PERFORMATIVE SPEECH AND MINOR CHARACTERS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation, utilizing the theories of J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, and Alex Woloch, analyzes performative speech in Victorian novels to highlight its profound illocutionary effects on minor characters and diegetic outcomes. I argue that performatives act as the crucial textual site of convention and characterization, intention and ethicality, representation and ideology, storyworld and structure. Be it promising, naming, warning, narrativizing, expressing love, or becoming engaged, this "doing something with words" is a textual mechanism by which authors effect plot-level action and highlight or create a character's otherness. Beyond the storyworld, the reverberations of dialogic and novelistic performatives produce unforeseen, and little explored, multifaceted perlocutionary ethical effects and structural disruption.

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Contributors

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Early in Willie Collins's 1859 novel *The Woman in White,* protagonist Walter Hartright meets a mysterious woman on the road in the middle of the night. She seems skittish and strange, seeks assistance, and asks one question repeatedly:

"If you could show me where to get a fly—and if you will only promise not to interfere with me, and to let me leave you, when and how I please—I have a friend in London who will be glad to receive me—I want nothing else—will you promise?"

She looked anxiously up and down the road; shifted her bag again from one hand to the other; repeated the words, "Will you promise?" and looked hard in my face, with a pleading fear and confusion that it troubled me to see...Only say you will let me leave you when and how I please—only say you won't interfere with me. Will you promise?"

As she repeated the words for the third time, she came close to me and laid her hand, with a sudden gentle stealthiness, on my bosom—a thin hand; a cold hand (when I removed it with mine) even on that sultry night. Remember that I was young; remember that the hand which touched me was a woman's.

"Will you promise?"

"Yes."

One word! The little familiar word that is on everybody's lips, every hour in the

day. Oh me! and I tremble, now, when I write it. (Collins 22-23)

A lost, confused minor character begs the narrator to promise something, and he

does. Performative speech acts, such as promising, betting, warning, naming, and

vowing, are words or phrases that make something happen. They change, or have the

potential to change, a state of affairs. Repetition of the phrase "Will you promise?"

coupled with searching eyes, and the sense of foreboding the narrator experiences when

he responds in the affirmative, creates reader intrigue and promotes sympathy for the

pale, confused, unnamed young woman. When the locution is complete, the narrator

goes on his way. Though she is "the woman in white" and the reader eventually learns

that her name is Anne Catherick, this character plays only a small role in the plot. She is

the double, the exchangeable, the minimized and effaced; she pops in and out of the

narrative and pushes the plot forward like so many other minor characters in so many

other novels. Her pleading, imploring "Will you promise?" draws the reader in and

makes accomplices of the narrator and reader alike. Anne Catherick's fragility and

vulnerability are revealed through the demand of a promise, and the protagonist's

response shows him to be ethical and kind, facts that prove to be important in the story

world (he goes on to save his beloved Laura from an asylum and win her heart and

hand).

Performative speech comes in many forms, of which promises are but one

instance, and can serve as a vital tool for investigating the intersection of otherness,

subjectivity, ethics, and characterization in nineteenth century novels. Specific Victorian

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texts felicitously display the consequences of dialogic (those found directly in character dialogue), diegetic (those pertaining to the world of the story), and absent performatives on minor characters. Promising and numerous other performative speech acts were first identified by J. L. Austin in a series of lectures in the 1950s, published posthumously under the title *How to Do Things With Words.* Rigorous scholarly debates have ensued on the relevance, extent, and limitations of speech act theory. Utilizing categories of the performative set out by Austin, and how later thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Louis Althusser, Judith Butler, Jonathan Culler, and J. Hillis Miller have morphed and modified these concepts, I argue that diegetic speech acts affect novelistic structure, reveal or obscure information to the reader, elicit or prevent a sympathetic reader response, and act as sites of ethical discourse and response. While this seems like a great deal to ask of one theoretical apparatus, scholars have long identified the performative's value as a tool of critique. J. Hillis Miller summarizes speech act theory's relationship to literature, dialogue, plot, reader response, and writing, thusly:

> Putting things in words is speech that acts. It does something that may do other
> things in its turn. It is a way of doing things with words. Three forms of this
> may be identified in connection with literature...(1) The author's act of writing is
> a doing that takes the form of putting things in this way or that....(2) The
> narrators and characters in a work of fiction may utter speech acts that are a form
> of doing things with words—promises, declarations, excuses, denials, acts of
> bearing witness, lies, decisions publicly attested, and the like. Such speech acts
> make up crucial moments in the narrator's or the characters' conduct of life. (3)

The reader, in his or her turn, in acts of teaching, criticism, or informal comment, may do things by putting a reading into words. Doing that may have an effect on students, readers, or acquaintances. Teaching, or writing criticism, or just talking about a book is a doing that may do other things in its turn. (Miller, *Literature as Conduct* 2)

Miller argues in a number of his books and articles that writing inadvertently builds in performative speech and is performative in and of itself. I find this to be an incredibly convincing argument and base my use of speech act theory on a similar assumption.

While literature acts performatively itself and creates the thing to which it refers, it frequently contains individual instances of speech acts within the storyworlds themselves, as noted in Miller's breakdown.   Take again, for example, novelistic promises. When an ethical and kind narrator earnestly *tries* to keep a promise, as with Hartright's promise to Anne in *The Woman in White,* s/he proves that s/he is ethical and kind. But what are the implications for minor characters who do not keep their promises to ethical narrators? Such is the case of Mrs. Reed in Charlotte Bronte's 1847 novel *Jane Eyre.* Cruel and vengeful, Mrs. Reed's despicable nature is unabashedly revealed early in the novel through her inability or unwillingness to keep a promise. Jane, protagonist and narrator explains:

...I knew that he was my own uncle—my mother's brother—that he had taken me when a parentless infant to his house; and that in his last moments he had required a promise of Mrs. Reed that she would rear and maintain me as one of her own children. Mrs. Reed probably considered she had kept this promise; and

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so she had, I dare say, as well as her nature would permit her; but how could she

really like an interloper not of her race, and unconnected with her, after her

husband's death, by any tie? It must have been most irksome to find herself

bound by a hard-wrung pledge to stand in the stead of a parent to a strange child

she could not love. (Bronte 12)

Jane appears to give Mrs. Reed the benefit of the doubt, but really she has become a

master at repressing her true emotions. The ailing older woman clearly knows that she

has failed as Jane's guardian and not kept her promise. She discusses the matter on her

deathbed:

"Well, I have twice done you a wrong which I regret now. One was in breaking

the promise which I gave my husband to bring you up as my own child; the

other—" she stopped. "After all, it is of no great importance, perhaps," she

murmured to herself: "and then I may get better; and to humble myself so to her

is painful." (268)

Mrs. Reed, the promise-breaker and grudge-holder, makes promise-keeping protagonist

Jane appear saintly by comparison. Jane does not give the dying woman the satisfaction

of seeing her repressed pain. The performative, or failed performative as it were, of Mrs.

Reed's promise to her husband on his deathbed eliminates any possible sympathy a

reader may have for the woman's situation. It's not that she is a struggling adoptive

mother with no understanding of role expectations; it is that she is a begrudging

caregiver with cruel intentions and willful role abandonment. If Anne's desperate

pleading for a promise in *The Woman in White* engenders sympathy in the reader for

both her and the protagonist, the conscious breaking of a promise by Mrs. Reed in *Jane Eyre* hampers reader sympathy and shifts it instead to enduring, persevering Jane. In both instances performative speech plays a role in creating a hierarchy of character-ethicality.

Other scholars have evaluated the role speech acts play in how meaning is made by and through language in various works of fiction. Edward Neill, for example, argues that Jane Austen uses performative speech in *Sense and Sensibility* as "an enquiry into desire, identity, and representation" (114), while Candace Nolan-Grant argues that the uses of the performative in the novel corresponds to developments in the theory itself: moving through the text from "the official performative (given force by institutions), the explicit social performative (given force by accepted social mores), and the implicit social performative (given force by the peculiarities of context)" (863). Debra J. Rosenthal examines performative speech by female characters in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to question where "linguistic authority lies," noting the potent violence behind threatening speech. Satoshi Nishimura contends that *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* is a "story about speech acts" which "explores the functioning of language as something more than a means of cognition, something that acts in one way or another" (208). Leila May analyzes the performative in Lewis Carroll's Alice books to suggest that infelicities abound yet that strange, unique speech acts function logically in illogical Wonderland based on that world's particular conventions. E. Warwick Slinn, though focusing on another genre, uses performative speech to show the political critique inherent in much Victorian poetry. Broadly, he argues that the relationship of Victorian

poetry to the political and historical contexts of a work's creation is revealed through the performative. He claims that performativity

> as a model for the relationship between poetry and culture is thus another
> way...of showing how doing things with words locates poems within a matrix of
> social relations-- albeit a matrix that is dynamic and relations that are
> unstable. The presence of these poems as events within that matrix draws
> attention to the matrix itself as a series of linguistic traces. It also, by the same
> token, makes the performative language of these poems inveterately political,
> inextricable from the means by which power relationships are enacted between
> people and or between people and institutions. (7)

While my focus is concerned with novels, not poetry, I too utilize the performative as means of understanding power dynamics in a text, how power relationships are upheld or undermined by speech acts, and what role institutions inside and outside the novel play in their function. How minor characters are treated in the text, how they are created or destroyed through performatives is indeed "inveterately political," and while I touch lightly on politics in individual chapters regarding individual texts and specific characters, my concern lies especially with the structural and ethical consequences of dialogic speech acts. Ethics and politics are not natural enemies in such an analysis. As Jeffrey T. Nealon argues in *Alterity Politics:*

> as a mode of inquiry, ethics necessarily concerns itself both with general
> theoretical structures and specific concrete responses; indeed one might argue

that its ability to bring together the theoretical and political is one of the reasons

ethics has reemerged so centrally in recent critical discourse. (2)

The merging of "theoretical structures" and "concrete responses" is precisely the modus operandi of this dissertation. While as noted above, some scholars have examined the role of literary speech acts, a critical gap still exists concerning the performative's relationship to minor characterization, structure, and ethicality. My study will ideally fill this gap by revealing the performative's ability to illuminate hidden aspects of characterization and structure, excesses and omissions, otherness and interpellation.

Beyond speech act theory, Alex Woloch's *The One vs. the Many* grounds this study and sets the terms of the discussion concerning character minorness. In making the case that minor characters are both implied persons and structural entities, Woloch attempts to resolve the division he sees between character as reference and character as function, claiming that "the literary character is itself divided, always emerging at the juncture between structure and reference" (17). He conceives the character-system to be an extension and reflection of Victorian society as a whole, with minor characters serving as the proletariat of the novel while the protagonists act as the bourgeoisie. My work builds on Woloch's argument to explore the intersection of minor characters as reference to real persons in real societies, reflecting the requisite hierarchies, classes, and power structures, and as functional beings acting as functionaries within structured storyworlds. Woloch's hyper-focus on minor characters refreshingly places them at the critical center as a response to the existing "gap between a minor character's implied being and the manifestation of this being in the fictional universe" (24). He identifies

two types of minorness of character that result from the available descriptive conventions: "the engulfing of an interior personality by the delimited signs that express it and the explosion of the suffocated interior being into an unrepresentable, fragmentary, symptomatic form" (24). He goes on:

> These two existential states lie behind the two pervasive extremes of minorness within the nineteenth-century novel: the *worker* and the *eccentric*…In one case, the character is smoothly absorbed as a gear within the narrative machine, at the cost of his or her own free interiority; in the other case, the minor character grates against his or her position and is usually, as a consequence, wounded, exiled, expelled, ejected, imprisoned, or killed (within the *discourse*, if not the *story*). In both cases, the free relationship between the surface and depth is negated; the actualization of a human being is denied. (25)

In this dissertation there are instances of both workers and eccentrics and I detail the ways in which they are "absorbed," "exiled," "expelled," or "killed." However, rather than simply argue that characters do or do not fall into these categories (they most often do), I show how speech acts enable this denial of actualization. Likewise, the covert means by which speech acts contribute to character effacement, inform reader sympathy, and enable an ethics of performative subjectivity, prove them to be sites where the novel's structure and its storyworld diverge. For these readings, I take as a starting point the narratological categories of character-space (the human personality and space allotted to a given character within a narrative) and character-system (the collective positionings, hierarchies, and distributions of character-spaces in a narrative

structure).[1] To this I add the term "character-ethicality," by which I mean the moral

uprightness and relative moral standing of a character within a narrative by the

conditions and standards set in individual storyworlds, in Victorian society and culture

more generally, and in the novel's eschatological treatment of the character (i.e. the

doling out of rewards and punishments).

Within narratological studies, characters and characterization have been

dominant topics of scholarly study since even before E. M. Forster first gave us flat and

round characters, yet minorness as a class of its own has had more limited formal

exploration. In the last three decades, relatively little new scholarship has focused on the

study of minor characters. One significant contribution, Deidre Lynch's *Economy of*

Character, explores minor characters primarily in the eighteenth century novel. Lynch's

work seeks to define how characters are read differently over time by showing that

"definitions of what will count as a character and count as a character reading" are

historically contingent (1). She argues that as conditions of the market change, so too do

what define and comprise a character's psychological depth. More recently, F. Jeremy

Rosen's *Minor Characters Have Their Day* also examines characters as products of a

given marketplace, as he explores the twentieth century phenomenon of minor characters

taken from canonical novels being given prominence in narratives of their own. In 2019,

Adam Reed writing for *PMLA* uses Woloch's theories in order to explain how and why

members of literary societies dedicated to reading the works of specific authors so

readily relate to minor characters in the works they read. He claims that what "drives a

readerly engagement with secondary characters" is the "referential status of the minor

character, its implied person, that makes readers feel that its narrative position is always restrictive and that in turn motivates their interest" (70); in other words, engaged readers tend to care about the little person (68). My study, like Reed's and Woloch's, marries elements of formalism and reader response theory, but leans most heavily upon post-structuralist approaches to investigating the textual advent, function, and structural effacement of minor characters. Though the body of research on minor characters is not yet extensive, each of the aforementioned scholars looks at minor characters as such and deems them worthy of study. Ideally this dissertation, while focusing extensively on the history and value of speech act theory as a unique tool for literary and ethical analysis, will be in concert with, and make an intervention into this developing conversation on character minorness.

The chapters in this dissertation invite onto their pages a diverse mix of minor characters, ranging from a murdered maiden to a renamed child, a kept mistress to a Jewish princess, a madman and a woman who goes "mad" to avoid the altar. All chapters take as their starting point the three crucial criteria of otherness, minorness, and structural disruption. While this study continuously takes the categories of gender, sexuality, religion, and race into consideration, it does so through primarily focusing on minor characters as the sites where the storyworlds and structures of the Victorian novel clash, crash, and diverge. The intertwining yet often contradictory spaces of diegesis and composition manifest their separateness through the speech acts involving these minor characters.

Through a variety of approaches, the chapters also offer readings of the Victorian society which produced these characters. Considering a wide range of texts spanning the mid to late Victorian era, focus falls predominately on the Realist novel to anchor several chapters due to its wide social gaze and emphasis on psychological insight. However, the sensational and Gothic subgenres also reflect the anxieties surrounding various categories of otherness of the period and therefore anchor portions of the discussion as well. This dissertation thus pursues the relationship between narrative, structure, and performative speech in relation to class, power, and ideology to illuminate the role minor character play in embodying Victorian yearning, ills, and concerns.

To start things off, the second chapter welcomes the reader with a brief history of speech act theory. While the theory begins with Austin, it has been rewritten, reassessed, and reinterpreted by a number of scholars since the 1960s. This chapter retraces the philosophical path speech act theory has taken, delves into some of its more instructive nuances, and delineates the particular vein most useful and relevant for thinking about minorness of character. Finally, embracing the thinking of several theorists, it argues for the performative's unique, if imperfect, contribution to literary theory and its invaluable significance as a vehicle for analysis of the Victorian novel and beyond.

Shifting the focus from speech act theory itself to how it functions as a tool for literary analysis, the third chapter "Interpellation and the (Re)naming of Sissy Jupe in *Hard Times"* explores subject-formation in Charles Dickens's 1854 novel. Using Louis Althusser's concepts of the hail, interpellation, and the Ideological State Apparatus, as

well as Judith Butler's theories on naming, performativity, and hate speech, this chapter argues that the renaming of a minor character early in the novel disrupts the structural coherence of the text, revealing both the literary power of the performative and the relative unachorability of its perlocutionary effects, while simultaneously offering rich critiques of class, race, gender, schools, and other Victorian institutions.

The following chapter, "Self-Narrative in *Daniel Deronda,*" assesses the speaking subject in George Eliot's 1876 novel. Utilizing Judith Butler's essay "Giving an Account of Oneself" to frame the discussion, yet complicating that framework with Susan J. Brison's conceptions of the reconstructive potentialities of self-narrative, chapter four explores how character-space separates the protagonist from minor characters, how character-space and character-ethicality are aligned in this particular novel, and how they are determined by performative speech acts. What does not take place on the level of plot in the storyworld of *Daniel Deronda* instead takes place in its structure, eschatologically punishing the morally questionable minor female character.

The fifth chapter, "Love Speech and Intention in *The Eustace Diamonds,*" turns toward matters of romance as it explores love speech, engagement, and commitment in Anthony Trollope's 1872 novel. Utilizing Owen Ware's theory of "love speech" and Judith Butler's analysis of hate speech to set the terms of the discussion, this chapter explores how characters are coded as "good" or "bad" based on whether their intentions align with their enunciations. The novel's omitted love speech, silent and reticent lovers, broken engagements, and euphuistic falsities create a largely loveless world where character-space and character-ethicality function inversely.

Also dealing with missing speech acts and opaque intentions, the next chapter "Uninvited: Entries, Gaps, and Omissions in *Dracula*" illuminates the performative's role in revealing the complex dynamics among architectural, mental, and textual spaces in Bram Stoker's infamous 1897 Gothic novel. Inarticulable memories, absent invitations, and omitted narratives act as junctures where the storyworld and narrative structure collide to marginalize and criminalize minor characters, while simultaneously revealing historical anxieties around notions of consent.

While the type and form of performative evaluated in this dissertation varies by chapter, most take place, or are noted as absent, in the speech of specific characters. The performative in chapter two is foisted upon the minor female character by the speech of an authority figure, thus it figures interpellation. The performative in chapter three takes place in the speech of narratively significant minor characters, thus revealing something narratively amiss about the one who is given no such speech. Chapter four weighs the love speech of the protagonist and that of the minor characters to reveal that character-ethicality is wrought through an alignment between speech and intention. The missing performative in chapter five should give permission and consent, so its absent-presence leaves a dialogic, textual, and epistemological gap. Like Louise Barnett who claims that there is a certain "dramatic immediacy" in character dialogue which "has experiential value for the reader, the impact of showing rather than telling" (13), I too privilege dialogue and active character speech to argue that what these performatives "show" the reader is often more complicated than the simple storyworld locutions immediately suggest because they play an active role in disrupting structural and diegetic coherence.

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Promises

  When Marian Halcombe, the female protagonist and another narrator of *The Woman in White,* makes the statement to Walter Hartright that her kind and gentle, though somewhat passive, half-sister Laura Fairlie "never broke a promise in her life— you know that she entered on this engagement at the beginning of her father's fatal illness, and that he spoke hopefully and happily of her marriage to Sir Percival Glyde on his deathbed" (Collins 140), it serves to prove that Laura's character-ethicality, her ethical measure relative to other characters, is beyond reproach. Though she wholly loves another, Laura explains to Sir Glyde her reasoning for not calling off the engagement:

> What I have said so far has been spoken with the wish to acknowledge my whole obligation to you. My regard for that obligation, my regard for my father's memory, and my regard for my own promise, all forbid me to set the example, on *my* side, of withdrawing from our present position. The breaking of our engagement must be entirely your wish and your act, Sir Percival—not mine.
> (170)

Laura, not the most critically beloved female character of the novel (that honor belongs to Marian), is constructed as ethical and sympathetic by keeping the promise she makes to another on his deathbed (despite misgivings and a broken heart). In the making and then keeping or breaking of promises, characters, minor and protagonist alike, affirm and reaffirm their 'character,' and this specific performative can act as shorthand for

ethicality in the Victorian novel. In William Makepeace Thackeray's 1848 novel *Vanity Fair* for example, the moral bankruptcy of Sir Pitt Crawley is emphasized by his brother Bute Crawley's observations:

> "Pitt will promise anything," replied the brother. "He promised he'd pay my college bills, when my father died; he promised he'd build the new wing to the Rectory; he promised he'd let me have Jibb's field and the Six-acre Meadow— and much he executed his promises! And it's to this man's son—this scoundrel, gambler, swindler, murderer of a Rawdon Crawley, that Matilda leaves the bulk of her money. I say it's un-Christian." (Thackeray 109-10)

Unkempt, lecherous, and unpleasant, Sir Pitt Crawley's character-ethicality is further diminished by his brother's claim that he is unable or unwilling to keep a promise, for "a promise must promise to be kept, this is, not remain 'spiritual' or 'abstract,' but to produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, [and] organization" (Derrida, *Specters* 89). Infelicitous performatives, such as the breaking of promises or inauthentic love speech, serve to undermine a character's 'character' whether in a novel from the 1850s or the 1890s; character-ethicality remains rigorously, diegetically determined even if cultural norms shift and evolve. Dialogic and novelistic performatives in the Victorian novel act as the intersection of Jacques Derrida's "conditions of possibility" (the conventions and structures of language) and Michel Foucault's "conditions of emergence" (power, discipline, knowledge) to produce a site of ethical quandary ripe for literary commentary and analysis.

Yet situating individual texts in the moment and culture of their production remains essential. To this end, each chapter frames its investigation starting with the author's own words. These writings provide insight into that chapter's themes, while simultaneously revealing the wily, slipperiness of performative speech. In its tendency to act as a site of misalignment between story and structure, performatives produce perlocutionary effects and readings perhaps unforeseen in the novel's moment of composition. These writings and novels, separately from diegetic and dialogic speech acts, also behave performatively, promising ever-evolving meanings, readings, considerations, and reconsiderations. Their promise, like all promises, "does not promise, literally, to *say* in the constative sense, but again to '*do.*' It promises another 'performative,' and the content of the promise is determined, like its form, by the possibility of that other" (Derrida, *Truth* 3). In the written word, the conditions of possibility meet the conditions of emergence, and this dissertation too enters the fray, by situating the performative in its own theoretical evolution before wielding it as a theoretical apparatus to offer new readings of both well-worn and slightly more obscure Victorian texts. Ideally this dissertation's mode of inquiry, its own doing something with words, if fruitful, may play a part in illuminating performative speech and minor characters as sites of epistemological revelation into storyworlds and story structures and how sometimes they are telling quite different stories. To you, my dear reader and other, I promise that I will try to keep it interesting.

CHAPTER II

SPEECH ACT THEORY: A HISTORY, EVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTION

To begin, I would like to trace J. L. Austin's speech act theory from its inception, through deconstruction, to its influence in literary and cultural studies. Austin's labeling of the performative arises out of his analysis of declarations which state a fact, describe a state of affairs, and are either true or false. He calls such statements constative utterances. He classifies another group of utterances, the ones with which we are currently concerned, as performatives in that they do not merely declare things to be true of false, but perform the action to which they refer.

There are numerous examples of Austin's performative in action, including the "I do" of weddings, and the more routine "I promise." These utterances, neither true nor false, are instead "felicitous" or "infelicitous" based on the context in which they are spoken and the conditions surrounding them. The essential aspect of performative utterances is that they are not mere description; they perform the action they designate. They create the thing that they name in the moment of enunciation. This is the crux of speech act theory, though the nuances can get a bit dicey and convoluted, providing theorists, philosophers, and linguists with much to debate. This dissertation cannot account for all iterations and developments in speech act theory, but will utilize specific aspects of the theory and its evolution that are best suited to literature, literary studies, and this specific work of scholarship.

In his lectures, Austin quickly realizes that speech act theory is fraught with complications, and he attempts to account for many of these issues by using incredibly precise examples, caveats, and contexts. For example:

> "I bet" as opposed to the use of that verb in another tense or in another person. "I betted" and "he bets" are not performatives but describe actions on my and his part respectively — actions each consisting in the utterance of the performative "I bet". If I utter the words "I bet . . .", I do not state that I utter the words "I bet", or any other words, but I perform the act of betting; and similarly, if he says he bets, i.e. says the words "I bet", he bets. But if I utter the words "he bets", I only state that he utters (or rather has uttered) the words "I bet": I do not perform his act of betting, which only he can perform: I describe his performances of the act of betting, but I do my own betting, and he must do his own. Similarly an anxious parent when his child has been asked to do something may say "he promises, don't you Willy?" but little Willy must still himself say "I promise" if he is really to have promised. Now this sort of asymmetry does not arise at all in general with verbs that are not used as explicit performatives. (Austin 63)

These implicit performatives, lacking an explicitly performative verb, such as "I will pay you tomorrow," can be a promise to pay and can also be proven true or false. This is problematic in that if there is no explicitly performative verb present, almost any utterance can fall into the category of implicit performative. According to Austin, stating, describing, and reporting, which are constative utterances, also perform actions. So Austin starts by identifying performatives as a subcategory of constatives,

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but moves on to consider constatives as a specific type of performative. Realizing that the distinction between constatives and performatives is fuzzy at best, Austin moves to identify the locutionary act, which is the act of speaking a given sentence or phrase. This differs from the act performed by speaking the sentence, the illocutionary act, and the effects that result from speaking the sentence, the perlocutionary act. Therefore, in addition to constative and performative utterances, Austin distinguishes three aspects to every speech act--locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary--which form a particularly important and influential, if debated, theory of language.

From a Saussurian[2] standpoint, meaning derives from linguistic conventions as a result of a system of differences. Because an utterance can have different meanings in different contexts, the conscious, animating intention of the speaker would seem to be the source of meaning, and an utterance means what it means in a given instance based on that intention. If this is the case, this would imply that meaning is derived "as a signifying intention present to consciousness at the moment of utterance," making "the meaning of a speech act as ultimately determined by or grounded in a consciousness whose intention is fully present to itself" (Culler, "Convention and Meaning" 19). But is intention knowable? Is it necessary for a performative to be felicitous? This question of intention, still debated today, unleashed a fierce dispute amongst theorists. Austin's exclusion of parasitic instances of language, such as language spoken by an actor on stage, or language written within a poem, are for him instances of supplementarity; these nonserious uses of language are in addition to language, are in excess of it, and are

dependent upon it. They can be excluded from discussions of ordinary language in that they are parasites, nothing more, according to Austin.

Austin found it problematic that his predecessors assumed ordinary language was primarily composed of true or false statements, and excludes those cases (the parasitic, the nonserious) in formulating his theory of performatives. John Searle, an American scholar, defended Austin's exclusion of parasitic, nonserious instances of speech acts, and engaged in a widely-read debate and exchange with Jacques Derrida in a series of writings on the implications of such an exclusion.[3] Searle finds Austin to be correct in focusing on serious cases of language, while bracketing the exceptions. Searle argues that nonserious examples of performatives are not of primary importance, but are merely provisional. He explicates the issue thusly:

> The existence of the pretended form of the speech act is logically dependent on the possibility of the nonpretended speech act in the same way that any pretended form of behavior is dependent on nonpretended forms of behavior, and in that sense the pretended forms are parasitical on the nonpretended forms. (205)

 Yet Derrida and other scholars argue that Austin performs an incredibly problematic exclusion when attempting to bracket off nonserious uses of language in his theory. Searle, in his short attack on Derrida's interpretation of Austin, goes on:

> If we want to know what it is to make a promise or make a statement we had better not start our investigation with promises made by actors on a stage in the course of a play or statements made in a novel by novelists about characters in the novel, because in a fairly obvious way, such utterances are not standard cases

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of promises and statements….we do not demand of the author how he knows that

his characters have such and such traits in a way that we normally expect the

maker of a statement to be able to justify his claims. (204)

Derrida replied to these charges in his book *Limited Inc*, in which he not only thoroughly

rebutted each of Searle's claims, but also raised the stakes of the performative to include

ethics, politics, events, and responsibility. In his manipulation and understanding of the

performative, Derrida unleashed a profound and highly influential theory of language

himself. Because later theorists build not only upon Austin's theory but Derrida's

unique critiques and understanding of the theory, a fuller account of Derrida's

intervention is essential for the purposes of this dissertation.

