

**LOBBYING EXPOSURE AND COMMITTEE PREFERENCES  
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS**

An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

Lobbying Exposure and Committee Preferences in the United States Congress

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Lobbying has been an important part of the U.S. political landscape for over a century. A rich variety of literature in economics and finance has shown that lobbying efforts aimed at congressional representatives can affect political outcomes, and that personal relationships of politicians with lobbyists can lead to deferred benefits for politicians. Because of these effects, I hypothesize that members of Congress seek access to lobbying, and I look for evidence of this in requests for congressional committee assignments submitted by members of the U.S. House of Representatives between 2000 and 2008. Modern political science identifies three central motivations that drive a congressman to request assignment to a specific congressional committee: constituency priorities, policy interests, and a broad desire for political power and influence. I hypothesize that a fourth motivation may exist: exposure to lobbyists. If so, then a congressional committee's lobbying exposure would have a significant effect on the desirability of that committee and the number of requests to serve on it. Results show that lobbying is positively and statistically correlated with the probability that a congress member requests a committee.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Money in politics has long been a contentious topic of debate, which has made it an interesting topic of study for economists and political scientists. Decades of empirical research on lobbying and financial contributions to political campaigns have shown that a strategic injection of capital can significantly shape election outcomes, economic policy, and regulatory and economic benefits that accrue to firms. One realm which lends itself especially well to the study of money in politics is the U.S. Congress. Composed of 535 members across its two chambers, the U.S. Congress is a dynamic arena in which candidates compete for influence through committee assignments. Congressional committees preside over a broad range of economic and policy legislation, and as the salience of various economic issues changes over time, so does attention paid by firms and their lobbyists to various committees.

The empirical literature on money in politics has largely shown that lobbying tends to be more effective than campaign contributions in generating economic benefits for companies. Wright (1990) and Sorauf (1992) found that campaign contributions have little direct effect on congressmen's voting behavior and thus benefits for firms. Lobbying, on the other hand, appears to have a detectable effect on economic outcomes, and has been linked to lower effective tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009) and larger federal grant receipts (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006), among other financial benefits. Researchers have estimated that the overall return to lobbying ranges between 140 and 500 percent (Kang, 2015; De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006).

But lobbying may also generate benefits for politicians. Close connections to lobbyists employed by prominent corporations lead to professional contacts, which may give politicians access to corporate funds to support their reelection campaigns or result in lucrative industry employment upon exit from politics (a phenomenon known as the “revolving door”) (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi, 2014; McKay, 2018). The potential for these personal benefits provides strong incentives for congressmen to meet the lobbyists’ (and their clients’) demands, which helps to explain the exceptional returns that researchers have estimated. If congress members stand to gain personally from their connections with lobbyists, then they should be actively seeking to maximize opportunities to establish such connections. This raises an important question: do members of congress try to increase their exposure to lobbyists through their choice of committee service?

Shortly after elections and before the start of each new congress, all freshman members of congress (and some returning members) submit requests for committee assignments for the upcoming two-year term. Researchers have identified three main motivations that drive congress members to request assignment to a specific committee: a desire to benefit one’s constituency, interest in crafting impactful public policy, and desire for personal political power within one’s congressional chamber (Bullock, 1976; Deering and Smith, 1997; Frisch and Kelly, 2006). These motivations lead congressmen to request to be assigned to a constituency committee, a policy committee, or an influence committee, respectively. I hypothesize that what is missing from this list is the types of personal benefits that extend beyond a political career---that is, those offered by connections with lobbyists.

Lobbyists tend to work most closely with those congressional committees that deal with the most salient economic and political issues. Some of these issues are recurring and

consistently fall within the jurisdiction of a single committee (e.g., the House Committee on Energy and Commerce), while other issues may arise temporarily as a result of social, political, or economic shocks, and may briefly put a committee in the spotlight (for instance, the House Committee on Ethics during a governmental misconduct investigation). I use variation in lobbying intensity across committees and across time to evaluate whether congress members' interest in committees mirrors that of lobbyists.

