

**THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON  
DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES**

A Thesis

by

EMILY MORGAN BONNEAU

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2005

Major Subject: Political Science

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May 2005

Major Subject: Political Science

**ABSTRACT**

The Influence of Politics and Institutional Position

on Distributive Policies. (May 2005)

Emily Morgan Bonneau, B.S., Eastern Michigan University

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Central to the distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use strategic committee assignments to fund pork projects for their districts. Committees that are primarily constituency service based are considered most susceptible to pork barrel politics. The Public Works and Transportation Committee, in particular, has developed a reputation for distributing pork projects. Adler's (2002) study of six committees found impressive evidence that members of certain committees are able to channel disproportionate benefits to their districts—the lone exception was the Public Works and Transportation Committee. Given the folklore about Public Works and “pork,” this result seems odd. In this study, I make two major adjustments to the research design. First, I isolate the dollars spent on committee programs that were not allocated by a formula. Formulas have prior built-in controls that are not subject to bargaining after the formula has been set, and thus are not illustrative of the pork process. Second, I expand the years studied (1983-1996) and analyze the data with a pooled cross-section/time series design, which better controls the potential effects of time on the distribution of federal funds. These modifications do not produce results to reconcile the conflict with congressional folklore, instead they question the generalizability of allocation decisions for constituency service committees.

To Rene and Jack,  
who never fail to bring me immeasurable joy every day.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I would also like to thank the other members of my advisory committee, Ken Meier and Pat Hurley. My first class here at A&M was Dr. Meier's POLS 645 class, which taught me what a good graduate seminar should be. In this class I first became interested and engaged in the relationship between Congress and the Bureaucracy, which proved to be the beginning of this project. Dr. Meier was instrumental in the research design of this thesis, and I would like to thank him for all his words of wisdom. I would like to also thank Dr. Hurley for her counsel at a time when I was ready to quit. Without her advice and support, this project most likely would have not been finished. The same goes for Cary Nederman, who has proved to be nothing but helpful during my time at A&M, and I would like to thank him for that.

I owe a special thanks to Bob Stein who has been helpful over the past two years

in providing me with the data necessary to complete this project. Dr. Stein did not only send me the data, but he also spent a good deal of his time helping me tailor the data for my own specific needs. A special thanks to Scott Adler as well, for his great book that helped serve as a foundation for this project, as well as access to his own data and analyses.

Any acknowledgment pertinent to any of my accomplishments in political science, should not fail to mention Jeffrey Bernstein, who has been my mentor from the beginning. He instilled the qualities of a good social scientist early in my undergraduate career and also has served as an inspiration for my first love—teaching. Seeing how much Jeff cares about his students and giving them a quality education has given me my own drive for reaching out and focusing on students.

The love and support from my family cannot go unrecognized. Moving so far from home was the hardest thing I have ever done, and without their love and support I would have not been able to make it through that first month. They have always supported me throughout all my trials and endeavors without hesitation. My grandparents, parents, and brothers have always been my biggest supporters. I love and miss them every day, but they are such a part of me that they are never that far away.

And finally, to Rene. This project was started with the intention to be an ending, but it soon became obvious that it was more indicative of a beginning. The beginning of a wonderful life, with the only one in the world who was meant for me. Every day I get to spend with my best friend, and for that, I am most grateful.

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## INTRODUCTION

How much particularized benefits count for at the polls is extraordinarily difficult to say, but it would be hard to find a Congressman who thinks he can afford to wait around until precise information is available. The lore is that they count. –Mayhew (1974, 57)

According to Mayhew, most members of Congress believe bringing benefits back home positively affects their chances for reelection, as it serves as something they can claim credit for in their next campaign. Just as members of Congress have tried to obtain pork projects for their districts to satisfy their desire for reelection, political scientists have tried to investigate the political and institutional factors that are conducive to acquiring those benefits—with little consensus. The distributive theory suggests the constituencies of committee members receive a disproportionate amount of benefits from the programs under their jurisdiction (Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Thus, much attention has been placed on strategic committee assignments as the primary means of influence over distribution of pork projects, although the empirical evidence demonstrating committee bias has been mixed (e.g. Adler 2002; Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Recent research on the subject has shifted focus to other institutional power structures affecting acquisitions of pork projects, such as partisanship and seniority, as well as to political indicators of electoral vulnerability (e.g. Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman

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This thesis follows the style and format of *American Political Science Review*.

2002; Bickers and Stein 1996; Rundquist and Carsey 2002). The empirical evidence produced by these studies also provides mixed support for the distributive theory.

In this thesis, I seek to contribute to this debate and build on this research by extending Adler's (2002) commendable study. I am interested in examining whether the political motivations and institutional position of members have an effect on the distribution of particularized benefits over and above what would be expected by objective indicators of need for committees that are most focused on constituent service. According to the distributive theory, committees that deal primarily with constituent service, as opposed those committees that focus more on policy oriented issues, are most susceptible to pork politics. Members join these "high demand" constituency service committees with the hope of siphoning off money for their own districts, to aid their reelection goals (Adler 2002).

I propose to examine further the effects of committee membership on the distribution of federal funds, by extending Alder's study in three important ways. Specifically, the distribution of pork projects varies over both space (i.e., across districts) and over time. Yet, the measures and research designs typically employed in previous studies of individual members' behavior (including Adler's) do not tap and analyze both types of systematic variation jointly. I plan to extend the period of time studied to 14 years and use a pooled cross-sectional times series to account for potential time effects on the distribution of federal projects. Second, I control for the amount of each program's allocation that is based on a formula. Theoretically, formulas are created to distribute federal funds on the basis of need. The inclusion of formula dollars in the

analysis, as previously done by Adler, potentially skews the data towards finding significant control measures, which bias the results against the institutional and political indicators of pork politics. Third, I add to the number of programs Adler identified under the jurisdiction of each standing committee included in my study to yield a more comprehensive list of committee programs.

In the next section, I review previous research on distributive politics, and explain the theory. The following sections in this thesis describe how my study seeks to correct some of the limitations of past research, and presents my analysis of distributive policies on both the Public Works and Transportation Committee and Agriculture Committee over the period 1983-96.

## LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

### Theory

The distributive theory (Lowi 1964; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975) is based on the common assumption that members of Congress are motivated by the desire to be reelected (Mayhew 1974). Congressional scholars typically assume that legislators seek to maximize the likelihood of their reelection and that members believe that actions taken while in office will affect their reelection odds. This theory suggests that there are institutional structures in place that put certain members at an advantage in receiving particularized benefits for their districts.<sup>1</sup> In order to further their goals of reelection, members will act strategically within their institutional position in Congress to bring home pork projects.

Members of Congress are most able to benefit their district through membership on a specific standing committee that has jurisdiction over the interests most akin to their districts (Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). As rational actors seeking reelection, members want to collect pork money for their district, so they join the committee they believe best represents their district's interests. Certain committees are more inclined to serve constituency interests than others do; therefore, "constituency centered" committees are more likely to attract members interested in siphoning off money for the geographic allocation of benefits (Adler 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Fenno 1973). Consequently, the distributive theory asserts committees overrepresent districts with a particular interest in programs under that committee's jurisdiction (Ray

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<sup>1</sup>Lowi (1964, 690) defined policies that qualify as distributive benefits as those that can be subdivided into many parts and each of which can be implemented in different areas of the country.

1980). If committees are overrepresentative of members holding particular interests specific to a committee's area of influence, then those committees will be "outliers" on those particular interests relative to the chamber mean. In this thesis, I am interested in studying the constituency characteristics that determine a district's level of "policy need" based on economic, social, and geographic information (Adler and Lapinski 1997, 898). This approach focusing on policy need differs from studies that found no evidence that committees are "preference outliers," or overrepresented with particular constituency interests using measures of political ideologies (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Groseclose 1994; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel 1990, 1991). Comparing members' ideologies on a specific committee to the ideologies of the chamber as a whole does not have much relevance to any claims of overrepresentation according to the distributive theory. Instead, investigating whether or not a committee is a "preference outlier" is most relevant for studies involving aspects of policy-making. For this thesis, I focus on identifying whether the districts that have the highest degree of policy need and those that hold the most interest in the programs under a committee's jurisdiction, actually make up the membership of the selected committees. Focusing on the need and interest indicators is more integral to determining how policy benefits are allocated than comparing the ideology of the committee to that of the chamber.<sup>2</sup>

Because electoral considerations induce members to join a specific committee, one would expect that there is a payoff from serving on that particular committee. If

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<sup>2</sup>A district's level of "interestedness" is based on the amount of appropriations the district has received from the committee in the past. If a district has received an amount, it has a vested interest to maintain the allocation in the coming years.

particular committees' membership is concentrated with members of relatively homogenous interests, it follows that these legislators opt to sit on these committees in order to control the distribution of benefits for these specific policy areas with an eye towards securing benefits for their own districts. These particularized benefits serve as political commodities, which members can use in their credit claiming strategy for reelection (Mayhew 1974).

The committee structure itself facilitates the strategic distribution of pork projects (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Vote trading both between members within a committee and between members on different committees enables the successful passing of particularized benefits. Inter-committee logrolling between committees and non-committee members when the issues under committee jurisdiction are not universally salient is "easiest to arrange" (Maltzman 1995, 677). Committees that deal with narrow, homogenous issues tend to be considered to be constituency based. Non-committee members are more likely to allow these committee members more discretion in their allocation decisions because the programs under their power are of little interest, or salience to them (Maltzman 1995). This committee-centered approach explains why pork programs are able to pass in legislation, even when they benefit a minority. Non-committee members will want to support a committee's proposed pork barrel programs, even if they do not benefit from them, in exchange for support for the programs that do benefit their district (Weingast 1994).

This logrolling strategy differs from the more universalistic, coalition-forming approach. Mayhew's (1974) characterization of universalism is that legislators'

common goal of reelection will act as an incentive to form large coalitions to bring geographically concentrated benefits to their own districts with costs evenly dispersed throughout the legislature. However, generally universalism has not been supported by empirical evidence (Collie 1988; Stein and Bickers 1995). Instead, we expect members to join committees with jurisdictions over their “policy need” areas (Adler 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997) and that their pork projects will be successful due to the logrolling across areas of special interests (Weingast and Marshall 1988).

Logrolling is not exclusively an inter-committee activity, as members can, and often do, trade votes within their own committees to provide for their own “district-directed” benefits (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler 2002, 83). To illustrate intra-committee logrolling, one can consider the different indicators of policy needs a legislator may consider when joining the Public Works and Transportation Committee. Some members may be more interested in bringing home money for flood management programs, while others may want to secure money related to transportation programs. Members can cooperate and make deals within their committee to provide pork projects for each other’s constituencies, while still achieving their own particularized benefits.

Members are likely to trade votes to help ensure that when the time comes, their particular projects will get through. All members are driven by the desire to get their district-specific benefits passed through Congress, so they can use those acquisitions to aid their reelection efforts. Bringing back programs that help their district’s economy is a good example of how individual members can demonstrate their effectiveness in Congress to their constituents and increase the likelihood of reelection (Mayhew 1974).

All members of Congress seeking reelection have motivations to use this credit-claiming strategy. The research shows that House incumbents receive electoral benefits through the number of new program awards to their district (Stein and Bickers 1994) as well as increased federal outlays (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Levitt and Snyder 1997).

Mayhew's (1974) statement that members believe particularized benefits count has been substantiated by empirical results—it is no longer lore. To that end, members who are electorally more vulnerable might try to use the acquisition of pork projects as a reelection strategy, so he or she will be able to take credit for it back home.

While an electorally vulnerable member may have additional motivation to acquire pork projects, they must have the requisite institutional position to get them. As mentioned before, belonging to the standing committee puts members right at the core of the allocation process for programs under the committee's jurisdiction, as well as putting them in a position to logroll within the committee in order to acquire the program they want for their districts (Adler 2002; Weingast and Marshall 1988).

Members need to work within the committee's structure of power to make the compromises necessary to bring home-particularized benefits. The effect of one's party can combine with the effect of committee membership to shift the distribution of benefits to one's favor (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The majority party has the power (based on membership size) to give a member an edge in acquiring project money for their district (Alvarez and Saving 1997b). Partisan influence may be particularly important in distributive politics, in terms of protecting their party's numbers, come election time. If members think that bringing home benefits to their district helps their



reelection prospects, then the majority party should not allow the minority party equal access in acquiring those benefits. Logically, they would instead direct a greater proportion of federal funds to protect their party's prospects; however, the majority party does not allocate exclusively to their members. By including the minority party in pork projects, majority party members protect themselves from being solely blamed for wasteful spending (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla et al. 2002). Recent scholarship has demonstrated a majority party bias in the distribution of pork projects (e.g. Adler 2002; Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla et al. 2002; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Rundquist and Carsey 2002). Further, as a strategic move to help ensure that the majority party keeps its numbers to stay in the majority, members of the majority party who are electorally vulnerable receive a greater proportion of the benefits (Lee 2003).

