PARTISAN POLARIZATION, LAWMAKING, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

The composition of the two major parties, both at the mass and elite level, has changed dramatically over the past fifty years. In this period we have witnessed a notable resurgence of ideological separation between the parties. Yet we do not understand well the effects of polarization on other political processes. Does polarization affect the process of creating legislation (that is, lawmaking)? Does polarization affect the extent to which policy is reflective of public preferences (that is, representation)? Does polarization change the way individuals perceive the Congress and its processes (that is, approval)?

The dissertation seeks to answer these three questions. To do so, it leverages a theory with a rich intellectual history: Conditional Party Government (CPG). Most basically, CPG assumes that lawmaking strategies and policy outputs should vary systematically with the shape of majority preferences (relative to minority preferences) and the amount of ideological separation between the two. In its current form, however, CPG is not sufficiently developed to make systematic predictions about the nature of lawmaking across all arrangements of majority and minority parties. Moreover, no test of CPG has used quality measures of key concepts over time in a systematic, longitudinal test of the theory. Accordingly, I formalize the predictions of CPG for three key outcomes—majority power, minority power, and policy results—for each of the possible combinations of political parties (heterogenous and homogenous, ideologically similar and dissimilar).

The contribution of the dissertation is fourfold. First, it provides a systematizing of CPG. That is, it generates unique predictions for each of the possibly observable conditions of parties. Second, it fills a large gap in the literature by providing the

first systematic, longitudinal tests of CPG and, thus, the effects of polarization on lawmaking. By quantifying the "conditions" of CPG, we can identify the importance of each of the components of the theory—majority and minority party shape and the distance between the two—in determining the expected patterns of partisan lawmaking strategies and policy outputs.

Third, it generates a novel measure of restrictive legislative rules over time. Rules are notoriously hard to measure, and no quality, longitudinal measures of the restrictiveness of rules exist. Accordingly, I code all recorded votes in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* from 1947 to 2012 (over 27,000), isolate all votes on any motion pertaining to legislative rules (over 3,000), collect those rules and content-analyze them, using `Python`, to determine if they fit patterns of restrictiveness (barring amendments, limiting time for debate, and so on). This strategy can be extended to code virtually any desired attribute of rules over time. This is one of the most comprehensive datasets on legislative rules in the discipline. In particular, I employ these data in the dissertation to test the theory I develop regarding the implications of polarization on lawmaking.

Fourth, the dissertation uses CPG to test the implications of polarization for representation and for approval. These novel analyses help to advance the discipline beyond investigating the causes of polarization and toward examining its effects on the American political system.

DEDICATION

To my family, who never stopped believing in me. To my friends, whose conversations shaped the pages that follow. To my advisors, who patiently helped me craft the theory and tests.

And to Victoria. The most amazing, loving, and patient woman I have ever known. For five years you put up with this. These pages have my words on them, but they echo your love and encouragement.

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More individuals deserve to be acknowledged here than I have room for, but you know who you are. Your name doesn't have to be in a list to know that I appreciate your help in shaping my theoretical ideas (or keeping me mostly sane).

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The other members of my committee—Patricia Hurley, Dan Wood, and Kevin Barge—deserve major credit in this respect as well. Patricia helped shape many of the early theoretical ideas, from as long ago as my second semester of graduate school. Dan taught me almost everything I know about methods, and his advice improved the analyses offered here immeasurably. Kevin helped shape the way I think about theories, pushing me to make them more complete and account for more phenomena. And each of them, especially Kim, slogged through the sections of this dissertation an innumerable amount of times. With incredible speed, I might add.

I enjoyed many theoretical contributions from my classmates at Texas A&M. Lake walks with Grant Ferguson and Clayton Webb helped push the theory and the analysis along during times where I was out of creative ideas. Grant has been an incredible friend and mentor of sorts: my first experience with an older American politics graduate student who could show me the lay of the theoretical land and how to use `R`. It should be noted that Clay is a sanctions scholar, so his outside

perspective on my seemingly obsessive analysis of Congressional rules was critical. "Fetus: is it polarized?" Angel Molina has been my office neighbor for years now: much commiserating has happened in both of our offices.

Even more wine-based theoretical contributions came from the American Politics Wine Hour. Paul Kellstedt was kind enough to provide the wine that got the American politics graduate students talking about dissertations and the ideas in them. In no particular order, I'm thankful to those students for helping me think through some of the theory here: Nick Conway, Alison Higgins, Kathryn Haglin, and Travis Whisenant. Paul himself has been more than a wine provider, giving me the opportunity to teach at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and mentoring me through that process.

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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The composition of the two major political parties, both at the mass and elite level, has changed dramatically over the past fifty years. Whereas scholars once noted the lack of ideological differentiation between the parties (Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979), even lamenting this ideological overlap (APSA 1950), the last thirty years have witnessed a notable resurgence of ideological separation between the two (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008; Abramowitz 2010). Our understanding of this process is imperfect, but it is clear that, especially at the elite level, Republicans and Democrats have become increasingly different from one another. This ideological separation is commonly called polarization. While polarization can take many forms (Wood and Jordan 2011), in the most general sense it is the phenomenon of parties becoming ideologically distinct.

As we build an understanding of the causes of polarization, however, we know relatively less about its effects. The effects of polarization are potentially far reaching. One set of effects of polarization is with regards to the construction of legislation, heretofore referred to as lawmaking. Lawmaking itself is comprised of several individual components. Legislation must be scheduled to reach the floor of a lawmaking institution. Once there, rules govern both the length and openness of debate on the legislation, as well as how open it is to amendment.

Lawmaking also has its own effects. Rules and procedures can be constructed in such a way as to move the ideological tenor of legislation from non-median outcomes. As a result, laws can shift in how representative they are of the average dispositions of the public they are meant to serve. In other words, lawmaking can have a direct effect on the quality of representation a public receives from a legislative institution.

Lawmaking might also affect the public's disposition toward an institution. Depending on how open or closed the lawmaking process is generally, or how combative the parties are during that process, the public might change in how much it approves of the institution.

At its core, this dissertation is about the puzzle of how polarization, lawmaking, and the subsequent effects of lawmaking are linked. While scholars have danced around the edges of this puzzle, we lack systematic predictions regarding exactly how polarization affects lawmaking and both lawmaking and polarization affect representation and approval. To generate these predictions, the dissertation leverages a theory with a rich intellectual history: *Conditional Party Government* (CPG).[1] Most basically, CPG assumes that lawmaking strategies and policy outputs should vary systematically with the shape of aggregated majority party preferences in the Congress (relative to minority preferences) and the amount of ideological separation between the two. In its current form, however, CPG is not sufficiently developed to make systematic predictions about the nature of lawmaking across all arrangements of majority and minority parties.

What is in order, then, is a full explication of CPG and its strengths and its shortcomings as a systematic theory of lawmaking. Grasping exactly what the theory does (and does not) predict is critical to understanding polarization and lawmaking. With this understanding in hand, we can begin to envision a comprehensive theory

[1]Congress is a much studied institution. As such, any new theory of lawmaking must ground itself in the extant literature. I adopt CPG theory in my research because my reading of the competing theories of lawmaking in Congress—which includes those advanced by Chiou and Rothenberg (2011), Cox and McCubbins (2005), Krehbiel (1998), and Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007)—suggests that CPG is the dominant research paradigm on this topic, in Kuhn's (1962) sense of the latter term. As further evidence for this point, a keyword search in the political science journal articles archived in JSTOR in September 2104 for "conditional + party + government" produced 256 pages of citations or article-uses of that term. In contrast, a comparable search for "cartel + theory" produced 60 pages of citations, and a search for "pivotal + politics + theory" returned 149 pages of citations.

of lawmaking.

1.1 Existing Work on Polarization and Lawmaking

CPG traces back to the works of Rohde (1991) and Aldrich (1995).[2] Aldrich (1995) is concerned with the strategic reasons why politicians, such as legislators, might accede to join a party as an organization. Through parties, ambitious politicians access a network through which to obtain office, they get to claim credit from common policy positions via a party label, and the party subsequently helps them overcome the collective action problem once in government (284-285). This has been referred to as the "electoral connection" of CPG.

Naturally, the success of the party in the electorate has implications for how it operates in the legislature. Rohde (1991) summarizes the intertwined nature of elections, party, and leadership (162-163). Electoral victories produce different types of party caucuses, akin to the effects of "external" factors characterized by Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979). When majority-party caucuses are particularly homogeneous, especially relative to a heterogeneous minority party, party members are expected to delegate considerable powers to the party leadership. These powers are consensually expected to be used to achieve partisan legislative ends. The importance of party leadership in achieving partisan ends has been noted before (Cooper and Brady 1981).

CPG, then, should be a formalization of these diffuse expectations. In the particular case of the United States Congress, the willingness of members of Congress (MCs) to delegate authority and power to party leadership should vary predictably over time. Specifically, it varies according to the "condition" of CPG: consistently

[2] As will be discussed, CPG can claim a voluminous literature. Not all of that literature is covered here. Instead, I focus on those most important pieces which are most concerned with constructing or verifying the core components of the theory.

Table 1.1: CPG: Conditions and Expectations

Condition	1. Homogeneity of majority party (relative to minority)
	2. Distance between parties
Expectations	1. Increased leadership powers
	2. Expectation of the party to use those powers
	3. Partisan legislation

defined as the degree of homogeneity within the majority party, relative to the minority party, and the amount of policy separation between the two (Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias 2004, 3; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 5; Aldrich and Rohde 2001, 5; Rohde and Aldrich 2010, 236).[3] Satisfaction of this condition should lead to three consequences: increased leadership powers, an expectation of the party to use those powers, and subsequent partisan legislation as a result of using those powers (Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 5; Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias 2004, 3; Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias 2007, 103).[4] These two critical components—the conditions and expectations of CPG—are presented in Table 1.1.

A variety of evidence has been marshalled in support of the theory. Rohde (1991) demonstrates how resurgent partisanship in the House was a cause of increased homogeneity, increased leadership, and leader orientations. Aldrich (2011) shows how, as more extreme MCs arrive in the House,[5] party voting and partisan legislation increase, especially through the use of special rules in legislation. Aldrich and Rohde (2000) show that satisfaction of the "condition" of CPG also leads to partisan

[3]Fortunately, this consistency offers two fairly well defined concepts that can be measured in a straightforward way (with a review of potential measures as early as Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979).

[4]It is possible to imagine other theoretically implied outcomes, such as partisan organization of committees (Aldrich and Battista 2002). But I focus on the three major outcomes, as consistently defined by the original authors of the theory.

[5]The "electoral connection" of CPG is elaborated in Aldrich and Rohde (2001).

advantages on committees, especially critical ones, as well as advantages in Speaker powers and agenda setting. Rohde and Aldrich (2010) describe broadly the various institutional changes within the House since the mid-twentieth century and relate them to changes in the level of CPG.

The comprehensiveness of CPG (it accounts for the electoral connection between constituencies and the members they send to Congress, it makes predictions about the interplay between types of caucuses and the leadership powers they will afford their party leadership, and it continues this connection all the way through to policy outcomes) has spawned an industry of scholars documenting additional evidence for the theory, at multiple levels and across multiple predictions. Among the more important works, Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008), testing the mechanism of leadership powers, demonstrate that the use of special rules in the House varies systematically according to the institutional structure of the House (the construction of which is influenced by CPG). Aldrich and Battista (2002) find that state-level CPG affects the distribution of committee assignments within the state (regardless of the jurisdiction of the committee). Clucas (2009) uses a survey of state-level legislators to assess state-level CPG and demonstrates that states with high CPG adopted independent "Contracts with America" in the 1994 election cycle. Testing other implications, Taylor (2003) demonstrates that PAC contributions shift to party leadership from standing committees as CPG rises.

Despite its strengths, CPG is currently limited in a number of ways. Most importantly, the theory itself is incomplete. It relates the conditions of CPG to expected outcomes, but it fails to specify predictions for all possible observable "conditions." Evidence for the core components of the theory is usually drawn from case studies of partisan and leader influence on particular roll calls, rather than systematic longitudinal tests. Even when empirical tests are specified, they are rarely truly

longitudinal and instead investigate "eras" of institutional structure in the House. These limitations—and the opportunities for future research they create—are explored more fully in the next section.

1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Limitations and Unsolved Puzzles

The most problematic omission of the current form of CPG is that its theoretical predictions are incomplete.[6] In a well documented criticism by Cox and McCubbins (2005), CPG offers little theoretical insight on expectations when the condition of CPG is *not* met. In fact, the foundation of Cox and McCubbins' criticism is that certain majority powers are *unconditional*. Specifically, the majority should never set an agenda so as to pass a bill against the wishes of the majority of the majority party. This expectation is regardless of the shapes of the distributions of the two parties or the distance between them. Expanding on similar criticisms, Krehbiel (1998, 168) goes so far as to imply that, in its current form, CPG is largely not testable against other theories of lawmaking (particularly his theory of majoritarian pivotal politics).

In addition, CPG implicitly assumes that all of the conditions (majority homogeneity, minority heterogeneity, and ideological separation) will be satisfied simultaneously. Indeed, the preferred measure of CPG is constructed in Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias (2007) as a multiple-dimension principal components analysis of four separate variables,[7] calling the latent dimension the "condition." Such an assumption might be undesirable, especially given critiques like that of Cox and McCubbins (2005) on the lack of theoretical expectations when various parts of the condition *are not* satisfied.

These criticisms are depicted in Table 1.2. This typology generalizes the possible

[6] For a more detailed treatment of the following criticisms, see Smith (2007).

[7] Inter-party homogeneity, intra-party homogeneity, party separation (according to a discriminate function analysis), and the R^2 from the discriminate function, all using DW-NOMINATE scores.

Table 1.2: CPG: Current Predictions According with Varying Degrees of the "Condition"

		Majority Party	
		Heterogenous	Homogenous
Minority Party	Heterogenous	No Prediction	CPG
	Homogenous	No Prediction	"Some" CPG

"CPG" should be interpreted as the three outcomes predicted by the theory, outlined in Table 1.1.

permutations of parties, of course, but it is a useful heuristic in organizing the state of CPG. At best, the current formulation of the theory makes theoretical predictions in only two of the four possible permutations of party distributions: when majorities become more homogenous. It makes no predictions when majorities are heterogenous, and it implicitly assumes that there will just be "more" party government if homogenous majorities face heterogenous minorities (rather than homogenous ones) but does not quantify this difference or offer any predictions on its form.[8] Additionally, the theory implicitly assumes that these conditions will occur alongside divergence between the parties. Yet it is possible to observe any of these party configurations between parties that are both polarized and unpolarized. A comprehensive theory of lawmaking would rectify this deficiency by supplementing and extending these core predictions for each of the potentially observable configurations of the parties.

[8]Other work on CPG, such as that of Smith and Gamm (2009, 143), which attempt to test the theory rely on the same, broad theoretical expectations that are difficult to test.

Additionally, in practice, almost all testing of CPG at the Congressional level has been by case studies. Case studies are valuable, but it is inadequate to test a theory that changes expectations based on conditions that *vary over time* by non-randomly selecting incidents that validate the theory. A rigorous, over time test of the theory is necessary, demonstrating both how the varying satisfaction of the conditions of CPG affects specific leader powers *and* the source of the variation in those conditions.

The dissertation, then, offers original and systematic predictions, grounded in previous literature, to rectify these inconsistencies and articulate CPG as a full theory of lawmaking. This full theory makes theoretical predictions across all possible permutations of party arrangements. The dissertation also uses original measures of the restrictiveness of the lawmaking process to test the new, expanded theory in a truly longitudinal way. These theoretical goals are outlined more fully in the next section.

1.3 Theoretical Goals of the Dissertation

Any full statement of CPG as a theory of lawmaking must trace it from the electoral connection, to the composition of the parties in Congress, to the powers those parties are endowed with, to the type of policy they produce. The major deficiencies in CPG, as it stands, are its failure to make clear theoretical predictions at the third step and its failure to provide a comprehensive, quantitative test of the whole process over time. The dissertation provides specific, enumerated, testable hypotheses regarding each step in this set of linkages. To be fair, some of these hypotheses, such as the electoral connection, are simply restatements of past hypotheses from CPG literature. Later, though, I describe data and a research design to actually *test* all of these hypotheses (and, as such, the theory comprehensively) simultaneously. This is a clear contribution to CPG research.

Once MCs arrive in the House, their preferences aggregate, by party identification, to form a distribution of party preferences. CPG expects these distributions to be relatively homogenous or heterogenous within parties and to be either relatively similar or dissimilar across parties. However, it only provides diffuse theoretical expectations for when certain combinations of these conditions are met (see Table 1.1). Moreover, a latent assumption of the theory is that the conditions will be met *simultaneously*, meaning that it makes no predictions for when only some of the conditions are met. But in reality, we can (and do) observe heterogenous majorities in the face of homogenous minorities.[9] Accordingly, we should develop theoretical predictions for each of the three expectations (outlined in Table 1.1) for each of the possible distributions of parties.[10]

Recall that the three expectations of CPG (when the condition is increasingly satisfied) are increasing leader powers, increasing expectations of the use of those powers, and partisan policy outputs as a result of the use of those powers. An important theoretical concept, then, is what those leadership powers actually entail. A clarifying distinction is important here. Those powers that are used to structure the policy agenda of the House are known as *substantive* powers, while the powers that are used to structure the debate and passage of policy within the House are known as *procedural* powers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, Cox and McCubbins 2005). Within each type of power are two broad types. *Negative* powers are the ability to keep those items that are despised by the majority of the majority party

[9]For instance, recall the heterogenous Democratic party in the face of an increasingly homogenous Republican party in the 1970s, with only a small amount of ideological separation (Sundquist 1983). CPG makes no specific prediction for such cases.

[10]Other work, such as Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) focuses on the dimensions of intraparty unity and divisiveness between parties. It makes hypotheses about the extent of party influence, but makes no predictions on the tenor of policy outcomes and fails to recognize the importance of the unity of the opposite party. Any test of the theory outlined above, then, naturally encompasses such literature.

off the floor; *positive* powers are the ability to get those items that are favored by the majority of the majority party onto the floor.

The complete theory articulated in this dissertation encompasses all of the above powers and conditions. For each potential distribution of parties (homogenous or heterogenous, both majority and minority), paired with their possible degrees of ideological separation, it makes predictions for observed use of majority substantive and procedural powers (both positive and negative), minority use of substantive and procedural powers (both positive and negative), and the observed policy outputs from the use of such powers. It then tests these predictions, using an original dataset of over 2,400 rules, each content-analyzed to determine its restrictiveness. These predictions are tested primarily using Partial Adjustment Models and Vector Auto-Regressions (VAR), given the endogeneity among the key concepts in the theory.

Additionally, the dissertation explores the effects of lawmaking on two other important concepts: representation and approval. The degree and character of political representation are addressed by a body of scholarship with much intellectual history. Several different forms of representation theory exist, both at the aggregate and dyadic level. One theoretical characterization of representation is the so-called "standard model" (Hill n. d.). Originating with Kuklinski (1977), in this conceptualization, one-way linkages run from constituency preferences to policy outputs, with a separate influence coming from the party identification of the member. Much evidence has been gathered in support of this instructed-delegate model of representation (for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001*b*; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Clinton 2006; Griffin 2006).

There is strong reason to believe that the fit of this model varies systematically with CPG. First, the model explicitly includes a term for the party identification of the MC. CPG notes that, as the composition of parties changes, they use increasing

amounts of positive substantive and procedural powers to achieve increasingly partisan legislation. Thus the strength of the party identification dummy variable should vary as the "condition" of CPG varies. Second, the electoral connection assumes that the preferences of MCs come from their constituencies. So even if policy is becoming more extreme as a result of substantive and procedural powers, it might be reflecting the aggregate preferences of the *majority* party in the electorate, rather than the electorate as a whole. Accordingly, we should expect that the quality of representation might not be changing over time, but the constituency represented might be changing as a result of increasing CPG. These diffuse predictions are formalized and tested in later sections.

The dissertation also investigates the effects of CPG on public approval of Congress. Some research exists on the determinants of Congressional approval over time. Some of that work has found that Congressional approval varies negatively with institutional strife as operationalized through veto overrides, conflict, and scandals (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997) and partisan lawmaking generally (Ramirez 2009). This work, however, has largely ignored the changing ideological composition of both the electorate and of Congress.

The full theory of CPG offered in the dissertation implies some revisions to our current understanding of Congressional approval. As polarization increases at both the elite and mass levels, Republicans should be particularly satisfied with Congress when it is controlled by Republicans (and ostensibly pushing Republican policy goals) and particularly dissatisfied with Congress when it is controlled by Democrats (vice versa for Democrats) precisely because of the increasing use of the substantive and procedural powers to accomplish partisan goals outlined above. Traditionally, we would expect that when a homogenous Republican majority uses special rules to pass partisan legislation it should lower overall evaluations of the institution (Ramirez

2009, Ramirez 2013). But these dynamics should be the exact opposite by party identification. That is, it should drastically raise approval among Republicans and drastically lower approval among Democrats. Again, these predictions are formalized and tested in subsequent sections.

To be clear, the resulting predictions for representation and approval only arise because of the fully explicated theoretical predictions for CPG. The main work, both theoretical and empirical, of the dissertation is developing and testing that full set of predictions.

1.4 Research Beyond the Scope of the Dissertation

It is important to clarify what will not be covered in the research at hand. First and foremost, tests of the theory will focus on the United States House of Representatives. To be sure, CPG is a theory that can be tested in a variety of legislatures. All it requires is two principally competing parties and a legislative process in which party leadership has the opportunity to influence procedure. Focusing on the House, however, offers a variety of advantages. Most notably, its structure allows for party leadership to have either relatively little control over the legislative process (by deferring entirely to the Rules Committee) or relatively absolute control (by controlling the Rules Committee for partisan ends). Additionally, this control is straightforward to measure by focusing on the rules released by that committee. In contrast, the Senate operates almost exclusively on a series of unanimous consent agreements, given the autonomy allowed to each individual Senator (Oleszek 2011). Measuring the circumstances around these agreements, for instance, is much more difficult.

Additionally, the House provides more variation in many of the independent and dependent variables. With regards to lawmaking, there are more avenues to exercise procedural control in the House. There is also reason to believe that representational

processes are stronger in the House (because of a more direct linkage of MCs to constituencies), and most survey respondents think of the House when approving of the institution of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Finally, almost all existing work on CPG focuses on the House of Representatives, as well. Thus the work here builds on the principal foundation of prior research on CPG.

Second, the dissertation is not a theory about the causes of polarization. The electoral connection of CPG assumes that MCs are a reflection of their constituency. Accordingly, if MCs grow more extreme over time, constituencies are growing more extreme over time. I am not out to uncover the root cause of this increasing ideological extremity; I defer to other work on polarization. Instead, I assume that electoral polarization grows over time as a result of some sort of exogenous change in the system, much like Theriault (2008, 55). The planned methodological work will account for the potential endogeneity between mass polarization, elite polarization, and lawmaking. However, it does not seek to explain the causal process behind the increases and decreases in that polarization.

