

caution to “bear no malice” in “Man, if thou mind heaven to obtain” to create a kind of estrangement evokes uses of repetition in *Weather* (“head”) and *Love* (“conscience”) to signal how the idea now holds a potential to inflict harm, given its politicized, destructive use in the Henrician regime of the 1530s. Earlier dramatic works also inform the poet’s enigmatic insect-parable *The Spider and the Fly*, which employs allegory in a fashion evoking *Gentleness* and *Weather*. Walker’s summations of various dramatic speeches, such as that of John in *Witty and Witless*, “the witless are saved by their own incapacity,” do much to elucidate for new readers the gist of sixteenth-century debate language in dramatic form, as well as to demonstrate the value of the epigram so appreciated by Heywood and others of his time. One can imagine that new and experienced present-day audiences might also welcome the idea that “old” plays addressing such unfortunate truths conclude with a moral message, in this case of the importance of using one’s wisdom to practice good deeds for the purpose of helping others in this life as well as for personal salvation in that which follows. With a style lucid, engaging, and approachable, Walker weaves a remarkable, sophisticated narrative of Heywood’s life, time, and creative work alongside contemporaneous and scholarly accounts of matters of Church and State. The result is a sensitive and deep engagement of the playwright that brings to life a figure exceptional for his discursive breadth, length of career, and humane, “merry” spirit. The volume is a highly valuable contribution to Heywood studies that will surely inspire literary scholarship for years to come.

Jonathan Scott. *How the Old World Ended*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2019. xvi + 392 pp. \$35.00. Review by CHARLES BEEM, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, PEMBROKE.

This reviewer cannot remember reading a history book this enjoyable and edifying. In *How the Old World Ended*, Scott takes the knowledge and experience of a long and distinguished career to craft what is unmistakably his masterwork. This is a work of global history, leaving behind the limitations of “national” histories to create a history in which people, ideas, and commodities flowed freely in and around

a Northwestern European Archipelago, which created and then dominated global patterns of trade in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, across the Atlantic, and around Africa to South and East Asia. The book's thesis is that there was an Anglo-Dutch-American "Revolution" which unfolded over the course of a century and a half, from the beheading of Charles I in 1649 to the beheading of Louis XVI in 1793, which encompassed technological innovation in agriculture and shipping, encouraged and empowered by the emergence of modernizing states capable of maintaining a global empire. But in addition to this material explanation, religious toleration (coupled with a Weberian Protestant work-ethic), freedom of movement, and the free exchange of ideas were also crucial elements in this revolutionary mix, which in Scott's analysis developed by a process of cultural osmosis from Holland to Britain and then out to the rest of the world through imperial dominance of North America and control of global trading routes. This revolution reached its apotheosis with the Industrial Revolution, which we all know happened first in Britain, an achievement Whiggish inclined historians have celebrated for centuries.

But Scott avoids falling down the rabbit hole of Neo-Whiggism; in his analysis "Revolutionary" Britain did not "go it alone," a notion long a Whig dogma that was simpatico with the idea that the *nation state* of Great Britain was "separate" from Europe. Scott erased national boundaries to create a regional analysis in which Britain was just one component. In fact, it was permeability that ultimately allowed Britain to benefit materially by its openness to the flow of people and ideas from co-religionists, the Dutch, and the diaspora of technological know-how that left France in the wake of Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Such an interpretation in fact is another dagger in the heart of the Whig interpretation, which refutes the notion of the historical inevitability of British superiority, another key tenet of the Whig interpretation. While post-imperial historians continue to debate the merits of the emergence and dominance of the British Empire, Scott sidesteps this issue to present an image of Britain as the *recipient* rather than the originator of the essential ingredients for modernization, which included political revolution, the creation of the military fiscal state, the emergence of a commercial class which gained the ability to direct government to protect its interests with its

modernized armed forces. In Scott's analysis, this is not the achievement of Britain; it was the achievement of an archipelago consisting of Britain and Holland, along with the Americas, India, and the East Indies, all bursting with raw materials for trade and industry and later as an insatiable market for finished manufactured goods—a perfect storm for the emergence of the Industrial Revolution.

The book unfolds in mostly chronological order, charting the “love-hate” of Britain and Holland. In particular, Scott highlights the similarities that outweighed their differences, even as they went to war three times in the middle of the seventeenth century before a Dutch stadtholder (William of Orange) became king of England and Scotland, achieving a sort of “union” between these two countries that had its origin with Holland's offer to Elizabeth I to assume the sovereignty of an emergent Dutch republic as it began its near century of war of independence from Catholic Spain. As both were on the Protestant “side” of the Reformation, the need for both countries to stick together was more than just religious; the influence the Dutch imparted to Britain was also technological, entrepreneurial, and ideological, as Scott outlines the close relation between the Dutch and the English republics; indeed Scott offers an expansive definition of republicanism that encompasses the post-Republican British monarchy as a form of quasi-republic, which created “modernity” by forging a military fiscal state that built a state of the art army and navy whose primary purpose was to protect globalized English imperial commerce. The Dutch had done all this first in the late middle ages and in the sixteenth century when the center of wealth and commerce shifted from the Mediterranean to the Low Countries. Britain built on this model, but with considerably more ecological advantages within Britain, in terms of agricultural output but also in raw materials such as coal, which became the fuel of the Industrial Revolution. These advantages were coupled with the ecological bonanza that the North American colonies created. As a source of both raw materials and then as the market for British manufactured goods, Britain's dominance of trans-Atlantic trade (including the slave trade) created the “perfect storm” of Britain's ultimate emergence as the first modern industrialized nation. If this sounds like a Jared Diamond (of *Guns, Germs, and Steel* fame)-like material explanation, it is supplemented by the

force of culture, of ideology, and of religious belief (particularly the Calvinist version of Protestantism).

But Scott's is not the only voice present in this book. In fact, he brings in the voices of numerous contemporary observers, historians, and other scholars who have written over the past two centuries prominently in block quotes liberally sprinkled throughout the text to support his thesis. It is as if Scott was standing on a stage backed by a large chorus that includes Thomas More, Daniel Defoe, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and Mark Kishlansky, who all get brief cameos in the book's narrative. In fact, it is the scholarly version of pop stars like Tony Bennett and Ray Charles who have record duet albums with other artists. In Scott's case, just about every reputable observer and historian of the last half millennium whose work has touched on the themes of this book is given a cameo voice, which not only adds to the richness of the narrative but also supports the validity of its thesis.

In the book's final pages, Scott's preoccupation with the present is made perfectly clear. Make no mistake—this work is a plea for globalization as it is for the virtues of tolerance, diversity, and openness to new ideas, which to Scott allowed the material and ideological foundation of Anglo-Dutch-American modernity. In an era where the utility of history is increasingly under attack, Scott's book provides for us a model to learn from, arguing that the transformations of the Anglo-Dutch-American Revolution are capable of informing contemporary problems like pandemic disease and inward-looking nationalistic impulses, if we let them. He ends his narrative with a eulogy on Brexit, "an act of self-mutilation, like the revocation of the Edict of Nantes." While acknowledging Britain's historical achievements in bringing forth the modern world, Scott reminds us that it happened not in isolation, but in collaboration, the direct result of the free flow of people and ideas. This is the true value of history today, to remind and warn us before the last tree is felled and the last river polluted, and to exhort us to work together to solve the globalized problems of the modern world in which we live.