Due to their legislative experience, members who have the highest seniority may also be put at an advantage in acquiring benefits for their district. Members who have been around longer have more skills in the actual legislative process (e.g. writing bills, chamber procedures, etc.), which helps them be more effective in politics across the board (Hibbing 1991, 1993).

The institutional structures of committee membership, partisanship, and seniority can give a member of Congress an advantage in the allocation of distributive benefits. Electoral indicators of vulnerability can also influence the proportion of benefits a member receives. I turn now to a discussion of past research.

## **The Findings and Limitations of Previous Research**

Research on the distribution of federal projects has reported a wide range of findings. Some studies report committee members are able to procure more benefits for their constituencies than nonmembers (Alvarez and Saving 1997a; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Carsey 2002); while others do not find any evidence of such a relationship (Levitt and Poterba 1999; Ray 1980; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Others have found mixed results for different committees (Adler 2002; Arnold 1979).

The wide range of findings in the literature results in part from differences in measures and methods of analysis. First, scholars have not come to a consensus on the appropriate unit of analysis for studies of distributive politics. Several scholars have used states as the unit of analysis (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Levitt and Poterba 1999; Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee 1996) while others have used districts (Adler 2002; Alvarez and Saving 1997; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Rundquist and Carsey (2002) observe that more data is available at the state level as well as that state data is more consistent because state boundaries do not change every ten years as districts' boundaries do. Further, representatives may have ambitions for higher political office that may serve as motivation to bring benefits back for their whole state, not just their own constituency (Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). The problem with using states as the unit of analysis in these studies is that it can result in biased estimates of congressional influence (Arnold 1979, 84-85). Arnold found populations of states have a high level of variation from each other. One would expect large population states to receive more

shares of benefits than those with small populations; thus, the dependent variable correlates with state population. He also found committee membership is highly correlated with state population—those large states are more likely to have a member on a committee.

The argument for districts as the unit of analysis in tests of the distributive theory is that the House is organized by districts, not states. By analyzing data at the district level scholars are able to identify a district's level of "policy need" (Adler and Lapinski 1997), which is generally more homogenous than at the state level (Fenno 1982). The specific make-up of a district can determine which committee the member serves on (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Carsey and Rundquist 1998), and defines what types of programs he can use to claim credit to his constituents to aid with his reelection. Also, while members may have ambitions for higher office, the primary concern for members is reelection in their own districts (Mayhew 1974). In this respect, members will profit more from the direct electoral payoffs of providing particularized benefits to their own districts than to the far-off payoff goals of supplying benefits to the entire state (Adler 2002, 85). In this thesis, I adopt Adler's (2002) gains-from-exchange theory, which bases committee membership on constituency demands, and asserts committee members work within their committee to bring back particularized programs to their district. The allocation of benefits is the sole focus of this study, so the choice of districts as the unit of analysis is appropriate and is the best way to capture the relationship between members of Congress and particularized benefits.

Along with varying units of analysis, previous studies of distributive politics

have analyzed different dependent variables over different time periods. Although there are a number of appropriate measures of the key concepts in this literature, data limitations have frequently prevented an optimal test of the relations between committee members and the geographic allocation of federal funds.

Some earlier studies specified their dependent variable as either change in expenditures by districts or by new outlays, as opposed to focusing exclusively on total outlays (Ferejohn 1974; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Their choice of using a measure of change in the outlay amount (or new outlays) better captures the relationship between current member of Congress and the benefits currently being brought home. Using total outlays rather than a measure of change or new outlays could include the effects of previous members of the House serving that district (Alvarez and Saving 1997b). The studies that used districts as a unit of analysis in this set of work were also limited by the data available at that period of time (Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). District-level data was only available for large federal programs and this could have translated into a selection bias problem (Adler 2002).<sup>3</sup>

An aggregation of all outlays to the district has also been used as the dependent variable (Levitt and Snyder 1995). However, Adler (2002, 85) points out that at this broad level, the effects of the intra-committee logrolling under the gains-from-exchange model are not accounted for. Aggregating outlays for programs under the jurisdiction of a specific authorizing committee corrects this problem.

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<sup>3</sup>Programs that have a higher level of saliency attract more of an interest from other members. Large federal programs, due to the size and expense, might attract more interested members than small, low saliency programs. It is these small, low saliency programs that are suited best for distributive politics. Thus, with large programs scholars may not be able to observe the effects of pork barreling (Maltzman 1995).

The different types of programs selected in previous studies can also explain in part the variation among the findings. Several studies have focused on defense committee programs (Arnold 1979; Carsey and Rundquist 1998, 1999; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Studies have also looked at programs under the jurisdiction of the Public Works and Transportation Committee (Adler 2002; Arnold 1979; Ferejohn 1974; Lee 2003; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975), as well as various other programs and committees (Adler 2002; Balla et al. 2002; Stein and Bickers 1994). The different scope and nature of programs may enable them to be more or less susceptible to the effects of distributive politics.

Using district-level data regarding the outlays of programs under the Agriculture committee successfully captures the effect of committee membership on the allocation of distributive benefits consistent with the gains-from-exchange model. Aggregating all programs under a committee's jurisdiction accounts for the intra-committee-logrolling behavior. If the study was limited to one specific program, the effects of intra-committee logrolling would be lost. Specifically, the examination of only one program could result in biased findings if the program was either very susceptible to pork politics, or less prone to such politics. By selecting a single or small group of programs to analyze, one risks not getting an accurate picture of the distributive politics on that particular committee. In order to develop a valid test of this theory one must use the most valid measure available, which for this study is a dependent variable that is indicative of the nature of all the programs under the committee's jurisdiction.

