WHO'S GOING TO BUILD YOUR WALL?:

THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS ON LOCAL IMMIGRATION POLICY

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to understand the influence of non-governmental institutions on local public policy outputs. Within immigration policy, current shifts in the implementation of enforcement have allowed local law enforcement agencies to function as extensions of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement leading to an unprecedented rise in the deportations of immigrants from the interior of the country. By examining the outputs of the Secure Communities program from 2009 through 2014, this research evaluates how non-governmental institutions can influence the deportability of immigrants within a community. In influencing the deportability of immigrants, non-governmental institutions alter Secure Communities outputs. The first part of this dissertation takes an empirical focus on theorizing how language as an institutional characteristic serves as a mechanism of representative bureaucracy. Using the theory of representative bureaucracy, linguistic congruence between local law enforcement agents and policy target should lead to decreased policy outputs. Using the Law Enforcement Management and Administration Survey, the results indicate that language can function as active representation decreasing Secure Communities outputs, but only in counties with small immigrant communities. The second section of this dissertation is a multi-method study that develops a conceptual framework for the philanthropic sector's influence on public policy. Beginning with the empirical analysis, the first part of the framework focuses on establishing the link between the philanthropic sector's grant making patterns and immigration policy outputs. The results indicate an incredibly small effect between philanthropic foundations' immigration-related grant making patterns and the identification

of deportable immigrants. To understand the relationship between the philanthropic sector and policy outputs, the final part of this study takes a qualitative approach to study how nonprofit grant recipients and their work with the immigrant community alters immigrant deportability. The two studies together develop a conceptual framework that provides insights into how philanthropic funding translates into redefining citizenship at the community level with the aim to reduce the deportability of the immigrant community. This dissertation provides insights into how non-governmental institutions can shape the concept of citizenship and alter policy through citizen-state feedback.

DEDICATION

Para mis abuelos, mi abuelita Maria Guadalupe y mi abuelito Justino, y mi mamá

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As I wrote my dissertation, the harsh realities of U.S. immigration policy progressively worsened. Today, as a result of the U. S's "zero tolerance" policy, immigrants seeking refugee are being separated from their children. This heartbreaking consequence has, once again, caused me to reflect on the strong immigrant roots of my own family. I am reminded of my hardworking grandparents, my naturalized grandmothers along with my grandfathers' and father who are proud residents of this country. All I have achieved and will achieve is only possible because of the sacrifices they made in coming to this country in search of the American Dream for their future generations. A dream they have given me by working their bodies in the fields of this country deferring their own talents and skills. They are the strongest, most intelligent, beautiful people this country has to offer and I am proud to carry their legacy. Thank you to my grandparents, my mom, both of my dads, Tio Peter, Tio Jr., and my Tia Cruz. I hope that I can give the world back a piece of want you have given me and I know that I will have left this world a better place. I know that there is no gratitude to ever express how grateful I am to the world you all have given me.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States has long struggled to mend the tensions between its historic past as a nation of immigrants and its punitive immigration policies. Not since the Reagan administration has the United States been able to pass legislation providing a path to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants residing within the U.S. borders. With no comprehensive immigration reform and Congress's inability to address the underlying causes of immigration, America's deportation regime has only continued to grow expanding into our local communities (Jones-Correa & de Graauw 2013; Motomura 2012; Ewing 2012; Bodvarsson & Van den Berg 2009; Daniels 2005). Current immigration enforcement programs stem from the last immigration policy passed in contemporary history, the Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IRIRA).

The role of public policy centers on delineating "who gets what, when, and how" (Laswell 1950) thereby creating the boundaries of citizenship (Mettler & Soss 2004). Citizenship boundaries that not only include the political community but consequently feedback into society to influence the views of social membership and the creation of new policy (Cambell 2012; Mettler 2002; Soss & Schram 2007). IRIRA was no different. Overnight, IRIRA redefined citizenship within the U.S. The 1996 immigration policy increased the deportability of all immigrants residing within her boundaries regardless of legal status. IRIRA's core mechanism to increase "illegality" was its retroactive expansion of what "crimes" constituted inadmissibility to include non-violent offenses and crimes for

