

the reasons why many of them have survived, albeit in quite different forms, to this day.

Gowing is a skilled storyteller. Throughout the book she reconstructs the social life of work, with multigenerational households teaming with activity and ties of kinship shaping economic opportunities. Many of the careers she reconstructs through court cases remind us that the margin between prosperity and penury was very fine, and lives as well as livelihoods could be overturned in an instant. In such an environment, partnership and shared accommodation could be crucial forms of social as well as economic support, perhaps especially for single women in an urban society based on the household. Gowing is able to illuminate such commonplaces because she has both a highly sophisticated command of methodology and an eye carefully attuned to nuances hidden in the turns of a phrase in court records. Finally, and perhaps best of all, she writes in a style that makes her book readily accessible to students and those generally interested in early modern daily life.

Ian Gentles. *The New Model Army Agent of Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022. xii + 386 pages, illustrations, maps. \$38.00. Review by EDWARD M. FURGOL, MONTGOMERY COLLEGE-ROCKVILLE, MD.

Gentles has revised his 1992 study of the English New Model Army and expanded its coverage from 1654 to 1660. In doing so he has produced a thorough study of the Army and its impact on politics and political ideology. For the immediate future the book will serve as the definitive work on that subject. The author's mastery of the relevant manuscript and printed primary sources and secondary works is exemplary.

The political activity of the army dominates the book's fifteen chapters; thus, the book is not a military history. The first twelve cover the story from 1645 through 1653. Chapter one deals with the army's founding, which illustrates the author's incisive analysis. Three decisions made then had a crucial impact on its ideological diversity. One, not requiring the enlisted men to swear the Solemn League and

Covenant (9) prevented unity with the Scottish Covenanters and the Protestant forces in Ulster. The decision not to purge radicals (12) gave that group not only a safe haven, but the possession of weapons to obtain their ends. The failure to include a clause requiring the protection of the king's person (as opposed to rescuing him from wicked councilors, 14–15) planted the seeds of revolution. In chapter two we learn that service in the infantry required an act for drafting men. It was essential as the desertion rate for the foot soldiers was fifty percent. In the army's first two months it lost over 4,000 recruits, a situation that continued in 1646. By autumn 1645 it had only two-thirds of its authorized numbers. The challenge of adequately funding the army led to men living on free quarter, a situation that was never solved despite increasing taxes. Arrears in pay came after April 1647, but many had arrears for their pre-1645 service, which made them resistant to disbanding until paid. (Not mentioned by the author, but doubtless known to soldiers from coastal areas, was the fact that English governments in the 1500s and 1600s routinely discharged Royal Navy seaman without paying them.) Only chapter three deals solely with military operations, covering those of 1645–46. Chapter four covers religion and morale. The latter was high due to the army's "collective religious consciousness" (46). While Gentles cites Anne Laurence's work on army chaplains, he does not divulge if they were constantly present. The reviewer has long wondered if the absence of ministers led officers and soldiers to preach, a question which is not addressed. While the Covenanting armies replicated civilian religious practice—each regiment was a parish, and each army had a presbytery—some New Model units saw themselves as "gathered churches" separate from civil society (55). The issues of pay, an act of indemnity, and selection for service in Ireland are the well-known grievances that politicized the army. In chapters five and six Gentles, using pamphlets, petitions, and other primary documents, painstakingly discusses how the army transformed from being the servant of Parliament to its master. He deals with the defeat of the counter-revolution or Second Civil War in chapter seven. The political story resumes in chapter eight, dealing with the decisions to try and execute Charles I. Chapter nine harkens back to the pre-regicide period, dealing with the Levellers mutiny and its destruction at the hands of the Army's senior officers or grandees.

Diversions to army conquest and rule in Ireland and Scotland follow in individual chapters. Chapters 12–15 return to the political field, with the *Western Design* (261–67) serving as a break from political activity. (Intriguingly, there is no coverage of the army's more impressive intervention in Flanders nor its ideological components. How did the officers regard alliance with a Roman Catholic kingdom? Was antipathy to Catholics and kings offset by fighting soldiers of the militant Counter-Reformation? Nor do we learn anything about the units who went there—was it seen as chance to reduce the number of radicals in the Protectorate or was a chance for those most loyal to Cromwell to shine?) Gentles covers the political narrative in meticulous detail and analysis. In the 1650s the army's political consciousness came to rest in the officer corps (p.237) Was that due to the dilution of recruits or to a lack of hope in political change—due to the defeats of the Levellers and Fifth Monarchists—amongst the enlisted men? Given the strident political opinions of the officer corps the reviewer has always thought it odd that the republican officers did not fight Monck's army. Gentles explains that the prospect of political defeat paralyzed their ability to act (61). By 1656 the Army officers realized that their aspirations conflicted with those of the overwhelming majority of subjects in the three kingdoms (283), which enforced unity in the corps and may have enhanced its feeling of hopelessness. Lambert's republican force, which was in the path of Monck's advance from Scotland, suffered from low morale, no pay and desertion, thus convincing its commander not to fight (306, 308). Perhaps Gentles' most surprising find is Monck's conversion to royalism in August 1659 (315). The residue of republicanism in the horse regiments (thirty percent of the men) was insufficient leaven to outweigh the other soldiers' hope of arrears from a restored Charles II (316). The decline of the enlisted men's interest in politics, divisions within the officer corps and Monck's constant statements of support for the republic coalesced with the three kingdoms' desire for the restoration of the monarchy. While the New Model Army would eventually be seen as a force for representative government and law reform, its legacy also created antipathy to standing armies in Britain and its empire (321).