Derrida used Austin's speech act theory as a conduit to contribute to the branch

of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being. Derrida, like Austin, takes a previous

system, previously unprovoked and unchallenged, and reorders it. He argues that the

idea of communication that we get throughout history is consistently one and the same,

and that it is blatantly flawed. This history has functioned under the assumption that

communication is a transmission of meaning, and that spoken and written

communication function in the same manner with writing simply enabling the

communication to occur over a much greater physical space or period of time. Writing

is viewed as an extension of speech existing in the same space of communication which

was already there in the spoken utterance. Further, writing has been viewed as almost

parasitic on speech, as if speech came first and was a direct expression of a speaker's

intention, dependent on and anchored in his/her presence. Because writing does not

require presence in the same way, it has been condemned as corruptible throughout the history of philosophy, as something to be wary of, with spoken utterance privileged as more trustworthy than written utterance. Writing, for many a philosopher, has been this dangerous thing because it continues to function short of the animating control of the original intention. These assumptions, though only occasionally addressed specifically, go uncontested throughout history according to Derrida.

The classical notion of "communication" is that humans have something to "communicate" to one another and it remains unchanged throughout the "communication." Writing, in this understanding, extends the space over which one is able to communicate, and even allows transmission of meaning to absent persons. The move from speech to writing assumes that the absence implied in the context of writing is not a "real" change in presence; it is exhibited as a continuous homogenous modification of presence and representation. Derrida challenges this assumption, arguing that in order for writing to function, the absence that must be at work in writing must be a "radical absence," an absence that is not a modification of presence. Derrida's entire schema depends on meaning being circulated in the radical absence of an original intention. Writing functions only due to the essential possibility that it be completely separable from its moment of original production with all the intentions and contexts of that moment. Writing continues to be legible and iterable in this absolute absence.

According to Derrida, if a sign were completely unique, it could not signify, and therefore by very definition must be repeatable. Such iterability is at the heart of the idea of citation and grafting. This is the capacity of a mark to be cited and put between

quotation marks. What constitutes the written utterance's capacity to function as a mark is its possibility of completely breaking off from its original context, and more radically, from every context. If one subscribes to this theory, it makes writing tricky, in that a text can, and will, be spliced into infinitely new definitions and readings, and the originator has no control over its citation or grafting. Meaning and interpretation of the text will change. Under these theoretical assumptions, precisely pinning meaning down is impossible, and attempting to do so "only postpones the problem" (Derrida, "Letter" 2). All signification has this structure, and therefore, all signification belongs to the general field of writing. It is writing that physically manifests the structure that works in all signification. If this structure of writing extends to all communications, then that means that in order for a spoken utterance to signify, there must be the possibility of it signifying in the speaker's absence. Therefore, according to Derrida, the spoken utterance is no more dependent on a person's presence than their written utterance.

Derrida further argues that the signs can function as signs only on the *condition of the possibility* of total misinterpretation, or complete radical failure to communicate. The condition of the possibility of communication is the possibility of the impossibility of communication. Communication can happen only if it is possible that communication will not happen. Derrida makes the case that our experience of presence is conditioned by the possibility of this radical absence. In this instance, it has not preceded "immediately to a neutralization" ("Signature Event Context" 329). It has, "by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practiced an overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system" (329). Signs

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function only because they are repeatable and recognizable, and therefore are not unique, singular things. This means a thing is never quite itself. Its identity in not a self-identity and is always multiple. There are only contexts, and signs signify separately from any determinable contexts and from any one in particular. Any sign can function in any context, which are not constraining because of this possibility of citation and grafting. Therefore, contexts do not constrain meaning and there can be no absolute anchoring of meaning. This is not just an accidental quality of language according to Derrida. It is the very condition of the possibility of the functioning of the sign. So the condition of the possibility of meaning is that meaning can be lost on the way, can be misinterpreted, and reinterpreted ad nauseum.

The idea of context is important for Derrida. In particular, he questions the idea that a context could ever be rigorously determined, that the limits of a context could be determined conclusively at all. The limits of context are important because of how much meaning gets determined by context. The context in which a word finds itself could be examined meticulously and yet no *one* decisive definition would emerge because for Derrida, conclusively defining anything, particularly based on context, is ultimately indeterminate.

All utterances, no matter how much they appear to depend on the values of context or presence, presence meaning conscious *intention*, are all just instances of the general field of writing in Derrida's theories. For him, the larger point is that presence is an effect of absolute absence. Speech is an effect of the structure of writing in general. Everything thought to come first, in fact came second. Derrida writes that

everything construed as primary and original, like consciousness, is secondary. Ultimately, Derrida's critique of Searle and Austin is a critique of the metaphysics of presence. For Derrida, the entire history of philosophy depends on this value of presence; all of philosophy takes for granted that presence comes first and absence is what happens when presence goes wrong. All these things that seem mere possibilities of accident are in fact constitutive of what is primary. This is how the general field of writing extends to presence in general, to consciousness, to the experience of experience itself. The larger stake is to show that everything experienced as primary, is in fact an effect.

The history of philosophy keeps the possibility of failure totally on the outside of the success of language, but for Derrida, it is actually what makes success possible. Presence for him is an effect of the failure, or of the absence, or of the difference. The possibility of failure is essential to the language phenomenon. He argues that the singularity of the event should be questioned if its singularity and very happening depends on iterability, recognizable as something that has happened before. This singular thing, this pure presence, can be pure presence only because it is recognized as happening before. The sign can always be divorced from the presence of the original production, divorced and mobile without limit across this infinitely open field of possible meaning, possible contexts, and possible instances of itself. It is all citation and grafting and all signs function in the same way that writing functions. It is not that writing comes before speech, certainly not chronologically, and not even structurally. Derrida takes a binary relationship and changes it, displacing the preconceived system.

In doing so, deconstruction has provided "itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticizes" ("Signature Event Context" 329). Thought, consciousness, and the experience of presence are revealed to be an effect of pure absence. With this line of critique, Derrida is "overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated" ("Signature Event Context" 329) and he does this using the performative as his tool. He argues that a performative utterance succeeds only because it is identifiable as a citation of an iterable model. A standard case of promising, for example, is recognizable only because it is an instance of a conventional practice which gets repeated. Derrida claims that an utterance can only succeed if it is iterable, if it can function in both serious and nonserious contexts, and be cited and parodied. The condition of the possibility of signification is precisely, and only, its repeatability. The iterability expressed in the exceptions and excesses is what enables the original to signify at all.

Though Derrida appears rather settled in his claims, the issue of intentionality never seems to go away. Austin, though treading lightly and adding caveat upon caveat, suggests that meaning is at least in part determined by the animating intention in the consciousness of the speaker. By first setting aside the nonserious, Austin inadvertently connects serious speech with intention in that speech can only be considered serious if the speaker consciously assents to the act being performed. He also sets aside and dismisses speech acts performed under duress, or by mistake for any reason; in other words, speech acts performed lacking intention. J. Hillis Miller, writing extensively on speech acts, explicates the contradiction of intention thusly:

On the one hand, the performative depends on the intentions or sincerity of the one who speaks. As other commentators on speech-act theory have noted, Austin's concept of the felicitous performative is closely tied to the presupposition of the self-conscious "I," the male ego capable of speaking words like "I promise" or "I bet" or "I declare" in full possession of his senses and with sincere intentions....On the other hand, the performative must *not* depend on the intentions or sincerity of the one who speaks. If Austin's theory is to be cogent, and if he is to attain his goal of securing law and order, the words themselves must do the work, not the secret intentions of the speaker or writer. For civil order to be maintained, we must be able to hold speakers and writers responsible for their words, whatever their intentions at the time. Austin's is a doctrine of how to do things with words, not a doctrine of how to do things by thinking about them. (*Speech Acts in Literature* 29)

Therefore, many theorists argue that intention cannot serve as a primary foundation for speech acts to "work." Jonathan Culler agrees, arguing that contextual features only alter illocutionary force, not intention. In summation:

What the indissociability of performative and performance puts in question is not the determination of illocutionary force by context but the possibility of mastering the domain of speech acts by exhaustively specifying the contextual determinants of illocutionary force...But total context is unmasterable, both in principle and in practice. Meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless. (24)

Context is unmasterable in that "any attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a new context which escapes the previous formulation" (25). As proof, look to Derrida's discussion of signatures he deploys as a rebuttal to Searle. A signature seems to imply consciousness, presence, and at least in the moment of its signing, an intention to sign. Yet Derrida shows that a signature functions precisely because it is not a unique specimen; it is a reiteration of a convention already in place. He explains that in order for a signature to function, it must be repeatable, iterable, and imitable in form as well as be able to break off from its moment of singular and conscious intention. A signature functions because it is recognizable as a repeatable form. Iterability then, at the heart of the signature, functions precisely because it only functions as a repetition. Take for example checks signed by a machine, which a signatory never specifically and personally signed. This example of the mechanized signing of the checks is not parasitic on more conventional forms of check signing; rather, it reveals the condition of the possibility of the signature to function at all. The very structure that allows signatures to function is built upon the notion that they be fundamentally iterable and thus not unique unto themselves.

Therefore all speech acts, like the signature, depend on conventional and contextual factors for meaning. The evaluation of signatures reveals "the impossibility of exhausting contextual possibilities…thus the impossibility of controlling effects of signification or the force of discourse by a theory, whether it appeal to intentions of subjects or to codes and contexts" (Culler 28). Thus the "view of meaning to which this leads is not simple; it entails, on the one hand, the contextual, conventional

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determination of meaning and, on the other hand, the impossibility of ever saturating or limiting context so as to control or rigorously determine the 'true' meaning" of an utterance (28). Therefore, it "is possible, and even appropriate, to proclaim the relative indeterminacy of total meaning."

Important to many theorists, however, is not the absolute indeterminacy of meaning, but the framework for upending systems which yielded this conclusion. A great many tangential theories have emerged becoming highly influential in and of themselves. Judith Butler in particular has made extensive use of the performative as an analytical tool, applying it most famously to gender and identity. Butler argues that gender is not stable, innate, and enduring, but something one performs and something one does. In her application, one becomes either a man or a woman by performing, repeatedly, acts which designate one as either a man or a woman. These acts function within social conventions akin to how Austin's performatives function by and within the conventions of language. Just as convention dictates the proper way to bet, get married, make a promise, and so forth, societal conventions of a particular culture dictate the proper way to "be" a man or a woman. Further, proclaiming "it's a boy," or "it's a girl," is not so much a constative utterance for Butler, as in true or false, but is a performative that through repetition will create the subject it identifies, who will then take up the world in a culturally determined, specific way. According to both Butler and the deconstructionists, repetition and iterability are key to understanding the performative and its broad application not just to presence and language, but to subjectivity and ethics.

For Butler, the performative aspect of language influences a number of ways in which we inhabit the world beyond the assignment of gender. In the mode of Derrida's reordering of presence and absence, and speech and writing, she claims that "compulsory heterosexuality often presumes that there is first a sex that is expressed through a gender and then through a sexuality," and contends that this sequence is erroneous (Butler, *Imitation* 318). Because heterosexuality is compulsory[4], and fictitiously held as "natural" and "original" according to Butler, then the sexuality it produces is not developed in a vacuum; instead, it is the product of a performance of gender and sex which is mandated. Building upon her use of the performative in formulating first a highly influential theory of gender, Butler here utilizes speech act theory to critique the heterosexual matrix[5]; her later applications of speech act theory, used extensively in this dissertation, give rise to new theories of ethics, hate speech, and self-narrative, and depend heavily on the frameworks Derrida established.

The "Austinian Literary Event"

Though the stakes for Austin (a new theory of language), Derrida (presence/absence, iterability, intention) and Butler (gender, sexuality, hate speech, ethics) are undeniably great, one could ask: what does any of this have to do with literature? Let us now turn to literary criticism to reveal the influence and lasting effects of Austin's theories. Traditional models saw language as making true and false statements about the world, whereas Austin revealed the dynamic, creative aspects of language, and this shift has had profound implications for literary criticism. Literary discourse has integrated, though morphed, Austin's theories by focusing on the creative

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potentialities lurking in language; language no longer just "says" but "does." The literary utterance, like the performative, is not true or false and does not merely refer to a prior state of affairs, but creates as it expresses. Reference and enunciation become one in a literary text. Literary utterances bring characters and their actions into being, while also bringing concepts and ideas into existence. Literature behaves as speech act in that it creates worlds and meanings. Culler argues:

> the first result of the performative is to bring to center stage a use of language previously considered marginal—an active, world-making use of language, which resembles literary language—and to help us to conceive of literature as act. The notion of literature as performative contributes to a defense of literature: no longer made up of frivolous pseudo-statements, it takes its place among the acts of language that change the world by bringing into being the things that they name. ("Philosophy and Literature" 507)

Despite Austin's protests against literature in his lecture series, later theorists such as Culler and Miller argue that literature is, like the performative, an act and an event. For Austin, the performative should not constitute a significant disruption between meaning and intention, as an act performed with words is not solely determined by intention, but also by convention and context. An utterance, per Austin's understanding, cannot merely be the external sign of an intention that it represents truly or falsely. This is crucial in that it implies that the literary performative is not determined absolutely by authorial intent. The author cannot entirely anchor or control meaning derived from the literary event. Thus the performative is well suited to analyzing literature compared to

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other available models in that one can analyze how meaning in made in a given text absent the knowledge of the author's intentions. The literature itself does things with words absent a conscious, knowable intention to do those specific things. For the purposes of this dissertation, this fact is especially crucial. The structural disruptions the performative creates in certain texts may or may not have been intentional, but this is beside the point. That character-space, the character-system, character-ethicality, and the novel's structure *are* affected as a result of the performative, analyzing them is the point, and the *intention* of this dissertation is to explicate the various ways contexts, though unanchorable and multiple, manipulate and create meaning.

Though Austin's performative places language firmly in social contexts and functions, like getting married, calling a meeting to order, or christening a boat, these uses are heavily context dependent. But "for literary theorists, the notion of the performative stresses above all the self-reflexive character of language, the fact that the utterance itself is the reality or the event to which the utterance refers" (Culler, "Philosophy and Literature 508). These two different conceptions of the performative, as either a socially grounded act or as a self-reflexive act, form two distinct notions of the fundamental character of language. This dissertation acknowledges the performative as both context dependent and self-reflexive, if not always felicitous in its endeavors. But what does it mean for a literary utterance to be felicitous or infelicitous? The literary critic does not ask whether the opening line of a sonnet is true or false, but if it works "happily with the other lines" (Culler, "Philosophy and Literature" 508). The "felicitousness of a literary utterance might involve its relation to the conventions of a

genre." For example, one may ask "Is this writing indeed a sonnet, or does it misfire?" But more than that, a literary event is the notion that a literary work is a singular, specific act that creates the reality which is the work, and that for a given work, one may specify what it accomplishes, just as one can try to spell out what is promised in a particular act of promising. A more Butlerian derived notion of a literary event might entail a work succeeding only by its reiteration in acts of reading and recollection, where its performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition that continues to birth that which it repeats. Both are valid conceptions of literature as its own performative. J. Hillis Miller in his book *Speech Acts in Literature* claims that despite Austin's attempts to exclude literature from speech act theory, he cannot for a number of reasons, including *How to Do Things with Words* being literature in and of itself. The book certainly did something with words: unleashed a revolutionary theory of language upon the world. In his book *Literature as Conduct,* his follow-up to *Speech Acts,* Miller explains the relationship between the author, intention, and what a piece of literature "does":

> the efficacy of a performative does not depend on the conscious intention of the speaking or writing subject. The ''author'' of the words does not even need to be still alive for his or her words to be effective. In a certain sense, the moment of performative efficacy is always the death of the author...words in themselves have a performative effect that may go counter to the intention of the speaker or writer and that does not depend on his or her continued existence as a conscious ''I'' for their power. We intend to do one thing or intend to do nothing at all, and something we had neither foreseen nor intended happens anyway, as a result of

the words...This means that we are always likely to be doing things with words whenever we speak or write, but that full understanding of what we are doing is forbidden—before, during, and after. Human temporality may be another name for the impossibility of bringing together the cognitive and performative functions of language. *(LAC* 8-9)

While total determinacy of the possible meanings of our words and writings in unknowable, we continue to write nonetheless. This dissertation certainly takes a more Derridean approach to the performative than it does a Searlean, and while no one strand of thinking concerning the performative is more "correct" than any other, by tracing the performative's history, its flexibility and nuance become obvious.

Cooperation between philosophy and literature, and philosophy and literary theory, allow us to continue to explore the modes and means of events created or reiterated through language and literature. The quandary of the indeterminacy of meaning should not deter literary scholars from exploring texts. Assuming a fatalism over the indeterminacy of meaning seems rash. Instead, we should evaluate language in all its iterations and nuances and continue to explore the ways in which language constructs, conditions, controls, and corrupts that which it names and creates.

Miller claims that "each performative, even though it may repeat a form of words used perhaps innumerable times before, is radically singular and inaugural. It changes the rules and institutions themselves, as well as the surrounding context, rather than simply depending on them to get something efficiently done" (*LAC* 8). To that end, and as a performative act itself, this dissertation explores speech acts occurring within

Victorian texts in very specific ways, and draws certain conclusions based on those particular contexts. Love speech, though it tends to behave in certain ways conventionally, for example, may look and feel different when it is produced in the dialogue of different classes of characters in a realist Victorian novel. Speech act theory acts a vehicle into the proliferation of possible meanings, meanings somewhat anchored and controlled by genre (the Victorian novel), mode of production (serial release), and culture (the West, nineteenth century England). The performative is a tool with its own conventions, functioning because of citation and grafting and the general field of writing, deployed dialogically in the Victorian novel based on that genre's own conventions, both carrying the weight of cultural contexts. In the following chapters, I abstract and explicate instances of the performative, offer new understandings of how they function in a given text, and theorize how they bear on characterization. This dissertation is my small contribution to the belief that it is essential to continue to explore, analyze, and interpret texts, and to illuminate, insofar as it is possible, the "conditions of signification" (Culler, "Convention and Meaning" 28). Absolute meaning may be indeterminable, but that which conditions meaning is absolutely determinable.

CHAPTER III INTERPELLATION AND THE (RE)NAMING OF SISSY JUPE IN

*HARD TIME**[1]

"...dost thou think that thou wilt always kill outright the robber Fancy lurking within—or sometimes only maim him and distort him!" (Charles Dickens, *Hard Times*)

Much scholarly ink has been spilled on the topic of Charles Dickens's techniques of characterization. While most scholars find his characters to be flat and caricaturesque (see: Collins, James, and Woloch), others recognize them as masterfully rendered idiosyncratic linguistic creations (see: Sorensen and Ruano). Dickens's distinct naming conventions have also been a favorite topic of scholarly inquiry (see: Stone, Harder, Fowler, and Bodelsen), with scholars frequently noting his tendency to make up names and allow names to reflect the "character" of a character (see: Gordon and De Laski), or to present through naming that individual characters are both "singular eccentrics and embodiments of particular social types" (Grener and Parker 21). As such, exploring the intersection of naming and characterization in Dickens is not fresh territory; however, evaluating how a specific performative act of naming in a specific Dickens novel functions, how it produces and reinforces certain types of characterization, and how it reflects systems of power within both the fictional and real worlds, reveals the

performative's power to lay bare the "conditions of signification" (Culler, "Convention and Meaning" 28) the way few other linguistic or literary tools can.

Dickens was an advocate of schooling for all citizens and set many scenes in school rooms. He routinely addressed the state of education in his speeches and correspondence, finding aspects of Victorian education worthy of both praise and denunciation. In a speech at the fourth anniversary dinner of the Warehousemen and Clerks Schools in 1857, Dickens listed the various types of schools that he found particularly unsatisfactory. After discussing his own inadequate early educational experiences, he states:

> I don't like that sort of school—and I have seen a great many such in these latter times—where the bright childish imagination is utterly discouraged, and where those bright childish faces, which it is so very good for the wisest among us to remember in after life—when the world is too much with us, early and late—are gloomily and grimly scared out of countenance; where I have never seen among the pupils, whether boys or girls, anything but little parrots and small calculating machines. (*Speeches* 292)

This is the school he presents to the reader in his 1854 novel *Hard Times*. Here the educational system functions as an overt political tool to develop a certain type of thinker and citizen, and there is a precise scene where the reader witnesses the essential workings of that apparatus's power of interpellation over a minor and minor character. This scene occurs between Sissy Jupe and Mr. Gradgrind in the second chapter, and reveals Sissy's character's initial moment of active resistance to the

ideological imperatives surrounding her in the novel. Through an Althusserian and Butlerian reading, I will show that, contrary to critical consensus, the resistance presented through this speech act and minor character is only moderately successful, as she is forever bound to two identities: Sissy, as she is called by her father, and the name Cecelia, insisted upon by the Ideological State Apparatus's functionary in the novel, Mr. Gradgrind. The dual naming permanently affixed to traveller Sissy/Cecilia proves that the pushback against the forces of interpellation can ever only succeed to a certain extent within the storyworld, and that because it was initially serialized, it prevented Dickens from letting a character fade too long from sight; therefore, he had to use both names throughout the novel once each had been introduced. The work's material structure thus determines certain elements of the plot and the naming and renaming of characters. Sissy Jupe had to be called Cecelia because the reader, reading the novel initially as it was serialized, may not remember her by one name, but by the other. Therefore, the very necessity of keeping both names is built into the structure of the text beyond its myriad implications in the storyworld. Sissy/Cecelia cannot be the great figure of resistance as critics have argued because the original production and structure of the writing does not allow it. Her characterization is thus conditioned by power structures both within the diegesis of the novel and by the means of production of writing in the mid-nineteenth century.

Examining minor characters in Dickens, as well as any other novel, is not without its perils. Alex Woloch critiques a certain critical stance of "overload[ing]

minor characters with metaphoric significance" while "simultaneously considering the significance of this strange and discordant thematic significance" (126). He goes on:

> This interpretive stance asks what specific minor characters stand for in Dickens's
>
>> novels, in place of another fundamental question: *why are minor characters made to stand for so much in the first place?* In fact, a minor character's very importance, as an affective space within the novel, might work *against* his or her incorporation into the larger thematic or analogic structure. (127)

Why is Sissy made to stand for so much? Why tightly focus on her naming? She appears only sporadically throughout the novel, one of many minor characters. Yet she, like so many other minor characters, bears strategic importance, and I argue that the way that she is interpellated through the performative act of naming undercuts the overall function she otherwise serves in the novel. More broadly, she is one of several minor characters I explore in this dissertation that reveal that through performative speech acts of various kinds, perlocutionary effects, not so much in the storyworlds in which they take place, but in the structure of the novels and the minds of the readers, change, influence, and dictate how meaning is made by and through these texts.

Though scholars have scrutinized *Hard Times* from a number of positions, an explicitly Butlerian/Althusserian Marxist and poststructuralist reading of Sissy Jupe, her naming and minorness, has never been offered; as such, Sissy Jupe and her vital function, though critically acknowledged, remains only partially explored.

Michael Kramp argues that Sissy "embodies alternative principles and remains free from both the disciplinary measures that organize society and the capitalistic fervour that drives the ambitions of Coketown's leaders" (193). He claims that Sissy, and the circus entertainers alike, represent a society outside "the strict regulation of education and labor," and that Sissy is utilized as a tool to reveal the values of the entertainers to middle-class Victorian society (197). Many critics have claimed that Sissy is Roma gypsy, though Dickens never uses these terms in the text. Victorian perceptions of the limited cognitive abilities and moral inadequacies of the Roma people shine through in aspects of the circus people's representation, they argue. Sissy, however, is consistently found to be one of the most caring and generous characters in the novel, despite the novel's insistence on her stunted learning capabilities. Kramp further argues:

> ...while Sissy is stylized as a dark-skinned gypsy in accordance with stereotypical conceptions and raciological discourse, she cannot be effectively disciplined or involved into mainstream society; and yet, this status allows her to perform important cultural work as a dark outsider who reinforces White racial supremacy and solidifies the power of the White domestic realm in the modern industrial nation. (202)

Sissy's purpose according to this assessment is to reveal the domesticating power of the white home, though she remains unable to be fully assimilated into it. The domestic space in the novel acts as a disciplinary mechanism bringing the other into the fold of middle-class Victorian society through its emphasis on education, religion, and the nuclear family. Sissy, in this view, allows "Dickens to end his novel with an image of

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the revived White woman who shares in the maternal performance of the dark outsider"

(208); thus, she provides a valuable function to white society while taking up her

socially sanctioned and prescribed role as a married woman and mother.

Cynthia Northcutt Malone also argues that Sissy exists in opposition to the

disciplining technologies and techniques of both industrialization and gentile Victorian

society, serving to reveal the value of kindness and the singular importance of "the

individual human heart" (17). Yet Malone argues that "in the family, as in the circus,

each observer is part of the disciplinary system, subject to the hierarchy of gazes; each

observer is also observed" (18). In this view, each person in the novel watches,

disciplines, and controls everyone else, akin to Michel Foucault's notion of

"Panopticism." The ubiquity of disciplinary systems, and indeed the imperative for each

character to discipline herself and others through observation, is certainly prevalent in

the novel. Most scholarly analyses of Sissy have in common the view that she exists

outside of middle-class Victorian society and/or presents an exception to mechanisms of

discipline, punishment, and domestication as expressed in the novel. My analysis will

also confirm that Sissy's characterization does resist much of the attempt to enculturate

her into the system of "Fact," but it will insist that there is a precise moment of hailing

and interpellation that reveals the ideological intent of the system presented in the text;

Sissy, and indeed Dickens, resist the imperative of that exact moment, but are unable to

elude its implications entirely. The moment exceeds the novel's ability to completely

eradicate its effects. Its perlocutionary effects remain, forever uniting "Sissy" to

"Cecilia." Sissy's interpellation, or the means by which ideology hails subjects into

being through social interaction, takes place in the storyworld when we first meet her as "girl number twenty," and is unable to be radically excluded for the remainder of the novel as it brings into linguistic existence a character-subject irreducible to her former individuation.

As noted earlier, Dickens's style of characterization, particularly of his memorable minor characters, has been thoroughly scrutinized. Alex Woloch suggests that Dickens's minor characters must frequently be larger than life precisely because they are structurally minimized and lack the character-space to be developed in a more subtle, understated fashion. This larger-than-life representation tends to disrupt the narrative:

> Dickens's forceful caricature--his insistent distortions of secondary characters-- is the wellspring of their affective force. It is as though he has followed the process of asymmetry to the point where it turns in on itself. Making people minor produces more and more distortion and flatness, until that distortion is so extreme that it begins to call attention to itself. In this way the minor character's significance rests in--not against--his insignificance; his strange prominence is inseparable from his obscurity. The surging forth of minor characters within Dickens's novels always takes place in relation to this socionarrative condition: the character's presence (visually, affectively) is intricately linked to his or her simultaneous effacement (structurally, axiologically). (129)

Sissy Jupe, ostensibly flat, quiet, and understated for a Dickens minor character, axiologically stands out due to her kindness and generosity of spirit, as compared to cold

Louisa who is purely the product of facts and figures. Louisa, though a protagonist

based on character-space allotment, proves to be Sissy's inferior in character ethicality.

