

other revolutions and reactions. The Revolution of 1688, the rise of Parliament, the construction of Union, and defining succession were destabilizing events, creating new sets of winners and losers. Both groups found links to the past. This dynamic rejects stability, but demands greater research into revolution. Therefore, we are left questioning when the United Kingdom became stable, why it happened, and what forces constructed this more stable environment.

Todd Butler. *Literature and Political Intellection in Early Stuart England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. xiii + 240 pp. \$77.00. Review by BRETT A. HUDSON, MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY.

In *Literature and Political Intellection in Early Stuart England*, Todd Butler re-examines the political tensions and the struggle for power between the monarchies of James I and Charles I and their judiciaries and Parliaments through the context of the seventeenth century's shifting understanding of private and public deliberation. Butler's journey through what he describes as intellectual prerogatives and liberties charts an intriguing path through confessionals, court rooms, chambers of Parliament, royal cabinets, and Edenic domiciles in order to illustrate the gradual democratization of decision making and interpretation during the seventeenth century. Butler's use of the term intellection is situated near the developing field of cognitive studies; however, he eschews a firm use of anatomical or scientific terms and instead chooses to focus on political intellection as "the various ways that early modern individuals sought to think through the often uncertain political and religious environment they occupied, and how attention to such thinking in oneself or others could itself constitute a political position" (6). In using this methodology, Butler reveals how intellection was not only a process by which political opinions and their subsequent actions were formed but also a process over which political battles were fought throughout the seventeenth century's Early Stuart period and beyond.

We are introduced to Early Stuart intellection in the context of the Gunpowder Plot. The fears and anxieties over treasonous thoughts and actions which followed the Gunpowder Plot animated debates over

religious conscience and motivated James I to find a coercive means of knowing, interpreting, and controlling the potentially radical thoughts of his subjects. By examining the polemical debates over the doctrine of equivocation, Butler shows how the Oath of Allegiance's meaning was tightly controlled by the monarchy's interpretive prerogatives, allowing James to combat the intellectual liberties and communicative ambiguities created by the doctrine of equivocation and to assert the process of meaning making as well as the private thought process which accompanies the act of interpretation solely as the jurisdiction of the king. Butler presents James as being mostly successful in framing intellection as a royal prerogative in his examination of John Donne's *Ignatius His Conclave* and *Pseudo-Martyr* as texts which defend the impenetrability and inscrutability of the king's mind and which support the wrenching away of mental reservation from English Catholics, forcing subjects to moderate their thoughts according to the king's understanding of language.

Shifting to less discussed topics, Butler goes on to examine James' battle over thought control in more corporate modes of thinking by charting the collapse of the 1614 Addled Parliament and analyzing debates over the independence of the judiciary in the context of intellectual rights and the right to private deliberation without the interference of the king. Of interest is how Butler points to the Parliament's systematizing of its operations and its consultation of its own records of proceedings to form a collective identity and memory to rival the monarchy's deliberative prerogatives. Noting the Addled Parliament's refusal to consider first the king's legislative agenda, Butler suggests the conflict between James and Parliament was intellectual as Parliament attempted to emancipate itself from a solely consultatory role which was traditionally subservient to the king's prerogative of decision making. Later, Butler points to the debates of legal jurisdiction between Edward Coke and Francis Bacon over the imprisonment and trial of the preacher Edmund Peacham to show again James' desire to intervene in deliberative processes, which allows Butler to exhibit Coke's *Institutes of the Laws of England* and his *Reports* as evidence of evolving seventeenth-century views of public debate and interpretation. Butler points to Coke's democratizing of the understanding and interpretation of the law through the act of publication as a catalyst

that would further divide king and Parliament.

Butler juxtaposes James' successes at maintaining private deliberation and meaning making as distinctively royal prerogatives against Charles' inability to rule England completely unaided by Parliament's deliberative agenda. Butler shows how in Charles' early Parliaments, political debates "moved beyond tactical and procedural particulars to engage more fundamental questions of individual rights and constitutional prerogatives, with matters of procedure and precedent—the very structure of Parliament's deliberations—becoming enmeshed with potential challenges to royal authority" (127). Particularly, Parliament's exercising of deliberative delay was an irritant to the king and an indicator of shifting power dynamics in Caroline England. Charles' tyrannically inclined solution was to prorogue Parliament while funding his wars through forced loans. To elucidate these events, Butler again looks to the evolving dynamics of public reception and the democratization of interpretation that exacerbated the political and intellectual tensions between king and Parliament. Butler examines publicly accessible texts such as Philip Massinger's play *The Roman Actor* and makes engaging observations on the play's defense of actors whose words might inspire moral or immoral thoughts and actions. The play argues that internal personal critique is "the result of successive stages of experience and deliberation, moral reformation thus occurring not immediately but through a succession of properly directed cognitive acts" and that places the agency of deliberation (and the burden of guilt in the cases of immoral thoughts) in the audience. In doing so, the play was modeling the political environment wherein the Commons sought out a space for deliberative delay as an "intellective bulwark against a potentially encroaching royal prerogative" (141).

