ESSAYS ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION AMONG THE NEW AMERICANS IN THE ERA OF IMMIGRATION AND POLARIZATION

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Scholars, politicians, and pundits have repeatedly described new Americans, mostly Asian Americans and Latinos, as a "Sleeping Giant" to emphasize their potential as the decisive voter who shuffles up traditional U.S. party politics. However, this sleeping giant has been either half-asleep or half-awake such that their voter turnout rate has never been higher than, or even close to, either White or Black voters. Why don't new Americans participate in politics? How do polarized political environments affect the way new Americans join politics in the U.S.? In my dissertation, I try to solve this puzzle by studying the development of party identification among new Americans. Understanding how new Americans develop their party identification is important to our understanding of why new Americans do or do not participate in the politics of the U.S. This is because choosing a "team" in the politics of the U.S. precedes all other political behaviors such that, without adopting a party, one cares less about the "games" of American politics. The first essay focuses on how increased clarity in party differences due to polarization affects the development of party identification among early-generation immigrants. I find that polarization ironically benefits early-generation immigrants by helping them increasingly self-identify with their own party with motivations like native-born Americans over time, by applying supervised machine learning techniques for text similarity. The second essay studies the origins of negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos focusing on factors uniquely relevant to Asian American and Latino experiences/perceptions in the U.S. I find that, first, Asian Americans and Latinos do develop negative partisanship but to a lesser degree compared to other non-immigrant Americans; second, that perceived social discrimination asymmetrically shapes negative partisanship toward each Democrat and Republican minorities; and third, that linked fate with the pan-ethnic group only has a small impact on negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. In the third essay, I suggest a general theory of minority party identification focusing on acculturation psychology. I find that a strong assimilation (multicultural) psychology is related to Republican (Democratic) party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos.

DEDICATION

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NOMENCLATURE

ANES   American National Election Studies

AUC   Area Under Curve

NAAS   National Asian American Survey

NSL   National Survey of Latinos

PR   Precision-Recall

ROC   Receiver Operating Characteristics

SVM   Support Vector Machine

SIT   Social Identity Theory

TAMU   Texas A&M University

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1. INTRODUCTION

Immigration has shaped the demographics of the United States throughout its history. In recent decades new immigrants, mostly from Asia and Latin America, have moved to the U.S. since the *Immigration and Nationality Act* in 1965; and 13.7% of the total population of the U.S. was foreign-born in 2018 (Pew Research Center 2019). Furthermore, more than 70,000 foreigners were naturalized in 2018, and that the foreign-born share of total eligible voters reached 10% in 2020 (Budiman, Noe-Bustamante, and Lopez 2020). What is more striking is that the children of naturalized citizens also will become eligible voters as time passes. Twenty-seven percent of American youth were either first or second-generation immigrants in 2017 (Child Trends 2018). These data imply that more immigrants will incorporate into the politics of the U.S., either passively or actively, and it is nearly impossible to understand American political behavior without considering the impact of immigration.

Despite their increasing number, however, our knowledge of these new immigrants is still limited. Scholars, politicians, and pundits have repeatedly described these new immigrants, Asian Americans and Latinos, as a "Sleeping Giant" to emphasize their potential as the decisive voter who shuffles up traditional U.S. party politics (Alvarez and Nagler 1999; Jackson 2011; Leonhardt 2018). Contrary to this expectation, however, this sleeping giant has been either half-asleep or half-awake such that their voter turnout rate has never been higher than, or even close to, either White or Black voters. Particularly, many of the new immigrants and their children refuse to adopt either one of the major parties as their own, and so do not join politics of the U.S. (Hajnal and Lee 2011)

Why has this been the case? I try to solve this puzzle in my dissertation by studying the development of party identification among early-generation Americans. Understanding how the new Americans develop their party identification is important to our understanding of why new immigrants do or do not participate in the politics of the U.S. This is because choosing a team in the politics of the U.S. precedes all other political behaviors such that, without adopting a party, one cares less about the games of American politics. One will not care what the party stands for, who

the candidates are, who will win the election, and how the result will affect his or her life.

In the first essay, I investigate how increased clarity of party differences due to polarization affects the development among first- and second-generation Americans. Specifically, studies of party identification among immigrants and their children have long theorized that they develop their attitudes towards parties in the U.S. under ambivalence and confusion due to limited political socialization and parental party transmission. I offer a novel explanation of how polarization affects the development of party identification among early-generation Americans. I hypothesize that polarization has ironically enabled early-generation Americans to more readily self-identify with one of the major parties in ways similar to native-born Americans. I use under-utilized historical big data and a recently available technical methodology. The resource is the open-ended survey responses from American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1984 to 2016 that capture the meaning of party attachment, likes, towards each party. The method is supervised text analysis with machine learning techniques, Support Vector Machine (SVM). I estimate the degree to which each response of early-generation Americans is semantically similar to those of native-born Americans applying SVM. After estimating the similarity, I examine how increased polarization affects the evolution of early-generation party identification over time.

In the second essay, I investigate the origins of negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Specifically, recent scholarship in American politics has suggested that out-party animosity is increasing and it has become a stronger predictor of American political behavior. However, less scholarly attention has been given to negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Accordingly, we know less about if negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos exists and, if so, what it would look like. Based on prior studies of Asian American and Latino political behavior and Social Identity Theory, I argue that negative partisanship among the new Americans is expressive partisanship such that they develop their negativity in a way to protect their in-group status from potential threats from out-groups. Specifically, I focus on unique experiences/perceptions of Asian Americans and Latinos such as perceived undecidedness/uncertainty, social discrimination, and linked fate with one's own pan-ethnic group. Using the ANES in 2016

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and 2020, I examine how these factors affect negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos.

In the third essay, I suggest a holistic theory of Asian American and Latino partisanship that explains both the Democratic and Republican partisanship at a time. Previous studies have investigated Asian American and Latino party identification focusing on their Democratic Party identification. However, these studies can't explain 20-30% of Asian Americans and Latinos who identify with the Republican party. Why do some Asian Americans and Latinos turn away from the Democratic Party and choose instead to identify with the Republican Party? I address this question by focusing on their acculturation psychology—the degree to which ethnic minorities/immigrants want to absorb the rules, norms, and values of a large society of the host country and preserve those of the country of origin. I employ three empirical studies. First, I use the ANES in 2016 and 2020. Second, I use two other nationally representative surveys of each Asian American, the National Asian American Survey (NAAS) in 2008 and 2016, and Latino, the National Survey of Latinos (NSL) in 2006 and 2014. Second, I employ an original survey experiment to determine whether acculturation psychology cause Asian American and Latino party identification.

2. First Essay: Why Do New Americans Join the Party? Polarization and the Evolution of Party Identification among Early-Generation Americans

2.1 Introduction

Studies show that elite polarization has increased the clarity of party differences, helping ordinary Americans easily understand "what goes with what," particularly solidifying partisanship among the engaged electorate (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010; Layman and Carsey 2002; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Research on partisan sorting suggests that an alignment of partisanship with political ideology and other social identities has made party identification more simple, such that liberals increasingly identify with the Democratic party and conservatives with the Republican party; likewise, non-Whites increasingly identify with the Democratic party, and Whites with the Republican party (Levendusky 2009a; Mason 2018; Westwood and Peterson 2020). This process has divided Americans by their lifestyle to the extent that ordinary citizens can even make a decent guess about one's party identity by looking at one's car (Hetherington and Weiler 2018). Over time, polarization has reduced ambivalence towards parties among independents and increased their consistency in voting (Smidt 2017).

While this research suggests that polarization has changed the way most Americans perceive parties and other fellow Americans, less scholarly focus has been given to early-generation Americans, first-generation and second-generation immigrants who are limited in terms of pre-adult political socialization and parental party transmission (Carlos 2018; Carlos 2021; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Raychaudhuri 2020). This is not a small omission given that the share of the first- and second-generation population in the United States had increased from 16.5% in 1980 to 25.7% in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2019) and 27% of American youth were either first or second-generation in 2017 (Child Trends 2018). The consequence is that we have little knowledge about how the growth of polarization has affected the socialization process of this growing group of Americans.

Does polarization affect partisan motivations among early-generation Americans? If so, how

does it affect the way they develop their party identification over time? These questions are important to understanding new Americans because they develop their attachment to a party under ambivalence and confusion because their foreign-born parents are also limited in terms of political socialization in the U.S. (Carlos 2018; Carlos 2021; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Raychaudhuri 2020). Existing studies have long theorized that Americans develop their party identification during the pre-adult socialization period under the influence of their American parents (e.g. Beck and Jennings 1991; Campbell et al. 1960; Hatemi et al. 2009; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009). Obviously, these well known theories do not apply to the socialization process of the new Americans. Moreover, early-generation Americans transmit their attitudes towards parties to their children so we can further enhance our knowledge of higher-generation Americans by understanding how and why early-generation Americans develop a psychological attachment to a political party in the U.S. Prior studies of immigrant[1] partisanship have not considered the effects of polarization so we don't know whether polarization facilitates or inhibit the development of party identification among immigrants (e.g. Audette, Brockway, and Weaver 2017; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Carlos 2018; Carlos 2021; Cisneros 2016; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Phan and Garcia 2009; Raychaudhuri 2020; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005;Wong 2000).

In this study, I extend existing knowledge of the impact of polarization and American party identification by examining how early-generation Americans develop their party identification under increasingly polarized political environments. Building on prior studies, I argue that polarization has ironically enabled early-generation Americans to more readily self-identify with one of the major parties in ways similar to native-born Americans. In other words, more early-generation Americans develop their party identification based on the information most readily available in the contemporary political contexts like native-born Americans do. This is because polarization, both at the elite and mass level, reduces early-generation ambivalence towards each political party and group in the U.S. and helps them easily differentiate between parties, which was not easily available

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1. In following, I use a term "immigrants" to indicate ones who have ties to immigrant societies.

before polarization. In short, polarization helps early-generation Americans by complementing the role of pre-adult political socialization and parental party transmission.

To document the impact of polarization on the evolution of early-generation party identification, I use the open-ended response questionnaire from the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1984 to 2016,[2] keeping the actual words early-generation Americans use to express their meaning of party attachment to their own party. I estimate the degree to which each response of early-generation Americans is semantically similar to those of native-born Americans applying machine learning techniques called Support Vector Machine (SVM). After estimating the similarity, I examine how increased polarization affects the evolution of early-generation party identification over time.

I find that both early-generation partisans increasingly expresses their meaning of party attachment to their own party more like native-born Americans as a response to increasing polarization. However, polarization has exerted more impact on early-generation Republicans such that the degree to which early-generation Republicans express their attachment to their own party like native-born Americans has increased more than that of early-generation Democrats. I also find that early-generation partisans develop their attachment to their own party more like native-born Americans once they perceive important differences between parties, which supports the claim that increased clarity due to polarization leads to the development of party identification.

This paper contributes to our understanding of American party identification. First, I suggest that new Americans may no longer develop their party identification under ambivalence and confusion under polarization as prior studies describe. This gives normative implications to the study of American political behavior about the consequence of polarization in that it may exert positive effects on early-generation Americans. Second, the use of open-ended responses allows us to examine variations in the meaning of party attachment among new Americans. The traditional measures of party attachment, e.g. party self-identification and feeling thermometer, cannot capture such variations and that it provides unique insights into how new Americans assimilate into party politics.

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2. The unredacted open-ended responses are available following the completion of the Institutional Review Boards Approval with author's institution and Restricted Data Access application with the ANES.

Third, I introduce an innovative way to estimate text similarity by applying a supervised machine learning technique. This is important considering the increasing use of large text corpora for the study of political behavior.

2.2 Alternative Explanations of American Party Identification in the Era of Immigration

As new Americans from Asia and Latin America have constituted a large proportion of the total population of the U.S. since the *Immigration and Nationality Act* in 1965, studies have suggested alternative accounts to explain immigrant party identification focusing on factors unique to their experiences as a racial/ethnic minority. These studies share two commonalities. First, many new Americans lack parental sources that guide them to develop their party identification in the U.S. because their foreign-born parents have a short history in the politics of the U.S. Second, new Americans find it hard to situate their interest and ideology to the major political parties because their interests, ideology, and identities cross-cut or overlap the traditional partisan cleavages that have been shaped before their arrival (Hajnal and Lee 2011). In short, the two traditional approaches that have explained American party identification, the Michigan Model (Campbell et al. 1960) and Downsian Model (Downs 1957), require revisions for a theory of American party identification in the era of race and immigration.

Reflecting this, earlier studies in this sub-field focus on sociological concepts to explain variations in the adoption of partisanship. For example, Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991) explored Asian American and Latino party identification focusing on factors of immigrant assimilation such as the length of residence in the U.S. and immigrant generational status, and found that the assimilation in the U.S. leads to an adoption of partisanship. Wong (2000) takes a similar approach and found that length of residence, naturalization, proficiency in English, and media use lead to the adoption of party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos. Moreover, Phan and Garcia (2009) showed that the length of residence and political interests explain the adoption of party identity among Asian immigrants.

Other studies focus on the social psychology of immigration and ethnic minorities. In more detail, scholars have shown that pan-ethnic identity among Asian Americans and Latinos promotes

the adoption of a particular party by increasing the political relevance of their group consciousness. For example, Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) showed that perceptions of a common, "linked fate," lead to party identification among Asian Americans; and Cisneros (2016) found similar results in that pan-ethnic Latino identity plays a decisive role in shaping Latino party identification, especially identification with the Democratic party. Furthermore, Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017) give attention to particular experiences of Asian Americans, such as social exclusion, to explain Asian American party identification and find that social exclusion increases Asian American support of a party most closely associated with immigrant societies, the Democratic party.

More recent studies actively seek factors that complement the role of (pre-adult) political socialization and parental party transmission. For example, Carlos (2018) shows that socializing institutions such as schools, labor unions, and churches help the development of party identification among second-generation Americans because such institutions substitute the role of pre-adult political socialization. Raychaudhuri (2020) shows that local contexts where Asians reside help their development of party identification. Scholars also find that religion, especially Christianity, promotes political engagement and adoption of party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos (Audette, Brockway, and Weaver 2017; Cisneros 2016; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005).

There was an attempt to reconcile the traditional and alternative explanations of American party identification for a general theory of partisanship in the U.S. In their important book, *Why Americans (Don't) Join the Party*, Hajnal and Lee (2011) suggest a general theory of partisanship that can be applied to all major racial groups in the U.S. They argue that information, ideology, and identity are the key factors that explain American party identification. Specifically, each of the major racial groups in the U.S. such as African-American, Asian, Latino, and White live within idiosyncratic information, ideology, and identity environments such that some groups are more or less certain about political information, some groups are more or less ambivalent about the concept and meaning of political ideology, and some groups put more or less emphasis on group identity. Based on this, they suggest that a large proportion of the non-White Americans, especially from immigrant communities, are uncertain and ambivalent towards the parties, such that they find no

major political parties neatly represent their interest, ideology, and identity. As a result, the baseline partisanship for them rather is a "*non-identifier*" than either a partisan or an independent.

Here, I claim that Hajnal and Lee (2011)'s theory raises an important concern to future studies of American party identification: new Americans, especially early-generations, may develop an attachment to a party while not fully internalizing the concept and meaning of political information, ideology, and identity. For example, some early-generation Americans may self-identify with the Republican (Democratic) party because of its conservative (liberal) stance like some other native-born Republicans (Democrats) whereas others may self-identify with it based on predispositions/experiences that are related to their country of origin such as anti-communism, hatred towards a certain foreign leader, and strong ethnic identity. Or, simply because a particular party is good for their country of origin. In such cases, the traditional measure of party identification, party self-identification,[3] cannot capture such variations in the meaning of party attachment among new Americans. In other words, we are not equipped to fully understand why new Americans develop a psychological attachment to a particular party by solely using the traditional measure of party identification.

Instead, we can capture variations in why and how new Americans adopt a party by examining their meaning of party attachment. If one self-identifies with a party with motivations that are related to particular concerns shaped from the country of origin or any other predispositions shaped outside of the U.S., we can say that one has developed his or her party identification largely aloof from the politics of the U.S. On the other hand, some new Americans develop their party identification based on current issues of American politics, e.g. based on ideology or policy issues at the time, like other native-born Americans. In this case, we can say that the one has developed his or her party identity by developing his/her attachment to a party similarly as native-born Americans or under the context of American politics. In the following, I study the development of early-generation American party identification by examining both the *meaning of party attachment*—an expression

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3. A measure that captures one's party identity with closed-ended questions such as *"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"* from National Election Studies or *"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a . . . ?"* from Cooperative Congressional Election Study.

of one's attachment to each party—and *party self-identification*—self-identification with a party.[4]

Notwithstanding the contributions of the prior works, the aforementioned studies do not fully incorporate the impact of polarization when discussing party identification among immigrants. Specifically, the prior works explain immigrant partisanship focusing on factors unique to immigrants as a racial/ethnic minority but no existing studies fully incorporate how polarized political environments affect the way they develop their party attachment and identification. However, no political actors shape their political attitudes in isolation to political environments so understanding how immigrants develop their party identification under polarized political environments is important to our understanding of how new Americans assimilate into U.S. politics. Does polarization affect partisan motivations among early-generation Americans? If so, does it inhibit or facilitate the development of party identification? In the following section, I investigate two mechanisms that polarization helps early-generation American incorporation into U.S. party politics.

2.3 Polarization and the Evolution of Early-generation Party Identification

In this section, I discuss how polarization, both at the elite and mass level, affects the way early-generation Americans develop their party identification. First, I argue that elite polarization enables early-generation Americans to develop a psychological attachment to their own party more like native-born Americans. Before elites are polarized, only a small segment of American voters had "what goes with what" knowledge (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964) such that the more educated, politically active, and sophisticated only were able to receive the messages from the elites with a coherent belief system. Obviously, immigrants, first- and higher-generations alike, back then were not able to "see meaning, content, or value in the partisan options that are typically offered," in the U.S politics (p.181, Hajnal and Lee 2011). Therefore, they can hardly develop their attachment to a particular party, even when adopting a party as their own, based on current information and ideology of the U.S. Consequently, many new Americans in the past were largely

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4. Early-generation partisans show variations in their meaning of party attachment to their own party both across time and individuals. Some express their meaning of party attachment like native-born Americans and others do not, and the substantive meaning of their party attachment changes over time. For more information, please refer to appendix A.

aloof from American politics so they developed a psychological attachment to a particular party largely based on experiences/predispositions that were shaped from their country of origin (e.g. Cisneros 2016; Schildkraut 2010; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).

However, recent studies of polarization suggest that polarization dramatically transformed the way most Americans see parties and other fellow Americans to the extent that it has become considerably easier for less sophisticated citizens to see differences between the parties today than in the past (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010; Layman and Carsey 2002; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Smidt 2017). Under this circumstance, more early-generation Americans are better able to find meaningful differences between parties like other native-born Americans. Particularly, the mass public makes sense of politics through political elites (Zaller 1992); and they realign their issue positions in a way to fit their elites' orientation when the issue positions of elites are clarified through mass mobilization (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Given that new Americans from immigrant communities also receive elite signals when they shape their attitudes towards parties and their candidates through targeted policies, campaign rhetoric, and candidate characteristics (e.g. Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sadhwani 2020; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; White 2016), this suggests that more early-generation Americans can get clear messages from elites more frequently due to increasing elite polarization, and this will reduce their ambivalence and confusion towards parties in the U.S.

Second, polarization at the mass level, particularly by affect,[5] also helps early-generation Americans to easily differentiate between parties and groups in the U.S. Particularly, recent studies show that ordinary Americans divide not only by ideology but also by affect so party identification in the U.S. has become simple. In more detail, studies on partisan sorting show that members of the mass public increasingly sort their party identity with ideology and some other dimensions such

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5. Mass polarization is a multifaceted concept such that it could mean increasing divergence among the mass by issue positions, ideology, or affect (Lelkes 2016). However, studies show that mass does not seem to polarize by issue positions and ideology but rather by their affect (e.g.Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Lelkes 2016; Mason 2015). Though I do not exclude the possibility that mass polarization by ideology and issue positions may affect the development of party identification among early-generation Americans, I posit that mass polarization by affect exerts a most significant impact on early-generation party identification.

as geography, religion, and race (Levendusky 2009b; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Westwood and Peterson 2020). Further studies show that ordinary Americans also divide by their affect such that they increasingly like their own party and its members while disliking the opposite party and its members (Mason 2018; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). The degree of this divide is so strong that the strength of affective polarization by partisanship is as strong as polarization based on race (Iyengar and Westwood 2015); and it affects how Americans date (Huber and Malhotra 2017), recruit employees (Gift and Gift 2015), and evaluate physical attractiveness of other Americans (Nicholson et al. 2016).

What this implies is that early-generation Americans can differentiate between parties through their interaction with other ordinary Americans, which was not available before mass polarization. Consequently, more of them easily know why each partisan likes (dislikes) their own party (the opposite party) and its members; and, through this process, their uncertainty and ambivalence toward each party and its members decrease. Given that the mass public develop their attachment to a party based on people who are associated with each of political parties (Berelson et al. 1954; Converse 1964; Converse 1964; Greene 1999; Donald, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), polarization at the mass level significantly reduces both cognitive and social cost of party identification for the new Americans.

