COMPETITION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES OF REBEL GOVERNANCE

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Why do rebel groups establish governance institutions? What motivates their institutional choices of governance? This dissertation advances an institutional choice theory to explain why rebel groups establish governance and the particular institutional arrangements they make. Existing research explains variation in rebels' governance provision and institutional differences by often emphasizing group-level explanations. At the same time, the literature highlights rebels' resource constraints which limit the set of possible actions. The institutional choice theory of rebel governance provides a unified framework that answers why rebels establish governance institutions and why they make particular institutional choices by arguing that rebels establish governance to reap material and non-material benefits in response to their competitive environment. The empirical strategy employs quantitative and qualitative methods to test the theory and illustrate the causal mechanism. The quantitative analysis examines rebel groups from all around the globe between 1960 and 2012, while the qualitative analysis is a case study of the Taliban between 1994 and 2021.

In the analysis, I find support for the assertions of the institutional choice theory and show that rebels become less likely to establish governance institutions if their existential threat in form of their competition increases. I further show that, when rebel groups establish governance institutions, greater existential threats motivate the creation of specific subsets of governance institutions. The subset of institutions depends on the type of competition. Rebels in competition with the state are more likely to establish governance that emulates the looks of the state without assuming any of its functions. This is unless rebels' compete with a weaker state. Rebels in inter-rebel competition establish immediately beneficial governance as they try to reap more material and non-material resources in the immediate term to secure their survival.

In conclusion, the institutional choice theory of rebel governance as presented in this dissertation explains rebels' governance creation as well as their institutional choices. The findings of this dissertation have vast implications for the literature of rebel governance, civil war, and policies of state-building, counterinsurgencies, and the work of relief organizations.

DEDICATION

Für Opa,

Halt die Ohren steif.

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NOMENCLATURE

CPN-M	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FLEC	Forces for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro
UNITA	National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front

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1. INTRODUCTION

Rebel groups are primarily thought of as armed insurgents fighting their opponents to achieve some socio-political change. While all rebel groups engage in violent civil war — otherwise they would not be considered rebel groups — many also take non-violent actions. For example, some rebel groups go out of their way to adhere to international law (Jo 2015), while others provide goods and services in governance institutions.

Of the 235 rebel groups in the UCDP Armed Conflict Termination Data (Kreutz 2010), 168 or 71% established governance institutions. Rebel groups use these governance institutions to mobilize additional forces (Loyle 2021), gain financial resources (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021; Mampilly 2011), or bolster their legitimacy (Coggins 2015; Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021). Beyond these short-term effects, governance institutions have impacts even long after they ceased their existence as they can improve household welfare (Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014) or improve the odds of post-conflict democratization (Huang 2016*b*).

The process of establishing and maintaining governance institutions involves an inherent trade-off for rebel groups: on the one hand, by establishing governance institutions, rebel groups can reap material resources, support, and legitimacy — all of which are important to fund rebels' campaign and increase the rebels' chances of achieving their long-term goals. On the other hand, establishing and maintaining governance institutions is costly for rebel groups as it can stretch their scarce resource pool even further, making them more vulnerable, and exposing them to defeat at the hands of their opponents. Hence, each time rebel groups establish and maintain governance institutions, they make a trade-off between resources, legitimacy, and support on the one side, and vulnerabilities and defeat on the other. Even when rebels survive post-governance creation confrontations with their opponents, they still incur the costs of diverting resources from military capabilities to establish governance institutions.

Given these potentially fatal costs associated with providing governance institutions, why do rebel groups establish them? Furthermore, what explains the institutional rebels make when they

establish governance institutions?

While the literature on rebel governance is growing, much of the attention is paid to the consequences of rebels' governance. In comparison, the literature on the determinants of rebel governance is relatively small. So far, the question of rebels' institutional choices of governance has been almost completely neglected with the few exceptions focusing on why rebel groups provide healthcare over education (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021) or how inclusive political institutions are (Breslawski 2021). The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation addresses this important gap in the literature.

1.1 Preview of the Argument

Rebel groups fight their opponents, the state and other rebel groups alike, for control of the state to achieve political goals. The focus on military conquest should lead rebel groups to favor using their resources almost exclusively on increasing their military capabilities rather. Yet, over 71% of rebel groups divert resources that could be used to increase their fighting capabilities and establish governance institutions instead. Some rebel groups provided education such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) did in Sri Lanka (Mampilly 2011) while others created complex judicial systems with district, province, and national courts as the Taliban did in Afghanistan (Provost 2021). What explains rebel groups' institutional choices of rebel governance?

In this dissertation, I argue that rebel groups establish governance institutions that provide rebel groups with resources — either material ones or non-material support and legitimacy — that the rebel group needs to ensure its survival in the short term. Furthermore, I argue that rebels' resource needs influence the governance institution they create. This, in turn, depends on the competition rebel groups experience.

The dissertation distinguishes between two types of competition rebel groups experience: rebel-state and inter-rebel competition. Each of these types of competition is characterized by rebels' main competition: in the former, it is the state and in the latter, it is other rebel organizations that exist within the country.

Rebel-state competition means that rebel groups compete with the state, often for (a part of) the state. The rebel groups want to undermine the state's claim to be the sovereign while simultaneously strengthening their own claim to being the legitimate government of (part of) the country. To be aided in this quest, rebel groups can establish governance institutions that, at the very least, appear as they were taking on state functions.

However, as rebel groups do want to focus their forces to achieve their goal, they do not want to be distracted and split up by potential uprisings against their own rule. They want to avoid any backlash and focus on governance that appears as if it were to take on the state's governance functions like holding elections. Yet, when the state is weak, and thus rebel groups' survival would not be endangered by potential backlash and the same backlash is less likely, rebel groups establish governance institutions that replace the state's governance. An example of this type of governance would be the creation of a rebel-sponsored civilian government.

Rebels in competition with other rebel groups are focused on strengthening their own position as this ensures their own survival in the short-term while simultaneously increasing the probability that they will be able to achieve their long-term goals. To strengthen their own capabilities, rebels can extract material resources through potentially dangerous coercion or establish governance institutions that allow them to generate support and legitimacy, in addition to reaping material benefits. As rebels are in greater competition with other rebels, they put a premium on generating additional resources. Thus, these rebel groups establish governance institutions that provide the rebel group with the desired benefits immediately.

Hence, rebel groups in rebel-state competition establish governance that looks state-like. This is unless they compete with a weak state, then they establish governance that rivals the state's governance institutions. Rebels in inter-rebel competition establish governance institutions that let the group reap benefits shortly as resource generation is of critical importance.

1.2 Contribution to the Literature

The theory presented in this dissertation introduces a new framework to understand rebels' institutional choices of governance. While most studies of rebel governance take institutional choices as externally given, this dissertation scrutinizes this assumption and treats rebels' institutional choices as the result of a conscious and intentional decision-making process. As the literature has spent little effort to explain rebels' institutional choices while exerting a lot of effort in examining the consequences of rebel governance, the dissertation addresses and fills a significant and important gap in the literature.

In addition to filling a hole in the existing literature by explaining the institutional choices of rebel governance, the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation also explains geographical and temporal variations in rebels' governance provision and institutional choices. This is another significant hole that the existing literature has left wide-open as most explanations of rebels' governance provision focused on rebel group-level explanations, e.g. rebels separatist goals (Stewart 2018, 2021) or their ideological orientation (Revkin 2017).

While the theoretical framework of this dissertation fills an important hole in the current literature, it also allows for a more accurate assessment of the impact of rebels' governance. Governance institutions have short- and long-term effects, even long after they ceased their existence (Huang 2016*b*; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). The reason why governance structures have these important and lasting impacts might be the same why they were established in the first place. For example, Huang (2016*b*) argues that rebels' reliance on the civilian population increases the country's post-conflict democratization odds. By understanding why rebel groups established governance institutions that relied on civilians, as rebel groups might take advantage of civilians' desires, the effect of rebels' reliance on post-conflict democratization could be more accurately accessed.

1.3 Scope

The institutional choice theory of rebel governance is designed to explain the governance provision and institutional choices of rebel groups in both, conflict and peace times. I assume that rebel groups require at least tacit civilian support from local populations to evade counterinsurgency efforts and generate necessary resources ranging from material resources to non-material support and legitimacy.

The theory applies most directly to conflicts where rebel groups fight at least some of their opponents and actively participate in the civil war. Situations such as those in the Syrian Civil War, where at one point, the government and the Kurdish rebel groups did not actively engage one another and even followed a live-and-let-live approach (Beauchamp 2014) are not applicable to this theory. The theory assumes that rebel groups take actions to achieve their goals, either capturing the state or seceding from it. Frozen conflicts such as the South Ossetian conflict or the Nagorno-Karabakh are not applicable to the theory developed in this dissertation.

Furthermore, the theory laid out in this dissertation only applies to inclusive governance, i.e. governance that is available to everybody regardless of their relationship to the rebel group. Hence, governance-providing rebel groups cannot use their governance to selectively recruit new members or provide selective benefits. This is not to say that the theory developed in this dissertation could not apply to rebels' provision of exclusive governance, quite the contrary. Yet, the theory was not developed with exclusive governance in mind and as such, it should not be used to explain rebels' provision of exclusive governance.

Lastly, the theory implicitly assumes that the rebel groups possess sufficient financial resources and manpower to potentially achieve their long-term goals. Hence, rebel groups are assumed to have a certain innate strength. This implicit assumption is also present in the data used to test the theory as the universe of cases is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which lists rebel groups only when they have caused 25 battle-deaths in a single year and are part of a conflict that caused 1,000 battle-deaths. So, while the theory assumes that the rebel groups are potentially strong enough to achieve their goal, the test of the theory introduces a similar and related assump-

tion: that the rebels have to be deadly enough to be relevant for the conflict.

1.4 Outline and Research Design

This dissertation proceeds as follows: In the next chapter, Chapter 2, it introduces concepts and assumptions which are essential to the institutional choice theory of rebel governance. This theory is presented in Chapter 3 in which also testable hypotheses are developed. Chapter 4 applies theory to two competitive environments, rebel-state competition and inter-rebel competition. A brief outline of the research design used in this chapter is described in the following section.

Following the quantitative analyses in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 illustrates the causal mechanisms hypothesized in the preceding three chapters using qualitative case study evidence of the Taliban's rebel governance between 1994 and 2021. The last chapter, Chapter 6, concludes the analysis of the theoretical framework of the institutional choice theory of rebel governance, the evidence provided in support of it, and the illustration of the causal mechanisms from the qualitative case study. This chapter also lays out the dissertation's contribution to the literature and its implications for policy-makers.

1.4.1 Research Design Outline

The quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 use the Rebels Quasi-State Institutions Data by Albert (Forthcoming) and similarly created measures of competition. Each competition measure is born out of the Non-State Actor Dataset's *rebel strength* and measures the rebel group's competition in the size of the rebel group in question. This provides a measure of the subjective existential threat rebels face from their competition.

The outcome variables used in those chapters are grouped into state-like or state-replacing governance institutions, and immediately or potentially beneficial governance institutions.

The quantitative analysis employs probit models to estimate the effect of rebels' competition on governance provision. First, each analysis examines how competition affects the creation of gov-

ernance institutions in general, and then examines particular institutional choices that are deemed representative of the larger set of institutional choices rebel groups can make. In the next chapter, Chapter 5, the dissertation provides qualitative evidence in support of assertions made in the two quantitative chapters.

1.4.2 Qualitative Case Study Outline

The purpose of the qualitative case study in Chapter 5 is to illustrate the causal mechanism described in Chapter 3. To do so, the case study is divided into three larger sections that align with periods of different competition types for the Taliban. The first section, covering the Taliban from their founding in 1994 until they take control of Kabul and thus Afghanistan in 1996, covers the group's inter-rebel competition and the Taliban's resulting governance.

Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban consolidated their rule and claimed to be the government of Afghanistan, which in 1997 they renamed from the Islamic State of Afghanistan to Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. During this period, the Taliban's competition type transitions from inter-rebel towards more rebel-state governance. Despite the Taliban's claims to be the state, the wide non-recognition of the movement as the legitimate representative of Afghanistan puts them squarely in competition with the widely recognized Islamic State of Afghanistan. Thus, they increasingly establish governance institutions motivated by this type of competition.

The last section covers the Taliban between their ousting from power in 2001 and their recapture of the entirety of Afghanistan in 2021. This period is characterized by clear rebel-state competition as the Taliban maintain their claim to being the legitimate government, while the newly installed, and widely recognized, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, lays claim to the government of Afghanistan as well. Due to the rebel-state competition, the Taliban's governance is motivated by desires to strengthen the group's claims, both domestically and internationally. However, the latter does not truly come to fruition. Even though the Taliban signed a peace agreement with the United States to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan — something that should be within the prerogative of the Islamic Republic — the United States took action to ensure the agreement cannot be con-

strued as recognition of the Taliban by the United States government as the agreement repeatedly refers to the Taliban as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and United States of America 2020).

2. KEY CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This chapter introduces the concepts and assumptions which are essential to the institutional choice theory of rebel governance, which provides a new framework to understand the relationship between civil wars' conflict dynamics and non-violent actions by violent non-state actors in rebel groups. First, by briefly outlining the political foundations of state sovereignty, the chapter motivates a discussion of the armed challengers of sovereignty. The various actors in a civil war, states and rebel groups, compete with one another over the solution of a number of issues. The argument presented in this dissertation focuses on the rebels' actions that follow and arise due to this competition. Hence, the conflict environment is defined and subsequently discussed as the motivating factor for rebel groups. The following section then defines governance, rebel governance, and the assumptions made with regard to rebel governance. It is important to provide these definitions and discuss the underlying assumptions as rebels' relationship with local civilian populations is structured by both, the norms and institutions converging expectations and the provision of rules, goods, and services by the rebel group — or rebel governance in short. Lastly, as the theoretical framework relies heavily on competition to explain rebels' governance provision, the last section defines and conceptualizes the term as to how it will be used in the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation.

2.1 Sovereignty, Control, and Civil War

In the post-Westphalian international system, states are sovereign, meaning that they have the full right and power to govern themselves without any interference. Aspiring states or political organizations gain sovereignty by claiming to be the exclusive political authority over a defined territory and other existing states collectively recognize this claim. Aspiring states need not only to lay claim to exclusive political authority within their claimed territory but also needs to have the backing of the international community of states (Fazal 2011).

In addition to a claim and the international community's backing of that claim, aspiring states need the recognition of their claim by the domestic, constituent population that resides within the claimed territory. In other words, political organizations that want to be domestically and internationally recognized as states require the consent of the governed as "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government" (United Nations 1948, Art. 21). While various philosophers have argued about the amount of consent a state requires to be legitimate and therefore sovereign, explicit rebellion against the state's rule can be interpreted as the state lacking the consent of the governed (Pettit 1997). Therefore, states with explicit rebellion against their government would be illegitimate and not sovereign.

States' need for internal recognition to legitimize their rule bears fruit to a significant problem for states: Many domestic challenges to states' sovereignty predate the modern, post-Westphalian system of sovereign statehood. Social structures such as ethnic, tribal, or other kinship ties can be the foundation and reason for challenges to states' sovereignty. Furthermore, capacity constraints may limit states' ability to project their sovereignty evenly across their territory. Weak states in particular will be troubled by this issue and are more likely to face internal challenges. These internal challengers may seek to replace state authority in the entire state or just in specific geographic or policy areas. When an organized, violent challenge to a state's sovereignty emerges, a state is considered to be in a civil war.[1] By their very nature, civil war is about control: control over people, territory, and political authority, all of which rebels need to seize and hold in order to advance their military, and ultimately their political objectives.

2.2 The Conflict Environment of Civil Wars

Coercion and threats of violence against civilians are an innate part of civil wars. The relationship of rebels and civilians is particularly heavily impacted by this as much of what civilians do (or are allowed to do) during times of civil war is done under severe coercion. For example,

[1]Civil war is defined as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities" (Kalyvas 2006, 5).

many rebel groups collect contributions from a variety of sources such as local businesses or the trade of goods to finance their operations. Rebels can collect these contributions by either asking for voluntary donations or by using coercion to extort them. Even when rebels do not extort civilians explicitly in their attempt to generate contributions, civilians may feel compelled to contribute since rebels may take note of non-compliers and punish them. So, even though the contributions were not explicitly extorted, they were not made voluntarily either. Regardless of the level of extortion applied to extract the contributions, rebels will often refer to them as "taxes."

Coercion is omnipresent not only when rebels want to finance their struggle. Civilians have ties with the incumbent states, the rebel group, and potentially with other rebel groups as well. These ties "put rebels in constant danger of betrayal" (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015, 3). To curb the potential for betrayal and prevent resistance to their rule, rebel groups can use selective coercion to generate popular support (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2015). However, rebels have to be careful in their use of coercion as civilians will withhold support if the rebel group violates shared norms, for example by using excessive force (Hoffmann 2015).

Rebels want to generate at least a minimum level of cooperation to make their rule easier and more effective. The enforcement of their rule is almost always imperfect as even with considerable coercive power and effective techniques, total compliance is unattainable for rebel groups (Levi 1989). While partial resistance, or resistance against particular decisions, can make rebels' governance more effective as civilians communicate their opposition and sometimes suggest alternative solutions to particular issues (Arjona 2015), full resistance is hindering rebels' ultimate goals. So, if just a few civilians cooperate with the rebel group, it reduces the probability of resistance that coercion is likely to engender (Coggins 2015). Therefore, while coercion is an innate part of civil war which heavily impacts the relationship between civilians and rebels, it does not need to define those relationships. Governance can still have coercive aspects to it but it is less coercive than rebels outright harming or killing civilians as it aims to coopt and generate consent compliance.

The civilian-rebel relationship can be heavily influenced by outright coercion or cooptation, or intermediate steps of those two such as somewhat coercive, somewhat cooptive governance institu-

tions. For example, instead of relying on the groups' military to police and enforce its rule, rebels may create governance such as a justice system to control civilians and enforce its rule. When rebels would prefer to coopt civilian populations to increase their collaboration, rebels can set up institutions that cover welfare or education.

2.3 Rebel Governance

Several scholars have defined the concept of *rebel governance* with each definition having slight yet important differences. I briefly discuss these existing definitions including their assumptions that make them unsuitable for my theory before creating my own definition of rebel governance. It is necessary to create my own definition of rebel governance as even the more general term of *governance* is used to describe numerous different concepts within political science. Fukuyama (2016) notes that in the field of political science, governance can refer to governments' public administration within their sovereign territory and the regulation of social behaviors through (non-state) networks and other non-hierarchical mechanisms, but it can also encompass cooperation between sovereign states and between states and international organizations. While the term rebel governance does not encompass as many different concepts, the existing definitions still vary substantially, thus creating a need to clarify what this dissertation regards as rebel governance.

2.3.1 Previous Definitions

One of the earliest definitions of rebel governance was developed by Weinstein (2007). His definition of what he calls "rebel government," which conflates the two concepts of rebel regime and rebel governance, has three scope conditions. First, rebel groups have to exercise "control over territory." Control does not mean that rebel groups are the only actors in the area, they just have to be the strongest force and have to have a monopoly on the use of force. Second, rebel groups have to create institutions either within or outside of the group's military wing "to manage relations with the civilian population." Third, rebels use these institutions to set "a series of formal

and informal rules" to "define a hierarchy of decision making and a system of taxation" (Weinstein 2007, 164). By requiring rebel groups to have territorial control, institutions with the expressed purpose of managing a civilian population, as well as institutions establishing a hierarchy of decision making, and requiring a system of taxation, Weinstein's definition of rebel governance is highly demanding of rebel's governance efforts. Just examining the importance of taxation makes it apparent how demanding Weinstein's definition is. He makes taxation a defining feature of rebel governance, rather than one possible form rebel governance can take on. This is controversial as even some states do not have a system of taxation[2] and thus demanding it from rebel groups makes governance less comparable.

Kasfir's (2015) definition of rebel governance also requires three scope conditions. Similar to Weinstein, Kasfir requires rebels to "hold some territory within the state against which it is rebelling" and this territory must be inhabited by civilians (Kasfir 2015, 25).[3] In addition to these two criteria, Kasfir requires rebel groups' use or threat of armed violence (Kasfir 2015). The first condition means that rebel groups must have adequate control over territory to be in a position to set up a governance infrastructure. The second condition differentiates rebel governance as a means to manage a population from rebel conduct where rebel groups create training facilities and bases of operations to maintain their military efforts. The last condition differentiates rebel governance from governance by other actors, state and non-state actors alike. For this, rebel groups have to have had engaged "an initial act of violence to become rebels" and then at least continuously threatened the continuation of these hostilities (Kasfir 2015, 25). The rebellion is an integral part of Kasfir's definition of rebel governance as not only do rebel groups have to partake in violent acts to become rebels and offer rebel governance but also with the end of the conflict, rebel governance ends. The reason why rebel governance ends is that even though the institutions of rebels continue their existence, rebel groups lose their insurgent status changing their governance from rebel to non-state actor governance.

[2]System of taxation refers to the taxation of civilians and civilian businesses.

[3]In earlier scholarship, Kasfir referred to rebel governance as "the range of possibilities for organization, authority, and responsiveness created between guerrillas and civilians" (Kasfir 2002, 4). This earlier definition highlights the importance of management of civilians for Kasfir.

Both, Weinstein and Kasfir, have created definitions that rely on restrictive assumptions. Huang provides a less restrictive definition of rebel governance, which she characterizes as "a political strategy of rebellion in which rebels use political organizations to forge and manage relations with civilians" (Huang 2016*b*, 51). Her definition specifically mentions that rebel governance can vary widely, in both quantity and quality as it can be "patchy or elaborate, highly functional or barely at all, and successful or less so" (Huang 2016*b*, 51f.). While this definition identifies rebel governance as a wartime strategy to manage civilians, it does not require rebels to have territorial control. Huang relaxed this assumption because "rebel governance can emerge very rapidly with only tenuous territorial control" by the rebel group (Huang 2016*b*, 52).

Albert (Forthcoming) examines the most common assumptions made in the definitions of rebel governance and shows that rebels provide governance even if they do not fulfill several of the aforementioned scope conditions. Most notably, she shows that rebel governance is not a wartime strategy, does not require territorial control, nor is its chief objective to manage civilians. She defines rebel governance, what she calls *rebel quasi-state institutions*, as institutions created by rebel groups that mimic state behavior. So, while a huge part of rebel governance can be the management of civilian populations, Albert's definition also encompasses rebel groups engaging in diplomacy (Huddleston 2019; Mampilly 2015) or symbolic acts (Coggins 2014, 2015). Many studies of rebel governance (and thus the definitions brought forth in these studies) are concerned only with a specific subset of services rebels provide to civilians (Arjona 2016; Heger and Jung 2017; Huang 2016*b*; Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018). However, governing encompasses more than public goods provision as it involves a larger set of institutional practices (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Risse 2011).

2.3.2 Definition of Rebel Governance

To develop my definition of rebel governance, I build on Risse's definition of governance since rebel governance is a specific subset of governance. Risse characterizes governance as "the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding

rules, or to provide goods" (Risse 2012, 700). So, governance is a form of control exerted by political state and non-state actors alike over social, economic, and political interactions within a constituent population (Kahler and Lake 2004). This definition focuses on the relevant processes of social control without diluting it by incorporating concerns of effectiveness or legitimacy.

Building on Risse, rebel governance can then be defined very broadly as "the set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war" (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015, 3). But rebel governance includes more than the regulation of non-combatant life as it incorporates actions rebels take to increase their sovereignty (Mampilly 2011, 2015).

In the spirit of Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015), Huang (2016*b*) and Risse (2011, 2012), I define rebel governance as the set of constraints devised by rebel groups to affect, regulate, and influence the social, political, and economic life of rebels' audience, e.g., local populations or foreign states, to increase the groups' access to material resources and non-material support. This conceptualization does not prescribe to a specific method of delivery of governance, meaning that rebels need not create explicitly civilian institutions. Additionally, rebel governance institutions can vary in the degree of their coerciveness and inclusiveness.[4]

Therefore, the definition rests on three pillars. First, rebel governance affects, regulates, and influences the life of civilians as well as rebel groups' international audiences. The latter group includes non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and foreign states. The definition is agnostic about the inclusiveness of the rebel governance, so both inclusive and exclusive governance is covered by this definition.[5]

The second pillar is about the location of the regulation: rebel groups can create institutions to regulate the life of their population and engage in efforts to influence international audiences both within its military wings and outside of it. Thus, rebel groups are not required to create civilian

[4]Furlan (2020) and Mampilly and Stewart (2021) provide excellent discussions of the dimensions along which rebel governance can differ.

[5]Inclusive governance is governance for all people regardless of their relationship to the providing rebel group. Exclusive governance is governance that requires civilians to have some sort of relationship with the providing rebel groups to have access to it.

institutions or engage in power-sharing with civilians in order to have their governance efforts be called rebel governance.

The third pillar describes when rebels can engage in rebel governance. In contrast to Kasfir (2015), rebel governance is not limited to wartime. It can occur before, during, and after a conflict. It ends when a rebel group no longer attempts to engage in efforts to regulate, affect, and influence social, political, and economic life. Basically, this pillar means that rebel governance is simply governance provided by rebel groups - regardless of the timing or the provision of this governance.

2.4 Competition in Civil War

Competition, the interaction between at least two actors to secure some good or resource in short supply (Begon, Townsend and Harper 2006), is the major factor affecting rebels' personal and organizational survival as well as their ability to achieve their goals. Civil wars are competitions by nature as conflict parties compete with one another to secure resources, land, or political power, among others. Rebel groups and the state government compete with one another, often militarily, for control of political authority and other types of control. At its most basic level, civil wars are the struggle by conflict parties to determine who gets to make binding decisions. It is the struggle for, lacking a better term, self-realization for each group.

The field of ecology identifies two mechanisms to explain how competition occurs. These mechanisms can be divided into direct and indirect mechanisms: interference and exploitative competition. Two actors are in interference competition if they interact directly with one another and they affect each other's ability to survive. This happens when, for example, rebels fight the state to take control of the government. Each incremental improvement in the position of the rebel group decreases the state's ability to survive, and vice versa. Exploitative competition occurs when actors consume a common, limited resource. As one actor consumes more of the resource, less is available for a second actor to consume (Begon, Townsend and Harper 2006). In civil wars, exploitative competition occurs as a type of resource competition as rebel groups compete for various resources such as recruits or financial resources, and the more one actor, let it be the state or a rebel

group, consumes, the less will be available for the other civil war actor. In civil wars, both of these mechanisms are at play at the same time with sometimes one of them being more prominent than the other.

In civil wars, actors such as rebel groups and states compete for control of a variety of resources with different competition-inducing mechanisms, depending on the resource at hand.[6] Major resources over which civil war actors can compete are political authority, territory, population, economic resources, and domestic as well as international legitimacy, among many others. Often, it is difficult to disentangle between the different types of resource competition as commonly the resources are present at the same time and location. So, populations live within an area that also holds economic resources such as valuable ores. When actors in a civil war try to capture this region, their goal may be to control the population, the economic resources, the territory itself, or a combination of these three. Often, the exact reason is unknown which is why this dissertation aggregates all the resources over which civil war actors can compete up to different types of control, rebel groups and government could be seeking. Therefore, competition is when civil war actors, rebel groups and the state, compete with one another for political, military, or territorial control. I will refer to these as the modes of competition.

Civil war actors compete for political control, i.e. control of the political realm in a defined territory. For example, rebel groups desire to overthrow and oust the current state government replacing it with another. Actors in a civil war are often in fierce military competition over specific sets of resources. Lastly, civil war parties can be in competition for territorial control. Rebel groups and the government will take and (attempt to) establish control in territories to strengthen their claim to be a legitimate representative of the people in this area. These different resource competitions are the result of the type of competition: the competition against other conflict parties.

[6]Therefore, at its most general level, civil war competition can be described as competition against other conflict parties over these resources.

2.4.1 Types of Competition

The type of competition that rebel groups experience is determined by their main opponent, either the incumbent state or other rebel organizations. When rebel groups mainly face the government of their state and only have limited interactions with other rebels, they are in rebel-state competition. Rebels rise up against the state because they are unable to strike a mutually beneficial agreement with the state that allows either side to avoid militarized conflict (Walter 2009). As such, rebels' competition with the state is often rooted in ideological differences and incompatible goals as rebels have secessionist or center-seeking goals involving the ousting of the current government from office. Either way, the state is unlikely to agree to these demands as it would alter the state significantly.

Rebels' main concern during the conflict is not regarding the type of government they enact at the conflict but rather ensuring the groups' organizational survival during the conflict. Rebels groups' organizational survival is critical as only by securing this do rebel groups have the opportunity to achieve their long-term goals. Due to this, rebel-state competition is primarily characterized by rebels' existential threat, specifically the military balance between the rebel group and the state, as rebels will take any possible action to increase their chances of survival. Only secondarily, once they have secured their survival in the short-term, are rebels concerned with their ability to achieve their long-term goals.

While the power balance between state and rebel organizations is an important indicator of rebels' existential threat, rebels have to take into account an additional factor: the state's capacity to learn information about the rebels and act upon it. On the one hand, rebels want the state to know about the group's existence and its strength as this allows the group to force the state to the negotiating table and extract valuable concessions if the rebel group is relatively strong (Walter 2009). On the other hand, rebel groups want to limit the amount and accuracy of information the state has about them as this allows rebel groups to overstate their capacity and goals, which in turn enables them to extract greater concessions (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009). Additionally, if the state has a lot of information about the rebel group, it could increase the effectiveness of the state's

counterinsurgency campaigns which in turn endanger the rebel groups' organizational survival. Thus, if the state has more information about rebel groups and a greater ability to act upon them, rebel groups' survival is threatened. Therefore, state capacity is the second part that characterizes rebel-state competition.

Civil wars with rebel-state competition are the most common examples of civil conflicts, such as the Rwandan Civil War in which the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) overthrew the government or the Nepalese Civil War during which the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) attempted to take control of the state. Yet, not all conflicts characterized by rebel-state competition are only two-party civil wars. A multi-party civil conflict, in which the rebel groups fight together against the government, in a loose or strictly formalized alliance, is still characterized by rebel-state competition.

The civil war environment, i.e., whether the state fights a single group or multiple groups, is one of the most defining aspects of civil wars as it influences rebel groups' actions. Often, multi-party civil wars see competition between rebel groups or inter-rebel competition. Ideally, rebel groups would like to fight only the government as this allows them to benefit from anti-government sentiment, tap into various sources of funding and support while allowing them to focus their military efforts. For example, by being the only opponent to the government, rebels can claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people, increasing their legitimacy, and thus helping with resource generation and giving them leverage (Terpstra and Frerks 2017) to force the government to the negotiation table. This is more complicated if multiple, non-allied rebel groups fight in a conflict resulting in multiple claims. Additionally, each additional rebel group decreases each group's bargaining power, leading to fewer concessions (Walter 2006), and decreasing rebels' ability to mount a successful challenge as they have to fight more opponents. To overcome this, and to maximize governmental concessions, rebel groups in inter-rebel competition will attempt to outbid one another militarily (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2015). These motivations for outbidding are the reason why, even though rebel groups may primarily challenge the government, they are considered to be in inter-rebel competition. An example of this would be the

LTTE which targeted other Tamil separatist groups to eradicate them and unite the Tamil separatist movement under the banner of the LTTE (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021).