Third, the dissertation will test each of the phenomena at the national level. That is, I will use "national" preferences and distributions of constituency preferences, rather than district-level ones. This is simply out of necessity. No quality measures of district-level constituency ideology exist over time, and the popular proxy measure of the presidential vote share in the constituency suffers from poor validity and reliability (Hill and Jordan n. d., Leogrande and Jeydel 1997).

Fourth, I have referred, at several points, to the theory explicated in the dissertation as a "full" or "complete" theory of CPG. That is, it makes theoretical predictions for each of the potentially observable distributions of parties.[11] In em-

[11]The following sections make hypotheses regarding the stylized compositions of parties suggested in Table 1.2, but tests those predictions across the permutations.

pirical reality, however, some of these distributions have never been observed in the United States House of Representatives. As a result, the *test* of the theory might not be comprehensive, even though the *theory itself* is. In the words of Holton (1952, 138), sometimes only the "smallest part of reality" of some possible observable phenomenon is presented to us directly, though our explanations should try and account for the entire theoretical iceberg. The complete description of the theory advanced here might not be matched by raw data in the observed world: but "theories are more complete descriptions than obtained data, since they describe processes and entities in their unobserved as well as in their observed states" (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest 1966). The dissertation tests all the components of the theory possible, given empirical reality, but attempts to explain lawmaking more generally than its narrow empirical realities.

1.5 Outline

The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates and clarifies the predictions of CPG theory, as broadly alluded to here. It then tests the theory over time, rather than using the traditional case study approach employed in the CPG literature. Section 3 integrates CPG with theories of representation, specifically generating and testing the logical implications of polarization for representation. Section 4 tests the implications of polarization (with insights driven by CPG) for evaluations of the institution of Congress, as outlined above. Section 5 concludes.

2. A DETAILED TEST OF CONDITIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT

The previous section outlined the broad goal of detailing a full theory of Conditional Party Government. Recall that such a theory requires predictions for the use of positive and negative powers, both procedural and substantive, for both the majority and minority party, when those parties are separated ideologically and when they are not. In this section, I elaborate on that full theory. I then detail the data that I use to test this newly formed theory of lawmaking, taking care to demonstrate how certain patterns of lawmaking through rules meet the criteria for positive and negative power. Finally, with theory and data in hand, I test the principal predictions of the theory.

2.1 A Fully Elaborated Theory of Conditional Party Government

Recall that any full statement of CPG as a theory of lawmaking must trace it from the electoral connection, to the composition of the parties in Congress, to the powers those parties are endowed with, to the type of policy they produce. Accordingly, the elaboration provided here begins with the electorate. CPG theory implies that electoral processes shape the preferences of MCs when they arrive in the House (Aldrich and Rohde 1998). Subsequently, more polarized constituencies (with Republicans at one pole and Democrats at another) should send more polarizing (with more extreme preferences) members to Congress. Accordingly, we have H_1:

> H_1: The more extreme the constituency, the more extreme the preferences of the Member of Congress who represents the constituency.

H_1 literally brings MCs to Congress, respecting that their preferences (and their incentive to comply with the party) are shaped by the electoral connection.

Once MCs arrive in the House, their preferences aggregate, by party identification,

to form a distribution of party preferences. CPG expects these distributions to be relatively homogenous or heterogenous within parties and to be either relatively similar or dissimilar across parties. However, existing presentations of the theory only provide theoretical expectations for when certain combinations of these conditions are met (see Table 1.1). Moreover, a latent assumption of the theory is that the conditions will be met *simultaneously*, meaning that it makes no predictions for when only some of the conditions are met.

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 clarify the point. (For consistency, I always depict the party on the left as in the majority.) CPG only makes predictions as parties move from the arrangement in 2.1(a) to 2.2(b) because of the latent assumption that as the arrangement of parties shifts in terms of their homogeneity or heterogeneity, inter-party distance also increases. But in reality, we can observe any of the other six distributions.[1] Accordingly, we should develop theoretical predictions for each of the three expectations (outlined in Table 1.1) for each of the eight possible distributions of parties.

Recall that the three expectations of CPG (when the condition is increasingly satisfied) are increasing leader powers, the expectation of the use of those powers, and partisan policy outputs as a result of the use of those powers. For the sake of clarity, I repeat the distinction made in the previous section in regards to the specific types of powers available to each party. Those powers that are used to structure the policy agenda of the House are known as *substantive* powers, while the powers that are used to structure the debate and passage of policy within the House are known as *procedural* powers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, Cox and McCubbins 2005). Within each type of power are two broad classes of power. *Negative* powers are the ability to

[1]For instance, recall the heterogenous Democratic party in the face of an increasingly homogenous Republican party in the 1970s, with only a small amount of ideological separation (Sundquist 1983). This configuration would fall under Figure 2.1(c). CPG makes no prediction for such cases.



(a) Heterogenous Majority; Heterogenous Minority.

(b) Homogenous Majority; Heterogenous Minority.



(c) Heterogenous Majority; Homogenous Minority.

(d) Homogenous Majority; Homogenous Minority.

Figure 2.1: Hypothetical Distributions of Parties: Unpolarized

keep those items that are despised by the majority of the majority party off the floor; *positive* powers are the ability to get those items that are favored by the majority of the majority party onto the floor. We will consider each in turn, specifying how each power should vary for both the majority and minority party according to the



(a) Heterogenous Majority; Heterogenous Minority.

(b) Homogenous Majority; Heterogenous Minority.



(c) Heterogenous Majority; Homogenous Minority.

(d) Homogenous Majority; Homogenous Minority.

Figure 2.2: Hypothetical Distributions of Parties: Polarized

distribution of each party and the ideological separation between them.

Negative substantive powers are the ability to keep policy goals that run against the majority of the majority party off the floor. Necessarily, this is an agenda setting power. Theoretical expectations here are indicated clearly by past research: negative

substantive powers are invariant over time. Using "roll rates" (how often legislation passes that the majority of the majority party does not like), Cox and McCubbins (2005) demonstrate that the majority is hardly ever rolled, suggesting that its ability to keep legislation off the floor, through negative agenda setting, does not vary over time. Accordingly, any theory of CPG that accounts for when the condition is not met must account for the invariance of negative substantive powers.

Positive substantive powers are the ability to pass policy goals that are preferred by the majority of the majority party, necessarily skewed away from the floor median (Krehbiel 1998). Current CPG suggests that positive substantive powers grow as the condition of CPG is increasingly met. Positive party goals, though, should not rely on the shape of the minority party or the separation between the parties. When the majority party is heterogenous, it is costly for leadership to exert enough discipline to get heterogenous members to vote with party proposals. As the majority party grows more homogenous, more members naturally want to vote with party proposals (Aldrich 2011, 205). This is invariant to the shape of the minority party and the amount of ideological separation between the parties. Positive substantive power, then, is only conditional on the shape of the majority party.

Policy goals, though, are contingent on ideological separation. In either Figure 2.1(b) or 2.1(d), the majority party can pursue positive policy goals. These goals, though, will differ only a little from the floor median, given that the party itself does not want to pursue very partisan policy. The homogenous majority in Figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(d) can pursue substantive goals that are much more partisan than the floor median. In other words, the substantive power of all the homogenous parties is the same, but the policy outcomes as a result of exercising that power vary according to ideological separation.

As a result of the negative power of the majority party, the minority party should

never have either positive or negative substantive control. In functional terms, this means that the minority party should never pass a bill (or amendment) that is antithetical to the interests of the majority of the majority party.

Positive and negative procedural powers are more difficult to define. Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008), the prevailing work on CPG and its implications for procedural powers, define positive and negative procedural powers parallel to positive and negative substantive powers. That is, negative procedural powers are the ability to keep procedural rules disliked by a majority of the majority party off the floor, while positive procedural powers are the ability to structure procedural rules in a way preferred by the majority of the majority party. As they note, this conceptual distinction is particularly difficult to retain in empirical reality, given that positive rules are often accompanied by negative rules. In their words, "although special rules are inherently a vehicle for positive action, they will often involve blocking alternative proposals" (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, 38).

I suggest that both structuring debate and blocking minority party proposals are positive forms of procedural control. Like negative substantive powers, true negative procedural power lies in never allowing the minority party to structure the rules of debate (much like never allowing the minority party to structure the agenda). It makes little sense to define negative procedural rules as taking positive action (that is, instituting a special rule) to forbid the minority from entering any alternatives. Instead, negative procedural power is not allowing the minority party to structure the actual rules of debate.

An aside on the mechanics of action in the House is necessary here to explicate the measurement of these concepts.[2] A prime example of procedural powers is the use of special and restrictive rules when considering legislation. The process for

[2]For a good discussion of this process, see Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008).

instituting these special rules is as follows. The special rule is reported from the Rules Committee. Debate on the rule itself, like all other legislation on the House floor, is managed by a majority-party designated floor manager. At the end of the time for debate, the floor manager can order the previous question on the rule. If the majority party loses this vote, the minority party gains (as opposed to the majority party) control of the debate of the resolution. This control allows them to offer whatever minority-party (substantive) amendments they like to the rule at hand. The consequences of losing the previous question, then, are steep for the majority party. However, if it wins the previous question, the rule proceeds to an immediate up-or-down vote on the text as written. It completely precludes any opportunity for the minority party to offer amendments or points of order. This protects, in an absolute sense, the procedural or substantive goals written into the rule.

More generally, constructing a special rule requires majority party control of the Rules Committee and a Rules Committee amenable to being used as a partisan agent in structuring debate. Of course, the Rules Committee has gone through various institutional reforms to make it *become* a partisan agent. A full theory of CPG would predict these institutional changes. That is, when I claim that positive and negative procedural power should be used according to different distributions of the parties, it necessarily implies that, if that power does not currently exist, the majority party will institute institutional reforms to *create* that power from within an institution. The longitudinal tests offered here do not deal specifically with these institutional changes—attempting to codify committee reform and the invention of new types of rules is exceptionally difficult. However, the theory still predicts them.

Having described this process, we are now in a position to specify how both positive and negative procedural powers should vary over time. The use of positive procedural powers—the explicitly advantageous structuring of procedure on the floor—by

the majority party should vary according to the composition of the minority party. As the minority party grows more homogenous, its opposition to the employment of positive *substantive* power grows more credible because the homogeneity of member preferences reduces the cost of minority leadership enforcing minority opposition to majority bills (much like majority homogeneity increases the natural incentive for party members to vote with the party majority). In the face of unilateral opposition, the majority party should attempt to use positive procedural power more often in order to control the debate on the floor. This tendency should increase, moreover, when the separation between the parties is high. As the "stakes rise," homogenous minority parties are even more likely to fight majority party positions (as they are increasingly opposed to the minority party's own preferred policies). Majority parties, then, should exercise positive procedural control the most in the face of homogenous minority parties that are ideologically different from their own preferences. (Likewise, if these procedural powers do not exist within the institution, the majority party should *create* them.)

Negative procedural powers for the majority, like negative substantive powers, should be invariant over time. That is, the majority party should never allow the minority party to structure the debate on the floor.

What should we expect with procedural power and the minority party?[3] The opposition (on rules votes) should rise as the ideological divergence between the parties increases, as losing the rule results in increasingly costly procedure that the minority party dislikes. We can view this opposition to special rules as a sort of minority negative power: an attempt to keep the floor debate as the status quo.[4]

[3]I focus here on the application of the theory in the House in particular. In the Senate, negative procedural powers would be embodied by practices like the filibuster (Koger 2010). More generally, though, the theory makes predictions about when positive and negative substantive and procedural powers will be used, giving specific examples of the types of powers in the House.

[4]This is similar to Aldrich's (2011, 205) logic: the minority party can settle on what not to seek

Admittedly, CPG is relatively more interesting in its predictions for majority parties than for minorities. This is simply due to the nature of majority rule in the House. As a result of winning elections, the majority party wins the opportunity to structure both procedure and substance to their advantage. Without more explicit channels for minority influence—like the Senate's filibuster—the theory is left to predict the changing nature of minority opposition to the majority.

We now have complete predictions for the usage of positive and negative substantive and procedural powers, fulfilling our need to formalize the powers the parties are endowed with. All that remains is the type of policy they produce. The prediction here is strongly implied by previous research (Aldrich 2011). Partisan policy outputs are more guaranteed with the successful use of positive procedural powers: keeping minority legislation off of the floor and preserving a policy output aligned with majority party preferences. So policy outputs should grow more partisan (in the direction of the majority party) as positive procedural power is used. The stronger predictor of policy outputs, however, is the degree of ideological separation between the parties. As the majority party grows more ideologically distinct from the minority party, policy outputs will more strongly resemble the preferences of the majority than the floor median, as implied by the increasing use of positive substantive powers. When this is coupled with positive procedural powers, legislation should be the most partisan. In the latter circumstances, it is both reflective of a distinctive majority party *and* immunity from changes on the floor by the minority party, due to procedural power.

I formalize the theoretical predictions from the above paragraphs below. In all instances, sub-hypothesis a refers to majority powers, sub-hypothesis b refers to minority powers, and sub-hypothesis c refers to the tenor of policy outputs. Addition-

even if unable to agree on what to seek for themselves.

ally, each hypothesis refers to the average activity for any given Congress (average use of powers and average policy outputs).

When both parties are heterogenous and relatively similar (Figure 2.1(a)):

H_{2_a}: The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and negative procedural power.
H_{2_b}: The minority party will exercise neither type of substantive or procedural power.
H_{2_c}: Policy outputs will be only barely more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When the majority is homogenous and the minority is heterogenous, and the parties are relatively similar (Figure 2.1(b)):

H_{3_a}: The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive power and negative procedural power.
H_{3_b}: The minority party will exercise neither type of substantive or procedural power.
H_{3_c}: Policy outputs will be somewhat more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When the majority is heterogenous and the minority is homogenous, and the parties are relatively similar (Figure 2.1(c)):

H_{4_a}: The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and both positive and negative procedural power.
H_{4_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.[5]
H_{4_c}: Policy outputs will be only barely more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When both parties are homogenous and relatively similar (Figure 2.1(d)):

H_{5_a}: The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive power as well as both positive and negative procedural power.
H_{5_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.
H_{5_c}: Policy outputs will be somewhat more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

[5]Recall that the minority party's negative power is attempting to defeat the use of those powers by the majority. These attempts are mostly unsuccessful, but the attempt is the same as exercising the power.

When both parties are heterogenous and relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(a)):

H_{6_a}: The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and negative procedural power.
H_{6_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.
H_{6_c}: Policy outputs will be more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When the majority is homogenous and the minority is heterogenous, and the parties are relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(b)):

H_{7_a}: The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive power and negative procedural power.
H_{7_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.
H_{7_c}: Policy outputs will be much more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When the majority is heterogenous and the minority is homogenous, and the parties are relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(c)):

H_{8_a}: The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and both positive and negative procedural power.
H_{8_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.
H_{8_c}: Policy outputs will be more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

When both parties are homogenous and relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(d)):

H_{9_a}: The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive power as well as both positive and negative procedural power.
H_{9_b}: The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise negative procedural power.
H_{9_c}: Policy outputs will be much more partisan than the floor median (in the direction of the majority party).

These hypotheses are shown in Table 2.1, which maps to the hypothetical distributions in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.[6]

[6]Other work, such as Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) focuses on the dimensions of intraparty unity and divisiveness between parties. It makes hypotheses about the extent of party influence, but makes no predictions on the tenor of policy outcomes and fails to recognize the importance of

Table 2.1: CPG: Revised Predictions According with Varying Degrees of the "Condition"

Majority Party

		Heterogenous	Homogenous	
Minority Party	Heterogenous	H_{2_a}, H_{2_b}, and H_{2_c}	H_{3_a}, H_{3_b}, and H_{3_c}	*Low*
	Homogenous	H_{4_a}, H_{4_b}, and H_{4_c}	H_{5_a}, H_{5_b}, and H_{5_c}	

Ideological Separation

		Heterogenous	Homogenous	
Minority Party	Heterogenous	H_{6_a}, H_{6_b}, and H_{6_c}	H_{7_a}, H_{7_b}, and H_{7_c}	
	Homogenous	H_{8_a}, H_{8_b}, and H_{8_c}	H_{9_a}, H_{9_b}, and H_{9_c}	*High*

It should be apparent that the hypotheses for many of the permutations of the distributions of parties are equivalent despite whether the parties are similar or dissimilar. (Note, for instance, that H_{4_a} is equivalent to H_{8_a}.) What separates these hypotheses is whether or not the exercise of these powers is *successful*. For instance, the majority party can introduce a special rule and then be defeated on that rule by the minority party—a phenomenon we observe multiple times. This is not a majority *roll*, but a majority *defeat* (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008). We never expect

the unity of the opposite party. Any test of the theory outlined above, then, naturally encompasses such literature.

the majority to be rolled (we always expect negative substantive and procedural power to prevail), but we do *not* expect for the majority to always be successful when they attempt to exercise positive power. The mitigating factor is the degree of difference between the parties. As the ideological stakes of passing the positive party agenda rise, party leadership should be more successful in exercising positive power, both substantive and procedural. If distance is low, the cost of members defecting (crossover voting) is much lower than if distance is high. In other words, as we move from the top to bottom of Table 2.1, we expect the success of positive powers to change, even if the attempted usage of positive powers remains constant. Accordingly, I offer H_{10}:

> H_{10}: The successful use of positive majority powers increases as the ideological separation between the parties increases.

The converse is true for negative procedural powers by the minority (successfully opposing the use of majority positive power). As the stakes rise, the majority party should never let negative minority powers be used successfully. Thus, H_{11}:

> H_{11}: The successful use of negative minority (procedural) powers decreases as the ideological separation between the parties increases.

Collectively, H_1 to H_{11} lay out a comprehensive theory of CPG, covering all possible permutations of whether the "condition" of CPG is met. We still need to *operationalize* the actual use of these powers. For that, I turn to a detailed discussion of the nature and types of rules used in the House.

H_{10} and H_{11} are not directly tested in the dissertation, though they can easily be tested in the future. For the current application, I am more interested in explaining the systematic use of rules, regardless of if they are used successfully. But the reader should take comfort in a few minor points. First, rules are rarely used unsuccessfully. So the analyses here are not misleading in the sense of explaining the pattern of

rules that are introduced but abandoned. Second, a comprehensive test of each hypothesis would make this section too complicated. Instead, I choose to test those (secondary) hypotheses at a later date. In the same vein, not all of the hypotheses regarding the behavior of the minority party are tested, either. We know very little systematically about the usage of rules by the majority party, where they have the strongest potential to affect the direction of policy. As such, this section focuses on testing those hypotheses first.

Further, I recognize that the hypothetical distributions of parties—of fully homogenous ones versus heterogenous ones, severely overlapping or severely polarized—presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and referenced in previous tables are meant to be used as heuristics for understanding how parties operate in idealized circumstances. It is certainly possible to test those specific hypotheses in the traditional, case-study manner (identifying when a set of parties meets the idealized distributions and examining their behavior). Here, though, I recognize that parties can fall into a variety of homogenous or heterogenous shapes. The empirical tests account for the full range of the theoretical variables.

Lastly, it should be noted that the analyses executed here are all time serial in nature, though the predictions offered above are all cross-sectional (predictions based of a single, static arrangement of the parties). When testing the theory, then, I do not test a singular hypothesis alone. Rather, the theoretical tests consider moving from one arrangement to another, and, as such, moving *across* hypotheses.

2.2 Previous Work with Rules

There is no lack of study on the use of rules. The literature can broadly be classified into two subsets: one which focuses on the use of rules within a single Congress (with the unit of analysis often the single rule), and another which focuses

on the variation in rules as institutional factors vary (with the unit of analysis often the year or Congress).

In the first strain, three theories emerge as potential explanations for the use of rules. Informational theory (Krehbiel 1991) assumes that rules reduce uncertainty on the House floor caused by the complexities of legislative topics and the amending activity that might happen in any given session. Distributive theory (Mayhew 1974, Ferejohn 1974) assumes that rules exist to facilitate the distribution of policy benefits among members of Congress. Lastly, partisan theories (Binder 1997, Rohde 1991, among others) assume that the Rules Committee exists to help accomplish policy goals of the majority party. Among these theories, partisan theories consistently receive the most empirical support (Marshall 2002).

Even though partisan explanations of the use of rules routinely receive the most support, the evidence for these explanations is still quite limited. While we have strong evidence predicting the partisan behavior of the Rules Committee *within* a certain Congress, such as more restrictive rules on more partisan legislation (Marshall 2002), we have weak evidence relating this behavior to systematic factors such as polarization and party competition. Much of the former work characterizes the use of restrictive rules within a single Congress (Krehbiel 1997, Marshall 2002, Sinclair 1994), and much of the latter work analyzes special rules in a case-study approach (Rohde and Aldrich 2010).

The core problem of our traditional characterization of special rules is that it is too simplistic. As early as Bach and Smith (1988), scholars adopted the Rules Committee convention of defining open, modified open, modified closed, and closed rules on the basis of amending activity allowed on the floor (for a precise definition of these categories, see Marshall 2002).[7] These categories might have been useful when rules

[7]It's worth noting that the Rules Committee still continues this practice, characterizing their

were relatively benign (as we will discover was the case in the "textbook" Congress period), but a flurry of strategic development in special rules led to measures that are grossly oversimplified. To illustrate the point, consider House Resolution 477, reported in the 112th Congress (House Committee on Rules 2011). In part, the resolution reads

> [I]t shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee Print dated November 18, 2011. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order against that amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in part A of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.

Note that the resolution not only prohibits amending activity on the floor (as a classic "closed rule"). It also makes only a single amendment in the nature of a substitute in order (which supersedes all of the original text of the bill), only makes one amendment to that substitute in order (which was crafted in the Rules Committee), and prohibits second degree amendments to the amendment in the nature of the substitute. In essence, the Rules Committee is drafting legislation in committee and demanding an up-or-down vote on the House floor. Treating this rule as a simple "closed rule" misses much of the procedural nuance that accompanies contemporary resolutions.

Additionally, scholars have traditionally treated all rules reported from the Rules Committee as a signal of restrictiveness (for one among many examples, see Finoc-

rules into these categories, despite their dubious utility (see House Committee on Rules 2012).

chiaro and Rohde 2008). Yet even in the "textbook" Congress, the Rules Committee was an active agent simply because of the vast hurdles encountered when scheduling legislation to come to the floor. The rules reported, however, were not restrictive in the classic sense: they brought legislation to the floor under open conditions because the likelihood of legislation reaching the floor for debate was low without scheduling assistance. Once on the floor, however, these rules provided for open debate and amendment under normal House procedures.