Assuming that members of congress are rational agents, and certain committees offer greater exposure to lobbyists, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between a committee's lobbying intensity and the probability that it is requested by a congressman. By examining committee requests of freshman and returning members of the U.S. House of Representatives between the years 2000 and 2008, I provide new insight as to whether there exists a fourth motivation for committee preferences within the U.S. Congress. Regression results provide support for my hypothesis, showing that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the probability with which a member of congress requests a committee and the intensity with which that committee is lobbied.

## CHAPTER II

### METHODS

In order to analyze the effect of lobbying on committee choice, I integrated lobbying data into the existing theory for committee requests based on the research of Bullock (1976), Deering and Smith (1997), and Frisch and Kelly (2006).

#### Models

I began my empirical analysis by examining the general relationship between lobbying and committee type, controlling for changes in lobbying over time. This relationship helps illustrate whether certain committee types are systematically more attractive to lobbyists. If congress members seek exposure to committees that receive more attention from lobbyists, then knowing whether there is a systematic bias in lobbying across committees will help me form more accurate expectations about congress members' request behavior. Model (1) is specified as follows:

$$\text{Lobbying}_{c,y} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Type}_c + \beta_2 \text{Time}_y + \varepsilon_{c,y}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\text{Lobbying}_{c,y}$  is the total amount of money, in log dollars, spent on lobbying efforts aimed at committee  $c$  in time period  $y$ ;  $\text{Type}_c$  is the committee type (constituency, policy, influence, or other), and  $\text{Time}_y$  is a linear time trend.

Next, I examined whether and how lobbying affects committee requests at the congress level. Model (2) below estimates the impact of lobbying efforts on the total number of requests,  $\text{Count}_{c,y}$ , submitted by all congress members for committee  $c$  during congress  $y$ .

$$\text{Count}_{c,y} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Lobbying}_{c,y-1} + \beta_2 \text{Type}_c + \beta_3 \text{Openings}_{c,y} + \beta_4 \text{Time}_y + \varepsilon_{c,y} \quad (2)$$



I lagged the lobbying variable in model (2) by one congress (two years) to allow congress members to observe committee-specific lobbying activities before submitting their requests.  $Openings_{c,y}$  captures the number of new members added to committee  $c$  during congress  $y$ , and all other variables are as defined in model (1).

Finally, in model (3), I examined the effect of lobbying on committee requests at the individual congress member level.

$$PR(\text{Request}_{m,c,y} = 1 | X) = \Phi(\text{Lobbying}_{c,y-1}, \text{Type}_c, \text{Member}_{m,y}, \text{District}_{m,y}, \text{Openings}_{c,y}, \text{Time}_y), \quad (3)$$

where  $Request_{m,c,y}$  is a binary indicator set to 1 if member  $m$  requests committee  $c$  during congress  $y$ , and zero otherwise;  $Member_{m,y}$  captures congress member  $m$ 's party affiliation and incumbency status during congress  $y$  (i.e., whether the member is a freshman or a returning congressman);  $District_{m,y}$  is a set of seven variables that capture specific constituency characteristics of member  $m$ 's congressional district---characteristics that help approximate the nature of the member's district (i.e., whether the member represents a narrowly-focused district, like a district in rural Iowa that is more likely to be a constituency district, or a district with a broader base of political issues); all other variables are as defined in models (1) and (2); and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is a standard normal CDF.

## Data

My data came from two main sources and cover the 107<sup>th</sup> through 110<sup>th</sup> congresses (years 2001 to 2009). Lobbying data come from the House of Representatives Office of the Clerk and information on committee requests comes from Frisch and Kelly (2008).

*Lobbying data*

For each firm that spent \$2,500 or more on lobbying activities during a quarter, I observe quarterly lobbying disclosure reports that include the broad issue categories for which the firm lobbied, a description of the specific issues addressed, and the total amount spent by the firm on all its lobbying efforts during the quarter (see Appendix A for list of broad issue categories). Altogether I observe 823,490 unique lobbying disclosure documents that cover the time period 1998 quarter one to 2005 quarter four.




Figure 1. The average amount spent on lobbying committee-specific issues, over two year periods.

I matched broad lobbying issue categories to the congressional committees that have jurisdiction over them using a mapping method developed by Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2014) (see Appendix B for issues assigned to each committee). In the case of issues overseen by multiple committees (17 of 76 broad issue categories I observe), the mapping method

distributes the issue to all committees (usually no more than two) that have jurisdiction over the issue.

