THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURE TO WARTIME VIOLENCE

A Dissertation

by

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Submitted to the Graduate and Professional School of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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August 2023

Major Subject: Political Science

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the effect of wartime violence on individual preferences and behavior in the context of national security and foreign policy. The central theory proposes that exposure to wartime violence instills fear in both elites and the general public, leading to increased support for military armaments, particularly the development of nuclear weapons, as a means of safeguarding their respective nations from external aggression. This heightened fear also makes them hesitant to employ military force due to a profound understanding of the devastating consequences of war. The dissertation consists of three papers that examine this relationship at three distinct levels: the general public, national leaders, and legislators.

The first paper demonstrates that individuals who were exposed to wartime violence during childhood exhibit increased support for nuclear proliferation. These individuals are more sensitive to security threats, leading them to place greater value on nuclear weapons as a deterrent against major invasions. This theory is empirically validated through a difference-in-differences analysis of the South Korean public.

The second paper extends the analysis to the elite level, examining whether leaders' decisions to initiate conflicts are influenced by their childhood exposure to wartime violence. By using an original dataset, I compare leaders who experienced foreign military invasions during their childhood, drawing on the variations in their personal traumatic experiences. The findings reveal that leaders who suffered family deaths, family injuries, or displacement due to war are less inclined to initiate militarized disputes compared to those who did not undergo such experiences. These effects are particularly pronounced when political constraints are weak.

The final paper investigates the behavior of legislators with prior experiences of state repression and their propensity to criticize foreign political rights violations. These politicians empathize with foreign victims whose experiences resonate with their own, and they are driven by domestic political motivations to advocate for human rights. The theoretical argument finds support in the analysis of roll-call vote patterns within the South Korean legislature.

DEDICATION

To my family, my lifelong companion Jeehee, and my beloved Chookbok, who bring boundless joy, motivation, and strength to my life. My father, Dr. Byunglo "Philo" Kim, whose inspiration has guided me along this long journey, has my eternal gratitude. I would also like to thank my mother, sister, grandfather, and grandmother for their consistent support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Matthew Fuhrmann, whose intellectual inspiration and patient mentorship have been instrumental in shaping me into the scholar I am today. His profound knowledge, invaluable feedback, and dedication to my academic development have always inspired me to achieve greater heights in my research. I am truly fortunate to have had the opportunity to work under his guidance, and I am grateful for the countless hours he spent reading my works and fostering my intellectual growth.

I am also indebted to my committee members and the faculty of the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University for their helpful feedback. Their expertise and willingness to engage in meaningful discussions have contributed to the overall quality of this dissertation. I would like to extend a special acknowledgment to Mike Koch, who I am certain would have been pleased with my achievement had he still been with us. In addition, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who have provided support, encouragement, and insightful discussions throughout my doctoral journey.

CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES

Contributors

NOMENCLATURE

ATOP   Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions

CINC   Composite Index of National Capability

COW   Correlates of War

IPUS   Institute for Peace and Unification Studies

IR   International Relations

IRB   Institutional Review Board

MID   Militarized Interstate Dispute

OHCHR   Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN   United Nations

WAC   World Affairs Council

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Exposure to Violence in International Relations

What are the political consequences of exposure to wartime violence? Armed conflicts affect people of all ranks and ages, but civilians who lack the means to defend themselves are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of such violence. As of June 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported over 23,000 civilian casualties in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.[1] Additionally, millions of people are experiencing the loss of their families and the destruction of their livelihoods due to bombings on their home soil. However, despite the gravity of these circumstances, the academic field of international relations (IR) has primarily focused on the impact of violence on military personnel, leaving the consequences of violence experienced by civilians relatively understudied.[2]

My dissertation aims to advance our understanding of how civilian exposure to wartime violence affects attitudes and preferences regarding national security among the general public and the elite who survived such violence. Specifically, I concentrate on one distinct subgroup of civilians: *children*. My central argument is that childhood exposure to wartime violence leads individuals to adopt fear-driven foreign policy orientations, characterized by an emphasis on military armament while simultaneously harboring reservations about using military force. These individuals are inevitably fearful of being exposed to additional wartime violence. The experience should teach a lesson about the anarchic nature of the international system, so they believe that countries need a strong military for peace and stability. It will make these people place a special emphasis on bolstering deterrence and national defense. However, their excessive fear also makes these individuals more cautious about using militarized forces. They are aware that innocent lives must be sacrificed if their country once again becomes a key battlefield. Hence, they approach the utilization of

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[1] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Ukraine: civilian casualty update 13 February 2023." https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-24-april-2023 [accessed June 5, 2023]

[2] Exceptions include studies examining the effects of wartime rapes (Cohen, 2013), the destruction of educational infrastructure (Lai and Thyne, 2007), and gender differences in the war experience (Plümper and Neumayer, 2006).

military force abroad conservatively, with the objective of averting further wartime violence.

1.2 What Do We Know and Not Know?

Traditionally, IR scholars have tended to downplay individual-level variation when analyzing foreign policy outcomes, instead emphasizing systemic and institutional factors (Waltz, 1959; Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Clark and Nordstrom, 2005). Leaders were seen as operating within the constraints imposed by their domestic and international environments, and the role of personal history has often been simplified (Jervis, 2013). However, leaders do not arrive into adulthood as fully-formed individuals (Ellis, 2017, 11). Their beliefs and personalities are shaped over time by a series of earlier events, which can have cumulative effects. Many leaders themselves acknowledge the significance of their childhood experiences in shaping their conflict-related decisions (Ellis, 2017, 12).

Consider Raymond Poincaré, the national leader of France during World War I, who, at the age of 10, experienced the German military invasion. His hometown remained occupied for four years, and he encountered German soldiers in his daily life. Reflecting on his childhood memories, Poincaré's fear of further wartime violence intensified, leading him to prioritize military preparedness and exhibit concerns about the potential risks of German military expansion (Keiger, 2008). Another example is Golda Meir, the former Israeli prime minister, who faced Russian aggression during her childhood. Meir attributed her resolve to establish Israel as a secure and powerful nation to the significant impact of her early experiences.[3]

Recent empirical research utilizing the "personal biography approach" (Krcmaric, Nelson and Roberts, 2020) has significantly contributed to our understanding of how the life experiences of public officials shape foreign policy outcomes (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002; Colgan, 2013; Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015; Lupton, 2021). Exposure to violence, among other life experiences, has been found to have a significant impact on the national security and foreign policy preferences of leaders. Studies have demonstrated that leaders who have firsthand combat experience during

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[3]Encyclopedia of World Biography. "Golda Meir Biography." `https://www.notablebiographies.com/Ma-Mo/Meir-Golda.html` [accessed May 17, 2023]

military service are less likely to initiate militarized disputes, whereas former rebels are more prone to doing so compared to civilian leaders (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015; Horowitz et al., 2018). However, the existing literature predominantly focuses on wartime violence experienced by uniformed military personnel, whether as members of national armed forces or rebel groups.

This dissertation examines one of the underexplored aspects of the literature on the legacy of violence: exposure to wartime violence during childhood. During a war, military soldiers are not the only ones who face life-threatening situations; many civilians are also placed in harm's way, experiencing traumatic violence and even death. Especially for those who are young, this traumatic experience can be particularly acute. To my understanding, no political science research has examined the effects of childhood war exposure on foreign policy preferences.[4]

Scholars from fields other than international relations have investigated the political legacies of early exposure to violence, but their focus has remained on non-security policy outcomes. For example, exposure to violence influences loyalty to perpetrator (Balcells, 2012; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), political ideology (Zeitzoff, 2014; Charnysh and Finkel, 2017), political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019), altruism (Hartman and Morse, 2020), and institutional trust (Hong and Kang, 2017; Wang, 2021). By contrast, this dissertation explores the residual effects of childhood exposure to wartime violence on national security and foreign policy preferences, specifically military armament and conflict initiation, after they survive such violence.

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[4]One exception is Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, chapter 5). In their book, the authors present a short section about global leaders with childhood war exposure, finding that the childhood experience of having lived through any war correlates positively with the propensity to initiate conflicts (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015, 156). However, the study's conclusions are drawn partly from comparisons between leaders of different generations. Leaders of a war generation who were exposed to wartime violence and those of a post-war generation who never witnessed such violence may differ in ways that are difficult to be observed or measured. As such, the resulting pattern in the data would not reflect a causal relationship but may be driven by generational effects. More importantly, if those unmeasured differences affect decisions about conflict initiation, the resulting findings might be misleading.

1.3   Contributions to the Literature

1.3.1   Childhood Exposure to Wartime Violence

This dissertation makes several significant contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First and foremost, it shifts the theoretical focus from military personnel to *children* when examining the consequences of exposure to violent conflict. The experience of witnessing wartime violence as a child is inherently more traumatic than experiencing the same violent event as an adult or soldier. Children, as a vulnerable subset of the population, depend on protectors, such as parents, for their survival. Their helplessness in the face of wartime violence and their frequent victimization in one-sided acts of violence make their experience uniquely traumatic. Unlike soldiers who voluntarily choose military service and acknowledge the potential for violence, children are innocent victims who did not select to be exposed to such brutality.

Furthermore, childhood is a crucial period for brain development, and exposure to wartime violence during this time has a profound impact on a child's worldview, shaping their perceptions, values, and understanding of the world throughout their lives (Kim and Lee, 2014). Psychological research highlights the concept of a sensitive period during which brain plasticity is at its peak (Bauer et al., 2014). Childhood represents such a critical period when certain parts of the brain fully develop. Traumatic experiences during childhood alter brain structure, resulting in the formation of more neural connections associated with fear, anxiety, and impulsivity (Kesternich et al., 2014; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Kim, 2017). These factors demonstrate that traumatic exposures during critical periods of personality formation significantly influence individuals' perspectives on the world, themselves, others, and their expectations for the future (Pynoos, Steinberg and Wraith, 1995, 86). By focusing on childhood experiences, this research sheds light on the crucial role of this developmental period in shaping individual personalities.

The central argument of my dissertation is that individuals exposed to wartime violence during childhood harbor a heightened fear of further violence. Since children are the most vulnerable group during times of armed conflict, their traumatic experiences make them highly susceptible

to excessive fear. They become easily terrified, hypersensitive to security threats, and concerned about the potential for another military invasion. This fear may intensify when children witness the loss of family members, which is a significant predictor of severe trauma (Morgos, Worden and Gupta, 2008).

This experience influences the attitudes and preferences of both the general public and the elite, leading them to prioritize military planning and armament as a means to ensure their country's safety. Individuals who have endured wartime violence as children tend to question their country's ability to protect its citizens and territory during future conflicts. Consequently, when faced with external security threats, they favor stronger security policies and the development of robust deterrence capabilities to prevent potential enemy invasions.

Second, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of foreign policy orientations by challenging the assumption that the propensity for military armament and the willingness to use military force always align positively. Scholars have traditionally posited that individuals' tendencies to arm themselves and employ military force are likely to move in the same direction. Based on this assumption, they have explored whether exposure to violence makes individuals more aggressive or more peaceful later in life. However, this dissertation argues that individuals who experienced war during childhood believe in the necessity of military preparedness for deterrence but exhibit hesitation when it comes to using military force. The findings suggest that the conventional dichotomy between militarism (e.g., hawkish orientation) and pacifism (e.g., dovish orientation) may be overly simplistic when explaining the foreign policy orientations of these individuals. Instead, their preferences for military armament and engagement in conflict should be understood as distinct dimensions.

Lastly, this research seeks to minimize empirical barriers to inference by enhancing the homogeneity of the "treatment" and "control" groups by examining within-group variation among individuals who were almost equally eligible to experience wartime violence. Rather than comparing individuals with and without violence exposure, the study compares individuals who were exposed to more severe violence with those who experienced the same conflict but remained rela-

tively safe. The theory predicts that those who suffered more severe harm from war will be more profoundly affected by the impact of violence compared to those who escaped the conflict without personal trauma. This approach avoids making "apples-to-oranges" comparisons and maintains a more similar sample, thereby strengthening the validity of the findings.

1.3.2 Exposure to State Violence

The second significant contribution of this dissertation is the examination of the impact of *state repression* on foreign policy preferences, particularly in relation to international human rights resolutions. While much of the literature on state-to-state naming and shaming treats each country as a unitary actor, it is essential to recognize that individual-level variation may exist within the same country regarding support for foreign human rights. For any given foreign human rights violation, some politicians may criticize it more strongly than others. This becomes particularly significant in the context of legislative enactment of resolutions, as the preferences of individual legislators influence the passage of such resolutions.

The argument put forth in this dissertation is that politicians who have personally experienced state repression become more critical of political rights violations abroad. Their direct exposure to state repression fosters a strong advocacy for political rights on the global stage. They possess a greater sense of empathy for foreign victims whose political rights are violated, and their personal experience shapes their commitment to protecting human rights. Moreover, these politicians are also motivated by domestic political incentives, as the defense of human rights aligns with their political identity and voter expectations. Therefore, when a foreign country commits a human rights violation, these legislators are more likely to publicly condemn the perpetrator, using it as an opportunity to differentiate themselves as politicians.

By focusing on the individual-level impact of state repression on foreign policy preferences, this research expands our understanding of the complex dynamics involved in state-to-state interactions regarding human rights. It recognizes the variation that exists within a country and highlights the role of personal experiences in shaping politicians' attitudes and responses to human rights violations in other nations.

1.4 Applications to Contemporary International Politics

While most political science research has primarily focused on the effects of violence on military personnel, this dissertation addresses a critical gap by examining the consequences of wartime violence on children. The scale of this issue is staggering, as in 2019, two-thirds of the world's children were living in conflict-affected countries, with over 400 million children residing within 50 kilometers of active conflict zones (Østby, Rustad and Tollefsen, 2020). In the ongoing war in Ukraine, nearly 10 percent of civilian casualties are children.[5] These figures likely underestimate the true extent of the problem, considering unreported cases and the number of children displaced by conflict. Children, who rely on their guardians for protection and survival, constitute one of the most vulnerable civilian groups in armed conflicts. However, the consequences of violence experienced by this vulnerable population have received limited attention.

This dissertation provides important implications for countries whose leaders have themselves experienced war as children. Since 1950, there has been an upward trend in the number of global leaders with childhood war exposure (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). This trend is expected to continue, given the increase in the number of children living in conflict zones since 1990 (Østby, Rustad and Tollefsen, 2020). Moreover, countries recently invaded by foreign military forces, such as Ukraine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, are more likely to produce future leaders who have experienced childhood war trauma. While scholars have examined the long-term effects of wartime violence, its political legacies on leaders' foreign policy preferences remain understudied.

To understand these leaders' national security policy decisions, my dissertation suggests that it is necessary to comprehend how the war affected their childhoods in addition to their adulthood military experiences. Leaders exposed to severe violence from foreign invasions early in life are more likely to be fixated on building a strong military and preventing further violence. For instance, if the young generations in Ukraine who have suffered the loss, injuries, or displacement of family members due to the Russian invasion ascend to positions of power in the future, the findings

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[5]The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Ukraine: civilian casualty update 13 February 2023." `https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/02/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-13-february-2023` [accessed February 21, 2023]

suggest that Ukraine is likely to allocate significant resources towards military development while minimizing its involvement in armed conflicts.

Additionally, this dissertation contributes to the literature by demonstrating that childhood experiences of wartime violence can lead to nuanced foreign policy orientations. Conventional wisdom suggests that preferences for military armament and conflict initiation are positively correlated, assuming that those who invest more in the military are more willing to use force. Hawks are typically associated with a preference for higher defense spending and a readiness to employ force abroad, while doves exhibit the opposite inclination. However, my research challenges this conventional wisdom by showing that exposure to political violence does not have a uniform effect on leaders' preferences for militarism or military conservatism. Instead, the theory posits that such experiences can result in political elites supporting military buildups for the purpose of enhancing national security while simultaneously displaying caution when it comes to engaging in foreign conflicts.

In conclusion, this dissertation's contributions shed light on the long-term effects of childhood exposure to wartime violence and their impact on leaders' foreign policy preferences. By examining the experiences of children and the nuanced ways in which violence shapes their attitudes, this research provides insights into contemporary international politics, highlights the vulnerabilities of children in conflict-affected regions, and informs our understanding of the decision-making processes of future leaders who have endured war in their formative years.

1.5   Roadmap of the Dissertation

In the next section, Section 2, I explore the long-term impact of childhood wartime violence experiences on nuclear proliferation preferences. I argue that individuals who were exposed to traumatic war violence during childhood are more likely to value strong national security shields such as nuclear armament. Violent experiences of this nature tend to lead individuals to question the country's ability to protect its citizens and territory during militarized conflicts. These individuals tend to be more concerned about whether or not the country will be able to protect them from another war violence. Therefore, when another external security threat arises in the future,

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these individuals favor a more reliable and stronger security policy for deterring a potential enemy invasion.

I test individual-level variation in preferences for nuclear weapons with South Korean survey data and provincial-level wartime violence data during the Korean War. By utilizing the geographic variation of violence intensity during the war, I compare the pre-war and post-war cohorts who resided in severely damaged regions and relatively safe areas. Within the pre-war cohort, I find that individuals who resided in war-torn areas are more supportive of nuclear proliferation than those who were exposed to less violence. This regional difference, however, is not substantial in the post-war generation. The results suggest that direct exposure to wartime violence during childhood increases public demand for nuclear weapons when confronted with security threats.

In Section 3, I turn to leaders as my level of analysis. I develop and test two competing arguments about the effects of childhood war exposure on future conflict behavior. One argument expects leaders exposed to war at a young age to be less likely to initiate conflict because they understand and fear its consequences. Another perspective expects that these leaders are more likely to initiate conflict out of anger and a desire for revenge. I test my hypotheses using a research design that reduces omitted variable bias compared to prior research. My analysis only compares leaders who experienced foreign military invasions during childhood based on the variation in their personal traumatic experiences. I find that those who experienced family deaths, family injuries, or displacement from war initiate fewer militarized disputes than those who did not experience such events. These effects are substantial, particularly when political constraints are weak. My results suggest that childhood war trauma makes leaders conservative about the use of force.

Section 4 explores how the state violence experiences of legislators affect their roll-call voting behaviors on international human rights resolutions. Compared to the previous two papers' focus on childhood wartime violence, this paper focuses on exposure to political repression from an authoritarian government. I argue that legislators' prior exposure to state repression makes them strong advocates for international criticism of political human rights. These politicians have greater empathy for victims whose political rights are violated. In addition, they have domestic political

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motivations, as the protection of human rights is central to their political identity and what voters expect of them. The evidence from roll-call vote patterns in the South Korean legislature and qualitative interviews supports the theoretical argument. The results suggest that past state repression experience is one of the sources of individual-level variation in preferences for international human rights policy, which has received less attention in prior research.

The concluding section summarizes the key findings from each preceding section, emphasizing their significance and contributions to the field of political science. It discusses the broader implications of the research for understanding the consequences of childhood exposure to violence and state repression in the realm of international relations. The section concludes by acknowledging the limitations of the study and proposing avenues for future research, thereby encouraging further investigation of the explored topics.

2. THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF CHILDHOOD WARTIME VIOLENCE ON PREFERENCES FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION*

2.1 Introduction

Does early exposure to wartime violence affect an individual's preference for national security policies? During a war, military soldiers are not the only ones who face life-threatening situations; many civilians are also placed in harm's way, experiencing traumatic violence and even death. Witnessing the deaths of neighbors, friends, and family members due to war violence at a young age is a highly traumatic experience for individuals. This destructive experience can have a long-run impact on one's personality and value system. Extensive research in social science shows that childhood violent experiences affect individuals' political attitudes and behaviors in both the short- and long-term. For example, early exposure to violence causes individuals to be less trusting in the government and more active in political participation (Carmil and Breznitz, 1991; Punamaki, Qouta and Sarraj, 1997; Blattman, 2009; Hong and Kang, 2017; Conzo and Salustri, 2019).

Surprisingly, however, the effect of childhood wartime violence on preferences for national security policies is a question that has received little attention in scholarship. War-related violence, in comparison with interpersonal, social, and state violence, is especially likely to shape individuals' preferences and attitudes toward national security policy because it is closely related to the goal of preventing a similar type of violence in the future. This paper examines whether people who experienced wartime violence during childhood demonstrate a greater propensity for nuclear weapons acquisition.

I argue that individuals who were exposed to traumatic wartime violence during childhood are more likely to support nuclear proliferation. Violent experiences of this nature have a tendency to lead individuals to be more concerned about their safety and being exposed to additional wartime violence. The experience of the government's inability to safely secure its national territory makes

these individuals question whether or not the country will be able to protect them in the future. Therefore, when an external security threat arises, people who have experienced wartime violence perceive the threat as riskier than those who have not, and they hyperfocus on worst-case thinking of suffering from a catastrophic war. This leads them to prefer a national security policy that they believe can deter such large-scale conflict.

Scholars have shown that nuclear weapons can have both positive and negative security effects (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989; Sagan, 1994; Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010; Monteiro and Debs, 2014; Bell and Miller, 2015; Lee et al., 2023). Some studies show that nuclear weapons benefit national security by bolstering deterrence, while others demonstrate that possessing nuclear weapons does not lower the risk of conflict but rather increases it by inviting preventive strikes and low-level disputes. I argue that people exposed to violence early in life naturally favor the security-enhancing aspects of nuclear deterrence. Since they have suffered from traumatic wartime violence, they are more fearful of suffering from a disastrous war in the future. This will lead them to favor a nuclear arsenal that is effective in deterring major invasions on their home soil. Also, people with childhood war trauma who better understand the tragic nature of destructive weapons will focus on the defensive uses of nuclear weapons. They may oppose using nuclear weapons for offensive purposes, but they will support nuclear proliferation if they believe it can defend their country from high-level conflicts.

Using geographical variation in violence intensity during the Korean War, this paper compares the war and post-war generations in South Korea who lived in war-torn and safe regions during their childhood. The theory predicts that people who lived in areas more affected by the war demonstrate a greater propensity to favor nuclear weapons acquisition than those who lived in areas relatively untouched by military conflict. If wartime violence experiences influence preferences for nuclear weapons acquisition, the difference in preferences between people who experienced severe wartime violence and those who lived in safe areas should be significant in the war generation. In contrast, such a geographical difference between those who lived in the same regions after the war ended should not be substantial. Therefore, the theory expects that the regional difference only

exists within the pre-war cohort and not in the post-war cohort.

There are substantive reasons to examine the Korean War case. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 killed over a million civilians, which is about 5% of the total population of the country. The traumatic event might have shaped the survivors' political attitudes. Yet, the effects of Korean War violence have rarely been systematically analyzed.[1] Moreover, South Koreans have recently been confronted with significant nuclear threats from their northern neighbor, North Korea. Nuclear proliferation has become a salient issue in South Korea since Pyongyang's first nuclear test in 2006. While more than a majority of the South Korean public shows constant support for nuclear proliferation, there is a cross-sectional variation in the degree of support among the public. Public preferences for nuclear armament in South Korea serve as a relevant indicator for how much individuals perceive nuclear threats seriously and value an extreme but effective protection against nuclear attacks (Waltz, 1990; Gaddis, 1986).[2]

The results provide strong support for the theory. Within the war generation, an experience of living in a war-torn region during childhood increases the individual's level of support for nuclear proliferation by 5.6 percentage points. However, as predicted, this geographical difference is not present within the post-war generation. I also offer an explanation of potential mechanisms through which people with childhood experiences of wartime violence show greater preferences for nuclear proliferation. Empirical evidence suggests that they perceive external security threats as more threatening and are less likely to trust their security to external actors than those without such experiences.

This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the microfoundation of nuclear policy by showing that childhood wartime violence increases an individual's preference for nuclear weapons. A growing number of scholars have begun to examine how individual-level preferences for nuclear proliferation vary in different external security situations. For example, recent articles find that a

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[1]A few exceptional studies include Kim and Lee (2014) and Hong and Kang (2017).

[2]It is important to note that preferences for nuclear weapons might not be a relevant indicator in other situations because nuclear weapons are not necessarily a solution to every national security problem. For example, nuclear weapons are not effective for compellence or deterring low-level conflicts from nuclear-armed challengers (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013; Geller, 1990; Gibler, Rider and Hutchison, 2005; Rauchhaus, 2009; Lee et al., 2023).

patron state's nuclear security guarantees affect the client state's domestic demand for nuclear weapons (Sukin, 2019; Ko, 2019). This paper examines the existing heterogeneous preferences among individuals: given the same external security condition, why are some people more supportive of nuclear proliferation than others? Existing studies suggest that individuals' preferences for nuclear proliferation are shaped by their rebel experience (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015), political orientation (Press, Sagan and Valentino, 2013), age (Sagan and Valentino, 2017), and psychological traits (Rathbun and Stein, 2020). This paper contributes to the literature by showing that childhood exposure to wartime violence makes members of the general public favor nuclear proliferation in their later lives as a deterrent against foreign aggression.

2.2 Theory

2.2.1 Childhood Wartime Violence and Nuclear Proliferation Preference

Early exposure to military violence has lasting repercussions. Many scholars across a variety of academic fields have focused on the effect of wartime violence on individuals. Studies in psychology and the medical sciences have shown that traumatic childhood experiences of wartime violence can have an effect on future physical and mental disorders. For example, childhood exposure to war violence has long-lasting negative impacts on mental health, such as increased levels of fear and depression (Kesternich et al., 2014; Kim, 2017). Also, school-aged children exposed to World War II violence experienced long-run detrimental effects on physical growth, educational attainment, and labor market participation (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014).

Scholars in economics highlight the relationship between early exposure to traumatic events and an individual's preferences for risk-taking and trust. Several empirical investigations have found that violent experiences during one's youth lead individuals to be more risk-averse later in life (Kim and Lee, 2014; Byder, Agudelo and Castro, 2015). Bernile, Bhagwat and Rau (2017) discover that CEOs who witnessed potentially traumatic events without suffering extremely negative consequences lead firms in a much more aggressive manner, whereas CEOs who experienced highly traumatizing events exhibited more conservative attitudes. Conzo and Salustri (2019) show

that individuals exposed to World War II in the first six years of life display lower trust and social engagement levels during adulthood.

Political scientists, additionally, pay close attention to the residual effects of war violence on people's political behaviors (see especially Walden and Zhukov, 2020). For instance, Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009) show that people who experienced civil war violence in Sierra Leone were more likely to participate in political activities, such as voting, attending community meetings, and joining local political groups. In addition, Hong and Kang (2017) find that South Koreans who experienced the Korean War during their youth are less supportive of the national government and, in particular, the administration and military.

Despite extensive literature on the residual impacts of wartime violence on domestic political behaviors and attitudes, we know less about the potential relationship between wartime violence and an individual's preferences for national security policies. The first-hand experience of atrocities is likely to shape an individual's perception of threats and the valuation of safety in general. The deep-rooted effects of exposure to wartime violence will impact a person's future preferences for national security policies, especially if the decisions are directly related to war and peace. For example, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155) argue that exposure to wartime violence at a young age leads to a desire for violent revenge. They find that leaders with childhood war exposure are more willing to start military interventions. As the authors also noted, however, the evidence is limited to preliminary correlation analysis,[3] and we do not fully understand how the legacies of childhood wartime violence shape people's national security policy preferences decades later.

I argue that childhood exposure to wartime violence makes individuals support the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal in their later lives. Those who have suffered traumatic violent events during their youth are more fearful of additional wartime violence. The violent experience will increase individuals' sensitivity to security threats and cause them to overestimate the possibility of large-scale invasions of their home territories. They will view nuclear weapons as

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[3]The conclusions are drawn partly from comparisons between leaders of different generations: leaders of a war generation who were exposed to wartime violence and those of a post-war generation who never witnessed such violence. As such, the observed pattern in the data would not reflect a causal relationship but may be driven by generational effects.

a means of deterrence against foreign aggression that can assure national security. The following sections explain in detail why *wartime* violence experiences during *childhood* increase people's preferences for *nuclear proliferation*.

2.2.1.1 Why Wartime Violence?

Violent experiences can be divided into three categories: 1) interpersonal violence, 2) state violence, and 3) war violence.[4] Interpersonal violence is an individual experience of being physically abused by another person. State violence refers to the experience of physical repression by national governments. This type of violence is more common in totalitarian regimes where the government occasionally represses its citizens to discourage anti-regime behavior. The last type of violence is war violence, which includes both intrastate and interstate wars. The common aspect of war violence is the failure of the national government and military to protect its citizens from security threats, either rebel groups or another state.

Experience of violence from the first two cases does not necessarily affect national security preferences since these cases of violence, and a broader sense of threat within such violence, do not originate from outside the state. However, people who were directly exposed to war violence will demonstrate a strong proclivity for more capable national security protection. Therefore, this paper formulates the theory around the third category of violence, namely violent experiences from *wars*.

Early exposure to violence leads to higher anxiety about safety. In particular, the experience of interstate wartime violence, which originates from external threats, makes individuals fearful of additional wartime violence and skeptical about whether the government can protect its citizens if the security threat emerges again in the future. This will lead such individuals to have a deeper concern for safety and a higher valuation of extreme forms of national security assurances. They are likely to prefer a robust source of protection even when the actual chance of risk is low because they are more susceptible to potential risks (Kim and Lee, 2014; Byder, Agudelo and Castro, 2015),

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[4]The categorization of violent experiences is the author's own definition.

2.2.1.2 Why Childhood Wartime Violence?

Another important factor of the theory is focused on an individual's early life, specifically *childhood*, experiences with war violence. It is distinguished from the conventional focus in political science scholarship on violence experienced by military soldiers. Extensive literature finds that military experiences influence individuals' future attitudes towards the use of force (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Gelpi and Feaver, 2002; Feaver and Gelpi, 2005; Kertzer, 2016). By contrast, this paper focuses on the effect of wartime experiences as children in shaping their preferences for security-related policies in the future.

Childhood experience of wartime violence is different from adulthood military combat experience in two ways. First, childhood is the period that is more prone to shaping brain development. Developmental psychology literature suggests a *sensitive period* for a living organism that is critical timing for development when brains are relatively more plastic (Bauer et al., 2014). Childhood is a sensitive period for human beings when certain parts of the adolescent brain fully develop. Thus, traumatic experiences during this period may have a greater impact on transformations of one's personality, value systems, and worldviews.