This thesis revisits Adler's (2002) study, in which he analyzed six different

standing committees-- Agriculture, Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Interior and Insular Affairs; Public Works and Transportation; Science, Space, and Technology; and Veterans' Affairs--that are disposed to pork barrel activity. He analyzed four Congresses, the 99th, 100th, 101st, and 104th, using an Ordinary Least Squares regression. This analysis found evidence of disproportionate benefits going to committee members' districts for every committee *except* Public Works and Transportation—a committee with a notorious reputation for pork barrel politics. It is puzzling that a committee “...often considered one of the main providers of federal project grants to localities” (Adler 2002, 87) was the *only* panel in Adler's study that did not have evidence of pork politics.

In this study, I seek to contribute to this debate and build on this research by extending Adler's (2002) study for two committees, Public Works and Transportation and Agriculture. By making the following adjustments and methodological alterations, I am interested to see if Adler's puzzling finding regarding the Public Works and Transportation Committee lack of committee bias in distributive politics still holds. Also, in an effort to make this study more comprehensive, I make the same adjustments to the analysis of the Agriculture Committee, to see if my extensions produce results that are unique to the Public Works Committee, or whether these methodological alterations may influence findings regarding other high-demand committees.

Using a method that does not account for the variance over time could partly explain Adler's findings. Adler separately analyzed four different Congresses, which did not allow him to account for the effects of time on the distribution of federal

projects. Using a pooled cross-sectional times series accounts for potential time effects on the federal allocations (Rundquist and Carsey 2002). I believe that utilizing a panel design that enables me to analyze both cross-sectional and time components of the relationship between committee membership and the allocation of pork projects, is an important consideration that most of the distributive work has neglected.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Rundquist and Carsey (2002) used pooled cross-section/time series analysis, but with the state as the unit of analysis.

## DATA AND METHODS

The units of analysis are congressional districts over the period 1983 to 1996. The number of observations is over 6000 (435 House members x 14 years = 6090), though the actual n analyzed is smaller due to retirements and vacancies.

### **Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the aggregated outlays of all nonformula programs under the jurisdiction of the Public Works and Transportation and Agriculture Committee, in the form of total dollar amounts allocated to each congressional district in each calendar year over the period 1983 to 1996.<sup>5</sup>

This measure differs from previous studies that have used as their dependent variable as aggregated program total outlay dollars, not controlling for the nature of allocation for each individual program. How a program is allocated is important to understanding the nature of distributive politics. At the time of creation, Congress decides to what extent—if at all—the program’s outlays are going to be allocated based according to a formula of need-based indicators. The purpose of determining a program’s funds by a mathematical formula is to ensure that the money is going to districts that meet the specific criteria. This does not remove politics from the process however; formula writing just moves the deal-making politics to the point in the process in which the formula is determined. If a member of Congress can work their interest into the formula, then the allocation is subsequently automatic, and they do not have to continuously work at getting specific benefits for their district. Getting one’s interest

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<sup>5</sup>Dependent variable is total outlay dollars (divided by 1000s). Dollars are adjusted to constant 1982 dollars.



into a formula might even mean membership to the overseeing committee is not as important. Since the amount of the allocation is already ensured by the formula, members do not need to be involved in the haggling for the dollars. It is the non-formula money which is most important to committee members, as it is the money that they have an advantage in getting being involved in the allocation decisions.

By failing to account for the implications of including formula dollars in studies involving distributive politics, that is, including dollars that have been siphoned off for districts that meet the formula requirements, previous studies have perhaps biased their results. Allocations based on formulas are going to favor district need indicators as explanatory variables in models, as the formulas themselves are determined based on such determinants of need. The rationale follows that including them in an analysis is going to result in findings that are biased toward the district needs indicators, which may hide evidence of the pork process. Isolating the dollars of each committee program that are not distributed based on a formula, and remain theoretically up for grabs by politicians, brings further validity to this study.

The outlay amount for each of the 435 districts, specified by federal program, as well as the relevant characteristics of the program (block, formula, etc), is available through Bickers and Stein's Federal Assistance Awards Data System. For each program, I removed the amount that was distributed by a need-based formula, leaving only non-formula dollars as the dependant variable.

I selected the programs under the jurisdiction of the selected committees by going through every program in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (U.S.

General Services Administration 2004) and deciding if each program's description corresponded with the jurisdiction of the respective committee included in the House rules. I utilized the House parliamentarian as a cross-reference to confirm the committee's jurisdiction over specific programs. This approach differs from Adler's (2002, 94-95) approach of consulting hearings to determine the committee with jurisdiction. Errors in my approach are likely to be programs included as Public Works or Agriculture that are not. Examination of Adler's database, however, revealed a number of programs that were not assigned a committee jurisdiction, suggesting that his approach misses some programs. Some programs with no committee designation in Adler's data seem likely to fall under the jurisdiction of the selected committees. I believe my approach results in a more comprehensive listing of programs authorized by the Public Works and Agriculture committees. Including those previously unspecified programs in this dataset is an important adjustment to Adler's study.

Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The average district receives \$36,963,970 from the Public Works and Transportation Committee, with a minimum value of \$0 and a maximum value of \$1,577,397,000. The mean district allocation for the Agriculture Committee is \$51,309,130, with a minimum value of \$-77,942,100, and a \$3,009,278,000 maximum allocation to district.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The negative minimum value for the Agriculture Committee reflects Bickers and Stein's measurement in the Federal Assistance Awards Data System. The negative number reflects money allocated to a district that was not used, either because the recipient district has failed to comply with the terms of the program, or most commonly, the recipient has failed to spend up to the full obligation level (Bickers and Stein 1990). Negative total outlays of non-formula dollars occurred nine times for the Agriculture Committee. Because these values are not accurate accounts of how much was originally allocated to the district, I dropped these nine cases from the analysis.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
<b>Public Works Committee Model Only</b>					
<b>Total Non-Formula Dollars for Public Works*</b>	<b>6090</b>	<b>36963970</b>	<b>109554900</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1577397000</b>
Public Works Committee Membership	6090	.120525	.3256	0	1
Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee Membership	6090	.04334	.2052	0	2
State Representation on Public Works Committee	6087	.8141	.3889	0	1
No. of Construction Works in district	6090	14688.1	4629.735	3167	33306
District Flood Potential	6090	23.1150	53.2354	.01	367.4122
<b>Institutional and Electoral Indicators for Both Committee Models</b>					
Seniority	6088	10.59593	8.1155	0	53
Majority Party	6090	.5756	.4942	0	1
Favorable District Partisanship	6068	.6702	.2763	.0005	.9999
Increased Electoral Threat	5606	444.7295	379.9197	1.2738	5670.063
<b>Agriculture Committee Model Only</b>					
<b>Total Non-Formula Dollars for Agriculture*</b>	<b>6090</b>	<b>51309130</b>	<b>156381600</b>	<b>-77942100</b>	<b>3009278000</b>
Agriculture Committee Membership	6090	.1026	.3035	0	1
Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee Membership	6090	.0276	.1638	0	1
State Representation on Agriculture Committee	6086	.6811	.4851	0	1
Population in Rural Farm Areas	6090	11401.84	16960.92	0	121636
Number of People Working in Farming	6090	6566.097	6514.898	332	47112
Size of District in Square Miles	6090	60604.72	1823913	7	7.06e+07
Population of District in Square Miles	6090	2400.98	6801.948	.703973	79773.43