Yet Sissy's "effacement" is only partial, due in part to her axiological prominence--her

goodness hanging like a shadow over other characters--but also due to Dickens's

inability to reduce her to one name or the other. She stands out as this strange

intersection of narratively minimized yet hauntingly prevalent characterization, uniting

multiple storylines taking place within the novel.

  Hard Times presents a unique site for the study of minor characters and

performative speech acts in that who qualifies as the protagonist and who qualifies as a

minor character is not as readily apparent here as in other Dickens novels. Woloch

claims that the strong affective space of the minor characters in Dickens results in an

asymmetry in that they "rarely break from a central protagonist, just as the forceful

presence of his minor characters does not alter their position *as* secondary characters"

(132). *Hard Times* does not have *one* central protagonist, though Louisa, Bounderby,

and Mr. Gradgrind seem to qualify based on character-space alone. Perhaps then, *Hard

Times*, more than most of his works, illustrates the tendency for "Dickens's central

characters [to be] overshadowed by the minor characters who surround them" resulting

in "strong minor characters who *together* configure the narrative in such a way as to

make...an extremely weak protagonist" (132). Appropriately, the dispersed nature of the

narrative is reflected in the broad, nonspecific title, *Hard Times.* Such a title does not

center on a singular protagonist, but suggests that every character, major and minor

alike, is struggling. Indeed, it suggests that the entire society of its bleak storyworld is

struggling, whether it be with industrialization, modernization, or identity. As Stephen

Dobranski notes, nine of Dickens fifteen novels are either titled after the book's

protagonist or bear the name of a principal character in a longer title (388). This fact

highlights Dickens's particular interest in names and naming, but more importantly

reveals that *Hard Times* offers a wider gaze in its critique. It is a novel about struggle in

youth, in old age, in education, in industry, in parenting, in marriage, and in love; it is

about class, gender, and identity. As such, each character, no matter how minor, flat, or

exaggerated, serves a vital function in how meaning is made in and through the text.

While Woloch notes that almost every minor character in Dickens "enter[s] the

novel after something terrible seems to have already happened--and produced one or

another kind of eccentric and disturbing 'completeness'" (155), this is both true and

untrue of Sissy. She is already a child of fancy, but has never had a confrontation with

systems that attempt to overtly interpellate her. She does not seem to know that she is

lacking, and does not think of herself as unintelligent until after this confrontation. In

this way, as a minor character Sissy serves the distinct function of coming into

knowledge via an outside force, and having her idiosyncrasies and failings become

apparent through the lenses of those particular forces. For much of the novel Sissy is

defined by inability to learn, adjust, and assimilate and these deficiencies precede and

exceed her moment of introduction within the novel.

The introduction of Sissy illustrates Judith Butler's politics of the performative as

delineated in her book *Excitable Speech*, and this will be the lens through which I

evaluate Sissy's actions and the actions of Mr. Gradgrind. The inciting incident and

indeed injury to Sissy occurs in Mr. Gradgrind's insistence that she change her name, and respond to being hailed by its proper form, Cecilia. The moment of Sissy's interpellation takes place early in the novel, when the reader is first introduced to the schoolroom and its emphasis on facts rather than fancy:

> "Girl number twenty," said Mr. Gradgrind, squarely pointing with his square forefinger, "I don't know that girl. Who is that girl?"
>
> "Sissy Jupe, sir," explained number twenty, blushing, standing up, and curtseying.
>
> "Sissy is not a name," said Mr. Gradgrind. "Don't call yourself Sissy. Call yourself Cecilia."
>
> "It's father as calls me Sissy, sir," returned the young girl in a trembling voice, and with another curtsey.
>
> "Then he has no business to do it," said Mr. Gradgrind. "Tell him he mustn't. Cecilia Jupe." (9–10)

This scene is essential to understanding Sissy's characterization for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it insists that she accept and embrace a name she is not typically called, despite her resistance to the idea. Dickens establishes Mr. Gradgrind as being in a certain power position with the ability to name, and Sissy as in a certain relative disempowered position, by having her character named in such a manner. In *Excitable Speech*, Judith Butler, building on the work of Louis Althusser, argues that the speech act of naming is a unique site of subjection and subject-making for individuals,

and I extend it here to include fictional characters when naming actively takes place in the face of other characters and the reader within a given narrative. Butler argues:

> First, a name is offered, given, imposed by someone or by some set of someones, and it is attributed to someone else. It requires an intersubjective context, but also a mode of address, for the name emerges as the addressing of a coinage to another, and in that address, a rending of that coinage proper. Thus, the scene of naming appears first as a unilateral action: there are those who address their speech to others, who borrow, amalgamate, and coin a name, deriving it from available linguistic convention, and establish that derivation as proper in the act of naming. And yet, the one who names, who works within language to find a name for another, is presumed to be already named, positioned within language as one who is already subject to that founding or inaugurating address. This suggests that such a subject in language is positioned as both addressed and addressing, and that the very possibility of naming another requires that one first be named. The subject of speech who is named becomes, potentially, one who might well name another in time. (*Excitable Speech* 29)

Mr. Gradgrind, the voice of authority, the voice of the educational system, and the voice of cultural hegemonic ideals, is already named, and in turn, wields the power to name in his classroom. Sissy, a girl written as wishing to be called one name, is coerced into being called another name via the powers that be within the classroom, which serves here as a most potent locale of an Ideological State Apparatus.

Ideological State Apparatuses

Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) is a term proposed by Louis Althusser which provides a theory on how individuals are brought into various systems of thought and control. He expands upon Marx's notion that society is constructed on two levels, the infrastructure and the superstructure, with the infrastructure acting as the economic base, the unity of the productive forces, and the relations of production, while the superstructure is comprised of the politico-legal regime and the ideology of a given society. A state deals in repression by utilizing formal institutions such as the police, courts, military, prisons and so forth and class struggles are rooted partly in a conflict over who can control the (Repressive) State Apparatus (17). Ideological State Apparatuses are specialized institutions, including but not limited to: the Church, the educational system, the political system, unions, media, and culture. While the (Repressive) State Apparatus is public, the majority of the ISA is private. Althusser argues that "the Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence,' whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses *function 'by ideology*'" (19). The ruling class controls the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but it also indirectly controls the ISA. Ideology is present so long as there are subjects practicing and acting within them. Ideology "interpellates," or recruits and transforms individuals into subjects. Althusser argues that an ideology is "not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live" (39). Thus, for Althusser, ideology has no history, connects the imagined relationship to the actual lived conditions, has a material existence, and interpellates individuals into

subjects in the world (34-37). The cumulative forces of RSAs and ISAs create communal and national culture, and define individuals through naming, hailing, and interpellation. Situating a performative transformation within an ISA (school room) allows Dickens to critique the state of education in Victorian England, revealing its active oppression of pupils, ideas, and individuality, while also placing minor character Sissy in a unique and specific critical role for the remainder of the novel as an individual functioning in a racist, sexist, and classist system.

The interpellating incident in the classroom certainly seems injurious to Sissy, as her character kindly, but strenuously objects to Mr. Gradgrind's naming imperative. Injurious language, according to Butler, does not always have to come in the form of a hateful or derogatory word; it is not always hate speech, though frequently it is. Occasionally, it is mere naming. An individual and indeed a character can be "brought into social location and time through being named" (29). The name chosen, and the name rejected, have significance in this instance. Being named, however, does not end the violence that can be done unto a person via naming, for even after receiving a name proper, one remains ever open and vulnerable to being named again. In this way, "the vulnerability to being named constitutes a constant condition of the speaking subject" (30). Sissy is presented as never free of the threat of being renamed within the text, and can never be secure in having initially resisted the naming that is thrust upon her in this inauguratory scene in the classroom. The looming threat of being redefined by a naming agent remains ever present. Sissy's character does not have possession of her name, and she can again be called "girl number twenty," or Cecelia, or even another

name, at any point according to the whim of the authoritative other, or any other subject in language within the storyworld. These names always carry weight, histories, and specific implications, both inside the storyworld and outwardly to the reader.

Significantly, Sissy's father, the only person in the text with the official, established, state-sanctioned authority to name and call her whatever he likes, is also indirectly implicated and corrected in the moment of naming in the classroom, speaking to the power and force of the performative moment. A father can presumably name and call a child whatever he likes; but here, Mr. Gradgrind, acting as the voice of hegemonic discourse, tells Sissy that the father "has no business to do it," and that "he mustn't" continue to call her Sissy (10). An outsider, a non-family member, in this instance, not only names the child in question, but critiques the very person endowed with the authority and responsibility of being the proper naming subject in the text. With this scene in the classroom, Dickens reveals the power of institutions to exceed their assumed limitations and reach into the very fabric of an oppressed person's life and interpellate her against her will, while simultaneously undercutting the power and position of her guardians and community elders.

The naming of individuals, according to both Butler and Althusser, is a divine performative. In order words, it immediately brings into being that which it names, but it simultaneously subordinates the same person brought into being. Butler claims that "social ideology operates in an analogous way to the divine voice," which "inadvertently assimilates social interpellation to the divine performative" (31). She continues: "The example of religion thus assumes the status of a paradigm for thinking ideology as such:

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the authority of the 'voice' of ideology, the 'voice' of interpellation, is figured as a voice almost impossible to refuse" (31). Mr. Gradgrind, written in the mold of educators from Dickens's own life, "whose business it was to make as much out of us and put as little into us as possible" (Dickens, *Speeches* 292), acts as the voice of authority, assumes a position that is the voice of ideology and has the right and power to name, even over that of the biological father in the text. The power of naming wielded by Mr. Gradgrind is a stand-in for the divine power of naming and "structures the theory of interpellation that accounts for the ideological constitution of the subject" (Butler 31–2). In the moment in the classroom when Sissy is called Cecilia, she is both made a new, unique textual subject, and is simultaneously subjected to the power of Mr. Gradgrind, and indeed mainstream Victorian ideological imperatives.

Of course, a character existed within the text prior to Mr. Gradgrind's naming. For Mr. Gradgrind to address and name someone, there had to be an addressee prior to the address. Like all performatives, the naming simultaneously creates what it names: there is no "Cecilia" without the name "Cecilia" of an entity to be named. A name is a linguistic guarantor of existence and the character existing under the name "Cecilia" is not the same character that could ostensibly function under the name "Sissy." Butler explains:

> as a prior and essential condition of the formation of the subject, there is a certain readiness that suggests that one is, as it were, already in a binding relation to the divine voice before one succumbs to its call. In other words, one is already

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claimed by the voice that calls the name, already subordinate to the authority to

which one subsequently yields. (32)

Dickens clearly makes Sissy quite resistant to the formal name foisted upon her. She

makes objections and seeks the authority of her father's complicity in calling her

Sissy. But one cannot reject a name given by an authority, or indeed by any other named

subject, in narrative as in actual life. A name may continue "to force itself upon you, to

delineate the space you occupy, to construct a social positionality. Indifferent to your

protests, the force of interpellation continues to work. One is still constituted by

discourse, but at a distance from oneself" (*Excitable Speech* 33). According to this

argument, characters, like people, ultimately cannot resist renaming; in the distance is an

other, here the reader, constituting her in discourse via the new name that has been

presented. If other characters or the narrator reference a character by a certain name,

classify her as a certain race or class, she is interpellated into the ideology of the text and

that of the reader via those assertions. Interpellation's primary purpose "is to indicate

and establish a subject in subjection" (34), whether or not the subject is subjected

willingly in the plot.

In other words, the performativity of naming creates perlocutionary effects. This

refers to the effects that come from the act of naming that are not immediately apparent

in the moment of the naming itself. These could include treatment: is a Sissy Jupe

treated differently than a Cecilia Jupe? Is Cecilia Jupe of the Gradgrind household

treated differently in public than Sissy Jupe, the clown's daughter? In all likelihood, yes,

she is. Cecilia Jupe of the Gradgrind household is a different character inhabiting a

different social sphere and position than Sissy Jupe. The perlocutionary effects of being Cecilia Jupe thus extend far beyond Sissy responding to a different name, but actually change the manner in which Sissy inhabits the storyworld, for she is being interpellated into white, middle-class Victorian society, whether or not she wishes to be. In being housed after her father abandons her, in the attempts to educate her, in being kept as a worker and companion, and being informally adopted by the family, she is shed of her "stroller" (*Hard Times* 20), or traveller, associations. Yet the persistence of the name Sissy in the text seems to act as a constant reminder that she is not wholly of this new world. She is a character trapped between worlds and names.

Importantly, however, Dickens presents the Ideological State Apparatus as failing to wholly eradicate the prior subject "Sissy." It fails as he allows her to cling, mostly, to her original identity and not solely be referenced as Cecilia for the bulk of the novel. Butler writes that "according to [Austin's] view of the illocutionary speech act, the name performs itself, and in the course of that performing, becomes a thing done" (44). But this is not in fact the case with Sissy. The schoolroom scene so early in the novel clearly indicates that Mr. Gradgrind fully intends to fix Sissy as Cecilia permanently in the narrative; he attempts to bring fact-focused, head-driven, statistically sound Cecilia into being and to banish the gypsy girl "Sissy" from the storyworld. The informal sounding "Sissy," almost like a nickname, immediately brings up notions of the family, a sibling relationship, closeness, and familial love; surely Dickens, with his attention to detail and noted play in the naming of characters, did not miss these associations. He has Mr. Gradgrind disregard these connotations and histories attached

to the name, while simultaneously rejecting their potential value in an individual. In this moment, through the naming and performative properties attached to the act of naming, Mr. Gradgrind intends to transform "Sissy" the brown girl with the horse-riding, circus-entertainer father, into middle-class, white, fact-minded Cecelia. The naming is performative, and is intended to have immediate and binding illocutionary force. The name Cecilia both signifies an ideal, and enacts Sissy's transformation into that ideal.

The Austinian account of performativity enacted in the naming of Cecilia assumes a subject as sovereign in that an individual speaks and in doing so brings into being that which s/he speaks. Sissy, as a dark-eyed and dark-haired girl of a travelling group of performers, is already "raced" and "gendered." From the moment a child is born, and its sex is determined, what follows is a "long string of interpellations by which the girl is transitively girled: gender is ritualistically repeated" (*Excitable Speech* 49). Sissy, as a female and a racial minority, is always-already gendered, raced, and now, named. Butler contends that "the power to 'race' and, indeed, the power to gender, precedes the 'one' who speaks such power, and yet the one who speaks nevertheless appears to have that power" (49). Though the moment exceeds both Gradgrind and Sissy, its effects nonetheless are generative of further effects.

But does the renaming of Sissy within the narrative qualify for what Butler calls "the injurious word?" The injurious word is a word "that not only names a social subject, but constructs that subject in the naming, and constructs that subject through a violating interpellation" (49). Does demanding that Sissy be called Cecilia qualify as a "violating interpellation?" Insofar as it also demands that she renounce her history, her

heritage, the name her father calls her, her previous learning, even her father's occupation, indeed, her very way of life, it is certainly "a violating interpellation." Wrapped up in the naming is a shift from freer traveller lifestyle, with the reading of storybooks and other fanciful works, to an intense and narrow focus on facts, which the novel reveals Sissy not to understand. There is a shift from a warm extended family-like community with the travelling circus group, to what is initially a cold middle-class home, where affection is neither prized nor encouraged. In every way, the naming represents a rupture with that which came before, and the beginning of what is an attempt to radically alter the social and psychological paradigms of Sissy's existence in the storyworld thereafter.

So what does it mean that the performative effort, the injurious word, *mostly* fails? Sissy does not in fact become Cecilia for the majority of the novel; she remains, partly, Sissy Jupe. In attempting to change her name, Mr. Gradgrind endeavors to position himself as the voice of the authority; "the subject achieves a temporary status in the citing of that utterance" (50). However, the supposed subject-effect of naming another is bound in the citation of a history of changing the names of marginalized individuals and giving them proper Christian, Westernized names. Though the name "Sissy" is not in and of itself outside the bounds of a typical Western address, it is not formal enough for a student of fact and figures. That the dark, raced, classed girl must bear and wield her proper Christian name reiterates in the storyworld the long history of such naming in the real world. Dickens, in this scene, reflects the practice of forcibly

renaming minority children, inevitably bringing its long history to bear in that precise moment of utterance by Mr. Gradgrind.

Contact Zones

What the scene in the classroom entails is the union of power structures, namely the school, the state, Christianity, and Empire, coming to bear on a child marked by the otherness of no education, exemplifying the minority status of a member of a culture which remains always outside, unable to be assimilated into the culture at large. This moment in the novel is *the* confrontation for Sissy's character, as the classroom in this context becomes a "contact zone." The notion of the "contact zone" is a theory proposed by Mary Louise Pratt who argues that these are "social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths" (74). Mr. Gradgrind's classroom is precisely such a site in the storyworld. Here, the traveller girl's culture, learning, assumptions, and very vocabulary are put on trial. The following exchange takes place in the classroom immediately following Mr. Gradgrind's naming of Cecilia:

"What is your father?"

"He belongs to the horse-riding, if you please, sir."

Mr. Gradgrind frowned, and waved off the objectionable calling with his hand.

"We don't want to know anything about that, here. You mustn't tell us about that, here. Your father breaks horses, don't he?"

"If you please, sir, when they can get any to break, they do break horses in the ring, sir."

"You mustn't tell us about the ring, here. Very well, then. Describe your father as a horsebreaker. He doctors sick horses, I dare say?"

"Oh yes, sir."

"Very well, then. He is a veterinary surgeon, a farrier, and horsebreaker." (9–10)

The very terms by which Sissy would refer to her father are found to be lacking; thus, they are eradicated and duly replaced. Sissy's true understanding of her father's business is impermissible in the classroom of dominant, middle-class values, where low-brow occupations are found too distasteful to be enunciated. This attempted erasure of not only Sissy's name, but of her understanding of her father, is the educational Ideological State Apparatus at work. On paper then, for Mr. Gradgrind's purposes, he does not have a Sissy Jupe whose father rides horses in the circus, but a Cecilia Jupe whose father is a horse surgeon and horse-breaker. Not only are Sissy's values under assault in Dickens's clearly articulated contact zone, but her identity is considered, dismissed, and rewritten. Pratt writes:

> Descriptions of interactions between people in conversation, classrooms, medical and bureaucratic settings, readily take for granted that the situation is governed by a single set of rules or norms shared by all participants…Despite whatever conflicts or systematic social differences might be in play, it is assumed that all participants are engaged in the same game and that the game is the same for all

players. Often it is. But of course it often is not, as, for example, when speakers

are from different classes or cultures, or one party is exercising authority and

another is submitting to it or questioning it. (79)

Here, "the game" is to dislocate Sissy's character from her past, from the identity that

constitutes her understanding of the world, and to refigure her as someone and

something else in an entirely new situation without a past. In this contact zone, her

character's very being is that which is under assault.

If the moment of naming, the performative action of turning Sissy Jupe into

Cecilia Jupe, in the classroom mostly fails, is it not due to misalignment between

animating intention of the speaker, Mr. Gradgrind, and his enunciation. Dickens is clear

in his detailed characterization of Mr. Gradgrind as a no nonsense, intentional, and

consistent character. As a protagonist, he is given this richer development and nuance.

Here his insistent protagonist will pushes against Sissy's minor flatness, asking that she

relinquish all the histories and identities that encompass being "Sissy." Yet the

reliquising of history proves tricky, as his action of naming in the classroom, with the

force of history, race, and Empire behind him, is based on prior exercises of the power of

naming, that Dickens could place such a character in such a position to presume that

renaming could succeed at all. Actual history is the condition of the possibility of

success, linguistic and structural guarantor. Butler argues that "a performative 'works'

to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is

mobilized. In this sense, no term or statement can function performatively without

accumulating and dissimulating historicity of force" (51). In other words, the moment

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Dickens gives us in the classroom is not a confrontation between Sissy and Mr. Gradgrind; nor is it merely a confrontation of disparate ideologies, that of the circus people and middle-class Victorian values. Instead, it is a confrontation of histories, built into conventions functioning due to iterability, exercising power over individuals because of ritualized citation and grafting, represented successfully in a fictional scene due to its specific setting. The confrontation neither originates in, nor is original to, the moment. Dickens empowers Mr. Gradgrind, representing the school, the state, Empire, Christianity, and the West, to speak with the force and conventions of history as they name and attempt to destroy the history of (an)other in the naming moment.

Is she destroyed? Alex Woloch argues that "Dickensian narrative works to both substantialize and dehistoricize the character's minorness. Characters barrel into the novel with the immediate effects of their minorness fully apparent; and while they might change or progress in the story-world, they rarely escape or climb out of their minorness" (155). If Sissy's name changed fully to Cecilia, and Dickens referred to her as such throughout the remainder of the novel, would this qualify as such an escape? Would the dynamism of this move propel Sissy out of her minorness? Sometimes even when characters "exhibit a capacity for change," (Woloch 155), their eccentricities and peculiarities of characterization remain. Woloch thus suggests that "such change, in other words, does not occur on the level of narrative structure, rarely loosening a 'doom' that obtains in the strict coordinates of their subordinated delimitation, regardless of their fate in the story-world itself" (155). But the (re)naming of Sissy Jupe does take place in the narrative structure of the novel, appearing and reappearing as both Cecilia and Sissy,

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and neither Cecilia nor Sissy. She is this liminal character existing betwixt and between two warring identities, structurally disrupting the narrative by remaining both yet neither.

Naming and Resistance

If she is not destroyed, how does Dickens have Sissy "talk back" to this name and resist the Ideological State Apparatuses attempting to subordinate her? If, as so many critics have claimed, Sissy is a figure of resistance to the forces of modernization and mechanization, resisting both the demands of individuals and greater Victorian middle-class society, how is this expressed? By being called something, by being named, in both the real world and in fiction, we are brought into linguistic existence, even if the name is in the language of the linguistic other. Butler notes:

> the terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open. (38)

In the gap, Sissy's character clings to the name Sissy and remains Sissy for the majority of the novel. In allowing her to mostly keep the name Sissy, Dickens gives her character some agency. Prior readings of Sissy consistently find that her character stands as a resistance to mechanisms of discipline and control within the narrative. Problematically, these readings miss key evidence that suggests this is not *entirely* the case. Perhaps due in part to the serialized form by which the novel was first published, the name "Cecilia"

resurfaces in the third part of the text. Late in the novel, when Louisa leaves Bounderby and returns to her father's home, Bounderby and Gradgrind discuss the situation: "I—I had intended to recommend, my dear Bounderby, that you should allow Louisa to remain here on a visit, and be attended by Sissy (I mean of course Cecilia Jupe), who understands her, and in whom she trusts" (178). In this instance, Sissy is recognized as no longer just connected to the name Sissy, despite the fact that it is the one her character clearly prefers, and the one used to refer to Sissy/Cecilia/girl number twenty for the majority of the novel. Here, she must be referred to as "Cecilia" by the powers that be, Mr. Gradgrind and Bounderby, in order to be recognized amongst them, for that is the name they have bestowed upon her. For them, she has been successfully interpellated as Cecilia and the singular name of Sissy will no longer suffice.

The name Cecilia may also resurface at this juncture due to the fact that for the middle part of the novel, Sissy is not essential to the plot and is barely mentioned; her character has no role for much of the developing novel. Therefore, it might also be Dickens who is reminding the potentially forgetful reader that Cecilia and Sissy are the same person. Yet this fact too shows the power of the performative. In the moment of enunciation of Sissy's new name by Mr. Gradgrind, Sissy becomes Cecilia and Sissy simultaneously; girl number twenty is ensconced in a metalepsis that is impossible to shake. The reader now and forever associates young Ms. Jupe with both names. In this way, the enunciation, the hail in the classroom, has proven to be successful despite Sissy's attempts in the novel to remain Sissy, in that she is ever associated with the

proper, middle-class formal name she wished to reject. The names are inextricably

linked and indivisibly sewn from the moment of hailing onward.

Because Dickens has to return momentarily to the name Cecilia, even late in the

novel, it is confirmed that the powers of interpellation are manifold and lasting. Sissy's

character does not get to choose the way that she is constituted in the diegesis of the

novel; she may actively resist the forces that be and still be constituted by them all the

same. This sly slippage of calling Sissy, "Cecilia," again late in the novel reveals that

the matter has not been entirely put to rest, and that the character "Sissy" is ever altered

by the performative interpellating hail, forever unifying Sissy/Cecilia into one

character. Butler asks "And what if one were to compile all the names that one has ever

been called?…Would one find oneself alienated in language, finding oneself, as it were,

in the names addressed from elsewhere?" (30). By novel's end, is Sissy indeed Cecilia, a

middle-class girl, educated though not exceptionally bright, choosing to marry and live a

proper Victorian lifestyle idealized for middle-class white women? Dickens offers few

details:

> Herself again a wife—a mother—lovingly watchful of her children, ever careful
>
> that they should have a childhood of the mind no less than a childhood of the
>
> body, as knowing it to be even a more beautiful thing, and a possession, any
>
> hoarded scrap of which, is a blessing and happiness to the wisest? Did Louisa
>
> see this? Such a thing was never to be. But, happy Sissy's happy children loving
>
> her; all children loving her; she, grown learned in childish lore; thinking no
>
> innocent and pretty fancy ever to be despised; trying hard to know her humbler

fellow-creatures, and to beautify their lives of machinery and reality with those

imaginative graces and delight." (219)

Here at novel's end, Dickens gives us a one sentence summation of Sissy's life.   We are

to understand that she married and had children and that those children have a felicitous

relationship with Louisa. But the frame of reference is entirely centered on Louisa,

confirming yet again that this is in no way the minor character's story; she is an aside in

someone else's narrative. Yet because the home and children were particularly valued in

Victorian society, it seems that in this respect Sissy is more successful than protagonist

Louisa. Yet without additional details, the reader is not to know the exact nature of

Sissy's situation. Did she marry a respectable, middle-class man, or did she marry a

fellow traveller? Did she impart to her children both facts and fancy, or only fancy?

The reader does not know; only Louisa's contribution to the children is included. In

leaving out the precise details of Sissy's life, Dickens forces her final

effacement. Sissy/Cecilia is a successful mother, we are told, but is simultaneously

middle and working class, traveller and settled Victorian woman, educated in facts *and*

fancy, all things to all readers, yet worth hardly more than a passing mention.

　　　　While Sissy's resistance to the Ideological State Apparatuses presented within

the novel is noteworthy, it is not the whole of her character's story. She is indeed

interpellated into the storyworld as Cecilia. Despite her pushback, however, her

character cannot structurally shake this reconstitution. Her story is never her own and

even her happy ending is framed through the lens of another character's narrative. Thus,

Sissy is not Dickens's great figure of resistance; instead, she is Dickens's figure of

interpellation, entering the ideological world of the novel through a subjugating,

performative hail her character is never able to entirely reject or elude.

CHAPTER IV

SELF-NARRATIVE IN *DANIEL DERONDA*

"The most pitiable of all silly novels by lady novelists are…novels intended to expound the writer's religious, philosophical, or moral theories." (George Eliot, "Silly Novels by Lady Novelists")

George Eliot, in her 1855 essay "The Morality of Wilhelm Meister," defends Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* against claims that it is an immoral book. She may as well be writing about her own much later novel *Daniel Deronda* when she claims that "for youthful minds of the ordinary cast it will have no attractions, and that the exceptional youthful mind which is strongly arrested by it is of too powerful and peculiar a character to be trained according to educational dogmas" (305). She goes on:

> Goethe, it is sometimes said, seems in this book to be almost destitute of moral bias: he shows no hatred of bad actions, no warm sympathy with good ones; he writes like a passionless Mejnour, to whom all human things are interesting only as objects of intellectual contemplation. But we question whether the direct exhibition of a moral bias in the writer will make a book really moral in its influence...Now, the moralizing novelist produces the same effect on his mature readers; an effect often heightened by the perception that the moralizing is rather intended to make his book eligible for family reading than prompted by any profound conviction or enthusiasm. Just as far from being really moral is the so-called moral denouement, in which rewards and punishments are distributed

according to those notions of justice on which the novel-writer would have

recommended that the world should be governed if he had been consulted at the

creation. (306-7)

Eliot's assessment of Goethe's work summarily explains her approach to her own

writing; *Daniel Deronda* in particular does not diegetically distribute good outcomes to

"good" characters nor does it, by and large, punish "bad" characters. However,

structurally, in terms of character-space and self-narrative, the novel does make

pronounced moral arguments in favor of some characters and against others.