Previous psychological and medical research shows that experiences during childhood are crucial for one's developmental life cycle (Kesternich et al., 2014; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Kim and Lee, 2014; Kim, 2017). While there is no consensus about the exact cut-off years to define the sensitive period, empirical studies mostly focus on the age between 0 and 15 (Green et al., 1994; Kim and Lee, 2014; Hong and Kang, 2017). Experience of wartime violence, a highly traumatizing experience, during the period leading up to the age of 15 may have lasting impacts on shaping one's personality and attitude.

Another unique feature of childhood war trauma is that children are a vulnerable subset of the population that needs help from protectors (e.g., parents) for survival. Developmental theory suggests that violence experiences that reduce human security have a higher impact on shaping worldviews (Masten and Osofsky, 2010). Children who are not protected by effective caregivers at the time of a catastrophic event may be particularly vulnerable to the disaster's effects (Chemtob

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et al., 2010). Disasters can also harm children via their effects on parents and parenting quality (Masten and Obradovic, 2008; Masten and Osofsky, 2010; Osofsky, 2004; Osofsky, Osofsky and Harris, 2007; Pine, Costello and Masten, 2005). These factors suggest that the role of childhood war trauma in shaping one's value systems should be more substantial than violent experiences in later life.

2.2.1.3   *Why Preference for Nuclear Proliferation?*

Academic research on international politics points out that nuclear weapons can have both positive and negative security effects. Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons are one of the most powerful instruments for enhancing national security (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989). Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons in human history, which provides a unique military advantage for a country (Jervis, 1984; Glaser, 1990). Therefore, those who call for unparalleled deterrence benefits are more likely to support the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal in order to ensure national and personal safety in future crises.

On the other hand, nuclear pessimists focus on the risks of pursuing nuclear weapons. They contend that nuclear weapons do not deter conflicts but actually increase the risk of conflicts by inviting preventive strikes and international backlash (Sagan, 1994; Debs and Monteiro, 2017). Nuclear weapons also bring systematic aggression because the strategic balance increases the chance of low-level conflicts (Snyder, 1960; Geller, 1990; Krepon, 2004; Gibler, Rider and Hutchison, 2005; Rauchhaus, 2009). This line of thinking suggests that individuals who seek reliable security protections might ultimately prefer not to pursue nuclear weapon development.

That being said, there are reasons why early exposure to wartime violence causes the overvaluation of nuclear deterrence. These people tend to be more anxious about safety and whether the government will be able to protect its citizens in future violent crises (Hong and Kang, 2017). This will lead such individuals to overreact to security threats and be hyperfocused on the worst-case scenario of suffering from additional catastrophic war. They will desire extreme forms of military weapons that can protect the country and themselves from major conflict. There is much less debate among scholars and policymakers that a nuclear arsenal provides a critical degree of deter-

rence against wars at high levels of intensity, such as large-scale military invasions and nuclear use (Waltz, 1990; Gaddis, 1986). Even one of the most vocal critics of nuclear deterrence, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1983, 79), wrote that nuclear weapons are "totally useless – except only to deter one's opponent from using them." Citizens with a strong belief in a high risk of a major war will advocate for the domestic development of a nuclear arsenal to avoid such large-scale attacks on their homeland.

In addition, people with childhood wartime violence experiences will focus on the defensive nature of nuclear weapons because the first-hand experiences of atrocities lead people to better understand the tragic consequences of using destructive weapons. These individuals will be reluctant to use military weapons for offensive purposes; instead, they will pay more attention to the defensive nature of weapons. Individuals who think of nuclear weapons as defensive should view the nuclear arsenal as stabilizing. Even those who oppose the use of nuclear weapons can still support the proliferation if they believe the possession can deter foreign aggression and defend the country (Sukin, 2019). Therefore, people exposed to wartime violence early in life are more likely to believe that the security-enhancing aspects of nuclear capability outweigh the security-diminishing ones.

Since building an independent nuclear weapons arsenal is not the only option for enhancing national security, especially amid increasing external security threats, one might question whether the theory can be extended to other security policies which could provide more reliable methods for national defense. For example, the public may prefer to form or strengthen a military alliance with an existing nuclear power in order to benefit from an extension of their nuclear umbrella. However, it is less likely to find similar results for people's preference for military alliances. I argue that exposure to war violence as a child lowers trust and leads an individual to be skeptical about whether an ally will provide security assistance when needed. People who are reluctant to leave their security in the hands of another country will expect greater benefits from having an indigenous nuclear arsenal than relying on an ally to provide a nuclear umbrella. Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015) argue that former rebel leaders value nuclear weapons because they are less

willing to trust their security to external actors. For example, Charles de Gaulle maintained that France should build its own nuclear arsenal because he believed that the United States would not risk New York to save Paris.[5] Similarly, people with childhood war exposure who are less likely to be satisfied depending on military alliances to guarantee their safety will expect greater utility from nuclear proliferation.

2.2.2 Hypotheses

The theory argues that individuals who experienced war violence during childhood show a higher preference for nuclear proliferation. The theory expects that among the war generation, people who lived in severely damaged areas are more likely to advocate nuclear proliferation than those who lived in relatively safe zones. In contrast, such geographic variation will not exist in the post-war generation who were born after the war's termination.

Hypothesis 1a: Within the war generation, individuals who resided in war-torn areas will show greater support for nuclear proliferation than those who resided in war-safe areas.

Hypothesis 1b: Within the post-war generation, people who resided in war-torn areas will *not* show stronger support for nuclear proliferation than those who resided in war-safe areas.

Regarding why people with childhood experiences of wartime violence are more likely to show greater preferences for nuclear proliferation, I argue that people exposed to more severe wartime violence are more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence than those who lived in safe regions during the war. These people believe that nuclear weapons unambiguously enhance security because they tend to focus on the defensive nature of nuclear weapons and do not prefer to rely on security guarantees for their defense. This hypothesis is a direct test of the mechanisms that explain why those exposed to severe wartime violence early in life naturally favor the security-enhancing aspect of nuclear deterrence. As with the first hypothesis, I do not expect the regional difference to be observed in the post-war cohort.

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[5]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962. `https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d30` [accessed 7 July 2021]

Hypothesis 2a: Within the war generation, individuals who resided in war-torn areas will be more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence than those who resided in the war-safe areas.

Hypothesis 2b: Within the post-war generation, people who resided in war-torn areas will *not* be more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence than those who resided in the war-safe zones.

2.2.3 Alternative Hypotheses

Alternative explanations may explain the relationship between wartime violence experience and nuclear proliferation preferences. For instance, some scholars have demonstrated that nuclear weapons could be destabilizing by inviting preventive strikes and increasing the likelihood of low-level conflicts (Sagan, 1994; Debs and Monteiro, 2017; Snyder, 1960; Geller, 1990). Based on this view of nuclear weapons, individuals who seek reliable security protection might ultimately oppose the development of nuclear weapons. Prior research suggests that wartime violence experience led to decreased support for nuclear proliferation in the cases of Japan and Germany (Berger, 1998, 2014). There is a deep-seated antimilitarist sentiment in both countries because the horrific experience of World War II made people remain unaggressive. As a result, both countries have decided not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons.

This line of thinking suggests that people who experienced more severe wartime violence during childhood will show less support for nuclear proliferation than those who remained safe during the war because they are more scared of militarized conflict, which can be invited by nuclear armament. It is a prediction that is opposite to my first theoretical expectation, so I test whether this alternative hypothesis is correct by testing H1.

Another alternative logic could argue that people exposed to wartime violence may possess hawkish foreign policy inclinations. Exposure to violence could make people have a desire for retribution and become more risk-acceptant in potentially violent situations. They might prefer the aggressive use of militarized forces, even at the risk of war. According to this perspective, people exposed to wartime violence value nuclear proliferation because it allows the country to use military actions with greater freedom, not because of its deterrent effects. This leads to a predic-

tion that is observationally equivalent to H1 that wartime violence experience leads to support for nuclear proliferation, so I use qualitative evidence to adjudicate this alternative argument.

2.3 Data and Research Design

2.3.1 Case Selection: South Korea

This paper features South Korea as a focused case study, examining the effect of early exposure to Korean War violence on South Koreans' preferences for nuclear proliferation. Using cohorts born during the 10 years before and after the Korean War, I divide the pre-war cohort who experienced the war as children and the post-war cohort who were not exposed to wartime violence. Given the sub-national geographic variation in violence intensity, I compare the preferences for nuclear proliferation between individuals who lived in the regions that experienced severe wartime violence and those who lived in safe areas in both the pre-war and post-war cohorts.

South Korea is an exemplary case for examination for the two following reasons. First, South Koreans experienced a highly destructive war, the Korean War, which broke out on June 25, 1950, and lasted for three years, only concluding when both sides agreed on a ceasefire under the United Nations (UN) on July 27, 1953. During the war, South Korea received support from sixteen countries, including the United States, while North Korea was backed by China and the Soviet Union. The war involved over two million soldiers in total, with the majority of the battles taking place on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, over a million civilians died during the war. Most of the South Korean civilian casualties occurred in 1950 when the North Korean army, after the invasion, quickly occupied most of the South Korean territory with the exception of the most southeastern province.

While the majority of today's South Korean citizens are from the post-war generation, a significant number of people who experienced the war are still alive. This allows comparison within each of these two generational groups and an examination of whether the pre-war generation shows a significantly different pattern of support for South Korea's nuclear proliferation than the post-war generation. Given that war intensity substantially varied across South Korean territory during

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the war, this paper examines how wartime violence has affected the war generation differently. Some regions were more severely damaged, and other regions remained relatively safe during the conflict. Exploiting geographical variation of war violence intensity, this paper compares people within pre-war and post-war generations respectively based on where they lived during their childhood and their exposure to violent experiences during the Korean War.

Second, South Korea is currently facing an increasing external threat from its nuclear-armed neighbor, North Korea. Since 2006, when North Korea first conducted a nuclear test, nuclear proliferation has become a salient issue in South Korea. The agenda was initially raised by several rightist politicians. The most popular example is Chung Mong-joon, one of the key right-wing politicians in South Korea, who argued in 2013 in Washington D.C. that "the time had come for South Korea to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and match North Korea's nuclear progress" (Sanger, 2013). Until today, more than a majority of the South Korean public constantly support the development of indigenous nuclear weapons.[6] At the same time, there is variation in the degree of support for nuclear weapons within the South Korean public. In general, respondents' political ideology, gender, and age influence their attitudes toward nuclear armament. The paper adds to existing knowledge that the level of violence experienced during the Korean War systematically explains the variation across South Koreans' preferences for nuclear proliferation.

2.3.2 Variables and Measurement

2.3.2.1 Survey Data

This paper uses responses from the "Unification Perception Survey" conducted by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University, South Korea, to measure pre-war and post-war cohorts' preferences for nuclear armament.[7] This research utilizes survey data from 2013 to 2019. This range was chosen due to the survey in 2013 including for the first

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[6]The evidence comes from annual public surveys conducted by various institutes, including Gallup Korea, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies.

[7]It is an annual survey that began in 2007. Each survey is conducted with 1,200 respondents. Survey responses were gathered in collaboration with Gallup Korea with the goal of examining trends in South Koreans' perceptions about unification and North Korea. The raw survey data are available on the website of the Korea Social Science Data Archive (https://kossda.snu.ac.kr).

time question on participants' level of support for South Korea's nuclear proliferation. In total, 8,400 individuals' responses were used in this study's analyses.[8] Of these 8,400, 1,014 people were born between 1941 and 1950 who were defined as a pre-war cohort, and 3,496 people were born between 1954 and 1963 who were defined as a post-war cohort.

The dependent variable of interest is the level of each individual's preference for nuclear proliferation in South Korea. It is measured based on the answers to the survey question which asks how much the respondent agrees with the following statement: *South Korea should also acquire nuclear weapons*.[9] Respondents choose the answer on a 5-point Likert scale, from (1)"strongly disagree" to (5)"strongly agree."

The primary explanatory variable of interest is exposure to wartime violence. As such, I generated a dummy variable, PRE-WAR, to identify people who were born before and after the war. This variable is coded 1 for people who were born between 1941-1950, the 10-year period before the war broke out, and 0 for people who were born between 1954-1963, the 10-year period after the war's termination. One objection to this measurement would be that people born in 1950 are too young to remember the war. However, previous literature on the effect of traumatic experiences argues that age 0-2 is still a critical period for trauma to shape one's value system (Green et al., 1994; Hong and Kang, 2017). As a robustness test, I replicate the analysis with various year ranges for deciding the pre-war and post-war cohorts, and the findings are consistent.

2.3.2.2 Korean War Violence

I use calculations on Korean War casualties and injuries per population at the 16-province level following previous research (Kim, 1996; Kim and Lee, 2014). Figure 1 shows the geographic variation of war violence. The numbers within parentheses represent the ratio of civilian casualties and injuries to the regional population. These numbers range from 0.001 (Jejudo) to 0.115 (Gangwondo). The national average is approximately 0.05, which means that about 5% of total South

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[8]In the entire sample, 4,260 were men and 4,140 were women. The oldest respondent was born in 1941, and the youngest respondent was born in 2000.

[9]This statement, especially by adding "*also*", implicitly asks respondents whether South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons in response to North Korea's nuclear armament.

Figure 2.1: Civilian casualties and injuries from the Korean War per population by province

Note: The figure is generated via the *grmap* package in Stata. Data sources: Kim (1996); Kim and Lee (2014)

Korean civilians were killed or injured during the war (Kim and Lee, 2014).

Additionally, the survey asks a question about the region where each respondent lived the longest before the age of 15. This paper uses these answers to determine where respondents resided during their childhood. Based on these data, I generated a dummy variable, RISK AREA, for people who lived in the provinces that experienced higher civilian injuries and casualties per capita than the national average during the Korean War, and 0 otherwise. These provinces include Gangwondo (a northeastern province of South Korea that shares its northern border with North Korea; casualty rate: 0.115), Seoul (capital of South Korea; casualty rate: 0.09), Jeollanamdo (a southwestern province of South Korea which is connected to the South Sea of the Korean Peninsula; casualty rate: 0.064), and Chungcheongbukdo (a central province in South Korea and it is a vital region for transportation; casualty rate: 0.061). To explore the sensitivity of this operationalization, the paper replicates the analysis using a continuous measure of casualty rates of the region each respondent

lived in during childhood.

Utilizing data on the average violence intensity at the provincial level provides two advantages for testing the theory. First, even though there might exist a variation of violence within each province, it is theoretically plausible to analyze at the regional level considering the Korean War evidently generated the safest and riskiest provinces. The two southeastern provinces are the only areas that were not occupied by the North Korean army, leaving them the safest places during the war. In contrast, the northeastern province (Gangwondo), the southwestern province (Jeollanamdo), and the capital (Seoul) were the riskiest regions because they were the provinces that North Korean soldiers first attacked, advanced most quickly, and were strategically important, respectively. Therefore, the variation in violence intensity across provinces was much more significant than the within-province variation.

Moreover, using the casualty rate can control for the variation in the total regional population across the provinces. If the absolute number of casualties per region is used, then people who lived in the population-dense area are more likely to experience greater violence based on this calculation. However, the experience of ten casualties in a region with 100 people might be as severe as experiencing 100 deaths in a region with 1,000 people. My measure can capture the level of violence experienced by people on average so that it can be compared across regions with greater relative nuance.

2.3.2.3   Control Variables

I include a set of covariates to control for relevant individual-level traits that might be related to both explanatory and outcome variables: political ideology, age, gender, income, education level, unemployment, and religiosity. First, the experience of war violence may affect the formation of political ideology. Political ideology also plays an important role in shaping preferences for nuclear proliferation because people with right-leaning political ideology tend to be in favor of hawkish foreign policies. PID is coded 0 for left-leaning respondents (supporting the Democratic Party), 1 for centrists, and 2 for right-leaning (supporting the Conservative Party) respondents. Second, age is a key factor that determines whether the individual did or did not experience war in South Korea.

Also, age is considered a crucial indicator in explaining proliferation preferences because older respondents are generally more supportive of nuclear weapons. Thus, the analysis includes AGE, which is a continuous variable that captures the respondent's age when the survey was conducted. Third, MALE is included in the analysis, which is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 for male and 0 for female. Respondents' gender is likely to influence the level of violence they experienced during the war, and scholars have shown that male respondents tend to be more supportive of nuclear policy. Lastly, childhood wartime violence may affect various socioeconomic statuses of individuals in the long-run, such as income, education, employment status, and religiosity. Such socioeconomic status might also affect an individual's preferences for nuclear proliferation.[10]

One might be concerned about the post-treatment bias when including all control variables since some of them might be driven by war experiences. For example, wartime violence experiences can lead people to be more hawkish, thus, resulting in a right-leaning political ideology. The only exogenous variables that are not affected by the war experience are age and gender, while other covariates are possibly post-treatment to some degree. Therefore, in the empirical analysis section, I report the results of both models with and without potential post-treatment variables.

2.3.3 Research Strategy and Estimation

To test the hypotheses, I construct the following equation.

$$\text{Nuclear}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{RiskArea}_i + \beta_2 \text{Pre-war}_i + \beta_3 \text{RiskArea}_i \times \text{Pre-war}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X}'_i + \upsilon_s + \epsilon_i$$

where i indicates individuals. NUCLEAR$_i$ denotes the preference level for South Korea's nuclear proliferation of individual i. PRE-WAR$_i$ represents whether an individual i belongs to the pre-war or post-war cohort. RISK AREA$_i$ indicates whether an individual i lived in areas that experienced more severe violence than the national average during childhood. I also replicate the analysis by

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[10]INCOME is measured based on the total monthly salary of the family members who are currently living together: (1) below 2 million KRW ($2,000 USD) (2) between 2-3 million KRW ($2,000-3,000 USD)(3) between 3 million and 4 million KRW ($3,000-4,000 USD) (4) above 4 million KRW ($4,000 USD). EDUCATION is a measure that ranges on a 5-point scale: (1) elementary graduate, (2) middle school graduate, (3) high school graduate, (4) college graduate, and (5) above graduate education. UNEMPLOYED and RELIGIOSITY are binary variables that respondents are coded as 1 if they are unemployed and have a religion, respectively, and coded as 0 otherwise.

replacing *risk area* with a continuous variable of casualty rate in Models 3 and 4. I include an interaction term between PRE-WAR and RISK AREA to estimate the effect of geographical variation in wartime violence on preference for nuclear proliferation across the pre-war and post-war cohorts. The coefficient on the interaction term, β_3, can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to wartime violence on nuclear proliferation preference. β_1 captures whether the regional difference is persistent within the post-war generation. The theory expects β_3 to be significant and positive and β_1 to be statistically insignificant.

I also include individual characteristics ($\mathbf{X'_i}$) that might be related to an individual's nuclear proliferation preference as well as pre-war and post-war cohorts. This includes political ideology, age, gender, income, education, employment status, and religiosity. Since the research is pooling surveys from the year 2013 to 2019, I also include survey fixed effects, υ_s, to control for the year that the survey was conducted because the timing of a survey can affect people's preferences for nuclear proliferation. I estimate it as a mixed-effects multilevel linear regression model because the equation includes variables at different levels: individual and regional levels.

2.4 Findings

The results presented in Table 1 support the theory. In Models 1 and 2, I use a dichotomous measure of wartime violence intensity variable. In Model 1, I only include only pre-treatment controls, age, and gender, and in Model 2, I include all of the control variables that are arguably post-treatment variables to some degree, as well as the pre-treatment variables included in Model 1. In Models 3 and 4, I replicate the analysis by replacing *risk area* with a continuous variable of casualty rate. The coefficients on the interaction terms are consistently positive and statistically significant across various model specifications, as expected by Hypothesis 1a. The results suggest that the war generation who resided in risk areas show higher support than others in the same cohort. The coefficients on RISK AREA are statistically insignificant based on a 95% confidence level, indicating that the regional difference is not substantial in the post-war cohort. This supports Hypothesis 1b that the effect of living in the regions with higher casualty rates does not exist within the post-war generation who were not directly exposed to the Korean War. These results imply that

Table 2.1: Regression Analysis of Violence Experience and Nuclear Proliferation Preferences

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
PRE-WAR COHORT	-0.00578	-0.00653	-0.140	-0.133
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.154)	(0.155)
RISK AREA	-0.0716	-0.0687	-0.546	-0.397
	(0.0530)	(0.0540)	(0.950)	(0.971)
PRE-WAR COHORT × RISK AREA	0.290*	0.292*	4.784*	4.627*
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(2.156)	(2.171)
MALE	0.0292	0.0124	0.0285	0.0136
	(0.0451)	(0.0487)	(0.0452)	(0.0488)
AGE	-0.00237	0.000306	-0.00275	-0.000336
	(0.00801)	(0.00848)	(0.00802)	(0.00848)
PID		0.0409		0.0439
		(0.0312)		(0.0313)
EDUCATION		0.0426		0.0383
		(0.0356)		(0.0358)
INCOME		-0.00252		-0.00430
		(0.0250)		(0.0250)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0484		-0.0590
		(0.104)		(0.104)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0286		-0.0314
		(0.0475)		(0.0476)
CONSTANT	3.699***	3.411***	3.724***	3.456***
	(0.439)	(0.495)	(0.443)	(0.497)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2248	2213
Log Lik.	-3349.4	-3301.9	-3341.5	-3294.0

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

regional variation in exposure to higher casualty rates during the war increases the aspiration for nuclear weapons acquisition.

Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect of Wartime Violence on Nuclear Proliferation Preference

To move beyond the coefficients table, I visualize the marginal effect of living in risky areas across the pre-war and post-war cohorts based on Model 2. The graph in Figure 2 suggests supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1a that people who lived in the risky area during the Korean War demonstrate a 0.224 higher level of support for nuclear proliferation compared to people who lived in the non-risky area during the war. Considering the dependent variable was measured based on 5-point scale answers, the wartime violence experience leads the people to show 5.6 percentage points higher support for acquiring nuclear weapons. Within the post-war cohort, however, the difference in preferences for nuclear proliferation between people who lived in risky and non-risky areas is not statistically distinguishable from zero, confirming Hypothesis 1b.

2.4.1 Mechanisms

In this section, I explore potential mechanisms through which people who were exposed to wartime violence during childhood show greater preferences for nuclear proliferation. I argued that people with childhood war experiences are more concerned about being exposed to wartime violence in the future, thus preferring nuclear proliferation as a tool for national deterrence.

To assess whether these people overreact to security threats, I would ideally want to examine the differences in the perceived threat of North Korean nuclear development between individuals from war-torn and war-safe areas. But the exact question does not exist in the survey, so I conduct an analysis with alternative data that is useful, though imperfect, to suggest this mechanism. I use answers to the following survey question: *Do you think removing North Korea's nuclear threat should be the top priority of South Korea's North Korea policy?*[11] Respondents who agreed with this statement can be considered as perceiving North Korea's nuclear threats more seriously than others. The left panel of Figure 3 confirms Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The graph demonstrates that war generation exposed to severe wartime violence show greater concern for North Korea's nuclear threat than those who remained safe during the war, and the difference is not found in the post-war cohort.

Why would these people prefer nuclear weapons to enhance security since it is not the only policy option for improving national defense? For example, why would these people not favor external security guarantees? I argued that people with war exposure do not prefer to rely on foreign countries for security because they are skeptical that foreign powers will help their nation when it needs security assistance. Past war experiences may have led them to believe that all countries act only in their own interests, so their country should be self-reliant for its defense rather than relying on others. To assess this mechanism, an ideal question should ask whether each respondent would like to rely on military alliances to enhance national security. Again, due to the lack of such data, I analyze how much emphasis respondents put on cooperation with the

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[11]Other listed policy goals include (1) increasing inter-Korean cooperation and humanitarian support, (2) reforming/opening North Korea and promoting human rights, (3) preparing for the unification, and (4) signing a peace agreement.

Figure 2.3: (Left Panel) Marginal Effect of Wartime Violence on North Korean Nuclear Threat Perception. (Right Panel) Marginal Effect of Wartime Violence on Preferences for Cooperation with the United States.

United States, a major ally of the country. I use answers to the following survey question: *Do you think cooperation with the United States is more important than improving inter-Korean relations?* The right panel of Figure 3 suggests that people who lived in war-torn areas are less likely to prefer to rely on cooperation with the United States than those who lived in war-safe zones. This geographical variation is substantial in the pre-war cohort but not in the post-war cohort.

Next, I explained why people with childhood war experience perceive nuclear weapons as security-enhancing rather than security-diminishing. They overvalue nuclear weapons because they are hyperfocused on worst-case thinking of suffering from a catastrophic war in the future. They perceive that the risk of a major war is significant, thus they expect greater costs of not being nuclear-armed. Also, they focus on the defensive use of nuclear weapons because they better understand the tragic consequences of destructive weapons.

Former South Korean presidents provide exemplary cases of how these mechanisms shape indi-

vidual preferences for nuclear development. Among past presidents, Rho Moo-hyun (2003-2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) fit the definition of this paper's war generation.[12] Coming from opposite political parties, the two leaders pursued many contradictory foreign policies. However, both shared a positive stance on nuclearization, transcending their political partisanship. The case of Rho, coming from the liberal political party, is particularly surprising given that support for nuclear proliferation is more prevalent among conservative political elites. In his memoir, former South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon recalls that Roh seriously contemplated pursuing independent nuclear armament in 2006.[13] Rho believed that "nuclear weapons are a means of deterrence to protect the country from external threats."[14] Roh continuously emphasized self-reliance in national defense, and this tendency has been strengthened during his presidency. The experience of a failure of national protection that he suffered as a child influenced him to overreact to national security issues by emphasizing terms such as 'self-defense' and 'survival of the nation' after he became president.

It is also possible that exposure to violence might lead to preferences for aggressiveness. If so, these people's support for nuclear weapons may stem from their preferences for attacks. However, qualitative evidence suggests that it is more plausible to believe that exposure to violence causes individuals to have preferences for defense over offense. Another former South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, who lost family members at the age of 10 due to wartime violence, had expressed his "opposition to any military response to North Korea's upcoming provocations." He added, "the government's primary responsibility is to protect its own citizens" and "an offensive strategy would be counterproductive to achieving the objective."[15] This is also surprising given that conservative

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[12]President Roh was born in 1946 and experienced the war during the age of 4-7. President Lee, born in 1941, was attending elementary school when the war broke out, and he lost his older sister and youngest brother during the war.

[13]In his memoir [Moving the Glacier], Song writes, "after North Korea's first nuclear test, President Roh said that South Korea has no choice but to nullify the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula if we cannot stop the North Korean nuclear program." He also writes, "In early April 2006, as there is no improvement to resume the six-party talks, President Roh said that South Korea should raise its voice on cycling its own nuclear fuel." (Original texts are written in Korean and translated by the author.)

[14]During the speech at World Affairs Council (WAC) in Los Angeles (November 13, 2004). The original speech was given in Korean and translated by the author. `http://archives.knowhow.or.kr/m/record/all/view/86986` [accessed 26 January 2022]

[15]Interview with the Financial Times on March 29, 2009. At the time of the interview, North Korea had already threatened to test-fire long-range missiles on April 4. Full interview transcript can be accessed at `https://www.`

party leaders typically endorse offensive military strategies, such as preemptive strikes and military retaliation. In fact, his response was harshly criticized by conservative political figures,[16] and his successor from the same political party have expressed her support for the offensive use of military force.[17]

A review of the current literature also provides supportive evidence that exposure to violence is likely to cause individuals to prioritize defensive over offensive uses of destructive weapons. Scholars have shown that leaders with combat experience are less likely to initiate militarized disputes than others (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015), as direct exposure to violence leads to "intimate knowledge of the horrors of war" (Morris, 1960, 230). Some micro-level data also suggests that people who have been exposed to violence are more reluctant to use force (Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990; Feaver and Gelpi, 2005). The current scholarly consensus supports my mechanism that those who have experienced violence are not aggressive and have a preference for defense, whereas it contradicts the second alternative argument.

2.4.2 Potential Counterarguments

One possible counterargument is based on the fact that people could have moved in response to the expected war intensity. For example, people with a greater preference for strengthened security protections could have moved to a safer province in an attempt to avoid military violence during the war. However, this seems unlikely to be true as most scholars and historians agree that the breakout of the Korean War was unanticipated. The well-established fact that approximately half of the South Korean soldiers were on vacation the day North Korea invaded (because it was Sunday) suggests that even military officials did not expect war to break out when it did. Therefore, it is not plausible to assume that people could have predicted the war or even specific military conflict

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ft.com/content/b199dc66-1c43-11de-977c-00144feabdc0 [accessed 8 August 2022]

[16]Yonhap Television News. "Chairman Lee Hoi-chang said, 'President Lee's remarks about North Korean missiles were inappropriate' (March 31, 2009)." The original article is written in Korean and translated by the author. https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0101_200903311027470159 [accessed 9 August 2022]

[17]The Washington Post. "South Korea's president vows all-out push to punish North for provocations (February 16, 2016)." https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-koreas-park-vows-all-out-effort-to-punish-north-for-provocations/2016/02/15/f4c6aece-4d3f-4378-b9c0-eccef80c1966_story.html [accessed 9 August 2022]

zones and preemptively moved to safer regions based on this knowledge (Kim and Lee, 2014). Moreover, even if we allow for the possibility of pre-war civilian migration, it will attenuate the expected effects because people with higher preferences for security protection should have moved to safer areas. If this is true, people who lived in safe areas are more likely to support nuclear weapons acquisition, which makes it more difficult to find the paper's theoretical expectation.

It is also possible that citizens could have moved after an outbreak of the conflict when information about war intensity had been available. People with specific characteristics, for example, higher socioeconomic status or liberal ideology, could have migrated early in the war, and these factors can affect the preferences for nuclear proliferation. To address this concern, an empirical robustness check only including *non-movers*, whose current place of living and residence at the age of 15 remains the same, is considered.[18] In Appendix Table 2, the results are robust to the main analysis, which corroborates my findings. I also find that movers and non-movers show no significant difference in observable characteristics.