Rebels can be in primary competition with the government or with other rebel groups. In many conflicts, rebels are in conflict with both, the government and other rebel groups, which themselves are in conflict with the government. Thus, it is important to understand what determines the relationship between inter-rebel and state competition.

While rebel groups are definitely in competition with another actor when they fight each other, rebel-state competition begins with the creation of the rebel group. The sheer existence of a challenger to the government's political authority puts the group in competition with the government. Once the actors fight one another, they certainly are in competition with one each other. While they compete primarily over political authority, they also compete over resources, people, territory, and international audiences, among other things, and they act and behave accordingly.

The origins of inter-rebel competition are less clear-cut than those of state competition as rebel groups can exist in a country without competing with each other over political authority or some other type of control. A good example of this is the relationship between the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) on the one side and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) on the other side. During the anti-Colonial war, all three of these groups fought against the Portuguese colonizers without competing with one another. However, once Angolan independence was achieved and the MPLA took over the central government, UNITA challenged this new government. Meanwhile, the FLEC also continued its struggle for its independence from Angola. In contrast to UNITA's fight for control of all of Angola, FLEC only operated in the province of Cabinda. Even though the two groups existed in the same country, neither group was competing with the other.[7]

Even when rebels fight other rebel groups, they may consider themselves to be primarily in

[7]This is with the exception of a few operations in 1990 when the MPLA government convinced UNITA to help them in their fight against FLEC. After the unstable alliance broke, FLEC only fought the government yet again (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1995).



Figure 2.1: Continuum of Rebel-State Competition, in Rebels' Relative Strength.

competition with the government. Other rebels may consider themselves to be primarily involved in inter-rebel competition. Thus, it is important to examine the relationship between inter-rebel and state competition. In their effort to mount a strong challenge of the government's political authority rebels have to ensure their own survival first. Rebels' size relative to other rebel groups' affects whether rebels consider themselves in competition with other rebels or just the government. Rebel organizations that are roughly as strong as other rebels will be more likely to consider other rebels their main opponent compared to a rebel group that is clearly the strongest group. In such a scenario, all these similarly sized rebel groups pose existential threats to the rebel group as every single one of them could potentially eliminate the group. Stronger rebels should be less worried about facing external threats from smaller rebel groups and would therefore be more likely to consider themselves to be mainly in competition with the government. Hence, whether rebels are mainly in competition with the government or other rebel groups is a product of the relative size of the rebel organizations.

Each civil war is characterized by a different type of competition. Only one rebel group may fight the government like the CPN-M in the Nepalese Civil war or many rebel groups may fight the government as well as each other like in the Syrian Civil War. The type of competition affects these civil wars and the behavior of the civil war actors. I conceptualize the competition types as distinct from each other. For each civil war, each rebel groups' competition can be measured on both, the rebel-state and rebel-competition continua. Figure 2.1 shows the continuum of rebel-state competition based on a rebel group's relative size and capacity, relative to the government. The figure shows that the stronger the state is relative to the government, the higher is the rebels' competition as they face a greater existential threat in the government. The continuum of the inter-rebel competition based on rebels' strength relative to other groups, shown in Figure 2.2, is similar to



Figure 2.2: Continuum of Inter-Rebel Competition, in Rebels' Relative Strength.

the continuum of rebel-state competition. The continuum reflects the number of rebel groups of the same size a given group faces. So, if a group faces only one rebel group of the same size, rebels are in intermediate competition. However, when rebel groups face many rebel groups of their own size, they are in high competition, also called a free-for-all.

2.4.2 The Primacy of Competition Type

The type of competition rebels face, whether their primary opponent is the state or other rebel groups, takes primacy over all other kinds of competition, such as the previously mentioned modes of competition over control of territory, military, or political affairs. While the modes of competition are important and affect rebel groups' behavior, these considerations are secondary to the type of competition. The type of competition, or "against whom you fight," determines the arenas in which rebel groups have to engage their opponent in. Thus, rebel type determines the modes of competition, or "what you fight over." The reasoning for specific aspects of competition and why these competition types take primacy over other aspects of competition is discussed in the following section.

The need for resources puts rebel organizations in competition with other parties to the civil conflict. This need can affect the institutions rebels establish as they attempt to acquire the necessary resources and alleviate their need. However, the type of competition against other actors in the civil war determines the resources rebels require to mount a successful campaign. In the absence of competition against other actors, rebel groups would not have a resource need and thus there is no competition over resources. Hence, competition against other actors takes primacy over competition over resources. However, this is not to say that competition over resources does not

have an effect on rebels' institutional choice of governance. This effect is mitigated by rebels' competition against other actors.

Similarly to the competition over resources, the competition for audiences, either civilians or international actors influences the rebels' competition with other actors. However, again rebels' competition against other actors is more important than the competition for the audiences. As civil war parties try to defeat each other militarily, they take over territory and control over civilians. In the international arena, rebels could compete over international audiences such as recognition or help from other states. However, even when rebels take territory their competition is not necessarily over this territory or the people that inhabit it. Rather, they take the territory due to its strategic value in their goal to defeat their opponent. The competition against other actors can explain why rebels fight over audiences, for example, to legitimize their struggle. In the absence of competition with other actors, there is no need to compete over audiences. Hence, competition against other actors takes primacy over competition over audiences. This does not mean that competition over audiences does not affect rebels' institutional choice. This influence is mitigated by rebels' competition against other actors.

Competition based on ideology or beliefs is different than competition over resources or audiences. Beliefs or ideologies are not necessary to win a conflict while resources and audiences often prove to be critical. It would make sense that rebels are in competition with other actors in the civil war due to different ideologies. However, for competition based on ideologies to impact rebels' actions, all actors with differing ideological beliefs have to be politically relevant. Without one group being strong enough to act on their beliefs, the other will see no need to engage that group and be in competition with it. Thus, ideology takes a backseat to *realpolitik* and the *competition against* takes primacy over *competition based on beliefs*.

3. AN INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF REBEL GOVERNANCE

This chapter introduces the institutional choice theory of rebel governance, which explains how rebels' competitive environment alters their incentive structure to create rebel governance institutions. The theory focuses on different types of competition and pressures which affect rebels' actions, including their institutional choices of rebel governance. The first section lays out key assumptions, defines the relevant actors, and specifies their interests. The next section discusses rebels' motivations to establish governance institutions. After laying out the institutional choice theory's key assumptions, I present the theory's logic. I illustrate the conditions under which competition increases rebels' investment in governance institutions (to achieve their intermediate goal). Given these expectations, I characterize the conditions under which competition encourages or deters rebels' governance creation in the first place before discussing the effects of competition on rebels' institutional choices. The next two sections, one for each type of competition, then lay out the institutional choice theory in detail.

To maintain the theory's parsimony and to isolate the effect of competition from other factors affecting rebels' governance decisions, I make a set of simplifying assumptions about various interesting characteristics of local-level civil war dynamics. I focus on the strategic interaction between rebel groups and their audiences, including civilians, and make assumptions about the state's role in shaping this interaction. The theory does not include the state as a strategic actor providing governance. Rather, it is assumed that the state establishes, or attempts to establish, governance institutions uniformly across its territory and the populace. I assume that civilians do not have any partisan preferences for any of the rebel groups or the state but rather are only interested in the governance they can access and their own survival. Rebels are assumed to lack an intrinsic interest in providing governance. Rather, it is assumed that they provide governance to ensure their own survival in their bid to achieve their long-term goals. I address the implications for the theory, as well as possible extensions for future research, in Chapter 6.

3.1 Actors: Rebel Groups and Civilians

A rebel group or rebel organization is a group of individuals that claim to be a collective organization that has a formal command structure and control, and "intends to seize political power using violence" (Staniland 2014, 5). Insurgent groups are referred to as rebels because they "violently oppose the existing state government and/or any other rebel group" (Kasfir 2015, 24). Rebel organizations often have centralized processes of decision-making and institution-building, as well as organized processes of recruitment and tactical combat (Staniland 2014). Rebel groups can employ "conventional military forces and irregular fighters who use guerrilla strategies" or terrorist tactics (Kasfir 2015, 24).

Rebel groups have two important potential audiences. First, there are international audiences of foreign states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. These actors are important to rebel groups as they can provide critical material and political support to the rebels' insurgency or the rebels' opponents. Foreign states or international organizations could also intervene in civil wars on either side or mediate settlement negotiations.

The other important audience for rebel groups are civilians. Civilians are individuals not belonging to any warring party (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 1977, Art. 50) and can be distinguished from rebels as the former do not "plan, lead, [or] participate in combat" (Kasfir 2015, 24). Even when they provide rebels with material or popular support, civilians do not relinquish their non-combatant role. Civilians become rebels when rebel groups incorporate them "into planning or carrying out military operations" (Kasfir 2015, 24). So, individuals are civilians unless they take up arms on either side of the conflict. Their support, material or popular, is not enough to transform individuals' status from civilian to combatant.

Civilians can be grouped into one of two important audiences for rebels: local and domestic. Local civilians are civilians that live under the control of and are subject to the rebel group's governance. Domestic civilians are those living in the same state as local civilians but they are not under the rebel group's control — they live under the control of the government or the control of another rebel group. Rebel groups want to gain legitimacy, support, and material resources from

local civilians while they also want to signal to domestic civilians in efforts to enhance their own legitimacy, decreasing other civil war parties' legitimacy, and potentially lead domestic civilians to support the rebel group instead of their local group. For example, rebel groups may lead domestic civilians to rebel against the actor controlling those civilians. Such a rebellion could then enhance the rebel group's chances of winning the civil war.

3.2 Additional Assumptions

The theory rests on several additional simplifying assumptions. First, civil wars are more than just armed conflicts. In the previous chapter, I conceptualized civil war as the struggle for different types of control. Since military theorist Carl von Clausewitz characterizes "war [as] politics by other means," civil wars need to be understood as political acts as much as they are military ones. Actors in civil wars struggle for control, political legitimacy and authority, and military victory equally. Building on that and Hannah Arendt's identification of "violence, being instrumental by nature, [is] rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it" (Arendt 1970, 70), I assume that rebel groups in civil wars decide on their strategy and actions, including the creation of governance institutions rationally and in relation to the larger political goals of the groups.

The second assumption is that the state enjoys a material advantage. In addition to this advantage, states also have preexisting governance institutions as they had more time to build these up. However, the state may not be able to project its might, such as counterinsurgent capabilities or governance structures, uniformly throughout the territory. The state's ability to project its might decreases as the distance from centers of state power increases (Boulding 1962). If the state is weak, it may also fail to establish or maintain structures of governance that are necessary to retain political authority, provide public safety, or deliver basic goods and services.

While the state might lack the ability to distribute governance uniformly throughout its territory, the theory assumes states' governance provision is not the result of strategic considerations. States lose domestic and international legitimacy, and thereby sovereignty, when they fail to dis-

tribute governance in an area as the absence of the state gives internal challenges the chance to rise (Fazal 2011). Therefore, strategically forgoing the governance provision in even one region can be costly for the state and the elites in office. If states, following their strategic denial of governance institutions, want to increase their presence in a region, these state-building or governance provision actions can increase the risk of intrastate conflict (Ying 2021) which also undermines states' claims to domestic and international legitimacy and sovereignty. Hence, the institutional choice theory of rebel governance assumes that states do not want to be strategic in their governance provision and that they want to defeat any challenger as quickly as possible.

The last assumption is that violence, and the mere presence of armed conflict parties, renders preexisting governance institutions unclear or irrelevant. This is regardless of whether the preexisting institutions were local or state-wide. This makes these institutions relatively easy to displace with rebels' governance. However, the strength and extent of the preexisting institution may vary quite substantially across different conflicts.

Legitimate and effective local institutions, regardless of whether they are state- or local-level institutions, can provide order and stability in the territory. This does not mean that strong preexisting institutions can withstand the pressures of civil wars. Quite the contrary, institutions, this includes strong, pre-conflict institutions, can experience disruption or collapse as they are vulnerable to the pressures of civil war. Obviously, weak institutions have a more limited ability to withstand those pressures than stronger institutions. Even if they can withstand those pressures, weak institutions may give birth to contentious claims of legitimacy, unclear political selection processes, and even ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms (Arjona 2016).

3.3 From Competition to Governance Institutions

Rebel groups have to decide between different actions by weighing how it affects the odds of their short-term survival and the ability to achieve their long-term goals as favoring one too much may endanger the other. This tension between these two objectives, securing short-term survival and maintaining or increasing the capabilities to achieve their long-term goals, is exacerbated by

rebels' limited resources which constrain the set of potential actions available to rebel groups. Thus, I argue that the generation or acquisition of additional resources is of critical importance for rebel groups as these resources would allow them to secure their short-term survival and work towards achieving their long-term goals. The factor impacting rebel groups' objectives and their actions is the type of competition they experience.

At their core, rebels' main motivator for any action is their desire to maximize their chances of accomplishing their long-term goals without unnecessarily endangering the groups' organizational survival. For this, rebel groups must meet needs to sustain their organization and be able to mount successful challenges against their opponents. These needs can cover a wide array of areas such as material resources, e.g., rebels need recruits, arms, and ammunition to fight enemy forces, and non-material support in the form of at least tacit support from civilians to escape counterinsurgency efforts and political support, from international actors who may intervene on the behalf of the rebels.

As resource constraints are frequently major obstacles to rebel groups' ability to sustain an effective insurgency (Berti 2020; Hazen 2013), successfully generating a sufficient amount of necessary resources increases rebel groups' likelihood of success. Rebels can extract material resources using costly coercion and threats against civilians (Keister and Slantchev 2014), but this can undermine the groups' ability to fight as "rebels cannot fight wars effectively while holding a gun to the head of every civilian" (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015, 3). Alternatively, rebels can establish governance institutions to extract material resources, gain non-material support, and generate legitimacy. Additionally, rebel governance may help rebel groups collect critical information from the local population, attract supporters and new recruits, while increasing rebels' control over the territory and its population. Furthermore, establishing governance institutions can increase rebels' legitimacy, thus making it easier for them to gain international support and be included in any settlement negotiations. These numerous positive effects of rebel governance make it easy to see why rebels, given the chance, would create governance institutions.

It is important to understand that preferences and values of key rebel audiences, for example,

the local population, matter, as rebel groups do not exist in complete isolation. Rebels' "operation necessarily take it beyond itself and involve interfacing with a political and social context" (Jo 2015, 17). Therefore, rebel groups need to take socio-political contexts into account when making the decision on how to generate the required resources and support. Achieving the desired outcome may require rebel groups to take undesired actions as those are preferred by key audiences.

While rebel groups have incentives to bring the civilian population on their side, rebel groups also know that civilian communities have incentives to limit their support. Violence in the community imposes high human and economic costs, as Kalyvas (2006) describes in detail. So, to avoid these high costs, civilians may choose not to enthusiastically support the rebellion: They are better off encouraging cooperative strategies to preserve their physical and economic security (Kaplan 2017). Civilians' use of these strategies means that rebel groups have to provide greater incentives to the entire community of civilians in order to identify and convince likely supporters to either join the rebellion outright or more actively support the rebel group's struggle.

Even though rebel groups have obvious incentives to engage in governance building, rebel groups are assumed to prioritize their personal and organizational survival, as well as their military and political objectives, over delivering benefits such as governance to constituent populations or other important audiences. So, even when rebels strongly favor the creation and maintenance of new governance systems, they may not establish such a governance system if it endangers the group's chances of survival.

Establishing governance institutions can be a costly endeavor. First, there is the cost associated with the creation and maintenance of the institution itself. For example, when creating a medical clinic, rebel groups have to devote time, money, and precious resources to set up and maintain the clinic. If rebel groups forgo establishing such a governance institution, they could use the resources to instead increase their fighting capabilities, for example, by investing in better military equipment. By providing governance institutions, rebel groups reduce the resources available to them to pursue military objectives, which can potentially endanger the group's survival - at the very least in the short term.

Second, rebels are faced with the potential cost of backlash. Rebel groups do not know with certainty how their audiences such as local civilians will react to rebel governance. Civilians may gladly accept the newly established rebel governance but they may also disapprove or outright reject it. Thereby, rebels' governance institutions could lower rebels' legitimacy (Terpstra and Frerks 2017) and lead civilians to reject it (Stewart 2021) with the possibility that civilians' negative reaction to rebels' governance endangers the rebel groups' survival (Arjona 2015; Opper 2018). However, before establishing governance institutions, rebels can figure out how civilians would react to their governance ideas by listening to community feedback. While rebel groups may actively solicit civilian feedback, often civilians will demand changes to rebel governance actively or passively, regardless of the rebel groups' solicitation (Kasfir 2005). The potential costs of providing governance institutions could appear to be even greater in the short term as some benefits of governance institutions, such as legitimacy, do not realize immediately. So, establishing and maintaining systems of governance can be costly to rebel groups and endanger the overall success.

Taking rebels' competitive environment into account, the cost of governance can outweigh its benefits, leading rebel groups experiencing a greater existential threat — due to greater competition — to refrain from establishing governance institutions. The reasons for this exacerbation are two-fold. First, due to the greater competition, rebel groups compete with each other and the state over resources, material and non-material ones, and the conflict puts a greater emphasis on rebels' military might. Due to this emphasis, rebel groups should value military capabilities higher than any investments in governance institutions as the opportunity costs of governance are too great. This makes rebels less likely to establish governance as they pool their resources to increase their military capabilities and ensure the groups' short-term survival militarily.

Second, the costs of potential backlash to rebels' governance increase when rebels experience greater competition. Due to the greater existential threat to rebel groups as a result of the greater competition, any backlash — to their governance or other aspects — could prove to be fatal. Rebel groups taking care of backlash to their actions such as establishing governance institutions can be taken advantage of by their competitors who capitalize on the group's distraction and its divided

forces. To avoid risking their existence as a result of mis-invested resources or civilian backlash, rebels will forgo providing governance as they experience greater levels of competition. This applies to inter-rebel and rebel-state competition equally.

Despite the potentially severe costs of establishing governance institutions, as it could spell doom for rebels' survival chances, some rebel organizations provide governance. This could be explained by rebels' desire to manage civilians (Huang 2016*b*; Loyle 2021; Weinstein 2007), state-building efforts (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018), or ideology (Revkin 2017), among others.

Rebels' propensity to create governance institutions is partially influenced by the rebels' own organization. Separatist rebels create a variety of governance institutions that make the rebel organization appear more state-like by for example issuing driver's licenses, holding elections, and even creating a national archive as did POLISARIO's Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Herz 2012). Such rebels are even more likely to act state-like by allowing everybody to benefit from their services. They are more than three-hundred times more likely to do so than other rebels (Stewart 2018). Ideological rebels with transformative goals are also more likely to establish governance structures, either by creating new governance or empowering traditional structures (Kalyvas 2015; Stewart 2021). While these factors appear to be independent of rebel-state or inter-rebel competition, it is not. Rather, as some goals such as separatism affect the competition rebels face: Rebels need to win their conflict domestically and internationally which forces them to be in fiercer competition.

Another factor that influences the creation of governance institutions is external support. When rebels have external support, they have access to greater resources which gives them the capacity to establish governance institutions. As they have more resources, these rebels can spend freely and establish complex, and costly, governance institutions, assuming they are motivated to do so. On the other hand, externally funded rebels may have little need to invest in governance institutions as they have no need for additional funding and can coerce the little that they need by force (Huang and Sullivan 2021). Hence, external support could decrease the likelihood that a rebel organization creates a governance institution.

All of these factors influence rebels' decision whether to establish governance institutions. Rebels may fight separatist, territorial conflicts or they may fight to control the central government. Their goals and specific conflict situations affect their desire to create and maintain governance institutions. Rebels with transformative ideologies use their governance institutions to establish administrations supportive of their ideologies (Stewart 2021). While many state that leftist rebels who fight for control of the central government are more likely to create governance institutions (Mampilly 2011), leftist rebels are good, and presumably, better records keepers than other types of rebels. Hence, it may only appear that leftist rebels create more, and more extensive governance institutions, as other rebel organizations' governance institutions establishment efforts are underreported. Additionally, there may be a reporting bias towards larger, stronger rebel groups that makes governance efforts by smaller, weaker rebel groups underreported (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021).

As with any choice in any realm of politics, rebels' governance provision is the product of two concepts: opportunity and willingness. In order to create specific governance institutions, rebels have to have the opportunity, or the "possibilities that are available within any environment," as well as the willingness, defined as "the selection of some behavior option from the range of choices" (Most and Starr 1989, 23), to do so. The theory put forth in this dissertation assumes that rebel groups establish governance institutions, despite the potentially devastating ramifications, because they expect to reap the benefits of those governance institutions. These rebel groups expect to be around long enough to reap the benefits with only minimal immediate repercussions to the group.

3.4 Institutional Choice of Rebel Governance

Rebel groups establish governance institutions because they expect to reap benefits from them. The decision of which governance institution rebel groups establish, like many other actions in civil wars, is made "by the balance of [expected] cost and benefits" (Morrow 1993, 208). The balance of governance's expected costs and benefits is, in turn, a result of rebels' competitive environment.

Hence, the institutional choices of rebel governance can be broadly categorized in choices made under rebel-state competition and those made experiencing inter-rebel competition. While rebel groups experience both types of competition, in most cases, one type of competition is likely to take precedence.

When rebel groups are in competition with the state, they will put a premium on outgoverning the state — or at least appearing like they are doing so. I argue that this focus is due to rebels' ability to generate the most resources, support, and legitimacy by being *the better administrator*. Outperforming the state on the administration of the country — or appearing as doing so — can undermine the state's claim to sovereignty, strengthen rebels' claim of being the legitimate or rightful representative of the state and its people, and can increase the resources the organization generates due to anti-state sentiment and the people's desire for change or foreign sponsors. In this type of competition, external support and political legitimacy can prove to be vital for rebels if the conflict has a long duration as either of these can be helpful even when the sides of the civil war negotiate a settlement.

In addition to the state, rebels can also be, and often are, in competition with other rebel groups. I argue that in this type of competition increasing their own resources and support is of great importance to rebel groups as only with these two in their pockets can they expect to outlast weaker rebels and have a chance of achieving their long-term goals. So, rebel organizations in inter-rebel competition want to improve their short term survival odds by employing governance institutions. Hence, rebel groups will focus on establishing governance institutions with more immediate benefits, be it material resources like money or immaterial support, and short amortization periods, while forgoing the creation of governance institutions with little to no benefits and long amortization periods.

3.5 From Rebel-State Competition To Rebel Governance

Armed opposition to the state is a defining feature of rebel groups. Naturally, rebel groups are thought of as military organizations first and anything else second. This is despite the fact

that about 65% of rebel groups establish a wide array of governance institutions. Some rebel groups establish healthcare (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021; Stewart 2018) and justice institutions (Loyle 2021) while others hold elections (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021) or engage in diplomacy (Huang 2016*a*; Huddleston 2019). Each of these governance institutions has different consequences, in the short- and the long-term, for both, the providing rebel group and the state as a whole. For example, rebel groups can create justice institutions in efforts to attract new recruits (Loyle 2021) which would increase their fighting capabilities. Justice institutions also allow rebel groups to manage their relationship with civilians (Loyle 2021). By relying on civilian populations for aid and support, rebel organizations increase the odds of the country's post-conflict democratization (Huang 2016*b*).

While many theories explain rebels' governance provision, for example, local-structural factors (Ahmad 2017), rebels' long-term (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018) and transformative goals (Stewart 2021), ideological concerns (Revkin 2017), or rebels' reliance on civilians (Huang 2016*b*), could all explain why rebel groups establish governance institutions, limited time has been spent to address the question of rebels' institutional choice: why do rebel groups make specific institutional choices? As rebels' governance has short- and long-term consequences, it is critical to understand the reasoning behind rebels' institutional choices to fully fathom the effects of rebel governance.

In line with the theory put forth in Chapter 3, this chapter argues that rebel groups' institutional choices are products of strategic considerations by rebel groups to increase their chances of survival and ability to achieve their goals. The strategic considerations are made based on cost-benefit analyses for each potential governance institution. As rebels' competition with the state increases and they need to increase their resources and legitimacy to ensure their survival, they are more likely to establish governance institutions that allow them to stylize themselves as a viable alternative to the state. However, rebel groups do not want to incur backlashes resulting from state-like governance as those can make the group vulnerable to military defeat by the state. Hence, rebel groups engage in isomorphic mimicry: they create governance institutions that make them look like they

provide state-like governance without taking on any state-like functions. Only rebel groups that face weaker states and thus are less threatened by potential backlashes establish governance that effectively rivals and replaces governance by the state.

Rebel groups rise up against the state to achieve socio-political changes that they were unable to achieve peacefully. In their armed struggle against the state, rebel groups can achieve their goal either through military victory or by reaching negotiated settlements. Only when they suffer military defeat do rebel groups fail to make even incremental improvements towards their goals. Thus, rebel groups want to avoid military defeat and end the armed conflict on favorable terms.[8] Only when rebel groups are militarily strong enough to win the conflict militarily or spoil any peace agreement from which they are excluded can they hope to achieve their goals. So, rebel groups want to be militarily strong enough to challenge the government and be a veto player whose exclusion from negotiations spoils any peace process.[9]

In order to increase their military capabilities rebel groups need to boost their resources as only with additional resources can rebels afford to purchase additional or better weaponry or recruit more fighters, all of which would raise rebels' military capabilities. Rebels can use two strategies to boost their resources in pursuit of their long-term goals, coercion, and governance. By using coercion, rebel groups can increase the extraction of financial resources and the mobilization of manpower. While single instances of coercion have limited downsides for the perpetrating rebel groups, repeated coercion can expose rebels to significant risks. Rebels' use of coercion, time and time again, can result in inefficient resource collection and even rebellion-threatening backlashes by the coerced population (Arjona 2016; Gawthorpe 2017; Opper 2018; Podder 2017). Instead of relying on coercion to generate compliance, rebel groups can establish and provide governance to generate consent compliance and to not only extract the material resources and manpower necessary to increase their military capabilities but to accrue non-material benefits such as the support

[8]The theory assumes that rebel groups prefer military victory and negotiated settlements over military defeat while they prefer victory over settlements.

[9]For any actor to be a veto player, they need to have separate preferences from other actors, have sufficient internal cohesion to overcome any collective action problems associated with the veto, and have the ability to continue the conflict if the other actors were to come to an agreement (Cunningham 2006).

of the local population (Arjona 2016; Huang 2016*b*; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra 2017; Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2020).

While governance provision allows rebels to reap more benefits than coercion, it also comes with its fair share of costs and risks. Most importantly, governance is an investment that requires rebel groups to pay establishment costs up-front. These costs may, or may not, amortize over time. Due to the cost associated with their establishment, rebels' investment in governance comes with an opportunity cost. Instead of sinking money in the establishment of governance institutions, rebel groups could invest in and increase their military capabilities directly — albeit this increase in military capabilities may be minimal or outright inconsequential in the grand scheme of things. The opportunity cost might make rebels' governance provision cost-prohibitive. Additionally, if rebels decide to establish governance institutions, they accept the risk of experiencing civilian backlash to their governance which might ultimately endanger the rebel organization's survival (Terpstra and Frerks 2017). This previously happened to the Chinese Soviet Republic which collapsed due to civilians' disdain towards the Chinese Communist Party and the governance provided by it (Opper 2018). So, even though establishing governance institutions clearly has great benefits for rebel groups, as they might be able to extract vital material and non-material resources, the opportunity costs associated with governance provisions as well as the potential for rebellion-endangering backlash may lead rebel groups to shy away from providing governance.

When considering all their options, rebel groups weigh how each of them affects their short-term survival odds against the change in ability to achieve their long-term goals as favoring one too much can endanger the other. The degree of their competition can sway rebel groups to favor one more than the other. Higher levels of competition imply a stronger, more dangerous government opposing the rebel group resulting in a greater existential threat to the rebel group. In such competition, rebels would focus more on their short-term survival than achieving long-term goals as they need to do the former to be able to achieve the latter. While rebel groups want to increase their resources to be able to improve their military might, more competitive environments and thus greater threats to the groups' existence may lead rebels to forgo governance creation as its benefits

are outweighed by its costs and too high opportunity costs.

The opportunity costs of establishing governance institutions will appear greater to rebel groups as their existential threats, such as a stronger state, is significant. Rebels in greater competition cannot afford the potential fall out from choosing the wrong investment as even relatively small backlash can endanger the group's organization survival. Furthermore, as they face a greater existential threat, rebel groups want to increase their survival odds in the most optimal manner. The best way to increase their survival odds may be for rebels to invest in military capabilities, which can directly translate into better survival odds as it reduces the chances of military annihilation of the rebel group, instead of creating governance institutions, which can increase rebels' resources and indirectly increase rebels' organizational survival odds. Because rebel groups have limited resources they need to decide how to invest their limited resources to increase their odds of survival — both personal and organizational. This means that rebel groups with greater potential existential threats, such as stronger states opposing them, prefer investing in military capabilities directly rather than providing governance.

Rebel groups operate as clandestine organizations as their secretive nature increases rebels' personal and organizational security and thus helps them achieve their long-term goals. Due to this, rebel groups want to avoid each and any kind of situation that would expose their operations to the state, such as the provision of governance institutions. The state can use the knowledge it gained from learning about rebels' governance institutions, their extent, and location, to make inferences about the rebel organization's strength, the location of the rebels' main bases of operations and supply routes, and maybe even about rebels' organizational structure. Having access to all of this information can make it easier for the state to defeat their rebel opponent militarily while also reducing rebels' bargaining power were the two sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Either way, a state's capacity to learn about people in its territory, will negatively affect the chances of rebels to achieve their long-term goal while also endangering their organizational survival. So, rebels should be less likely to engage in the provision of governance if there is a greater chance of detection by the state.

Therefore, even though rebel groups may have intrinsic motivations to engage in governance provision and establish governance institutions, they will refrain from this strategy due to its potential negative externalities. Rebel groups in greater rebel-state competition will focus their energy and resources on increasing their odds of surviving in the short term by investing their limited resources in efforts to increase their military capabilities. As rebels have fewer disposable resources, they are less likely to engage in governance provision. When these rebels need to generate additional material resources, they will use coercion due to its relatively lower up-front cost. The greater existential threat to rebels' organizational survival, in terms of greater rebel-state competition, means that the behavior of rebel group organizations will be heavily influenced by realpolitik concerns of short-term survival and thus, rebel groups in this type of competition are less to establish governance institutions.

Hypothesis 1: As rebel-state competition increases,
rebels are less likely to create governance institutions.

When rebel groups create governance institutions, they do so with the expectation of benefiting from the provided governance. These benefits can come in the form of material support such as financial resources, and non-material support by domestic and international actors. Additionally, the institution's costs and risks to rebels' odds of short-term survival should be minimal as to not outweigh the benefits — otherwise, rebels should not establish governance institutions. The costs, benefits, and potential for backlash differ between the various governance institutions. Rebel groups know this and make their institutional choices strategically based on which governance institution provides the maximum benefits while minimizing the costs and backlash potential.

Rebels can estimate the financial costs associated with the creation and operation of governance institutions as well as approximate the time it takes to establish an institution. By listening to community feedback, rebel groups can also approximate how much an institution would benefit them and how probable civilian backlash to a proposed institution would be. This civilian feedback may be actively solicited by the rebel group but more often civilians will demand changes, actively

or passively, to rebels' governance institutions (Kasfir 2005). Based on all this information, rebel groups have a good idea of how beneficial a governance institution would be to them and which institution would provide the maximum benefits while minimizing rebels' risk exposure.