Building on the discussion above, I argue that polarization has enabled early-generation Americans to more readily self-identify with one of the major parties in ways similar to native-born Americans over time. In other words, more early-generation Americans develop their party identification based on the information most readily available in the contemporary political contexts like native-born Americans do. Two sources drive the evolution of their party identification. In one instance, elite polarization has increased clarity of party differences, so more early-generation Americans can easily differentiate between parties. In another instance, polarization at the mass level, particularly affective polarization, has increased opportunities for the new Americans to learn about the partisan divide among ordinary Americans and find meaningful differences in parties over time. Based on this, I expect that elite polarization increases the likelihood of expressing the meaning of

party attachment to their own party like native-born Americans among early-generation Americans (Hypothesis 1). I also expect that affective polarization has enabled early-generation Americans to more readily self-identify with one of the major parties in ways similar to native-born Americans. Thus, affective polarization increases the likelihood of expressing the meaning of party attachment to their own party like native-born Americans among early-generation Americans (Hypothesis 2). In short, polarization facilitates the development of party identification by complementing the role of pre-adult socialization and parental party transmission.

2.4 Research Design

Data and Scope

In this study, I examine the development of party attachment among early-generation Americans. To do so, I use a data source that keeps the words that early-generation Americans use to describe their attachment, *likes*, to their own party. The data comes from the open-ended responses from the American National Election Studies (ANES) that asks each respondent "Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic (Republican) party?" from 1984 to 2016. If respondents say "yes" to the question, then they can provide reasons for their likes about the party up to five times; and the ANES keeps the actual words.[6] Because the open-ended responses keep the actual words used to express likes about their own party among early-generation Americans, we can estimate the degree to which each response of the early-generation Americans is semantically similar to those of native-born Americans.

I define early-generation Americans to indicate first- and second-generation Americans in terms of immigration status. While first-generation Americans are most confused about U.S. politics, second-generation Americans are also confused about politics in the U.S. They are also limited in terms of parental party transmission because of delayed political socialization and no parties neatly represent their interests (Carlos 2018; Carlos 2021; Fraga 2018; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong, García, and Valdivia 2019). Studies find that both first- and second-generation Americans show similar behavioral patterns in their political participation while immigrants begin to show similar behav-

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6. No likes are provided if the respondent answers "no," "don't know," or "refused."

ioral patterns to native-born Americans starting from the third generation (Lopez 1999; Potochnick and Stegmaier 2020). For this reason, I group both first- and second-generation Americans into one group and compare their meaning of party attachment to that of third- or higher-generation Americans. The scope and definition of immigrant generational status vary by field, discipline, and research question. In this study, I follow the definition provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and Pew Research Center to define generational status such that "The first generation refers to those who are foreign-born. The second generation refers to those with at least one foreign-born parent. The third- and -higher generation includes those with two U.S. native parents."

Measuring Semantic Similarity Score

I estimate the degree to which each response of the early-generation Americans is semantically similar to those of native-born Americans, which I call *Semantic Similarity Score*, applying the supervised text-analysis technique which is called Support Vector Machine (SVM). The basic intuition of SVM is to train a machine learning algorithm to learn by examples, which are provided by human researchers, to create labels for the unknown data (Noble 2006); and it is widely used and developed by various fields primarily to classify the quantity of interest. As such, prior research in political science uses SVM to create labels such as classifying news articles by topic (D'Orazio et al. 2014), party affiliation from public speech (Yu, Kaufmann, and Diermeier 2008), and the level of conceptualization (Allamong et al. 2020). In this study, I use SVM to estimate a probability that each response of early-generation American is classified as that of native-born Americans rather than creating labels for each response.[7]

I follow several steps to estimate the semantic similarity score. I first randomly extract a certain percent of responses from each early-generation American and native-born American by election year. I then train multiple machine learning algorithms to learn each response of early-generation Americans and native-born Americans. Third, I assess the performance of each machine learning

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7. SVM first predict a probability that each case is classified as a certain label, and then it creates a label based on the predicted probability. While most applications of SVM use it to create labels, some uses it to estimate the probability depending on research questions. For example, Huff and Kertzer (2018) use SVM to estimate the predicted probability that a range of violent incidents is classified as terrorism rather than labeling each event as terrorism or not.

algorithm and choose a model that produces the best performance. Fourth, I predict a probability that each response of early-generation Americans is classified as that of native-born Americans using a model that I've chosen in the previous step. This probability technically represents a probability that each response of early-generation Americans is classified as that of native-born Americans however it substantively means the degree to which each response of the early-generation Americans is similar to that of native-born Americans. It ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates that a response of early-generation American is not similar to that of native-born Americans at all and 1 indicates that a response of early-generation Americans is perfectly similar to that of native-born Americans.[8] For more information about this process and model performances, please refer to appendix A.

The SVM has several advantages over other methods for text similarity. First, I can give the most accurate examples when training machine learning algorithms because I can feed the algorithms with the actual responses of each early-generation and native-born American. Given that reliability of the supervised machine learning technique is highly contingent on the accuracy of examples provided by a human coder, the use of actual responses allows me to build reliable machine learning algorithms (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Second, I do not need to make any decision to guide the supervised machine learning algorithms to quantify each response unlike other methods that requires discretion from researchers (e.g. Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). The SVM makes a dictionary for each early-generation and native-born American when training its algorithm. Hence, it is from errors that could be generated by human researchers.[9] Third, most of the existing methods for text similarity such as Cosine Similarity and Latent Semantic Indexing, etc, allow "one-to-one pairwise comparison" of two texts. The SVM overcomes this limitation because it enables us to run

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8. After this, I manually fixed some responses as 0 if the respondents say "don't know," "no," and "refuse to say." This is because these responses do not entail any meanings of party attachment. However the machine learning algorithm predicts the probability for these responses. In a similar vein, I also code responses as 0 if the respondents initially answer "no," "don't know," or "refused" to the initial prompt to the open-ended responses. This way I include both engaging, who provide at least one like about each party, and unengaging respondents, who provide no *likes* about each party.

9. Achieving the "excellent" or "outstanding" level of performance, however, does not guarantee that I have constructed the perfect model that provides 100% of accuracy. It rather indicates that the models are free from more errors. However, the SVM provides more, at least equally, accurate and consistent predictions compared to the human researcher (Pang, Lee, and Vaithyanathan 2002).

"one-to-group comparison" as it estimates the text-similarity for each early-generation American in comparison to a whole corpus of native-born Americans.

Estimation Strategy

To examine the impact of polarization on the development of party identification among early-generation Americans, I regress the semantic similarity score on the overtime variations in polarization following model specification of Hetherington (2001) and Smidt (2017).

$$SemanticSimilarityScore_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PolarizationIndex_t + \alpha_r + \gamma_i + \epsilon_i \qquad (2.1)$$

Here, i indexes individuals and t indexes each election year. The vector α_r contains fixed effects for each region where each respondent resides and γ_i is a vector of individual-level covariates from the ANES. The polarization index varies across time at the national level in each election year, t. This means that β_1 captures how over time variation in political polarization at the national level leads to variation in semantic similarity score at each individual level, i . I chose this specification because the estimator plausibly captures how over-time variation in polarization index at national level is associated with individual variation in the semantic similarity score.

For a measure of elite polarization, I take the distance between Democratic and Republican House caucuses by taking differences in means using *DW-NOMINATE* scores. In doing so, I lag by one congress to correctly identify the effect of elite polarization similarly as Hetherington (2001). However I use only the mean of the first dimension because it is more relevant to racial/ethnic minorities as it contains more racial issues (Highton and Kam 2011). Demographic factors also affect how early-generation Americans express their meaning of party attachment, so I added them as controls. These controls include gender, age, education, race, and income. I also control union membership and religion because one is highly likely to learn about politics by joining activities through unions or religious ceremonies. Moreover, I control each respondent's level of political interest because one will likely to develop their attachment more like native-born Americans as he

or she has a higher level of political interest.

For a measure of affective polarization, I've created affective polarization index for each election year based on a difference in means between feeling towards one's own party and the opposite party using feeling thermometer questions that capture each respondent's feelings towards each party from the ANES. This means that I've created a single measure of affective polarization for each election year similarly as elite polarization index so the estimator of affective polarization plausibly captures how over-time variation in affective polarization at national level leads to individual variations in the semantic similarity score. For more information about how each variable is coded, please refer appendix A.

2.5 Results

Polarization and the Evolution of Early-generation Party Identification

In this section, I examine the impact of polarization on the development of party attachment among early-generation partisan identifiers. I first start by looking at the impact of elite polarization on the degree to which early-generation partisans express their attachment to their own party like native-born Americans using the *semantic similarity score*. I then examine the impact of affective polarization on the development of early-generation party identification. To do this, I first fit the regression models described in the previous section and predict the semantic similarity score given specific covariate values when the polarization index varies over time in each election year. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 display how the predicted similarity score changes over time. The results of regression analyses suggest that both elite and affective polarization are associated with an increase in semantic similarity score and the results are robust across different model specifications. The results of regression analyses are reported in appendix A.

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Figure 2.1: Impact of Elite Polarization on the Development of Party Attachment among Early-Generation Partisans

(a) Early-generation Democrats   (b) Early-generation Republicans

Note: They are generated from linear regression estimates for 40 years old Democrat (Republican) Latino male with a some college degree, 34th to 67th percentile income, slightly liberal (conservative), moderate interest in politics, Catholic, union member in family, and lives in Western states. The elite polarization index varies over time and the Y-axis shows the predicted semantic similarity scores in each election year. The band indicates 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2.1 shows that the predicted semantic similarity score among each early-generation partisan has increased over time as a response to increasing elite polarization. This means that elite polarization has enabled early-generation partisans to incorporate more of information, ideology, and identity that matter to native-born Americans when they develop their attachment to their own party. Specifically, the predicted semantic similarity score for early-generation Democrats was 0.31 in 1984 but it has increased to 0.35 in 2016 while that of early-generation Republicans was 0.18 in 1984 but it has increased to 0.30 in 2016. The semantic similarity score is derived from a probability that a response of early-generation Americans is classified as that of native-born Americans. Thus, we can interpret this result that the probability that early-generation partisans develop their attachment more like native-born Americans has increased about 1.13 times for early-generation Democrats and 1.67 times for early-generation Republicans from 1984 to 2016.

The results show that the impact of elite polarization is much smaller for early-generation Democrats compared to the Republicans. Given that elite polarization is mainly driven by conservative shift by the Republican elites than the Democratic elites' shift towards liberal ideology (Lewis et al. 2018), the results imply that a smaller (larger) effect among Democrats (Republicans) is because of less (large) polarization by the Democratic (Republican) elites. To test this claim, I regress the semantic similarity score of each partisan on mean *DW-NOMINATE* scores of each party following the same model specification in Equation 2.1. This way I examine how over-time changes in polarization movements by elites from each party lead to the development of party attachment among each partisan. The first column of Table 2.1[10] shows the effect of liberal movement by the Democratic elites on the development of party identification among early-generation Democrats and the second column shows that of conservative movement by the Republican elites on early-generation Republicans. The results suggest supportive evidence to the claim in that the effect size of the Republican elites is almost twice as larger than that of Democratic elites.

Table 2.1: The Effect of Elites' Movements on the Development of Party Attachment among Early-Generation Partisans (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Semantic Similarity Score	Democrat	Republican
Elites' Movements towards Ideological Extreme	0.375^{*a}	$0.749^{***a,b}$
	(0.235)	(0.156)
N	1,722	866

Note: Entries are estimates of regression model with standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects and individual covariates are controlled. ***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level; a = one-tail test; b = two-tail test.

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10. I present the results of both one-tail and two-tail tests because I have a clear expectation that the effect of polarization is associated with an increase in the semantic similarity score from findings of Figure 2.1.

Figured 2.2 shows that affective polarization also affects each of early-generation Democrats and Republicans similarly as elite polarization. Specifically, the result shows that affective polarization has increased the semantic similarity for both early-generation Democrats and Republicans, and it reduces the gap between early-generation Democrats and Republicans over time. One noticeable difference compared to the finding in Figure2.1 is that early-generation Republicans have begun to develop their attachment more like native-born Americans starting from the 2000s. Specifically, the predicted similarity score from 1984 to 1996 rather shows fluctuations such that the predicted similarity was 0.16, 0.17, 0.16, 0.18 in each 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 respectively but it has begun to increase since 2000. In 2016, the predicted similarity was 0.26., about 1.62 times more than 1984.

Figure 2.2: The Impact of Affective Polarization on the Development of Party Attachment among Early-Generation Partisans

(a) Early-generation Democrats

(b) Early-generation Republicans

Note: They are generated from linear regression estimates for 40 years old Democrat (Republican) Latino male with a some college degree, 34th to 67th percentile income, slightly liberal (conservative), moderate interest in politics, Catholic, union member in family, and lives in Western states. The affective polarization index varies over time and the Y-axis shows the predicted semantic similarity scores in each election year. The band indicates 95% confidence intervals.

To summarize, though gradual, I find that polarization at both elite and mass level have bene-fited the development of party identification among early-generation Americans as we find that each polarization has increased the similarity among early-generation partisans. In other words, polar-ization has benefited early-generation partisans to develop their party identification based on the information most readily available in the contemporary political contexts like native-born Ameri-cans do.

Suggested Mechanism: Polarization, Clarity of Party Differences, and the Development of Early-Generation Party Identification

In this section, I examine how increased clarity, due to polarization, affects the development of early-generation party identification. If polarization has benefited early-generation Americans by increasing clarity of party differences, we should be able to find that, first, the percent of early-generation Americans who perceive important differences between parties should increase over time, and, second, early-generation partisans who perceive the differences between parties express their attachment to their party more like native-born Americans than those who don't. I test this claim by examining the relationship between the semantic similarity score and the percentage per-ceiving differences between parties.

Figure 2.3: Percent of Early-generation Partisans who Perceive Important Differences Between Parties

I first plot the percent of early-generation Americans who perceive important differences between major parties using data from the ANES cumulative data. To do this, I used a questionnaire that asks *"Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?"* from the ANES cumulative file. Figure 2.3 shows that more early-generation Americans claim they percieve important differences between parties over time. The trend follows the pattern of whole population of the U.S. described in Hetherington (2001). In more detail, only 45-50% of early-generation Americans saw important differences between parties before the 1970s; however, the number has begun to increase since the 1980s such that 64% of early-generation Americans saw the differences in 1988 but the percent has consistently increased to 87% in 2016. What this suggests is that the impact of polarization is almost universal such that it even has enabled early-generation Americans to perceive important differences between major parties as well. Table 3.1 shows the impact of polarization on perceiving important differences between parties following the same model specification. The first two columns show the effect of elite polarization on each early-generation Democrat and Republican, and the last two columns show that of affective polarization. The results are suggestive that polarization has a significant effect on whether early-

generation partisans perceive important differences between parties.

Table 2.2: The effect of Polarization on Perceiving Important Differences Between Parties (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

| DV: Perceiving Differences	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Elite Polarization	4.195***	4.129***		
	(0.847)	(1.031)		
Affective Polarization			0.069***	0.068***
			(0.014)	(0.017)
N	1,527	856	1,527	856

Note: Entries are estimates of logistic regression model with standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects and individual covariates are controlled. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Next, I examine the effect of perceiving differences between parties on the development of early-generation party identification. If early-generation partisans express their attachment to their own party more like native-born Americans once they perceive important differences between parties, it implies that polarization affects the development of early-generation party identification via increased clarity. Figure 2.4[11] shows that this is the case. Specifically, the result shows that perceiving differences has increased the similarity score by 0.12 points for the Democrats and 0.19 points for the Republicans respectively. In other words, perceiving important differences makes both early-generation partisans develop their party identification to their party more like native-born Americans. This substantively means that early-generation Americans incorporate current information, ideology, and identity similarly to native-born Americans only when they perceive differences between parties.

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11. I follow a similar model specification, pooled OLS but all of regressors are at individual level, to Figure 2.1 and 2.2. The results in Table 3.1 and Figure 2.4 are robust across different model specifications. For more information, please refer the appendix A.

Figure 2.4: Perceiving Difference between Parties and Semantic Similarity Score

(a) Early-generation Democrats

(b) Early-generation Republicans

Note: The Y-axis shows the predicted semantic similarity scores. They are generated from linear regression estimates for 40 years old Democrat (Republican) Latino male with a some college degree, 34th to 67th percentile income, slightly liberal (conservative), moderate interest in politics, Catholic, union member in family, and lives in Western states. The band indicates 95% confidence intervals.

2.6   Conclusion

The findings suggest several implications for future studies on American party identification in the era of immigration and polarization. First, the ANES is the only available historical source that provides the open-ended responses of early-generation Americans. As such, the use of the open-ended responses in this study provides unique insights to the study of the new Americans.[12] The open-ended responses suggest that the meaning of party attachment among early-generation Americans is far more heterogeneous and idiosyncratic than native-born Americans. Some early-generation Americans self-identify with their own party like native-born Americans whereas others do it based on experiences/predispositions from the country of origin or issues that uniquely matter

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12. This does not mean that the ANES is free from any limitations. It tends to include citizens who are fluent in English thus scholars point out that it is not representative of a broad immigrant population in the U.S. I address this issue in appendix A.

to them as an immigrant.[13] This implies that the traditional measure of party identification, *party self-identification* cannot fully capture such variations in how new Americans develop their attachment towards the parties in the U.S. This suggests that future studies can extend our understanding of party identification among new Americans by using the open-ended survey responses.

Moreover, the findings give implications for the study of political participation among immigrants or early-generation Americans because their decision to participate in the politics of the U.S. largely depends on how they've developed their attachment to a particular party. For example, if one has adopted the Republican party because of small government and moral traditionalism, one is more likely to participate in politics once the Republican elites emphasize conservative ideology. However, one is hardly mobilized if one has adopted a party because of issues that are particularly important to them unless the party emphasizes the issues. By examining how new Americans join party politics with open-ended responses, I suggest that future studies can utilize them to study political participation among immigrants.

Second, prior studies have explained party identification among immigrants based on factors that are unique to immigrants as a racial/ethnic minority however no existing studies fully incorporate how polarized political environments affect the way they develop their party identification. By showing that the impact of polarization is much stronger than we've assumed such that it even exerts its impact on early-generation Americans, who are mostly uncertain and ambivalent towards parties in the U.S., I suggest that this description of the "confusion" and "ambivalence" needs to be re-examined because political environments do help early-generation Americans by complementing the role of pre-adult socialization and parental party transmission.

The scope of this study is to examine how increased clarity due to polarization affects early-generation party identification over time. However, much can be examined to understand which aspects of polarization lead to the development of party identification in a more strict causal manner. For example, increased clarity may facilitate the development of early-generation, or more broadly immigrant, party identification by promoting information-seeking behavior or intention to

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13. For more information, please refer to appendix A.

join social membership in the U.S. Or, it may promote threat perception among new Americans so it may affect their political engagement. By showing that polarized political environments affect political attitudes among the new Americans, I suggest that we can further extend our knowledge of racial/ethnic minorities by examining specific mechanisms that lead to the development of party identification among new Americans under polarization.

Finally, I've focused on early-generation *likes* about their own party. However, recent scholarship in American politics has suggested that animosity towards the opposition party is a stronger predictor of American political behavior; and scholars conceptualize this as negative partisanship. Compared to a recent focus on this new concept, however, existing studies of negative partisanship have ignored race and immigration. As such, we don't even know if negative partisanship exists among new Americans and, if so, what it would look like. Does negative partisanship exist among early-generation Americans and, more broadly, immigrant-origin Americans? Does the meaning of negative partisanship among early-generation Americans similar to those of native-born Americans? This means that I've exclusively focused on positive partisanship, as defined by Bankert (2020), and thsese questions are unanswered yet. I leave this for future studies as a next step.

3. Second Essay: Uncertainty/Undecidedness, Social Discrimination, and Linked Fate:

Negative Partisanship in the Era of Race and Immigration

3.1 Introduction

Recent studies of negative partisanship have suggested that American animosity toward the opposition party is increasing (e.g. Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Boonen 2019; Bankert 2020b; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Medeiros and Noël 2014; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). Related studies further suggest that negative partisanship has become the one of main drivers of American political behavior in recent elections (e.g. Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Bankert 2020a). Compared to this increasing focus on this new concept, however, existing studies have not fully incorporated race and immigration. If they focus on race, they tend to focus on the traditional White-Black racial divide (e.g. Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Abramowitz and McCoy 2019). As a result, little attention has been given to understanding negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos, the new Americans who have moved to the U.S. since *Immigration and Nationality Act* in 1965. Consequently, we know less about whether negative partisanship exists among the new Americans and, if so, what it would look like.

