

THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON FREE TRADE

A Dissertation

by

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation takes the form of a series of three papers. The first paper, Chapter 2, is a time series analysis on Protectionist Sentiment in the United States from 1973 to 2018. The second paper is a repeated cross-sectional analysis on the changing effect of partisanship on Protectionist Sentiment in the United States, using individual level data from the NES surveys in 1986, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. The third paper uses a time series analysis on trade policy in order to determine whether trade policy responds to changes in Protectionist Sentiment.

## DEDICATION

To my husband Brett who has been my rock through graduate school, this dissertation, and life itself—and our boys: Noah Gabriel, Benjamin Michael, and William Robert. Anything is possible with hard work and determination.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT .....	ii
DEDICATION .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE DYNAMICS OF PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT .....	2
2.1 Introduction.....	2
2.2 Literature Review .....	4
2.3 Theory .....	5
2.4 Data and Methods .....	9
2.4.1 Developing a measure of Protectionist Sentiment .....	9
2.4.2 Developing a measure of anxiousness about trade in the news .....	12
2.5 Results .....	21
2.6 Conclusion.....	25
3. THE CHANGING ROLE OF PARTISANSHIP IN POLICY PREFERENCES ON FREE TRADE.....	27
3.1 Introduction.....	27
3.2 Literature Review .....	29
3.3 Theory .....	32
3.4 Data and Methods .....	36
3.5 Results .....	42
4. PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT AND REPRESENTATION .....	47
4.1 Introduction.....	47
4.2 What are Temporary Trade Barriers (TTBs) and where do they come from?.....	48
4.3 Literature Review .....	52

4.4	Theory .....	55
4.5	Data and Methods .....	59
4.6	Results .....	63
4.7	Conclusion.....	69
5.	CONCLUSION.....	72
	REFERENCES .....	74
	APPENDIX A. ....	78
	A.1 Survey Questions.....	78

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	Page
2.1 Protectionist Sentiment .....	12
2.2 Anxiety Surrounding Media Discussion about International Trade in the United States.....	16
2.3 Number of NY Times Articles About Trade.....	18
2.4 Marginal Effects of Anxious Rhetoric about trade in the news on Protectionist Sentiment .....	21
3.1 Protectionism in Party Platforms .....	35
3.2 Survey Response Choices for Question about Trade from ANES .....	38
4.1 Temporary Trade Barrier Counts: the World Bank TTB database .....	51
4.2 Trade as a Percentage of GDP .....	54
4.3 Google Search Trends of "trade war" and "us trade" from 2004 to 2020 .....	57
4.4 Dependent Variables: Protectionist Trade Policy (Temporary Trade Barrier Counts) and the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP .....	65



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	Page
2.1	LIWC Dictionary Anxious Category words (Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010)).... 14
2.2	Variables and Tests for Stationarity ..... 20
2.3	Anxiety in the Media about Trade and Protectionist Sentiment: A Time Series Analysis..... 23
2.4	Trade in the Media and Economic Variables: Correlations ..... 25
3.1	Respondents who “haven’t thought much about this”: Marginal Effects by year using probit models ..... 40
3.2	Variable Description ..... 42
3.3	The Changing Effects of Partisanship on Protectionist Sentiment: A Simple Probit Model..... 44
4.1	Variables and Tests for Stationarity: Augmented Dickey Fuller tests and KPSS in levels tests ..... 62
4.2	The Effects of Protectionist Sentiment on Trade Policy: A Time Series Analysis. 64
4.3	A Model of the Effects of Protectionist Trade Policy on the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP ..... 66
4.4	The Effects of Protectionist Sentiment on Trade Policy Outcomes: A Time Series Analysis using the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP ..... 68
4.5	A Time Series Model of Protectionist Trade Policy ..... 69
A.1	Survey Questions Used to Develop Protectionist Sentiment Index ..... 78

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation sets out to address the role of politics in Protectionist Sentiment. I will begin by addressing the over time changes in Protectionist Sentiment. Why is the American public sometimes protectionist and other times open to free trade? Furthermore, I will examine the evolution of the role of partisanship in Protectionist Sentiment by analyzing the effects that partisanship, ideology, education, and industry have on individual level opinions in non-continuous years from 1986 to 2016. Finally, I will complete this project by examining the consequences of Protectionist Sentiment on trade policy. I will attempt to address whether there is a responsive relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy, in which trade policy responds to changes in Protectionist Sentiment. These papers are the first to incorporate politics into the determinants of trade preferences over time.

## 2. THE DYNAMICS OF PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT

### 2.1 Introduction

Since 2017, news headlines of the “Trade War with China” have filled our screens and have shed light on the fact that trade policy affects everyone. President Trump’s August 2019 plan to increase tariffs on most Chinese goods from 10% to 25% sent retail stocks tumbling. According to a report authored by 17 trade associations that represent the retail industry in the United States, families will pay an estimated \$500 more per year to purchase goods such as shoes, clothes, and travel and home goods with the addition of this tariff. Trade policies, such as tariffs, directly affect the price one pays for a pound of sugar at the grocery store, a bottle of Italian red wine, or a new car. If a tariff is eliminated, retailers might pass these savings on to consumers in the form of lower prices, and if a tariff is implemented retailers are likely to pass these costs along to consumers by raising the prices. In general, when tariffs—such as President Trump’s proposed 25% tariff on Chinese goods—are levied, the basket of goods a consumer can purchase with their fixed income changes. A 2019 Bloomberg article by Einhorn and Whitley reports that popular companies such as Apple, Walmart, Target, and Lowe’s would all be impacted (Einhorn and Whitley (2019)). Consumers would pay more for numerous goods, including smartphones, watches, headphones, handbags, soaps, shampoos, plates, cups, hammers, screwdrivers, chainsaws, lawnmower parts, vacuum cleaners, clothes, and makeup.

In an era of increasing globalization, trade policy is only going to matter more. Many of the goods we buy are made in and imported from countries such as, China, Vietnam, and Peru. One hundred years ago the extensive global markets that we know today did not exist. Because these global markets are more expansive—providing individuals with lower priced goods and a greater supply of goods—we might expect trade policy preferences to matter more now than they did in the past. Or, at least, we should be concerned about how they matter, because of their expansive effects. But, within the academic study of public opinion, the public’s preferences on

trade have not been studied consistently over time. Yet, we know the effects of trade policies are thoroughly felt by the public. Therefore, just as public opinion on education, defense, and welfare spending vary over time, we may expect public opinion on trade to change over time as well.

What I will call Protectionist Sentiment in this dissertation describes the underlying preferences of the country for or against protectionist trade policy. I will examine Protectionist Sentiment as a fundamentally dynamic concept that potentially ebbs and flows over time. Sometimes, the mass public prefers more protectionist trade policies, such as barriers to trade, and other times the public prefers more free trade policies. When the country prefers protectionist trade policies, Protectionist Sentiment is high in the United States. And when Protectionist Sentiment is low, the public prefers more liberalized trade policies, such as eliminating tariffs. But what causes Protectionist Sentiment to change? Why is the public sometimes more protectionist and sometimes more pro-free trade? This chapter attempts to analyze the potential causes of Protectionist Sentiment over time. Economic theories on preferences for trade policy argue that, at the individual level, free trade attitudes are determined by skill level (the Factor Endowments Model) and industry (the Specific Factors Model). However, they do not consider the role of politics in shaping and changing Protectionist Sentiment over time. This paper is the first to incorporate politics into the determinants of trade preferences over time.

In this paper I develop the first over time, continuous measure of Protectionist Sentiment, to date. Furthermore, I argue that Protectionist Sentiment is driven, in part, by the status of the economy, such as consumer confidence and unemployment, and anxiety-inducing political rhetoric on trade. Using this measure of aggregate opinion on trade, I argue that when the media, or political elites, take on a more anxiety-inducing tone in regards to trade the public will become more protectionist, and when the political rhetoric surrounding trade consists of a more neutral tone, the public becomes less protectionist and more supportive of free trade.

## 2.2 Literature Review

There is an extensive literature in Political Science dedicated to determining what causes individual level attitudes about trade (Stolper and Samuelson (1941), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Guisinger (2017), Mansfield and Mutz (2002), Bartels (2000), Owen and Johnston (2017), etc). However, there has been no research on aggregate level attitudes about trade *over time*. Although exploring individual level attitudes about trade and the changes in what causes these attitudes over time is important, it is equally interesting and necessary to examine the aggregate public's changing demand for trade protectionism over time.

Within this research on individual attitudes about trade, there are economic based models and models that attempt to account for the political variables absent in the economic models. However, as I mentioned before, these models are estimated at the individual level, rather than the aggregate level. Stolper and Samuelson (1941)'s factor endowments model argues that low skilled workers will be protectionist and high skilled workers will prefer more free trade. This is because high skilled workers are assumed to benefit from trade, whereas low skilled workers do not benefit from trade. The other economic model to consider is Scheve and Slaughter (2001)'s specific factors model, which uses the industry an individual works in as a predictor for trade attitudes. Owen and Johnston (2017) attempt to distinguish between the factor endowments model and the specific factors model. They propose that not only is it skill level that matters, but the offshorability of a job does too. This is due to the shift in the effect of trade to the individual job rather than an entire industry. Although these models are important in determining individual level attitudes, they do not translate well to determining what causes changes at the aggregate level in trade attitudes over time. Furthermore, they do not account for any political variables.

Guisinger (2017) and Mansfield and Mutz (2002) both attempt to consider variables such as education, fear of the other, partisanship, gender, and ideology to determine trade attitudes. Guisinger (2017) develops a sociotropical model in which trade attitudes at the individual level, pooled from 1986 to 2012, are determined by projected individual and community benefits

of trade. In Guisinger (2017)'s model it is more about "others' jobs" rather than "my job." Rather than trying to make one of the economic models fit with political variables, Mansfield and Mutz (2002) put the factor endowments model and specific factors model head-to-head and determine that neither model is appropriate. In fact, they argue that it is really education that matters instead of industry or skill-level. Furthermore, they find that once you account for "fear of the other" the effect of education on trade attitudes no longer matters, and it is really this fear that accounts for variation in individual level attitudes. Although both Guisinger (2017) and Mansfield and Mutz (2002) use data from more than one year, they do not examine the aggregate, over time changes.

In addition to the absence of existing research on aggregate opinion about trade, there is also no one survey that asks about trade attitudes each year. The focus on public opinion about trade in surveys such as the American National Election Survey, Pew, Gallup, etc seems to be sporadic. There is no continuous, over time measure of trade opinions. Therefore in this paper, I develop a continuous, over time measure of Protectionist Sentiment in order to examine how it changes over time, as well as what causes changes in it.

### **2.3 Theory**

Below I will argue that two distinct forces—media coverage and economic forces— each will play a role in shaping the over-time dynamics of Protectionist Sentiment. I will start with the role of media coverage through inducing anxiety in the public on Protectionist Sentiment. Then, I will turn to how confidence in the economy affects the aggregate opinion about trade.

I argue that Protectionist Sentiment should be determined, in part, by anxiety inducing rhetoric about trade in the media and the economy. Albertson and Gadarian (2015) find that emotions permeate the political life, in which anxiety drives more protectionist type political attitudes in immigration, environmental issues, terrorism, and public health. However, they do not examine the role anxiety plays in political attitudes about trade policy. In their theory, anxiety acts as a fire alarm in politics. Something happens that instigates anxiety within the public. This increased anxiety which is built on uncertainty about the future causes the public

to have more protectionist political attitudes (Albertson and Gadarian (2015), p. 8). Albertson and Gadarian (2015), (p. 101) argue that the framing of a policy topic is what determines a protectionist policy preference. Building on their argument, I expect that anxiety surrounding trade among the political elite (e.g., the media, Congress, and the President) should increase Protectionist Sentiment in the United States. The existing literature on determinants of political attitudes on trade focuses on the more rational explanations of politics, such as the state of the economy or the perceptions of how the economy affects you and your neighbors Guisinger (2017). This paper considers whether emotions (such as anxiety) around trade cause the public to become more protectionist in regards to trade.

Anxiety stimulates a desire for safety and protection (Albertson and Gadarian (2015)). I argue that perceived threats to the economy, to the “American” way of life, or to the country as a whole stimulate anxiety around the issue of trade. They cause Americans to be uncertain about the present and future of the economy, their way of life, or of the country. Therefore, when citizens are primed with anxiety frames, they will demand more protectionist trade policies in order to protect their way of life. This demand for protectionist trade policies, captured by Protectionist Sentiment, may include policies such as tariffs, trade wars, or quotas. We could look to the recent example of President Trump’s trade wars with China in order to see this more explicitly. China is a world power and is often considered a growing threat to the United States both economically and militarily. This animosity between the United States and China has created some level of uncertainty about what the future will bring in regards to our relationship with China. Could tariffs increase? Could the trade war lead to military conflict? Will China and the United States reach an agreement? This uncertainty causes anxiety within the public in the United States around trade, causing the public to prefer more protectionist policies around trade.

But how does this anxiety surrounding trade among the public come about? Albertson and Gadarian (2015) argue anxiety among the public is stimulated by the domination of one policy option within elite discussion. This means that sometimes political elites are able to dominate the policy discussion with trade policy options and other times they are not. Therefore, some-

times there is anxiety about trade and other times there is not. When political elites are able to dominate the discussion with one trade policy option, such as protectionist policies dominating the 2016 Presidential election, the politicians can invoke anxiety about trade within the public. Furthermore, politicians are able to invoke this anxiety card by utilizing rhetoric to instill anxiety within the public when there is less opposition to the protectionist position taken by the political elites. Typically there are two sides to the issue of trade policy: pro-free trade and anti-free trade (or protectionist). However, during the 2016 Presidential election, President Trump ran on a platform focused on "fair trade" which included protectionist policies (RepublicanParty (2016)). Hillary Clinton, the Democratic presidential candidate, abandoned supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and turned, likewise, toward more protectionist rhetoric in her focus on "fair trade" as well (DemocraticParty (2016)). In essence, there was a domination of protectionist policy propositions among the political rhetoric during the 2016 Presidential campaign. This protectionist political rhetoric should cause an increase in the anxiety felt by the American public and therefore, holding the economy constant, an increase in Protectionist Sentiment. We should also expect in times of less public anxiety about the economy, the state of the world, etc. more people should prefer free trade and therefore there should be low Protectionist Sentiment because on average, people prefer lower prices on goods. <sup>1</sup>

Most people learn about elites' opinions through the news media. They do not typically listen to political elites' speeches from first hand sources, instead they mostly get this information and tone from the news. This is because the news media is a short cut to this information

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<sup>1</sup>Although, as you will see in 2.1 soon, there is low Protectionist Sentiment during the 2016 election but here I am predicting there will be higher protectionist sentiment because of the domination (both in the presence of anxiety and the quantity of anxious news) of protectionist rhetoric during this time, I believe this should be the case absent the state of the economy. However, we know that the economy was doing very well during this time and therefore 2.1 may be illustrating the effects of the economy and anxiety-inducing political rhetoric during this time.



from the political elite. They listen or read about these political speeches and political elites' actions in the news. Even if they do not read or listen to news articles and broadcasts per se, the information they hear or see second hand from friends, coworkers, family, or social media are all reflective of the information and tone in the news. When the news is dominated by anxious rhetoric about trade via the political elite Protectionist Sentiment should increase because this anxious feeling in the media is transferred to the public.