which immigrants had paid their debt to society (Motomura 2012; Ewing 2012; Bodvarsson & Van den Berg 2009). For example, in 1988, Mary Anne Gehris plead guilty to "pulling a woman's hair," a misdemeanor assault. In 1999, Gehris, an immigrant from Germany, applied for naturalization and because of IRIRA her misdemeanor assault became categorized as a "crime of violence." Labeled as a violent criminal, instead of receiving naturalization she entered deportation proceedings. IRIRA allowed a conviction from eight years before its passage to make Gehris eligible for deportation three years after its enactment (Ewing et al. 2015). If Gehris had applied for naturalization before the enactment of IRIRA, it is unlikely that she would have gone into deportation proceedings for a prior misdemeanor.

Today, the concept of citizenship is intimately intertwined with deportability as the U.S. remains unable to refocus the debate away from "illegal" immigration (Jones-Correa & De Graauw 2013). As a consequence of lacking formal citizenship, individuals must live with the reality that any interaction with a state institution or by extension their representative can lead to their "exclusion, subjugation, repression" and ultimately the removal from their community (De Genova 2002, 427). Constitutionally, the federal government is the only branch of government allowed to set the boundaries of political citizenship. Yet, as the levels of government most affected by immigration patterns, states and municipalities increasingly exercise their power to regulate the lives of immigrants by setting laws that affect their ability to reside and move freely within their communities (Reich 2017; Provine et al. 2016; Monogan 2009). The devolution of federal immigration enforcement to local law enforcement agencies has given rise to the "multi-jurisdictional

patchwork of enforcement policies and practices (Provine et al. 2016, 3)" (Armenta & Alvarez 2017; Provine et al 2016; Decker et al. 2009).

Bureaucracies serve as one of the central actors in our political system (Heffron 1989). Despite their removal from electoral accountability, bureaucracies implement public policy to meet the expectations of citizens. Implementation of policy is driven through bureaucratic interaction with multiple actors within their policy environment such as political forces, industry forces, and citizen forces (Boyne & Meier 2009; Boyne 2003; Meier 1994). As a consequence of devolution, citizen forces working to redefining deportability within their policy environment affect the implementation of local immigration enforcement. In the era of immigration devolution, this dissertation provides answers to the following question: *how do non-governmental institutions can influence local policy implementation*? The citizen forces of focus are non-governmental institutions. My first empirical chapter views an institution as an established practice conveying identity, norms, and values within a community (Institution 2018), in this case, language. The second definition of a non-governmental institution is an organization established to serve the community outside the bounds of the public sector, specifically the philanthropic sector.

In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the specific interior immigration enforcement program enforcing IRIRA within local communities. In that section, I provide an overview of Secure Communities Program, the criticism of Secure Communities, and the policy outputs of interest. The final section focus on providing an overview of each of the studies and their unique contributions to the literature of public policy, public administration, philanthropy, and immigration policy.

La Migra, La Policia, La Misma Cosa[1]

True to his campaign promises, President Trump signed the "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States" Executive Order thereby reviving Secure Communities five days after inauguration. Unlike the previous enforcement programs and the first Secure Communities Program under President Obama, Trump's Secure Communities allowed for the removal of all immigrants convicted or charged with committing a crime even "where such charge has not been resolved" (E.O 2017). Two administrations, two different goals, one strategy. A strategy reliant upon leveraging local law enforcement agencies to serve as force multipliers in identifying immigrants for removal from the interior of the United States.

The mission of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is "to identify, arrest, and remove aliens who present a danger to national security or are a risk to public safety, as well as those who enter the United States illegally or otherwise undermine the integrity of our immigration laws and our border control efforts. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) upholds America's immigration laws at, within and beyond our borders through efficient enforcement and removal operations (ICE 2016)". As the way of achieving this goal, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the Secure Communities program from 2009[2] to 2014. Secure Communities served as an intergovernmental tool leveraging the policing efforts of local law enforcement agencies to achieve ICE's mission. By tapping into local law enforcement arrests, Secure Communities drastically expanded the identification of deportable immigrants by ICE from the interior

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[1] ICE, the Police, the Same Thing

[2] Under the Bush Administration, a select number of counties activated in October 2008.

of the United States. sComm's full initiation began in 2009 with a staggered county-level implementation achieving nationwide partnerships in 2013[3]. Figure 1 displays the activation pattern of Secure Communities across the 48 continental U.S. states. The partnership "shared" fingerprint background checks with FBI to help identify policy targets eligible for deportation (Kohli et al. 2011; ICE 2016).