Prior studies of negative partisanship[1] suggests that several factors such as sorting, ideological constraint, and an exposure to media are associated with the rise of negative partisanship among the mass public (Bougher 2017; Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar 2017; Levendusky 2009a; Mason 2015; Mason 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). While theses factors may increase Asian American and Latino negativity towards the the major parties, studies of Asian Americans and Latinos find that factors that have traditionally explained American political behavior such as political ideologies, information, and identities can't sufficiently explain Asian American and Latino political behavior (e.g. Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong

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1. Scholars interchangeably use a term "affective polarization" to indicate increasing negativity, or partisan disdain, towards the out-partisans. Note however that other scholars suggest a different definition of negative partisanship, negational partisanship where one supports or identifies with a certain party because he/she disapproves of another (Lelkes 2021; Medeiros and Noël 2014). In this study, I focus on the first definition, *partisan disdain and animosity*, to narrow the scope of this study.

2004; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017). Instead, scholars have focused on factors that have uniquely relevant to the new Americans such as uncertainty/undecidedness, social discrimination, and linked fate with a pan-ethnic group to explain their political behavior (e.g. Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Carlos 2018; Cisneros 2016; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; DeSipio 1998; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Raychaudhuri 2020; Rodolfo 2019; Wong 2000; Wong et al. 2011). Based on these studies, I discuss how these factors are associated with the development of negative partisanship among the new Americans. Additionally, I also examine how sorting, ideological constraint, and exposure to media affect negative partisanship among the new Americans.

Using the ANES 2016 and 2020, I first find that Asian American and Latino level of negative partisanship is lower, about 10 percentage points, than other races in the U.S. Second, I find that social discrimination affects the development of negative partisanship among the new Americans in various ways: 1) it increases negative partisanship toward the Republican Party regardless of their partisanship and 2) it even decreases negative partisanship among Asian American and Latino Republicans as a racial/ethnic minority. Third, I find that the perception of linked fate with pan-ethnic groups exerts only a small effect on negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Finally, I find that factors that are considered to be associated with an increase in negative partisanship such as sorting and media exposure affect the development of negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos as well.

The results have important implications for our understanding of American party identification in the era of race and immigration. By showing how unique perceptions/experiences of Asian Americans and Latinos affect their development of negative partisanship, I show that negative partisanship among the new Americans follows the model of expressive partisanship where the minorities develop partisan animosity toward a party that increases potential threats to their pan-ethnic group (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Second, negative partisanship has become one of the main drivers of American political behavior. By showing which factors are associated with a

rise of negative partisanship among the new Americans, I try to extend our knowledge of Asian American and Latino political behavior in the era of race and immigration.

3.2 The Rise of Negative Partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos

A lot of studies find that Americans increasingly develop animosity toward out-partisans while they consistently like their own party and its members, and scholars define this phenomenon as negative partisanship. For example, Abramowitz and Webster (2016) find that negative feelings toward the out-party and its candidates have increased over time. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) find that Americans are increasingly unhappy with a potential inter-party marriage and believe that out-partisans are less-intelligent, selfish, and closed-minded. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) find that fear and loathing towards the opposition party is deeply ingrained in voters' minds and that Americans almost automatically disapprove of their out-partisans. Webster (2020) further finds that Americans increasingly feel anger towards out-partisans such that about 90% of voters in 2016 felt angry with presidential candidates from out-party (Webster, Connors, and Sinclair 2021). Though scholars use different measures and definitions to capture various aspects of partisan animosity (Lelkes 2021), they commonly suggest that animosity and hatred toward the opposition party and its members have increased especially in recent decades. Related studies further suggest that it affects American political behavior such as partisan loyalty, voting behavior, and policy preferences, and attitudes toward the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Bankert 2020a; Druckman et al. 2021; Lee et al. 2022); it even affects non-political life of the mass public such that Americans are not happy with potential marriage with out-partisans (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), find out-partisans physically unattractive (Nicholson et al. 2016), and don't want recruit and date out-partisans (Gift and Gift 2015; Huber and Malhotra 2017).

Compared to this increased attention on this new concept, most existing studies have not fully incorporated race and immigration. If they focus on race, they tend to focus on the traditional racial divide between White and Black (Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Robison and Moskowitz 2019). For example, Abramowitz and Webster (2018) argue that racial realignment of the major parties since the civil right movements in the 1970s—White for the Re-

publican Party and Black for the Democratic Party—is the main driver of the negative partisanship in the U.S. Abramowitz and McCoy (2019) further discuss that Trump's mobilization strategy has caused negative partisanship mainly among White voters and it strongly affected White working-class voters and college-educated Whites. Robison and Moskowitz (2019) investigate the origin of negative partisanship focusing on evaluations of each Democratic and Republican group among the mass but they focus on Blacks as a Democratic group. Furthermore, related studies investigate the origin of negative partisanship focusing on several factors such as sorting, ideological constraint, and exposure to media (Bougher 2017; Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar 2017; Levendusky 2009a; Mason 2015; Mason 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and Abramowitz 2017); however, these studies also do not separately focus on Asian Americans and Latinos. As such, Asian American and Latino negative partisanship is underexplored and undertheorized.

However, prior studies of Asian Americans and Latinos suggest that factors that have traditionally explained American political behavior such as political ideologies, information, and identities can't sufficiently explain Asian American and Latino partisanship (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Instead, scholars have suggested alternative explanations focusing on unique experiences of Asian Americans and Latinos such as undecidedness/uncertainty, social discrimination, linked fate with a pan-ethnic group, and acculturation to understand their partisanship (e.g. Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991;Carlos 2018; Cisneros 2016; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; DeSipio 1998; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Raychaudhuri 2020; Rodolfo 2019; Wong 2000; Wong et al. 2011). These studies suggest that factors that are considered to be associated with an increase in negative partisanship—e.g. sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure—may not exert the same impacts on negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. For example, we can't be sure whether an alignment of party identity and ideological identity increase Asian American and Latino negative partisanship if they are undecided about political ideologies and identities in the U.S. Similarly, we can't be sure whether media exposure exerts the same impacts on Asian Americans and Latinos if they are uncertain about political information in the U.S. Likewise, prior explanations of negative partisanship may not be

equally applied to negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Alternatively, factors that are uniquely relevant to Asian American and Latino experiences may distinctively shape their negative partisanship. Thus, we need to look at Asian Americans and Latinos separately from other White or Black Americans to better understand their negative partisanship.

Figure 3.1: American Feelings toward In- and Out-Party

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative File from 1984 to 2020.

The Figure 3.1 shows that Asian Americans and Latinos have developed negative partisanship over time. Specifically, Figure 3.1 shows American feelings toward the in- and out-party from 1984 to 2020. The solid line represents feeling thermometer scores toward in-party; the dotted line represents those toward out-party. The left panel represents the feelings scores of all Americans including all races such as White, Black, Asian, Latino, Native-American, and other (mixed) races; the right panel represents those of Asian Americans and Latinos. The right panel shows that Asian Americans and Latinos also have developed negative partisanship in the U.S. Specifically, the dotted line in the right panel shows that Asian American and Latino attitude toward their own party has been relatively stable over time and it has been always warmer than their feelings

toward their out-party. The right panel shows that Asian Americans and Latinos follow a similar pattern to the general public in the U.S. However, they also show differences. Specifically, Asian American and Latino feelings toward the out-party are slightly warmer than those of all Americans across all periods within the observable time range. Consistent with prior studies, Asian American and Latino feelings toward the out-party have significantly dropped in 2016 as political parties actively mobilized them in the 2016 presidential election (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018;Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2020). In 2020, Asian American and Latino levels of negative partisanship were highest in 2020.

What factors are attributable to a rise in negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos? Do they develop their negativity in a similar way other Americans do? Or, is there something particular about their negativity towards the major parties in the U.S.? In the following section, I focus on undecidedness/uncertainty, social discrimination, and linked fate with their own pan-ethnic group to answer these questions.

3.3 The Origins of Negative Partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos

Undecidedness/Uncertainty

Campbell et al. (1960) in their canonical work, "*The American Voter,*" contend that Americans develop their party identification during the pre-adult socialization period under the parental influence. When Campbell et al. (1960) emphasize the role of parental party transmission, they originally discussed that parents can inherit both *attractive* and *repelling* qualities that are associated with each party when they transmit their partisan attitudes to their children. However, most studies focus on the transmissibility of positive attachments and find that parents succefully transmit their positive party identification to their children (e.g. Beck and Jennings 1991; Hatemi et al. 2009; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009). Boonen (2019), however, examines the transmissibility of negative partisanship in the context of politics in Belgium, and finds that parents do transmit their partisan disdain to their children. Though he does not test his claim in context of the U.S. politics, the finding suggests that

parental transmission of negative partisanship may occur in the U.S. as well such that Americans may develop their negative feelings toward out-party under the influence of their parents during the pre-adult socialization period.

The new Americans, however, lack this parental source of negative partisanship in the U.S. This is because their foreign-born or early-generation American parents also have a short history in the U.S. and did not go through the pre-adult socialization process unlike other Americans (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Carlos 2018; Carlos 2021;Hajnal and Lee 2011; Raychaudhuri 2020). Particularly, Hajnal and Lee 2011 (2011) discuss that Asian Americans and Latinos are undecided and uncertain about political information, ideologies, and identities of the U.S. because of the lack of parental transmission and cross-cutting interests. Thus, most of them face difficulties when developing their party identification in the U.S. Similarly, Carlos (2018) contends that a lot of Asian Americans and Latinos experience delayed political socialization due to the lack of parental party transmission; even English speaking children can help their parents' political assimilation (Carlos 2021). Though the prior studies mostly focus on the lack of parental influences to understand the development of positive partisanship among the new Americans, I argue that the lack of parental influences can explain negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos as well. Therefore, *Asian American and Latino levels of negativity toward the out-party should be lower than other races in the U.S.* (H1)

Social Discrimination

Prior studies have focused on group-based resources to understand minority political behavior because socioeconomic factors and other political resources do not effectively explain political behavior among racial/ethnic minorities (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Verba and Nie 1987). Among many group-based resources, scholars have focused on social discrimination to explain Asian American and Latino political participation (Barreto 2010; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Wong et al. 2011) and their party identification (Hajnal 2004; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017). Specifically, scholars have focused on social discrimination to understand the Democratic Party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos. For example, Hajnal and

Lee (Hajnal and Lee 2011) find a pattern that Asian Americans and Latinos who perceive more social discrimination are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017) find with an experiment that social discrimination causes the Democratic Party identification among Asian Americans; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz (2016) find that Latinos who see pervasive discrimination tend to support the Democratic Party.

Though these studies focus on social discrimination to explain the Democratic Party identification, I further discuss that it also affects negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. According to the Social Identity Theory and its sibling theory in Political Science, expressive partisanship (e.g. Tajfel et al. 1979; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018), individuals develop positive identification to a party if the party seems to protect their group status. However, the SIT simultaneously suggests that individuals develop negative identification toward a party if the party is expected to increase potential threats to their own group. What this suggests is that social discrimination should increase negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos toward a party that increases threats to their group status via discriminatory rhetoric and policies—the Republican Party (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2020; Reny and Barreto 2022). Based on this, I argue that *Asian American and Latino negativity toward the Republican Party should increase as their perceived level of social discrimination increases regardless of one's party self-identification* (H2). I further contend that social discrimination may affect each Democratic and Republican identifiers differently. *For Democrat Asian Americans and Latinos, social discrimination should increase negativity toward the Republican Party because heightened awareness of social discrimination even further increases negativity toward the Republican party* (H2-1). However, heightened awareness of social discrimination differently affects the Republicans because it increases the salience of Asian American and Latino identity as a racial/ethnic minority and this will lead to a decrease in the relevance of their Republican partisanship. Thus, *perceived social discrimination even affects negative partisanship among Asian American and Latino Republicans in that it may decrease negativity toward the Democratic Party* (H2-2).

Linked Fate with A Pan-Ethnic Group

As another group-based resource of minority political behavior, scholars have focused on perceptions of linked fate with a pan-ethnic group. Particularly, Dawson Michael (1994) contends that racial minorities tend to act as a member of their racial group because minorities tend to perceive that their individual fates are tied to those of their racial/ethnic group. He originally invented this concept to explain African American political behavior, e.g. why highly educated and affluent African Americans support the Democratic party and endorse liberal policies, however many scholars use this concept to explain Asian American and Latino political behavior (Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez 2022; Masuoka 2006; Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016; Rogers and Kim 2021). For example, Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) show that strong pan-ethnic consciousness and identification is associated with active political and civic engagement among Asian Americans. Stokes (2003) and Shaw, Foster, and Combs (2019) finds a similar result with Latinos in that strong group consciousness as Latino is associated with more political participation. Related studies have revealed that perceptions of linked fate with their own ethnic group, or strong pan-ethnic consciousness, is associated their Democratic Party identification. For example, Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) found that most Asians do not identify with none of the parties in the U.S. If they identify with a certain party, however, they tend to identify with as Democrats when they have a strong pan-ethnic consciousness. Cisneros (2016) finds a similar result in that Latinos who have strong pan-ethnic consciousness tends to identify with the Democratic party because they believe that the Democratic party is more likely to protect status of their pan-ethnic group.

Based on Social Identity Theory (SIT), I argue that perceived linked fate with their own pan-ethnic group affects negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. This is because the new Americans should increase negative attitudes toward a party that is highly associated with the majority society—the Republican Party—when they have a higher level of perceived linked fate with their pan-ethnic group. This is because a strong awareness of linked fate with one's own pan-ethnic group increases the saline of their identity as a racial/ethnic minority and this leads to negative attitudes toward a party that is highly associated with the majority society, White-led,

of the U.S. (Westwood and Peterson 2020). Thus, *Asian Americans and Latinos who perceive a higher level of linked fate with their own pan-ethnic group are more likely to develop negativity toward the Republican Party*, (H3). I further contend that the linked fate consciousness may affect each Democratic and Republican identifiers differently similar to social discrimination. *For Democrat Asian Americans and Latinos, perceived linked fate with one's own pan-ethnic group may increase negativity toward the Republican Party because heightened awareness on linked fate even further increases negativity toward the Republican party* (H3-1). However, it exerts different impacts on Asian American and Latino Republicans. This is because it increases the salience of Asian American and Latino identity as a racial/ethnic minority and this will lead to a decrease in the relevance of their Republican identification. Thus, I further argue that *linked fate with one's own pan-ethnic group even affects negative partisanship among Asian American and Latino Republicans as a racial/ethnic minority in that it may decrease negativity toward the Democratic Party* (H3-2).

3.4 Data and Measurement

Data. I use the American National Election Studies (ANES) in 2016 and 2020. First, it asks survey questions that are more relevant to this study such as awareness of social discrimination against one's own pan-ethnic (racial) group and media exposure to various media types such as TV, radio, newspapers, or the Internet beginning in 2016. Earlier studies does not ask these questions. Second, studies show that Asian Americans and Latinos have actively been mobilized to negative campaigns since 2016 presidential election. Thus, we can examine the association between group-level sources and their negative partisanship by focusing on these years (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Reny and Barreto 2022).

Animosity toward the Major Parties. Scholars use the term "negative partisanship" to indicate various aspects of negativity towards the major parties and their members. Specifically, some studies use the term to indicate partisan animosity toward the major parties and their elites (e.g. Abramowitz and Webster 2016). Others use it to capture partisan disdain toward non-elite members of each party (e.g. Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Others use it to mean negate party identity

where one identifies or supports a certain party because he/she disapproves of another (e.g. Lee et al. 2022; Medeiros and Noël 2014). In this study, I narrow the scope of this study to focus on partisan animosity toward the major parties and their elites. To do this, I use a survey response that asks respondents to rate each Democratic and Republican Party on a scale of the feeling thermometer from 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm) (Druckman and Levendusky 2019). Asian Americans and Latinos not only can develop negative attitudes towards the out-party, but also can develop negative attitudes towards their own party, particularly, the Republican Party, disregarding one's partisanship as a racial/ethnic minority in the U.S. For the ease of the hypotheses testing and interpretation, I code the feeling scores in two different ways. To measure partisan animosity toward the out-party, I first reverse scale the feeling thermometer scores to indicate that higher (lower) scores mean cold (warm) feelings toward the out-party. Second, however, I do not reverse scale it but use the original scale where 0 means very cold and 100 means very warm to measure feelings toward each of the major parties.

Perceived Social Discrimination. To measure perceived social discrimination, I use a survey questionnaire that asks "How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups [Asian Americans/Hispanics/Blacks/Whites]?" Respondents can provide their responses in 5 scale measures from 1 (none at all) to 5 (great deal). I rescaled the response to vary from 0 to 1 where 0 means no discrimination at all and 1 means a great deal of discrimination. Each respondent provides their responses for each race. Thus, I can capture perceived discrimination against each respondents' racial group.[2]

Perceived Linked Fate with Pan-Ethnic (Racial) Group. To measure perceived linked fate with each respondent's pan-ethnic (racial) group, I use feeling thermometer scores that capture each respondent's feelings toward each of racial groups in the U.S. such as White, Black, Asian Americans, and Hispanic. If each respondent report that they have warm feelings toward their own pan-ethnic racial group, then it indicates that one has a strong perceived linked fate with the

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2. Please not that this is different from other measures that capture perceived discrimination against each individual, e.g. Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017). To be consistent with the suggested hypothesis, I focus on perceived discrimination against one's own racial group in this study.

group. I follow prior studies of linked fate, for example, among women because they use the feeling thermometer scores to measure the strength of group consciousness or linked fate with women as a group (e.g. *The Significance of Linked Fate for Women: A Data-Driven Learning Guide;*Simien and Clawson 2004).

Sorting: An Alignment of Partisan and Ideological Identity. To measure sorting, I use two survey questionnaires that capture a respondent's party identification strength and ideological identity strength following Mason (2015). To be specific, I use the traditional 7 scale party identity strength measure that varies from 1 (Strong Democrat) to 7 (Strong Republican) to categorize each respondent into strong partisans, weak partisans, leaning independents, and pure independents. Additionally, I use the traditional 7 scale measure of ideological identity strength that varies from 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 7 (Extremely Conservative) to categorize each respondent into very strong, strong, weak, and moderate ideological identity. I then take the absolute difference between the traditional 7 scale measure of party identity strength and ideological identity strength, and reverse-scaled it. Finally, I create a measure of partisan identity and ideological sorting by multiplying an identity alignment score, the absolute difference, by the partisan identity strength score and the ideological identity strength score. I rescaled it to vary from 0 (least aligned or sorted) to 1 (most aligned or sorted).

Ideological Constraint. To measure ideological constraint, I use 6 survey questionnaires that capture each respondent's positions toward six issues: 1) allow abortion by law or not, 2) prioritize government service versus spending, 3) government should spend more for health care or not, 4) whether we should aid blacks/minorities, 5) more or less defense spending, and 6) whether government should guarantee jobs or not. Using the mean value of responses from the six survey questionnaires, I create a measure of ideological constraint by calculating the standard deviation. I then re-scaled it to vary from 0 (no ideological constraint) to 1 (ideological constraint) following Mason (2015).

Media Exposure. To measure the level of media exposure, I use a survey questionnaire that asks "And how closely do you follow politics on TV, radio, newspapers, or the Internet?" Respondents

can provide an answer in 4 scale measure from 1 (very closely) to 4 (none at all). Using this survey questionnaire, I first reverse-coded and rescaled it to vary from 0 (no exposure at all) to 1 (a great deal of exposure).

3.5   Results

Uncertainty/Ambivalence

Do Asian Americans and Latinos develop a lesser degree of negative partisanship toward the opposite party? To answer this question, I regress negative feelings toward the out-party on whether a respondent is Asian American/Latino. I control for basic demographics such as gender, age, education, income, and religion. Additionally, I control for sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure because these factors are known to be associated with an increase in negative partisanship (Bougher 2017; Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar 2017; Levendusky 2009a; Mason 2015; Mason 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and Abramowitz 2017); and interact these factors with whether a respondent is Asian American/Latino to examine whether being an Asian American/Latino moderate the effect of each sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure respectively. This way I test whether these factors substantively matter to the new Americans compared to other Americans such as White and Black.