The number of news articles about trade varies from year to year. Sometimes trade is discussed a lot and other times it is rarely discussed. This means that even if anxiety is present in the news about trade, the amount of anxious rhetoric about trade that the public gets also varies. The role that anxiety about trade has on Protectionist Sentiment should be dependent upon the number of articles about trade in that given year. If there are many stories about trade and these stories include anxious rhetoric, then Protectionist Sentiment should be higher than a year in which there are very few articles about trade, even if they are anxious.

In addition to the role that anxiety about trade in the news plays in changes in Protectionist Sentiment, I also expect measures of the economy—inflation, unemployment, and consumer confidence—to, in part, cause Protectionist Sentiment to ebb and flow. I argue that lower values of Protectionist Sentiment may indicate that people are more open to the risk associated with free trade policies in regards to job security, because they are willing to potentially give up jobs in order to procure more free trade policies. Whereas a demand for more protectionist policies may indicate a demand for shielding the “American” way of life and U.S. labor and industries. When the economy is faring poorly, people feel the effects of it and may want government to provide more protection for things such as prices, jobs, and stimulating the economy. Therefore we should expect that when inflation is high, unemployment is high, or consumer confidence is low that Protectionist Sentiment will increase because of this desire for trade protectionism. Similarly, when the economy is doing well people will be more likely to support free trade and therefore Protectionist Sentiment should decrease.

I argued above that both media coverage and economic forces play a role in shaping Protectionist Sentiment over-time. I argued that the more anxiety about trade there is in the news, the

more protectionist the aggregate public will become. Similarly, the less anxiety there is about trade in the news should lead to less Protectionist Sentiment. Furthermore, I argue that this effect is moderated by the number of news stories about trade. When there are a lot of news stories about trade and anxiety is high then Protectionist Sentiment will increase. However, when news stories about trade is low, the effect of anxiety about trade in the news on Protectionist Sentiment should decrease. Likewise, when anxiety is low in the news about trade and there is a lot of news content about trade, I expect the relationship between anxiety about trade in the media and Protectionist Sentiment to be larger than when there are few news stories about trade. Next, I turned to the role of economic forces on the over-time dynamics of Protectionist Sentiment. I argued that when the public is more confident in the economy (e.g., Consumer Confidence is high, unemployment is low, or inflation is low) we should expect Protectionist Sentiment to decrease because the public is more willing to take on the risks. And we should expect Protectionist Sentiment to increase when the economy is faring poorly. I will test these expectations below.

## **2.4 Data and Methods**

It's easy to see why there are no aggregate over time analyses of trade attitudes, since there is no single series that captures about trade attitudes. In the absence of such a series, I will need to knit together a "quilt" of sorts to capture such a concept. These "scraps" of survey questions that are available do not provide much information about aggregate trade attitudes on their own, but by sewing them together, they tell us a lot more. Using this concept, I will test my hypothesis that anxiety-inducing political rhetoric increases protectionist sentiment using a time series analysis.

### **2.4.1 Developing a measure of Protectionist Sentiment**

In order to create the broad concept I mention above, I use 32 survey questions on trade policy, retrieved from the Roper Center's database. These questions are asked a total of 214 different times, between 1972 to 2018. I combine these indicator series together to develop an underlying index of attitudes about trade policy within the United States which will be used for

my dependent variable, *Protectionist Sentiment*.

Since 1986, the National Election Study has asked the following question 10 times:

“Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports?”

With only 10 time points, this is not ideal to conduct time series analysis on, but it is a useful indicator of Protectionist Sentiment. In order to create an annual measure, I combine this NES question with other indicators. I create an aggregate measure of public opinion on free trade over various survey houses and years using Stimson (1999)’s Policy Mood method. Stimson (1999)’s method developed an algorithm to extract the common variation of the public across survey question topics. Since no single question on free trade preferences is asked consistently over time, Stimson (1999)’s method allows me to use many different questions from different surveys to extract an underlying score of Protectionist Sentiment within the United States, where each indicator is score:  $100 + \text{Anti Free Trade}\% - \text{Pro Free Trade}\% = \text{Protectionist Sentiment}$ . This allows for the normalization of scores across years. Therefore, the score assigned to a specific year can be interpreted as “support for protectionist trade policies,” where a number above 100 is anti-free trade and below 100 would be pro-free trade. Using Stimson (1999)’s method, I create an index of Protectionist Sentiment over time, by comparing each and every dyad, where year  $t$  is compared to year  $t+k$ . This comparison allows the algorithm to develop a trend across the averaged ratios that compares a survey question’s marginal response to its past and future responses. If there is no trend among the survey question marginals, Stimson (1999)’s method would return white noise. If there exists a trend among the survey marginals, an underlying correlation emerges. This results in the Protectionist Sentiment index.

I use the Roper Center survey database to collect the marginals from 32 survey questions that are asked in at least two different years and are related to free trade (for a complete list of survey questions and their wording, the years they were asked, and their correlations to the Protectionist Sentiment index see Table A.1, located in the Appendix). There are a total of 214 records of questions asked between 1974 and 2018, however after accounting for those questions that

were asked more than once in a year, there are 132 questions. In order to maximize my data availability, Stimson (1999)'s method allows for some variability in the way questions about free trade are asked. Therefore, I include questions that ask about policies such as existing trade agreements. Mansfield and Mutz (2002)'s findings on respondent consistency across trade policy related questions such as questions on NAFTA and import limits support this decision as well. I include questions similar to this Pew question asked in 2018, 2017, 2016, 2009, and 2008:

“In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the US and other countries have been a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?”

There may be some trade-offs to including these types of questions, such as actually capturing feelings towards a specific country rather than trade in general. However, both questions capture the general feeling of respondents towards free trade. By utilizing the aggregate survey marginals to conduct this index of Protectionist Sentiment we should eliminate any noise from the surveys. If there is no central tendency among both questions of feelings on trade and trade with a country within the public, then there will be no coherent Protectionist Sentiment—instead it will be only noise. <sup>2</sup>

As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, Protectionist Sentiment ebbs and flows over time. The public is the least protectionist in 1972 and the most protectionist in 1995. We see an increasingly protectionist public between 1972 and 1980 and then after reaching a peak of protectionism in 1980, the public became more supportive of free trade. This decrease in Protectionist Sentiment lasts until about 1990 when the public becomes more protectionist. Following this increasingly protectionist period from 1990 until 1995, we see the public become decreasingly protectionist until 2000. This ebb and flow trend continues with increasing Protectionist Sentiment from 2000

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<sup>2</sup>According to the correlations located in Table A.1, it seems that the various questions used to compile the Protectionist Sentiment Index do load on to each other, even when including questions about NAFTA. However, questions about the TPP do not seem to be correlated to the series, in fact they are inversely correlated.




Figure 2.1: Protectionist Sentiment

to 2008, where Protectionist Sentiment peaks during the Great Recession in 2008. Protectionist Sentiment peaks in 2008 and is followed by a decreasingly protectionist public.

#### 2.4.2 Developing a measure of anxiousness about trade in the news

My key independent variables will be anxiety-inducing political rhetoric about trade and the economy. I derive this measure of anxiety-inducing political rhetoric from a corpus of 17,628 media texts about trade from 1972-2018, from The New York Times Archives database. In order to filter the articles to ones about trade, I use the search term “international trade AND prices AND U.S.,” from 1972-1980 because between these years it is not possible to filter by section “U.S.” I then use the search term “international trade AND prices,” from 1981 to 2018 and filter by section “U.S.” I chose this search term after reading various articles that contained the type of information I wanted. As Figure 2.3 shows, there is no systematic difference in

the counts per year before and after 1981. However, in order to ensure that these two searches are capturing the same sets of articles, I search use the search term “international trade AND prices AND U.S.,” in 1982 and am able to retrieve similar sets of articles. This method does introduce a potential source of error as the articles are not the same when using pre-1982 search term in 1982. But because of the way the New York Times manages their search engine for these two time periods, by adding “U.S.” to the search term the search engine doesn’t seem to know where to look and disregards the U.S. section. This method of webscraping has its limitations, as scraping the New York Times archives allows for less control over obtaining the texts. Nonetheless, the texts of these articles do capture the level of anxiety surrounding the media’s discussion about international trade. Furthermore, it allows me to gather the entire text, whereas using the New York Times API only allows for access to the metadata for these articles, which includes a snippet of the article, but not the full text itself.

I use these texts to construct a corpus. The corpus is made up of unstructured data in order to conduct sentiment classification. In order to capture anxiety-inducing political rhetoric from the text it must be extracted from the text using sentiment classification (Pang and Vaithyanatha (2002) and Pang and Lee (2004)). Sentiment classification allows me to estimate how much anxiety-inducing text is included in each document. First, I group all of the texts by year. This allows me to create a measure of yearly anxious political rhetoric about trade. Before I begin sentiment classification, I first preprocess the text by removing punctuation, stop words, and capitalization (Benoit et al. (2018)). Preprocessing the text in this manner decreases the vastness of the corpus and will help to more accurately pick up on the level of anxiety in a text using the dictionary words (Denny and Spirling (2018)).

Table 2.1: LIWC Dictionary Anxious Category words (Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010))

afraid	alarm*	anxiety	anxious	anxiously	anxiousness	apprehns*
asham*	aversi*	avoid*	awkward	confuse	confused	confusedly
confusing	desperat*	discomfort	distraught	distress*	disturb*	doubt*
dread*	dwel*	embarrass*	fear	feared	fearful*	fearing
fears	frantic*	fright*	guilt	guilt-trip*	guilty	hesita*
horrible	horribly	horrid	horror	humiliat*	impatien*	inadequa*
indecis*	inhibit*	insecur*	irrational*	irrita*	miser*	nervous
nervously	nervousness	neurotic*	obsess*	overwhelm*	panic*	paranoi*
petrif*	phobi*	pressur*	reluctan*	repress*	restless*	rigid
rigidity	risk*	scare	scared	scares	scarier	scariest
scaring	scary	shake*	shaki*	shaky	shame*	shook
shy	shyly	shyness	starl*	strain*	stress*	struggl*
suspicio*	tense	tensely	tensing	tension*	terrified	terrifies
terrify	terrifying	terror*	threat*	timid*	trembl*	twitchy
uncertain*	uncomfortabl*	uncontrol*	uneas*	unsettl*	unsure*	unsure*
upset	upsets	upsetting	uptight	vulnerab*	worried	worrier
worries	worry	worrying				

Each document can be thought of as a collection of  $W$  features, where each document is now a vector and each entry the frequency of a term, or token, from within the text. This creates a document term matrix (DTM),  $dxw$  where  $d$  = documents in the corpus and  $w$  = tokens found in the document. I use this DTM, which consists of 14,790 text documents, to measure the extent to which the text in each document is associated with inducing anxiety. In order to determine how anxious a text is I choose a dictionary that includes anxiety as a category of sentiment. The LIWC dictionary has an anxiety category for affective (Table 2.1) words, as well as negatively associated words, anger, and sadness (Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010)). Table 2.1

includes a list of the 115 words that are considered to be anxious such as: unsettling, uneasy, risk, scare, and alarm. This list includes the stems of some words so that it includes variations of unsettl\*, unsettle, unsettled, unsettling, etc. The categorization of these words as *anxious* comes from the psychology literature in which it was determined that these words capture whether the writer or speaker is anxious or not. The LIWC dictionary categorizes the words of the text into different sentiment categories and counts how many words in the text fall into this category. For instance, it counts how many words fall into the category of anxiety and how many are associated with positive affect. Using both the LIWC dictionary and Quanteda, a text analysis package in R (Benoit et al. (2018)) I analyze whether rhetoric about trade is becoming more or less anxious over time.

My measure of anxiety inducing rhetoric in the news is measured as the average proportion of anxiety within a text in that given year. Anxiety in a text is captured using a count of the words that fall into the “anxious” subcategory in the LIWC dictionary (Table 2.1). For each text in a given year, the LIWC dictionary method returns the percentage of anxious words out of the total word count. If a text has a LIWC output of 0.46, it means that 0.46% of the words in the text are “anxious” words. I take the average of the proportion of anxiety in the texts within each year in order to create a measure of yearly anxiousness surrounding trade in the news. These values can be seen in Figure 2.2, where they range from 0% to 1.2%. Although an article in 2008 does have an anxiety value of 12.9%, this seems to be an outlier and therefore I leave it out of my analysis. Figure 2.2 shows the level of anxiety in each text using the dots, the darker the dots the more texts that had similar anxiety scores are found. Figure 2.2 also shows the annual averages depicted by the line, which makes up my key independent variable. A majority of the documents contain less than 1% of anxious words in their text, in fact the median percentage of anxiousness in the texts is 0.22%. The annual averages, are more representative of what this level of anxiety looks like, as they range from 0.207% in 1996 to 0.647% in 2001. A spike of anxiety surrounding international trade and prices in 2001 is understandable, following the 9/11 Terror Attacks. However, the level of anxiety surrounding international trade remains significantly higher post-9/11 than it does before. This shift in anxiousness about trade in the



media may, in part, have caused the increase in Protectionist Sentiment that we see between 2001 and 2015 Figure (2.1). It even seems in 2016, there is a dip in anxiety surrounding the news on trade in the New York Times articles, regardless of the 2016 Trump campaign for President.




Figure 2.2: Anxiety Surrounding Media Discussion about International Trade in the United States

Not only does the level of anxiety in the media about trade vary overtime, but the number of news articles does as well. It appears that sometimes there is much more discussion about international trade in the media than there is at other points in time. In 1996 there were only 28 news articles in the New York Times archives that fall into the filtered category I use, in which

it is about (1) international trade, (2) prices, and (3) the U.S. However, in 2006, there were 996 articles that fell into this category (Figure 2.3). Not only is trade sometimes more important in the public's mind and other times less important, it also seems to be the case that sometimes it is more and less important to the news media as well. In a post-9/11 era where trade may have become a more important issue for the time being, we can see that the number of news stories in the New York Times is reflective of this as well. Perhaps this wave of importance to the public is what President Trump was able to identify and ride into the White House with his protectionist agenda. The number of news stories is important to include because it should be the case that the effect of more anxiety in the news about trade on Protectionist Sentiment should be dependent upon the number of news stories. When there are more news stories the effect of anxiety in the news about trade on Protectionist Sentiment should be initiated. But when there are very few news stories about trade, even if they are very anxious, we shouldn't expect them to have the same effect on Protectionist Sentiment because the public won't be as exposed to these few anxious stories as they would be if they were inundated with anxious news stories.