Interpellation, as explored in the last chapter, is imposed from the outside, and is

exerted by another character, institution, or force; self-narrative, explored in this chapter,

is a performative act that allows a character to express her own existence and interiority

out into the storyworld for the reader's understanding. In both instances, the

performative, or lack thereof, can reinforce, create, or maintain the minorness of

characters. Which characters narrate themselves, and which do not, speaks to the moral

diegetic value of a character, even if the storyworld and distribution of positive and

negative outcomes suggests something altogether different, or gives no ethical

assessment at all.

Using Judith Butler's essay "Giving an Account of Oneself" to frame the

discussion, yet complicating Butler's framework with Susan J Brison's conceptions of

the reconstructive potentialities inherent in self-narrative, this chapter examines how

recognition by (an)other and self-narrative act as performatives to bring some characters

into being as fully formed subjects in George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*, while leaving

others only partially formed to mire in their narrative minorness. Which female characters Eliot forms by extensive self-narrative, and which characters she does not, reveals the function of a character as either referential universal stand-in, or as a specific, embodied subject within the text, worthy of prolonged diegetic consideration, potentially earning the sympathy of the reader. This exploration seeks to expose a little considered aspect of a novel where difference, whether racial, religious, gender, or class based, has been explored at length. Parsing the use of the performative here exposes a new way to understand character development and the character hierarchy in the novel, as well as expose the manner by which moral and ethical judgments may lurk not in story outcomes, but in structural components of the narrative.

In *Daniel Deronda*, Eliot writes long, detailed self-narratives for several characters including Mirah, Princess Halm-Eberstein, and Mordecai. Daniel Deronda and Gwendolen Harleth are richly explicated by the omniscient narrator. Lydia Glasher, the literal "other woman" in the novel, is additionally "othered" by the lack of a first-person account of her motivations and history; for a character whose presence determines so much of the action of the novel, to be less fully developed, or so differently developed, than other minor characters warrants notice. This chapter contends that the lack of self-narrative for Lydia acts to structurally differentiate this one minor character from the others. If Lydia self-narrativizes into a sympathetic, or at the very least a fully developed character like others in the novel, complete with a particular history whose motives the reader clearly understands, then she is not "a woman's life." Instead, Lydia must remain interchangeable and tragic, an instance of the "I" filled but

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for a second, a character never produced in a unique subjectivity of her own. She serves as an instance of Woloch's minor "worker" character: she is "smoothly absorbed as a gear within the narrative machine at the cost of…her own free interiority" (25). She drives the narrative, yet has quite a different relationship to it than the other minor female characters.

Denial of performative self-production for this character, the dark, unchaste, unmarried, "other" other woman, leaves the reader as the gawking, hailing, interpellating other of a partially formed and specially minimized minor character. Ultimately, the reader unconsciously internalizes the performative's power to subtly create and reinforce certain characters as a character's space and her place in the character-hierarchy is largely determined by these performative acts. Though in her writings Eliot overtly rejects the novel which moralizes, *Daniel Deronda* does so covertly by structurally silencing the morally questionable fallen woman.

Narrative treatment of self and other, and subjectivity, as well as the ethical duties and responsibilities of the novel, have been popular sites of inquiry for the better part of two decades. Dorothy Hale, for example, proposes disparate ethical theories to form a common theory about the value of literature, and the value of the novel specifically, to function as a means of ethical education. Hina Nazar argues that a Hegelian ethics, as expounded by Butler, offers fertile grounds for evaluating the function of the novel, particularly the nineteenth century novel. Eliot herself addresses the issue of the novel as a tool of moral and ethical education in her essay on Thomas Carlyle when she writes:

it may be said that the most effective writer is not he who announces a particular

discovery, who convinces men of a particular conclusion, who demonstrates that

this measure is right and that measure wrong; but he who rouses in others the

activities that must issue in discovery, who awakes men from their indifference

to the right and the wrong, who nerves their energies to seek for the truth and live

up to it at whatever cost. ("Carlyle's Life of Sterling" 310)

This is achieved not by rewards and punishments narratively distributed in a just and

moral fashion, but by rousing the reader's sympathies to that distribution regardless of

how it plays out in the plot. However, as is the case with self-narrative in *Daniel

Deronda*, structurally excluding certain characters from performative acts of self-

disclosure does, discreetly yet profoundly, encode moral judgments into the text and

create an undeniable if unacknowledged ethical hierarchy of characters.

Eliot creates this hierarchy and its attendant moral judgments by having some

minor characters use self-narrative extensively. These are not the protagonists of the

novel, Daniel and Gwendolen, but are the second tier characters who are of consequence

and significance. If measured in Alex Woloch's "distributional matrix,"[6] these

characters would occupy substantial character-space and appreciably affect the

happenings of the plot. In this fictive universe, they step into the "I" of a discourse, in

the face of an other or others[7], and give other characters, and more significantly, the

reader, a full account of themselves. Other characters temporarily step into the "I" of a

locution, but are denied an extensive stay there; these characters are narratively denied

the chance to self-produce, and therefore are unable to establish a diegetic subjectivity

beyond the particular locution because no grander narrative can be attributed to them. Even if a given self-narrative is incomplete at best, it remains the site of self-production in the face of the other within the novel. Butler claims that "every time I enunciate myself, I undergo something of what cannot be captured or assimilated by that 'I,' that I always come too late to myself" ("Giving an Account of Oneself" 37). Her argument that self-narrative always fails the self in that the self is something that cannot be fully narrativized, as something is inevitably left out and always missing, suggests then that perhaps we, and by extension characters in novels and the writers who write them, narrativize for other purposes. Many psychotherapists and trauma theorists contend that attempts to self-narrativize are productive, cathartic, and therapeutic, even if imperfect. Perhaps we all understand this intuitively as the impulse to talk about oneself is a well understood phenomenon. Some characters are provided this diegetic catharsis and some are not, and what this denotes both structurally and for the reader is significant. Self-narrative in *Daniel Deronda* functions as a space of revelation; epistemological gaps between both the characters in the novel, and the reader and the novel, are closed by the moments of self-narrative. It is in these prolonged engagements in the subject position of the "I" that characters reveal details about their pasts so that other characters, and by extension readers, may judge, or more importantly, not judge them, based on these past experiences. Self-narrative becomes a site of building, or not building, sympathy with the reader.

Parsing the subjectivity and the production of self for fictional creations in a fictional and wholly false world is of course tricky. However, realism, in its striving to

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accurately, as is possible, reflect "actual" life, opens an avenue for such an inquiry. Because Eliot saw realism as the "proper goal of art" (Rigall 324), psychological processes and conditions and the ways in which they affect actual human beings, should be reflected as similarly as possible in the realist novel. John Rigall, commenting on Eliot's realism, writes:

> Human life is always seen under the pressure of the "hard unaccomodating
>
> Actual" (*DD* 33), and subject to a rigorous law of cause and effect, action and
>
> consequence. Her narrators are not credited with a transcendent omniscience but
>
> appeal to, and seek to promote through the extension of sympathy, a shared
>
> understanding of the world that bridges the differences of class and culture. (326)

As such, performative production of the self through self-narrative and the reader's potential sympathy which does or does not arise as a result, serves as a tool to bridge the gap between fictional and actual.

Self-narrative

Judith Butler, building on the concept of the face established by Emmanuel Levinas, stresses that intersubjectivity makes us always-already responsible to our other; our subjectivity is only established in interactions with the other and therefore we are ultimately responsible to this other. Though she does not address the issue directly, she appears to be responding to critiques of poststructuralist theory which claim that when such theories complicate subjectivity, they inadvertently remove individual responsibility. Emile Benveniste, for example, argues that pronouns function by having

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us step into preexisting structures of language to express our subjectivity, but we can only do so precisely because of the structure which precedes us. He argues:

> What then is the reality to which *I* or *you* refers? It is solely a "reality of discourse," and this is a very strange thing. *I* cannot be defined except in terms of "locution," not in terms of objects as a nominal is. *I* signifies "the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing *I*." (Benveniste 218)

In *The Problems of General Linguistics,* Benveniste shows that the pronoun "I" is a unique entity in that it does "not constitute a class of reference since there is no 'object' definable as *I* to which" it can consistently refer (218). *I* or *you* refer to a "reality of discourse" which exists solely in the circuit of locution, and "not in terms of objects" (218). Through discourse, a speaker can appropriate "empty" signs such as "I" and "you," and in so doing, posit herself as a "subject." The function of language, Benveniste argues, is not to enable communication, but to establish subjectivity by stepping into these empty signs. He goes on:

> Then, what does *I* refer to? To something very peculiar which is exclusively linguistic: *I* refers to the act of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the speaker. It is a term that cannot be identified except in what we have called elsewhere an instance of discourse and that has only momentary reference. The reality to which it refers is the reality of discourse. It is in the instance of discourse in which *I* designates the speaker that the speaker proclaims himself as the "subject." And so it is literally true that the basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language. If one really thinks about it, one will

see that there is no other objective testimony to the identity of the subject except

that which he himself thus gives about himself. (Benveniste 226)

Thus, it is in an individual instance of discourse that subjectivity is established, not

eradicated, as Butler claims. She takes particular issue with self-narration in the face of

the other. She argues:

We, as subjects who narrate ourselves in the first person, encounter in common

something of a predicament. Since I cannot tell the story in a straight line, and I

lose my thread, and I start again, and I forget something crucial, and it is too hard

to think about how to weave it in, and I start thinking, thinking, there must be

some conceptual thread that will provide a narrative here, some lost link, some

possibility for chronology, and the "I" becomes increasingly conceptual,

increasingly awake, focused, determined, it is at this point that the thread must

fall apart. The "I" who narrates finds that it cannot direct its narration, finds that

it cannot give an account of its inability to narrate, why its narration breaks

down, and so it comes to experience itself, or, rather, reexperience itself, as

radically, if not irretrievably, unknowing about who it is. And then the "I" is no

longer imparting a narrative to a receiving analyst or Other. The "I" is breaking

down in certain very specific ways in front of the Other. ("Giving an Account of

Oneself" 35)

But what precisely constitutes such a breakdown? Does this breakdown mean that

attempts at self-narration are unfruitful, or even futile? Why then does there exist, in

both life and fiction, the imperative for people and characters to self-narrativize? Butler

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argues "that at the moment when we narrate we become speculative philosophers or fiction writers" (37).   She continues:

> My account of myself breaks down, and surely for a reason, but that does not mean that I can supply all the reasons that would make my account whole. There are reasons that course through me that I cannot fully recuperate, that remain enigmatic, that abide with me as my own, familiar alterity, my own private, or not so private, opacity. I speak as an "I," but do not make the mistake of thinking that I know precisely all that I am doing when I speak in that way. I find that my very formation implicates the Other in me, that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. (37)

If the "I" cannot be fully accounted for, and if the self, even when it attempts to self-narrativize, remains divided, elusive, fragmented, then why the imperative to self-narrativize at all? It is precisely because in the hail and recognition, and individual acts of discourse and locution, we come into being as subjects. In attempting to self-narrativize, we acknowledge our relationship with the other, that s/he constitutes us, that we only possess the "I" in this moment of discourse, but that self-narrative attempts to establish a more permanent, lasting subjectivity. We may fail. Our self-narrative may be incomplete, inconsistent, or even outright false. But it is our attempt to step into our moment of subjectivity and narrate ourselves into being, to bring a more saturated sense of ourselves to the other. This revelation of self may in turn produce sympathy or judgment in our interlocutor based on the self we have produced in her presence in this specific speech act and circuit of locution.

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Butler's project in "Giving an Account of Oneself" is significant in that it reorders the commonplace ethical assumption that the self "is viewed as the locus of autonomous agency and responsibility and, hence, is the subject of praise or blame" (Brison 41). Butler, in claiming that accounting for oneself always fails, and fails in the face of the other, therefore claims that responsibility to the other should take precedence over all else because it is to this other, and only to this other, that we are responsible. Susan Brison, in her book *Aftermath,* instead claims that "others continue to shape and define us throughout our lifetimes, but also because our own sense of self is couched in descriptions whose meanings are social phenomena" (41). The language we use to produce ourselves in narrative is, like all language, social. Therefore, we are always and only constituted in subjectivity, socially; the self-narrative is an attempt to bring the self into being via our social, shared language and produce a self, yes still constituted by the other, but inhabiting the "I" in a distinct moment of time, attempting to show the other how the self exists beyond these formulas and structures of self/other. Self-narrative has a function, and that function is to provide one's perspective on one's own life; it may never be Truth, but it serves a function in both life and narrative. First-person narratives are vital in that they offer us "imaginative access to others' experiences. Such access can facilitate empathy with others, which is valued by many feminist theorists as a method of moral understanding needed to complement more detached analytical reasoning" (Brison 25). In locating the ability to empathize in the other who bears witness to a first-person account, Brison provides a possible explanation for Eliot's extensive use of self-narrative.

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Eliot writes long, detailed self-narratives for Mirah and Princess Halm-Eberstein. Yet, Eliot does not give Lydia Glasher a first-person account; how does such a denial create and maintain an ethical hierarchy of characters? Eliot inadvertently denies Lydia empathy both within the diegesis of the novel and with the reader by this omission. Eliot produces Lydia in a limited way, reinforcing her minorness through the lack of the performative, suggesting that a beautiful though unchaste woman's story is either unimportant or unworthy of being told in the way that other othered characters deserve in character-space allotment. Ultimately, Eliot denies Lydia's character full subjectivity by allowing her only to be constituted in the face of the other in the storyworld, but not to inhabit the speaking position of a subject to enunciate, at length, her own personal life experiences in the face of the reader. Lydia is singled out as the only significant minor female character who does not self-narrativize, and as such, this exclusion cannot be dismissed as merely an effect of minorness in and of itself.

Character-hierarchy and Subjectivity

Subject-formation through the performative and the consequent character-space allotment cements character-ethicality in *Daniel Deronda*. Lydia is undeniably a minor character, flawed, unethical, and with relatively little character-space, yet a reasonable amount of critical attention has been paid to her. The scholarship on Lydia focuses on her racial otherness, her description as Medea and Medusa, and her position as a kept mistress. Kathleen Slaugh-Sanford argues that George Eliot focuses on the darkness of Lydia Glasher as a means of revealing her racial impurity and inferiority; Slaugh-Sanford attempts to move past typical postcolonial readings of the novel which focus on

Jewishness, to assert that Eliot frames Lydia as a figurative "colonized woman under the control of Henleigh Grandcourt" (402). This reading of Lydia offers an alternative, though not entirely viable, explanation as to why Lydia's character is not given the opportunity of self-narrative: as the racialized other, she must remain voiceless. It is sufficient for her merely to be the dark cloud hanging over Gwendolen's bright future, and the agitating itch that Grandcourt must continue to scratch because she is undeserving of a fuller story told from her own vantage point. If Lydia is in fact the dark woman of *Daniel Deronda* as Slaugh-Sanford claims, then structurally the novel attests to the fact that the subaltern cannot speak.

Jules Law views Lydia differently, as a darkness, a nonreflective surface, and a grave from which no light escapes, while Mirah acts as an unreadable transparency; these two characters serve as the limit-cases in the production of meaning in the novel. According to Law, George Eliot uses the concept of transparency, in terms of aspirations, motives, and minds, in order to reveal the way in which the self is, or is not, constituted in language. The fact that Mirah gets pages and pages of self-narrative, while Lydia gets mere paragraphs, also polarizes these figures in terms of language and their constitution therein.

Katie R. Peel, instead, argues that Eliot paints Lydia incredibly sympathetically by placing her in a domestic setting at Gadsmere as a kept mistress with whom Grandcourt has a rather routine and unfrought financial arrangement (should he remain unmarried and never produce a legitimate heir). Peel draws a parallel between Lydia's position as almost-wife and Eliot's own situation with George Henry Lewes and

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suggests that Eliot may have significant self-interest in representing Lydia favorably. Interestingly, Peel claims that the most important relationship in the novel is not that between Grandcourt and either Lydia or Gwendolen, or Daniel any other character, but between Gwendolen and Lydia in that this is a relationship where Lydia establishes dominance and does not recess into the shadows as polite society would have her to do. Peel argues that Lydia's visibility in this and other segments of the novel is enough to consider her portrayal a sympathetic one, while the angel-in-the-house portrayal at Gadsmere is enough to redeem her morally.

Yet she *is* a minor character without much character-space. In a rather lengthy novel, her scenes constitute one small part of one half of the story. Why then are critics fascinated with her? Perhaps it is precisely because she is the mistress, the Medea, the Medusa, the dark fallen woman. In this character, Eliot masterfully couples unique otherness with the same longings as most middle-class Victorian women: marriage, security, and legitimacy. Lydia is not clumsily concocted as evil; she's written as flawed yet steadfast. This is no more obvious than in the scene when Lydia confronts Gwendolen, the book's heroine (if the book has such a person). When Gwendolen foils Lydia's plan to marry Grandcourt by becoming engaged to him herself, Lush, Grandcourt's manservant, encourages Lydia to confront the spirited young woman. The recognition that occurs between Lydia and Gwendolen upon first meeting brings each "other" into being through the recognition they offer. This diegetic exchange reveals the vital dependency in subject formation on the other, our fundamental constitution through the social means of recognition in the other, and yet the threat inherent in our exposure

to someone who is utterly and wholly other, even in fiction. As Butler argues, in a

moment of recognition, "the uniqueness of the Other is exposed to me, but mine is also

exposed to her, and this does not mean we are the same, but that we are bound to one

another by what differentiates us, namely, our singularity" ("Giving an Account of

Oneself" 25). And yet, in the meeting of Lydia and Gwendolen, Gwendolen "felt a sort

of terror" as she realized that Lydia's life declared "I am a woman's life" (Eliot, *DD*

133). In this exchange, both Gwendolen and Lydia are brought into existence as

subjects by mutual acknowledgement; and yet, the "I" brought into being by the other

powerfully situates Gwendolen's concept of herself, because of her other, in a totalizing,

universalizing understanding of what it means to be woman. Thus Gwendolen herself is

constituted as an active, independently recognizable subject, and simultaneously as a

woman, subject to a woman's experience, substitutable for Lydia in her romantic affairs,

body, and function. In other words, she is still "the one" but not unlike "the many."

Lydia, denied the particularity bestowed on Gwendolen, is not rendered a fully formed

subject in this exchange, but becomes merely a stand-in for a "woman's life." A

"woman's life" in the context of the novel is a life lived at a man's mercy, subject to his

whims:

> And all the while the dark shadow thus cast on the lot of a woman destitute of
>
> acknowledged social dignity, spread itself over [Gwendolen's] visions of a future
>
> that might be her own, and made part of her dread on her own behalf. She shrank
>
> all the more from any lonely action. What possible release could there be for her
>
> from this hated vantage ground, which yet she dared not quit, any more than if

fire had been raining outside it? What release, but death? Not her own death. Gwendolen was not a woman who could easily think of her own death as a near reality, or front for herself the dark entrance on the untried and invisible. It seemed more possible that Grandcourt should die:—and yet not likely. The power of tyranny in him seemed a power of living in the presence of any wish that he should die. The thought that his death was the only possible deliverance for her was one with the thought that deliverance would never come—the double deliverance from the injury with which other beings might reproach her and from the yoke she had brought on her own neck. No! she foresaw him always living, and her own life dominated by him; the "always" of her young experience not stretching beyond the few immediate years that seemed immeasurably long with her passionate weariness. The thought of his dying would not subsist: it turned as with a dream-change into the terror that she should die with his throttling fingers on her neck avenging that thought. Fantasies moved within her like ghosts, making no break in her more acknowledged consciousness and finding no obstruction in it: dark rays doing their work invisibly in the broad light. (Eliot, *DD* 534)

The scenes with Lydia and Gwendolen are not about Lydia at all, but instead about the terror Lydia incites in Gwendolen. These scenes reveal how Gwendolen is produced by Lydia and are centered on the revelations the confrontations with Lydia force in Gwendolen. Yet many women characters in the novel have in common that they are produced in the face of a male other. This makes the Gwendolen-Lydia dynamic unique.

The death of men, Grandcourt for Gwendolen and her father for Princess Halm-Eberstein, offers the only freedom and relief from a certain kind of constitution: the women in these situations are created by these others, but they are created as only a certain controlled version of themselves, an extension of the will of a man. Death, or so these characters imagine, could free them from this control and allow them to produce themselves differently. Thus Gwendolen fantasizes about Grandcourt's death; Princess Halm-Eberstein experiences a feeling of elation and freedom upon the death of her father. But in neither case is the woman absolutely free. Both are still constituted in the face of yet another other: Daniel Deronda. Daniel represents the legacy and long shadow of Princess Halm-Eberstein's father that did not die with him, but lives on to resurface, to remind her of her Jewishness, and to carry the faith forward. Daniel rejects Gwendolen, disappointing her secret hopes, but in so doing, he makes her a better person. In both the case of Gwendolen and the Princess, subject-formation begins in the face and recognition of one person, and death merely transitions the subject-making position to another. The gothic trope of the family curse seems to subtly agitate here in Eliot's carefully constructed realism. Princess Halm-Eberstein's father's wish does not die with him. And Lydia's curse in her letter to Gwendolen on the day of her marriage serves as another performative utterance, bringing into being that which it predicts: "Will he think you have any right to complain when he has made you miserable? You took him with your eyes open. The willing wrong you have done me will be your curse" (Eliot, *DD* 314). Indeed, Lydia's

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curse upon Gwendolen bears fruit, as Grandcourt certainly makes her miserable, and after fantasizing about his death, Gwendolen has to live with herself after letting him die in front of her.

Like the "yolk" Gwendolen feels Grandcourt to be upon her neck, Princess Halm-Eberstein too bears the burden of a "yolk." She tells Daniel that he is the grandson his grandfather wanted and that the grandfather's yoke remains upon her. In both cases the female character is a beast of burden bearing the full weight of a male character's construction of her subjectivity. Despite her efforts to constitute herself, the Princess remains cast in the image her father desired for her. She cannot escape her past nor her father's demands despite actively spiting them in the flower of her youth. Eliot's construction of the Princess forces the reader to ask: can one ever constitute oneself? If the curse of another, the subjectivity that s/he has willed upon you, is inescapable, is true subjectivity possible? Perhaps for the Princess's character it is, but only temporarily. As in language, one assumes the "I" position only in the face of another, and only temporarily for the duration of a particular interaction and locution. Perhaps for the Princess, the death of her father temporarily allowed other others to be her other, to allow her temporarily to take up her subjectivity in the "I" in a slightly more comfortable position. This other other is the world; on the stage, her "I" could be filled with any number of subjectivities, none more or less truthful than the last. Alas, the Princess ultimately enters in a discourse with Daniel and self-narrativizes a past from which she has run long and hard. In this locution, with the son she abandoned, the longed-for Jewish grandson of her father, the Princess Halm-Eberstein can tell her story, her true

story, assume the "I" and have her animating intentions match precisely with her enunciations; who she enunciates into being is an angry old woman, unrepentant, and yet, still, somehow pitiable. The fact that she stridently clings to her past actions, attempts to justify them, and yet remains pitiable, speaks to the power of self-narration in rendering, at least to the extent that it is possible, the self into language for a character in narrative space with perlocutionary effects in both the storyworld and in the reader. In her self-narration, she acknowledges her constitution from outside of herself:

> …it is not true to say that I have changed. Things have changed in spite of me. I am still the same Leonora"—she pointed with her forefinger to her breast—"here within me is the same desire, the same will, the same choice, *but*"—she spread out her hands, palm upward, on each side of her, as she paused with a bitter compression of her lip, then let her voice fall into muffled, rapid utterance— "events come upon us like evil enchantments: and thoughts, feelings, apparitions in the darkness are events—are they not? I don't consent. We only consent to what we love. I obey something tyrannic"—she spread out her hands again—"I am forced to be withered, to feel pain, to be dying slowly. Do I love that? Well, I have been forced to obey my dead father. I have been forced to tell you that you are a Jew, and deliver to you what he commanded me to deliver. (Eliot, *DD* 553)

The Princess does not feel like she is ever free to write her own narrative, even in the act of doing so. She is blind to the contradiction she actively inhabits. Even in her old age, slowly dying, her father still conditions, disciplines, and determines her "personal narrative." Events outside of her control dictate her decisions and force her into certain

actions, which she then attempts to narrate. In neither case, does she give deliberate

consent to the events shaping her life. Her life is not her own; she is still created by an

other; in this case a dead other whose legacy hangs heavy over her heart and life.   For

the Princess:

> The "I" finds that, in the face of an Other, it is breaking down. It does not know
>
> itself, and perhaps it never will. But is that the task, to know itself, to achieve an
>
> adequate narrative account of a life? And should it be? Is the task to cover over
>
> the breakage, the rupture, which is constitutive of the "I" through a narrative
>
> means that quite forcefully binds the elements together in a narration that is
>
> enacted as if it were perfectly possible, as if the break could be mended and
>
> defensive mastery restored? ("Giving an Account of Oneself" 36)

Yet even if the Princess's self-narrativizing proves unsatisfactory, her character is

provided the narrative space to do it, and at great length. Lydia, on the other hand, does

not attempt to mend the gaps; the novel offers her no such self-narration. Eliot thus

renders Lydia doubly unsympathetic: first she characterizes Lydia as an unchaste

woman who abandons her child who then dies, and who bears the bastard children of a

man to whom she is not married; then she denies Lydia, and thus the reader, a self-

narrative that could make her a more sympathetic character. Lydia is provided no

attempt to "cover the breakage" but instead is only allowed to insist and dwell only on

the present and future iterations of herself and her children. In her meeting with

Gwendolen, this is the little bit of self-disclosure Lydia offers:

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My name is Lydia Glasher. Mr. Grandcourt ought not to marry any one but me. I

left my husband and child for him nine years ago. Those two children are his, and

we have two others—girls—who are older. My husband is dead now, and Mr.

Grandcourt ought to marry me. He ought to make that boy his heir. (Eliot, *DD*

133)

Comparatively, this constitutes a paltry and disproportionately minor bit of character-space in the subject "I" position. In the case of Princess Halm-Eberstein, the reader is given, on page after page, her entire background story, and made to understand her sufferings and her longings. The reader understands her cruelty and regrets, and the power her dead father exerts over her past, present, and future. The reader acts as her other, hears her self-narrative, and when the reader judges or sympathizes with her, s/he makes the judgment or gives the sympathy from a position that s/he feels to be informed. With Lydia, the reader makes a judgment based only on her actions. The reader is not privy to her character's understanding of her own actions; in turn, the reader does not understand why Lydia would leave her child or husband for another man who mistreats her. The novel does not provide an account to fill the epistemological gap opened by Lydia's choices. So even if self-narrative is always contrived, always lacking as Butler contends, it still functions in the novel as a means of giving the reader a fuller understanding of a character's intentions and motivations. When this fuller understanding is withheld and/or purposefully denied to the reader, it is structurally significant and creates a partially formed character-subject with whom the reader can only, at best, partially sympathize, if at all.