A secondary question is whether or not the geographical variation of war intensity is endogenous to the individual's preference for safety guarantees and the resulting nuclear weapons proclivity. In other words, some could argue that individuals who lived in the province with a higher war intensity during the Korean War might already have an existing proclivity for strong national security protection. As shown in Kim and Lee (2014), however, variations in war intensity seem exogenous to any factor related to individual preference because the war proceeded rapidly. After the war broke out on June 25, 1950, North Korea occupied nearly all of South Korea, except for a small portion of the southeastern part of South Korea, within the first two months. Moreover, the intensity of violence seems to have been haphazard across provinces because it was determined by the respective countries' battle strategies. For example, in September 1950, UN forces led by General McArthur decided to land directly in Incheon, the port city in the midwest of the Korean Peninsula, next to Seoul. Most North Korean soldiers were left behind in the middle eastern and southwestern parts of South Korea. Thus, civilian casualties remained higher in these provinces

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[18]By excluding *movers*, the sample size decreases from 2,254 to 1,233 individuals.

even when the major battlefield moved to Northern regions. As a result, provinces that experienced significant civilian casualties are dispersed across South Korea. Therefore, I believe that this potential concern regarding endogeneity is unlikely to be a factor.

Another concern might arise from my measure of exposure to wartime violence at the provincial level because it is limited in understanding whether an individual who lived in the region was really exposed to actual violence. While micro-level data on people's exposure to violence would be beneficial, robustness tests using continuous indicators of casualty rate and various definitions of *risk area* all indicate that war intensity variation at the province level is significant as well.[19] Further, it is hard to believe that people within the same province were exposed to systematically different levels of violence during the war.

One could also question why the effect of violence is not persistent. The literature on historical legacies of violence argues that political attitudes produced by exposure to violence are transmitted intergenerationally. For example, the effect of violence on general political attitudes, such as trust in the government, can be transmitted to future generations (Hong and Kang, 2017). However, support for nuclear weapons stems from fear engendered by first-hand exposure to violence, making the war generation show distinct preferences for nuclear proliferation compared to the post-war generation. To assess the intergenerational transmission mechanism, I run a robustness test with people's level of trust in the president. In Appendix Table 12, the results confirm that people who grew up in war-torn zones and war-safe areas show significantly different levels of trust in the president at the 90% confidence level in both war and post-war generations.

Those aware of the historical context of domestic politics in South Korea may be interested in the relationship between living in risky (or safe) regions during the war and political partisanship today. The regions that are defined as war-torn areas during the Korean War include the historically politically left-dominant region (Jeollanamdo), and war-safe areas include right-dominant regions (Gyeongsangbukdo and Gyeongsangnamdo).[20] Given this relationship, one can raise the question

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[19]In Appendix Table 5 and 6, I use 75th and 25th percentile casualty rates as new thresholds to define risk and safe areas.

[20]Among the entire sample of the survey, regression analysis confirms that living in Jeollanamdo during childhood is highly related to being politically left-leaning and supporting the Democratic Party. On the other hand, people who

of whether or not the relationship between the experience of wartime violence and nuclear prolifer-ation is driven by political ideology. However, the direction of the effect of partisanship on support for nuclear acquisition is the opposite of my theory, which makes it harder to find the relationship.

As previous South Korean public polls suggest, people who have a right-leaning political ide-ology are more supportive of nuclear weapons acquisition than left-leaning supporters on average. This means that people who lived in war-safe areas (right-dominant regions) during childhood are more likely to show a more intense aspiration for nuclear weapons, and those who lived in war-torn areas (left-dominant regions) are less likely to support nuclear proliferation, which is the opposite to my theoretical expectations. This geographical pattern of public preference for nuclear arma-ment is observed in all of the post-war generations, however, it is absent only in the pre-war cohort. Within the war generation, people who lived in risky areas during childhood are more supportive of nuclear weapons despite their left-leaning political ideology, while those who lived in war-safe areas are less supportive of nuclear weapons despite their right-leaning partisanship. Exposure to wartime violence made the war generation have the exact opposite preference for nuclear prolifera-tion compared to the younger generation of the same region. Thus, the impact of the experience of wartime violence on nuclear proliferation preferences would be more substantial, considering the counterfactual preference that people would have had if there had never been a war on the Korean Peninsula.

People can also raise a question about the effect of age on the relationship between war expo-sure and nuclear attitudes. As existing literature suggests, age could influence people's attitudes toward nuclear weapons for reasons other than exposure to wartime violence (Sagan and Valentino, 2017; Press, Sagan and Valentino, 2013). For example, older respondents might be more supportive of nuclear proliferation because they expect smaller economic impacts from international sanctions or because they are less informed about the costs. More complicatedly, age also interacts with po-litical ideology; older individuals tend to be more conservative, which could impact preferences for nuclear weapons. The regression analysis using the entire sample of the South Korean public

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lived in Gyeongsangbukdo and Gyeongsangnamdo during their childhood are more likely to be right-leaning and in support of the Conservative Party.

(Appendix Table 14) shows that age is a strong predictor of preferences for nuclear weapons. The positive coefficient confirms that older respondents are more supportive of nuclear proliferation on average.

Even though it is not possible to completely separate the effects of age and exposure to wartime violence, it is worth highlighting my empirical strategy of using the narrow bandwidth of ages: I compare people within the 10-year cohort born before and after the war. For example, the analysis rules out a comparison of 20-year-old respondents and 60-year-olds, minimizing concerns that my results are an artifact of differences associated with age. In addition, the analysis requires an interaction between age and geographic location. Thus, even if age predicts greater support for nuclear proliferation in general, it still will not be enough to explain the distinctive interaction I find with the geographical pattern of war violence intensity. In the placebo tests (Appendix Table 8 and 9) where I replicate the main analysis with the arbitrary age cohorts of ten years that are not based on the pre-war and post-war cohorts, I find that there is not the same geographic interaction for these random age groups. The non-relationship between geographic variation and random age cohorts enhances the plausibility of my findings about war and post-war generation.

2.4.3   Robustness Checks

I run several robustness tests to explore the sensitivity of the main analysis. First, I estimate the models with different year ranges to define the pre-war and post-war cohorts. First, I assume the pre-war cohort includes people who were born during the war. Since the war broke out in 1950 and ended in 1953, I define the pre-war cohort as people born between 1944-1953 and the post-war cohort as people born between 1954-1963. Second, I measure the pre-war cohort of people who were born between 1941-1953 and the post-war cohort of people who were born between 1954-1967. This is the broadest measure of the cohorts, which covers thirteen years for the pre-war and post-war generations. Third, I include people born during the war as the post-war generation. The pre-war cohort includes people born between 1941-1950 and the post-war cohort includes people born between 1951-1960. Coding people born in 1951-1953 as the post-war generation might be another useful robustness test considering the war intensity was at a peak in 1950, and most

of the South Korean casualties occurred in that single year. Lastly, I use the 8-year cohort born before and after the war: the pre-war cohort with people born between 1941-1948 and the post-war cohort with people born between 1953-1960. The results in Appendix Table 3 and 4 confirm that my findings are robust to various definitions of pre-war and post-war cohorts.

For the second robustness check, I use two other thresholds other than the national average casualty rate to operationalize RISK AREA. First, I generate RISKIER AREA for respondents whose childhood residences are above the 75th percentile casualty rate.[21] The theory expects that people who resided in the riskier areas will be more supportive of nuclear proliferation than others. The coefficient on the interaction term between RISKIER AREA and PRE-WAR should be positive and statistically significant. I also generate SAFE AREA for respondents who grew up in provinces below the 25th percentile casualty rate.[22] The theory expects that people who resided in safe areas and were exposed to the least severe wartime violence during the Korean War are less likely to support nuclear proliferation than others. I expect negative and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term between SAFE AREA and PRE-WAR. The results in Appendix Table 5 support the theory. As expected by the theory, the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level across all model specifications. This geographical variation, however, is muted within the post-war cohort.

I perform placebo tests by replacing the outcome variable with preferences for non-security policies. My theory predicts that exposure to wartime violence will only increase individuals' preferences for stronger national security protection but not for other policy issues, such as social or economic-related preferences. Thus, I replicated the analysis with individuals' preferences for cultural diversity and the unemployment problem. The null relationship between the wartime violence experience and non-security preferences would enhance the confidence in my finding. The coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant in all model specifications in Ap-

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[21]These provinces include Gangwondo (northeastern province of South Korea), Seoul (the capital), and Jeollanamdo (southwestern province) of South Korea.

[22]These provinces include Gyeongsangnamdo and Gyeongsangbukdo (southeastern provinces of South Korea), Jejudo (an island located south of the Korean Peninsula), and Chungcheongnamdo (a mid-west province in South Korea).

pendix Table 6 and 7. Overall, the evidence from the placebo tests is consistent with my theoretical expectation that childhood wartime violence experiences only shape individuals' preferences for security-related preferences but not for non-security policies.

Lastly, there could be a question of whether the estimates are disproportionately derived from populations residing in Seoul since 18.8% of the current population resides in the capital. If this is the case, the effects that I found cannot be distinguished from the effects of living in a city. However, around the time of the Korean War, the population ratio residing in the capital was not as high as today, which attenuates this concern. In my sample, only 12.2% of pre-war and post-war cohorts resided in Seoul before the age of 13. In Appendix Table 13, a robustness check excluding Seoul residents also shows that the results are similar to those of the main analysis.

2.5 Summary and Implications

This article introduces a theory of childhood experiences of wartime violence and aspirations for stronger national security in the form of nuclear weapons. People who experienced a higher level of wartime violence during childhood are more likely to support more extreme methods of security protection to ensure that external threats will not, once again, invade or control their country. The paper explores the effects of the Korean War experience on the South Korean public's nuclear proliferation preferences by comparing a pre-war cohort of ten years, citizens born in 1941-1950, with a post-war cohort of ten years, those born in 1954-1963. Within the pre-war cohort, people who lived in provinces with a greater level of violence show 5.6 percentage points higher support for nuclear proliferation than those who did not live in these risky and life-threatening regions. However, such a geographical difference is not found in the post-war cohort who did not experience the treatment of wartime violence. Empirical evidence confirms the theoretical expectation that people who experienced severe wartime violence demonstrate a stronger proclivity for nuclear weapons.

This study contributes to the literature on the legacies of political violence by suggesting that it shapes people's preferences for national security policy decades later. Scholars have shown that early exposure to wartime violence influences an individual's risk-taking preferences and domestic

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political attitudes. This research shows that wartime violence can make members of the general public support the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal in their later lives. They are more fearful of being exposed to additional wartime violence, but this tendency does not always lead to demilitarization. When confronted with significant external threats, they could demonstrate a greater demand for nuclear proliferation as a means of deterrence against foreign aggression and to keep their country safe.

While much of the political science scholarship has focused on the effects of violence experienced by military soldiers, this paper considers the impact of wartime violence on children. Armed conflicts affect people of all ranks and ages, but children are especially susceptible to their effects. In fact, there is a significantly greater number of children exposed to violence than soldiers. In 2019, two-thirds of the world's children were living in conflict-affected countries, and more than 400 million children were living within 50 kilometers of the actual fighting (Østby, Rustad and Tollefsen, 2020). However, the consequences of violence experienced by this vulnerable population have received less attention. The paper helps understand how early exposure to war affects an individual's preferences for national security after they survive such violence.

One area for future research is the generalizability of the paper's findings: whether the theory can be extended to other contexts. It is possible to suggest, here, two conditions which are necessary for the effects of experienced wartime violence to be able to influence the preference for nuclear weapons acquisition. First, the country would need to possess the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Even though the theory expects that early exposure to wartime violence has the potential to promote aspirations for stronger security shielding of the nation, if pursuing nuclear weapons is not a viable option due to a lack of technology, it would not be logical nor feasible for these experiences to lead to a higher preference for nuclear weapons. Second, the country would have to face an immediate and significant security threat from abroad. This would cause people who seek reliable security protection to demonstrate a preference for nuclear proliferation. These conditions offer guidelines for how and when the theory could be applied to other countries. For example, the theory would hold for several World War II countries, such as Poland

and Ukraine, that experienced enormous casualties. Some Asian countries, namely Vietnam and Taiwan, could also be good cases for analysis for the reason that these countries experienced destructive wars during the 1950s and 60s, and are currently facing international security uncertainty.

There might also be exceptions. Berger (2014) argues that exposure to wartime violence decreased support for nuclear proliferation in Japan and Germany. Japan might be a unique case in studying the effect of war experience on proliferation since it is the one and only victim of nuclear bombings in August 1945, which killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese people. This unique historical case might have caused a strong anti-nuclear sentiment prevalent in the Japanese public (Berger, 1998). Germany and Italy could be exceptional countries as well because they were defeated together with Japan in World War II.

This paper provides implications for proliferation. As more citizens are exposed to fatal conflicts in a country, it may result in an unintended increase in domestic demand for nuclear weapons. For example, as the young Ukrainian generation, which has witnessed the fatal invasion, grows up, domestic voices calling for nuclear armament may become stronger because they are likely to believe that it can prevent the same tragedy by deterring foreign aggression. Public preferences for proliferation matter in a democracy because the strong voice of the public gives political elites incentives to consider nuclear armament as a policy option (Sukin, 2019; Ko, 2019).

The study's results also help explain why some people in countries that have experienced destructive conflicts, such as Iran and North Korea, stick to nuclear weapons and believe their nuclear program is essential to regime survival. The research suggests that domestic variation in support for nuclear weapons is explained by one's prior exposure to wartime violence. People who lived close to major battlefields at a young age will desperately demand nuclear proliferation at home, while those who went through war without witnessing severe violence will be less inclined to demand nuclear weapons.

3. FEAR OR ANGER? LEADERS' CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA AND THE INITIATION OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES

3.1 Introduction

How does leaders' childhood exposure to wartime violence influence their conflict behavior later in office? Since Horowitz and Stam (2014), there have been numerous discussions in the international relations (IR) literature on the effects of leaders' exposure to wartime violence on the use of military force. Current scholarly consensus holds that leaders who have been exposed to combat as regular military personnel are less likely to initiate militarized disputes, whereas former rebels are more likely to do so than civilian leaders (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015; Horowitz et al., 2018). However, nearly all of them focused on the wartime violence experienced by uniformed military personnel, whether they were members of the national military or rebel groups.[1] We do not fully understand how leaders' non-uniformed wartime violence experiences affect their propensity to use military force. This paper focuses on one specific type of civilian violent experiences among leaders: *childhood* war experience.

Childhood war exposure may affect future militarized decisions of leaders by shaping their understanding of the consequences of fatal conflicts and their attitudes toward international adversaries. Wartime violence is particularly frightening for children because they are unprepared and defenseless during armed conflicts. The experience may also inflict an inflated level of anger against foreign enemies, as they will likely believe they are innocent victims. Moreover, childhood is an important period for the formation of personality and worldviews because particular parts of the adolescent brain mature during this time (Bauer et al., 2014; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014). Yet, due to the mixed nature of childhood war exposure, the direction of the effect of childhood war exposure on the use of military force remains unclear, and there are competing theoretical expectations.

One view suggests that leaders who experienced war as children are less likely to initiate mil-

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[1] One exception is Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155-157). In their book, the authors present a short section about leaders' childhood war trauma and conflict initiation, finding that the childhood experience of having lived through any war correlates positively with the propensity to initiate conflicts.

itarized conflicts (military conservatism hypothesis). In war, children lack the ability to defend themselves and are exposed to one-sided aggression. They have a greater appreciation for the costs and horrors of war and believe that it should never occur again. IR scholars have shown that leaders who have been directly exposed to battlefield violence are later more reluctant to use militarized force than those who have not (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). If the same rationale can be applied to children who have witnessed wartime violence, they will understand the disastrous realities of armed conflict and have "intimate knowledge of the atrocities of war," the driving force behind military conservatism (Morris, 1960; Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990).

The other perspective suggests the opposite effect: childhood exposure to wartime violence increases the propensity to initiate conflicts (militarism hypothesis). This view emphasizes the innocence of children during a conflict, which can leave a sense of victimization. Children were irrelevant to war decisions made at the national level. In addition, children have never voluntarily chosen to be exposed to violent conflict, while soldiers can expect to face violence as they enlist. They may be left with anger and revenge in mind (Gäbler and Maercker, 2011). They will have a firm belief in the evil nature of perpetrators and a desire for violent retribution, which could cause them to become militant once they take office (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015, 155).

To my understanding, no political science research has systematically explored the effects of leaders' childhood war exposure on their conflict behavior.[2] In this paper, I test my hypotheses using a research design that reduces barriers to inference in two ways. First, I seek to increase the homogeneity of my treatment and control groups. Specifically, I restrict my sample to leaders who share the national-level experience of foreign military invasion during childhood. I also include two-way fixed effects. Country-fixed effects allow me to compare only leaders within the same

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[2]One exception study is Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155-157). The authors find that the childhood experience of having lived through any war correlates positively with the propensity to initiate conflicts. However, the study's conclusions are drawn from comparisons between leaders of different generations (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015, 156). Leaders of a war generation who were exposed to wartime violence and those of a post-war generation who never witnessed such violence may differ in ways that are difficult to observe or measure. As such, the resulting pattern in the data would not reflect a causal relationship but could rather be the artifact of generational effects. More importantly, if these unmeasured differences affect decisions regarding the initiation of militarized disputes, the findings might be misleading.

country, controlling for time-invariant country-specific confounders. Year-fixed effects control for unobservable confounders that vary over time, such as annual shocks and fluctuations.[3] This approach is advantageous because it avoids comparisons between leaders from different generations or countries and keeps the sample as comparable as possible.

Second, I use a direct measure of exposure to wartime violence, including family deaths, family injuries, and displacement. Scholars have assumed that leaders who participated in armed conflict were equally affected by the violence of war. The current measurement, however, is limited in understanding the exact level of violence intensity experienced by each leader. Some may have witnessed the deaths of guardians and friends firsthand, while others may have remained relatively untouched throughout a war without losing loved ones. Using original micro-level data on leaders' war experiences as children, I compare those who were more severely affected by the conflict to those who were able to avoid personal traumatic events.

The results support the military conservatism hypothesis that leaders who experienced childhood war trauma are significantly less likely to initiate conflicts than those who did not experience such events. Specifically, childhood exposure to family deaths, family injuries, or displacement reduces the probability of conflict initiation by 10.6 percentage points. I also find that the effects are more substantial when domestic political constraints are weak. In non-democratic settings, childhood war trauma decreases the risk of conflict initiation by 17.0 percentage points, whereas in democracies, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Overall, my analysis presents new evidence that leaders with childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate conflict.

This paper contributes to the existing literature on leaders' violent experiences and their propensity to initiate conflict. Since Horowitz and Stam (2014), many IR studies have demonstrated that it is essential to know if a leader has been exposed to violence in order to predict his or her militarized decisions while in office (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015; Horowitz et al., 2018). However, the majority of research has focused on political elites' wartime

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[3]The use of two-way fixed effects may produce biased results if there is heterogeneity in the size of the treatment's effect (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Imai and Kim, 2021). Therefore, in the main analysis, I report the results of replacing year-fixed effects with dummy variables for four major eras in the history of world conflict: pre-World War I, interwar, post-World War II, and post-Cold War. The results are consistent with both model specifications.

experiences while they were affiliated with the national military or rebel groups, and no scholars have examined the effects of childhood war exposure.

I develop and test hypotheses regarding childhood war trauma and future militarized decisions of leaders. The research raises important theoretical implications because, unlike combat exposure, childhood war trauma can result in both fear and anger, making it more difficult to expect its effects on the future propensity to use military force. This issue is also of practical importance, as the number of children exposed to violent conflict has been rapidly increasing since 1990, and in 2020, more than 400 million children were living in conflict zones (Østby, Rustad and Tollefsen, 2020). Consequently, we are observing an upward trend in the number of leaders with childhood war exposure in power (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015, 156). However, we know less about the political effects of childhood wartime violence on future national security decisions of leaders. The only scholarly knowledge we have is from Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155-157), whose preliminary analysis found a positive correlation. With a more deliberate research design, I find negative effects, suggesting that childhood exposure to wartime violence makes leaders conservative about the use of force. My results also imply that leaders' adult experiences on the battlefields, such as combat and rebellion, may have less of an impact on those who have already witnessed wartime violence as children.

3.2 Childhood War Trauma and Conflict Initiation

Studies in IR have shown that military service and participation in armed conflict have a significant impact on a leader's propensity to initiate conflict. Leaders with prior military service may be inclined to be militaristic while in office because they have expertise in the use of violence and are socialized to view force as a potentially effective solution to political problems (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Former rebels are also prone to initiating militarized conflicts because their experience of rising to power through armed rebellion makes them risk-acceptant and have positive efficacy beliefs regarding the use of force (Horowitz et al., 2018). In contrast, direct combat exposure reverses the general effect of military service (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Firsthand exposure to atrocities on the battlefield makes leaders fear further exposure to wartime

violence, thereby increasing their risk sensitivity. They are more cautious and restrictive about the circumstances in which the use of force is appropriate. Taken together, existing research suggests that whether a leader was directly exposed to wartime violence is crucial for understanding their propensity to initiate conflict.

Despite the extensive literature on leaders' military experience and foreign policy orientations, we know less about the potential relationship between leaders' *childhood* war exposure and their preferences for national security policy. The political legacies of childhood exposure to violence have been studied by scholars outside of IR (see especially Walden and Zhukov, 2020). For instance, scholars have shown that childhood exposure to violence influences disloyalty to the perpetrator (Balcells, 2012; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), political ideology (Zeitzoff, 2014; Charnysh and Finkel, 2017), political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019), and institutional trust (Hong and Kang, 2017; Wang, 2021). However, their focus has remained on non-security outcomes, and we do not fully understand how childhood war exposure affects a leader's propensity to use military force.

In this paper, I examine the residual effects of leaders' childhood exposure to wartime violence on their national security policy preferences, specifically the initiation of interstate militarized disputes. In the remainder of this section, I first explain why childhood war exposure should factor into leaders' national security decisions. Then, I develop two competing arguments on how childhood exposure to war influences leaders' propensity to use force abroad, focusing on how it changes their worldviews through fear or anger. The section that follows explains when a leader's preference for conflict initiation is more likely to translate into actual policy outcomes. I expect that individual leaders' preferences will play a more significant role in policy decision-making in non-democratic regimes, while democratic leaders will be constrained by institutional checks. With these arguments, testable hypotheses are presented at the end of each section.

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3.2.1 Why a Leader's Childhood War Exposure?

How does leaders' exposure to war as children affect their conflict behavior? In this paper, I define war exposure as the experience of a foreign military invasion of one's home territory. Children's exposure to armed conflict on home soil influences their understanding of the power and consequences of militarized violence. The war was likely life-threatening for children, and they may have witnessed the devastation of their hometowns and the deaths of family members and companions. This will increase their ability to comprehend the costs and horrors of war. Additionally, it teaches them that the international system is anarchic in nature. Invasion by foreign militaries should make them realize that they cannot rely on any other nation for security and that they must be strong to defend themselves and survive in the world. This will make them emphasize planning and armaments as a means of promoting peace and stability.

Experiencing wartime violence at a young age can also shape a child's worldview through brain formation. Psychology literature suggests that childhood is a sensitive period in the human developmental life cycle because particular parts of the adolescent brain fully develop during this time (Bauer et al., 2014; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014). When a child is exposed to traumatic events, his or her brain size shrinks, and more neural connections are created in the parts of the brain related to fear, anxiety, and anger (De Bellis, 2001; Joshi and O'donnell, 2003). Wartime violence can be particularly traumatic when a child witnesses family members being killed, injured, or displaced, which are the most predictive events of severe trauma (Morgos, Worden and Gupta, 2008; Blattman, 2009). Overall, childhood exposure to wartime violence will have a lifelong effect on conflict behavior by shaping how seriously they perceive security threats, how much they value safety and security, and how they understand the nature of the world (Cardozo et al., 2003; Masten and Osofsky, 2010).

One may wonder if these children could alleviate the impact of trauma by building solid, supportive relationships. Although the flexible brain can reverse the damage, it is uncommon for children who have endured war trauma to undergo a significant shift in a safe living environment. Furthermore, people may re-experience the trauma later in life if they encounter triggers related to

previous trauma (Brewin, 2015). Especially when an individual experiences trauma at a young age, the memory is preserved in both the brain and the mind. These individuals may have no difficulties during times of peace, but similar security threats stemming from childhood trauma may trigger early memories of war. For example, people who suffered World War II atrocities as children are easily startled by the war in Ukraine, as it triggers their earlier traumatic memories from decades ago.[4]

Another question remains as to whether the childhood experience of wartime violence differs from combat exposure as a soldier. There are two differences between childhood exposure to wartime violence and combat exposure. First, children are in a more helpless position than soldiers during armed conflict. While soldiers are trained and equipped to fight against the enemy, children are incapable of self-defense and should rely on their guardians for survival. Children are consequently the victims of one-sided aggression in the vast majority of armed conflicts. They may be more frightened and experience a profound sense of helplessness due to their inability to protect themselves in violent situations. A survivor of an armed conflict recalls that "being a child in war is difficult because you learn to function in madness very quickly, and you are exposed to extreme levels of violence you have never even heard of."[5] Individuals who experience such traumatic events may fear that they will be exposed to additional wartime violence for the remainder of their lives.

Second, children have never voluntarily chosen to be exposed to such brutal violence, whereas soldiers who join the military are aware that they may encounter violent situations. The involuntary nature of the experience will lead survivors to believe that they are blameless and leave them with a sense of victimization. They may also firmly believe that the perpetrators, foreign militaries, are evil, resulting in inflated anger and revenge sentiment. As they grow up, they may be motivated by violent revenge and attempt to compensate for their trauma by using force against the offender.

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[4]CBS News, "'It's always in my mind': For World War II survivors, the war in Ukraine stirs painful childhood memories." https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-children-wwii-survivors-trauma/

[5]A long journey: The story of Ishmael Beah. https://www.unicef.org/stories/long-journey-story-of-ishmael-beah

These two distinctive aspects of childhood war exposure suggest that it may have both positive and negative effects on leaders' propensity to initiate conflict. In the below sections, I present two competing expectations primarily based on the psychological consequences of childhood war exposure, focusing on how it changes leaders' worldviews through an inflated fear or anger.

3.2.2 Military Conservatism

The first view argues that leaders with childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate conflict because they fear its consequences. Children's exposure to wartime violence is particularly frightening and leaves them with excessive fear because children are a vulnerable subset of the population. They are unprepared for combat and must have the protection of their guardians in order to survive. They are often exposed to one-sided aggression during war. In addition, children's exposure to wartime violence is likely to be shocking because it is the first time they have encountered such extreme violence. The frightening memory will remain in their brains and minds for the rest of their lives.

Psychology research shows that people exposed to violence early in life tend to be more watchful and "on alert" for possible dangers around them in order to avoid trauma reminders (Kisiel and Lyons, 2001). War-traumatized leaders will likely be hypervigilant about potential threats around the country. They will be easily startled by security threats that do not bother others and fear being exposed to additional wartime violence (Kim, 2023). They may emphasize armaments that can protect the country, but not the actual use of force (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015) because they wish to minimize the risks of their country being engaged in additional fatal conflicts.

Leaders with childhood war trauma will be hesitant to initiate military conflict even at a limited scale for fear of escalation into a high-level conflict. They have little confidence in the ability of countries to control escalation. Due to their childhood wartime memories, they believe that once a conflict begins, it can quickly spiral out of control. Even in seemingly minor conflict settings, they may be overly concerned that the country may be dragged into a war; therefore, they may pursue militarized options with greater caution in the first place (Kim and Lee, 2014; Byder, Agudelo and Castro, 2015; Bernile, Bhagwat and Rau, 2017).

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Leaders who experienced foreign aggression as children also have a deeper understanding of the costs and horrors of war, which is the driving force behind military conservatism (Morris, 1960; Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990). They believe that war cannot be the best solution to a problem because it is too catastrophic and will eventually make every side a loser. They better understand the tragic consequences of war than anybody else: the land will be in ruins, and innocent lives will be lost. They are aware that if military weapons are once again used on their soil, even if the war is ultimately won, it will be a wounded victory because of the tremendous human costs that need to be sacrificed.

Fear may also influence leaders' conflict behavior by influencing their risk-taking preferences. Even though there is mixed evidence on how exposure to violence affects risk preference, several experimental studies indicate that people who have been exposed to violence tend to be risk-averse in situations that remind them of past trauma and trigger fear (Jennings, Markus and Niemi, 2019; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). The initiation of militarized disputes is directly related to the trauma of leaders; as a result, these leaders will be more hesitant to use force to prevent situations that induce fear.

A former French president gives anecdotal evidence that exposure to war as a child heightens a leader's fear of wartime violence. Raymond Poincaré, who served as president during World War I, experienced the German military invasion at the age of 10. His hometown had been occupied for four years, and he encountered German soldiers in his daily life. In retrospect, his childhood memories intensified his fear of German military expansion. Poincaré viewed German military expansion as riskier than his predecessor and was preoccupied with the worst-case scenario of suffering through another catastrophic war with Germany (Keiger, 2008).

The first school of thought suggests that leaders who were exposed to severe foreign aggression early in life are more reluctant to initiate militarized disputes because they are fearful of the tragic consequences of violent conflict. The childhood lesson will increase a leader's ability to appreciate the costs and risks of conflict; consequently, they will be more cautious about initiating conflict.

Military Conservatism Hypothesis: Leaders with childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate militarized disputes.

3.2.3 Militarism

A contrasting perspective asserts that leaders with childhood war trauma are more likely to initiate conflict. There are several reasons why leaders who experienced war as children might be more aggressive in office rather than seeking peaceful alternatives. First, exposure to wartime violence at a young age increases anger and the desire for violent retribution. Unlike soldiers' combat experiences, wartime violence leaves children with a deep sense of victimization. Foreign militaries unilaterally harmed them because they were unable to defend themselves against violence. In addition, they have never selected to experience it, while combatants are expected to confront brutality when they enlist. The involuntary nature of childhood war exposure will make them feel intense anger in the future. They are likely to view themselves as innocent victims and the perpetrators as evil. They will have no doubt that their nation is in the right and that their adversary, who deserves punishment, is in the wrong.