Figure 2.3: Number of NY Times Articles About Trade

Automated text analysis has potential weaknesses. It introduces the possibility for error because I rely on an automated unsupervised process, and this is not an exact replication of actual human coding, but serves as a valid substitution. The benefits of this dictionary method far outweigh the need to find a perfect way of classifying texts.

In order to accurately determine what causes Protectionist Sentiment to ebb and flow over time, I include economic measures in my analysis. These economic measures include: the average annual unemployment rate (BLS (2021)), the rate of inflation, and the Index of Consumer Confidence. I also include a lagged measure of Protectionist Sentiment. I include unemployment, inflation, and consumer confidence because these are real economic measures that might affect the public’s demand for more or less protectionism in trade.

However, before simply including Protectionist Sentiment, anxiety about trade in the news, and the economic variables to my analysis, I must first determine whether they are stationary in

levels in order to ensure my model is balanced. Using both an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which tests for the presence of a unit root and a KPSS test for stationarity in levels, I determine whether or not these variables are stationary in Table 2.2. According to both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, and the KPSS test for stationarity in levels, Protectionist Sentiment is not a stationary series and a unit root is present. This lack of stationarity in the annual measure of Protectionist Sentiment presents a problem in which I must address. Therefore, in order to remove the unit root and ensure equation balance, I use the first difference of Protectionist Sentiment. I next test for a unit root in my annual measure of anxiousness about trade in the news and conclude that this series is stationary, thus it does not need to be transformed. As I show in Table 2.2, both the count of NYT articles about trade and the interaction between anxiety in the text and the count of articles are also stationary, according to their respective augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.

As Table 2.2 shows, inflation is a non-stationary series between 1972 and 2018. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test fails to reject a unit root in the series and the KPSS test in levels determines that we can reject the null of stationarity. In order to transform inflation to be stationary, I use a differenced measure of inflation,  $\Delta$ Inflation. Tests for stationarity for both the annual average unemployment rate and consumer confidence resulted in mixed results for stationarity. As Table 2.2 shows, the Dickey-Fuller test resulted in a unit root for both the unemployment series and the consumer confidence series. However, the KPSS test in levels returned unclear results for both unemployment and consumer confidence. For the unemployment series at the 10% level, the KPSS test rejects the null of stationarity, but at the 5% level it fails to reject (the 5% critical value is 0.463 and the test statistic is 0.404). For the consumer confidence series, the KPSS test in levels results in failing to reject the null of stationarity in levels at the 5% level (the 5% critical value is 0.463 and the test statistic is 0.453), however it rejects the null of stationarity at the 10% level. These mixed results lead me to include two models in my analysis, one in which I include the differenced measures of unemployment and Consumer Confidence, and one model including these measures in levels. I suspect that these series should be differenced, because the augmented Dickey-Fuller test concluded that there was a unit root

Table 2.2: Variables and Tests for Stationarity

Variable	Augmented Dickey Fuller Test	KPSS in levels Test	Conclusion	Solution
<b>Dependent Variable</b>				
Protectionist Sentiment <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.1054)	Reject null of stationary in levels	Not Stationary	Difference
<b>Independent Variables</b>				
Protectionist Sentiment <sub>t-1</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.0590)	Reject null of stationary in levels	Not Stationary	Difference
Anxiety Inducing News about Trade <sub>t</sub>	Reject Unit Root (p value: 0.0038)		Stationary	—
Count of NYT articles about trade <sub>t</sub>	Reject Unit Root (p value: 0.0002)		Stationary	—
Anxiety Inducing News about Trade <sub>t</sub> x Count of NYT articles about trade <sub>t</sub>	Reject Unit Root (p value: 0.0026)		Stationary	—
Unemployment Annual Average <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.1955)	Fail to reject at 5% Stationary (5%: .463 and Test statistic: .404), but reject Stationarity in levels at 10%	Suspected Non-stationary	Treat as stationary
Inflation <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.2362)	Reject null of stationary in levels	Not Stationary	Difference
Consumer Confidence <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.1547)	Fail to reject at 5%: Stationary (5%: .463 and Test Statistic: .453), but reject Stationarity in levels at 10%	Suspected Non-stationary	Treat as stationary

and this result was not on the cusp at any critical value, while the KPSS test in levels did return mixed results, but only at the 10% level. However, regardless of my suspicions I still include both models to check for robustness.

Therefore, my time series model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta\text{Protectionist Sentiment}_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Anxious News about Trade}_t + \beta_2\text{Count of NYT Articles} \\ & \text{about trade}_t + \beta_3\text{Anxious News about Trade}_t \times \text{Count of NYT Articles about} \\ & \text{trade}_t + \beta_4\Delta\text{Protectionist Sentiment}_{t-1} + \beta_5\text{Consumer} \\ & \text{Confidence}_t + \beta_6\Delta\text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_7\Delta\text{Inflation}_t + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

## 2.5 Results

My theoretical expectations are that the marginal effect of anxiety on Protectionist Sentiment should always be positive and the effect of anxiety on Protectionist Sentiment should increase as the number of articles about trade increased. Table 2.3 contains the results for the fully specified interaction model. The results of this model in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4 are largely inconsistent with the theory that there is a statistically significant relationship between the media and opinion about trade.




Figure 2.4: Marginal Effects of Anxious Rhetoric about trade in the news on Protectionist Sentiment

Figure 2.4 shows that the effect of anxiety in the New York Times on Protectionist Sentiment increases as the count of articles about trade in the New York Times increases. Although, the slope of the marginal effect is positive and consistent with the theory that the marginal effect of anxiety about trade in the New York Times on Protectionist Sentiment increases with the count of articles about trade in the NYT, the marginal effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the marginal effect of anxiety on Protectionist Sentiment as the count of NYT articles about trade increases is statistically negatively significant until 323 articles in a year, above 323 articles in a year the effect becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0. There are 20 years that have 323 or fewer articles about trade in the New York Times in which this negative relationship would exist. This indicates that almost half of the time period that is included in this analysis should have this negative relationship. According to this analysis, an increase in anxious rhetoric about trade decreases Protectionist Sentiment in the public when there are low counts of New York Times articles about trade. This is inconsistent with the theory that the more anxious the media is about trade the more protectionist the public will be and when this effect is moderated by the number of articles about trade.

I expected Consumer Confidence to have a negative relationship with Protectionist Sentiment, which is consistent with what Table 2.3 shows. A 10 point shift in Consumer Confidence, holding everything else constant, leads to a negative change in Protectionist Sentiment by 2.05. A typical shift in Consumer Confidence is 11 points, and the standard deviation of Protectionist Sentiment is 8.085. Therefore, a typical shift in Consumer Confidence leads to a one-quarter standard deviation change in Protectionist Sentiment. This relationship between consumer confidence and Protectionist Sentiment suggests that people do make the connection between the economy, or what they perceive of the economy, and their attitudes about trade. Additionally in Table 2.3, the objective economic measures that include unemployment and inflation do not have a direct effect on Protectionist Sentiment. This is not to say that these objective economic measures do not matter. It may be the case that they do have an effect on Protectionist Sentiment, but through consumer confidence.

Table 2.3: Anxiety in the Media about Trade and Protectionist Sentiment: A Time Series Analysis

	$\Delta$ Protectionist Sentiment
$\Delta$ Protectionist Sentiment <sub><i>t</i>-1</sub>	-0.328 (0.165)
Anxiety in the NYT about trade	-29.11* (13.94)
Count of NYT articles about trade	-0.00892 (0.0109)
Anxiety in the NYT about trade $\times$ Count of NYT articles about trade	0.0435 (0.0298)
Consumer Confidence	-0.205* (0.0824)
Unemployment Annual Average	-0.604 (0.672)
$\Delta$ Inflation	0.0613 (0.413)
Constant	29.16* (12.12)
$R^2$	0.336
Observations	45

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

But according to this analysis the more anxiety there is in the New York Times about trade,



the less protectionist the public is when there are smaller numbers of articles. There are multiple reasons why I might find these results. First, this I might find this negative relationship because of the lack of power in the model with only 46 observations. Other, and possibly more probable, explanations for these findings might be that (1) I have mismeasured the media variable or (2) the theory is wrong and there is no connection between the media and opinion about trade. It may be the case that the New York Times index of articles about trade is not a good way to capture media content about trade either because it is missing articles or it is not representative of the public's media consumption about trade. Or, it could be the case that using the LIWC dictionary coding for "anxiety" does not actually capture anxious tone in the media. The public might also not pay attention to the media about trade because it isn't as important of an issue as others are. This might be the case because after further exploration into correlations between the media variables: the tone and the count of articles, and the economic variables: inflation, unemployment, and consumer confidence, it seems even expectations about the direction of these correlations is wrong.

Table 2.4 shows the correlations between these variables. These correlations do not follow the intuitive expectations in which the worse the economy is the more anxious the tone about trade would be in the media. Instead, Consumer Confidence and anxiety in the NYT about trade are correlated at 0.0462, which suggests that the more anxiety there is about trade in the NYT the more confident the public is in the economy. Furthermore, anxiety in the NYT about trade is negatively correlated with inflation (-0.4755) and unemployment (-0.2555). These correlations suggest that the higher inflation or unemployment is the less anxiety is portrayed about trade in the New York Times. This is counter-intuitive because we might expect that the worse off the economy is, the more anxious the media is in their discussion about trade. This may suggest that anxiety in the media about trade isn't actually captured in this analysis.

Ultimately, I do not find support for my hypothesis that there is a direct effect of anxious rhetoric about trade in the news on Protectionist Sentiment. Nor is there a significant effect between my interaction of anxious tone and the quantity of articles on Protectionist Sentiment. But there is a direct relationship between confidence in the economy and Protectionist Senti-

Table 2.4: Trade in the Media and Economic Variables: Correlations

	<b>Consumer Confidence</b>	<b>Inflation</b>	<b>Unemployment</b>
<b>Anxiety in the NYT about trade</b>	0.0462	-0.4755	-0.2555
<b>Count of NYT articles</b>	-0.2579	0.2070	-0.1499

ment. Perhaps this suggests that its not anxiousness about trade that drives Protectionist feelings in the public, but anxiousness or worry about the economy which is reflected in Consumer Confidence.

## 2.6 Conclusion

Earlier in this chapter, I argue that trade is important because of the economic implications that reach everyone. I argued that people should care about trade because it effects our every day lives. Perhaps it is the case that this argument is true and people really are making the connection between trade and its potential economic effects on things such as the price of a bottle of wine or a car. But rather than anxiety about trade itself in the news driving changes in Protectionist Sentiment, it may be anxiety about the outcomes of trade, such as consumer confidence.

This absence of a direct relationship between anxious rhetoric about trade in the news and Protectionist Sentiment might have important implications. Albertson and Gadarian (2015) find that anxiousness about a topic leads to negative opinions about that policy topic. But since that does not appear to be so in the case of trade, perhaps trade is inherently different from other policy areas, such as immigration.

It may be the case that trade does not matter to everyone at all times nor does anxiety about trade in the media translate to more protectionist opinions. Nonetheless, trade is an important issue that does surge in the news periodically. Furthermore, as Figure 2.1 shows there is a dynamic changing Protectionist Sentiment present in the American public.

This dissertation chapter is the first to develop an overtime measure of Protectionist Sentiment, and thus lends itself to opening a potential avenue of further research on Protectionist

Sentiment and its effects. According to the results in Table 2.3, we know that Consumer Confidence, in part, drives Protectionist Sentiment. However, we do not know the potential effects of this changing Protectionist Sentiment, nor is the relationship between confidence in the economy and a demand for more protectionism in trade fully explained.

### 3. THE CHANGING ROLE OF PARTISANSHIP IN POLICY PREFERENCES ON FREE TRADE

#### 3.1 Introduction

We experience partisanship and polarization every day. We watch it on the news, we see it on social media, we experience it throughout our day to day lives. Aside from our every day experience and anecdotal evidence of the widespread partisanship and polarization in the United States, we even find non-academic articles on partisanship and polarization in the U.S. with headlines such as: “U.S. Partisanship Is Highest in Decades, Pew Study Finds”; “Is America Hopelessly Polarized, or Just Allergic to Politics?”; “Are Online Dating Sites Making Americans More Extreme?” and “Political partisanship is vicious...” There is a universal consensus among the literature and the non-academic world, that the United States has become and is continuing to become more and more polarized—or, well sorted—along partisan lines (Chokshi (2016); Klar and Ryan (2019); Rosenbluth and Shapiro (2018)). Many scholars such as Bartels (2000), Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus (2013), Iyengar and Westwood (2015), Dunlap and Yarosh (2016), and Mason (2018) have addressed the increasing role partisanship plays in voting, opinion formation, political attitudes, and even in the non-political sphere. Dunlap and Yarosh (2016) investigate the role partisanship plays on climate change attitudes and Iyengar and Westwood (2015) demonstrate the extent to which partisan biases penetrate spheres of life such as, “race, gender and other social divides.” If partisanship plays an influential role on things such as vote choice, climate change attitudes, and has even permeated our social world by helping to determine dating partners (Iyengar and Westwood (2019)) and evaluations of job candidates (Iyengar and Westwood (2015)). Even though we experience the role of partisanship in some of the most seemingly politically disconnected scenarios, there have been no studies that examine the evolving role partisanship has played in opinions about trade.

Trade has a deep history in the realm of politics in the United States. One could argue it dates back to pre-American Revolutionary times and the Boston Tea Party in 1773. Perhaps

a preference for free trade was initiated when Britain implemented high tariffs on tea for the colonists without consulting the Americans. However, a desire for protectionism, especially from Great Britain, existed in America through 1820. This is, in part, due to Jefferson's and the Republicans' protectionist trade policies aimed at Great Britain. Then during the 1830's the Compromise Tariff of 1833 brought tariffs down, which helped to stimulate trade in cotton and grain. In the post-Civil War era, tariffs returned to more protectionist levels in order to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition (Irwin (2018)). The early 1930's saw a retraction of world trade as a result of high tariffs. Post-World War II saw a steep decline in tariffs and an increase in trade agreements. Then in 1968 President Nixon campaigned on a protectionist policy of implementing quotas and the highly contested Trade Act of 1970. This act would have implemented protectionist policies similar to those pre-1830 levels, however it failed to pass in Congress, ultimately resulting in a failure of this push for protectionism and the Trade Act of 1974 which authorized the President to make tariff and non-tariff policies. Despite numerous attempts by the international community to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade during the 1970's, the United States held onto its protectionist policies in order to protect the domestic economy and to pursue foreign policy retaliation against the Soviet Union, until Reagan ushered in a pro-free trade administration (Canto (1984)). This brief history of trade policy in the United States is important, but more important is that trade policy—or the absence of trade policy—affects everyone.