The reader gets "this fuller understanding" of protagonist Daniel Deronda, for example, for whom the book is named, when he is conditioned and constituted by implication in the self-narrative of another. The Princess Halm-Eberstein attempts to use her narrative to heal herself from the wound caused by her father's coldness. Daniel longs to have his mother's narrative heal the rupture in his life formed by her departure. Both imperatives fail. The talking exhausts the Princess, as she defiantly and defensively declares her lack of regrets. The telling offers no great catharsis; her positions remain unaltered and she shatters her other in the telling of "her" story, which is also his story. Daniel leaves the situation not knowing

> …how he got out of the room. He felt an older man. All his boyish yearnings and anxieties about his mother had vanished. He had gone through a tragic experience which must forever solemnize his life and deepen the significance of the acts by which he bound himself to others. (Eliot, *DD* 585)

While the Princess's attempts to self-narrativize allow the reader to judge or sympathize with her, yet fail her as a means of constructing a fully coherent and free self, their greatest power lies in binding Daniel more solemnly to others. He realizes that his yearnings mean little; what matters is his relationship with and to others. The Princess' self-narrative serves to reaffirm his constitution only in the face of the other as he properly locates himself as external to himself, created in and by others, creating others all the while. The Princess's "self"-narrative actually affirms for Daniel the primary importance of our relations with others. Thus, the self-narratives in the novel seem to

serve multiple functions. Daniel, recognizing and hailing his mother, is hailed and recognized in return. Empathy follows:

> But Deronda had recovered his fuller self. He was recalling his sensibilities to what life had been and actually was for her whose best years were gone, and who with the signs of suffering in her frame was now exerting herself to tell him of a past which was not his alone but also hers. His habitual shame at the acceptance of events as if they were his only, helped him even here. (Eliot, *DD* 551)

The Princess's self-narrative helped her to situate herself in the mind of another and create in him an ethic based on empathy and understanding, even toward someone whom he feels did him a great wrong. If one's story is not shaped into a narrative for the benefit of others, then it cannot adequately create a "you" for them beyond the particular locution. One is still hailed, recognized, and brought into being; but only one's actions can be assessed unless a self-narrative is offered. Even in the incomplete story offered by such a narrative, an interlocutor can find his or her way into the story, attempt to find common ground, attempt to access his/her sympathy or empathy, and continue to hail the other from a more informed and just position. This is what is at stake in the self-narrative offered by various characters in the storyworld of *Daniel Deronda.*

The princess sees Judaism as a prescribed narrative with a specific arc; her father has chosen this narrative for her life and she chooses another. In choosing another, she must give up Daniel, thus altering his life trajectory in the process. Upset by her remembrances, in their meeting, she tells him:

You are not a woman. You may try—but you can never imagine what it is to

have a man's force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the slavery of being a girl.

To have a pattern cut out—'this is the Jewish woman; this is what you must be;

this is what you are wanted for; a woman's heart must be of such a size and no

larger, else it must be pressed small, like Chinese feet; her happiness is to be

made as cakes are, by a fixed receipt.' That was what my father wanted. He

wished I had been a son; he cared for me as a make-shift link. His heart was set

on his Judaism. He hated that Jewish women should be thought of by the

Christian world as a sort of ware to make public singers and actresses of. As if

we were not the more enviable for that! That is a chance of escaping from

bondage. (554)

When she is attempting to self-narrativize, the memories flood back to her; language

fails her as "This last sentence was uttered with an abrupt emphasis, and she paused after

it as if the words had raised a crowd of remembrances which obstructed speech"

(555). She claims:

Others have loved me—and I have acted their love. I know very well what love

makes of men and women—it is subjection. It takes another for a larger self,

enclosing this one,"—she pointed to her own bosom. "I was never willingly

subject to any man. Men have been subject to me. (Eliot, *DD* 585)

Yet she is wrong. In mirroring their love, in bearing her husbands' children, in finally

following through with her father's desires, she is subject to them. Her father and

husbands sought to be her only others, yet she desired to be created by a wider audience: the world:

> "She is not like that?" said the Princess, taking from her wallet a miniature with jewels around it, and holding it before her son. It was her own in all the fire of youth, and as Deronda looked at it with admiring sadness, she said, "Had I not a rightful claim to be something more than a mere daughter and mother? The voice and the genius matched the face. Whatever else was wrong, acknowledge that I had a right to be an artist, though my father's will was against it. My nature gave me a charter. (Eliot, *DD* 583)

Eliot uses the Princess's self-narrative to justify her character's choices and create, to the extent that it is possible, sympathy in the reader. Yet no minor character demands more sympathy in the novel than perhaps Mirah. The novel allows Mirah to fully embrace an incitement to discourse as she discloses, in great detail, the story of her life and childhood. Mirah, as the tenets of psychoanalysis dictate, willfully reconstructs her life into a coherent narrative to inhabit the subject position of the "I" for an extended period of time. In recalling her past and finding her present self in the novel, Mirah claims that her memory of her mother mainly resurfaces in her dreams. Reconstructed memories are not reliable in actual people, yet still tend to bring comfort. This seems to be their function here as well. Mirah appears to be at peace when she remembers her mother. The reader gets a sense that she seeks to return to something once hers, then lost:

> I can dream myself back into that time when I am awake, and it often comes back to me in my sleep—my hand is very little, I put it up to her face and she kisses it.

Sometimes in my dreams I begin to tremble and think that we are both dead; but

then I wake up and my hand lies like this, and for a moment I hardly know

myself. But if I could see my mother again I should know her. (Eliot, *DD* 184)

Mirah ardently declares, when asked by Mrs. Meyrick for her history, that "It is dreadful

to speak of, yet I must tell you—I must tell you everything" (185). Why is Mirah utterly

compelled to relay her story? Is it for the sake of her interlocutors or for her own?

Brison would argue that "just as one can be reduced to an object through torture, one can

become a human subject again through telling one's narrative to caring others who are

able to listen" (57). Here Mrs. Meyrick and Daniel listen, and so too does the reader,

allowing Mirah an attempt to reconstruct herself. Brison argues that the social aspect of

the self-narrative is the crucial fact of self-narrative: "the self is created and sustained by

others and, thus, is able to be destroyed by them. The boundaries of the will are limited,

or enlarged, not only by the stories others tell, but also by the extent of their ability and

willingness to listen to ours" (Brison 62). Here, willing, listening others in the

storyworld allow Mirah to access her painful memories and temporarily relieve herself

of them.

In her self-narrative, Mirah reveals that she clung to religion as a child in order to

be closer to her mother:

I asked her to take me with her to the synagogue; and I read in her prayer-books

and Bible, and when I had money enough I asked her to buy me books of my

own, for these books seemed a closer companionship with my mother: I knew

that she must have looked at the very words and said them. In that way I have

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come to know a little of our religion, and the history of our people, besides

piecing together what I read in plays and other books about Jews and Jewesses;

because I was sure my mother obeyed her religion. (Eliot, *DD* 187).

Yet the Princess rejects her religion in order to pursue her art. Her father tried to keep

her from being an artist and instead she rejects both him and her religion. Mirah's father

tried to make her into an artist, and while she was talented, she claims that she had no

interest in being one. The artist clings to her art and makes it her religion; the pious girl,

hungry to be at peace, rejects her artistic talents and clings to religion. Mirah's suffering

is tied to a history of suffering as she claims that "it comforted me to believe that my

suffering was part of the affliction of my people" (187). Whereas the Princess Halm-

Eberstein longed to have the world as her other, Mirah loathes the attention she receives

when she is composed in the face of the collective other, the audience:

> Perhaps I make it worse than it was—you don't know that life: but the glare and
>
> the faces, and my having to go on and act and sing what I hated, and then see
>
> people who came to stare at me behind the scenes—it was all so much worse
>
> than when I was a little girl. I went through with it; I did it; I had set my mind to
>
> obey my father and work, for I saw nothing better that I could do. (Eliot, *DD*
>
> 190)

Because Mirah is past puberty at this point in her recollection, it is surely a sexual

attention that she receives and loathes. Daniel's mother, on the other hand recalls how

she loved the stage and the adoration of so many men who sought her attention and

affection. One character is revealed through her self-narration to possess a temperament

suited to such things, while the other is shown not to possess such a temperament. It is

only through the self-narratives offered in the novel that an artist is produced; so too is

the meeker, more pious personality.

The "Other" Woman

Gwendolen's backstory makes up a large portion of the novel; therefore, self-

narrative is unnecessary. As with Daniel, the novel builds Gwendolen into a fully

formed subject by lingering on her and giving her an overwhelming amount of character-

space. She still experiences recognition in the face of others within the novel, but it is

never imperative for her to seize and monopolize the "I" of a locution as her story

curiously dominates the storyworld of a novel named for another character. Mirah's

self-narrative reveals a woman with a traumatic past, seeking to establish a stable,

religiously-focused present and future. Her constitution in the face of the other and her

successful attempts at self-narrativizing reveal that stepping into the "I" of discourse

allows her character to accept its past, recreate itself in the present, and look forward to a

desirable future. The Princess Halm-Eberstein's self-narrative both succeeds and fails,

as she cannot free herself from the mental bondage of her father as permanent other, still

shaping and dictating her "self"-narrative. Her narrativizing is successful in terms of the

novel in that Daniel comes to understand his heritage and is thus able to move forward

on a mission with Mirah; the Princess's "self"-narrative inadvertently brought a pious,

Jewish man into being. Her narrative is also successful in that she is able to somehow,

even though she is stridently unrepentant, make the reader feel sympathy for her

situation. Her self-narrative reveals that she pursued a forbidden dream, but in the end,

had to play the role her father designed for her: bearer of a male Jewish heir. Her self-narrative, then, paradoxically reveals the unconventional liberties she took in life and her own lack of freedom.

Mirah and Princess Halm-Eberstein, because of their Jewishness, darkness, and foreignness, could be perceived as more other and othered than Lydia given the time and place of the novel's writing as well as the novel's setting. Though she shares the black hair and black eyes of these Jewish women, Lydia is a white British woman with all of the advantages and privileges this would confer on such a woman in mid-nineteenth century England. However, several factors indicate that Lydia is more narratively restrained and limited than these two Jewish characters. The first is that both Mirah and the Princess were born and raised Jewish by no choice or will of their own. They are born into their otherness, whereas Lydia has created hers. Mirah ultimately embraces her Jewishness willingly, but it was always something that she would have to confront and either accept or reject. The Princess too was born into her otherness, her Jewishness, and she actively rejects it for the better part of her life, but again she is tasked with this choice simply by chance. Lydia, instead, is an active participant in the choices that render her other. Despite her religious and ethnic advantages, she chooses to leave her marriage, commit adultery, and continue a liaison with a man to whom she is not married, bearing multiple illegitimate children. Through Lydia, Eliot seems to suggest that our actions determine our outsider status more than our birthright. This is no more apparent than in the scene where Grandcourt drives by Lydia and two of their children on the street and does not acknowledge them. His rejection of Lydia in the

storyworld mirrors the novel's rejection of her in terms of performative self-production. Mirah and the Princess, for all of their markedness, are never denied in the storyworld or in narrative space..

The second and more significant reason that Lydia is marked as the true outsider of *Daniel Deronda* rather than Mirah or the Princess Halm-Eberstein is that the novel is specifically trying to be less anti-semitic than its historical moment. While Jewish women were outsiders in Victorian society, the diegesis of the novel renders them as highly sympathetic. Oliver Lovesey argues that

> in Eliot's critical revision of Anglocentrism through the representation of the othered woman in *Daniel Deronda*, the other is accorded iconic status. Mirah, who is the very type of the iconic outsider within, becomes a focus of English anti-Semitism and channels Deronda's diffuse anxieties into a quest for personal and collective myths of origin. The other woman provides Deronda's access to a national/racial "make-believe of a beginning" (p. 35). Mirah's position within the "category of the exotic" is most clearly seen in the novel's usage of her story as a typology of Jewishness. (511)

Whether in accepting her Jewishness, as Mirah does, or in rejecting it to pursue art, as the Princess does, both characters are rendered sympathetically as victims of forces outside of their control. There is a certain element of fate in their characterization. Lydia, however, is accorded no such redemption for the outsider status she has chosen and cultivated. Though the storyworld does not overly punish her (her son does become Grandcourt's heir after all), the structure of the novel certainly does.

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Lydia, lacking significant character-space and self-narrative, denied a prolonged entry into the "I," is thus constituted partially and limitedly in the novel. She does very little with words and thus words do little for her character. Eliot provides her little affective space of her own, so she remains the Medusa, the Medea, and never an individualized woman, with a rich and nuanced backstory, deserving of our consideration and sympathy. For a writer utterly concerned with sympathy, it can be by no accident that Eliot denies the Medusa of *Daniel Deronda* a fully saturated self-narrative; if Lydia is written as a fully developed character, with a particular self-expressed history, she is not "a woman's life." She must remain somewhat interchangeable, a little tragic, slightly misunderstood, an instance of the "I" filled but for a second, never produced in a unique character-subjectivity of her own.

In the character-system of *Daniel Deronda,* Lydia exists in a strange position of being narratively essential, yet structurally minimized. As the most pronounced example of what Woloch would deem a proletarian of the novel, she has like common laborers a common task: enable Gwendolen's character to be actualized without being actualized herself. Eliot ensures Lydia's minorness and structural minimization by giving her no performative self-production through speech. The hierarchy of character-ethicality is clear, even if Eliot denounces such equations in her personal essays. When she writes that Goethe's application of ethics "seems to us precisely that which is really moral in its influence. It is without exaggeration; he is in no haste to alarm readers into virtue by melodramatic consequences; he quietly follows the stream of fact and of life, and waits patiently for the moral processes of nature as we all do for her material processes" (Eliot,

"The Morality of Wilhelm Meister" 308-9), she is praising an ideal to which all realist writing may strive. Yet Eliot, overtly or inadvertently, buries the adulteress of *Daniel Deronda* by writing her differently than she writes other significant minor characters. While the storyworld itself may not overly punish Lydia, the narrative's composition certainly does. Perhaps the moral and ethical education of *Daniel Deronda* lurks in the structural details and not merely in the plot-level distribution of reward and punishment.

CHAPTER V LOVE SPEECH AND INTENTION IN *THE EUSTACE DIAMONDS*

"If we are to deal with heroes and heroines, let us, at any rate, have heroes and heroines who are above such meanness as falsehood in love." (Anthony Trollope, *The Eustace Diamonds*)

In his autobiography, Anthony Trollope dedicates only one paragraph to *The Eustace Diamonds.* In this paragraph, he identifies the novel as a redemptive commercial success after a series of less successful efforts. He attributes its popularity not to its being a great love story, but to giving the readers what they want in a protagonist. He writes:

> There is not much love in it; but what there is, is good. The character of Lucy Morris is pretty; and her love is as genuine and as well told as that of Lucy Robarts or Lily Dale. But *The Eustace Diamonds* achieved the success which it certainly did attain, not as a love-story, but as a record of a cunning little woman of pseudo-fashion, to whom, in her cunning, there came a series of adventures, unpleasant enough in themselves, but pleasant to the reader. As I wrote the book, the idea constantly presented itself to me that Lizzie Eustace was but a second Becky Sharpe; but in planning the character I had not thought of this, and I believe that Lizzie would have been just as she is though Becky Sharpe had never been described. (Trollope, *An Autobiography*)

Trollope acknowledges protagonist Lizzie's appeal and her similarity to other fictional characters, though he centers audience intrigue on her (mis)adventures rather than her characterization as such. How he creates "genuine" minor character Lucy Morris and

"cunning" Lizzie Eustace respectively, however, through the use of genuine and disingenuous performatives is the focus of this chapter. Performative speech in *The Eustace Diamonds* creates a villainess protagonist by shielding her intentions and keeping her from the shattering inherent to love speech that is spoken in earnest. Whereas transparency into the heart and mind of the protagonist can create an ethical being at the center of a narrative, likewise, opacity can create a morally questionable character. In these instances, transparency shifts to the minor characters of the novel, rendering them sympathetic and higher on the character-ethicality hierarchy. The elusive, opaque protagonist, in the mold of William Makepeace Thackeray's Becky Sharp, and later Edith Wharton's Undine Spragg, is set apart by the disingenuousness of her proclamations of love. The cunning protagonist is created through her opacity and the disconnection between intention and speech.

Performatives of affection-- declarations of love, promises, and proposals, litter the Victorian novel, and though the phrase "I love you" does not appear frequently, love speech abounds. J. Hillis Miller argues in "Literature and a Woman's Right to Choose: Not to Marry" that a fundamental truth of Anthony Trollope's novels is "that, for the most part, one person can see spontaneously into the heart of another...Trollope's people, unlike George Eliot's, say, or Jane Austen's, are usually almost completely transparent to one another. The vehicle of this transparency is the face of the other" (52). One great exception to Trollope's alleged transparency of character is Lizzie Eustace of *The Eustace Diamonds*. As the protagonist, whether interacting with friends, family, or lovers, she is deceitful, malicious, and plotting. Her love speech, promises, and

proposals differ from those of Lucy Morris and Lucinda Roanoke, who as minor

characters, more closely resemble the transparent characters Miller correlates with

Trollope's oeuvre. Lizzie is of a different ilk than other female characters in this novel,

and Trollope structurally differentiates her within the text by having the animating

intentions of her commitments lack alignment with her proclamations. Lizzie is not

cunning because she attempts to keep diamonds that do not belong to her, but because

she is untrue in love.

Primarily my study thus far has examined how minor characters are created and

maintained by uses of the performative in active dialogue, ideologically implied by the

actions of other characters, and reinforced in the structural nuances of specific Victorian

novels. This chapter shifts focus slightly to an exploration of a particular type of

protagonist, one with immense moral failings, by showing that a lack of unity between

intention and love speech differentiates her from the transparent and sympathetic

rendering of the minor characters surrounding her. While the claims made in this

chapter derive from the study of Victorian novels, these patterns are by no means

isolated to works of this period. Such analysis may be applied to novels of other genres

and time-periods, though the mid-nineteenth century Realist novel with its wide social

gaze and emphasis on psychological insight serves up perhaps the best case studies. As

with the other chapters, this chapter attempts to underscore and explicate a narrative

process that is relevant to characterization across a range of periods and places.

Lizzie is the cunning protagonist of *The Eustace Diamonds* precisely because her

animating intentions do not match her proclamations of love and affection; this opacity

and lack of alignment disempowers love speech's ability to wound her. Therefore it is
not the felicitous intentions of love speech that give such speech its power, but it is the
infelicitous act which emboldens the speaker, and removes her from the "shattering"
effect of love speech spoken in earnest. Applying this infelicity to a character, in fact
making it a central aspect of her characterization, distinguishes her as unsympathetic
while the character space allocated to her makes her the one among the many. In her
wholeness, in her opacity, she never steps into language and the conventions of love
speech in a genuine enough way to be destroyed by them. Because Lizzie is never fully
present, with her speech and actions matching her intentions in the face of the reader, she
never gains our sympathy. This technique of rendering the unsympathetic protagonist
opaque can be witnessed in the characterization of other wicked female characters,
including Becky Sharpe to whom Trollope alluded, and though he claims in his
autobiography that he did not mean to mimic her characterization, the misalignment
between speech and intention is readily apparent. That the minor characters in these
same novels speak with an alignment between their intentions and their love speech
gives them the moral high ground and creates an ethical hierarchy of characterization
that does not favor the protagonist. Any time intention does not match true affection, a
gap between reader and sympathetic representation is exposed. When the female
protagonist is not transparent, the author creates a villain(ess). When a minor character
is not aligned between animating intention and speech, her opacity mirrors her
minorness. In either instance, alignment and transparency of intention and speech/action
create a character regarded as morally superior within the storyworld and regarded more

sympathetically by the reader. Delineating use of the performative in any text offers opportunities for understanding how character-space, character-hierarchies, and character-ethicality interact to create meaning, while naming, dialogic speech acts, self-narrative, and transparency of intention in love speech function structurally to render a character either the one, or one of the man.

Lucy Morris in *The Eustace Diamonds* represents what Alex Woloch describes as "the tension between a protagonist who is interesting in-and-of herself and minor characters who function only in relation to a central protagonist" (45). Lucy Morris, in all her honesty and integrity, ultimately serves as foil to Lizzie, whose opacity centers her as the protagonist. Lizzie is Woloch's "aesthetic construct" (46) precisely because love speech does not shatter her, and her engagements to Florian Eustace and Lord Fawn do not arise from sincere animating intentions of love. Lucy and Lucinda, minor characters, are alternately sincere in love and utterly devoid of it, resulting respectively in a felicitous union and the breaking off of what would have been an infelicitous union. Whereas self-narrative in fiction allows a character to elicit sympathy in the mind of the reader, and its denial can inadvertently render a character unsympathetic, so too can hiding the intentions of a character through lack of transparency. Because Lizzie is the protagonist, the structural means of throwing her character's ethicality into question differs from similar moves made toward minor characters in *Daniel Deronda*. By "scrutinizing the origin of the protagonist's centrality as contingent instead of positing it as simply natural or intrinsic to narrativity as such" (Woloch 322) reveals significant

epistemological gaps between the reader and characters in some instances and less pronounced gaps in other instances based around performatives and love speech.

The storyworld of *The Eustace Diamonds* requires minor character Lucy to be a paragon of virtue. Sincere, honest, kind, and hardworking, she embodies all the great virtues of a good Victorian woman, making her a 'typical' Trollopean female character. J. Hillis Miller finds Trollope's novels to be

> a fantasy world, in spite of their presumed reflection of Victorian bourgeois society. They are fantasies not only in the way almost all of them end happily in the triumphant reaffirmation of the ideology I have described, but also in their promulgation of that ideology in other ways, and in such features as the assumption that his characters are transparent to one another, can see spontaneously into one another's minds and hearts, or as in the assumptions that lie behind the climactic moments in so many of Trollope's novels in which the weak, usually the heroines, stand up to the strong (in the form of parents, friends, siblings, other authority figures) and prevail. I consider Trollope to be probably the purest expression of Victorian middle-class ideology, including the ideology of "family values" and of the rights of unmarried women, at least as seen from a male perspective. That qualification is important. Victorian female novelists, George Eliot or Elizabeth Gaskell, not to speak of the Brontes, saw these matters somewhat differently. (Miller, "Woman's Right to Choose" 44)

Lucy fits neatly within this framework Miller establishes; however, "on the level of narrative discourse" (Woloch 47), Lucy is needed for entirely different reasons than to

merely reflect idealized Victorian notions of respectable womanhood. Instead, she acts as a foil to Lizzie in love. Lizzie is not only cunning because of her plotting and scheming with regard to the diamonds, but because she is unknowable and untrue, unlike virtuous Lucy. Where Lizzie exceeds Lucy in beauty, charm, wit, and style, she pales in trueness, generosity, and constancy in love. *The Eustace Diamonds* finely exemplifies what Woloch identifies as "the dual use of 'character' [lying] at the heart of the birelational process...where nuanced adumbration of inner qualities emerges only through the social juxtaposition of different people" (Woloch 54). Lucy, a working governess who must toil away in the homes of others, comes to be the noble poor who are transparent in their motives, steadfast and true in all endeavors. Lizzie becomes the ignoble bourgeoisie, greedy, hoarding, and protective of that which she perceives to be rightfully hers. Because the novel places this lying, materialistic, unloving character at the center of its narrative, *The Eustace Diamonds* stands as an exception to broad generalizations about the "good" female characters inhabiting Trollope's fictional worlds.

A reasonable body of scholarship exists on *The Eustace Diamonds*, most of which focuses on law and property in the novel. Alan Roth claims that *The Eustace Diamonds* presents "the greatest property law hypothetical ever" (879) as he dissects real property, chattel, paraphernalia, and heirloom law in nineteenth century England. Ian Ward argues that *The Eustace Diamonds* is Trollope's sly intervention into the sensational novel craze where the reader encounters "sex, crime, and a wicked woman; and...a legal system which was patently unable to do much about the sex, the crime or

the wicked woman" (67). He identifies the confusion and anxiety produced by the novel

as arising from the passing of the 1870 Married Women's Property Act and the

problematic nature of some sensation novel heroines whom contemporary readers should

have "condemned" and "maybe pitied a bit." Instead, he claims that Lizzie's actions

could possibly, problematically, be "understood" or even "condoned" by Victorian

women readers of the novel (79).   Albert D. Pionke acknowledges the frequent

inaccuracies of law found in Trollope's earlier novels, and notes the extensive efforts

Trollope thus made for *The Eustace Diamonds* to be more accurate. Uniquely, Frederik

Van Dam concerns himself with how law reflects character intention in the novel.

Scholars not specifically concerned with property and law tend to focus on

commodity, exchange, and the various markets represented in the novel. Jen Satteur

analyzes objects in the novel, diamonds, books, horses, and Lizzie's safebox, to argue

that the discourses surrounding them defend Lizzie's mercenary character, as she too is a

commodity in a novel about the worth of objects, women included. Dagni Bredesen

attempts "to show how Trollope exploits the narrative trajectories and contradictions

produced by the intersection of money, property, and female marital status and how the

figure of [Lizzie] is the lever he uses to do this, even as he tries to assimilate this figure

in the end" (99), while Christopher Lindner argues that *The Eustace Diamonds* centers

on "mercenary female duplicity" (38), claiming that the novel ultimately "examines,

challenges, and experiments with commodity culture's economic constructions of the

feminine" (38).   Aviva Briefel, unifying both forms of critique, claims that *The Eustace*

Diamonds emerges to narrate issues, and anxiety, arising from reforms in property

law. She claims that this and other such novels, "[t]hrough their depiction of woman's overly intimate relationship to her gems and to herself as gem...figure female ownership as redundant. These narratives deploy a discourse of fakes and authenticity to assert that women's status as objects prevents them from owning property themselves" (136). William Cohen's psychoanalytic evaluation, rather than conflating the gems and jewel box with male and female sexuality, instead claims that Lizzie exerts a unique self-assertiveness while enacting "a wholesale symbolic revaluation of jewels themselves" as the story "forms an erotic drama of protecting, transporting, concealing, and revealing the necklace" (239).

Kathy Alexis Psomiades pushes back against such arguments, and instead claims that *The Eustace Diamonds* exceeds simple discourses of commodity and exchange that represent comparatively "good" and "bad" (95) women characters in a marriage market, though she acknowledges that false Lizzie is associated with ill-gotten gains, while Lucy is represented as a genuine "treasure." Psomiades situates the real economic power in the novel not in the male characters, but in Lizzie who forces suitors to vie for the economic security she could provide through a marriage alliance. She explains:

> In this world, Lizzie, Lucy, Frank, and Lord Fawn no longer signify bad and good feminine and masculine sexuality, but £4000, £80, £2000, and £2500, their yearly incomes. In the older, metaphorical world of heterosexual exchange, Lizzie and Lucy circulate as bad and good objects, dangerous and proper property. In the newer world both Lizzie and Lucy have economic agency, Lizzie as the possessor of property and Lucy as a wage earner. (98)

Psomiades concludes by finding that *The Eustace Diamonds* comes to represent a gender-blind world organized around capital rather than sexual difference and its associated dynamics. Finally, Zubair Amir examines gossip in the novel as a way to "disrupt preexisting class histories, catalyze new alliances, rearrange social relations, and in so doing, open a niche for the parvenu," (188), but finds that "Trollope's assignment of sociocultural agency to such traditionally marginalized, even vilified, forms of discourse ultimately unsettles novelistic form," (188) revealing nineteenth-century realism's inability to fully and accurately represent narratives of social advancement.

My study does not ignore the dominant roles law, property, markets, and class climbing play in the novel nor the body of scholarship surrounding these topics; rather, my work attempts to show how characterization, as it relates to both the protagonist and minor characters, established via performatives and aligned or misaligned intentions, makes possible, and believable, the endless drama these transfers of property create while contributing substantially to the valuation or devaluation of players in the novel's marriage marketplace.

Love Speech: a Theory

In order to understand how love speech functions as a particularly instructive insight into characterization and the creation of ethical or unethical characters, it is imperative to understand how love speech functions generally. Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, and Judith Butler, as well as many other theorists, have written, directly or indirectly, on the complexities of love speech. Owen Ware, marrying and

elaborating on these approaches, argues in his article "Love Speech" that such speech, specifically the phrase "I love you," is a unique utterance that is both constative and performative in nature. Also drawing specifically on Butler's analysis of hate speech in *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*, used extensively in my third chapter, Ware attempts to account for both the similarities and dissimilarities between the two types of speech as well as to offer his own theory of how love speech functions. Ware's analysis opens many avenues for inquiry concerning love speech, its structural components, caveats, and singularities, and serves as a critical lens for this chapter.