For example, French children who endured invasion and occupation by Prussian armies during the Franco-German War of 1870 exhibited a general propensity for vengeance as they grew older. Their early experiences led to a "pathological desire for *revanche*" at the national level (Keiger, 2008; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015), resulting in support for a war against German military expansion during the First World War. Empirical evidence supports the idea that childhood exposure to wartime violence makes leaders aggressive in office. In the systematic analysis of global leaders, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155) find that leaders whose countries were at war at some point during their childhood are positively associated with conflict initiation.

Second, these leaders are likely to hold a deterrence-oriented worldview. Childhood invasion experiences have taught them the anarchic nature of the international system and the expansionist nature of their enemies. They believe that war is inevitable and that the most effective way to prevent further violence is by bolstering defense capability and deterrence. Instead of relying on diplomacy, they believe that countries should rely on self-help and always be militarily prepared

for foreign aggression in order to survive the anarchy.

These leaders will prefer to build a strong military arsenal and be willing to use force when necessary because would-be aggressors are only deterred when they believe that the country is capable and willing to use force. Conversely, these leaders believe that the country's weakness emboldens adversaries to pursue aggressive strategies to achieve their goals. War experience has taught them that a world in which their country is incapable and hesitant to use force would harm national security.

Former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir is a perfect example of how childhood exposure to violence strongly influenced her later commitment to using force to make Israel an eventually safe and secure state. During Meir's childhood, she and her family were forced to leave their home to escape Russian anti-Jewish pogroms. Meir recalled that her childhood experience of anti-Jewish violence had a significant impact on her later determination to build Israel as a safe and strong country. She viewed a willingness to use force and retaliate as the most effective way to prevent a more severe security crisis.[6] Meir's support for using force against Israel's adversaries in the region, such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, has stood out during her four years in office. During her administration, Israel initiated high-level disputes an average of twice per year, which is nearly double the national average since the country's creation.[7]

Lastly, studies outside of IR provide several potential mechanisms pointing in the direction of aggressiveness. Psychology literature suggests that childhood trauma itself can contribute to risky behaviors. Research shows that multiple childhood traumatic experiences increase the likelihood that a person will engage in risky behaviors, such as aggressive outbursts and picking fights (Dube et al., 2006). Additionally, leaders with childhood war trauma may initiate conflict to relieve their trauma. Trauma has the characteristic of trying to relieve one's wounds by transferring them to others (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1995). For example, a person who was exposed to personal

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[6]Encyclopedia of World Biography. "Golda Meir Biography." `https://www.notablebiographies.com/Ma-Mo/Meir-Golda.html` [accessed May 17, 2023]

[7]According to the MID dataset, Israel initiated 68 disputes in total between 1948 and 2010, averaging 1.08 disputes per year. From 1970 to 1973, when Meir was in office for the entire calendar year, Israel launched a total of eight MIDs, all of which involved the use of force or war.

violence as a child may develop a behavioral pattern that seeks to compensate for their trauma by committing violence against others as an adult. Similarly, leaders who were exposed to wartime violence by foreign militaries in childhood may display a tendency to use force against other states when in office, as a means of alleviating their trauma.

The second perspective suggests that childhood war trauma may contribute to the aggressiveness of leaders. Due to an inflated level of anger and a desire for retribution, leaders who experienced severe wartime violence as children are more likely to initiate militarized disputes during their tenure than those who did not.

Militarism Hypothesis: Leaders with childhood war trauma are more likely to initiate militarized disputes.

3.2.4 Political Constraints

IR research on leaders acknowledges that a leader's personal preferences do not always translate into actual policy outcomes (Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 2018; Fuhrmann, 2020). Until very recently, conventional IR scholars have focused on structural factors and neglected the role of individual leaders in explaining foreign policy decision-making. This view emphasizes that every leader operates within political constraints posed by the environment, either domestic or international (Jervis, 2013). Policy outcomes are, therefore, the product of intricate interactions between leaders, domestic factors, and structural factors.

The first important factor is domestic institutional constraints. Every political system has rules of operations, checks, and balances that make it difficult for leaders to enact policies exactly as they desire (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). The degree to which leaders are constrained by domestic political institutions, however, varies considerably across time and space. The primary factor that determines a leader's capacity to translate their preferences into actual policy outcomes is a country's regime type (Debs and Goemans, 2010; Jervis, 2013). For instance, in personalist regimes, where few bureaucratic restrictions exist on a leader's power, there is much room for policy choice and individual preferences. Under these circumstances, individual leaders may be better

equipped to execute their preferences without interference from domestic institutions, thereby exerting the greatest influence (Jones and Olken, 2005; Weeks, 2012). In contrast, in established democracies where there is a high degree of political constraint, the head of state cannot determine national policy on his or her own (Fuhrmann, 2020). The decisions of leaders are more likely to be governed by institutional incentives, other domestic actors such as the legislature, cabinet members, and public opinion, and the rules that regulate them. Therefore, even if a leader wishes to avoid or support the use of force abroad, he or she may end up in a position contradictory to their views.

In sum, the domestic political constraints argument suggests that the effect of leaders' childhood war trauma on the initiation of conflict will be more significant when the leader faces weaker political constraints at home. The relationship should be more uncertain in cases where there are higher political constraints on top executives. This provides the following two conditional hypotheses for both military conservatism and militarism arguments:

Military Conservatism-Domestic Political Constraints Hypothesis: Leaders with childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate militarized disputes when there are *fewer* domestic institutional constraints on leader decision-making.

Militarism-Domestic Political Constraints Hypothesis: Leaders with childhood war trauma are more likely to initiate militarized disputes when there are *fewer* domestic institutional constraints on leader decision-making.

Additionally, a leader is constrained by international structural-level variables. The most well-known argument comes from Waltz (1959), in which he emphasizes the anarchy of the international system as the primary ordering principle for every state. According to this perspective, all states (and leaders) do what they must, not what they want. The external security environment and the responsibilities to survive amid security threats will dictate how every leader behaves in office, offering little leeway for individual leaders' preferences. For example, changes in power distribution, such as the end of the Cold War, determine the foreign policy decisions of leaders rather than the views of the individual in office (Rock, 1989; Goertz and Diehl, 1995; Bennett, 1997; Jervis,

2013). This line of thinking would suggest that, regardless of domestic regime types, leaders' prior experience will not be significant in predicting their militarized decisions, as their decisions will be driven by international events and strategic considerations at the point of the decision. This yields the final hypothesis, which predicts that there is a null relationship between leaders' childhood war trauma and conflict initiation.

International Political Constraints Hypothesis: Leaders with childhood war trauma are neither more nor less likely to initiate militarized disputes.

3.3 Data and Research Design

3.3.1 Research Strategy

One way to empirically test the hypotheses would be to compare leaders with and without childhood war exposure (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). However, one of the potential threats to inference posed by this approach is that these groups of leaders are fundamentally different due to the non-random assignment of childhood war exposures. One of the important factors to consider is the generational effect: these two groups of leaders are likely to represent two different generations (e.g., war generations and post-war generations) (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Since these groups are likely to differ on both observable and unobservable dimensions, we cannot adjudicate whether any differences in policy outcomes are driven by war exposures or an artifact of differences associated with age. More importantly, any unobservable generational traits that are associated with national security preferences will bias the results.

To address this empirical concern, I focus on a subset of leaders who experienced military invasion by foreign powers at some point during their childhood. I investigate the variation within this subgroup using the different levels of wartime violence experienced by these leaders. In specific, I compare leaders who experienced either the death or injury of family members or who were displaced as a result of foreign aggression to those who experienced the invasion but were not exposed to traumatic events. This allows me to exclude leaders who were not eligible to experience wartime violence as a child and to maintain my treatment and control groups as similar as possible.

I collected an original dataset of cross-national leaders and their childhood war experiences between 1872 and 2010. I identified 249 individual leaders in 49 countries who experienced military invasions or occupations between the ages of 0 and 17. It provides 1,626 country-year observations of when these leaders are in power in a given year. [8] I use a monadic setup because my theory is interested in how these leaders initiate conflicts in general and does not specify the types of targets.

3.3.2 Variables and Measurement

3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Conflict Initiation

The outcome variable of interest is the initiation of militarized disputes. It is a binary variable, coded 1 if a leader's country initiated any level of militarized dispute in a given year t and 0 otherwise. The data is obtained from an updated version of the Correlates of War's (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset by Gibler, Miller and Little (2016). In my sample, 20.1% of total country-year observations are coded as initiating militarized disputes.

3.3.2.2 Explanatory Variable: Leader's Childhood War Trauma

The independent variable of interest is the leader's childhood war trauma. It is operationalized as whether the leader experienced at least one of the following events between ages 0 and 17: (1) the death of one or more family members due to foreign military violence; (2) the injury of one or more family members due to foreign military violence; and (3) the displacement due to foreign military violence. I collected an original dataset of leaders' micro-level war experience using information from biographies, obituaries, and online websites.[9] The variable CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA is measured on a dichotomous scale, with a value of 1 if a leader with at least one childhood war traumatic experience is in office in a given year t and 0 otherwise. In total, 25 leaders with childhood war trauma were identified, including 9 leaders whose family members had been killed, 5 leaders whose family members had been wounded, and 11 leaders who had been displaced, accounting for 14.1% of the total number of country-year observations.

It is worth highlighting that my operationalization of leaders' childhood war experience differs

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[8]Some country-year observations were excluded from the analysis because of data unavailability.
[9]The online Appendix provides details regarding each leader's childhood war trauma.

from the prior study. In Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, 155-157), leaders whose countries were involved in any war throughout their adolescence were measured as having had childhood war exposure. By this rule, leaders' childhood wars and actual battles need not have occurred in their own country. It is possible that the leader's country was involved in violent events on foreign soil. The majority of former U.S. presidents, for instance, were coded as having had childhood war exposure due to U.S. involvement in wars that happened outside the continental United States.[10] However, these conflicts should not have been traumatic for their childhood memories, given they were not exposed to actual risks of violence. Since my theory focuses on firsthand exposure to atrocities and the resulting psychological effects, I measure a leader's childhood war trauma using a direct measure of exposure to violence, which excludes all of the former U.S. presidents.

3.3.2.3 *Moderating Variable: Domestic Political Constraints*

I have two conditional hypotheses that domestic political constraints shape the degree to which a leader's childhood war trauma affects conflict initiation. I operationalize this variable using Polity V scores as a continuous variable. I obtained the data from the Polity V dataset and included raw polity scores measured on the 21-point composite indicator, ranging from -10 to +10 (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2002). In my sample, 38.7% of total observations are established democracies of polity score greater than 5, and 44.8% of total observations are consolidated autocracies of polity score lower than -5.[11]

For robustness assessment, I conduct a replication of the analysis using political constraint data from Henisz (2002), providing a more direct measurement of the level of executive power constraints. This measure incorporates various factors such as the number of independent branches of government with veto power and the degree of party alignment between the executive and legislative branches. The political constraint scores theoretically range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of constraint on executives and thus reduced feasibility of policy change

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[10]More detailed examples include Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, who were both born in 1946. They are coded as having had childhood war exposures because the U.S. was engaged in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.

[11]In my sample, the variable's mean value is -0.055 and its standard deviation of 7.8.

(Henisz, 2002).[12] The findings in Table 13 and Figure 8 of the appendix provide additional support for the consistency of the main results.

3.3.2.4 *Control Variables*

To reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I control for a number of confounding factors related to leaders' childhood exposure to wartime violence and their conflict behavior decisions. First, I control for the country's national capability using the Correlates of War (COW) Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). The more material resources there are, the greater the potential for conflict initiation and the greater the likelihood that a leader has experienced foreign aggression in the past. Second, I control the regime type of each country using the polity score. Democracies are less likely to initiate conflicts against each other because of institutional and normative constraints (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001). This will affect both the chances of childhood war exposure and conflict behavior. Third, I control the country's conflict history by including whether the country was targeted in a militarized dispute in the past five years. Recent conflict history is likely to correlate with the probability of a country's engagement in conflicts in the past and future.(Bell and Miller, 2015; Lee et al., 2023). Fourth, the existence of military alliances with major powers may heighten the likelihood of initiating militarized disputes, while potentially reducing the likelihood of childhood war exposure. To capture this dynamic, I introduce a binary variable indicating whether a country has a defense pact with a major power, as determined by Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds et al., 2002) and the COW list of major powers (Correlates of War Project, 2017). Additionally, a country's international status based on diplomatic interactions is an important confounding variable because dissatisfied states are more likely to initiate conflicts. At the same time, prior invasions may have impacted the country's current status. Therefore, I control each country's international status using data from Renshon (2016) by including a 5-year lag for the status variable.

I include a set of leader-level demographic characteristics that are known to affect their conflict

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[12]In my sample, the variable ranges from 0 to +0.73, with a mean of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.21.

initiation decisions. First, I include a continuous variable that captures a leader's age in the given year. Age is directly related to a leader's experience with military invasions. Furthermore, age is regarded as an important predictor of the likelihood of a militarized interstate conflict (Horowitz, McDermott and Stam, 2005; Potter, 2007; Bak and Palmer, 2010). Second, I include a binary variable for a leader's gender because previous research shows that female executives increase both conflict initiation and defense spending (Koch and Fulton, 2011). Third, scholars have shown that leaders with military backgrounds but no actual combat exposure tend to be more aggressive than their civilian counterparts, whereas leaders with direct battlefield experience are more reluctant to use force abroad (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Therefore, I include three binary variables that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: leaders who served in the military and were exposed to combat, leaders who served in the military but were not exposed to combat, and leaders with no military experience. Lastly, I control for former rebels because they are more likely to initiate militarized disputes (Horowitz et al., 2018). Childhood war trauma may also influence a leader's desire to participate in future rebellions.

I control for the temporal dynamics of conflicts by including the number of peaceful years that have passed since the country has been in conflict, along with its squared and cube terms (Carter and Signorino, 2010). In models in which I exclude year-fixed effects, I account for major eras in the history of world conflict, as countries may have different national security strategies at different times. I include binary variables that represent the pre-World War I era, the inter-war era, the post-World War II era, and the post-Cold War era.

3.3.3 Estimation

To test my unconditional hypotheses, the Military Conservatism Hypothesis, the Militarism Hypothesis, and the International Political Constraints Hypothesis, I construct the following equation:

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Childhood War Trauma}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{ijt}} + \upsilon_j + \tau_t + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

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where *ijt* indicates a leader i of country j in year t. Y_{ijt} represents whether state j initiated militarized disputes in year t. Childhood War Trauma$_i$ is a dummy variable representing whether a leader in power experienced childhood war trauma. I also include a list of time-variant country-specific and leader-specific characteristics (X'_{ijt}) that might confound the relationship between a leader's childhood war experiences and conflict initiation. Finally, I include country-fixed effects, υ_j, to account for unobservable time-invariant dyadic specific confounders, and year-fixed effects, τ_t, to account for yearly fluctuation not explained by explanatory variables.

The Military Conservatism Hypothesis will be supported by a negative and statistically significant β_1: militarized conflicts are less likely to be initiated when a leader with a childhood war trauma is in power, while a positive and statistically significant β_1 will support the Militarism Hypothesis. The null findings will support the International Political Constraints Hypothesis, confirming that the views and preferences of individual leaders do not matter in actual policy decisions.

In order to test two conditional hypotheses regarding domestic political constraints, I include an interaction term between the primary explanatory variable and the moderating variable, as well as its constituent terms.

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Childhood War Trauma}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polity}_{jt}$$
$$+ \beta_3 \text{Childhood War Trauma}_i \times \text{Polity}_{jt} + \boldsymbol{\beta} X'_{ijt} + \upsilon_j + \tau_t + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

All variables remain the same as in the earlier equation except for the addition of the interaction term between the explanatory variable and Polity$_{jt}$, which captures country j's Polity V score in year t. I expect the negative effects of childhood war trauma will be stronger in countries with lower polity scores because leaders face fewer domestic institutional obstacles. In contrast, I expect a greater level of uncertainty as the country's polity score increases because leaders will be less capable of translating their preferences into actual policy outcomes. Thus, I expect β_3 to be statistically significant. Marginal effect graphs will be provided to determine which specific conditional hypothesis is supported.

3.4 Findings

Table 1 presents the results of the logit regression analysis of leaders' childhood war trauma and conflict initiation. In Models 1 and 2, I test unconditional hypotheses about whether leaders with childhood war trauma initiate fewer or more conflicts on average. Models 3 and 4 test conditional hypotheses by examining the interaction between the explanatory variable and Polity scores. In Models 2 and 4, I include two-way fixed effects, while in Models 1 and 3, I replace year-fixed effects with four separate period dummy variables.

The findings support the Military Conservatism Hypothesis. First, in Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA is negative and statistically significant, confirming Hypothesis 1a. In terms of the substantive size of the effect, a leader's exposure to childhood war trauma decreases the likelihood of conflict initiation in a given year by about 12.9 percentage points - from 27.2 percent to 14.3 percent, based on Model 2. The results imply that leaders who have lost family members or been displaced are, on average, less inclined to initiate militarized disputes than those without such experiences.

The results in Models 3 and 4 are consistent with the Military Conservatism-Domestic Constraints Hypothesis. The coefficients on the interaction terms are consistently positive and statistically significant, as predicted by the theory. To better interpret the coefficient table of interaction models, I plot the marginal effects of the primary explanatory variable across political regime types. The left panel, which visualizes Model 3, suggests that the negative effect of leaders' childhood war trauma on conflict initiation is statistically significant and negative when countries have fewer institutional constraints on executives. For example, in a highly consolidated dictatorship with a polity score of -10, a leader's childhood war trauma reduces the probability of conflict initiation by 16.2 percentage points (95 percent interval: -0.210, -0.114). The negative effect remains statistically significant until the country's Polity scores are below 2. In contrast, in an established democracy with a polity score of $+10$, the effect is not statistically significant (p-value: 0.303). The null effect in highly democratized nations corroborates my hypothesis that domestic institutional restrictions will condition the effects of leaders on actual policy results.

Table 3.1: Regression Analysis of Leaders' Childhood War Trauma and Conflict Initiation

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.200**	-1.183*	-0.742**	-0.490
	(0.373)	(0.562)	(0.278)	(0.392)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V			0.132***	0.197***
			(0.0319)	(0.0423)
POLITY V	0.0586+	0.0659	0.0503	0.0551
	(0.0308)	(0.0454)	(0.0316)	(0.0455)
AGE	0.00723	0.0159	0.0105	0.0242*
	(0.0103)	(0.0114)	(0.0104)	(0.0116)
MALE	-0.755	-0.853	-0.0432	-0.107
	(1.115)	(1.296)	(0.735)	(0.900)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.310	-0.536	-0.215	-0.362
	(0.691)	(0.793)	(0.691)	(0.792)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.354	0.388	0.489*	0.594+
	(0.224)	(0.353)	(0.215)	(0.311)
REBEL	0.562*	0.430	0.513*	0.330
	(0.271)	(0.419)	(0.241)	(0.379)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.651+	1.280*	0.710+	1.459**
	(0.388)	(0.516)	(0.375)	(0.481)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0199	-0.0275	-0.0218	-0.0292
	(0.0328)	(0.0368)	(0.0313)	(0.0374)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.525+	-0.558	-0.558+	-0.628+
	(0.318)	(0.350)	(0.302)	(0.382)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	0.00411	-0.00753	0.0277	-0.00635
	(0.188)	(0.202)	(0.188)	(0.202)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.251*		-1.275*	
	(0.555)		(0.571)	
INTERWAR	-0.856+		-0.824+	
	(0.495)		(0.500)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.445**		-1.418**	
	(0.444)		(0.437)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.170		0.0511	
	(0.310)		(0.278)	
CONSTANT	4.328	6.254	3.838	5.801
	(3.346)	(4.396)	(3.112)	(3.920)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1241	1088	1241	1088
Log Lik.	-532.7	-440.1	-528.5	-432.6

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Figure 3.1: (Left Panel) Marginal Effect of Leaders' Childhood War Trauma on Conflict Initiation across Polity Score (continuous). (Right Panel) Marginal Effect of Leaders' Childhood War Trauma on Conflict Initiation across regime type (dichotomous).

In the right panel of Figure 1, I replicate Model 3 by substituting the continuous variable of Polity scores with a dichotomous variable of democracy, which is measured by 6 or greater Polity scores. The graph demonstrates that in non-democracies, leaders who experienced childhood war trauma are 19.5 percentage points less likely to initiate conflict than those who did not, holding all other factors constant. The effect can be as great as 24.1 percentage points or as minor as 14.9 percentage points, based on the 95 percent confidence range. When a leader who experienced invasion without childhood war trauma is in power in non-democracies, the predicted probability of initiating military disputes is 31.9 percent. This chance drops to 12.4 percent if the same leader experienced childhood war trauma. In democracies, however, the difference in conflict propensity between leaders who experienced childhood war trauma and those who did not is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value: 0.305). Overall, both panels support the Military Conservatism-Domestic Constraints Hypothesis.

Several control variable findings merit further investigation. First of all, NATIONAL CAPABIL-ITY is consistently positive and statistically significant across all models at the 90% confidence level. The results show that powerful states should have more opportunities and resources to initiate conflicts. Also, ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER is significant at the 90% confidence level and negative except for Model 2, indicating that countries are less likely to initiate conflict when they have alliances with great powers. In Models 1 and 3, REBEL achieved statistical significance with a positive direction at the 95% confidence level. The results are consistent with a previous study's finding that former rebels are more inclined to initiate militarized disputes than others (Horowitz et al., 2018).

Other control variables, including the leader's military and combat experiences, conflict history, and international status, failed to achieve statistical significance. This is due, in part, to the small sample size, which decreases the power of the model. The study's distinct sample may also be a factor. I intentionally restricted my sample to include only countries that faced foreign military invasions in order to keep my groups as comparable as possible. The results show that some confounding variables may not be as significant as previously believed in this subset of countries that have suffered a military invasion.

For example, earlier research using a global sample of countries indicated that leaders with a military background but no combat experience are more likely to initiate conflicts, whereas those with actual combat experience are less likely to do so (Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). In my model, however, the majority of the coefficients on military service and combat exposure variables are statistically insignificant, and their directions contradict what is predicted by the literature. The results suggest that in countries that have recently gone through destructive wars, leaders' childhood exposure to wartime violence may be more influential on their conflict behavior than their later military and combat experiences.

3.4.1 Robustness Checks

I conducted multiple robustness tests to address the limitations of the main analysis. First, I modified my dependent variable in two ways so that it only included high-level and low-level mil-

itary conflict, respectively. In Appendix Table 1, I reestimated by only including severe conflicts: wars, uses of force, and displays of force. Leaders with childhood war trauma fear additional wartime violence, so they are reluctant to initiate high-level conflicts. The results are statistically stronger, as indicated by the smaller p-values, but the marginal effects are similar. In Appendix Table 2, I only consider low-level military conflicts by excluding the use of force. I claimed that these leaders are less likely to initiate even small-scale disputes for fear of escalation because childhood war trauma diminishes their confidence in countries' ability to manage escalation. The results indicate that leaders who experienced war trauma as children are significantly less inclined to initiate even minor conflicts, but the difference between democracies and non-democracies is not substantial.

One may also question if any leaders who have experienced the death of a family member, regardless of the cause, are less prone to initiate conflict. My theory predicts that only childhood trauma resulting from wartime violence would influence the national security decisions of leaders, not personal or domestic trauma. I replicated the main analysis by including FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR, which represents whether a leader lost family members during childhood due to circumstances other than wartime violence. This category includes illness and accidents. According to Appendix Table 3, FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR is not a significant predictor of conflict initiation in any model specifications. The null relationship between non-war-related traumatic experiences and conflict initiation enhances my confidence in previous findings.

I conducted several sensitivity analyses. One issue with my main analysis is the limited number of treated leaders. This may increase the concern that my results are sample-dependent. Thus, I replicated the analysis using multiple subsamples to determine whether the results are consistent. First, I shifted my geographical focus. The majority of the sample comes from European leaders who experienced World Wars I and II as children. To determine whether the findings are not specific to the European continent, I ran a robustness test by excluding European countries. I also modified the analysis's temporal scope to only include the post-World War I and post-World War II eras. The results of the main and interaction models are consistent across all subsamples, as shown

by Appendix Tables 4 and 5.

The heterogeneity of my treatment may also be questioned, as it comprises three categories: family deaths, family injuries, and displacement from war. To address this concern, I first conducted a robustness test, taking into account only leaders who had lost family members to foreign violence. This reduces the number of cases to 13 leaders with 125 country-year observations, which takes up 7.8 percent of the total sample size. This alternate measure of the independent variable provides identical results in Appendix Table 6. I also reestimated the model, this time considering only displaced cases. Twelve leaders were displaced during childhood, producing only 61 observations, or 3.7 percent of the sample. In Appendix Table 7, the results are consistent only in two-way fixed effects models.

I reestimated the main model using alternative identification strategies. Following Imai, Kim and Wang (2021), I used the matching method for time-series cross-sectional data to increase the similarity between the treatment and control groups. This method guarantees that each treated observation is matched with a set of control observations that share the same treatment history for a maximum of two years while maintaining a covariate balance. Second, I estimated using a conditional fixed-effects logistic model, which drops countries or years with no variation in the dependent variable from the analysis. Third, I used a linear probability model to include observations with no variations, leading to a larger sample. Fourth, I changed the outcome variable from a binary measure to a count measure of the total number of conflict initiations and estimated it as a Poisson regression model. The results in the appendix (Figures 3 and 4, and Tables 8, 9, and 10) largely confirm the robustness of the main findings.

Lastly, I removed the sample restriction and expanded the sample to include all leaders. My main analysis focuses only on leaders who experienced military invasion as children and analyzes within-group variation to keep my control and treatment groups as similar as possible. This is a hard test of the theory, but some may question if expanding the analysis to include all leader cases who have not experienced war results in different conclusions. The findings in Appendix Table 11 are broadly similar to those in the main analysis. The negative and statistically significant (p

< 0.05) coefficients on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA indicate that leaders who have experienced childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate conflict than other leaders, confirming the military conservatism hypothesis.

One might also ask if the size of the effects of exposure to wartime violence is proportional to the severity of the violence experienced. In Appendix Table 12, I include three mutually exclusive dummy variables representing (1) leaders who have experienced invasion and trauma, (2) leaders who have experienced invasion but not trauma, and (3) leaders who have not experienced invasion. The first group of leaders might be the most conservative, the second group moderately conservative, and the third group the least conservative. I can omit one group from the analysis as a baseline category and interpret the coefficients on the remaining variables in terms of the effects relative to the baseline. In Models 1 and 2, the baseline is the second group; in Models 3 and 4, the baseline is the third group. The coefficient on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA is negative and significant across all models, indicating that the first group is most conservative about using force. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficient on CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA is negative but statistically insignificant (p-values: 0.294 and 0.493), and we cannot confirm whether an invasion experience without personal trauma increases military conservatism.

3.5 Summary and Implications

This paper examines whether leaders' conflict initiation decisions are shaped by their childhood exposure to wartime violence. While much research explains leaders' foreign policy behaviors using their military and combat experiences, I focus on their childhood exposure to war. I test the theoretical expectations by analyzing cross-national leaders who experienced foreign invasion or occupation during childhood. I find supportive evidence that leaders who lost family members or were displaced due to wartime violence during childhood are less likely to initiate militarized disputes than those who went through childhood war without such traumatic experiences. The results also indicate that the effects of childhood war trauma are more substantial when domestic political constraints are weak.

The paper contributes to the growing body of research on leaders' childhood experiences and

foreign policy decision-making. While many political scientists have investigated the historical legacies of childhood wartime violence, its effects on national security and foreign policy have received little attention: how does childhood wartime exposure influence a leader's foreign policy decisions after surviving such violence? Recent studies have shown the long-term impacts of childhood experiences on foreign policy preferences (Kim, Han and Han, 2022; Kim, 2023). My study adds to this new wave of research by demonstrating that leaders' early life experiences shape their worldviews and foreign policy decisions.

In addition, the paper contributes to the research on leaders' violent experiences and national security policy. Research in IR has demonstrated that leaders' exposure to violence influences their behavior in various areas of international security, including conflict initiation, nuclear proliferation, the development of weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of peace agreements (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015; Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015; Horowitz et al., 2018). Despite this, the theoretical focus of IR scholars remained on leaders' violent experiences in uniform, whether as members of the national regular military or rebel groups. My study shows that for leaders who witnessed battlefield atrocities at a young age, understanding their childhood exposure to wartime violence is more important than their later combat or rebel experiences. This early encounter is especially traumatic since it was their first exposure to extreme levels of violence. Also, their childhood experience may have inspired them to participate in future militaristic actions. My research suggests that these leaders will be preoccupied with avoiding additional wartime violence and will be reluctant to use force in office.

This paper provides important implications for countries whose leaders were exposed to war as children. To understand these leaders' national security policies, it will be more important to comprehend how the war affected their childhoods than their previous military experiences. Since 1950, the number of global leaders with childhood war exposure has been on the rise (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Furthermore, countries that have recently been invaded by foreign military forces, such as Ukraine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, are more likely to generate future leaders with childhood war trauma. In Russia's war in Ukraine, for instance, almost 10 percent of civilian

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casualties are children.[13] If we include unreported cases as well as those who have been displaced, these numbers will be considerably higher. If a politician from the war generation who lost family members or was displaced at a young age due to wartime violence becomes a decision-maker, the country will be less likely to engage in violent conflict under low levels of domestic political constraints.

This paper raises three avenues for future research. First, one can further examine the effects of childhood war trauma on other national security policy decisions. Although the focus of this paper was on the initiation of militarized conflicts, it may have implications for other facets of national security. One possibility is a preference for military armament. Both fear and anger mechanisms in the paper suggest that these leaders will likely prefer to build a strong national military, either to protect the nation from further invasion or to attack foreign enemies. They may be inclined to invest more resources in military expansion. Second, scholars can investigate the impact of civil war trauma on militarized decision-making. Theoretically, I expect that childhood trauma from civil war will affect militarized decisions against intrastate armed groups but not necessarily foreign powers. Lastly, scholars can examine the difference between war trauma experienced at various stages of life. For example, one can compare the effects of war trauma on infants, preschoolers, teenagers, and even young adults. The results will help us understand which stages of life are most sensitive to the effects of war trauma.