But where and when does partisanship matter above and beyond the effects of the economic approaches and how has it changed overtime? Using ANES data in 1986, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020, I will examine the role partisanship plays in support for trade protectionist sentiment at the individual level. In this paper I estimate a series of repeated cross-section models for each year the ANES data is available. There is evidence that this changing role of partisanship we have experienced in our day to day lives also exists in attitudes about trade.

### 3.2 Literature Review

Deeper than the history of trade policy in the United States though, is the history of economic models estimating individual trade attitudes, such as the specific factors model (Scheve and Slaughter (2001)) and the factor endowments model (Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006)). This existing research on individual trade attitudes focuses on economic models that include skill level, industry, and education. I do not argue that these economic models are incorrect, but only that they are incomplete in the face of the political realm we find ourselves in today, where the effects of partisanship are increasing evermore.

The existing economic literature on trade attitudes consists of two frameworks: the specific factors model (Scheve and Slaughter (2001)) or the factor endowments model (Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006)). These frameworks explain the role economic circumstances and individuals' ties to economic sectors and industries have on trade preferences. The factor model approach implies that those who benefit from trade will be the ones who are more supportive of free trade and therefore, those who are highly skilled will be greater proponents of free trade than low skilled labor. The specific factors approach predicts preferences for trade are determined by the individual's industry. If their industry depends on overseas markets, they will support free trade and if their industry faces competition from foreign companies they will oppose free trade. As the United States became more economically and industrially diverse with the decline of the concentration of manufacturing, trade became less about "my job" and more about "others jobs" (Guisinger (2017), chapter 1). Neither of these economic frameworks are capable of capturing the consideration of "others jobs."

These models predict what we think of to be the more historic partisan alignment on free trade: the Republican party is typically pro-free trade and the Democratic Party typically leans more protectionist. Adherents to the Republican Party will be pro-free trade because of their industry interests and reliance on the global market. While those affiliated with the Democratic Party generally represent a more low skilled labor force and belonged to or supported unions who faced competition from foreign companies in the face of free trade. However, the 2016

election has turned what we know from these economic models on its head. The Republican Party, led by candidate Donald Trump, became more protectionist. With this partisan emphasis on trade policy and the growing influence partisanship has on political and non-political attitudes, we should expect partisanship to play a changing role in attitudes on trade policy, above and beyond economic factors.

Importantly, neither of these traditional economic models incorporates the role of *politics* in developing preferences on free trade. Guisinger (2017) and Mansfield and Mutz (2002) attempt to incorporate politics into explaining trade attitudes. Guisinger (2017) attempts to solve the dilemma the decline of industrial manufacturing created by developing a sociotropical model of trade attitudes. While, Mansfield and Mutz (2002) attempt to unpack these economic models and find no support for them. Using a pooled cross-sectional analysis from 1986 to 2012, Guisinger (2017) finds support for the inclusion of political factors such as partisanship. However, because Guisinger (2017) pools her data, it does not allow us to observe any potential changes in the effect of partisanship on trade attitudes. Mansfield and Mutz (2002) also find support for including variables other than skill level and industry. In fact, they find that its really these omitted variables such as education and the fear of the other that drive trade attitudes. Although Guisinger (2017) and Mansfield and Mutz (2002) attempt to account for such political variables both fail to account for or allow us to observe the changing role of partisanship over time in attitudes about trade.

Mansfield and Mutz (2002) put the factor endowments model and the specific factors model head to head and find that it is neither of these theories driving preferences for free trade. Instead they find education does all of the work, but only through fear of the other. Mansfield and Mutz (2002) use data from the NAES survey in 2004 and the 2007 Knowledge Networks survey to conduct their analysis. They do not theoretically consider the effects of partisanship on free trade preferences, although they do include partisanship as a control. Instead, Mansfield and Mutz (2002)) focus on the effects of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and intervention into other countries' affairs, as well as perceptions of how the changing economy affects their family. They test their models on the NAES 2004 data and then again on the 2007 Knowledge Networks

data where they include measures of ethnocentrism, isolationism, and nationalism. Mansfield and Mutz (2002) find no support for either the factor endowments model or the specific factors model. They do find that more education is associated with preferences for free trade policies. They argue the results of education's effect on trade preferences goes away once you consider the role ethnocentrism plays in forming trade policy preferences. Furthermore, Mansfield and Mutz (2002) find partisanship has no effect on trade policy preferences in 2004 but in the 2007 Knowledge Networks data, being a Republican drives individuals to prefer more protectionist trade policies, which contradicts what the traditional economic models might predict.

In an attempt to account for the shift from the focus of "my job" to "others' jobs," Guisinger (2017) develops the individual-sociotropic model in explaining American opinion on trade. Guisinger (2017) argues that individuals make assessments on the projected individual and community benefits they would receive from trade liberalization. She proposes that when an individual perceives large benefits to themselves and to the community they will oppose protectionist trade policies; when there are no benefits to the individual or to the community, they will support protectionist policies. Furthermore, depending on how the individual weights their benefits and relative to the community's benefits, if individual benefits or community benefits are present but the other is not, the individual will not know whether they prefer protectionist trade policies or not. Using the available ANES data from 1986 to 2012 and 2006 CCES data, Guisinger (2017) finds more skilled individuals are more likely to prefer less limits on trade. She finds high income earners to also fall into this pro-free trade preference. Furthermore, Guisinger (2017) finds Republican individuals are likely to prefer less limits on trade. Those who prefer more limits on trade include: females, minorities, home owners, union members, and those who live in a racially diverse area. Throughout her theory and discussion on the results, Guisinger (2017) focuses on the gender and race gaps in trade attitudes. She argues that both being female and being a minority are in part, determinants of protectionist sentiment. She argues this is because they are more concerned with how unemployment and the economy will respond to trade liberalization based on their history with more unstable employment.

Although Guisinger (2017) includes partisan identity in her models, her results are the ef-



fects of partisan identity from pooling all 10 years of data. By definition, pooling her data from 1986 to 2012 eliminates the ability to observe how the role of partisan identity on trade attitudes has changed over time. Throughout her analysis, she finds that identifying as a Republican reduces the probability that individuals will support limits on trade (Table 4.1, Table 5.2, and Table 6.3). Although Guisinger (2017)'s findings suggest partisanship matters in a way in which being Republican is associated with less protectionist sentiment, she finds (Table 6.3) that in the post NAFTA era partisanship is no longer a predictor of support for limits on trade. In addition to Guisinger (2017)'s development of the sociotropic model of trade preferences, she discusses the effects of perceptions of the economy on opposition to limits on trade (chapter 5). Guisinger (2017) finds that perceiving the economy to be doing well was correlated with more opposition to limits on trade. She argues this is the case because these people do not want to risk damaging the growth of the economy, whereas those with negative views of the economy are more supportive of limits on trade because they believe they could reverse or mitigate the poor economy.

### **3.3 Theory**

This evolving role of partisanship needs to be accounted for and explained. Partisanship affects an individual's trade attitudes, which I will call protectionist sentiment, in two ways. First, partisanship infiltrates the entirety of an individual's political and non-political areas of their life. And second, because people fail to make the connection between trade policy and the actual effects of trade policy they experience—trade is a low salience issue—they utilize partisanship as a cue for determining their attitudes about trade. What I will refer to as protectionist sentiment in this paper is defined as protectionist trade attitudes at the individual level. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, we can think of these attitudes as a demand for more or less free trade at the individual level. When an individual prefers more restrictions on trade, their protectionist sentiment is higher. Whereas if they prefer less restrictions on trade, then their protectionist sentiment is lower (they prefer more free trade policies).

Bartels (2000) finds that over time individuals have relied more on partisanship when faced with choosing who to vote for in presidential and congressional elections. This increased impact of partisanship on voting behavior paired with the use of partisanship as a cue for policy attitude formation (Jacoby (1988)) only exacerbates the growing partisan antipathy in the United States. Partisan antipathy has surged over the past twenty years. According to a Pew report from 2014 (Center (2014)), partisanship has become consistently more ideological. Additionally, partisans have greater and stronger negative feelings about the other political party. 79% of Democrats feel unfavorable toward the Republican party compared to the 57% in 1994, while 82% of Republicans feel unfavorable toward the Democratic party compared to the 68% in 1994 (2014 Political Polarization in the American Public). Moreover, 27% of Democrats see the Republican party as a threat to the nation's well-being and 36% of Republicans see the Democratic party this way. Because individuals rely on partisanship cues in their policy attitude formation and the partisan identity is so strong, partisanship should drive an individual's Protectionist Sentiment more now than it did before.

Partisanship has become part of who an individual is; it has seeped through into every part of our lives whether we realize it or not. People constantly find themselves surrounded by like-partisans: at work, in their neighborhoods, in their circles of friends and family, on social media, etc. Like-partisanship is no longer a coincidence, but a part of the many things we use to identify the people we interact with on a day to day basis. Because partisanship has infiltrated life to such an extreme where it affects our day to day lives and trade policy affects our day to day lives, it necessarily follows that partisanship should affect trade attitudes.

Although the market is no longer focused on the production of goods and therefore competing with foreign manufacturers, people still buy imported goods. In fact, almost everyone buys goods imported to the United States—more people buy imported goods than those who worked for an import competing manufacturer. This means that the effects of trade are now felt by more individuals rather than a focus on those whose livelihoods are directly impacted by these import-competing manufacturers. But individual's changing purchasing power due to changes in trade policy is not necessarily felt as much as the loss of a job due to competing with

an foreign manufacturer. People know they prefer lower prices. When someone goes to the grocery store, they notice if the price of the Italian bottle of wine they normally buy goes up or down. They notice if the price of new tires for their car has increased since the last time they put tires on their car. Changes in trade policy are reflected in the price of imported goods we purchase at the store (or online). The changes in prices affects our purchasing power—if trade policy changes so that the price of an imported good increases, we can no longer buy as many of that good as we could before. It also follows that if policy changes such that the price of an imported good decreases, we could now buy more of that good. We feel these real changes on a day to day basis. They are a part of our lives, similar to social circles, school, work, etc. Because this is the case we should expect partisanship to have an influence (at least in part) on our opinions about restrictions on trade. Nonetheless, trade remains a less salient political issue in comparison to immigration, defense, taxes, and social issues. Although we feel these changes in trade policy on a day to day basis, people do not always make the connection between prices of imported goods and trade policy. They use partisanship as a cue for how they should feel about trade protectionism. This is because of the team player mindset that individuals find themselves in regards to political parties. This disconnect between recognizing the effects of increasing or decreasing trade restrictions—or, eliminating or establishing trade restrictions—is what has allowed partisanship to become a factor in trade attitudes over time. I argue that it is not the case that partisanship has always mattered, but rather that partisanship matters differently now than it did in previous years.

Because trade is a low salience issue, average Republicans and Democrats do not have a firm stance on trade. Instead, they take their cues from the leaders of their political party. A political party is lead by the Presidential candidate, an opportunist who capitalizes on taking stances that will benefit them at the voting polls. This means that sometimes party platforms can change over time as each candidate determines the best strategy to win, especially platforms on low salience issues that the public does not staunchly associate with one party over the other (Figure 3.1). Low salience political issues, such as trade, are not continuously in the public's faces, nor are they tied to a party in the same way that defense or welfare are tied

to specific political parties. For example, the Republican party was free-trade under President H.W. Bush, but protectionist under President Donald Trump. During President George H.W. Bush's tenure as President from 1989 to 1992, he was a champion of normalizing trade relations between the United States and China. He was a true proponent of the idea that more free trade policies in China would help to build up their economy and once their economy reached a certain point the people would no longer stand for the atrocities the government imposed. However, in 2016 President Trump's opinion on China was clear to everyone. China was bad and the U.S. needed to take action against China by imposing numerous sanctions ultimately resulting in a Trade War. The average Republicans received these partisan cues and became protectionist under President Trump, when they were clear supporters of free trade in 1990. This example is not unique to the Republican party. As Figure 3.1 shows, between 1980 and 2016,




Figure 3.1: Protectionism in Party Platforms

Source: The Manifestos Project

sometimes the Democratic party was more protectionist, while other times the Republican party experienced surges of protectionism in their party platforms. The y-axis measures protectionism in party platforms where higher numbers equate to more protectionism and lower numbers are less protectionism. The x-axis indicates time. Between 1982 and 1988, the Democratic party platform was more protectionist than the Republican party. However, the Republican party has experienced two surges of protectionism in 1992, due to Republican's opposition to President Clinton's support of NAFTA and between 2012 and 2016. The 2012 to 2016 surge in protectionism in the Republican party platform could be in response to President Obama's Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which President Trump capitalized on. It is clear the effect of identifying with a political party—or, team—has become a driving factor of predicting an individual's attitudes about trade.

### **3.4 Data and Methods**

Since 1986, the National Election Study has asked the following question in 1986, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020:

“Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports?”

Because my data is limited to these ten years and is not continuous over an extended period of time, I cannot use a time series model. Therefore, I will test my model in repeated cross-sections in order to observe whether there is a changing effect of partisanship on protectionist sentiment across time at the individual level.

From 1998 to 2016, the ANES offers respondents the opportunity to answer the question with “I haven't thought much about this” in addition to favoring limits or opposing limits and the typical “I don't know” response. The group of respondents who answer “I haven't thought much about this” is large and changes throughout the years. Therefore, below I further investigate who these respondents are that chose this answer. The response “I haven't thought much about it” allows respondents the opportunity to not pick a side while maintaining their credibility. It is

important to note that in 1986, 1992, and 2020, the ANES did not include this response as an option and instead only included "I don't know" as an alternative to choosing whether the respondent favors or opposes limits on trade. By not offering the opportunity for respondents to answer that they hadn't thought much about the topic, it forced respondents to choose whether they opposed limits or were in favor of limits on trade. In 1986, 95% of respondents replied with an answer of either in favor or opposed limits and in 1992, the proportion of respondents who provided one of these answers was 98% and it was again 98% in 2020. However, in 1996 only 56% of respondents fell into this group, while 43% declared they hadn't thought much about it. This trend continues when the response choices include "I haven't thought much about it." As you can see in Figure 3.2 the percentage of respondents who say they haven't thought much about it ebbs and flows over this time period. The proportion of respondents who answered with "I haven't thought much about this," is significant, and therefore raises the question of whether or not it is necessary to model this in a two-step process, with the first step being offering an opinion, and the second step being the specific opinion offered. However, it is not necessary to use a selection model because being a Republican or a Democrat (my main independent variables) does not also affect whether a respondent answered the question at hand or answered that they hadn't thought much about it. The only time identifying as either a Republican or a Democrat affects whether the respondent is going to be more or less likely to not have thought much about it is in 2012. In 2012, being a Republican decreases the chance that a respondent will not have thought much about limiting imports by 15.4%. Therefore, I did investigate the potential for a selection effect using a Heckman Selection Censored Probit model, not only were the results unchanged, but they confirmed that the selection model was not necessary.