According to Ware, love speech is a unique type of performative that performs the speaker's openness to the interlocutor to whom s/he is professing love. Love speech differs from hate speech in that hate speech buttresses the speaker's position of power by inflicting harm on the other, while love speech harms, or potentially harms, the speaker instead. Both love speech and hate speech open an asymmetrical power dynamic, but in an inverse fashion to one another.

Ware claims that no words can stand in for "I love you." It is always, and only, properly expressed as a phrase, responded to by the same phrase, and any deviation from this arrangement undermines its power and potency. Love speech, "I love you," is always uttered in precisely the same format, and though uttered billions of times before, is but a citation that possesses a singular power and expression in language for which there is no stand-in. That this phrase is so rarely uttered precisely in the Victorian novel warrants mentioning. However, love speech, derivative of "I love you" and perhaps weaker in its ability to shatter the speaker, is quite present. Promises, engagements, and

marriages fill the pages. More importantly, expressions of love consistent with the

internal condition of actually being 'in love,' in other words, based on intention, offer as

rich a means for analysis as does the direct phrase "I love you."

　　　　While Ware claims that love speech does not enact or bring love into being in the

moment of its utterance, Jacques Derrida argues that it functions like testimony,

testifying to the fact that the love professed is true. The constative aspect of the

utterance is the bearing witness to the truth of one's love. The testimonial aspect

functions like a promise: I swear this is true. Though the veracity of the claim is never

verifiable, built into the phrase is the implication that it is spoken in truth. This is not to

say that "I love you," cannot be cited and abstracted and used in nonserious ways. This

issue is precisely what this chapter seeks to explore: does love speech used earnestly,

consistent with animating intention and expressed in a locution with the object of the

expressed affection function differently than infelicitous expressions of love arising from

false or even nefarious intentions? Further, how does this manifest in characterization

and in the creation of protagonists and minor characters?

　　　　Whereas hate speech, according to Judith Butler, attempts to subordinate and

exclude the other, love speech wounds and subordinates the speaker of the declaration of

love. Love speech acts as a particular site of asymmetry, as the speaker exposes herself

in the utterance.   Love speech renders the speaker "vulnerable to the other," "shattering"

(Ware 499) her in the utterance. Whether this shattering occurs *because* of the utterance,

or whether the utterance simply reveals our prior dislocation and vulnerability to and in

language, is unclear. That uttering the phrase, at the very least, bears witness to such a vulnerability, is a primary aspect of love speech.

Love speech, like hate speech, can be violent. It may be perceived as shocking and emotionally painful to both interlocutors. According to both Ware and Slavoj Zizek, love speech can never be politically correct. It shatters the speaker in its utterance, but can also shock and violate the other to whom it is directed, particularly if the love is unrequited or undesired. Zizek claims that "finding oneself in the position of the beloved is so violent, traumatic even: being loved makes me feel directly the gap between what I am as a determinate being and the unfathomable X in me which causes love" (64). In the context of a loving relationship, however, insults can be freely exchanged because there is no pure love or hate speech, as "true love" is a "respect for the other's alterity" (Ware 502). For this reason, many comfortable lovers feel free to insult and chastise each other, with no lasting harm done. Both hate speech and love speech open up a space to be heard, and/or act as a plea for the other to listen, even if the plea is tinged with violence.

Further, absolute transparency in love speech is impossible. Even if one lover replies perfectly, sincerely, and in a timely fashion to another's proclamation of love, the return fails because of the asymmetry upon which love speech functions and the "irreducible alterity of the other's ego" (Ware 505). Perfect reciprocity in love speech is an impossibility because the other remains opaque to us, despite even mutual declarations of love. And that's the rub. If, as Ware claims, the locution is never properly executed and absolute transparency is an impossibly, how can the entire

endeavor be built upon a consistent intention? Further, how do authors use love speech

and intention to promote a hierarchy of character-ethicality? *The Eustace Diamonds*

offers some answers later in this chapter.

The banality of love speech, as it occurs or is exchanged in a stable long term

relationship, proves that the context in which love speech takes place can determine its

power. Over time in a relationship, love speech loses its power and is delivered

routinely. If something disrupts the stability of a relationship, then the love speech again

possesses the power it had when first invoked or upon early declarations. But because

love speech has no external referent, it refers only to itself ("I love you"), it exhausts its

meaning in the moment of its utterance. Therefore it must be repeated, repeatedly. This

is the second performative aspect of the phrase: not only does it act as a testimony,

"what I say is true," but presents a secondary promise that "I will continue to love you."

But the phrase is not merely a promise to continue to love the other, it is also a promise

to continue to love and to continue to confess that love. Building on Gilles Deleuze's

claims concerning the affirmation of the affirmation, Roland Bathes expresses the

sentiment thusly:

> what I have affirmed a first time, I can once again affirm, without repeating it,
>
> for then what I affirm is the affirmation, not its contingency: I affirm the first
>
> encounter in its difference, I desire its return, not its repetition. I say to the other
>
> (old or new): Let us begin again. (24)

The phrase exhausts and burns upon delivery, and therefore must continue to be invoked

and reiterated, by both loving interlocutors.

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Love speech acts like the Nietzschean "yes," "the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming," demanding a circuitous return to itself (Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play" 292). Yet love speech is also Hegelian in that what two lovers desire, what they yearn for in their expressions of love is a transcendent harmony and mutual affirmation akin to the Hegelian "Yea" (Ware 503). Yet love speech always falls short of both of these desires, for the very condition of the possibility of love speech is the asymmetry which both gives it its power and denies its satisfaction.

Love speech, and the imperative to discuss love speech, arises out of our desire to talk or write about love on behalf of someone, a lover either real or imagined. As a result, a detached discourse on love is decidedly impossible according to Ware. Love speech then, even when we place it in scare quotes and attempt to detach from all contents and cite and graft it at will, is only enabled by our attaching it to a person or the idea of a person. In this way, any discussion of love or love speech always takes an object; it is never impersonal, no matter how objectively argued. Love escapes all attempts to engage it theoretically in that it "breaks from the very limits of quotation, citation, and nonseriousness that try to bind it as a topic of inquiry" (508). "I love you" then remains uniquely linguistically isolated, unable to be fully anchored by any discussion or narrative.

A significant difference between love speech and hate speech lies in responsibility, or lack thereof. In *Excitable Speech,* Butler addresses the problematic intersection of hate speech and responsibility, proclaiming that the power of injurious speech, because of convention and citationality, exceeds both the speaker in the moment

of utterance, and the interlocutor to whom the injurious speech is addressed. She asks, "[b]ut what is precisely being prosecuted when the injurious word comes to trial and it is finally or fully prosecutable?" (50). She hints that what is really at stake, what is really on trial, is history. In other words, we search "for subjects to prosecute who might be held accountable and, hence, temporarily resolve the problem of a fundamentally unprosecutable history" (50). In this way, she ostensibly relieves the speaker of the responsibility of the words spoken since their power and function exceed the moment of their utterance and the context in which they are uttered. Where Ware focuses on the animating intention of the speaker in his discussion of serious/nonserious love speech, and in his question of whether "I love you" is performative or merely an acknowledgement of certain emotions, for Butler, intention is almost beside the point precisely because the language expressed in hate speech exceeds the moment of utterance; it is a call to history, not to the immediate animating intention of the speaker. Instead, love speech is rooted almost entirely in intention, thus tied to responsibility, though Ware does not explore these lines of reasoning. It is tied to intention in that if love speech is uttered insincerely, it misfires and cannot shatter the self; felicitous love speech is rooted in the vulnerability of the speaker. If it is spoken in earnest, then it functions precisely because it felicitously adheres to lovers' conventions of confessing their love to one another, while simultaneously opening the gap for both shattering and rebuttal. Hate speech invokes certain histories regardless of intention; love speech operates differently depending on animating intention.

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This issue of intention, which drives my analysis, troubles, and is troubled by Ware. He notes that in saying "I love you" as a joke or in poetry, "there is always the risk of such speech becoming serious, the risk of 'I love you' transforming from citation to real affection" (498). In its consistency with testimony, love speech is a constative; it speaks an inner state of affairs. Yet it is performative in that it indirectly expresses a promise: I am speaking the truth. Because it is an implicit promise, does it bear within the utterance a certain responsibility that it be made in sincerity?

Love as an opening, as an exposure of the self to the other that is revealed in the moment of the utterance of love speech makes the enunciation the site of asymmetry. Love as a performative is odd in that "the thing it brings into being (love) is not a positive state of affairs, for to be in love is to be shattered" (Ware 499). This shattering "deconstitutes" the speaker when s/he speaks the words "I love you," rendering the speaker "defenseless" (499). Yet that we, and characters in fiction, are always constituted in and subject to language is hardly specific to love speech. Ware acknowledges this when he notes it may not be love that shatters or breaks the "I," but merely that the admission of love reveals its always-already broken state. But it is an event, according to Ware, precisely because it brings into being an asymmetrical situation in the moment of utterance due the vulnerability enacted upon the speaker. Ware is unable to resolve the inconsistency and cannot say if it is love that breaks the self, or if it merely reveals that the self was already broken. In an overt comparison to hate speech, one could ask: does the naming in hate speech shatter and subjugate the other, or does it merely reveal the other as already shattered and

subjugated (as subject) by the Althusserian hail, like Sissy in *Hard Times* who is interpellated in the hail, but was always-already a subject prior to the hail as well?

The asymmetry revealed in the utterance of love speech does seem to set it apart from other types of utterance, including naming and hate speech. That hate is *constituted* in and of historical or contemporary asymmetries seems at least tangentially relevant to the discussion. Hate speech and naming hails and subjugates the other until s/he is ready to reappropriate the speech in the gap opened by a given locution. Love speech behaves in a similar, though not identical way, as it can render the speaker physically in pain, *and* be intrusive and hurtful to the other. It has the potential to shatter or harm both interlocutors. Ware, though he briefly discusses the potential violence of unwanted love speech, does not make this point. Instead, he explains:

> The love address is typically understood as a claim to knowledge. The *you* that I love is the *real you.* This is why love speech can be so intrusive. I'm asserting my comprehension of you. But if this comprehension has yet to be confirmed by the beloved, the lover's declaration seems to misfire. By saying "you don't even *know* me," Dan is effectively saying, 'your love is without basis.' What this tells us is that love-speech performances can be solipsistic. (501)

This relates to Butler's assertion, explored in chapter three, that one can be interpellated by naming even against one's will, even when one does not relate to the name (or identity) by which s/he is hailed. The hail, per Althusser and Butler's usage of it, and my application of it in chapter two, has seemingly unexplored parallels to this aspect of love speech in that both interpellate the subject, whether or not s/he rejects its

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demand. In this manner, love speech functions *precisely* like naming and hate speech in that by addressing another, interpellating and constituting another with love speech, one simultaneously "runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the" proclamations of love (Butler, *Excitable Speech* 2). Thus, love speech and hate speech, in this instance at least, are structurally identical: both hail another, either with a name (hate speech), or with "I love you" (love speech), bring into being a momentarily asymmetrical dynamic until the addressee can respond, either with "I love you," or a reappropriation of the hate speech. She may be momentarily stunned by the speech in either case, and she has the power to (possibly) wound in her retort. Love speech here may be perceived as violent, as a demand of possession on the other. Ware suggests that "in both instances, the speaker denies the other's

freedom. Possession can be just as violent as exclusion" (502). Thus love speech is structurally similar to hate speech/naming in that it attempts to deny the other's agency and instead constitute and control her by an utterance. Butler utilizes a similar argument:

> The illocutionary speech act performs its deed *at the moment* of the utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment. The "moment" in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance. (Butler, *Excitable Speech* 3)

Butler shows that this is structurally built into the moment of utterance in hate speech. Yet Ware attempts to present love speech as singular for a number of reasons,

including the fact that the utterance exhausts itself immediately upon being spoken. But

it is only in building on the history of "I love you" as *the* lover's speech that I love you

can signify at all. Both hate and love speech exceed the instance of their utterance; love

speech then is not ahistorical after all in that it exists in the ritual, thus convention, of

saying "I love you."

Ware's theory of love speech hinges on the idea that "[l]ove demands asymmetry

as its condition of possibility" (503), yet the manner in which that asymmetry functions,

and who possesses the power, remain fraught. Ware's final point that "[l]ove is without

topos, without ground. And this suggests that 'I love you' is always on some level, *I

love you*, without scare quotes" (508), draws yet a final correlation to naming and hate

speech that I would like to make. We have to say the wounding words in either instance

in order to speak *of* them. There can be no censorship of "I love you." Butler makes the

point that the courts often must use the very speech they are trying to censor in litigating

cases concerning hate speech. Yet even removed from specific contexts, and used in a

neutral space such as the courtroom, does not injurious speech still bear within it the

histories that wound and injure? Most frequently, yes. Ware then is making a similar

argument about "I love you": it is always *I love you* precisely because it always opens

an asymmetrical gap, signifying a specific and powerful intention. Yet he asserts that

"[l]ove escapes all dissertations on love because it breaks from the very limits of

quotation, citation, and nonseriousness that try to bind it as a topic of inquiry"

(508). This gives it precisely the same power as hate speech and naming. Perhaps in

examining how narrative uses love speech, and how love speech conditions and

structures characterization, can we momentarily capture this most elusive of performatives and explicate it beyond its supposed slipperiness.

Intention and Characterization

Great care has been taken in detailing the nature, power, and structure of love speech, and how it performatively functions. What then of specifically infelicitous love speech? When a character expresses love, how does her sincerity, or insincerity, render her sympathetic or unsympathetic to the reader? What are the differences when the insincere character is the protagonist versus when she is a minor character? Let us turn again to the *The Eustace Diamonds.*

The novel, first serialized in 1871 in the *Fortnightly Review,* in its first sentence, presents the reader with Lizzie Greystock in all her glory, as it manages the reader's expectations by slyly conveying that Lizzie is unliked, even though she has found monetary and social success: "It was admitted by all her friends, and also by her enemies,—who were in truth the more numerous and active body of the two,—that Lizzie Greystock had done very well with herself" (Trollope, *TED* 1). She is our singular, central protagonist, yet the minor characters surrounding her, most particularly Lucy Morris, will prove to be far more transparent in their speech and actions. Lizzie's opacity and falsity are precisely what set her apart and dominate her characterization.

Because animating intention in love speech spoken earnestly gives it the power that Ware and Butler ascribe to it, I suggest that love speech not spoken in earnest is meant to suggest unethicality about the speaker. This is witnessed early in the novel when Lizzie becomes engaged to Florian Eustace, a wealthy and handsome, though

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sickly, young man. Beautiful Lizzie is in debt, and does not love Florian. Trollope only occasionally makes the reader privy to Lizzie's inner workings, but clearly articulates Lizzie's inconstancy in the opening pages. Florian loves Lizzie though, and "when he began to talk of love again, she stood with her forehead bowed against his bosom. Of course the engagement was then a thing accomplished" (Trollope. *ED* 9). Love speech leads to engagement, as one performative upon another pushes the plot forward early in the novel.

Florian dies of his illness, giving Lizzie her title, a son, a share in Portray castle, and a diamond necklace to wear on one specific occasion. What he does not give her is endlessly emphatic love speech. He comes to see her for who and what she is, and that is an unloving, mercenary wife. Trollope does not paint her sympathetically: "There must have been qualms as [Lizzie] looked at his dying face, soured with the disappointment she had brought upon him, and listened to the harsh querulous voice that was no longer eager in the expression of love" (11). The "eager" "expression[s] of love" die even before Florian does, as he is already shattered and the reader is coming to understand that unrequited love, even when a commitment and union have been established, has bodily repercussions. Lack of alignment between Lizzie's true feelings and her presumed expressions hastens Florian to his death, revealing that a felicitous union, state-sanctioned and committed, can in fact be infelicitous if internal states do not match external expressions and commitments. She married him, but did not love him. He learns this too late, and it hastens him to this death. Performatives of love, including not only "I love you" but also commitments, even when felicitously sanctioned and

made official, require constant, sincere upkeep. Recommitment is the very condition of the possibility of commitment, as Butler shows:

> Commitment would be the agreement to commit oneself anew, time and again, precisely when circumstances change. And this would mean changing the concrete meaning of commitment as circumstances change. In other words, commitment would rely on the renewability of the vow, if commitment requires a vow. But it would also require an openness to changing oneself and one's comportment depending on what new circumstances demand. Thus, commitment would not involve inflexibility, but would entail an agreement to make oneself anew in light of the unexpected demands that challenge one's commitment. If one is committing one's love, one is not making the commitment once, as one sometimes does in a ceremony of public proclamation. If one only commits once, then the rest of life is dedicated to honoring the commitment that one has made. But the commitment then belongs to the past, and whatever desire and love and choice were bound up with that commitment of love are also understood as historic monuments to be safeguarded at any cost. But if commitment is to be alive, that is, if it is to belong to the present, then the only commitment one can make is to commit oneself again and again. "I love you and I choose you again and again." (Butler, "Response" 238).

Lizzie commits to Florian first with the engagement and then with the marriage, but because her love is never true constant recommitment under such infelicitous circumstances seems even more necessary: "I am not in love with you, but I continue to

commit myself to you nonetheless." One could imagine commitment alone being represented as felicitous enough for some writers writing certain characters; however, Florian's sad and lonely death indicates that intention matters more than the mere taking of the vows and the enduring of a union in the Trollopean universe.

Just after the marriage, fresh in love, Sir Florian creates his generous will. A contract can be love speech expressed lawfully, materially, and enforceably. The will serves as the most visible love speech of this union in that the novel does not give the reader actual locutions of love after the engagement. The reader is not privy to their love speech, but notices the absence of it in the matter-of-fact descriptions Trollope offers of the couple's honeymoon. That the false love is not revealed and celebrated via emphatic love speech serves to structurally mirror the emptiness of the union. Later, the novel does give the reader detailed false speech, but only when both parties in the locution are neither shattered nor true, and the reader knows that both characters know the words to be utterly fictitious. Florian's animating intentions very much mirror the power and efficacy of the words "I love you," but Trollope shields the reader from this speech, thus from his shattering in the face of his other, Lizzie, and ours, the reader. This gentleness in treatment through the showing or hiding of direct dialogic love speech serves not only the characterization of Florian, but allows the negative characterization of Lizzie to build. Engaging her in enunciated, clear yet false love speech too early in the novel would not let the animus properly build.

For sincerity in love speech, Trollope instead gives us Lucy Morris, who in all her goodness and modesty, is set up as Lizzie's foil. She "certainly was a treasure,—a

treasure though no heroine. She was a sweetly social, genial little human being whose presence in the house was ever felt to be like sunshine" (28). This non-heroine treasure is actually an orphan, with no countess aunt to take her in; thus, she is excluded from the access to society granted to Lizzie and others in the novel. Yet her nobility and superiority is revealed not only through the flowery, romantic diction Trollope employs in her descriptions, but by having her intentions match her outward expressions:

> She was quite resolved to be somebody among her fellow-creatures,—not
> somebody in the way of marrying a lord or a rich man, or somebody in the way
> of being a beauty, or somebody as a wit; but somebody as having a purpose and a
> use in life. She was the humblest little thing in the world in regard to any possible
> putting of herself forward or needful putting of herself back; and yet, to herself,
> nobody was her superior. (31).

Lucy tends to exemplify the type of character, and by extension individual in the real world, eulogized in the closing lines of George Eliot's *Middlemarch:*

> But the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably diffusive: for the
> growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things
> are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the
> number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs. (Chapter
> LXXXVI.)

Lucy does not need to be rich, beautiful, or conspicuous; instead, she strives for a quiet, hidden life of significance. Lizzie, on the other hand, attempts to be witty or at least thought to be intellectual by being seen reading the right books; she is beautiful by all

accounts and longs for money, property, and title. In earnestness and sincerity, the minor character is set up as the morally superior agent. She is virtuous, possessing transparent, knowable intentions in all matters, while it is the protagonist who is unscrupulous, conniving, vindictive, and obfuscated.

Yet for all Lucy's goodness and uprightness, she does not immediately earn the affection of her love object in the novel. For minor male characters, the narrator attributes the incitement to love speech primarily to proximity:

The reader, who has read so far, will perhaps think that Frank Greystock was in love with Lucy as Lucy was in love with him. But such was not exactly the case. To be in love, as an absolute, well-marked, acknowledged fact, is the condition of a woman more frequently and more readily than of a man. Such is not the common theory on the matter, as it is the man's business to speak, and the woman's business to be reticent. And the woman is presumed to have kept her heart free from any load of love, till she may accept the burthen with an assurance that it shall become a joy and a comfort to her. But such presumptions, though they may be very useful for the regulation of conduct, may not be always true. It comes more within the scope of a woman's mind, than that of a man's, to think closely and decide sharply on such a matter. With a man it is often chance that settles the question for him. He resolves to propose to a woman, or proposes without resolving, because she is close to him. Frank Greystock ridiculed the idea of Lady Fawn's interference in so high a matter as his love,—or abstinence from love. Nevertheless, had he been made a welcome guest at Fawn Court, he

would undoubtedly have told his love to Lucy Morris. He was not a welcome

guest, but had been banished; and, as a consequence of that banishment, he had

formed no resolution in regard to Lucy, and did not absolutely know whether she

was necessary to him or not. But Lucy Morris knew all about it. (38)

Lucy knows and the reader knows. The knowledge is transparent to all but

Frank. However, with Lizzie, "she desired to be so in love that she could surrender

everything to her love. There was as yet nothing of such love in her bosom. She had seen

no one who had so touched her. But she was alive to the romance of the thing, and was

in love with the idea of being in love" (54). While Lucy knows, shows consistency and

steadfastness, and Frank loves but in a controlled, logical fashion, Trollope has more fun

with Lizzie's romanticizing of romance. After Lizzie's had the adoring, true love of Sir

Florian early in the novel, Trollope gives us the dry, quotidian "love" of Lord Fawn:

> Then Lord Fawn, at considerable length, explained to the two ladies the nature
>
> and condition of the British Parliament. Miss Macnulty experienced an innocent
>
> pleasure in having such things told to her by a lord. Lady Eustace knew that this
>
> was the way in which Lord Fawn made love, and thought that from him it was as
>
> good as any other way. If she were to marry a second time simply with the view
>
> of being a peeress, of having a respected husband, and making good her footing
>
> in the world, she would as lief listen to parliamentary details and the prospects of
>
> the Sawab as to any other matters. She knew very well that no Corsair
>
> propensities would be forthcoming from Lord Fawn. (58).

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A poor aristocrat courting a wealthy though ill-respected woman who does not love him by talking of parliamentary functions is as amusing as it is pointed. Lord Fawn does not love Lizzie and he does not overly pretend to either. These two, though they do not end up together, are well matched in their vacuousness: Lizzie in her outright falsity and Lord Fawn in his dry, pragmatic courtship.

Lucy, though exemplifying "true love" in the novel, must also exemplify patience by waiting for the returned affection of her love object. Trollope increases the tension by having Frank Greystock briefly consider a courtship of Lizzie with all her beauty and wealth. Like Lord Fawn, it is in his interest to marry well. But

> [i]f he talked to himself of love, if he were ever to acknowledge to himself that love was to have sway over him, then must Lucy Morris be the mistress of his heart. He had come to know enough about himself to be aware of that;—but he knew also that he had said nothing binding him to walk in that path (59).

A commitment is not clearly articulated for a good portion of the novel; therefore, Frank is not bound by such speech. An engagement is an overt performative; once an engagement is settled, a commitment to commit ensues. Yet a commitment made where no true love exists cannot shatter the individual the way that love speech aligned with intention does or can and therefore, when Frank Greystock is briefly considering courting Lizzie, he knows that there will be no real consequences to his being or sense of self no matter the outcome. He knows the courtship does not have to be overly formal, nor "long. He could ask her to marry him to-morrow,—as for that matter to-day,— without a feeling of hesitation. She might accept him or might reject him; but, as he said

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to himself, in neither case would any harm be done" (60). This is because Frank does

not love Lizzie and any desire to court her and/or marry her is purely acquisitive.

Because he has not spoken of his love to Lucy, it too is of no consequence. Once words

are spoken and an engagement is in place, the matter becomes much more serious. J.

Hillis Miller explores the treatment of engagement in the Victorian novel, arguing that

> [t]he right to say no is the privilege to utter a "felicitous" performative in
>
> response to the performative invitation of the proposal. It is felicitous in the
>
> sense that it works. It makes something happen. It is a way of doing things with
>
> words. The proposal is a bona fide speech act because it puts the woman in the
>
> position of having to answer either yes or no, or perhaps a temporizing "maybe."
>
> The proposal cannot lead to publicly acknowledged engagement and then to
>
> marriage, procreation, and the redistribution of property, or perhaps rank unless
>
> the woman says yes. ("Woman's Right to Choose" 43)

Hillis, in paraphrasing Derrida, explains that "you do not fall in love until you say '*Je*

t'aime'" (*Speech Acts in Literature* 137). The enunciation creates that which it

names. Until Frank speaks the magic words or makes a similar shattering confession, he

is free.

Unlike the seriousness with which Trollope approaches Lucy and her affections,

he is much more playful with protagonist Lizzie, not only through the debacle with

jewels, but through her various courtships, each one uniquely iterated but consistent in

its falsity. She married Florian Eustace to settle debts and become wealthy. She

entertains the cold courtship of Lord Fawn for potential power and title and when she

thinks he will help her keep the jewels, "her heart softened towards her betrothed" (Trollope, *ED* 110). But "it was not love that had brought Lord Fawn to Mount Street." He is marrying Lizzie for her money, and this is an all but a stated fact between them. Yet when he begins to learn of her character, as indicated by her refusal to surrender the diamonds, he reconsiders their betrothal. Lizzie, again, not out of love but out of a need to win, does not let him slip from her grasp quite so easily. First, she determines to continue with the engagement out of spite toward Lord Fawn's family:

> Lady Eustace, as soon as she was alone in the room, stood in the middle of it, scowling,—for she could scowl. "I'll not go near them," she said to herself,— "nasty, stupid, dull, puritanical drones. If he don't like it, he may lump it. After all it's no such great catch." Then she sat down to reflect whether it was or was not a catch. As soon as ever Lord Fawn had left her after the engagement was made, she had begun to tell herself that he was a poor creature, and that she had done wrong. "Only five thousand a year!" she said to herself;—for she had not perfectly understood that little explanation which he had given respecting his income. "It's nothing for a lord." And now again she murmured to herself, "It's my money he's after. He'll find out that I know how to keep what I've got in my own hands." Now that Lady Fawn had been cold to her, she thought still less of the proposed marriage. But there was this inducement for her to go on with it. If they, the Fawn women, thought that they could break it off, she would let them know that they had no such power. (106)

When Lord Fawn is sufficiently horrified by her behavior with respect to the diamonds, she locks him into the engagement by announcing it in writing to her friends and family:

> The door was hardly closed behind him before Lizzie began to declare to herself that he shouldn't escape her. It was not yet twenty-four hours since she had been telling herself that she did not like the engagement and would break it off; and now she was stamping her little feet, and clenching her little hands, and swearing to herself by all her gods, that this wretched, timid lordling should not get out of her net. She did, in truth, despise him because he would not clutch the jewels. She looked upon him as mean and paltry because he was willing to submit to Mr. Camperdown. But still she was prompted to demand all that could be demanded from her engagement,—because she thought that she perceived a something in him which might produce in him a desire to be relieved from it. No! he should not be relieved. He should marry her…[She] wrote letters to her various friends, making known to them her engagement. Hitherto she had told no one but Miss Macnulty,—and, in her doubts, had gone so far as to desire Miss Macnulty not to mention it. Now she was resolved to blazon forth her engagement before all the world. (118)

This act of defiance on Lizzie's part reveals that her actions do not animate from love, but out of need to control and win. She is intensely competitive, as witnessed in the riding and hunting scenes in the novel, and this character trait extends into her courtships. She also knows the value of bringing the community into her affairs; a thing announced is a thing set in motion. The community's knowledge of a courtship or

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engagement represents the complex perlocutionary effects of the performative. Performatives can bind. Community knowledge acts as an adhesive on a union in that breaking off an engagement after an announcement can lead to public scrutiny, gossip, and condemnation. Lucy, who uses neither gossip nor community manipulation to achieve her ends, also exhibits no particular competitive urges. She keeps things mostly to herself, loves quietly and earnestly, and patiently awaits the returned affections of her love object. She is the quintessential embodiment of what J. Hillis Miller's characterizes as Trollope's "English girls":

> the tenderness, modesty, and freshness of Trollope's English girls, their gift for playing their parts most properly, is especially displayed in their charmingly correct behavior during courtship, and in their acceptance, with "gratitude," of their subordinate role. Most of Trollope's novels center on the question of what man the delightful English girl will marry. Once she is married, she is comparatively uninteresting...When a British maiden has reached marriageable age, she is the focus of anxious and absorbed attention by her parents and siblings, her friends, the whole circle of her "community." Whom will she marry? Until she marries, her selfhood, insofar as it depends on her subject position as the wife of so-and-so, has not yet been settled. She is a wild card, without a fixed value, unpredictable. She is even dangerous to the status quo, since it is impossible to predict with certainty to whom she will say yes or no, how she will employ her right to "marry when she wants." ("A Woman's Right to Choose" 45)

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Lucy accepts this role in the novel whereas Lizzie does not. Lizzie is determined to decide who will ask her and make it a thing accomplished. Lizzie is not Trollope's typical "good girl":

> In any case, it is clear that, for Trollope, in order for [a female character] to be a proper, modest, and frank young woman, she must say no to [a man's] proposals as long as she is not aware of being in love with him. She must also accept him, when he asks for her hand, once she is aware that she does love him...Good girls, in Trollope's world, don't tell lies. (Miller, "A Woman's Right to Choose" 48-49)

Lucy is a good girl, and Lizzie is not, but it is minor character Lucinda Roanoke who is perhaps the most interesting case study for intention and love in the novel.

