EVALUATING FARM POLICY CHANGES ACROSS COMMODITIES:

A STOCHASTIC SIMULATION APPROACH

A Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1930's, agricultural policy has played a major role in stabilizing the United States agricultural economy. Agricultural policy is a minor player in terms of overall federal budgetary impact, but the programs remain significant for US producers. Understanding how changes to farm safety net programs would affect government expenditures would be beneficial in maintaining and refining agricultural support programs into the future.

The objective of the project was to create a model that uses stochastic simulation to estimate expenditures or score agricultural policy changes, for 9 major agricultural commodities. The study used many of the factors that the federal government uses to accomplish the same goal including calculating payments based on a national scale. This was intentional because estimates for this project were expected to approximate the scores achieved by the Congressional Budget Office. As part of the analysis, a State based model was created as an alternative approach to scoring the main agricultural support programs. This alternative was compared to the original approach to determine differences between the two in terms of effectiveness and detail provided when estimating future program payments.

This research provided models that score the programs as they are currently, but allows for modifications to be made on various parameters. This has provided – and will continue to provide – the ability to evaluate effects of proposed program changes on projected program payments.

The results of the study indicate the national model scored projected program payments more accurately than the state model structure. However, after both models were adjusted to

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limit the difference in the PLC projected payments and CBO, the state model preformed more closely to CBO.

The models are a useful tool for current analysis of ARC and PLC program expectations. Even more valuable though, is the potential to analyze future proposals to these programs. With that in mind, the national model is far more seamless to adjust program parameters, and the state model enables the regional effects of program changes to be seen.

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Contributors

This work was supervised by a thesis committee consisting of Dr. Joe L. Outlaw and Dr. Henry L. Bryant of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Dr. Monty Dozier of the Department of Soil and Crop Sciences.

The risk applied to the CBO means for price and yield projections was provided via the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri. The draws used were from the 2019 FAPRI Baseline from January 2019.

Other data used was all from publically available sources, including the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS).

The data correlation induction portion of Chapter 3 was highly directed by Dr. Bryant. The covariance matrix in particular that was used in Chapter 3 was calculated by Dr. Bryant. All other work conducted for the thesis was completed by the student independently.

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NOMENCLATURE PAGE

| Acronym | Definition |
|---------|---|
| ARC | Agricultural Risk Coverage |
| PLC | Price Loss Coverage |
| СВО | Congressional Budget Office |
| RAF | Risk Adjustment Factor |
| FAPRI | Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute |
| МҮА | Marketing Year Average |

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1930's, agricultural policy has played a major role in stabilizing the United States agricultural economy. Legislators involved in the writing of the last farm bill that doesn't expire, the Agricultural Act of 1949 (1949 farm bill) recognized the importance of addressing the dynamic needs of the agricultural sector regularly. As a result, subsequent agricultural acts, or 'farm bills' as they are commonly referred to, have each been written to expire roughly every five years since the 1970s. This expiration creates a sense of urgency for future Congresses to act to pass farm bills or face reverting back to the provisions of the act of the 1940's. This provision is uncommon amongst other non-agricultural legislation. Regularly passing farm bills has enabled legislators to attempt to tailor changes in farm support programs to reflect producers' needs depending on the current state of the farm economy.

An important component of the farm bill deliberation process is the scoring of the legislation. Scoring is a term that refers to development of cost estimates for the proposed changes relative to Baseline or status quo estimates. Prior to 1974, many of the functions performed now by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were undertaken by analysts within the administration (Page 2005). However, in an effort to remove partisan issues that often arose over cost estimates, Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that requires CBO to work with Congressional budget committees. CBO provides cost estimates or "scores" of all legislation that has potential to change government spending. The goal of scoring is to make congress aware of the amount of funding going toward each individual part of major legislation, along with providing an overall cost of the entire bill. Scoring is used in agricultural policy as each farm bill is being developed to ensure the new farm bill does not

spend more than the budget for the bill. The farm bill includes about 12 titles, depending on the bill, encompassing everything from commodity support programs, to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), to conservation programs, to federal crop insurance.

Agricultural producers and their commodity organizations are routinely asked to provide policy suggestions prior to the development of each farm bill. Groups often have several suggestions for potential policy changes, however, without knowing the cost of their policy proposals they have no idea what would be financially feasible. If they ask for a change that is too expensive it may be dismissed once CBO scores the changes. They may not get an opportunity to ask for additional changes beyond this point, and thus lose their chance to reform agricultural policy. Therefore, it is important to develop a scoring tool that can be used to assist producers, their associations and other interest groups in developing policy proposals that fit within budget guidelines.

Objectives

The primary objective of this thesis is to create a model that uses stochastic simulation to score changes in the two major agricultural support mechanisms, agricultural risk coverage (ARC) and price loss coverage (PLC), for 9 major agricultural commodities. The model will use many of the parameters and prices from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline in order to best approximate the CBO score of the same policy proposals. An alternative methodology will be developed and evaluated to determine which method provides the most similar payment projections to the CBO baseline.

The first approach scores the cost of programs based on nationally averaged parameters which is the approach CBO uses. The alternative methodology that will be used is to evaluate

predicted program costs for each major state, and then aggregating them to form national expenditures estimates. This aggregation of data will be explained further in Chapter III. The state based model will provide more specific yield variability than the national model. Both approaches will be compared to the 2019 CBO Baseline to see which is the most effective.

Justification

Changes to farm safety net programs are regularly proposed by agricultural interest groups. A model that mimics CBO Baseline scoring for ARC and PLC creates ample opportunities to analyze potential changes. This research develops a model that scores the programs as they are currently but allows for modifications to be made on various parameters. This gives the user the ability to evaluate the effect of potential program changes on government expenditures. The user-friendly design of the model makes it suitable for a wide range of users and is, therefore, available for more what-if analyses.

Budgetary pressure frequently dictates which aspects of the agricultural policy framework will be retained, modified, or cut. Policy influencers have an advantage when proposal ideas are presented with facts and well-researched potential outcomes, specifically related to budget effects. The ability to estimate the cost of commodity program changes helps validate a policy proposal.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

U.S. Agriculture relies heavily on the stability provided by the safety net programs provided by government programs. These programs are required to be reauthorized and potentially updated roughly every five years with the passage of a new farm bill. During this legislative process, it is required that the programs be scored by the CBO to create a baseline estimate of the cost of the programs assuming no changes to current program provisions. The score created by CBO is essential because the expected cost of a program can set the tone for how it is viewed by congress, as well as, the public during the legislative process.

Scoring History

In his work on policy analysis, Manski discusses what he refers to as inappropriate certitude (Manski, 2011). The desire for certainty and the peace of mind created by a forecast with simplicity that reflects a confident determination. The author argues, that the presentation of information in policy analysis should not be reflected in this way. In policy analysis, there are numerous variables that cannot be predicted with 100 percent certainty. The directly relatable point in Manski's work is that CBO reports scores that imply certitude in spite of the uncertainty of the assumptions made in order to create a 10 year forecast. Acknowledging the challenge of choosing the correct system of presenting risk, the author proposes that one process would be to present a low and high score based on various possible future circumstances and present both figures so that the user of the analysis has a clearer picture of the potential costs of the program being viewed. Although this methodology is not the most sophisticated, Manski raises many valid concerns.

In an extensive explanation of CBO scoring, Page reveals the introduction of the scoring process to congress in the Congressional Budget act of 1974. He describes that by definition a legislative score must be presented as a point estimate, and explains how this is necessary to make the scoring baselines more clear and concise.

In their work on the 1996 farm bill, Jagger and Hull explain the benefits of introducing a one-sided bet probability scoring model. According to the article, the research was relevant after the 1996 farm bill because the probability scoring model was used significantly for the first time in the farm bill process. In brief, the probability scoring concept aims to capture change in outlays due to shifts or changes from current circumstances, such as prices and yields. They introduce this methodology in contrast to the normal point-estimate procedure that has been commonly used in the CBO scoring process. This presentation is simple to understand by someone with limited knowledge of the program or industry, but does not reflect the amount of uncertainty around the point estimates. A brief example is as follows: if we expect that policy will drive wheat production down slightly in the coming years, then we can expect that wheat price will slightly increase. Thus, the policy forecast could take into account the new expected price when predicting program outlays for that year. The authors suggest the use of the onesided bet as a forecasting system that does not change the cost of a given program in the baseline scenario. However, the one-sided bet does account for a possible change in the policy parameters which could change total outlays. In practice, the one-sided bet was only taken into account when the analysis led to an increase in program costs. An example the authors noted of a one-sided bet that was analyzed during the 1996 farm bill reconciliation is: increasing a commodity loan rate to just below baseline market prices. In this particular case study, the authors determine probability scoring was appropriate and effective in their analysis. This

influence further validates the current project, but differs in that the current project will create 500 payment estimations that may be used to create an entire distribution of expected payments above and below the baseline.

Stochastic Forecasting in Agricultural Policy Analysis

Richardson, Klose, and Gray provide a detailed description of the usefulness of simulation in their work on multivariate empirical (MVE) probability distributions. Similarly, this thesis will utilize simulation, but will differ in that the forecasts will be taken from the Food and Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri as opposed to being created on a MVE distribution. The authors also explain the use of simulation of at least 500 iterations over whatever probability distribution is chosen. This scoring model will use simulation to establish expected means, and the probability density functions (PDF) for each projected payment for ARC and PLC. As is the case in the Richardson and Klose paper, simulation strengthens the findings.