First, in addition to investigating the use of the Heckman Selection Censored Probit model, in Table 3.1 I analyze whether there is anything that makes these respondents who answered that they haven't thought much about trade limits different from those who chose a response of favoring or opposing limits on trade using probit models for each year. Table 3.1 shows, that not only are certain people more likely to respond that they hadn't thought much about limits on trade, but this effect is fairly consistent over time. Neither being a Republican nor a




Figure 3.2: Survey Response Choices for Question about Trade from ANES

Democrat is a significant predictor of whether the respondent will answer the question about limiting imports with they hadn't thought much about it. It is interesting to note though that across each year, being a female increases the likelihood that a respondent will not have thought much about limiting imports. Similarly, both age and education decrease the likelihood of a respondent saying they hadn't thought much about it (Table 3.1). These variables: female, age, and education, are key independent variables in Mansfield and Mutz (2002) and Guisinger (2017). The older an individual is the less likely they are to respond that they hadn't thought much about trade limits. Additionally, the more educated someone is the less likely they are to choose this response instead of responding that they are in favor or oppose limits on trade. It is probable that respondents who are older or have higher education think more about trade policy than someone who is not and when the option to say they just haven't thought much about it rather than choosing a policy stance or saying they don't know, younger or less educated individuals will choose this path. Guisinger (2017) also finds that people who are more educated

or older are less likely to not have an opinion on trade limits. Being a female makes an individual more likely to respond with this non-answer response choice. This may be because females are less likely to want to get involved in world politics than men (Mansfield, Mutz and Silver (2015)). Furthermore in 1998, both respondents with more income and higher evaluations about the economy in the past year are less likely to say they hadn't thought much about trade limits. Whereas, in addition to age, gender, and education, income seems to play a role in 2004. In 2012, both Republicans and those who had better evaluations of the economy in the past year are more likely to choose between favoring or opposing limits on trade.



Table 3.1: Respondents who “haven’t thought much about this”: Marginal Effects by year using probit models

	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Republican	0.0314 (0.108)	-0.0615 (0.124)	0.222 (0.162)	-0.0444 (0.171)	-0.223 (0.188)	-0.154* (0.0623)	-0.0243 (0.0700)
Democrat	0.116 (0.102)	0.00802 (0.112)	0.221 (0.162)	-0.0187 (0.165)	-0.0372 (0.178)	-0.0876 (0.0598)	0.114 (0.0694)
Ideology (1: Very Conservative to 7: Very Liberal)	-0.0414 (0.0579)	0.000538 (0.0657)	0.0473 (0.0810)	0.00182 (0.0512)	-0.0899 (0.0690)	-0.0444 (0.0285)	-0.0271 (0.0319)
Economy better/worse past	0.0349 (0.0297)	-0.0721* (0.0328)	0.0681 (0.0496)	-0.00158 (0.0314)	0.0193 (0.0669)	-0.0645** (0.0205)	0.000840 (0.0211)
Economy better/worse future	0.0243 (0.0236)	0.0372 (0.0280)	-0.0885 (0.0685)	0.0217 (0.0328)	-0.0725 (0.0430)	0.000147 (0.0217)	-0.000242 (0.0226)
Belong to Labor Union	0.0596 (0.106)	0.0625 (0.124)	-0.0596 (0.159)	0.0673 (0.114)	-0.218 (0.148)	0.0436 (0.0493)	-0.0272 (0.0561)
Income	-0.00681 (0.00729)	-0.0230** (0.00699)	-0.0103 (0.0154)	-0.0236** (0.00828)	-0.00403 (0.00872)	-0.00373 (0.00247)	-0.00154 (0.00265)
Age	-0.00552* (0.00240)	-0.00834** (0.00275)	0.00131 (0.00327)	-0.0105*** (0.00258)	-0.0123*** (0.00284)	-0.00777*** (0.00111)	-0.00526*** (0.00110)
Education	-0.0876** (0.0280)	-0.0631* (0.0300)	-0.00109 (0.0373)	-0.101*** (0.0299)	-0.0890* (0.0356)	-0.0634*** (0.0123)	-0.0578*** (0.0135)
Female	0.558*** (0.0816)	0.521*** (0.0927)	0.426*** (0.108)	0.294*** (0.0863)	0.327*** (0.0960)	0.294*** (0.0364)	0.155*** (0.0387)
Constant	-0.155 (0.264)	0.317 (0.269)	-1.338*** (0.391)	0.706** (0.273)	1.061** (0.396)	0.749*** (0.134)	-0.420** (0.152)
Observations	1132	866	812	966	752	5002	6050

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Although it is clear that there are sometimes systematic differences between respondents who are likely to choose an answer of favoring or opposing trade limits and those who would

rather say they hadn't thought much about it (Table 3.1), who those individuals are seems to change from year to year. There may be an interesting story in what is going on with these respondents, but most importantly my question is about the changing role partisanship has played in trade attitudes over time, not about non-attitudes. Therefore, I measure my dependent variable, Protectionist Sentiment—attitudes about trade—as a binary variable, after dropping those who responded with either "I don't know" or "I haven't thought much about it." Using the responses to the ANES question on limiting foreign imports above, I code the respondents who oppose limits on foreign imports—prefer free trade policies—as 0. The respondents who favor limits on imports—prefer protectionist trade policies—are coded as 1 (Table 3.2).

The details of variable descriptions and codings are in Table 3.2. My key independent variables include: partisanship, ideology, and consumer confidence. In order to capture the individual "being on a political team," I measure partisanship with two different binary variables: Republicans and Democrats. This allows me to use Independents as a reference group and answer whether belonging to the Republican Party "team" or the Democratic Party "team" drives an individual's protectionist trade attitudes. I measure ideology on the typical 7 point scale where higher numbers are associated with being more liberal, therefore 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal.

I control for membership in a labor union, gender, household income, education, and race. My variable Labor Union is a binary variable where 1 is the respondent or someone in the respondent's household is associated with a labor union and 0 is the respondent has no association with a labor union. I choose to use whether the household has an association with a labor union because Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) find that spouses who are married to someone who has an association with either an import-competing manufacturer or a labor union are equally affected by that association. I measure gender as a dummy variable for female, where being female is a 1 and male is 0. Education is measured using the ANES ordinal categorization which allows respondents categories to choose from. These categories range from 8th grade or less to an advanced degree. In order to see more clearly when it is that education matters, I also run a model with a dummy variable for College and a dummy variable for Advanced Degree. Both

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) and Mansfield and Mutz (2002) break down level of education using dummy variables and find that a college degree is when education begins to have an effect on trade attitudes.

Table 3.2: Variable Description

Variable	Details
Protectionist Sentiment	0: Opposes limits on trade; 1: Favors limits on trade
Republican	0: Democrat or Independent; 1: Republican
Democrat	0: Republicans and Independents; 1: Democrats
Partisanship	1: Republican; 2: Independent; 3: Democrat
Ideology	1: Very Conservative to 7: Very Liberal
Labor Union (someone in the household belongs to a union)	0: No; 1: Yes
Female	0: Male; 1: Female
Income (Household income)	1: under 5,000 to 28: 250,000 or more
Age	17 - 90
Economic Evaluations Past Year	1: much better to 5: much worse
Economic Evaluations Next Year	1: much better to 5: much worse
College Degree	0: Below a college degree; 1: Has a college degree
Advanced Degree	0: Below an advanced degree; 1: Has an advanced degree

### 3.5 Results

Using repeated probit models for each year: 1986, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020, I estimate the marginal effects of partisanship on protectionist sentiment. I choose to use this repeated cross sections strategy, without pooling my data, in order to observe whether the effect of partisanship on trade attitudes has changed from year to year. This modeling strategy allows me to estimate the marginal effect of being a Republican (or Democrat) on protectionist sentiment for each year and compare the yearly effects over time.

I first run a simple probit model, to see the effects of being a Republican and being a Democrat on an individual's protectionist sentiment, before controlling for anything else that might also be associated with partisanship and protectionist sentiment. Table 3.3 shows that identifying as Republican is associated with an individual's protectionist sentiment sometimes and other times it is not. Furthermore, how partisanship affects protectionist sentiment has also changed. Until 2012, being a Republican did not significantly affect their protectionist sentiment. In 2012, identifying as a Republican decreases the probability of being Protectionist by 23.1%. But, in 2016 being a Republican increases the probability of being Protectionist by 20.8%. Between 2012 and 2016, perhaps with the emergence of President Trump's presidential campaign, being a Republican changes from making someone less likely to be protectionist to making them more likely to want protectionism on trade. Identifying as a Democrat also exhibits this change in effect of partisanship on whether or not they want more protectionist measures on trade. Although not statistically significant at the conventional 0.05 level, being a Democrat increases the probability of an individual being protectionist in 2012, by 12% (this is significant at the 0.1 level). But in 2016, being a Democrat now decreases the probability that an individual is protectionist by 38.5%. Unlike Republicans, Democrats seem to be more likely to be protectionist in 1986 by 33.3%, 1996 by 34.1%, and 1998 by 28%. Partisanship does not appear to have the same effect on protectionism over time, instead being a Republican (or a Democrat) is associated with more protectionism at some points in time and less protectionism at others. Of course there are many things that are associated with partisan identification and trade attitudes such as: ideology, evaluations about the economy, belonging to a labor union, income, age, education, and gender. Does partisan identification affect the probability of being protectionist above and beyond through these other avenues?

Table 3.3: The Changing Effects of Partisanship on Protectionist Sentiment: A Simple Probit Model

	1986	1992	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016	2020
Republican	-0.0160 (0.0916)	0.225 (0.166)	0.0271 (0.114)	-0.0448 (0.122)	-0.00277 (0.109)	-0.291 (0.189)	-0.0937 (0.149)	-0.231** (0.0801)	0.208* (0.0811)	0.616*** (0.0354)
Democrat	0.333*** (0.0859)	0.107 (0.144)	0.341** (0.111)	0.280* (0.116)	-0.106 (0.117)	-0.0654 (0.189)	0.0445 (0.143)	0.121 (0.0784)	-0.385*** (0.0794)	-0.316*** (0.0345)
Constant	0.463*** (0.0648)	-0.250* (0.108)	-0.0791 (0.0842)	-0.0420 (0.0867)	-0.0212 (0.0942)	0.282 (0.173)	0.487*** (0.132)	0.458*** (0.0703)	0.411*** (0.0709)	0.0469 (0.0308)
<hr/>										
$R^2$										
Observations	1431	413	792	692	1035	602	1007	2913	2743	14448

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table ?? shows the marginal effect of merely identifying as a Republican changes over time (while holding everything else constant). It seems that being a Republican didn't effect whether an individual was protectionist or not until 2012. But then in 2012, it is clear that Republicans were now significantly less likely to be protectionist. Above and beyond things we normally associate with trade attitudes such as income, labor union membership, education, age, and gender, identifying as a Republican still *decreases* the probability of an individual being protectionist by 19.9% in 2012. But then in 2016, being a Republican now *increases* the probability that they are protectionist by 12% (this is significant at the 0.1 level). In 2016, the parties underwent a "flip-flop" where Republicans were decidedly more protectionist and Democrats were significantly less protectionist. This change persisted into 2020, where identifying as a Republican increased the likelihood that an individual is protectionist by 39%.

Although being a Republican wasn't associated with more or less protectionism until 2012, being a Democrat increased the probability of being more protectionist in 1996, by 39.7% and

1998, by 33.3%. This increased probability of protectionism in Democrats remains in 2012, where being a Democrat increased the probability of being protectionist by 16.2% (significant at the 0.1 level). However, in 2016, the Democrats experienced a similar switch in their association with protectionism that Republicans did. In 2016, being a Democrat now made an individual less likely to be protectionist by 18.4%.

These results mean that after accounting for ideology, evaluations of the economy, belonging to a labor union, income, age, education, and gender—all things that can affect partisanship—there is still some effect of belonging to a political party on the probability of being protectionist. This finding supports my hypothesis that the effects of partisanship will change over time. These partisan effects are not evident in Guisinger (2017)'s analysis on individual attitudes on trade policy, because she pools her data and in fact finds that the more Republican an individual is the less likely they are to be protectionist. Guisinger (2017)'s results are different from those I find in Table ??; her results indicate that Republicans are less likely to be protectionist. But she uses a 7 point partisan identification variable to measure partisanship, and therefore theoretically, this would mean that with each small incremental change from being a strong Democrat to being a strong Republican, they are less likely to be protectionist. I find that this is not the case and being a Republican does not increase or decrease the probability of one being protectionist until 2012 and even at that, the effect changes between 2012 and 2016. But being a Democrat matters sometimes and other times it does not. These findings are also consistent with the changes in party platforms that I showed in Figure 3.1, where sometimes the Republican party was more protectionist and other times the Democratic party was. Guisinger (2017)'s findings did not address these over time changes in party platforms.

Consistent with Guisinger (2017)'s findings though, I do find that income decreases the probability of protectionism and being a female and union membership both increase the probability of protectionism. Guisinger (2017) finds that age does not predict protectionism, but that skilled labor decreases protectionism. But Table ?? shows that sometimes age increases the probability of being protectionist but these effects are incredibly small, and although they are distinguishable from 0, barely increase the probability of protectionism, which contextually is

very similar to Guisinger (2017)'s findings, that the effect of age on protectionism is 0. Furthermore, Guisinger (2017) does not account for ideology or perceptions of the economy, both of which seem to matter at various times between 1986 and 2020.

Contrary to Guisinger (2017)'s findings that partisanship matters, Mansfield and Mutz (2002)'s findings are more similar to the results in Table ??, where the effect of partisanship changes. Mansfield and Mutz (2002) examine survey responses from 2004 and 2007 and do not pool their data. As I mentioned earlier, they find that in 2004 partisanship does not affect trade policy preferences but in 2007, being a Republican is associated with a preference for more protectionist trade policies. I do not find any relationship between being a Republican and protectionism until 2012.

Aside from these main results the effects of some of the controls are interesting as well. I find that in accordance with Mansfield and Mutz (2002) and Guisinger (2017), education decreases the probability of being protectionist. This effect is consistent from 1996 to 2020. Additionally, the size of the effect of having a college degree on being protectionist is fairly consistent as well from 2000 to 2016. Having a college degree decreases the probability of being protectionist by 78.5% in 1986. The magnitude of this effect decreases to 66.5% in 1996 and 73.2% in 1998. Having a college degree in the 21st century then decreases the probability an individual is protectionist by between about 30% to 40%. Having a college degree seems to matter less in predicting protectionism over time, in fact from 2016 to 2020 the effect decreases from 31.1% to 19.9% less likely to be protectionist. This is consistent with Mansfield and Mutz (2002), who find that it is not skill level or job industry that effects an individual's level of protectionism, but instead its education. This strong and consistent finding on education's effect on Protectionist Sentiment, supports their findings.