Of 823,490 unique lobbying disclosure documents in my sample, 346,315 report lobbying activity on more than one issue. This creates some ambiguity about how much of the total expenditures were related to each lobbying issue. For simplicity, I assumed that lobbying dollars are divided equally and computed an average amount spent per reported issue (see Figure 1).

#### *Committee request data*

For each member of the U.S. House of Representatives that submitted a formal request to be assigned to one or more committees between 107<sup>th</sup> and 110<sup>th</sup> congresses, I observe the requested committee(s), the member's party affiliation, and which state and congressional district the member represents. I limited my sample only to requests for standing (i.e., permanent) committees because temporary or special committees may not be subject to the same systematic assignment process as standing committees. Of 1,785 total members of congress that served in the House during my time sample, I observed a total of 347 unique first-choice committee requests and 742 total committee requests, with up to seven ranked preferences (see Appendix C for a breakdown of committee requests). Figure 2 shows the distribution of requests across congresses and Figure 3 shows the number of requests for each committee during each congress.




Figure 2. Number of committee request, by congress




Figure 3. Number of requests, by committee/congress;  
No requests reported for the House Committee on Official Conduct

181 first-choice requests came from returning members of congress, while 166 came from freshmen. While nearly all freshmen members submit formal requests, returning members only submit official requests if they are dissatisfied with their assignment during the previous congress. By congressional property right norm (Shepsel, 1978, p. 30), all returning congress members have a right (but not an obligation) to resume service on the committee(s) to which they were assigned during the previous congress. It appears that many returning members during my period of analysis were dissatisfied with their previous assignments and chose to submit a formal request, rather than to use alternative channels to obtain a seat on a different committee. Republicans submitted 218 of all first-choice requests, while Democrats submitted 129. The House was under Republican control during my period of observation, and since the majority party is entitled to a larger number of committee seats, it is not surprising to observe more requests from Republican representatives, although Frisch and Kelly note that even under a Democratic-controlled House, Republicans tended to submit more committee requests (Frisch and Kelly, 2006, p. 98).

#### *Committee type data*

To represent the three original committee request motivations identified in the literature, I used the classification identified by Frisch and Kelly (2006) to specify each House committee in my sample as either influence committee, constituency committee, policy committee, or other. Appendices E and F show the classification of committees by type in general and by political party.

### *Constituency data*

I collected additional publicly available data on characteristics of congressional districts over time in order to more accurately delineate constituency committees. The constituency-driven motivation of committee requests posits that constituency-driven congress members select committees that reflect the dominant interests of the voters within their districts in order to improve chances of the members' reelection. Frisch & Kelly (2006, p. 107) confirmed this relationship for the narrowly focused committees on Agriculture and the Armed Forces, though not for other committees.

To better represent constituency committees, I selected demographic proxies to characterize each of the seven identified constituency committees in the U.S. House of Representatives: Agriculture; Armed Services; Natural Resources; Science, Space, and Technology; Small Business; Transportation and Infrastructure; and Veterans' Affairs. Replacing the constituency indicator variable with these proxies in my regression models allowed me to evaluate whether some constituencies were more attractive to congressmen regardless of the amount of lobbying they attracted.

The variables I chose to represent constituent interests are informed by the issues over which each committee has jurisdiction, which are specified under House Rule X. Constituencies are represented as follows: Agriculture: percent of congressional district's civilian population 16 years and older employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; Armed Services: percent of district's labor force employed in the armed forces; Natural Resources: an indicator of whether or not the congressional district contained within its geographic area a national battlefield, site, park, historic park, preserve, reserve, lakeshore, monument, military park, memorial, river, recreation area, seashore, scenic or recreational river or trail, or parkway;

Science, Space, and Technology: percent of employed civilian population engaged in life, physical, and social science occupations; Transportation and Infrastructure: amount of federal-aid highway funding by lane mile; Small Business: the total number of businesses under 500 employees in the state; Veterans’ Affairs: percent of the district’s population 18 and older that are veterans.




Figure 4. Select constituency demographics, by data source.