The Table3.1 shows the results. The dependent variable in this table is negative feelings toward the out-party. Thus, positive (negative) coefficient values indicate that each covariate increases (decreases) the negativity toward the out-party. The first row in every model shows the effect of being an Asian American/Latino on negative feelings toward the out-party. The baseline category is other Americans such as White, Black, and others. The first Model includes only basic demographic variables and I add sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure in the following models. The fifth model includes all relevant variables with interaction terms. The first row in each model shows that being an Asian American/Latino is associated with a decrease in negative attitudes toward the out-party. In other words, Asian Americans and Latinos develop a lesser degree of negativity toward the out-party compared to other Americans. Specifically, Model (1) shows that the new

Table 3.1: The Correlates of Out-Party Negativity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Asian/Latino	−3.48***	−5.09***	−12.02***	−7.93***	−16.27***
	(0.76)	(0.99)	(2.74)	(2.04)	(3.34)
Sorting	20.88***	13.41***	20.91***	20.86***	16.03***
	(0.79)	(3.04)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(3.14)
Ideological Constraint	3.96***	3.99***	−12.24**	4.11***	−10.87**
	(1.48)	(1.48)	(5.20)	(1.48)	(5.26)
Media Exposure	44.56***	44.36***	45.11***	11.50	16.35
	(4.03)	(4.03)	(4.03)	(14.61)	(14.87)
Republican	−0.23	−0.25	−0.23	−0.26	−0.26
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Female	−1.46***	−1.46***	−1.43***	−1.48***	−1.45***
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Age	2.02	2.07	2.03	2.05	2.09*
	(1.27)	(1.27)	(1.27)	(1.27)	(1.26)
Education	2.40**	2.35**	2.43**	2.35**	2.35**
	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.14)
Income	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.25
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Religion	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Year: 2020	6.04***	6.03***	6.06***	6.04***	6.05***
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Asian/Latino × Sorting		6.89**			4.49
		(2.71)			(2.80)
Asian/Latino × Ideological Constraint			14.47***		13.38***
			(4.46)		(4.51)
Asian/Latino × Media Exposure				30.00**	25.95**
				(12.74)	(13.01)
Constant	59.21***	61.05***	68.59***	64.11***	73.32***
	(1.93)	(2.06)	(3.47)	(2.84)	(4.06)
Observations	6,247	6,247	6,247	6,247	6,247
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19

DV: Negative feelings toward the opposite party.

Baseline category is White/Black/Other.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Americans have 3.48 points less negativity toward their opposite party, and results in models from (2) to (5) consistently provide similar results. Particularly, the first row in the Model (5) shows that Asian Americans and Latinos are associated with -16.27 less degree of negative partisanship toward the out-party when their level of sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure is zero simultaneously. The first rows in Models (2), (3), and (4) show similar results in that Asian Americans and Latinos are associated with a lesser degree of negativity toward out-party when their level of sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure is zero each respectively.

Do factors that explain the origin of negative partisanship among all Americans exert the same effects on negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos? Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of each sorting, ideological constraint, and media exposure conditional on whether respondents is a recent immigrant American, Asian American/Latino, or White/Black/Others derived from Model (5) in Table 3.1. If the marginal effect is positive and statistically significant for Asian Americans/Latinos, we then can say that each factor is also associated with an increase in negative partisanship among the new Americans. The panel on the left side shows the marginal effect of sorting conditional on the race and it shows that increases in sorting, from its minimum to maximum values, are associated with increases in out-party negativity, about 25 points, among the new Americans. Similarly, the panel in the middle shows the marginal effect of ideological constraint conditional on race and it also shows that increases in ideological constraint are associated with increases in out-party negativity, about 2.5 points, among the new Americans. However, the result is insignificant at a 90% significance level. This may mean that ideological constraint has either a very small or statistically insignificant effect. However, please note that we may get significant findings if we do the same analysis with a data set with more Asian American and Latino respondents. Finally, the third panel shows the marginal effect of exposure to media conditional on race and the finding shows that increases in exposure to media, from its minimum to maximum values, are associated with an increase in out-party negativity, about 42 points, among Asian Americans and Latinos. In short, the findings suggest that factors that scholars find to increase negative partisanship explain negativity among the new Americans.

Figure 3.2: The Marginal Effect of Sorting, Ideological Constraint, and Media Exposure on Negative Partisanship Conditional on Race

Note: Dots represents value of each estimate and bands represent confidence interval at 90% significance level.

Social Discrimination

Does perceived social discrimination affect how Asian Americans and Latinos develop their partisan animosity toward the major parties in the U.S.? To answer this question, I regress feelings toward the major parties on perceived social discrimination against one's own pan-ethnic racial group with the same model specification in Table 3.1. Specifically, Model (1) in Table 3.2 shows the impact of perceived social discrimination on feelings toward the Republican Party. Model (2) shows the impact of perceived social discrimination on feelings toward the Republican Party among Democrats. Model (3) shows the impact of perceived social discrimination on feelings toward the Democratic Party among Republicans. Across all Models, I interact perceived social discrimination with respondents' race to examine whether race moderates the effect of social discrimination. This way I test whether perceived social discrimination is uniquely relevant to Asian/Latino negative partisanship. Here, I code race into three categories—White, Black, and Asian/Latino—and the

baseline category is Black.

Table 3.2: The Impact of Perceived Social Discrimination on Feelings towards the Major Parties

	(1) Republican Party (All Americans)	(2) Republican Party (Among Democrats)	(3) Democratic Party (Among Republicans)
Perceived Discrimination (PD)	−21.83***	−21.33***	37.10***
	(4.80)	(4.68)	(12.44)
Republican	40.79***		
	(0.59)		
Sorting	3.92***	−14.80***	−22.66***
	(0.90)	(1.17)	(1.13)
Ideological Constraint	−11.42***	−10.46***	4.04*
	(1.66)	(2.23)	(2.12)
Media Exposure	−42.75***	−53.36***	−36.33***
	(4.46)	(5.77)	(5.84)
Female	2.40***	2.52***	0.71
	(0.51)	(0.64)	(0.68)
Age	2.19	−6.62***	−0.58
	(1.41)	(1.82)	(1.84)
Education	−9.48***	−2.41	−1.12
	(1.27)	(1.63)	(1.67)
Income	−0.72***	−0.18	−0.22
	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Religion	−1.51***	−1.24***	0.97***
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Asian/Latino	−6.53	−7.20	12.91
	(4.57)	(4.79)	(10.04)
White	−18.68***	−17.57***	18.74*
	(4.22)	(4.18)	(9.76)
Year: 2020	−0.04	−6.18***	−5.00***
	(0.54)	(0.69)	(0.71)
Asian/Latino × PD	9.52*	10.02*	−19.16
	(5.62)	(5.87)	(13.33)
White × PD	36.10***	31.01***	−47.28***
	(4.98)	(5.10)	(12.52)
Constant	62.34***	66.26***	16.07
	(4.49)	(4.56)	(10.10)
Observations	6,403	3,006	2,879
R^2	0.58	0.21	0.22

Note: Baseline category is Black.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table3.2 shows the results. First, Model (1) shows that perceived discrimination is negatively associated with feelings toward the Republican Party among Asian Americans and Latinos. This means that Asian American and Latino negativity toward the Republican Party increases when they feel that discrimination against their own group is increasing regardless of their party identification. Specifically, the panel on the left side shows the marginal effect of perceived discrimination on feelings toward the Republican Party conditional on race. It shows that increases in perceived discrimination, from its minimum to maximum values, are associated with decreases, about 15 points, in feelings toward the Republican Party among Asian Americans and Latinos. Second, Model (2) shows the impact of perceived discrimination on feelings toward the Republican Party among Asian American and Latino Democrats and it shows that perceived discrimination is negatively associated with feelings toward the Republican Party among Democrats among Asian Americans and Latinos. This means that Asian American and Latino Democrats' negativity toward the Republican Party is increasing as they perceive more discrimination against their own group. Specifically, the panel in the middle shows that increases in perceived discrimination, from minimum to maximum, are associated with decreases, about 14 points, in feelings toward the Republican Party among Asian American and Latino Democrats. Third, Model (3) shows that perceived discrimination is positively associated with feelings toward the Democratic Party among Asian American and Latino Republicans. This means that Asian American and Latino Republicans' negativity toward the Democratic Party decreases as they perceive more discrimination against their own group. Specifically, the panel on the right side shows that increases in perceived discrimination, from its minimum to maximum values, are associated with increases, about 18 points, in feelings toward the Democratic Party among Asian American and Latino Republicans.

Note in Figure reffigure2 that Asian Americans and Latinos show a similar pattern to Blacks when it comes to their negative partisanship and perceived social discrimination. All racial minorities tend to develop negative feelings toward the Republican Party when they perceive social discrimination against their own group regardless of party identification while Whites only tend to develop positive feelings toward the Republican party when they increasingly feel that discrimina-

tion against White is prevalent. The same pattern applies to feelings toward the out-party among the minority Democrats in that they develop negativity towards the Republican Party when they perceive more social discrimination. Even if they are Republicans, racial minorities tend to develop a lesser degree of negativity toward the Democratic Party when they see more discrimination against them. However, Whites show the opposite patterns. The findings suggest that Social Identity Theory and a theory of expressive partisanship (e.g. Tajfel et al. 1979; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018) go beyond positive partisanship to explain negative partisanship among racial minorities in the U.S. such that social discrimination even can reduce the relevance of positive party identification among the minority Republicans.

Figure 3.3: Marginal of Perceived Social Discrimination on Feelings towards the Major Parties by Race

Note: Dots represents value of each estimate and bands represent confidence interval at 90% significance level.

Linked Fate with Pan-Ethnic Group

I examine whether linked fate with a pan-ethnic group affects negativity towards the major parties among Asian Americans and Latinos. To do this, I regress feelings toward the major parties on strength of linked fate following the same model specification in the previous analysis. Specifically, Model (1) in Table3.2 shows the impact of linked fate on feelings toward the Republican Party. Model (2) shows the impact of linked fate on feelings toward the Republican Party among Democrats. Model (3) shows the impact of the linked fate on feelings toward the Democratic Party among Republicans. Across all Models, I interact linked fate with respondents' race to examine whether race moderates the effect of social discrimination. This way I test whether linked fate is uniquely relevant to Asian/Latino negative partisanship. Here, I code race into three categories—White, Black, and Asian/Latino—and the baseline category is Black.

Table3.3 shows the result. First, Model (1) shows that linked fate with other Asian Americans and Latinos is negatively associated with feelings toward the Republican Party. This means that Asian American and Latino negativity toward the Republican Party increases when they increasingly perceive linked fate with their pan-ethnic group regardless of their party identification. Specifically, the panel on the left side in Figure 3.4 shows the marginal effect of linked fate on feelings toward the Republican Party conditional on race. It shows that increases in linked fate, from its minimum to maximum values, are associated with decreases, about 0.1 points, in feelings toward the Republican Party among Asian Americans and Latinos. However, linked fate does not affect how Asian Americans and Latinos feel toward their out-party. The panel in the middle and right side in Figure 3.4 shows that increases in the perception of linked fate do not affect how each Democrat and Republican Asian Americans and Latinos feel toward their out-party. Unlike the prior studies that find a strong relationship between the linked fate and positive party self-identification (e.g. Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Cisneros 2016), the linked fate exerts a very small effect on Asian Americans and Latinos such that it only is associated with a decrease in negative attitudes towards the Republican Party.

Table 3.3: The Impact of Linked Fate with Pan-Ethnic (Racial) Group on Feelings toward the Major Parties

	(1) Republican Party (All Americans)	(2) Republican Party (Among Democrats)	(3) Democratic Party (All Republicans)
Linked Fated (LF)	0.04	0.09	0.34**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.18)
Republican	42.35***		
	(0.57)		
Sorting	3.60***	−15.25***	−23.30***
	(0.91)	(1.17)	(1.16)
Ideology Constraint	−12.39***	−11.04***	3.89*
	(1.70)	(2.25)	(2.18)
Media Exposure	−45.58***	−54.62***	−38.66***
	(4.53)	(5.80)	(5.97)
Female	2.17***	2.25***	0.35
	(0.52)	(0.65)	(0.70)
Age	1.09	−5.98***	−0.20
	(1.44)	(1.84)	(1.88)
Education	−11.65***	−3.84**	0.36
	(1.28)	(1.64)	(1.69)
Income	−0.86***	−0.16	−0.29
	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Religion	−1.43***	−1.12***	1.05***
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.29)
Asian/Latino	16.29**	11.38	14.82
	(6.55)	(7.06)	(15.35)
White	−3.52	1.94	15.07
	(5.38)	(5.17)	(14.38)
Year:2020	0.10	−6.44***	−5.32***
	(0.55)	(0.69)	(0.73)
Asian/Latino × LF	−0.14*	−0.09	−0.26
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)
White × LF	0.10	0.03	−0.34*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.18)
Constant	43.39***	41.83***	15.65
	(5.47)	(5.26)	(14.51)
Observations	6,246	2,926	2,819
R^2	0.57	0.21	0.20
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 3.4: Marginal of Perceived Linked Fate on Feelings toward the Major Parties by Race

Note: Dots represents value of each estimate and bands represent confidence interval at 90% significance level.

3.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Asian Americans and Latinos have gradually been incorporated into party politics in the U.S. Particularly, they have become a victim of negative campaigns by former president Donald Trump since the 2016 presidential election. Corresponding to the anti-Asian and anti-Latino rhetoric, the mass public also has been divided into two groups where one group of people believes that the new Americans hurt the spirit of the U.S. by not assimilating into the culture of the larger society of the U.S. and links Asian Americans with the COVID-19 virus; whereas another group of people reject these kinds of claims or simply believe that such claims are unfounded (Schildkraut 2010; Ramirez and Peterson 2020; Reny and Barreto 2022). As such, anti- and pro- Asian and Latino issues has radically been politicized in recent years so Asian American and Latino can easily identify which party stands *against*, rather than *for*, their interests over recent decades. However, no studies have fully examined whether negative partisanship exists among the new Americans. I try to extend our knowledge of American party identification by focusing on Asian American and Latino negative

partisanship.

I find that social discrimination shapes Asian American and Latino negativity toward the major parties in the U.S. As a racial/ethnic minority, the new Americans have positive attitudes toward a party that has been traditionally and historically associated with racial/ethnic minorities in the U.S.; the Democratic Party. Simultaneously, they tend to have negative attitudes toward the Republican Party which has supported the interests of the White-led society in the U.S. Related to this, I find that the perception of social discrimination increases Asian American and Latino negativity toward the Republican party regardless of their party identification and it further increases negativity toward the Republican Party among the minority Democrats. Particularly, I find that the new Americans who represent themselves as Republicans even shape positive attitudes toward the Democratic Party when they increasingly perceive that social discrimination against their pan-ethnic group is prevalent. I further find that Blacks follow the same pattern. This suggests that the expressive model of partisanship not only explains how minorities develop their attachments to parties but also explains how they develop their negative affect toward the parties.

Additionally, many studies find that social discrimination is associated with the Democratic Party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos. However, Hopkins et al. (2020) find with five experiments that social discrimination or perceived discrimination against one's own racial group does not cause positive identification with a particular party. The alternative explanation could be that there really is a reverse causality such that those who identify with the Democratic Party may perceive that social discrimination against them is more prevalent. However, it could be that social discrimination may cause negative partisanship, rather than positive party identification, among Asian Americans and Latinos. In this study, I did not test whether social discrimination cause negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. However, I find that the association between social discrimination and negative partisanship is robust across various model specifications. Future studies can test whether there is a causal effect of social discrimination.

Finally, I find that factors that previous studies discussed to be associated with an increase in partisan animosities such as sorting and media exposure also are associated with negative parti-

sanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Studies of Asian American and Latino political socialization suggest that Asian Americans and Latinos are less familiar with political information, ideology, and identities in the U.S. due to their lack of parental party transmission and cross-cutting interests (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Even considering these factors, I find that sorting—an alignment of party identity with ideological identity—increases negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. This finding shows that Asian American and Latino negative partisanship also follows expressive partisanship. Particularly, I find that frequent exposure to various media increases negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. This suggests that media in current years may help the political socialization process among the new Americans, though in a negative way, who lacks parental sources of party transmission.

4.   Third Essay: To become a 'Real' American: Acculturation Psychology and Republican

Partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos

4.1   Introduction

Prior research of party identification among racial/ethnic minorities has long discovered that members of these groups have a strong proclivity to identify with the Democratic Party and its candidates (e.g. Carmines and Stimson 1989; Dawson Michael 1994; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Valentino and Sears 2005). As new Americans have moved to the United States since *Immigration and Nationality Act* in 1965, more attention naturally has been given to explain why Asian Americans and Latinos identify with the Democratic Party, focusing on factors uniquely matter to the immigrant groups such as social discrimination, unique socialization experiences, predispositions from country of origin, linked fate with pan-ethnic group, and attitudes towards immigration (Carlos 2018; Cisneros 2016; DeSipio 1998; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Raychaudhuri 2020; Rodolfo 2019).

While we know a lot about why members of immigrant groups from Latin America or Asia might identify with the Democratic Party, less is known about why some identify with the Republican Party and its candidates. This is not a small omission given that a non-negligible proportion of Asian Americans and Latinos have supported the Republican Party and its candidates over the past decades. For example, 23% and 15% of Asian Americans identified with the Republican Party in 2008 and 2016 respectively (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). When it comes to voting decisions, 26% and 27% of Asian Americans voted for the Republican candidates, Mitt Romney and Donald Trump, in 2012 and 2016 (Lee 2016). Latinos also show a similar pattern. According to the National Survey of Latinos, about 15% of Latinos have identified with the Republican Party since the 1990s. When it comes to voting decisions, 28% and 32% of Latinos voted for the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, in 2016 and 2020 respectively (Chavez 2020). This is puzzling given that the connection there is between social discrimination and the Republican Party has

increased through discriminatory policies against Asian Americans and Latinos.

When they and their families immigrate to the U.S., Asian Americans and Latinos go through a process that requires modifications of their original cultural orientations as a racial/ethnic minority in the U.S. This adjustment process is called "acculturation" and it creates a psychological tension between absorbing rules, norms, and beliefs of a larger society of the U.S.—*assimilation psychology*—and preserving those of country of origin—*multicultural, or ethnic-specific, psychology* (Sam 2006). Consequently, each member of the minority group shows differences in how each assimilates into a larger society of the U.S. and maintains their original cultural orientations (Berry 1990). Though several studies have examined how factors of immigrant acculturation such as length of residence, language proficiency, and immigrant generations are related to the adoption of certain partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos (e.g. Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Phan and Garcia 2009; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005), no studies have examined how acculturation psychology affects the direction of their party identification.[1] In this study, I try to extend our knowledge of minority party identification by examining how acculturation psychology affects the development of party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos.

Based on studies of immigrant acculturation from social psychology (Berry 1990; Brewer 1991; Roccas and Brewer 2002) and identity based theory of party identification from political science (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018; Mason 2015; Mason 2018; Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987), I hypothesize that individuals with high amounts of assimilation psychology will be more likely to support the Republican Party. This is because strong assimilation psychology turns them away from the party most closely associated with immigrant societies, the Democratic Party, and simultaneously increases support for a party

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1. Acculturation psychology, or psychological acculturation, is a distinctive concept to the observed indicators of acculturation such as length of residence, English proficiency, and immigrant generation status (Sam 2006). The former captures psychological tension between assimilation and multicultural psychology among racial/ethnic minorities while the latter rather captures the actual, or observed, level of acculturation. While scholars have long been differentiated between the two concepts, acculturation psychology has been relatively neglected (Arends-Toth and Vijver 2006; Graves 1967). Note that some studies use acculturation preference or emotional acculturation interchangeably with acculturation psychology.

that is associated with majority societies of the U.S., the Republican Party. In contrast, I also hypothesize that individuals with high amounts of multicultural psychology will be more likely to support the Democratic Party. This is because strong multicultural psychology increases support for a party that is associated with the immigrant societies of the U.S., the Democratic Party.

I test this hypothesis with three observational studies and an original survey experiment. First, I find that strong assimilation (multicultural) psychology is associated with Republican (Democratic) Party identification using the American National Election Studies (ANES), National Asian American Survey (NAAS), and National Survey of Latinos (NSL). Second, I employ a survey experiment to examine whether acculturation psychology causally affects party identification among new Americans. Third, I find the null results with the experiment. However, this does not mean that acculturation psychology may not cause party identification. I provide a discussion about the non-manipulable nature of assimilation psychology and its implications to better interpret the results of this study comprehensively.

The results have important implications for our understanding of American party identification in the era of race and immigration. First, I find that acculturation psychology has implications beyond cultural and social integration among minorities/immigrants and may influence how they develop attitudes toward the major political parties in the U.S. Second, the results suggest that party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos follows the expressive model (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015) where minorities choose a party in a way that secures their subjective in-group identification.

4.2 Existing Explanations for Asian American and Latino Party Identification

Earlier studies of immigrant[2] party identification have focused on the adoption of partisanship, without giving much consideration to which partisan identity is adopted. These studies commonly assume that immigrants are indecision and ambivalent towards the major parties in the U.S.: they lack parental party transmission that guides political attitudes unlike other native-born Americans

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2. In this study, I use the term "immigrant" to broadly indicate immigrants and their children, particularly from Asian American and Latino communities in the U.S. I use the term "new Americans" and "immigrants" interchangeably.

(e.g. Beck and Jennings 1991; Campbell et al. 1960; Hatemi et al. 2009; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009) and they have political interests and ideologies that cross-cut existing partisan cleavages that have been shaped before their arrival (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Consequently, factors that reduce undecidedness and ambivalence has received the scholarly attention; and numerous studies have studied the adoption of partisanship based on factors of immigrant acculturation such as length of time, age, language proficiency, and immigrant general status (e.g. Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Phan and Garcia 2009; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005).