Secure Communities was a priority level enforcement program focusing on the removal of deportable immigrants based on three priority levels. The priority levels[4] centered on the intersection between an immigrant's criminal background and an evaluation of their threat to public safety and national security. Level one priority offenders include immigrants "convicted of "aggregated felonies"…or two or more crimes punishable by more than one year, commonly referred to as "felonies" (IDENT 2014)." Immigrants identified as a level one priority deportable immigrant are considered the highest level threat to public safety and national security. Immigrants falling under level two priority include immigrants "convicted of any felony or three or more offenses punishable by less than one year, commonly referred to as a "misdemeanor" (IDENT 2014)." The final priority level includes immigrants convicted of "offenses punishable by less than one year (IDENT 2014)." Under Secure Communities, level two and three offenders are not a high priority for removal as their records contained only misdemeanors

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[3] Although ICE states nationwide activation, twelve counties were not reporting outputs: Kalawao, HI; Bronx, NY; Kings, NY; Queens, NY; Richmond County, VA; Shannon, SD; Emporia City, VA; Fairfax City, VA; Manassas City, VA; Poquoson City, VA; Doddridge, WV.

[4] Level one, high priority immigrants, offenders have committed aggravated felonies. Level two and three offenders are immigrants convicted of misdemeanors including offenses involving minor drugs, property crimes, public disorder, DUI, traffic violations. (Pedroza 2013).

or civil immigration violations. Unlike any other immigration enforcement program, the Department of Homeland Security released detailed interoperability reports on the outputs of Secure Communities providing a rich dataset by which to evaluate its implementation and enforcement at each step of policy implementation.

The policy reports for Secure Communities were released between three to four times a year, but never in a uniform manner. For all activated counties at the time of the report, each report detailed cumulative statistics for each level of implementation. Policy outputs were disaggregated to show the efforts at each step of the implementation process, the local and federal. The first two measures are local immigration outcomes: submissions and matches, the best measures for this research. The final policy outcome of removals from the country measures federal immigration outcomes[5]. Regardless of the level of government to which the policy output belongs, all outcomes are reported at the county level.

Submissions measure the total number individuals who were arrested and booked into jail. Upon processing the fingerprints, a background check is run by the FBI and Homeland Security to scrutinize the arrestee's deportability. A match is reported if the individual has met any of the inadmissibility criteria. Matches are then spilt into the deportable high and low priority categories. With this information, if ICE officials deem the immigrants a deportation priority, the local law enforcement agency receive a detainer

[5] The total deportation and deportations by priority level is of high interest and importance, but out of scope for the purposes of this research. Local law enforcement agencies are responsible for identifying deportable immigrants, but do not have the power to create deportation orders or place them into deportation proceedings.

to place a 48-hour hold on immigrants. Matches[6] indicate the local law enforcement agency's force multiplier effectiveness in helping achieve the federal immigration bureaucracy's ultimate policy outcome of "removing all removable aliens." The final and only federal outcome reported is the total deportations that occurred within the county. This outcome, like matches, is broken down into high and low priority immigrants.

For this research, I have chosen to focus on examining the influence of non-governmental organizations at the local level rather than the federal level. The local level output is a measure of the implementation by local law enforcement agencies operating on a daily basis within the community. The proximity of the local bureaucracy to the non-governmental institutions of interest create a shorter distance by which citizen forces can influence the implementation of immigration policy. Immigrants' level of deportability increases by linking ICE's ability to identify immigrants from the interior through the daily policing within communities. Prior to Secure Communities, interactions with police before only lead to increased deportability through the Criminal Alien Program. The Criminal Alien Program identified immigrants for deportation after they served time for criminal convictions (Kandel 2016). Secure Communities increased immigrants' deportability simply through interacting with a local law enforcement agent regardless of the reason for the interaction. As Motomura (2011) notes enforcement discretion is the most important in the process of immigration enforcement. The discretion exercised by local law enforcement agencies is crucial to helping reduce the overzealous nature of deportation in

[6] Matches and identification of deportable immigrants are used interchangeably throughout the research. Both terms refer to an arrest of a deportable immigrant.

the U.S. of non-criminal immigrants with roots in the community (Motomura 2011; Jones-Correa & De Graauw 2013).