Butler's analysis of Early Stuart political intellection culminates in the tumultuousness of the Civil Wars when Parliament utilized the captured correspondence of Charles and Henrietta Maria to alienate the king and the people. Central to Butler's analysis is print culture. Highlighting the use of print by both king and Parliament in polemical defenses and attacks, Butler contributes to the existing substantial body of scholarship dedicated to seventeenth-century print culture in order to show how print became an interpretive space where the public could enter and participate in the process of political intellec-

tion. Butler moves beyond the typical examination of newsbooks to private correspondence that is intercepted and subsequently read by unintended audiences. Butler's particular focus is on the captured correspondence of the king and queen referred to as the Naseby Letters, which were published as *The Kings Cabinet Opened* and which represented a substantial "expansion of the intellectual franchise" of Parliament and the wider reading public (168). The Naseby Letters illustrate the role reversal experienced by the monarchy in Early Stuart England. Where early in the century James successfully penetrated, exposed, and interpreted the minds of his subjects by means of trials and oath taking, Charles' mind had become the object of penetration, exposure, and subsequent interpretation. Butler reveals Charles' ineffectual attempts at aligning interpretive authority with authorial intent. Butler successfully echoes themes from earlier in the study, showing how Charles, like James, became embroiled in public debates over royal prerogatives to receive his own council as well as concerns of Catholic influence. The Naseby letters laid bare the intimate and wide-ranging discourse of Charles and the Catholic Queen Henrietta Maria for all to behold. However, Butler shows the extent to which royal prerogatives of intellection had become democratized by suggesting that Charles' defense of general intellectual privacy ultimately hinged on degrees of distinction rather than positing the king's private deliberations as inherently different.

In the final chapters, Butler pivots to discursive and deliberative domesticity. By placing the discursive intimacy of Charles and Henrietta Maria in the center of the battle over intellectual liberties, Butler is able to follow a line of analysis examining the gendering of political discourse during Charles' reign. Central to his analysis is Parliament's assertion that the queen was usurping its role as counselor to the king. Within the Parliament's attacks on Henrietta Maria as political interloper and the king's defense of the queen as domestic partner of the king, Butler sees echoes of Milton's divorce tracts, though their publication (as Butler points out) precedes the Naseby controversy by four months. Still, Butler presents Milton as illustrating "the immediate political currency of marital conversation during the 1640s" (193). Butler asserts that Milton "emphasize[s] masculine headship in ways more consonant with Parliament's presumptive position as

the primary, and resolutely masculine, source of deliberative authority within the nation" (178). Though the discussion of Milton's divorce tracts may seem anachronistic, Butler's insights, particularly in how the tracts thematically interact with concepts of marital discourse and deliberation, are very relevant to Butler's goal of charting the development of how individuals thought through decisions in the new and developing political spheres and spaces of the seventeenth century. Butler makes references to contemporaneous texts such as marriage handbooks, and the reader is left wondering what a closer analysis of such texts could reveal about the period's intellectual shifts. However, Butler continues to push the discussion of Charles and Henrietta Maria further away from the political moment of the Naseby letters and the royal marriage as he turns the attention of his study of political intellection directly on to Milton and gender when he begins his examination of *Paradise Lost*. Building upon the scholarship of Laura Knoppers, Diane Purkiss, and Thomas Luxon, Butler's reading of the gendered discourses, marital privacy, and cognitive separation of Adam and Eve as well as Satan and Sin are used to illustrate the "specifically political complexities of mid-seventeenth-century human intellection" (198). Interestingly, Butler reads *Paradise Lost* aside Martin Lluelyn's 1645 poem *A Satyr Occasioned by The Author's Survey of a Scandalous Pamphlet Intituled The King's Cabinet Opened* and, by doing so, almost seems to be leaving Early Stuart England behind. In the final pages, Butler drifts further into the Restoration by glancing at Milton's *Samson Agonistes*.

In his conclusion, Butler fortunately returns to the 1640s for a more fitting capstone text, *Eikon Basilike*, in order to show the irony of the democratization of intellection in Early Stuart England. Butler points out how the earlier attacks on Charles' royal prerogatives of deliberative privacy and mental impenetrability later served as a tool of royalists in the defense of the monarchy as the Naseby letters were able to set a precedent of authentic access into royal deliberative interiority. In making this return to Charles and the printed incarnation of his mind, Butler reminds us of the quickly shifting landscape of intellection which he has charted throughout his study. On the outset of the Early Stuart Period, the monarchy stood with firm control over thought, yet in the wake of Charles' execution, the public were

impowered to access the mind and interpret the final thoughts of a dead king.

Thomas M. Lennon. *Sacrifice and Self-Interest in Seventeenth-Century France: Quietism, Jansenism, and Cartesianism*. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 304. Leiden: Brill, 2019. xvii + 300 pp. \$139.00. Review by ELISSA CUTTER, GEORGIAN COURT UNIVERSITY.

Thomas Lennon's *Sacrifice and Self-Interest in Seventeenth-Century France* makes a welcome contribution to the growing corpus of English-language scholarship on the religious history and spirituality of seventeenth-century France. His focus is on the debate over the "pure love" of God and its role in the moral theology and spirituality of the period. This topic is framed as a debate between two seventeenth-century movements—both ultimately deemed heretical—Jansenism and Quietism. Lennon, however, approaches this topic from the perspective of philosophy, though he does admit the debate was "philosophically rather inconsequential" (xi). In this, Lennon makes a connection between these two religious movements and a third intellectual movement of seventeenth-century France, Cartesianism. Lennon thus identifies, in the prologue, Cartesians as supplying "the conceptual terms of the debate," namely the idea of the will as expressed in René Descartes's philosophy, while the Jansenists were antagonists and the Quietists protagonists (x). In some ways, this book serves as an apology for Descartes and the misuse of his ideas by others. Importantly, this approach illustrates the way in which the disciplines of philosophy and theology blend together and interact with each other in this period of French intellectual history. In all this, Lennon's goal is to make the history of this debate and its significance more well known among English-language readership, and he succeeds in meeting that goal.

The first chapter examines the foundational idea of pure love, especially by setting the debate in the historical, political, and religious context of seventeenth-century France. As Lennon explains, many at the time in France "were concerned that their love of God be of the right sort, that it not be merely self-serving" (2). Here, he introduces