The larger point is that restrictive rules are conceptually distinct from other scheduling rules. "Rule" does not mean *special* rule or *restrictive* rule. It is simply a resolution reported by the Rules Committee for the purpose of scheduling legislation. If a rule is restrictive, however, it is not enough to simply define it as "open" or "closed." Rules can (and do) vary widely in their restrictiveness and openness. But the extent of that openness should be a key part of our analyses of these rules, not whether or not a rule was reported from committee.

This mistaken conceptualization matters for research. Using raw counts of all rules reported from committee to test theories of lawmaking potentially leads to bias due to confusing the open with the restrictive. Polarization might not seem to affect the issuance of rules, but this finding might emerge for no other reason than that scholars are searching for conflict on open rules. (Later in this section, I demonstrate exactly that: analyzing rules in the aggregate leads to starkly different inferences than treating them separately.) At their core, theories of lawmaking are concerned with the rise in restrictiveness in the process: so we should not bias our understanding by unknowingly examining both restrictive and open rules together.

This critique of the state of the field is not meant to indict any given piece of research. To be sure, there are practical reasons that we have defaulted to our current oversimplification of the essence and nature of rules. First, rules are notoriously

hard to access. Digitized, plain text versions of House Resolutions only exist for years after 1990. Before that time period, scholars are forced to comb through the *Congressional Record* for printed resolutions. A particularly cumbersome resource, the *Congressional Record* produces upwards of 200 pages of recorded proceedings from the House and Senate every calendar day. And these were not accessible to the academic community, except through hard copy, until the advent of large-scale online databases. Reading through them is tedious, even if the analyst knows exactly what he or she is looking for. (An example of a rule printed in the *Congressional Record* can be found in Figure 2.3.) So at the time we were building our theories of the usage of rules, the omission of this resource was largely out of sheer practicality.

In addition, we now benefit from a wide range of text analysis software that aids in the processing of voluminous text. Reliably coding the thousands of rules used in even the second-half of the twentieth century was a dubious and daunting task. But modern programs like `Python` and `R` (with text mining extensions like `tm` [Feinerer, Hornik, and Meyer 2008]) greatly reduce the analyst's workload in constructing and coding text-based documents for analysis. With a given, well defined set of search criteria, one can relatively easily identify various aspects of text documents (like rules) for given patterns.

The following data collection effort leverages both of these new resources, along with a systematic qualitative evaluation of the nature of special rules over time, to develop a set of criteria by which to code the restrictiveness of rules over time. The goal is to develop measures that can be used to systematically (and appropriately) test the theory elaborated above. The first step is the definition of our search criteria, a task I turn to in the next section.

Mr. DINGELL moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 67, and agree to the same, with an amendment as follows: On page 22, line 3, of the Senate engrossed amendments, strike out "Section" and insert the following: "With respect to the offer made on June 29, 1971, and effective with the making of such offer, section."

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amend the title so as to read: "An Act to establish a national environmental data system and State and regional environmental centers pursuant to policies and goals established in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and for other purposes."

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. DINGELL

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. DINGELL moves that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the title of the bill, and agree to the same.

The motion was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider the votes by which action was taken on the several motions was laid on the table.

DIRECTING CLERK OF HOUSE TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN ENROLLMENT OF H.R. 56

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a House concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 716) relating to the conference report just agreed to, and ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the concurrent resolution.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution as follows:

H. CON. RES. 716

Concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make corrections in the enrollment of H.R. 56

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Clerk of the House of Representatives, in the enrollment of the Bill (H.R. 56) to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, to provide for a National Environmental Data System, is authorized and directed to make the following corrections:

On page 1, line 7, of the House engrossed bill, strike out "NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SYSTEM" and insert the following: "SHORT TITLE."

On page 2 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following center heading: "NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SYSTEM."

On page 3, line 7, of the House engrossed bill, before the period insert the following: ", knowledge, and data."

On page 3, line 8, of the House engrossed bill, after "Information" insert the following: ", knowledge,."

On page 3 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following center heading: "AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE, AND DATA."

On page 4 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 11 and 12 insert the following center heading: "DIRECTOR OF THE DATA SYSTEM."

On page 6 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 9 and 10 insert the following center heading: "ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS."

On page 6, line 22, of the House engrossed bill, before "data," insert the following: "knowledge, and".

On page 6 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 23 and 24 insert the following center heading: "INTERAGENCY COOPERATION."

On page 8 of the House engrossed bill, between lines 13 and 14 insert the following center heading: "AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS."

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The concurrent resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the conference report just agreed to.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBERS OF COMMISSION ON REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of section 804(b), Public Law 91-452, the Chair appoints as members of the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling the following Members on the part of the House: Mr. PURCELL, of Texas; Mr. CURLIN, of Kentucky; Mr. HOGAN, of Maryland; and Mr. HUNT, of New Jersey.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 16656, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1972

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1145 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1145

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16656) to authorize appropriations for construction of certain highways in accordance with title 23 of the United States Code, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Public Works, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Public Works now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, said substitute shall be read for amendment by titles instead of by sections, and all points of order against said substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 16(c), Rule XI, and clause 4, Rule XXI are hereby waived. At the conclusion of such consideration, the committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. After the passage of H.R. 16656, it shall be in order in the House to take from the Speaker's table the bill S. 3939 and to move to strike out all after the enacting clause of the said Senate bill and insert in lieu thereof the provisions contained in H.R. 16656 as passed by the House.

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. YOUNG of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1145 provides an open rule with 2 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 16656, the Federal Highway Act authorization. It shall be in order to consider the committee substitute as an original bill for the purpose of amendment; all points of order are waived for failure to comply with clause 16(c) of rule XI—jurisdiction of Public Works Committee—and clause 4 of rule XXI—appropriations in a legislative bill—after passage of H.R. 16656, it shall be in order to take S. 3939 from the Speaker's table, move to strike all after the enacting clause and amend it with the House-passed language.

Total authorizations in H.R. 16656 from the trust fund for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 are $14.8 billion. There is also authorized out of the general fund a total of approximately $1.5 billion for the 2 years.

The sum of $700 million is authorized for the primary system for each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975, $400 million for the secondary system, $400 million for the extensions of the primary and secondary systems in urban areas, and $700 million for the urban system.

The sum of $3.5 billion is authorized per year for the Interstate System for 1974 to 1978 and $2.5 billion is authorized for 1979, which will be the last year of the Interstate program authorizations.

Authorizations for the safety program are increased and new money is made available in a number of categories.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the rule in order that the legislation may be considered.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I anticipate there will be some controversy about this bill and particularly about the rule, so I would like to try to state the situation and put it in focus as to what has happened so far.

We held extensive hearings in the Committee on Rules on this particular matter. The main question had to do with whether or not the highway trust fund should be opened by amendment for the purpose of using some of the money for mass transit or mass transportation. We heard testimony on that, and when we went into executive session the original motion that was made was in accordance with the rule that was requested with the exception that we

Figure 2.3: Average *Congressional Record* Page.

2.3 Rules and Coding Criteria

While rules reported from the Rules Committee vary greatly in their scope and purpose, they tend to vary predictably in their structure and language. The reason for this systematic repetition is twofold. The first is that, like all floor debate, rules reported by the Rules Committee must follow basic parliamentary procedures. So when rules waive points of order, for instance, they must do so in the "correct" fashion to be legitimate and effective.

The second is that when the Rules Committee finds a rule effective at accomplishing a particular goal, they are apt to use its structure again. Consider the king-of-the-hill procedure, by which the House can vote for (and adopt) multiple amendments, but, in the case of multiple adoptions, only the last amendment adopted is considered finally adopted in the House. As long as the majority party orders the amendments correctly, this structure gives members political cover by allowing them to vote "yea" on amendments that their constituencies prefer (but the majority party does not) *and* vote "yea" on amendments that the majority party prefers for final passage. This dual opportunity for position-taking (by the member) and policymaking (by the party) accomplishes competing goals. As such, it has been used many times by the majority party. For our purposes, the critical aspect for the analyst is that, each time it is used, it uses identical or near-identical language to structure the rule.

This repetition in structure and language gives the analyst the opportunity to code, relatively straightforwardly, instances of certain types of rules being used over time. The only requirement, of course, is that we know which patterns are important. A systematic qualitative evaluation of the rules suggests three key repeating types of restrictive rules.

The first type is a self-executing rule that adopts an amendment outlined in the

resolution. In the text of rules, these are introduced with the following language: "*an amendment [in the nature of a substitute] ... shall be considered as adopted.*" These rules are restrictive in the most basic sense. They preclude the opportunity for debate on the amendment on the floor, and they preclude the opportunity for the minority party to vote against an amendment they may not agree with ideologically. In our theoretical framework, these rules occupy positive substantive powers for the majority. They completely alter legislation without any opportunity for minority party participation in the legislative process. Moreover, substitute amendments are particularly restrictive, as they replace the entire text of a bill with the substitute amendment, in essence stripping all authority from the committee from which the bill was originally reported.

The second is similar in nature, but not as positive. It prioritizes amendments, but it does not go so far as to consider them as adopted. In the text of rules, these are introduced with the following language: "*an amendment [in the nature of a substitute] ... shall be considered as read.*" They clearly set the agenda for debate of legislation by establishing priority to the consideration of majority-selected amendments.

The third type is clearly negative as it restricts the amendments allowed to be offered on the floor. In the text of rules, these are introduced with the following language: "*no amendment shall be in order except ...*." These rules are essential in offering the Rules Committee (and subsequently the majority party) complete control over reducing uncertainty on the floor. The amendments that are allowed to be offered often come from many jurisdictions, like the *Congressional Record* or the committee with original jurisdiction. They are not necessarily positive substantively, but definitely procedurally. They structure the nature of the debate itself to advantage the majority party without necessarily advancing a substantive goal.

Note the advantages of coding these types separately. It avoids dichotomizing rules into overly simple categories of "open" and "closed." It reveals the wide range of flexibility available to the Rules Committee when constructing rules. Additionally, the categories can be combined to demonstrate a wider spectrum of restrictiveness (for instance, a rule can consider a substitute amendment as adopted [type 1] and forbid amendment to that amendment [type 3]). Yet this coding structure retains a longitudinal, quantitative measure that can be used to test theories of lawmaking over time.

I used `Python` to identify and code each of these types of rules. The `Python` script used was a simple program that searches a folder of documents for a user-defined regular expression, establishes a user-defined window around any located matches, and prints the window in a new document if said window also includes additional terms defined by the user (or, conversely, does not include terms).

For the first type, amendments considered as adopted, I searched the rules database for instances of the word "amendment*" with a window five words to the left and fifty words to the right. The window also had to include "nature," "substitute," "consider*," and "adopt*," and must not include "whole" (to except phrases that flag the Committee of the Whole rising) or "last" (for resolutions instituting a king-of-the-hill procedure).

For the second type, amendments considered as read, I searched the rules database for instances of the word "amendment*" with a window five words to the left and eighty words to the right. The window also had to include "nature," "substitute," "consider*," and "read," and must not include "whole" (to except phrases that flag the Committee of the Whole rising), "last" (for resolutions instituting a king-of-the-hill procedure), or "adopt*" (to preclude rules in type 1).

For the third type, "no amendment shall be in order except . . .," I searched the

rules database for instances of the word "amendment*" with a window three words to the left and fifty words to the right. The window must also include "no$," "shall," and "except."

For each of these codings, every rule was hand-checked to ensure that the `Python` script had accurately coded the rules into categories. Each of the search windows was optimized by gradually increasing the size of the window before the program returned considerably more non-germane resolutions (95%) than germane. Each of the search terms was also evaluated to ensure that it was not accidentally limiting out rules that fit the category. Final counts were obtained by analyzing the individual document counts returned by `Python` by year using the `R` package `tm`.

It should be noted that the first and third types of rules—amendments considered as adopted and no amendments except—fit the theoretical profile (positive substantive/positive procedural rules) especially cleanly. The second type of rule—amendments considered as read—is more mixed. The strongest evidence for the theory, then, should emerge on the most clean, "prototypical" type of rules. If we get more mixed evidence for the usage of the second type of rule, but stronger evidence for the first and third, this should be considered stronger evidence for the theory.

The database of special rules comes from the rules identified by the Political Institutions and Public Choice dataset (Rohde 2010), extended from 1947 to 2012. These data code all recorded votes on rules issued by the Rules Committee, as identified by *Congressional Quarterly*. I supplemented this initial coding by evaluating all recorded votes in *Congressional Quarterly* to determine if the recorded vote was taken on a rule. For each of the rules identified, I obtained the full text of the corresponding House Resolution from either the *Congressional Record* (through Proquest Congressional, 1947-1989) or THOMAS (from 1990-2012). The total number

of rules collected is 2,413, accounting for rules that were defeated and reintroduced once amended.

2.4 Other Data and Methods

The measures of rules are clearly important to the operationalization of positive and negative procedural and substantive powers. A full test of the theory, however, requires measures of the shapes of the legislative parties and the distance between them. For those measures, I use inflation-adjusted Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) interest group scores (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999). The relevant party homogeneity measures are constructed by aggregating scores by party identification and taking the variance of those scores.[8] The distance measure is constructed by taking the absolute value of the distance of the means of the intraparty scores.[9]

The final measure required is a measure of policy outputs. Here, I follow Ramirez (2013). In general, we desire a way to measure how ideological the major outputs of the House are in any given year. To capture ideological votes, I first record all votes designated as ideological by the ADA and the American Conservative Union (ACU). I then record all *Congressional Quarterly* "key votes," a set of the most important votes taken by the House each year as determined by the non-partisan contributors to that volume. Lastly, I match recorded ideological votes to the non-partisan key votes. A key vote is counted as having an ideological direction if either of the interest group scores recorded it as such. The final measure of policy outputs, then, is the percent of key votes that were ideological in any given direction.[10] Positive values are

[8]The results presented are robust to using party standard deviations, as well.

[9]The results presented are also broadly robust to using more general measures of polarization (like distributional polarization, see Wood and Jordan 2011). However, the theory illuminates separate dynamics for each of the individual components of distributional polarization, so I test them separately here.

[10]Ramirez (2013) found this measure to have strong construct validity with regards to policy movement and public demand for policy.

more liberal, and negative values are more conservative. A value of one, for instance, would indicate that all key votes in a given year were rated as liberal. This represents the continuous nature of the direction of policy. Also, it allows us to measure which of those key votes used various types of rules to achieve passage. Since the tests that follow only test whether majority and minority party shapes are theoretically related to lawmaking, *not* Republican or Democrat shapes, the output variable here also just broadly captures ideological movement. This measure is consistent, however: in all years, if outputs have an ideological direction, they always move in the direction of the majority party.

The primary statistical tests take two forms. The first tests are partial adjustment models, where the dependent variable is changes in the number of rules (of any particular type) from the previous year. These models allow us to examine cleanly the short-term effect of the theoretical variables—distance and respective variances—on the year-over-year usage of types of rules. For each of those models, a general-to-specific modeling strategy was used (De Boef and Keele 2008), eliminating lags of the independent variables as they were insignificant. As it turns out, no lag of any independent variable was significant, allowing us to estimate the models with only the contemporaneous values of the independent variables.

The second tests recognize that, often, we are interested in long-run effects as well as short-term ones. In addition, several of the variables in the system are endogenous, as parties that change in their homogeneity also tend to move further from one another. One modeling strategy is particularly well equipped to handle this circumstance. Vector auto-regression, explained more fully in the next section, allows for variables to be endogenous *and* allows the analyst to estimate a system with a mix of integrated and stationary variables. VAR here would only be problematic if one or more of the variables were cointegrated, in which case a Vector error-correction

Table 2.2: Predicting Usage of Rule Types

Variable	Change in Use of Rules in the Nature of a Substitute Considered as Adopted	Change in Use of Rules in the Nature of a Substitute Considered as Read	Change in Use of Rules for No Amendment Except
Change in Y_{t-1}	-0.384**	-0.417**	-0.560**
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.106)
Minority Variance	0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Change in Majority Variance	0.005	0.002	0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Change in Majority Variance$_{t-1}$	-	0.007*	-
		(0.004)	
Change in Distance	0.176	0.423	0.520*
	(0.170)	(0.249)	(0.276)
Constant	-0.156	0.414	0.040
	(1.274)	(1.798)	(2.091)
R^2	0.15	0.28	0.35
N	64	64	64
AIC	5.352	6.049	6.346
BIC	87.155	133.934	150.760

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$. Standard errors in parentheses.

LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.

(VECM) format would be preferred. Johansen tests, however, indicate that in none of the VARs estimated is the rank of the cointegrating vector found to be more than zero (that is, there is no cointegration present).

2.5 Results

Table 2.2 displays the results of the three key primary models: partial adjustment models predicting the differenced series for each type of special rule outlined above.[11]

[11]By all criteria, each of these types of rules was found to be integrated. Majority variance and distance are also integrated; minority variance is stationary. Accordingly, the models here deal with only minority variance in levels and all other variables in differences.

We will examine each of these models in succession. Turn first to the first type of rule: amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted. The partial adjustment model, presented in differences, in the first column of Table 2.2, is substantively uninteresting. The series is negatively autoregressive, meaning that increases from the previous year lead to decreases in following years (a broadly oscillating pattern). But nothing else matters substantively. Minority variance, differenced majority variance, and distance all do not have statistically significant effects on the first type of rule. This seems highly unlikely: a significant amount of prior literature has found these party shape variables to at least broadly influence types of lawmaking (such as the CPG literature cited in Sections 1 and 2).

Instead, what seems to be happening is that the model in differences is obscuring the effects found in levels. To uncover these effects, we need a system of estimation that allows for multiple variables to exist in levels, even if they are integrated. In addition, it might very well be that multiple variables in the model are endogenous (in particular, party variances might be highly related to distance). Vector auto-regression (VAR) is well equipped to handle such endogeneity. Unlike conventional regression analysis, in which the righthand-side variables are assumed to be exogenous (and independent), VAR analysis treats each variable in the system symmetrically. Through this symmetric treatment, VAR allows for two-way relationships among the variables, includes strong controls for history, and affords the analyst the ability to track the temporal dynamics of the relationships through time. When executed, the variables of interest are organized as a system of equations where *each* variable is regressed on multiple lagged values of itself and multiple lagged values of the other variables in the system. The resulting inferences are made regarding the system of variables taken as a whole. Accordingly, I recast this model as a four-variable (rule type, minority variance, majority variance, and distance) VAR

Table 2.3: Granger Causality: VAR for Nature Substitute Adopted

	Response Variable			
Shocked Variable	Distance	Nature Substitute Adopted	Majority Variance	Minority Variance
Distance	-	→	→	
Nature Substitute Adopted		-		
Majority Variance	→		-	
Minority Variance	→	→		-
System (All Lags Jointly)	→	→	→	→

From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at $p < 0.10$.

with one-year lag, as determined by likelihood ratio tests and other fit criteria. The contemporaneous correlations between the variables are all very low, far below the $\mid \rho \mid > 0.2$ standard recommended by Enders (2010, 311). Accordingly, we can feel confident in the inferences obtained from the VAR ordered as reported. I use the same order for each of the following VARs: distance first, followed by rule type, then majority and minority variance.

I begin by investigating Granger causality for each of the possible relationships. The causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed in the columns. If the contemporary and lagged series of the shocked variable Granger cause the response variable (they are jointly significant), the cell linking that row and column receives an arrow. The results are presented in Table 2.3. The most important theoretical evidence is in the third column: is the usage of positive substantive rules Granger-caused by distance and by majority variance? We receive support for the theory on the first expectation. Distance exerts a statistically significant effect on the usage of these types of positive substantive rules. Majority variance, however, does

not Granger-cause the usage of rules. However, Lütkepohl (2007, 48) shows that "... a lack of a Granger-causal relationship from one group of variables to the remaining variables cannot necessarily be interpreted as lack of a cause and effect relationship," as Granger tests do not consider dynamic feedback among variables . Therefore, we must also consider the system of dynamic impulse responses before reaching strong conclusions about the nature of the relationships between the variables in the system. For that, we turn to impulse response functions.

By its nature, VAR produces a large amount of output when estimating a system. An especially useful way to summarize this output is through impulse response functions.[12] Impulse response functions trace the responses to all variables in the system to a shock in a single variable. The variable being shocked runs along the y-axis (in rows), the variable responding along the x-axis (in columns). Accordingly, the diagonal is the variable responding to a shock in itself. Figure 2.4 depicts the impulse response function for the four-variable VAR described above. The matrix offers a visual representation of how the system responds to changes in each of the endogenous variables of interest. The plots show the immediate and long-term effects of these changes and afford us the opportunity to track direct and indirect relationships among the variables. The plots in each row show how the other variables respond to a one-unit shock in standardized versions of the series. Confidence intervals are

[12]Each endogenous variable in the system can be shocked mathematically to produce a response in the other variables in the system. The responses to these simulated shocks take into account feedback across variables that can either suppress or accentuate the relationships. Plots of the resulting innovations—called impulse response functions (IRFs)—allow one to observe the behavior of the system through time. If two variables are related, a shock in one variable will cause an observable change in the other. A feature that distinguishes VAR from other time series methods that warrants special attention concerns the issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary. The goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not determine specific parameter estimates (Enders 2004). Differencing produces no gain in asymptotic efficiency in an autoregression, and throws away important information. Enders (2010) notes that the "majority view" is that the form of the variables in the VAR should mimic the true data generating process.



Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions: VAR for Nature Substitute Adopted.

calculated for the responses. Responses are "significant" as long as these confidence intervals do not include zero. Zero is represented by the horizontal line in each of the plots. A response above the zero line denotes a positive effect. A response below the zero line denotes a negative effect.

Note first that each variable responds significantly to itself (the impulse responses along the diagonal are all positive and significant). Each of the shocks on the diagonal also displays the characteristic rise in the immediate period followed by a mutli-period decay to zero. Theoretically, the most interesting results are in the fourth column which depicts responses in the rule series to shocks in the other variables in the system.

More compelling evidence for the theory emerges from the results of majority variance and distance. Since the impulse response functions of the full VAR may be hard to read, I present the panels of majority variance and distance on rules separately in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. In the case of majority variance, the theory predicts that majority parties should use positive substantive powers more often as majority variance decreases (for instance moving from H_{6_a} to H_{7_a}). And we observe this exact effect in Figure 2.5. A positive shock to majority variance (making the party more heterogenous) leads to an immediate and negative effect on the usage of positive substantive rules. Moreover, this effect persists for multiple time periods. Figure 2.6 provides even more evidence for the theory with regards to the expectations on distance. The theory anticipates that increasing distance leads to more partisan policy through the use of positive substantive powers (comparing, for instance, H_{2_c}-H_{5_c} to H_{6_c}-H_{9_c}). And again this is exactly what we observe. A positive shock to distance increases the usage of positive substantive rules. This effect is delayed—the shock is not felt in the first two periods, indicating that parties take a year or two to assess the shapes of the parties before attempting to use positive substantive



Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions: Majority Variance and Nature Substitute Adopted.



Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions: Distance and Nature Substitute Adopted.

rules. But the effect is felt for multiple time periods. Increasing distance between the parties is important for the usage of positive substantive powers.

The theory is largely supported in the above tests of positive substantive powers. How about in the test of those rules that are a broader mix of positive substantive and positive procedural powers? Recall that the second type of rule—amendments considered as read—is a mix of these types. Such a rule places a substantive emphasis on a majority-defined substitute amendment, a clear substantive goal, but fails to go so far as to consider that amendment as adopted, rather just as read. Moreover, such rules assist primarily in setting the procedural agenda. The majority party is exercising procedural power to place emphasis on a certain amendment above all others, but, unlike the prior type, allows for debate and amendment to that amendment (which would not be possible if the amendment was considered as adopted). Accordingly, then, increases in majority variance should lead to decreases in the usage of this type of rule (paralleling the positive substantive logic in moving from H_{6_a} to H_{7_a}). Similarly, increases in distance should lead to increases in the usage of this type of rule, as majority parties take advantage of its positive substantive effects (like moving from H_{2_c}-H_{5_c} to H_{6_c}-H_{9_c}). New, however, is the prediction regarding minority variance. The theory predicts that the use of positive procedural powers should increase as minority variance decreases (like moving from H_{6_a} to H_{8_a}). Accordingly, we should observe a negative sign on minority variance, a positive sign on distance, and a negative sign on majority variance in the models on rules of the second type.

The results of the partial adjustment model in differences are presented in the second column of Table 2.2. Again, we get a negative sign on the lagged dependent variable, indicating that year-over-year increases in the usage of this type of rule are associated with decreases in the following year. Again, similar to the model

on the first type of rule, much of the partial adjustment model in differences is substantively uninteresting. Here, however, the coefficient on the lag of majority variance is positive and significant.[13] This indicates that as majorities become more heterogenous, not homogenous, they use this type of rule. Of course, this is counter to our theoretical expectation. But a plausible explanation exists. As the party grows more heterogenous, a greater emphasis is placed on the procedural aspect of this rule. Instead of serving to accomplish substantive goals, these rules serve to reduce uncertainty on the House floor. Heterogenous majorities in particular want to avoid conflict and challenges on the floor, both from the minority party but also from within their own party. It is plausible, then, that majorities would use these rules more often as they became more heterogenous. This effect is statistically significant but substantively somewhat limited. A one standard deviation increase in majority variance (around 125 units) results in only about a one-unit year-over-year increase in the number of rules that consider substitutes as read. Our ability to explain changes in the usage of this type rule is stronger than the first type as well ($R^2 = 0.28$ relative to $R^2 = 0.15$ in the first model).

Similar to the previous rule, it could be that the model in differences is obscuring important long-run effects only found in the model in levels. Accordingly, I estimate the system as a VAR, again with one lag as determined by likelihood ratios. Recall that the order is the same as the previous model: distance, rules, majority variance, and minority variance. The Granger causality tests are reported in Table 2.4. Here

[13]This model includes the lagged value of majority variance following the advice of De Boef and Keele (2008), arguing that unnecessary restrictions on the lag structure of independent variables (here that all lags are zero) leads to problematic estimation. Accordingly, I tested whether any lag structure other than immediate contemporaneous effects existed in any of the theoretical models presented. Only in this case—majority variance and substitute amendments considered as read—did any lag have an effect. In all other cases for all other variables, the effects of lagged differences were statistically and substantively insignificant. I do not present those results for ease of exposition and clarity.

Table 2.4: Granger Causality: VAR for Nature Substitute Read

	Response Variable			
Shocked Variable	Distance	Nature Substitute Read	Majority Variance	Minority Variance
Distance	-	→		
Nature Substitute Read		-		
Majority Variance	→		-	
Minority Variance	→	→		-
System (All Lags Jointly)	→	→	→	→

From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at $p < 0.10$.

again, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed in the columns. Again we observe the importance of distance, as it Granger-causes the use of rules that make amendments be considered as read. Evidence for the theory is mixed with regards to majority variance, as it fails to Granger-cause the usage of rules. We also observe that minority variance is important for the use of these types of rules: a finding we will further investigate using IRFs.

The IRF from this VAR is shown in Figure 2.7. Again, the most theoretically interesting results are in the fourth column which depicts the response of the rules series to shocks in each of the other variables. Note first that majority variance fails to exert a statistically significant effect on the rules series, offering a mixed perspective on the possible alternative explanation offered above. We get even more mixed evidence regarding the effect of minority variance. As illuminated further in Figure 2.8, increases in minority variance (minorities becoming more heterogenous) again lead to increases in the use of this type of rule, not the expected negative sign. This effect, though, is small, but persists for a number of time periods. The



Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Functions: VAR for Nature Substitute Read.



Figure 2.8: Impulse Response Functions: Minority Variance and Nature Substitute Read.



Figure 2.9: Impulse Response Functions: Distance and Nature Substitute Read.

long-term effect actually persists into ten time periods, indicating that changes in party composition have real, persisting effects on lawmaking.

Again, however, we have a plausible alternative explanation. Theoretically, we expected that homogenous minority parties should require positive procedural maneuvering by the majority party, as they represent a unified opposition (groups of like-minded legislators would vote together more easily to defeat majority proposals). But it could also be the case that majorities are strategic enough to exploit heterogenous minorities. That is, majority parties know when they are facing relatively heterogenous minorities. Majority parties should recognize this disunity and take advantage of it by passing procedurally advantageous rules, knowing that they will not be defeated. Even if the minority party does not like a rule, its own heterogeneity keeps it from building a coalition to defeat the rule. The analyst should remember: the use of positive powers is *costly*. Party leaders usually pay that cost on the basis of natural party unity, meaning that the shared goals of the members of the party provide substantive and natural reason for the party to remain unified in opposition. Delay or other minority party opposition "can be quite irksome to some minority party members, leading to more, not less, dissention within its ranks" (Green 2015, 120). Minority parties, especially heterogenous ones, must employ delay judiciously. In this sense a majority party might "exploit" a heterogenous minority by passing positive procedural rules. We will return to this point in the next set of results.

Note that distance again is in the correct sign and direction when considering the system in levels. The IRF of distance is isolated in Figure 2.9. The effect is clear. A one-unit increase in the standardized distance variable leads to a strong and persistent response in the rules series. This response persists for four time periods, too. Our theoretical expectations, then, receive a mix of support when considering

the model both in differences and in levels.

We return a final time to Table 2.2. The third column presents the results for those rules that make no amendment in order except one prescribed in the rule. This is a cleanly positive procedural power, as the amendment advocated is not required to have any substantive content. Rather, the rule itself is simply about controlling the procedural agenda. Accordingly, we should expect a negative sign on minority variance (the same logic as moving from H_{6_a} to H_{8_a} above), but no necessary corresponding expectations for majority variance or for distance.

The results again provide mixed evidence for the theory. Even without strong theoretical expectations, the differenced distance measure exerts a positive and significant influence on the differenced rule series. A one-unit year-over-year increase in distance leads to an expected 0.520-unit year-over-year increase in the usage of these types of positive procedural rules. The largest year-to-year increases in distance are about ten units, so the immediate effect of this increase is considerable. Note also that the previously troubling positive coefficient on majority variance reemerges, this time on a strictly procedural rule. This evidence indicates that the majority party truly does use positive procedural powers to guard against both minority party challenges as well as internal challenges. This type of rule simply reduces uncertainty on the House floor without necessarily pursuing substantive goals: we observe that majority parties use it more often when their own members become relatively more heterogenous. Minority party variance, the only variable with a strong theoretical prediction, is not statistically significant in this model.

Just as with the other rules series, we can recast the system as a VAR to ensure that no important long-run relationships are being obscured in the model in differences. Again, for clarification, the order of the VAR follows the same logic of the contemporaneous correlations of the variables in the system: distance, rule type,

Table 2.5: Granger Causality: VAR for No Amendment Except

	Response Variable			
Shocked Variable	Distance	No Amendment Except	Majority Variance	Minority Variance
Distance	-	→		
No Amendment Except		-		
Majority Variance	→		-	
Minority Variance	→	→		-
System (All Lags Jointly)	→	→	→	→

From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at $p < 0.10$.

majority variance, then minority variance. The Granger causality tests are presented in Table 2.5. Here again, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed in the columns. A now familiar pattern emerges: the usage of this type of rule is Granger-caused by both distance (theoretically expected) and minority variance (not theoretically expected). To illuminate these effects, I interpret the IRFs from this VAR in the next paragraph.

The full IRF from a VAR with one lag is shown in Figure 2.10. As before, the responses of the theoretically interesting variable, the rule series, are shown in the fourth column. The IRF provides additional evidence for the importance of distance. Just as in the other series, a shock to distance leads to a response in even these solely procedural rules, though this effect is fairly immediate and does not persist. Clearly, distance is important for the use of all positive powers, both procedural and substantive.

The other theoretically emergent finding is the effect of minority variance. Recall that we theoretically expect minority variance to exert a negative effect: majorities



Figure 2.10: Impulse Response Functions: VAR for No Amendment Except.



Figure 2.11: Impulse Response Functions: Minority Variance and No Amendment Except.

use positive procedural rules to protect themselves against more homogenous minority parties. To help elucidate this test, the isolated IRF for minority variance on the rule series is presented in Figure 2.11. Here, we actually observe a positive effect. This parallels the effect found in rules that consider substitutes as read. Instead of guarding against homogenous minorities, majority parties seem to exploit minorities that grow more heterogenous by passing positive procedural rules. This effect is delayed, but takes a considerable amount of time to decay.

Overall, then, the theory receives mixed initial evidence. For the most important predictions, and with the most appropriate statistical models, we get strong evidence for the theory. Distance always behaves as expected: increasing distance leads to the increased use of positive powers, both procedural and substantive. For the use of positive substantive powers particularly, majority variance also behaves as expected. Majority parties increasingly use positive substantive powers as their base becomes more homogenous (and can increasingly agree on a single policy to pursue). The theory receives weaker support on procedural powers. Instead of responding, as expected, to minority variance by guarding against it, majority parties seem to exploit heterogenous minorities by using positive procedural powers. On this point, readers should be encouraged that this is the first systematic test of a fully elaborated iteration of Conditional Party Government. Future research should test more fully the theory developed in this section (majorities shielding themselves against homogenous minorities) against this plausible alternative hypothesis (majorities exploiting heterogenous minorities).

2.6 Theory Versus Conventional Wisdom

One of the overarching criticisms offered here is that the current literature fails to theoretically or methodologically account for important variation in the usage of

different types of rules. In particular, it fails to differentiate between positive and negative rules that accomplish either procedural or substantive goals. In the previous section we illuminated the contrasting theoretical dynamics among the usage of three different types of rules. It would be interesting, then, to compare these theoretical findings with the conventional wisdom on rules to display the importance of the theory.

According to the conventional wisdom, I collapse all of the rules together. That is, the dependent variable is simply the collection of all rules, regardless of their content, issued within a given year. As this variable is also integrated, the analysis that follows is a partial adjustment model on the dependent variable in differences. I include the three key theoretical predictors from above—majority variance, minority variance, and distance—as well as a dummy variable for Republican control of the House. This variable is interacted with distance following the conventional wisdom that Republicans are inherently more prone to issuing special rules than Democrats as distance increases, due to ideological factions like the Tea Party. Other conventional controls, like a dummy for the first session, or theoretical controls, like majority size and minority size (from Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger [2007]) were found to be insignificant.[14] The results are presented in Table 2.6.

None of the theoretical findings from the previous section is reflected in the conventional wisdom model. Minority variance, changes in majority variance, and changes in distance (for Democrats) are all found to be unrelated to year-over-year changes in the usage of broad rules. This is extraordinarily important. The three most important variables to the theory—and the three most important variables to the nature of conflict between the parties—are wholly unrelated to the broad is-

[14]It is important to note that they were also insignificant in the theoretical models presented in Table 2.2. These models are not presented due to space concerns, but they are available from the author.

Table 2.6: Conventional Rules Wisdom

Variable	Change in All Rules Total
Change in Y_{t-1}	-0.444**
	(0.121)
Minority Variance	-0.003
	(0.014)
Change in Majority Variance	0.005
	(0.016)
Change in Distance	0.703
	(0.673)
Republican Control	-2.787
	(4.227)
Republican Control∗ Change in Distance	2.584
	(1.860)
Constant	1.842
	(5.178)
R^2	0.28
N	64
AIC	8.119
BIC	268.553

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$. Standard errors in parentheses.
LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.

suance of rules to accomplish legislative ends. Put another way, when we treat all rules as equivalent in procedure and substance, we find that polarization (the parties separating or growing more homogenous) is totally unrelated to lawmaking. Clearly, the more nuanced portrait provided in the theory and its tests above are warranted.

The lone exception is that the (atheoretical) interaction between Republican control and changes in distance comes close to statistical significance. The marginal effects of that interaction, then, are investigated further in Table 2.7.[15] We already

[15]Of course, conditionality implies that if the effect of changes in distance is conditional on party control, so too is the effect of party control conditional on distance (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). However, those effects were not statistically or substantively significant for any realistic sample value for changes in distance (like year-over-year increases in distance of over ten points, or

Table 2.7: Marginal Effect of Changes in Distance

Value	Marginal Effect	Standard Error	p Value
Republican Control = 0	0.703	(0.673)	0.297
Republican Control = 1	3.286	(1.888)	0.082*

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

know that the marginal effect of changes in distance for Democrats is insignificant (the coefficient on distance in the model). The coefficient on changes in distance for Republicans, however, is significant at $p = 0.08$. This model informs us that year-over-year increases in distance only lead to increases in the use of all rules when Republicans are in control of the House. As much as this finding pairs nicely with journalistic wisdom on the vilification of the Republican party and government shutdowns, it is not theoretically informed. The theoretically motivated findings concerning the different types of rules separately, however, show the opposite. Regardless of party control, majority variance and distance affect the usage of rules in systematic ways. Moreover, those effects depend on whether the rule in question is procedural or substantive in nature. It is imperative to account for these theoretical distinctions or we might be led astray by the types of results illustrated in Table 2.6.

2.7 Changes in Policy

The final theory tests in this section concern the directional movement of policy. (The policy extremism series itself is presented in Figure 2.12.) Recall that higher values in this series indicate a higher percentage of key votes (Congressional output) that is classified as ideological (in either direction). That is, does the usage of certain types of rules lead to the creation of more extreme policy? The results of that model are presented in Table 2.8. As the policy movement is stationary, the model is run

10% of the entire scale of the variable).

Table 2.8: Changes in Policy

Variable	Interest Scores
Y_{t-1}	0.243*
	(-0.137)
Minority Variance	-0.000
	(0.000)
Change in Majority Variance	0.000
	(0.000)
Change in Distance	0.010
	(0.011)
Republican Control	-0.028
	(0.062)
Change in Majority Size	0.005
	(0.003)
Change in Minority Size	0.007*
	(0.003)
Change in Substitute Adopted	0.020**
	(0.009)
Change in Substitute Read	-0.014*
	(0.007)
Change in No Amendment Except	-0.007
	(0.006)
Constant	0.280**
	(0.092)
R^2	0.22
N	65

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$. Standard errors in parentheses.
LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.

in levels, rather than differences. The theory implies two direct predictions. First, policy should become more ideological as majority party homogeneity increases. Second, policy should become more ideological as distance increases. The theory, as well as the empirical results above, also imply an indirect prediction. As the majority party uses positive procedural rules, such as rules that consider amendments in the nature of a substitute as adopted, we should observe more ideological policy.



Figure 2.12: Policy Extremism Time Series.

The empirical results only partially support these predictions. With regards to distance and majority party homogeneity, we observe null effects for both variables. Interestingly, changes in distance between the parties seem unrelated to the level of ideological policy in any given year. We do, however, observe the expected positive coefficient on positive substantive rules. A one-unit increase in the year-to-year change in the number of rules in which a substitute amendment is considered as adopted leads to a total (long-run effect included) effect of increasing ideological policy extremism by 3% (as the scale of the policy variable is 0 [no ideological policy] to 1 [all ideological policy]). This indicates that simply using only three more of these types of rules over the prior year is enough to increase ideological policy by almost

10%. The effect of this substantive lawmaking strategy is substantively significant.

Again, we might have general concerns that the model with differences could be missing long-run dynamics only present in levels. Accordingly, the system was cast as a VAR. Since the time series are short, however, not enough degrees of freedom are available to estimate the whole model as shown in Table 2.8. Accordingly, the seven-variable system includes the policy variable, minority variance, majority variance, distance, Republican control, majority size, minority size, and the positive substantive rule (amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted), as these are the most theoretically important variables *and* the most theoretically important type of rules. Again, fit statistics indicate that a lag length one is appropriate for the model. In addition, Johansen tests again indicate that there is no cointegration present. Lastly, the same analysis of contemporaneous correlations was done for each of the pairs of series in the model to determine the order of the system. Distance retains its importance, so it is entered first so as to allow it to contemporaneously affect all of the other variables in the system. Rule type is second, followed by policy outputs, then majority variance and minority variance, and finally majority size and minority size. The system is fairly robust to specification of the final four variables, but the order for distance, rule type, and policy is important (as it theoretically should be: distance, rules, and policy jointly comprise the bulk of lawmaking). Republican control of the House of Representatives is entered deterministically.

The IRF for the entire system is not presented, as a seven-by-seven panel tests the limits of usefulness in interpretation. Instead, Granger causality tests are shown in Table 2.9. As a reminder, Granger causality tests indicate whether a variable and its lags are jointly significant in determining another variable in a VAR system. In Table 2.9, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed

Table 2.9: Granger Causality: VAR for Policy Outputs

	Response Variable						
Shocked Variable	Policy	Maj. Var.	Min. Var.	Distance	Nature Substitute Adopted	Maj. Size	Min. Size
Policy	-				$\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$	
Majority Variance		-	$\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$			
Minority Variance			-	$\rightarrow$			
Distance				-	$\rightarrow$		
NSA					-		
Majority Size						-	$\rightarrow$
Minority Size		$\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$		$\rightarrow$	-

From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).

Johansen test indicates no cointegration.

Causality denoted at $p < 0.10$.

in the columns. A few general words are in order, however. The effects of distance and majority variance, though they have the correct sign (positive and negative, respectively), are insignificant in the impulse response function on the policy measure (not shown) and fail to Granger cause the policy variable. Interestingly, we get more confirmatory evidence for the general theory presented in this section. Echoing the theoretical findings in the previous models, distance is shown to Granger cause rules in the nature of a substitute as adopted in this expanded model.

A final word is in order concerning the substantive effect of the rules series on the policy variable. Even though the effect of rules on policy extremism is not Granger-causal, recall the prior admonition from Lütkepohl (2007, 48), forcing us to examine the IRFs more carefully before drawing inferences about a cause-and-effect relationship. Broadly reflecting the findings from the partial adjustment models, we again see a positive and significant effect for the use of positive substantive powers



Figure 2.13: Impulse Response Functions: Substantive Powers and Policy Movement.

increasing policy extremism through the impulse response function shown in Figure 2.13. The effect is delayed, but persists for multiple time periods once felt. The use of these most restrictive types of rules has a clear impact on overall policy. Again, this is the first theoretical insight that we have on the systematic nature of these effects.

2.8 Conclusion

This section has covered a lot of ground. The elaborated theory of lawmaking was introduced. We made general predictions for the types of powers, both procedural and substantive, that should be observed given different compositions of the parties and the distance between them. We uncovered new evidence for that theory, primarily based on new empirical data measuring the usage of different types of rules over time. And we contrasted that evidence in particular to the conventional wisdom surrounding the usage of rules.

The evidence is strongest for positive substantive powers. The usage of these rules is clearly related to the distance between the parties as well as the homogeneity of the majority party, both of which are predicted by the theory. Moreover, these types of powers are directly related to increasing policy extremism, also predicted by the theory. For the most important types of rules, creating the most important types of legislation, the theory receives the strongest support.

It is worth dwelling on the latter point. The analyses presented here also illustrate the potential dangers of continuing to analyze the usage of rules without regard for their specific substantive or procedural content. If we treat all rules equivalently, we find evidence for journalistic accounts of Congress: Republican extremity in the usage of rules with little theoretical or strategic motivation. Moreover, we find no evidence of a compelling theoretical story for variables that *should* be consistently

significant: majority variance, minority variance, and distance. Only when we regard each series separately does a theoretically informed account emerge. The usage of different types of rules responds to different theoretical elements. And only the most restrictive types of rules—those positive substantive rules that consider amendments as adopted—have real effects on the nature of policy extremism.

The evidence is more mixed for positive procedural powers. The usage of these powers is still substantially related to the distance between the two parties, not necessarily predicted by (but not inconsistent with) the theory presented here. We did find, however, contradictory evidence for how positive procedural powers related to minority party homogeneity. Rather than shielding itself from increasingly homogenous minority parties, the majority party seems to exploit heterogenous minorities more often by passing more procedural types of rules. Further evidence is certainly needed on this point. It is imperative to keep in mind that this is the first longitudinal test of the elaborated theory of lawmaking. While its central (and most theoretically and substantively important) predictions are supported, there are several opportunities to refine the theory and its predictions in future analyses. A variety of potentially competing explanations for this unanticipated finding exist. Most importantly, we now have both the empirical data required to test those explanations and a theoretical foothold in which to ground new expectations.

We also have empirical evidence for an idea that analysts have long suspected but have been unable to demonstrate: rules are not created equally. Parties use rules differently in changing circumstances; moreover, that changing usage responds systematically to predictable theoretical conditions. Our understanding of the lawmaking process is inherently limited if we fail to take the differences in types of rules to account. While it is true that some of the above analyses have generated more theoretical questions than they have answered, it is important to remember that,

without analyzing these series separately, we would not know which questions to ask in the first place.

Having tested the core of the theoretical expectations in this section, the next two sections test secondary predictions of the theory. Specifically, if lawmaking varies systematically with the shapes of the parties and the distance between them, what does this mean for representation? And if lawmaking becomes more procedural through the use of different types of (unpopular) rules, what does this mean for approval? We turn to these questions in the next sections.

3. RESTRICTIVE RULES AND REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES

The previous section illuminates many of the changing patterns of lawmaking as polarization, specifically through changing the "condition" of Conditional Party Government, changes the types of laws made and the types of rules used to make those laws. Observing these changes, a logical question is how this new type of lawmaking impacts the quality of representation received by the mass public?