The Good, the Bad, and the Heroine

Lucinda is not one of Trollope's "good girls," nor his iconoclastic "bad girl" (Lizzie); she is the novel's "heroine":

> Of her own education and antecedents, Lucinda never spoke at all. "I'll tell you what it is," said a young scamp from Eton to his elder sister, when her character and position were once being discussed. "She's a heroine, and would shoot a fellow as soon as look at him." In that scamp's family, Lucinda was ever afterwards called the heroine. (409)

Lucinda's frankness of feeling and bluntness of tongue force the respect of the other characters. She is pressured by her aunt to be engaged to the wealthy and older Sir Griffin Tewett and though she knows it is a necessity, and a marriage of convenience, she is remarkably transparent in her feelings on the matter. An alignment between truth

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of feeling and outward expressions afford this minor character the tongue-in-cheek title of "heroine." But for a while she is forced to keep her engagement:

> when Christmas came the engagement was still an engagement. The absolute
> suggestion that it should be broken, and abandoned, and thrown to the winds,
> always came from Lucinda; and Sir Griffin, when he found that Lucinda was in
> earnest, would again be moved by his old desires, and would determine that he
> would have the thing he wanted. (482)

For a woman in the nineteenth century, to commit to an engagement was a matter of no small consequence. Overwhelmingly, she would have to metaphorically and literally grin and bear it and follow through with the thing, lest it become a public scandal. Lucinda does not quite manage to grin, but she does bear it temporarily:

> In the midst of all this Lucinda was passive as regarded the making of the
> arrangements, but very troublesome to those around her as to her immediate
> mode of life. Even to Lady Eustace she was curt and uncivil. To her aunt she
> was at times ferocious. She told Lord George more than once to his face that he
> was hurrying her to perdition. "What the d—— is it you want?" Lord George
> said to her. "Not to be married to this man." "But you have accepted him. I
> didn't ask you to take him. You don't want to go into a workhouse, I
> suppose?" Then she rode so hard that all the Ayrshire lairds were startled out of
> their propriety, and there was a general fear that she would meet some terrible
> accident. (483)

Her spunk and vitality are fodder for much gossip, particularly between Mrs. Carbuncle and Lizzie:

> "She would be just like that whoever the man was," said Mrs. Carbuncle.
>
> "I suppose so," said Lizzie, wondering at such a phenomenon in female nature. But, with this fact understood between them to be a fact,—namely, that Lucinda would be sure to hate any man whom she might accept,—they both agreed that the marriage had better go on.
>
> "She must take a husband, some day, you know," said Mrs. Carbuncle.
>
> "Of course," said Lizzie.
>
> "With her good looks, it would be out of the question that she shouldn't be married."
>
> "Quite out of the question," repeated Lizzie.
>
> "And I really don't see how she's to do better. It's her nature, you know. I have had enough of it, I can tell you. And at the pension, near Paris, they couldn't break her in at all. Nobody ever could break her in. You see it in the way she rides."
>
> "I suppose Sir Griffin must do it," said Lizzie laughing. (484)

That is it a laughing matter in the novel for an abusive man to "break" his bride-to-be, or that it is between these two particular characters at the very least, suggests a certain Victorian unpleasantness toward troublesome, honest women. Lizzie, a hopeless romantic but terribly mercenary pragmatist, ignores the darker implications of such a realization, and sees Lucinda's impending wedding as a time to cash in, as she also

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demands gifts and money on Lucinda's behalf in a chapter aptly titled "Tribute." Lucinda, like Lucy, in her authenticity and uprightness does not attempt to monetize her position as a marriageable young woman, even if the rules of the marriage marketplace bear on her as they do the other characters in the novel. She, like Lizzie, feels incapable of true romantic love. Unlike Lizzie, however, she will not fake love for mercenary reasons. This juxtaposition further sets Lizzie apart as the wicked protagonist; the other young women in the novel's marriage market are conducting themselves with an alignment between intention, speech, and action, even when it disempowers and harms them in that marketplace. Lucinda would rather go mad than marry a man she does not love; Lucy would rather be alone. It is only Lizzie that displays an patent, even malicious willingness to play the market to her advantage when love is absent.

More pointedly, Lizzie remains false throughout the novel, routinely and as a matter of course. She ultimately marries a sleazy bigamist, who John Eustace, her late husband's brother, thinks might "be an impostor, who might, for aught he knew, pick his pocket" (412). The other characters openly discuss how he is conning Lizzie and intends to marry her only for her money. Trollop further signals Lizzie's moral decay to the contemporary Victorian by making this character Jewish, for "an obnoxious anti-Semitism runs all through Trollope's work. Being married to a foreigner, let alone being Jewish, is usually enough to make someone suspect in Trollope's novels" (Miller, "A Woman's Right to Choose" 54). In the end, Lizzie's disingenuousness in love results in her alignment with someone as equally as despicable as herself.

Contrary to what some scholars argue, Lizzie does not "get away" with her vile

behavior. Trollope, in having Lizzie's diamonds stolen from her, in having her finally

confess her lies, and in marrying her off at novel's end to a man of ill repute, gives

Lizzie her comeuppance.   As Woloch describes:

> The dismissal of each individual character (along with the characteristics into
>
> which they are subsumed) points to a larger process—the dismissal of an entire
>
> mode of character for another, what we could see as the persistent transformation
>
> of characters as social beings into character as the reflection of internal, abstract
>
> qualities. This transformation... is also enacted in the narrative as a whole;
>
> through the derealization of minor characters. (56)

In the end, it is Lizzie who is derealized. Her "abstract qualit[y]" of being a romantic

utterly devoid of actual romance is revealed by the means of Mr. Emilius's successful

wooing. His love speech to her is as disingenuous as her affections have been

throughout the novel. He tells her:

> God forbid that you should be hurt. Heaven forbid that even the winds of heaven
>
> should blow too harshly on my beloved. But my beloved is subject to the malice
>
> of the world. My beloved is a flower all beautiful within and without, but one
>
> whose stalk is weak, whose petals are too delicate, whose soft bloom is
>
> evanescent. Let me be the strong staff against which my beloved may blow in
>
> safety. (909)

Lizzie, though she knows the speech to be rote and likely plagiarized, "liked being called

a flower" and thus opens herself to the flattery of it:

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> She had never been made love to after this fashion before. She knew, or half
>
> knew, that the man was a scheming hypocrite, craving her money, and following
>
> her in the hour of her troubles, because he might then have the best chance of
>
> success. She had no belief whatever in his love; and yet she liked it, and
>
> approved his proceedings. She liked lies, thinking them to be more beautiful
>
> than truth. To lie readily and cleverly, recklessly and yet successfully, was,
>
> according to the lessons which she had learned, a necessity in woman and an
>
> added grace in man. (908)

She knows that his intentions do not match his speech, yet the speech is lovely enough in

and of itself to win her unloving commitment. No one is shattered and no one hurts.

Trollope, in this scene, leaves no question in the reader's mind: these are intensely

distasteful characters, of the same ilk, and they deserve each other. And it is no

coincidence that it is well spoken, flowery, over-the-top, absolutely false love speech

that wins Lizzie's hand, though of course not her heart. His speech is as empty as her

heart, and it is her empty heart and not her thievery which paints her as a truly unethical,

villainous protagonist.

CHAPTER VI

UNINVITED: ENTRIES, GAPS, AND OMISSIONS IN *DRACULA*

"Apart from excising minor details which I considered unnecessary, I have let the people involved relate their experiences in their own way." "Author's Preface," 1901 Icelandic edition of *Dracula*[8]

Dracula, Bram Stoker's 1897 Gothic novel of enduring fame, addresses a host of *fin-de-siècle* issues including the rapid progression of technological advance (Wicke), anxieties about the New Woman (Showalter), and more broadly, "the social, psychological, and sexual traumas of the late-nineteenth century" (Koc and Demir). The title character and antagonist of the novel, Dracula, is a critical darling, variously recognized as reverse colonizer (Arata), homosexual threat (Craft), unmarked Jew (Zanger), and disease carrier (Twitchell). *Dracula* thematically grapples with issues of good versus evil, the ancient versus the modern, the East versus the West; it is simultaneously sensual and pedantic. Sensational, epistolary, and invader fiction alike, *Dracula* transgresses as many boundaries as do the characters within its pages.

The multifarious makeup of the text, composed of journals, letters, memoranda, newspaper clippings, and schedules, continuously shifts the narrative voice. Harriet Hustis claims that the "diverse amalgamation of texts suggests that *Dracula* is perhaps less concerned with product (a linear, unified novel) than with process, namely, the very production of textuality in all its potential manifestations" (19). The text is self-referential and continuously attends to, and reminds its reader of, its status as a literary object. This is apparent from the brief paragraph that begins the novel, where the typical

Gothic device of the "found manuscript" is manipulated into a heterogeneous, assembled "history":

> How these papers have been placed in sequence will be made manifest in the reading of them. All needless matters have been eliminated, so that a history almost at variance with the possibilities of later-day belief may stand forth as simple fact. There is throughout no statement of past things wherein memory may err, for all the records chosen are exactly contemporary, given from the standpoints and within the range of knowledge of those who made them. (Stoker 4)

That last phrase, "within the range of knowledge of those who made them," combined with the assertion that "[a]ll needless matters have been eliminated" reveals the opening of an epistemological gap that will permeate the novel: what a character does or does not know is compounded by the possibility of intentional omissions by the fictional "collector" or "editor" of the text. How the character Lucy slips into this textual gap and how the present-absence, or absent-presence, of her memory, writings, and speech acts uniquely affect and efface her character both within the structure and storyworld of *Dracula* will be the focus of this chapter.

Character breakdowns and labels in *Dracula* are complicated for several reasons. Dracula himself has so little character space that it causes Neil Gaiman to remark: "we see so little of him, less than we would like. He does not wear out his welcome" (Klinger xviii). This is a common sentiment, with scholars tending to focus on the fact that Dracula gets no first person narrative, with for example, Jamil Khader arguing that

this choice ensures "the disavowal of the Other as incomprehensible" (75). While the storyworld certainly treats Dracula as the radical other, the textual exclusion of his voice cements such a characterization. As main character and antagonist, he is joined by a group of characters who share the role of protagonist, including Abraham Van Helsing, who Gaiman claims the novel "is not about," but "we would happily see so much less of him" (xviii). Character-space is oddly and unevenly distributed amongst the other protagonists with Mina Murray, Jonathan Harker, and Jack Seward dominating the narration via their respective letters, journals, and recordings. The shifting narrative gaze and the resultant textual structure offer opportunities for exploring how characterization is made by and through authorial choices; absences and exclusions craft characterization equally as much as voiced presence and inclusion.

As radical other, the profoundly "incomprehensible" Dracula is most disturbing in that he infects others with his otherness, specifically the minor characters Lucy and Renfield, who invite the vampire in. The performative of allowance, permission, or invitation, literally allows him into their personal spaces in the novel, but metaphorically speaks to the Victorian England's fear of being penetrated by foreigners, outsiders, and the infected, through the complicity of its own people. In rendering the vampire as more than a mere blood-sucker, but as a being that inhabits a supernatural space, Stoker codifies certain vampire traits. He introduces the 'rules' that a vampire must be asked to enter a home, that it cannot see its reflection in a mirror, and that it must sleep in the dirt of its homeland.

The requirement that a vampire receive an invitation or permission to enter a home is a particularly salient addition to vampire lore. Within the text, Van Helsing sums the rule up thusly: "He may not enter anywhere at the first, unless there be some one of the household who bid him to come; though afterwards he can come as he please" (Stoker 339). According to a footnote by Leslie Klinger in *The New Annotated Dracula*, "this sentence is added to the Manuscript in Stoker's hand. There is no folkloric support for Van Helsing's assertion" (339). He also notes that this requirement could reflect "the tradition that the Devil can transact only with willing 'customers'" (43). In earlier vampire fiction of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which includes poems, short stories, serials, and plays, no such convention exists. That Dracula cannot enter a home without the proper performative speech first being spoken suggests that a supernatural boundary of sorts exists for the vampire, and this issue of boundary crossing more generally has been a particularly fruitful avenue of scholarship regarding the novel. Laura Croley argues that "transgressing spatial boundaries could be identified as the controlling metaphor of *Dracula*" (98). She writes:

> When the Count comes around, virtuous English citizens discover strange red marks on their necks, but, more striking, they experience a whole host of spatial transgressions, including invasions, escapes, and re-openings. The Count slips through windows and cracks of doors...The zoo animals, Lucy, and the children who follow her as the "Bloofer Lady" all escape the enclosed space they previously inhabited. Both Seward and Mina must re-open diaries they have definitively closed, the former stating explicitly, "every thing is . . . now

reopened" (190); even Jonathan's mind becomes "unhinged" (36) after his

encounter with the vamps at Castle Dracula. And of course Stoker's choice of

homeland for the Count— Transylvania, across or beyond the forest—signals his

interest in the crossing of boundaries. (Croley 98)

Michael Kane continues this argument when he notes that "it is this boundary-drawing

and boundary-defining drive to separate the 'inside' from the 'outside', 'us' from

'them'...that we find in *Dracula*, and, as is usual with such exercises, the 'outside'

becomes the imagined repository of anything deemed undesirable which exists 'inside'"

(10). This attention to boundaries, borders, and barriers and how it plays out in regards

to nations, cultures, genders, bodies, and species in *Dracula* has received far more

scholarly attention than the boundaries and barriers breached around individual homes

and buildings. In the text, the conditions under which the vampire enters these

individual spaces must be recounted by his interlocutors because as noted the novel

provides him no first person narrative. As such, these locutions either reveal the

performative speech or textual silencing of minor characters.

In their attendant rules and restrictions for entering private homes, Stoker's

vampires bear much in common with Victorian bailiffs, known today as enforcement

officers. According to the 1911 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, bailiff comes from the Late

Latin *bajulivus*, adjectival form of *bajulus*, meaning "a governor or custodian," but in

practice, these debt collectors exercised court orders by entering the homes of debtors

and seizing qualified property. Strict rules bind the conditions by which bailiffs may

gain entry, and these rules were tested continuously in nineteenth century case law. As

with Dracula, a bailiff must receive permission to enter a domicile for the first time and may not break a window or door to enter. Once he has gained entry, he "has a legal right to re-enter the property" (*House of Commons Library)* without additional permissions, though R vs. Lockwood in 1856 held that "Re-entry may be forced but with the minimum of force" ("Case Law"). In another case, Long vs.Clarke in 1894, the court held that climbing over a wall to access a home did not constitute trespassing, so long as no damage occurred. Interestingly though, in all cases, a closed window could not be used to enter a home. In deciding the case Nash vs. Lucas (1867) where a landlord entered a home through a window at the suggestion of a worker inside, the judges in the case argued that "Without going against any of the cases we may say that a land lord is not entitled, for the purpose of distraining, to enter through a window which is shut but not fastened" (Best and Smith 535); in other words, neither the bailiff nor the landlord may enter a home through the window in order to seize property. However, in *Dracula*, windows are the only means by which the vampire enters the rooms of his victims. Thus, Dracula's penetration of the home through unlawful and explicitly forbidden means presents him as an even more problematic blood-sucker than the reviled debt-collector "bums"[9] of Victorian Britain.

Additional Victorian connotations draw disfavor to Dracula's choice of entry. Laura Croley notes, for example, the window's correlation with the lumpenproletariat, a term she uses to refer to the poorest of the poor (vagrants, gypsies, petty thieves, beggars, and the like). She writes:

Vampiric and lumpenproletariat invasion share a spatial parallel...windows and

doors act as the locus of entry for both. The Count's reliance on the open window

to access his victims may seem rather banal for a monster of his supernatural

caliber; he can change shape, command animals, and summon the "strength of

twenty men" and the "aids of necromancy" (237), but has trouble with closed

windows. Stoker's focus on windows and doors makes more sense, however, in

light of contemporary representations of the lumpenproletariat. An 1850 *Punch*

cartoon entitled "A Retired Neighborhood" provides a fairly early depiction of a

vagrant kept from the drawing room (and the female observer) by one thin pane

of glass. Like Dracula, this vagrant seems to be warded off more by a young

woman's attitude than any physical barrier—she looks more disdainful than

frightened. Doors and windows were associated with the lumpenproletariat in the

nineties as well: Booth notes that "it is customary in the slums to leave the house

door open perpetually, which is convenient for tramps, who creep into the hall

ways to sleep at night" (162); slum neighborhoods were distinguished from

respectable working-class neighborhoods by, among other things, their open

doors and broken windows (Walkowitz, 35); and the demonstrations of 1887

included, significantly, the breaking of windows in the fashionable Pall Mall

district. (99)

Given this vast array of historical connotations, whether he is read as an invader, a

pestilence, or a social parasite, Dracula's repeated entries through windows heightens the

reader's awareness that destruction of polite norms is at play. The impropriety is

immediately obvious, as no rightful and welcome guest chooses to enter through a window. These entries connote violation and wrongful entry; they serve to strike fear. Allan Johnson notes that Stoker's use of "architectural space as both metaphor and symbol" foreshadows "a key literary technique for later British modernists such as E. M. Forster, George Bernard Shaw, and Virginia Woolf" (80), and that "the vampires in the novel seek to invade and dominate architectural spaces just as they invade and dominate their victims" (80). He notes that Harker receives an explicit invitation to enter Dracula's castle, though, as a human and mortal, he does not require one. Dracula says to Harker: "Come freely. Go safely; and leave something of the happiness you bring!" (Stoker 42). The irony is of course that Jonathan is kept captive in the castle until his escape, introducing into the novel "the motif of the permeability of thresholds and passages" (Johnson 80).

Stoker, however, was hardly the first writer to foreground architecture, thresholds, and windows in a Gothic tale, and though vampires appear regularly in fiction beginning in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century brought them squarely into the public's imagination. Three prominent novels precede *Dracula:* John William Polidori's 1816 *The Vampyre*, James Malcolm Rymer and Thomas Preskett (or Peckett) Prest's 1847 meandering *Varney the Vampire,* and Sheridan Le Fanu's 1872 *Carmilla.* Whereas Dracula cannot enter a home without explicit consent, Sir Francis Varney, the gentleman vampire at the center of a popular penny dreadful later turned novel, is able to freely enter the window of unsuspecting prey without a formal invitation from a member of the household. Note the similarities of the scenes in *Varney the Vampire* and *Dracula*

where a frightful creature lurks menacingly outside the window of a lovely young woman:

> A tall figure is standing on the ledge immediately outside the long window. It is its finger-nails upon the glass that produces the sound so like the hail, now that the hail has ceased. Intense fear paralysed the limbs of that beautiful girl. That one shriek is all she can utter—with hands clasped, a face of marble, a heart beating so wildly in her bosom, that each moment it seems as if it would break its confines, eyes distended and fixed upon the window, she waits, froze with horror... No word is spoken, and now she fancies she can trace the darker form of that figure against the window, and she can see the long arms moving to and fro, feeling for some mode of entrance... She tries to scream again but a choking sensation comes over her, and she cannot. It is too dreadful—she tries to move— each limb seems weighed down by tons of lead—she can but in a hoarse faint whisper cry,—... A small pane of glass is broken, and the form from without introduces a long gaunt hand...The fastening is removed, and one-half of the window, which opens like folding doors, is swung wide open upon its hinges...It approaches the bed with a strange, gliding movement…She has drawn up all her limbs; she cannot even now say help. The power of articulation is gone.
>
> (Chapter 1)

Despite the tension and melodrama, of note here is the entry through a window and the speechlessness and immobility of the victim. Not only has Flora not given the creature permission to enter, she cannot articulate her objections to his intrusion. The

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"speechlessness" and paralysis of the victim reflect earlier nineteenth century writer John William Polidori's noted interest in somnambulism. Anne Stiles, who writes extensively on neurological influences found in vampire fiction of the nineteenth century, notes that Polidori wrote his medical thesis on somnambulism, responding to "the influences of mesmerism and phrenology" of the Romantic era "while anticipating mid-Victorian theories" that later influence penny dreadful writers and Bram Stoker ("Somnambulism" 790). Throughout the remainder of the century, like window intrusions, instances of mesmerism, trance, and sleep-walking come to permeate vampire literature.

In Sheridan Le Fanu's 1872 *Carmilla,* the vampire's entry into the homes of her victims is far more complex, as it begins to anticipate the demand of an invitation. In this novella, the invite hinges on a carefully orchestrated ruse. With an accomplice, the youthful appearing Carmilla pretends she is injured in a carriage accident in order to stay with a host family:

> If Madame will entrust her child to the care of my daughter, and of her good
> gouvernante, Madame Perrodon, and permit her to remain as our guest, under my
> charge, until her return, it will confer a distinction and an obligation upon us, and
> we shall treat her with all the care and devotion which so sacred a trust deserves.
> (Le Fanu "A Guest")

Later in the story, it is revealed that the vampire, also known at various times as Mircalla and Millarca, has conned her way into another home in a similar fashion:

> She went on to make her petition, and it was in the tone of a person

from whom such a request amounted to conferring, rather than seeking a favor.

This was only in manner, and, as it seemed, quite unconsciously. Than the terms

in which it was expressed, nothing could be more deprecatory. It was simply that

I would consent to take charge of her daughter during her absence...This was, all

things considered, a strange, not to say, an audacious request. She in some sort

disarmed me, by stating and admitting everything that could be urged against it,

and throwing herself entirely upon my chivalry. At the same moment, by a

fatality that seems to have predetermined all that happened, my poor child came

to my side, and, in an undertone, besought me to invite her new friend, Millarca,

to pay us a visit. (Le Fanu "A Petition").

In both instances, the owner of the home invites the vampire in, even though the reader

is not overtly told that this is a necessary condition of the vampire's ability to enter.

However, it must be noted that this is not Carmilla's first entry into Laura's home; as a

child, Laura "dreamed" she saw a beautiful woman in her room who she later realizes is

Carmilla. Therefore, though the reader is privy to two individual sites of a formal

invitation in the text, it is not presented as a prerequisite for entry. There are no broken

or breached windows, but an intrusion occurs nonetheless.

Stoker, for his part, brings together dream-states, window breaches, and formal

invitations in his ambitious work. With Dracula's victim Lucy, whose attacks bear

similarity to the scene with Flora in *Varney the Vampire*, the reader does not witness the

invitation. Leonard Wolf claims in *The Essential Dracula* that "A member of the

household must bid [the vampire] to enter. We have seen that Lucy, after becoming his

victim on the 'suicide seat' on the cliffs of Whitby, invited him in in the form of what appeared to be a 'good-sized bird'" (290). I argue, however, that this is not the case. As Mina is returning from a stroll, she glances up at their window,

> and saw Lucy's head leaning out. I thought that perhaps she was looking out for me, so I opened my handkerchief and waved it. She did not notice or make any movement whatever. Just then, the moonlight crept round an angle of the building, and the light fell on the window. There distinctly was Lucy with her head lying up against the side of the window-sill and her eyes shut. She was fast asleep, and by her, seated on the window-sill, was something that looked like a good-sized bird. I was afraid she might get a chill, so I ran upstairs, but as I came into the room she was moving back to her bed, fast asleep, and breathing heavily; she was holding her hand to her throat, as though to protect it from cold. (Stoker 162-3)

The bird creature, presumably Dracula, has bitten her, but sits outside the home on the window-sill while Lucy's head initially leans out. This is not the invitation to enter as Lucy presents her neck beyond the invisible boundary of the home and the bird does not enter the room. Several days later in Whitby, Mina finds a sleeping Lucy again leaning out of the window. These small details strongly suggest that the clear invitation for the vampire to enter must take place once she returns to London.

Back in London and experiencing troubled sleep, Lucy writes in her journal of "a sort of scratching or flapping at the window" (179). However, she writes of the flapping: "I did not mind it, and as I remember no more, I suppose I must then have

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fallen asleep. More bad dreams...This morning I am horribly weak. My face is ghastly pale, and my throat pains me" (Stoker 179). Clearly the vampire puts her into a trance-like state prior to attack, as he had when he first preyed upon her outdoors and at the window in Whitby.

As Lucy begins to wane, measures are taken to prevent further attacks. Dracula does not prey on her when Van Helsing or Jack guards her room. However, one night when only her mother is with her, his attacks resume. Lucy writes:

As she lay there in my arms, and I in hers, the flapping and buffeting came to the window again. She was startled and a little frightened, and cried out: "What is that?" I tried to pacify her…After a while there was the low howl again out in the shrubbery, and shortly after there was a crash at the window, and a lot of broken glass was hurled on the floor. The window blind blew back with the wind that rushed in, and in the aperture of the broken panes there was the head of a great, gaunt grey wolf. Mother cried out in a fright, and struggled up into a sitting posture, and clutched wildly at anything that would help her. Amongst other things, she clutched the wreath of flowers that Dr. Van Helsing insisted on my wearing round my neck, and tore it away from me. For a second or two she sat up, pointing at the wolf, and there was a strange and horrible gurgling in her throat; then she fell over—as if struck with lightning, and her head hit my forehead and made me dizzy for a moment or two. The room and all round seemed to spin round. I kept my eyes fixed on the window, but the wolf drew his head back, and a whole myriad of little specks seemed to come blowing in

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through the broken window...I tried to stir, but there was some spell upon me,

and dear mother's poor body, which seemed to grow cold already—for her dear

heart had ceased to beat—weighed me down; and I remembered no more for a

while. (Stoker 219-20).