Though these earlier studies explicitly investigate the adoption of party identification, they had a great influence on subsequent research on the direction of party identification. This is because scholars assume that both Asian Americans and Latinos increasingly perceive their status as a racial and ethnic minority as they spend more time in the U.S., including strengthening of (pan-) ethnic identity and raised awareness on social discrimination/exclusion. Thus, studies have suggested that these new Americans have a strong proclivity to identify with a party that is highly associated with racial and ethnic minorities, the Democratic Party (e.g. Carmines and Stimson 1989; Feinstein and Schickler 2008; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Lee 2002). For example, Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991) find that the length of residence in the U.S. is related to the Democratic Party identification among Latinos. Uhlaner and Garcia (2005) find similar results among Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans. Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) and Cisneros (2016) further find that strong pan-ethnic identity as Asian or Latino leads to the Democratic Party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos respectively.

More recent studies stand in line with this tradition. In more detail, scholars try to understand their Democratic Party identification focusing on the unique experiences of Asian Americans and Latinos. For example, Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017) find with an experiment that social exclusion/discrimination leads to the Democratic Party identification among Asian Americans. Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz (2016) find similar results to Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017) in that Latinos who see pervasive discrimination against Latinos are more likely to identify with the Democratic

Party. Moreover, Raychaudhuri (2020) finds that Asian Americans are predominantly Democrat because they develop their party identification under liberal political environments in large metropolitan cities. Still other studies investigate the patterns of the Democratic/Republic Party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos focusing on their country of origin (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).

While we can understand why Asian Americans and Latinos identify with the Democratic Party with existing studies, most explanations tend to focus on their Democratic Party identification. As such, we have less knowledge about 20-30% of Asian Americans and Latinos who identify with the Republican Party and its candidates. However, more recent studies show that Asian American and Latino party identification is more complex than previously been theorized such that the non-existence of Democratic Party identification, or factors that cause it, may not simply explain their Republican Party identification. For example, Hopkins et al. (2020) argue that the relationship between social discrimination and party identification could be spurious; they find with five experiments that social discrimination does not directly cause party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos. This finding suggests that we can't simply expect Asian Americans and Latinos will identify with the Republican Party if they haven't experienced any social discrimination/exclusion. Similarly, studies have shown that a lot of Asian Americans and Latinos who live in a liberal political environment still support the Republican Party and its candidates, e.g. 22% and 23% of Asian Americans and Latinos in California in 2020 (Mayes 2020). Thus, we can't fully explain why Asian Americans and Latinos identify with the Republican Party even under liberal political environments (e.g. Raychaudhuri 2020). As such, we can't apply existing explanations to fully understand their non-Democratic party identification and we need a new account to understand their non-Democratic Party identification.

In the following section, I provide a general theory of immigrant party identification, which explains both the Democratic and Republican Party identification at a time, focusing on acculturation psychology. In doing so, I first introduce the definition of acculturation psychology and its effects. I then discuss how acculturation psychology affects Asian American and Latino party identification.

4.3 Acculturation Psychology and Minority Party Identification

Concept, Framework, and Effects

The study of acculturation dates back to the fourth century when Plato, in "*Laws*," first discusses that people have natural tendencies to imitate the manners of strangers (Pangle 1988). This concept has received full-fledged attention when immigrants from various racial/cultural backgrounds had moved to the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. Powell (1882) first introduced the term "acculturation" after observing how native Americans respond to the European settlers and defined it as the psychological changes induced by cross-cultural imitation. Similarly, Simons (1901) suggested that acculturation, reflecting on a study of acculturation in the U.S. by Giddings (1898), is a "reciprocal accommodation" process where different cultural groups accommodate features of one another. As such, these early studies understand that acculturation is a process where people from different cultures *mutually* modify their original orientations as a result of cultural intercourse.

More recent studies have begun to focus on power asymmetry between dominant and non-dominant groups to study acculturation and differentiated the concept of acculturation from assimilation (Teske Jr and Nelson 1974). This is because the new immigrants, particularly from Asia and Latin America, have entered the U.S. after European immigrants had established their dominance in the U.S. (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). Particularly, Berry (1990; 2002) has theorized acculturation process for each dominant and non-dominant group. According to him, members of non-dominant groups such as immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities have two sets of acculturation psychologies: a) a desire to absorb rules, norms, and values of a larger society of a host country—*assimilation psychology*—and b) a desire to maintain those of a country origin—*multicultural, or ethnic-specific, psychology*. Therefore, Berry (1990; 2002) theorizes that assimilation is a sub-set of acculturation that describes psychological/behavioral orientation among minorities where one wants to shade their original cultural orientations and identities for the purpose of being a member of the mainstream society. Thus, one wants to contact the culture/people of the mainstream society when one has a strong assimilation psychology. In contrast, one wants to preserve their cul-

tural heritage and maintain connections to their ethnic groups when one has a strong multicultural psychology. Though following studies have revised Berry (1990 2002)'s approach depending on research question, topic, and area of study, many studies have has adopted Berry's framework to understand the origins and consequences of immigrant acculturation (Sam 2006).

Scholars have examined the impact of acculturation and found that it affects the so-called ABCs (Affects, Behavior, and Cognition) among immigrants (Berry 1997; Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013). Among them, studies have emphasized that acculturation psychology affects how each immigrant subjectively self-identifies with various groups in the U.S. On one hand, acculturation brings *ethnic switching* among immigrants when one has strong assimilation psychology for it leads them to turn away from their original cultural background and community to identify and interact with the members of a larger society of a host county (e.g. Berry 1990; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Feagin and Ducey 2018; Gurin, Hurtado, and Peng 1994; Huddy 2001; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Nagel 1995). On the other hand, related studies find that immigrants do not abandon their original ethnic identity when they have strong multicultural psychology and it even separates them from a larger society of the U.S. where one avoids contact with culture and the mainstream society to hold on to their original cultural orientations (e.g. Caplan 2007; Farver, Narang, and Bhadha 2002; Nguyen 2006; Sam and Berry 2010; Singh Ghuman 1997). In short, acculturation psychology affects how immigrants develop their psychological attachments to various groups in the U.S. such that assimilation (multicultural) psychology increases one's desire to contact and identify with the mainstream (ethnic) society.

4.3.1 The Effect of Acculturation Psychology on Minority Party Identification

What happens if acculturation psychology affects how immigrants develop their psychological attachments to various groups in the U.S.? Based on identity based theory of party identification (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018; Mason 2015; Mason 2018), I provide a theory of how each sub-set of acculturation psychology—*assimilation psychology* and *multicultural psychology*—affects the development of party identification among the new Americans in the U.S.

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First, I argue that individuals with high amounts of assimilation psychology will be more likely to support the Republican Party. This is because strong assimilation psychology increases the salience of a social membership to the larger society in the U.S. The social identity complexity (SIC) theory defines this type of identity representation as "cultural dominance" (Roccas and Brewer 2002; Berry, Trimble, and Olmedo 1986). Under this condition, an identity of a dominant group reduces the salience of other competing identities, including his/her own ethnic identity, and it ultimately leads to ethnic switching among minorities. The consequence is that they see the identity of a larger society of the U.S.— *American*—- as their in-group as opposed to their ethnic group. As they perceive the larger society as their in-group and immigrant groups as part of the out-group, they increasingly develop favoritism towards the the larger society and animosity towards other immigrant groups (Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987). Given that the mass public chooses a party that seems to protect their in-group status (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018), this turns the new Americans away from the party most closely associated with immigrant societies, the Democratic Party, and increases support for a party that is associated with the majority societies of the U.S. — the Republican Party.

The multicultural, or ethnic-specific, psychology also affects how the new Americans develop their party identification. Specifically, I argue that individuals with high amounts of multicultural psychology will be more likely to support the Democratic Party. This is because strong multicultural psychology increases the salience of a social membership to their (pan-) ethnic group as opposed to the larger society of the U.S. The consequence is that they increasingly view their (pan-) ethnic group with positive connotations, favoritism, as in-group, whereas the larger society of the U.S. with negative connotations, animosity, as out-group. Given that the mass public chooses a party that seems to protect their in-group status (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Huddy, Bankert, and Davies 2018), this leads to support for a party that is associated with immigrant groups of the U.S., the Democratic Party, and it turns them away from the party that is associated with the majority societies of the U.S., the Republican Party.

4.4 Observational Evidence

4.4.1 Study 1: ANES

I first analyze the American National Election Studies (ANES) in 2016 and 2020 because the ANES began to ask survey responses that are related to minority acculturation since 2016. The dependent variable of interest for this study is party self-identification. In doing so, I first identify party identifiers using the traditional 3-point scale measure. I later include leaning independents as a party identifier using a survey questionnaire that captures preferences toward each party. 55% of Asian Americans and Latinos identify with the Democratic Party; 27% with Republican Party; and 17% as pure Independent. I

To measure assimilation psychology, I create a summary measure of assimilation psychology using four survey questionnaires that captures Asian American and Latino attitudes toward 1) whether minorities should adapt to customs/traditions of the U.S., 2) whether the will of the majority should always prevail, 3) to be truly American (it is) important to speak English, and 4) to be truly American (it is) important to follow America's customs/traditions. I take an average of the four responses and rescale them from 0 to 1 where 0 means very weak assimilation psychology and 1 means very strong assimilation psychology. I control for standard political and demographic variables and other variables: political ideology, gender, income, education, age, and religion. Additionally, I control for current state of residence because minorities socialize in their local contexts and it may affect their partisan attitudes (Raychaudhuri 2020).[3] I exclusively include Asian Americans and Latinos in this analysis because the same four questions I here use to measure assimilation psychology capture a different construct—*acculturation expectations* against immigrant societies from a host society (Sam 2006)—for other races, particularly Whites.

Table 4.1 shows the result of multinomial logistic regression of party identification on assimilation psychology and other covariates. The reference category is the Democratic Party identification. Thus, each coefficient shows correlational evidence of the impact of each covariate on non-

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3. All other covariates are coded in a binary fashion. For more information about coding, please refer the Appendix A.

Table 4.1: Correlational Evidence of the Impact of Assimilation Psychology on Republican Party Identification Relative to Democratic Party Identification

	Reference Category: Democrat	
	Independent	Republican
Assimilation Psychology	1.299***	2.935***
	(0.375)	(0.382)
Ideology (Conservate)	0.661***	1.841***
	(0.162)	(0.153)
Gender (Female)	−0.299*	−0.690***
	(0.156)	(0.148)
Income	−0.084	0.309
	(0.391)	(0.315)
Education (College)	−0.597***	0.313**
	(0.176)	(0.156)
Age	1.256	0.022
	(1.531)	(1.353)
Age^2	−1.949	−0.534
	(1.593)	(1.366)
Religion	−0.644***	0.236
	(0.160)	(0.153)
Western States	−0.105	−0.129
	(0.160)	(0.151)
Year:2020	0.056	0.349**
	(0.165)	(0.156)
Constant	−1.485***	−3.315***
	(0.439)	(0.422)
Observations	1,644	1,644
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,298.728	2,298.728

Source: American National Election Studies 2016 and 2020 (pooled)

Estimators are derived from multinomial logistic regression

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Democratic Party Identification relative to the Democratic Party identification. The result shows that assimilation psychology tends to increase the probability that each Asian American and Latino self-identifies with the Republican Party over the Democratic Party. Specifically, the relative risk of self-identifying with the Republican Party would be 18.8 times more likely when assimilation psychology increases from its minimum to maximum values. This coincides with the main argument of this paper in that strong assimilation psychology makes both Asian Americans and Latinos turn away from the Democratic Party. Note that strong assimilation psychology increases the likelihood that both Asian Americans and Latinos turn away from the Democratic Party to identify as independent as well. Conservative ideology increases the likelihood to identify with the Republican Party; more education is related to an increase in the Republican Party identification. However, more education is also related to an increase in the Democratic Party identification over independent identification. Income is not related to party identification and having a religion is related to increases in the Republican Party identification.

4.4.2 Study 2: NAAS and NSL

Though the ANES is a national survey of the U.S. and it has increasingly included Asian and Latino/Hispanic respondents in recent years, it tends to skew toward including citizens who are fluent in English. For this reason, I analyze two representative surveys of each Asian American and Latinos, the National Survey of Asian Americans (NAAS) in 2008 and 2016 and the National Survey of Latinos in 2006 and 2014 (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017; Ramakrishnan et al. 2008).[4] The dependent variable of interest for these studies is party self-identification and it includes leaning independent consistent with Study 1. The 53% of Asian Americans identify with the Democratic Party; 27% with Republican Party; and 20% as pure Independent. Approximately 59% of Latinos identify with the Democratic Party; 25% with the Republican Party; and 16% as pure Independent.

To proxy for assimilation psychology, I use a survey questionnaire that captures how each respondent prioritizes multiple group identities in the U.S. When respondents answer that they pri-

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4. I've pooled all publicly available waves of NAAS. I've pooled the 2006 and 2014 NSL because only the two waves ask questions that are relevant to Latino acculturation.

oritize the national identity of the U.S., e.g. American, over their ethnic identity, I coded them as having strong assimilation psychology because racial/ethnic minorities identify with the national identity of a host country when they have strong assimilation psychology.[5] To code Asian Americans, I coded them as having moderate assimilation psychology if one combines their ethnic identity with the national identity, e.g. Chinese-American or other hyphenated American, because it suggests that both identities are equally important (Citrin and Sears 2014); and as weak assimilation psychology when one self-identifies only with identity of their related ethnic group, e.g. Chinese or Asian. For Latinos, I coded them as having high assimilation psychology when one identifies with the national identity of the U.S.; as having weak assimilation psychology when one identifies with Latino/Hispanic or an identity that is related to their county of origin only, e.g. Mexican. Given that minorities identify with their ethnic groups when they have strong multicultural psychology, weak assimilation psychology here is conceptually identical to strong multicultural psychology.

I control for standard demographic variables and other variables that uniquely matter to Asian Americans and Latinos: gender, income, education, age, length of residence in the U.S., religion, and citizenship. Particularly, I control for the length of residence to control for the effect of exposure to the U.S.[6] Finally, I control for the country of origin because studies find that minorities from some countries of origin tend to identify with the Republican Party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).[7]

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5. Many other studies in political science also use one's subjective group identification as a proxy for immigrant assimilation (e.g. Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001;Citrin and Sears 2014).

6. I followed the same model specification to Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017). However, the NAAS 2016 does not ask about political ideology. To be consistent with NAAS 2008, I did not include it in the model. Also, NSL 2014 does not force respondents to report their current residence of state. To be consistent, I did not include it.

7. All covariates are coded in a binary fashion. For more information about coding, please refer the Appendix A.

Figure 4.1: Correlational Evidence of the Impact of Assimilation Psychology on Republican Party Identification Relative to Democratic Party Identification

(a) Asian Americans

(b) Latinos

Note: Estimators are derived from multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is party self-identification and the reference category is "Democrat." 90% confidence intervals are shown.

Figure 4.1 shows the result of multinomial logistic regression of party identification on assimilation psychology and other covariates. The reference category is the Democratic Party identification. Thus, each coefficient shows correlational evidence of the impact of each covariate on Republican Party Identification relative to Democratic Party identification.Please refer the Appendix A for the result of Independent identification relative to Democratic Party identification.[8] Specifically, the y-axis refers to each covariate and the x-axis refers to the magnitude of estimated coefficients. The result shows that assimilation psychology tends to increase the probability that each Asian American and Latino self-identity with the Republican Party over the Democratic Party. Specifically, the relative risk of self-identifying with the Republican Party would be 1.1 (1.3) times more likely when there is a unit increase—low to moderate or moderate to high—in assimilation psychology for each Asian American (Latino). This coincides with the main argument of this paper in that strong assimilation makes both Asian Americans and Latinos turn away from the Democratic Party to identify with the Republican Party. Note that higher income is associated with the Republican

8. For more information about the full result and table, please refer the Appendix A.

Party Identification for both Asian Americans and Latinos. Females, however, are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party for both Asian Americans and Latinos, and more education is related to an increase in the Democratic Party identification among Latinos. Having citizenship and religion is associated with the Republican Party identification among Asian Americans.

4.5 Experimental Evidence

4.5.1 Design and Procedure

The findings in the previous section suggest that acculturation psychology is associated with the direction of party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos. In this section, I employ a survey experiment to examine whether assimilation psychology *cause* party identification. First, there could be omitted variables that might affect Asian American and Latino party identification. The observational studies cannot rule of theses possibilities. Second, there could be reserve causation such that the Democratic (Republican) Party identification may affect their acculturation psychology such that the Democrats (Republicans) may believe that they should endorse strong multicultural (assimilation) psychology. For this reason, I exogenously promote either assimilation (multicultural) psychology by randomly assigning individuals to read a short article either emphasizing the importance of absorbing the rules, norms, and culture of the U.S. or emphasizing the importance of preserving the rules, norms, and cultures of their Asian or Latino heritage. If strong assimilation (multicultural) psychology has a causal effect on Asian American and Latino attitudes towards each party, I should be able to find that the promotion of assimilation (multicultural) psychology should increase one's support for the Republican (Democratic) party.[9]

Respondents began the survey by reporting their demographics such as age, gender, income, and educational level, and their personal and family history in the U.S. such as where they were born, citizenship status, country of origin, length of residence, and immigrant generational status. After this, they were randomly assigned to either read a article emphasizing the importance of

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9. The experiment was done through Amazon Mechanical Turk from May 2nd to 5th, 2022. Only Asian Americans and Latinos were recruited and total of 1,186 respondents were recruited. I followed the pre-specified protocol approved by the Internal Review Board (IRB) at Texas A&M University (IRB2021-0529M) and pre-registered plan (https://aspredicted.org/see_one.php

absorbing the rules, norms, and culture of the U.S. or emphasizing the importance of preserving the rules, norms, and cultures of their Asian or Latino heritage. I then ask respondents, "We want to collect more sources of information. Can you think of another reason why you think [absorbing the rules, norms, and cultures of the mainstream of the U.S/ preserving the rules, norms, and cultures of the Asian Heritage] is important for [Asian Americans/Hispanic or Latinx] in the U.S.?" This way, I give a time for respondents to reflect on the importance of assimilation/multiculturalism and provide treatments in a way that resembles a real-world stimulus.

4.5.2 Outcome Measures

I've created a 6-scale point party identification measure. First, I ask each respondents' party identification with a 3-scale measure with "other party," "Do not think in terms of political parties," "Don't Know," and "Refused." Second, I ask party identity strengths to respondents who self-identify with either one of the major parties in the first question by asking "Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong[Democrat/Republican]?" Third, I ask the remaining respondents to capture which party they are closer to by asking "Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?" Based on the answers, I've created a 6-point scale measure of party self-identification, (1: Strong Democrat)-(2: Weak Democrat)-(3: Leaning Democrat)-(4: Leaning Republican)-(5: Weak Republican)-(6: Strong Republican), following Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017).

Prior studies find that party self-identification does not change frequently unless one has important life-changing experiences and affects other political behavior throughout the course of life (Campbell et al. 1960). This means that respondents may not change their party self-identification regardless of the stimulus. For this reason, I ask three other questions to capture each respondent's attitudes toward the major parties. These questions include *closed-minded*, *ignorant*, and *represent interest*. To do this, I ask "How well does the term [*closed-minded/ignorant*] describe [Democrats/Republicans]?" and "How well do you think the [Democratic Party/Republican Party] is likely to represent the interests of people like yourself?" Respondents can provide their answers on a 5-point scale; (1: Not Very Well)-(2: Slightly Well)-(3: Moderately Well)-(4: Very Well)-(5:

Extremely Well). Based on the collected responses, I take a difference between attitudes towards the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Thus, each outcome variable measures pro-Republican attitudes. I re-scaled them from 0 to 1. Thus, 0 indicates very unfavorable attitudes toward the Republican Party and 1 indicates very favorable attitudes towards the Republican Party compared to the Democratic Party. Finally, I create a *Pro-Republican Index* by creating a summary measure of *closed-minded*, *ignorant*, and *represent interest* and re-scaled it from 0 to 1.

4.5.3 Results

Does acculturation psychology affect how Asian Americans and Latinos shape their party identification and attitudes towards the major parties? I regress a respondent's post-treatment attitudes towards the major parties on assimilation psychology, a treatment indicator variable for whether they were randomly assigned to see an article that emphasizes the importance of absorbing the rules, norms, and beliefs of the U.S. The baseline category is a group that read an article that emphasizes the importance of maintaining the rules, norms, and beliefs of Asian American/Latino heritage. If strong assimilation (multicultural) psychology increases the Republican (Democratic) Party identification and pro-Republican attitudes, all coefficient values in Table 4.2 should be positive and statistically significant.