Once rebel organizations have made the decision to establish governance institutions, they need to make concrete institutional choices. These are made based on rebels' need for material resources and non-material support and whether a particular institution is able to fulfill these needs quickly. For example, rebel groups have the option to establish rudimentary healthcare with minimal costs to the group when they send their own battlefield medics to civilian villages during times of reduced fighting. This helps rebel groups to maintain a healthy civilian workforce they can use to benefit from natural resources (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021). Furthermore, by providing this kind of social governance rebel groups can win the hearts and minds of civilian populations (Ahmad 1982; Kalyvas 2006; Stewart 2018) while also increasing their domestic and international legitimacy and support (Arjona 2014, 2016; Kasfir 2015; Johnston et al. 2016; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2007). Alternatively, rebel groups may hold elections for civilian offices and thus give local civilian populations a stake in the group's overall success. This reinforces the informal social contract between rebel-rulers and the ruled civilians while also allowing rebel groups to reap "legitimacy benefits that likely exceed what they could obtain from the offer of other public goods and services alone" as they enfranchise civilian populations (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021, 88). The benefits of enfranchising the local population can result in material resources and non-material support that bolster rebels' fighting capabilities (Stanton 2016; Fazal 2018) while also reducing the likelihood of civilian backlash to rebel rule. Due to these benefits, the aforementioned institutions help rebels to increase their chances of short-term survival — despite the fact that rebel-civilian relations can be characterized as part of long-term relationships in which the rebels govern civilians for an extended period of time.

Rebel groups have great incentives to engage in the provision of governance which increases their military fighting capabilities as doing so increases rebels' odds of organizational survival in the short-term while also increasing their odds at ending the conflict favorably through military

victory. Additionally, investing in more long-term governance institutions which could help rebel groups gain a seat at the negotiation table can be beneficial too. Especially if military victory is unlikely to be achieved, which may be due to a multitude of reasons ranging from biased military interventions by foreign states or inability to increase military capabilities through the acquisition of additional resources, rebel groups want to be able to affect the conflict outcome by being party to the settlement negotiations. While military might is important to be invited to settlement talks, so is the group's legitimacy as perceived by domestic and international audiences.

Rebels' existential threat and their likelihood to establish governance institutions are also affected by the state's capacity. Greater capacity makes it more likely that states learn about and can efficiently fight against rebel groups (Fjelde and De Soysa 2009). Thus, rebel groups face a greater existential threat when they fight more capable states. When rebel groups operate in such an environment, providing governance may threaten their organizational survival as the state may use it to learn more about the rebel group and gain insight into how to effectively defeat it.

Furthermore, highly capable states are likely to already provide numerous services and governance institutions, which limits the benefits rebels can reap from providing governance themselves. Rebel groups can only expect to reap benefits such as material resources and non-material support if they establish governance institutions that fill needs and are viable alternatives to the state's system. Since rebel groups establish governance institutions with the expectation of reaping benefits, their governance provision is highly selective, especially when operating in high-capacity states.

For example, during their insurgency against the — highly capable — Spanish state, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), did not establish any governance institutions. In their situation, establishing governance institutions had limited benefits, as the Spanish state provided ample governance services, and came with potentially dangerous costs. By providing governance institutions, the ETA would have diverted valuable resources from its military wing to non-military operations, and additionally, the group would have been left vulnerable as civilian backlash to governance or the state using the governance to learn more about the ETA's operation could have endangered the group's organizational survival. Hence, the ETA had little to gain and a lot to lose from providing

governance.

Rebels' competition with the state influences all their actions, including their governance provision. In their competition with the state, rebel groups will choose strategically to establish governance institutions that either rival the state's governance or take on functions typically reserved for state institutions (*state-rivaling* governance). Alternatively, rebel groups can establish governance institutions that only appear to take on state functions without actually fulfilling any of the state's functions. The former governance type rivals and replaces the state's governance, in look and function, while the latter governance type only looks the part and is thus *state-like*.

The potential costs and benefits associated with either governance type differ significantly between the various level of rebel-state competition and the differing levels of state capacity. For example, rebels in high levels of competition with a highly capable state, such as the ETA in Spain, should, if they were to decide to establish governance institutions, establish state-like governance. This way, the rebel group can reap the benefits of legitimacy and support for appearing to replace the state without the cost of actually having to replace the state and potentially endangering the entire organization.

In their struggle against the state, it is of primary importance for rebel groups to secure the — at least tacit — support of the local population, regardless of the degree of competition they experience. The support of the local population is critical as it allows rebel groups to avoid and outlast counterinsurgency efforts and thus increases the probability that rebels secure the groups' organizational survival in the short-term. Additionally, domestic support allows rebel groups to be treated as legitimate actors who warrant inclusion in negotiations to end the civil war through settlements. To generate critical support for their organization and the rebellion at large, rebel groups can establish governance institutions.

In states with weak or low capacity, which often struggle to fulfill many basic functions of the state, rebel groups can establish governance institutions that fulfill these functions in a bid for domestic and international legitimacy. The functionality of rebels' governance is not of great importance in low-capacity states as it takes little for rebel governance to outperform the state. This is

important as it minimizes the potential for civilian backlash to rebel governance as the alternative to rebel governance would be no or worse governance by the state.

Rebels in competition with more capable states want to provide governance that provides the group with many benefits while limiting negative externalities to organizational survival or long-term goals. To improve their position without alienating current and potential supporters by engaging in controversial governance, such as enacting new laws which could incite backlash and endanger the rebellion, rebel groups want to establish a specific type of governance institution. These rebels engage in isomorphic mimicry to establish governance institutions that look like they take on functions of the state without actually doing so.

By engaging in state-like governance, such as elections and constituency politics, rebel groups reap the benefits associated with providing governance such as legitimacy and support. However, this type of institution allows rebel groups to avoid negative externalities often associated with actual governance such as backlash to new laws or government structures. Elections are particularly useful for rebel groups as they are low-cost, provide large legitimacy benefits (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021), and reinforce the social contract between rebels and civilians. The reinforced social contract can further improve rebels' chances of survival as civilians may be more likely to share information with the rebels. This information can help the group to avoid counterinsurgency efforts and thus increase rebels' odds of survival. Additionally, the reinforced social contract, and the resulting legitimacy gains for rebels, may help the rebel group gain a seat at the negotiation table, were a settlement to be offered to civil war parties.

When rebel groups engage in constituency politics, they further strengthen the social contract with the civilian population while also showing domestic and international actors that they act on behalf of the people. This results in legitimacy benefits for the rebel group in both, the domestic and international political arenas. As legitimacy can be converted into material support and foreign intervention — especially in the existence of cross-border co-ethnics, engaging in constituency politics can be highly beneficial to rebel groups. The cost of constituency politics is limited as any domestic and international actor accepts that rebels' have limited resources and cannot afford

every desire of the local population. Furthermore, rebels can limit their constituency politics to their main constituency group, engaging in clientelistic politics to further their agenda under the auspices of constituency politics.

Its low costs and potentially large benefits make state-like rebel governance an attractive option for rebel groups. Since greater competition with the state increases rebels' need for material resources and non-material support to ensure their survival, rebels should become more likely to establish state-like governance as rebel-state competition increases.

Hypothesis 2: As rebel-state competition increases,
governance-providing rebels are more likely
to establish state-like governance institutions.

Using isomorphic mimicry to establish governance institutions that appear as if they take on state functions without actually doing so allows rebel groups to reap legitimacy benefits and generate support from domestic and international audiences. Yet, establishing rebel governance that takes on state functions can also be highly beneficial to rebel groups. By establishing governance institutions that rival the state's institutions in their functions, and de facto aim to replace the state, rebel groups open up an additional battlefield with the state. However, rebel groups are only able to reap the benefits of state-rivaling governance institutions if their governance can outperform the state. As rebels want to establish those kinds of governance institutions that are beneficial to them, the state's capacity is an important predictor of whether rebels provide this kind of governance. This is more likely in low-capacity states as they are, by definition, less likely to fulfill the functions of statehood. Due to this, rebel groups should be more likely to reap benefits from their state-rivaling governance as they outperform the state.

Rebel groups in competition with low-capacity states want to outperform the state on and off the battlefield. This includes providing governance institutions that take on traditional state-centric roles and increase rebels' resources and support. State-rivaling governance institutions allow rebel groups to undermine the states' claim to being the only sovereign and reinforce the social contract

between rebel groups and civilians. Additionally, these institutions serve as a beacon of the states' inability and the rebels' ability to perform as a (nation-)state. Foreign states and international organizations could react to these beacons by intervening in the conflict, either directly or indirectly, on the rebels' behalf, while domestically, civilians could flock to the rebel group in support.

Rebels in greater rebel-state competition with weaker states are more likely to establish state-rivaling governance institutions to still their increased demand for material resources and non-material support which itself is a result of greater rebel-state competition. For rebels to be able to benefit from their own state-rivaling governance, the state has to fail to perform fundamental functions of statehood. Therefore, rebel groups are more likely to establish state-rivaling governance institutions when the state is less of a state as it fails to deliver typical state functions, e.g., the state is less capable and weaker.

Hypothesis 3: As rebel-state competition increases, governance-providing rebels fighting weaker states are more likely to engage in state-rivaling governance.

Two state-rivaling governance institutions are particularly useful for rebel groups as they serve as *beacons of stateness* and provide potentially huge benefits to the rebel groups: civilian governments and diplomacy. These institutions are beacons of stateness as their functions are closely associated with the state. Simply by engaging in these kinds of governance do rebel groups undermine the state's sovereignty and its statehood while increasing the rebels' own legitimacy and reinforcing the social contract between the group and civilians. Additionally, diplomatic efforts might result in foreign intervention, either militarily or through mediation, on behalf of the rebels which might shift the conflict balance of power in the rebels' favor. Hence, these institutions allow rebel groups to reap critical benefits.

3.6 Inter-Rebel Competition Motivates Governance

Rebel groups establish a wide variety of governance institutions including healthcare and education (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021; Stewart 2018, 2021), diplomatic missions (Huang 2016*a*; Huddleston 2019), or justice institutions (Loyle 2021). Current scholarship suggests rebel groups' decision to provide governance is a product of local-structural factors (Ahmad 2017), long-term (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018) and transformative goals (Stewart 2021), ideological concerns (Revkin 2017), reliance on civilians (Huang 2016*b*), or rebels' ability to pursue the creation of new social orders in locations where state institutions are weak (Arjona 2016). Despite this multitude of explanations, current scholarship still lacks an explanation of rebels' institutional choices when they provide governance. Why do rebel groups provide governance and which form does it take? As rebels' institutional choices of rebel governance have various important short- and long-term implications, it is important to understand the rationale behind rebels' institutional choices.

The theory of this chapter argues that rebel groups' institutional choices of governance are the result of strategic considerations to increase the groups' chances of survival by generating material resources and non-material support. Rebel groups make these choices in response to their competitive environment as greater inter-rebel competition requires rebels to focus more on ensuring the groups' survival which means increasing their available resources. Thus, rebel groups will provide governance that benefits them immediately, e.g., by increasing the available manpower pool.

Ethnic rebel groups experience greater competition as they compete with existing and potential rebel groups (Fjelde and Nilsson 2018) for a relatively limited and identifiable community (Chandra 2006). Since this community is the primary, if not only source of resources and support for ethnic rebel groups, securing resources from this community is critical to ethnic rebel groups' survival. In times of greater competition with the state, ethnic rebel groups need to rely even more heavily on this community. Hence, ethnic rebels establish governance institutions that provide immediate benefits to the rebel groups with an even greater likelihood than non-ethnic rebel organizations.

In addition to the state, rebel groups often compete with other rebel groups as they try to

achieve long-term goals without endangering their organizational survival. Rebels decide between actions based on their effect on organizational survival and the ability to achieve rebels' long-term goals. If rebel groups favor one too much and thus take actions to ensure achieving one of these objectives, they might endanger achieving the other. Furthermore, this tension is exacerbated by rebels' limited resources. Due to resource constraints, rebel groups can only choose from a limited set of potential actions to achieve their two objectives. It is this resource constraint that makes the generation or acquisition of additional resources an important action critical to rebels' organizational short-term survival.

The competition of rebel groups can make resource generation more difficult while forcing rebel groups to favor actions that increase their chances of survival in the short run. Higher levels of competition imply more and stronger opponents, i.e., other rebel groups, entailing greater existential threats resulting in rebel groups favoring actions that increase their short-term survival, including resource generation. Resource generation becomes increasingly fierce, and thus even more important, as competition increases. This is due to several factors.

First, given that a country has finite amounts of resources, e.g., a manpower pool of a particular size from which rebel groups draw their recruits, higher levels of competition mean that finite resources are divided by a larger number of actors. This leads to fiercer competition over resources as each group tries to maximize their share, especially if the resource is necessary to ensure rebel groups' survival in the short term. Second, more competitive environments are associated with higher costs of operation for rebel groups as they have to do more to distinguish themselves from other rebels. Relatedly, more competitive environments are more costly for rebel groups as they have to engage with more opponents on multiple fronts: with political fighting happening in the shadow of military fighting, each additional rebel group forces rebels to compete on two additional fronts. For these reasons, rebel groups need to generate resources in attempts to ensure the groups' short-term survival as well as help them achieve their long-term goals.

This is exacerbated for ethnic rebel groups, whose access to resources is even more limited and they have to navigate *windows of opportunity* and *windows of vulnerability* (Pischedda 2020) with

rebels who claim the same ethnic constituencies, as well as the rising of potential rebel contenders. Structural barriers to entry of rebel contenders include incumbent rebel groups' ability to control resources (Fjelde and Nilsson 2018). This means that ethnic rebel groups have higher potential costs, as they compete over a smaller pie of resources and, in addition to currently existing rebel groups, also compete with potential contenders. Thus, ethnic rebels in particular have to maximize their resource generation to improve their odds of survival and achieving their long-term goals.

Rebel groups can employ two strategies to generate the resources necessary to continue their struggle in pursuit of their long-term goals, coercion, and governance. Coercion can be a useful tool to extract financial resources or manpower. Repeated coercion, however, can result in inefficiencies and even backlashes by the coerced population which could endanger rebels' survival (Arjona 2016; Gawthorpe 2017; Podder 2017). Governance, on the other hand, does not only allow for the extraction of financial resources and manpower but also enables rebel groups to accrue non-material benefits, e.g., support from local populations (Arjona 2016; Huang 2016*b*; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra 2017; Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018).

While providing governance allows rebel groups to extract material and non-material resources, it is not without costs and risks. Governance is an investment that requires rebels to pay up-front costs which may amortize over time. Instead of investing in governance, rebels could use their resources to strengthen their capabilities, e.g., their military capabilities which help them ensure their survival. The opportunity cost of establishing governance institutions might be prohibitively expensive for rebels to engage in governance. Another downside of governance creation is that by establishing new institutions, rebels might alter important existing institutions and norms. This could result in backlash by the civilian population and ultimately endanger the rebels' survival (Terpstra and Frerks 2017). Hence, even though providing governance can be beneficial to rebels as a means to extract vital material and non-material resources, the opportunity costs of establishing governance and the potential backlash to governance may lead rebels to refrain from governance provision.

Taking rebels' competitive environment into account, the costs of governance can outweigh its

benefits, leading rebel groups in higher levels of inter-rebel competition to refrain from providing governance. The reasons for this exacerbation are two-fold. First, as inter-rebel competition increases, rebel groups compete more with one another for resources and fight each other more often, the opportunity costs of establishing governance increase significantly. Due to the greater inter-rebel competition, which results in a greater emphasis on rebels' military might, rebels will value investments in their military capabilities higher than investments in governance institutions. This makes rebels less likely to establish governance as they pool their resources to increase their military capabilities and ensure the group's short-term survival militarily. Second, the costs of potential backlash to rebels' governance increase for rebels as the level of inter-rebel competition increases. Due to the greater existential threat to rebel groups as a result of inter-rebel competition, any backlash to their governance could prove to be fatal. When rebels deal with the governance backlash, their competitors might take advantage of their apparent weakness and defeat the group. To avoid risking their existence as a result of mis-invested resources or civilian backlash, rebels will forgo providing governance as inter-rebel competition increases.

The existential threat resulting from mis-invested resources or civilian backlash to governance is worse for ethnic rebels. Not only do they have to compete with existing rebel groups, which can defeat the group following mistakes but they also have to prevent the rise of rebel contenders. By mis-investing resources, rebel groups remove a structural barrier of entry for potential rebel contenders (Fjelde and Nilsson 2018). Hence, mis-invested resources do not only expose ethnic rebels to an existential threat, as they are weaker than they could have been had the resources been invested in another area such as the military fighting capabilities, but ethnic rebels also run the risk of allowing a potential future opponent to rise, which then increases the group's competition even further. Additionally, ethnic rebels may not need to establish governance to benefit from population-based resources as their proclaimed ethnic constituencies might support them simply due to the ethnic claim. Yet, the same ethnic claim might incentivize rebels to establish governance institutions to *take care* of their people. This incentive might not be enough for rebels to establish governance institutions as the potential downsides of rebel governance in the form of existential

threat, opportunity costs, and the rise of potential challengers outweigh their desire to take care of their constituency.

While rebel groups may be inclined to establish governance institutions due to several motivations, the potential negative externalities associated with governance provision should dissuade rebels from engaging in it. As rebels are in greater inter-rebel competition and focus increasingly on their own survival, e.g., by investing in their military capabilities, rebels have fewer disposable resources and are less likely to provide governance. The focus on realpolitik concerns of group short-term survival means that rebels, ethnic and otherwise, are less likely to establish governance institutions.

Hypothesis 4: As inter-rebel competition increases,
rebels become less likely to create governance institutions.

Rebel groups establish governance institutions with the expectation of reaping benefits in the form of material resources and non-material support while minimizing the costs and risks to rebels' chances of survival. Governance institutions differ in up-front costs, potential backlash, and ability to generate resources. These factors influence how quickly rebels will benefit from each institution. Governance-providing rebels make their institutional choices based on which institutions maximize the benefits while minimizing the costs of providing governance.

While governance institutions could be categorized into topical categories, *economic*, *political*, or *social*, categorizing governance institutions based on the immediacy of their benefits to the providing rebel group makes more sense. Governance institutions are either immediately beneficial or have the potential to be beneficial to the rebel group. *Immediately beneficial governance* (IBG) are institutions that result in the rebel group receiving material resources and non-material support shortly after the institution's inception, while *potentially beneficial governance* (PBG) takes time and continuous effort to result in benefits to the rebel group. How do rebels calculate the benefits of governance and whether an institution is immediately or only potentially beneficial?

Before establishing a governance institution, rebels can estimate the financial costs associated with its creation and operation and the time it takes to establish. Rebels can also figure out how an

institution would benefit the group by listening to community feedback. Rebel groups may actively solicit civilian feedback, but often civilians will demand changes to rebel governance actively or passively, regardless of rebels' solicitation (Kasfir 2005). Based on pre-establishment estimations of costs and benefits, and in combination with additional community feedback, rebel groups have a good idea if an institution can be considered immediately or potentially beneficial governance.

When confronted with concrete institutional choices, rebel groups will decide on particular institutions based on their own needs for material resources and non-material support and a given institution's ability to generate these resources and support quickly. For example, rebel groups can provide rudimentary healthcare with minimal costs, which helps them maintain the health and well-being of their civilian workforce (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021). Additionally, this kind of social governance can help the group to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population (Ahmad 1982; Kalyvas 2006; Stewart 2018) and increase their domestic and international legitimacy and support (Arjona 2014, 2016; Kasfir 2015; Johnston et al. 2016; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2007). Similarly, rebel groups might hold elections for civilian office to give civilians a stake in the group's success. By enfranchising the population, rebel groups can generate "legitimacy benefits that likely exceed what they could obtain from the offer of other public goods and services alone" (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021, 88). Thereby, elections reinforce the informal social contract between rebel-rulers and ruled civilians. The material resources and non-material support can bolster rebel groups fighting capacity (Stanton 2016; Fazal 2018). Hence, rebel elections can reduce the civilian backlash which helps increase the group's chances of short-term survival. Rebels can also engage in law enforcement to provide the valuable public good, *social order*, which reduces the need to use rebel military forces to repeatedly establish rebels' rule which could ultimately result in backlash. These three immediately beneficial governance institutions cover a wide array of topics with the first being a social institution, the second a political one, and the third is a socio-political institution. Regardless, all three provide valuable, immediate benefits to the rebel group.

Rebel groups can also establish institutions that may only pay off in the somewhat distant fu-

ture. Rebel groups could establish embassies abroad to generate international legitimacy and make their case in front of an international audience in the hopes of gaining external sponsorship and support (Huang 2016*a*). Although this external support may only arrive when levels of violence are high (Huddleston 2021). While it may make sense for rebels in protracted conflicts and wars of secession to establish governance institutions without immediate benefits to the group, inter-rebel competition forces rebels to focus on efforts that increase the groups' short-term survival odds. Rebels in greater inter-rebel competition should forgo the creation of embassies or diplomatic missions abroad. For example, while the POLISARIO Front engaged in diplomacy to advocate for the recognition of the independence of Western Sahara for years, nothing has come to fruition (Huddleston 2019). On the other hand, the rebel groups of Kurdistan and Somaliland have both engaged in diplomacy (Caryl 2015; Somaliland Sun 2018) and benefited from their international relations, militarily (McCleary 2017; Tomson 2017) and non-militarily (African Review 2019; Bryden 2004; Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 2012). It is important to recognize that it took significant time for these rebel groups to realize these benefits, which is why diplomacy is considered to be potentially beneficial.

Rebel groups could also engage in another type of political governance and organize the rebel group like a government. While establishing governmental institutions to regulate everyday life can be highly beneficial to the rebels' ultimate cause (Breslawski 2021), organizing the rebel group like a government combines two functions in one as rebel groups are often primarily a military. While this type of organization can help rebels administrate territory and people under their control more effectively, it divides their attention and creates inefficiencies within the group. Overcoming these inefficiencies takes time, so this is considered to be only potentially beneficial governance.

Another potentially beneficial governance institution rebel groups could engage in is law-making. In contrast to law enforcement, which is a socio-political process, law-making is a purely political process. By creating laws, rebel groups can mold local populations and institute societal change, though this can take some time to materialize. Additionally, law-making can result in negative backlashes that could endanger the rebels' short-term survival. Due to these factors, this

governance action is categorized as only potentially beneficial, while law enforcement is considered immediately beneficial as it provides a public good in *societal order*.[10]

Rebel groups favor IBG at the expense of PBG for a couple of reasons. First, the investment cost of governance institutions involves opportunity costs as rebels could have invested in their military capabilities instead. Thus, by creating governance institutions, rebel groups expose themselves to potential military defeat and the resulting uncertainty as they try to amortize their investment. This danger of defeat is higher at greater levels of competition. To reduce the danger and limit opportunity costs, rebels favor governance institutions that provide immediate benefits associated. Second, the greater existential threat of higher inter-rebel competition reduces rebels' ability to spend their resources relatively freely. Rebels have less *room for error* in their governance and military strategies as they need to know quickly how much benefit they can draw from a particular governance institution. As this is easier to gauge with IBG than PBG, rebels in higher levels of inter-rebel competition should favor the former.

Hypothesis 5a: As inter-rebel competition increases,
governance-creating rebels become increasingly more likely
to create immediately beneficial governance.

Ethnic rebel groups, who need the support of their ethnic constituencies to maximize the benefits of their limited and concentrated support base, and prevent the rise of rebel contenders, have even greater incentives to establish immediately beneficial governance institutions. As these rebels receive the majority of their support from a limited part of the population, they have to maximize the amount of resources they are extracting fast. Hence, ethnic rebels tap into all of these potential markets by establishing immediately beneficial governance, especially if the group experiences greater inter-rebel competition.

Hypothesis 5b: As inter-rebel competition increases,
governance-creating ethnic rebels become increasingly more

[10] A discussion of the inter-relation of law enforcement and law-making can be found below.

likely to create immediately beneficial governance.

3.6.1 Law vs. Policing: Rebels' Institutional Choices

Law-making and law enforcement, or policing, are two intertwined and closely related concepts. Without law, there is no enforcement of *nonexistent* law. Similarly, without law enforcement, laws are meaningless as their abidance cannot be controlled and potentially forced. Law-making is a political process and law enforcement is a socio-political process that is necessary to keep societies safe and controlled.

By creating and enforcing laws, rebel groups can mold the local population and institute societal change. The creation of new laws by itself does not provide any tangible benefits to rebel groups in the immediate term, however. In the worst-case scenario, law-making results in negative backlash endangering rebels' existence (Opper 2018). As law-making rebel groups will draw utility mostly from the societal change they instituted and less from the legislative process itself, law-making is characterized as potentially beneficial governance. This societal change takes time to be fully implemented. Thus, it takes time for rebel groups to benefit from law-making and it falls into the category of potentially beneficial governance as it can provide benefits to the rebel groups after some time. By enforcing laws using police, rebel groups provide a valuable public good, order, to local populations, and reduce the need to use their military forces to repeatedly establish their own rule as they control the population through other means. As rebel groups can focus the use of their military forces on fighting their opponents rather than squashing internal rebellions and repeatedly reestablishing their own control, rebel groups gain an immediate benefit from policing. Hence, law enforcement is considered to be immediately beneficial governance.

Law-making is the practice of establishing laws, law enforcement or policing is the practice of enforcing laws and establishing order. The previous paragraph discussed these governance institutions as separate, albeit related. Assuming rebel groups only police their civilian populations and do not establish any laws, this leads to the question of how do rebels enforce laws in the absence of law-making? Or, in other words, can you have one without the other? Rebels engage in law-

making when they enact or implement laws. These laws need not be written by the rebel group but could be, for example, religious law. Rebels engage in policing, or law enforcement, when they police intra-civilian relations, i.e., relations of people not associated with the rebel movement. In this sense, policing does not require explicit laws that are enforced but rather a police force that provides societal order. Rebels' law enforcement can occur at an *ad hoc* basis without underlying law but rather enforcing commonly understood societal rules, such as the prohibition of theft. With this interpretation of law enforcement and law-making, it is possible to have the former without the latter.

3.7 Rebels' Governance Choices under Competition

Up to this point, the theory treated rebel-state and inter-rebel competition as two separate phenomena in efforts to simplify the theory-building aspects. In real life, rebels groups do not face only one type of competition but rather face both types of competition simultaneously. However, the urgency and prevalence of one competition type might overshadow another. So, while rebel groups might fight primarily against the state government, situations might arise thrusting them into competing against other rebel groups. For example, in Sri Lanka, the LTTE sought to eliminate other Tamil rebel groups even though its main goal was to challenge and compete with the state of Sri Lanka for sovereignty over the Tamil lands in the country (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021).

More often than not, rebel groups will experience two types of competition: rebel-state and inter-rebel competition simultaneously. As each type and degree of competition is associated with specific and governance expectations, which potentially oppose and cancel one another, rebels' institutional choices might differ from the expectations outlined above.

Regardless of competition type, a greater degree of competition is associated with the expectation of a lower likelihood of rebel governance. The downsides to rebel governance, in form of the potential elimination of the rebel group, outweigh the benefits rebel groups can reap from governance provision. However, when rebel groups decide to establish governance institutions, their

institutional choices are a product of the degree of both types of competition.

There are four possible competition combinations as shown in Table 3.1. When the degree of one type of competition is high while the degree of the other competition type is low, rebels' institutional choice is motivated by the competition type with a higher level. For example, if rebels experience high inter-rebel competition but low rebel-state competition, they focus on establishing immediately beneficial governance. Were the same rebels to experience low inter-rebel competition but high rebel-state competition, they establish state-like governance.

This is not to say that rebels will completely forgo any other kind of governance institution. In the latter of the two cases mentioned above, rebel groups might also establish potentially beneficial governance. Yet, the overlap often narrows down the institutional choices of rebel governance even further. For example, while greater inter-rebel competition is associated with rebels' choice of immediately beneficial governance, if rebels are also in great competition with the state, rebels' institutional choice of governance will be immediately beneficial and state-like. In such a situation, rebels might decide to hold their own elections or, if the state lacks capacity, establish a justice system including courts.

When rebels experience low competition in both competition types, their institutional choices are significantly more wide-open. In such a situation, the rebel groups face a low existential threat from both the state and other rebel groups. Subsequently, when they decide to establish governance institutions, they can afford to establish potentially beneficial governance and state-rivaling governance. Immediately beneficial governance, as well as state-like governance institutions, also remain options. It depends on the preferences of the rebel group.

In Table 3.1, the type of governance institution that takes precedence over all other types for each of the four competition scenarios is italicized. In the top-left corner, when both rebel-state and inter-rebel competition are low, rebel groups are expected to create either of the four types of governance institutions. As neither one of the four types takes precedence, neither is italicized and all are deemed to be equally likely. In contrast, in the bottom right corner, which shows the case of both high rebel-state and high inter-rebel competition, rebel groups are expected to create

immediately beneficial and state-like governance such as elections.

		Rebel-State Competition	
Inter-Rebel Competition		Low	High
	Low	IBG, PBG, State-Like, State-Rivaling	*State-like*, PBG (Weak State: State-rivaling ex. Justice, Courts)
	High	*IBG*, State-like, State-Rivaling (ex. Healthcare)	*IBG, State-like* (ex. Elections)

Table 3.1: Governance Expectations under Both Competition Types

3.8 Alternative Explanations

While a variety of theories can be used to explain rebels' creation of governance institutions, significantly fewer can be used to explain the institutional choices of governance rebel groups make. This section briefly discusses two alternative explanations for both, institutional creation and institutional choices by rebel groups.

3.8.1 Local Conditions-based Explanation

Non-state actor governance, which includes the subset of rebel governance, can arise due to structural local conditions (Ahmad 2017). When rebel groups enter an area they are faced with the question of whether to establish governance institutions, rule through martial law or leave the population alone and not engage in any governance. As they enter different areas, rebels might be able to capture existing institutions of one type, for example, healthcare, but fail to capture any law enforcement institutions, which alters the upstart costs for rebel governance as the former, maintenance governance, will be cheaper than the creation of new institutions in the latter case. Therefore, rebels' governance creation, as well as the institutional choices might be a product of pre-existing institutions and thus local conditions.

Alternatively, rebel groups might choose to maintain some pre-existing institutions while in-

novating and creating their own governance institutions in some areas. For example, the LTTE maintained existing public goods and services institutions while it innovated and created its own security and justice institutions (Furlan 2020). However, many pre-existing institutions are rendered meaningless in the conflict and specifically after a new fighting force, for example, the rebel group, takes over.

Governance might also be a natural outcome of self-organization: in the absence of state governance, rebel groups self-organize and try to mount a successful challenge of the status quo. In the process, they create institutions, not with a grand goal such as isomorphic mimicry of the state in mind, but to address a need in the organization of the rebellion and the administration of the population. Then, institutional creation is a product of a governance vacuum while institutional choices are the product of local needs by the group and the local population. In this explanation rebel groups need to take a laissez-faire approach with civilians and are most likely only concerned with militarily challenging the state and other rebel groups.

The explanations of Arjona (2016), who argues that rebel groups may provide governance as a result of having excess resources which cannot be invested into better possibilities such as securing the group's survival, and Huang and Sullivan (2021) who hypothesize that external funding allows rebel groups to provide extensive governance institutions which they otherwise could not afford, are in line with the aforementioned explanations. This is, with the small exception of rebel groups' role as facilitators of governance. Building on Arjona (2016) and Huang and Sullivan (2021), rebel groups would then need to be willing to spend their excess resources on governance but would not engage in any strategic choices of governance institutions.