## 4. PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT AND REPRESENTATION

### 4.1 Introduction

Protectionist Sentiment, the underlying preferences of the country for trade policy, ebbs and flows over time, as I have shown in Chapter 2. When the country prefers protectionist trade policies, Protectionist Sentiment is high in the United States. And when Protectionist Sentiment is low, the public prefers more liberalized trade policies. But what are the consequences of a changing national Protectionist Sentiment? Furthermore, does the public get what it wants in more or less trade protectionism?

The American Revolution was, in part, initiated against high tariffs implemented on the colonists. However, in the early days of the new American republic, Jefferson and the Republicans pursued protectionist trade policies aimed against Britain. Then during the 1830's the Compromise Tariff of 1833 brought tariffs down, which helped to stimulate trade in cotton and grain. In the post-Civil War era, tariffs returned to more protectionist levels in order to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition (Irwin (2018)). The early 1930's saw a retraction of world trade as a result of high tariffs. Post-World War II saw a steep decline in tariffs and an increase in trade agreements. Then in 1968 President Nixon campaigned on a protectionist policy of implementing quotas and later was a driving force behind the highly contested Trade Act of 1970. This act would have implemented protectionist policies similar to those pre-1830 levels, however it failed to pass in Congress. Despite numerous attempts by the international community to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade during the 1970's, the United States held onto its protectionist policies in order to protect the domestic economy and to pursue foreign policy retaliation against the Soviet Union, until Reagan ushered in a pro-free trade administration (Canto (1984)).

It is clear that the United States has experienced eras of both protectionism and free trade. But what causes these shifts in American trade policy? Perhaps this shift in trade policy, over time, is evidence of a delegate representative model in which representatives respond to changes



in Protectionist Sentiment by giving the public the policies they want? Or, perhaps due to the nature of where trade policy comes from this process of shifting trade policy may be void of public opinion considerations. Before determining the role of public opinion in American trade policy, it is important to know just what trade policy looks like and where it comes from.

#### **4.2 What are Temporary Trade Barriers (TTBs) and where do they come from?**

Protectionist trade policy has taken on many forms throughout the history of the United States. Most commonly trade policy is associated with tariffs and quotas, in which the government collects a tax on imported goods or limits the quantity of goods imported. However, these are not the only avenue to pursue protectionist trade policies. In fact, due to the international community's agreement to severely limit a country's ability to levy tariffs and quotas against imports, they are much less common today. Countries have continued to pursue the use of other non-tariff trade barriers to protect their domestic import competing industries. The most common of these are Temporary Trade Barriers, which include anti-dumping laws, countervailing duties, and safeguards.

Temporary Trade Barriers, or TTBs, are a type of non-tariff barrier implemented by countries in order to pursue protectionist trade and have become increasingly popular since the 1980s. In the United States, these TTBs find their origins in the Countervailing Duty Law of 1897, 19 U.S.C. 1303, where anti-dumping laws were established to punish foreign firms who sold subsidized goods in the United States. However, these laws were not explicitly outlined until the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, that required "predatory intent" to be proven in order to punish the foreign firm. Then in 1921, the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, relaxed this requirement for "predatory intent" and instead only required that the goods be priced lower than the market value in the United States to be considered dumping. Since 1921, the 1930 Tariff Act, the 1979 Trade Act, the 1984 Trade Act, and the 1988 Trade Act have all amended the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 to make it easier for U.S. firms to initiate complaints against foreign firms and the government to restrict foreign imports (Irwin (2018)).

Although these non-tariff barriers to trade have been around since 1897, they did not become

popular until the mid 1970s, due to countries seeking new avenues for protectionism. The 1947 GATT allowed for free trade agreements and limited countries' abilities to increase tariffs on imports above their pre-Preferential Trade Agreement levels. According to the 1947 GATT Article XXIV 5(b),

the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area... shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area.

However, the 1947 GATT gave little explicit guidance on Temporary Trade Barriers and left them much less limited than tariffs. (Bown (2011)) This left an avenue open for countries to still pursue protectionist policies. Yet, it wasn't until the 1974 Trade Act delegated a vast amount of power to the President and executive branch and relaxed the requirements of U.S. firms having to prove injury from unfair imports and instead only "cause damage to the industry to a degree not less than any other case," that the use of TTBs as a protectionist policy really took off (Bown (2011)). Since then the use of these Temporary Trade Barriers as protectionist policy has become less temporary and more pseudo-permanent. The process for removing a TTB requires the firm the TTB investigation was associated with to prove they had remedied the situation that caused the investigation in the first place. However, this is an expensive process and oftentimes results in the status quo rather than overturning it. Therefore many firms opt to wait the five years until the TTB expires and file then to eliminate the Temporary Trade Barrier. Because of this not only have Temporary Trade Barriers become more popular, but the length of time they remain in place has also increased.

The number of initiated Temporary Trade Barriers ebbs and flows over time as Figure 4.1 shows. 1982, 1985, 1988, 1992, and 2001, all saw spikes in the number of TTBs initiated. But between 2013 and 2018, rather than spiking and returning to a lower number, initiated TTBs have steadily increased. In order to gain an understanding of what this series of TTBs looks

like, it's important to first examine the series in detail. The largest spike in TTBs (Figure 4.1) is in 1982, in which 209 Temporary Trade barriers were enacted. This spike in the use of TTBs, and the beginning of their popularity, is due to the Steel Import Crisis with the European Economic Community. The United States used these anti-dumping and countervailing policies to wage a trade war on the European Economic Commission for selling steel in the United States far below the manufacturing price. In order to protect the U.S. steel industry, the Reagan Administration relied heavily on the use of Temporary Trade Barriers, even more so than the Carter Administration did in 1980, following the 1980-1981 Recession. In what may have been a push from the Reagan Administration to help initiate a lower unemployment rate to finally recover from the 1980 Recession, the Reagan Administration enacted another 141 TTB policies in 1985. This was the second highest TTB count between 1980 to 2019. In the last year of President George H.W. Bush's administration, and also the year the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed, 1992 saw the 3rd highest peak of TTB policies implemented by the United States. Unlike his fellow Republican Presidents, his father and President Reagan, President George W. Bush's administration saw a period of the lowest initiated TTBs since 1980, from 2005 to 2008. This trend of low numbers of initiated temporary trade barriers continues into President Obama's administration through 2012. The enactment of new temporary trade barriers begins to increase, specifically within President Trump's administration in 2017 during his Trade War with China. The prevalent use of Temporary Trade Barriers has led to concern about retaliation by other countries and the use of these "Trade Wars," utilized by what seems to be mostly Republican Presidential administrations. Perhaps Republican Presidents use these temporary trade barriers as a way to discretely protect American domestic import competing companies. It may be the case that Democratic Presidents pursue different types of policies to protect the domestic economy such as focusing on domestic spending. Although it may be the case that Republican Presidents have historically used these TTB counts more than Democratic Presidents at times, they are still a popular choice in protectionist trade policy. But where do these Temporary Trade Barriers come from and how are they initiated?

As I mentioned earlier, the 1974 Trade Act delegated a great deal of protectionist trade pol-




Figure 4.1: Temporary Trade Barrier Counts: the World Bank TTB database

icy making to the Department of Commerce, and thus the President as well, through the use of temporary trade barrier policies (TTBs). This delegation of power from the legislative branch to the executive branch to create and enforce protectionist trade policies is rather rare, but not unheard of (Congress delegated the levying of tariffs to the President). The delegation of making protectionist trade policy to the executive branch, which consists of both experts and the President, is more than a move for efficiency but is a relinquishing of power by Congress. Congress maintains the power to more clearly define what constitutes a violation of anti-dumping and countervailing laws, so Congress has not delegated all of its trade-making authority to the executive branch. But they have chosen not to use their trade-making authority. This delegation of power to the executive should insulate Congress from public opinion about trade policy, but since they do maintain the ability to revise the status quo it might lead to instances of Congress responding to demands for more or less protectionist trade policy under certain conditions.

This paper will address the potential effects Protectionist Sentiment has on trade policy after Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have attempted to unpack Protectionist Sentiment, itself. This paper

asks whether dynamic representation, (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995)) in which public opinion on free trade affects trade policy over time, exists. If Protectionist Sentiment is the public's attitudes towards trade policy—essentially a demand for protectionist trade policies—trade policy, or the equivalent elite preferences for trade policy, may respond to changes in the public's preferences (Bartels (1991)). The ideals of a representative democracy would suggest that our representatives care about and make policy decisions based on the demands and preferences of the public. Because of this, changes in trade policy might be driven by shifts in Protectionist Sentiment. Evaluating the possible connection between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

### **4.3 Literature Review**

Public opinion is the demand of the public for certain policy preferences. And policy responds to changes in public opinion, in a process called dynamic representation (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995)). We know that, "People in and around government sense a national mood...and [know] when the mood shifts...and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes" (Kingdon (1984) from Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995)). Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995) posit that public opinion impacts policy because elected officials are forward thinking, strategic actors who are well-informed about this national mood on certain topics. These elected officials care about what the public wants in anticipation of future elections to give themselves the best chance to hold onto their office. Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995) find that this model of dynamic representation exists through a direct and an indirect relationship. Not only does public opinion affect policy through elections, because elected officials who wish to stay in office will adjust policy in order to remain "in step" with the shifting demands of the public. However, Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995) do not include trade policy, nor opinion about trade in their research. But their results do indicate that a direct relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy should exist.

The idea that a dynamic representation model exists in this more specific policy arena be-

tween public opinion about trade and trade policy necessarily requires that public opinion on trade changes over time and that trade policy also changes over time. As I showed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation (Figure 2.1), we know that Protectionist Sentiment or the public's preferences for trade policy, ebbs and flows over time. Sometimes, the country wants more protectionism and other times the public has a preference for more free trade policies and less restrictions. Furthermore, we know from Figure 4.4 that in some years there are more protectionist trade policies passed in the form of Temporary Trade Barriers and in others there are less. But do these shifts in the level of protectionism in the United States correspond to the changes in Protectionist Sentiment of the country? Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) and Guisinger (2009) both attempt to provide an answer to this question, but provide incomplete explanations.

Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) attempt to use proxies for the demand for protectionist policies, using inflation and unemployment. However, these proxies are not the same as actual public opinion on trade. Furthermore, we do not know how well they even serve as proxies. Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) do find that under divided government, which they define as when the Presidency and Congress are under different partisan control, there is more protectionism, measured by  $(Duties/Imports) * 100$ . They find that inflation causes less protectionism and that Republican Presidents are more protectionist, but when they introduce their divided government variable, the partisan control of the Presidency and inflation have no effect on protectionism. Additionally, Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) fail to actually capture changes in trade policy and instead only capture outcomes of the policy, but these are not the same thing. Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994)'s focus on trade policy *outcomes* rather than the policy itself, fails to estimate the relationship between the demand for trade policy and trade policy itself.

Although Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) use a measure of trade policy outcomes, Guisinger (2009) captures actual trade policy by measuring 2005 Senate votes on the Central American Free Trade Agreement. She finds that voters do not think of trade policy as an important issue and therefore might call into question voter-driven models of trade policy. However, Guisinger (2009) examines the probability of voting for a candidate based on how closely their position on CAFTA matches the candidates. This result assumes that voters, or the general public, knows

what their position is on a particular policy and a knowledge of what their elected officials policy position is, which seems to be an unreasonable expectation of the public. Furthermore, although trade policy is not always a salient topic to the public, as I argue in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, it is nonetheless an important issue (if not increasingly important issue) that affects everyone.




Figure 4.2: Trade as a Percentage of GDP

Figure ?? demonstrates just how increasingly important trade has become since 1970. Between 2005 and 2019, trade has reached a point in which it makes up 25% to 30% of U.S. GDP. It is clear that trade policy, at least in the form of temporary trade barriers (Figure 4.1), changes over time. We should expect changes in Protectionist Sentiment to correspond with these changes in trade policy (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995)). We know from Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) that trade policy outcomes seem to be affected by a divided partisan control in the government. We also know that voters do not make voting decisions based on the

proximity of their protectionist sentiment to the candidate's (Guisinger (2009)). However, the literature on trade policy has yet to incorporate the potential effects of public opinion about trade on trade policy.

#### **4.4 Theory**

Protectionist Sentiment is inherently a dynamic concept that shifts and changes over time at the national level. Furthermore, trade is also an issue with national consequences and is a nationally legislated policy. Congressmen and women are entrusted to not only translate their constituencies' preferences into policy, but to also steer the country in the "right" direction. They have greater ambitions in sight that require larger and more diverse constituencies, therefore they may expand their attention to a greater crowd than their present voter in order to achieve re-election or pursue their further ambitions. There are also numerous subcommittees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate that have the authority to work on trade issues to include: the Senate Finance Committee, Senate Commodities, Markets, Trade, and Risk Management; the Senate Tourism, Competitiveness, and Innovation; the House Ways and Means Committee, House Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, House Monetary Policy and Trade, House Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and House Agriculture, Energy, and Trade. In addition to these numerous committees and subcommittees the President (executive branch) also has the authority to make trade agreements for International Economic Policy (2018). This results in policy made by various representatives with a much larger and diverse constituency than any one congressman or woman. Furthermore, because the United States' economy has diversified and become less concentrated in certain locals, representatives are less likely to be responsible for a single manufacturing product, such as steel Guisinger (2017). Therefore, I argue that political representatives pay attention to the Protectionist Sentiment of the entire country when it comes to trade policy (Page and Shapiro (1983); Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995); Stimson (1999)) and should be addressed at the national level.

Constituencies elect officials into office in order to pursue the policies they want. Although these constituencies do not consider every policy when voting for their delegate, they send a



signal to the elected officials about what type of policies they would prefer (liberal or conservative). In fact trade policy is not normally high on the list of most important issues during an election, voters are not determining which candidate to vote for based on their position on trade policy. But in some cases it has been an important factor, for example in 1992 Ross Perot redirected focus to trade, then again trade became an important issue in 2012 with Mitt Romney and then again in 2016 with President Trump's campaign. Nonetheless, trade—or, protectionism—continues to matter to the public and Protectionist Sentiment still ebbs and flows. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the relative popularity of the search terms “trade war” and “us trade” on Google from 2004 to 2020, where a value of 100 is the most popular the term has been and a value of 50 would mean that it was half as popular at that moment. Clearly, trade is more popular even in google searches at some times and not as popular at others, but still remains a searched term. The key factor here is that the elected officials were elected to pursue policies in line with their constituents ( McCrone and Kuklinski (1979)), regardless of whether the issue was at the forefront of voters minds. This is not far-fetched because the public's approval of their elected officials decreases when the elected officials do not pursue the policies in the way in which the public desired. The public is interested in actual policy—or, legislation. Therefore, we should expect protectionist trade policy to be, in part, determined by Protectionist Sentiment. When the public prefers more protectionism we should see protectionist trade policy increase; and when the public prefers less protectionism we should see less protectionist trade policy.