Demographic characteristics for agriculture, armed services, veteran, natural resources, and science constituencies come from the 2000 census for the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress and the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) for the 108<sup>th</sup> to 110<sup>th</sup> Congresses, while data for transportation and infrastructure came from the Federal Highway Administration. The 2006 American Community Survey is based on a representative sample of the U.S. population, which alleviates any concern about bias. Even though my constituency proxies were somewhat lower (by 8 to 20 percent as shown in Figure 4) using ACS data than 2000 Census data, the difference

was systematic across all variables and partly reflected geographic changes that followed the 2002 redistricting. Appendix D provides summary statistics for each of my chosen constituency variables.

#### *Committee openings data*

I assumed that the number of openings on a committee would likely impact the number and probability of a given member to request a committee. Congress members would be more likely to request a spot on a committee for which they know spots are available. If the number of openings is low or zero, a request would most likely be wasted. To better capture preferences for committees with open spots, I included a count of the number of new members admitted to a committee during a particular congress. Thus, I assume that all congress members know how many open spots each committee has at the start of each congress.



## CHAPTER III

### RESULTS

I estimated three regression models to examine the relationship between lobbying and congressional committee requests. I first modeled the relationship between lobbying and committee type to investigate general lobbying patterns. Next, I investigated how lobbying impacts aggregate requests for specific House committees, estimating the impact of lobbying intensity on the average congress member. Lastly, I modeled the effect of committee-specific lobbying intensity on an individual congress member's probability of requesting that committee. These three models provide a well-rounded view of the relationship between firms' lobbying efforts and congressmen's committee preferences.

#### **Model 1**

Table 1 shows results of my first empirical model, depicted in equation (1). The constituency committee serves as the reference category. Results show a statistically significant relationship between committee type and lobbying intensity, measured by the average committee-level lobbying expenditure during a given congress. Specifically, all else equal, over my period of analysis firms spent significantly more money lobbying policy and influence committees than they did lobbying constituency committees. Lobbying expenditures also increased over time, by about 20 percent per two-year congressional period. Not surprisingly, these results suggest that lobbyists engage more with certain committee types systematically, rather than distributing their efforts among committee types randomly.

Table 1. Relationship between committee type and average lobbying expenditures

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Policy                1.062***
                    (0.033)

Influence             0.864***
                    (0.032)

Other                 -0.106***
                    (0.025)

Time                  0.182***
                    (0.012)

_cons                 17.253***
                    (0.035)
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N                      6669
-----
Robust standard error in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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**Model 2**

Table 2 displays results of my second empirical model, described by equation (2). Again, constituency committees serve as the reference category. The first column of table 2 displays results where the outcome variable counts the total number of times a committee is requested, regardless of how far down the list of preferences it appears. In the second column, the outcome variable counts the number of times a committee appears as one of the top three preferences. The third column reports results where the outcome variable counts only the number of times a committee appears as a congress member’s top choice. All three model specifications show that an increase in lobbying expenditures is associated with a larger number of requests for that committee. Specifically, a 100 percent increase (i.e., doubling) in lobbying spending is associated with an additional two to three requests for a committee. This confirms my main

hypothesis that congress members' requests are indeed related to how much exposure to lobbyists a committee provides.

Policy and influence committees appear on request lists no more frequently than constituency committees, although there is some evidence that influence committees appear on request lists less frequently. Interestingly, there does not appear to be any relationship between the number of open seats on a committee and the number of times it is requested.

Table 2. Impact of lobbying on the total number of times a committee is requested

	All Requests	Top Request	Top Three
ln(Lobbying)	2.543*** (0.860)	2.269*** (0.668)	2.965*** (0.854)
Policy	0.319 (2.764)	0.332 (1.701)	0.251 (2.720)
Influence	-4.792** (2.391)	1.048 (1.725)	-2.853 (2.434)
Other	-6.101** (2.805)	-0.503 (1.829)	-3.782 (2.746)
Openings	0.473 (0.302)	0.324 (0.211)	0.473 (0.301)
Time	-3.598*** (0.746)	-1.819*** (0.536)	-3.192*** (0.736)
_cons	-28.807** (13.132)	-34.471*** (10.106)	-39.795*** (12.826)
N	76	76	76

Robust standard error in parentheses

\* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01

### **Model 3**

Tables 3 and 4 report results for equation (3), estimated as a Probit at the individual congress member level. Once again constituency serves as the reference committee type. I report marginal effects, rather than coefficients of Probit regressions. The outcome variable in Table 3 is a binary indicator set to one if a member has requested assignment to a committee, and zero otherwise, and the three columns report the same specifications described in table 2. Results in Table 3A are based on a model that includes specific demographic characteristics for district constituencies, though these are not reported.