3.8.2 Constituency-based Explanation

Another set of explanations would be the roles of rebels' constituencies play in rebel governance. Rebel groups have social ties to some social bases while they lack ties with other communities. These ties or lack thereof might motivate rebel groups to either take care of their constituencies or win the hearts and minds of communities (Ahmad 1982; Kalyvas 2006; Stewart 2018) with

which they currently lack social ties. Rebel groups that claim to fight on behalf of any subset of the population such as an ethnic group, should be more likely to create governance as this increases the legitimacy of the rebel group's claim to fight on behalf of that subset of the population. Additionally, when rebel groups feel a duty to their constituency they may make particular institutional choices. Breslawski (2021) argues that rebel groups that claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic constituency are more likely to create political governance institutions. While the degree of inclusiveness of these institutions varies depending on the constituency's social cohesion, the decision to create institutions is mainly based on whether rebels claim a constituency group.

Rebel groups claiming specific constituencies might be more likely to establish governance institutions to show that they can be an effective alternative to the state. The institutional choices of such groups would focus on mimicry of common and important state institutions. In such situations, rebels' governance may be less discriminatory to show rebels' superiority over the state and other rebel groups. Stewart (2018) argues that separatist rebels, which are a particular subgroup of rebels with constituencies, are more likely to create inclusive health care and educational institutions. For these kinds of groups, the main motivation to create rebel governance is to project state-like behavior towards the international community of states in an effort to generate acceptance and increase the chances of their break-away state being recognized (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018). Regardless of the specific mechanism, constituency-based explanations argue that rebel groups create governance institutions to strengthen their claim of them fighting on behalf of the constituency groups.

3.8.3 Discussion of Alternative Explanations

While explanations based on local conditions and constituencies can explain why rebel groups provide governance institutions, they do not provide implications into the set of institutional choices rebel groups should make. While constituency-based explanations should lead to more inclusive institutions and local conditions-based explanations state that local conditions such as pre-existing local conditions shall affect institutional choices, neither type of explanation leads to particular

institutional choices.

4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter of the dissertation tests the institutional choice theory of rebel governance using quantitative methods. The next section introduces the data used, including how the competition measures are constructed and presents summary statistics. Then, I discuss the empirical strategy used in the test. Following this, the next section presents the findings before briefly delving into a brief discussion of potential issues, including endogeneity. Lastly, I discuss the findings and what they mean for the theory.

4.1 Data

The data on rebel groups' governance provision is taken from the Rebel Quasi-State Institution Dataset (RQSI), which compiles annual information on twenty-five different governance institutions created by rebel groups between 1945 and 2012 (Albert Forthcoming). This annual data is provided every year of a rebel group's existence and is not limited to the times when the rebel group was engaged in armed conflict. The key advantage of the RQSI over other datasets on rebel governance such as the Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Social Services Dataset (Heger and Jung 2017) or the Social Service Provision Dataset (Stewart 2018) is that the RQSI strikes a great balance between temporal coverage and the number of governance institutions included. Furthermore, it is carefully hand-coded and provides a high variation in the governance provision. One caveat of the RQSI is that the rebel groups within the RQSI are identified in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). Hence, the RQSI only provides data on rebel governance institutions if the rebel groups were active during a civil war which resulted in at least 1,000 battle deaths while the rebel group has been responsible for at least 25 battle deaths.

Based on governance institution data in the RQSI Dataset, I create the *institutional creation* variable which is coded 1 if a rebel group created at least one of twenty governance institutions in a given year, and 0 otherwise. For example, if a rebel group established a civilian government in

the year 2000, the institutional creation variable for that year is coded as 1. If the group does not have a government in 2001 and does not create any other kind of institution, institutional creation is coded as zero.

The institutions that are the basis for this variable were chosen as they are governance institutions that each and any rebel group could potentially establish. So governance actions that could not be taken by all rebel groups are excluded from the institutional creation variable. For example, for rebels to negotiate a resource deal, they have to have access to natural resources or be able to acquire access through military victory. Yet, not all rebel groups have this option and therefore could not negotiate resource deals. Therefore, negotiating a resource deal is not a governance variable included in the creation of the institutional creation variable. For a full list of the institutions included in and excluded from the institutional creation variable, see Table 4.1. This variable is used to examine the effect of competition on rebels' desire to establish governance institutions in general.

4.1.1 Categorizing Governance Institutions

For the hypotheses concerned with concrete institutional choices, the dependent variables are taken directly from the RQSI. I categorize the institutions into either state-like or state-rivaling governance as well as into immediately or potentially beneficial governance. Each of the individual institutional choice variables are coded as 1 if rebels engaged in them in any given year and 0 otherwise.

The big difference between the former types of governance is that state-like governance only emulates the state institution's looks while state-rivaling governance takes over state functions and effectively replaces state institutions. Elections and constituency politics are categorized as state-like institutions since they make rebel groups appear as if they were taking on typical state functions. However, as those are not bound to produce particular outcomes, rebel groups can let them be toothless paper tigers that do not produce anything of note. So, they are categorized as state-like without actually taking on state functions to which civilians might object in the form of

Included Variables	**Excluded Variables**
Civ. Government	Attempt to Join IO
Government-like Org.	Join IO
Border Security	Is Political Party
Constitution	Negotiate Resource Deal
Elections	Economic Treaty
Diplomacy	Armed Forces external to group
ID Cards	
Media Outlets	
Currency	
Taxation	
Healthcare	
Education	
Welfare	
Public Housing	
Infrastructure	
Public Transport	
Justice System	
Law-Making	
Law Enforcement	
Constituency Politics	

Table 4.1: Variables Included, Excluded from *Inst. Creation* Variable.

protests.

By creating state-rivaling institutions such as governments, justice systems, or by engaging in diplomacy and law-making, rebel groups take on functions that are typically considered the primary areas of the state. Thereby, rebels effectively replace the state as the sovereign by being a claimant to sovereignty themselves. The categorizations of all governance institutions into state-like or state-rivaling institutions can be found in Table 4.2.

State-like Governance	**State-replacing Governance**
Elections	Government
Constituency Politics	Diplomacy
	Law-making
	Org. Like Government
	Justice System
	Constitution
	Taxation

Table 4.2: Categorization of State-like, State-Replacing Governance.

In addition to the categorization in either state-like or state-replacing, governance institutions can also be categorized in how immediate they return benefits to the creating rebel group. Immediately beneficial governance allows rebel groups to reap benefits shortly after the creation of an institution of this type. Within roughly the first three months of the creation of a governance institution, the institutions allow rebel groups to receive material benefits or legitimacy and support. Regardless of which type of benefit rebel groups receive they can use it to increase the odds of their short-term survival. For example, if rebels engage in taxation resulting in material benefits, they can use this benefit to increase their fighting capacity by purchasing more advanced weaponry. On the other hand, if rebels hold elections, they receive legitimacy benefits as they enfranchise the population (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021). Then, rebel groups could use these legitimacy benefits to hold recruitment drives and increase the odds of survival by increasing their military

might.

On the other hand, engaging in diplomacy or media, are actions that are considered to be potentially beneficial as those are more long-term investments. While media or diplomacy can increase rebels' fighting capacity and thus boost their odds of survival, they require significant intermediate steps and time. For example, using media allows rebel groups to motivate and mobilize potential recruits. However, the people the rebel groups will reach, and who have yet to join the rebellion, are unlikely joiners or require significant convincing. Neither of those is likely to happen in a short period of time. Similarly, while diplomacy can result in third-party interventions or external support and thus shift the conflict's power-balance in the rebels' favor, rebels need to hope that their diplomatic pleas fall on sympathetic ears. Otherwise, their governance is for naught. Due to this, these governance institutions are considered to be potentially beneficial. Table 4.3 shows in which group each governance institution is categorized. A brief description as to why each institution is categorized in that group follows below.

Immediately Beneficial Governance	**Potentially Beneficial Governance**
Elections	Government
ID Cards	Org. Like Government
Taxation	Border Security
Education	Constitution
Healthcare	Diplomacy
Welfare	Media
Law Enforcement	Currency
Public Transport	Law-Making
Public Housing	
Justice System	
Constituency Politics	

Table 4.3: Categorization of Immediately, Potentially Beneficial Governance.

Elections allow rebel groups to reap legitimacy and material benefits as well as support for enfranchising the population (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021). Many of these benefits are

immediate or realized shortly after the election. ID cards make it easier for rebel groups to maintain public order and reduce the likelihood of *agent provocateurs* leading uprisings behind the front lines. Thus, they reduce rebels' existential threat and are immediately beneficial to the group by giving it security.

Taxation enables rebel groups to collect valuable financial resources that they can invest in their military strength or additional governance institutions. These benefits realize immediately.

By providing education, rebel groups work towards winning the hearts and minds of the population. However, as education is a continuous process, which takes a long time to bear fruit beyond increasing the rebels' standing it has a longer amortization period than other immediately beneficial governance. It could be described as borderline between immediately and potentially beneficial governance. Rebel groups can establish healthcare institutions to win hearts and minds, generate legitimacy, and make civilians less opposed to paying taxes or accepting other aspects of the rebel group. Healthcare can be provided in small increments and can be interrupted without larger downsides. Additionally, by providing healthcare rebel groups maintain a healthy pool of workers and potential recruits.

Welfare, public transportation, and public housing all enable rebel groups to win the hearts and minds of the people, resulting in legitimacy and support benefits that can be converted into material benefits such as financial resources and manpower through taxation. While these benefits are not directly realized, they are immediately available to the rebel group. In this sense, these governance institutions are similar to when rebel groups engage in constituency politics.

The creation of law enforcement and a justice system help rebels maintain social order, which reduces uprisings against the rebel groups thus increasing their security. Furthermore, it allows the rebel group to generate legitimacy and support as they appear to be interested in creating a safe environment for civilians who can show their gratitude through sharing information or providing material benefits to the rebel group.

Creating a separate government or organizing themselves like governments do not provide immediate benefits to rebel groups. Rather, these are signals to the state's governments, foreign

states, and the civilian population that the rebel groups could administer the country if they were victorious. In the long run, rebel groups can benefit from these institutions to reap benefits but in the short-run little, if any benefits will come from administering the country as this just puts an additional strain on the already scarce resources of the rebel group.

Relatedly, creating a constitution, engaging in diplomacy, establishing media outlets, creating their own currency or laws are all prestige projects that may result in benefits in the long run. A constitution and currencies make rebel groups appear more like a state but those are mere symbols — unless the constitution is adhered to by the rebel group itself. Similarly, creating law is important for rebel groups as they shape society. However, law-making requires law enforcement. By itself, making a law is prestige project too. All of these can result in legitimacy benefits resulting in foreign states intervening on their behalf or the rebel group generating increasing domestic support. Yet, neither of them creates immediate benefits, tangible or intangible.

Lastly, if rebels establish border security, they may reduce the influx of potentially hostile people. Yet, as any border is considered to be porous, effective border security requires law enforcement. Without it, border security is a similar prestige project with limited upside and thus only potentially beneficial to the rebel group.

4.1.2 Competition Variables

In this section, I briefly discuss the creation of the two competition variables. Each of these variables is measuring a rebel group's military power relative to their competitions' military power. I adapt the idea behind the Laakso-Taagepera index, originally used to measure firm market share (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), and Smith's version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Smith 2000) to create a measure of how strong the competition is relative to the rebel group, which is expressed in units of the rebel group's own strength. So, if the rebel group and their competition, let it be the state here, possess similar military strength, the competition is measured as *1*. This indicates that the rebel group's competition is equivalent to one-times the strength of the rebel group.

This intuitive measure which records rebel group i's rebel-state competition as the size of the

state's military fighting capabilities in terms of rebel group's *i* own strength is created by the following steps. First, the share p_s of the state's *s* fighting capabilities relative to total fighting capabilities is squared. This is then divided by the squared proportion p_i of fighting capabilities of rebel group *i* to return the *real rebel-state competition* (RRSC) of group *i*. This measure is time-invariant.

$$RRSC_i = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_s^2}{p_i^2} \tag{4.1}$$

In the next step, the RRSC is transformed into the rebel-state competition (RSC) index, bounding it between 0 and 1, by dividing each group's RRSC by the maximum of all RRSCs. Theoretically, a 0 on the RSC would indicate that a rebel group does not experience any competition with the state, while a 1 indicates total competition in which any mistake by the rebel group risks annihilation of the group at the hands of the government. While the RSC is theoretically bound between 0 and 1, the de facto bounds are 0.04 and 1. In 1996, in the year they took control of about 60% of the country and became the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban experienced limited rebel-state competition with an RSC score of 0.11. In 2012, the year after the US troop surge ended, the Taliban were in total competition with the Afghan government and its allies as the group's RSC was 1.

The variable for inter-rebel competition is created similarly. First, I sum up the squared proportions *p* of all rebels' *j* fighting capabilities relative to the total rebel movement,[11] and divide by rebel group *i*'s squared proportion *p*. This creates an intuitive measure that records rebel group *i*'s inter-rebel competition as the strength of all rebel groups *j* relative to rebel group's *i* own strength. In a situation in which two groups are at parity, each group has an inter-rebel competition score of 1 as they fight one *real* rebel group. I call this the *real rebel competition* (RRC) of group *i*. In a situation where rebel group *i* has fifty percent of the rebel movement's strength and fights three rebel groups, two accounting for twenty percent of the rebel movement's strength, and one account for the remaining, rebel group *i* fights 0.36 rebel groups of its own strength. This is even though the rebel group competes with three rebel groups that account for the same proportion of strength

[11] *Rebel movement* refers to the entirety of all rebel groups existing in a country in a given year.

in the rebel movement as does rebel group *i* alone. Substantively, the RRC reports how many rebel groups group *i* competes against by reporting it in terms of *units of rebel group i* or *real rebel groups*. As the number of rebel groups fluctuates every given year, the RRC is time-variant.

$$RRC_i = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_j^2}{p_i^2} \tag{4.2}$$

Then, I create the inter-rebel competition (IRC) index for each rebel group, and bound between 0 and 1, by dividing each group's RRC by the maximum of all RRCs. 0 indicates the absence of any competitors, while 1 indicates a free-for-all in which there is a multitude of competing rebel groups. Standardizing inter-rebel competition in form of the IRC index allows for inter-group and between-conflict environment comparisons. For example, in their founding year of 1994, the Taliban had an IRC index of 0.841 indicating high inter-rebel competition. Following the US troop surge in 2012, the Taliban experienced low inter-rebel competition as their IRC index was only 0.227.

The data used to create both, the RSC and the IRC indices, is the *rebel strength* variable from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013), which records a rebel group's military strength relative to the government. The *rebel strength* variable is mainly a "composite indicator" that measures rebels' ability to mobilize support, procure weaponry, and their ability to fight (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013, 526). As it measures rebels' military fighting capacity, the Non-State Actor Data's *rebel strength* variable mirrors rebels' existential threat as lower strength increases the existential threat of rebels' organizational and individual survival.

4.1.3 Other Variables

The theory calls for two additional explanatory variables. One is state capacity and the other is ethnic claim. The *state capacity* variable measures a "state's ability to perform the core functions most commonly deemed necessary for modern states"(Hanson and Sigman 2021, 1497) including

protection from internal threats (Tilly 1992), maintenance of internal order as well as the administration and provision of basic infrastructure (Mann 1984) and the extraction of revenue (Levi 1989; North 1981; Tilly 1992). The variable used in the analysis is the latent state capacity variable from Hanson and Sigman (2021), which offers annual variation for all countries between 1960 and 2015.

The other explanatory variable is *ethnic claim*, which measures whether rebel groups have claimed ethnic groups as their constituencies. When a rebel group claims an ethnic constituency, *ethnic claim* is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. As this data is from the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), it is recorded at the group-level. When one of these aforementioned variables is not included as an explanatory variable, it is included as a control variable.

I control for several additional factors that have been linked to either rebels' creation of governance institutions or competition between rebel groups and governments. The long-term goals of rebel groups may affect their propensity to create governance institutions while also affecting their competition with the government and other rebel groups. Rebels who prescribe to communist ideology, such as Communism, Socialism, or Marxism among others, may be more likely to engage in governance institution-building as Mao (2000) and Guevara (1998) argue it is a necessary condition for successful, leftist rebellion. Thus, I include a *Communist Ideology* variable that is coded 1 if a rebel group partakes voices their adherence to communist ideology, and 0 otherwise. Equally, rebels prescribing to religious ideology may also be in greater competition with other rebel groups due to their desire to create religious governments. Therefore, I include *Religious Ideology* that is coded as 1 if a rebel group has a politico-religious ideology and 0 otherwise. These data are from the Non-State Actor (NSA) and the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2019).

While rebel groups can and do exist in times of peace, armed conflict is the utmost extreme version of competition as political actors attempt to achieve their goal, basically winning their competition, by engaging in military acts. Thus, I also control for armed conflict. I use the *armed conflict* variable from the RQSI data, which indicates whether a rebel group was engaged in armed

conflict in a given year. It is coded 1 if the group was in armed conflict and 0 otherwise.

Territorial control may facilitate the creation and provision of governance such as rudimentary medical facilities (McColl 1969; Olson 1993), although territorial control is not necessary nor sufficient to provide governance institutions (Jackson 2018). Therefore, I included a measure of whether a rebel group-controlled territory in a given year. The variable *Territorial Control* is coded 1 if the group-controlled territory in a given year, and 0 otherwise. External sponsorship may also affect rebel groups' likelihood to create governance institutions as the inflow of material resources and non-material support can reduce the necessity to generate these resources from local populations. On the other hand, the sponsor may condition their material and non-material support on rebel groups' provision of governance. Therefore, I include the variable *External Support*, which is coded as 1 if a rebel group received military or non-military aid from outside sources, and 0 otherwise. These two variables are drawn from the Non-state Actor Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013).

Rebels' governance strategy may be altered if they have access to natural resources as rebels that can profit from natural resources are less likely to engage civilians in a positive way (Weinstein 2007). However, rebel groups that profit from natural resources are more likely to provide health care to civilians, while forgoing the provision of education (Conrad, Reyes and Stewart 2021). Regardless of the exact direction, natural resources affect rebels' governance strategies. I created a dummy variable whether natural resources were present in the conflict zone, based on data from Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009).

Rebels that have their bases in remote areas where they and civilians are out of the government's or other potential rival's reach could also be more likely to provide governance. By effectively replacing the state's governance, rebels in these environments can attract non-material support and realize material resources. Hence, I control for the inaccessibility of terrain, operationalized as the logged percentage of a country's mountainous terrain (Lujala 2010).

If the population is highly fractionalized along ethno-linguistic lines, providing governance may be less beneficial to rebels due to higher costs associated with serving more diverse popula-

tions. Therefore, I control for a country's ethno-linguistic fractionalization to measure the diversity of the country. I operationalize the *ethno-linguistic fractionalization* using data that was originally collected for the Soviet Ethnographic Atlas but was extended and made available by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Lastly, I also include an indicator variable for the Cold War as external funding such as sponsorship by foreign powers was significantly more likely during the Cold War and rebels may not have a need to create any kind of governance institutions. The variable *Cold War* is coded 1 if the year is 1991 or earlier, and 0 otherwise.

4.2 Summary Statistics

The created dataset consists of 235 rebel groups with a total of 4,566 rebel group-years. 168 of the recorded rebel groups created rebel governance institutions for a total of 2,894 rebel group-years. Table 4.4 provides summary statistics of rebels' governance provision and the mean of inter-rebel competition. It shows that the vast majority of rebel groups, almost 71%, establish governance institutions over their lifetime. Interestingly, the mean inter-rebel competition of governance-establishing rebel groups is slightly lower than the mean inter-rebel competition of rebel groups that do not establish any governance institutions. This provides support for the assertion of Hypothesis 4, although it does not say anything about rebels' institutional choices.

	Governance	No Governance	Total
No. Rebel Groups	168	67	235
No. Rebel-Years	2,894	1,692	4,586
Rebel-State Comp. (mean)	0.559	0.640	0.169
Inter-Rebel Comp. (mean)	0.091	0.122	0.103

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Full Dataset (1945-2012).

Due to the imperfect overlap of state capacity and rebel governance data, the data is restricted to 231 rebel groups with a total of 4,251 rebel group-years between 1960 and 2012. Only 149 of

these rebel groups establish governance institutions and they do so for a total of 2,703 years. Table 4.5 provides summary statistics of rebel groups' governance provision, the mean of rebel-state military competition, and state capacity. It shows that the vast majority of rebel groups establish governance institutions in their tenure. Interestingly, the table also shows a correlation between levels of rebel-state competition and governance provision. However, this relationship is in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Furthermore, Table 4.5 indicates that rebel groups that provide no governance compete with lower capacity states than rebel groups that establish governance institutions. Again, this apparent correlation is contrary to expectations.

	Governance	No Governance	Total
No. Rebel Groups	149	82	231
No. Rebel-Years	2,703	1,548	4,251
Rebel-State Comp. (mean)	0.566	0.652	0.597
Inter-Rebel Comp. (mean)	0.094	0.129	0.107
State Capacity (mean)	-0.161	-0.347	-0.319

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Analyzed Dataset (1960-2012).

4.3 Results

The results for the test of Hypothesis 1 are reported in Figure 4.1a.[12] As the predicted probability of institutional creation declines sharply as the *RSC Index* increases, Figure 4.1a shows that rebel groups are less likely to establish governance institutions as rebel-state competition increases. According to the same figure, the probability that rebel groups establish governance institutions decreases by about 30% when the competitive environment goes from a non-competitive environment, as evident by an RSC score of 0, to a free-for-all total competition environment, an RSC score of 1. So, this provides support for hypothesis 1 and shows that even when rebel groups have a desire to establish governance institutions, such as secessionist (Stewart 2018) or transformative goals (Stewart 2021), they would forgo governance provision in response to greater competition.

[12]The results of these and all following models are also reported in Regression Tables in Appendix A.

Figure 4.1b plots the predicted probabilities of rebel groups engaging in governance provision based on the state's capacity. The figure shows that the negative relationship between rebel-state competition and rebels' governance provision is driven by rebel groups competing with strong states. While these rebel groups are the most likely to establish governance institutions at low levels of rebel-state competition, as the risk of existential threats resulting from governance provision is minimal, the likelihood that those rebels provide governance declines dramatically as competition with the state becomes more fierce. Interestingly, the probability of rebel groups in low-capacity states establishing governance institutions is virtually unchanged across all levels of rebel-state competition. In short, the analyses reported in Figure 4.1 find support for the assertions of Hypothesis 1 that greater rebel-state competition reduces the probability of rebels' governance provision. It also provides implicit support for the assumption that rebel groups in weaker states have less to fear from those states, in contrast to rebel groups competing with stronger states.



(a) Rebels' Governance Creation (b) Governance Creation by State Capacity

Figure 4.1: Rebels' Governance Creation, Rebel-State Competition.

The main question of the dissertation and this chapter, in particular, is how do rebel-state competition and the state's capacity shape rebels' institutional choices of governance? The theory predicts that rebels in greater rebel-state competition provide state-like governance institutions such as holding elections and engaging in constituency politics. Figure 4.2 reports the predicted proba-

bilities for these governance institutions for all rebel groups that establish governance institutions. Both, Figures 4.2a and 4.2b show a strong positive correlation between rebel-state competition and the respective institutional choice, which supports Hypothesis 2. However, the way these relationships come to be is very different from one another. Rebel elections, as shown in Figure 4.2a, have an almost linear, positive relationship with rebel-state competition. So, as rebel groups experience greater competition and thus face greater existential threats, they become more likely to enfranchise local populations, reinforce the existing rebel-civilian social contract, and generate legitimacy and support benefits. Meanwhile, the relationship between rebel-state competition and rebels' use of constituency politics could best be described as exponentially increasing, shown in Figure 4.2b. At lower levels of rebel-state competition, there is only an incremental increase in rebels' use of constituency politics. Yet, at higher levels of competition, rebel groups engage in constituency politics exponentially more often.

These different styles of trends in Figure 4.2 can be explained due to the different behavior of rebel groups depending on the opposing state's capacity. As rebel-state competition increases, rebels in lower and medium capacity states are increasingly more likely to use elections as shown in Figure 4.3a. Rebel groups in high capacity states do become slightly less likely to use this type of governance, although the difference is statistically and substantively insignificant.

On the other hand, state capacity has strong and significant effects on rebels' use of constituency politics. Figure 4.3b shows that as rebel-state competition increases, rebel groups in different states react very differently from one another. Rebel groups in weak states become drastically less likely to engage in constituency politics as rebel-state competition increases. Meanwhile, rebel groups in medium- and high-capacity become slightly more likely to use this kind of governance. Therefore, one might describe elections as governance of all rebels which is predominantly used by rebels in weaker states while constituency politics tends to occur in weak states and in highly competitive, medium-to-high capacity states. The results of Figures 4.2 and 4.3 indicate strong support for Hypothesis 2 that as rebel-state competition increases rebels become more likely to establish state-like governance institutions.



(a) Rebel Elections



(b) Rebel Constituency Politics

Figure 4.2: Institutional Choices: State-like Governance.



(a) Rebel Elections



(b) Rebel Constituency Politics

Figure 4.3: Institutional Choices: State-like Governance by State Capacity.

Furthermore, the theory predicts that higher levels of rebel-state competition in less capable states increase rebels' establishment of state-rivaling governance institutions. The implicitly stated inverse of this prediction is that as rebels compete in medium-to-high capacity states, they become less likely to engage in state-rivaling institutions. Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probability plots of state-rivaling institutions, highlighting that as rebel-state competition increases, rebel groups become less likely to establish state-rivaling governance institutions. However, rebel groups in lower capacity states respond differently to greater rebel-state competition than those rebel groups in higher capacity states as shown in Figure 4.5.

With the exception of Rebel Constitutions (Figure 4.5f), it is rebels in weaker states that drive the push for state-rivaling institutions (compare Figures 4.5a, 4.5b, 4.5g). In particular, Figure 4.5b shows that, as rebel groups experience greater levels of rebel-state competition, rebel groups in lower capacity states become more likely to engage in diplomacy. Meanwhile, rebel groups in medium-to-high capacity states become less likely to engage in diplomacy. In this case, it is easy to describe diplomacy as the 'weapon of the weak' but it might be more accurate to call it rebels' *weapon against the weak (state)*.

Due to their opponent state's weaker capacity, rebels in lower capacity states have it easier to stylize themselves as viable alternatives to the current state and reap benefits from this kind of governance. As rebel-state competition increases, these rebels have more to gain from engaging the international community due to the greater existential threat they face in the state. On the other side, rebels in medium- and high-capacity states become less likely to engage in diplomacy as their benefits from engaging in state-rivaling governance is unlikely to bear similar fruits and take away valuable resources from militarily engaging the state in efforts to ensure the group's organizational survival. The findings presented in Figure 4.5 support Hypothesis 3.

A similar, yet even more pronounced pattern holds for rebels' likelihood to establish their own government. Figure 4.5a shows that as rebel-state competition increases, so does the propensity of rebel groups in lower-capacity states to establish their own government. Meanwhile, the likelihood of rebel groups in medium- and high-capacity states to establish their own civilian government decreases, albeit the decrease is comparatively small for rebels in medium-capacity states. Rebel groups in lower capacity states can reap great benefits, which are important to ensure the group's organizational survival, by fulfilling essential functions of a modern state — functions which the state fails to fulfill. These benefits can range include legitimacy benefits, material benefits, and non-material support benefits. Rebel groups in stronger states do not want to establish their own government as the more capable state makes divesting from their military costly. The results of this test find support for the assertion made in Hypothesis 3: rebels in weaker states become more likely to establish state-rivaling governance institutions as rebel-state competition increases.



(a) Rebel Government



(b) Rebel Diplomacy



(c) Rebel Law-Making



(d) Rebels Org. Like Government



(e) Rebel Justice System



(f) Rebel Constitution



(g) Rebel Taxation

Figure 4.4: Institutional Choices: State-Rivaling Governance.

Yet, as previously discussed, rebel-state competition is not the only type of competition which rebel groups experience. Inter-rebel competition can also motivate governance creation and institutional choices of governance. However, as Figure 4.6a shows, as inter-rebel competition increases, the likelihood that rebels establish governance institutions decreases sharply.[13] Thus, it shows that rebel groups are less likely to establish governance institutions as inter-rebel competition increases. These findings support the assertions of Hypothesis 4.

When examining the drivers of institutional creation under inter-rebel competition, as presented in Figure 4.6b, it becomes apparent that there is no significant difference between ethnic and non-

[13]The results of these and all following models are also reported in Regression Tables in Appendix A.



(a) Rebel Government



(b) Rebel Diplomacy



(c) Rebel Law-Making



(d) Rebels Org. Like Government



(e) Rebel Justice System



(f) Rebel Constitution



(g) Rebel Taxation

Figure 4.5: Institutional Choices: State-Rivaling Governance by State Capacity.

ethnic rebel groups in their creation of governance institutions. In short, both of these findings presented in Figure 4.6 find support for the assertions of Hypothesis 4: greater inter-rebel competition reduces the probability of rebel groups engaging in governance provisions of any kind.

It is noteworthy that, while increasing inter-rebel competition from no competition (IRC = 0) to a total free-for-all (IRC = 1), reduces the probability that rebel groups establish governance institutions by 60%, rebels at low levels of inter-rebel competition are pretty likely to establish governance institutions.

However, the main outcome of interest is not whether rebel groups engage in governance building but how competition, in terms of the IRC index and claims of ethnic constituencies, shapes



(a) Rebels' Governance Creation. (b) Governance Creation by Ethnic Claims.

Figure 4.6: Rebels' Governance Creation, Inter-Rebel Competition.

rebels' institutional choices. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 report the results of tests for immediately beneficial and potentially beneficial rebel governance, respectively. In line with the expectation hypothesized in Hypothesis 5a, as inter-rebel competition increases rebels become more likely to establish governance with immediate benefits for the rebel group. While Figure 4.7 is the direct test for Hypothesis 5a, an additional test can be performed by examining potentially beneficial governance. By examining Figure 4.8 the negative association of potentially beneficial governance and inter-rebel competition is plain to see. Thus, there is strong support for the assertions of Hypothesis 5a.

Figures 4.9 and 4.10 report the results for the tests of Hypothesis 5b. The results show strong support for the assertions of the hypothesis that ethnic rebels' propensity to establish immediately beneficial governance institutions increases strongly, and more strongly than non-ethnic groups' propensity, as inter-rebel competition increases. Interestingly, as Figure 4.10b shows, non-ethnic rebel groups have a higher propensity to engage in diplomatic efforts at lower levels of inter-rebel competition. However, their probability of creating this governance institution drops starkly as inter-rebel competition increases. Meanwhile, the probability of rebels claiming ethnic constituencies engaging in diplomatic relations reduces more gradually as inter-rebel competition increases. Thus, these tests lend additional support to Hypotheses 5a and 5b.

(a) Healthcare. (b) Education. (c) Welfare.

(d) Transportation. (e) Housing. (f) Elections.

(g) ID Cards. (h) Taxation. (i) Law Enforcement.

Figure 4.7: Institutional Choices: Immediately Beneficial Governance, Inter-Rebel Competition.

