A.U. force and a May 5,
2006 peace accord opposed to it, and there is no guarantee that if he did limit the support that the attacks and slave raids would cease.

Aside from the source of the militas’ support is the fact that thousands of people in Darfur are dying each month that a resolution is delayed. These are not casualties among two warring armies, but among civilians. To negotiate a peace settlement without having control of Darfur seized from the Janjaweed would be misguided because there would be no means to enforce that peace. Furthermore, it would be irresponsible to conduct negotiations while such a high volume of civilians are murdered during delays in negotiations. Nevertheless, a peace agreement was signed on May 5, 2006 between Sudan and the SLA with the assistance of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick (Associated Press). While the establishment of security in Darfur is preferred before beginning negotiations out of consideration for the lives of Sudan’s citizens, security is a necessity to enforce any peace negotiations for the region and the lack of security will likely undermine the May 5th accord. It is al-Bashir’s failure to satisfy this most basic level in the Hierarchy for the citizens of Darfur that negates his ability to provide the higher needs in the Hierarchy, including an absolute right to sovereignty.

The al-Bashir government seems to have recognized that it lacks control in Darfur and has even willingly given up a measure of control of the region, whereby forgoing a portion of Sudan’s sovereignty in Darfur, by allowing an A.U. force to intervene. Thus, to ensure the safety of Darfur’s citizens, as al-Bashir has already concluded through his support of the A.U., an outside independent force is required to
initially stop the violence and create security in the region before its sovereignty can be reestablished.
The Case for American Involvement

The United Nations was created following World War II to maintain international peace and security. To achieve that goal, the U.N. endeavors to prevent and remove threats to peace and suppress aggression that threatens peace. Furthermore, its Security Council assesses threats to peace and security, determines actions to nullify these threats, and, if necessary, can apply economic sanctions and military force to suppress an aggressor. Despite several assessments by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and Secretary General Kofi Annan providing evidence of government violence against civilians in Darfur and the abduction of southerners into slavery, the Security Council has failed to act to suppress the Omar al-Bashir government’s aggression that has led to civil war on two fronts.

The reason behind the Security Council’s inaction lies in its structure. The Security Council is comprised of ten elected member countries who serve two year terms and five permanent members. The permanent members are the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China. While each member possesses one vote in Council matters, on items other than procedural matters, a majority is required with unanimous support from the permanent members. These items include any measures that would allow the Security Council to stop Sudanese aggression against the citizens of Darfur. China has vowed to bar any such measures.

China’s rapid industrialization over the last decade of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first has placed an increasingly heavy burden on the world’s oil supply. According to Dr. Michael Economides, an energy expert at the University of Houston,
China’s oil demand increased 140% in the decade preceding 2004 and in 2004 alone, increased 20%. “There has never been a country in the history of humankind whose energy demand increased by 20% in one year,” Economides explains. “China will shape the world energy for the foreseeable future, more than any other country” (5). Indeed, China, more than any other country, has shaped the oil industry in Sudan. China’s domestic oil reserves reached maximum capacity in the 1990s, but as Dr. Economides explained, China’s appetite continued to increase and their “voracious appetite for raw materials,” as a Washington Post article termed it, have led Chinese companies “to distant points of the globe in pursuit” (Goodman). The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a nationalized Chinese company, invested so heavily in Sudanese oil that by 1999, it owned 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the consortium dominating Sudan’s oil reserves, which is the single largest share. According to Human Rights Watch, this investment in Sudan is the CNPC’s “biggest overseas project to date” with a 1999 revenue of $500 million (“China’s Involvement”). The heavy Chinese investment in oil has had political repercussions. After repeatedly threatening to veto by neglecting to vote in the affirmative on any U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Sudan, China allowed a moderate resolution in 2004 that threatens Sudan with oil sanctions should it continue violence in Darfur. The resolution also calls for an expanded African Union force in the region and a probe into reported atrocities in Darfur, but China’s Ambassador to the U.N., Wang Guangya, warned that “he would veto any future resolution that would impose sanctions” (“UN Adopts”). In essence, a threat to veto further action has
eliminated the Security Council’s ability to interfere in stopping violence in Darfur because China’s veto would keep any resolutions from leaving the Council. Guangya has denied any correlation between oil investments and the threat to veto, saying instead that sanctions would eliminate Sudan’s incentive to cooperate with international bodies, but Chinese diplomatic experts, including Dr. Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton, disagree. Dr. Lake stated at a lecture at Texas A&M University on April 5, 2006 that China was the reason for the lack of U.N. Security Council interference in Darfur because of China’s vast investment in oil infrastructure and its increasing oil demand. Regardless of the reason behind the veto is the fact that a negative Chinese vote prevents UN forces from intervening in Darfur and because this 2004 resolution was in essence an empty threat without Chinese support, there is little indication China will change its position on the matter.

China’s position has made an effort to transfer an ill-equipped 7,000 man African Union (A.U.) peacekeeping mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation a difficult one. The A.U. mission, sent to Sudan in July 2005, has been limited by insufficient materiel support and will likely not be relieved by a U.N. peacekeeping force due to China’s veto power and Sudan’s opposition to such a force. While U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that "a U.N. mission will be a necessity for Darfur," this seems unlikely to happen within 2006 or perhaps at all unless China suddenly changes its position on the matter. Even if China does reverse its position, it seems improbable that it would support an aggressive or forceful U.N. intervention in Darfur after staunchly opposing it in concert with Sudan for the better part of a decade.
With an ineffective A.U. force unable to establish security in Darfur and unlikely to be relieved by a U.N. force, citizens of the region continue to be victims of the Janjaweed. Action is needed much sooner than is possible from the U.N. for their lives to be protected. Promise lies in supporting the A.U., as Sudan wholeheartedly backed the extension of their mission in Darfur and pledged to send 10,000 troops to supplement the A.U. forces. More support for the A.U. force would presumably provide a quicker establishment of security in the region, but while President Bush has highlighted a desire to stop violence in Darfur, most notably with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2004 and a September 2004 appeal for international support in ending the war, directly doing so seems a dubious proposition at best.

With U.S. troops heavily deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003, respectively, deployment in a third theater would presumably begin to test the limits of the armed forces. Furthermore, the situation in Iraq as of 2006 has begun to deteriorate. Sectarian violence has seized the country and hindered the formation of a stable government. Casualties due to terrorism, the violence the U.S. mission endeavored to eliminate, continue alongside sectarian murders that have caused increasing public backlash against the war in the U.S. with disapproval ratings of the handling of the situation reaching 58% in a June 2005 Washington Post/ABC News poll and expert claims that the conflict may be devolving into civil war (Washington Post).

Complicating the matter further is Sudan’s history of violently resisting outside influence. Dating back to Egyptian influence on the country, Sudan has resisted outside influence and only accepted it when it lacked the power to maintain its sovereignty, but
the most apt example of resistance was the Madhist Revolution in 1882. The roots of the revolt against British and Egyptian rule began with the military governance of Charles Gordon, who spurred resentment by using British and Egyptian troops to police the Sudan. The resistance was fiercest in Darfur where even Gordon realized force would not be a suitable resolution. In the end, nationalism won out, Gordon was killed, and an independent state established until 1895. This history suggests that Darfur would be particularly opposed to Western military dominance in an effort to establish security in the region, but the modern situation with the acceptance of an A.U. force suggests that less heavy-handed foreign assistance would be preferred to genocide.