Of course, we know quite a bit already about the quality of representation in the United States. At the dyadic level (Member of Congress to constituency, such as Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002), across different issues (Miller and Stokes 1963; Hurley and Hill 2003), and in the aggregate (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), representation exists in some form or another. Representation may be better on some issues than others (Hill and Hurley 1999), to some constituencies than others (Griffin and Newman 2005), or may take a lagged functional form (Wlezien 1995), but it is largely found to exist.

One such path for these effects is through lawmaking. The resurgence of polarization has led to a broad growth in the use of restrictive rules in passing major legislation (Duff and Rohde 2012). The use of these rules could have the clear effect of increasing representation for some partisan subgroups over others.

This section aims to answer this question. In particular, I use novel data on rules and polarization to investigate how patterns of representation change with polarization. On the upside, polarization does not seem to preclude the representation of any particular partisan group, including Independents. Though the quality of that representation may decline, the general pattern of representation still seems to exist. However, it is apparent that the use of rules is not unbiased. For Republicans in

particular, restrictive rules help to shift policy outcomes toward Republican policy demands, often at the expense of others.

3.1 Literature Review and Theory

Representation can arise in a variety of ways, and the quality of that emergent representation can vary significantly. Political science, working at least since the seminal cross-sectional work of Miller and Stokes (1963), has provided a wide variety of evidence for policy representation by the United States House of Representatives. Most important for the analysis at hand is that this representation is often unequal. Most notably, representation often skews towards co-partisans (Hurley and Hill 2003). Adams, Bishin, and Dow (2004, 348) find that voters prefer and electorally reward when candidates present non-centrist positions on issues, though there is some concern that too much ideological extremity (in the view of the district) can hurt Members (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).

While we have evidence that representation exists at the dynamic, global level, between broadly aggregated public preferences and broadly considered government policy outputs (for instance Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002), we have little research on how this process has changed as the political environment has changed. Most notably, it is easiest to represent public opinion when most members of the public aggregate to a single, well defined policy preference, and most Members can compromise to create policy that reflects that interest. Recall: only a single policy is created for all individuals. Both of those realities, however, have shifted dramatically. Individuals in the mass public are possibly becoming more ideologically extreme on the basis of party identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). At the very least, they are becoming more consistent in their policy preferences on the basis of their party identification (Levendusky 2009). Accordingly, it is more disingenu-

ous to aggregate over all of their preferences and establish a single, representative policy average to be represented in the traditional dynamic, demand-input model. Instead, we have multiple, separate subgroups demanding increasingly different types of policy, often mutually exclusive. Our tests of the quality of representation should reflect these differences, especially if we know that dyadic representation often skews towards co-partisans.

Politicians are also becoming more ideologically extreme. Across any given measure, Members of Congress are growing more divided on the basis of party identification (Fleisher and Bond 2004). This exacerbates the problem of representation. Not only is it harder to establish the aggregate public position to be represented, but politicians themselves are less likely to compromise to represent such an aggregate position, even if it existed. Instead, they are more likely to demand extreme positions and extreme policy alternatives, possibly hurting the quality of representation.

The previous section illuminated some of these potential problems. Changing shapes of parties led to certain, more substantive rules being used to pass legislation. And those positive substantive rules move policy toward the policy preferences of the majority party in Congress, not towards the preferences of the public. As these rules are used more, party control of the institution during polarized time periods might fundamentally shift policy outcomes away from the floor median, as parties use rules and other leadership powers to pursue firmly partisan legislation. Yet even despite the preponderance of evidence demonstrating changing methods of lawmaking, we have little evidence on how these new patterns of lawmaking affect representation over time. Even though we are fairly certain of changing elite and mass polarization, we haven't yet tested their effects on representation.

Only a single study attempts to disentangle these potential effects. Ura and Ellis (2012) attempt to measure policy preferences by partisan subgroup explicitly,

jettisoning the idea of a single aggregate preference to be represented globally. They find that each of the partisan moods—Republican, Democratic, and Independent—is responsive to macro conditions (like the economy). The main difference between the parties is their responses to policy choices despite parallel responses to conditions. Partisan subgroups perceive policy alternatives differently, and they adjust their preferences in non-identical ways when evaluating those policies.

The patterns described above have logical implications for the quality of representation that could emerge as polarization increases. Two ideas are immediately apparent. First, policy could potentially shift from being representative to aggregate policy preferences (of the whole public in the average) to being more representative of specific partisan preferences. As polarization increases, more issues might become party defining, leading to an electoral benefit of representation of co-partisans over the mass public *or* better representation on the basis of broader belief-sharing. No matter the mechanism, representatives might become more responsive to their co-partisans as polarization increases.

Second, a main driver of that process should be the increasingly partisan use of rules, especially restrictive ones on major legislation, as a normal pattern of lawmaking. On this point, Conditional Party Government is clear. As the "condition" of CPG becomes more satisfied, meaning, broadly, that as the parties become more polarized, the majority party is increasingly empowered to use restrictive rules to accomplish party goals. In light of the first theoretical expectation, these rules could be used to increasingly represent the policy preferences of co-partisans over partisans. The above discussion implies that these effects might be conditional on one another. That is, the use of rules might be exclusively devoted to representing co-partisan mood. As preferences shift to become more extreme, rules might be used to represent those changes in preferences. Generally, then, we are left with three

theoretical expectations.

> H_{12}: The higher the level of polarization, the better the representation of the mass co-partisans of the party that controls the House.

> H_{13}: As polarization increases, restrictive rules should increasingly be used to shift policy outputs towards the preferences of the mass co-partisans of the party that controls the House.

> H_{14}: As polarization increases, restrictive rules should especially be used to shift policy outputs towards the preferences of the party that controls the House as its co-partisan, mass preferences grow to be more extreme in the direction of the majority party (Democrats becoming more liberal and Republicans more conservative). That is, the representational benefit of restrictive rules is conditional on mass policy preferences moving to become more extreme.

Of course, previous sections speak to the theoretical predictions here. For instance, the theory laid out in Section 2 (and tested there) demonstrates how the usage of the most restrictive types of rules increases with the specific purpose of passing partisan legislation as elite polarization increases. This is already indirect support for H_{13}: as elite polarization increases, the usage of rules specifically moves policy toward the preferences of the majority party. The theoretical predictions and empirical tests in this section test whether that linkage emerges explicitly: whether or not there is a direct linkage between the policy preferences of mass co-partisans of the majority party and policy outputs.

The analyses presented here are a first cut at examining these potential relationships. What follows makes use of the data and time periods available, which, unfortunately, are quite limited. In addition, the specifications of the models that follow are limited by the availability of the data. I encourage discussion and ideas on all of these points. I turn to a description of that data in the next section.



Figure 3.1: Number of Rules over Time.

3.2 Data and Methods

The theory above suggests three key data series are required to test these expectations. The first is a measure of the use of rules over time. The database of special rules comes from the rules identified by the Political Institutions and Public Choice dataset (Rohde 2010), extended from 1947 to 2012. These data are described previously in Section 2. The series is shown in Figure 3.1.

Of course, the evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that certain types of rules are more important for policy goals than others. Accordingly, I mirror these same analyses using the most positive, substantive type of rule discussed in Section 2: rules that make amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted. The



Figure 3.2: House Polarization over Time.

results look identical, both presenting largely null findings. To keep from presenting too many results, I only consider the VAR with all rules (the results are similar when considering the positive substantive rules, too).

The measure of polarization comes from Wood and Jordan (2011). In particular, the data use inflation-adjusted ADA scores to simulate distributions of Republicans and Democrats in the House over time. The measure of polarization is the amount of overlap between the two distributions. It ranges from zero (complete overlap) to one (no distributional overlap). This measure has been found to be robust to alternative measures of ideology and broadly consistent with other measures of polarization. The series is presented in Figure 3.2.

The measure of policy is from Ramirez (2013). In general, we desire a way to

measure how ideological the major outputs of the House are in any given year. To capture ideological votes, I first record all votes designated as ideological by the ADA and the American Conservative Union (ACU). I then record all *Congressional Quarterly* "key votes," a set of the most important votes taken by the House each year as determined by the non-partisan contributors to that volume. Lastly, I match recorded ideological votes to the non-partisan key votes. A key vote is counted as having an ideological direction if either of the interest group scores recorded it as such. The final measure of policy outputs, then, is the percent of key votes that were ideological in any given direction.[1] This represents the continuous nature of the direction of policy. The series is shown in Figure 3.3.

We also need a measure of preferences. The preferences of partisan subgroups are from Ura and Ellis (2012). In particular, they collect policy preferences on *Mood*-like indicators from the General Social Survey and then disaggregate them by party identification. For information on the validation of those measures, as well as their general movements, see Ura and Ellis (2012). As they use GSS data, those series begin in 1972 and continue through 2008. Like I do, they use WCALC to smooth the data and to generate preference measures in off-survey years, as the GSS is fielded irregularly.[2] The measure of "full" policy preferences is the classic *Mood* from Stimson (1999), updated through 2014. It takes survey marginals from a variety of different policy questions and aggregates them via a dyadic ratios algorithm. On all of the series, higher values indicate more liberal preferences. Each of these series is shown together in Figure 3.4.

I also control for Republican control of the House in some of the following analyses.

[1]Ramirez (2013) found this measure to have strong construct validity with regards to policy movement and public demand for policy.

[2]This approach has been used several times to investigate "sub-group" mood, for instance the mood of informed groups over others (Enns and Kellstedt 2008).



Figure 3.3: Policy Series from Ramirez (2013).

None of the hypotheses presented in this section directly implies that policy should move to be more or less conservative or liberal when the House is controlled by Democrats or Republicans. Yet the theory in Section 2 gives us some direction. Recall that the majority party is thought to exercise perfect negative power, meaning that it will never be defeated (in any real sense) on the House floor. Even if CPG is low, meaning that majority parties should not be pursuing partisan policies, policy should at least broadly reflect the party in power. However, this linkage is not explicit. Accordingly, I also present models omitting the Republican control variable.

Lastly, this analysis controls for economic expectations over time. Generally, as the economy improves, individuals hold more liberal policy preferences. Accordingly, I control for economic perceptions with the Index of Consumer Sentiment.



Figure 3.4: Moods, from Ura and Ellis (2012) and Stimson (1999, 2014).

Each of the moods is integrated. Policy is stationary over time. Consumer sentiment is also integrated over time. Accordingly, this analysis makes use of two types of modeling strategies. Partial Adjustment Models are used to model policy in levels, with moods in differences. That is, lagged changes in mood are thought to move policy up or down to absolute levels. To ensure that changes in differences are not obscuring important effects found in levels, each of these analyses is also recast as a six-variable Vector Autoregression (VAR) system. Each system contains one lag of the variables in the system, as suggested by virtually all fit criteria (AIC, BIC, and LR). Johansen tests for cointegration suggest that the variables in the system are not cointegrated.

3.3 Results

I start by reporting the results of the Partial Adjustment Models. Recall here that the dependent variable—policy—is preserved in levels, while the key integrated independent variables—rules and moods—are measured in differences. For each group, we test two models. The first model is constituted of the same six variables in the VAR. The second model interacts mood and rules for each partisan group. According to the theory, the effect of rules on policy should be conditional on movements in partisan mood. Only when moods change do rules affect policy movements.

Table 3.1 presents the first set of results, this time for the full mood series. The pattern of effects in Table 3.1, Model 1 can be quickly summarized, as they are mostly insignificant. Changes in rules, changes in sentiment, changes in House polarization, and, most importantly, changes in mood are all insignificant on the liberalness or conservativeness of policy outputs. Only Republican control of the House is significant (which lends the model some validity). When Republicans are in control of the House, it leads to an immediate 0.376-unit decrease in the liberalness of policy outputs. Considering the scale of the policy variable—it ranges from -1 (perfectly conservative policy) to 1 (perfectly liberal policy)—this effect is quite large. Note that we do get evidence of a sort for H_{12}, as changes in polarization do not enhance representation of the full constituency.

The interactive model in Model 2 is substantively uninteresting. Most importantly, the interaction is insignificant (and the estimated effect itself is close to zero). The effects of changes in rules are not conditional on changes in full mood. Recall, though, that the theory is specifically about partisan subgroups. So such a null finding is not necessarily unexpected.

Null findings persist if we examine only positive substantive rules rather than all

Table 3.1: Full Mood and Policy

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Y_{t-1}	0.180	0.196	0.145	0.192	0.204	0.264
	(0.168)	(0.201)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.198)	(0.195)
ΔAll Rules	0.001	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.003)	(0.004)				
ΔNature/Adopted	-	-	-0.006	-0.011	-0.009	-0.017
			(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
ΔConsumer	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.004
Sentiment	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Republican Control	-0.376**	-0.367**	-0.370**	-0.328**	-	-
	(0.129)	(0.142)	(0.130)	(0.133)		
ΔHouse	0.675	0.688	0.774	1.027	1.519	1.770
Polarization	(1.469)	(1.495)	(1.444)	(1.445)	(1.571)	(1.524)
ΔFull Mood$_{t-1}$	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.018	0.036	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.042)
ΔFull Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	0.000	-	-	-	-
ΔAll Rules		(0.003)				
ΔFull Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	-	-	0.016	-	0.023*
ΔNature/Adopted				(0.012)		(0.013)
Constant	0.156*	0.153*	0.156*	0.123	0.009	-0.016*
	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.071)	(0.069)
R^2	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.33	0.11	0.19
N	38	38	38	38	38	38
AIC	1.026	1.078	1.027	1.080	1.207	1.212

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

rules. Again Republican control is significant in Models 3 and 4, and the estimated effect is almost identical. The interaction between changes in full mood and rules is stronger, but still insignificant.

If we exclude the somewhat atheoretical Republican control variable, two things happen. First, our explanatory power drops significantly, as the R^2 declines from 0.33 to 0.19 in the interactive model. Second, however, the interaction between changes in positive substantive rules and changes in mood becomes positive and significant. The



Figure 3.5: Marginal Effects of Changes in Nature/Adopted at Levels of Changes in Full Mood.

marginal effect of that interaction is presented in Figure 3.5. If mood is not changing (0 on the x-axis), then year-over-year increases in positive substantive rules have no effect on changes in policy. However, if full mood changes, positive substantive rules help to move policy in the direction of the change in mood. In general, then, there is some evidence of representation to the full constituency.

Recall, however, that the general pattern in Table 3.1 was of null findings. These null findings also persist across some partisan subgroups. The theoretical expectations presented above do not necessarily suggest a test of each partisan subgroup separately, but examining them helps to illuminate some interesting ancillary results. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for Democratic and Independent mood can be summarized to-

Table 3.2: Democrat Mood and Policy

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Y_{t-1}	0.093	0.088	0.061	0.119	0.131	0.214
	(0.183)	(0.203)	(0.197)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.218)
ΔAll Rules	0.001	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.004)	(0.004)				
ΔNature/Adopted	-	-	-0.005	-0.010	-0.006	-0.014
			(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
ΔConsumer	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.004
Sentiment	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Republican Control	-0.328**	-0.332**	-0.326**	-0.299*	-	-
	(0.141)	(0.156)	(0.141)	(0.146)		
ΔHouse	0.586	0.581	0.635	0.740	1.077	1.184
Polarization	(1.528)	(1.559)	(1.510)	(1.525)	(1.610)	(1.597)
ΔDemocrat Mood$_{t-1}$	0.008	0.009	0.011	0.005	0.018	0.007
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)
ΔDemocrat Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	0.000	-	-	-	-
ΔAll Rules		(0.004)				
ΔDemocrat Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	-	-	0.013	-	0.021
ΔNature/Adopted				(0.016)		(0.017)
Constant	0.131	0.133	0.132	0.107	0.009	-0.015
	(0.087)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.074)	(0.076)
R^2	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.06	0.11
N	34	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	1.093	1.211	1.091	1.184	1.213	1.275

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

gether. Changes in rules, regardless of how they are measured and regardless of the inclusion of the Republican control variable, never exert a significant, unconditional effect on changes in policy. In neither partisan case are shifts in rules conditional on shifts in mood (Models 2, 4, and 6 in both Tables have insignificant interactions). Moreover, in neither case are shifts in mood independently significant, as evidenced by the null findings in Models 1, 3, and 5 of both Tables. Just as in the models for the full mood series in Table 3.1, the only significant force on levels of policy is

Table 3.3: Independent Mood and Policy

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Y_{t-1}	0.092	0.097	0.065	0.123	0.134	0.214
	(0.182)	(0.187)	(0.199)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.221)
ΔAll Rules	0.001	0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.004)	(0.004)				
ΔNature/Adopted	-	-	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.008
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
ΔConsumer	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.004
Sentiment	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Republican Control	-0.330**	-0.327**	-0.328**	-0.305**	-	-
	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.145)		
ΔHouse	0.620	0.647	0.672	0.730	1.136	1.175
Polarization	(-1.522)	(1.555)	(1.504)	(1.516)	(1.604)	(1.594)
ΔIndependent Mood_{t-1}	-0.010	-0.016	-0.009	-0.011	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.037)	(-0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)
ΔIndependent Mood_{t-1}*	-	0.001	-	-	-	-
ΔAll Rules		(-0.002)				
ΔIndependent Mood_{t-1}*	-	-	-	0.020	-	0.030
ΔNature/Adopted				(0.025)		(0.026)
Constant	0.134	0.135	0.135	0.110	0.011	-0.013
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.074)	(0.076)
R^2	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.05	0.10
N	34	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	1.091	1.148	1.091	1.184	1.216	1.283

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

Republican control of the House. The size of the effects for this variable is consistent with the findings for full mood, too.

We lastly turn to the effects of Republican mood on policy. The findings are presented in Table 3.4. The findings across all of the models largely echo those for Democrats and Independents: the only significant influence on policy is Republican control of the House. Changes in rules, regardless of how they are measured, and changes in Republican mood do not exert significant effects on changes in policy.

Table 3.4: Republican Mood and Policy

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Y_{t-1}	0.104	-0.078	0.072	0.038	0.143	0.144
	(0.182)	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.216)	(0.209)	(0.227)
ΔAll Rules	0.001	-0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.004)	(0.004)				
ΔNature/Adopted	-	-	-0.004	0.000	-0.004	-0.005
			(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)
ΔConsumer	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002
Sentiment	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Republican Control	-0.323**	-0.356**	-0.321**	-0.333**	-	-
	(0.140)	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.145)		
ΔHouse	0.542	0.589	0.631	0.529	1.076	1.080
Polarization	(1.512)	(1.450)	(1.495)	(1.537)	(1.591)	(1.635)
ΔRepublican Mood$_{t-1}$	0.026	0.027	0.023	0.022	0.029	0.029
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)
ΔRepublican Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	-0.005*	-	-	-	-
ΔAll Rules		(0.003)				
ΔRepublican Mood$_{t-1}$*	-	-	-	-0.012	-	0.000
ΔNature/Adopted				(0.028)		(0.029)
Constant	0.131	0.125	0.132	0.132	0.011	0.011
	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.076)
R^2	0.22	0.31	0.22	0.23	0.07	0.07
N	34	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	1.076	1.071	1.078	1.189	1.197	1.315

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

The interactive model, however, is more interesting for Republicans, but only for the measure of all rules, not just those most positive and substantive (Model 2). Namely, the interaction between changes in rules and changes in mood is significant for changes in policy. This significant interaction appears to provides empirical support for the theory, but the coefficients alone in Table 3.4 do not fully portray the underlying changes. To appreciate the substantive nature of the interaction, we need to plot these effects as well.



Figure 3.6: Marginal Effects of Changes in Rules at Levels of Changes in Republican Mood.

To talk in any meaningful way about the magnitude of those effects, it is important to consider marginal effects plots, as the coefficients in the model are conditional and not interpretable in any theoretically meaningful way (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). The marginal effects of changes in rules at different levels of changes in Republican mood are demonstrated in Figure 3.6.

The pattern observed is interesting. When Republican mood shifts to become more conservative, the effect of increasing the number of rules used is to make policy more *liberal*, not conservative. Rules, then, seem to be accomplishing the opposite of a representational benefit. Instead, rules make it more likely to observe the opposite of the policy preferences that the party holds.



Figure 3.7: Mass Co-partisan Mood.

Yet it could be that we are failing to capture the appropriate measure of preferences. The theory directly implies that responsiveness should increase to mass co-partisans over time, not to one specific partisan group over another. It is possible to capture that linkage in the above models by interacting each of the separate partisan moods with the control of the institution, but such an approach is inefficient and obscures interpretation of the coefficients. Instead, I create a new series, co-partisan mood. This series is Democratic mood when Democrats control the House and Republican mood when Republicans control the House. As is expected, it is more liberal in the former years (higher positive values) and more conservative in the latter. Co-partisan mood is presented in Figure 3.7

Table 3.5 presents the same models, using co-partisan mood as the key indepen-

Table 3.5: Co-partisan Mood and Policy

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Y_{t-1}	0.147	0.131	0.060	0.061	0.126	0.128
	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.208)	(0.210)
ΔAll Rules	0.001	-0.001	-	-	-	-
	(0.004)	(0.004)				
ΔNature/Adopted	-		-0.003	0.005	-0.001	0.007
			(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)
ΔConsumer	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.006
Sentiment	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Republican Control	-0.289**	-0.292**	-0.320**	-0.325**	-	-
	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.147)		
ΔHouse	0.827	0.913	0.633	0.646	0.970	0.986
Polarization	(1.504)	(1.498)	(1.513)	(1.524)	(1.606)	(1.623)
ΔCopartisan Mood	0.015	-0.031	0.005	-0.008	0.018	0.007
	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.030)
ΔCopartisan Mood*	-	0.001	-	-	-	-
ΔAll Rules		(0.001)				
ΔCopartisan Mood*	-	-	-	-0.002	-	-0.002
ΔNature/Adopted				(0.003)		(0.003)
Constant	0.108	0.113	0.131	0.117	0.009	-0.006
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.08)
R^2	0.22	0.25	0.210	0.230	0.070	0.080
N	34	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	1.055	1.125	1.092	1.186	1.198	1.301

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

dent variable. In the basic, non-interactive specifications (Models 1, 3, and 5), our inferences are fundamentally the same as when we look at partisan groups separately. (Note that the mood variable is *not* lagged: I assume that elites represent party shifts in control of the House [when Republicans take control from Democrats and vice versa] in the same time period.) Republican control of the House has a negative and significant effect on the tenor of policy outputs, making them more conservative. Changes in co-partisan mood seem to have no direct effect. And changes in rules,



Figure 3.8: Marginal Effects of Changes in Rules at Levels of Changes in Co-partisan Mood.

regardless of the measure, do not have an effect on changes in policy.