4.3.1 Law vs. Policing: Rebels' Institutional Choices

Figure 4.11 show the predicted probability plots of rebels' decision to engage in law-making and law enforcement as a result of inter-rebel competition.[14] These two governance institutions are closely related to one another and thus are the perfect test of whether rebels engage in one type of governance over another by making conscious decisions as those motivated by their competitive environment.

The findings reported in Figure 4.12b show that ethnic rebel groups, who are in greater competition than non-ethnic rebel groups, are increasingly likely to establish immediately beneficial

[14]The results of this analysis can be found in more detail in Appendix A.



(a) Rebel Constituency Politics. (b) Rebel Diplomacy. (c) Rebel Government (d) Rebel Law-Making.

(e) Rebel Org. Gov. (f) Rebel Justice (g) Rebel Border Patrol. (h) Rebel Constitution.

(i) Rebel Media. (j) Rebel Currency. (k) Rebel Infrastructure.

Figure 4.8: Institutional Choices: Potentially Beneficial Governance, Inter-Rebel Competition.

governance of law enforcement as they experience greater inter-rebel competition. Figures 4.11a and 4.12a shows that rebels in greater inter-rebel competition do not engage in law-making, a potentially beneficial governance institution. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 5b but fail to find any for Hypothesis 5a.

Concluding, due to the immediate benefits associated with policing, rebel groups are more likely to engage in law enforcement when they are in greater inter-rebel competition and claim ethnic constituencies (Fig. 4.12b). On the other hand, rebel groups refrain from engaging in law-making as its benefits are not immediate and may even have negative externalities regardless of whether rebels claimed ethnic constituencies (Fig. 4.12a).

This discussion shows that rebel groups make a conscious choice when providing governance by deciding on institutions that provide immediate benefits to the group. Inter-rebel competition



(a) Healthcare. (b) Education. (c) Welfare.



(d) Transportation. (e) Housing. (f) Elections.



(g) ID Cards. (h) Taxation. (i) Law Enforcement.

Figure 4.9: Institutional Choices: Immediately Beneficial Governance by Ethnic Claims.

increases the need for rebel groups to generate resources and support almost immediately. Rebels try to fulfill this need by establishing particular rebel governance institutions.

4.4 Addressing Endogeneity Issues

In the analysis, the potential endogeneity issues have yet to be addressed. In this section, I address potential endogeneity concerns through a variety of tests. I acknowledge that the methods I use are imperfect, yet they are the best possible option and in combination, they hopefully address any endogeneity concerns.

The potential endogeneity issue is that whatever motivates rebels' creation of governance in-



(a) Rebel Constituency Politics.



(b) Rebel Diplomacy.



(c) Rebel Government



(d) Rebel Law-Making.



(e) Rebel Org. Gov.



(f) Rebel Justice



(g) Rebel Border Patrol.



(h) Rebel Constitution.



(i) Rebel Media.



(j) Rebel Currency.



(k) Rebel Infrastructure.

Figure 4.10: Institutional Choices: Potentially Beneficial Governance by Ethnic Claims.

stitutions might also be what makes them enter the conflict and be in competition with the state and other actors. Rebel-state and inter-rebel competition can arise due to a number of factors such as ethnic claims, ideological differences, or the state's lack of capacity to enforce domestic peace. Ethnic claims by rebel groups put them squarely in competition with other rebel groups who claim other ethnic groups as their constituency and the state. The latter is particularly important as ethnic rebel groups implicitly state that the current regime lacks sovereignty as it apparently does not take care of all its citizens. Ideological differences put rebels at odds with one another as well as with the state. When rebel groups and the state have differences in ideology, they want to create outcomes the other side does not like which forces them to fight one another to find a solution. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. "between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds, I see no remedy except force" (Holmes Jr. 1953). Lastly, when the state is unable



(a) Law Enforcement (IBG). (b) Law-Making (PBG).

Figure 4.11: Institutional Choices: Law-making and Law Enforcement.

to deter or coopt potential challengers, indicating a lack of state capacity, rebel groups should enter the competition, with one another and the state. Thereby, a lack of state capacity would increase rebel-state and inter-rebel competition.

To address the potential issue of endogeneity, I first analyze what affects rebels' competition. Figure 4.13 shows that only ideologies affect both types of competition.The analysis of institutional creation in Table 4.1 shows that ideological considerations do not affect rebel groups' governance creation directly. As rebels' communist and religious ideologies affects rebels' likelihood to establish governance institutions only through competition, communist and religious ideologies can be used to instrument for competition in efforts to overcome the potential endogeneity issues.

It is important to note that instrumenting for competition with rebels' communist and religious ideology is a crude measure as rebel groups may declare to adhere to one type of ideology but could switch if it is beneficial to the group. Particularly, it is "the pressure of competition [which] forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically (...) to maximize their chances of survival and success" (Tokdemir et al. 2021, 729). Regardless, rebel groups' communist and religious ideologies are the best instrumental variables available to ease endogeneity concerns.

Table 4.6 shows the results for institutional creation using the instrumental variable approach. Its results show that neither the rebel-state nor the inter-rebel competition variable are statistically



(a) Law Enforcement (IBG). (b) Law-Making (PBG).

Figure 4.12: Institutional Choices: Law-making and Law Enforcement by Ethnic Claims.

significantly associated with rebels' institutional creation. However, the most extreme type of competition, being engaged in *armed conflict*, is positively and statistically significantly related to institutional creation. As previously pointed out, the instrumental variable approach as designed here is rather crude and unlikely to be able to help fully overcome potential endogeneity issues.

For parsimony's sake, the results of the instrumental variable approach are only presented for institutional creation. The results of the instrumental variable approach for the concrete institutional choices can be found in Appendix C.

An additional test for the presence of potential endogeneity issues is performing a survival analysis on the group-level characteristics that Figure 4.13 shows affect at least one type of competition. The working assumption for the survival analysis is that, if these group-level characteristics affect rebels' competition and the likelihood to establish governance institutions, thereby inducing a problem of endogeneity, the survival estimates should be remarkably different between rebel groups with and without those characteristics. Specifically, rebels with these characteristics should be more likely to establish governance institutions and thereby drop out faster in the survival analysis.

The survival analysis tests four characteristics that could be related to competition: ethnic constituency claims, communist and religious ideology, and whether rebels are in armed conflict. The

	Inst. Creation	Inst. Creation
RSC Index	0.475	
	(0.519)	
IRC Index		-0.527
		(1.561)
State Capacity	-0.042	0.015
	(0.088)	(0.065)
Ethnic Claims	0.085	-0.006
	(0.118)	(0.119)
Territorial Control	0.028	0.146
	(0.142)	(0.150)
Armed Conflict	0.232***	0.194***
	(0.056)	(0.061)
Ethnic Frac.	0.035	0.109
	(0.148)	(0.202)
Mountainous Terrain (log)	-0.011	0.027
	(0.037)	(0.043)
External Support	0.136*	0.088
	(0.078)	(0.056)
Natural Resources	-0.017	0.074
	(0.099)	(0.092)
Cold War	-0.027	-0.030
	(0.054)	(0.070)
Constant	0.070	0.437**
	(0.353)	(0.175)
Observations	3956	3951

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.6: Instrumental Variable Approach for Institutional Creation.



Figure 4.13: Determinants of Rebel-State and Inter-Rebel Competition.

results in Figure 4.14 show that there is no significant difference between rebel groups claiming ethnic constituency or adhering to communist or religious ideologies. Hence, endogeneity does not appear to be an issue. Only when rebel groups experience armed conflict do they have significant differences in their likelihood of establishing governance institutions: armed conflict, which is the ultimate form of competition, makes rebel groups significantly more likely to establish governance institutions. Thus, it lends further support for the hypotheses above.

In short, examining the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates indicates that there does not appear to be an issue of endogeneity. However, similar to the instrumental variable approach, it is also unlikely to be able to fully overcome any potential endogeneity issues.



(a) Rebels Claim Constituency



(b) Rebels' Communist Ideology



(c) Rebels' Religious Ideology



(d) Rebels in Armed Conflict

Figure 4.14: Survival Analysis of Institutional Creation by Rebel Group Characteristics.

4.5 Discussion

When rebel groups decide to provide governance they make institutional choices in efforts to further their organizational survival and strengthen their ability to achieve their long-term goals. Rebel groups take the competitive environment, the likelihood that the group will cease its existence due to military defeat, and the ability of the state to gather information and outperform the rebel group into account when making their choices. Due to their opposition to the current state government rebels' institutional choices are made with regards to the state's governance. Simply put, rebels face the question of whether they want to contest the stateness or just look the part.

Due to the issue of backlash which may endanger the rebel groups' organizational survival,

rebel groups favor engaging in isomorphic mimicry over contesting the state. Especially in situations of greater competition with the state do rebel groups want to avoid the potential existential threat of backlashes to their governance as these situations turn even limited backlashes into potentially existential threats. This is because states can take advantage of the civilians' rebellion to the rebellion and start counterinsurgency efforts.

Only in the absence of such a scenario, i.e. when the state is relatively weak or incapable, do rebel groups have an interest in contesting the stateness. Rebel groups fighting weak states are more likely to establish state-rivaling governance such as diplomacy or governments as the rebel-state competition increases. Due to the weak state, even though rebel groups face a greater existential threat, they are willing to establish this type of governance as its benefits outweigh the potential cost. In such a situation, backlashes are less costly as the state is unlikely to be able to capitalize on them to launch effective counterinsurgency campaigns.

Rebels' governance provision can create an informal social contract - "a set of interlocking right and duties for both governors and governed" (Wickham-Crowley 1987, 483) that can help rebel groups entice civilian cooperation, preventing civilians' defection (Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra 2017), and help rebel groups accrue material benefits and non-material support (Olson 1993; Mampilly 2011; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra 2017; Arjona 2016; Huang 2016*b*; Stewart 2018).

However, governance institutions are not all equal in their costs and benefits. While creating justice institutions can serve as a recruitment tool (Loyle 2021), elections can increase rebel groups' legitimacy (Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer 2021). Additionally, each governance institution can have implications beyond the short-term needs of rebel groups. Rebel groups that engage civilians and rely on civilian aid lay the groundwork for post-conflict democratization (Huang 2016*b*). If rebels create an institutionalized system of taxation, this system can increase household welfare between 16 and 25 percent (Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). Thus, it is imperative to understand what influences rebel groups' decision to create one governance institution over another.

In this chapter, I argue that inter-rebel competition, which produces pressures on rebel groups to generate material resources and non-material support, forces rebel groups to create governance institutions that provide an immediate benefit to the rebel group. In the same context, rebel groups forgo governance institutions that do not have an immediate impact, even though these governance institutions may potentially provide a far greater payoff in the future. Especially for ethnic rebel groups, who are in even greater competition as they also have to be concerned with losing their ethnic power base to rising rebel contenders, exemplify the hypothesized relationships.

4.6 Conclusion

Why do rebel groups establish governance institutions and what institutional choices do rebel groups make when establishing governance institutions? This chapter tests a theory that answers both questions: rebels' competitive environment, how severe their competition is with the state and other rebel groups is. As well as how capable the state is to perform the state and whether rebel groups claim ethnic constituencies. Each of these factors affects rebel organizations' short-term survival odds and subsequently the odds of achieving their long-term goals. As rebel organizations want to survive to achieve their long-term goals, they carefully calculate the risk and benefits of governance provision before deciding whether to provide governance and which institutions they create.

In their efforts to ensure their survival, rebel groups establish governance institutions that provide the group with benefits, either immediately or potentially, and by either engaging in isomorphic mimicry as they want to look like they take on state functions while avoiding essential state functions such as law-making. Rebel groups fighting less capable states are engaged in governance that effectively rivals the state's and might even replace the state as they establish civilian governments and use diplomatic efforts to also further their goal. Due to the lower risk in low-capacity states, these rebel groups benefit greatly from this additional governance. When rebel groups decide to provide governance, greater inter-rebel competition increases ethnic rebels' propensity to establish governance institutions that provide immediate benefits to rebel groups. Meanwhile,

greater inter-rebel competition leads rebels to create less potentially beneficial governance.

Furthermore, the chapter contributes to the literature by allowing insight into broader trends of rebels' institutional creation across conflicts. Most studies of rebel governance focus on either one (Arjona 2016) or a handful of countries (Mampilly 2011). Others focused on specific types of conflicts and institutions (Stewart 2018) while some studies aggregated rebels' institutional choices, not at the group but the conflict-level (Huang 2016*b*). By focusing on a wider array of governance institutions in a greater number of countries, this chapter provides a more complete understanding of rebels' institutional choices. Hence, it increases our knowledge about rebel groups' decisions but also helps the study of post-conflict outcomes as it allows for the correct examination of the impact of rebel governance on post-conflict outcomes.

Rebel institutions do not only have short-term effects as they affect the day-to-day lives of civilians living under rebels' rule or audiences that are affected by the rebels' rule, but also carry long-term implications for the prospects of democratization, economic development, and public health. Thus, it is critical to understand the factors that shape rebels' institutional choices. This chapter shows the effect of within-country conflict dynamics, e.g., inter-rebel competition, on rebels' institutional choices. These choices have long-term effects like the prospects of post-conflict democratization (Huang 2016*b*), human welfare, and economic development. Therefore, these institutional choices need to be studied and understood to further increase our understanding of conflict and post-conflict outcomes.

5. THE TALIBAN'S GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY

This chapter provides a detailed qualitative case study of the Taliban since 1996 to illustrate the causal mechanism between competition and rebels' governance creation. Throughout their existence, the Taliban conquered most of Afghanistan twice — once in 1996 and again in 2021. While the circumstances of them taking control of Afghanistan differed significantly in these two instances, each time, the Taliban's fortunes on the battlefield were supported by their ability to offer efficient governance.

First, this chapter discusses the case selection criteria and what makes the case of the Taliban a good test for the theory outlined in Chapter 3 and tested in chapter 4. The next section briefly outlines the different competitive environments and the theoretical expectations for the Taliban's governance choices that are associated with each competitive environment. Then, the chapter goes into details of each competitive environment and the Taliban's governance provision before summarizing the Taliban's rebel governance, the competition they experienced, and what the findings of the case study mean for the overall theory.

5.1 Case Selection

The universe of cases from which the qualitative case study was selected is the rebel groups in the Rebel Quasi-State Institution Dataset (Albert Forthcoming). The RQSI has data on the governance provision of 235 rebel groups in 69 countries. The ideal case has a long history to allow for variation on the level of competition and differences in rebels' governance provision. Ideally, the selected rebel group would experience both, rebel-state and inter-rebel competition.

The Taliban have had a long history of armed struggles to take control of the entirety of Afghanistan. For their existence, the Taliban competed with various opposing rebel groups, leading them to experience inter-rebel competition. After taking control of Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban were engaged in high levels of inter-rebel competition while trying to consolidate their

rule as the new government of Afghanistan. Additionally, they were also part of a lengthy insurgency against the state and its allies from 2001 to 2021, which was characterized by rebel-state competition. So, the Taliban case is ideal as it has a lot of variation in the Taliban's competition.

Additionally, the Taliban established a vast variety of governance institutions during their existence. These governance institutions were not established uniformly across time. Rather, the Taliban focused on establishing different governance institutions based on time and location. The variation of governance in governance strategy makes the Taliban a great case to illustrate the causal mechanisms of the theory.

Another aspect that makes the Taliban a great case to illustrate the causal mechanism is that the group focused almost exclusively on their military campaigns — at least until after their takeover of Kabul. Thereby, the early years of the Taliban, and by extension, the Taliban as a whole, are one of the hardest tests for the theory and the causal mechanism.

In combination, the Taliban were selected as the case for the qualitative study to illustrate the causal mechanisms of the theory as they exist for a long duration, a time during which they experienced both, inter-rebel and rebel-state, and did not establish governance institutions uniformly across time and space. Hence, the variation in combination with the duration makes the Taliban an ideal group to study closely as part of the qualitative case study.

5.2 Theoretical Expectations

The Taliban's struggle for Afghanistan can be broadly divided into three periods, each of which is characterized by a different type of competition and thus different theoretical expectations for their governance institutions. These expectations are summarized in Table 5.1.

In the early years of their existence, the Taliban were in inter-rebel competition as they competed regionally with Kandahar warlords and mainly the Hezb-i Islami, a major rebel group in the ongoing Afghan Civil War. The theoretical expectation for this type of competition is that the Taliban establish immediately beneficial governance institutions. For the Taliban, this meant that they created justice systems or courts to disperse (their version of) justice.

After their takeover of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban's competition transitioned from inter-rebel towards rebel-state competition as the Taliban fought a relatively united movement under the leadership of the state. At the same time, the Taliban sought to consolidate their control over their territory and their claim to being the legitimate government of Afghanistan. They continued to dispense justice, now under the auspices of being the state government, and expanded their governance to include more state-rivaling governance institutions such as diplomacy and policing.

Following being ousted from being the de facto government of Afghanistan in the wake of the US-led invasion in October 2001, the Taliban were competing with the newly installed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The group's competition with the state resulted in them engaging in more state-rivaling governance. As the state was ineffective in dispersing justice outside of major metropolitan areas, the Taliban established their state-rivaling justice system. Additionally, the Taliban engaged in diplomatic negotiations although they failed to be recognized by another state. Yet, the negotiations were successful by leading to the withdrawal of the state's allies' military troops. As the majority of the state's allies were withdrawn, the Taliban used their built-up strength — due in part to their governance institutions — to take over the Afghan government.

This brief discussion of the theoretical governance expectations shows that rebel groups can use the same governance in different competitive environments as they fulfill different functions. The Taliban established justice systems as immediately beneficial and state-rivaling governance. This is because, in these different contexts, the same governance institution can provide the required benefits. Yet, not all governance institutions can be used in either competitive environment. For example, while healthcare institutions are immediately beneficial as it helps rebel groups win the hearts and minds of the population, the institution would not help rebels in their quest to rival the state's governance.

5.3 Rise of the Taliban, 1994-1996

The first few years of the Taliban's existence, from 1994 to 1996, are characterized by severe inter-rebel competition. The group fights several local warlords while competing with them for

Time Period	1994-96	1996-2001	2001-*present*
Competition Type	Inter-Rebel	Inter-Rebel, Transition to Rebel-State	Rebel-State
Governance Expectation	Immediately Beneficial G.	IBG; Transition to State-rivaling G.	State-rivaling G.
Taliban's Governance	Justice System, Org. Crime Networks	Justice System, Diplomacy, Police	Justice System Diplomacy

Table 5.1: Expectations of Taliban Governance, 1994-2021

resources and control. While the Taliban focused their early efforts on their competition with local warlords, they did not shy away from challenging larger rebel factions. Almost from their founding, the Taliban competed with the Hezb-i Islami, a major rebel group in the Afghan Civil War.

As the Taliban experienced inter-rebel competition, the theoretical expectation is for them to establish governance institutions that are immediately beneficial to the group. The Taliban did just that by focusing on a select few institutions that allowed them to reap important material resources and non-material support.

5.3.1 The Early Taliban

By the time the Taliban emerged in 1994, Afghanistan had experienced continuous fighting since 1979. Rampant corruption and warlordism fragmented the country and while ""elsewhere in the country, things were more or less working," the Taliban's home province of Kandahar was described as "chaos and anarchy, absolutely" (U.S. Consul General in Peshawar Richard Smyth (Gutman 2013, 63)). The situation in Kandahar was so bad that international aid agencies were fearful of operating in the city as warlords "seized homes and farms, (...) abused the population, kidnapping young girls and boys for their sexual pleasure" and robbing merchants (Rashid 2010). In this climate, the Taliban who have a "firm stance against strife and disorder" and prescribe "law and order" as a pillar of their ideology, emerged (Provost 2021, 120).

Different accounts are given about the origin of the Taliban, although almost everyone begins with a vigilante response by former mujaheddin-turned Mullah Mohammed Omar and about thirty young religious students against a warlord raping adolescents in spring to summer 1994 (Gutman 2013). According to the official Taliban version, the group was founded by Mullah Omar who, incensed by the violent excesses of Kandahar warlords rose to create justice and order. From there, the Taliban rode a wave of popular anger and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996 (Davis 1998).

Afghans were enthusiastic about the Taliban and what their emergence meant for Afghanistan as the Taliban were hailed as those that would bring "peace and security to the country" (Gutman 2013, 63). The Taliban "appeared to enjoy the open admiration of most Afghans for taking action against" warlords and the popular support they received was due to frustration with the current situation and existing forces (U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) 1994). In these early days, the Taliban were supported by those same existing forces and warlords with whom the people were frustrated (Gutman 2013).

The Taliban relied on Kandahar merchants and neighboring warlords for financial support and weaponry (Davis 1998; Gutman 2013). In September 1994, the Taliban sought and received President Rabbani's endorsement and financial backing before clearing the road between Pakistan and Kandahar from warlords (Davis 1998). With this backing, the Taliban took their first major action of the Afghan Civil War when they attacked and captured the Spin Boldak border crossing and the Pasha arms depot from the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Davis 1998). Kandahar's warlords were alarmed by the Taliban takeover of Spin Boldak as it "was the first real sign of an impending shift of forces in Afghanistan" (Davis 1998, 46).

At this point, the Taliban competed with local warlords but also competed with a major player in the Afghan Civil War as the Hezb-i Islami was trying to conquer Kabul to capture the government (Tomson 2011). Despite their competition, the Taliban had not established any governance institutions as it was less of a rebel group and more of a band of vigilantes who cleared roads (Davis 1998; Gutman 2013; Rashid 2010). This changed shortly after the group conquered its first

strategic position in Spin Boldak.

5.3.2 From Kandahar to Kabul

Motivated by their takeovers of Spin Boldak and the Pasha arms depot, the Taliban turned began their attack on Kandahar city. Within a few days, the Taliban had defeated three of the local warlords and bribed the fourth to take control of Kandahar city (Davis 1998). According to some reports, the Taliban, and their ally Pakistan, spent about US$1.5 million to ensure the takeover of Kandahar (Oxford Analytica 1994).

In Kandahar, the Taliban gained access to advanced weaponry including MiG-21 fighter jets (one of which was still operational), Mi-17 transport helicopters, tanks, and armored fighting vehicles.[15] Additionally, the Taliban gained legitimacy for their quest for justice and order (Davis 1998), the goal the Taliban literally wore on their flag (Provost 2021), as they pacified a chaotic and anarchic city. As a result of these benefits, the Taliban had gone from a virtually unknown and insignificant force of several hundred ill-equipped fighters to a well-equipped, significant actor in the civil war with some 2,500-3,000 fighters in a little less than a month (Davis 1998).

In the next few months, the Taliban expanded further into neighboring Uruzgan and Zabul provinces and launched a successful attack on Abdul Ghaffar Akhundzadeh, an early supporter of the Taliban and the ruling warlord of Helmand province (Davis 1998; Rashid 2010). With the fall of Helmand province and controlling a large chunk of Afghan territory, the Taliban "came up against the major warlords" (Rashid 2010, 33).

Despite their earlier dealings with the Rabbani government, the Taliban quickly denounced any suggestions of an alliance with the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Rather they declared themselves "neutral in the power struggle between [the government of President Burhanuddin] Rabbani and [Hezb-i Islami leader Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar" (United Press International (2009) quoted in (Davis 1998, 52)). While the direct message of the above statement was

[15]The exact numbers of each type of weapon are disputed. AFGHANews (1995) reported that the Taliban captured seven helicopters and eight jets at Kandahar airport with additional resources having been seized from the four warlords.

that the Taliban were not fighting with one of the two groups against the other, the subtext of the statement was that the Taliban saw a future of Afghanistan (only) under their control. In the period of a few weeks, the Taliban had undergone a drastic shift as their goal was no longer just peace and security in Kandahar province but apparently, taking over Afghanistan as a whole. Due to the secrecy surrounding the Taliban-leading shura council, it remains unclear as to who made the decision to change the goals and why it was done so (Davis 1998).

As the Taliban expanded they also established governance institutions to consolidate their power, finance their struggle, recruit fighters, and create a society following their ideals. The Taliban identified "social stability as the effective solution" to the problems plaguing Afghan society and they were "determined to achieve law and order in society through Islamic ways" (Gohari 2000, 55). Thus, the Taliban's governance focused on the creation and enforcement of Islamic law by establishing a judicial system of regional courts.

After capturing Kandahar, the Taliban passed and enforced their laws banning music, chess, association football, and volleyball (Anderson 1995; Gannon 1995; Penberthy 1995). The group also passed laws that women had to be veiled, could not work outside their own homes, and could not leave their homes without a male family member accompanying them (Anderson 1995; Burns 1995; Penberthy 1995). The Taliban's legislative governance was not immune to backlash and they were not ignorant of feedback either. When they banned women from shopping in Kandahar's bazaars and stores, a ban that was subsequently protested by women, the Taliban amended their law to allow women entry to the bazaars as long as they did not go into shops run by men (Burns 1995).

The main governance institution that the Taliban created were their courts. Dispersing and implementing justice was a key part of the Taliban's strategy to consolidate their rule (Baczko 2018) as it was the one thing that originally set them apart from all other actors. It was so critical to their mission that before establishing any other type of institution, the Taliban established courts (Provost 2021) to consolidate their rule (Amnesty International 1995; MacFarquhar 1995; Rashid 1995*b*). Courts allowed the group to deliver on their promise of *justice and order* that the Taliban

wore literally on their flag. It also gave them the opportunity with the local population about the Taliban's intentions (Loyle 2021) and laid out a basic social contract, thereby reducing the risk of uprising while allowing the group to generate support and legitimacy. Both were valuable *resources* for the Taliban in their quest to conquer Afghanistan.

Despite the valuable benefits their courts allowed the Taliban to reap, the group did not create this institution without implicit prompting by the competitive environment. The Taliban, who wrote *justice and order* literally on their flag and declared establishing law and order as their mission (Provost 2021), only began to establish courts once they left their home provinces and experienced the first resistance to their movement (Rashid 1995*b*).

As the Taliban expanded further north and west in the early months of 1995, reports about Taliban courts become more frequent (Amnesty International 1995; MacFarquhar 1995), including reports about courts and their decisions in Kandahar (Amnesty International 1995; Anderson 1995; Hugeux 1995). So, as the inter-rebel competition increased and the Taliban reached provinces that were widely at peace and often relatively well administered by opposing warlords, the mere promise of *justice and order* was not enough. The Taliban needed to back up their promise with governance institutions as they could not afford "to alienate the vast majority of the population with whom they [had] reached a modus vivendi" (Keating 1998, 139).

The Taliban understood that just creating institutions was not enough and that they needed to deliver on their promise to dispense justice. Therefore, the Taliban brought in their judges, who were trained in the Hanafi Shari'a school of law and could distinguish between strong and weak points of Islamic law, to newly conquered provinces. These judges were also used to set examples in terms of "spirit and appearance" as well as to conduct (Excerpt from an unpublished document written by a former senior leader of the Taliban, quoted in (Strick van Linschoten 2016)). While the Taliban exerted many efforts to establish courts in every province of the country, they still focused their energy mostly on fighting the war (Davis 1998).

The Taliban could afford to focus their energy on fighting, and forwent most provisions of rebel governance as they had close relations with the Quetta-Chaman transport mafia. The transport

mafia originally paid the group a monthly retainer but soon funded the Taliban to an increasingly greater degree. The transport mafia was important to the Taliban's finances as it could deliver the required payments for the group to continue co-opting local warlords and tribes without endangering military advancements, in exchange the Taliban opened the roads for the transport mafia (Rashid 2010). Additionally, the Taliban levied one-time, all-inclusive*customs duties* at the important border crossing of Spin Boldak (Rashid 1995*a*). Furthermore, the Taliban were willing to compromise on their morals in exchange for valuable resources. By 1996, heroin smugglers paid taxes to the Taliban to transport heroin out of the region — a trade that was officially allowed by the Taliban, in contrast to heroin (Rashid 1997). Each of these was an important income stream for the Taliban which did not alienate civilian populations or undermined the public's support or the Taliban's legitimacy.

These resources and the governance helped the Taliban's advance on Kabul and their quest to conquer Afghanistan. By mid-February 1995, the Taliban had conquered almost half of Afghanistan and were located on the outskirts of Kabul (Marsden 1998). Their rapid rise to becoming a major player in the Afghan Civil War made the Taliban themselves a target to forces that previously ignored them. Thus, inter-rebel competition increased further for the Taliban as the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud launched assaults on the Taliban positions outside of Kabul (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1995; Keesing's Record of World Events 1995). As the Taliban retreated they shelled Kabul and thus shattered "their reputation as a benevolent faction that sought to restore peace to Afghanistan" (Barfield 1996, 42). While the anti-Taliban alliance managed to push the group back on two fronts, in Herat and Kabul province and reduced the provinces under their control from twelve to eight (Rashid 2010), the Taliban managed to retake most of their positions by October 1995.

In March 1996, the anti-Taliban alliance between the government of Afghanistan and the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar became official (Keesing's Record of World Events 1996*b*; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1996*a*). However, the alliance could not defeat the Taliban. Quite the contrary, following a surprise attack on Jalalabad in early September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul on 27 September and their "victory was complete" (Rashid 2010, 49).

Even after capturing Kabul and becoming the de facto government of Afghanistan, the Taliban were focused on dispersing justice — or at least their version of it. They tortured and hanged former President Mohammad Najibullah on a traffic control post just outside the Presidential Palace, a few blocks away from the United Nations compound where Najibullah had lived since 1992. He was staged with cigarettes between his fingers and afghani banknotes in his pockets to symbolize Najibullah's alleged debauchery and corruption (Rashid 2010).

In the first two years of their existence, the Taliban established governance, such as the creation of laws and courts, that provided the group with immediate benefits in legitimacy and support, as they were experiencing existential threats by both, other rebel groups and *domestic* or internal uprising. However, the Taliban focused on a handful of institutions as to not stretch their resources too much while their main focus remained on military operations. The group made conscious institutional choices: Law and order everywhere as it was the main part of their ideology, taxation, and cooperation with criminal networks as needed to finance their fight.

5.4 Taliban in Government, 1996-2001

While the Taliban capture of Kabul meant that the Taliban were the de facto government of Afghanistan, they were opposed by the widely recognized government, the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Additionally, as the map in Figure 5.1 shows, the Taliban only controlled only about 60% of the country. Although, it is important to note that the map only displays the best estimate of territorial control at the provincial level based on information by Dorronsoro (2005). The actual level of territorial control for the Taliban can and almost certainly did differ significantly between different provinces.

Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban slowly extended and consolidated their control so that by October 2001, they controlled about 90% of Afghanistan. In the same period, the Taliban's competition type shifted from inter-rebel competition in 1996-97 towards rebel-state governance from 1998 onward. Therefore, the theoretical expectations of the Taliban's governance shifted from being focused on immediately beneficial governance such as courts to state-rivaling governance

such as diplomacy and law enforcement, which underscored their claim to be the government of Afghanistan.

5.4.1 Consolidating Control

In response to the Taliban takeover of Kabul, their opposing warlords formed an alliance, the United Front.[16] The United Front launched a multi-front assault almost immediately following the Taliban's capture of Kabul, which almost reached Kabul (Reuters 1996*a*,*b*,*c*; Spillus 1996; The Economist 1996; Cooper 1996; Dynes 1996) but soon the front lines stabilized (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network 1996*b*; Agence France Presse 1996*b*; Radio Pakistan Network 1996; White 1996). By the end of the year, the Taliban began an extensive offensive, capturing many strongholds of United Front commander Massoud (Agence France Presse 1997*a*; Bakshian 1997; Abdullah 1997*a*; Reuters 1997), and forcing a withdrawal of the United Front forces into the Panjshir valley. During their retreat, the anti-Taliban forces blasted the hillsides near Salang Pass (Agence France Presse 1997*b*) and blew up part of the Salang Highway to prevent the Taliban from advancing (Abdullah 1997*b*; Agence France Presse 1997*c*).