Richardson, Outlaw, and Raulston analyzed the potential payments for ARC county (ARC-CO) and PLC from 2016 – 2021 for the United States. Their work explained the way the programs functioned based on the provisions of the 2014 farm bill. They discuss how the abrupt decline in commodity prices is what caused ARC-CO to be a favorable choice for corn and soybean farmers specifically. This analysis is applicable to the current research because movements like the one from 2011-2016 that caused high ARC-CO payments, could be a possible explanation of why the program pays well again in this analysis, or not. Beyond a brief historical explanation of the programs, the goal of their project was to arrive at payment projections from ARC-CO and PLC for the years 2016-2021. The details of this article outline how payments can be forecasted on a county level for the major covered commodities and then

aggregated. The uncertainty of the future is accounted for by simulating probabilistic forecasts of the ARC-CO and PLC payments for each year 500 times. Their results show that the original thoughts that high ARC-CO payments on a national scale, were due to the high grain prices of the past, but will not be sustained without continued price decline holds true with the ARC-CO projection of \$45.9/acre for 2016 versus \$8.62/acre for 2021. The methodology used aggregate to the national level in their study is similar to what will be required to create a stochastic scoring model that shows total program outlays for both of these programs. The difference is that Richardson, Outlaw and Raulston based the payments off of county level information, and this project will use both national and state level models that are aggregated. The formulas to calculate payments are very similar between the PLC and ARC-CO of the 2014 farm bill, and the PLC and ARC of the 2018 farm bill because the programs only changed marginally.

The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri provides analysis and projections on agricultural markets and policies (FAPRI, 2019). This study utilizes the baseline projections from the FAPRI 2019 Baseline Outlook for mean price, and yield projections. The FAPRI means are based on a range of projected market outcomes that account for uncertainty in each price and yield figure. The range is spread over 500 possible outcomes for each respective price and yield over the 10-year projection and based on a unique probability distribution. Due to the partnership between FAPRI and the Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M University, this study is able to use the specific 500 price and yield draws from each year, explained above, to calculate expected payments. The risk associated with each crop's price and yield will then be used to create a distribution around the CBO mean prices and yields from the January 2019 CBO Baseline. This application of risk based on FAPRI's price and yield distributions is necessary because the CBO baseline does not report how their model assigns risk on their projections.

The results of this study will be compared to the January 2019 CBO Baseline. A one sample t-test will be conducted for each of the ARC and PLC payment projections to achieve the comparison. In this common statistical test, the population mean is the CBO Baseline projection and the sample mean is the payment projected by this study. The t-statistic will be used to get p-values by comparing them against tabulated values that indicate the likelihood of the population mean hitting that respective sample mean given the degrees of freedom (Whitney, 2002). The 2 tailed p-values will establish whether the sample means are statistically different at a 90% confidence interval. Meaning that any p-values < 0.10 are statistically significant, and result in a rejection of the null hypothesis. The methods used will be further explained in chapter 3.

Current Commodity Programs

All of the calculations for the ARC and PLC programs will be done based on the provisions of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill) text. It should be noted, however, that some discrepancies may exist between the current interpretation of the 2018 farm bill text, and the final regulations for the bill which are not yet public information. Specific changes to the programs in the 2018 farm bill that will effect ARC and PLC will be included in the model. One of the major assumptions used in scoring is that the baseline is developed assuming the programs being scored will retain their current provisions for the next 10 years. Therefore, CBO baselines are for 10 years into the future even though farm bills generally only last 5 years.

The ARC calculations for the state based model present a unique challenge with regard to the projected yields. The FAPRI yields that will be used to calculate the ARC variations in the national model are a national average yield. However, FAPRI does not project an average state yield. The use of this information will be further explained in Chapter III, but it is important to note here that a method of Correlation Induction will be used in the state based model to assign a state yield to each iteration that has the appropriate relationship respective to the iteration's national price and national yield. Evidence that the correlation induction process can be a viable one was found in research by Avramidis and Wilson, as well as Tew and Wilson. In this study, the induction of future state yields aligns most clearly with Tew's statement that this methodology may be used when seeking the prediction of future responses in a real system. Although the steps taken to achieve induced correlation in this study, as depicted in Chapter III, are slightly different than those laid out in the articles above, the foundation and intent are very similar.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will develop estimates of future Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program payments that make up the crop support portion of the commodity title, or Title I of the most recent farm bill. The estimates will then be compared to the CBO Baseline to determine the accuracy of the models. Both programs were created in the 2014 farm bill, and were amended slightly in the 2018 farm bill. These programs are dependent on commodity specific annual information such as crop yields among other variables. They are both briefly described below as they are administered.

Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC)

ARC is a revenue based support program that develops a benchmark revenue using the previous 5-year Olympic average of market prices and county yields and provides a payment when the annual revenue (market price * county yield) is below the benchmark for that year. The specific variables and equations are below:

Variables:

BMY: Benchmark Yield is the 5-year Olympic average yield. The average of the previous 5 years of county yields after dropping the maximum and minimum.

BMP: Benchmark Price is the 5-year Olympic average price. The average of the previous 5 years of market prices after dropping the maximum and minimum.

BMR: Benchmark Revenue is the product of BMY and BMP and is unique for each county

Payment Factor: 0.85 based on current legislation

ARC Payment Rate: Per acre payment for Base Acres enrolled in the ARC Program. The ARC Payment Rate is limited to the 10% of the BMR. Payment is only made when this figure is positive.

Enrollment Proportion: Percentage of base acres in that particular crop enrolling in ARC. This number is reported in the CBO baseline.

Total ARC Payment: ARC Payments made nationally for that particular crop.

 BMY_{2018} = Olympic Average County Yield 2013 – 2017

 BMP_{2018} = Olympic Average National MYA Prices 2013 – 2017

 $BMR_{2018} = BMP_{2018} * BMP_{2018}$

Revenue Gaurentee = $BMR_{2018} * 0.86$

Actual Revenue = $Actual Yield_{2018} * Actual MYA Price_{2018}$

ARC Payment Rate = (Actual Revenue – Revenue Guarentee)

Total ARC Payment = ARC Payment Rate * Base Acres * 0.85 * Enrolled Proportion

Price Loss Coverage (PLC)

PLC provides price protection by providing a payment if the market price drops below the commodity specific reference price. The quantity of the payment is dependent on producer payment yields for each farm as opposed to the ARC payment being based on county average yields.

PY = Payment Yield; designated yield per base acre established based on historical production. Unique based on information from each FSA farm number.

MYA = Marketing Year Average national price as determined by NASS

RP = Reference Price; established price for each covered commodity that determines price support level.

Payment Factor: 0.85 based on current legislation

PLC Payment Rate: Only paid if MYA price falls below the reference price.

Enrollment Proportion: Percentage of base acres in that particular crop enrolling in ARC. This Number is reported from the CBO baseline.

Total PLC Payment: PLC payments made nationally for that particular crop

PLC Payment Rate₂₀₁₈ =
$$(RP_{2018} - MYA Price_{2018}) * PY$$

Total PLC Payment₂₀₁₈

= Base Acres * PLC Payment Rate2018 * 0.85 * Enrollment Proportion

These programs are based on county (ARC) or individual (PLC) information. However, this study will estimate payments in an aggregated fashion based on state and national parameters. In order to score the programs into the future, projections of this information must be used within the model. When CBO publishes a scoring report their results are presented deterministically as point estimates. Evaluation of risk is accounted for in CBO's forecasted scores, but their methodology is not made public. This project will use current support program parameters based on the formulas above and risk to create a scoring model designed to mimic that of the CBO. The intention being to provide an estimate that would be as close as possible to CBO's value. This scoring model will analyze major current agricultural support programs by producing national outlays for 9 major commodities: corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, peanuts, sorghum, long grain rice, medium and short grain rice, and temperate japonica rice from 2018 - 2028. The model will emulate the methodology the CBO uses when possible, understanding that the distributions on price and yield projections are not known. The shapes and scales of these distributions are the only portion of CBO's model that cannot be duplicated.

Recent Program Description

For the calculation of Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) payments for each crop, the model incorporates provisions of the 2018 farm bill with only minor changes from the 2014 programs as described by Richardson, Outlaw, and Raulston. Additional minor changes made in the 2018 farm bill are as follows. First, scaling reference prices enable the reference prices used in the PLC and ARC programs to be raised up to 15% when 85% of the Olympic Average of the MYA price over the last 5 years is greater than the established reference price for that commodity. The formula for this change is written below:

Effective Reference $Price_{2019} = 0.85 * (Olympic Average MYA price 2014 - 2018)$

Second, there are new loan rates for many of the major covered commodities. These loan rates are fixed over the life of the bill as opposed to the reference prices. Likely the most significant change between the 2014 and 2018 farm bills with regard to the ARC and PLC programs was the re-incorporation of upland cotton as a covered commodity under the commodity title as seed cotton (H.R. 2). The seed cotton program structure was developed and

passed into law in February 2018 through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. The legislation describes seed cotton as the weighted average of cottonseed and cotton lint on a per pound basis. The MYA price of seed cotton is the MYA price of cottonseed and the MYA price of upland cotton lint weighted by each of their national production respectively.