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[13]The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Ukraine: civilian casualty update 13 February 2023." https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/02/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-13-february-2023 [accessed February 21, 2023]

4. STATE REPRESSION EXPERIENCE AND ELITE SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RIGHTS

4.1 Introduction

Do politicians who previously experienced state repression become more critical of political rights violations in foreign countries? Scholars in international relations (IR) have shown that country-level variables such as regime type, material capability, and adversarial relationship with a violator shape a nation's propensity to criticize foreign human rights violations. However, much research has treated a criticizing country as a unitary actor, and we know less about why some individuals within the same country are more critical of human rights violations abroad than others. Understanding individual-level variation is especially important in legislative decisions to enact a resolution condemning foreign violators because individual legislators' vote choices will influence the possibility of passage. This research examines how legislators' prior exposure to state repression influences their propensity to criticize political rights violations abroad in the future.

State repression is often employed in authoritarian regimes to penalize disloyal citizens, demobilize anti-regime movements, and ultimately maintain regime stability. Methods of violent repression include physical persecution (Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Wang, 2021), hunger (Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019), forcible displacement (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017), and even massacre (Yehuda et al., 1995, 2008; Charnysh and Finkel, 2017; Wayne and Zhukov, 2022). These acts of violence are typically one-sided, resulting in severe trauma for the survivors. Therefore, state repression has both short- and long-term effects on victims and their descendants, shaping their physical and mental health, social identity, and economic development (Scholte et al., 2004; Young, 2019).

Political scientists have shown that prior state repression experience influences an individual's attitudes toward in-groups and perpetrators (Hayes and McAllister, 2001; Beber, Roessler and Scacco, 2014; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). Little is known about how this affects people's attitudes

toward *foreign* victims of human rights violations who are unrelated to their previous trauma. Do survivors of state repression become more critical of international human rights violations? This paper specifically focuses on the decision-making of legislators and explores whether those who have previously experienced state repression are more likely to support the adoption of a resolution criticizing foreign political rights violations in Congress.

I argue that legislators who have experienced state repression are more likely to condemn foreign violations of political rights. This type of violent experience tends to make individuals more determined to ensure that the same violation is never repeated (Wayne and Zhukov, 2022). They feel solidarity and sympathy for foreign victims of human rights violations because they have a greater understanding of the hardships and suffering caused by such brutality. In addition, these politicians actively criticize foreign violators for domestic political reasons. They have likely constructed their political identities as defenders of democratic norms, so voters expect them to be ardent advocates for human rights. Promoting universal human rights will increase their domestic popularity and, consequently, their chances of reelection. Therefore, when a human rights violation occurs in a foreign country, these legislators are more likely to publicly condemn the perpetrator in order to distinguish themselves as politicians.

A difficult aspect of statistically analyzing the effects of state repression is that politicians with and without violent experience are typically fundamentally different in unobservable ways. For instance, they are likely to be from distinct generations, as only those who have lived under authoritarian regimes prior to democratization are eligible to experience state repression. Additionally, those with preexisting democratic preferences may influence both state repression and support for human rights protection. Therefore, any comparison between legislators with and without experience of state repression will be driven by generational and selection effects.

To address this issue, I analyze South Korean politicians of the same generation who selected into democratic movements and experienced some degree of state repression during the last decade of the country's military dictatorship, from 1980 to 1987. During this period, the majority of

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posters were in their 10s and 20s, and state violence against these protesters was indiscriminate.[1] Almost all young protesters were equally susceptible to state repression during the democratization. As a result, the majority of victims were ordinary protesters, who were arbitrarily sacrificed by the military's indiscriminate use of force.[2] Variation in demonstrators' exposure to state violence that appears to be haphazard reduces concern for selection effects. In specific, I compare those who experienced severe physical repressions, such as injuries, torture, and imprisonment, with those who remained relatively safe. The theory predicts that legislators exposed to more severe state violence will demonstrate a greater propensity to promote human rights at the global level than those not exposed to such violence.

The results suggest that a history of severe state repression is associated with a greater propensity to criticize internationally on political human rights issues. Among ex-protesters, those who experienced more severe forms of physical repression, such as injuries, torture, and imprisonment, are 14.0 percentage points more likely to vote for resolutions condemning foreign violations of human rights than those who did not. I also offer an explanation of potential mechanisms based on in-depth interviews. According to qualitative evidence, politicians who have experienced severe state repression believe that human rights violations should never again occur anywhere in the world. They feel a moral obligation to stand in solidarity with people suffering from human rights abuses. In addition, their prior experiences with state repression constitute a central aspect of their political identity. They emphasize their past resistance to authoritarian governments and their ability to promote universal human rights as their relative advantages as politicians, providing domestic political incentives to advocate for human rights issues.

This study makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, scholars have demonstrated that both state-level factors and strategic considerations play a role in condemning foreign human rights violations (Brysk, 2009; Terman and Voeten, 2018), but we know less about why certain

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[1]The May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission's Biannual Investigation Report says in multiple times that "Military forces carried out indiscriminate shooting, beatings, and arrests regardless of whether or not they were actively involved in the protests."

[2]According to the most recent investigation report, most in-depth interviews of survivors and martial law forces reveal that "the vast majority of victims of state repression during the period were ordinary people regardless of whether they participated in protests."

individuals are more supportive of promoting human rights at the global level. My findings provide evidence that individuals' past experience of state repression makes them strong advocates of universal human rights norms in the future. Second, my study contributes to our understanding of the political consequences of state repression. Previous studies have shown that exposure to state violence has both short- and long-term impacts on people's various political preferences, such as voting, political ideology, participation in rebellion, and institutional trust (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019; LeBas and Young, 2022). My evidence suggests that people who were previously targeted by state repression become more supportive of promoting human rights situations for people who share similar experiences, even if they are in foreign countries and not directly related.

4.2   Exposure to State Repression and International Political Rights

State repression has been a central topic for decades among political scientists, and there have been numerous attempts to conceptualize it. Davenport (2007, 2) defines state repression as the "actual use of physical sanctions against an individual, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government institutions." Specific examples of government repressive behavior include political surveillance, violations of economic and social rights (e.g., suspension from an organization and illegal home detention), and violations of personal security and integrity.

Conventionally, scholars have focused on how state repression affects other socio-political phenomena at the aggregate level. For example, state repression is found to affect mass attitudes toward the national government and the participation rate in rebellion (Gibson, 2006; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Recent scholarly works have begun to pay attention to how repressive behavior influences individual citizens' political behavior. Scholars have shown that state repression experience shapes an individual's policy preferences on a range of domestic political issues, including political participation and ideology, participation in protests, opposition to the perpetrators, and trust in the national government (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017;

Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019; Young, 2019; Wang, 2021; LeBas and Young, 2022). These studies have focused on cases that are still authoritarian today, including the Soviet Union, China and Zimbabwe. For example, people who lived in regions that were severely affected by Soviet repression in the 1930s and 1940s are more opposed to the perpetrator government, both short- and long-term (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019). Wang (2021) examines the consequences of the Chinese government's violence during the Cultural Revolution and finds that people in the localities of state-sponsored violence are less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system today.

Yet, we do not know much about how exposure to state repression affects attitudes toward *foreign policy*, specifically international political rights issues. Those who were subjected to a particularly intense form of state repression tend to be more likely to resist authoritarian rule and strongly fight for democracy (LeBas and Young, 2022). But once their own country is democratized, they will continue to feel obligated to support victims whose experiences resonate with their own (Wayne and Zhukov, 2022). Past experience with state repression helps develop aversion and appreciation for the costs of political rights violations. A shared experience may create a sense of solidarity with foreign victims suffering similar hardships, thereby increasing the likelihood that survivors will criticize political rights violations in foreign countries.

International criticism of human rights has been a scholarly interest for a long time. It has been studied as both explanatory and dependent variables. When it is taken as an explanatory variable, scholars have studied when and how international criticism changes public opinion and legal practices in the target country. Scholars have suggested that international criticism may have both positive and negative effects on human rights protection (Murdie and Davis, 2012; Dietrich and Murdie, 2017; Terman, 2019; Snyder, 2020). Scholars have shown that the effectiveness of criticism depends on a variety of factors, including the identity of the speaker, the relationship between the speaker and the target, domestic civil societies, and transnational activism (Brysk, 1993; Keck, Sikkink et al., 1998; Risse et al., 1999; Simmons, 2009; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Nielsen and Simmons, 2015; Kelley and Simmons, 2019). Research on state-to-state criticism has

focused mainly on material pressure and has found that economic sanctions and military interventions worsen or have no effect on human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Wood, 2008; Peksen, 2009, 2012; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Drury and Peksen, 2014).

Another group of scholars has studied interstate criticism as a dependent variable and examined which countries are more likely to blame other countries' human rights violations. Brysk (2009) finds that democratic middle powers are most likely to send international condemnation of human rights violations in foreign countries. These states, such as Canada, Sweden, Costa Rica, and South Africa, consciously constructed their national identities and interests in "accordance with universalist norms, roles, and expectations (Brysk, 2009, 31)," thus their support for human rights propels them towards moral universalism. Terman and Voeten (2018) suggest that international criticism is solely comprised of strategic considerations. The authors conclude that states coddle human rights issues in their allies, arms trade partners, and countries with the same geopolitical ideology. The findings suggest that states select into international criticism and use it as a politicized instrument in international relations.

While these findings are fruitful, previous works have treated criticizing countries as unitary actors and only considered country-level determinants. We know less about the variation in preferences for international human rights issues among individuals within the same country. After observing the same violation in a foreign country, some people respond more actively and enthusiastically to enacting change, while others appear less bothered. Understanding individual-level variation is important, especially in legislative decisions regarding international human rights resolutions, because the preferences of each legislator will affect the passage of each resolution.

This paper offers a novel explanation for the variation in legislators' preferences for international human rights. I argue that former victims of state repression are more likely to support congressional resolutions condemning foreign human rights violations. This relationship develops for two reasons. First, the history of state repression strengthens the bonds of solidarity between these politicians and foreign victims whose experiences mirror their own. These legislators have a greater appreciation for the costs and hardships of exposure to state violence, as well as the extent

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to which it can compromise one's safety and well-being. They feel morally obligated to support them by publicly condemning the violating actions. Second, advancing human rights benefits these politicians domestically. During electoral campaigns, they are likely to emphasize their prior experience with state violence and their passion for human rights. This will establish their political identities as defenders of democratic norms. Supporting policies in line with one's political identity will satisfy voter expectations, thereby enhancing domestic popularity. Therefore, these politicians are more likely to advocate for universal human rights in order to distinguish themselves as politicians and increase their chances of reelection.

4.2.1 Solidarity

Prior experience with state repression increases an individual's preference for international political rights by creating a sense of solidarity with those whose political rights are being violated. When individuals experience traumatic violent events, they are more likely to empathize with those who are suffering from the same type of violence as themselves (Wayne and Zhukov, 2022). They are better able to empathize because they can put themselves in their position and identify with their predicament. For example, individuals who have experienced political repressions such as torture and mass killing can easily sympathize with those who are living under foreign dictatorships because they have also spent the majority of their lives fighting against dictatorships and for democracy. Former victims of state repression may find it easier to empathize with other victimized people abroad whose experiences parallel their own historical treatment.

Exposure to state repression also teaches them the personal costs of state violence and how it jeopardizes an individual's safety and well-being. Scholarly research in IR suggests that individuals who have experienced violent conflict are hyperfocused on the costs of being exposed to additional violence, and are more cautious in similar fear-triggering situations (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Kim, 2023). Similarly, politicians with prior state repression experience will have a greater understanding of the costs and hardships of state violence and will believe that such violence should never occur anywhere in the world again. They may feel a moral obligation to stand in solidarity with foreigners whose political rights are violated by publicly con-

demning such actions and urging a change in policy. Politicians exposed to state repression are more likely to support international human rights resolutions to show their support for persecuted groups abroad.

Additionally, these individuals might harbor deep-seated resentment toward any political rights violators whose actions resemble the authoritarian rule that has harmed them in the past. They were exposed to one-sided aggression by their own national government for innocent reasons. The victimizing experience leads them to believe that human rights violators are evil and that victims are on the right side. They pay greater attention to foreign political rights violations, even if these violators have no direct connection to their past oppressors. In summary, individuals' personal histories of state repression play a crucial role in garnering support for foreign victims whose political rights are violated, fostering solidarity with oppressed populations abroad, increasing their ability to comprehend the consequences of human rights abuses, and vilifying the violators.

4.2.2 Domestic Political Motivation

In addition to creating a sense of solidarity, prior exposure to state repression may shape the political identity of these legislators, thereby creating domestic political motivation to advance international human rights. The experience of violent state repression is one of the most salient political events that a person can experience. Especially for those who enter politics after having been violently victimized by the national government, the past experience may have inspired them to become politicians. Their primary motivation for engaging in politics likely stems from past victimization. Also, on their path to becoming politicians, they may have strategically emphasized their prior experience of resistance against authoritarian governments and fighting for democracy, as it may have provided them with a distinct advantage over other politicians. This experience has the potential to transform these politicians into national symbols of democratization. Their political identity as defenders of democratic values will distinguish them as politicians.

Consequently, these politicians own human rights issues in general. Originally, issue ownership referred to a specific political party owning an issue if voters viewed it as the most competent party to solve a particular problem (Petrocik, 1996). I argue that individual politicians can also take

ownership of issues based on their expertise and prior experience. For example, legislators from the professional military or war veterans are perceived as experts on militaristic issues (Fordham, 2001; Swers, 2007), whereas leaders with business experiences are recognized for their ability to boost the economy. Similarly, those who have fought for democratic values and endured hardships will be viewed as proponents of democratic values who are more capable of advancing human rights.

Voters expect that these politicians will actively engage in human rights issues and demonstrate their competence. Their popularity will suffer if they fail to address these issues, which they are known to be capable of solving and care deeply about. When a serious violation of human rights occurs domestically or internationally, public condemnation can strengthen their political identity as defenders of democratic norms. This helps them appeal to their domestic constituents, which increases their domestic popularity and chances of reelection. Therefore, they have domestic political incentives to support international human rights protection.

4.2.3 Hypothesis

I argued that prior state repression experience makes individual legislators more sympathetic toward people experiencing human rights violations. Due to their prior experience, they are able to empathize with those who share similar experiences and are aware of the costs of such hardships. In addition, these legislators have domestic political motivations for advancing human rights issues, as doing so can boost their popularity. My hypothesis, therefore, predicts that legislators who have experienced state repression will be more critical of international human rights violations.

Hypothesis 1: Legislators who have experienced severe state repression are more likely to criticize international human rights violations than those who have not experienced such violence.

I also expect that the positive effect of prior state repression on international human rights will be substantial, particularly when legislators can independently vote on legislation. The ability of legislators to vote according to their personal beliefs and preferences should vary depending on domestic political contexts. For example, when party cohesion is high, individual politicians

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are more likely to vote based on their party's views than their own. In addition, when a piece of legislation is highly contentious between political parties, legislators are more likely to vote in accordance with the decision made at the party level. In contrast, if a bill deals with bipartisan issues or is not controversial, it will be easier for politicians to vote following their personal beliefs and preferences, without the influence of the party. Therefore, I expect that the effect of prior state repression on legislators' support for international human rights will be stronger when there is less party pressure on individual legislators.

Hypothesis 2: Legislators who have experienced severe state repression are more likely to criticize international human rights violation when there is less party pressure on roll-call votes.

4.3   Data and Research Design

To assess the effects of state repression on international human rights, this article compares the roll-call votes of South Korean legislators who experienced severe forms of repression with those who suffered less violence. Quantitative data come from individual roll-call votes on human rights protection resolutions by the members of South Korea's most recent 21st National Assembly, founded in 2020.[3]

To account for generational and selection effects, I limit my sample to the members of the same generation who selected to experience state violence at some point during the democratization process. I collected an original dataset on the micro-level democratic movement participation and state repression experience of all 300 legislators using biographies and online websites. I identified a total of 89 legislators who participated in democratic protests and were subjected to at least some degree of state repression. 35 out of these 89 legislators were exposed to severe physical repression, including injuries, torture, and imprisonment. Less severe cases among the 54 legislators include suspensions from college or employment, and witnessing violence.

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[3]Since 2016, the South Korean National Assembly has disclosed to the public how each legislator voted on each bill. Data are available at `https://open.assembly.go.kr/portal/mainPage.do`.

4.3.1 Case selection: South Korea

South Korea is a good case for the two following reasons. First, I can utilize the quasi-random variation in the indiscriminate intensity of state violence experienced by South Korean protesters. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea had been governed by authoritarian regimes for almost 35 years. Mass repression became widespread when the military dictatorship began in 1961 and lasted for about three decades until the Constitution was amended in 1987. During the final decade of military dictatorship in the 1980s, a number of national democratic movements emerged, and the violence against demonstrators notably escalated to the level of large-scale massacres.

During this period, college students and other young factory workers led the protests, which were met with state-sponsored violence.[4] More importantly, the state's violence against the young population was indiscriminate rather than targeted. According to in-depth interviews with survivors and military personnel from the 1980s state repression, "Military forces engaged in indiscriminate shooting, beatings, and arrests regardless of whether or not they were actively participating in the protests."[5] The vast majority of victims were ordinary participants who were almost arbitrarily sacrificed by the indiscriminate use of force by the national military. Therefore, I can utilize the variation in the intensity of violence experienced by participants while minimizing concerns about potential selection effects.

Second, after the democratization, many of the protesters who experienced state violence as college students entered politics and formed one of the country's most influential political groups until today. This group is also known as the "86 Generation." (Hwang and Yang, 2002; Park, 2009).[6] In recent South Korean National Assemblies, a considerable number of legislators are from

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[4]Investigation Activity Report for the Second Half of 2022 by the May 18 Democratization Movement Fact-Finding Investigation Committee (in Korean), says "Martial law forces attacked young people whoever dressed as university students." The report also reveals that 71.4% of those killed or injured during the May 18 Democratization Movement, one of the largest democratic protests in the country's history, were teenagers or young adults. The May 18 Democratization Movement Fact-Finding Investigation Committee is the first investigation committee established by the South Korean national government to investigate the use of military force against civilians and reveal human rights violations in Gwangju, such as civilian deaths, injuries, and sexual assault.

[5]Investigation Activity Report for the Second Half of 2022 by the May 18 Democratization Movement Fact-Finding Investigation Committee (in Korean), pages 76 and 96.

[6]The term 86 Generation was coined because these people were born in the 1960s and attended college in the 1980s.

the 86 Generation.[7] This allows for comparison within this generational group and an examination of whether those who were subjected to a more severe form of repression show a significantly different pattern of support for global human rights protection than others exposed to less violence.

4.3.2 Variables and Measurement

4.3.2.1 *Dependent Variable: Roll-call Votes on International Human Rights Resolutions*

I measure each legislator's preference for international political rights by using their roll-call voting behavior on the resolutions condemning foreign political rights violations and urging for their improvement. Among the various political behaviors of legislators, roll-call vote behavior is the most definitive indicator of a legislator's preferences and ideology. Human rights resolutions can include political, economic, and social rights. My theory is interested in politicians' preferences for political rights, which are directly related to the repression of authoritarian regimes. In my analysis, I therefore only consider resolutions that broadly pertain to political rights and exclude resolutions that deal with other aspects of human rights.[8]

The 21th South Korean National Assembly has passed seven resolutions condemning political rights violations at the global level. The full list of legislative resolutions is listed in Table 1. The unit of observation is the individual roll-call vote of each legislator on each resolution. This provides a total of 618 observations. The dependent variable is measured as a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the legislator voted "yay" to the resolution, and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that 0 includes not only those who voted "Nay," but also those who abstained or were absent from the meeting. This is due to the fact that South Korean legislators often express opposition by abstaining from voting or being absent on the voting day. Those who attend the meeting are very likely to vote "Yay." The aggregate voting results indicate that the vast majority of ballots are "Yay."

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[7]For example, in the 21th National Assembly, 54% of total legislators have participated in democratic protests in the past.

[8]For example, I excluded a resolution condemning the Japanese government's release of Fukushima's radioactive water and calling for the establishment of an international consent procedure that was passed by the South Korean National Assembly in October 2020 because it did not pertain to political rights.

Table 4.1: List of South Korean Legislative Resolutions for Global Human Rights Protection

Number	Title	Date	Proposer
1	Resolution on the expansion of protection status for North Korean refugees	November 19, 2020	Conservative
2	Resolution condemning the military coup and calling for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar	February 26, 2021	Bipartisan
3	Resolution condemning racism, hatred and discrimination against Asians	June 29, 2021	Democratic
4	Resolution calling for the establishment of peace and the protection of human rights in Afghanistan	September 16, 2021	Bipartisan
5	Resolution condemning the violent crackdown on women's rights protests in Iran	December 5, 2022	Bipartisan
6	Resolution calling for the ratification of the United Nations International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	December 8, 2022	Bipartisan
7	Resolution calling for support for the recovery from earthquake devastation in Turkey and Syria	February 14, 2023	Bipartisan

4.3.2.2 Independent Variable: State Violence Experiences

The independent variable of interest is a legislator's state repression experience. It is operationalized as whether the legislator experienced at least one of the following events: (1) injury; (2) torture; and (3) imprisonment due to state violence. These experiences can be considered severe forms of state violence that cause physical repression. I collected an original dataset of the micro-level state repression experience of legislators using biographies and online websites. In total, 35 legislators are coded as 1 who were severely repressed, which provides 39% of total observations to be coded as 1 in my sample. 54 legislators experienced less severe forms of state repression, such as arrest, suspension from college or working organization, and witness of violence.

4.3.2.3 Qualitative Data

Examining the empirical pattern of legislators' voting behavior will provide evidence of the association between their prior exposure to state repression and their preference for global human rights protection. However, observing voting behavior alone is insufficient to understand the theoretical mechanisms. Therefore, I use qualitative interviews to validate my claims regarding why state repression should increase one's future preferences for global human rights protection.

In 2022, I conducted semi-structured interviews with two South Korean legislators to understand the theoretical mechanisms underlying the quantitative results.[9] One of the interviewees had experienced state repression (described as Legislator A hereafter), while the other had not (described as Legislator B hereafter). Interviews were conducted in their offices. Interviews began with questionnaires asking personal histories of state repression experiences, whereupon respondents were later asked to elaborate on their closed-ended answers to explore key mechanisms, including reasons for voting/not voting for specific resolutions, the history of state repression in South Korean politics, and the political identities of politicians with state repression experiences. The details of this qualitative study are provided in the Online Appendix, and only relevant results are highlighted in this article.

4.3.3 Empirical Strategy

The simplest method to quantitatively test the hypothesis is to compare the voting behavior of legislators who have experienced and have not experienced state repression. One major barrier to inference from this approach, however, is that they may differ in ways that are difficult to observe. For example, they are likely to come from two distinct age groups, the first group being the democratization generation and the second group being the generation born after democratization. Consequently, the resulting pattern in the data would not reflect a causal relationship but rather could result from generational effects. Moreover, if these unmeasured differences influence human rights protection preferences, the resulting findings might be misleading.

In order to address this issue, I examine the within-variation of a subset of legislators who experienced state repression. The impact of state repression may depend on the intensity of an individual's exposure to violence, whether it be direct physical repression or indirect witnessing through friends' experiences. If the theoretical mechanisms between state violence and human rights preferences are functioning properly, then we should expect to observe that legislators who were directly affected by state violence have a greater preference for human rights protection than

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those who were not directly harmed. Therefore, I compare legislators who experienced more severe forms of state repression, such as torture and imprisonment, with those who were not personally affected by state violence.

4.3.4 Estimation

To test Hypothesis 1, I construct the following equation.

$$\text{Resolution}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{State Repression}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{i}}' + \upsilon_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where *i* indicates each vote by legislators and *j* indicates each resolution. RESOLUTION$_{ij}$ denotes the legislator *i*'s roll-call vote for supporting human rights protection resolution *j*. It is coded as 1 if *i* voted "yay" for resolution bill *j*, and 0 otherwise. My independent variable is STATE VIOLENCE which represents whether a legislator experienced severe state violence during democratic movements.

I include a set of individual-level covariates, ($\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{i}}'$), that might be related to an individual's human rights protection preferences as well as the experience of state violence during the 20s. First, I control for a legislator's political party affiliation. The past experience of state repression is likely to have an effect on the political party they choose in the future. It is also suggested that political ideology is a strong predictor of preferences regarding international human rights protection. Second, I include the age and gender of the legislator. Age is directly related to the likelihood that a legislator will be subject to state repression. Gender also plays a significant role in determining the likelihood of physical repression. Both age and gender may play important roles in shaping their views on human rights protection. Third, I control for a legislator's seniority. Legislators who are subject to severe state repression may be more likely to be elected for extended terms. Seniority can also influence a member's preference for human rights issues, as newer members of Congress are generally more enthusiastic about human rights issues. Lastly, I account for a legislator's prior experiences, specifically military service. All males in South Korea should serve in the military. However, there may be exemptions due to illness or injury. The possibility of exemption from

military service may depend on the extent to which you were subjected to state repression, and the military service may also influence their support for international human rights issues.

I also include bill fixed effects, v_j, since the research is pooling roll-call votes for multiple resolution bills. Given that my dependent variable is dichotomous, I estimate the model as a logit regression model. Hypothesis 1 expects β_1 to be significant and positive. A positive and statistically significant β_1 means that legislators exposed to severe state violence are more likely to support resolutions for global human rights protection than those who did not experience such violence.

In Hypothesis 2, I argue that domestic political contexts moderate the extent to which a legislator's prior exposure to state repression affects their roll-call voting behavior on global human rights promotion. To test this conditional hypothesis, I add the moderating variable and its interaction term with the explanatory variable while keeping all other variables the same as the earlier equation.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Resolution}_{ij} =& \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{State Repression}_i + \beta_2 \text{Bipartisan}_j \\
&+ \beta_3 \text{State Repression}_i \times \text{Bipartisan}_j + \boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X}_i' + v_j + \epsilon_{ij}
\end{aligned}
$$

The moderating variable is operationalized based on whether or not the specific resolution is bipartisan. I coded 1 for the resolution if it was proposed by legislators from both parties and 0 otherwise. Six of the eight resolutions in my sample were bipartisan legislation. I expect the positive effects of prior state repression to be stronger in bipartisan resolutions because legislators face fewer pressures from their parties so that they can follow their personal beliefs and preferences. In contrast, I expect a greater level of uncertainty when the resolution is a non-bipartisan resolution because they may be pressured by peers to follow the party's view. Individual legislators' preferences will be muted, and they will be less capable of translating their preferences into actual voting outcomes. Thus, I expect β_3 to be statistically significant and positive for Hypothesis 2. Marginal effect graphs will be provided to determine if this conditional hypothesis is supported.

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4.4 Findings

Table 4.2: Regression Analysis of State Repression and Support for Foreign Human Rights Resolutions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Main Model		Interaction with	
			BIPARTISAN BILL	
STATE REPRESSION	0.722**	0.737**	-0.125	-0.143
	(0.269)	(0.275)	(0.402)	(0.403)
BIPARTISAN BILL			-0.610*	-0.834*
			(0.264)	(0.375)
STATE REPRESSION × BIPARTISAN BILL			1.186**	1.253**
			(0.437)	(0.441)
RIGHT-WING PARTY	-0.367	-0.415	-0.377	-0.424
	(0.297)	(0.314)	(0.295)	(0.313)
AGE	-0.0774***	-0.0681**	-0.0771***	-0.0689**
	(0.0220)	(0.0231)	(0.0221)	(0.0231)
MALE	0.0393	0.0751	0.0396	0.0702
	(0.378)	(0.389)	(0.380)	(0.391)
SENIORITY	-0.202*	-0.229*	-0.208*	-0.236*
	(0.0893)	(0.0936)	(0.0906)	(0.0953)
MILITARY SERVICE	-0.000936	-0.0213	0.000352	-0.0157
	(0.285)	(0.293)	(0.288)	(0.295)
CONSTANT	5.459***	4.601***	5.904***	5.370***
	(1.253)	(1.356)	(1.264)	(1.313)
Bill Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	618	618	618	618
Log Lik.	-354.1	-340.2	-349.9	-336.1

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Bill fixed effects are included in Models 2 and 4 but not reported in the table.

[+] $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < .01$, [***] $p < .001$

The results of the logit regression analysis of legislators' state repression and votes on human rights resolutions are presented in Table 1. In Models 1 and 2, I examine whether legislators with state repression experience are, on average, more likely to support the resolution (Hypothesis 1). In Models 3 and 4, I test conditional Hypothesis 2 by examining the interaction between the

explanatory variable and the bipartisanship status of the resolutions. In Models 2 and 4, I include resolution fixed effects, whereas they are excluded in Models 1 and 3.

The results provide evidence in support of both hypotheses. First, in Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on STATE REPRESSION is statistically significant and positive, confirming Hypothesis 1. Based on Model 1, exposure to severe state repression increases the likelihood that a legislator will support a human rights resolution by 14.0 percentage points (95 percent confidence interval: 4.0% points, 24.0% points). The findings imply that legislators who have been injured, tortured, or imprisoned as a result of state repression are, on average, more likely to support resolutions for global human rights protection than those who have not endured such repression.

Results from Models 3 and 4 support Hypothesis 2. As predicted by the theory, the coefficients on the interaction terms are consistently positive and statistically significant. To better interpret the coefficients table of interaction models, I plot the marginal effects of the primary explanatory variable across resolutions' bipartisanship status. Figure 1, which visualizes Model 3, suggests that the positive effect of prior state repression on future human rights protection is statistically significant when voting on bipartisan resolutions. Legislators who have experienced severe state repression are 19.9% points more likely to support resolutions to protect global human rights than those who have not, holding all other factors constant. Based on the 95 percent confidence interval, the effect can be as great as 30.3 percentage points or as minor as 9.5 percentage points. When a legislator has not experienced severe state repression, the predicted probability of supporting a bipartisan resolution is 61.7 percent. This probability increases to 81.5 percent in a counterfactual scenario where the legislator experienced severe state repression. When the resolution is not a bipartisan issue, however, the difference between legislators who have experienced state repression and those who have not is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value: 0.757).