Protectionist trade policy is any policy which would put in place or increase barriers to trade. Therefore, increasing protectionist trade policy would mean that the United States has increased barriers to trade. Of course, decreasing protectionist trade policy would constitute the U.S. pursuing policies that liberalize trade by eliminating barriers to entry. When the public has a preference for more protectionism (i.e., Protectionist Sentiment is high), this translates into a demand for protectionist policies. The alternative would also hold, when the public has a preference for less protectionism, they have a demand for less protectionist policies. We should expect because representatives have electoral incentives, they translate the public's demand into actual policy—to give the public what it wants.




Figure 4.3: Google Search Trends of “trade war” and “us trade” from 2004 to 2020

Because of the limitations for Congress to levy tariffs placed on them by the international community, Temporary Trade Barriers have become the primary source of protectionism in the United States. In fact, the United States is the leading developed country in the implementation of Temporary Trade Barriers (Bown (2011)). As I discussed earlier, Congress delegated the power to initiate Temporary Trade Barriers to the executive branch, by giving the power to the Department of Commerce to initiate these cases. However, Congress does still hold onto the ability to define and control the use of the Temporary Trade Barriers. They can alter the definition, eliminate them all together, or substitute them with another protectionist policy. Nonetheless, Congress has insulated itself from the tasking of determining what violates the dumping and countervailing laws they implemented and has given more and more power to determine who and when these cases occur to the executive branch. This shift in power from the legislative branch to the executive in regards to protectionist trade policy ultimately may insulate trade policy on some level from public opinion because not only does the Department of Commerce not have an incentive to pay attention to public opinion, but the public does not

easily see these protectionist policies at work. Thus we may expect trade policy, or Temporary Trade Barriers, to not directly be affected by public opinion about trade because the Department of Commerce does not have an incentive to pay attention to the Protectionist Sentiment of the country. Ultimately, the relationship between trade policy and Protectionist Sentiment should look different from the relationship between general policy and mood (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995)) because the process of enacting trade policy looks different. However, we might still expect there to be an indirect relationship of opinion about trade on trade policy through the President. Furthermore, Congress still maintains the ability to alter the definition and control the use of these TTBs, which may lead an avenue open in which if Protectionist Sentiment is different enough from the current status quo of the trade policy, Congress would alter the ability for the Department of Commerce to continue to make protectionist policies.

1

In order for Congress to regain control of legislating trade policies, the easiest avenue would be through a unified Congress. In a unified Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives are both controlled by the same political party. During these times of a unified Congress it is easier to implement legislative changes—which would include trade policy—and bypass any potential gridlock. It is not necessary for the President to be of the same political party, because as I discussed earlier, legislating protectionist trade policy would require Congress to choose to regain their trade-making authority by taking it back from the executive branch. Obviously, it would be easier for Congress to regain this authority if the President was of the same political party, but then Congress may not have the incentive to take that once delegated power away from the President. They would lack the incentive because the President is of the same party Congress is and therefore should want the same types of policies Congress does. Whereas, if a Congress controlled by one party disagrees with the executive branch, such a Congress

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<sup>1</sup>There are other possible ways to model this relationship between trade attitudes and trade policy, such as including the President or the politics of the Commerce department, and ignoring the role Congress plays.

would have an incentive to reinstate their trade-making authority. A unified Congress should accelerate the effect of Protectionist Sentiment on protectionist trade policy. And a Congress that consists of a Republican majority in one house and a Democratic majority in the other should slow or turn off the effect of Protectionist Sentiment on trade policy because Congress has a greater incentive to continue to allow the Department of Commerce and the President to create protectionist trade policy, rather than changing policy itself.

#### **4.5 Data and Methods**

Because I am interested in actual trade policy, I use a measure of temporary trade barrier counts from the Temporary Trade Barrier Database at the World Bank (Bown (2011))) as my dependent variable. Temporary trade barriers are non-tariff barriers. It is argued that these capture actual trade barriers better than tariffs do because there are so few actual tariffs today and temporary trade barriers have essentially replaced tariffs (Bown (2011)). The World Trade Organization restricts the use of tariffs, and therefore these temporary trade barriers such as, anti-dumping and countervailing policies are often used in place of tariffs as protectionist policies. Anti-dumping policies prevent foreign manufacturers from importing products and selling them below the cost of production or below their sale's price in their home market. This practice of dumping hurts American producers because they are not able to compete with these foreign manufacturers. Anti-dumping policies help to protect American producers by limiting foreign manufacturers ability to dump. Similarly, countervailing policies protect American producers by levying a fee against foreign producers whose governments provide unfair subsidies to the production and/or exportation of goods. The World Bank provides a yearly count of these protectionist policies in the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown (2011)). This yearly count of temporary trade barriers is not a cumulative count, instead it is the number of temporary trade barriers implemented in each year. I use this count as a measure of Protectionist Trade Policy in the United States.

I use the measure of Protectionist Sentiment, which is measured annually, that I develop in Chapter 2 to capture the underlying preferences for trade policy of the public. This demand

for protectionist trade policies, in part, may determine actual trade policy. When Protectionist Sentiment is high, we should see an increase in protectionist trade policy and when Protectionist Sentiment is low, we should see a decrease in protectionist trade policy.

First I need to investigate the uni-variate properties of the variables in my model. To do this I use both an Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test and a KPSS test in levels. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test tests for a unit root, where the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root in the series. The KPSS test in levels tests a null hypothesis of a stationary series in levels. Using these tests, Protectionist Sentiment is determined to not be stationary. Table 4.1 shows that an augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Protectionist Sentiment fails to reject the null that there is a unit root present in the series. Therefore, I use a differenced measure of Protectionist Sentiment,  $\Delta$  Protectionist Sentiment.

Obviously, translating Protectionist Sentiment into actual trade policy is easy to accomplish in some circumstances and difficult in others due to the legislative process. When the legislative branch is unified, it is easy for elected officials to change policy to reflect the changing demands of the public. But when Congress is split (i.e., the Senate and the House of Representatives are controlled by different parties), we can imagine the gridlock that may result, and thus makes meeting the demands of the public more difficult. Therefore, I include a measure for unified Congress in my analysis. When both houses of Congress are of the same party it is easier for more (or less) Protectionist Sentiment to be translated into more (or less) protectionist trade policy. I measure this unified Congress variable as a dummy variable where, when both the Senate and the House of Representatives have the same party in the majority, unified Congress equals 1, and is 0 otherwise.

Furthermore, trade policy may be used to combat economic changes such as fluctuations in inflation and unemployment in order to “protect” the American economy. This same strategy may be employed by the professionals who determine whether or not to initiate a case and implement a Temporary Trade Barrier, also—in part—may cause changes in protectionist trade policy. Therefore, I include annual measures for inflation and unemployment in my analysis. I use an annual average measure of unemployment (FRED). I expect that when unemployment

is high this indicates that the economy is doing poorly and therefore, protectionist trade policy will increase, because the Department of Commerce experts (or the President) have decided to utilize this strategy to insulate the American economy. I include an annual measure of inflation (FRED) and expect that when inflation is high protectionist trade policy (TTB counts) will increase in order to help domestic firms not have to compete against foreign firms who may be able to produce at a lower price.

In order to proceed with these variables in my time series analysis, I need to check for stationarity. I include both of the results for an augmented Dickey-Fuller test as well as the KPSS in levels test for stationarity. As Table 4.1 shows, inflation is clearly a non-stationary series between 1972 and 2018. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test fails to reject a unit root in the series and the KPSS test in levels determines that we can reject the null of stationarity and determine that the series is not stationary in levels. In order to make inflation stationary and my model balanced, I use a differenced measure of inflation,  $\Delta$ Inflation. Tests for stationarity for the annual average unemployment rate resulted in mixed results for stationarity. As Table 4.1 shows, the Dickey-Fuller test resulted in a unit root for the unemployment series. However, the KPSS test in levels returned unclear results for unemployment. At the 10% level, we reject the null of stationarity, but at the 5% level we fail to reject (the 5% critical value is 0.463 and the test statistic is 0.404). These mixed results lead me to include two models (1) where I include unemployment in levels and (2) I include differenced measures of unemployment. I suspect that these series should be differenced, because the augmented Dickey-Fuller test concluded that there was a unit root and this result was not on the cusp at any critical value, while the KPSS test in levels did return mixed results, but only at the 10% level. However, regardless of my suspicions I still include both models.

Table 4.1: Variables and Tests for Stationarity: Augmented Dickey Fuller tests and KPSS in levels tests

Variable	Augmented Dickey Fuller Test	KPSS in levels Test	Conclusion	Solution
<b>Dependent Variables</b>				
Temporary Trade Barrier Counts	No unit root (p value: 0.0001)	Fail to reject: Stationary	Stationary	—
Trade as a % of GDP	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.3357)	Not Stationary	Rate of Trade as a % of GDP	
Rate of Trade as a % of GDP	No unit root (p value: 0.000)	Fail to reject: Stationary	Stationary	—
<b>Independent Variables</b>				
Protectionist Sentiment <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.1054)	Not Stationary	Difference	
Unified Congress <sub>t</sub>	No unit root (p value: 0.0251)	Fail to reject: Stationary	Stationary	—
Protectionist Sentiment <sub>t</sub> * Unified Congress <sub>t</sub>	No unit root (p value: 0.0276)	Fail to reject: Stationary	—	
Unemployment Annual Average <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.1955)	Fail to reject at 5% Stationary (5%: .463 and Test statistic: .404), but reject Stationarity in levels at 10%	Suspected Non-stationary	Run 2 models, 1 with $\Delta$ Unemployment, 1 with it in levels
Inflation <sub>t</sub>	Fail to reject: Unit root (p value: 0.2362)	Not Stationary	Not Stationary	Difference

In order to test whether or not the public gets the protectionism that they want through protectionist trade policies, I use a time series model where,

$$\text{Trade Policy}_t = \beta_1 \Delta \text{Protectionist Sentiment}_t + \beta_2 \text{Trade Policy}_{t-1} + \beta_3 \text{Unified Congress}_t + \beta_4 \text{Protectionist Sentiment}_t \times \text{Unified Congress}_t + \beta_5 \Delta \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_6 \Delta \text{Inflation}_t$$

#### 4.6 Results

Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.2 use the count of temporary trade barriers as the dependent variable. Model 1 includes unemployment in levels and Model 2 includes the differenced measure of unemployment. In neither of these models does Protectionist Sentiment have a direct effect on Protectionist Trade Policy (as it is measured here). Even the lagged dependent variable, where we would think that perhaps temporary trade barrier counts from last year have an effect on the count this year, does not have a significant effect. I theorized that perhaps the effect of Protectionist Sentiment is sometimes activated by a unified Congress where it is easier to change policies because one party has control, and other times Protectionist Sentiment does not affect trade policy because of the gridlock that exists in Congress and the delegation of power to the executive. Furthermore, only inflation seems to actually have an effect on temporary trade barrier counts. When the change in inflation is high there are less temporary trade barrier policies passed in that year. Thus when the U.S. experiences large shifts in inflation, we actually get less protectionism. This result for the effect of inflation on temporary trade barrier policies does not hold in Model 2 when I use the differenced measure of unemployment, but the negative direction of the effect remains negative and is very close to statistical significance (the standard error is 5.77 and therefore 2 times the standard error is 11.54, whereas the coefficient is -11.01).



Table 4.2: The Effects of Protectionist Sentiment on Trade Policy: A Time Series Analysis

	Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts)	Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts)
	(1)	(2)
TTB Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts) <sub>t-1</sub>	0.145 (0.157)	0.156 (0.159)
D.Protectionist Sentiment	0.774 (1.486)	0.703 (1.535)
Unified Congress	193.4 (114.6)	165.3 (104.7)
Protectionist Sentiment x Unified Congress	-2.063 (1.145)	-1.828 (1.074)
Unemployment Annual Average	2.880 (5.083)	
D.Inflation	-10.79* (4.651)	-11.01 (5.770)
D.Unemployment Annual Average		0.876 (7.740)
Constant	31.01 (40.46)	52.32** (17.28)
$R^2$	0.317	0.310
Observations	38	38

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

I find null results for my main hypothesis that Protectionist Sentiment is positively related to Protectionist Trade Policy, using the temporary trade barrier counts (Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.2). Therefore, I include a model where I use the growth rate of Trade as a percentage of GDP. Trade as a percentage of GDP is non-stationary, and in order to make it stationary and the model balanced, I calculate and use the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP. The growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP is an outcome of trade policy, rather than policy itself (Figure 4.3). The null result using the TTB counts might signal that the delegate model that I propose

makes up the relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and Protectionist Trade policy does not actually exist. I then test whether a trustee model, where the public does not care much about the actual policy but rather cares about the outcomes of the policy exists. In order to do this, I use the growth rate of Trade as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank as my dependent variable.




Figure 4.4: Dependent Variables: Protectionist Trade Policy (Temporary Trade Barrier Counts) and the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP

Before using the Growth Rate of Trade as a percentage of GDP as my dependent variable, I first show evidence that there indeed is a relationship between protectionist trade policy (TTB counts) and the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP in Table 4.3. The instantaneous effect of an increase in TTB counts by 1 results in a decrease of the growth rate of trade as a

percentage of GDP by 0.068% and the cumulative (or long run) effect results in a decrease of the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP by 0.061427% for an increase in Temporary Trade Barriers by 1. Although this seems like an incredibly small effect, the fact that the addition of one temporary trade barrier can move the needle on the economy where the GDP is in the trillions is significant and suggests that protectionist trade policies in the form of Temporary Trade Barriers work. Therefore, as shown in Table 4.3, the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP is an outcome of protectionist trade policy.

Table 4.3: A Model of the Effects of Protectionist Trade Policy on the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP

	Growth Rate of Trade as a % of GDP <sub>t</sub>
Growth Rate of Trade as a % of GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.107 (0.150)
Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts) <sub>t</sub>	-0.000680** (0.000229)
Constant	0.0512** (0.0160)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.198
Observations	39

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Model 3 and 4 in Table 4.4 use the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable. Model 3 uses unemployment in levels, whereas Model 4 uses a differenced

measures of unemployment. As I mentioned earlier, I suspect that differencing these variables is the correct specification in order to balance my model. Model 3 returns null results for all of my variables, except inflation. Where in Models 1 and 2 higher shifts in inflation led to lower temporary trade barriers, in Models 3 and 4 higher shifts in inflation leads to a higher growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP. A change in inflation leads to a 2.74% increase in the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP (Model 3, Table 4.4). This makes sense because as you can see in Table 4.3, there appears to be a negative relationship between the number of temporary trade barriers (Protectionist Trade Policy) and the growth rate of trade as a percentage of GDP. Model 4, using the differenced measure of unemployment still finds null results for everything, including a relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and trade outcomes. It still appears that there is a disconnect between public opinion on trade and trade policy and even trade outcomes. It seems trade policy (and even the outcomes of those policies) is insulated from direct influences of public opinion because of the delegation of power to the Department of Commerce, contrary to Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994)'s conclusions that public opinion on trade (through the use of inflation and unemployment) does affect trade policy outcomes. I believe differencing unemployment might be the correct avenue because we only fail to reject the null of stationarity in levels at 5%.