Seed Cotton MYA Price 2019 = (U.S.Lint Prod. * U.S.Lint MYA Price + U.S.Cottonseed Prod. * U.S.Cottonseed MYA Price)/ (U.S.Lint Prod. + U.S.Cottonseed Prod.)

In the formula, cotton lint and cottonseed are both to be measured in pounds. This study calculated expected payments on upland cotton as a crop based on this recently established program.

Nationally Based Scoring Model

Commodity payments are, in practice, paid to tens of thousands of individuals each with their own specific program parameters. However, the CBO estimates of expected national payments for ARC and PLC each year are based on one equation for ARC and one equation for PLC using aggregated information for the nation. The same methodology will be used for the national scale model in this study. Aggregation of payment yield data in the case of PLC, and actual yield data in the case of ARC are intended to achieve the following motives: make the model concise enough to be run in Microsoft Excel, have the ability to analyze payments for 9 major crops at once, and mimic the methodology used by CBO.

Utilizing Risk in Projections

Historical national prices and yields used in the model will be obtained from the National Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS) for 2011 - 2017. For the years 2018 – 2028, the current

research will use the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) projections of 500 random draws for prices and yields. FAPRI projections are frequently used in conjunction with USDA forecasts as an alternative estimate for Congress (U.S. Baseline Outlook). The FAPRI projections are established as 500 random draws around the mean for each price and yield value in each year. The values are developed according to the variability of each commodity applied via their large structural model. Each of their 500 iterations of price and yield are associated with a given run of their model, so matched pairs of a price draw and a US yield draw automatically reflect their joint distribution as modelled by FAPRI.

The nationally aggregated payment projections will also be adapted to the CBO means reported in the 2019 CBO Baseline because the objective is to create projections that mimic CBO. However, since the CBO reports a single point estimate for the future prices and yields for each commodity, the risk associated with the 500 random draws from FAPRI will be assumed as the risk around the CBO mean estimates. The model will then provide the ability to determine the scores based on the FAPRI or CBO mean projections considering risk. The results for this study will all be in terms of the CBO means in accordance with the project objectives. Ideally the model would use the exact draws that CBO uses to assign risk to their projections, but that information is not available, so using FAPRI risk is the next best available alternative.

Limitations

This national scale payment method will provide a national payment estimate, but national models have no ability to reflect the differences in regional yields or regional program history factors. For example, for a given realized price and yield, the US ARC model may be close to having a payment trigged, but not quite. However, in such a situation a non-trivial number of producers are likely to be receiving payments.

State Based Scoring Model

This study will also evaluate the outlays for ARC and PLC using state level aggregation in order to address the objective of determining an alternative method to predict program outlays. This effort should overcome at least some portion of the aggregation issues described above. This assumption is sound because regional yield variability will be taken into account. A state-based analysis should also prove to be invaluable in further research because lawmakers will be able to understand how a policy change would directly affect their respective state.

States Included

A major limitation to this study is the size of the models because the more disaggregated the model, the larger the model becomes. Therefore, for the state level analysis, only the major producing states for each commodity will have specific program payment projections, and the remaining states will have their base acres summed creating an "other states" payment. The "other states" differ for each crop. For corn and soybeans, the top eight states in corn and soybean base acres respectively are included, followed by Texas, and then "other states." Texas is intentionally included individually because the project is being done in Texas, even though it is not actually the ninth highest in corn or soybean base acres. Peanut and rice base acres are both only found in a handful of states because of the unique growing conditions they require. The table below shows the states that are included and those that make up the "others states" for each crop.

| Corn | Soybeans | Wheat | Cotton | Peanuts | Sorghum | Long Grain Rice | Med and Short Grain Rice |
|-------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| 1 IOWA | ILLINOIS | KANSAS | CALIFORNIA | GEORGIA | KANSAS | ARKANSAS | ARKANSAS |
| 2 ILLINOIS | IOWA | NORTH DAKOTA | MISSISSIPPI | TEXAS | TEXAS | LOUISIANA | LOUISIANA |
| 3 NEBRASKA | MINNESOTA | MONTANA | GEORGIA | ALABAMA | NEBRASKA | TEXAS | TEXAS |
| 4 MINNESOTA | NORTH DAKOTA | OKLAHOMA | CALIFORNIA | NORTH CAROLINA | MISSOURI | MISSISSIPPI | MISSOURI |
| 5 INDIANA | SOUTH DAKOTA | TEXAS | ARKANSAS | FLORIDA | OKLAHOMA | MISSOURI | MISSISSIPPI |
| 6 SOUTH DAKOTA | INDIANA | COLORADO | LOUISIANA | OKLAHOMA | NEW MEXICO | CALIFORNIA | * CALIFORNIA |
| 7 KANSAS | MISSOURI | WASHINGTON | NORTH CAROLINA | SOUTH CAROLINA | COLORADO | | |
| 8 WISCONSIN | OHIO | SOUTH DAKOTA | TENNESSEE | VIRGINIA | ARKANSAS | | |
| 9 TEXAS | TEXAS | NEBRASKA | ALABAMA | OTHER STATES | SOUTH DAKOTA | | |
| 10 OTHER STATES | OTHER STATES | OTHER STATES | OTHER STATES | | OTHER STATES | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| 11 ОНЮ | NEBRASKA | MINNESOTA | OKLAHOMA | NEW MEXICO | LOUISIANA | FLORIDA | * Temperate Japonica |
| 12 MISSOURI | KANSAS | IDAHO | ARIZONA | MISSISSIPPI | MISSISSIPPI | OKLAHOMA | |
| 13 NORTH DAKOTA | ARKANSAS | MISSOURI | MISSOURI | ARKANSAS | ILLINOIS | TENNESSEE | |
| 14 MICHIGAN | MICHIGAN | OREGON | SOUTH CAROLINA | TENNESSEE | GEORGIA | ILLINOIS | |
| 15 KENTUCKY | NORTH CAROLINA | ILLINOIS | FLORIDA | LOUISIANA | TENNESSEE | KENTUCKY | |
| 16 COLORADO | MISSISSIPPI | ARKANSAS | NEW MEXICO | ARIZONA | ALABAMA | SOUTH CAROLINA | |
| 17 NEW YORK | KENTUCKY | OHIO | VIRGINIA | CALIFORNIA | NORTH CAROLINA | ALABAMA | |
| 18 NORTH CAROLINA | WISCONSIN | CALIFORNIA | KANSAS | MISSOURI | KENTUCKY | | |
| 19 PENNSYLVANIA | TENNESSEE | MICHIGAN | MARYLAND | COLORADO | SOUTH CAROLINA | | |
| 20 TENNESSEE | LOUISIANA | NORTH CAROLINA | KENTUCKY | NEBRASKA | CALIFORNIA | | |
| 21 VIRGINIA | MARYLAND | NEW MEXICO | NEBRASKA | | ARIZONA | | |
| 22 MARYLAND | VIRGINIA | INDIANA | | | FLORIDA | | |
| 23 CALIFORNIA | SOUTH CAROLINA | KENTUCKY | | | VIRGINIA | | |
| 24 SOUTH CAROLINA | PENNSYLVANIA | GEORGIA | | | MARYLAND | | |
| 25 GEORGIA | OKLAHOMA | TENNESSEE | | | INDIANA | | |
| 26 MISSISSIPPI | ALABAMA | WYOMING | | | IOWA | | |
| 27 LOUISIANA | DELAWARE | MISSISSIPPI | | | PENNSYLVANIA | | |
| 28 OKLAHOMA | GEORGIA | SOUTH CAROLINA | | | NORTH DAKOTA | | |
| 29 ALABAMA | NEW YORK | UTAH | | | DELAWARE | | |
| 30 IDAHO | NEW JERSEY | VIRGINIA | | | UTAH | | |
| 31 ARKANSAS | WEST VIRGINIA | ALABAMA | | | NEW JERSEY | | |
| 32 WASHINGTON | FLORIDA | LOUISIANA | | | MONTANA | | |
| 33 DELAWARE | COLORADO | MARYLAND | | | OHIO | | |
| 34 NEW MEXICO | MONTANA | WISCONSIN | | | IDAHO | | |
| 35 WYOMING | MAINE | ARIZONA | | | WISCONSIN | | |
| 36 FLORIDA | VERMONT | PENNSYLVANIA | | | OREGON | | |
| 37 MONTANA | WASHINGTON | NEW YORK | | | WEST VIRGINIA | | |
| 38 NEW JERSEY | OREGON | IOWA | | | MICHIGAN | | |
| 39 VERMONT | MASSACHUSETTS | DELAWARE | | | MINNESOTA | | |
| 40 WEST VIRGINIA | NEW MEXICO | NEVADA | | | WYOMING | | |
| 41 OREGON | CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | | | NEVADA | | |
| 42 UTAH | ARIZONA | NEW JERSEY | | | NEW YORK | | |
| 43 ARIZONA | UTAH | WEST VIRGINIA | | | WASHINGTON | | |
| 44 MAINE | WYOMING | MAINE | | | VERMONT | | |
| 45 CONNECTICUT | IDAHO | VERMONT | | | CONNECTICUT | | |
| 46 MASSACHUSETTS | CONNECTICUT | ALASKA | | | NEW HAMPSHIRE | | |
| 47 NEW HAMPSHIRE | NEW HAMPSHIRE | CONNECTICUT | | | MASSACHUSETTS | | |
| 48 NEVADA | | MASSACHUSETTS | | | RHODE ISLAND | | |
| 49 RHODE ISLAND | | | | | MAINE | | |
| 50 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

Program Assumptions

Given that PLC payment yields are not publicly available by state, the PLC payment yields for each county will be weighted depending on their respective base acres for that commodity, to create state-level payment yields. For the "other states" category for each commodity, the PLC yields will be weighted on each state's weighted average payment yield, and their respective total base acres. The payment yields, the FAPRI 500 MYA price draws for 2018 – 2027, and the base acreages for each state, are all that is needed to generate the state level PLC payments.