\*Dependent Variables

## **Independent Variables**

### *Committee Members*

The primary independent variable of interest is whether or not a member of the House is a member of the Public Works and Transportation or Agriculture committee. Following Adler (2002), I have measured not only whether or not each legislator was a member of the authorizing committee, but also of the corresponding Appropriations subcommittees. Adler (2002) found evidence challenging the belief that appropriations subcommittee members are unbiased “guardians of the federal treasury” (Wallace 1960). Based on Adler’s argument and evidence, appropriation members are just as likely to seek pork projects for their districts as the standing committee members are. I have coded membership to the selected standing committees and the corresponding appropriation subcommittee(s) as separate dichotomous variables (1=member, 0=nonmember).

### *Majority or Minority Party*

As mentioned above, partisan influence may come in to play in distributive politics. The majority party may assert their power when making allocation decisions that advantage their party members. I specify what party the member belongs to in the model (majority=1, minority=0).

### *Seniority*

Another power structure within Congress that might contribute to members’ acquisition of federal funds for their district is the level of seniority. Consistent with the gains-from-exchange theory, those who have the highest seniority on a committee might

have the strongest networks and more experiencing making the intra-committee logrolling deals that yields programs for their own districts (coded by actual seniority rank in Congress-at-large).

### *Electoral Vulnerability*

The primary motivation in the distributive theory is desire for reelection. Members most vulnerable to defeat have the greatest incentive to pursue “pork,” and they should be more successful than those who are less threatened. Students of congressional elections have used a number of indicators of electoral vulnerability, including vote margins, district presidential vote, experience and characteristics of the challenger, and campaign spending (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997; Canon 1990; Jacobson 1989, 1990a, 1990b). I use two indicators—general constituency partisanship and expected change in electoral threat.

The partisanship of voters in congressional constituencies can range from strongly pro-Republican to relative partisan parity to strongly pro-Democrat. Members from districts in which voters overwhelmingly favor their party are less vulnerable to defeat than those who represent districts with closely split party preferences; the most vulnerable members are those few who get elected in districts where voters strongly favor candidates of the other party. I estimate district partisanship with a measure developed by Powell (2001). This probability-based measure is interpreted as the probability that a Republican would win an open seat in a congressional district. I orient this measure to the party of the incumbent, so that values closer to 1.00 indicate a high

probability the district would elect a candidate of the incumbent's party in an open seat race, and values close to zero indicate a low probability.

The available measures of vulnerability are objective indicators of what the researcher believes should be threatening to an incumbent. The logic of using election margins, for example, is that incumbents who have close races are likely to feel more vulnerable than those who had a lopsided victory. Such logic is generally correct, but it is a crude indicator of perceived threat. There are undoubtedly members who had an easy election but know something about the politics of their districts that makes them feel insecure about the next election. A measure based on incumbents' behavior, therefore, is likely to be a better indicator of how safe the incumbent feels. The literature offers guidance about how to construct a behaviorally based measure of insecurity.

Research on congressional elections clearly demonstrates the importance of campaign finances. The relative effects of incumbent and challenger spending, however, are subject to debate. Research on campaign spending consistently shows that the more the incumbent spends the lower the vote margin. The reason for this odd result is that incumbent spending is endogenous. Incumbents are able to raise and spend as much as required to respond to a threat—the more the challenger spends, the greater the threat, and the more the incumbent spends to try to fend it off. Some times these efforts fail, and the incumbents that lose spend the most. Those without vigorous opposition need to spend relatively little to rack up huge reelection margins. Hence, there is a negative relationship between incumbent spending and vote margin (Jacobson 1980; 2001, 40).

The incumbent's spending behavior from one election to the next, therefore, is a good indication of how vulnerable the incumbent feels. My second indicator of vulnerability is the difference in incumbent spending in the upcoming and previous elections (incumbent spending<sub>t</sub> - spending<sub>t-1</sub>). Incumbents who increase their spending relative to the previous election probably feel more threatened and vulnerable than those who decrease their spending.

#### *State Representation on a Committee*

A state's presence on a committee may impact whether money goes to any of the state's districts. Some programs allocate money to state governments first, which are then responsible for reallocating the money to the individuals, organizations, or institutions that qualify (Adler 2002). A member may join a committee and benefit from bringing money not only to his or her district, but to the entire state. This could be particularly true for members who represent districts that are portions of major cities, where multiple districts benefit from the allocation.

#### *District Need*

Federal benefits are most effective if they are directed at a district's particular social, geographic, and economic needs (Carsey and Rundquist 1998). An allocation is considered "pork" only if it is significantly greater than what is necessary to meet district need. To control for the effects of district need, I used two indicators of district characteristics that might indicate a need for federal programs under the jurisdiction of Public Works. These control variables measure flood damage regions and the number of construction workers in the district, both serving as rough measures of the potential

district need for Public Works and Transportation programs. To control for the effects of district need for the Agriculture committee, I used four indicators of district characteristics that might indicate a need for federal programs under the jurisdiction of Agriculture. First I included a measure of the number of people in a district identifying themselves as farm workers. Second, a variable measuring the population in rural farm areas is included.<sup>7</sup> These two variables capture the degree of farm activity within a district. I also included a measure of population per square mile of a district, using the logic that the less densely populated areas will be indicative of more agriculture activities; and size of district in square miles, following a similar logic, that the larger the district, the less people, which can be used as a loose indicator of agricultural regions. All of these district need variables are taken from Adler's Congressional District Dataset, and are used in the attempt to most closely match the control variables Adler used in his 2002 study.<sup>8</sup>

### **Method: Panel Analysis**

Because federal outlays are distributed to congressional districts over time, we need a method that accounts for both types of variance. Panel analysis, a type of pooled cross-section/time series analysis, is appropriate. A panel design with multiple observations of each case increases degrees of freedom and the confidence we have in the coefficient estimates (Gujarati 1995, 522). As is common in studies of political processes, these panels are unbalanced. In this analysis of the distribution of program outlays from 1983

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<sup>7</sup> Rural farm areas comprise all rural households and housing units on farms (places from which \$1,000 or more of agricultural products were sold in 1989).