Throughout the tenure of Secure Communities, deportations skyrocketed with more than two million removals resulting in a 400% increase since 1996 (Kohli et al. 2011; TRAC 2014). A majority of the sComm deportations encompassed individuals whose most serious crime was a traffic violation. A crime that labels them as criminal immigrants constituting a "threat" to public safety and, ultimately, disqualifying them from membership in the U.S. (TRAC 2014a,b). By linking local law enforcement agencies and ICE, the identification and removal of immigrants through this program further strengthen the "illegality" of their membership and the ever infamous crimigration narrative (Abrego et al. 2017; Ewing 2017; Ewing et al. 2015; Stumpf 2006). The 400% increase in deportations was only possible through the more than 43 million fingerprint submissions. Of these 43 million fingerprint submissions, local law enforcement agencies were effective 0.05% of the time in identifying deportable immigrants. Of those deportable immigrants matched, local law enforcement agencies were almost three times more likely to match a low priority deportable immigrant than a high priority deportable immigrant (IDENT 2014).

Criticism of Secure Communities Program

Officially the Secure Communities program was discontinued by Jeh Johnson, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in November of 2014. In his memo, Johnson stated, "the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement of our immigration laws (2014)." The Secure Communities was

intended to act as an efficient way of identifying criminal aliens from the custody of local law enforcement agencies. Contrary to sComm's stated goal, critics argued that its implementation facilitated legal violence by targeting "an entire class of people mostly with noncriminal social characteristics such as language spoken or physical appearance, that associate them with a particular immigrant appearance (Menjívar & Abrego 2012, 1388)."

The two main criticisms of sComm centered on the racial profiling and its inability to reduce crime within communities (Ramos 2011; Cox & Miles 2013; Miles & Cox 2014; Treyger et al. 2014; Martinez & Iwama 2014). As counties became active jurisdictions for Secure Communities, local law enforcement agents received no training to identify "criminal immigrants" unlike the training received in the predecessor local immigration enforcement 287(g) program (Ramos 2011). Coupled with early activation of counties with high Hispanic populations, Secure Communities led to racial profiling of the Hispanic community. Although, Hispanic immigration represents 53% of the immigrant population it disproportionately represented 75% of deportations (Kohli et al. 2011). Additionally, contrary to popular belief, immigrant communities are associated with lower crime rates than their native counterparts (Davies and Fagan 2012; Martinez and Lee 2009; Hagan et al. 2008; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). In leveraging local law enforcement agents under the guise of safety, the implementation of Secure Communities created a rift in community policing and weakened trust between the immigrant community and local law enforcement agents. These negative consequences undermined their ability to carry out their first and foremost mission of serving and protecting and had no significant effect on decreasing

crime across counties (Waslin 2010; Solomon et al. 2017; Abrego 2011; Koper et al. 2013; Miles & Cox 2014).

The consequences of Secure Communities culminated in the creating social disorganization and legal violence against immigrant community as local law enforcement agents identified and helped deport immigrants who posed no threat to community safety. Figure 2 illustrates the identification outputs for each year that Secure Communities operated. The heightened state of deportability that immigrants experienced caused them to socially isolate themselves not only from community connections but from reaching out to any state institution because of the fear of deportation. Not only does the effects of heightened deportability affect immigrants, documented and undocumented, but it spills over to their families especially in mixed-status households (Leyro & Stageman 2018; Warren & Kerwin 2017; Abrego et al. 2017; Hagen et al. 2015; Leyro 2013; Hagan et al. 2011; Arbona et al. 2010; Hagan et al. 2008; Rodriguez & Hagan 2004). Most significant is the feedback that Secure Communities provides to the immigrants and their families about their "citizenship" within the community (De Genova 2002).

Local Policy Outputs

The focus of this research is understanding the influence of non-governmental institutions on the implementation of local immigration policy outputs. In order to construct the policy outputs of interest, I selected to create the policy outputs measures from the local policy output of matches. This measure reflects the local implementation of immigration policy. Matches focuses on the total number of identifications that local law enforcement agencies contribute to the federal immigration regime. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the yearly total matches, the total identification of deportable immigrants, from 2009 through 2014.