The interactive specification in Model 2 of Table 3.5 seems, at first, to also be uninteresting. Republican control is still negative and significant, mood is still insignificant, and the interactive specification is insignificant. The interaction, however, is in the correct direction, and is close to statistical significance. To give the reader an idea of the estimated effects, I present the marginal effect in Figure 3.8. When co-partisan mood shifts to become more conservative, increases in the number of rules used have a *negative* effect on policy outputs: making policy more conservative. As co-partisan mood stays constant (zero change), rules do not have an effect on policy outputs. And as co-partisan mood becomes more liberal, rules have a positive effect

on policy outputs. These estimated effects overlap with zero (and with one another), making them insignificant. But the overlap is narrow, suggesting that, as we would expect, more data and a longer time series could uncover support for the theoretical predictions offered.

There are a number of caveats to the above analyses. First, and foremost, we are dealing with a severe problem in the number of degrees of freedom. These effects may be hard to identify because there is not enough information in the model to estimate them consistently. Second, it could be that there isn't enough variation in the theoretical variables to test the theory adequately. We have only observed twenty years of increased polarization, and many of those years were exclusively under one party's control. This also lends criticism to the use of the Republican control dummy variable without an explicit theoretical accounting. Until we observe a fuller mix of Republican and Democratic control in a polarized time period, the dummy variable risks soaking up the effects of polarization generally, rather than Republican control specifically. In order to fully test the theory, we need more variation in both party control of the House and partisan moods. The information available is severely limited.

Third, the pattern of effects could be conditional on more than just partisan mood and the number of rules. Namely, control of the House might play a large role in the representational benefit of partisan moods. I do not insert such an interaction here, however. The model is already difficult to identify, given the small number of observations. Theoretical model specification is a clear opportunity for future work.

The lack of representational linkages above might be disconcerting. In particular, though, we could be seeing such a pattern because the models are estimated in differences. Accordingly, I now turn to presenting the VAR results in levels. We described the VAR procedure and its interpretation (through IRFs) in detail in the

previous section. Just recall that impulse response functions trace the responses to all variables in the system to a shock in a single variable. Most of the variables here are theoretically uninteresting, so I isolate the relevant impulse responses. The most important relationship here is between mood and policy outcomes. In particular, the following models account for the endogeneity between rules, polarization, mood, and policy. This robust specification allows for a powerful identification of the relationship between policy and mood.[3] Moreover, moods and policy both remain in levels, allowing us to determine whether absolute increases in levels of mood lead to corresponding changes in policy.[4] In each case, the relevant mood series is in a VAR system with consumer sentiment, policy outputs, rules, House polarization, and Republican control, each with the contemporaneous levels and the lagged values.[5]

Turn first to the IRF in Figure 3.9. A standard-deviation increase in Republican mood (meaning mood becoming more liberal)[6] leads a 0.22-unit increase in standardized policy outputs (the policy outputs variable standardized about its mean), meaning that policy becomes more liberal. This increase persists for four years, as well. Compare this effect to the effect of a standard-deviation shock to Democratic mood, illustrated in Figure 3.10. The estimated effect of an increase is smaller—only around 0.18 units. This suggests that the relationship between Republican mood and policy is stronger (in an absolute sense) than Democratic mood and policy. The effect in Figure 3.10, however, persists for more time periods than the effect in Figure 3.9. The relationship between Democratic mood and policy, however, persists for a

[3]I don't present full IRFs for the entire system, as many of the relationships are insignificant and theoretically uninteresting. Granger causality tests are available from the author.

[4]Of course, we already have evidence for the general relationship between full mood and policy, discussed earlier (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). But their evidence does not consider lawmaking in particular, and it does not account fully for the changing nature of polarization.

[5]The reader is advised that a low number of degrees of freedom are available. The limiting variable is policy: interest group ratings from multiple groups are only available since the 1970s.

[6]This effect would be the same if I reversed the coding.



Figure 3.9: Impulse Response Function: Republican Mood on Policy.

longer time period.

The relationship between Independent mood and policy is much weaker. Note the IRF in Figure 3.11. The effect of a standard-deviation shock to Independent mood on policy only barely reaches statistical significance. Even then, it is only significant for a single time period and dies out quickly. In a system that accounts for polarization, restrictive lawmaking, and partisan mood, it seems as if Independents lose out in that process.

The relationship between full mood (the classic Stimson measure) and policy is presented in Figure 3.12. A standard-deviation shock to full mood leads to an immediate increase in policy liberalism, again reflecting the general pattern of representation observed at the partisan level. Note, however, that the magnitude of



Figure 3.10: Impulse Response Function: Democratic Mood on Policy.

this increase is considerably smaller, especially than the Republican effect in Figure 3.9. However, this effect lasts much longer than either of the other partisan effects: a shock to full mood has lingering effects on the system for up to seven years. In general, then, while all partisan groups seem to receive some representation, that representation varies both in immediate magnitude as well as lingering effects across partisan groups.

Three other patterns of effects from the respective VARs are worth investigating. First it is reasonable to wonder what the effect of lawmaking (that is, rules) is on partisan mood? After observing partisan or contentious lawmaking strategies, do partisan groups become more or less conservative or liberal? Figure 3.13 presents the results of the IRF of rules on Republican mood. The pattern is intriguing. The



Figure 3.11: Impulse Response Function: Independent Mood on Policy.

effect of a standard-deviation shock to the usage of rules is to immediately make Republicans more conservative. That is, simply observing a contentious lawmaking process makes Republicans want more conservative policy outputs. This pattern of effects is not present for any other partisan subgroup.

Figures 3.14 and 3.15 display two last interesting results from the VAR. Namely, how do partisan subgroups respond in their preferences to observing elite polarization? For Democrats and Independents, at least, it makes them demand more liberal policies. For Independents, the effect of a standard-deviation shock to polarization is actually quite considerable: a 0.20 unit increase in standardized Independent mood. This effect persists for roughly eight time periods, too. For Democrats, the effect is less pronounced. A standard-deviation shock to House polarization increases stan-



Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Function: Full Mood on Policy.

dardized Democratic mood to become more liberal by about 0.15 units. This effect, however, persists for a longer time period. Such a shock only decays after almost ten years. Increases in polarization, then, have real and lasting influences on partisan moods.[7] Recall also that, since this is a VAR, those shocks to partisan mood are reentered into the system as effects on policy. This is true also for the effects of lawmaking on Republican mood. Since we observe a general pattern of representation—partisan moods broadly are reflected into policy—increases in polarization have the effect of increasing liberal policy (through making Democratic demands more liberal), and increases in the usage of rules have the effect of increasing conservative policy (through making Republican demands more conservative). This system has real effects.

[7]These effects are not significant for Republicans.



Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Function: Rules on Republican Mood.

The final pattern of effects involves the co-partisan mood series. Figure 3.16 displays the estimated effect of co-partisan mood on policy outputs, accounting for the other variables in the system. Note two attributes of these effects. First, they are greater in absolute magnitude than *any* of the separate partisan mood series. That is, when we account for polarization and rules in an endogenous system, shifts in co-partisan mood are best represented in policy outputs, better than any separate partisan group *or* in the policy demands of the entire public (full mood). Second, these effects take longer to decay than the other partisan groups as well. The effects of shifts in co-partisan mood last as long as five years, as opposed to a near-instantaneous decay for Independents and a three- or four-year period for Democrats and Republicans. Once we account for the system of effects, co-partisans certainly



Figure 3.14: Impulse Response Function: House Polarization on Democratic Mood.

seem to be well represented by policy in a polarized world.

3.4 Conclusion

The quality of representation certainly varies. One particularly interesting way that elite (and possibly mass) polarization might cause the quality of representation to vary systematically is the responsiveness of policy to particular constituencies, especially as lawmaking changes. As elite polarization increases, Democrats should become especially more responsive to Democrats, Republicans to Republicans, and Independents might lose out in the process. Moreover, conflictual lawmaking strategies, like the use of special rules, might exacerbate these partisan representational benefits.



Figure 3.15: Impulse Response Function: House Polarization on Independent Mood.

There is, at best, mixed support for these expectations. We observe support (though statistically insignificant) for H_{12} in Figure 3.8, as changes in the general usage of rules led to changes in policy, as co-partisan mood changed. In addition, there was no direct representation of the full constituency through the use of rules in Table 3.1, suggesting again that only co-partisans are to benefit from changing rules as polarization changes. So the theory is diffusely supported by that evidence.

Evidence for H_{13} and H_{14} is much weaker. In Table 3.5, changes in co-partisan mood do not have a direct effect on changes in policy (even in the non-interactive specifications), and none of the interactions are statistically significant, indicating that the relationship is not conditional on the usage of rules to achieve policy change in the direction of mass co-partisans of the majority party in the House. In fact,



Figure 3.16: Impulse Response Function: Co-partisan Mood on Policy.

only in Figure 3.16 do we observe evidence that, as co-partisan mood changes, so do policy outputs. Again, these effects are estimated in levels.

We uncover some indirect support for the theory presented in Section 2. In all cases, partisan control of the House has real effects on policy outputs. Republicans are consistent creators of more conservative policy than their liberal counterparts. In differences, however, the theory receives little support. The evidence for basic representational linkages—changes in mood causing changes in policy—is lacking. The conditional theoretical support—those changes in mood being conditional on lawmaking strategies—is only observed for Republicans, and even then not in the expected direction. As Republican mood decreases (becomes more conservative), increases in rules make policy more liberal, not conservative. There is considerable

question whether these effects are well identified, however.

When we turn to the more appropriate statistical tests, we receive better support for the theory. The theory is better supported in levels. From the VARs, the basic representational linkage is always present. Shifts in partisan moods (as well as overall mood) lead to changes in policy. More interesting are Figures 3.13 to 3.15. The usage of rules also causes Republicans to grow more conservative. Observing a lawmaking process full of conflict is enough to make Republicans demand more conservative policy outputs. Another opportunity for future research is whether this effect is also conditional on party control. Interestingly, there is considerable reason to think it is not. As Republicans observe conflictual lawmaking in a Republican-led House, they might reward it by demanding more conservative (and, in an elite-polarized world, more "acceptable") policy. At the same time, if Republicans observe conflictual lawmaking by Democrats, they might withdraw into the party fold and grow more conservative out of annoyance with the majority party. Both patterns of effects are plausible. These effects do not exist for any other partisan group.

For Independents and Democrats, polarization has more interesting effects on mood. As elite polarization increases, both Democrats and Independents become more liberal. For Democrats, this pattern makes more immediate sense. Observing a world of elite-level conflict that extends to multiple issues (Carsey and Layman 2006), Democrats might respond by developing more liberal preferences. Independents are harder to characterize. They might be behaving closer to Democrats than to "true" Independents, or it could be that recent policy times characterized by high levels of polarization might also simply be more liberal than others. Again, more data is necessary. The short time series available here limits our ability to test theory, both in the sense of a small N for testing theory as well as limited observations of both parties in power at differing levels of polarization.

These analysis present multiple opportunities for future research, and they raise many questions. Representational patterns certainly exist, but they also almost certainly vary as polarization changes over time. The theoretical nature of that relationship should continue to be a research focus for political science.

4. RESTRICTIVE RULES AND PUBLIC APPROVAL

The preceding sections have provided considerable evidence for the differential behavior of Congress on the basis of partisanship. Democrats and Republicans use rules systematically in response to the changing nature of the parties. Moreover, those rules are used to respond differently to Republican and Democratic public opinion, depending on which party has the majority in Congress.

This section tests a logical implication of those patterns. If the usage of rules is changing over time, and Republicans and Democrats use rules differently to respond to their co-partisans, we might naturally wonder whether these processes affect public approval of Congress, either in the aggregate (among all individuals) *or* specifically among partisan identifiers.

This section sheds new light on a longstanding research question. Scholars have long been interested in the dynamics of public approval of policymaking institutions. In the American context the obvious legislature is Congress. And conventional wisdom regarding public approval of Congress maintains that approval of it is abysmally low. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 1) go so far as to say that, because of the frictional nature of policymaking in Congress, "public negativity [toward Congress] pours forth with only the slightest provocation and has been duly recorded by countless political observers." Such claims are discouraging. But they are also rarely tested. And traditional tests of this conventional wisdom ignore potentially important dynamics among subsets of the public.

This study sheds new light on the phenomenon of public approval of Congress. Based on the implied logic of the theory—that certain representational outcomes vary systematically with the use of rules by party—it breaks entirely with past re-

search by creating new series of Republican, Democratic, and Independent approval of Congress, rather than examining approval solely in the aggregate.

Moreover, it leverages the unique lawmaking series discussed in earlier sections to offer new insights concerning approval and lawmaking. To be sure, the creation of policy is still a "sausage-making" process in which testimony, markup, amendment, and debate cloud the public's perception of Congressional productivity. But new lawmaking strategies—particularly the rules discussed throughout this dissertation—have shifted the means by which policy, especially the most partisan policy, is crafted. The following analyses represent a first attempt at including these new types of lawmaking in our understanding of approval.

In so doing, this section sheds light on several conventional assumptions regarding the approval of Congress: that it is abysmally low, that it is evaluated in terms of members, not the institution, and that it is particularly disliked because of the explicitly partisan nature of lawmaking. To begin the analysis, though, it is important to review these assumptions in past literature.

4.1 Past Work on Congressional Approval

Scholars have long been interested in approval of or confidence in the major American institutions, especially the presidency (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Kinder 1981; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Kriner and Schwartz 2009) and the judiciary (Gibson 1989; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Of the three major American political institutions, however, Congressional approval has received by far the least amount of attention.

Initial forays into the determinants of Congressional approval simply replicated models of approval of other institutions and applied them to the legislature. Parker's (1977) original analysis, though, found that many of the variables that affect presi-

dential approval—rally-around-the-flag effects, economic slumps, and Barber's (1972) positive-active presidents—significantly affect Congressional approval. Improvements in theoretical specification clarified the process of Congressional approval in two ways: accounting for those activities specific to Congressional lawmaking and elaborating on the distinction between Congress and member.

Evidence for the importance of Congressional activity comes at both the longitudinal and cross-sectional levels. In perhaps the canonical time series analysis of Congressional approval, Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) find that aggregate Congressional approval is highly autoregressive; positively responsive to positive media coverage of Congress; negatively responsive to important legislation, institutional strife as operationalized through veto overrides, conflict, and scandals; and unresponsive to vetoes, minor legislation, and presidential approval. Ramirez (2009) extends the analysis (using an extension of the same approval series) and finds that partisan lawmaking generally (such as cloture votes, scandals, and partisan conflicts) is associated with decreases in Congressional approval. Ramirez (2013) clarifies the puzzling negative finding of important legislation—if Congress overcomes its inherent gridlock to pass policy, we should think it would be *rewarded*—by demonstrating that only when policy is out-of-step with public opinion is Congress punished.

In perhaps the canonical cross-sectional analysis, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) find that individuals hold generally low evaluations of Congress, partly because of unrealistic expectations of compromise and bipartisanship in the political process. This echoes the broader sentiment of low Congressional approval on the basis of Washington "changing" the character of members of Congress to become partisan robots rather than noble compromisers. For instance, Kimball and Patterson (1997) and Grant and Rudolph (2004) demonstrate that levels of approval of Congress are generally low because individual perceptions of members of Congress fail to meet

their expectations of those members.[1] Lipset and Schneider (1983) demonstrate that the feeling of "Congress losing touch" with reality drives approval lower as well. In all, then, existing evidence suggests that the uniquely discomforting way in which Congress makes policy leaves a negative image in most minds when individuals decide whether to approve of Congress.

The second broad distinction is that of Congress from member. Given the sparseness of questions about approval of *members* of Congress over time, evidence on this point is almost entirely cross-sectional or time-series cross-sectional. Here again, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) suggest that since individuals do not expect or approve of the political process of lawmaking outlined above, they respond by asymmetrically rating their own member of Congress highly but rating the institution poorly. Parker and Davidson (1979) suggest that some of this divergence might also be driven by the ability of the member to shore up approval through district-level activities such as service and personal campaigning.

Interestingly, ratings of Congress and member might have some effect on one another. Kimball and Patterson (1997) and Jones and McDermott (2002) both find that positive evaluations of incumbent members significantly lead respondents to rate Congress higher as a body. Grant and Rudolph (2004), through a bivariate probit model, suggest that unobserved common factors drive a significant portion of the joint relationship between the two evaluations. This evidence, though, is cross-sectional, and likely suffers from endogeneity problems. The only study that attempts to tease out this endogeneity is Born (1990), who uses two-stage least-squares in repeated cross-sections to evaluate whether judgments of members are endogenous to judgments of the institution. He finds that they are: but only for the

[1] And, in part, these expectations are driven by failure of "noble" policymaking such as loyalty to party, seeking personal gain or profit, and self-interest in reelection.

least educated respondents. Accordingly, without better longitudinal evidence, we are unlikely to know the nature of the exact interplay between these two concepts.

A much broader class of national- or government-level (that is, not specific to Congress) factors also affects Congressional approval. At both the longitudinal level (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Ramirez 2009; Ramirez 2013; Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 2000;[2] Lebo 2008)[3] and cross-sectional (individual) level (Grant and Rudolph 2004; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Rudolph 2002;[4] McDermott and Jones 2003), there is strong evidence that the economy moves sentiment toward Congress. Some find an interplay with other institutional approval levels, such as the president (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Ramirez 2009; Jones and McDermott 2002; Lebo 2008; McDermott and Jones 2003; but see Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). There is also evidence of a general trust in government effect (Ramirez 2013; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000), as well as an effect of political efficacy (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992; Grant and Rudolph 2004; but see Jones and McDermott 2002). In all, some clearly non-Congress specific factors partially determine the process of Congressional approval.[5]

So we have a broad sense of the determinants of the process of Congressional approval. Yet few studies have studied the dynamics of Congressional approval in recent periods of increasing mass and elite polarization. Few studies (Ramirez 2009, 2013) extend the analysis past 2000. And no cross-sectional study exists that leverages the changing nature of polarization over time. This is particularly troubling

[2]Specifically that Congressional approval and economic expectations are fractionally cointegrated

[3]Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997), Ramirez (2009), and Ramirez (2013) follow the Durr (1993) practice of purging economic expectations from real economic conditions.

[4]Specifically economic retrospections.

[5]There is some irony in mentioning these contextual factors, given that many of them do not appear in later models. The overarching problem is data limitation. The creation of partisan measures of Congressional approval is simply not possible prior to the 1970s

given that Congress is consistently found to be the most polarized institution over time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008). If polarization should affect the dynamics of approval of a single institution, then, it should be Congress, especially given the public's established distaste for partisan politics. But we have little evidence on this question in recent periods of polarization. This work expands on these changing dynamics. Particularly, it uses the general theory offered in previous sections to deduce the logical implications of partisan lawmaking for approval.

4.2 Polarization and the Need for Disaggregation

There is ample evidence that Congress has grown more polarized. Previous sections have alluded to this phenomenon generally, but by a variety of measures (NOMINATE: Poole and Rosenthal 2007; inflation-adjusted ADA scores: Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Anderson and Habel 2009; common space Bayesian scores: Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; NPAT survey scores: Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001*a*), members of Congress (MCs) have grown more ideologically extreme and separated from one another on the basis of party identification.

There is no such agreement on mass polarization. Some (such as Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) point to a growing divergence of the mean response to the seven-point ideology scale by party identification, paired with similarly more extreme responses on issue specific questions (such as gay marriage or abortion, see Hetherington and Weiler 2010), as evidence of polarization in the electorate. Others (like Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011) claim that such polarization is an artifact of polarized elite choices, noting that few respondents place themselves in extreme survey response categories. In their view, at most, individuals realign their ideological beliefs to fit their party identification through a process called "sorting" (Levendusky 2009).

Despite these observations, however, little work has considered how the polarized nature of the mass and the elite affects mass evaluations of elite institutions. Even more generally, scholars have only investigated the partisan dynamics of approval for one institution: the presidency. Instead, scholars have relied on "marginals" of approval ratings in the aggregate of surveys. This study extends our understanding of Congressional approval by accounting for whether the dynamics of approval vary across partisan identifiers.

Accounting for partisan dynamics has the potential to resolve the puzzlingly inconsistent effects of party identification across previous research. Some (McDermott and Jones 2003; Grant and Rudolph 2004; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) find that party identification conditions whether an individual approves of Congress, but others (Born 1990; Jones and McDermott 2002; Adler and Wilkerson 2013, 48) find no evidence for such an effect. Each of these studies, though, is cross-sectional, with the authors forced to make comparisons about between party identification and *control of Congress*. Better quality evidence on this point would compare the feelings of different groups of partisans over time, accounting for the shifting nature of party control.

The basic research question here is how the dynamics of Congressional approval respond to Congress through changing periods of polarization: which necessitates an examination of the role of party identification. How, then, should we examine the role of party identification over time, given the above limitations? I follow the lead of others who study phenomena that are thought to exhibit separate dynamics among Republicans and Democrats over time, especially as polarization increases: disaggregate the series. For instance, Ura and Ellis (2012) disaggregate public mood (Stimson 1999) into separate series for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. Kriner and Schwartz (2009) do the same for presidential approval.

Both find that aggregation—especially in times of polarization—masks important dynamics between party identifiers.

A natural extension, then, is to disaggregate Congressional approval by party identification as well. We should expect that sharp partisan divisions affect evaluations of political institutions, especially polarized institutions. Most simply, we should expect that a polarized electorate should diverge in its evaluations of Congress across partisan cleavages, relying on partisan cues to evaluate the institution. That is, Republicans should evaluate Congress differently than Democrats in an era of polarization, but they should *especially* evaluate Republican Congresses differently than Democratic Congresses. These basic dynamics have not been tested. This analysis, then, offers a first cut at the basic dynamics of approval in polarized conditions.

4.3 Theoretical Expectations

We noted above the inconsistent findings regarding the effects of party identification on Congressional approval. In might be possible to reconcile this inconsistency by treating Republican, Democrat, and Independent approval as separate phenomena. But what should our expectations be for the behavior of these series?

Two papers in particular provide some insight. Jones and McDermott (2002) find that individual evaluations of Congress are shaped by perceived ideological distance from members of the Congressional majority party. For Democrats, when Democrats control the Congress, this ideological distance should be much lower than when Republicans control Congress (vice versa for Republicans). So we should expect approval among Democrats to be higher under Democratic Congresses than under Republican ones.

Suggesting that aggregate approval should respond to changes in control of Congress obviously requires some basic political knowledge. Though political knowledge among

Americans is persistently low (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, but see Gibson and Caldeira 2009), we believe that the majority are sufficiently aware of the control of the Congress. Kimball and Patterson (1997), writing at a time of the first Republican House in a decade, note that Republicans rated the new Congress higher, as opposed to the traditional effect of Democratic identification increasing approval. They note specifically that "[the] citizen sensitivity to partisan change in Congress is quite remarkable" (Kimball and Patterson 1997, 720).