In light of this situation, it seems unlikely that Congress would approve the deployment of a third military force to Darfur with the mission of defeating the Janjaweed and establishing security in the region. By nature, the military mission would require the establishment of military jurisdiction throughout the region in order to carry out legal military operations, which is the exact same situation Gordon unsuccessfully created in his attempt to quell the rebellion. Furthermore, the situation in Iraq and the public backlash against it suggests that American public opinion, defined by Congress’ constituents, has turned against military missions violating the sovereignty of another country without their approval. Nevertheless, in light of the War on Terror and the possibility of insecure regions like Darfur harboring terrorists and terrorism, aside from the humanitarian concerns, U.S. interest in the situation at the executive level of government remains.
Without the option of direct military intervention, the U.S. can provide materiel support to A.U. troops to increase their effectiveness, provide military advisors to aid A.U. commanders, deploy clandestine forces to gather intelligence and conduct military missions outside the guise of public scrutiny, or a combination of the three.

The A.U. force has been hamstrung by deficient supplies as the governments of Nigeria and Rwanda have been unable to adequately supply their forces in Darfur with enough weapons and ammunition to remain effective against the Janjaweed and the SLA. The simplest method of involvement for the U.S. is to rectify this problem by supplying the A.U. force. Supplying the force incurs no risk of casualties to American troops, except in delivering the supplies, and provides teeth to an agreement between the A.U. and Sudan already in place, which will help enable the mission to succeed.

Historical precedent for this type of action exists in Afghanistan’s revolt against the USSR in the late 1970s. As Charlie Wilson disclosed in a November 29, 2005 discussion in response to George Crill’s book about his involvement in supplying Afghani rebels with American armaments, entitled *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History*, the U.S. undertook a massive armament campaign to undermine Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The campaign was ultimately a success with a defeat of Soviet forces in 1989, but Afghanistan was then confronted with the problem of American weapons floating unregulated throughout the country during the rise of the Taliban and the intervention of American forces in 2001. Similar assistance in Sudan would not likely incur the same risk of the weapons
becoming unregulated in the hands of rebels because they would be supplying standing armies.

The significant difference between the precedent in Afghanistan and the situation in Sudan is the fact that the armament operation in Sudan would not have to be conducted covertly because the mission has the approval of the Sudanese government and the A.U. to defeat the Janjaweed, mitigate SLA retaliatory violence, and establish security. Legitimate armament through legal sales, leases, or free legal armament of the Nigerian and Rwandan troops under the control of the A.U. would be possible under this arrangement. It is important to distinguish between the independent Nigerian, Rwandan, and Sudanese armies, and those under the A.U. The governments of all of these countries have been traditionally unstable and to trust their militaries with large quantities of American weapons seems somewhat of a dubious proposition. Instead, forces under the 53-member African Union are responsible to 52 governments other than their own, making unilateral military engagement more difficult. Nevertheless, American arms must not be given indiscriminately.

The amount of armaments given or sold to A.U. forces must be determined by an American military assessment team and not by A.U. forces to ensure that unnecessarily large numbers of weapons don’t float around in Darfur, Rwanda, or Nigeria after the A.U. force disengages. Perhaps the most fail-safe method would be an adaptation of the Lend/Lease Program under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II. Under this program, Allies were given supplies with the understanding that they would be returned or paid for after the war. In the adaptation for Sudan, A.U. forces could be loaned
weapons for the duration of their deployment in Darfur and at the termination of the deployment, conduct a disarmament of the forces’ American weapons arranged at the signing of the agreement between the U.S. and the A.U. While all the weapons would presumably not be returned, it is reasonable to say that the majority would be, allowing the U.S. to refurbish or destroy them, ensuring they are not used in further conflicts the U.S. does not support.

American military assessment of the amounts of weapons needed by the A.U. would necessarily be conducted by American military advisors. Advisors would be used in their traditional disengaged role to assess the needs of the A.U. forces to defeat the Janjaweed, establish security in Darfur, and coordinate the distribution of armaments to A.U. forces. If deemed necessary by U.S. military planners and palpable by Congress and the A.U., these advisors could also advise A.U. forces in strategy and training to improve their effectiveness. In order to avoid a situation like Vietnam or Iraq, however, it will be exceedingly important that U.S. military advisors do not overstep the limits set for them by the A.U. with Sudan’s support. This will most obviously mean that advisors are not to engage in actual warfare, instead simply advising.

The third option for U.S. intervention is clandestine and covert operations. This can be conducted independently or in conjunction with the first two options, but marks a definite increased involvement, commitment, and risk by the U.S. to resolve the conflict in Darfur. The covert operation disaster in Somalia in October 3, 1993 that cost the U.S. forces two Blackhawk helicopters, 18 lives, and an explosion of public backlash in Mogadishu speak to the risks of such operations. Nevertheless, covert and clandestine
operations operate under Executive Orders, not Congressional approval, making them much more flexible than a full-scale military commitment, and can be invaluable to the prompt establishment of security in Darfur.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established with the mission of providing military intelligence to military planners and fighters and could be applied to assist A.U. forces in determining the vulnerabilities of enemy forces. The DIA is regarded as among the best, if not the best, defense intelligence agency in the world and is far superior to any comparable intelligence agency employed by the A.U. Traditionally the DIA is coordinated through Defense Attachés at U.S. Embassies abroad and the 2005 full-time reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum may allow for such an arrangement to apply in Sudan when a Defense Attaché is appointed. Problematically, however, has been the Khartoum government’s unwillingness to allow travel into Darfur by foreign diplomats and officials. The agreement allowing for advisors to participate in the A.U. force’s efforts would necessarily include permission for the Defense Attaché and his staff to travel to the region as well, allowing for intelligence operations to be conducted. If this option is denied or a Defense Attaché is not appointed within 2006, another option is to travel to the region covertly under the control of the Defense Attaché in Khartoum, if present, or the Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt. The details of DIA will have to be worked out with the A.U. and Sudan after the agreement allowing U.S. support of the effort is reached, but it is safe to assume that clandestine DIA operations could be conducted to assist the A.U. effort.
A promising indication that Sudan would cooperate with a DIA operation in Darfur is its cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Ken Silverstein’s Los Angeles Times article entitled, “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism” Sudan has been “a surprisingly valuable ally of the CIA.” Mukhabarat, Sudan’s CIA counterpart, has cooperated in providing intelligence on suspected terrorists and has willingly arrested al-Qaeda suspects. Even more encouraging to an American intelligence partnership is the fact that the Mukhabarat is well-trained, with one anonymous official stating, "Their competence level as a service is very high. You can't survive in that part of the world without a good intelligence service, and they are in a position to provide significant help [in the War on Terror]" (Silverstein). Sudan’s willingness to cooperate with U.S. intelligence officials seems to be vested in an interest in being removed from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism. While neither the U.S. nor Sudan have officially recognized the Mukhabarat’s efforts to apprehend terrorists for the U.S., both sides acknowledge a strong partnership between the two intelligence agencies and have shared large volumes of intelligence information regarding terrorism and al-Qaeda.