The amount of base acres of each commodity in each county was last reported by FSA for the 2014 crop year. The base acres listed in this report do not match the amount of base used by CBO in the baseline. This can be explained by the fact the 100% of existing base acres are not enrolled in farm programs each year. This study will simply take the percentage of base acres of each crop in each state and apply that to the amount of total base acres reported for that crop in the CBO Baseline. For example, if Texas had 9% of the wheat base in the 2014 crop year according to FSA, then that 9% will be multiplied by the total wheat base in the CBO baseline to obtain an estimate of Texas wheat base.

In order to calculate a state based ARC payment, the MYA price will also use the FAPRI 500 draws for MYA price from 2018 – 2028. FAPRI, however, does not provide state-level average yield predictions. Thus, the yields that are yet to be realized (2019 – 2027) will be simulated for each state that is to be included in accordance to the table above. The historic yields used for the "other states" will be simulated by taking a weighted average of the historical production from the states. The 'weight' of each state will then be applied to the historical planted acre yields to create an entry that encompasses all of the states that cannot be modeled individually. Note that payment projections will be calculated for the "other states" just as they will be for the states that are included individually.

Correlation Induction for Yield Projections

The methods below explain the calculation of 500 unique state yields for 2019 - 2027 based on each state's historical yield, the correlations among them, and their correlations with the national

historic price and national historic yield deviates. The historic yields and prices will be obtained from NASS. For each year, stochastic draws are needed for J state yield deviates. These must be correlated with the US average yield and change in the natural logarithm of the market price, which are pre-drawn (i.e., they are from FAPRI). A general approach to inducing correlation among some pre-drawn random variables and some newly simulated variables is described below.

A covariance matrix from the historic yield deviates and historic log changes in price for each state will be calculated. The optimal level of shrinkage to use was found based on Ledoit's methods (Ledoit, 2003). The resulting covariance matrix is then decomposed based on the Cholesky Decomposition method.

Suppose K is the total number of variables in the system, J is the total number of variables to be drawn, K – J is the total number of pre-drawn variables, N is the total number of observations, while also noting that $J \ge K / 2$. Also suppose C represents the Scaled, Correlated Variables, L represents the Cholesky Decomposition of the covariance matrix described in the previous paragraph (Lower Triangular), and that Z represents the Standard Normal Variables.

$$(1) \quad \boldsymbol{C} = \boldsymbol{L} \boldsymbol{Z}$$

Then, scaled correlated variables are calculated from independent standard normal variables using the following relationship. We can write (1) in terms of partitioned matrices as follows.

$$\mathbf{Z} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{Z}_1 \\ \mathbf{Z}_2 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{with dimension } (K \times N) \qquad \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{Z}_1 \text{ is } J \times N \\ \mathbf{Z}_2 \text{ is } (K - J) \times N \end{array}$$

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{with dimension } (K \times N) \quad \begin{array}{l} C_1 = J \times N \\ C_2 = (K - J) \times N \end{array}$$
$$L = \begin{bmatrix} L_{11} & L_{12} \\ L_{21} & L_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

Note:
$$L_{12} = 0$$

The partitions of L have the following dimensions:

Then, the correlation induction process is as follows.

(2): $Z_1 = L_{11}^{-1} C_1$ Draw Z_2

(3): $C_2 = L_{21} Z_1 + L_{22} Z_2$

Once the Cholesky decomposition L is found, the "top" of the system is used to solve for Z_1 , given the pre-drawn realizations contained in C_1 (2). Then, after drawing independent standard normal draws (Z_2), the values for the non-pre-drawn variables (C_2) are calculated using equation (3).

The correlations found for each state using this correlation induction methodology will be applied to create 500 unique state yield draws for each state for each projected year. The matrix operations, along with the generation of standard normal variables (Z) that are drawn in the formulas above will be calculated in an add-in to Microsoft Excel called Simetar (Richardson, et al.).

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Results from both the national and state-based models are discussed in this chapter. The national model is discussed first, providing a comprehensive look at the likelihood, and amount of an ARC or PLC Payments for each crop in each year. In addition, the scores from this study will be compared to those provided by the 2019 CBO Baseline.

National Model Results

The results are first shown based on average expected payments per year by crop and compared with the expected payments reported by CBO in the 2019 CBO Baseline report. The results for the crops are listed below and are organized based on fiscal year (FY) as opposed to crop year. This distinction is important because, in practice the 2016 - 2017 MYA price is based on the crop that is harvested in the fall of 2016. However, because of the schedules of ARC and PLC payments, those made from the parameters above are to be reported on FY2018. It is also important to note that the data from FY 18 and FY 19 is already established, and therefore has no uncertainty in the model. Table 4.1 is simply the January 2019 CBO baseline score for ARC and PLC for those same commodities. Table 4.2 includes the mean payments for each commodity in the national model, and Table 4.3 shows the difference in the scores from the national model and the CBO baseline. The basic formula for the differences calculated for the national and state models is below.