<sup>8</sup> Adler did not include a description of what control variables he included in his model.



to 1996, for the two selected committees, the number of different representatives who served and ran for reelection (788) is much greater than the number of time points (14 years).

The unbalanced pool prevents estimating panel corrected standard errors.<sup>9</sup> The Hausman (1978) test offers guidance about whether a fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate. We are unable to reject the null that the individual effects are correlated with the other regressors, so a fixed effects estimator is appropriate (Greene 2003, 301-03).

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<sup>9</sup> The effect is to overestimate the standard errors, which works against finding significant coefficients.

## FINDINGS

### **Public Works and Transportation Committee**

Table 2 reports estimates of the relationship between indicators of institutional position, electoral vulnerability, and district need on non-formula based outlays of Public Works Committee programs. I should start with the observation that the model explains a trivial amount of the variance in federal outlays ( $R^2 = .003$ ). However, there is debate in the discipline over the importance of the  $R^2$ . Some argue that the  $R^2$  is not particularly useful in assessing a model. Instead, what is important is the F-test (model specification test)—which is statistically significant here ( $F(794,4547) = 19.63, p = 0.0000$ ). The way to tell how strongly independent variables influence the dependent variable is to interpret the unstandardized regression coefficients (King, 1986).

Neither measure of district need is statistically significant in the model. Districts with more construction workers do not receive higher outlays than those districts that have fewer workers. An increase in the flood potential of a district does not have an effect on the amount of federal outlays allocated to a district either.<sup>10</sup>

None of the institutional position variables exert a statistically significance effect on the distribution of outlays. In particular, the position of most interest for this analysis—membership on the Public Works and Transportation Committee—is not

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<sup>10</sup> In another model (Appendix A), not excluding the formula based allocations, the construction worker variable was significant at the .05 significance level; an increase of about 4600 workers (a standard deviation change) was associated with an increase of about \$6.4 million. The coefficient for the flood potential of the district is not significant at normally acceptable levels ( $p = .053$ , with a one-tail test). Being that formula dollars are distributed primarily based on need, in a model not excluding formula allocations, it would seem reasonable that these control measures would be more significant than in the final model that only non-formula dollars.

Table 2. Influences on Outlays of Public Works Committee Programs

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>	<b>Substantive Effect</b>
<b>Institutional Position</b>		
Member Public Works Committee	2187.70 (0.43)	---
Member Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee	4579.73 (0.59)	---
State Representation on Public Works Committee	-1969.80 (-0.59)	---
Seniority in Congress	382.50 (1.31)	---
Majority Party	-1982.53 (-0.91)	---
<b>Electoral Vulnerability</b>		
Favorable District Partisanship	-15920.8** (-3.15) F	\$4.4 Million
Increased Electoral Threat	7.46** (2.50)	\$2.8 Million
<b>District Need</b>		
District Flood Potential	18.75 (0.67)	---
No. of Construction workers in Dist.	.6273 (1.37)	---
Constant	30117.85 (3.36)	---
<b>N</b>		
	5494	
<b>Overall R<sup>2</sup></b>		
	0.0017	
* $p < .05$		
** $p < .000$		

The substantive effect of statistically significant variables is estimated as the effect of changing the independent variable an amount equal to one standard deviation.

significantly related to outlays. Consistent with Adler's (2002, 99) analysis, I found no evidence that members of this committee channel disproportionate benefits to their districts. Further concurring with Adler's findings, is that members of the appropriations subcommittee for Public Works, also do not target more Public Works and Transportation program dollars to their own districts than other districts. An even broader test of the influence of committee membership--whether a member of Congress from one's state serves on the committee benefits any of the other members from that state--also fails in this model. Similarly, the model indicates that the other indicators of a member's institutional position are not significant in determining the allocation of Public Works funds. The more senior members and majority party members do not receive a disproportionate share of benefits.<sup>11</sup>

The analysis does indicate that members who are most vulnerable to defeat receive disproportionate benefits. Members from districts with a favorable partisan balance have less need and motivation to pursue "pork" than those from districts with hostile partisanship. Those incumbent members who serve districts in which there is a partisan slant against their party, when there is a low probability the district would elect a candidate of the incumbent's party in an open seat election, are able to acquire more pork projects for their district, than those members who serve districts that have a more favorable partisan climate. As seen in Table 2, if the probability of electing a candidate of the incumbent's party in an open seat race increases about .28 (a one standard

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<sup>11</sup> I also looked at several interactions and found no evidence that majority party members of Public Works or members with more committee seniority received greater allocations. In addition, I logged the dependent variable to account for several large outliers; this model performed worse.

deviation change), then expected outlays from Public Works decline about \$4.4 million. The second electoral indicator included in this analysis, also affects the allocation of Public Works pork projects. Behavior indicating that the incumbent feels threatened in their upcoming election, which is measured by an increase in campaign spending from their previous election, is associated with disproportionate outlays. Members who spend a standard deviation change in the upcoming election than in the previous one, acquired about \$2.8 million more in outlays after controlling for influences. It seems on the Public Works Committee political concerns motivate pork; whereas, one's institution position seems to not have a significant impact on allocations.

### **Agriculture Committee**

Table 3 reports estimates of the relationship between indicators of institutional position, electoral vulnerability, and district need on outlays of Agriculture programs. Again, as with the analysis of the Public Works Committee, the  $R^2$  is notably low, at .0001. As mentioned earlier though, the F-Test for this model is significant ( $F(794, 4782) = 34.50, p = 0.0000$ ), thus satisfying some scholars.

Controls for district need vary in their explanatory power for the model. Districts that have more people reporting employment in farming receive higher outlays than those districts who have lower amount of farm workers; an increase of about 6514 workers (a standard deviation change) is associated with an increase of about \$57 million. The coefficients for the population living in rural farm areas and the size of the district in square miles are not significant in this model. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for population per square mile is positive and significant at the .01 level.