Table 4.2 shows that acculturation psychology may not cause Asian American and Latino party identification. In more detail, I find the null results across all different outcome measures. The first column shows that respondents who read an article that are designed to increase strong assimilation psychology tend to have 1% point increases in pro-Republican attitudes compared to respondents who read an article that are designed to increase strong multicultural psychology. They showed similar patterns with other outcomes that respondents who read the assimilation article tend to report that Republicans are less closed-minded, about 0.4% point, and less ignorant, about 0.2% point. Also, they reported that the Republican Party represents their interests 2.3% point more. The fifth column shows that respondents who read the assimilation article tends to decrease strength of Republican Party identification. Note, however, that none of the results in Table 4.2 are statistically significant. The findings suggest that acculturation psychology may have either no effect or, at best,

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Table 4.2: Experimental Evidence of the Impact of Assimilation Psychology on Pro-Republican Party Attitudes Compared to the Democratic Party

	PRI	Less Closed-Minded	Less Ignorant	More Represent	PID
Assimilation Psychology	0.010	0.004	0.002	0.023	−0.063
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.151)
Constant	0.001	−0.001	−0.009	0.012	3.270***
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.105)
Observations	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,026
R^2	0.0005	0.00003	0.00001	0.001	0.0002

Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
PRI: Pro-Republican Index
PID: Party Identification
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

a very small effect on party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos.

4.5.4 No Causality Confirmed vs. Low Statistical Power? Non-manipulable Nature of Acculturation Psychology

The null results are attributable to two sources: first, there really is no causal relationship between acculturation psychology and minority party identification and, second, there is an effect but we were not able to find it with current data. We need to parse out which is the case to avoid potential publication bias to our knowledge of Asian American and Latino party identification (Gerber, Green, and Nickerson 2001; Mehler, Edelsbrunner, and Matić 2019; Thornton and Lee 2000). In this section, I provide an interpretation of the null results in the previous section and discuss their theoretical and empirical implications.

First of all, acculturation psychology is a stable psychological construct that is difficult to experimentally manipulate like other constructs such as religion, gender identity, and party identification (e.g. Batson 1977; Raychaudhuri 2020). Prior studies of acculturation psychology suggest that acculturation psychology is shaped by constellations of factors that are embedded in the cultural system of both home and host country (e.g. Sam and Berry 2010; De Leersnyder 2017). Thus, it

is very stable for a long time once formed and evidence from longitudinal panel studies finds that it changes at a moderate level when it is observed over a longer time period (Vijver, Breugelmans, and Schalk-Soekar 2008). Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez (2022) find a similar result with population-based panels of Asian Americans and Latinos that the strength of attachments to pan-ethnic, or national origin, group is very stable such that their pan-ethnic attachment score was virtually identical across several waves for both Asian Americans and Latinos. Though their quantity of interest—attachments to pan-ethnic or national origin group—is different from a construct this study is interested in—acculturation psychology—, they are highly related to acculturation psychology because strong multicultural psychology is related to an increase in attachments to pan-ethnic or national origin group (Berry, Trimble, and Olmedo 1986). Thus, Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez (2022)'s finding suggests that acculturation psychology is hard to manipulate within a short-term period. Due to this stable and durable nature of the construct, research of acculturation psychology heavily relies on observational studies and, if experimental, they rather adopt a field, lab, or natural experimental design which exposes immigrants/minorities to strong assimilation stimulus, for example, through assimilation education, or, intense discussions about acculturation in real life or lab settings (Brown and Zagefka 2011).[10] Here, acculturation psychology is a treatment variable and this stable and non-manipulable nature implies low statistical power to the experiments in this study and this may be a source of the non-significant results in Table4.2.

The manipulation check and post-experiment power analysis suggest that the stable nature of the construct and the small sample size may be attributable to the null results in the experiments. As a manipulation check, I ask respondents, "How much do you think learning American culture and English is important to you?," to each treatment group and checked that respondents from each group did not show differences at a significance level of 90% (p-value: 0.16). This suggests that the treatment only minimally affected the independent variable of this study and we can't easily find the significant results under these circumstances. Table 4.3 shows the results of the post-experiment

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10. Contrary to the scarcity of experimental design to the study of acculturation psychology among minorities, a lot of studies manipulate acculturation psychology among majorities—whether a member of majority societies prefer assimilation or multiculturalism from minority—with experimental design (Brown and Zagefka 2011; Ramirez and Peterson 2020).

power analysis. The first column shows the statistical power of each model in Table 4.2. The second column shows the required sample size that produces a statistical power of 0.8 at a significance level of 0.10 given the same treatment effect size and standard deviation of each of the outcome measures in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 reveals that the statistical power of the employed analysis is very low such that it ranges from 5% to 30% across all outcome variables. This means that the probability that the analysis correctly rejects the null hypothesis is very low. Thus, we should be very careful when interpreting the null results as no causal effects. Furthermore, the second column in Table 4.3 shows that I may need to recruit from 5,744 to 735,942 respondents to get significant results with a statistical power of 0.8 at a 90% significance level. These results suggest the need for further research with more powerful treatments like Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017)[11] and larger samples to correctly confirm the causal effect of acculturation psychology on Asian American and Latino party identification.

Table 4.3: Post-Experiment Power Analysis

	Statistical Power	Ideal Sample Size
PRI	0.19	12,215
Less Closed-Minded	0.07	174,865
Less Ignorant	0.06	735,942
More Represent	0.30	5,744
PID6	0.05	36,226

Statistical power is calculated at a significance level of 0.10.
Ideal sample size is calculated at a significance level of 0.10 and a statistical power of 0.8.

4.6   Conclusion

In his book, "*Who governs?: Democracy and power in an American city,*" Dahl (2005) argues that American democracy has become "divisive" because of immigrants who maintain strong ties to their own ethnics while denying assimilation. When he uses the term "immigrants," it indicates

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11. They stimulate perceived social discrimination by asking a discriminatory question to Asian Americans in-person through a lab experiment to simulate real-world like discrimination.

immigrants from Europe such as Germany, Ireland, Italy, etc, who now predominantly constitute the White population in the U.S.; and it obviously does not indicate Asian Americans and Latinos. However, the question he tries to answer throughout his book, "How do assimilation and ethnicity make voters in the U.S. divisive?," still gives important implications to present-day U.S. politics. Does new immigrant groups still show such variation that had been depicted in Dahl (2005) work? If so, how does it affect the new American voters? In this study, I revisit these questions in the context of Asian American and Latino party identification.

There are three main contributions of this study. First, I suggest a novel theoretical framework to understand minority party identification. By bridging studies from the social psychology of immigration and identity-based theories of party identification, I show that acculturation psychology has implications beyond cultural and social integration and may influence how minorities/immigrants develop attitudes toward the major political parties in the U.S. Second, prior studies of Asian American and Latino party identification mostly focus on their Democratic part identification. However, the absence of the Democratic party identification, or factors that cause it, can't simply explain their Republican party identification. Focusing on each sub-set of acculturation psychology, I provide a holistic theory of the minority party identification which explains both party identification at a time. Third, the result suggests that minority party identification is largely expressive than instrumental because Asian Americans and Latinos choose a party in a way that protect their subjective in-group acculturation.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, at least more than 20 different Asian groups constitute Asian American community in the U.S. and more than 14 different Latino/Hispanic groups constitute the Latino/Hispanic community in the U.S. This study does not suggest that this heterogeneity is not important. Different Asian American and Latino groups may endorse a certain party identification more than others (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Based on research from social psychology which focuses on a variation in acculturation at an individual level (Berry 1990), I rather investigate the consequences of acculturation psychology on their party identification. Future studies can investigate how group differences in acculturation patterns affect

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their political identification.

The suggested theory can be extended to explain other immigrants in the U.S. such as African Americans, Middle Eastern Americans, and European Americans. These immigrants also go through cultural adjustment process, and, through this process, some shade their original predispositions to assimilate into the larger society while others maintain their original predispositions. This may affect their subjective in- and out-group representation and this may affect their party identification. Finally, the U.S is not the only country in the world that receives immigrants. As such, we can apply the theory to explain immigrant/minority party identification in other countries.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Why don't new Americans, particularly Asian Americans and Latinos, participate in politics? How do polarized political environments affect the way new Americans join politics in the U.S.? Prior studies have found that factors that have traditionally explained American political behavior such as income, education, and political ideologies can't sufficiently explain Asian American and Latino political behavior. Alternatively, scholars have explained their political behavior focusing on factors that are uniquely relevant to the new Americans such as acculturation, uncertainty/undecidedness, social discrimination, and linked fate with a pan-ethnic group to explain their political behavior (e.g. Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Carlos 2018; Cisneros 2016; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; DeSipio 1998; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Raychaudhuri 2020; Rodolfo 2019; Wong 2000; Wong et al. 2011). Based on these studies, I extend our knowledge of Asian American and Latino party identification. The first essay investigates whether increased clarity in party differences affects the development of party identification among first- and second-generation Americans. The second essay investigates the origins of Asian American and Latino negative partisanship focusing on undecidedness/uncertainty, social discrimination, and linked fate. The third essay investigates how acculturation psychology affects their party identification.

The first essay finds that both early-generation partisans increasingly expresses their meaning of party attachment to their own party more like native-born Americans as a response to increasing polarization. However, polarization has exerted more impact on early-generation Republicans such that the degree to which early-generation Republicans express their attachment to their own party like native-born Americans has increased more than that of early-generation Democrats. Prior studies have assumed that Asian Americans and Latinos are ambivalent/uncertain about the politics of the U.S. due to the lack of parental party transmission and their cross-cutting interests. However, I find in this essay that a lot of ambivalence and uncertainty once existed has been reduced due to polarization and it helps their political socialization by complementing the role of parental party

transmission. This gives normative implications to the study of American political behavior about the consequence of polarization in that it may exert positive effects on early-generation Americans.

The second essay finds that Asian American and Latino negative partisanship is expressive partisanship where the minorities develop their negative attitudes toward the major parties in a way to protect their group status. Specifically, I first find that Asian American and Latino level of negative partisanship is lower, about 10 percentage points, than other races in the U.S. Second, I find that social discrimination affects the development of negative partisanship among the new Americans in various ways: 1) it increases negative partisanship toward the Republican Party regardless of their partisanship and 2) it even decreases negative partisanship among Asian American and Latino Republicans as a racial/ethnic minority. Third, I find that the perception of linked fate with pan-ethnic groups exerts only a small effect on negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos. Finally, I find that factors that are considered to be associated with an increase in negative partisanship such as sorting and media exposure affect the development of negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos as well. As such, this essay provides the first comprehensive analysis and discussion of the origins of negative partisanship among Asian Americans and Latinos.

The third essay finds that strong assimilation (multicultural) psychology is associated with Republican (Democratic) Party identification using the ANES, NAAS, and NSL. Second, I employ a survey experiment to examine whether acculturation psychology causally affects party identification among new Americans. However, I find the null results of the experiment. However, this does not mean that acculturation psychology may not cause party identification. Asian Americans and Latinos go through a process that requires modifications of their original cultural orientations as a racial/ethnic minority in the U.S. when they or their family migrate to the U.S. This process is called acculturation and it creates a psychological tension between absorbing rules, norms, and beliefs of a larger society of the U.S.—*assimilation psychology*—and preserving those of country of origin—*multicultural, or ethnic-specific, psychology* (Sam 2006). I suggest in this essay that acculturation psychology has implications beyond cultural and social integration among minorities/immigrants and may further influence how they develop attitudes toward the major political

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parties in the U.S. Also, I suggest that party identification among Asian Americans and Latinos follows the expressive model (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015) where minorities choose a party in a way that secures their subjective in-group identification.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX FOR THE FIRST ESSAY

A.1 Support Vector Machine for Semantic Similarity Score

A.1.1 Pre-Processing

I take three steps to prepare the open-ended responses for supervised machine learning. First, I translated hundreds of responses provided in Spanish to English. While American National Election Studies (ANES) keeps the records of language that was used by interviewee since 1978 including English, Spanish, French, and other, respondents have provided their response entirely in English from 1984 to 2004. However, hundreds of respondents have begun to provide their responses in Spanish since 2008. Hence, I've translated them into English using Google translation following Lucas et al. (2015). Instead of using the R package, `translateR`, I used Google Sheets to translate using the pre-equipped function, `GOOGLETRANSLATE`. Second, I've reduced the complexity of each text response. At this stage, I conversed all characters to lowercase, removed any punctuation, removed numbers, white spaces, and stemming. I then removed "interruption indicators," which provide information on when the interviewer prompts respondents for further responses such as "Anything else? (AE)" or "Tell me more (TM)." These interruption indicators are recorded in abbreviated in two words with or without parenthesis such as (AE), (TM), or (WM). Third, I removed words that appear less than 3 times in any responses and terms that appear less than 2 documents because those terms are very low in frequency so it conveys little information about the corpus. After taking these steps, I've transformed each word into numbers using *term frequency-inverse document frequency* for further analyses.

A.1.2 Specification-Machine Learning Algorithm

I built 18 machine learning algorithms for each text of the Democratic party likes and the Republican party likes across 9 general election years from 1984 to 2016. The objective of this analysis

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to quantitatively estimate a probability that a response of early-generation Americans is categorized as that of native-born Americans because the probability substantively means the degree that an expression of each early-generation American looks similar to that of native-born Americans. For this reason, I chose a binary classifier model for all 18 machine learning algorithms. Also, unlike other supervised machine learning techniques, I did not hand-code a sample of responses because I used actual responses of both early-generation Americans and native-born Americans to train each machine learning algorithm. The sample is highly imbalanced such that the proportion of positive cases, a response of native-born Americans, was much higher than that of the negative cases, a response of early-generation Americans. For this reason, I created synthetic cases using SMOTE package in R (Chawla et al. 2002). I used an R package, caret, to construct all 18 machine learning algorithms (Kuhn et al. 2008).

We have to make several decisions to optimize support vector machine using: *kernel* initialization and *parameter values*. First, the kernel is a function that draws the "best" hyperplane that maximizes the distance between different classifications. If we can form a hyperplane that produces a maximum margin between two classifications, our algorithm is the best classifier. I tried two kernels in this study, *linear* and *radial*, that are considered as appropriate for text classification. Second, we need to specify parameter values to obtain a kernel function that maximizes the margin between classifications. The linear kernel is powerful and simple because it starts with linear function however it bears some costs that come from misclassification. It is called as cost and we need to specify the value. The radial kernel assumes non-linearity so it has one additional parameter, *gamma*. The *gamma* parameter indicates the influence of single training. However, identifying the best parameter values requires heavy computational capacity because we need to compare all possible combinations of values, which could be almost infinite. For this reason, I pre-specified a range of parameter values by setting a tuning grid to simplify this process but I retained algorithms that produce the largest Area Under Curve (AUC) under the Precision-Recall Curve (PR Curve). Additionally, I also set weight parameters because our training set is imbalanced due to the inherent nature of the proportion of early-generation Americans, negative class, and native-born Americans,

positive class.

Finally, I've performed k-fold cross-validation approach, as opposed to the simple holdout approach, because k-fold cross-validation significantly reduces the variance of our algorithm. With the holdout approach, we randomly choose a training set from the pre-classified dataset by a researcher, then train the model based on it. However, this approach tends to increase the variance that comes from errors in our training set. The k-fold cross-validation solves this problem because it randomly extracts k folds of training sets with equal size. It trains our algorithm k times using each fold as our training set and produces the average performance of k-folds repetition. I use 5-fold cross-validation, repeated five times, to construct optimal machine learning algorithms.

A.1.3 Performance

In this section, I provide information about the performance of Support Vector Machines. I assess the model performance by applying the Precision-Recall curve (PR) approach, rather than the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve approach.[1] There are two reasons why. First, my training set is imbalanced due to the inherent nature of the proportion of early-generation Americans, negative class, and native-born Americans, positive class. However, the ROC curve is not an ideal choice when the data is highly imbalanced, and that scholars suggest using the PR curve for imbalanced data (Davis and Goadrich 2006; Saito and Rehmsmeier 2015). Second, this study is not interested in minimizing false-positive cases because it is theoretically feasible and important that immigrants can also be considered as native-born Americans, in terms of their meaning of party attachment, if they express their like about each political party like native-born Americans. Rather, it is more important to have a model that minimizes the false-negative cases, the expression of native-born Americans are falsely considered as that of immigrants, to correctly estimate the degree that immigrants' meaning of party attachment looks similar to that of native-born Americans. For these reasons, I employ the PR approach, over the ROC approach, for a model selection strategy because the PR approach measures a model's performance based on positive cases exclusively.

Figure A1 shows PR Curves for the Democratic party likes and Figure A2 shows that of the Republican party likes among early-generation Americans. The red line represents the performance of a model with a linear kernel and the blue line shows a model with a radial kernel. I chose a model that produces a larger area under the curve for it means that a kernel performs well regardless of the threshold values for prediction. In this study, I do not need to identify a threshold value for I will not classify each case. However, we can have an optimal model if we can have a model that

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1. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is used when researchers assess the performance of the machine learning model if they want to minimize trade-offs between the true positive rate ($\frac{\text{True Positives}}{TruePositives+TrueNegatives}$) and false positive rate ($1 - \frac{\text{True Positives}}{TruePositives+TrueNegatives}$). The Precision-Recall curve (PR) is used to minimize the trade-off between the true positive rate and the positive predictive value($\frac{TruePositives}{TruePositives+FalsePositives}$). Intuitively, the ROC curve is used when we want to correctly identify both positive and negative cases while we use the PR curve when we are exclusively interested in correctly identifying positive cases. Or, we use the PR curve if are not interested in negative cases.

performs best across all possible ranges of the threshold values, from 0 to 1. Across all 18 models, they perform well in that all models meet the criteria that are considered by the practitioners of SVM as "excellent" or "outstanding," Area Under Curve (AUC) is lager than .8.

Figure A1: Precision-Recall Curves for the Democratic Party Likes

(a) 1984 (AUC:0.86)   (b) 1988 (AUC:0.83)   (c) 1992 (AUC:0.90)

(d) 1996 (AUC:0.89)   (e) 2000 (AUC:0.92)   (f) 2004 (AUC:0.87)

(g) 2008 (AUC:0.83)   (h) 2012 (AUC:0.88)   (i) 2016 (AUC:0.95)

Figure A2: Precision-Recall Curves for the Republican Party Likes


(a) 1984 (AUC:0.93)   (b) 1988 (AUC:0.86)   (c) 1992 (AUC:0.90)

(d) 1996 (AUC:0.97)   (e) 2000 (AUC:0.97)   (f) 2004 (AUC:0.87)

(g) 2008 (AUC:0.92)   (h) 2012 (AUC:0.89)   (i) 2016 (AUC:0.89)

A.2 Information on Coding, Model Specifications, and Results

A.2.1 ANES Variables and Coding

- Early Generation Americans

I use two questions to identify respondents' generational status. First, I use a questionnaire, VCF0142, that asks *"Where were you born? (If the UNITED STATES) Which state?"* The respondent provides the states if they were born in the U.S.; otherwise, provide their country of birth. When respondents say they were not born in the U.S., I coded them as first-generation. Second, I use a questionnaire, VCF0143, that asks *"Were both your parents born in this country?"* When respondents say "no," it indicates that a respondent has at least one foreign-born parent. I used the second questionnaire to define early-generation Americans because all foreign-born respondents reported that both of their parents are not born in the U.S. This way, 4,261 early-generation partisans were included. I define one as a native-born American if both parents are born in the U.S. I define them as third- or higher-generation in terms of immigration status.

- Party Identification

Variable: VCF0301, Coding: Democrat = 1, 2, 3; Republican = 5, 6, 7.

-Ideology

Variable: VCF0803, Coding: Extremely liberal = 1; Liberal = 2; Slightly liberal= 3; Moderate, middle of the road = 4; Slightly conservative = 5; Conservative = 6; Extremely conservative = 7.

-Gender

Variable: VCF0104; Coding: 1 = Male; 2 = Female; 3 = Other.

Age

Variable: VF0101, Coding: 17-96 = Age as coded (1992: 91=91 or older; 2012,2016: 90=90 or older); 97 = 97 years old (1952, 1974, 1996 and later: or older); 98 = 98 years old (1958-1962, 1966, 1968: or older); 99 = 99 years old (1976-1990,1994,2002: or older).

-Education

Variable: VCF0110, Coding = 1 = Grade school or less (0-8 grades); 2 = High school (12 grades

or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable); 3 = Some college (13 grades or more but no degree; 1948 ONLY: college, no identification of degree status); 4 = College or advanced degree (no cases 1948).

-Income

Variable:VCF0114, Coding: 1 = 0 to 16 percentile; 2 = 17 to 33 percentile; 3 = 34 to 67 percentile; 4 = 68 to 95 percentile; 5 = 96 to 100 percentile.

-Religion

Variable: VCF0128, Coding: 1 = Protestant; 2 = Catholic [Roman Catholic]; 3 = Jewish; 4 = Other and none (also includes DK preference).

- Union Membership

Variable: VCF0127, Coding: 1 = Yes, someone (1948: head) in household belongs to a labor union; 2 = No, no one in household belongs to a labor union

-Race

Variable: VCF0105a; Coding: Hispanic = 5; Other = 1 (White non-Hispanic), 2 (Black non-Hispanic), 3 (Asian or Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic), 4 (American Indian or Alaska Native non-Hispanic), 6 (Other or multiple races, non-Hispanic), 7 (Non-white and non-black).

-Political Interest

Variable: VCF0310, Question: Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in (1952-1998: following) the political campaigns (so far) this year?; Coding: 1 =Not much interested; 2 = Somewhat interested; 3 = Very much interested.