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 265 | 270 | 169 | 2110 | 1706 | 1900 | 1859 | 1920 | 2053 | 2172 | 2608 | 2353 |
| ARC | 2917 | 1226 | 581 | 114 | 94 | 126 | 138 | 153 | 173 | 191 | 214 | 189 |
| Subtotal | 3182 | 1496 | 750 | 2224 | 1799 | 2026 | 1997 | 2073 | 2227 | 2363 | 2822 | 2542 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 10 | 11 | 14 | 547 | 328 | 282 | 261 | 225 | 155 | 178 | 149 | 151 |
| ARC | 606 | 672 | 420 | 236 | 120 | 111 | 96 | 80 | 54 | 70 | 67 | 79 |
| Subtotal | 616 | 683 | 434 | 783 | 448 | 392 | 357 | 305 | 208 | 248 | 216 | 229 |
| Subiolai | 010 | 085 | 434 | 785 | 440 | 392 | 337 | 202 | 200 | 240 | 210 | 225 |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 1369 | 718 | 372 | 728 | 702 | 702 | 705 | 689 | 721 | 689 | 683 | 711 |
| ARC | 511 | 423 | 209 | 65 | 67 | 73 | 53 | 59 | 55 | 61 | 65 | 72 |
| Subtotal | 1880 | 1140 | 581 | 793 | 769 | 775 | 758 | 748 | 776 | 751 | 747 | 784 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | | | 213 | 573 | 514 | 446 | 392 | 337 | 308 | 281 | 261 | 250 |
| ARC | | | 44 | 15 | 19 | 19 | 16 | 14 | 16 | 15 | 14 | 15 |
| Subtotal | | | 257 | 589 | 533 | 465 | 408 | 351 | 324 | 296 | 275 | 265 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 607 | 414 | 417 | 388 | 412 | 412 | 406 | 406 | 415 | 425 | 432 | 446 |
| ARC | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 608 | 414 | 417 | 388 | 412 | 413 | 406 | 406 | 415 | 426 | 433 | 447 |
| Sorahum | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sorghum PLC | 383 | 246 | 179 | 232 | 157 | 147 | 146 | 148 | 146 | 148 | 148 | 149 |
| ARC | 24 | 240 | 24 | 232 19 | 137 | 147 | 9 | 148 9 | 8 | 148 9 | 148 9 | 149 9 |
| Subtotal | 24 407 | 25 269 | 24 203 | 19 251 | 14 171 | 11 158 | 9 156 | 9 157 | ° 154 | 9 157 | 9 156 | 9 158 |
| SUDIOLAI | 407 | 209 | 205 | 291 | 1/1 | 120 | 130 | 127 | 104 | 127 | 130 | 720 |
| Rice | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 1032 | 515 | 776 | 764 | 746 | 724 | 704 | 691 | 674 | 664 | 650 | 642 |
| ARC | 22 | 7 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Subtotal | 1054 | 522 | 786 | 767 | 749 | 727 | 706 | 693 | 677 | 666 | 653 | 645 |
| Totals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 3666 | 2174 | 2140 | 5341 | 4564 | 4613 | 4473 | 4416 | 4472 | 4557 | 4931 | 4702 |
| ARC | 4081 | 2351 | 1287 | 452 | 317 | 342 | 315 | 318 | 309 | 348 | 371 | 367 |
| Subtotal | 7747 | 4524 | 3427 | 5794 | 4881 | 4955 | 4788 | 4733 | 4781 | 4906 | 5302 | 5068 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-----------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------------|-------|-------|-------|------------|-------|------------|------------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 209 | 210 | 64 | 1896 | 1963 | 2482 | 2341 | 2366 | 2575 | 2880 | 3204 | 3057 |
| ARC | 3906 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 48 | 84 | 79 | 101 | 146 | 173 | 196 | 191 |
| Subtotal | 4116 | 210 | 64 | 1943 | 2011 | 2566 | 2420 | 2467 | 2721 | 3052 | 3400 | 3248 |
| Subtotal | 4110 | 210 | 04 | 1343 | 2011 | 2500 | 2420 | 2407 | 2721 | 3032 | 5400 | 5240 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 2 | 727 | 548 | 515 | 530 | 447 | 397 | 436 | 468 | 462 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 210 | 122 | 112 | 97 | 73 | 80 | 102 | 125 | 126 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 2 | 937 | 670 | 627 | 627 | 521 | 477 | 538 | 593 | 589 |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 1378 | 667 | 344 | 936 | 1022 | 1074 | 1051 | 1009 | 1017 | 1039 | 1033 | 1057 |
| ARC | 735 | 593 | 0 | 9 | 20 | 21 | 31 | 37 | 40 | 48 | 45 | 46 |
| Subtotal | 2113 | 1260 | 344 | 946 | 20 1042 | 1095 | 1082 | 1046 | 40 1057 | 1088 | 45 1077 | 40 1103 |
| Subtotal | 2115 | 1200 | 344 | 540 | 1042 | 1095 | 1082 | 1040 | 1057 | 1088 | 1077 | 1105 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | | | 207 | 883 | 849 | 778 | 733 | 657 | 579 | 594 | 560 | 546 |
| ARC | | | 56 | 32 | 49 | 46 | 37 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 28 | 29 |
| Subtotal | | | 263 | 915 | 898 | 823 | 770 | 685 | 608 | 626 | 588 | 576 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 597 | 348 | 439 | 433 | 424 | 417 | 417 | 413 | 415 | 419 | 432 | 442 |
| ARC | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 599 | 348 | 439 | 433 | 424 | 417 | 418 | 413 | 416 | 420 | 433 | 442 |
| Sorahum | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sorghum PLC | 338 | 213 | 193 | 279 | 213 | 218 | 208 | 210 | 212 | 212 | 217 | 216 |
| ARC | 338 11 | 9 | 26 | 275 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Subtotal | 350 | 222 | 220 | 300 | 228 | 231 | 220 | 222 | 224 | 225 | 230 | 230 |
| Rice | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC - LG Rice | 947 | 539 | 687 | 697 | 680 | 621 | 581 | 543 | 530 | 523 | 521 | 519 |
| PLC - MGSG Rice | 35 | 21 | 18 | 24 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 21 |
| PLC - TJ Rice | 84 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 52 | 77 | 87 | 97 | 88 | 86 | 73 | 67 |
| ARC - LG Rice | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ARC - MGSG Rice | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARC - TJ Rice | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 1071 | 563 | 707 | 798 | 756 | 723 | 693 | 666 | 643 | 634 | 617 | 608 |
| Totals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fotals PLC | 3589 | 1998 | 1954 | 5948 | 5773 | 6205 | 5972 | 5767 | 5837 | 6213 | 6530 | 6387 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC | 4660 | 625 | 103 | 420 | 331 | 378 | 368 | 374 | 421 | 478 | 502 | 496 |
| Total | 8248 | 2623 | 2056 | 6368 | 6104 | 6583 | 6340 | 6140 | 6258 | 6690 | 7032 | 6882 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -56 | -60 | -106 | -214 | 257 | 582 | 483 | 445 | 522 | 707 | 596 | 705 |
| ARC | 990 | -1226 | -581 | -67 | -45 | -42 | -59 | -52 | -27 | -18 | -18 | 2 |
| Subtotal | 934 | -1286 | -686 | -281 | 212 | 539 | 423 | 394 | 494 | 689 | 578 | 706 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -10 | -11 | -12 | 180 | 220 | 233 | 269 | 222 | 242 | 258 | 319 | 311 |
| ARC | -606 | -672 | -420 | -26 | 2 | 2 | 1 | -7 | 26 | 33 | 58 | 48 |
| Subtotal | -616 | -683 | -432 | 154 | 221 | 235 | 270 | 216 | 269 | 291 | 377 | 359 |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 9 | -51 | -27 | 208 | 320 | 372 | 346 | 320 | 296 | 350 | 350 | 345 |
| ARC | 223 | 170 | -209 | -55 | -47 | -53 | -22 | -22 | -15 | -13 | -20 | -26 |
| Subtotal | 233 | 119 | -236 | 153 | 273 | 320 | 323 | 298 | 281 | 337 | 330 | 320 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | | | -7 | 310 | 335 | 332 | 340 | 320 | 271 | 314 | 299 | 296 |
| ARC | | | 12 | 16 | 30 | 27 | 22 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 14 | 14 |
| Subtotal | | | 6 | 326 | 365 | 359 | 362 | 334 | 285 | 330 | 313 | 311 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -10 | -66 | 22 | 45 | 12 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 0 | -6 | 0 | -4 |
| ARC | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | -8 | -66 | 22 | 45 | 12 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 0 | -6 | 0 | -4 |
| Sorghum | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -45 | -33 | 14 | 46 | 57 | 71 | 62 | 63 | 67 | 64 | 69 | 67 |
| ARC | -13 | -13 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Subtotal | -57 | -46 | 17 | 49 | 58 | 74 | 64 | 65 | 70 | 68 | 73 | 72 |
| Rice | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 34 | 45 | -72 | 32 | 8 | -3 | -12 | -26 | -33 | -32 | -35 | -36 |
| ARC | -17 | -5 | -8 | -1 | -1 | 0 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Subtotal | 16 | 41 | -79 | 31 | 8 | -4 | -13 | -27 | -34 | -33 | -36 | -37 |
| Totals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -78 | -176 | -180 | 297 | 874 | 1260 | 1158 | 1030 | 1094 | 1341 | 1300 | 1389 |
| ARC | 578 | -1746 | -1214 | -147 | -90 | -91 | -79 | -79 | -12 | 5 | 23 | 28 |
| Subtotal | 501 | -1922 | -1395 | 150 | 784 | 1169 | 1079 | 952 | 1081 | 1347 | 1323 | 1416 |

The purpose of this project was to match the score from the model as close to the 2019 CBO Baseline as possible. To address this, the amount of risk applied to the CBO means, based on the draws from FAPRI, were multiplied by a Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF). This will reduce the differences between projected PLC payments for the national model and the CBO Baseline. The RAFs were applied directly to the percent deviate of each FAPRI draw of projected prices. The adjusted percent deviates were then applied to the CBO mean prices to create 500 unique draws for each projected year (2018 - 2027).

The fact that the ARC program depends on both price and yield variability, causes the scores for ARC to be more difficult to mimic. Meaning, the aggregated ARC scores are far less likely to match than the PLC scores. Assuming that CBO is using all of their own parameters for total base acres, average MYA price, payment yield, and ARC/PLC enrollment percentage, the only factors effecting PLC payments that can be different between the CBO Baseline and this model are the shape, and scale of the distribution of MYA prices.

In Table 4.3, corn has a positive difference on PLC in FY 21, or the national model has a larger payment projection than CBO. Thus, an RAF < 1 was applied to the percent deviates in that fiscal year in order to shrink this difference until the model scores the average national PLC payment within roughly \$1 million of the CBO estimate for PLC in FY 22. This process is the best way to produce scores as close as possible to the CBO baseline without having access to their exact distribution of MYA projected prices. As seen below, each year from FY 20 – FY 29 was adjusted for each crop because they have differing price distributions, thus, they require a different RAF. As a reminder FY 18 and FY 19 were not scaled because their respective prices and yields are already established.

| Table 4.4: Natio | Table 4.4: National Model Risk Adjustment Factors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 | | | | | |
| Corn | 8.25 | 1.1 | 0.901 | 0.7953 | 0.813 | 0.836 | 0.819 | 0.7585 | 0.796 | 0.7559 | | | | | |
| Soybeans | 3 | 0.675 | 0.645 | 0.635 | 0.5875 | 0.65 | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.555 | 0.5775 | | | | | |
| Wheat | 7 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.415 | 0.43 | 0.445 | 0.512 | 0.433 | 0.43 | 0.453 | | | | | |
| Seed Cotton | 1.8 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.305 | 0.36 | 0.395 | | | | | |
| Peanuts | 5.75 | 0.5 | 0.87 | 0.945 | 0.885 | 0.945 | 1 | 1.08 | 1 | 1.07 | | | | | |
| Sorghum | 4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | | | | | |
| Rice | 1 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 2.28 | 2.63 | 2.335 | 2.27 | 2.02 | 1.72 | | | | | |

The tables that are referred to as "adjusted" are labeled in that way to indicate that their respective RAF has been applied. Below in Figure 4.1 is the probability density function (PDF) of fiscal year 2021 corn prices depicting the price distributions, unadjusted and adjusted.




Table 4.5 on the following page shows the difference in the RAF based projections from the national model, and the CBO baseline.