Table 3. Influences on Outlays of Agriculture Committee Programs

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>	<b>Substantive Effect</b>
<b>Institutional Position</b>		
Member Agriculture Committee	30092.17** (3.20)	\$30.1 million
Member Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee	45884.02** (4.10)	\$45.9 million
State Representation on Agriculture Committee	-3683.72 (-1.20)	---
Seniority in Congress	2708.08** (8.17)	\$21.9 million
Majority Party	-8978.76** (-3.50)	-\$4.4 million
<b>Electoral Vulnerability</b>		
Favorable District Partisanship	2957.92 (0.50)	---
Increased Electoral Threat	1.09 (0.32)	---
<b>District Need</b>		
Population in Rural Farm Areas	3.14 (3.40)	---
Number of People Working in Farming	8.75** (6.26)	\$56.9 million
Size of District in Square Miles	-0.69 (-1.86)	---
Population of District in Square Miles	3.14 (3.40)	---
Constant	-6043.69 (-0.46)	
<b>N</b>		
	5588	
<b>Overall R<sup>2</sup></b>		
	0.001	
* $p < .05$		
** $p < .01$		

None of the indicators of electoral vulnerability exert a statistically significant effect on the distribution of Agriculture outlays. Members from districts with a favorable partisan advantage in their next election are no more likely to receiving Agriculture outlays than those with a less favorable partisan balance within the district. An increase in campaign spending--classified as an indicator of the incumbent feeling electorally threatened—is also not associated with disproportionate outlays.

Instead, it seems factors related to a member's institutional position are much more influential in impacting a member's ability to receive money for their district, in terms of for Agriculture programs. The variable of most interest in this study—membership on the Agriculture Committee—is significantly related to outlays. Consistent with Adler's (2002) analysis, this model indicates that members of this committee are able to route disproportionate benefits to their districts. Members of the Agriculture Committee benefit from a \$30 million advantage in allocation of agriculture outlays than nonmembers.<sup>12</sup> This model also shows that members of the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee are able to gain more Agriculture funds for their district, \$46 million more than nonmembers, further providing evidence against the conventional assumption that members of the various appropriations committees do not have a personal stake in their assigned area. The presence of a member on the standing

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<sup>12</sup> This is a particularly interesting finding considering the state of Agriculture policy during this period. Congress instituted the system of direct payments in 1973, which in effect shifted the support of federal commodity programs from consumers to taxpayers. Agricultural expenditures drastically increased during the farm crisis from \$8.8 billion in 1980 to \$31.4 billion in 1986, due to nearly all government supports a direct budgetary outlay (Sheingate 2001). This increase in spending coincided with the deficit becoming a politically prominent issue--Agriculture programs suffered through budget cuts in both farm bills and omnibus budget acts in the 1980s. Pierson (1994) asserted that deficit politics weakened the pro-spending logrolls and consequently reduced opposition to agriculture retrenchment; however, my finding demonstrates that pork barreling was alive and well in spite of this period of agriculture budget cutbacks.

committee does not benefit other members of Congress from the respective state's amount of total Agriculture outlays.

Seniority in Congress does help members yield more outlays for their districts; an increase in seniority by one standard deviation change is associated with an increase of almost \$22 million. The effect of party is contrary to my expectations—members of the majority party receive significantly fewer Agriculture outlays than do members of the minority. Majority party membership does not put members at any advantage; instead members of the minority party reap the benefits in agriculture outlays. This relationship may occur because of the strong intra-committee logrolling effects that stress bipartisan (or party-blind) compromises and deals. Perhaps this phenomenon is indicative of the Agriculture committee being a forum for compromises between the two parties. From an inter-committee logrolling perspective, maybe it is easier to buy minority party members off with agriculture allocations, for their agreement on other larger projects.



## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study set out to test whether members of committees with the reputation of being constituent service oriented have an advantage over non-committee members in acquiring distributive benefits for their districts. In a previous study, Adler found that members of several committees in the House use their position to acquire disproportionate benefits—the lone exception is Public Works. I wondered if I might reconcile this inconsistency with congressional folklore with changes in the research design—in particular, changing the dependent variable to a more valid measure including only program dollars that were not allocated by a pre-determined formula, as well as estimating the model with a pooled cross-section/time series design to account for the time dimension in the distribution of federal outlays. By running analyses on two such committees, Public Works and Agriculture, I have found that the two committees make their allocation decisions based on different dynamics. Consistent with Adler's findings, Public Works members do not receive an advantage in acquiring pork projects over their non-committee counterparts; whereas, the most electorally vulnerable members of Congress receive the most Public Works program dollars. Institutional position variables do play a significant role for Agriculture committee members, however, and the indicators of electoral vulnerability are not significant in that model.

As a test to see how incrementalism affected the model, I created a lag of the dependent variable for each committee. For the Agriculture Committee, the findings with the addition of the lag relatively held to their original results. Members of the standing and appropriations subcommittees receive a pork advantage over nonmembers,

as well as those members who have more seniority and are of the minority party. For Public Works, the addition of the lag washed out the significance of the electoral vulnerability indicators.<sup>13</sup>

As Adler's findings did, this study's results raise the question of why two committees which both deal primarily with constituent service issues allocate their program funds using different indicators. One possible explanation of this difference is that Agriculture could be attracting members that come from districts that have a higher degree of need for Agriculture programs, as well as from districts who have received money in the past and have a vested interest in continuing that line of money; whereas, the Public Works Committee may draw more from the chamber-at-large, attracting members with less need and a history of less interest. In order to test this hypothesis, I ran another series of analyses using membership to either the Agriculture Committee or the Agriculture Appropriations Sub-Committee as the dependent variable,<sup>14</sup> and pooled cross-sectional probit analysis as the estimator, with the district controls and electoral indicators as the explanatory variables, and in a second model including the lagged amount of non-formula dollars awarded to the district as a measure of interest. As Table 4 shows, three out of four of the district need indicators are significant in the expected direction of Agriculture committee membership, the population living in rural farm areas, the number people working in the farm industry, and the population of district in square miles. The addition of the lagged non-formula dollars is also significant in

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<sup>13</sup> For results, see Appendix B.

<sup>14</sup> The dependent variable is dichotomous. If a district's member belonged to both the standing and appropriations subcommittee it is coded as 1.