The book has some dubious elements. The book is obviously not a military history, despite its references to military operations. No

military historian would relegate logistics to the notes, as occurs for 1645 (330–31, notes 29–32) and for the invasion of Scotland (351, note 6). Although the author credits Cromwell with concentrating on pay, supply and naval aid in the Irish campaign (176–77), he also notes that half-pay led to poor conduct (184). In 1648 Gentles gives Cromwell credit for capturing Berwick and Carlisle, fortresses the Scottish Engagers evacuated not due to military action but to the Treaty of Stirling (126). While the recruiting of Irish Roman Catholics as replacements is acknowledged, there is no follow up (193). Did these men convert? If they did not, what impact did they have on unit cohesion? The Scottish chapter (eleven) is full of erroneous matter. That the Engagers contained mostly Covenanters, with a sprinkling of Hamiltonian Royalists, is entirely overlooked. The statement that the Kirk Party represented “A majority of Covenanters” is wrong, as is the assertion that it joined with the Engagers to resist Cromwell’s 1650 invasion (both on 205). Equally, incorrect is the statement that Cromwell weaned “many Scots” from supporting Charles II (206). Only three military officers defected (Strachan, Dundas, and Swinton), and the Western Remonstrants (who refused orders from the royal government in Stirling) hated the religious aspects of the New Model as much, if not more, than it distrusted Charles II. Assigning Cromwell and Lambert all the credit for Dunbar (213–14) overlooks Lieutenant General David Leslie’s failure to ensure a robust scouting/picket line, the officers’ desertion of their units, and Major General Holburn’s order that only ten percent of the musketeers should keep their matches lit, meaning that body of men was unready for immediate action. Calling Colonels Ker and Strachan “moderate Covenanters” (214) would receive no agreement from Leslie or any Scottish historian. The account of the battle of Inverkeithing (217) fails to analyze the Scottish force, which was too small, mixed veteran and raw troops, as well as Kirk Party and militant Royalists, and had no artillery. The gross mistreatment of the Dunbar prisoners of war is glossed over (“if they had not already died in England,” 223) with over half dying in captivity (making the army’s treatment of them like the Germans of Red Army prisoners in World War II). The brutal pillaging of Dundee is mentioned (223), but no explanation is offered for it lasting *two* weeks. Monck’s system of passes for people moving within Scotland

appears as an innovation when it copied the established requirement for testimonials if a person changed parishes. Similarly, his holding clan chiefs responsible for the behavior of clansmen copied pre-1639 Scottish Privy Council mandates (233). Gentles makes the fascinating statement (331, note 36) that the initial color(s) of uniforms was not necessarily replicated in new issues of clothing. Countless books, lacking the author's knowledge, have credited the army with making the red uniform coat a constant presence.

The supporting material in the book is of a mixed nature. The notes (fifty pages) sadly appear after the text. The sixteen illustrations are well chosen. Most of the nine maps are of questionable value. Six of them deal with battles in 1645–51, which in a book that is not a military history seem utterly out of place. One map showing sites of important army political events in England and another for London would have been more valuable. Another map is of Hispaniola for the 1655 campaign; a map of the Caribbean would have suited the narrative better. Only the maps of Monck's 1654 campaign against Glencairn's Royalist rising in Scotland and the provinces of the major-generals in 1655–56 add to one's understanding of events. The select bibliography (only a page and a quarter) is a disservice to the author whose knowledge of the sources is comprehensive. It diminishes the book's value as a foundation for future research.

The book should attract the attention of diverse readers. Those wanting to know the importance of the army—outside of its victories—will find the answer in it. Portions could be assigned to undergraduate and postgraduate students. Anyone dealing with English politics in 1645–60 should consult it.

Sigrun Haude. *Coping with Life during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)*. Boston: Brill, 2021, xvi + 311 pp. Review by EDWARD M. FURGOL, MONTGOMERY COLLEGE-ROCKVILLE, MD.

Sigrun Haude has authored an important book dealing with life during the Thirty Years' War. The expected details of theft, flight, assaults are present, as are the failure of local governments to provide protection and sufficient relief to their populations. What is unex-