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -56 | -60 | 1 | -6 | 0 | -1 | 1 | 0 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 0 |
| ARC | 990 | -1226 | -135 | -46 | -58 | -76 | -86 | -84 | -82 | -95 | -91 | -80 |
| Subtotal | 934 | -1286 | -134 | -52 | -58 | -77 | -85 | -84 | -83 | -96 | -92 | -80 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -10 | -11 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 |
| ARC | -606 | -672 | -266 | -106 | -73 | -71 | -80 | -65 | -44 | -57 | -52 | -60 |
| Subtotal | -616 | -683 | -267 | -106 | -73 | -70 | -80 | -64 | -44 | -56 | -53 | -61 |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 9 | -51 | 0 | -1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 |
| ARC | 223 | 170 | -208 | -64 | -66 | -73 | -52 | -55 | -47 | -57 | -62 | -66 |
| Subtotal | 233 | 119 | -208 | -65 | -67 | -72 | -52 | -56 | -47 | -58 | -62 | -66 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | | | 0 | 281 | 215 | 163 | 113 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ARC | | | 12 | -7 | 10 | 5 | -9 | -11 | -11 | -12 | -11 | -11 |
| Subtotal | | | 12 | 274 | 224 | 168 | 104 | 38 | -11 | -12 | -11 | -10 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -10 | -66 | 0 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARC | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | -8 | -66 | 0 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sorghum | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -45 | -33 | 15 | 21 | 10 | 15 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 13 |
| ARC | -13 | -13 | 6 | 2 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -3 | -2 | -2 | -2 | -2 |
| Subtotal | -57 | -46 | 21 | 23 | 8 | 13 | 8 | 7 | 11 | 7 | 12 | 12 |
| Rice | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 34 | 45 | -72 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARC | -17 | -5 | -8 | -1 | -1 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Subtotal | 16 | 41 | -79 | -2 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 0 |
| Totals | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | -78 | -176 | -57 | 37 | 11 | 17 | 13 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 12 | 13 |
| ARC | 578 | -1746 | -610 | -215 | -200 | -222 | -221 | -208 | -175 | -211 | -208 | -208 |
| Subtotal | 501 | -1922 | -667 | -177 | -189 | -205 | -208 | -197 | -163 | -203 | -195 | -196 |

After the RAFs were introduced, the national level model results for PLC were much closer to the CBO Baseline, as shown above. Note that only the projections (FY 20 - FY 29) shifted because the FY 18 and FY 19 are both established years that do not contain any risk. There were differences in projected PLC scores in Table 4.5 for cotton, peanuts, sorghum, and rice that did not squeeze closer to zero as their respective RAF was adjusted. Barring some specific adjustment by CBO to these particular projections that is not reported, the reason the

scores will not all match is due to the shape of their respective price distributions. The scale of the distribution is what was adjusted with the RAF's but the shape cannot be addressed because it is not public information. Therefore, nothing else can be done to make the scores match more closely without having the exact price distributions that CBO used in their model.

As introduced in Chapter II, p-values from the t-statistics based on the hypothesis that the projected mean from the model equals the CBO baseline mean, are reported to show how well the national model mimicked the CBO baseline. A 90% confidence interval was used to establish which projections differ enough from CBO to reject the hypothesis. Table 4.6 will shade the instances where the p-value is greater than 0.10. The shaded values are not significantly different than the CBO Baseline projection. The shading helps to see that the RAF's caused the model projections to no longer be significantly different than the CBO Baseline projections.

| | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.89 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.92 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.43 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.99 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | | 0.05 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.44 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.96 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.93 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | .0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.68 | 0.35 | 0.60 | 0.97 | 0.63 | 1.00 | 0.73 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.98 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 0.98 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.56 | 0.08 | 0.02 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| Sorghum | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 on for that | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

State Model Results


As opposed to the previous model, the state model establishes a score for each of the most prominent states and an all other for each crop (Table 4.7), and then these scores are summed by crop. This enables the state based scoring method to be compared to the CBO Baseline. Note the state model is less aggregated, allowing the scores to encompass more state-level information. In the PLC calculation, the payment per acre is based on a state level PLC payment yield, as opposed to using one for the entire country as the national model does. As discussed in detail in Chapter III, ARC includes yield variability based on each states' historical planted acre yield. An example of the top 3 unadjusted state scores for corn are shown in Table 4.7, but the entire collection of each crop score in each state can be found in the appendix.

| Table 4.7: State | e Model - Co | orn Calcula | ated Mea | ns | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|-------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
| IOWA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 43 | 43 | 13 | 388 | 358 | 452 | 427 | 431 | 469 | 525 | 584 | 557 |
| ARC | 212 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 27 | 34 | 32 | 34 | 37 | 40 | 42 | 42 |
| ILLINOIS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 35 | 35 | 11 | 320 | 295 | 373 | 352 | 356 | 387 | 433 | 482 | 460 |
| ARC | 347 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 25 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 35 | 36 | 40 | 39 |
| NEBRASKA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 29 | 29 | 9 | 260 | 240 | 304 | 286 | 289 | 315 | 352 | 392 | 374 |
| ARC | 635 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 12 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 22 | 20 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| CORN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 249 | 249 | 76 | 2255 | 2084 | 2636 | 2486 | 2512 | 2734 | 3058 | 3402 | 3246 |
| Total ARC | 3406 | 190 | 89 | 172 | 135 | 174 | 175 | 189 | 209 | 223 | 248 | 239 |
| Subtotal | 3654 | 439 | 164 | 2427 | 2219 | 2809 | 2661 | 2701 | 2944 | 3281 | 3650 | 3485 |
| SOYBEANS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 0 | 0 | 2 | 763 | 575 | 540 | 556 | 470 | 417 | 458 | 492 | 485 |
| Total ARC | 0 | 78 | 5 | 249 | 167 | 150 | 133 | 106 | 101 | 134 | 138 | 152 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 78 | 7 | 1011 | 742 | 690 | 689 | 575 | 518 | 592 | 630 | 637 |
| WHEAT | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 1385 | 670 | 344 | 925 | 1022 | 1079 | 1034 | 993 | 1001 | 1023 | 1017 | 1040 |
| Total ARC | 590 | 508 | 60 | 76 | 82 | 89 | 76 | 78 | 86 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Subtotal | 1975 | 1178 | 404 | 1001 | 1104 | 1167 | 1110 | 1072 | 1087 | 1113 | 1107 | 1130 |
| SEEDCOTTON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 0 | 0 | 237 | 1014 | 975 | 893 | 841 | 755 | 665 | 683 | 644 | 627 |
| Total ARC | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 241 | 1018 | 979 | 897 | 844 | 757 | 667 | 685 | 646 | 630 |
| PEANUTS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 624 | 340 | 447 | 440 | 432 | 425 | 425 | 420 | 423 | 427 | 440 | 450 |
| Total ARC | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Subtotal | 626 | 341 | 448 | 441 | 433 | 426 | 426 | 421 | 424 | 428 | 442 | 451 |
| SORGHUM | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 337 | 212 | 189 | 276 | 211 | 216 | 207 | 209 | 211 | 210 | 215 | 214 |
| Total ARC | 35 | 13 | 30 | 28 | 18 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 13 |
| Subtotal | 373 | 226 | 219 | 304 | 230 | 232 | 220 | 221 | 223 | 223 | 228 | 228 |
| ALL RICE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 1026 | 538 | 678 | 717 | 708 | 641 | 604 | 565 | 555 | 544 | 543 | 543 |
| Total ARC | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Subtotal | 1031 | 540 | 680 | 719 | 710 | 642 | 605 | 567 | 556 | 546 | 544 | 545 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| CORN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -16 | -21 | -94 | 146 | 378 | 735 | 627 | 592 | 681 | 885 | 794 | 639 |
| Total ARC | 489 | -1,036 | -492 | 58 | 41 | 48 | 37 | 36 | 36 | 32 | 34 | 25 |
| Subtotal | 473 | -1,057 | -586 | 204 | 420 | 783 | 664 | 628 | 717 | 918 | 828 | 664 |
| SOYBEANS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -10 | -11 | -12 | 216 | 247 | 258 | 295 | 245 | 262 | 280 | 342 | 334 |
| Total ARC | -606 | -594 | -415 | 13 | 46 | 39 | 36 | 25 | 48 | 65 | 71 | 74 |
| Subtotal | -616 | -605 | -426 | 229 | 293 | 298 | 331 | 270 | 310 | 345 | 413 | 408 |
| WHEAT | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 16 | -48 | -27 | 197 | 320 | 376 | 329 | 304 | 280 | 333 | 334 | 329 |
| Total ARC | 79 | 86 | -149 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 23 | 19 | 31 | 28 | 25 | 18 |
| Subtotal | 94 | 38 | -176 | 208 | 335 | 392 | 352 | 324 | 311 | 362 | 359 | 346 |
| SEEDCOTTON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | | | 24 | 441 | 461 | 447 | 449 | 418 | 357 | 402 | 383 | 377 |
| Total ARC | | | -41 | -12 | -16 | -15 | -13 | -12 | -13 | -12 | -12 | -12 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | -17 | 429 | 445 | 432 | 436 | 406 | 344 | 390 | 371 | 365 |
| PEANUTS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 16 | -74 | 30 | 53 | 20 | 12 | 19 | 14 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 4 |
| Total ARC | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Subtotal | 18 | -73 | 31 | 53 | 21 | 13 | 20 | 15 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 5 |
| SORGHUM | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -45 | -34 | 10 | 44 | 55 | 69 | 60 | 61 | 65 | 62 | 67 | 66 |
| Total ARC | 11 | -9 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| Subtotal | -34 | -43 | 16 | 53 | 59 | 74 | 64 | 64 | 69 | 66 | 72 | 70 |
| ALL RICE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -6 | 24 | -99 | -46 | -38 | -83 | -100 | -125 | -119 | -119 | -107 | -99 |
| Total ARC | -18 | -5 | -8 | -2 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Subtotal | -24 | 19 | -107 | -48 | -39 | -85 | -101 | -126 | -120 | -120 | -109 | -100 |

Unadjusted results for FY 20 - FY 29 were used to compare the national model with the state model results to determine which one more closely matched CBO. The information in Figure 4.2 indicates which model structure did a better job at mimicking CBO.