While the Taliban fought to unite the country militarily, the group continued with their inter-rebel competition strategy to establish immediately beneficial courts as it was this governance that originally helped them gain support. Yet, the Taliban also exerted energies to solidify their claim of being the legitimate government of Afghanistan. They created government ministries and a cabinet, even though most of the decisions were made in parallel structures within the Taliban organization (Strick van Linschoten 2016), and passed laws regulating society.

To enforce their laws and court decisions, the Taliban established the *Amr bil Ma'rouf wa ak-*

[16]The United Front was also known as the Northern Alliance. Its major members were government forces under the control of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Junbish-i Milli of Abdul Rashid Dostum (Bruno 1996; Perrin 1996), the Harakat-i Islami, and the Mahaz (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1 1996). Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i Islami forces are considered part of the government since they signed a power-sharing agreement making Hekmatyar prime minister in May 1996 (Keesing's Record of World Events 1996*a*; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1996*b*).

Nahi 'an al-Munkar,[17] a religious police. It is unclear whether the religious police was active before the Taliban took control of the government in 1996. Despite taking on a policing role in the Taliban government, the *Amr bil Ma'rouf* was not under the power of the ministries of the interior or justice. Rather it was its own ministry under the control of the council of ministers (which was under the control of Mullah Omar) as well as under direct control of Mullah Omar. This dual-positioning of the Amr bil Ma'rouf exemplifies the dual structure of the Taliban where the official government structure and the direct control of the Taliban leader overlapped.

The Taliban were able and willing to adjust their governance if the situation demanded it, as evidenced by their policy changes allowing women to shop in the bazaars of Kandahar (Burns 1995). At other times, the Taliban "prefer[ed] ignoring, or pretending to ignore, necessary arrangements that deviate[d] from their policies" (Vaux 2003, 132). When the Taliban began their offensive against the United Front in December 1996, the group could not afford to experience any uprisings as these would force the group to split up their forces, open new fronts, and potentially endanger the group's organizational survival. Yet, at exactly this time, anti-Taliban demonstrations broke out in Herat. The Taliban responded by violently dispersing the demonstration, imposing curfews, and deploying heavy weaponry to maintain order at all costs (Agence France Presse 1996*a*; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network 1996*a*,*c*). When the Taliban had secured their strategic positions surrounding Kabul and Herat, they loosened many of the restrictions which had originally caused much of the unrest. They did so in most places except for Herat (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Refugee Branch Asylum Division 1997), which was near another soon-to-be battleground state and the Taliban needed to avoid any potentially dangerous uprisings.

As the United Front had blocked the Taliban's advances towards the Panjshir valley, the group concentrated on capturing the northern town of Mazar-i-Sharif. The city was so important as, even though the majority of the Afghan population was located in the south, the majority of agricultural resources and industry, mineral, and gas wealth was located in Afghanistan's north. Controlling

[17]Translated as "the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice," literally "enjoying what is right and forbidding wrongs." The Qu'ran highlights the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice as Muslims' important duties (Rahim and Sheriff 1980).

the north was key to state-building and economic development and thus "for the Taliban, [who were] determined to conquer the country and keep it united, the autonomy enjoyed by the northern warlords had to be crushed" (Rashid 2010, 55).



Figure 5.1: Political Divisions in Afghanistan in 1996.

As the Taliban advanced north on Mazar-i-Sharif, they also worked on legitimizing their claim of being the government of Afghanistan by not only establishing governance institutions such as courts, or reestablishing ministries, but engaging in diplomacy. As the Taliban took Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997 without a fight, due to a negotiated surrender, Pakistan recognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan (Rashid 2010). Thus, at least in the eyes of Pakistan, the Taliban had not only rivaled but effectively replaced the Islamic State of Afghanistan as the government.

As per usual when bribing and scheming themselves into control of an area, the Taliban were quick to go back on their promises. They did not share power with the local warlord, Malik, and began disarming his troops. Furthermore, the Taliban implemented many of their very conservative laws. They did so in a city, where 1,800 of the university students — attending the only functioning university of the country — were women; a city that contained one of the most important Shi'a religious sites; a city that "had remained the most open and liberal in the country" (Rashid 2010, 58). So when, on 28 May 1997, a group of Hazaras resisted their disarmament, it was the proverbial match to light the powder keg of Mazar-i-Sharif.

In the following weeks and months, the Taliban were forced out of Mazar-i-Sharif and the United Front, led by Massoud, launched a counter-offensive that, by September, was a few kilometers outside of Kabul. In combination, the Taliban had experienced their worst defeat up to that point with at least 3,000 casualties and some 3,600 forces taken prisoner (Rashid 2010).

This did not stop the Taliban's attempts to be recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Quite the opposite, while the Taliban were in a weaker position, both militarily and regarding their claim to the state, they sought and received help. In early September, Saudi Arabia issued promises of help on the issues of healthcare and education before the Saudi King announced his full financial and political backing of the Taliban (Rashid 2010). Receiving international recognition from Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia was important for the Taliban's legitimacy as other states, such as the United States, declared they would not recognize the Taliban government (Goodson 2001; Rashid 2010).

In the last few years of the twentieth century, as Afghanistan was increasingly under Taliban control and infighting of the United Front prevented any advances against the Taliban, the Taliban tried to increase the domestic situation without incurring tremendous costs. The Taliban negotiated with two oil companies over a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. In addition to rent for the pipeline, the Taliban wanted the oil companies to engage in road and water supply building, as well as telephone and power lines (Rashid 2010). The group also had diplomatic exchanges with Chinese, Chechen, and American diplomats (Goodson 2001; Rashid 2010; U.S. Department of State 1998).

Despite the United States' statement not to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, the United States engaged in quasi-diplomatic relations. The United States government awarded the group with a US$43 million grant (Carpenter 2002), which was only awarded to states, for banning and reducing the cultivation and trade of poppy (Carpenter 2002; Gutman 2013) The size of the grant by the United States may not appear like a lot of money for a state but to put this into perspective, in 1998, the Taliban government of Afghanistan had a budget of approximately US$10 million. Hence, the US grant was a major cash infusion for the Taliban government.

In the early years of being in power, as the Taliban were trying to consolidate their power by both conquering territories and strengthening their rule in conquered territory, their governance was focused on increasing the group's survivability and limiting existential threats. In later years, as most of Afghanistan had been conquered and their rule solidified, the Taliban went all out to engage in governance that fitted more the role that they thought they ought to play: the state.

5.5 Beaten but not Broken, 2001-2021

Operation *Enduring Freedom*, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, routed the Taliban from power within a month. Following a period of reorganization for the Taliban, the group reemerged and started a long insurgency culminating in the Taliban's total control of Afghanistan and the recapture of the Afghan government.

As the Taliban were the only noteworthy rebel group in opposition to the government, they

experienced rebel-state competition. The theoretical expectation for this type of governance is that the Taliban would establish governance institutions that rival the state's institutions. During their insurgency, the Taliban focused on governance that the government failed to deliver in, namely by re-establishing their justice system.

5.5.1 Rise of the Phoenix

By November 2001, the US-supported United Front had completely routed the Taliban so badly, it took until mid-2002 before the Taliban began to reorganize partially as their leadership was split up as some went "to Karachi, some went to Quetta and some went to Waziristan" in Pakistan (a Taliban leader quoted in Giustozzi (2019, 19)). Additionally, the Taliban lacked funding sources and supplies. Efforts by the group to overcome their resource shortages by fundraising, taxation, or gaining support from tribal elders were only moderately successful. So the next few years were spent trying to re-organize the organization, raise funds, and generate support (Giustozzi 2019).

Remnants of the Taliban continued modest operations in Kandahar and Helmand province. Groups, inspired by the former Islamic Emirate and led by former low- to mid-rank Emirate officials, also began small-scale operations near the Pakistani border in Nangarhar province between 2002 and 2003. In the beginning, none of these *Taliban fronts* were collaborating with one another. The Taliban of this time were described as "little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency" while lacking resources and the capacity for any governance (Giustozzi 2012). Around 2005, these different fronts were integrated into Taliban command structures in Pakistan such as the Quetta and Peshawar shuras (Giustozzi 2019).[18] Originally, the Quetta Shura aimed to force the Karzai government and the United States to accommodate the Shura's demands as overthrowing the Karzai administration was not deemed a realistic goal (Giustozzi 2019).

[18]Giustozzi states "technically, there is no such thing as the Quetta Shura" but it is the term used to describe the organization which evolved around the Leadership Council (*Rahbari Shura*) such as commissions, sub-shuras, etc. (Giustozzi 2019, 32).

Even though he did not attend the launch of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Omar endorsed it, thereby giving it legitimacy. This allowed the shura to engage in systematic and successful fundraising campaigns, create elaborate plans, and become "a more attractive option to the isolated [Taliban fronts] active until then" (Giustozzi 2019, 33). The Quetta Shura's legitimacy received another boost when the Miran Shah Shura, which began its operations first, recognized it in 2004 (Giustozzi 2019).[19]

Beginning almost immediately after its creation in 2003, the Quetta Shura appointed leaders of operational zones, as well as provincial and district governors who were in charge of all Taliban-affiliated groups in these areas (Baldauf and Tohid 2003; Giustozzi 2019). Partially due to their cooperation and organization, the Taliban managed to operate in seven of Afghanistan's 34 provinces by the end of 2004 (Giustozzi 2019). By that time, "the Taliban began targeted killings of police officers, government officials, spies and elders who were working with the Americans" (Yousafzai 2009) and Mullah Omar declared the Taliban insurgency against the United States and the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai (Gall 2004) — a turning point in the Taliban insurgency.

Before the declaration of the insurgency, the Taliban had engaged with few people outside of the old circles. They also had not engaged in much governance provision except for organizing a shadow government and appointing regional governors (Giustozzi 2019; Peters 2009). In 2005 and 2006, the Taliban escalated their insurgency as well as their governance operations. To fund their operations, the Taliban relied heavily on the drug trade (Peters 2009) supplemented by occasional local taxation (Witting 2012). To stylize themselves as the legitimate government that sought to "regain the sovereignty of [its] country" (Gall 2004) and put itself in direct competition with the Karzai administration, the Taliban drafted and approved a constitution that "promulgated harsh, unorthodox edicts" (Wilkinson 2007).

Throughout 2006, the Taliban escalated the number of their attacks - both on civilians and coalition troops - "sharply" (Human Rights Watch 2007). The coalition was also heavily criticized by many for how they conducted their operations, including President Hamid Karzai (Gutman 2013).

[19]In 2007, the Miran Shah Shura, which is almost synonymous with the Haqqani Network, became fully autonomous again but continued to generally cooperate with the Quetta Shura (Giustozzi 2019).

Criticized for their conduct, and with the Karzai administration unable to change the coalition's conduct, the Taliban took steps to improve their popular perception. They issued the Layha code of conduct for Taliban, which covered a wide range of issues, such as sections on intra-Taliban and Taliban-civilian dispute resolution, protection of the common people, education, and health (Clark 2011).

The Taliban knew they had no chance to outfight their opponents' military forces and instead "attempted (...) to "outgovern" their enemies, capitalizing on the shortfalls of the Kabul government" (Provost 2021, 121). Hence, it is no coincidence that the Taliban expand their governance structures exactly at the same time as they expand their operations and challenge the government and coalition forces increasingly.

Similar to their actions in 1994/95, the Taliban operated "a law-based mode of governance, based on procedural decision making and enforcement" (Baczko 2016, 1423) that also included "health and security officers at the district, provincial and national levels" (Baczko 2016, 1415). The Taliban were intent to show that they are the legitimate government of Afghanistan and that they can *perform* the state. This explains why, despite their limited resources, the Taliban governance heavily emphasized "institutions and formalisms" and appear "hierarchical and centralized" (Baczko 2016, 1426). The Taliban's approach to governance was to convey that their governance was institutionalized authority with predictable behaviors which were constrained by rules (Giustozzi and Baczko 2014). They took every step necessary to outgovern the Karzai administration. In this process, the Taliban were also severely helped by the international community and coalition forces, which were tasked with "developing new codes, laws and regulations" (Abbas 2014, 179). Under the leadership of Italy, the international community produced a criminal procedure code that was "so irrelevant to Afghan society" that President "Karzai refused to sign it into law" (Abbas 2014, 179). Yet, as Italy threatened to withhold their funding for the justice sector, "Karzai was forced to compromise and the colonial-like project continued" (Abbas 2014, 179).

While the Taliban attempted to outgovern the Karzai administration, they also advanced militarily and took control of Helmand province in 2009. Meanwhile, they operated at least 13 courts

in southern Afghanistan, each heard both civil and criminal matters (Kilcullen 2009) and had shadow governments in 33 of 34 provinces. Their governance, in combination with the contested presidential elections that were "widely considered a sham," helped the Taliban gain favor among Afghanistan's population (United Press International 2009). In response to the Taliban advancements, the United States announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops (BBC 2009).

Until early 2010, the locations of Taliban courts were well known and civilians could approach clerks and judges with complaints and file their case (Giustozzi, Franco and Baczko 2013). The troop surge and the resulting pressure led to a change in the Taliban's governance: they transitioned their justice system from stationary to mobile courts to allow civilians continued access to their justice system. Still, this transition hindered accessibility to courts and considerably shortened trials (Provost 2021). This undermined the Taliban's strength and support as it was widely agreed upon that the weak justice sector of the government, which was characterized by corruption, insufficient security, lack of transparency, and limited accessibility (especially in rural areas) allowed the Taliban to gain strength (Forbes 2013; Giustozzi and Baczko 2014; Sarwary 2012). Even putting accessibility aside, "the low cost and high expediency of Taliban courts" were also considered "noteworthy advantages over their government counterparts" (Provost 2021, 126). By switching to mobile courts, the Taliban's court system had become significantly less expedient as complainants had to wait for the court to arrive before it could settle disputes.

In combination with the troop surge which forced the Taliban back militarily, the less efficient mobile courts reduced the Taliban's backing in the local population. Once the troop surge was over in 2012, the Taliban's governance strategy reverted to favoring stationary courts (Jackson 2018; Nossiter 2021). In districts that were without stationary courts, Taliban commanders or district governors were tasked with inquiring about complaints and dispersing the mobile numbers of judges who could be called when necessary (Giustozzi 2012; Giustozzi, Franco and Baczko 2013). Over the next few years, the Taliban regained their pre-surge levels of control in all provinces.

The Taliban's strategy to outgovern the state while also challenging it outright by projecting "[the group] as an effective parallel government" (Schmid 2019) by using logos, letters, and stan-

dardized approaches (Giustozzi and Baczko 2014), delivering justice (Provost 2021), among other types of governance (Baczko 2016), proved to be successful as it helped the rebel group to win over the local population and enabled it to go from being severely beaten in 2001 to being a dominant force in 2014.

5.5.2 Reclaiming Afghanistan

Beginning in 2014, the coalition forces transferred the security responsibilities to the Afghan government and the Afghan National Army. The Taliban tried to take advantage of this by increasing the territory under their control, including Kunduz (Rubin 2015) and Helmand (Popalzai and Hume 2015). Additionally, the Taliban switched their strategy by no longer attacking symbols of the Afghan government but rather "systematically co-opting aid and state-building efforts" (Jackson 2021, 103). As a result of the Taliban's efforts, in late 2016, the United States military believed them to control 10% of Afghanistan and contesting an additional 26% (Browne 2016).

As the Taliban advanced slowly, they reached an agreement with the United States on 29 February 2020 for the total withdrawal of all 13,000 remaining US and coalition troops. The withdrawal was set to be completed within 14 months, with the first withdrawal of 3,400 troops having to be completed within 135 days (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and United States of America 2020). At the same time, as the Covid-19 pandemic swept across Afghanistan, the Taliban expanded their governance into healthcare governance (The Economist 2020). Taliban healthcare governance is not the creation of a parallel Taliban healthcare system but rather the cooptation of local officials or non-governmental organizations so that either the Afghan government or somebody else pays for the services provided by the Taliban (Jackson 2018). Even more so, often the government has to pay the Taliban a tax — and thereby financially support them — to provide the services in areas under Taliban control (Semple 2018).

Armed with the knowledge of the imminent withdrawal of coalition troops, expanding its governance network, and increasing its legitimacy, the Taliban laid low and prepared their next large-scale offensive. On 1 May 2021, the scheduled withdrawal day of the last troops, the Taliban began

with their summer offensive. The Taliban advanced very quickly in part due to their tried-and-true strategy of negotiated or paid surrenders (George 2021; Zucchino 2021). By 16 June, the Taliban controlled 104 and contested another 201 of the countries 399 districts (Roggio and Tobin 2021). In July and early August, the Taliban advanced on provincial capitals and the national capital of Kabul. The group began coordinated assaults on all non-captured provincial capitals on 6 August. Most of them were captured without a fight (Akhgar, Faiez and Krauss 2021), while Herat, Kandahar, and Leshkargah fell after week-long fighting (Washington Post 2021). Two days later, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country and the Taliban took control of Kabul without a fight. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was fully reinstated (Seir et al. 2021) and its control over most of Afghanistan.[20]

After being ousted from power by an international coalition led by the only remaining superpower in the world, that beat them into retreat very quickly, it appeared that the group was defeated. Yet, it managed to gain support, resources, and legitimacy by providing governance to underserved populations allowing the group to gain strength and ultimately, the ability to climb back to the top by taking control of Afghanistan again. The Taliban rose, like the Phoenix from the ashes.

5.6 Taliban Governance Across The Years

Throughout their existence, the Taliban experienced inter-rebel and rebel-state competition, while capturing the government twice. During their conquest of Afghanistan, the Taliban established several governance institutions, including an extensive justice system of district, provincial and supreme courts (Provost 2021) while establishing an almost-nationwide shadow government (United Press International 2009). The institutional choices the Taliban made were a product of the competition they experienced.

In the early years of the Taliban's existence until after the capture of Kabul, the Taliban were experiencing high inter-rebel competition. The situation in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand had been described as anarchy (Gutman 2013) — a free-for-all. In this situation, the

[20]Only Parwan and Panjshir provinces were not under Taliban control (Roggio 2021).

Taliban offered security and a regulated court system to settle disputes. This governance required little up-front cost for the Taliban and allowed them to reap legitimacy benefits as well as material resources and support.

After the capture of Kabul, as they wanted to consolidate their rule over Afghanistan further, the Taliban continued to provide their trusted governance services of security and justice. At the same time, the Taliban passed laws that were closely aligned with their vision for Afghanistan as an Islamic state (Penberthy 1995; Anderson 1995; Gannon 1995). Yet, in the consolidation phase, the Taliban were willing to compromise on their policies as after protests the Taliban shifted the policy farther away from their policy ideal points to prevent future uprisings (Burns 1995). Only when their power was consolidated did the Taliban create policies and governance closer to their policy ideal points (Dupree 1998). The Taliban also engaged in diplomatic efforts to receive international recognition as the government of Afghanistan.

In the post-invasion time, the Taliban took time to regroup and reorganize. Yet, many of their strategies, military, and governance, stayed the same. As it became apparent that the new Afghan state was incapable of delivering services outside of urban areas, and specifically justice, the Taliban again stepped in and delivered what the state could not. In this period, the Taliban — which still saw themselves as the legitimate government of Afghanistan — wanted to show that they are the better government, which is in line with the arguments of rebel-state government made in Chapter 3.

Throughout their 18-year insurgency, the Taliban managed to outperform the Afghan government by dispersing justice, particularly in rural areas. The Taliban even went so far as to ensure that they had everything from the state, for example, statements of land ownership acquired through bribes or otherwise, to settle disputes effectively (Coburn 2013). As the Taliban grew in military strength and territory under their control they expanded their governance into other areas, e.g. education. However, in these areas, they co-opted the government's services and only allowed people and materials vetted by themselves into their provinces. Often, the Taliban even charged the government a tax to deliver its services (Semple 2018). The Taliban outdelivered the state in terms of

governance and as a result, gained strength which they used to take over Afghanistan after coalition troops had mostly departed.

6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation introduces a new theoretical framework to explain rebels' governance. In particular, this framework addresses a crucial gap in the literature explaining the institutional choices of rebel governance. Despite the growing literature on rebel governance, existing research explaining rebel governance has largely neglected the realpolitik concerns of rebel groups with even little if any attention paid to rebels' institutional choices. The institutional choice theory of rebel governance complements the existing explanations of rebels' governance provision prominent in the literature that emphasize structural and group-level mechanisms.

The theory builds on the assumption that competition affects rebels' need for and ability to generate material resources and non-material support. It predicts that rebel groups establish governance institutions to fill these needs as only by fulfilling these needs can they ensure the group's survival, while also strengthening its ability to achieve its long-term goals. By linking competition dynamics with rebels' institutional choices, the theoretical framework moves the field forward as it presents an explanation for rebels' institutional choices of rebel governance applicable to rebel groups in various types of conflicts. This is important as institutions do not only affect rebel groups in the short-term but can also have long-term implications as they, for example, affect the prospects of post-conflict democratization (Huang 2016*b*).

The empirical findings support the theory's expectations: with greater competition, as it becomes more critical to acquire resources, support, and legitimacy, they establish governance institutions that help them collect resources and generate legitimacy and support. Rebel groups competing with the state establish governance institutions that make them appear like a state to increase legitimacy and support. When they compete with a weak state, rebels establish governance institutions that rival the state's in appearance and function. Inter-rebel competition makes rebel groups put a premium on the acquisition of additional material resources which they acquire by establishing governance institutions that provide benefits immediately without endangering the group's survival odds. Analyses in the appendices show that these correlations persist using a va-

riety of measures for competition and institutional choices. Furthermore, the findings are robust to alternative specifications of the models.

A qualitative case study of the Taliban, their experience of different competitive environments, and their governance institutions illustrates the causal mechanism of the theory. In the early years of the Taliban insurgency, as they were in inter-rebel competition, the Taliban established governance institutions that allowed them to reap benefits immediately. Later, during their insurgency against the Afghan state and its international allies, the Taliban were in rebel-state competition. The group established governance institutions that undermined the state's claim to be the sovereign and strengthened the Taliban's claim of being the legitimate government of Afghanistan. These institutions allowed the Taliban generate support and legitimacy, which ultimately helped the Taliban gain enough strength to defeat the state and become the government of Afghanistan again.

In addition to highlighting the causal mechanism of the theory, the Taliban case study also highlighted the need for additional research to verify the inferences drawn in support of the theory. The Taliban case study shows that rebel groups that experience different levels of competition in different areas will respond by establishing different governance institutions. Furthermore, the case study indicated that rebels' governance institutions can be influenced by the governance of the state and other rebel groups. So, further empirical investigation, with more qualitative case studies and more, fine-grained data, is necessary to test and generalize the theory.

6.1 Implications for Literature and Policy

This dissertation introduced a new framework to understand rebels' institutional choices when they establish governance institutions. The theory focuses on an inherent part of civil war, competition, to explain why some rebel groups create healthcare institutions while others engage in diplomacy. By focusing on an inherent part of any civil war, the theory applies to all rebel groups in all civil wars, regardless of the rebels' political objectives, their ideology, or other factors. Thus, the theory is an improvement upon existing explanations of rebel governance.

Furthermore, the theory presented in this dissertation contributes to the literature by explaining rebel groups' institutional choices. Most studies of rebel governance take the institutional choice

as externally given rather than as the result of a conscious decision-making process. Therefore, not much thought went into why rebel groups provide one type of institution but forgo another. Despite this lack of an explanation in the literature, and with the existing theories of rebel governance creation being unable to explain geographical and temporal variations, the framework presented in this dissertation allows the field to move forward and accurately measure the impacts of rebels' governance institutions.

By understanding the logic which went into the decision-making process of rebel governance, the future literature will be able to more accurately assess the impact of governance institutions. As governance institutions have short- and long-term effects, even long after they existed (Huang 2016*b*; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014), it is important to understand why these institutions were created in the first place and why other institutions were not created.

As the institutional choices are made to alleviate the needs of the rebel organizations, this has implications for state-building efforts, counterinsurgency campaigns, and aid campaigns by relief organizations. Each of these is either directly affected by rebels' governance institutions or at the very least by their aftermath.

Rebel governance institutions can either directly undermine state-building efforts if the rebels' governance is focused on state-like and state-rivaling institutions. In these situations, any shortcoming of the state in their state-building efforts, even if this shortcoming is marginal in the grand scheme of the operation, could undermine the capacity-building efforts assuming that the rebel group provides similar and more effective services. For example, the post-2001 Taliban created an elaborate system of courts to dispense justice to the population of Afghanistan. While the state established courts of its own, those were often limited in their reach to urban centers and were plagued by corruption and inefficacy. On the other hand, the Taliban provided a system of justice that was widely accessible and delivered swift, fair rulings. The Taliban went out of their way to ensure the integrity of their courts by rotating justices, while fair rulings were ensured by collecting all documents necessary from the state, often through bribery (Baczko 2016, 2018; Provost 2021).

As governance is created to generate vital material resources and non-material support, any

counterinsurgency campaign needs to take this into account. The location of rebel governance might allow counterinsurgent troops to infer the approximate location of rebel groups and thus makes military campaigns more effective. Alternatively, the counterinsurgency can focus on undermining rebels' governance to deny rebel groups the desired resources, thus allowing any counterinsurgency measure to be more effective. Coupling such efforts with state-building efforts, which then decrease the benefits rebels can reap from any governance, would further increase the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns as the rebels' support in the community would fall. For example, the Taliban were so effective to generate support and legitimacy from the local population with their governance as the state was perceived as corrupt and kleptocracy (Abbas 2014).

Lastly, rebel governance has implications for relief organizations. In Afghanistan, the Taliban used government or relief organization-provided governance to further their cause. As the group was in control of many provinces, they restricted what could enter the areas and often charged taxes so that the government and relief organizations actually supported the Taliban (Semple 2018). Relief organizations need to take this into account when providing governance. Even when rebel groups do not do this, the relief organizations need to take into account how their governance provision and relief efforts affect and potentially support the rebel group. Potentially, providing aid helps rebel groups continue their struggle and can prolong the violent conflict, increasing the number of those killed, maimed, or forced to seek refuge elsewhere. Thus, relief organizations might implicitly make matters worse for the outcome of the conflict. They need to understand that their actions can be taken advantage of by the rebel groups.

6.2 Extensions for Future Research

The existing theory, with its focus on rebels' material and non-material needs, highlights rebels' strategic actions. To retain its simplicity, the theory marginalizes strategic decision-making by both, the state and local civilians, rather fixing each of those two's interests and actions. These simplifications are justified by claims of greater resources by the state, and civilians' preference for securing their survival.

To extend the theory, a multiple-actor model involving rebel groups, state, and civilians will be developed. The expectation is that the results of the dissertation will also hold in this more complex model. If civilians were acting more strategically with rebel groups and withheld their support and resources, greater competition should result in rebel groups providing immediately beneficial governance that is also desirable for civilians. Strategic state-civilian interaction could potentially reduce rebels' need for governance institutions. If the state withholds its governance and yet governance is demanded by civilians, rebels could profit by establishing minimal rebel groups. On the other hand, if the state provides governance in excess of what rebels can provide and of what civilians want, it would make rebels' governance obsolete but also endanger the rebellion as the generation of additional resources would become increasingly difficult. Either way, the multiple-actor model will be an important extension of the theory. It could potentially be further expanded to contain multiple rebel groups and constituency civilians.

Furthermore, future research should engage in a micro-level analysis of rebel governance institutions to examine whether the governance provision of the same rebel group differs in areas of different competition levels and types. The anecdotal evidence of the Taliban and how they treated the area around Herat in late 1996 differently from the other territories under their control hints that the assertion would hold. In particular, studying the geographical distances of front-line to specific types of institutions might be interesting as might be differences in governance for civilians that are considered to be core constituencies and those who could be classified as non-core constituency civilians.

Related to this, examining how inter-rebel relations affect governance strategies will be an important extension of this research. Inter-rebel and rebel-state relations can range from alliance over live-and-let-live arrangements to clear opposition and fighting. Different relationships with the actor surrounding a rebel group certainly affect the rebel groups' actions, such as their governance strategy, as this dissertation theorizes. However, rebels' relationship with the actors' surrounding them and those actors' governance strategies are almost certain to affect the rebel group's governance strategy. By employing a network analysis of rebel groups, their relations, and rebel-state

relations, in combination with those actors' governance strategies, the governance strategy of the rebel group of interest can be examined. It would be interesting to see if the rebel group emulates others' governance or whether it purposefully differentiates by establishing different governance institutions. Of course, this extension would also benefit from qualitative case studies showing the nuances of all involved rebel groups' governance strategies.

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APPENDIX A

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: ALL RESULTS

This appendix chapter contains all the analyses, presented in the figures in the main text of this dissertation, as tables. In the analysis of some institutional choices, some control variables might have been omitted due to lack of variation.

The institutional choices of rebel groups under rebel-state competition are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2. The institutional choices of rebel governance for rebel groups in inter-rebel competition are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4. Table A.5 reports the analysis of the determinants of rebel-state and inter-rebel competition, reported in the main text in Figure 4.13.