4.4.1 Qualitative Evidence

To better understand the role of prior state repression in preferences for international human rights issues, I turn to interviews with two legislators. Idealistically, I would like to hear what all or the vast majority of legislators have to say about their past experience with state repression and

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Legislators' Prior State Repression on International Human Rights Resolutions Across the Bipartisan Nature of the Bill.

their views on global human rights. My qualitative evidence is limited due to the small number of interviewees; however, several informative patterns emerged from the semistructured interviews that suggest my mechanisms.

I argued that legislators who have been exposed to state repression have a greater appreciation for the hardships associated with violations of political rights. They are more sympathetic and more likely to share solidarity with foreign victims of human rights violations. Legislator A responded to an interview question regarding the purpose of politics by stating, "The purpose of politics is to eliminate the greatest enemy, human rights violations, and to devote all of our efforts to combating them and improving human rights everywhere." Legislator B characterized a group of politicians with experience in state repression as "having a way of thinking that categorizes everything as either good or evil." Legislator B emphasized, "They believe that human rights violators are inherently evil, while they, the innocent victims, are inherently virtuous." Using the words of Legislator

A, these politicians "feel a sense of unity with those whose experiences resonate with their own," and firmly believe that " such (political rights) violations should never be repeated anywhere in the world."

The second mechanism suggests that politicians who have been subjected to state repression have domestic political incentives to advance human rights. They tend to highlight their passion for advancing human rights, which stems from their prior experience with repression, as one of their relative strengths as politicians. Voters perceive them as more capable of resolving human rights issues and expect that they will play an active role in addressing these issues. To meet the expectations of their voters and increase their chances of reelection, these politicians adopt human rights-oriented policies. Legislator B provides qualitative evidence that "the experience of state violence and the experience of human rights violations played a significant role in the formation of their identities as politicians." They believe that "they have greater moral obligations than other members of Congress with regard to issues of democracy and universal human rights." Overall, evidence from in-depth interviews reveals narratives that echo the suggested theoretical mechanisms regarding individual preferences for international human rights.

4.5 Summary and Implications

This article introduces a theory of the relationship between state violence experiences and promoting human rights at the global level. Politicians who have experienced more severe state violence are more likely to condemn foreign violations of human rights. The paper explores the effects of legislators' exposure to state violence in South Korea by comparing former protesters who experienced severe physical violence with those who remained relatively safe. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical expectation that legislators who have experienced severe state violence are more likely to support resolutions criticizing foreign human rights violations. Among legislators who have previously participated in democratic protests, those who have been injured, tortured, or imprisoned are 14.0 percentage points more likely to support resolutions than those who have not faced life-threatening situations. I also find that the effects of personal state repression experience on voting behavior are more substantial when legislators face less pressure from

their parties, such as when voting on bipartisan issues. Qualitative evidence suggests that these politicians feel solidarity with foreign victims who share similar violations of political rights. They feel morally obligated to support these people. They also have political incentives to implement these resolutions because human rights are central to their political identities.

My paper provides two major contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, I offer a novel explanation for individual-level variation in preferences for human rights issues in foreign countries. Conventionally, scholars have focused on state-level factors of interstate naming and shaming in order to determine which countries are more likely to criticize international human rights violations (Brysk, 2009; Terman and Voeten, 2018). By contrast, I examine which individuals within the same country are more critical of foreign human rights issues than others. In recently democratized countries with a history of repressive government behavior, the level of state violence experienced by individuals will play a significant role in deciding their future stances on international human rights issues. Understanding individual-level variation is particularly important for legislative decisions on human rights resolutions, as the vote choices of each legislator affect the possibility of passage.

My research also contributes to our understanding of the political consequences of exposure to state repression. Numerous scholars have studied the short- and long-term impacts of state repression, focusing primarily on the attitudes of individuals toward their national government and perpetrators, political participation, and the degree of trust and altruism. Their prior exposure to violent repression by authoritarian governments enables them to appreciate the personal costs of such violence and the importance of universal human rights protection. My findings suggest that experience with state repression increases future preferences for promoting human rights at the global level.

An interesting avenue for future research is the generalizability of the paper's findings: determining whether the theory can be extended to other contexts. The paper focused on a single country case, South Korea, for analytical advantages, but it is worthwhile to consider the paper's theoretical scope conditions. First, the country should have experienced authoritarian state repres-

sion at the national level with little variation in the severity of violence across geography. Second, the country should have democratized. Former victims of state repression can only empathize with foreign victims who share a similar experience after their country's democratization. If their country is still governed by authoritarian rule, they are likely to place a greater emphasis on promoting domestic human rights. Lastly, former victims of state repression should have formed a substantial portion of the government's legislative branch and adequately represented the generation of democratization. Latin American nations such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, as well as Eastern European nations such as Poland and Hungary, are examples of countries in which the theory may be generalizable under these conditions.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

This dissertation demonstrates how the legacies of childhood experiences of wartime violence reverberate for years by shaping individuals' national security policy preferences decades later. My theory highlights that this violent experience makes elites and members of the general public more fearful of additional wartime violence. They are more supportive of military planning and armament that can protect the country but more conservative about using force. My research contributes to the existing literature by showing that early exposure to wartime violence shapes long-term attitudes and behaviors in national security policy.

In Section 2, I showed that members of the public who experienced wartime violence are more supportive of nuclear proliferation. Understanding public preferences for nuclear proliferation is especially crucial in a democracy because the strong voice of the public gives political elites incentives to consider nuclear armament as a foreign policy option. By analyzing South Korea as a focused case study, I find that those who lived in war-torn areas during the Korean War are more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence; consequently, they support the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which they believe can deter large-scale military invasions.

Section 3 took the theory to an elite-level analysis and examines whether leaders' foreign policy decisions are also shaped by their childhood exposure to wartime violence. While much research explains leaders' foreign policy behaviors using their military and combat experiences, I focus on their childhood exposure to war. By analyzing an original dataset on global leaders' personal war trauma, I find that those who have experienced family deaths, family injuries, or displacement from foreign military invasions as children initiate fewer conflicts than those who escaped the invasions intact. Leaders exposed to severe foreign aggression early in life are unwilling to use destructive weapons because they have a greater understanding of the devastating consequences of militarized violence. My results suggest that leaders' foreign policy decisions are shaped by the violent events

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that occurred decades ago and motivate them to be conservative about the use of military force.

In Section 4, I turned my focus from wartime violence to state repression. State repression is often employed in authoritarian regimes to penalize disloyal citizens, demobilize anti-regime movements, and ultimately maintain regime stability. Methods of violent repression include physical persecution, hunger, forcible displacement, and even massacre. These acts of violence are typically one-sided, resulting in severe trauma for the survivors. Existing literature shows that prior state repression experiences influence an individual's attitudes toward domestic in-groups and perpetrators. Little is known about how this affects people's attitudes toward foreign policy. This paper specifically focuses on legislators' voting behaviors on international human rights resolutions and explores whether those who have previously experienced state repression are more likely to support the adoption of a resolution criticizing foreign political rights violations in Congress.

I argue that legislators' prior exposure to state repression makes them strong advocates for international political rights. These politicians have greater empathy for victims whose political rights are violated. In addition, they have domestic political motivations, as the protection of human rights is central to their political identity and what voters expect of them. The evidence from roll-call vote patterns in the South Korean legislature and qualitative interviews supports the theoretical argument. The results suggest that past state repression experience is one of the sources of individual-level variation in preferences for international human rights policy, which has received less attention in prior research.

5.2 Implications

5.2.1 Microfoundation of Nuclear Policy

The paper contributes to understanding the microfoundations of nuclear policy by examining the impact of exposure to wartime violence on individuals' attitudes toward nuclear weapons. While previous research has explored various factors influencing preferences for nuclear weapons, such as rebel experience (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015), political orientation (Press, Sagan and Valentino, 2013), age (Sagan and Valentino, 2017), and psychological traits (Rathbun and Stein,

2020), this study focuses specifically on the role of exposure to wartime violence. The findings of the study demonstrate that individuals who have been exposed to wartime violence tend to perceive external security threats as more significant risks and have lower levels of trust in military alliances. Consequently, they are more likely to support the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing national security.

Academic research on nuclear security has shown that nuclear weapons can have both positive and negative security effects (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989; Sagan, 1994; Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010; Monteiro and Debs, 2014; Bell and Miller, 2015; Lee et al., 2023). Some studies show that nuclear weapons benefit national security by bolstering deterrence, while others demonstrate that possessing nuclear weapons does not lower the risk of conflict but rather increases it by inviting preventive strikes and low-level disputes.

The study provides insights into why individuals exposed to violence early in life tend to favor the security-enhancing aspects of nuclear deterrence. First, these individuals are particularly concerned about security and tend to engage in worst-case thinking, fearing the recurrence of catastrophic wars. This will lead them to favor a nuclear arsenal that is effective in deterring major invasions on their soil. Second, individuals with childhood war trauma focus on the defensive uses of nuclear weapons. They are aware of the tragic consequences of using destructive weaponary. They may oppose using nuclear weapons offensively, but they believe that the possession of nuclear weapons will defend their country from high-level conflicts.

From a policy perspective, the research highlights that domestic variation in support for nuclear weapons can be explained by prior exposure to wartime violence. The war in Ukraine, for example, may potentially stimulate demand for nuclear weapons as a reliable means of protection against Russian aggression and nuclear threats. The study suggests that preferences for nuclear weapons among Ukrainians in the future will vary depending on the level of violence experienced during the recent invasion. Those living in close proximity to major battlefields are more likely to advocate for nuclear weapons, while individuals who endured the war without experiencing extreme violence will be less inclined to demand such weaponry.

Furthermore, the research carries broader implications for nuclear proliferation. When a country experiences fatal conflicts, and as more citizens are exposed to such violence, there may be an unintended increase in domestic demand for nuclear weapons. This is especially significant in democratic contexts where public preferences hold significant weight, potentially influencing political elites to consider nuclear armament as a policy option. For instance, as the younger generations in Ukraine, who have witnessed the horrors of war, grow up, there may be a stronger domestic call for nuclear armament as a deterrent against Russian aggression.

5.2.2   Peaceful Aggression: Fear-driven Foreign Policy Orientation

My dissertation shows that exposure to wartime violence during childhood makes people have a distinct, fear-driven foreign policy orientation. This orientation, which can be termed *peaceful aggression*, involves a preference for military armament but a reluctance to use military force. These individuals may be perceived as aggressive due to their support for military buildups, including nuclear armament. However, the goal of such aggressive actions is to achieve peace rather than engage in violent conflict.

The fear-driven foreign policy orientation is a result of the increased anxiety and fear stemming from childhood exposure to war. Individuals with this orientation tend to adopt a Hobbesian worldview, which emphasizes the need for a strong military to maintain stability and peace. Hobbes's famous quote, "Fear and I were born twins," represents the fact that his mother gave birth to him prematurely because she was terrified by the Spanish Armada's invasion. More importantly, it emphasizes the central role of fear in his political worldview. The traumatic childhood experiences of military invasion led him to claim that a strong, albeit oppressive, government is superior to the fear of anarchy.

In the realm of international relations, a Hobbesian worldview refers to the belief that countries should always be militarily prepared for external aggression to survive in the anarchic state of the international system. Past experiences with foreign aggression have taught them the anarchic nature of the international system and the expansionist nature of their enemies. Therefore, these individuals perceive external threats as riskier than those without such experiences. They also

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believe that a strong military is the best way to avoid one. They would be firm believers in the adage, "if you want peace, prepare for war."[1] The adage is usually interpreted as meaning "peace through strength" — a strong society being less likely to be attacked by enemies. They are likely to be opposed to offensive uses of military weapons, but they will support building military power for defensive purposes because they believe it can deter such large-scale conflict.

These individuals believe that war is inevitable and that the most effective way to prevent further violence is by bolstering defense capability and deterrence. Instead of relying on diplomacy, they believe that countries should rely on self-help and always be militarily prepared for foreign aggression in order to survive the anarchy. They will value building a strong military and bolstering deterrence, leading them to put special emphasis on military armament. These people believe only superior military strength discourages aggression. From their previous violent experience, they understand how a world where their country is not militarily dominant would be more dangerous and harmful to their interests. They believe the country's weakness encourages an aggressor to take the risk of using force to achieve its goals.

Individuals with childhood war exposure are also conservative about the use of military force. Children's exposure to wartime violence is particularly frightening and leaves them with excessive fear because children are a vulnerable subset of the population. They are unprepared for combat and must have the protection of their guardians in order to survive. They are often exposed to one-sided aggression during war. In addition, children's exposure to wartime violence is likely to be shocking because it is the first time they have encountered such extreme violence. The frightening memory will remain in their brains and minds for the rest of their lives.

People exposed to violence early in life tend to be more watchful and "on alert" for possible dangers around them in order to avoid trauma reminders (Kisiel and Lyons, 2001). War-traumatized individuals will likely be hypervigilant about potential threats around the country. They will be easily startled by security threats that do not bother others and fear being exposed to additional wartime violence (Kim, 2023). They may emphasize armaments that can protect the

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[1]The adage was adapted from a statement found in Book 3 of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus's De re militari, although the idea it conveys is also present in earlier works, such as Plato's *Laws*.

country, but not the actual use of force (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015) because they wish to minimize the risks of their country being engaged in additional fatal conflicts.

Favoring military armament while simultaneously being conservative in their use of force is particularly surprising when considering how scholars have explained foreign policy inclinations. Conventional knowledge suggests people's preferences for armament and the use of force tend to move together: those who prefer to spend more resources on the military tend to be more comfortable using force abroad. In contrast, those who are opposed to military buildups are reluctant to use force.

The most well-known division is the hawk-dove framework (Schultz, 2001, 2005; Koch and Fulton, 2011; Mattes and Weeks, 2019). Every leader has a different level of *hawkishness* based on two factors: views about the political world and whether military force is the best method to obtain their goal (Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon, 2018). Hawks believe that their international enemies are expansionists by nature. It leads to the belief that conflicts are inevitable, and the most effective way to prevent conflict is by bolstering deterrence by building its own arms. By contrast, doves believe that the primary source of international conflict is misperception. Thus, building its own arms does not solve the fundamental problem, and states should cooperate to solve this informational problem.

In addition, hawks believe military forces are the best method to achieve their political goals in interstate relations. In contrast, doves believe diplomatic measures, such as dialogue and negotiation, are better solutions in interstate relations. These people are more likely to resort to reconciliation rather than militarized conflict when dealing with an adversary and reduce defense spending. Consequently, hawks are more likely to spend more on defense and are more comfortable using force than their dovish counterparts.

My dissertation suggests that individuals' childhood war exposure has nuanced effects on their foreign policy orientations, such that they cannot be simply classified as hawks or doves. As shown in Table 5.1, conventional wisdom suggests that leaders' preferences in defense spending and conflict initiation tend to move together, and that those who spend more on the military tend to be more

comfortable using force. For example, hawks prefer larger investments in defense and are comfortable using force abroad, while doves prefer the opposite. The dissertation suggests that this may not be the case for a subset of people who experienced war as children. They emphasize military planning and armament while minimizing the use of military force. Excessive fear stemming from past war trauma causes a special emphasis on building a strong military for deterrence but caution in using force, placing them in a unique category I refer to as fear-driven peaceful aggression.

Table 5.1: Four Types of Foreign Policy Orientations

	Use of Military Force ↓	Use of Military Force ↑
Military Armament ↓	Dovish Orientation	Reckless Militarism
Military Armament ↑	(Fear-Driven) Peaceful Aggression	Hawkish Orientation

5.3   Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

While my dissertation provides valuable insights, there are limitations to consider. One limitation pertains to the generalizability of the findings beyond the case of South Korea. Although Sections 2 and 4 primarily concentrate on a single country case, South Korea, for research evidence, the underlying theoretical arguments and mechanisms can be applied to other countries that share two scope conditions. First, a country should face security threats from nuclear-armed enemies. This would cause people who seek reliable security protection to demonstrate a preference for nuclear proliferation. Second, the country should possess the technical capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Some examples that satisfy these conditions include Ukraine, Poland, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Future research can directly test the validity of my theoretical argument using empirical data from these nations.

My dissertation raises interesting avenues for future research. First, one can further examine the effects of exposure to wartime violence on national security policy decisions beyond nuclear proliferation and conflict initiation. One area of interest is defense spending preferences. Theo-

retical mechanisms proposed in the dissertation suggest that individuals who experienced wartime violence are more likely to advocate for increased defense expenditures to bolster their country's military capabilities and protect against future invasions.

Expanding the theoretical scope to include the effects of exposure to civil war violence is another fruitful direction for future research. While this dissertation focuses on the consequences of interstate wartime violence, there is potential to explore how childhood trauma from civil war influences militarized decisions concerning intrastate armed groups. Theoretically, I expect that childhood trauma from civil war will affect militarized decisions against domestic armed groups but not necessarily foreign nations. Understanding the differential effects of wartime violence experienced in different contexts will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of violence on individuals' national security preferences.

Additionally, it would be valuable to investigate the variations in the effects of exposure to violence at different stages of life. For example, one can compare the impacts of war trauma on individuals at various life stages, including infants, preschoolers, teenagers, and even young adults. This research can shed light on identifying the most sensitive periods during which exposure to violence has the most significant effects.

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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2

A.1 Additional Robustness Tests

- **Mutually exclusive explanatory variables.** In Table 1, I replicate my analysis using four dummy variables that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. I first generate two main independent variables: PRE-WAR and RISK AREA. PRE-WAR represents whether an individual belongs to the pre-war or post-war cohort. RISK AREA indicates whether an individual lived in areas that experienced more severe violence than the national average during childhood. Then I create four dummy variables with the PRE-WAR and RISK AREA based on the main definition of the pre-war cohort (1941-1950) and post-war cohort (1954-63). The four variables, PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA, PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA, POST-WAR IN RISK AREA, and POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA, are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Therefore, I can make one variable a baseline category in the analysis and interpret the coefficients on the remaining variables in terms of their effects relative to the excluded variable. This model could be useful to some readers because it is more intuitive to interpret, and I can present whether both hypotheses are confirmed in a single table without a graph. All other model specifications except for the dummy explanatory variables, such as the inclusion of control variables and survey fixed effects, remain the same as in my main analysis. With the mutually exclusive and exhaustive dummy variables, I construct the following equation.

$$\text{Nuclear}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Pre-war in Risk Area}_i + \beta_2 \text{Pre-war in Non-risk Area}_i$$
$$+ \beta_3 \text{Post-war in Risk Area}_i + \beta_4 \text{Post-war in Non-risk Area}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X}'_\mathbf{i} + \upsilon_s + \epsilon_i$$

One must keep in mind that one of the four dummy variables in the equation should be omitted for estimation. Otherwise, the statistical program will automatically drop one of the

four variables. In Models 1 and 2, I test Hypothesis 1a by making PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA as the baseline category. The coefficient on PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA, β_1, should be interpreted as the effect of the exposure to wartime violence on nuclear proliferation preference in the pre-war cohort. β_1 represents the difference in nuclear proliferation preference between people who resided in provinces with greater casualties and injuries per capita than the national average and those who did not dwell in the provinces across the pre-war cohort. A positive and statistically significant β_1 means that within the pre-war cohort, people who lived in hazardous areas are more likely to support South Korea's development of nuclear weapons.

In Models 3 and 4, I test Hypothesis 1b by making POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA as the baseline category. I should interpret the coefficient on POST-WAR IN RISK AREA, β_3, which captures whether the regional difference is persistent within the post-war generation. Hypothesis 1b expects β_3 to be statistically insignificant. If the impact of the regional difference is only substantial in the pre-war cohort but not in the post-war cohort, which can be suggested by a statistically insignificant coefficient on β_3, it implies that the regional differences in nuclear proliferation preference in the pre-war cohort are due to the experience of the Korean War.

In Models 1 and 3, I present a baseline model that includes only pre-treatment controls, age, and gender. In Models 2 and 4, I include all of the control variables that are arguably post-treatment variables to some degree, as well as the pre-treatment variables included in Model 1.

The results presented in Table 1 support the theory. In Models 1 and 2, where I make PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA as a baseline category, positive and statistically significant coefficients on PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA indicate that war generation who resided in risk areas show higher support than others in the same cohort. In Models 3 and 4, where I make POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA group as a baseline category, statistically insignificant coefficients on POST-WAR IN RISK AREA suggest that the post-war cohort who lived in the

war-torn regions after the war termination do not demonstrate higher support for nuclear weapons acquisition than others in the post-war generation.

- **Excluding movers.** It is possible that citizens could have moved after an outbreak of the conflict. Since my measure for childhood residence is based on where the respondents spent the most time in the first 15 years of life, a robustness test is performed with people whose current residence remains the same as in childhood. I generate a variable MOVER if a respondent's current living place is different from the place they lived most until the age of 15. Table 2 replicates the main analysis excluding *movers*. The results are consistent with the paper's findings.

- **Alternate PRE-WAR and POST-WAR cohort years.** In Tables 3 and 4, I modify the year range of the independent variable, PRE-WAR, to check whether the results are sensitive to different definitions of pre-war and post-war cohorts. Table 3 only includes pre-treatment covariates and Table 4 includes potential post-treatment variables as well as pre-treatment variables. In Model 1, I define the pre-war cohort as people born between 1944-1953 and the post-war cohort as people born between 1954-1963. In Model 2, I measure the pre-war cohort of people born between 1941-1953 and the post-war cohort of people born between 1954-1967. This is the broadest measure of the cohorts, which covers thirteen years for each pre-war and post-war generation. Model 3 measures the pre-war cohort with people born between 1941-1950 and the post-war cohort with people born between 1951-1960. Lastly, Model 4 includes people born during 1941-1948 in the pre-war generation and those born between 1953-1960 in the post-war generation. All of the results remain consistent with the results of the main analysis.

- **Alternate RISK AREA variable.** In Table 5, I modify another key independent variable, RISK AREA, and replicate the analysis. In the main analysis, I used the national average casualty rate as a threshold to determine whether each region experienced more severe violence during the war or not. In Table 5, I report the analysis results using different thresholds: 75th

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and 25th percentile. Regions above 75th percentile are considered the riskiest areas during the war (Models 1 and 2), while regions below 25th percentile are considered relatively safe zones during the war (Models 3 and 4). These modifications do not produce major changes in my results. People who were residing in riskier areas are more likely to support nuclear weapons acquisition than others, and those who lived in safe places during the war show significantly less support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons than others.

- **Placebo tests.** In Tables 6 and 7, I perform placebo tests to examine contexts where my theory would not expect to find a relationship between childhood wartime violence experiences and policy preferences. My theory does not anticipate a link between wartime violence experience and non-security preferences. I argue that childhood wartime violence experiences increase the desire for stronger national security protections. However, if wartime violence experiences simply make people different than others in every aspect, they are likely to show different preferences in non-security policies to some degree. Evidence of a nonrelationship in these contexts would enhance the plausibility of my argument.

In Table 6, I replace the outcome variable with an individual's preference for sociocultural policy - accepting cultural diversity. It is measured based on the answers to the survey question, which asks how much the respondent agrees with the following statement: *"Accepting multiple ethnicities as South Korean citizens will undermine the nation's solidarity."* In Table 7, I replace the outcome variable with an individual's preference for economic policy - the unemployment problem. I use the respondent's answer to a survey question of *"how much serious do you think the unemployment problem is in our society today?"* In both Tables 7 and 8, the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. A null relationship between wartime violence experience and non-security preferences, therefore, increases the credibility of my finding.

In Tables 8 and 9, I conduct another placebo tests where I generate arbitrary age groups that are not based on the pre-war and post-war cohorts. I picked the random age cohorts of ten

years from a random number generator. By replicating the main analysis with these arbitrary age cohorts, I show that there is not the same geographic interaction for these arbitrary groups. Table 8 includes only pre-treatment control variables to age, and Table 9 includes all control variables. In both tables, coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. The non-relationship between geographic variation and random age cohorts enhances the plausibility of my findings about the war and post-war generations.

- **Pre-war cohort vs. post-war cohort.** In Tables 10 and 11, I compare the entire wartime generation and the post-war generation. Since the post-war cohort was not directly exposed to wartime violence, the theory expects that the pre-war cohort is more likely to prefer the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal than the post-war cohort. Table 11 suggests that generational difference is not substantial. The coefficients on the PRE-WAR are consistently positive as expected, but they fail to achieve the conventional statistical significance. Coefficients on PRE-WAR are consistently positive but statistically insignificant. The p-values range from 0.478 (Model 2) to 0.587 (Model 3).

To further investigate the generational difference, Table 11 uses the four dummy variables approach and separates the generational effects in war-torn and safe zones. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficients on PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA are positive and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The results suggest that in risk areas, the pre-war generation demonstrates stronger aspirations for the development of an indigenous nuclear weapons arsenal compared to the post-war cohort who lived in the same regions. However, the war generation who lived in safe areas does not demonstrate greater support for nuclear armament than the post-war cohort who lived in the same regions, as suggested by statistically insignificant coefficients on PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA in Model 1 and 2. The results imply that the generational effect of the wartime violence experience is more substantial in the regions that experienced more severe violence than in safe areas.

- **Historical legacies of violence.** There is an emerging consensus in the literature on historical

legacies of violence that political attitudes produced by exposure to violence are transmitted intergenerationally. Those born immediately after the war are likely to be influenced by the trauma of what their communities experienced. For example, the post-war generation living in war-torn areas consistently show low trust in the national governments and the military (Hong and Kang, 2017). I argue that the preference for nuclear proliferation stems from first-hand exposure to violence, which cannot be easily transmitted. This makes the war generation show distinct preferences for nuclear proliferation compared to the post-war generation.

In Table 13, I test whether the effect of wartime violence is persistent in other political attitudes by replacing the dependent variable with people's trust in the president. I use the respondent's answer to a survey question of *"how much trust do you have in the President?"* The number of samples used in the analysis is reduced to 328 because only the survey in 2017 asked about respondents' trust in the country's major institutions. Statistically significant coefficients on PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA in Model 1 and 2 and POST-WAR IN RISK AREA in Model 3 and 4 demonstrate that people who grew up in war-torn zones and war-safe areas show significantly different levels of trust in the president at the 90% confidence level in both pre-war and post-war cohorts. The results are consistent with the existing findings that the effects of violence are transmitted to the next generation in other political attitudes.

- **Excluding Seoul residents.** One might question whether the estimates are disproportionately derived from populations residing in Seoul since the majority of the population is focused on the capital. If it is the case, the effect could be driven by the differences between the city and countryside dwellers, not the war violence exposure. In Table 14, I replicate the analysis excluding respondents who lived in Seoul during their childhood. The results are consistent with the main finding, confirming that my findings are not sensitive to capital residents.

- **Entire South Korean public sample.** In Table 15, I replicate the analysis with the entire

sample of the South Korean public. One might raise a question regarding the statistical significance appearing only on the main independent variable of interest but not on any other confounding factors. For example, previous literature suggests that political ideology, age, and gender strongly predict individuals' preferences for nuclear weapons (Sagan and Valentino, 2017; Press, Sagan and Valentino, 2013). Male, older, and right-leaning respondents tend to show greater support for the acquisition or use of nuclear weapons. A similar pattern is observed in the South Korean public. In Table 15, MALE and AGE variables achieve statistical significance of 95% with the direction consistent with the existing literature. Male and older respondents are more supportive of nuclear armament. Then what explains the disappearance of the statistical significance when limiting the analysis to the 10-year cohorts of the pre-war and post-war generations? One possibility is that the wartime experience, a very rare but one of the most traumatic memories any individual can experience, dominates nuclear weapons preferences. The effects of other individual characteristics are attenuated within the war generation because the childhood wartime violence experiences make them less influential than they are in the larger set of the public.

- **Excluding people born before 1945.** In the pre-war cohort, the sample includes people who experienced, even if not personally, the nuclear bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One might question whether these people are significantly different from those who have never experienced nuclear attacks in the neighboring country. In Table 16, I replicate the analysis by excluding respondents who were born before 1945. The results are largely consistent with the main finding, but the statistical significance is slightly weaker: the results are significant at the 90% confidence level across all models (the p-values of the interaction term range from 0.056 to 0.074). The findings confirm that my findings are not sensitive to nuclear attack observers.

- **Methodological changes.** I make two methodological changes to evaluate whether any of them change the results. First, I replicate the analysis using OLS (Table 17). Second, I

use a multinomial logistic model (Table 18). In each case, I continue to find a positive relationship between childhood experiences of wartime violence and preferences for nuclear proliferation.

Table A.1: Regression Analysis Using Mutually Exclusive Explanatory Variables

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA	0.219*	0.224*	0.174$^+$	0.205*
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.0983)	(0.103)
PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA			-0.0453	-0.0190
			(0.0814)	(0.0862)
POST-WAR IN RISK AREA	-0.0268	-0.0502	-0.0721	-0.0693
	(0.0864)	(0.0926)	(0.0530)	(0.0539)
POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA	0.0453	0.0190		
	(0.0814)	(0.0862)		
MALE	0.0287	0.0117	0.0287	0.0117
	(0.0451)	(0.0487)	(0.0451)	(0.0487)
AGE	0.00155	0.00224	0.00155	0.00224
	(0.00513)	(0.00522)	(0.00513)	(0.00522)
PID		0.0409		0.0409
		(0.0312)		(0.0312)
EDUCATION		0.0434		0.0434
		(0.0351)		(0.0351)
INCOME		-0.00222		-0.00222
		(0.0248)		(0.0248)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0520		-0.0520
		(0.103)		(0.103)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0291		-0.0291
		(0.0474)		(0.0474)
CONSTANT	3.441***	3.283***	3.487***	3.302***
	(0.332)	(0.352)	(0.288)	(0.317)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2254	2219
Log Lik.	-3349.4	-3301.8	-3349.4	-3301.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

In Model 1 and 2, PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA is the baseline category.