-Region of Residence

Variable: VCF0112, Coding: 1= Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT); 2 = North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI); 3 = South (AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC,TN, TX, VA, WV); 4 = West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY).

Feelings towards the Democratic Party

Variable: VCF0218.

- Feelings towards the Republican Party

Variable: VCF0224.

A.2.2 Impact of Elite Polarization on the Development of early-generation Party Identification

I compare the result of pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in different specifications that are used to produce Table 2.1, Figure 2.1, and Figure 2.2. The first two columns in Figure A1 show the results without any fixed effects and the third and fourth columns show that result that is used for Table 2.1 with regional fixed effects. We can find that polarization at both elite and mass levels exerts similar effects on the semantic similarity score across different model specifications. The first two columns in Figure A2 and A3 show the results without any fixed effects and the third and fourth columns show that result that is used for Figure 2.1 and 2.2 with regional fixed effects. We can find that polarization at both elite and mass levels exerts similar effects on the semantic similarity score across different model specifications.

Table A1: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Table 2.1 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Semantic Similarity Score	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Polarization Movements towards Liberal Extreme	0.375		0.375	
	(0.235)		(0.235)	
Polarization Movements towards Conservative Extreme		0.770***		0.749***
		(0.155)		(0.156)
Ideology	-0.010***	-0.002	-0.010***	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender: Male	0.012	0.052***	0.013	0.051***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Gender: Other	0.287*		0.290*	
	(0.158)		(0.158)	
Age	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)
Education	0.008	0.033***	0.008	0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Income	-0.009	0.022**	-0.009	0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Religion	-0.008	-0.013	-0.008	-0.013
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Union Membership	0.037**	0.035	0.040**	0.039
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.010	-0.015	-0.010	-0.023
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.078***	0.052***	0.078***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.102	-0.452***	0.100	-0.473***
	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.086)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	1,722	866	1,722	866
R^2	0.051	0.142	0.052	0.144

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p<0.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.001$

Table A2: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Figure 2.1 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Semantic Similarity Score	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Elite Polarization	0.181**	0.467***	0.182**	0.450***
	(0.082)	(0.109)	(0.083)	(0.110)
Ideology	-0.010***	-0.002	-0.010***	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender: Male	0.013	0.051***	0.013	0.051***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Gender: Other	0.287*		0.289*	
	(0.158)		(0.158)	
Age	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)
Education	0.006	0.035***	0.006	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Income	-0.008	0.021**	-0.008	0.022**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Religion	-0.009	-0.012	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Union Membership	0.039**	0.035	0.041**	0.040
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.014	-0.012	-0.013	-0.020
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.079***	0.052***	0.079***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.098	-0.497***	0.096	-0.516***
	(0.073)	(0.095)	(0.074)	(0.098)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	1,722	866	1,722	866
R^2	0.052	0.136	0.053	0.138

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.001$

Table A3: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Figure 2.2 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Semantic Similarity Score	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Affective Polarization	0.004***	0.007***	0.003***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.010***	-0.002	-0.010***	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender: Male	0.014	0.052***	0.014	0.052***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Gender: Other	0.278*		0.280*	
	(0.158)		(0.158)	
Age	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)
Education	0.006	0.036***	0.006	0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Income	-0.008	0.021**	-0.008	0.022**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Religion	-0.009	-0.010	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Union Membership	0.039**	0.036	0.041**	0.040
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.014	-0.006	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.080***	0.052***	0.079***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.114*	-0.411***	0.112*	-0.432***
	(0.062)	(0.083)		
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	1,722	866	1,722	866
R^2	0.053	0.135	0.054	0.137

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

A.2.3 The Consequence of Clarity on the Development of early-generation Party Identification

In this section, I provide the results that are used to produce Table 3.1 and Figure 2.4 and show that the results are robust across different model specifications. The first two columns in Table A4 and A5 show the results without any fixed effects, and the third and fourth column shows the result with regional fixed effects for Table 3.1. Figure A6 show the results without any fixed effects related to Figure 2.4, and the third and fourth columns show the result with regional fixed effects that is used for Figure 2.4. The last two columns show the result with both year fixed effects and regional fixed effects. We can find that perceiving differences between parties exerts similar effects on the semantic similarity score across different model specifications.

Table A4: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Table 3.1 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Perceiving Differences	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Elite Polarization	4.292***	3.939***	4.195***	4.129***
	(0.841)	(1.013)	(0.847)	(1.031)
Ideology	-0.132***	-0.036	-0.132***	-0.034
	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.047)
Gender: Male	-0.227*	0.286	-0.213	0.278
	(0.137)	(0.181)	(0.137)	(0.182)
Gender: Other	11.384		11.507	
	(308.040)		(308.886)	
Age	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Education	0.318***	0.555***	0.312***	0.574***
	(0.087)	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.109)
Income	0.071	0.139	0.075	0.147*
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.086)
Religion	-0.022	-0.065	-0.020	-0.066
	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.081)
Union Membership	0.118	0.241	0.163	0.212
	(0.177)	(0.275)	(0.179)	(0.278)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.010	-0.167	-0.091	-0.072
	(0.154)	(0.203)	(0.165)	(0.217)
Political Interest	0.291***	0.597***	0.291***	0.609***
	(0.098)	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.125)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	1,527	856	1,527	856
Log Likelihood	-699.289	-398.160	-697.545	-396.119
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,422.579	818.320	1,425.090	820.237

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

Table A5: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Table 3.1 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Perceiving Differences	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Affective Polarization	0.071***	0.065***	0.069***	0.068***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Ideology	-0.133***	-0.041	-0.133***	-0.039
	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.047)
Gender: Male	-0.215	0.291	-0.201	0.282
	(0.137)	(0.181)	(0.138)	(0.182)
Gender: Other	11.216		11.346	
	(307.928)		(308.927)	
Age	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Education	0.335***	0.563***	0.328***	0.584***
	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.086)	(0.109)
Income	0.063	0.139	0.068	0.146*
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.068)	(0.086)
Religion	-0.015	-0.053	-0.013	-0.053
	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.081)
Union Membership	0.105	0.229	0.152	0.201
	(0.176)	(0.274)	(0.179)	(0.278)
Race (Hispanic)	0.009	-0.125	-0.078	-0.030
	(0.153)	(0.201)	(0.164)	(0.216)
Political Interest	0.299***	0.596***	0.300***	0.608***
	(0.097)	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.125)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,527	856	1,527	856
Log Likelihood	-698.846	-398.150	-697.038	-396.140
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,421.693	818.301	1,424.076	820.280

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

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Table A6: The Result of Ordinary Least Squares for Figure 2.4 (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Semantic Similarity Score	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Perceiving Differences	0.119***	0.188***	0.118***	0.190***	0.106***	0.174***
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.025)
Ideology	-0.009***	0.002	-0.009***	0.003	-0.007**	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender: Male	0.012	0.063***	0.013	0.064***	0.012	0.059***
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Gender: Other	0.279*		0.285*		0.266*	
	(0.155)		(0.155)		(0.154)	
Age	0.001**	0.002***	0.001**	0.002***	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)
Education	0.001	0.023*	0.001	0.021*	-0.001	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Income	-0.007	0.011	-0.007	0.012	-0.005	0.016*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Religion	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004	-0.009	-0.005	-0.014
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Union Membership	0.032*	0.040	0.036**	0.048	0.038**	0.046
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.029)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.018	-0.005	-0.020	-0.025	-0.025	-0.042*
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Political Interest	0.051***	0.069***	0.051***	0.068***	0.048***	0.062***
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Year Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Observations	1,526	791	1,526	791	1,526	791
R²	0.084	0.188	0.086	0.194	0.116	0.231

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

A.2.4 Robustness Check

*A.2.4.1 Representativeness of the American National Election Studies*

The American National Election Studies (ANES) is the only available historical source that provides the open-ended survey responses of early-generation Americans. Accordingly, the use of the open-ended survey responses in this study provides unique insights to the study of the new Americans. While notwithstanding its merit, this does not mean that they are free from any limitations because it tends to skew toward including citizens who are fluent in English so it tends to under-represent a broader set of immigrants who do not speak English.

Though the ANES has begun to include respondents who provide answers in Spanish since 2008 and it tends to include more Asian Americans and Latinos since the late 1990s, the ANES is still under-representative of racial and ethnic minorities, particularly Asian Americans and Latinos, compared to other surveys that are representative of them such as National Survey of Latinos (NSL) and National Asian American Survey (NAAS). This raises the concern related to representatives of the findings in this study: the analyses adopted in this study may be only representative of engaged immigrants who speak English.

For this reason, I compare over time trends in non-partisanship,[2] or *non-identifier*, using the ANES with two other studies that are representative of Asian Americans and Latinos. Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that immigrants refuse to self-identify with either one of parties in the U.S., Democrat, Republican, or Independent, when they are confused and ambivalent towards information, ideology, and identity in the U.S. This is because they don't "see meaning, content, or value in the partisan options that are typically offered," in U.S politics (p.181, Hajnal and Lee 2011). Thus, if polarization helps early-generation Americans by reducing confusion and ambivalence among early-generation Americans, we should be able to find that the share of non-partisan among early-generation Americans should decrease over time. I test the robustness of my findings by examining over time trends in non-partisanship with two other surveys that are representative of Latinos and Asian Americans but do not have open-ended responses.

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2. Respondents who refuse to identify with none of the parties in the U.S.

Figure A3: Percent of Early-generation Non-Partisanship, Non-Identifiers, Over Time

Source: American National Election Studies (ANES), National Survey of Latinos (NSL),

National Asian American Survey (NAAS).

Figure A3 displays the share of non-partisanship over time. The red line represents the share of the ANES, the blue line represents that of the NSL, and the green line represents the NAAS. The NSL is available from 2004 to 2018 and there are only two waves publicly available for the NAAS, 2008 and 2016. First, I find that the share of non-identifiers has decreased over time with the ANES. The percent has significantly decreased since 2012 in that only about 5% of early-generation Americans refuse to self-identify with either one of the parties in the U.S. This suggests that only a small segment of early-generation Americans are confused and ambivalent towards parties in current years.

Though there are about 5-10% differences compared to the ANES, I find that the share of non-identifiers also has decreased over time with the NSL and NAAS. In the mid-2000s, the non-

negligible share of early-generation Americans, 22.5% among Latinos in 2006 and 32.5% of Asian Americans in 2008, were ambivalent and confused about the parties in the U.S. as they refuse to self-identify with any one of the parties in the U.S. However, the proportion has significantly reduced to about 5.9% after in 2016 for Latinos and about 11.6% for Asian Americans. The results suggest that, though the trends reveal that ANES is inclusive of more engaged partisans as it has less share of non-identifiers than the NSL and NAAS, the results suggest that more early-generation Americans have become less ambivalent and confused about parties in the U.S. with surveys that are more representative of early-generation Americans. Thus, with caution, the findings of this study can be applied to a broader set of immigrants including Asian American and Latino communities in the U.S.

A.2.4.2   *Polarization, Non-partisanship, and Feelings towards Each Party*

If I can find that polarization reduces immigrant confusion and ambivalence towards parties with different outcomes, it is suggestive that the argument and findings presented here are more robust. To do this, I test two things. First, I regress whether one is a non-identifier on polarization, and, second, I regress the affective gap between the Democratic and Republican party on polarization based on the same model specification in Equation 2.1.

First, I regress whether one is a non-identifier on polarization. Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that immigrants refuse to self-identify with either one of parties in the U.S., Democrat, Republican, or Independent, when they are confused and ambivalent towards information, ideology, and identity in the U.S. This is because they don't "see meaning, content, or value in the partisan options that are typically offered," in U.S politics (p.181, Hajnal and Lee 2011). Thus, if polarization helps early-generation Americans by reducing confusion and ambivalence among early-generation Americans, we should be able to find that polarization has a significant effect on whether one is a non-identifier. The third and fourth column in Table A7 shows the results and we can find that polarization at both levels has a significant effect on whether being a non-identifier. In other words, an increase in polarization is associated with decreases in the likelihood of being a non-identifier. The results are suggestive that polarization reduces early-generation ambivalence and confusion and coincides

with the main findings of this study.

Table A7: The Effect of Polarization on Being a non-partisan, or non identifier, among Early-generation Americans (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Non-partisan	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elite Polarization	-4.247**		-4.349**	
	(1.714)		(1.727)	
Affective Polarization		-0.094*		-0.096*
		(0.054)		(0.055)
Ideology	-0.341*	-0.334*	-0.340*	-0.333*
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Female	0.368	0.373	0.368	0.374
	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.286)	(0.285)
Age	-0.024**	-0.024***	-0.023**	-0.024**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education	-0.101	-0.132	-0.099	-0.130
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Income	0.030	0.061	0.022	0.056
	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)
Religion (Christianity)	0.124	0.211	0.132	0.215
	(0.331)	(0.328)	(0.334)	(0.330)
Union Membership	0.218	0.253	0.253	0.283
	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.341)	(0.341)
Race (Hispanic)	0.088	0.015	0.043	-0.019
	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.335)	(0.335)
Political Interest	-0.773***	-0.771***	-0.781***	-0.776***
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.208)
Constant	2.416	1.893	2.325	1.802
	(1.549)	(1.726)	(1.554)	(1.730)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790
Log Likelihood	-219.397	-221.048	-219.065	-220.773
Akaike Inf. Crit.	460.794	464.095	466.130	469.547

Entries are estimates of logistic regression model with standard errors in parentheses.* $p<0.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.001$

Second, I regress the affective gap towards each party, the affective distance between one's own party and the opposite party, on polarization among early-generation partisans. If polarization reduces confusion and ambivalence towards parties, we should be able to find that early-generation partisans have distinctive feelings towards parties such that the affective distance—measured by feeling thermometer items—between one's own party and the opposite party should increase. The third and fourth columns of Table A8 and A9 show the result. In more detail, the third column of Table A8 and A9 show that polarization at both levels makes early-generation Democrats like more about their own party than the Republican party. However, I was not able to find significant results with early-generation Republicans. Given that the Republican party has increasingly shown hostile attitudes towards immigration and racial/ethnic minorities compared to the Democratic party, it may be that polarization does not necessarily increase positive feelings towards the Republican party even among early-generation Republicans.

Table A8: The Effect of Elite Polarization on Affective Gap between One's Own Party and the Opposite Party among Early-generation Partisans (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

DV: Feeling Gap	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Elite Polarization	49.807***	-3.079	48.276***	-4.862
	(10.475)	(15.324)	(10.608)	(15.463)
Ideology	7.272***	9.266***	7.249***	9.261***
	(0.910)	(1.507)	(0.911)	(1.520)
Female	3.216*	3.668	3.138*	3.674
	(1.684)	(2.683)	(1.687)	(2.690)
Age	0.108**	-0.020	0.114**	-0.022
	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.079)
Education	-1.694	0.139	-1.743*	0.309
	(1.039)	(1.542)	(1.042)	(1.547)
Income	-1.863	-3.133	-1.877	-3.262*
	(1.245)	(1.949)	(1.246)	(1.965)
Religion	-0.896	-1.977	-0.832	-1.881
	(1.847)	(3.036)	(1.855)	(3.048)
Union Membership	3.022	-0.008	3.168	0.740
	(2.015)	(3.719)	(2.046)	(3.795)
Race (Hispanic)	3.110	-2.154	2.547	-2.543
	(1.930)	(3.045)	(1.992)	(3.169)
Political Interest	9.069***	9.789***	9.046***	9.764***
	(1.271)	(1.942)	(1.274)	(1.945)
Constant	-24.285**	5.438	-24.097**	7.536
	(9.510)	(13.836)	(9.598)	(13.999)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Year Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	1,103	455	1,103	455
R^2	0.143	0.154	0.144	0.160

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

Table A9: The Effect of Affective Polarization on Affective Gap between One's Own Party and the Opposite Party among Early-generation Partisans (Pooled from 1984 to 2016)

| DV: Feeling Gap	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Affective Polarization	0.923**	-0.251	0.864**	-0.293
	(0.383)	(0.544)	(0.385)	(0.554)
Ideology	7.177***	9.242***	7.145***	9.220***
	(0.917)	(1.507)	(0.918)	(1.522)
Female	3.321*	3.677	3.206*	3.684
	(1.697)	(2.682)	(1.699)	(2.689)
Age	0.107**	-0.019	0.115**	-0.020
	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.079)
Education	-1.140	0.227	-1.223	0.377
	(1.040)	(1.545)	(1.043)	(1.548)
Income	-2.000	-3.059	-2.009	-3.155
	(1.254)	(1.951)	(1.255)	(1.972)
Religion	-1.862	-2.029	-1.787	-1.877
	(1.848)	(3.007)	(1.854)	(3.020)
Union Membership	2.472	-0.067	2.778	0.705
	(2.031)	(3.720)	(2.064)	(3.792)
Race (Hispanic)	4.415**	-2.048	3.613*	-2.530
	(1.927)	(3.020)	(1.995)	(3.143)
Political Interest	9.213***	9.822***	9.164***	9.792***
	(1.282)	(1.943)	(1.285)	(1.946)
	(1.271)	(1.942)	(1.274)	(1.945)
Constant	-14.271	9.720	-13.986	11.474
	(12.098)	(16.512)	(12.174)	(16.553)
Regional Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Year Fixed Effects ?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*
Observations	1,103	455	1,103	455
R²	0.130	0.154	0.132	0.160

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001

A.3   Meaning of Party Attachment

Individual Variations in the Meaning of Party Attachment

Figure A4 shows the distribution of the semantic similarity score among each early-generation partisan using a density plot. The x-axis represents the value of similarity and that of the y-axis represents their density. The left panel shows that of Early-generation Democrats and the right panel shows that of the Republicans. The 0 means the expression of early-generation Democrats is not similar to that of native-born Americans at all where 1 means it is perfectly similar to the native-born Americans. We can find that there is a great amount of heterogeneity among early-generation Americans in their meaning of party attachment to their own party. This substantively suggests that some early-generation Americans do identify with their own party more like native-born Americans and some others don't.

Figure A4: Variations in the Meaning of Party Attachment among Early-Generation Partisans

(a) Early-generation Democrats   (b) Early-generation Republicans

### A.3.1   Variations in the Meaning of Party Attachment over Time

Figure A5 shows the top 5 *term frequency-inverse document frequency* (tf-idf) words that Democrats used to express their attachment to the Democratic party and Figure A6 shows the words that Re-

publicans used to express their attachment to the Republican party. The upper panel of each figure shows the top 5 terms used by early-generation partisans and the lower panel shows that of native-born partisans. The use of td-idf words allows us to extract words that are most representative of each corpus, go beyond mere frequency and other methods for keywords extraction,[3] so we can plausibly understand how the meaning of party attachment has changed over time.

Figure A5a shows that the meaning of party attachment among early-generation Democrats has changed over time. In the 1980s and early 1990s, early-generation Democrats had developed their attachment to their own party with political characters such as Mike Dukakis ("dukaki") and Franklin D. Roosevelt ("roosevelt"). Many also liked the Democratic party because they disliked the Republican politicians and the party as we can find words "Reagan (reagan)" in 1984 and "Republican (rep)." Since the mid-1990s, they'd developed their attachment to the party based on policy concerns that matter to them as a migrant worker as we can find words such as "minimum," "wage (wage)," "social-security (secur)," "reform (reform)," and "protect" from 1996 to 2000. Given that native-born Democrats had developed their attachment to the party based on social concerns and their attachment to political characters such as "drug," "Robert Dole (dole)," and "Al Gore (gore)" during the same period, this suggests that early-generation Democrats had developed their attachment to the party distinctively from native-born Democrats. Since 2004, early-generation Democrats began to incorporate group concerns that are unique to immigrant societies as they used words such as "representation (repres)," "immigration (immigr)," "latino (latino)," and "diversity (divers)." Since 2008, however, they began to embrace other liberal and group-related concerns which equally matter to native-born Democrats as we can find words such as "gay (gai)," "marriage (marriag)," women, "healthcare (healthcare)" and "progress (progress)" in both Figure A5a and A5b. In short, early-generation Democrats first developed their attachment to the party based on their personal situation as a migrant worker in the 1980s and 1990s but began to incorporate their

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3. The "tf-idf" is an algorithm that gives a score to all words used in a document based on the frequency of each word in each document and the number of documents that uses each word among the collected document set. The tf-idf score increases (decreases) when the frequency of a certain word increases (decrease) in each document while the number of documents including the word in the whole documents decreases (increases). This way we can filter out words that are common across each document but extract the keywords that are most relevant to the selected document set.

Figure A5: Meaning of Party Attachment among Early-generation Democrats, (a), and Native-Born Democrats, (b),1984-2016.

(a) Top 5 Tf-idf words used by early-generation Democrats

(b) Top 5 Tf-idf words used by Native-Born Democrats

identity as ethnic minority and immigrant starting in 2004. Starting from 2008, however, they have gradually incorporated general ideas and issues of the Democratic party that are equally important to other native-born Democrats.