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
RSC Index	-0.028	0.292***	-0.108	0.697***	0.278*	0.292***	-1.417***	1.421***	-0.776***	-0.604***
	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.082)	(0.141)	(0.167)	(0.099)	(0.344)	(0.222)	(0.088)	(0.083)
State Capacity	-0.450***	-0.357***	-0.223***	-0.092	-0.994***	-0.357***	0.609***	-0.840***	-0.053	0.008
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.180)	(0.157)	(0.081)	(0.149)	(0.209)	(0.071)	(0.067)
RSC×State Cap.	0.438***	-0.325***	0.379***	0.087	0.394**	-0.325***	-2.337***	1.232***	-0.505***	-0.610***
	(0.097)	(0.120)	(0.090)	(0.205)	(0.166)	(0.120)	(0.359)	(0.209)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Ethnic Claims	-0.323***	0.086	-0.093	-0.112	0.284	0.086	-0.462	0.972***	-0.151*	-0.771***
	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.088)	(0.177)	(0.207)	(0.108)	(0.332)	(0.236)	(0.092)	(0.095)
Communist	-0.066	-0.084	-0.137**	-1.426***	0.465***	-0.084	-0.203	-0.254**	0.478***	0.317***
	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.226)	(0.162)	(0.086)	(0.166)	(0.124)	(0.080)	(0.069)
Religious	-0.472***	-1.153***	-0.495***	0.000	0.780***	-1.153***	0.000	-1.373***	0.109	-0.633***
	(0.082)	(0.179)	(0.081)	(.)	(0.171)	(0.179)	(.)	(0.342)	(0.102)	(0.098)
Territory Control	0.554***	0.739***	0.484***	1.583***	1.490***	0.739***	1.227***	0.094	0.918***	1.434***
	(0.111)	(0.122)	(0.091)	(0.188)	(0.233)	(0.122)	(0.407)	(0.157)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Armed Conflict	-0.005	-0.071	0.179***	0.233**	-0.331**	-0.071	-0.118	-0.199*	0.023	-0.163***
	(0.060)	(0.077)	(0.055)	(0.107)	(0.129)	(0.077)	(0.147)	(0.114)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.114***	-1.379***	-0.994***	-2.066***	-3.462***	-1.379***	0.336	-1.284***	-0.100	-0.930***
	(0.116)	(0.169)	(0.107)	(0.314)	(0.365)	(0.169)	(0.230)	(0.267)	(0.122)	(0.114)
Mountain(log)	0.028	-0.099***	0.021	0.067**	-0.189***	-0.099***	0.107**	-0.046	-0.111***	0.022
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Ext. Support	0.288***	0.688***	0.344***	1.092***	1.627***	0.688***	0.740***	-0.193	0.820***	0.605***
	(0.068)	(0.098)	(0.062)	(0.206)	(0.409)	(0.098)	(0.207)	(0.118)	(0.084)	(0.064)
Nat. Resources	0.236***	-0.618***	0.375***	-0.348***	0.381*	-0.618***	0.339**	-0.158	-0.023	0.465***
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.114)	(0.224)	(0.083)	(0.143)	(0.114)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Cold War	-0.205***	-0.890***	-0.179***	-0.037	-0.697***	-0.890***	-0.746***	-0.488***	-0.567***	-0.448***
	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.116)	(0.136)	(0.080)	(0.172)	(0.119)	(0.068)	(0.059)
Constant	-0.299**	-0.912***	-0.295**	-2.173***	-3.842***	-0.912***	-2.363***	-2.536***	-1.687***	-0.228*
	(0.134)	(0.161)	(0.126)	(0.426)	(0.566)	(0.161)	(0.322)	(0.339)	(0.159)	(0.125)
Observations	2311	2448	2448	1938	2437	2448	1885	2414	2381	2435
AIC	2467.93	1446.49	2982.91	747.56	526.22	1446.49	401.65	527.10	1939.65	2578.00

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.1: Institutional Choices: Rebel-State Competition (Pt. 1)

	Law-Making	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
RSC Index	-0.374***	-0.394***	-0.811***	-0.205**	-0.300***	-1.236***	0.017	-0.520***	-2.118***	-0.489***
	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.166)	(0.114)	(0.094)	(0.153)	(0.112)
State Capacity	-0.270***	-0.251***	-0.443***	-0.276***	-0.198***	-0.141	-0.046	0.502***	-0.264**	-0.474***
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.084)	(0.120)	(0.082)
RSC×State Cap.	0.102	-0.242***	0.238**	-0.010	-0.010	-1.093***	0.752***	-0.550***	-0.100	0.735***
	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.113)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.156)	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.164)	(0.123)
Ethnic Claims	-0.104	-0.210**	1.384***	-0.430***	-0.177*	-0.542***	0.100	0.729***	-0.335**	0.023
	(0.104)	(0.085)	(0.121)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.165)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.140)	(0.109)
Communist	0.021	0.323***	0.713***	0.027	0.202***	0.393***	-1.142***	0.815***	-0.733***	0.582***
	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.111)	(0.118)	(0.078)	(0.190)	(0.087)
Religious	0.146	-0.230**	0.610***	-0.442***	-0.414***	0.000	-1.992***	0.271***	0.000	0.082
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(.)	(0.254)	(0.092)	(.)	(0.105)
Territory Control	0.974***	0.793***	-0.054	0.589***	0.544***	1.551***	-0.259**	-0.427***	0.197	0.432***
	(0.113)	(0.090)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.218)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.170)	(0.116)
Armed Conflict	0.245***	0.453***	0.489***	0.344***	0.407***	-0.517***	-0.228***	0.239***	-0.647***	-0.190***
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.104)	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.141)	(0.071)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.302***	-0.056	-0.363***	-1.118***	-1.214***	-1.625***	0.255	-1.515***	-0.594***	-1.395***
	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.238)	(0.171)	(0.138)	(0.222)	(0.140)
Mountain. (log)	-0.033	-0.075***	-0.104***	-0.106***	-0.010	-0.080**	0.034	-0.021	-0.133***	0.188***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Ext. Support	0.454***	0.370***	0.516***	0.395***	0.731***	0.621***	0.247***	-0.222***	0.351***	0.728***
	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.136)	(0.085)	(0.067)	(0.130)	(0.095)
Nat. Resources	-0.323***	0.222***	0.940***	-0.286***	-0.194***	-0.691***	-0.376***	-0.359***	-0.531***	0.085
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.099)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.086)
Cold War	-0.814***	-0.936***	0.320***	-0.467***	-0.568***	-1.033***	-0.515***	-0.115*	-1.131***	-0.610***
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.146)	(0.075)
Constant	-0.353**	-1.000***	-3.577***	-0.211	-0.379***	-0.398**	-0.214	1.814***	-0.091	-0.560***
	(0.138)	(0.148)	(0.185)	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.197)	(0.169)	(0.179)	(0.278)	(0.160)
Observations	2365	2324	2432	2363	2332	1975	2397	2345	1983	2321
AIC	2105.42	2506.85	1769.56	2392.92	2315.77	835.30	1460.84	2230.59	506.10	1597.05

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.2: Institutional Choices: Rebel-State Competition (Pt. 2)

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
IRC Index	-1.481***	-1.793***	-0.838**	0.357	-4.348**	-1.793***	2.867***	-7.651**	-8.773***	-1.950***
	(0.395)	(0.655)	(0.361)	(0.938)	(1.755)	(0.655)	(0.587)	(3.588)	(0.739)	(0.337)
Ethnic Claims	-0.613***	-0.209	-0.289***	-0.081	0.019	-0.209	0.125	0.471**	-0.776***	-0.934***
	(0.117)	(0.135)	(0.102)	(0.228)	(0.205)	(0.135)	(0.309)	(0.218)	(0.131)	(0.110)
Ethnic×IRC	2.730***	4.111***	1.602***	1.534*	4.381**	4.111***	-2.935***	7.619**	7.693***	0.738*
	(0.479)	(0.727)	(0.444)	(0.893)	(1.748)	(0.727)	(0.730)	(3.522)	(0.761)	(0.425)
State Cap.	-0.179***	-0.485***	-0.010	0.068	-0.743***	-0.485***	-0.387***	0.195**	-0.370***	-0.384***
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.052)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Communist	-0.115	-0.100	-0.185***	-1.290***	0.457***	-0.100	-0.511***	-0.016	0.284***	0.163**
	(0.071)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.219)	(0.165)	(0.082)	(0.141)	(0.135)	(0.082)	(0.069)
Religious	-0.425***	-1.218***	-0.490***	0.000	0.995***	-1.218***	0.000	-0.767***	-0.028	-0.772***
	(0.085)	(0.193)	(0.079)	(.)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(.)	(0.287)	(0.104)	(0.098)
Territory Control	0.514***	0.741***	0.456***	1.511***	1.575***	0.741***	1.404***	0.233**	1.077***	1.468***
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.091)	(0.216)	(0.236)	(0.130)	(0.374)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.096)
Armed Conflict	-0.018	-0.106	0.169***	0.262**	-0.332**	-0.106	-0.122	-0.108	0.002	-0.193***
	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.055)	(0.104)	(0.132)	(0.079)	(0.134)	(0.109)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.174***	-1.499***	-1.031***	-2.240***	-3.608***	-1.499***	-1.158***	-1.087***	0.141	-0.783***
	(0.119)	(0.186)	(0.108)	(0.354)	(0.392)	(0.186)	(0.333)	(0.252)	(0.131)	(0.117)
Mountain. (log)	0.012	-0.089***	0.002	0.036	-0.193***	-0.089***	0.019	-0.093***	-0.065***	0.065***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Ext. Support	0.353***	0.729***	0.404***	1.066***	1.492***	0.729***	0.578***	-0.299***	0.862***	0.619***
	(0.069)	(0.108)	(0.062)	(0.200)	(0.379)	(0.108)	(0.196)	(0.110)	(0.090)	(0.066)
Nat. Resources	0.188**	-0.657***	0.320***	-0.343***	0.508**	-0.657***	0.062	-0.124	0.018	0.502***
	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.068)	(0.114)	(0.232)	(0.090)	(0.128)	(0.090)	(0.082)	(0.074)
Cold War	-0.212***	-0.913***	-0.188***	-0.018	-0.656***	-0.913***	-0.646***	-0.428***	-0.642***	-0.454***
	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.114)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.160)	(0.104)	(0.071)	(0.060)
Constant	-0.067	-0.566***	-0.178	-1.886***	-3.423***	-0.566***	-2.610***	-1.351***	-1.562***	-0.348***
	(0.136)	(0.159)	(0.128)	(0.457)	(0.586)	(0.159)	(0.289)	(0.279)	(0.163)	(0.130)
Observations	2306	2443	2443	1935	2432	2443	1882	2409	2376	2430
AIC	2454.04	1411.32	2985.59	753.97	528.28	1411.32	434.33	599.40	1879.09	2599.64

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Institutional Choices: Inter-Rebel Competition (Pt. 1)

	Law-Making	Taxation	Org. Gov	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
main										
IRC Index	-2.592***	-0.843***	-2.341**	-1.561***	-1.224***	-5.805***	-3.852***	-2.466***	-4.184***	-0.445
	(0.657)	(0.299)	(1.168)	(0.355)	(0.339)	(1.018)	(0.606)	(0.400)	(0.822)	(0.409)
Ethnic Claims	-0.372***	-0.433***	1.338***	-0.702***	-0.284**	-0.912***	-0.269**	0.488***	-0.486***	0.088
	(0.127)	(0.100)	(0.143)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.208)	(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.142)	(0.125)
Ethnic×IRC	2.329***	2.281***	-0.717	2.429***	0.763*	3.110***	4.474***	1.063**	-0.846	-1.257**
	(0.722)	(0.422)	(1.205)	(0.466)	(0.443)	(1.032)	(0.661)	(0.475)	(1.761)	(0.515)
State Cap.	-0.242***	-0.411***	-0.418***	-0.284***	-0.233***	-0.645***	0.348***	0.102**	-0.453***	-0.146***
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.079)	(0.051)
Communist	-0.063	0.192***	0.557***	-0.034	0.138**	0.198**	-1.144***	0.682***	-0.962***	0.473***
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.075)	(0.177)	(0.077)
Religious	0.092	-0.317***	0.597***	-0.490***	-0.471***	0.000	-1.906***	0.261***	0.000	0.112
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(.)	(0.215)	(0.095)	(.)	(0.095)
Territory Control	0.964***	0.699***	-0.098	0.570***	0.514***	1.681***	-0.288***	-0.342***	0.105	0.376***
	(0.119)	(0.092)	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.246)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.171)	(0.110)
Armed Conflict	0.224***	0.443***	0.511***	0.322***	0.396***	-0.525***	-0.241***	0.175***	-0.680***	-0.124*
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.098)	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.143)	(0.071)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.225***	-0.158	-0.150	-1.099***	-1.131***	-1.549***	0.204	-1.238***	-0.310	-1.338***
	(0.133)	(0.118)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.124)	(0.223)	(0.178)	(0.137)	(0.207)	(0.138)
Mountain. (log)	-0.021	-0.080***	-0.082***	-0.104***	0.002	-0.041	0.021	0.025	-0.126***	0.139***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.026)
Ext. Support	0.495***	0.444***	0.562***	0.448***	0.766***	0.643***	0.296***	-0.213***	0.394***	0.705***
	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.136)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.124)	(0.092)
Nat. Resources	-0.338***	0.143**	0.968***	-0.338***	-0.199***	-0.606***	-0.400***	-0.322***	-0.561***	0.085
	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.093)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.116)	(0.085)
Cold War	-0.847***	-0.923***	0.288***	-0.495***	-0.599***	-1.039***	-0.538***	-0.152**	-1.118***	-0.601***
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.150)	(0.072)
Constant	-0.250*	-0.983***	-3.782***	-0.089	-0.386***	-0.557***	0.202	1.728***	-0.558**	-0.749***
	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.201)	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.213)	(0.173)	(0.163)	(0.278)	(0.163)
Observations	2360	2319	2427	2359	2327	1972	2392	2340	1980	2316
AIC	2088.82	2492.13	1769.56	2365.45	2305.46	847.71	1467.28	2198.47	527.62	1648.20

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4: Institutional Choices: Inter-Rebel Competition (Pt. 2)

	Inter-Rebel Competition	Rebel-State Competition
main		
Ethnic Claims	-0.003	0.295***
	(0.251)	(0.104)
Communist Ideology	0.510**	0.441***
	(0.236)	(0.121)
Religious Ideology	0.779**	0.334***
	(0.395)	(0.126)
Ethnic Frac.	0.692*	0.000
	(0.360)	(0.183)
Mountainous Terrain (log)	0.111	0.061**
	(0.069)	(0.030)
State Capacity	-0.176	0.091
	(0.124)	(0.068)
Constant	0.296	-0.547***
	(0.350)	(0.156)
Observations	4055	11339
AIC	4000.48	14305.52

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Determinants of Rebel-State and Inter-Rebel Competition

APPENDIX B

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

This appendix chapter reports all the robustness checks done to support the findings of the dissertation presented in the text. One robustness check involves the use of a different independent variable, in lieu of the competition variables used for the analyses in the text.

B.1 Rebel-State Competition

Competition is operationalized by using the *rebel strength* variable of the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). As no other variable has the same temporal and geographical coverage as the Hanson-Sigman latent capacity data (Hanson and Sigman 2021), that variable is also used here. Exchanging this variable with another capacity variable would mean two require two things: First, it would require narrowing down which type of state capacity to focus on, for example, extractive or coercive capacity. Since it is difficult to impossible to disentangle different types of capacity, all possible measures would be imperfect and subject to sometimes immense biases (Hanson and Sigman 2021).

Second, choosing a different measure of state capacity means reducing temporal and/or geographic coverage. Specifically, if the Hanson-Sigman latent capacity data were to be replaced with another variable that is similarly all-encompassing for state capacity, it would mean to drop almost 40 years of observations as most of those measures only began coverage in the late 1990s at the earliest. The best non-Hanson-Sigman state capacity measure would be the Statistical Capacity measure produced by the World Bank. This covers 127 but only for the period of 2004-2015. As the rebel governance data ends in 2012, using this data would result in dropping 44 years of observations for a remainder of 8 years. This is almost certain to introduce various, potentially damaging, biases.

This robustness check returns expected results. However, due to the different nature of the

variable, the figures and tables are the opposite of the results in the tables. Higher values of *rebel strength* mean that rebel groups are in less competition as they are stronger than the government. So, while Tables B.1 and B.2 show that rebels become increasingly likely to establish governance institutions as the group gains stronger, this means that as their competition decreases, rebels establish governance institutions. This is in line with the expectation of the theory. The same tables show that as competition increases (in terms of decreasing *Rebel Strength* variable), rebels become more likely to establish state-like governance and less likely to establish state-rivaling governance. Yet, Table B.2 shows that rebels in weak states are most likely to establish state-rivaling governance institutions as their competition increases.

B.2 Inter-Rebel Competition

I test the robustness of findings from the analysis by using two alternative operationalizations of inter-rebel competition. I employ the simplest operationalization, a count of rebel groups in a given year. While rebel groups can be in loose or strict alliances, which would reduce inter-rebel competition, rebels are still competing with one another for material resources and non-material support. Therefore, even when rebel groups are not fighting one another, they are still in inter-rebel competition with one another. The count data was created using raw data on rebels' existence from the Quasi-State Institutions Data (Albert Forthcoming). The minimum number of rebel groups present in a country in a year is 0 while the maximum is 15. For the second alternative operationalization, I follow Mosinger (2018) and use the Laakso-Taagepera (LT) index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) to create the effective number of rebel groups in a given year. In the formula below, the number of effective rebel groups in a given year, *N*, is a function of the total number of rebel groups *n*, and *p*, group *i*'s proportion of size relative to the total rebel movement:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2} \tag{B.1}$$

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
Reb. Strength	-0.023	-0.227***	-0.029	-0.519***	0.062	-0.227***	0.679***	-1.060***	0.376***	0.284***
	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.092)	(0.129)	(0.060)	(0.111)	(0.156)	(0.053)	(0.050)
State Capacity	0.003	-1.069***	0.095	0.249	-0.287*	-1.069***	-1.813***	1.459***	-1.013***	-0.862***
	(0.096)	(0.141)	(0.088)	(0.185)	(0.163)	(0.141)	(0.446)	(0.192)	(0.085)	(0.099)
Strength×State Cap.	-0.125**	0.315***	-0.071	-0.202*	-0.287***	0.315***	0.792***	-0.990***	0.404***	0.316***
	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.075)	(0.234)	(0.147)	(0.049)	(0.056)
Ethnic Claims	-0.331***	0.062	-0.110	-0.277*	0.349*	0.062	-0.262	1.068***	-0.106	-0.729***
	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.088)	(0.157)	(0.206)	(0.110)	(0.228)	(0.266)	(0.091)	(0.095)
Communist	-0.067	-0.133	-0.162**	-1.453***	0.625***	-0.133	-0.237	-0.219*	0.416***	0.283***
	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.070)	(0.212)	(0.173)	(0.088)	(0.153)	(0.132)	(0.080)	(0.070)
Religious	-0.446***	-1.199***	-0.508***	0.000	0.884***	-1.199***	0.000	-1.582***	0.059	-0.678***
	(0.083)	(0.194)	(0.081)	(.)	(0.186)	(0.194)	(.)	(0.322)	(0.102)	(0.098)
Territory Control	0.544***	0.692***	0.455***	1.678***	1.676***	0.692***	0.986***	0.119	0.849***	1.376***
	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.091)	(0.194)	(0.264)	(0.125)	(0.244)	(0.160)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Armed Conflict	0.007	-0.083	0.187***	0.209*	-0.337***	-0.083	-0.207	-0.235**	0.047	-0.158***
	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.055)	(0.107)	(0.131)	(0.078)	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.148***	-1.317***	-1.024***	-2.064***	-3.710***	-1.317***	-0.030	-1.406***	-0.127	-0.932***
	(0.116)	(0.173)	(0.107)	(0.305)	(0.406)	(0.173)	(0.220)	(0.256)	(0.120)	(0.113)
Mountain. (log)	0.011	-0.106***	0.001	0.069*	-0.197***	-0.106***	0.154***	-0.037	-0.105***	0.028
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Ext. Support	0.292***	0.731***	0.366***	1.104***	1.555***	0.731***	0.632***	-0.246**	0.837***	0.607***
	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.062)	(0.195)	(0.411)	(0.099)	(0.187)	(0.124)	(0.085)	(0.064)
Nat. Resources	0.209***	-0.641***	0.336***	-0.375***	0.449**	-0.641***	0.460***	-0.125	-0.018	0.467***
	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.068)	(0.119)	(0.214)	(0.084)	(0.132)	(0.113)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Cold War	-0.200***	-0.922***	-0.181***	-0.058	-0.685***	-0.922***	-0.770***	-0.452***	-0.560***	-0.434***
	(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.056)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.081)	(0.166)	(0.125)	(0.068)	(0.059)
Constant	-0.255	-0.337*	-0.256	-0.851*	-3.991***	-0.337*	-3.730***	-0.091	-2.675***	-1.015***
	(0.159)	(0.189)	(0.157)	(0.435)	(0.526)	(0.189)	(0.373)	(0.338)	(0.192)	(0.161)
Observations	2306	2443	2443	1935	2432	2443	1882	2409	2376	2430
AIC	2484.46	1418.03	2999.13	740.85	519.80	1418.03	430.11	513.51	1950.87	2605.15

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.1: Robustness Check: Competition as Rebel Strength (NSA) (Pt. 1).

	Police	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
Reb. Strength	0.234***	0.243***	0.454***	0.139***	0.138**	0.606***	-0.244***	0.524***	0.501***	0.079
	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.059)
State Capacity	-0.313***	-0.663***	-0.450***	-0.343***	-0.267***	-2.068***	0.624***	-0.259***	-0.409***	0.382***
	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.122)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.174)	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.135)	(0.111)
Strength×State Cap.	0.064	0.169***	0.088	0.042	0.035	0.816***	-0.200***	0.307***	0.043	-0.294***
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.089)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.063)
Ethnic Claims	-0.096	-0.184**	1.327***	-0.438***	-0.168*	-0.518***	0.071	0.773***	-0.337***	0.004
	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.116)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.163)	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.108)
Communist	0.034	0.332***	0.693***	0.040	0.198***	0.316***	-1.202***	0.885***	-0.739***	0.506***
	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.079)	(0.170)	(0.082)
Religious	0.145	-0.242**	0.657***	-0.442***	-0.434***	0.000	-1.937***	0.328***	0.000	0.073
	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(.)	(0.228)	(0.094)	(.)	(0.105)
Territory Control	0.966***	0.772***	-0.025	0.604***	0.522***	1.425***	-0.332***	-0.408***	0.245	0.415***
	(0.115)	(0.091)	(0.117)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.217)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.180)	(0.118)
Armed Conflict	0.264***	0.463***	0.527***	0.356***	0.420***	-0.471***	-0.236***	0.250***	-0.574***	-0.151**
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.142)	(0.071)
Ethnic Frac.	-1.350***	-0.073	-0.404***	-1.139***	-1.238***	-1.621***	0.153	-1.553***	-0.698***	-1.498***
	(0.134)	(0.115)	(0.126)	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.241)	(0.168)	(0.141)	(0.212)	(0.140)
Mountain. (log)	-0.040*	-0.069***	-0.114***	-0.106***	-0.011	-0.070**	-0.005	0.020	-0.131***	0.173***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Ext. Support	0.452***	0.369***	0.516***	0.394***	0.738***	0.661***	0.272***	-0.271***	0.332***	0.710***
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.135)	(0.084)	(0.069)	(0.124)	(0.093)
Nat. Resources	-0.331***	0.224***	0.900***	-0.291***	-0.209***	-0.712***	-0.458***	-0.331***	-0.591***	0.022
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.103)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.116)	(0.085)
Cold War	-0.815***	-0.938***	0.341***	-0.462***	-0.575***	-1.053***	-0.541***	-0.110	-1.155***	-0.580***
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.101)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.151)	(0.074)
Constant	-0.928***	-1.610***	-4.716***	-0.553***	-0.750***	-1.927***	0.365*	0.708***	-1.729***	-0.824***
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.226)	(0.167)	(0.182)	(0.304)	(0.213)	(0.183)	(0.278)	(0.205)
Observations	2360	2319	2427	2359	2327	1972	2392	2340	1980	2316
AIC	2100.02	2501.28	1781.14	2385.42	2311.11	833.17	1479.02	2198.25	525.43	1630.71

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Robustness Check: Competition as Rebel Strength (NSA) (Pt. 2).

This measure allows to distinguish between situations with equal numbers of rebel groups but the groups have vastly different fighting capabilities. Therefore, using the LT index enables the balancing of numbers and size between rebel groups. Mosinger (2018) uses proportional troop counts to calculate the effective number of rebel groups. I use the Non-State Actor Data's (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013) *rebel strength* variable, which records a rebel group's military strength relative to the government, as the basis for a rebel group's proportion of the entire rebel movements' military strength. The reason for this departure from Mosinger (2018) is missing troop count data for some rebel groups.

For either operationalization, the results for Hypothesis 1 hold: as inter-rebel competition increases, rebel groups are less likely to create governance institutions. These two alternative operationalizations also lead to the same results for the tests of Hypothesis 2. However, in these tests, I can only partially support the previous findings. While both alternative operationalizations of inter-rebel competition find that inter-rebel competition statistically significantly increases rebel groups' propensity to create healthcare governance, neither of them shows a statistically significant impact of inter-rebel competition on rebel elections. Similarly, both operationalizations find a statistically significant negative impact of inter-rebel competition on rebels' diplomatic missions abroad (embassies), while neither finds a statistically significant effect on rebel groups' organization like a government. The results of all robustness checks are below. As either operationalization contains less information about rebel groups' relative fighting capabilities and therefore less information about the degree of inter-rebel competition, I argue that overall, the robustness checks support the findings of the analysis.

B.3 Selection Problem

The analysis in the main text of the dissertation analyzes rebels' institutional choices given that they have opted into the creation of governance in the first place. This exposes the analysis to a potential selection problem: rebel groups that establish governance institutions might be fundamentally different, including in their competition, from rebel groups that forgo governance

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
Rebel Count	0.015	-0.048***	0.026***	-0.026	-0.109***	-0.048***	0.002	-0.069***	-0.164***	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Ethnic Claims	-0.206**	-0.424***	-0.024	-0.033	-0.693***	-0.424***	-0.172	0.079	-0.703***	-0.292***
	(0.085)	(0.116)	(0.074)	(0.199)	(0.177)	(0.116)	(0.237)	(0.130)	(0.105)	(0.076)
Ethnic×Rebel Count	0.023*	0.088***	0.015	-0.008	0.175***	0.088***	-0.022	0.090***	0.147***	-0.015
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
State Capacity	-0.189***	-0.522***	-0.061*	0.049	-0.654***	-0.522***	-0.398***	0.180**	-0.331***	-0.284***
	(0.035)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Communist	0.113**	0.034	0.045	-1.163***	0.543***	0.034	-0.275**	-0.129	0.352***	0.307***
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.048)	(0.247)	(0.135)	(0.068)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.066)	(0.047)
Religious	-0.273***	-0.975***	-0.344***	0.000	0.957***	-0.975***	0.000	-0.555***	-0.101	-0.679***
	(0.072)	(0.167)	(0.065)	(.)	(0.163)	(0.167)	(.)	(0.213)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Territory Control	0.524***	1.022***	0.429***	1.557***	1.636***	1.022***	1.055***	0.534***	0.975***	0.989***
	(0.082)	(0.105)	(0.067)	(0.190)	(0.226)	(0.105)	(0.206)	(0.106)	(0.085)	(0.060)
Armed Conflict	0.516***	0.231***	0.652***	0.505***	-0.207*	0.231***	-0.058	0.195*	0.354***	0.379***
	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.051)	(0.097)	(0.115)	(0.077)	(0.136)	(0.115)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.806***	-0.956***	-0.658***	-1.289***	-3.023***	-0.956***	-0.450**	-0.376***	0.150	-0.440***
	(0.096)	(0.145)	(0.084)	(0.229)	(0.352)	(0.145)	(0.197)	(0.138)	(0.116)	(0.086)
Mountain. (log)	0.008	-0.015	0.009	0.129***	-0.055	-0.015	0.088***	-0.010	-0.005	0.047***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Ext. Support	0.996***	1.433***	1.074***	1.573***	1.994***	1.433***	1.235***	0.553***	1.564***	1.352***
	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.050)	(0.153)	(0.266)	(0.089)	(0.176)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.053)
Nat. Resources	0.203***	-0.372***	0.294***	-0.208**	0.402**	-0.372***	0.179	-0.130	0.084	0.455***
	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.093)	(0.188)	(0.071)	(0.110)	(0.087)	(0.066)	(0.055)
Cold War	-0.246***	-0.842***	-0.227***	-0.045	-0.706***	-0.842***	-0.689***	-0.352***	-0.597***	-0.383***
	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.044)	(0.105)	(0.127)	(0.071)	(0.151)	(0.094)	(0.063)	(0.045)
Constant	-2.010***	-2.096***	-2.041***	-2.966***	-3.669***	-2.096***	-3.142***	-2.628***	-2.609***	-2.278***
	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.078)	(0.346)	(0.392)	(0.100)	(0.222)	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.081)
Observations	11056	11227	11230	9414	11216	11227	9363	11184	11142	11187
AIC	3570.83	1901.96	4526.49	919.73	645.03	1901.96	538.44	775.86	2436.17	4266.19

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.3: Robustness Check: Competition as Rebel Count (Pt. 1).

	Police	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
Rebel Count	-0.051***	0.024**	-0.113***	0.007	0.002	-0.109***	-0.012	-0.039***	-0.050**	0.045***
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Ethnic Claims	-0.318***	-0.225***	0.610***	-0.259***	-0.121	-0.890***	-0.059	0.161***	-0.236*	0.183*
	(0.097)	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.136)	(0.080)	(0.050)	(0.121)	(0.101)
Ethnic×Rebel Count	0.051***	0.041***	0.106***	0.005	-0.005	0.060***	0.048***	0.033***	-0.099**	-0.034**
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.044)	(0.015)
State Capacity	-0.244***	-0.330***	-0.332***	-0.265***	-0.248***	-0.689***	0.166***	0.038	-0.553***	-0.197***
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.027)	(0.069)	(0.043)
Communist	0.132**	0.325***	0.471***	0.193***	0.294***	0.271***	-0.732***	0.563***	-0.627***	0.574***
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.101)	(0.039)	(0.144)	(0.061)
Religious	0.174**	-0.272***	0.457***	-0.344***	-0.300***	0.000	-1.459***	0.206***	0.000	0.234***
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(.)	(0.178)	(0.050)	(.)	(0.080)
Territory Control	0.953***	0.650***	-0.058	0.563***	0.588***	1.606***	0.162**	0.191***	0.566***	0.548***
	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.157)	(0.080)	(0.049)	(0.126)	(0.093)
Armed Conflict	0.594***	0.842***	0.688***	0.740***	0.736***	-0.220**	0.184**	1.022***	-0.405***	0.234***
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.130)	(0.067)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.841***	-0.190**	0.027	-0.730***	-0.814***	-1.243***	0.142	-0.323***	-0.514***	-1.345***
	(0.112)	(0.096)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.163)	(0.146)	(0.070)	(0.153)	(0.123)
Mountain. (log)	0.007	-0.044***	-0.010	-0.039**	0.015	0.019	0.019	0.044***	-0.060***	0.104***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Ext. Support	1.177***	1.062***	1.316***	1.089***	1.302***	1.703***	1.132***	1.132***	1.530***	1.225***
	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.120)	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.122)	(0.077)
Nat. Resources	-0.197***	0.137**	0.806***	-0.093*	-0.101*	-0.362***	-0.150**	0.128***	-0.281***	0.024
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.077)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.082)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.083)	(0.073)
Cold War	-0.763***	-0.777***	0.224***	-0.465***	-0.523***	-1.093***	-0.392***	-0.137***	-1.102***	-0.559***
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.085)	(0.061)	(0.037)	(0.121)	(0.062)
Constant	-1.831***	-2.453***	-4.031***	-1.958***	-1.996***	-2.121***	-2.022***	-1.675***	-2.383***	-2.224***
	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.142)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.126)	(0.095)	(0.061)	(0.157)	(0.113)
Observations	11134	11065	11208	11130	11085	9454	11170	11008	9462	11086
AIC	2900.11	3646.24	2458.76	3373.77	3158.75	1162.78	2162.04	6617.35	753.56	2114.99

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.4: Robustness Check: Competition as Rebel Count (Pt. 2).