Based on the above figure, the national model is closer to CBO, especially for PLC. This conclusion makes sense given that CBO uses a nationally based model in their projections.

RAFs were applied to the MYA price distribution using the same methods as the national model to shrink the difference between PLC scores produced by the state model, and the 2019 CBO Baseline. The adjusted results are reported below along with the RAF used for each year for each crop.

| Table 4.10: Stat | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
| Corn | 6.5 | 0.9413 | 0.8632 | 0.7583 | 0.7763 | 0.8026 | 0.78 | 0.7159 | 0.7436 | 0.795 |
| Soybeans | 2.95 | 0.634 | 0.622 | 0.616 | 0.57 | 0.633 | 0.608 | 0.597 | 0.548 | 0.568 |
| Wheat | 7 | 0.58 | 0.472 | 0.433 | 0.448 | 0.467 | 0.533 | 0.452 | 0.448 | 0.472 |
| Seed Cotton | 1 | 0.35 | 0.3 | 0.25 | 0.2 | 0.15 | 0.1 | 0.23 | 0.2965 | 0.334 |
| Peanuts | 7 | 0.55 | 0.77 | 0.85 | 0.8 | 0.87 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.91 | 0.95 |
| Sorghum | 1 | 0.5 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.4 | 0.37 | 0.4 | 0.373 | 0.37 |
| Rice | 1 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 2.84 | 2.83 | 3.28 | 2.82 | 2.82 | 2.35 | 2.02 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| CORN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -16 | -21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | 489 | -1,036 | -298 | 47 | 25 | 17 | 2 | -1 | -13 | -31 | -33 | -27 |
| Subtotal | 473 | -1,057 | -299 | 47 | 25 | 17 | 3 | -1 | -14 | -31 | -32 | -27 |
| SOYBEANS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -10 | -11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | -606 | -594 | -258 | -44 | -24 | -20 | -42 | -42 | -25 | -27 | -24 | -33 |
| Subtotal | -616 | -605 | -259 | -44 | -25 | -20 | -42 | -42 | -25 | -27 | -24 | -32 |
| WHEAT | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 16 | -48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | 79 | 86 | -82 | -2 | -9 | -13 | -7 | -12 | -1 | -10 | -16 | -22 |
| Subtotal | 94 | 38 | -82 | -2 | -9 | -13 | -7 | -12 | -1 | -10 | -16 | -22 |
| SEEDCOTTON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | | | 24 | 409 | 325 | 257 | 189 | 108 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | | | -41 | -12 | -17 | -16 | -14 | -13 | -14 | -14 | -13 | -14 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | -17 | 397 | 308 | 241 | 175 | 95 | -9 | -14 | -13 | -14 |
| PEANUTS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | 16 | -74 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Subtotal | 18 | -73 | 1 | 33 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| SORGHUM | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -45 | -34 | 10 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total ARC | 11 | -9 | 7 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Subtotal | -34 | -43 | 16 | 29 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| ALL RICE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total PLC | -6 | 24 | -99 | -49 | -42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 0 |
| Total ARC | -18 | -5 | -8 | -2 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 0 | -1 | -1 | -1 |
| Subtotal | -24 | 19 | -107 | -50 | -43 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -1 |

The differences in the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that they nearly all match the CBO scores in both the national model and the state model. Thus, when comparing the models post-adjustment, the ARC scores and the subtotals indicate that the state model matches CBO more closely in terms of how much the state model differs in absolute value.

Table 4.12 shows the p-values for the state model for each crop. Shading was done in the same way as Table 4.6. Similarly to Table 4.6, the state model RAF's made many of the PLC scores shift from "reject", to "fail to reject." This shift is beneficial because it means that the

RAF's caused many of the scores from the state model to be closer to the CBO Baseline

projections.

| | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|----------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------|
| Corn | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | 0.276 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.985 | 0.981 | 0.984 | 0.975 | 0.974 | 0.975 | 0.976 | 0.970 | 0.989 | 0.975 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0.023 | 0.021 | 0.101 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.013 | 0.112 | 0.811 | 0.900 | 0.284 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.044 |
| Soybeans | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.684 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.997 | 0.991 | 0.984 | 0.996 | 0.992 | 0.976 | 0.989 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.036 | 0.331 | 0.029 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.030 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Wheat | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.971 | 0.998 | 0.998 | 0.989 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.991 | 0.999 | 0.996 | 0.995 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.386 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.717 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Seed Cotton | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.456 | 0.981 | 0.988 | 0.995 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Peanuts | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.103 | 0.324 | 0.131 | 0.271 | 0.528 | 0.909 | 0.542 | 2. 0.778 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.995 | 0.000 | 0.972 | 0.993 | 0.982 | 0.973 | 0.996 | 0.990 | 0.993 | 0.984 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Sorghum | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC P-Value - Unadj. | 0.000 | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| PLC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.980 | 0.972 | 0.990 | 0.977 | 0.953 | 0.938 | 0.913 | 0.983 |
| ARC P-Value - Unadj | . 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| ARC P-Value - Adj. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.704 | 0.910 | 0.294 | 0.016 | 0.076 |

The differences in the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that they nearly all match the CBO scores in both the national model and the state model. Thus, when comparing the models post-adjustment, the ARC scores and the subtotals determine that the state model matches CBO more closely in terms of how much the state model differs in absolute value.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Agricultural policy analysis requires timely and accurate research to maintain relevance. With ever-present budgetary pressure, and a population that continues to migrate away from the farm, tools like the ones developed in this study will be needed in the future to defend and improve the programs put in place to protect US producers. Producers and their commodity organizations routinely provide policy suggestions prior to the development of each farm bill. Groups often have several suggestions for potential policy changes, however, without knowing the cost of their policy proposals they have no idea if such changes will be economically feasible. If they ask for a change that is too expensive, it could be quickly dismissed once CBO scores the changes. They may not have the opportunity to propose additional changes and, in essence, they have lost their chance to have a say in agricultural policy reform. Therefore, this scoring tool can be used to assist producers, their associations and other interest groups with developing policy proposals that fit within budget guidelines. This study, in particular, provides a holistic view of the major commodity programs and the projected expenditures on the main commodities produced across the country. These major crops can also be tweaked individually to compare program parameter changes beyond the baseline results that were reported in Chapter IV.

The primary objective of the project was to create a stochastic simulation model that can be used to score ARC and PLC changes for 9 major agricultural commodities. The model used many of the parameters and prices from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline so that estimates could be expected to approximate the CBO score of the same policy proposals. This

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analysis compared the CBO baseline projections with the results from two approaches to determine which method provides the most similar payment projections to the CBO baseline.

The first approach of this study was to project scores for the programs based on nationally averaged parameters. The alternative to this approach was to base the program parameters for ARC and PLC on state averages for the states with the highest acres of each crop. The nationally based model was used because it is the understood practice of the CBO. The state based model provided more specific yield variability and history across the analysis which could lead to a more useful model of expected payments. Both approaches were compared to the January 2019 CBO Baseline to see which most closely matched CBO.

The results in Chapter IV show that the unadjusted national model does a better job at mimicking CBO, especially for PLC. This conclusion is based on the fact the national model had a smaller difference from the CBO projection more often than the state based model. This makes sense because CBO uses a nationally based model in their projections.

After the models where adjusted so that the PLC scores are all adjusted to the point that they nearly match the CBO scores, the ARC scores and the subtotals determine that the state model matches CBO more closely.

Future Research

Analytical tools in this field will continue to be vital in helping policy influencers have an educated understanding of any proposed policy changes into the future. In terms of improving the results of the model, more knowledge of any wedges or unique factors used by the CBO would be beneficial when attempting to improve models.

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Finally, the state based model could potentially be made more effective by increasing the number of states considered individually. In this model, only 9 states were modeled separately and the remained states were weighted into an *others states* payment. The reasoning behind this was to analyze the major states, while also considering the size of the model. Even though the other states are accounted for the under 'other states' umbrella, the yield variability is dampened more than if they were factored in individually.