All three model specifications in Table 3 indicate that a one percent increase in lobbying is statistically significantly associated with a 3.7 to 4.7 percent increase in the probability that a congress member requests the lobbied committee. This provides even stronger evidence than that in table 2 that congressmen pay attention to a committee's potential to expose them to lobbyists.

As in table 2, policy committees do not appear to be more likely to be requested than constituency committees, but there is stronger evidence that influence committees are less likely to be requested. This is consistent with the fact that influence committees are traditionally populated by experienced congress members with a proven track record. Thus, the low chance of assignment disincentivizes freshman congress members from requesting influence committees.

Evidence on returning members is consistent with what we know about the avenues by which members get assigned to committees. Freshman members rely primarily on formally submitted requests, while returning congress members can also use informal networking channels to petition for a specific assignment. Thus, returning members are less likely to submit a formal request than freshman members. The data partly confirm this, showing that even though

returning members may be no less likely to submit an official request, they tend to limit their request lists to a single top-choice committee.

Table 3. Lobbying intensity and congress member's probability of requesting a committee

	All Requests	Top Request	Top Three
ln(Lobbying)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.004)
Policy	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)
Influence	-0.057*** (0.010)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.037*** (0.009)
Other	-0.144*** (0.035)	-0.044* (0.025)	-0.110*** (0.034)
Returning	-0.095*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.058*** (0.007)
Party	0.051*** (0.009)	0.003 (0.006)	0.028*** (0.008)
Openings	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Time	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.004)
N	6669	6669	6669

Constituency characteristics included, but not reported

Robust standard error in parentheses

\* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01

All constituency characteristics in this model are statistically insignificant, suggesting that aggregating committees across broad motivation-related types is appropriate (i.e., I don't gain any additional insight into congress members' request behavior by using more refined measures of the preferences of their district's voters).

I estimate model 3 a second time, introducing party-specific committee types. These committee types are recategorized based on how the average member of each party views each committee in terms of their legislative and personal motivations. Differences in categorization occur because the two primary U.S. political parties have different voter bases and policy priorities. For example, House Democrats view the House Committee on Banking and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology as primarily policy committees, while Republicans view them as mixed constituency and policy committees. Appendix F shows the breakdown of these party-specific committee types as identified by Fisch and Kelly (2006).

Table 4 reports the marginal effects from these Probit regressions with the constituency committee type as the reference category. Once again, lobbying appears to be positively and statistically significantly related to the probability that a congressman requests assignment to a specific committee. A one percent increase in lobbying leads to a 3 to 3.6 percent increase in the request probability. This model again illustrates that policy and constituency committees, and in this case, mixed policy/constituency committees, are selected at similar rates when looking at all or the top three requests. The probability of an influence committee being requested is 2.8 to 4.3 percent lower and the probability of a mixed policy/influence committee being requested is around 6 percent lower, compared to a pure constituency committee, when looking at top three and all requests. Committees that are not attached to a specific motivation are 7 to 10.8 percent less likely to be requested across all models. These results complement those displayed in Table 3 and confirm the observations of Frisch and Kelly (2006) on party-specific committee request motivations. All other evidence is consistent with that in Table 3.

An interesting pattern emerged when I considered results from tables 2 to 4 in combination. Lobbying intensity is the only variable that remained consistently correlated with a

top choice committee's request probability. The remaining explanatory variables—committee type, congress member characteristics, and number of committee openings—were statistically correlated only for committees that appeared lower on a congress member's preference list.