In Model 3 and 4, POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA is the baseline category.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.2: Excluding Movers

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	-0.0160	-0.00302	0.946	1.354
	(0.0751)	(0.0763)	(1.301)	(1.331)
PRE-WAR	-0.0813	-0.0872	-0.270	-0.288
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.205)	(0.206)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.409*	0.436*	6.536*	6.946*
	(0.169)	(0.170)	(2.952)	(2.973)
MALE	0.112+	0.112+	0.109+	0.114+
	(0.0624)	(0.0666)	(0.0623)	(0.0666)
AGE	0.00181	0.00516	0.00215	0.00499
	(0.0110)	(0.0116)	(0.0109)	(0.0116)
PID		0.0740+		0.0746+
		(0.0430)		(0.0429)
EDUCATION		0.0180		0.00891
		(0.0473)		(0.0472)
INCOME		-0.0140		-0.0156
		(0.0336)		(0.0335)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.282*		-0.300*
		(0.137)		(0.138)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.110+		-0.105
		(0.0653)		(0.0653)
CONSTANT	3.374***	3.132***	3.304***	3.097***
	(0.602)	(0.678)	(0.605)	(0.679)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1233	1218	1233	1218
Log Lik.	-1859.3	-1832.6	-1858.4	-1831.4

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.3: Alternate Pre-war and Post-war Cohort Years (Without Post-treatment Variables)

	(1) 1944-1953 vs. 1954-1963	(2) 1941-1953 vs. 1954-1967	(3) 1941-1950 vs. 1951-1960	(4) 1941-1948 vs. 1953-1960
RISK AREA	-0.0697	-0.0778$^+$	-0.0403	-0.0932
	(0.0532)	(0.0466)	(0.0567)	(0.0608)
PRE-WAR	-0.0625	-0.0885	-0.0271	-0.107
	(0.0871)	(0.0785)	(0.105)	(0.159)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.290**	0.311***	0.261*	0.347*
	(0.0993)	(0.0937)	(0.120)	(0.146)
MALE	0.0250	0.0272	-0.00598	0.0267
	(0.0425)	(0.0382)	(0.0474)	(0.0527)
AGE	0.000320	0.00361	-0.0000948	0.00123
	(0.00759)	(0.00529)	(0.00878)	(0.0119)
CONSTANT	3.556***	3.387***	3.561***	3.459***
	(0.415)	(0.282)	(0.507)	(0.675)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2558	3221	2062	1664
Log Lik.	-3813.1	-4827.0	-3074.6	-2478.7

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.4: Alternate Pre-war and Post-war Cohort Years (With All Control Variables)

	(1) 1944-1953 vs. 1954-63	(2) 1941-1953 vs. 1954-67	(3) 1941-1950 vs. 1951-60	(4) 1941-1948 vs. 1953-60
RISK AREA	-0.0676	-0.0764	-0.0386	-0.0907
	(0.0541)	(0.0475)	(0.0578)	(0.0620)
PRE-WAR	-0.0632	-0.0899	-0.0170	-0.0946
	(0.0880)	(0.0795)	(0.106)	(0.161)
RISK AREA $\times$ PRE-WAR	0.281**	0.305**	0.264*	0.354*
	(0.101)	(0.0949)	(0.121)	(0.147)
MALE	0.00890	0.0119	-0.0128	0.0206
	(0.0460)	(0.0412)	(0.0519)	(0.0571)
AGE	0.00363	0.00394	0.000655	0.00231
	(0.00806)	(0.00572)	(0.00935)	(0.0125)
PID	0.0320	0.0454$^+$	0.00797	0.00451
	(0.0294)	(0.0266)	(0.0328)	(0.0363)
EDUCATION	0.0489	0.0311	0.0196	0.0273
	(0.0334)	(0.0308)	(0.0356)	(0.0402)
INCOME	-0.00248	-0.0124	0.00701	0.00884
	(0.0234)	(0.0213)	(0.0258)	(0.0289)
UNEMPLOYED	-0.0567	-0.00980	-0.00112	-0.00543
	(0.102)	(0.0948)	(0.0995)	(0.115)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.00321	-0.0179	0.0241	0.0326
	(0.0448)	(0.0402)	(0.0503)	(0.0555)
CONSTANT	3.209***	3.263***	3.435***	3.286***
	(0.468)	(0.335)	(0.565)	(0.736)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2518	3170	2031	1639
Log Lik.	-3759.2	-4759.2	-3034.2	-2445.5

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.5: Alternate Risk Area: Riskier Area (Above 75th Percentile of Casualty Rate) and Safe Area (Below 25th Percentile of Casualty Rate)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	RISKIER AREA		SAFE AREA	
PRE-WAR	0.00947	0.0113	0.231*	0.229+
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.120)
RISKIER AREA	-0.0536	-0.0426		
	(0.0558)	(0.0567)		
RISKIER AREA × PRE-WAR	0.289*	0.281*		
	(0.122)	(0.124)		
SAFE AREA			0.0231	0.0194
			(0.0507)	(0.0519)
SAFE AREA × PRE-WAR			-0.323**	-0.319**
			(0.114)	(0.115)
MALE	0.0296	0.0148	0.0308	0.0165
	(0.0451)	(0.0487)	(0.0450)	(0.0487)
AGE	-0.00247	0.0000147	-0.00187	0.000120
	(0.00801)	(0.00847)	(0.00800)	(0.00847)
PID		0.0424		0.0462
		(0.0312)		(0.0314)
EDUCATION		0.0400		0.0357
		(0.0356)		(0.0356)
INCOME		-0.00364		-0.00380
		(0.0249)		(0.0250)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0556		-0.0410
		(0.104)		(0.104)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0271		-0.0228
		(0.0475)		(0.0477)
CONSTANT	3.694***	3.419***	3.633***	3.396***
	(0.439)	(0.495)	(0.439)	(0.496)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2254	2219
Log Lik.	-3349.7	-3302.3	-3348.1	-3300.6

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

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Table A.6: Placebo Test 1: Wartime Violence and Cultural Diversity Preferences

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	0.0388	0.0301	1.149	1.101
	(0.0436)	(0.0442)	(0.782)	(0.796)
PRE-WAR	0.0398	0.0574	0.140	0.163
	(0.0958)	(0.0968)	(0.126)	(0.127)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	-0.109	-0.0929	-2.772	-2.745
	(0.0969)	(0.0975)	(1.774)	(1.780)
MALE	0.0812*	0.0782+	0.0804*	0.0774+
	(0.0371)	(0.0399)	(0.0372)	(0.0400)
AGE	-0.00516	-0.00750	-0.00505	-0.00749
	(0.00659)	(0.00695)	(0.00660)	(0.00695)
PID		-0.0641*		-0.0637*
		(0.0256)		(0.0256)
EDUCATION		0.00621		0.00679
		(0.0292)		(0.0294)
INCOME		-0.0199		-0.0200
		(0.0205)		(0.0205)
UNEMPLOYED		0.0255		0.0303
		(0.0850)		(0.0853)
RELIGIOSITY		0.0337		0.0363
		(0.0390)		(0.0390)
CONSTANT	2.915***	3.121***	2.863***	3.070***
	(0.361)	(0.405)	(0.364)	(0.407)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2248	2213
Log Lik.	-2910.1	-2861.0	-2903.3	-2854.1

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.7: Placebo Test 2: Wartime Violence and Views on Unemployment Problem

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	-0.00141	-0.00328	0.0159	-0.0213
	(0.0312)	(0.0317)	(0.560)	(0.571)
PRE-WAR	-0.0169	-0.0234	-0.0664	-0.0741
	(0.0686)	(0.0694)	(0.0904)	(0.0913)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.0552	0.0569	1.383	1.418
	(0.0694)	(0.0700)	(1.270)	(1.277)
MALE	-0.0172	-0.0298	-0.0160	-0.0285
	(0.0265)	(0.0287)	(0.0266)	(0.0287)
AGE	-0.000753	-0.00129	-0.000626	-0.00119
	(0.00472)	(0.00499)	(0.00472)	(0.00499)
PID		-0.0243		-0.0233
		(0.0184)		(0.0184)
EDUCATION		0.00599		0.00648
		(0.0210)		(0.0211)
INCOME		-0.00823		-0.00863
		(0.0147)		(0.0147)
UNEMPLOYED		0.0581		0.0585
		(0.0610)		(0.0612)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.00329		-0.00221
		(0.0279)		(0.0280)
CONSTANT	1.503***	1.559***	1.492***	1.548***
	(0.259)	(0.291)	(0.261)	(0.292)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2248	2213
Log Lik.	-2156.7	-2124.2	-2151.6	-2119.2

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table A.8: Placebo Test 3: Using Arbitrary Age Cohorts (Without Post-treatment Control Variables)

	(1) 1967-1976 vs. 1977-1986	(2) 1981-1990 vs. 1991-2000	(3) 1970-1979 vs. 1980-1989	(4) 1975-1984 vs. 1985-1994
RISK AREA	0.0402	0.0655	-0.0115	-0.0214
	(0.0564)	(0.0747)	(0.0584)	(0.0591)
RANDOM COHORT	-0.121	0.0368	-0.0791	0.187*
	(0.0779)	(0.0897)	(0.0799)	(0.0843)
RISK AREA $\times$ RANDOM COHORT	-0.0441	-0.114	0.0695	0.0845
	(0.0765)	(0.0952)	(0.0790)	(0.0817)
MALE	0.0823*	0.0732$^+$	0.113**	0.0719$^+$
	(0.0364)	(0.0439)	(0.0376)	(0.0389)
AGE	0.0171**	0.0161*	0.0135*	-0.00165
	(0.00629)	(0.00810)	(0.00655)	(0.00688)
CONSTANT	2.849***	2.780***	2.938***	3.209***
	(0.207)	(0.175)	(0.198)	(0.172)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3629	2519	3392	3177
Log Lik.	-5477.8	-3811.7	-5114.8	-4794.6

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.9: Placebo Test 3: Using Arbitrary Age Cohorts (With All Control Variables)

	(1) 1967-1976 vs. 1977-1986	(2) 1981-1990 vs. 1991-2000	(3) 1970-1979 vs. 1980-1989	(4) 1975-1984 vs. 1985-1994
RISK AREA	0.0588	0.0682	0.00601	-0.0163
	(0.0571)	(0.0762)	(0.0593)	(0.0602)
RANDOM COHORT	-0.125	0.0407	-0.0626	0.188*
	(0.0788)	(0.0969)	(0.0812)	(0.0858)
RISK AREA × RANDOM COHORT	-0.0458	-0.0997	0.0644	0.0985
	(0.0775)	(0.0969)	(0.0801)	(0.0832)
MALE	0.109**	0.0904*	0.124**	0.0867*
	(0.0377)	(0.0449)	(0.0387)	(0.0400)
AGE	0.0159*	0.0160+	0.0115+	-0.00263
	(0.00641)	(0.00823)	(0.00670)	(0.00706)
PID	0.0872**	-0.0231	0.0514+	0.0207
	(0.0281)	(0.0352)	(0.0292)	(0.0308)
EDUCATION	-0.0332	-0.0178	-0.00382	-0.0482
	(0.0359)	(0.0487)	(0.0373)	(0.0407)
INCOME	-0.000267	0.0207	-0.00474	0.00750
	(0.0220)	(0.0258)	(0.0225)	(0.0232)
UNEMPLOYED	-0.0997	-0.0914	-0.116	-0.0305
	(0.199)	(0.147)	(0.185)	(0.151)
RELIGIOSITY	0.0548	0.0606	0.0386	0.0487
	(0.0380)	(0.0484)	(0.0397)	(0.0422)
CONSTANT	2.882***	2.766***	2.939***	3.336***
	(0.256)	(0.263)	(0.257)	(0.241)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3546	2446	3311	3089
Log Lik.	-5348.9	-3705.4	-4995.2	-4665.5

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table A.10: Comparing the Entire Pre-war and Post-war Cohorts

	(1) 1941-1950 vs. 1954-1963	(2) 1941-1950 vs. 1954-1963	(3) 1941-1947 vs. 1954-1960	(4) 1941-1947 vs. 1954-1960
PRE-WAR	0.0997	0.0993	0.0972	0.101
	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.170)	(0.170)
MALE	0.0300	0.0142	0.00499	-0.0122
	(0.0328)	(0.0444)	(0.0629)	(0.0824)
AGE	-0.00258	-0.000176	0.000658	0.00309
	(0.0114)	(0.0122)	(0.0132)	(0.0156)
PID		0.0425		0.0115
		(0.0269)		(0.0328)
EDUCATION		0.0392		0.0386
		(0.0386)		(0.0613)
INCOME		-0.00264		0.0120
		(0.0399)		(0.0538)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0482		0.0245
		(0.0971)		(0.166)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0279		0.00200
		(0.0480)		(0.0601)
CONSTANT	3.680***	3.415**	3.498**	3.232*
	(0.615)	(0.742)	(0.726)	(0.965)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	1466	1445
Log Lik.	-3352.5	-3304.9	-2184.4	-2155.9

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table A.11: Comparing the Entire Pre-war and Post-war Cohorts by Risk and Non-risk Areas

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA	0.285*	0.286*	0.213+	0.217+
	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.131)
PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA	0.0658	0.0622	-0.00578	-0.00653
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.118)
POST-WAR IN RISK AREA	0.0716	0.0687		
	(0.0530)	(0.0540)		
POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA			-0.0716	-0.0687
			(0.0530)	(0.0540)
MALE	0.0292	0.0124	0.0292	0.0124
	(0.0451)	(0.0487)	(0.0451)	(0.0487)
AGE	-0.00237	0.000306	-0.00237	0.000306
	(0.00801)	(0.00848)	(0.00801)	(0.00848)
PID		0.0409		0.0409
		(0.0312)		(0.0312)
EDUCATION		0.0426		0.0426
		(0.0356)		(0.0356)
INCOME		-0.00252		-0.00252
		(0.0250)		(0.0250)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0484		-0.0484
		(0.104)		(0.104)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0286		-0.0286
		(0.0475)		(0.0475)
CONSTANT	3.628***	3.342***	3.699***	3.411***
	(0.440)	(0.498)	(0.439)	(0.495)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2254	2219
Log Lik.	-3349.4	-3301.8	-3349.4	-3301.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

In Model 1 and 2, POST-WAR IN RISK AREA is the baseline category.

In Model 3 and 4, POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA is the baseline category.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table A.12: Historic Legacies of Violence on Trust in the President (Survey Year 2017)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
PRE-WAR IN RISK AREA	-0.306$^+$	-0.307$^+$	-0.103	-0.126
	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.193)	(0.195)
PRE-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA			0.203	0.181
			(0.197)	(0.198)
POST-WAR IN RISK AREA	-0.371$^+$	-0.336	-0.168$^+$	-0.155$^+$
	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.0891)	(0.0909)
POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA	-0.203	-0.181		
	(0.197)	(0.198)		
MALE	0.0373	0.0545	0.0373	0.0545
	(0.0747)	(0.0820)	(0.0747)	(0.0820)
AGE	-0.00998	-0.0152	-0.00998	-0.0152
	(0.0139)	(0.0149)	(0.0139)	(0.0149)
PID		0.123*		0.123*
		(0.0509)		(0.0509)
EDU		-0.0223		-0.0223
		(0.0608)		(0.0608)
INCOME		-0.0158		-0.0158
		(0.0403)		(0.0403)
UNEMPLOYED		0.0659		0.0659
		(0.163)		(0.163)
RELIGIOSITY		0.0862		0.0862
		(0.0786)		(0.0786)
CONSTANT	2.972**	3.161**	2.768***	2.981**
	(0.979)	(1.068)	(0.815)	(0.918)
Observations	337	328	337	328
Log Lik.	-346.0	-333.0	-346.0	-333.0

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

In Model 1 and 2, POST-WAR IN RISK AREA is the baseline category.

In Model 3 and 4, POST-WAR IN NON-RISK AREA is the baseline category.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table A.13: Excluding Childhood Seoul Residents

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	-0.0869	-0.0857	-0.645	-0.506
	(0.0597)	(0.0609)	(1.109)	(1.139)
PRE-WAR	0.0449	0.0360	-0.122	-0.128
	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.161)	(0.163)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.339**	0.348**	5.851*	5.819*
	(0.131)	(0.132)	(2.481)	(2.498)
MALE	0.0214	0.000647	0.0202	0.00173
	(0.0474)	(0.0515)	(0.0475)	(0.0516)
AGE	-0.00627	-0.00482	-0.00677	-0.00559
	(0.00845)	(0.00895)	(0.00846)	(0.00896)
PID		0.0179		0.0220
		(0.0328)		(0.0329)
EDUCATION		0.0375		0.0332
		(0.0378)		(0.0380)
INCOME		-0.0228		-0.0246
		(0.0264)		(0.0264)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0352		-0.0480
		(0.109)		(0.110)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0544		-0.0563
		(0.0500)		(0.0502)
CONSTANT	3.912***	3.784***	3.948***	3.841***
	(0.464)	(0.523)	(0.468)	(0.526)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2019	1986	2013	1980
Log Lik.	-2992.0	-2947.8	-2984.1	-2939.8

Standard errors in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.14: Entire South Korean Public Sample and Nuclear Proliferation Preferences

	(1) Entire Sample
MALE	0.0628*
	(0.0256)
AGE	0.00570**
	(0.000990)
PID	0.0517
	(0.0292)
EDUCATION	0.00522
	(0.0189)
INCOME	0.00249
	(0.0267)
UNEMPLOYED	-0.0724
	(0.0939)
RELIGIOSITY	0.0309
	(0.0239)
CONSTANT	3.106***
	(0.0757)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	8215
Log Lik.	-12420.2

Robust standard errors are clustered by surveys and in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.15: Excluding People Born Before 1945

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	-0.0715	-0.0683	-0.548	-0.386
	(0.0530)	(0.0540)	(0.950)	(0.971)
PRE-WAR	0.0119	0.0146	-0.140	-0.132
	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.167)	(0.168)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.241$^+$	0.246$^+$	4.813$^+$	4.734$^+$
	(0.135)	(0.136)	(2.513)	(2.525)
MALE	0.0353	0.0183	0.0362	0.0212
	(0.0464)	(0.0499)	(0.0464)	(0.0499)
AGE	-0.00147	0.00207	-0.00184	0.00137
	(0.00857)	(0.00904)	(0.00858)	(0.00904)
PID		0.0545$^+$		0.0583$^+$
		(0.0321)		(0.0322)
EDUCATION		0.0660$^+$		0.0633$^+$
		(0.0373)		(0.0375)
INCOME		-0.00549		-0.00871
		(0.0256)		(0.0256)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0907		-0.109
		(0.119)		(0.120)
RELIGIOSITY		0.000843		-0.000861
		(0.0488)		(0.0489)
CONSTANT	3.646***	3.215***	3.670***	3.258***
	(0.470)	(0.527)	(0.474)	(0.529)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2130	2096	2125	2091
Log Lik.	-3165.8	-3117.8	-3158.6	-3110.5

Standard errors in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

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Table A.16: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model Analysis

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
RISK AREA	-0.0716	-0.0687	-0.546	-0.397
	(0.0531)	(0.0542)	(0.953)	(0.975)
PRE-WAR	-0.00578	-0.00653	-0.140	-0.133
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.154)	(0.156)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.290*	0.292*	4.784*	4.627*
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(2.162)	(2.180)
MALE	0.0292	0.0124	0.0285	0.0136
	(0.0452)	(0.0489)	(0.0453)	(0.0490)
AGE	-0.00237	0.000306	-0.00275	-0.000336
	(0.00803)	(0.00851)	(0.00804)	(0.00852)
PID		0.0409		0.0439
		(0.0313)		(0.0314)
EDUCATION		0.0426		0.0383
		(0.0358)		(0.0359)
INCOME		-0.00252		-0.00430
		(0.0251)		(0.0251)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0484		-0.0590
		(0.104)		(0.104)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0286		-0.0314
		(0.0477)		(0.0478)
CONSTANT	3.699***	3.411***	3.724***	3.456***
	(0.440)	(0.496)	(0.444)	(0.499)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2248	2213
Log Lik.	-3349.4	-3301.9	-3341.5	-3294.0

Standard errors in parentheses.

Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported in the table.

$^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

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Table A.17: Multinomial Logit Model Analysis

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
	Binary RISK AREA		Continuous RISK AREA	
Slightly Disagree				
RISK AREA	-0.0653	-0.148	-5.656	-7.735
	(0.270)	(0.276)	(4.937)	(5.107)
PRE-WAR	-0.346	-0.294	-0.566	-0.557
	(0.613)	(0.622)	(0.831)	(0.834)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	-0.0510	0.0174	4.942	6.387
	(0.699)	(0.701)	(12.80)	(12.68)
MALE	0.139	0.151	0.140	0.138
	(0.240)	(0.258)	(0.241)	(0.258)
AGE	0.0231	0.0321	0.0208	0.0309
	(0.0425)	(0.0447)	(0.0426)	(0.0446)
PID		-0.135		-0.136
		(0.162)		(0.162)
EDUCATION		0.116		0.140
		(0.185)		(0.187)
INCOME		0.0581		0.0587
		(0.132)		(0.132)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0218		0.00245
		(0.527)		(0.527)
RELIGIOSITY		0.0787		0.0514
		(0.253)		(0.254)
Constant	-2.057	-2.863	-1.627	-2.468
	(2.329)	(2.592)	(2.348)	(2.601)
Neutral				
RISK AREA	-0.334*	-0.327*	-7.337**	-7.311*
	(0.157)	(0.160)	(2.807)	(2.863)
PRE-WAR1	-0.767*	-0.772*	-1.163*	-1.190*
	(0.354)	(0.358)	(0.474)	(0.478)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.741*	0.687+	14.12*	14.10*
	(0.375)	(0.378)	(7.061)	(7.054)
MALE	-0.215	-0.219	-0.210	-0.220
	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.137)	(0.148)
AGE	0.0400	0.0297	0.0370	0.0272
	(0.0245)	(0.0259)	(0.0246)	(0.0260)
PID		-0.0293		-0.0255
		(0.0942)		(0.0943)
EDUCATION		-0.158		-0.155
		(0.107)		(0.108)
INCOME		-0.0122		-0.0142
		(0.0758)		(0.0759)
UNEMPLOYED		0.00213		-0.00708
		(0.307)		(0.307)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.197		-0.221
		(0.144)		(0.144)
Constant	-1.229	-0.111	-0.795	0.306
	(1.345)	(1.507)	(1.358)	(1.517)
Slightly Agree				
RISK AREA	-0.475**	-0.475**	-7.372**	-7.347**
	(0.157)	(0.160)	(2.786)	(2.833)
PRE-WAR1	-0.434	-0.408	-0.924*	-0.880+
	(0.349)	(0.353)	(0.468)	(0.470)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.892*	0.870*	16.52*	15.93*
	(0.369)	(0.371)	(6.912)	(6.878)
MALE	-0.211	-0.195	-0.207	-0.188
	(0.136)	(0.146)	(0.136)	(0.146)
AGE	0.0198	0.0252	0.0170	0.0222
	(0.0243)	(0.0256)	(0.0244)	(0.0257)
PID		0.0278		0.0365
		(0.0935)		(0.0936)
EDUCATION		-0.00299		-0.00753
		(0.107)		(0.107)
INCOME		0.0540		0.0486
		(0.0752)		(0.0754)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.240		-0.273
		(0.312)		(0.313)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.0412		-0.0571
		(0.143)		(0.144)
Constant	0.142	-0.280	0.518	0.124
	(1.332)	(1.489)	(1.345)	(1.498)
Strongly Agree				
RISK AREA	-0.172	-0.187	-3.352	-3.532
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(2.990)	(3.030)
PRE-WAR1	-0.280	-0.279	-0.759	-0.747
	(0.383)	(0.387)	(0.508)	(0.509)
RISK AREA × PRE-WAR	0.883*	0.880*	16.51*	16.20*
	(0.394)	(0.395)	(7.293)	(7.237)
MALE	0.153	0.0905	0.151	0.0880
	(0.148)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.159)
AGE	0.00897	0.0136	0.00696	0.0117
	(0.0264)	(0.0278)	(0.0265)	(0.0278)
PID		0.0584		0.0645
		(0.102)		(0.102)
EDUCATION		0.109		0.106
		(0.115)		(0.116)
INCOME		-0.0251		-0.0281
		(0.0814)		(0.0814)
UNEMPLOYED		-0.0652		-0.0875
		(0.324)		(0.325)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.145		-0.167
		(0.155)		(0.155)
Constant	0.153	-0.336	0.394	-0.0737
	(1.445)	(1.611)	(1.459)	(1.620)
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2254	2219	2248	2213
Log Lik.	-3218.5	-3160.8	-3211.1	-3152.7

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Standard errors in parentheses.
Survey fixed effects are included in the analysis but not reported.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3

B.1 Additional Robustness Tests

- **Alternate dependent variable.** In Tables 1 and 2, I reestimated the main model using two alternate dependent variables, high-level and low-level military conflicts only. In Table 1, a replication of the main analysis by replacing by outcome variable to only include high-level conflicts shows that the results are consistent. In Appendix Table 2, I limit my outcome variable to only include low-level military conflicts. I argue that these leaders are also less likely to initiate disputes at a small scale for fear of escalation because childhood war trauma diminishes leaders' confidence in their countries' ability to manage escalation. The results indicate that leaders who experienced war trauma as children are much less inclined to initiate even minor conflicts. In addition, Figures 1 and 2 confirm that the effects are more significant in non-democratic countries, and there exists higher uncertainty in democratic settings.

- **Placebo test.** One might also wonder if leaders who have lost a family member, no matter what the reason, are less likely to initiate militarized disputes. My theory says that leaders' decisions about national security will only be affected by childhood trauma caused by wartime violence, not by personal or family trauma because they are directly related to earlier trauma. My theory does not predict a link between traumatic experiences unrelated to war and preferences about national security. If family loss experiences simply make people different in every way, they are likely to have different preferences in national security policies to some extent. Evidence of a nonrelationship in these contexts would enhance the plausibility of my argument.

  In Table 3, I conducted a placebo test including FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR variable, repre-

senting whether a leader lost family members during childhood due to circumstances other than wartime violence. This category includes illness and accidents. The results show that FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR is not a significant predictor of conflict initiation in any of the model specifications. The null relationship between non-war-related traumatic experiences and conflict initiation enhances my confidence in previous findings.

- **Sensitivity analysis.** One issue with my main analysis is the limited number of treated leaders. This may increase the concern that my results are sample-dependent. To address this concern, I conducted several sensitivity analyses in Tables 4 and 5. First, I replicated the analysis using only non-European countries to see whether the findings are not specific to the European continent. The majority of the sample comes from European leaders who experienced World Wars I and II as children. Models 1 and 2 in Tables 6 and 7 show that the results of both the main and interaction models are consistent. In Models 3, 4, 5, and 6, I modify the analysis's temporal scope: post-World War I and post-World War II. The results are robust to all subsamples and model specifications.

- **Alternate independent variable.** The heterogeneity of my treatment may be questioned, as it comprises three categories: the death of family members, the injury of family members, and displacement. In Tables 6 and 7, I modify the independent variable and replicate the analysis. First, in Table 6, I only included leaders who lost family members to foreign violence as children. I also estimated Table 7, this time considering only leaders who were displaced by war during childhood. These modifications do not produce major changes in my results.

- **Matching.** I ran a robustness test using the matching and weighting method for time-series cross-sectional data proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2021)'s proposal. This method ensures that each treated observation is matched with a set of control observations that share an identical treatment history for up to two years while maintaining a covariate balance. Figures 3 and 4 show the covariate balance before and after refinement with various methods.

Circles and daggers below the 45-degree line indicate that the standardized mean difference is reduced after refinement for a particular covariate. While balance does not improve for all covariates, it improves for most. With the balanced covariates, in Figures 5 and 6, I estimated the effects of my treatment variable over time using the Mahalanobis distance matching and covariate balanced propensity score weighting methods, which reduce covariate differences the most.[1] I estimate the average treatment effects up to ten years after leaders with childhood exposure to wartime violence come to power. Matching multiple pre-treatment years results in a very small number of control units; therefore, I used two pre-treatment lags for this analysis. With two lags, the number of treated units is 12, and the quantity of the matched set per treated unit varies between 1 and 20. The small sample size caused by the treatment distribution over time and the fact that this method matches the treatment year and history suggest that causal inference in this context is very difficult. The graph in Figure 5 shows that the possibility of conflict initiation decreases beginning the year a leader with childhood war exposure comes to power and remains significant for the next four years. The treatment effect becomes insignificant as more years pass after a leader's term in office.

- **Methodological changes.** I conducted several robustness tests using alternative identification strategies. First, In Table 8, I estimated using a conditional fixed-effects logistic model in order to exclude countries or years with no variation in the dependent variable from the analysis. Second, in Table 9, I reestimate the main model using the linear probability model (LPM), which can include all the dropped observations in the previous conditional fixed-effects logit model. The LPM maintains observations with no variations, leading to a larger sample. The results largely point in the same direction as the main findings. Third, in Table 10, I make another methodological change by using a count measure of the dependent variable and the Poisson regression model. The dependent variable here is the number of times a country initiated militarized interstate disputes during a given year. Table A9 displays the results from Poisson regressions. I find some evidence that leaders with childhood war

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[1]Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 are generated using the R package PanelMatch by (Imai, Kim and Wang, 2021).

trauma lower a state's propensity to initiate conflict in non-democracies but not in democratic countries.

- **Expansion of the sample to include all leaders.** In Table 11, I examine leaders with and without childhood war experiences together. In my main analysis, I intentionally restricted my sample to only leaders who experienced a foreign military invasion during childhood to make my treatment and control groups as comparable as possible. However, some may question whether an expansion of the sample to include all leaders leads to a different conclusion. In this setting, I have nearly four times as many observations as in the main analysis. The results are broadly similar. I find consistent negative effects in Models 1 and 2, which confirm that leaders with childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate conflicts than other leaders, albeit with slightly higher p-values (p-values: 0.031 and 0.040). In Models 3 and 4, positive and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term support the conditional hypothesis that the effects of the independent variable depend on the domestic political constraints on leaders. Figure 7, which is described based on Model 4, confirms that the effects of childhood war trauma on leaders' conservatism about the use of force are greater in non-democratic contexts.

- **Mutually exclusive explanatory variables.** As I expand my sample to include all leaders, one might ask if the effects of exposure to wartime violence are proportional to the severity of the violence experienced. I created three dummy variables to represent each of the following groups: (1) leaders who have experienced invasion and trauma, (2) leaders who have experienced invasion but not trauma, and (3) leaders who have not experienced invasion. It is possible that the first group of leaders is the most conservative about the use of force, the second group is moderately conservative, and the third group is the least conservative.