Polarization should exacerbate these dynamics. That is, as polarization increases at both the elite and mass levels, Republicans should be particularly satisfied with Congress when it is controlled by Republicans (and ostensibly pushing Republican policy goals) and particularly dissatisfied with Congress when it is controlled by Democrats (vice versa for Democrats). Independents, interestingly, should just approve of Congress at lower and lower rates: given that their ideology should not be changing, they should just generally disapprove of the ideological extremity in the Congress.

Moreover, previous sections illuminate specific reasons that co-partisans should approve of Congress through periods of polarization. Most specifically, rules of certain stripes in a polarized Congress are *used to accomplish partisan policy change*. This suggests a straightforward expectation that directly confronts prior literature: conflictual policymaking should not be viewed negatively by all individuals. Those who identify with the majority party in Congress should support that institution *more* when it uses restrictive rules, because those rules are being used to accomplish partisan goals.

The theory offered in previous sections suggests specifically that partisans should be most responsive to particular types of rules series. In particular, majority-party identifiers should approve most of the use of positive substantive rules, as they help

accomplish the most partisan policy. Accordingly, I offer the following formal hypotheses:

> H_{15}: As electoral polarization increases, identifiers with the majority party in the House will increasingly reward the use of positive substantive power and positive procedural power with approval. The opposite holds true among minority-party identifiers.

> H_{16}: The traditional explanation of Congressional approval should always hold true among non-partisans (Independents). They should react negatively to the increasing use of positive procedural and substantive powers.

4.4 Data and Methods

The basic need in this analysis is a quality, extended measure of the *partisan* nature of the approval of Congress. Most previous aggregate analyses (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Lebo 2008; Ramirez 2009; Ramirez 2013; Patterson and Caldeira 1990) rely on an amalgam of surveys regarding Congressional approval, leveraging as many as forty different question types all broadly meant to tap a dimension of the public's job approval of Congress. This might be acceptable if we wish to understand how approval of Congress as a diffuse concept moves over time. But because I wish to examine the separate dynamics of approval for each party, I prefer to focus instead on consistent surveys of a single survey question by a single survey house over time.[6] This practice should ensure that the series has strong validity across parties and over time.

Accordingly, this study uses all 143 surveys containing the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?" fielded by Gallup from the first administration (1974) to 2012. I then disaggregate the data by party identification and calculate the approval rate for Congress for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. Leaners are treated as Independents, given that the followup

[6]This strategy of focusing on a single survey question is also used by Rudolph (2002).

Figure 4.1: Congressional Approval: Republicans, Democrats, Independents, and the Full Sample.

leaner question was not asked before 1986, which would change the sample substantially over time. The surveys, of course, are not fielded regularly over time, so we need some way to smooth them into an annual measure. Accordingly, I used Stimson's (1999) WCALC program to produce a recursively smoothed measure of partisan Congressional approval over time.[7] The final measure is an annual series of approval, by party, from 1974 to 2012. The series are presented in Figure 4.1, with the approval rate of the full sample (the traditional measure) overlaid.

[7]I used WCALC5. Since all survey houses are Gallup, and I am simply using WCALC to smooth over irregular time intervals (as opposed to time intervals and survey houses), there is little risk that WCALC is causing a data problem.

Note three particular aspects of Figure 4.1. First, the gap between the different partisan approvals of Congress seems to grow over time, particularly in the most recent years. The gap between Republicans and Democrats was only more than 20 points in one year, before the mid-1990s. Since then, the gap has only been *below* 20 points in two years: in 2005 and 2006, when neither party liked Congress. Second, in more proximate times, the gap seems to be severely influenced by majority control of Congress. That is, Republican approval of Congress nearly bottomed out in 2008 after losing both chambers to Democrats, and only slightly recovered in 2010, after retaking the House of Representatives. The opposite dynamics hold among Democrats, but beginning as early as 2002. Third, note that Congressional approval actually reaches exceptionally high levels—and on multiple occasions. Approval among Republicans was over 65% around 2000; approval among Democrats hovered over 50% during Democratic control of Congress under President Reagan. We do not observe a "short memory and a tendency to return to some natural, low level" (Lebo 2008, 4) in the dynamics of Congressional approval. This directly rebuffs conventional wisdom, such as popular bemoaning of a Congressional approval "in the single-digits." When we account for partisanship, approval of Congress can reach over 50%.

The reader might have noticed that this section, like the one before it, simplifies the polarization dimension to a single aggregate measure, rather than the distance/minority variance/majority variance framework of the second section. Again, this is out of statistical necessity. While it might be preferable to examine the effects of each dimension of CPG separately, such a short time series, especially with respect to partisan Congressional approval, makes such an approach unfeasible. Additionally, the main theoretical effects (that is, the differential effect of partisan lawmaking by party identification) should respond to polarization, measured generally. Accord-

ingly, this section uses the general measure of polarization from Wood and Jordan (2011), discussed previously. Recall that this measure of polarization ranges from zero to one, with zero indicating full overlap between parties (no polarization) and one indicating no overlap between parties (total polarization). As OLS coefficients estimate the effect of a one-unit increase in a variable, the estimates for the effect of polarization seem erratically large. This is because they are estimating the effect of a move from no polarization to complete polarization (which would never be observed in reality). Despite this, I am reluctant to recode polarization for just this section. This is for two reasons. The first is that it would make the measure inconsistent with previous sections and hamper readability. The second is that the effect of polarization is always interpreted at *substantively* realistic levels. So there is little risk of drawing incorrect inferences.

Additionally, rules are examined only at the aggregate level. Certainly, some rules (like substitutes considered as adopted) should be more preferred by co-partisans than others, as they directly lead to more substantive policy change (see Section 2). However, causally, it is asking too much for respondents to be aware of the *content* of rules, though they might well be aware of their *presence*. Accordingly, I use the overall rules series in the analysis, assuming that respondents are generally aware of when lawmaking is happening in a conflictual way (Ramirez 2013). Some readers might be dissatisfied with whether mass respondents know when special rules are used to pass legislation. I offer two responses. The first is that prior literature, including that cited above, has found consistent effects for the usage of rules on Congressional approval. The second is that even if respondents are not aware of rules particularly, rules serve as a good proxy for partisan Congressional conflict generally. That is, we can use rules as a general indicator of lawmaking happening in a conflictual, non-textbook way. Moreover, they are particularly representative

of majority party leadership powers being used to construct legislation, especially in periods of high polarization. So even if respondents are not aware of the actual rules themselves, the series still serves as a good proxy for the effect of partisan lawmaking reflected in the theory.

Similar to the previous section, I account for economic context with the Index of Consumer Sentiment. Republican control is a simple dummy variable for whether Republicans have control of the House. The final control is borrowed from Ramirez (2013). Ramirez finds that it is not the creation of major policy that is important for Congressional approval, but how far that policy diverges from constituent desires. Accordingly, I include a measure of how major policy (as described in the previous sections) deviates from the specific co-partisan demand for policy—as described in the partisan moods from Ura and Ellis (2012). Policy Divergence, then, is how much the actual Congressional outputs deviate from desired partisan outputs (with "partisan outputs" measured, as appropriate, in each partisan model of approval).

The modeling strategy is identical to the previous section. Each of the approval measures is integrated, so I test for effects in partial adjustment models in differences. Explicitly, then, we are explaining changes in each of the partisan approval series. These models are especially theoretically appropriate, as the theory predicts changes in approval as other factors (number of rules, amount of polarization) change, not their absolute levels. In addition, Johansen tests do not indicate that none of the sets of variables are cointegrated. Partisan approvals seem to track together, but recall that the theory treats them separately, rather than in the same model.

Some might also wonder why the models presented here do not model Congressional approval as a fractionally integrated series, as previous work has done. I have three responses. The first is that fractional integration usually arises when aggregating over independent auto-regressive processes. Such is the case here, as I argue

that traditional estimates of "full" approval aggregate over (increasingly) heterogenous approval by party identification. In other words, our aggregating the different partisan series of approval to create a "full" series of *all* approval might itself be inducing fractional integration.[8] Second, and far more importantly, the data do not support a reliable estimate of the fractional integration parameter d. Recent work has demonstrated that robust estimates of d require upwards of 10,000 data points (Keele, Linn, and Webb 2015). The analysis here falls short of that requirement. Third, even if we do estimate the fractional differencing parameter d (which, again, we probably should not do with such a short time series), each estimate's 90% confidence interval overlaps with one, again indicating integration.[9] The estimate for Republican approval is actually exactly one: again presenting evidence for integration over fractional integration when dealing with partisan approval.

In all sets of models, the most important theoretical predictor is the triple interaction between Republican control, changes in rules, and changes in polarization. Republican control accounts for the key theoretical addition: that approval should vary on the basis of who controls the institution. Partisans should especially reward control of the institution, however, when the party is using that control to pursue

[8]There are two ways to follow this logic, discussed abstractly in Granger (1980) and applied specifically to Congressional approval by Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson (2000). The first is a forgiving definition of "auto-regressive." Of course, for something to be truly auto-regressive, the same respondents need to be sampled and draw on their previous responses in formulating their current one. Since approval series are created from random (and different) samples, it cannot meet this strict definition. The argument, though, is that each partisan has an equal probability of being sampled, and partisans follow identical processes when generating their approval estimates. So partisan approval is auto-regressive in the broad sense that, for instance, Republicans think in the same general way as other Republicans when generating their approval of Congress (and this thought process is auto-regressive). The second is much less demanding. Granger (1980) originally also demonstrates that fractional integration can arise when there are heterogenous dynamic relationships at the individual level that are aggregated over. As the analysis in this section demonstrates, partisans approve of Congress differently, based on their party identification (and are thus heterogenous). In either case, aggregating over *partisanship* is what is inducing the fractional integration. Following this logic, by disaggregating the series by partisan identification, we might observe this fractional integration disappearing.

[9]Stata refuses to even estimate d for such short time series.

Table 4.1: Fractional Integration Parameters Estimates for Congressional Approval Series

Series	GPH Estimate of d	
Full Congressional Approval	0.725	(0.199)
Democratic Congressional Approval	0.733	(0.199)
Republican Congressional Approval	1.019	(0.199)
Independent Congressional Approval	0.755	(0.199)

Estimates from RATS procedures @gph.

*Estimate indicates integration.

partisan goals. Accordingly, changes in the number of rules should be especially powerful when their party is in charge. Moreover, partisans should value both of these changes more as polarization increases. If the distance between the parties is decreasing, according to the theory in Section 2, parties will pursue less partisan goals. Co-partisans, however, should approve more of the institution as polarization increases and the changes in rules increase. This interaction should be positive for Republicans (using rules to pursue partisan goals as distance increases in a Republican Congress). It should be negative for Democrats. Like conventional wisdom, it is not expected to matter theoretically for Independents or all respondents. Each table also presents the results of estimating the constituent terms of that interaction (Republican control times changes in rules, changes in polarization times changes in rules, and Republican control times changes in polarization).

4.5 Results

Recall that the general expectation is that approval of Congress varies by partisanship, as expressed formally in H_{15}. This expectation is in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that all respondents follow the same process of approval. The first place to start, then, is the conventional model. How does full approval (among all

Table 4.2: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (All Respondents)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ΔY_{t-1}	-0.050	-0.028	-0.047	-0.208	-0.275*
	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.147)	(0.154)
Policy Divergence	-2.797	-1.395	-3.077	2.897	3.032
	(5.908)	(5.826)	(6.023)	(4.998)	(4.955)
ΔRules (All)	-0.071	-0.133*	-0.055*	-0.146**	-0.099
	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.074)
ΔConsumer Sentiment	0.238	0.311*	0.274*	0.352**	0.448**
	(0.150)	(0.154)	(0.173)	(0.125)	(0.144)
Republican Control	0.975	0.855	1.107	0.814	2.065
	(2.579)	(2.516)	(2.632)	(2.095)	(2.245)
ΔHouse Polarization	-3.053	-10.758	-2.317	-32.976	-34.751
	(28.924)	(28.610)	(29.369)	(24.615)	(24.316)
Republican Control∗	-	0.233	-	-	-0.122
ΔRules (All)		(0.145)			(0.149)
ΔHouse Polarization∗	-	-	-1.049	-	-2.351
ΔRules (All)			(2.397)		(2.205)
ΔHouse Polarization∗	-	-	-	368.186**	514.105**
Republican Control				(90.649)	(130.197)
ΔHouse Polarization∗	-	-	-	-	-4.146
Republican Control∗					(4.276)
ΔRules (All)					
Constant	-0.322	-0.689	-0.147	-2.086	-2.015
	(2.622)	(2.567)	(2.688)	(2.173)	(2.172)
R^2	0.12	0.19	0.12	0.44	0.51
N	37	37	37	37	37
AIC	6.988	6.958	6.908	6.592	6.779
BIC	136.229	136.713	133.282	123.176	139.790

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

individuals) vary with respect to the traditional theoretical model, including basic information about the number of rules passed? Table 4.2 presents the results.

Not much is interesting in this set of models. In Model 1, with no interactive specifications, none of the coefficients is significant.[10] Policy divergence, changes

[10]In what will be a common theme, many findings are consistent in direction with current lit-

in rules, changes in consumer sentiment, Republican control, and changes in House polarization all exert no significant effects on changes in House approval. In fact, policy divergence is *never* significant in any of the model specifications, regardless of partisanship. This could also be due to the shortened time series, or that policy divergence is notable in the short run (that is, quarterly), but averages over years (for instance by the end of a Congressional session).

Models 2 - 5 test the interactive effects of changes in House polarization, Republican control, and changes in rules, culminating in the triple interaction in Model 5. Model 2 interacts Republican control with changes in rules, testing the possibility that respondents reward or punish the usage of rules especially when one or the other party controls the House. When we account for this potentially conditional effect, the conventional finding of positive changes in consumer sentiment improving Congressional approval emerges. The interactive term itself is insignificant, but the presence of the interaction leads the coefficient on changes in rules—now representing those changes when the Democratic party is in control—to statistical significance. There is no *a priori* reason to expect that Democrats should be especially punished for the increased use of rules. This potentially confusing finding, coupled with the insignificant interaction, leads us to suspect that it is important to disaggregate approval.

Model 3 reflects the same patterns. Changes in consumer sentiment positively affect full approval when we account for the potential interaction between changes in polarization and changes in rules. Now, additionally, changes in rules have negative

erature, but not in significance. This is due mostly to the severely truncated N in the present analysis. Most previous analysis (such as Ramirez 2013) analyzes Congressional approval as a quarterly variable. I believe that the public does not update its opinion toward Congress on a quarterly basis. Additionally, when considering partisan Congressional approval, the data do not support a quarterly series until the mid-1990s. At this point, there is not enough variation in one of the key independent variables—House polarization—to support a valid analysis.

effect on full approval, a theoretically expected effect, but only when House polarization does not change (the interactive term is zero). Moreover, this interaction is not statistically significant.

Model 4, however, brings substantial changes to our understanding of approval. Note that our explanatory power increases substantially. By any measure of fit criteria, Model 4 does the best job of explaining changes in full approval, especially when accounting for the number of predictors in Model 5 (with AIC and BIC). Model 4 supports conventional wisdom in a number of ways, too. The effect of changes in rules on changes in approval is negative, statistically significant, and *unconditional* (there is no interaction term with changes in rules). A one-unit year-over-year increase in the number of rules used leads to a 0.146-unit decrease in year-over-year Congressional approval among all respondents. Using five more rules than the year prior, then, is enough to depress Congressional approval by a full percentage point. Consumer sentiment also is significant in the anticipated direction.

The theoretically interesting finding, of course, is the interaction. If the effect of X is conditional on Z, the effect of Z is also conditional on X (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Accordingly, I interpret the interactive effect in both "directions." The marginal effect of changes in House polarization across Republican control is presented in Figure 4.2, and the marginal effect of changes in Republican control across changes in House polarization is presented in Figure 4.3. In all cases in this section, marginal effects are interpreted at 90% confidence intervals. In my view, the extraordinarily small N justifies exploring effects that fail to meet the traditional 95% threshold. Many of these effects are theoretically consistent and close to traditional significance, so it is worth exploring them here.

Turn first to Figure 4.2. Recall that the theoretical range of the polarization variable used in this analysis is from zero—complete overlap between the two parties—to



Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect of Changes in Polarization across Party Control (All Respondents).



Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Republican Control across Changes in Polarization (All Respondents).

one—no overlap whatsoever. These seemingly extraordinary effects, then, are due to the scale of the variable. A "one-unit increase in year-over-year polarization" is equivalent to moving from completely unpolarized parties to completely polarized parties in a single year. This is quite a large effect! Accordingly, a "reasonable" effect of changes in polarization is about 10% of the size of the coefficient. Figure 4.2 indicates that, when Democrats control the House (Republican control is zero on the x-axis), changes in polarization have no marginal effect on changes in approval among all respondents. This finding makes sense, as for a great majority of Democratic control of the House, year-to-year increases in polarization were small at best. The effect for when Republicans control the House, however, is large and significant. A 0.10-unit increase in polarization from the previous value has the power to increase House approval among all respondents by an incredible 30 units! Respondents seem to reward polarization in the House when Republicans are in charge of the institution.

Figure 4.3 interprets the converse of this effect. Again, the same pattern emerges. Note that the tightest confidence intervals are when changes in House polarization are zero, indicating the need to interpret the values of changes in House polarization at reasonably small values. When House polarization decreases from year to year, Republicans are punished for controlling the House (substantively significant as well: when polarization falls by 0.10 units [again, 10% of the scale], respondents decrease their approval of the House by close to 30 points). It seems clear that, when considering all respondents together, individuals prefer when Republicans control a polarizing House and Democrats control a depolarizing one.

The final model in Table 4.2 considers the theoretically anticipated triple interaction. Note that changes in consumer sentiment are still positive and significant. None of the other unconditional coefficients are significant, however. Moreover, the triple interaction is clearly insignificant, and only one interactive effect—the changes

in polarization/Republican control interaction established in Model 4—is significant. We have evidence in multiple pieces, then, that the preferred model for all respondents is Model 4. Problematically, however, we have somewhat confusing effects. There is no strong theoretical reason to anticipate that individuals should increase their approval of Congress when it polarizes with Republicans in charge, but not Democrats. There are multiple potential explanations. First, due to the time period of the series, it just so happens that Democrats control most of the unpolarized Houses under investigation and Republicans most of the polarized ones. It could be, then, that the Republican control variable is soaking up some of the effect of polarization in the model. Here, though, we are constrained by data. Of course, the theory offered here attempts to resolve this confusion. Mainly, this odd effect emerges because the full series averages over two incredibly distinct subsets—Republicans and Democrats. Once we account for the partisanship of the respondent, this empirical confusion should resolve itself. We turn to that in the next tables.

The first model of partisan approval is presented in Table 4.3: the results of predicting Republican approval of Congress. So as to not belabor the point, Table 4.3 can be summarized more succinctly. In the base model (Model 1), with no interactive terms), nothing is statistically significant. Most troubling, of course, is that *not even Republican control* is independently significant. This suggests that there is no unique benefit to Republicans by simply controlling the institution. Instead, as we will uncover next, Republican identifiers in the mass public only increase or decrease approval of the institution when that control is used strategically (that is, interactively).

Unlike full approval, Model 2 presents the first piece of evidence that partisanship matters for control of the institution and the pursuit of partisan goals. The interactive effect of Republican control and changes in rules is statistically signifi-

Table 4.3: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Republicans)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ΔY_{t-1}	-0.075	0.087	-0.072	-0.140	-0.157
	(0.180)	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.124)	(0.142)
Policy Divergence	-2.748	-0.033	-2.355	6.800	6.663
	(8.241)	(7.370)	(8.490)	(5.910)	(5.921)
ΔRules (All)	-0.159	-0.308**	-0.177	-0.286**	-0.222**
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.114)	(0.068)	(0.090)
ΔConsumer Sentiment	0.273	0.416**	0.243	0.485**	0.580**
	(0.216)	(0.198)	(0.242)	(0.153)	(0.172)
Republican Control	5.215	3.347	5.060	2.579	1.732
	(3.777)	(3.412)	(3.878)	(2.635)	(2.754)
ΔHouse Polarization	-1.716	-18.901	-2.630	-49.522*	-48.499
	(39.762)	(35.767)	(40.571)	(28.606)	(28.513)
Republican Control$*$	-	0.600**	-	-	-0.043
ΔRules (All)		(0.208)			(0.214)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	1.004	-	-3.844
ΔRules (All)			(3.415)		(2.618)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	603.767**	518.870**
Republican Control				(107.952)	(161.731)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	-	8.322
Republican Control$*$					(5.703)
ΔRules (All)					
Constant	-1.378	-1.398	-1.553	-3.406	-3.096
	(3.296)	(2.923)	(3.405)	(2.292)	(2.315)
R^2	0.18	0.38	0.19	0.63	0.68
N	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	7.626	7.407	7.681	6.895	7.117
BIC	150.065	144.152	153.479	126.736	143.447

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

cant. When Republican control is zero (that is, when Democrats control the House), year-over-year increases in the number of rules used lead to significant *decreases* in changes in Republican approval of the House ($\beta = -0.308$). This negative effect is directly offset when Republicans control the House: the coefficient on the interaction

is both larger in absolute value and in the positive direction ($\beta = 0.600$). Moreover, the coefficient on Republican control alone—when changes in rules is zero—is insignificant. Republican identifiers reward Republican control of the institution *only when that control is used to pass more rules*, presumably in the pursuit of partisan goals (as outlined in previous sections). (I wait to present marginal effects plots until the full theoretical model, Model 5.)

Model 3 is statistically uninteresting, as none of the coefficients contributes statistically significantly to the understanding of changes in Republican approval. Note, however, that this speaks to the conventional wisdom. There is nothing uniquely independent about changes in polarization or changes in the number of rules, or their interactive effect, that bothers partisan identifiers. In other words, partisans are not moved to approve of the institution more or less simply because those forms of conflict do or do not exist. Instead, it is when that conflict is used for partisan ends that matters for approval.

Model 5 of Table 4.3 is the most theoretically interesting. As stated above, it accounts for the potential triple interaction of changes in polarization, changes in the number of rules, and Republican control. First note that the triple interaction is in the correct direction: when each of the constituent terms increase and Republicans control the House, year-over-year Republican approval increases. The term itself, however, misses statistical significance. However, the interactions jointly are significant ($F = 8.69$, $p = 0.0002$), and the triple interaction term is close to meeting the standard, with $p = 0.16$. I interpret the marginal effects of the triple interaction in Figure 4.4, for a few reasons. The first is again simple data limitations. The effect is theoretically consistent, but the analyst must appreciate the short time frame in the analysis $N = 34$. This could especially be problematic, given the relatively few years that Republicans have controlled the House. If we interpret the findings in Model



Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Party Control across Changes in Number of Rules at Different Changes in Polarization (Republican Respondents).