While there is a significant difference between apprehending al-Qaeda terrorists in Sudan and sharing intelligence on the aggressive Janjaweed in Darfur, a correlation can be made between the two. The Janjaweed’s continued violence in Darfur can be thought of as terrorism that has killed at least 100,000 people from their homes and forced a far greater number into refugee camps to escape the terror of Janjaweed raids on villages. The death toll alone far outnumbers the death toll from the World Trade Center
attacks in 2001 and it is a campaign of terror, regardless of the fact that it is conducted with firearms instead of bombings. If the Khartoum administration can be persuaded to see the situation in Darfur in this regard, they may be open to an expansion of CIA or DIA roles to assist the A.U. in establishing a secure Darfur, much less likely to harbor terrorists or allow terrorism. The growing partnership between the CIA and the Mukhabarat suggest this may be possible.

A second covert option for the U.S. in Darfur is the employment of Special Forces for specific missions against Janjaweed forces that are outside the scope of A.U. forces’ abilities. These operations would be conducted without Congressional knowledge, Sudanese knowledge, or A.U. knowledge under the power of American Executive Orders. The fact that the general public rarely learns of covert American special operations suggests that the missions are often successful while maintaining the unit’s cover. This consequently suggests that the covert U.S. Special Forces are extraordinarily effective and rarely caught, justifying the significant risk of their operations. The risk for these types of operations, however, is enormous with not only the risk of casualties, but for the force to be discovered is an act of war via an invasion of Sudan without governmental cooperation or approval. Consequently, while the probability of the unit being discovered is presumably low, the risks are significant enough that this type of U.S. involvement should be a last resort, utilized only if the materiel and intelligence support prove to be ineffective.

If covert U.S. Special Forces are used, however, they can provide the A.U. effort a distinct strategic advantage. For example, if A.U. forces are able to repel attacks on
villages, but not disrupt the supply line to Janjaweed forces, U.S. Special Forces could covertly intervene where the A.U. was unable to be effective. The elevated ability of Special Forces suggests that they would be capable of successfully undertaking any operation against the Janjaweed militia, which is less well organized and less well armed than U.S. Special Forces. Eliminating the most strategically advantageous targets would provide the A.U. with significant advantages over their opponents and bring a quicker resolution to the conflict in Darfur.

The defeat of the Janjaweed would also severely limit the slave trade. By destroying the militia force that conducts slave raids, slave traders would suddenly lack a support network that backs their raids with firepower. A successful campaign would not, however, apprehend or kill all slave traders or even disarm them. The purpose of the A.U. mission is to establish security in Darfur by defeating the aggressive Janjaweed forces and mitigating retaliatory violence by the SLA. Defeat, however, does not mean total disarmament because while the Janjaweed’s structure would be broken and its supply lines severed, small groups of Janjaweed would remain simply due to the fact that it will be impossible to determine with absolute certainty whether a person is a member of the Janjaweed or a civilian unless the person is shooting at A.U. forces. This resilience of slave traders was evident after Charles Gordon resigned from his post after nearly eliminating slavery only for slave traders to quickly reemergence upon his resignation. The benefit of establishing security, however, is that the ability for slave traders to conduct large-scale slave raids would be dramatically reduced. Without government support and with significantly reduced numbers, the slave traders would
logistically be unable to sustain their rate of slave seizures. The journey from Darfur to market is the same distance, but with fewer Janjaweed and fewer supplies, the time it takes to secure and sell a group of slaves would be significantly increased. Thus, while the establishment of security would nearly eliminate slavery in Sudan, it will not eliminate it completely. The successful establishment of security through U.S. reinforcement of Sudan-supported A.U. forces, however, is enough to establish meaningful peace talks on Darfur.

Peace talks occurring after security is established means that the talks can be pursued without the citizens of Darfur continuing to die through delays and impasses during negotiations. This negotiated settlement should logically adhere to the conditions established in the A.U.’s “Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur.” Since the principles are largely in line with the internationally praised CPA and have been met with approval from the Sudanese government, it seems logical to adhere to them. A summary of the principles defined in the declaration to which a peace agreement must adhere are:

1. The recognition of religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity in the free expression of the citizens of Sudan regarding the country’s territorial integrity.
2. Democracy, an independent judiciary, transparency in the government, and equal representation for all Sudan’s citizens.
4. A federal style of government with local representatives.
5. Equal sharing of national wealth.

6. Humanitarian aid will be provided in accordance with U.N. standards.

7. Refugees will be freely allowed to return to their homeland free from discrimination and with international support for them as they resettle.

8. Rehabilitation for Darfur, including compensation for losses of property and life.

9. Protection of sustainable economic practices and conservation of natural resources.

10. All resolutions formed in negotiations will be approved by the people of Darfur.

11. The cooperation of the A.U. and the international community to ensure the adherence to peace accords. (Abdallah)

To adhere to these principles means to integrate Darfur’s many factions into a democratic representative system. Perhaps the most effective means for this is to establish districts in Darfur who elect their own representatives that will augment the existing state-level representatives to Khartoum. Breaking the representation down to the local level will allow for more accurate representation at the state, and in turn, the national level of government.

A key to the successfulness of a representative democracy in Darfur is an independent judiciary. If the judiciary is outside the realm of control of government officials, it will allow for an internal enforcement of peace accords. For example, should al-Bashir attempt to secure more oil revenues for the north, an independent judiciary can bring charges against him for breaking the constitution outlined in the CPA and formally adopted since the signing of the agreement. Al-Bashir could be placed under arrest for
seditious and tried accordingly while a peaceful succession process is undertaken to find new leadership.

With al-Bashir’s unreliable history, however, an independent judiciary can only be reasonably assured of being established through monitoring by the international community, as outlined in the A.U.’s principles for resolving the conflict. Most logically, considering Sudan’s willingness to work with the A.U., the primary oversight body should be the A.U. who makes regular reports to the U.N. It is at this point, when a settlement is reached and implemented, that the U.S. pulls out its military forces and immediately, but gradually demilitarizes the A.U. of American weapons as the A.U. pulls out in parts over the course of the first year of the implementation of peace accords to ensure Darfur remains stable enough to adhere to the accords. Should the A.U. see that Sudan has in any way failed to adhere to the tenets of the peace agreements, it can apply diplomatic pressure, which would appear to be more authentic, if not effective, than U.N. pressure because it is comprised of Sudan’s neighbor states. Harboring good relations with his neighbors seems to have been part of al-Bashir’s plan in 2005-2006 with his signing peace accords with Chad and the SLA while supporting the A.U. mission in Darfur. If this diplomatic pressure fails, military action can once again be undertaken with the appropriate international support to rectify the situation, but only with a firm exit strategy defined beforehand.

Furthermore, international oversight will be required for adherence to the CPA. Already South Sudan has appealed to the international community when oil revenue payments from Khartoum were delayed and Khartoum quickly responded by paying in
full. Knowing that not only is the international community watching, but they have a vested interest proven through previous intervention in peace efforts will ensure the country’s adherence to peace. The primary overseeing bodies have thus far been the A.U., who has provided the U.N. with reports on the implementation of the CPA, and a Special Representative from the U.N. Since the CPA’s enactment, the U.N. has praised the accords, but also cited cost concerns in implementing the agreement and also called for an increase in international support, monetarily and otherwise, to ensure the government adheres to the agreement (United Nations “Comprehensive”).