While this scene reveals the vampire's ability to change forms, and silence and paralyze

victims, it still does not reveal an invitation to enter. The absence of the formal invitation

reiterates the character's lack of agency in a text where her only exercise of power

comes in the form of choosing which suitor to accept and deciding which details to

include in her letters and journals. Lucy's engagement to Arthur Holmwood is another

instance of an absent performative relating to this character. Lucy goes into great detail

in letters to Mina regarding two out of three of her engagements-- the ones that she does

not accept. In reference to the one she does accept, she merely notes in a post-script:

P.S.—Oh, about number Three—I needn't tell you of number Three, need I?

Besides, it was all so confused; it seemed only a moment from his coming into

the room till both his arms were round me, and he was kissing me. I am very,

very happy, and I don't know what I have done to deserve it. I must only try in

the future to show that I am not ungrateful to God for all His goodness to me in

sending to me such a lover, such a husband, and such a friend. (Stoker 112)

The reader is privy to the detailed, lengthy proposal from Quincey, yet with Arthur, "it

was all so confused." Because performatives are about making something happen, about

agency and power and the chance to act or choose, seemingly small omissions are not so

small indeed. What should be here, the details of the felicitous engagement, is not, while

the infelicitous engagements are detailed at great length. There's a dearth of agency in Lucy's characterization where she is always being chosen, but never witnessed choosing.

A minor character with more textual agency is Renfield. Unlike with Lucy's faulty and incomplete recollections, he seems to have total recall of events. Therefore, it is through this character that Stoker details how the vampire gets invited in. Renfield is the "madman" of the novel, housed in the asylum that Lucy's suitor Jack Seward runs. After being fatally injured by his "Master" Count Dracula, Renfield recounts the incident to Jack:

> He came up to the window in the mist, as I had seen him often before; but he was solid then—not a ghost, and his eyes were fierce like a man's when angry. He was laughing with his red mouth…I wouldn't ask him to come in at first, though I knew he wanted to—just as he had wanted all along. Then he began promising me things—not in words but by doing them."..."Then he began to whisper: 'Rats, rats, rats! Hundreds, thousands, millions of them, and every one a life; and dogs to eat them, and cats too. All lives! all red blood, with years of life in it; and not merely buzzing flies!' I laughed at him, for I wanted to see what he could do...He beckoned me to the window. I got up and looked out... and then He moved the mist to the right and left, and I could see that there were thousands of rats with their eyes blazing red—like His, only smaller. He held up his hand, and they all stopped; and I thought he seemed to be saying: 'All these lives will I give you, ay, and many more and greater, through countless ages, if you will fall down and worship me!' And then a red cloud, like the colour of blood, seemed to close

over my eyes; and before I knew what I was doing, I found myself opening the

sash and saying to Him: 'Come in, Lord and Master!' The rats were all gone, but

He slid into the room through the sash, though it was only open an inch

wide...All day I waited to hear from him, but he did not send me anything, not

even a blow-fly, and when the moon got up I was pretty angry with him. When

he slid in through the window, though it was shut, and did not even knock, I got

mad with him. He sneered at me…and he went on as though he owned the whole

place, and I was no one. (Stoker 386-7).

Dracula's entry into Renfield's cell looks incredibly different than his entry into Lucy's

room. In the case of Lucy, we see only the repeated incidences of disorientation and

paralysis the vampire produces in his victim; later, we see his brute force when he

plunges through the window as a wolf. With Renfield, we see Dracula's cunning,

revealing the text applies a different means of victimization for different characters. In

the case of the "rational" male inmate, who keeps detailed records of his zoöphagous

consumption, with "a method in his madness" (129), Stoker has Dracula appeal very

specifically and directly to his desires. While the scenes with Lucy cull material from

older vampire literature, Stoker's version of "repetition with a difference"[10] (Nealson

118), the scenes with Renfield clearly articulate Stoker's vision of the vampire's

manipulation, rhetorical prowess, and adherence to newly invented codes. Van Helsing

articulates the rules; Renfield plays them out. Lucy is the "repetition;" Renfield is the

"difference," and this matters because these characters come to act as sites embodying

either literary history and the past or the revolutionary, technological present and future.

It would seem that the articulation and codification of these preconditions of entry would have a simple result: the vampire either does or does not receive an enunciated invitation to enter; as a result, s/he does or does not enter. The performative here is the permission granted and unlike some other speech acts, it does not merely change an internal state of affairs, socially obligate the interlocutors, or produce a legal change; in the storyworld of *Dracula*, it enables the vampire to do his evil deeds. The specific performative invoked granting Dracula entry into the homes of his victims seems contentious and debatable, however. It could be what J. L. Austin labels "exercitivies":

> An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so; it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so; it is an award as opposed to an assessment; it is a sentence as opposed to a verdict. Arbitrators and judges make use of exercitives as well as issuing verdictives. Its consequences may be that others are 'compelled' or 'allowed' or 'not allowed' to do certain acts. (Austin 155)

He claims that "it is a very wide class" and examples include to name, proclaim, command, entreat, direct, grant, give, plead, and recommend. This is where Stoker's rule of explicit permission gets tricky. Certainly after the declaration is made that he may enter, Dracula is then "allowed" to enter, seemingly making the command an exercitive. Yet, in comparing exercitives to commissives, Austin claims that "many exercitives such as permit, authorize, depute, offer, concede, give, sanction, stake, and

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consent do in fact commit one to a course of action… It is obvious that appointing and

naming do commit us, but we would rather say that they confer powers, rights, name &c,

or change or eliminate them" (156). He claims that the "whole point of a commissive is

to commit the speaker to a certain course of action" (157), with the caveat that

"exercitives commit us to the consequences of an act, for example of naming. In the

special case of permissives we might ask whether they should be classified as exercitives

or as commissives" (159). This distinction matters because it may reveal the level and

type of consent a victim initially offers. It matters too because in one instance of

entering, Stoker invites the reader into the locution; in the other instance, the locution is

entirely absent. How did Dracula initially get into Lucy's room? What did Lucy say?

What did she expect? To what did she consent? A different invitation suggests a

different level of complicity.

It is true that Dracula, the female vampires in the castle, and Renfield alike do

not get their own narrative voice within the text. It is *Dracula* the novel that gives form

to Dracula the character as both *"*depend on a fictive act of construction for the very

form of their fictionality" (Hustis 27). Renfield does not keep a journal or diary of his

own other than notebooks about his number of kills; his retellings are filtered through

Seward's retellings. However, he is not on the "good" team (for that matter, is Lucy

presented as "good"?). Lucy alone has her performative speech expunged structurally.

Diegetically, her character mirrors this obliteration when she attempts to tear up her own

writings:

Towards dusk she fell into a doze. Here a very odd thing occurred. Whilst still

asleep she took the paper from her breast and tore it in two. Van Helsing stepped

over and took the pieces from her. All the same, however, she went on with the

action of tearing, as though the material were still in her hands; finally she lifted

her hands and opened them as though scattering the fragments. (Stoker 232)

I read this scene as a metaphor for Lucy's characterization. The tearing of the paper

represents Lucy's damaged and incomplete first person narrative: it is present but not

whole. The continued tearing at the air and attempt to scatter the fragments signify the

storyworld's destruction of the rest of her story; the reader is left with only imagined

pieces at which to blindly grasp. That Van Helsing grabs it from her in the storyworld,

and salvages it allows for its inclusion in the "Harker Files" at all; yet the presence of

Lucy's incomplete narrative in the literary object that is *Dracula* also calls attention to

the absent-presence of her character's performative speech and agency. What the

narrative includes draws attention to what it excludes.

Stoker's elimination of Lucy's performative speech, and therefore agency, gets

more complicated if once again the opening lines of the novel are considered: "these

papers have been placed in sequence [and] all needless matters have been eliminated"

(4) Some scholars claim that Mina has pieced the work together, while others claim the

"editor" is unknowable. If Lucy did if fact recall consenting to Dracula's admittance, or

willfully and joyfully bid him to enter, and she chanced to write it down in her blurry

and confused state, the "editor" of the assembled documents must have eliminated it.

Though the compiled tale is lengthy, these lines imply that inclusions were thoroughly

and thoughtfully curated, and by insinuating "the always already absent presence of an

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organizing editorial agenda (an absent presence that can never be completely identified with Mina Harker, Van Helsing, or Dr. Seward), the note hints that 'how' the reader will read *Dracula* has at least in some measure been predetermined but in what way and by whom we cannot know" (Hustis 20). Lucy comments that she "must imitate Mina, and keep writing things down" (Stoker 179); yet Stoker, with his play on inclusion and exclusion, could be implying that the inclusion of Lucy's invitation is unimportant, unnecessary, or extraneous. In a novel that "includes undelivered notes, unopened letters, and two-line telegrams that do little to advance the plot, how were these judgments of 'needless' or 'necessary' arrived at?" Hustis playfully asks (20). I suggest that with all the random inclusions, the exclusions are all the more obvious.

The textual play and layers of complications added with the addition of the "character" of the editor controlling the assemblage of *Dracula*, suggest that either Lucy did not write down her confrontations with the Count or she did and the compiler discarded them. Diegetically, it must be that one of these characters is at fault for the absences because it has been clearly stated that being invited prior to entry is an absolute necessity. The third and most likely storyworld explanation for the exclusion is that in her hypnotic state, Lucy gave the permission, the consent, the allowance, the invitation, however it looked in that particular speech event, and cannot remember upon waking from her trance due to either the trauma of the event(s) or her predilection toward unconscious or semi-conscious states. Some scholars explain lapses in the novel through trauma theory, with Jamil Khader arguing, for example, "the memory of the vampiric attacks can only be registered in their unconscious, and so remains unspeakable" (78).

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Lucy either does not write her trauma down because it is unspeakable, or does and it is deemed "needless matter;" in either case, the exclusion slyly reveals the text's eschatological underpinnings.

While the exclusion of Lucy's invitation to and confrontations with the Count constitute one instance of silencing, the lack of narrative the reader receives from vampire Lucy constitutes another. Khader argues:

> ...the band of witnesses forecloses Lucy's Otherness: in killing her, they frame her murder within a theological narrative of redemption and salvation that invests her death with meaning for them, while absolving them from complicity in her murder. Once Lucy functionalizes their redemption narrative, her presence and memory are obliterated from the text altogether. (78)

In the novel's "refusal of any act of witnessing" to vampire Lucy, it simultaneously "presents the inhumanity of testimonial speech acts that become involved in the mutilation of the victims' bodies and the obliteration of their memories" (Khader 84). Vampire Lucy is always and only framed through the Crew of Light's gaze and narratives; in her, Khader sees a trauma victim who cannot articulate her trauma, is not entirely aware of the extent and causes of the trauma despite being haunted by it, and who is deemed so other that she has to be savagely destroyed.   Further:

> While her voice and thoughts are made accessible through her diaries and memoranda before she is turned, after Chapter 12 they completely disappear. By the time news of the "bloofer lady" is made known (159), we only hear about Lucy from Mina and the testimony of the men, and after the hunt for Dracula

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begins, Lucy almost completely vanishes from the narrative. (Khader 86)

Lucy is effaced by inches. First, there are the missing performatives of her engagement to Arthur and her invitation to the vampire. Second, there are no recountings of confrontations or locutions with the vampire. Third, there is no narrative from un-dead Lucy, and finally, she stops being mentioned at all.

Despite these structural aspects of Lucy's characterization, most scholarship on Lucy tends to focus on her sleep-walking, trances, and undead state. Lois Cucullu argues that in "falling under the spell of a malevolent despot," she "relinquish[es] volitional control and with it the ability to check, account for, or even recall [her] actions. Spellbound but mobile...Dracula's betrothed, the precocious Lucy, engages in debauched and illicit acts" (305). In both states, entranced and then un-dead, Lucy's behavior is not that of a respectable Victorian woman. Alas, scholars can only assume such a thing for living Lucy; while the reader is never privy to un-dead Lucy's experience, I argue that the perspective it offers even for living Lucy is limited at best. It is the pretense of a narrative, the going through of the motions of an inclusion. Further, in what "debauched and illicit acts" does living Lucy engage? The text does not say; it does not even tell us if she invited the vampire in.

The deep and frequent trances and sleeping spells to which Lucy is prone act as a convenient excuse for her faulty memory, while also tying her to the history of sleepy, lethargic, and mesmerized victims of vampires. Stoker adds an additional level of realism to Lucy's condition by including what Eric Lewin Altschuler notes as "the first known discussion of hereditary somnambulism" (51). He cites Lucy's much mentioned

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sleep-walking habit in the novel and the instance when Lucy's mother tells Mina that "that her husband, Lucy's father, had the same habit [sleep-walking], that he would get up in the night and dress himself and go out, if he were not stopped" (Stoker 133). He concludes that "sleep-walking runs in the Westenra family" and "the next description of a hereditary component of somnambulism is not until nearly a half century later" (51). Cucullu explains that "fictional seductions...depend on somnambulism," frequently "taking place during an episode of altered consciousness" (305) She notes that "it is useful to recall that for an 1890s audience, somnambulism simply meant a trance state, whether from hypnosis or sleepwalking, the former artificially induced and the latter occurring naturally, albeit anomalously, during sleep." For readers of vampire literature in the nineteenth century, the idea that instinct-driven vampires could transform their victims into "automata" or "soulless beings incapable of independent thought or feeling, whose actions are governed by instinct and external influences (such as the Count's mesmeric power)" were particularly disturbing (Stiles 133). The "unconscious cerebration" mentioned by Jack Seward in the novel, alluding to the work of William Benjamin Carpenter which delves into "mental processes not accessible to conscious volition or awareness" (139), lends scientific credence and rationality to Lucy's habits and lapses. Most significantly, Stiles argues that these ideas were particularly frightening to contemporary readers "who saw intellect, consciousness, and language as integral to humanity's identity as a species" (146). In her predilection toward sleep-walking and trances, and in her inability to access memories of the events and coax them into language afterwards, Stoker creates a formidable female other precisely in the mode

most terrifying to his reading audience. Cucullu, however, notes other aspects of somnambulism's fictional uses:

> Under the thrall of somnambulism, these novels disrupt the states of volition and coercion, wakefulness and sleep to activate another state, one of restlessness and overstimulation, that allows these susceptible protagonists to act on corporeal impulses apparently loitering just beyond the threshold of their conscious selves when the occasion arises…[T]hese somnambulist fictions mobilize sleep, that most private and subjective state, and turn it from a restful condition into its opposite in order to represent what they deem women's latent desires. (306)

Somnambulism, then, besides making one easy prey, acts a window into the unconscious yearnings of a character. In the character of Renfield, though the mind is disordered, the text offers detailed, almost scientific accounts. Renfield is under the Count's spell when the invitation is extended, but he is able to recall the entire scene with great clarity. Locked into locution with the Count, he is persuaded through incisive visual rhetoric that plays on his particular fetishes and obsessions. But what are Lucy's desires? If the text does not speak her trauma, it certainly does not showcase her desires. If trauma renders the event unspeakable for some, it gives others a loquacious bent, mirroring the text itself in the context of these two minor characters.

Of course, the sexual connotations of 'letting the vampire in' are not to be passed over without comment. That one must let or invite the vampire in implies complicity to the depravity that follows. That Lucy lets the vampire in, repeatedly, and yet the reader is not privy to the initial moment of consent, leaves the encounters wholly open to

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interpretation. However, the absent-presence of this consent lingers as a mark, visually represented as literal fang marks on Lucy's neck. When Dracula finally breaks through the glass, disrupting any remaining illusion of boundaries or propriety, it reveals the blatant, flagrant penetration the other bestows on those who let him in. Lucy's mother, representing the older generation of Victorian women, immediately dies of a heart attack after bearing witness to the breach.

It is significant that Mina does not invite the vampire in; she is staying in the asylum when Renfield allows Dracula to slip through the window. Because of this small detail, she is still able to be the good British mother by story's end when Lucy (who had to have invited the vampire in) and Renfield (who absolutely invited the vampire in) have been violently eliminated from the text. Because the invitation connotes consent and complicity, Mina is characterized as an innocent bystander drawn in via the folly of others. Allan Johnson argues that "the text places much significance upon the flirtatiousness of Lucy and the virtuousness of Mina, and the dissimilar fates of these two characters may encourage us to see an attempt on Stoker's part to craft a seemingly 'moral' novel in the sensational vein" (74). To this end, some scholars note that Lucy's representation goes well beyond flirtatious. Croley argues that

> ...following the commentators who treated prostitutes as morally infectious, Stoker casts Lucy as a prostitute of sorts. Before being vamped, Lucy's nocturnal walks, alone and scantily clad, at worst suggest prostitution, at best, as Mina remarks, a serious risk to Lucy's "reputation" (92). After being vamped, Lucy's publicly sexual behavior includes the aggressive gaze and provoking deportment

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reformers attributed to the prostitute (Walkowitz, 23): she gazes unabashedly at the Crew of Light, her eyes "blaz[ing] with an unholy light" (211), and openly propositions Arthur, "Come to me. . . . My arms are hungry for you." (96)

These excursions outside of the safety of the home reinforce the notion that some level of complicity is at work in Lucy's vamping. Initially, she strolls freely about, unconfined and unrestrained. Ultimately, she ends up in her room, guarded and under siege. A contained and restricted body, as Julie Smith argues, has both mental and physical connotations in the Gothic tradition:

> psychosomatic implications are traditionally reserved for the heroine, and are a direct result of her victimization by the Gothic villain. Commenting on the fundamental role of embodiment under such conditions, Fludernik maintains that '[c]arceral topography revolves around the body, the body that is contained, chained or acted upon' (1999, 63). Moreover, such curbing of the body's capacity for unrestricted action has profound implications for gendered identity, especially considering the patriarchal binary construction of males as primarily associated with activity, while women, as noted by Julia Kristeva, are apparently relegated to 'the position of passive objects' by phallocentric discourse (1982, 70)." (125)

While these are typical Gothic tropes, she argues that *Dracula* subverts expectations by variously having Jonathan, Renfield, and Dracula "feminized" (125) by being trapped and controlled in confined spaces. I argue that with Lucy and Renfield, Gothic tropes of constraint and confinement are being both reiterated and subverted. While Renfield's

space is far more "confined" than Lucy's initially, it is a cell in an asylum after all, he too breaks out several times and briefly eludes his would be captors. The invitation he extends to Dracula to enter is active; he recounts the interaction word for word in his retelling of the events. Lucy's is inactive; not only does the text not present the scene or locution in her journal recollections, but her writings suggest that she is not even aware someone or something is entering her room and assaulting her. Her passivity intensifies over the course of the novel until she is confined to her bed and moving in and out of consciousness. It is only when the wolf breaks through the window that her ignorance is also metaphorically shattered reinforcing Johnson's point that *Dracula* "is built around images of breaking in or out of buildings" making "the navigation and confrontation with architectural space…a central motif in the novel" (82). The "threshold space" occupied by vampires also sheds light on Lucy's liminal existence in the text:

> These shifting tensions and negotiations around identity and power routinely occupy, at any given time, the liminality of the "threshold space." By definition, the Gothic is a host to sites of contestation, where contradictions of desire are often unresolvable, or where there may be no new vocabulary to adequately address or express new possibilities or understandings. The mystery, indeed the uncanniness of the Gothic is a function of this groping for possibility. Moreover, the Gothic foregrounds the tension between familiarity and strangeness, problematising the idea of home as a safe space. (Baker 4)

Lucy's interactions and locutions remain an enigma, her "vocabulary" limited.

At the heart of these limitations and mysteries lies the performative power of consent: does Lucy, under the influence of sleep or mesmerism, or with deliberate consent, allow Dracula in? Baker argues that "when deception is involved, an invitation might mean one thing to the host/victim and another to the guest/perpetrator" with the vampire occupying the "problematic nexus between rape and consent. While a victim might well submit to the charismatic and sexual allure of the vampire, seduction does not necessarily imply volition" (6). Stephanie Green argues that "Combined with the elements of multivocality and the proliferation of archived evidence, the dramatic irony of covert dialogical allusion builds towards a pleasure in an excess of textual performativity" (92). Instead, I argue that combined with limited multivocality and the specific exclusion or nonexistence of certain archived evidence, the dramatic irony of absent-present speech acts builds towards epistemological gaps in *Dracula*'s textual performativity. Further, the textual absence of the face-to-face encounter where Lucy and her radical other confront each other closes an obvious window of opportunity for reader sympathy to be fostered. The silencing of the character's speech acts in the text forecloses that moment where the reader recognizes not only Dracula's but Lucy's radical alterity from each other and from the reader him/herself, and despite the lack of identification with either, sympathizes nonetheless.

Yet in all his power, Dracula as other "is not free" (Stoker 339). His predation is predicated upon a specific speech act. Van Helsing explains: "Nay; he is even more

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prisoner than the slave of the galley, than the madman in his cell" (339). The

codification of traits, rituals, rules, and conventions Stoker creates for Dracula both

enslave and enable him, and the language of confinement and free movement permeate

Van Helsing's metaphors. In the matter of entering a home, Dracula is more akin to an

everyday laugh than Van Helsing's "King Laugh" which bursts out uncontrollably at the

absurd and melancholy in life. He explains that "tears come; and, like the rain on the

ropes, they brace us up, until perhaps the strain become too great, and we break. But

King Laugh he come like the sunshine, and he ease off the strain again; and we bear to

go on with our labour" (258-9). In what seems to be a direct comparison with the

vampire, he claims:

> But no more think that I am all sorry when I cry, for the laugh he come just the
>
> same. Keep it always with you that laughter who knock at your door and say,
>
> 'May I come in?' is not the true laughter. No! he is a king, and he come when
>
> and how he like. He ask no person; he choose no time of suitability. He say, 'I
>
> am here.' (258)

Dracula cannot say "I am here." His entry is contingent. Like the bailiff, he is bound by

rules and regulations, codes and permissions, and can only enter under certain

conditions. That two minor characters hold the key to his penetration of indoor spaces

and the bodies therein, bears notice. That one of these characters never consents to his

ingress, bears repeating.

J.L. Austin claims that "what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing

of an utterance in a speech situation" (139). Despite all its liminality, gaps, thresholds,

absences, and silences, or perhaps because of them, *Dracula* produces rich "speech situation[s]" ripe for endless exploration and speculation. In *Our Vampires, Ourselves,* Nina Auerbach claims that vampires "promise escape from our dull lives and the pressure of our times, but they matter because when properly understood, they make us see that our lives are implicated in theirs and our times are inescapable" (9). Perhaps that's what makes the continued study of this critically delicious *fin-de-siècle* novel feel utterly timely: the language of consent and assent, permission and admission pervades our contemporary discourse. So it is that *Dracula* offers a perpetual window into our evolving concerns with its Victorian Gothic ethos inviting us in and continuing to mesmerize.

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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Performatives, whether they are promising, warning, blaming, committing, naming, or inviting, change things; they make something happen. Sometimes they act as a means of defying conventions, and sometimes they are used to reinforce them. Frequently they do both. If indeed literary works are "fields of force, places of dissension and shifting interests, occasions for the jostling of orthodox and subversive impulses" (Greenblatt 2254), speech acts are a particular site within those fields where the specific "dissension" and "jostling" may be isolated and interrogated.

These heterogeneous examples of novelistic performatives, culled from Victorian literature of several genres, ideally delineate and illuminate the interplays of convention and characterization, intention and ethicality, story and structure. Performative speech is a mechanism by which authors effect action, make ethical claims, reinforce or highlight a character's otherness, and reflect genre elasticity and a text's historical moment of creation. The minor characters of these novels diegetically exert power, or are rendered powerless, by these same performatives, revealing "the complex networks of institutions, practices, and beliefs that constitute the culture as a whole" (Greenblatt 2254). In their form, function, and presentation, minor characters and speech acts marry story and structure in the Victorian novel, acting as the convergence of Derrida's "conditions of possibility" (the conventions and structures of language) and Foucault's "conditions of emergence" (power, discipline, knowledge).

Wolfgang Iser, writing about interactions between text and reader claims that "what is missing from the apparently trivial scenes, the gaps arising out of the dialogue—this is what stimulates the reader into filling in the blanks with projections" (1676). It is not always what is there but what is not there that merits exploration; "it is the implications and not the statements that give shape and weight to the meaning." With minor characters, there are always more "implications" than "statements," more "blanks" and "gaps." In their roles as "workers" or "eccentrics" (Woloch 25), there is frequently more absent than enunciated. Though performatives do things with words, the fact that minor characters so often do not get the performative speech that other characters get makes them endlessly pleasurable sites of exploration and communication. Iser claims that "Communication in literature… is a process set in motion and regulated…by a mutually restrictive and magnifying interaction between the explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment (1676), and with this description, he might as well be describing a minor female character's relationship to the text.

Beyond communication, in each of the novels, the minor characters and their speech acts constitute a liminal space. In *Hard Times,* young Miss Jupe is both Cecelia and Sissy, but by novel's end she is both and neither. In *Daniel Deronda,* Lydia is a specter, hanging over Gwendolyn and Grandcourt's marriage, there and not there with almost no character-space, but driving the plot nonetheless. In *The Eustace Diamonds,* Lucinda is crazy like a fox—sane enough to be too "mad" to marry. In *Dracula*, Lucy invites the vampire in, but never invites the vampire in, is living, but unconscious, and then dead but undead. Each character is a quandary and contradiction, betwixt and

between categories, acting as a threshold and a gap; they are each a sign with no singular signified.

Noticing and rereading minor characters can become an act of recovery: the scholar or careful reader can "save" a "person" (Reed) the narrative limits, buries, effaces, or distorts. In writing about these characters, a performative act by a performative subject, perhaps the scholar also shines a light on the ways words have the power to resurrect, change, and renew, for "all constatives—all identities and moralities—are always already performatives" (Nealon 170).

ENDNOTES

1. These are the primary categories Woloch seeks to establish in his work *The One and the Many.*

2. Ferdinand de Saussure was an early twentieth century Swiss linguist widely credited as being a founding thinker on semiotics/semiology.

3. In "A Reply to Derrida," Searle claims that "Derrida has a distressing penchant for saying things that are obviously false" (203).

4. Adrienne Rich (1980) claims that lesbian existence has been "crushed, invalidated, forced into hiding and disguise" because it is viewed as aberrant, while the assumption that women are "innately sexually oriented" towards men drives lesbian exclusion and denial (632).

5. In *Gender Trouble,* Butler describes the way heterosexuality get posited as "natural": "The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between "feminine" and "masculine," where these are understood as expressive attributes of "male" and "female." The cultural matrix through which gender identity has become intelligible requires that certain kinds of "identities" cannot "exist"—that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and those in which the practices of desire do not "follow" from either sex or gender" (98).

6. Woloch defines the distributional matrix as "how the discrete representation of any specific individual is intertwined with the narrative's continual apportioning of attention to different characters who jostle for limited space within the same fictive universe" (13).

7. Philosopher Emmanuel Levinas claims in *Totality and Infinity* (1961) that in the face-to-face encounter, we simultaneously recognize our difference from, and responsibility to, the Other, and this is where ethics begin.

8. In the preface written to the Icelandic edition of *Dracula* released in 1901, Stoker implies that he was provided with a file, "The Harker Papers," which he did not edit or alter, other than "excising minor detail that [he] considered unnecessary" (Klinger 5). This preface adds yet another layer of complication to the issue of the "editor" of *Dracula* mentioned in the first paragraph found in the novel's English first edition. This "Author's Preface" did not appear in English until 1986's *Bram Stoker's Dracula Omnibus* (5).

9. In the nineteenth century, Bailiffs were frequently referred to as "bum-bailiffs." The *Oxford English Dictionary* describes it thusly: "Apparently < bum *n.1* + bailiff *n.* as a term of contempt, perhaps alluding to the reputation of such officials for using physical force, and specifically to giving the debtor a shove in the behind or catching him or her from behind."

10. Jeffrey Nealon uses the phrase "repetition with a difference" with reference to the Gilles Deleuze's text *Difference and Repetition,* and claims that "there are two kinds of repetition: the static, 'reterritorializing' of repetition-as-representation, and the dynamic, 'deterritorializing' of repetition with a difference…'The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an a-presentation'" (119).

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