These three variables are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so one of the three dummy variables should be omitted for estimation. I can use the omitted variable as a baseline category and interpret the coefficients on the remaining variables in terms of their effects relative

to the excluded variable. All other model specifications except for the dummy explanatory variables, such as the inclusion of control variables and fixed effects, remain the same as in my main analysis.

In Models 1 and 2, the baseline is CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA. A negative and statistically significant coefficient on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA will suggest that personal trauma, in addition to invasion experience, will make leaders more reluctant to use force. In Models 3 and 4, the baseline is NO INVASION. I can interpret both coefficients on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA and CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA. Both coefficients are expected to be negative and statistically significant, with the coefficient on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA expected to be larger.

The results partially support expectations. In Models 1 and 2, the negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.1$) coefficients on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA indicate that leaders who have experienced childhood war trauma are less likely to initiate conflict than those who experienced invasion but no personal trauma. In Models 3 and 4, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA suggest that war-traumatized leaders are less likely to initiate conflict than those who have not experienced an invasion. However, statistically insignificant coefficients on CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA suggest that the difference in the propensity to initiate conflict between the second and third groups is statistically indistinguishable (p-values: 0.294 and 0.493). Taken together, leaders with childhood war trauma are least likely to initiate conflicts compared to all other leader groups. We cannot confirm whether an invasion experience without personal trauma increases military conservatism, while the direction and magnitude of the coefficients produce suggestive evidence.

- **Alternative Political Constraints Variable.** I replicate my analysis using an alternative measure of domestic political constraints. I obtained data on political constraints from Henisz (2002) to determine if the impact of childhood war trauma on the initiation of conflict

is diminished in institutionally constrained settings. The results presented in Table 13 and Figure 8 of the appendix are consistent with the main findings. The effect of childhood war trauma on the initiation of militarized disputes is negative and statistically distinguishable from zero when the political constraints variable is close to or below the sample mean (0.17). The marginal effects are not statistically significant for relatively more constrained executives, and some estimates are even positive. These findings provide evidence that domestic constraints moderate the effects of individual leader-level variables on policy outcomes.

Figure B.1: High-level Conflict Initiation Only: Average Marginal Effects


Figure B.2: Low-level Conflict Initiation Only: Average Marginal Effects

B.2 List of Leaders with Childhood War Trauma

Table B.1: Alternate Dependent Variable: High-level Conflict Initiation Only

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.001**	-0.965+	-0.592*	-0.329
	(0.343)	(0.519)	(0.287)	(0.388)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V			0.117***	0.179***
			(0.0330)	(0.0412)
POLITY V	0.0606*	0.0727+	0.0534+	0.0619
	(0.0309)	(0.0438)	(0.0315)	(0.0430)
AGE	0.00460	0.0143	0.00757	0.0215+
	(0.00972)	(0.0108)	(0.00981)	(0.0111)
MALE	-0.727	-0.892	-0.0994	-0.217
	(1.067)	(1.205)	(0.733)	(0.823)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.253	-0.426	-0.173	-0.273
	(0.681)	(0.778)	(0.682)	(0.774)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.419*	0.480	0.541**	0.673*
	(0.212)	(0.341)	(0.208)	(0.310)
REBEL	0.627*	0.505	0.586*	0.419
	(0.271)	(0.407)	(0.245)	(0.366)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.703+	1.321**	0.756*	1.464**
	(0.393)	(0.491)	(0.384)	(0.459)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0183	-0.0280	-0.0206	-0.0310
	(0.0313)	(0.0375)	(0.0298)	(0.0382)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.525	-0.585+	-0.551+	-0.639
	(0.322)	(0.356)	(0.307)	(0.390)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0224	-0.0465	-0.000757	-0.0407
	(0.190)	(0.198)	(0.190)	(0.197)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.216*		-1.212*	
	(0.565)		(0.572)	
INTERWAR	-0.828+		-0.796	
	(0.494)		(0.495)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.401**		-1.366**	
	(0.439)		(0.431)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.146		0.0396	
	(0.322)		(0.295)	
CONSTANT	4.748	6.742	4.314	6.268+
	(3.295)	(4.163)	(3.115)	(3.673)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1241	1088	1241	1088
Log Lik.	-528.2	-436.1	-524.8	-429.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table B.2: Alternate Dependent Variable: Low-level Conflict Initiation Only

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with DEMOCRACY
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.658***	-1.322*	-1.318***	-1.150*
	(0.464)	(0.547)	(0.397)	(0.484)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA× POLITY V			0.0906	0.0518
			(0.0603)	(0.0802)
POLITY V	0.0419	0.0667	0.0379	0.0651
	(0.0500)	(0.0564)	(0.0517)	(0.0562)
AGE	0.0126	-0.000976	0.0146	0.00107
	(0.0176)	(0.0239)	(0.0181)	(0.0242)
MALE	0.483	0.415	0.669	0.550
	(1.609)	(1.463)	(1.487)	(1.538)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.597	-1.003	-0.491	-0.920
	(0.421)	(0.683)	(0.435)	(0.673)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	-0.244	-0.693	-0.124	-0.612
	(0.419)	(0.598)	(0.425)	(0.649)
REBEL	0.0613	0.239	0.0451	0.227
	(0.438)	(0.527)	(0.450)	(0.539)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.754	1.660**	0.866+	1.730**
	(0.552)	(0.639)	(0.507)	(0.649)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0171	-0.0386	-0.0155	-0.0385
	(0.0259)	(0.0249)	(0.0262)	(0.0249)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-1.836***	-2.119**	-1.864***	-2.147**
	(0.451)	(0.771)	(0.450)	(0.776)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.00935	-0.0318	-0.0101	-0.0392
	(0.199)	(0.233)	(0.191)	(0.224)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-3.635*		-3.660*	
	(1.634)		(1.693)	
INTERWAR	-1.858*		-1.834*	
	(0.917)		(0.915)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-0.679		-0.626	
	(0.903)		(0.904)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.289		0.203	
	(0.381)		(0.343)	
CONSTANT	0.626	4.572	0.783	4.562
	(3.514)	(3.622)	(3.241)	(3.583)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1076	784	1076	784
Log Lik.	-315.7	-246.0	-314.8	-245.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table B.3: Placebo Test: Childhood Loss of Family Members Due to Illness or Accident

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR	0.157	0.246	0.137	0.223
	(0.377)	(0.441)	(0.374)	(0.457)
FAMILY LOSS BY NON-WAR× POLITY V			-0.0294	-0.0670
			(0.0360)	(0.0514)
POLITY V	0.0545$^+$	0.0654	0.0647*	0.0902$^+$
	(0.0294)	(0.0431)	(0.0324)	(0.0462)
AGE	0.00142	0.00750	0.00313	0.0124
	(0.0101)	(0.0123)	(0.0108)	(0.0123)
MALE	-0.228	-0.423	-0.326	-0.609
	(0.826)	(1.094)	(0.864)	(1.118)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.143	-0.359	-0.155	-0.333
	(0.717)	(0.833)	(0.729)	(0.878)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.476$^+$	0.486	0.517$^+$	0.576
	(0.281)	(0.395)	(0.280)	(0.384)
REBEL	0.600*	0.513	0.627*	0.599
	(0.298)	(0.417)	(0.301)	(0.438)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.857*	1.458**	0.835*	1.430**
	(0.402)	(0.488)	(0.390)	(0.493)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0126	-0.0196	-0.0119	-0.0189
	(0.0320)	(0.0362)	(0.0328)	(0.0376)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.247	-0.200	-0.221	-0.173
	(0.423)	(0.458)	(0.414)	(0.435)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	0.0141	0.0280	0.00258	-0.0108
	(0.188)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.197)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.045		-1.102$^+$	
	(0.659)		(0.655)	
INTERWAR	-0.693		-0.658	
	(0.558)		(0.570)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.250*		-1.293*	
	(0.565)		(0.542)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.211		0.155	
	(0.327)		(0.295)	
CONSTANT	5.083	7.259$^+$	4.923	6.559
	(3.217)	(4.190)	(3.154)	(4.222)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1241	1088	1241	1088
Log Lik.	-538.3	-443.9	-538.0	-442.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table B.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Model

	Model 1 Excluding Europe	Model 2 Excluding Europe	Model 3 Post-World War I	Model 4 Post-World War I	Model 5 Post-World War II	Model 6 Post-World War II
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.390***	-1.535*	-1.180**	-1.193*	-0.971*	-1.044+
	(0.399)	(0.627)	(0.401)	(0.589)	(0.413)	(0.582)
POLITY V	0.0418	0.0486	0.0412	0.0578	0.0561	0.0663
	(0.0362)	(0.0447)	(0.0315)	(0.0460)	(0.0357)	(0.0497)
AGE	0.00664	0.0212	0.00608	0.0160	0.0000427	0.00900
	(0.0112)	(0.0150)	(0.0110)	(0.0124)	(0.0113)	(0.0121)
MALE	-1.515+	-2.142+	-0.797	-0.864	-0.679	-0.827
	(0.805)	(1.163)	(1.042)	(1.217)	(1.026)	(1.275)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.397	-0.686	-0.346	-0.534	-0.677	-1.007
	(0.751)	(0.867)	(0.712)	(0.784)	(0.681)	(0.827)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.379	0.853	0.219	0.317	0.251	0.450
	(0.296)	(0.628)	(0.246)	(0.351)	(0.280)	(0.408)
REBEL	0.619+	0.344	0.666*	0.450	0.666*	0.353
	(0.321)	(0.587)	(0.292)	(0.428)	(0.321)	(0.432)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.672+	1.479+	0.670	1.164*	0.661	0.955
	(0.358)	(0.786)	(0.428)	(0.546)	(0.488)	(0.610)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	0.00328	-0.0202	-0.0196	-0.0247	-0.0255	-0.0303
	(0.0635)	(0.0902)	(0.0336)	(0.0379)	(0.0336)	(0.0379)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	0.166	0.289	-0.550	-0.601+	-0.123	-0.269
	(0.365)	(0.396)	(0.353)	(0.347)	(0.409)	(0.433)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0547	0.114	-0.215	-0.159	-0.165	-0.0175
	(0.214)	(0.239)	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.199)	(0.197)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-0.812					
	(0.891)					
INTERWAR	0.0385		-1.151+			
	(0.344)		(0.601)			
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.075		-1.751**			
	(0.875)		(0.612)			
POST-COLD WAR	-0.0298		0.254		0.357	
	(0.303)		(0.316)		(0.327)	
CONSTANT	4.105	7.687	4.889	5.370	2.980	4.234
	(2.550)	(5.826)	(3.762)	(4.721)	(4.026)	(5.180)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	705	576	1109	1033	1026	986
Log Lik.	-345.8	-270.1	-485.3	-423.4	-443.8	-396.0

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table B.5: Sensitivity Analysis: Interaction Model

	Model 1 Excluding Europe	Model 2 Excluding Europe	Model 3 Post-World War I	Model 4 Post-World War I	Model 5 Post-World War II	Model 6 Post-World War II
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-0.628[+]	-0.244	-0.696*	-0.491	-0.532[+]	-0.448
	(0.357)	(0.509)	(0.292)	(0.396)	(0.310)	(0.409)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V	0.143***	0.250**	0.137***	0.200***	0.129***	0.183***
	(0.0405)	(0.0783)	(0.0337)	(0.0434)	(0.0329)	(0.0436)
POLITY V	0.0441	0.0556	0.0331	0.0462	0.0460	0.0542
	(0.0365)	(0.0493)	(0.0333)	(0.0466)	(0.0375)	(0.0509)
AGE	0.00793	0.0274[+]	0.0101	0.0249*	0.00463	0.0187
	(0.0117)	(0.0143)	(0.0116)	(0.0126)	(0.0112)	(0.0121)
MALE	-0.474	-0.690	-0.0636	-0.125	-0.00333	-0.147
	(0.520)	(0.788)	(0.698)	(0.842)	(0.702)	(0.894)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.347	-0.546	-0.238	-0.365	-0.573	-0.838
	(0.778)	(0.973)	(0.721)	(0.789)	(0.683)	(0.828)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.479[+]	1.144*	0.368	0.520[+]	0.400[+]	0.636[+]
	(0.272)	(0.577)	(0.236)	(0.299)	(0.243)	(0.347)
REBEL	0.588[+]	0.192	0.631*	0.353	0.627*	0.258
	(0.313)	(0.525)	(0.266)	(0.390)	(0.294)	(0.416)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.650[+]	1.307	0.739[+]	1.358**	0.719	1.150[+]
	(0.387)	(0.839)	(0.411)	(0.517)	(0.464)	(0.588)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0155	-0.0518	-0.0210	-0.0259	-0.0272	-0.0318
	(0.0609)	(0.0869)	(0.0325)	(0.0386)	(0.0325)	(0.0386)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	0.0419	0.0410	-0.598[+]	-0.685[+]	-0.207	-0.433
	(0.374)	(0.376)	(0.332)	(0.369)	(0.388)	(0.459)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0150	0.197	-0.194	-0.167	-0.132	-0.0180
	(0.223)	(0.261)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.202)	(0.193)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-0.626					
	(0.895)					
INTERWAR	0.0506		-1.115[+]			
	(0.308)		(0.609)			
POST-WORLD WAR II	-0.876		-1.755**			
	(0.874)		(0.599)			
POST-COLD WAR	-0.119		0.136		0.240	
	(0.302)		(0.282)		(0.298)	
CONSTANT	2.740	4.406	4.426	4.980	2.492	3.973
	(2.704)	(6.451)	(3.572)	(4.279)	(3.694)	(4.852)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	705	576	1109	1033	1026	986
Log Lik.	-343.7	-265.5	-481.0	-415.8	-439.8	-389.5

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.
Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.
[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.6: Alternative Independent Variable: Family Death Cases Only

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
FAMILY LOSS BY WAR	-1.509***	-1.593**	-0.845**	-0.550
	(0.312)	(0.560)	(0.277)	(0.398)
FAMILY LOSS BY WAR × POLITY V			0.158***	0.243***
			(0.0345)	(0.0423)
POLITY V	0.0685*	0.0743+	0.0610+	0.0685
	(0.0307)	(0.0440)	(0.0314)	(0.0447)
AGE	0.00215	0.00948	0.00460	0.0145
	(0.0105)	(0.0123)	(0.0106)	(0.0124)
MALE	-0.316	-0.568	-0.388	-0.722
	(0.859)	(1.153)	(0.855)	(1.124)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.235	-0.457	-0.116	-0.244
	(0.723)	(0.843)	(0.729)	(0.853)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.464*	0.518	0.649**	0.815*
	(0.224)	(0.349)	(0.235)	(0.356)
REBEL	0.720*	0.632	0.678*	0.565
	(0.307)	(0.443)	(0.279)	(0.415)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.760+	1.300*	0.911*	1.649***
	(0.401)	(0.515)	(0.380)	(0.473)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0221	-0.0298	-0.0194	-0.0274
	(0.0315)	(0.0361)	(0.0323)	(0.0383)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.697*	-0.714*	-0.680*	-0.717+
	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.345)	(0.388)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0203	-0.0168	-0.0411	-0.0759
	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.199)	(0.198)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.048+		-1.127+	
	(0.625)		(0.619)	
INTERWAR	-0.887+		-0.849+	
	(0.494)		(0.509)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.207*		-1.214**	
	(0.471)		(0.451)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.204		0.0377	
	(0.319)		(0.283)	
CONSTANT	4.961	6.877	6.017+	8.741*
	(3.377)	(4.215)	(3.154)	(3.903)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1241	1088	1241	1088
Log Lik.	-532.9	-439.7	-529.6	-433.5

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

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Table B.7: Alternative Independent Variable: Displacement Cases Only

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
DISPLACED	1.067$^+$	2.260*	1.129	4.423***
	(0.634)	(0.967)	(0.814)	(1.046)
DISPLACED × POLITY V			-0.0148	-0.281**
			(0.0957)	(0.101)
POLITY V	0.0441	0.0483	0.0442	0.0514
	(0.0315)	(0.0480)	(0.0316)	(0.0487)
AGE	0.00125	0.00455	0.00122	0.00374
	(0.00942)	(0.0128)	(0.00941)	(0.0128)
MALE	0.216	0.278	0.184	0.177
	(0.750)	(0.938)	(0.776)	(0.954)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.0467	-0.109	-0.0504	-0.0922
	(0.726)	(0.851)	(0.732)	(0.861)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.513$^+$	0.470	0.514$^+$	0.434
	(0.273)	(0.394)	(0.273)	(0.394)
REBEL	0.554$^+$	0.533	0.552$^+$	0.572
	(0.302)	(0.403)	(0.302)	(0.406)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.894*	1.356**	0.893*	1.377**
	(0.363)	(0.431)	(0.364)	(0.426)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	0.00415	-0.00708	0.00427	-0.00729
	(0.0298)	(0.0295)	(0.0299)	(0.0294)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.395	-0.322	-0.394	-0.347
	(0.389)	(0.467)	(0.389)	(0.475)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	0.0171	0.0364	0.0172	0.0369
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.186)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.438*		-1.438*	
	(0.665)		(0.664)	
INTERWAR	-0.606		-0.605	
	(0.511)		(0.515)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.021*		-1.023*	
	(0.500)		(0.496)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.298		0.296	
	(0.353)		(0.353)	
CONSTANT	4.919$^+$	6.066$^+$	4.951$^+$	6.384$^+$
	(2.981)	(3.531)	(2.963)	(3.520)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1263	1119	1263	1119
Log Lik.	-553.5	-456.7	-553.5	-455.7

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.8: Conditional Fixed-Effects Logistic Model

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.169***	-0.729*
	(0.354)	(0.360)
POLITY V	0.0569*	0.0489[+]
	(0.0251)	(0.0252)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA $\times$ POLITY V		0.128**
		(0.0428)
AGE	0.00701	0.0102
	(0.00974)	(0.00987)
MALE	-0.723	-0.0447
	(0.687)	(0.722)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.308	-0.208
	(0.451)	(0.446)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.345	0.474[+]
	(0.242)	(0.247)
REBEL	0.544*	0.497[+]
	(0.261)	(0.264)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.635*	0.691*
	(0.286)	(0.290)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0192	-0.0210
	(0.0234)	(0.0239)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.511	-0.544[+]
	(0.330)	(0.330)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	0.00323	0.0261
	(0.137)	(0.139)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.222[+]	-1.246[+]
	(0.667)	(0.665)
INTERWAR	-0.833	-0.802
	(0.559)	(0.559)
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.406**	-1.381**
	(0.486)	(0.486)
POST-COLD WAR	0.162	0.0478
	(0.243)	(0.246)
Observations	1241	1241
Log Lik.	-476.8	-472.7

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.9: Linear Probability Model

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-0.139*	-0.115	-0.140**	-0.118*
	(0.0630)	(0.0737)	(0.0466)	(0.0525)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V			0.0188***	0.0224***
			(0.00481)	(0.00575)
POLITY V	0.00864+	0.00936+	0.00653	0.00684
	(0.00431)	(0.00526)	(0.00424)	(0.00528)
AGE	0.000379	0.00136	0.00133	0.00288+
	(0.00159)	(0.00175)	(0.00155)	(0.00161)
MALE	-0.0463	-0.0569	0.0178	0.0162
	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.0780)	(0.0746)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.0386	-0.0469	-0.0569	-0.0659
	(0.0840)	(0.0829)	(0.0833)	(0.0810)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.0512	0.0718	0.0679+	0.0946*
	(0.0413)	(0.0474)	(0.0398)	(0.0418)
REBEL	0.0797+	0.0598	0.0567	0.0295
	(0.0451)	(0.0523)	(0.0379)	(0.0452)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.123+	0.151*	0.123+	0.154*
	(0.0642)	(0.0678)	(0.0626)	(0.0670)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.00319	-0.00325	-0.00358	-0.00365
	(0.00658)	(0.00671)	(0.00616)	(0.00621)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.0436	-0.0248	-0.0529	-0.0321
	(0.0453)	(0.0415)	(0.0414)	(0.0412)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.00721	-0.00825	-0.00418	-0.00694
	(0.0199)	(0.0184)	(0.0182)	(0.0176)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-0.154*		-0.172*	
	(0.0746)		(0.0723)	
INTERWAR	-0.110		-0.108	
	(0.0731)		(0.0754)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-0.181*		-0.179*	
	(0.0779)		(0.0708)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.0273		0.00512	
	(0.0493)		(0.0442)	
CONSTANT	1.287*	1.373*	1.177*	1.226*
	(0.542)	(0.600)	(0.518)	(0.571)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1415	1415	1415	1415
R^2	0.291	0.375	0.298	0.385

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

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Table B.10: Count DV and Poisson Regression Model

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-0.355	-0.340	-0.114	0.0962
	(0.257)	(0.292)	(0.251)	(0.239)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V			0.0644*	0.111***
			(0.0305)	(0.0222)
POLITY V	0.0948+	0.114***	0.0881+	0.102***
	(0.0489)	(0.0298)	(0.0528)	(0.0290)
AGE	0.00826	0.00826	0.0104	0.0135+
	(0.00746)	(0.00739)	(0.00744)	(0.00746)
MALE	-1.365*	-1.481*	-0.717	-0.442
	(0.533)	(0.614)	(0.528)	(0.468)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.338	-0.273	-0.295	-0.208
	(0.270)	(0.349)	(0.284)	(0.350)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.143	-0.151	0.262*	0.0398
	(0.115)	(0.210)	(0.107)	(0.195)
REBEL	0.474**	0.457*	0.418*	0.371+
	(0.171)	(0.229)	(0.164)	(0.197)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.492	0.908**	0.571	1.128***
	(0.457)	(0.329)	(0.413)	(0.320)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	-0.0328	-0.0441*	-0.0314	-0.0421+
	(0.0265)	(0.0224)	(0.0276)	(0.0232)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.308+	-0.500*	-0.322+	-0.598**
	(0.186)	(0.213)	(0.174)	(0.226)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0929	-0.164	-0.0809	-0.155
	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.129)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.134*		-1.172*	
	(0.476)		(0.500)	
INTERWAR	-1.291**		-1.266**	
	(0.423)		(0.419)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.662***		-1.653***	
	(0.370)		(0.354)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.241		0.138	
	(0.237)		(0.211)	
CONSTANT	5.394	-9.081	5.232	-9.265
	(4.175)	(.)	(3.988)	(213.3)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1415	1415	1415	1415
Log Lik.	-927.8	-781.0	-925.0	-773.3

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Table B.11: Analysis of All Leader Sample

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Interaction with POLITY V	Model 4 Interaction with POLITY V
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-0.463*	-0.437*	-0.368[+]	-0.314
	(0.215)	(0.213)	(0.199)	(0.204)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITY V			0.0563[+]	0.0673*
			(0.0324)	(0.0336)
POLITY V	-0.0320*	-0.0315*	-0.0337*	-0.0336*
	(0.0143)	(0.0157)	(0.0145)	(0.0159)
AGE	0.00477	0.00365	0.00506	0.00407
	(0.00507)	(0.00507)	(0.00501)	(0.00495)
MALE	-0.0112	-0.0413	0.0576	0.0381
	(0.356)	(0.387)	(0.365)	(0.382)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.0724	-0.0975	-0.0744	-0.0987
	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.232)	(0.249)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	-0.0142	-0.0110	-0.00452	0.0000782
	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.121)
REBEL	0.0560	0.0560	0.0462	0.0447
	(0.152)	(0.160)	(0.149)	(0.155)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.481**	0.575***	0.489**	0.588***
	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.164)	(0.173)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	0.0559***	0.0580***	0.0558***	0.0580***
	(0.0146)	(0.0131)	(0.0144)	(0.0129)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	0.226	0.152	0.227	0.156
	(0.153)	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.174)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0747	-0.0373	-0.0749	-0.0385
	(0.0998)	(0.105)	(0.0992)	(0.104)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-0.810***		-0.808***	
	(0.231)		(0.230)	
INTERWAR	-0.595*		-0.594*	
	(0.258)		(0.257)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-0.376*		-0.377*	
	(0.187)		(0.187)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.217		0.193	
	(0.156)		(0.155)	
CONSTANT	1.195*	0.867	1.138*	0.721
	(0.523)	(0.758)	(0.526)	(0.726)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5283	5204	5283	5204
Log Lik.	-2095.0	-1963.8	-2093.6	-1961.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.12: Analysis of Three Mutually Exclusive Dummy Variables

	Model 1 Main Model	Model 2 Main Model	Model 3 Main Model	Model 4 Main Model
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-0.405$^+$	-0.394$^+$	-0.545**	-0.495*
	(0.232)	(0.230)	(0.211)	(0.215)
CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA			-0.140	-0.101
			(0.134)	(0.147)
NO INVASION	0.140	0.101		
	(0.134)	(0.147)		
POLITY V	-0.0339*	-0.0330*	-0.0339*	-0.0330*
	(0.0140)	(0.0154)	(0.0140)	(0.0154)
AGE	0.00472	0.00349	0.00472	0.00349
	(0.00501)	(0.00498)	(0.00501)	(0.00498)
MALE	-0.0231	-0.0478	-0.0231	-0.0478
	(0.339)	(0.378)	(0.339)	(0.378)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.0730	-0.102	-0.0730	-0.102
	(0.230)	(0.249)	(0.230)	(0.249)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	-0.0175	-0.0122	-0.0175	-0.0122
	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.124)
REBEL	0.0337	0.0402	0.0337	0.0402
	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.152)	(0.161)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.482**	0.574***	0.482**	0.574***
	(0.165)	(0.174)	(0.165)	(0.174)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	0.0556***	0.0577***	0.0556***	0.0577***
	(0.0139)	(0.0125)	(0.0139)	(0.0125)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	0.219	0.145	0.219	0.145
	(0.149)	(0.173)	(0.149)	(0.173)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0759	-0.0373	-0.0759	-0.0373
	(0.0990)	(0.104)	(0.0990)	(0.104)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-0.820***		-0.820***	
	(0.232)		(0.232)	
INTERWAR	-0.604*		-0.604*	
	(0.258)		(0.258)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-0.347$^+$		-0.347$^+$	
	(0.185)		(0.185)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.234		0.234	
	(0.153)		(0.153)	
CONSTANT	1.084*	0.845	1.224*	0.946
	(0.508)	(0.742)	(0.509)	(0.750)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5283	5204	5283	5204
Log Lik.	-2094.3	-1963.4	-2094.3	-1963.4

Models 1 and 2: CHILDHOOD INVASION, NO TRAUMA is the baseline category.

Models 3 and 4: NO INVASION is the baseline category.

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.13: Alternative Political Constraints Variable: Henisz (2002)

	Model 1	Model 2
		Interaction with
		POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA	-1.637***	-1.985***
	(0.268)	(0.414)
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS	0.505	0.998
	(0.755)	(0.894)
CHILDHOOD WAR TRAUMA × POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS	4.478***	6.323***
	(1.214)	(1.631)
AGE	0.00895	0.0197*
	(0.00998)	(0.00983)
MALE	0.142	0.0143
	(0.680)	(0.797)
MILITARY SERVICE, NO COMBAT	-0.244	-0.588
	(0.657)	(0.738)
MILITARY SERVICE, COMBAT	0.380	0.560
	(0.276)	(0.347)
REBEL	0.424	0.195
	(0.281)	(0.425)
NATIONAL CAPABILITY	0.483	1.228**
	(0.353)	(0.440)
CONFLICT HISTORY (5YRS)	0.0457	0.0418
	(0.0566)	(0.0625)
ALLIANCE WITH MAJOR POWER	-0.271	-0.282
	(0.302)	(0.408)
INTERNATIONAL STATUS	-0.0960	-0.116
	(0.183)	(0.227)
PRE-WORLD WAR I	-1.295*	
	(0.583)	
INTERWAR	-0.404	
	(0.579)	
POST-WORLD WAR II	-1.305***	
	(0.394)	
POST-COLD WAR	0.157	
	(0.271)	
CONSTANT	1.265	3.690
	(2.759)	(3.475)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes
Observations	1164	1011
Log Lik.	-485.9	-399.8

Robust standard errors are clustered by countries and in parentheses.

Cubic polynomials (three knots) of peace years are included but not reported in the table.

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

Figure B.3: Covariate Balance (Mahalanobis Distance Matching and Standard Propensity Score Weighting)


Figure B.4: Covariate Balance (Covariate Balanced Propensity Matching and Weighting)

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Figure B.5: Treatment Effects Over Time (Mahalanobis Distance Matching)


Figure B.6: Treatment Effects Over Time (Covariate Balanced Propensity Score Weighting)

Figure B.7: All Leader Sample: Average Marginal Effects

Figure B.8: Alternative Political Constraints Variable: Henisz (2002)

Leader Name	Country	Trauma experience	Age at trauma
Adamkus	Lithuania	Displaced	17
Ahtisaari	Finland	Displaced	5
Aoun	Lebanon	Displaced	8
Carranza	Mexico	Father, wounded in action	3
Craxi	Italy	Displaced	5
Dimitrov	Bulgaria	Displaced	11
Eyskens, Mark	Belgium	Displaced	7
Gorbachev	Soviet Union	Father, wounded in action	11
Haile Selassie	Ethiopia	Father, wounded in action	14
Halonen	Finland	Father, wounded in action	2
Horn	Hungary	Father, murdered	12
Jaruzelski	Poland	Displaced	16
Jiang Zemin	China	Father, killed in action	11
Kim Il-Sung	North Korea	Father, wounded in action	14
Kohl	Germany	Brother, killed in action	10
Landsbergis	Lithuania	Displaced	14
Lee Myung-Bak	South Korea	Two siblings, killed in bombardment	9
Meir	Israel	Displaced	8
Mesic	Croatia	Displaced	3
Mladenov	Bulgria	Father, killed in action	8
Saksgoburggotski	Bulgaria	Father, murdered	6
Schroder	Germany	Father, killed in action	1
Thorn	Luxembourg	Displaced	14
Walesa	Poland	Father, incarcerated and died	2
Yeltsin	Russia	Uncle, killed in action	10

Table B.14: List of Leaders with Childhood War Trauma (1872-2010)