With security established throughout the country and citizens of Sudan equally represented in the democratic government established in the Sudan, the country can begin to fulfill the higher needs in the Hierarchy. Security is the most basic need for a state to maintain its sovereignty, develop its economy, and implement anti-slavery reforms because if the country’s citizens are dying at the hands of the government, the other needs become secondary to survival. A peace agreement respecting the government of Sudan and the African Union and ensured of legitimacy by international oversight is a logical and practical method for establishing security in Sudan’s lone war-torn region, at which point it can fulfill the higher needs.
Sovereignty

A state establishes its sovereignty after securely defining its borders and maintaining them through military force, diplomacy, or in most cases a combination of both. A nation that is newly established, either through separation from another state or a revolution putting a new system of governance in power, must be recognized by the international community to have a legal right to sovereignty. This recognition of sovereignty traditionally allows the nation to operate independently from outside influence, but also establish diplomatic relations with other nations. With international relations established, the nation can pursue international trade, whereby moving to the next level in the Hierarchy by stabilizing its economy.

In the case of Sudan, these traditional steps to sovereignty have occurred somewhat out of order. A nation generally establishes its borders and maintains security within them, whereby mitigating legitimate threats to the government’s power from rival revolutionaries or other rivals. If an established government cannot rule without the threat of being deposed, then the laws it enacts and the authority with which it operates are increasingly meaningless, as was the case with Sudan’s military and civilian governments from 1956-1969 and again in 1985 with Jaafar Nimeiri’s military government being toppled among public resentment against it and again in 1989 with al-Bashir’s rise to power. In each case, the government lost its ability to maintain sovereignty because it could not maintain security and violent expressions of resentment yielded coups until al-Bashir’s ascension in 1989.
Al-Bashir’s government has yet to establish complete Security, but because of his military might, has been able to maintain power despite a civil war and genocide. Furthermore, al-Bashir has adapted as the situation in the South called for him to yield some authority and a measure of sovereignty to the region and successfully negotiated a peace agreement to end the civil war. It is perhaps al-Bashir’s resilience that has allowed him to establish some sovereignty in his seventeen year reign without entirely satisfying the Security level of the Hierarchy. Nevertheless, al-Bashir’s government is recognized and has established a small diplomatic corps, including the U.S., China, Germany, and Italy, among other nations. It is significant to note, however, that the American diplomatic presence in Sudan from 1996 until 2005 had been non-existent or minimal with consular officials coming in only for days at a time from the Cairo embassy until after the CPA was signed. Beginning in 2005, a full-time staff was stationed at the embassy with a Charge d’Affaires, but no Ambassador as of 2006.

Aside from China, Sudan has enjoyed little benefit from its diplomatic relations with little foreign investment and a great deal of criticism and scrutiny. The international oversight of the peace process in Darfur and monitoring of the peace accords in Darfur and the South, outlined in the Security chapter, stand to benefit al-Bashir more than any other type of diplomatic relations available in 2006. International oversight necessarily limits Sudan’s sovereignty, but al-Bashir has already given up that sovereignty by allowing the A.U. to intervene in Darfur. By allowing that intervention to continue, al-Bashir can show the international community that his government is committed to a peaceful Sudan and is willing to adhere to its peace accords. As it
becomes increasingly evident that al-Bashir’s government is willing to commit to peace and maintain security within its borders, the international oversight can be gradually lifted.

How quickly to lift international oversight is a decision that must be determined as the situation unfolds, but considering al-Bashir’s willingness to negotiate peace with the South and deploy troops to assist the A.U. force in Darfur, there is reason to suspect that al-Bashir will show the A.U. and the U.N. that he is willing to maintain peace. If he indeed does so, it seems reasonable to assume that international oversight can be withdrawn entirely five to ten years after peace is established in Darfur. The government’s ability to maintain its sovereignty will face a strong test following the withdrawal of the A.U. and U.N. as it operates for the first time under the government established by al-Bashir without the prospect of civil war or international intervention to take precedence over domestic issues.

It is essential that the government maintain sovereignty by adhering to its constitutional system allowing for equal representation for regions to express their will on legislation and, if the South votes to do so, allow the South to form a separate state after a free election. It is equally essential to maintain the independent judiciary for the enforcement of the constitution and the laws established by the representative government. There is little reason to suspect that if the government is truly representative of the people, as it has been designed to be in principle, that a revolution or coup would jeopardize the sovereignty of Sudan following the end of international intervention. Furthermore, the verification of whether that government is representative
in adherence with the Constitution and peace accords will have been conducted by the A.U. and U.N. before they end their oversight, which makes the maintenance of sovereignty even more likely.

With Security and Sovereignty firmly established in Sudan, the country can begin to use its diplomatic relations to forge more economic ties and strong diplomatic partnerships among countries with an interest in Sudan. The most obvious benefit would be economic as foreign governments could encourage their corporations to invest in Sudan, but diplomatic relations can provide important credibility should Sudan choose to involve itself more heavily in the A.U.. Most importantly, however, is that sovereignty signifies the international community recognizes that a country is stable and fully capable of making its own responsible decisions. A dedication to the CPA and peace in Darfur will allow the international community to recognize Sudan in just such a state and begin to provide the economic partnerships that will allow Sudan to fulfill the next level on the Hierarchy.
Economy

Solid economics are perhaps the most stabilizing force in all of politics. If a nation’s citizens have jobs and are paid enough to live comfortably, political initiatives often seem to be perceived as successful by the nation’s citizens. A Deloitte Research study verified this claim by showing that the economy grows 9.8% on average in the election year when American presidents are reelected, while when they are defeated, the economy drops an average of 1% (Steidtmann). That adage is true in China too where The Economist states that over the last 25 years, the economy’s “rapid growth has ensured political stability” (Ahmad). It logical to assume that similar economic stability would lead to long-term political stability in Sudan that will allow it to combat slavery.

It has been possible through history for nations to maintain political stability despite weak or unstable economics with an authoritarian military regime overpowering any opposition. North Korea and the Soviet Union come to mind as examples where military spending comprised a disproportionate amount of the national economy. While military spending in Korea has been difficult to determine because North Korea does not publish national income data, according to the most current CIA Factbook estimates, military spending accounted for 23.09% of North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GNP) in 2003 while U.S. military spending accounted for 4.06% of American GDP in 2005 (United States “Korea, North”, United States “United States). While these statistics are not exact comparisons because the figures are from different years, they provide an understanding of the significant differences in military spending relative to the national economy. The historical precedent for sustaining this type of spending does
not bode well for North Korea. While the Soviet Union, a much larger command economy, enjoyed economic growth in the two decades after World War II, by the 1970s the economy began to decline and by 1991, the communist government had collapsed entirely. The smaller command economy and authoritarian regime in North Korea presumably has the same fate.

A more promising economic model has been that of capitalism, utilized by the United States and increasingly by China. The U.S. has sustained a capitalist economy since its inception in 1776 and thrived on international trade and investment. China began with a command economy under Mao Zedong in 1949 and by the late 1970s began to implement capitalist reforms, broadening its economy beyond agriculture and beginning to attract foreign business. The result, once again relying on CIA figures, was tenfold growth in GDP since 1978 and the second largest economy in the world by 2005, trailing only the United States. In accordance with the correlation between defense spending and a stable economy, China’s military spending was 4.3% of its GDP in 2005 (United States “China”). As a result, China, while a communist country, has not endured the collapse of its government that the Soviet Union did and instead has become an increasingly influential country with increasingly reliant trade partners as its GDP grows.