Table 4. Probit Analysis of Influence on Agriculture Committee Membership

Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (SE)	Avg. Change, Min → Max	Coefficient (SE)	Avg. Change, Min → Max
Population in Rural Farm Areas	0.0001** (3.78e-06)	0.029	0.00002** (4.47e-06)	-0.834
Number of People Working in Farming	0.0001** (0.00001)	0.893	0.0001** (0.00001)	0.865
Size of District in Square Miles	1.03e-07 (7.36e-08)	0.002	1.03e-07 (7.43e-08)	0.003
Population of District in Square Miles	-0.0004** (.0001)	-0.003	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.004
Favorable District Partisanship	-0.5899** (0.1811)	0.0001	-0.5679** (0.1843)	0.0001
Increased Electoral Threat	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001
Lagged Total Non-Formula Dollars for Agriculture	---	---	0.0009** (0.0003)	.101
N	5592		5182	

Table 5. Probit Analysis of Influence on Public Works Committee Membership

Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (SE)	Avg. Change, Min → Max	Coefficient (SE)	Avg. Change, Min → Max
No. of Construction Works in district	9.20e-06 (8.79e-06)	0.001	8.78e-06 (3.25e-07)	0.002
District Flood Potential	0.0032** (0.0006)	0.0001	0.0029** (0.0007)	0.034
Favorable District Partisanship	-0.2513 (0.1344)	0.028	-0.2212 (0.1524)	0.0001
Increased Electoral Threat	-0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0001	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.002
Lagged Total Non-Formula Dollars for Public Works	---	---	1.24e-06** (3.25e-07)	0.182
N	5592		4990	

explaining who is on the Agriculture Committee. Table 5 shows the results for the Public Works Committee. One of the two district need indicators is positively significant, the district's flood potential. The lag of the non-formula Public Works dollars also has a significant, positive impact on committee membership.

Due to the limited number of district need indicators for the Public Works Committee in the model, compared to Agriculture, it is not appropriate to say that the Agriculture Committee attracts members of Congress with greater degrees of district need and interestedness. Again, the question remains of why two constituency-service committees act so differently?

Universalism could play a greater part in the process of allocating funds on specific committees than previously thought. As mentioned above, previous empirical studies have found little evidence of coalitions larger than a simple majority forming in support of programs involving geographically concentrated benefits. However, from an inter-committee logrolling perspective, perhaps the Public Works committee has been misdiagnosed as a committee that deals with primarily issues that are low in salience to the chamber-at-large. Typically, constituency service committees have been categorized as being more autonomous than committees that deal with more prevalent policy issues, as non-committee members have less of an interest in the committee's policy area, which enables these constituency-service committees to get their programs through Congress, despite that they reach only a minority of districts. It could be that the policy area that Public Works has jurisdiction over may be high in salience for many non-committee members, as compared with some committees that deal with more narrow

constituency interest, such as Agriculture. Every district, regardless of population density, or size in square miles has the need for roads to be built and maintained, but many fewer districts have the need for federal funds for potato crops. Because Public Works programs may be important for so many members of Congress, both committee and non-committee members, non-committee members may not allow as much discretion in allocation decisions to Public Works committee members, as they do to committees like Agriculture. It could be that the widespread saliency of Public Works programs forces it to go against its perceived reputation of a pork committee.

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## APPENDIX A

## Influences on Formula Only Outlays for the Public Works Committee

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>
Member Public Works Committee	-2334.25 (-1.08)
Member Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee	-8098.94 (-4.46)
State Representation on Public Works Committee	853.64 (0.60)
Seniority in Congress	-1008.187** (-8.14)
Majority Party	339.08 (0.36)
Favorable District Partisanship	781.33 (0.36)
Increased Electoral Threat	-0.73 (-0.58)
District Flood Potential	-9.15 (-0.77)
No. of Construction workers in Dist.	0.14 (0.71)
Constant	14011.96 (4.61)
N	5351
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.000
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$	

## Influences on Formula Only Outlays for the Agriculture Committee

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>
Member Agriculture Committee	3.81e+07 (3.14)
Member Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee	5.90e+07 (4.08)
State Representation on Agriculture Committee	4314078 (-1.09)
Seniority in Congress	4084144 (9.52)
Majority Party	-1.19e+07 (-3.59)
Favorable District Partisanship	-1435121 (-0.19)
Increased Electoral Threat	-227.93 (-0.05)
Population in Rural Farm Areas	-934.14 (-1.57)
Number of People Working in Farming	8717.91 (4.83)
Size of District in Square Miles	-258.25 (-0.54)
Population of District in Square Miles	4031.42 (3.38)
Constant	-4774816 (-0.28)
N	5580
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$	

## APPENDIX B

Influences on Outlays of Public Works Committee Programs with lag

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>
Lag	0.39 (36.88)
Member Public Works Committee	-1465.38 (-0.34)
Member Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee	-4579.87 (-0.70)
State Representation on Public Works Committee	-493.17 (-0.17)
Seniority in Congress	-725.63** (2.81)
Majority Party	122.75 (0.07)
Favorable District Partisanship	-5487.92 (-1.21)
Increased Electoral Threat	1.64 (0.64)
District Flood Potential	6.78 (0.29)
No. of Construction workers in Dist.	1.00** (2.61)
Constant	15775.85 (2.61)
N	4749
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.69
* $p < .05$	
** $p < .01$	

## Influences on Outlays of Agriculture Committee Programs with lag

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>b (t-test)</b>
Lag	0.97 (39.23)
Member Agriculture Committee	27366.15** (3.18)
Member Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee	30279.17** (2.94)
State Representation on Agriculture Committee	-1723.98 (-0.61)
Seniority in Congress	1353.31** (4.27)
Majority Party	-5303.98* (-2.33)
Favorable District Partisanship	7231.24 (1.36)
Increased Electoral Threat	1.12 (0.36)
Population in Rural Farm Areas	1.95* (2.35)
Number of People Working in Farming	7.44** (5.97)
Size of District in Square Miles	-0.63 (-1.92)
Population of District in Square Miles	1.95 (3.40)
Constant	-4340.18 (-0.35)
N	5178
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.004
* $p < .05$	
** $p < .01$	

## VITA

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Bonneau, Emily M., and Jeffrey L. Bernstein. 2005. "The Role of Civic Education in Closing the Political Knowledge Gender Gap." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2005.

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