Figure A6a shows that the meaning of party attachment among early-generation Republicans has changed over time as well. In the 1980s, early-generation Republicans also identified with the party because of political characters such as "Reagan (reagan)" and "leader (leader)." However, they mostly developed their attachment to the party based on concerns related to international political environments such that they used the words such as "war (war)," "peace (peac)," "defense (defens)," and "communist (communist)" to express their attachment to the party. Given that native-born Republicans had focused on domestic issues such as "inflation (inflat)" and "unemployment (unemploy)" during the same period, found in Figure A6b, we can easily find that early-generation Republicans developed their attachment largely aloof from domestic issues of the 1980s. In the 1990s, they began to incorporate domestic policy issues but distinctively from native-born Republicans. Specifically, early-generation Republicans began to incorporate policy issues and ideological concerns as we can find words such as "platform (platform)," "reduction (reduc)," "plan (plan)," "education (educ)," "school (school)," and "debt (debt)" from 1992 to 2008. During the same period, however, native-born Republicans had developed their attachment to the party based on their psychological attachment to their politician, "Robert Dole (dole)," "Jack Kemp (kemp)," and "Sarah Palin (palin) " and their own party, "Republican (repub)," Or based on domestic social issues such as "drug." Particularly, native-born Republicans were largely affected by September 11 attacks as we can find words like "terror," "terrorist," "Colin Powell (colin powel)," and "Iraq" especially in 2004. However, we cannot find those words from early-generation Republicans. Since 2012, the early-generation Republicans used the words that are indicative of conservative ideas and what native-born Republicans frequently use to express moral traditionalism such as "abort (abortion)," "pro-life (life)," "constitution (constitut)," "patriotism (patriot)," " conservative (conservat)." Though early-generation Republicans use different words to describe their conservative ideas, compared to native-born Republicans, they have developed their attachment to the party

Figure A6: Meaning of Party Attachment among Early-generation Republicans, (a), and Native-Born Republicans, (b),1984-2016.

(a) Top 5 Tf-idf words used by early-generation Republicans

(b) Top 5 Tf-idf words used by Native-Born Republicans

more similarly as Republicans since 2012. In short, early-generation Republicans first developed their attachment to the party based on concerns related to international politics aloof from domestic politics in the 1980s but they have gradually incorporated policy issues since the 1990s. Since the mid-2000s, they began to develop their attachment to the party more like native-born Americans with conservative ideas and concerns related to moral traditionalism.

APPENDIX FOR THE THIRD ESSAY

B.1 Observational Studies

B.1.1 Coding

B.1.1.1 American National Election Studies

-Party Identification from the Cumulative File: Variable: VCF0301. Coding: Republican (including leaners); Democrat (including leaners); Independent (pure independetns only).

-Gender from the Cumulative File: Female (2016): Variable: VCF0104. Coding: Female=1; Male=0.

-Income from the Cumulative File: Variable: VCF0114. Coding: Below 68 to 95 percentile =0; Above 68 to 95 percentile= 1.

-Education from the Commutative File (2016): Variable: VCF0110. Coding: more than some college =1; less than some college =0.

-Age from the Commutative File (2016): Variable: VCF0101.

-Religion from the Cumulative File (2016): Variable: VCF0128. Coding: 1 if any ; 0 no religion.

-Assimilation Psychology (2016): Variable: V162266, V162267, V162273, V162274

-Assimilation Psychology (2020): Variable: V202416, V202417,V202423, =V202424

B.1.1.2 Asian Americans: National Asian American Studies

-Party Identification (2008): Variable: QD1, QD1C. Coding: Republican=1; Democrat=2; Independent=3; Leaning Democrat=2 (QD1C); Leaning Republican=1 (QD1C).

-Party Identification (2016): Variable: QD1, QD1C. Coding: Republican=1; Democrat=2; Independent=3; Leaning Democrat=2 (QD1C); Leaning Republican=1 (QD1C).

-Gender: Female (2008): Variable: Gender. Coding: Female=1; Male=0.

-Gender: Female (2016): Variable: S7. Coding: Female=1; Male=0.

-Income (2008): Variable: QJ6. Coding: below $12,5000 =0; above $12,5000= 1.

-Income (2016): Variable: Q10_15. Coding: below $12,5000 =0; above $12,5000= 1.

-Education (2008): Variable: QJ1. Coding: more than some college =1; less than some college =0.

-Education (2016): Variable: S8. Coding: more than some college =1; less than some college =0.

-Age (2008): Variable: QJ10.

-Age (2016): Variable: Q10_18.

-Length of Residence (2008): Variable: QA6. Coding: 2008- first arrived in the U.S. if not born in the U.S.; age if U.S. born.

-Length of Residence (2016): Variable: Q10_3A. Coding: 2008- first arrived in the U.S. if not born in the U.S.; age if U.S. born.

-Religion (2008): Variable: QH1. Coding: 1 (Any Religion) if <97; 0 if 97, 98, 99 (no religion).

-Religion (2016): Variable: Q10_21. Coding: 1 (Any Religion) if <97; 0 if 97, 98, 99 (no religion).

-Citizenship (2008): Variable: QJ13. Coding: citizen=1; non-citizen=0.

-Citizenship (2016): Variable: CITIZEN. Coding: citizen=1; non-citizen=0.

-Vietnamese (2008): Variable: QA1. Coding: Vietnamese=1; non-Vietnamese=0.

-Vietnamese (2016): Variable: ETHNICALPHA. Coding: Vietnamese=1; non-Vietnamese=0.

-Assimilation Psychology (2008): Variable: QF101. Coding: Strong Assimilation Psychology=2, Moderate Assimilation Psychology=1; Weak Assimilation Psychology=0.

-Assimilation Psychology (2016): Variable: Q4_101. Coding: Strong Assimilation Psychology=2, Moderate Assimilation Psychology=1; Weak Assimilation Psychology=0.

B.1.1.3   Latinos: National Survey of Latinos

-Party Identification (2006): Variable: qn45, qns46. Coding: Republican=1; Democrat=2; Independent=3; Leaning Democrat=2 (qns46); Leaning Republican=1 (qns46).

-Party Identification (2014): Variable: party_combo. Coding: Republican=1; Democrat=2; Independent=3; Leaning Democrat=2; Leaning Republican=1.

-Gender: Female (2006): Variable: qns5. Coding: Female=1; Male=0.

-Gender: Female (2014): Variable: gender. Coding: Female=1; Male=0.

-Income (2006): Variable: qn80. Coding: below $12,5000 =0; above $12,5000= 1.

-Income (2014): Variable: income. Coding: below $12,5000 =0; above $12,5000= 1.

-Education (2006): Variable: qn59. Coding: more than some college =1; less than some college =0.

-Education (2014): Variable: educ. Coding: more than some college =1; less than some college =0.

-Age (2006): Variable: qn63.

-Age (2014): Variable: age.

-Length of Residence (2006): Variable: qn37. Coding: 2006- first arrived in the U.S. if not born in the U.S.; age if U.S. born.

-Length of Residence (2014): Variable: q3q3ot_combo. Coding: 2006- first arrived in the U.S. if not born in the U.S.; age if U.S. born.

-Religion (2006): Variable: qn19. Coding: 1 if Christianity; 0 if other or no religion.

-Religion (2014): Variable: relig. Coding: 1 if Christianity; 0 if other or no religion.

-Citizenship (2006): Variable: qn5, us_born; Coding: citizen=1; non-citizen=0.

-Citizenship (2014): Variable: q9. Coding: citizen=1; non-citizen=0.

-Cuban (2006): Variable: ident2a. Coding: Cuban=1; non-Cuban=0.

-Cuban (2014): Variable: q3. Coding: Cuban=1; non-Cuban=0.

-Assimilation Psychology (2006): Variable: qn18b. Coding: Strong Assimilation Psychology=2, Moderate Assimilation Psychology=1; Weak Assimilation Psychology=0.

-Assimilation Psychology (2014): Variable: q50. Coding: Strong Assimilation Psychology=1; Weak Assimilation Psychology=0.

B.1.2 Tables

Table B1: Effect of Acculturation Psychology on Party Identification (Asian Americans)

	Reference Category: Democrat	
	Independent	Republican
Assimilation Psychology	−0.156***	0.110**
	(0.047)	(0.049)
Female	−0.270***	−0.245***
	(0.035)	(0.040)
Income	−0.401***	0.236***
	(0.010)	(0.015)
Education	−1.097***	−0.199***
	(0.034)	(0.038)
Age	0.026***	0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age^2	−0.0003***	−0.0001*
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Length of Residence	−0.0001	−0.001**
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Religion	−0.372***	0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Citizen	−0.420***	0.036
	(0.016)	(0.028)
Vietnamese	0.095***	0.546***
	(0.022)	(0.036)
Year:2016	1.112***	−0.842***
	(0.012)	(0.026)
Constant	−0.492***	−0.222***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	11,607	11,607
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,448.579	5,448.579

Source: Asian American National Survey 2008 and 2016 (pooled)

Estimators are derived from multinomial logistic regression

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B2: Effect of Acculturation Psychology on Party Identification (Latinos)

	Reference Category:Democrat	
	Independent	Republican
Assimilation Psychology	0.053	0.248*
	(0.043)	(0.143)
Gender	0.337**	−0.250**
	(0.136)	(0.114)
Income	0.426***	0.323**
	(0.083)	(0.127)
Education	−0.481***	−0.136
	(0.084)	(0.119)
Age	0.019**	−0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age^2	−0.0003**	0.0002**
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Length of Residence	0.0001	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Religion	−0.298***	0.052
	(0.070)	(0.123)
Citizen	−0.855***	0.052
	(0.082)	(0.120)
Cuban	−0.503***	1.129***
	(0.003)	(0.014)
Year:2014	−0.416***	−0.263**
	(0.135)	(0.118)
Constant	−0.790***	−0.393***
	(0.008)	(0.014)
Observations	3,520	3,520
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,263.439	3,263.439

Source: National Survey of Latinos 2006 and 2014 (pooled)

Estimators are derived from multinomial logistic regression

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B3: Basic Demographics

Statistic	N	Mean (or %)
Female (%)	1,186	0.277
Age (Average)	1,186	34.044
U.S. Born (%)	1,186	0.983
U.S. Citizen (%)	1,186	0.977
Both Parent Born in the U.S. (%)	1,186	0.888
Asian American (%)	1,186	0.505
Democrat (Including Leaners) (%)	571	48
Republican (Including Leaners) (%)	455	38
Independent (%)	160	13

B.2 Experimental Studies

B.3 Basic Description

The respondents were recruited by Amazon's Mechanical Turk. I followed the pre-specified protocol approved by the Internal Review Board (IRB) at Texas AM University (IRB2021-0529M) and pre-registered plan (https://aspredicted.org/see_one.php).

B.4 Treatment Vignette

B.4.1 Assimilation Psychology

B.4.1.1 - Asian Americans

B.4.1.2 - Latinos

B.4.2 Multicultural Psychology

B.4.2.1 - Asian Americans

B.4.2.2 - Latinos

Figure B1: Vignette for Asian Americans (Assimilation Psychology)

American Dream:
Key to Success in the United States

UPDATED ON: MAY 10, 2021 / 11:30 AM / U.S. NEWS

According to Pew Research Center, Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the U.S. such that the percent of Asian Americans who newly arrives in the U.S. first exceeded that of Hispanics in 2009. Together with this, Asian Americans are the highest-income and best-educated racial group in the U.S. Forty-nine percent of Asians have a bachelor's degree or more while 31 percent of whites, 18 percent of blacks, and 13 percent of Hispanics do; median house income for Asians was $66,000 while $54,000, $40,000, and $33,300 in 2010 for each White, Black, and Hispanics respectively. What drives this success in the U.S.? In this article, we investigate key factors that make Asian Americans successful in the U.S.

Meet the New Immigrants:
**Asians overtake Hispanics**
% of immigrants, by year of arrival, 2000-2010

— Asian race   — Hispanic origin

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Asian Americans Lead Others
In Education, Income
% with a bachelor's degree or more,
among ages 25 and older, 2010

U.S. Population	28
Asians	49
Whites	31
Blacks	18
Hispanics	13

Median household income, 2010

U.S. Population	$49,800
Asians	$66,000
Whites	$54,000
Blacks	$33,300
Hispanics	$40,000

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First, Asian Americans move up the social ladder in the U.S. by attaining degrees from higher education and English proficiency. In more detail, Dr. Le from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in his book, "Asian American Assimilation: Ethnicity, Immigration, and Socioeconomic Attainment," shows that Asian Americans who attain degrees from higher education earn more than the ones who don't. The report from U.S. Census Bureau shows similar results in that people who spoke only English were more likely to be employed, more likely to find full-time work when employed, and, even having found full-time employment, experienced higher median earnings.

Second, Asian Americans proactively learn the rules, norms, and culture of the U.S. and maintain connections to the mainstream society of the U.S. to adjust themselves to fit into the American way of life. These Asians try to be a member of the U.S. as an "American" rather than "Asian descendants in the U.S." such that, for example, they celebrate national holidays of the U.S., make their personal connections outside of Asian American communities, Americanize their first name, and make friendships with other races such as White, Black, and Hispanic. This increases their competency in the American culture and creates new opportunities. A report from the National Research Council, "Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment of Data Needs for Future Research," also suggests that Asian immigrants and their family advance their social and economic status with greater assimilation to American culture and society.

Third, Asian Americans who assimilate into American society are much happier than other Asian Americans who keep their Asian heritage in their ethnic enclaves. Studies reveal that Asian Americans get stress both in their daily life and workplace when other Americans treat them as "forever foreigners" -- meaning that they are frequently seen as foreigners and outsiders and as such, not "real" Americans. However, scholars find that they receive less stress from the stereotypes because other races don't feel that they are foreign when they show competency in American culture and society.

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# Figure B2: Vignette for Latinos (Assimilation Psychology)

American Dream:
Key to Success in the United States.

UPDATED ON: MAY 10, 2021 / 11:30 AM / U.S. NEWS

Latinos have become considerably more upbeat about their personal finances and optimistic about their financial future since the Great Recession, according to newly released results from a national survey of Latino adults. The survey also shows that Latinos have pulled even with the general U.S. population in their views of their personal finances and continue to outpace them on optimism about the future. Four-in-ten Latinos say their personal finances are in "excellent" or "good" shape, a 17-percentage point increase since 2008, when only 23% made a similarly positive assessment of their finances (the Great Recession began in December 2007). By contrast, the share of all Americans who have a similarly positive view of their finances remained essentially flat during the same seven-year period. Also, 72% of Latinos see economic upward mobility for their children. What drives this mood? In this article, we investigate key factors that make Latinos successful in the U.S.

First, successful Latinos in the U.S. move up the social ladder in U.S. by achieving degrees from higher education and trying to be fluent in English. A report from National Center for Educational Statistics shows that Latinos who attain degrees from higher education earn more, about 1.7 to 2 times, than the ones who don't. The report from U.S. Census Bureau shows similar results in that those people who spoke English were more likely to be employed, more likely to find full-time work when employed, and, even having found full-time employment, experienced higher median earnings.

Second, successful Latinos proactively learn the rules, norms, and culture of the U.S. and maintain connections to the mainstream society of the U.S. to adjust themselves to fit into the American way of life. These Latinos try to be a member of the U.S. as an "American" rather than "Latino/Hispanic descendants in the U.S." For example, they celebrate national holidays of the U.S., expand networks outside of Latinx communities, Americanize their names, and make friendships with other races such as White, Black, and Asian Americans. This increases their competency in the American culture and creates new opportunities. A report from the National Research Council, "Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment of Data Needs for Future Research," suggests that Latino immigrants and their family can advance their social and economic status with greater assimilation to American culture and society.

Third, Latinos who assimilate into who assimilate into American society are much happier and more successful than other Latinos who only keep their Latino/Hispanic heritage in their ethnic enclaves. Studies reveal that Latinos get stressed both in their daily life and workplace when they are frequently seen as illegal immigrants and as such, not "legitimate" Americans. However, scholars find that Latinos receive less stress from the stereotypes and discrimination because other Americans don't feel that they are illegal but more American when they show competency in American culture and society.

Figure B3: Vignette for Asian Americans (Multicultural Psychology)

Asian Culture and Heritage:
## Key to Success in the United States

UPDATED ON: MAY 10, 2021 / 11:30 AM / U.S. NEWS

Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders have a rich heritage thousands of years old and have both shaped the history of the United States and had their lives dramatically influenced by moments in its history. According to Pew Research Center, Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the U.S. such that the percent of Asian Americans who newly arrives in the U.S. first exceeded that of Hispanics in 2009. Together with this, Asian Americans are the highest-income and best-educated racial group in the U.S. Forty-nine percent of Asians have a bachelor's degree or more while 31 percent of whites, 18 percent of blacks, and 13 percent of Hispanics do; median house income for Asians was $66,000 while $54,000, $40,000, and $33,300 in 2010 for each White, Black, and Hispanics respectively. What drives this success in the U.S.? In this article, we investigate key factors that make Asian Americans successful in the U.S.

Meet the New Immigrants: Asians overtake Hispanics
% of immigrants, by year of arrival, 2000-2010

— Asian race   — Hispanic origin

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Asian Americans Lead Others In Education, Income
% with a bachelor's degree or more, among ages 25 and older, 2010

U.S. Population	28
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Median household income, 2010

U.S. Population	$49,800
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Whites	$54,000
Blacks	$33,300
Hispanics	$40,000

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First, successful Asian Americans are aware of the importance of keeping Asian heritage in the U.S. Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders have a rich heritage thousands of years old. This Asian heritage provides them with a source of identity. They connect generations and strengthen Asian American bonds, and help them feel that they are part of something unique in the U.S. Also, they benefit them with the wealth of knowledge and skills that is transmitted from one generation to the next over thousands of years in Asia.

Second, successful Asian Americans actively maintain their connections to Asian American communities and their country of origin. Scholars find that Asian Americans have shaped their own mainstream in the U.S. as their number becomes sufficiently large enough to be self-sufficient without strong connections to a larger society of the U.S. As a result, they can make a living in larger Asian American cities and local Asian communities without abandoning their Asian identity. For example, they can buy Asian foods and culture and meet other Asian Americans in several Asian towns across regions in the U.S. They can also pursue their career/business opportunities by maintaining ties to their Asian American communities in the U.S. and their country of origin outside.

Third, successful Asian Americans use their multicultural competency for their professional career development in the U.S. Reports from headhunters, such as Indeed, suggest that employers prefer to hire employees with multicultural competency--" Cultural competence is increasingly important as our means of communication and collaboration in working environments evolve. Learning how to respect, communicate and collaborate with an increasingly diverse work culture is crucial to optimizing a company's efficiency and productivity." Related studies show that bilingual people with multicultural earn about 20 more than monolingual people with less cultural competency.

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Figure B4: Vignette for Latinos (Multicultural Psychology)

Latino/Hispanic Culture and Heritage:
Key to Success in the United States.

UPDATED ON: MAY 10, 2021 / 11:30 AM / U.S. NEWS   🇫 🐦 📷

Latinos have become considerably more upbeat about their personal finances and optimistic about their financial future since the Great Recession, according to newly released results from a national survey of Latino adults. The survey also shows that Latinos have pulled even with the general U.S. population in their views of their personal finances and continue to outpace them on optimism about the future. Four-in-ten Latinos say their personal finances are in "excellent" or "good" shape, a 17-percentage point increase since 2008, when only 23% made a similarly positive assessment of their finances (the Great Recession began in December 2007). By contrast, the share of all Americans who have a similarly positive view of their finances remained essentially flat during the same seven-year period. Also, 72% of Latinos see economic upward mobility for their children. What drives this mood? In this article, we investigate key factors that make Latinos successful in the U.S.

First, Latinos have a rich heritage thousands of years old and have both shaped the history of the U.S. and had their lives dramatically influenced by moments in its history. Successful Latinos are aware of the importance of keeping Latino/Hispanic heritage in the U.S. because it provides them with a source of identity; it connects generations and strengthen Latino bonds, and help them feel that they are part of something unique in the U.S. Also, it benefits them with the wealth of knowledge and skills that are transmitted from one generation to the next over thousands of years from Latin America.

Second, successful Latinos actively maintain their connections to Latino/Hispanic communities and their country of origin. Scholars show that Latinos have shaped their "own" mainstream in the U.S. as their number becomes sufficiently large enough to be self-sufficient without strong connections to a larger society of the U.S. For example, Latinos can make a living by themselves in local Latino/Hispanic communities: they can buy Latino/Hispanic foods and culture and meet other Latinos in several Latino/Hispanic towns across regions in the U.S. Also, they can run their business and become successful by maintaining ties to other Latino communities.

Third, successful Latinos use their multicultural competency for their professional career development. Reports from headhunting firms, such as Indeed, suggest that employers prefer to hire employees who have multicultural competency: " Cultural competence is increasingly important as our means of communication and collaboration in working environments evolve. Learning how to respect, communicate and collaborate with an increasingly diverse work culture is crucial to optimizing a company's efficiency and productivity." Related studies suggest that bilingual people with multicultural competency earn about 20 more than monolingual people without multicultural competency.