Sudan has expressed a willingness to develop an international capitalistic economy with its welcoming of corporations from other countries, namely China, to drill for oil. According to the World Bank, Sudan’s oil revenue from exports comprises only 8.6% of its GDP in 2005, compared to the 36% of the GDP contributed by agriculture
(Bacon 48, United States “Sudan”). The CIA has documented, however, that Sudan’s economic growth has been fueled by “increased oil production, revived light industry, and expanded export processing zones,” which would seem to justify Sudan’s relationship with Chinese oil companies as it seeks to grow its GDP (United States “Sudan”). While oil wealth like that garnered through Sudan’s trade with China is quite lucrative and can be used to develop a vibrant economy like that of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Qatar, examples of misallocation of that wealth can be equally as devastating as that in United Arab Emirates and Qatar has been successful.

The UAE boast the 67th largest GDP in the world and a 2.4% unemployment rate in 2001. Qatar has only the 109th largest GDP in the world, but had only a 2.7% unemployment rate in 2001. Both countries rely heavily on oil and gas with the UAE earning 30% and Qatar earning 60% of their GDP from oil and gas exports (United States “United Arab Emirates”, United States “Qatar”). Oil export revenues in Saudi Arabia, are comparable to these two countries, with oil exports accounting for 40% of the country’s GDP, but the comparison ends there. The oil exports have created the 29th largest GDP in the world, but that growth has accompanied an unemployment rate officially listed at 13% with estimates reaching as high as 25% (United States “Saudi Arabia). To put these figures in perspective, during the Great Depression, the U.S. unemployment rate peaked at 25%. Unlike the UAE and Qatar, Saudi Arabia has been unable to fully employ its citizens despite vast oil wealth, signifying an unhealthy economy overly reliant on a single industry that is incapable of providing enough jobs for its citizens. Saudi Arabia is not alone.
Among the eleven members of OPEC including Saudi Arabia, seven have an unemployment rate in excess of 10% and three of those ten, excluding Saudi Arabia’s questionable data, have more than 25% unemployment. Two of the four with unemployment rates below ten percent are the UAE and Qatar with Nigeria and Kuwait as the other two countries. Of the seven countries with unemployment above 10%, none are ranked higher than 110 out of 196 in the CIA’s comparison of worldwide employment rates by country. For comparison, the United States and China are ranked 47th and 36th, respectively, although the figures for China are in dispute. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that the oil industries in these seven OPEC countries are unable to support rather large percentages of the population. Not coincidentally, four of the seven, or 57% of countries with unemployment over 10% have undergone a fundamental change in governmental system via a coup, revolution, or other means in the decade preceding 2006. By comparison, among the other four countries, only Nigeria has undergone a similar change over that period.

The evidence against overwhelming reliance on oil production is clear. To rely on this single industry significantly reduces the stability of that country’s government. Consequently, for Sudan to remain stable in the long-term, it is necessary for the country’s economy to diversify. Establishing industry from scratch, as the OPEC countries have found, is quite difficult. A promising model for such grassroots industry building can be found in Cambodia.

The comparison between Sudan and Cambodia politically or economically is loose, but the differences work in favor of the argument that the model can be applied to
Sudan. Following the Khmer Rouge revolution from 1975-1979, Cambodia largely lacked political stability until 1993 when a coalition government was established with the exception of a briefly violent power seizure by Hun Sen in 1997. Economically, Cambodia’s primary industry was subsistence agriculture, but in 1999, the United States and Cambodia signed the Bilateral Textile Agreement. The Agreement linked labor standards to trade by establishing the United States as Cambodia’s primary partner in the garment industry and defining a quota as part of a larger quota system on the amount of goods producers could export to the U.S. annually. If Cambodia demonstrated progress in improving working conditions and worker’s rights, its quota was increased for that year. These conditions were monitored and arbitrated by the International Labor Organization, a component of the U.N., with U.S. funding. The incentive worked. From 1999-2006, the amount of garment factories in Cambodia doubled from 150 to 300.

In 2005, garment manufacturers were able to export over $2 billion in garments through companies attracted to the high labor standards such as Gap, J.C. Penney, Target, Wal-Mart, and Nike. The Bilateral Textile Agreement ended quotas on January 1, 2005, but as the $2 billion export figure suggests, the garment industry has survived and exports even grew by 11% in 2005, albeit partly due to U.S. and European Union limits on Chinese exports in certain garment categories that will last through 2008. In order for Cambodia to compete with China and other low-cost producers, the U.S. has funded a training program to improve Cambodian production efficiency and pressured Cambodia to make its own improvements and develop efficiency standards. The
expectation is that by 2008, Cambodia will be able to compete with China without external aid (Spande).

There is little reason to doubt that such a model could be applied to Sudan. The political situation has been more stable with al-Bashir remaining in power since 1989 and will be even more stable after providing security for the entire country through the CPA and a Darfur peace agreement. Furthermore, Sudan’s firm establishment of its sovereignty will allow it to utilize its diplomatic relations to form such an economic assistance plan with the United States or another country. This plan could be formulated after Sudan has established security and while it is regaining its full sovereignty because diplomatic relations are currently in place and would be more firmly established as Sudan verifies to the A.U. and U.N. that it will honor its peace agreements.

The first step in implementing the Cambodia Plan in Sudan is for an embassy to conduct an economic assessment to determine which industry is most readily able to expand like the Cambodian garment industry. The most logical embassy is the American embassy due to the State Department’s success in Cambodia and the assessment could be completed after peace is established in Darfur. The reason for this is that there has been little foreign investment outside of oil during the civil war and conflict in Darfur, which suggests that the conflict makes investments too risky for corporations to undertake. With the establishment of security, the assessment would analyze Sudan’s natural and human resources, its infrastructure, market competition, sustainability, and production efficiency in various areas to determine the market for
products which Sudan is able to most readily produce. When the industry is determined, the Cambodia Plan could be applied.

Seed money for building or expanding the industry would be loaned to Sudan from the IMF, World Bank, and perhaps even other countries. Returns on the industry and the ensuing foreign investment in the industry would allow Sudan to repay the loans. Initial factories, for example, would produce domestically to refine their production to a standard acceptable to export.

Concurrent with the initial industry building would be the establishment of a quota agreement where the United States is the primary trading partner, allowing a certain amount of exports from Sudan to enter U.S. markets with the understanding that the quota can be raised for demonstrating progress in improving working conditions and workers’ rights. Because this quota system would not be part of a larger quota system, as Cambodia’s system was, the U.S. and Sudan must place an immediate emphasis on production efficiency to make prices, including those of the oil industry, more competitive. This emphasis, like in Cambodia, must center on training laborers and a Sudanese effort to establish industry efficiency standards to which factories must comply. If prices are not immediately competitive, and it seems unlikely that they would be, corporations would be attracted to invest if Sudan seeks to raise its quota by raising its standard of working conditions and workers’ rights as opposed to its competitors who may not adhere to comparable standards.