Table 4. Lobbying intensity and the probability of committee request

Outcome Variable: Probability of Request

	All Requests	Top Request	Top Three
ln(Lobbying)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.004)
Con./Pol.	0.005 (0.010)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.009)
Policy	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.014)
Pol./Inf.	-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.059*** (0.012)
Influence	-0.043*** (0.012)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.028** (0.011)
Other	-0.108*** (0.015)	-0.070*** (0.014)	-0.098*** (0.014)
Returning	-0.096*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.058*** (0.007)
Party	0.047*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.024*** (0.008)
Openings	0.005*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Time	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.004)
N	6669	6669	6669

Constituency characteristics included, but not reported

Robust standard error in parentheses

\* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

In this thesis I proposed that information about congressional lobbying activities can help us better understand what drives congress member's preferences over congressional committees. Existing empirical literature on the role that money plays in politics has found significant returns to lobbying and more modest benefits to political campaign contributions. Motivated by this observation, I proposed to augment the existing model of congressional committee preferences. Specifically, I proposed that in addition to being driven by one of three established motivations for committee service—the needs of one's constituency, the desire to form meaningful policy, and personal aspiration for power within one's congressional chamber—congress members may also be motivated by potential personal benefits that result from forming close relationships with lobbyists (e.g., access to corporate funds and post-political private industry employment). I hypothesized that a congress member's preference over committee assignment is thus statistically related to the intensity with which a specific congressional committee gets lobbied.

To test this hypothesis, I combined data on lobbying activities with congressional committee requests and congressional district characteristics to estimate the empirical relationship between lobbying, committee characteristics, and committee requests. The results of my three regression models show a positive statistical correlation between the probability with which a congressman requests a committee and the lobbying intensity of that committee. Although policy and influence committees seem to systematically attract more lobbying than constituency committees, lobbying expenditures are positively correlated with the probability that a member of the U.S. House of Representatives requests a particular committee even when I



account for the characteristics of that committee. This result is consistent with the theory of self-interested legislators and helps to expand our understanding of congressional motivations behind committee preferences. It also suggests that the mechanism through which lobbyists—and firms that hire them—are able to influence legislative outcomes operates through legislators' self-interest, suggesting important consequences for social welfare in a political system that easily accommodates the pursuit of personal gain. A further discussion of such consequences, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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## APPENDIX A

### Broad lobbying issue categories observed in Congressional Lobbying Reports

ACC	Accounting	HCR	Health Issues
ADV	Advertising	HOU	Housing
AER	Aerospace	IMM	Immigration
AGR	Agriculture	IND	Indian/Native American Affairs
ALC	Alcohol and Drug Abuse	INS	Insurance
ANI	Animals	LBR	Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace
APP	Apparel/Clothing, Industry/Textiles	LAW	Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice
ART	Arts/Entertainment	MAN	Manufacturing
AUT	Automotive Industry	MAR	Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries
AVI	Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines	MIA	Media (Information and Publishing)
BAN	Banking	MED	Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs
BNK	Bankruptcy	MMM	Medicare/Medicaid
BEV	Beverage Industry	MON	Minting/Money/Gold Standard
BUD	Budget/Appropriations	NAT	Natural Resources
CHM	Chemicals/Chemical Industry	PHA	Pharmacy
CIV	Civil Right/Civil Liberties	POS	Postal
CAW	Clean Air and Water Quality	RRR	Railroads
CDT	Commodities (Big Ticket)	RES	Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation
COM	Communications/Broadcasting	REL	Religion
CPI	Computer Industry	RET	Retirement
CSP	Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection	ROD	Roads/Highway
CON	Constitution	SCI	Science/Technology
CPT	Copyright/Patent/Trademark	SMB	Small Business
DEF	Defense	SPO	Sports/Athletics
DOC	District of Columbia	TAX	Taxation/Internal Revenue Code
DIS	Disaster Planning/Emergencies	TEC	Telecommunications
ECN	Economics/Economic Development	TOB	Tobacco
EDU	Education	TOR	Torts
ENG	Energy/Nuclear	TRD	Trade (Domestic and Foreign)
ENV	Environmental/Superfund	TRA	Transportation
FAM	Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption	TOU	Travel/Tourism
FIR	Firearms/Guns/Ammunition	TRU	Trucking/Shipping
FIN	Financial Instruments/Investments/Securities	URB	Urban Development/Municipalities
FOO	Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc)	UNM	Unemployment
FOR	Foreign Relations	UTI	Utilities
FUE	Fuel/Gas/Oil	VET	Veterans
GAM	Gaming/Gambling/Casinos	WAS	Waste (hazard/solid/interstate/nuclear)
GOV	Government Issues	WEL	Welfare