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
Eff. Rebels	0.007	-0.057**	0.020*	-0.050*	-0.102***	-0.057**	-0.023	-0.132***	-0.196***	-0.000
	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Ethnic Claims	-0.233**	-0.462***	-0.035	-0.130	-0.617***	-0.462***	-0.278	-0.045	-0.798***	-0.287***
	(0.095)	(0.138)	(0.083)	(0.209)	(0.179)	(0.138)	(0.239)	(0.185)	(0.109)	(0.084)
Ethnic×Eff. Rebels	0.024	0.098***	0.012	0.006	0.172***	0.098***	-0.005	0.140***	0.180***	-0.018
	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.017)	(0.013)
State Capacity	-0.185***	-0.520***	-0.060*	0.056	-0.666***	-0.520***	-0.393***	0.165**	-0.327***	-0.282***
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.091)	(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Communist	0.114**	0.058	0.046	-1.160***	0.552***	0.058	-0.234**	-0.102	0.360***	0.319***
	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.049)	(0.251)	(0.136)	(0.070)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.067)	(0.048)
Religious	-0.279***	-0.952***	-0.350***	0.000	0.953***	-0.952***	0.000	-0.530***	-0.107	-0.681***
	(0.072)	(0.164)	(0.065)	(.)	(0.171)	(0.164)	(.)	(0.205)	(0.088)	(0.084)
Territory Control	0.500***	1.036***	0.398***	1.564***	1.650***	1.036***	1.054***	0.486***	0.963***	0.955***
	(0.084)	(0.111)	(0.069)	(0.192)	(0.236)	(0.111)	(0.209)	(0.108)	(0.086)	(0.062)
Armed Conflict	0.489***	0.221***	0.622***	0.506***	-0.195*	0.221***	-0.058	0.177	0.338***	0.360***
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.050)	(0.097)	(0.114)	(0.075)	(0.136)	(0.109)	(0.061)	(0.052)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.842***	-1.021***	-0.672***	-1.253***	-3.067***	-1.021***	-0.358*	-0.346**	0.144	-0.450***
	(0.100)	(0.152)	(0.088)	(0.236)	(0.360)	(0.152)	(0.198)	(0.143)	(0.120)	(0.089)
Mountain. (log)	0.001	-0.026	0.004	0.134***	-0.062	-0.026	0.089***	-0.018	-0.020	0.036**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ext. Support	0.900***	1.275***	0.987***	1.481***	1.870***	1.275***	1.181***	0.445***	1.423***	1.259***
	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.049)	(0.160)	(0.260)	(0.087)	(0.182)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.053)
Nat. Resources	0.111*	-0.474***	0.219***	-0.236**	0.330	-0.474***	0.160	-0.193**	0.005	0.367***
	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.203)	(0.073)	(0.114)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.059)
Cold War	-0.249***	-0.849***	-0.234***	-0.028	-0.721***	-0.849***	-0.703***	-0.368***	-0.596***	-0.399***
	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.106)	(0.128)	(0.073)	(0.153)	(0.095)	(0.064)	(0.046)
Constant	-1.754***	-1.833***	-1.816***	-2.764***	-3.572***	-1.833***	-2.991***	-2.300***	-2.349***	-2.087***
	(0.098)	(0.131)	(0.092)	(0.377)	(0.397)	(0.131)	(0.240)	(0.216)	(0.124)	(0.094)
Observations	8025	8196	8199	6721	8185	8196	6670	8153	8111	8156
AIC	3503.12	1862.84	4451.39	912.53	642.42	1862.84	534.74	761.58	2402.22	4195.25

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.5: Robustness Check: Competition as Eff. Rebel Count (Pt. 1).

	Police	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
Eff. Rebels	-0.066***	0.020*	-0.151***	-0.003	0.002	-0.142***	-0.026	-0.067***	-0.077***	0.051***
	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Ethnic Claims	-0.375***	-0.230***	0.569***	-0.302***	-0.097	-0.968***	-0.107	0.067	-0.156	0.214*
	(0.112)	(0.089)	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.156)	(0.099)	(0.062)	(0.162)	(0.112)
Ethnic×Eff. Rebels	0.060***	0.043***	0.132***	0.006	-0.015	0.083***	0.058***	0.047***	-0.114*	-0.045***
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.067)	(0.016)
State Capacity	-0.247***	-0.344***	-0.334***	-0.268***	-0.249***	-0.681***	0.173***	0.051*	-0.541***	-0.207***
	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.067)	(0.043)
Communist	0.160***	0.337***	0.480***	0.203***	0.309***	0.351***	-0.733***	0.579***	-0.582***	0.598***
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.042)	(0.146)	(0.062)
Religious	0.166**	-0.268***	0.456***	-0.336***	-0.294***	0.000	-1.456***	0.166***	0.000	0.257***
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(.)	(0.178)	(0.051)	(.)	(0.082)
Territory Control	0.967***	0.638***	-0.075	0.561***	0.576***	1.658***	0.105	0.143***	0.508***	0.550***
	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.177)	(0.085)	(0.052)	(0.126)	(0.097)
Armed Conflict	0.568***	0.818***	0.672***	0.703***	0.709***	-0.215**	0.165**	0.955***	-0.409***	0.221***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.098)	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.129)	(0.066)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.901***	-0.198**	0.070	-0.781***	-0.873***	-1.369***	0.148	-0.353***	-0.502***	-1.426***
	(0.117)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.178)	(0.150)	(0.076)	(0.163)	(0.128)
Mountain. (log)	-0.002	-0.057***	-0.016	-0.054***	0.007	0.008	0.005	0.032**	-0.075***	0.101***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Ext. Support	1.046***	0.986***	1.251***	0.959***	1.180***	1.457***	0.998***	0.989***	1.247***	1.128***
	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.115)	(0.071)	(0.042)	(0.109)	(0.076)
Nat. Resources	-0.314***	0.075	0.780***	-0.202***	-0.183***	-0.527***	-0.228***	-0.047	-0.376***	-0.059
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.062)	(0.044)	(0.087)	(0.077)
Cold War	-0.774***	-0.790***	0.221***	-0.466***	-0.530***	-1.123***	-0.381***	-0.150***	-1.074***	-0.574***
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.090)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.127)	(0.063)
Constant	-1.538***	-2.310***	-3.877***	-1.673***	-1.778***	-1.697***	-1.766***	-1.213***	-2.053***	-2.047***
	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.157)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.163)	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.190)	(0.130)
Observations	8103	8034	8177	8099	8054	6761	8140	7977	6769	8055
AIC	2833.37	3587.98	2432.26	3288.12	3100.68	1122.00	2102.78	6238.21	728.74	2081.95

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.6: Robustness Check: Competition as Eff. Rebel Count (Pt. 2).

institutions. Relatedly, the creation of one governance institution might be too low of a threshold to argue that rebel groups establish governance institutions. To remedy both points of critique, I first examine how likely rebel groups are to establish five governance institutions. Second, I analyze rebels' institutional choices without conditioning on rebels' institutional creation.

From a theoretical standpoint, it does not make much sense to examine institutional choices of actors who do not opt into creating the broader set of institutions as their "institutional choice" is a null set. Regardless, testing rebels' institutional choices on the full dataset can provide additional validity to the findings presented in the main text.

Table B.7 presents the results for rebels' likelihood of creating (at least five) governance institutions. As inter-rebel increases, rebels become less likely to establish at least five governance institutions. This provides additional validity to the results in the main text. However, this analysis does not support the findings with regard to rebel-state competition. The results show that rebel-state competition is statistically insignificant and substantially not different from a null effect.

	Inst. Creation	Inst. Creation
RSC Index	-0.046	
	(0.234)	
IRC Index		-1.251*
		(0.667)
State Capacity	-0.219	-0.019
	(0.162)	(0.129)
RSC×State Cap.	0.188	
	(0.247)	
Ethnic Claims	-0.019	0.097
	(0.267)	(0.247)
Ethnic×IRC		-0.244
		(1.014)
Communist	0.229	0.272
	(0.199)	(0.197)
Religious	-0.546*	0.141
	(0.284)	(0.262)
Territory Control	0.509*	0.473**
	(0.293)	(0.238)
Armed Conflict	0.834***	0.554***
	(0.127)	(0.122)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.771**	0.240
	(0.370)	(0.340)
Mountain. (log)	0.013	0.064
	(0.064)	(0.053)
Ext. Support	1.334***	0.246
	(0.194)	(0.152)
Nat. Resources	0.225	0.164
	(0.208)	(0.161)
Cold War	-0.412***	-0.132
	(0.151)	(0.128)
Constant	-2.145***	-0.362
	(0.300)	(0.311)
Observations	11230	3951
AIC	3684.19	4828.37

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.7: Governance Creation with Five Institutions.

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
RSC Index	0.464***	0.465***	0.424***	0.629***	0.362**	0.465***	-0.782***	1.688***	-0.400***	0.193***
	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.059)	(0.133)	(0.143)	(0.085)	(0.259)	(0.217)	(0.078)	(0.059)
State Capacity	-0.306***	-0.412***	-0.183***	-0.114	-0.920***	-0.412***	0.325***	-0.677***	-0.133**	-0.124***
	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.198)	(0.053)	(0.038)
RSC×State Cap.	0.168***	-0.297***	0.197***	0.109	0.364***	-0.297***	-1.871***	0.858***	-0.349***	-0.427***
	(0.060)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.095)	(0.263)	(0.188)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Ethnic Claims	-0.121*	-0.083	0.016	-0.026	-0.000	-0.083	-0.337*	0.512***	-0.068	-0.357***
	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.061)	(0.134)	(0.171)	(0.082)	(0.194)	(0.149)	(0.070)	(0.060)
Communist	0.072	0.007	0.010	-1.263***	0.550***	0.007	-0.216	-0.354***	0.424***	0.297***
	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.050)	(0.221)	(0.134)	(0.074)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.064)	(0.047)
Religious	-0.353***	-1.070***	-0.399***	0.000	0.872***	-1.070***	0.000	-0.883***	-0.045	-0.717***
	(0.070)	(0.188)	(0.067)	(.)	(0.158)	(0.188)	(.)	(0.266)	(0.089)	(0.087)
Territory Control	0.495***	0.932***	0.423***	1.703***	1.566***	0.932***	1.160***	0.443***	0.811***	0.980***
	(0.082)	(0.099)	(0.066)	(0.225)	(0.243)	(0.099)	(0.252)	(0.150)	(0.073)	(0.060)
Armed Conflict	0.507***	0.228***	0.647***	0.451***	-0.174	0.228***	0.083	0.095	0.316***	0.360***
	(0.057)	(0.074)	(0.050)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.074)	(0.146)	(0.113)	(0.061)	(0.053)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.707***	-1.008***	-0.531***	-1.686***	-2.778***	-1.008***	0.104	-0.705***	-0.022	-0.491***
	(0.089)	(0.139)	(0.080)	(0.275)	(0.316)	(0.139)	(0.169)	(0.198)	(0.110)	(0.083)
Mountain. (log)	0.013	-0.040**	0.023	0.119***	-0.058	-0.040**	0.091***	-0.027	-0.049***	0.025*
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ext. Support	0.892***	1.248***	0.978***	1.370***	1.909***	1.248***	1.382***	0.116	1.541***	1.291***
	(0.064)	(0.090)	(0.054)	(0.161)	(0.317)	(0.090)	(0.220)	(0.134)	(0.084)	(0.058)
Nat. Resources	0.195***	-0.446***	0.314***	-0.392***	0.296*	-0.446***	0.150	-0.215**	0.029	0.401***
	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.103)	(0.178)	(0.068)	(0.120)	(0.106)	(0.066)	(0.054)
Cold War	-0.262***	-0.862***	-0.246***	-0.115	-0.718***	-0.862***	-0.716***	-0.498***	-0.552***	-0.405***
	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.044)	(0.108)	(0.126)	(0.070)	(0.167)	(0.107)	(0.060)	(0.046)
Constant	-2.103***	-2.245***	-2.099***	-3.023***	-4.253***	-2.245***	-3.335***	-3.440***	-2.926***	-2.228***
	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.317)	(0.465)	(0.100)	(0.219)	(0.280)	(0.122)	(0.078)
Observations	11056	11227	11230	9414	11216	11227	9363	11184	11142	11187
AIC	3540.03	1884.46	4500.49	899.95	650.77	1884.46	476.41	652.52	2516.56	4201.00

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.8: Robustness Check: Rebel-State Competition with Full Sample (Pt. 1).

	Police	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
RSC Index	0.124	0.220***	-0.314***	0.218***	0.046	-0.639***	0.421***	0.712***	-1.140***	-0.054
	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.163)	(0.090)	(0.048)	(0.146)	(0.096)
State Capacity	-0.298***	-0.259***	-0.326***	-0.278***	-0.252***	-0.310***	-0.082	0.018	-0.387***	-0.385***
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.031)	(0.071)	(0.060)
RSC×State Cap.	0.084	-0.165***	0.060	-0.013	0.000	-1.003***	0.497***	-0.106**	-0.402***	0.407***
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.107)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.098)	(0.080)
Ethnic Claims	-0.090	-0.093	1.025***	-0.245***	-0.138*	-0.643***	0.123*	0.343***	-0.386***	-0.018
	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.110)	(0.070)	(0.046)	(0.111)	(0.079)
Communist	0.109*	0.353***	0.538***	0.174***	0.287***	0.296***	-0.819***	0.466***	-0.564***	0.596***
	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.082)	(0.110)	(0.040)	(0.144)	(0.062)
Religious	0.148*	-0.281***	0.436***	-0.369***	-0.307***	0.000	-1.640***	0.104**	0.000	0.189**
	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(.)	(0.219)	(0.051)	(.)	(0.083)
Territory Control	0.888***	0.688***	-0.045	0.542***	0.582***	1.520***	0.122	0.053	0.607***	0.575***
	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.154)	(0.080)	(0.050)	(0.119)	(0.092)
Armed Conflict	0.578***	0.821***	0.696***	0.729***	0.734***	-0.236**	0.170**	0.919***	-0.416***	0.231***
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.103)	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.131)	(0.069)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.917***	0.005	-0.041	-0.711***	-0.814***	-1.310***	0.241*	-0.440***	-0.608***	-1.127***
	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.172)	(0.134)	(0.067)	(0.153)	(0.124)
Mountain. (log)	-0.003	-0.031**	-0.031	-0.041***	0.014	-0.007	0.036**	0.002	-0.069***	0.144***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Ext. Support	1.113***	1.013***	1.374***	1.040***	1.291***	1.681***	1.017***	0.913***	1.635***	1.330***
	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.151)	(0.082)	(0.045)	(0.124)	(0.099)
Nat. Resources	-0.245***	0.190***	0.805***	-0.106*	-0.108*	-0.430***	-0.125**	0.022	-0.277***	0.076
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.082)	(0.073)
Cold War	-0.752***	-0.807***	0.216***	-0.473***	-0.525***	-1.082***	-0.423***	-0.132***	-1.095***	-0.585***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.118)	(0.063)
Constant	-1.976***	-2.513***	-4.400***	-1.973***	-1.989***	-2.145***	-2.206***	-1.843***	-2.280***	-2.168***
	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.145)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.132)	(0.096)	(0.063)	(0.161)	(0.105)
Observations	11134	11065	11208	11130	11085	9454	11170	11008	9462	11086
AIC	2913.01	3694.06	2474.49	3365.48	3158.47	1147.90	2122.41	6419.02	745.39	2104.58

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.9: Robustness Check: Rebel-State Competition with Full Sample (Pt. 2).

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
IRC Index	-1.966***	-2.724***	-1.377***	-2.778**	-5.268***	-2.724***	2.730***	-6.789***	-8.611***	-2.266***
	(0.412)	(0.749)	(0.356)	(1.364)	(1.245)	(0.749)	(0.609)	(2.037)	(0.625)	(0.328)
Ethnic Claims	-0.491***	-0.414***	-0.227***	-0.378*	-0.344**	-0.414***	0.295	0.185	-0.655***	-0.642***
	(0.099)	(0.125)	(0.085)	(0.226)	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.280)	(0.185)	(0.107)	(0.087)
Ethnic×IRC	2.420***	3.933***	1.206***	3.606***	5.083***	3.933***	-3.851***	6.016***	6.866***	0.459
	(0.481)	(0.796)	(0.428)	(1.333)	(1.212)	(0.796)	(0.774)	(2.022)	(0.664)	(0.408)
State Capacity	-0.193***	-0.508***	-0.042	0.116	-0.684***	-0.508***	-0.444***	0.200**	-0.363***	-0.386***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.090)	(0.075)	(0.049)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Communist	0.032	0.075	-0.031	-1.238***	0.607***	0.075	-0.287**	-0.112	0.405***	0.321***
	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.057)	(0.233)	(0.150)	(0.077)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.075)	(0.057)
Religious	-0.231***	-0.888***	-0.329***	0.000	1.120***	-0.888***	0.000	-0.559**	-0.037	-0.639***
	(0.078)	(0.166)	(0.070)	(.)	(0.185)	(0.166)	(.)	(0.245)	(0.096)	(0.089)
Territory Control	0.700***	1.096***	0.605***	1.700***	1.751***	1.096***	1.427***	0.538***	1.140***	1.388***
	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.080)	(0.206)	(0.237)	(0.125)	(0.318)	(0.128)	(0.097)	(0.081)
Armed Conflict	0.239***	0.105	0.384***	0.443***	-0.242**	0.105	-0.086	0.043	0.190***	0.105**
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.047)	(0.097)	(0.115)	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.101)	(0.059)	(0.050)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.795***	-1.023***	-0.602***	-1.656***	-2.865***	-1.023***	-0.883***	-0.582***	0.225*	-0.454***
	(0.103)	(0.149)	(0.091)	(0.276)	(0.339)	(0.149)	(0.306)	(0.168)	(0.120)	(0.096)
Mountain. (log)	0.032*	-0.014	0.037**	0.125***	-0.052	-0.014	0.064**	-0.014	-0.012	0.092***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Ext. Support	0.338***	0.719***	0.397***	0.951***	1.287***	0.719***	0.543***	-0.203**	0.805***	0.584***
	(0.059)	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.185)	(0.302)	(0.090)	(0.184)	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.056)
Nat. Resources	0.211***	-0.469***	0.325***	-0.279***	0.398**	-0.469***	0.054	-0.112	0.073	0.491***
	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.105)	(0.188)	(0.076)	(0.126)	(0.086)	(0.072)	(0.063)
Cold War	-0.246***	-0.878***	-0.222***	-0.017	-0.715***	-0.878***	-0.753***	-0.402***	-0.639***	-0.497***
	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.050)	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.077)	(0.159)	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.051)
Constant	-0.898***	-1.237***	-0.946***	-2.063***	-3.225***	-1.237***	-2.953***	-1.708***	-1.971***	-1.129***
	(0.108)	(0.141)	(0.101)	(0.407)	(0.463)	(0.141)	(0.280)	(0.238)	(0.143)	(0.101)
Observations	3777	3948	3951	3158	3937	3948	3107	3905	3863	3908
AIC	3085.57	1724.92	3915.04	878.36	631.88	1724.92	476.89	676.84	2229.80	3511.11

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.10: Robustness Check: Inter-Rebel Competition with Full Sample (Pt. 1).

	Police	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
IRC Index	-3.196***	-1.343***	-0.996**	-2.108***	-1.781***	-6.506***	-4.715***	-2.713***	-4.041***	-0.889**
	(0.640)	(0.260)	(0.448)	(0.357)	(0.340)	(0.908)	(0.613)	(0.341)	(0.843)	(0.366)
Ethnic Claims	-0.387***	-0.348***	1.246***	-0.585***	-0.297***	-0.923***	-0.272***	0.192***	-0.340**	0.051
	(0.110)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.184)	(0.102)	(0.074)	(0.140)	(0.102)
Ethnic×IRC	2.283***	1.879***	-2.642***	2.182***	0.657	2.772***	4.253***	0.766*	-3.920*	-1.601***
	(0.709)	(0.376)	(0.584)	(0.465)	(0.447)	(0.995)	(0.668)	(0.411)	(2.038)	(0.500)
State Capacity	-0.266***	-0.386***	-0.417***	-0.277***	-0.251***	-0.692***	0.300***	0.025	-0.499***	-0.210***
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.069)	(0.048)
Communist	0.103	0.377***	0.535***	0.130**	0.262***	0.396***	-0.893***	0.495***	-0.615***	0.604***
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.053)	(0.157)	(0.069)
Religious	0.206**	-0.236***	0.552***	-0.316***	-0.318***	0.000	-1.540***	0.321***	0.000	0.258***
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(.)	(0.193)	(0.062)	(.)	(0.087)
Territory Control	1.158***	0.844***	0.030	0.728***	0.721***	1.917***	0.112	0.259***	0.547***	0.708***
	(0.107)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.212)	(0.094)	(0.068)	(0.142)	(0.103)
Armed Conflict	0.385***	0.573***	0.506***	0.488***	0.539***	-0.333***	0.014	0.504***	-0.469***	0.088
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.090)	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.123)	(0.063)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.934***	0.003	0.021	-0.764***	-0.770***	-1.297***	0.373**	-0.302***	-0.263	-1.062***
	(0.118)	(0.100)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.183)	(0.154)	(0.083)	(0.168)	(0.125)
Mountain. (log)	0.026	-0.022	-0.028	-0.033*	0.042**	0.035	0.061***	0.060***	-0.044*	0.126***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Ext. Support	0.450***	0.455***	0.705***	0.473***	0.718***	0.622***	0.334***	0.055	0.519***	0.612***
	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.112)	(0.081)
Nat. Resources	-0.269***	0.168***	0.937***	-0.175***	-0.111*	-0.421***	-0.188***	-0.035	-0.295***	0.074
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.083)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.093)	(0.077)
Cold War	-0.799***	-0.884***	0.213***	-0.479***	-0.564***	-1.121***	-0.396***	-0.130***	-1.061***	-0.627***
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.091)	(0.067)	(0.046)	(0.127)	(0.067)
Constant	-0.858***	-1.570***	-3.963***	-0.867***	-1.066***	-1.104***	-0.717***	-0.159*	-1.394***	-1.400***
	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.161)	(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.186)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.222)	(0.131)
Observations	3855	3786	3929	3852	3806	3198	3892	3752	3206	3808
AIC	2560.87	3221.31	2238.78	2981.80	2871.69	995.80	1838.54	4690.75	653.51	1937.29

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.11: Robustness Check: Inter-Rebel Competition with Full Sample (Pt. 2).

APPENDIX C

ENDOGENEITY ISSUES

Table C.1 reports the instrumental variable approach models for institutional creation. Both models indicate a statistically insignificant effect of competition (rebel-state and inter-rebel) on institutional creation. Furthermore, while inter-rebel competition appears to have a negative effect on institutional creation, which is in line with the theory presented in the main text, rebel-state competition has a positive association with institutional creation — an effect in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. This difference can partially be explained by the crudeness of the instrumental variable, which I previously discussed in the main text.

	Inst. Creation	Inst. Creation
RSC Index	0.475	
	(0.519)	
IRC Index		-0.527
		(1.561)
State Capacity	-0.042	0.015
	(0.088)	(0.065)
Ethnic Claims	0.085	-0.006
	(0.118)	(0.119)
Territorial Control	0.028	0.146
	(0.142)	(0.150)
Armed Conflict	0.232***	0.194***
	(0.056)	(0.061)
Ethnic Frac.	0.035	0.109
	(0.148)	(0.202)
Mountain. (log)	-0.011	0.027
	(0.037)	(0.043)
External Support	0.136*	0.088
	(0.078)	(0.056)
Natural Resources	-0.017	0.074
	(0.099)	(0.092)
Cold War	-0.027	-0.030
	(0.054)	(0.070)
Constant	0.070	0.437**
	(0.353)	(0.175)
Observations	3956	3951

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.1: Instrumental Variable Model for Institutional Creation.

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
RSC Index	-0.253***	-0.216**	-0.666**	-0.495***	0.349***	-0.179***	-0.104**	-0.133***	0.183**	-0.238***
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.264)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.090)
State Capacity	-0.058***	-0.020	-0.047	0.059***	-0.064***	-0.089***	-0.011	0.036***	-0.109***	-0.110***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.055)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Ethnic Claims	-0.141***	-0.064**	-0.176**	-0.041***	0.062***	-0.056***	-0.028**	0.001	-0.036*	-0.262***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.078)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Territorial Control	0.262***	0.265***	0.911***	0.214***	-0.009	0.234***	0.075***	0.052***	0.169***	0.499***
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.090)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Armed Conflict	-0.005	0.040**	0.054	0.036***	-0.015	-0.034***	-0.015**	-0.008	0.011	-0.053***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.340***	-0.275***	-1.296***	-0.129***	-0.203***	-0.227***	-0.032***	-0.045***	-0.069***	-0.258***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.103)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.033)
Mountain. (log)	0.008	0.016*	0.048*	0.027***	-0.031***	-0.007	0.008**	-0.003	-0.032***	0.015*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)
External Support	0.066***	0.105***	0.394***	0.031***	0.081***	0.078***	0.018**	-0.021**	0.190***	0.155***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Natural Resources	0.078***	0.155***	0.150**	0.006	0.005	-0.092***	0.008	-0.008	-0.040**	0.133***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Cold War	-0.065***	-0.093***	-0.307***	-0.000	-0.052***	-0.151***	-0.039***	-0.017**	-0.123***	-0.110***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Constant	0.487***	0.376***	1.473***	0.355***	-0.175***	0.349***	0.104***	0.138***	-0.072	0.446***
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.207)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Observations	2311	2316	2448	2390	2437	2448	2337	2414	2381	2435

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.2: Instrumental Variable for Inst. Choices under RSC (Pt. 1).

	Law-Making	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
RSC Index	-0.051	0.071	0.587***	-0.324***	-0.192**	-0.078	-1.220***	0.634***	-0.293***	0.275***
	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.128)	(0.101)	(0.040)	(0.079)
State Capacity	-0.049***	-0.141***	-0.135***	-0.067***	-0.055***	-0.081***	0.178***	-0.029	-0.011	-0.056***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Ethnic Claims	-0.033	-0.079***	0.255***	-0.175***	-0.094***	-0.121***	-0.062**	0.196***	-0.091***	0.009
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Territorial Control	0.233***	0.228***	-0.139***	0.268***	0.232***	0.223***	0.269***	-0.236***	0.114***	0.026
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Armed Conflict	0.053***	0.136***	0.113***	0.090***	0.114***	-0.066***	-0.044*	0.081***	-0.044***	-0.027*
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.358***	-0.036	-0.095***	-0.321***	-0.350***	-0.204***	0.072*	-0.390***	-0.041***	-0.311***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Mountain. (log)	-0.012*	-0.029***	-0.047***	-0.026***	0.001	-0.014**	0.035***	-0.031***	-0.014***	0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)
External Support	0.117***	0.118***	0.182***	0.088***	0.177***	0.049***	-0.077***	-0.020	-0.011	0.140***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Natural Resources	-0.085***	0.045**	0.089***	-0.058***	-0.041*	-0.112***	0.037	-0.165***	-0.042***	-0.026
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Cold War	-0.210***	-0.273***	0.055***	-0.123***	-0.145***	-0.134***	-0.071***	-0.013	-0.080***	-0.122***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Constant	0.382***	0.121*	-0.587***	0.529***	0.428***	0.304***	0.855***	0.659***	0.296***	0.161**
	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.040)	(0.063)
Observations	2365	2324	2432	2363	2332	2427	2397	2345	2435	2321

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.3: Instrumental Variable for Inst. Choices under RSC (Pt. 2).

	Healthcare	Education	Welfare	Transport	Housing	Elections	ID	Const. Pol.	Diplomacy	Government
IRC Index	-3.585**	-3.280**	-6.900**	-2.342***	0.883**	-4.320***	-0.983***	-0.957***	-1.181*	-8.959***
	(1.429)	(1.298)	(3.071)	(0.733)	(0.450)	(1.211)	(0.329)	(0.356)	(0.683)	(2.453)
State Capacity	-0.148***	-0.090***	-0.227***	-0.038***	-0.005	-0.170***	-0.035***	0.006	-0.090***	-0.260***
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.064)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.040)
Ethnic Claims	-0.272***	-0.182***	-0.455***	-0.109***	0.071***	-0.254***	-0.068***	-0.033	-0.118***	-0.684***
	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.169)	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.139)
Territorial Control	0.417***	0.416***	1.236***	0.278***	-0.005	0.476***	0.113***	0.089***	0.260***	1.027***
	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.205)	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.085)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.171)
Armed Conflict	-0.068*	-0.005	-0.049	0.005	-0.006	-0.103***	-0.032**	-0.021**	-0.014	-0.196***
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.079)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.062)
Ethnic Frac.	0.042	0.079	-0.556	0.103	-0.279***	0.254*	0.077*	0.056	0.090	0.752***
	(0.170)	(0.156)	(0.383)	(0.079)	(0.056)	(0.144)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.080)	(0.289)
Mountain. (log)	0.074**	0.075***	0.163**	0.053***	-0.034***	0.076***	0.023***	0.011	-0.001	0.194***
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.072)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.051)
External Support	0.060*	0.085***	0.378***	0.048***	0.062***	0.048	0.013	-0.020**	0.154***	0.079
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.063)
Natural Resources	0.222***	0.290***	0.388***	0.054	0.007	0.085	0.038**	0.020	0.027	0.519***
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.148)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.117)
Cold War	-0.174***	-0.179***	-0.511***	-0.072***	-0.023	-0.277***	-0.076***	-0.046***	-0.162***	-0.370***
	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.112)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.084)
Constant	0.575***	0.445***	1.528***	0.218***	-0.029	0.522***	0.115***	0.122***	0.125**	0.881***
	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.240)	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.087)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.059)	(0.176)
Observations	2306	2311	2443	2385	2432	2443	2332	2409	2376	2430

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.4: Instrumental Variable for Inst. Choices under IRC (Pt. 1)

	Law-Making	Taxation	Org. Gov.	Police	Justice	Border	Constitution	Media	Currency	Infrastructure
IRC Index	-0.172	-4.046***	2.439**	-4.102***	-5.384***	-2.672***	-5.062***	-1.800**	-1.340***	-1.920*
	(0.522)	(1.207)	(1.126)	(1.096)	(1.474)	(0.755)	(1.088)	(0.740)	(0.418)	(1.019)
State Capacity	-0.059***	-0.167***	-0.023	-0.168***	-0.147***	-0.128***	-0.017	0.037**	-0.068***	-0.044**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Ethnic Claims	-0.037	-0.312***	0.322***	-0.341***	-0.354***	-0.246***	-0.228***	0.033	-0.129***	-0.125**
	(0.032)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.083)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.059)
Territorial Control	0.236***	0.492***	-0.194***	0.475***	0.539***	0.382***	0.321***	-0.028	0.148***	0.189***
	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.064)
Armed Conflict	0.051***	0.066*	0.142***	0.031	0.045	-0.106***	-0.134***	0.027	-0.062***	-0.073***
	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.025)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.344***	0.439***	-0.338**	0.103	0.226	0.094	0.657***	-0.136	0.091*	-0.063
	(0.061)	(0.148)	(0.137)	(0.123)	(0.170)	(0.085)	(0.137)	(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.128)
Mountain. (log)	-0.011	0.058**	-0.071***	0.047**	0.110***	0.039**	0.104***	0.041**	0.001	0.070***
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.024)
External Support	0.120***	0.112***	0.156***	0.076**	0.115***	0.030	0.011	-0.079***	-0.001	0.113***
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Natural Resources	-0.084***	0.231***	0.047	0.095*	0.189***	0.001	0.101*	-0.008	-0.015	0.104**
	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.050)
Cold War	-0.216***	-0.402***	0.129***	-0.249***	-0.307***	-0.212***	-0.231***	-0.066**	-0.122***	-0.174***
	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.034)
Constant	0.365***	0.412***	-0.398***	0.607***	0.708***	0.428***	0.544***	1.175***	0.212***	0.452***
	(0.045)	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.076)
Observations	2360	2319	2427	2359	2327	2422	2392	2340	2430	2316

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.5: Instrumental Variable for Inst. Choices under IRC (Pt. 2).