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| Table A.1: State N | /lodel - Corn | Calculate | d Means | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
| IOWA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 43 | 43 | 13 | 388 | 358 | 452 | 427 | 431 | 469 | 525 | 584 | 557 |
| ARC | 212 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 27 | 34 | 32 | 34 | 37 | 40 | 42 | 42 |
| ILLINOIS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 35 | 35 | 11 | 320 | 295 | 373 | 352 | 356 | 387 | 433 | 482 | 460 |
| ARC | 347 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 25 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 35 | 36 | 40 | 39 |
| NEBRASKA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 29 | 29 | 9 | 260 | 240 | 304 | 286 | 289 | 315 | 352 | 392 | 374 |
| ARC | 635 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 12 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 22 | 20 |
| MINNESOTA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 24 | 24 | 7 | 219 | 202 | 256 | 241 | 244 | 265 | 297 | 330 | 315 |
| ARC | 51 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 20 | 21 | 24 | 24 |
| INDIANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 17 | 17 | 5 | 155 | 143 | 181 | 171 | 173 | 188 | 210 | 234 | 223 |
| ARC | 335 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 15 |
| SOUTH DAKOTA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 13 | 13 | 4 | 116 | 107 | 135 | 128 | 129 | 140 | 157 | 175 | 167 |
| ARC | 129 | 87 | 0 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 14 |
| KANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 14 | 14 | 4 | 125 | 115 | 146 | 138 | 139 | 151 | 169 | 188 | 180 |
| ARC | 128 | 103 | 0 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 12 |
| WISCONSIN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 10 | 10 | 3 | 91 | 84 | 106 | 100 | 101 | 110 | 123 | 137 | 131 |
| ARC | 91 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 10 |
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 5 | 5 | 2 | 48 | 45 | 57 | 53 | 54 | 59 | 66 | 73 | 70 |
| ARC | 111 | 0 | 89 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| OTHER STATES | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 59 | 59 | 18 | 535 | 494 | 625 | 590 | 596 | 649 | 725 | 807 | 770 |
| ARC | 1367 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 25 | 37 | 38 | 43 | 48 | 54 | 60 | 59 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ILLINOIS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 85 | 80 | 82 | 69 | 61 | 67 | 72 | 72 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 17 | 14 | 20 | 20 | 23 |
| IOWA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 83 | 78 | 80 | 67 | 60 | 66 | 71 | 70 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 21 | 20 | 17 | 13 | 14 | 20 | 20 | 22 |
| MINNESOTA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 | 62 | 58 | 60 | 51 | 45 | 49 | 53 | 52 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 24 | 19 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 13 | 15 |
| NORTH DAKO | ТА | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 34 | 32 | 32 | 27 | 24 | 27 | 29 | 28 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| SOUTH DAKO | ГА | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 30 | 27 | 29 | 31 | 31 |
| ARC | 0 | 38 | 0 | 18 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| INDIANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 45 | 42 | 43 | 36 | 32 | 35 | 38 | 38 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| MISSOURI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 35 | 33 | 34 | 28 | 25 | 28 | 30 | 29 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 3 | 19 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| оню | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 30 | 27 | 30 | 32 | 31 |
| ARC | 0 | 40 | 0 | 14 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER STATES | s | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 1 | 210 | 158 | 149 | 153 | 129 | 115 | 126 | 135 | 134 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 39 | 33 | 30 | 26 | 27 | 35 | 39 | 42 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| KANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 225 | 109 | 56 | 151 | 167 | 176 | 169 | 162 | 164 | 167 | 166 | 170 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 8 | 13 | 14 | 18 | 14 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 |
| NORTH DAKOT | A | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 201 | 97 | 50 | 135 | 149 | 157 | 151 | 145 | 146 | 149 | 148 | 151 |
| ARC | 124 | 113 | 0 | 23 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 13 |
| MONTANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 131 | 63 | 32 | 87 | 96 | 102 | 97 | 94 | 94 | 96 | 96 | 98 |
| ARC | 73 | 66 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| OKLAHOMA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 126 | 61 | 31 | 84 | 93 | 98 | 94 | 90 | 91 | 93 | 92 | 94 |
| ARC | 0 | 39 | 36 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 91 | 44 | 22 | 60 | 67 | 70 | 68 | 65 | 65 | 67 | 66 | 68 |
| ARC | 13 | 20 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| COLORADO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 57 | 28 | 14 | 38 | 42 | 45 | 43 | 41 | 41 | 42 | 42 | 43 |
| ARC | 13 | 0 | 16 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| WASHINGTON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 99 | 48 | 25 | 66 | 73 | 77 | 74 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 73 | 74 |
| ARC | 55 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| SOUTH DAKOT | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 63 | 30 | 16 | 42 | 46 | 49 | 47 | 45 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 47 |
| ARC | 35 | 35 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| NEBRASKA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 42 | 20 | 10 | 28 | 31 | 32 | 31 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| ARC | 15 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 350 | 170 | 87 | 234 | 258 | 272 | 261 | 251 | 253 | 258 | 257 | 263 |
| ARC | 261 | 215 | 1 | 14 | 20 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 27 | 29 | 29 | 29 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 66 | 282 | 271 | 249 | 234 | 210 | 185 | 190 | 179 | 175 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| MISSISSIPPI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 25 | 108 | 104 | 95 | 90 | 80 | 71 | 73 | 68 | 67 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEORGIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 21 | 91 | 88 | 80 | 76 | 68 | 60 | 61 | 58 | 56 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CALIFORNIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 32 | 137 | 131 | 120 | 113 | 102 | 90 | 92 | 87 | 85 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARKANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 17 | 73 | 70 | 64 | 61 | 54 | 48 | 49 | 46 | 45 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LOUISIANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 15 | 62 | 60 | 55 | 52 | 46 | 41 | 42 | 40 | 39 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NORTH CAROL | INA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 12 | 52 | 50 | 45 | 43 | 38 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 32 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TENNESSEE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 10 | 44 | 42 | 39 | 37 | 33 | 29 | 30 | 28 | 27 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ALABAMA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 9 | 40 | 38 | 35 | 33 | 29 | 26 | 27 | 25 | 25 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 29 | 125 | 121 | 111 | 104 | 93 | 82 | 84 | 80 | 78 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| GEORGIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 251 | 137 | 173 | 170 | 167 | 164 | 164 | 162 | 163 | 165 | 170 | 174 |
| ARC | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 116 | 63 | 80 | 79 | 77 | 76 | 76 | 75 | 75 | 76 | 79 | 80 |
| ARC | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ALABAMA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 73 | 40 | 56 | 55 | 54 | 53 | 53 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 55 | 56 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NORTH CAROLI | NA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 48 | 26 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 36 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FLORIDA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 49 | 27 | 37 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 36 | 37 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OKLAHOMA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 25 | 14 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 19 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SOUTH CAROLII | NA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 24 | 13 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| VIRGINIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 23 | 12 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 15 | 8 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | FY 18 | FY 19 | FY 20 | FY 21 | FY 22 | FY 23 | FY 24 | FY 25 | FY 26 | FY 27 | FY 28 | FY 29 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| KANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 129 | 81 | 72 | 106 | 81 | 83 | 80 | 80 | 81 | 81 | 83 | 82 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 110 | 69 | 62 | 91 | 69 | 71 | 68 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 71 | 70 |
| ARC | 20 | 4 | 19 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| NEBRASKA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 24 | 15 | 14 | 20 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| MISSOURI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 20 | 13 | 11 | 16 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 |
| ARC | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| OKLAHOMA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 9 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| ARC | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NEW MEXICO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 8 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| ARC | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| COLORADO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ARKANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 8 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| ARC | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SOUTH DAKOT | A | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 6 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ARC | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OTHER | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 18 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| ARC | 6 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

| Table A.7: State | FY 18 FY | | | | 22 FY | 23 FY | 24 F) | 25 FY 2 | 26 FY | 27 FY 2 | 8 F) | (29 |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|---------------|---------|---------|--------------|
| ARKANSAS | 1110 11 | | | | 11 | -5 11 | -7 [] | 112 | . J 11 | _/ 112 | | , |
| PLC | 436 | 248 | 316 | 321 | 313 | 286 | 267 | 250 | 244 | 241 | 240 | 239 |
| ARC | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 200 |
| | _ | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| LOUISIANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 173 | 98 | 125 | 127 | 124 | 113 | 106 | 99 | 97 | 95 | 95 | 95 |
| ARC | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 145 | 82 | 105 | 106 | 104 | 95 | 89 | 83 | 81 | 80 | 80 | 79 |
| ARC | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| MISSISSIPPI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 88 | 50 | 64 | 65 | 64 | 58 | 54 | 51 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 48 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| | Ũ | Ū | Ū | Ū | Ũ | Ū | Ū | Ũ | Ū | C C | Ū | |
| MISSOURI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 63 | 36 | 46 | 46 | 45 | 41 | 39 | 36 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| CALIFORNIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| OTHER STATES | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| Table A.8: State | Model - Mediur | n Grain ar | nd Short G | irain Rice | e Calculate | ed Means | | | | | | |
| | FY 18 FY | | | | 22 FY | | | 25 FY 2 | 26 FY | 27 FY 2 | 8 F | Y 2 9 |
| ARKANSAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 29 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 18 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| LOUISIANA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| TEXAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| ARC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MISSOURI PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| PLC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (|
| ARC | | - | - | 5 | 5 | č | č | č | ÷ | 5 | ÷ | |
| ARC | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Temperate Japoi | nica Rice (Califo | rnia Medi | um Grain) | | | | | | | | | |
| Temperate Japoı CALIFORNIA | | | | | 20 | 02 | 101 | 100 | 00 | 02 | 01 | |
| Temperate Japoi | nica Rice (Califo 82 1 | rnia Medi 0 0 | um Grain) 0 0 | 23 0 | 29 0 | 92 0 | 101 0 | 109 0 | 99 0 | 98 0 | 81 0 | 7(|