## APPENDIX B

### Lobbying Issues Assigned to Each House Committee for 107<sup>th</sup>-110<sup>th</sup> Congresses

Partially reproduced from Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2014

Agriculture: AGR, FOO, TOB, ANI, CDT

Appropriations: BUD

National Security (107-108)/Armed Services (109-110): AER, DEF, HOM, INT

Financial Services: HOU, FIN, INS, RES, MON, BAN, BNK, URB, GAM

Budget: BUD

Education and the Workplace (107-109)/Education and Labor (110): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL,  
ART

Energy and Commerce: ACC, CSP, ENG, TEC, FOO, FUE, ALC, MMM, MED, ENV, SPO, TRD, TOU, HCR,  
CAW, WAS, UTI, PHA, MAN, ADV, MIA, CPI, COM, CDT, CHM, BEV, AUT, APP

International Relations (107-109)/Foreign Affairs (110): FOR, ECN, REL

Government Reform and Oversight (107-109)/Oversight and Government Reform (110): GOV, POS, DOC

House Oversight (107-108)/House Administration (109-110): GOV

Judiciary: LAW, CON, CPT, IMM, CIV, TOR, FIR

Natural Resources (110)/Resources (107-109): MAR, NAT, IND, RES, GAM, CDT

Transportation and Infrastructure: APR, RRR, ROD, TRA, TRU, DIS

Rules: GOV

Science (107-109)/Science and Technology (110): ENG, SCI, AER, AVI, CPI


Small Business: SMB

Standards of Official Conduct: GOV

Veterans Affairs: VET

Ways and Means: UNM, TRD, TAX, WEL, RET

## APPENDIX C



Distribution of the total number of requests submitted by House members.



## APPENDIX D

Summary statistics for demographic constituency variables

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Range</b>
<i>Armed Forces (107)</i>	.0053	.0121	0.0-0.125
<i>Armed Forces (108-110)</i>	.0042	.0088	0.0-0.0782
<i>Agriculture (107)</i>	0.0153	0.0203	0.0-0.223
<i>Agriculture (108-110)</i>	0.0141	0.02	0.0-.1995
<i>Science (107)</i>	0.009	0.0052	0.003-0.046
<i>Science (108-110)</i>	0.009	0.0053	0.0013-0.0403
<i>Veteran (107)</i>	0.1264	0.0306	0.032-0.229
<i>Veteran (108-110)</i>	0.1037	0.0293	0.0242-0.2137
<i>Highway (107)</i>	4.3851	2.1319	1.0339-14.7924
<i>Highway (108-110)</i>	4.9203	2.2767	1.1066-14.9034
<i>Small Business (107)</i>	0.5027	0.0368	0.4349-0.7051
<i>Small Business (108-110)</i>	0.5051	0.0343	0.4455-0.7007

## APPENDIX E

### Committee classification

Partially reproduced from Frisch & Kelly, 2006.

<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Influence</b>
Agriculture	Banking	Appropriations
Armed Services	Education and Labor	Budget
Natural Resources	Energy and Commerce	Rules
Public Works	Foreign Affairs	Ways and Means
Science	Judiciary	
Small Business	Government Operations	
Veterans Affairs	Ethics	

“Other” committees omitted

## APPENDIX F

Committee classification by political party  
Partially reproduced from Frisch & Kelly, 2006.

	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Constituency/Policy</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Policy/Influence</b>	<b>Influence</b>
<i>Both</i>	Agriculture Armed Services Natural Resources Public Works	Foreign Affairs			
<i>Republicans</i>	Energy and Commerce Veteran's Affairs	Banking Science Small Business	Judiciary	Government Operations Ways and Means	Appropriations Budget Rules
<i>Democrats</i>	Education and Labor	Energy and Commerce House Administration Judiciary	Banking Science	Appropriations Budget	Ways and Means

“Other” committees omitted