With the industry and quota reward system established, the U.S. embassy can work with the Department of Commerce to attract American investors with the incentive
that establishing factories in Sudan will be secure, increasingly efficient, decreasingly costly, and will operate at low cost compared with factories in America with working conditions superior to Sudan’s competitors. The latter is primarily a public relations boost for manufacturers who have been criticized for using production facilities that may allow human rights violations, but the former three incentives make for a solid financial investment. Security is a prerequisite for any capital investment for the simple reason that if a corporation is going to spend money on a factory or any other type of investment, there must be a reasonable guarantee that the corporation will retain that investment long enough to make a return on it. Security provides that guarantee. Increasing efficiency and decreasing cost are tied together with efficiency leading to lower costs as fewer resources are wasted in production. Greater efficiency and lower cost means a higher return on the investment. The working conditions and human rights issues are what will distinguish Sudan from its competitors.

With American corporations invested in the industry, Sudan can begin to attract other foreign investors through similar use of its diplomatic relations to diversify its trade partners and foreign investors. Over time, probably a minimum of twenty years from initial investing, Sudan can use the revenue generated from foreign investment to diversify the economy further without foreign investment, allowing it to establish trade partners based on the cost and quality of product, rather than trade partners tied to returns on investments. This development would eventually make Sudan increasingly self-sufficient while still allowing foreign direct investment to buoy its economy. It seems reasonable to estimate this self-sufficient reality coming no sooner and probably
longer than fifty years after initial investment and thirty years after Sudan begins to
develop its own industry.

The benefit of a diversified and vibrant economy to the problem of slavery in
Sudan is tremendous. Slavery exists in Sudan because there is a market for it.
Arguments have been made by NGOs and scholars that slavery exists in Sudan because
of racism, the civil war, and al-Bashir’s adaptation of Islam, but in the end, slavery
would not exist if people did not buy slaves. As discussed in the Security chapter, a
military defeat of the Janjaweed would reduce, but not eliminate slave traders’ ability to
traffic slaves. The reason for slave traders’ persistence through history in Sudan is
because a market remains for slaves, which justifies slave traders’ costs in capturing
slaves even in difficult circumstances. A vibrant economy built with the Cambodia Plan
will help reduce the slave market because of the integrity with which industry, and its
leaders with the financial wherewithal to purchase slaves, must function in order to
maintain trade partners.

If the entire economy of Sudan is predicated on the notion that its industry must
adhere to international labor standards, there will necessarily be an ethical adaptation
among the leadership of the industry to maintain company action consistent with these
standards. It is presumably those with the highest income who purchase the majority of
slaves and leaders in industry would logically fit in this group. It is reasonable to
assume that in the majority of these leaders, ethical spillover would occur from their
corporate lives into their private lives, which means that if they are willing to limit the
hours of work a person can work in a day that they are probably not going to purchase
slaves who work without pay for as many hours as physically possible. With fewer buyers, traders will experience a surplus of slaves with decreased demand, thus causing traders to raise the price of slaves to justify the costs in capturing them while the negative shift in demand reduces the price at which consumers will purchase slaves. As this situation persists, it will become less and less economically feasible or lucrative for slave traders to continue slave raids because the payment received for slaves does not justify the costs in capturing them.

It would be naïve to assume perfect morals across the country after having been enveloped in a violent civil war and genocide as long as Sudan has and as a consequence slavery will continue on some level regardless of its economic feasibility. While the economic model suggests it is unfeasible to continue the trade, racism or any other ideology allowing slavery to persist will outweigh the economics of the situation for those who can afford increased prices and do not experience moral spillover from their professional lives. What a successful and stable economy provides, however is enough moral spillover from corporate to private lives of business leaders to reduce the slave market, whereby further reducing, but not eliminating, slavery in Sudan through economic and political stability.

The political ramifications of a diversified and vibrant economy are even more far-reaching than their effects on slavery because they signify that stability will be steadily maintained. If Sudanese citizens steadily see their standard of living rising as GDP increases, they will presumably be less dissatisfied with their government than they have historically been during economic mismanagement. The result would logically be
an unwillingness to violently disrupt the government that has allowed for the increase in
standard of living and a willingness to work within that government to voice any
discontent.

The reasoning behind the correlation between economics and political stability is
rather simple insofar as standard of living is logically linked to government approval.
The route to raise the standard of living, however, is not as simple. Through
international involvement and effort, Sudan can build a diversified and growing
economy with the Cambodia Plan and begin to form for itself a national identity.
Identity

National identity is difficult to define because it is largely different in every nation, but it fortunately tends not to need cultivation, and is instead formed on its own. It cannot be formed in the absence of stability provided in the Hierarchy’s necessities because when a country lacks stability, disparate factions vie for power, inherently undermining the ability of the nation to form a unified identity. Instead, national identity is formed over decades and even centuries of stability as citizens establish roots in the country made possible by physical security and economic growth made possible through diplomatic relations made possible by the international community’s recognition of the country’s sovereignty. With established roots, comes a sense of pride in the country, characterized as patriotism. Together, these components allow the nation to survive through prosperity and adversity because the good of the state begins to outweigh individual interests.

The citizens of Sudan will establish roots only after security and a stable economy are established because only at that point will they be reasonably assured that Sudan is the country in which they will remain and enjoy an acceptable standard of living. So many refugees have fled to Chad, Uganda, and other neighboring countries during the civil war and the conflict in Darfur that refugee camps have become more of a permanent home than the villages from which they fled in Sudan. Refugee camps, however, are temporary by definition and notoriously Spartan in their accommodations, often to the point of unbearable. Janjaweed raids on refugee camps in Chad have made the concept of home in Sudan even more difficult to grasp. With the establishment of
security throughout the country and a growing economy, refugees are likely to return to Sudan, which is why the A.U. principles to broker peace include a provision for amnesty of refugees who return to Sudan.

As repatriated refugees and Sudanese already in Sudan begin to participate in the expanding economy, they will begin to raise their standard of living through their work within the economy. As discussed in the Economy chapter, the process of building a self-sustaining economy will be slow, but progress would seem to be persuasive. For those born in Sudan, the country’s history of political activism, including coups, suggests a loyalty to Sudan, if not its government. Furthermore, history since independence suggests that the Sudanese are especially patient with a new government, which suggests a willingness to adapt to change. If by participating in the changing economic system, the Sudanese see increased standards of living with the continued maintenance of security, they are likely to continue to support the government in its efforts.

Over time, as the economy becomes increasingly self-sufficient, a sense of pride will be developed as the Sudanese identify their individual role in the progressive adaptation of their society, with the feeling that it is partly their creation. Traditionally, humans feel pride after accomplishing a feat and there is little reason to suspect this situation in Sudan will be different. As more Sudanese begin to feel this pride, they will begin to recognize the same sense of pride in their colleagues and contemporaries. The sense will probably be most obvious at the community level with most people in the community participating in similar ways and having very similar senses of pride in what
they have accomplished. By extension, as the entire country enjoys the benefits of an expanded economy, the sense of pride will be established on the national level. In essence, popular national pride in Sudan will be established.