Table 4.4: The Effects of Protectionist Sentiment on Trade Policy Outcomes: A Time Series Analysis using the Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP

	Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP (3)	Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP (4)
Growth Rate of Trade as a Percentage of GDP $t-1$	0.00890 (0.0962)	-0.0295 (0.0949)
D.Protectionist Sentiment	0.00271 (0.00157)	0.00207 (0.00160)
Unified Congress	-0.0159 (0.0973)	-0.00738 (0.102)
Protectionist Sentiment x Unified Congress	0.000146 (0.00101)	0.0000542 (0.00104)
D.Unemployment Annual Average	-0.0104 (0.00687)	
Unemployment Annual Average		0.00308 (0.00518)
D.Inflation	0.0274*** (0.00426)	0.0309*** (0.00413)
Constant	0.0222 (0.0141)	0.00409 (0.0414)
$R^2$	0.669	0.653
Observations	45	45

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

It is still clear that the interaction I theorized about doesn't seem to affect trade policy, nor does a unified Congress. However, I do acknowledge that my sample size in Models 1 and 2 (Table 4.2) is 38 and in Models 3 and 4 (Table 4.4) my sample size is 45, neither of these sample sizes are ideal for estimating a model with 7 parameters. Therefore, I take a step back to examine a paired down model with a more appropriate number of parameters in Table 4.5. However in this paired down model that only includes a lagged dependent variable and my key independent variable of Protectionist Sentiment I find no significant relationship between either the lagged DV or Protectionist Sentiment and protectionist trade policy and the growth

rate of trade as a percentage of GDP. These results in Table 4.5 suggest that perhaps there is no relationship between what the public wants in regards to trade and what they actually get.

Table 4.5: A Time Series Model of Protectionist Trade Policy

	Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts)	Growth Rate of Trade as a % of GDP
	(1)	(2)
Protectionist Trade Policy (TTB counts) <sub>t-1</sub>	0.276 (0.163)	
Growth Rate of Trade as a % of GDP <sub>t-1</sub>		0.0224 (0.145)
$\Delta$ Protectionist Sentiment	-0.606 (1.437)	0.00377 (0.00230)
Constant	40.26*** (11.21)	0.0182 (0.0107)
$R^2$	0.077	0.064
Observations	38	45

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 4.7 Conclusion

Although I find null results for whether Protectionist Sentiment drives trade policy, it may indicate that trade policy really is insulated from public opinion because of the delegation of power from Congress to the executive branch. It may be argued that this delegation ensures efficiency when making protectionist trade policy, but there are certainly implications of a lack of dynamic representation between public opinion about trade and trade policy itself that affects everyone. Trade policy affects everyone. Congress has the ability to take back this power from the Department of Commerce and reintroduce representation into the trade policy making arena.

It may also be the case that rather than a delegate model of representation, because of the nature of trade policy where people feel much more disconnected from it than other policy areas,

they are content with observing trade policy outcomes that give them what they want. Instead of having preferences on trade policy, perhaps the public has preferences on the outcomes of trade policy. This would suggest that rather than the delegate model of representation, the trustee model may be a better fit. In the trustee model, so long as the public gets the outcomes that it wants, they do not care (as much) about how those outcomes are achieved (). The idea that this model might be correct would have large implications for the existing literature's assumption that people who want liberal outcomes necessarily want liberal policies and instead they might want liberal outcomes but believe that it is possible to achieve this through more protectionist measures. This potential explanation needs to be explored further and presents an avenue for new research.

However, this is not the only part of this chapter that may need further exploration. These results might imply that there really are no consequences for a changing Protectionist Sentiment. Perhaps it is the case that no dynamic representation exists between the public's attitudes about trade and trade policy for the country. This would imply that policy makers make trade policy decisions that are void of any public opinion. However, it would also follow that if this is the case then the public either doesn't observe this, or they do not have real preferences over trade policies or outcomes. Because if they did observe it and these preferences existed, then they would hold policy makers responsible for failing to give the public what they want through elections. It is not conclusive that a relationship even exists between Protectionist Sentiment and Protectionist Trade Policy or trade policy outcomes. This may be a result of my measurement of Protectionist Trade Policy by using the temporary trade barriers policy counts from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database at the World Bank. Although temporary trade barriers are the most commonly used form of protectionist trade policy, the number of barriers implemented in a year do not seem to respond to the public's demand for protectionism. Perhaps this is because these trade barrier policies are not often major policies that get a lot of attention from the public, in fact most of them the public probably knows very little about. These temporary trade barrier policies are passed by Congress, but most of the power of implementation, what constitutes a violation of the policy, the fines associated with the policy, and investigations are all handled by

the Department of Commerce. In fact, Commerce handles most of the details in regards to the temporary trade barriers, ultimately insulating elected officials from the need to respond to their constituents demands. Rather than responding to the public, perhaps the responsive relationship exists between import competing companies interests and these policies, as Congress has the ability to influence the Department of Commerce on investigations into instances of potential violations of these anti-dumping and countervailing measures that make up the temporary trade barriers.

Although I find no direct relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy, it does not mean that one does not exist or that there may be an indirect relationship. It may be the case that there is an indirect relationship between the Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy via the President due to the delegation power Congress has given the executive to make protectionist trade policy using temporary trade barriers.



## 5. CONCLUSION

This series of papers that makes up my dissertation, sets out to unpack Protectionist Sentiment at both the aggregate and individual level, and attempts to explore the potential consequences of a changing Protectionist Sentiment. The first paper finds that consumer confidence, in part, drives Protectionist Sentiment, but there was no evidence for the theorized effect of the media on Protectionist Sentiment. The second paper finds that the effect of partisanship on trade attitudes has evolved over time and appears to have increased. This means that partisanship has a greater role in predicting attitudes about trade today than it did in the past. The third paper finds that dynamic representation does not exist through the delegate model between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy. Although this result does not support my theory, it still leaves an interesting story to unpack for the future. All three of these papers leave more work to be explored.

So what do we know about Protectionist Sentiment now? First, Protectionist Sentiment ebbs and flows over time. Sometimes the aggregate public is more Protectionist and other times they are not. Second, Protectionist Sentiment is distinctly different from attitudes about the economy, as I find no statistically significant direct relationship between Protectionist Sentiment and unemployment or inflation. It may be the case that these effects of the economy on Protectionist Sentiment happen through consumer confidence. Third, there seems to be no relationship between the media and Protectionist Sentiment. Fourth, the effect of partisanship on an individual's protectionist sentiment, above and beyond ideology, evaluations about the economy, belonging to a labor union, income, age, education, and gender, has changed over time. Sometimes being a Republican increases the chances of being protectionist and other times it does not. Similarly, being a Democrat increases the chances of being protectionist and other times it does not. Merely identifying with a political party can increase the probability of an individual being protectionist or not. Fifth, there is no evidence of a dynamic relationship between attitudes about trade and trade policy in which trade policy responds to changing

Protectionist Sentiment. When all of these results are taken together, Protectionist Sentiment acts differently from other policy attitudes. It may be the case that Protectionist Sentiment is actually an indicator of something other than preferences about trade policy.

But do people really care about trade? This series of papers is not conclusive about the effects of Protectionist Sentiment nor about what drives it. It is a rational assumption that everyone prefers lower prices to higher prices, but do they connect this preference for lower priced imported goods with trade policy? The second paper in this series may indicate that they do not and instead the effects of what your political party says is how you feel about trade. Perhaps due to this reliance on partisan cues to determine attitudes about trade, things like anxiety about trade in the media do not drive these attitudes.

I believe the third paper in this series, Chapter 4, leaves the most room for further research and improvement. I find that dynamic representation does not exist via the delegate model between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy. It is not the case that we can throw out dynamic representation between Protectionist Sentiment and trade policy and say that trade policy making is void of public opinion influences, but we can say that increases in Protectionist Sentiment do not lead to increases in protectionist trade policy itself. Perhaps this is because Protectionist Sentiment is indicative of something other than preferences for trade policy. Instead it may tell a story of how the public prefers certain outcomes they believe come from protectionist or liberal policies and so long as they see the outcomes they want, they don't choose to replace their policy makers.

In all, this research leaves many avenues to further explore to include developing better measures of anxiety in the news surrounding trade and trade policy. Or then again, maybe it doesn't leave much to explore and the theories presented in Chapter 2 and 4 are wrong. Perhaps Protectionist Sentiment is almost entirely a function of partisan cues.

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APPENDIX A

**A.1 Survey Questions**

Table A.1: Survey Questions Used to Develop Protectionist Sentiment Index

Source	Question	# of Yrs	Years	Corr
ANES	Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?	10	1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.4
ABC/WP1	Should the federal government try to preserve American jobs by imposing taxes and limits on foreign imports even if that means higher prices fro U.S. consumers?	3	1985, 1987, 1989	0.980
Bloomberg1	Overall, do you think NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, has been good or bad for the US economy?	2	2016, 2017	1.0

CAMQT1	In general, do you think people benefit more from free trade between nations, or more if each nation sticks to producing and selling within its own borders?	10	1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989	0.755
CBSNYT1	Which of the following statements comes closer to your opinion– 1. Trade restrictions are necessary to protect domestic industries, or 2. Free trade must be allowed, even if domestic industries are hurt by foreign competition?	7	1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1996, 2006, 2009	0.746
CBSNYT3	Do you favor or oppose the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada that eliminates nearly all restrictions on imports, exports, and business investment between the United States, Mexico, and Canada?	2	1993, 2015	1.0



ChicagoCGAP	<p>As you may know, the United States is now negotiating a free trade agreement with the twelve Pacific nations called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). Based on what you know, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this free trade agreement?</p>	3	2014, 2015, 2016	-0.476
DCS1	<p>(Now, I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people and organizations, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that person or organization, please say so.)...NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)</p>	4	2001, 2002, 2003, 2004	0.222

DCS3	<p>(Now, I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people and organizations, with one hundred meaning very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold.</p> <p>You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization. If you have no opinion or never heard of that person or organization, please say so.)</p> <p>...NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and international trade agreements...Give...NAFTA and international free trade agreements a rating, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.</p>	6	2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2016	0.753
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DCS4	Do you think that free trade agreements between the United States and other countries have been a good thing or bad thing for the United States? (Is that very or somewhat?)	2	2013, 2016	-1.0
EPIC-MRA1	Overall, do you approve or disapprove of free trade agreements with other countries?	2	1998, 2003	1.0
GALLUP2	As you may know, Canada and the United States now share a free trade agreement which ensures that trade between the two countries is not subject to tariffs or large import quotas. It has been suggested that a wider free trade zone could be established consisting of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In general, do you think a North American free trade zone consisting of these countries would be mostly good for the United States, or mostly bad for the United States?	2	1991, 1992	1.0

GALLUP3	Some people say a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico would be good for the United States because it would help the U.S. economy by expanding exports. Others say it will be bad for the U.S. because it will end up costing the U.S. jobs. Do you favor or oppose the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico?	2	1992, 1993	1.0
GALLUP6	Thinking about the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico –also known as NAFTA– overall, do you think NAFTA has been good for the US or bad for the US?	4	1997, 2000, 2004, 2017	0.727
GALLUP7	What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do you see foreign trade more as - an opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?	18	1992, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018	0.883

GSS1	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? America should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.	3	1996, 2004, 2014	0.834
LATIMESQ1	As you may know, Mexico and the United States are negotiating a free trade agreement that, if agreed to, will mean many of the restrictions, laws and controls that now govern commerce between the two countries, would disappear. Do you favor or oppose the free trade agreement between Mexico and the United States, or haven't you heard enough about the proposal to say?	3	1991, 1992, 1993	0.944
MONMOUTH1	In general, do you think that free trade agreements with different countries are good or bad for the United States, or are you not sure?	2	2015, 2018	1.0

NBCWSJQ4	As you know, Congress passed NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the free trade agreement with Mexico. So far, would you say NAFTA has had more of a positive impact on the United States or more of a negative impact on the United States?	2	1996, 1997	1.0
NBCWSJQ5	In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the US (United States) and foreign countries have helped the US, have hurt the US, or haven't they made much of a difference either way?	7	1999, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018	0.978
NBCWSJQ6	Which of the following statements comes closer to what you think?...Statement A: I think free trade with foreign countries is good for America because it opens up new markets and we cannot avoid the fact that it is a global economy. Statement B: I think free trade with foreign countries is bad for America because it has hurt manufacturing and other key industries and there is no proof more trade creates better jobs.	3	2015, 2016, 2017	0.823

NewsInterestIndex	How do you feel about NAFTA, the (North American) free trade agreement between the U.S. (United States), Mexico and Canada? Do you favor or oppose this treaty?	2	1993, 1995	1.0
PEW1	Do you think that NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, is a good thing or a bad thing from a US (United States) point of view?	4	1997, 2001, 2005, 2017	0.012
PEW2	In general, do you think that free trade with other countries is good or bad for the United States?	2	2000, 2006	-1.0
PEW3	In general, do you think that free trade agreements like NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, and the policies of the WTO, World Trade Organization, have been a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?	7	2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2009	0.595
PEW4	In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the US and other countries, have been a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?	7	2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018	0.329

PEW6	As you may know, the US and the EU (European Union) are negotiating a free trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP. Do you think this trade agreement will be a good thing for our country or a bad thing?	2	2014, 2015	-1.0
PEW7	As you may know, the United States is negotiating a free trade agreement with eleven countries in Asia and Latin America called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Do you think this trade agreement will be a good thing for our country or a bad thing?	2	2014, 2016	-1.0
PIPA/KNP1	Do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, has been good or bad for the United States?	2	2003, 2005	1.0
SOTN1	Turning now to the question of foreign trade, do you think the United States should cut down on certain kinds of imports from foreign countries, or do you feel we should follow the principles of free trade?	2	1972, 1974	1.0



TIME2	Some people think we should have protective economic measures, such as quotas and tariffs, to make sure that American products and jobs do not suffer from foreign competition, others believe we should rely on free trade and not take such measures. Which of these comes closest to your opinion—having protective measures or relying on free trade?	2	1984, 1985	-0.831
TIME3	Do you favor or oppose the free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico that would eliminate all trade barriers between those two countries?	2	1992, 1993	1.0