4, they are also theoretically anticipated, but significantly less interesting. Model 5 allows us to account for the potential interactions between Republican control and rules as well as Republican control and changes in polarization. (Note also that consumer sentiment is positive and significant, indicating that Republicans respond broadly positive to increasingly positive economic conditions.)

Figure 4.4 can be a lot to take in at first glance. Note that changes in the number of rules run along the x-axis, from forty fewer rules than the year before (the minimum value) to forty more rules than the year before. Three lines are presented: the dashed line at year-over-year increases in polarization (by 0.1 units), the solid line at no change in polarization, and the dotted line at year-over-year decreases in polarization. The y-axis is the marginal effect of switching from Democratic control to Republican control. Positive values, then, indicate that a certain context (in the sense of the x-axis and the line type) results in a positive return on Republican control.

One line is especially easy to interpret. When year-over-year polarization is stable (that is, no change [the solid line]), switches from Democratic to Republican control of the House has no effect, regardless of the change in the number of rules used. Republican identifiers account for the distance between the parties when forming their opinion of the institution. If that distance is constant, party control of the institution is irrelevant to approval.

One other context is simple to interpret as well. When the number of rules used from year-to-year declines significantly, control of the institution does not matter. Theoretically, Republicans seem not to care who controls the House, if the party in control is not using rules to accomplish partisan goals. If the normal Congressional lawmaking process (the "textbook" Congress) is taking hold, and rule usage is stable, Republicans do not increase or decrease their approval of the institution.

As rule usage increases year-over-year, though, we see the anticipated diverging lines. As the usage of rules increases, and polarization is increasing as well (the dashed line), Republican control of the institution begins to yield positive, significant returns on increases in Republican approval. These effects are large, too. Even for a moderate increase in the usage of rules (ten more rules than the previous year) and an increase in polarization of 0.1 units, Republican control of the House increases Republican approval of the institution by over 50 points. Approval only ranges between 0 - 100, so this effect is substantively huge. Partisan control of the institution has large effects in polarizing, partisan conditions. This effect is exactly the opposite in depolarizing conditions (the dotted line). Republican control decreases Republican approval if rules are being used in a depolarized context (presumably to pursue less partisan policy goals). On the whole, then, the interactive specification for Republicans provides strong support for the theory, given the limited number of degrees of freedom.

Table 4.4 presents the results for Democratic identifiers. The results have two broad patterns. First, they generally follow the theoretical predictions (discussed in a moment). Second, they are a mirror image of the effects for Republicans (which we should expect). Thus, when Republicans approve of increases in some concept under Republican control, Democrats disapprove (and vice versa).

Similar to Republicans, the straightforward Model 1 is statistically uninteresting. Recall, however, that this reflects the nuances of the theory over conventional wisdom, not the unimportance of the theoretical variables considered here. The only variable to exert a statistically significant effect is changes in consumer sentiment. These changes are in the anticipated positive direction. In fact, consumer sentiment exerts a positive effect in each of the models. This is only true for Democrats, giving some evidence that, for Democratic identifiers in particular, economic considerations

Table 4.4: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Democrats)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ΔY_{t-1}	0.097	0.096	0.122	0.022	-0.066
	(0.204)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.205)
Policy Divergence	4.524	4.498	3.200	7.415	7.848
	(6.776)	(6.911)	(6.968)	(6.892)	(6.808)
ΔRules (All)	-0.041	-0.045	0.006	-0.086	-0.029
	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.103)
ΔConsumer Sentiment	0.370*	0.373*	0.447**	0.422**	0.502**
	(0.187)	(-0.193)	(0.207)	(0.186)	(0.199)
Republican Control	-2.105	-2.129	-1.775	-3.041	-1.369
	(3.049)	(3.118)	(3.084)	(3.043)	(3.041)
ΔHouse Polarization	-26.307	-26.737	-24.430	-40.388	-42.078
	(33.508)	(34.503)	(33.716)	(34.043)	(32.344)
Republican Control$*$	-	0.016	-	-	-0.182
ΔRules (All)		(0.188)			(0.218)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-2.524	-	-1.993
ΔRules (All)			(2.866)		(2.976)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	197.528	505.547**
Republican Control				(130.814)	(186.149)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	-	-10.992
Republican Control$*$					(6.746)
ΔRules (All)					
Constant	-0.536	-0.522	0.078	-1.243	-1.305
	(2.789)	(2.846)	(2.886)	(2.765)	(2.728)
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.38
N	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	7.268	7.327	7.298	7.243	7.370
BIC	137.904	141.420	140.431	138.572	152.050

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

matter for Congressional approval.

Interestingly, our inferences *do not change* in Models 2 - 4. Each of the pairwise interactions between our theoretical variables of interest contributes nothing statistically significant to the explanation of Democratic approval. Accordingly, I only

substantively interpret the theoretical Model 5, which contains the triple interaction.

Again, in Model 5, changes in consumer sentiment exert a positive significant effect on changes in Democratic approval. Several of the unconditional effects are in the anticipated direction (Republican control is negative, changes in rules is negative, changes in polarization is negative), but all are insignificant. The triple interaction itself narrowly misses statistical significance, with $p = 0.12$. The interactions jointly are significant at the 0.10 level ($F = 2.09$, $p = 0.091$), and this interaction is in the anticipated negative direction. Again, I choose to substantively interpret the interaction for the same reasons outlined above (appreciating data limitations, theoretical interest in the combined interactive effects of the theoretical variables). The interactive effects from Model 5 are outlined in Figure 4.5.

Again, Figure 4.5 seems complicated.[11] To illustrate the theoretical flexibility of the interactive effects estimated, I change the x-axis to Democratic control versus Republican control. There are again three lines presented: the dashed line at year-over-year increases in polarization (by 0.2 units), the solid line at no change in polarization, and the dotted line at year-over-year decreases in polarization. The y-axis is the marginal effect of year-over-year increases in the number of rules used. Positive values, then, indicate that a certain context (in the sense of the x-axis and the line type) results in a positive return on using more rules.

Similar to Figure 4.4, when year-over-year polarization is stable (that is, no change [the solid line]), increases in the number of rules used from the previous year have no effect, regardless of which party controls the House (on the x-axis). Similar to Republicans, Democratic identifiers also account for changes in polarization when approving of the institution. If polarization is not changing, party control

[11]Some readers might wonder whether the triple interaction is being interpreted advantageously in the preceding figures. Accordingly, I present the same marginal effect structure in Figure 4.5 (for Democrats) in Figure 4.6 (for Republicans).



Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of Changes in Rules across Party Control at Different Changes in Polarization (Democratic Respondents).



Figure 4.6: Marginal Effect of Changes in Rules across Party Control at Different Changes in Polarization (Republican Respondents).

of the institution is irrelevant for approval.

Perhaps the most surprising finding in Figure 4.5 is the left condition of the Figure, when Republican control is zero. When Democrats control the House, changes in Democratic approval are immune to both changes in House polarization as well as changes in the number of rules. In this condition, then, the only relevant effects are traditional ones like changes in consumer sentiment.

These effects only differentiate themselves when Republicans control the House. If Republicans control the House and year-over-year polarization is increasing (the dashed line), changes in the number of rules used decrease Democratic approval. This effect makes sense, as those rules, in an increasingly polarized environment, are assumedly being used to pursue Republican substantive policy goals. This effect is substantively significant, too—a one-unit year-over-year increase in the number of rules used, given an increase in polarization of about 0.2 units, leads to a three-unit decrease in Democratic approval of Congress. The effect is the mirror image for decreasing polarization, suggesting that Democrats do not mind if Republicans use increasing numbers of rules, as long as they are used to pursue centrist policy.

One additional pattern is worth mentioning: by any conventional measure, our explanatory power is much stronger for Republican identifiers than for Democrats. I suggest two reasons. The first is Republicans have more experience controlling polarized Houses, rather than unpolarized ones. The theory anticipates that co-partisans should demand and reward partisan outputs as polarization increases. Republicans spent almost fifty years in the Congressional shadow, accustomed to Democratic rule. When they finally did win control in 1994, as polarization had already begun at both the mass and elite level, mass Republicans clamored for partisan policy. Those demand were rewarded, both with particularly restrictive rules and policy outputs (as described in Section 2). The second reason is that Republicans are more homogenous

Table 4.5: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Independents)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ΔY_{t-1}	-0.029	-0.020	-0.027	-0.182	-0.260
	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.189)	(0.156)	(0.162)
Policy Divergence	1.840	1.480	1.677	5.814	6.093
	(5.744)	(5.676)	(5.925)	(4.790)	(4.866)
ΔRules (All)	-0.083	-0.134*	-0.075	-0.167**	-0.115
	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.061)	(0.075)
ΔConsumer Sentiment	0.293*	0.336**	0.306*	0.402**	0.471**
	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.175)	(0.130)	(0.145)
Republican Control	1.054	0.709	1.105	-0.275	0.628
	(2.662)	(2.641)	(2.726)	(2.195)	(2.281)
ΔHouse Polarization	10.906	5.007	11.288	-16.855	-18.945
	(28.637)	(28.625)	(29.250)	(24.415)	(24.072)
Republican Control$*$	-	0.205	-	-	-0.167
ΔRules (All)		(0.156)			(0.166)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-0.424	-	-1.961
ΔRules (All)			(2.464)		(2.171)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	358.910**	547.040**
Republican Control				(93.546)	(141.080)
ΔHouse Polarization$*$	-	-	-	-	-4.739
Republican Control$*$					(4.900)
ΔRules (All)					
Constant	-1.450	-1.204	-1.367	-2.416	-2.430
	(2.403)	(2.380)	(2.494)	(1.973)	(2.001)
R^2	0.16	0.21	0.16	0.46	0.54
N	34	34	34	34	34
AIC	6.970	6.965	7.027	6.580	6.778
BIC	127.752	129.112	131.239	116.024	131.941

$^{**}p < 0.05$. $^{*}p < 0.10$.

Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.

than Democrats, and, when speaking about polarization, the first movers between the two parties (Wood and Jordan 2011; elite Republicans as well [Theriault 2013]). It makes sense, then, that they are universally more responsive to partisan policy.

The final set of models is presented in Table 4.5. These models predict changes in

approval among Independent identifiers. Recall the anticipated effects: Independents should be broadly immune to particular partisan effects and should instead follow conventional models (positive effects of the economy, negative effects of contentious policymaking) when approving of the institution. In general, the effects we observe should mirror those found for full approve in Table 4.2.

This is exactly what we observe. In fact, the coefficient estimates and patterns of interactive effects are almost identical for Independents in Table 4.5 as they are for the full series in Table 4.2. Changes in consumer sentiment are consistently positive in their effect on changes in Independent approval. Again, the preferred model is Model 4. Changes in rules have an unconditionally negative effect on changes in Independent approval. The estimated interaction between Republican control and changes in polarization is positive and significant. That interaction is interpreted in both directions in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.

What is especially intriguing about Figures 4.7 and 4.8 is that they are almost identical to Figures 4.2 and 4.3, which interpret the same interaction term for full respondents. The inferences are almost identical: Independents reward Republicans when year-over-year polarization increases (but not Democrats, seen in the x-axis of Figure 4.7), but punish Congressional approval when Republicans control depolarizing Houses (and reward Democrats, seen in the x-axis of Figure 4.8). This pairs nicely with our theoretical prediction—certain dynamics, such as partisan tools like changes in rules—should especially effect only approval among partisan identifiers. Others, like economic circumstances, should be immune to partisan control. And Independents should mirror the dynamics of the full set of respondents.

It should be noted that the other control variable—policy divergence—never exerts a statistically significant effect. This is probably due somewhat to the empirical limitations of the data. More theoretically, however, it seems that, especially when



Figure 4.7: Marginal Effect of Changes in Polarization across Party Control (Independent Respondents).



Figure 4.8: Marginal Effect of Party Control across Changes in Polarization (Independent Respondents).

we account for the partisanship of the respondent, policy outputs simply take a back seat to partisan dynamics of lawmaking and polarization in the institution.

One final comment is in order. Far and away, our best explanations of partisan approval arise for Republican respondents. Compare, for instance, the relative model fit statistics in each of the full theoretical models (Model 5) in Tables 4.2 to 4.5. It seems generally that Republicans understand changes in polarization and hold Congress to a more partisan standard as polarization increases. This pairs nicely with mass polarization evidence, indicating that Republicans are largely responsible (as the first movers) for increases in mass polarization (Wood and Jordan 2011).

4.6 Conclusion

Research on Congressional approval has been stagnated by attempting to answer some of the same questions. We wonder why individuals approve of their member differently than the institution (Parker and Davidson 1979), why individuals expect a non-partisan policymaking process (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), or if individuals punish Congress when policy is made in a contentious way (Ramirez 2009) or out-of-step with aggregate preferences (Ramirez 2013).

What these questions miss is the growing importance of partisan identification in determining an individual's preferred outputs in Congressional policy. As polarization grows, both at the mass and elite level, partisanship begins to provide an increasingly important answer to these questions. Moreover, it suggests *opposite* answers for Republicans versus Democrats. Republicans should increasingly approve of Republican Congresses when they use more rules to achieve Republican policy, and vice versa for Democrats. There is no single, aggregate dynamic of approval for all respondents.

This is exactly what we observe. The theory is well supported, though not quite

statistically significantly, in its predictions regarding partisan approval. Not only are the dynamics for each partisan identification different, they reflect growing partisan preferences as polarization grows. These findings help to resolve multiple points of confusion in the literature, such as the inconsistent findings of the effect of party identification on approval and the seemingly impossible low level of Congressional approval among mass identifiers. As polarization grows, political science must account for the appreciable differences between Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, both in their policy demands and the dynamics of how institutional outputs affect approval.

The analysis here is largely straightforward for partisans. For Independents, however, the implications are less clear. Some traditional dynamics retain their substantive importance, such as the effect of consumer sentiment. Others, however, are less clear. Independent policy divergence does not seem to play a strong role in determining how Independents approve of Congress. The usage of rules, however, clearly depresses Independent approval. Given that increasingly restrictive rules are becoming the normal way of passing partisan legislation (Section 2), Independents are at increasing risk of being left dissatisfied with Congress as polarization pushes partisan ideology and policy to the forefront.

This study is just a general foray into the analysis of Congressional approval among different partisan identifiers. Yet it has many strengths. First among them is the attempt to disaggregate the approval of a major American political institution among partisan identifiers. This disaggregation was fruitful: even a simple graphical examination demonstrates that different processes exists across the partisan groups. Examining these differential processes, especially in an era of mass and elite polarization, is an important exercise.

Lastly, it encourages a reconceptualization of the way scholars think about the

Congressional approval question. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) remark at several points that respondents answer the approval question thinking of their member, not of the institution. This analysis questions this conventional wisdom. There are clear, definable patterns to movements in approval among partisan identifiers, and these movements often respond to shifts in the partisan composition of institutions. This suggests that, especially in eras of polarization, respondents evaluate Congress as an (especially partisan) institution, not just as a group of individual members. This shifting framework has real consequences: McDermott and Jones (2003) demonstrate that individuals who evaluate Congress highly are more likely to vote for members of the majority party, even despite incumbency status. Adjusting our understanding of Congressional approval to reflect the resurgence of polarization is essential to our broader understanding of Congress.

5. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER WORK

The preceding sections have laid out a fully elaborated theory of lawmaking, working from the current conceptualization of Conditional Party Government. Conditional Party Government, as it exists currently, offers a limited set of incomplete predictions. The theory here elaborates those predictions to account for the use of positive and negative procedural and substantive powers by both the majority and minority party in the United States House of Representatives. The theory predicts the unique usage of those different types of powers on the basis of the "condition" of CPG: the homogeneity of the majority party (especially relative to the minority) and the distance between the two.

The core of these theoretical expectations is supported. Especially when working with the most appropriate statistical models (those effects found in levels), Section 2 presented evidence that the use of positive, substantive powers in particular responds to distance, as predicted by the theory. These powers are the most important ones, as well, because of their unique importance in shaping legislation before it even reaches the House floor. As polarization increases, recall, the majority party is increasingly jettisoning the use of the textbook Congressional process in favor of party-controlled legislation in committee.The use of positive procedural powers was more difficult to predict. Although these powers broadly responded to the distance between the parties, they do not respond in the theoretically anticipated way to minority party variance.

Moreover, certain types of rules are more important for moving policy than for others. Section 2 again presents evidence that rules in the nature of a substitute as adopted—rather than all rules generally—are important for increasing policy ex-

tremism over time. Recall exactly how important these rules can be: amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted allows the majority party to write legislation (often in the Rules Committee, not even in a substantive committee), send that legislation to the floor without any procedural hurdle, and pass that legislation *as written*: all by winning a single vote on a single rule. Previous analyses that treated all rules symmetrically have missed this important distinction.

The above findings illustrate another contribution of the dissertation. Currently, rules are measured as a single, aggregate concept. All rules are considered restrictive rules, and all restrictive rules are important. The theory here reconceptualizes rules as unique entities to be coded individually. That is, some rules are simply more important than others. The most restrictive of these rules—those that consider substitute amendments as adopted—are fundamentally different than other rules that set the time for debate or declare the source of an amendment. When we analyze these series separately, we find they respond to different factors theoretically. Moreover, the theory and methods outlined above provide a general path moving forward so that the analyst can identify *any* potentially important pattern in rules, generate a time series of those rules, and uncover what causes the usage of those rules over time.

The evidence for the theory is weaker with regards to representation. We expected to find that representation increases to co-partisans of the majority party in the House of Representatives as polarization increases and restrictive (positive substantive powers) are used to create policy. We found a shift in policy extremism as a result of these rules in Section 2, but no such direct linkage in Section 3. Although there was general evidence of representation in Section 3, rules did not enhance representation to the full constituency (consistent with H_{12}), and there was no evidence that rules (even positive substantive ones) were used to enhance rep-

resentation to partisan sub-constituencies. The VAR in levels, however, found that increases in moods (becoming more liberal or conservative), even co-partisan moods, were reflected by increases in policy extremism (becoming appropriately more liberal or conservative). We just did not find evidence that this relationship was conditional on rule usage.

The evidence for the implications of the theory for Congressional approval was much stronger. In Section 4, we found that, as polarization increases, partisans tend to approve of the House *more* when it uses rules in a conflictual way, evidently under the assumption that those rules are being used to accomplish polarizing, partisan goals. This relationship was only true among Republicans and Democrats. Independents followed the traditional model of Congressional approval, whereby individuals approve of Congress more when it makes policy and when the economy is good.

Here again we see strong evidence for the need to recast traditional research methods in a partisan light. Traditional studies of Congressional approval treat all partisan groups symmetrically, summarizing approval as a single, aggregate measure. The evidence presented here suggests it is necessary to examine partisan groups separately, especially once we account for polarization. Moreover, this disaggregation helped to resolve a traditional methodological question. Previous studies had found aggregate Congressional approval to be fractionally integrated. The results here suggest that fractional integration arose precisely because of summarizing over heterogenous respondents (individuals of different partisanship). Disaggregating the series, these issues disappear.

The theory and tests reported in the preceding sections have many merits. Chief among them, we can use the theory of lawmaking presented here to make *a priori* predictions about the precise use of different kinds of powers *and* the resulting quality of legislation that should arise as a result of the usage of those powers. Previous

studies of lawmaking, especially those advancing CPG, had been theoretically stagnated by a single, diffuse prediction: that the greater the "condition" of CPG, the more we see its outcomes. Here, we bypass that theoretical diffuseness by offering specific predictions for each potentially observable distribution of parties.

In addition, the above empirical results reflect the first systematic, longitudinal test of the fully formed theory of Conditional Party Government. Overwhelmingly, CPG had traditionally been "tested" through individual case studies. These studies provide anecdotal evidence for the use of powers in one specific circumstance, but little leverage on the empirical question of the variation of the use of rules over time in response to specific conditions. Here, we can actually *quantify* the expected use of *individual types* of rules in a particular Congress, based on the "condition" of CPG. In this sense, it is acceptable if not all of the original theoretical propositions offered here are supported empirically.

The dissertation has also demonstrated that the theory can be used to directly predict and explain lawmaking, but it readily offers clear predictions for other traditional Congressional research questions. In other words, the sections readily speak to each other. The representational benefit to co-partisans tested in Section 3 was directly implied by Section 2. The unique process of Congressional approval by partisanship tested in Section 4 was borne out of the predictions of Section 2 as well. The theory does not just explain lawmaking; it helps to explain Congress generally. This flexibility and innovation is prized, as it helps to offer a theoretically complete account of Congress.

The theory and evidence presented here, of course, can be improved. Chief among the concerns is the short time series in Sections 3 and 4. Approval is just not measured very far in time for Section 4. Moreover, we need more oscillation in partisan control of Congress, both in polarized time periods and unpolarized ones.

The measure of policy outputs could also be improved. As is readily identified from Figure 3.3, the measure of policy liberalism from Ramirez (2013) is very choppy. That choppiness could be inhibiting our ability to explain movements in policy with co-partisan moods. Also in Section 3, the measures of partisan moods could be updated. Ura and Ellis (2012) provide a nice starting point, but future research could update these series to bring more data to bear on the question of representation. The desire for a longer time series typically is a "common" complaint, meaning that all analysts prefer more data to less data. When the analyst needs to estimate a VAR with only 35 data points, the issue becomes more acute.

Other estimation strategies could be used. There are a few points where models are reported that, although they illuminate "first cuts" at the empirical relationships among the variables, they do a relatively poor job of accounting for some of the finer time-serial qualities of the estimation at hand. In particular, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions could be used to help account for the potentially correlated errors in the partisan approval equations in Section 4. Additionally, state-space models could help replace some of the partial adjustment models reported in Sections 3 and 4. Partial adjustment models, while they help to estimate the short-run effects of the variables, do not allow the analyst to examine long-run effects. The estimation strategies are opportunities for future work.

I close with the following observations. Lawmaking in Congress is an extraordinarily important field of research to political scientists concerned with the quality of democracy. It impacts how laws are made, what laws are made, how representative those laws are, and the openness of the entire process. For as important as lawmaking is, it is still undertheorized. We have broad expectations about what kinds of lawmaking should arise, but those expectations are diffuse and ill-prepared to offer specific predictions. Moreover, our tests of those expectations remain isolated in

time. The theory presented here, with all of its imperfections, offers a major step forward in that process. We have, for the first time, fully formed theoretical expectations of lawmaking for all possible permutations (stylized) of parties, a flexible measurement strategy of rules required to test those expectations, and longitudinal, time series, quantified models of those expectations in the real world. Not all of our theoretical expectations are supported. But before we can understand *why* we are wrong, we have to make predictions and uncover *where* and *when* we are wrong. The theory and tests here offer that first step.

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