National pride is quite a powerful idea. In the United States there has been precisely one domestic attempt to violently destroy the government in favor of another one: the Civil War. The United Kingdom has had no such threat since 1649 when its civil war ended. France has had no similar threat since 1851 when Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte staged a coup and declared himself emperor. The common denominator between these three countries has been national pride fostered by the belief in the nation’s government and the nation itself. To use the U.S. as an example, Vietnam was probably the most unpopular war in American history. The public failed to see compelling reasons for American involvement and was further alienated from the war by military shortcomings in the conflict. While President John F. Kennedy was assassinated during the buildup for Vietnam and small scale violent groups and uprisings against the war sprung up, there was never a popular movement to unseat the government. Instead, Americans seized the opportunity afforded them by President Lyndon B. Johnson when he declined to run for a second term and voted Richard Nixon into office on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. The American public, though dissatisfied with the government’s actions, believed in the structure of the government enough that they were content to voice their discontent within it by voting. The result of this national pride is stability in a time when the public increasingly failed to support the government’s actions in Vietnam.
This striking example of national pride is precisely the component of national identity that will foster the continuation of Sudan because while the cultural details of national identity, those that define what it is to be Sudanese, will be defined as the economy stabilizes and people establish roots in Sudan, national pride will allow for the expression of that identity through the existing government. National identity is the intangible quality that defines what it is to be Sudanese. The identity will evolve over time as the socio-political situation changes, but the national pride established in the Hierarchy’s necessities will ensure the state survives.
Adaptation

Adaptation is the level in which domestic reforms such as a campaign for government budget finance reform or for increased state-supported health care occur. It is the level at which the citizens of a country work within the government to fine tune it to better suit the needs of most citizens. This fine tuning is conducted through legislation and judicial cases, institutions validated by a stable political situation forged through Security, Sovereignty, Economics, and Identity.

In the case of Sudan, Adaptation is the level at which slavery is eradicated. Adaptation can begin to be fulfilled when the necessities are minimally fulfilled and gain greater influence as the necessities are completely satisfied. Minimum fulfillment for Sudan is the establishment of peace and security in Darfur and throughout the country, precisely as outlined in the Security chapter. Sudan’s minimal Sovereignty needs are for Sudan to develop its diplomatic relations to the point at which the Cambodia Plan can be applied to its economics. Economically, the Cambodia Plan must be implemented successfully enough for Sudan to show modest improvements in standard of living with the hope of expanding and increasing those improvements over time. The time frame for all of this, including the end of international oversight of the peace situation over five to ten years and the presumably slow development of the grassroots industries in the economy will be no less than ten years. In those ten years, however, the benefits for eliminating slavery afforded by the establishment of security and reducing the market for slaves will significantly contribute to the reduction of slavery. Also in those ten or more years, a national identity will begin to form that will commit the Sudanese people to
improving the country’s laws and standard of living, thus allowing for the first direct action against slavery by a Sudanese government since Khedive Isma’il in 1882.

As was the case with Khedive Isma’il, international pressure to eliminate slavery will likely be the catalyst for Sudanese action against it. That pressure already exists with the U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. As Cambodia’s primary trade partner, the U.S. has worked a great deal on eliminating human trafficking in that country, which is primarily the trafficking of sex workers, not chattel slavery, and there is no reason to expect the DOS not to pursue a similar effort in Sudan. The United States Political Cone in the Khartoum embassy will work with the CEAWC, U.N., and NGOs to determine an idea of the extent slavery still exists after security and economic reforms. With this data in hand, the U.S. can utilize its three Tier Placements and trade partner status to lobby for the Sudanese government to take action. The Tier Placements are divided into three tiers with a watch list between the second and third tier. Each tier represents progress in reducing trafficking in persons in that country, with Tier 3 showing little or no improvement. In 2006, Sudan is listed as a Tier 3 country, which allows for the possibility for U.S. economic sanctions should Sudan fail to demonstrate progress in combating the trafficking. Sudan has remained a Tier 3 country for a number of years prior to 2006 because economic sanctions have little effect when the U.S. maintains minimal economic relations with the country.

With the diversification of the Sudanese economy through the assistance of the U.S., Sudan will have already demonstrated through the establishment of security and the reduction of slave markets that progress has been made to combat slavery. The
progress in security will allow the U.S. the luxury of eliminating economic sanctions while it assists in building Sudan’s economy. With the economy growing and the U.S. as a primary trade partner, the prospect of economic sanctions from the U.S. for failing to eliminate slavery would be a significant loss. In a perfect world, Sudan would take action to eliminate slavery on its own volition, but the world is imperfect and the Tier Placement system is what will allow the U.S. to utilize the carrot and stick approach for Sudan, if necessary, with economics as the carrot and the Tier system as the stick.

Whether the impetus to combat slavery directly comes from within Sudan or from outside influences, is largely irrelevant to how it will be combated. The first step must necessarily be to enforce Articles 162 through 165 of Sudan’s Criminal Code, which as described in the "Slavery under Omar al-Bashir" chapter, outlaw slavery, but have not been strictly enforced. With stricter enforcement of the laws against slavery, slave traders would be arrested and prosecuted in Sudanese courts of law. The penalty for violating this law must be severe enough that it keeps slave traders and owners from paying a fine or being released from prison and returning to slave trafficking. Something as simple as an extended period of parole after release from prison or parole in exchange for cooperation with the CEAWC could provide this assurance.

With an avenue of prosecution established, a crackdown conducted by Sudanese police and armed forces would ensue using the model of Charles Gordon. Slave traders’ supply routes would be monitored and cutoff militarily. Traders that are apprehended in this cutoff to their supply of slaves and to their markets would be tried in a Sudanese court and punished according to the law while their slaves are freed and rehabilitated
into society. Furthermore, in slave markets, law enforcement and military officials would work to identify slave owners by utilizing information gathered from slave traders and other detective work to determine suspects. This crackdown attacks supply and demand, which is the distinction between the otherwise apt comparison of combating drug trafficking, because both are found within Sudan’s borders. Over several decades, slavery would be gradually eliminated through the elimination of both markets for and supplies of slaves.

It would be naïve to assume that such a crackdown could happen soon after peace and security are established throughout the country. A ten year estimate for beginning this crackdown is a perfect case scenario, which is why it is the minimum estimate. That estimate assumes that Sudan will be fully cooperative in building its economy and the international community will be fully cooperative in helping Sudan do so. In reality, the prospect of economic growth happening at a rate fast enough to politically stabilize the country, create a law against slavery, and establish a law enforcement capable of undertaking such a massive nationwide campaign against slavery seems quite unlikely. In this pragmatic view, such a crackdown is much more likely to occur with success when the economy and nation as a whole are more stable than they will likely be after only ten years of peace. A much more realistic estimate for this final crackdown on slavery is thirty to forty years after peace is established, at which point the economy will have been growing for four decades within an equally long period of stability conducive to the campaign.
The implementation of the final solution to slavery in Sudan is likely more than forty years from 2006, but security and economic reforms will have done great damage to the industry in that period. Slave traders who thrive on the market created by the immoral who view those enslaved as lesser creatures worthy of enslavement will be left when the crackdown is undertaken. It is these people that the crackdown will eliminate over time by destroying the market and supply of slaves. The success of this final campaign will not only signify Sudan’s full development as a nation through its fulfillment of the Hierarchy, but will end the thousands of years old inhumane practice of slavery in Sudan.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs outlines a solution to slavery in Sudan that not only solves the problem at its roots, but solves it in a practical and applicable manner. Implementation of the hierarchy by the United States, United Nations, African Union, and Sudan will create not only a stable country for the benefit of its neighbors, but it will create through its international relations, a stable country for the world. What is perhaps most important, however, is that the solution includes only concepts and initiatives that have been successfully implemented in the past in similar circumstances, signifying each method’s validity and practicality.

The Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs breaks the solution to slavery in Sudan into five parts of nation building. The lower three needs, the necessities, establish the foundation for a stable state. The establishment of Security throughout the country with the assistance of U.S. materiel support will greatly reduce the ability of slave traders to capture slaves and bring them to market by militarily cutting off their supply routes and forcing them to look outside the Sudanese government for materiel support. With peace established, Sudan will be in the position to satisfy A.U. and U.N. observers of their adherence to the peace process by fulfilling the peace agreements Sudan has shown a willingness to operate within by the signing of the accords.

Sudan’s successful fulfillment of its internal peace accords will allow for A.U. and U.N. observers to gradually back away from the country within ten years of the signing of peace accords in Darfur. Without international monitoring, Sudan will have fully established its Sovereignty and will begin to foster diplomatic relations with other
countries. These diplomatic relations will have the benefit of supporting Sudan in the international arena, but most importantly, they will yield avenues of economic growth.

Work by the U.S. embassy in Khartoum made possible by Sudan’s solid establishment of Sovereignty will allow for economic diversification and expansion. Using the Cambodia Plan, the U.S. will act on its presidential interest in Sudan by assisting in the grassroots development of new industry. The new industry will help to diversify Sudan’s increasingly oil-reliant economy and provide more jobs for its citizens through the use of high working standards. High working standards implemented by industry leaders will lead to a reduction in the slave market as moral spillover occurs in their personal lives, which will force them to characterize slavery as immoral.

With the necessities fulfilled, Sudan can begin to solidify itself in the long term and undertake the effort to completely eradicate slavery within its borders. The establishment of Identity in Sudan is the product of a solid economy and stable political situation, as citizens establish roots in the country and feel pride in their role within the improving society. This individual pride extrapolates outward into national pride, which allows for citizens to pursue grievances with the government within the governmental system, so as not to upset the stability that has led to the present situation.

Adaptation is the final level of the Hierarchy and it is the level at which slavery will be completely eliminated within Sudan. National pride established in Identity will cause the Sudanese to want to improve their country. Among these improvements would be a desire to end slavery borne out of improvements in working standards and standards of living because each would place a greater value on human life. The final
push to end slavery will be the model applied by Charles Gordon and will cutoff any remaining supply routes, apprehend slave traffickers and owners, and prosecute them under the law. Over several decades, the last vestiges of the self-contained slave trade in Sudan will be eliminated.

The value of this Hierarchy is that every component of it has a precedent that has proven successful in the past and is likely to prove successful in Sudan. Furthermore, the plan can be implemented immediately into the situation in Sudan found in 2006 or the situation found in Sudan at any point in the future because Sudan will find itself needing to address the Hierarchy’s needs to maintain stability in the long-term. It is thus a solution to slavery that can be applied at any time in any situation in Sudan, but is tailored to be implemented with maximum effectiveness to end the violence in Darfur. It is practical, flexible, and applicable, making the Nations’ Hierarchy of Needs solution to slavery one that is more likely than any other to eliminate slavery in Sudan after 5,000 years of its existence.
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Brandon Krueger

Education

Texas A&M University. College Station, TX. Masters Program in International Affairs
May 2008

Texas A&M University. College Station, TX. Bachelor of Arts in English,
Business and History Minors
August 2006
  ● Excelled with a 3.6 GPA in an academic program that included specialized coursework
  in:
    Creative Writing  International History  Business Principles

7 Habits of Highly Effective People.
October 2004

The American University in Cairo. Cairo, Egypt. Intensive Arabic Language Program
Summer 2004

San Antonio College. San Antonio, TX.
Summer 2003

Central Catholic Marianist High School. Graduated with Honors
May 2002

Language Skills

Arabic, Beginning knowledge.
  ● Modern Standard Arabic and Egyptian Colloquial Arabic
  ● Instruction at the American University in Cairo concurrent with a nine week immersion.

Spanish, Intermediate knowledge.

Professional Experience

Public Affairs Intern, United States Department of State – Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Summer 2005
  ● Represented the American Embassy at official functions and on official fact-finding trips.
  ● Interacted with local and international media regarding press inquiries.
  ● Designed five Access databases for information and inventory tracking.
  ● Ten week cultural immersion experience.
Research Experience

**Undergraduate Research Fellow**, Texas A&M University Undergraduate Research Fellows
2005-2006
- Thesis: *Solving Slavery in Sudan: Solving a Social Problem Through Nation Building*
- Conduct a trans-historical assessment of slavery through literature review and interviews in order to assess modern slavery in Sudan.
- Recommend methods to end modern slavery in Sudan.

Leadership Experience

**Senior Advisor**, Phi Eta Sigma, Texas A&M Chapter
2005-2006
- Advise Phi Eta Sigma President on all issues regarding this honors service organization.

**Board Member**, International Education Week Planning Board, Texas A&M
Fall 2005
- Served with student leaders and the International Programs Office to plan a weeklong promotion of international education at Texas A&M.
- Planned for a Department of State Diplomat in Residence to recruit during a Passport issuance day.
- Assisted in planning a discussion on global issues from international perspectives.

**President**, Aggie International Ambassadors, Texas A&M
2004-2006
- Lead six officers and twenty-five members in the promotion of study abroad and interaction between international and American students.
- Planned forums on Global Energy and Sex Slavery with Consuls General and an international audience.

**Cofounder and Co-Director**, International Student Consortium, Texas A&M
2004-2005
- Work with American forces in Iraq to bring veterinary supplies to Dahuk University.
- Conduct a supply drive among veterinarians throughout Texas.
- Coordinate supply shipments with the American military to Iraq.
Academy for Future International Leaders, Texas A&M International Center
2004-2005

• Among 18 students selected to participate in this international leadership training
course designed to yield a global perspective in our chosen fields of study and prepare
us for leadership roles in the increasingly international 21st Century.

President, Phi Eta Sigma, Texas A&M Chapter
2004-2005

• Led five officers, ten chairpersons, and several thousand members in tutoring
freshmen, performing community service, and promoting scholarship.
• Organized induction ceremonies and banquets for 500 new members.

Board Member, Arab Cultures Week Planning Board, Texas A&M
2004-2005

• Served with Arab students and the International Programs Office to plan a weeklong
celebration of Arab Culture in the College Station community.
• Led the planning of a soccer game including Arab and American students.

Director of External Activities, Aggie International Ambassadors, Texas A&M
2003-2004

• Restructured the bylaws and maintained the electronic member list and all non-
financial records.
• Networked with international organizations and oversaw all events involving anyone
outside of our organization including an international concert and football instruction
for international students.
• Served on the Executive Board.

Scholarship Chairperson, Phi Eta Sigma, Texas A&M
2003-2004

• Selected one outstanding junior scholarship recipient.
• Selected five students for competition in national Phi Eta Sigma scholarship
selection.
Awards

- Academic Achievement Award
- Stewart & Anna Morgan Scholarship
- Archbishop’s Medallion for Community Service
- Eagle Scout Award
- Academic Incentive Award
- T.A. Cheeves Endowment Recipient
- Dean’s List
- United States Army Reserve National Scholar Athlete Award