As previously mentioned, matches is the total number of identified deportable immigrants who have their information relayed to Immigration and Customs enforcement for possible deportation. To measure the influence of local law enforcement agencies in acting as a force multiplier for ICE, I focus on three policy outputs and a disparity enforcement measure. Secure Communities provided between three and four, yearly, interoperability reports beginning in October 2009 through December 2014. I created a panel dataset to include all U.S. counties from 2009 through 2014[7] that included all policy outputs. Due to the rollout basis of Secure Communities, for the analysis, non-active counties with no policy outcome to report were each re-coded to have a value of zero and each measure is logged to adjust for the non-normal distribution and skewness towards zero[8].

Each of the policy outputs is operationalized as a per capita measure to illustrate the impact of enforcement relative to the size of the policy target population. The per capita measure is created using the total policy target population, noncitizen population, within a county. This measure includes all noncitizens that have not naturalized, including documented and undocumented immigrants. The policy outputs include the overall goal of Secure Communities to act as a force multiplier for ICE and each priority level enforcement output. The final measure of interest is the enforcement disparity ratio. With the uneven priority enforcement, I create a disparity ratio to measure the disproportionate identification of low priority to high priority deportable immigrants within the county.

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[7] In the empirical analysis, I exclude the counties in Alaska and Hawaii based on their locations.

[8] To create the final logged measures, I, uniformly, added one to each variable in order to keep the observations that had a policy outcome of zero, structural or non-structural.

Figure 3 illustrates the yearly enforcement disparity ratios for Secure Communities from 2009 through 2014.

Outline of Dissertation

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how non-governmental institutions impact policy implementation and outputs. This research is unique in that it focuses on studying local law enforcement agencies tasked with implementing immigration policy. Unlike analyzing state and local immigration policy, the devolution of enforcement to local law enforcement agencies increases the ability to influence the deportation regime in the United States. At the national level, non-governmental institutions are unable to stop ICE from detaining immigrants for deportation processing as ICE's strategy used to be on executing final removal orders and workplace raids. With the enforcement devolution, non-governmental institutions can influence the implementation of local enforcement through their work in the local policy environment. At the local level, non-governmental institutions can affect the deportability of immigrants before ICE identifies them for deportation. This dissertation is composed of two quantitative chapters and a qualitative chapter examining three non-governmental institution's influence on local law enforcement's implementation of immigration policy.

¿Hablas Español[9]? Linguistic Accommodation & The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy

Using the theory of representative bureaucracy, chapter two focuses on the role of language in structuring the interactions between the immigrant community and

[9] Do you speak Spanish?

bureaucracy tasked with implementing immigration policy. English may be the institutionalized language for most Americans and the bureaucracies we interact with, but this is not always the case for the immigrant community. Language can provide information shortcuts to bureaucrats about their client's identity, culture, and needs. If the client's language is not English, this can signal their immigration status affecting their level of deportability. Theoretically, bilingual bureaucrats are better positioned to overcome immigrant stereotypes and exercise more discretion in policing when encountering immigrants. Therefore, language as an institution serves as a mechanism to affect the implementation of Secure Communities. Using data from Law Enforcement Management and Administration Survey and Secure Communities, I test how institutional commitment to hiring bilingual officers influences the implementation of Secure Communities. The results indicate that commitment by a sheriff's department to incentivize bilingual officers does serve as a mechanism to altering the implementation of immigration enforcement, but the direction of influence is dependent on the foreign-born population within a county.

In testing the role of language in policy implementation, this chapter contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy and bureaucratic incorporation. First, it is the first study to focus on language as a mechanism of representation. The theoretical contribution extends the theory of representative bureaucracy to encompass non-inherited or mutable traits by illustrating how linguistic congruence can lead to increased representation for non-English clients. Additionally, the empirical analysis focuses on testing representative bureaucracy outside traditional policy issues and redistributive bureaucracies. Unlike the research on policing and representative bureaucracy, this

research focuses on studying the effects of representation on not only a racial minority but a population with limited to no political rights.

Second, in finding that language serves to help immigrants dependent on the share of the foreign-born population, this research has implications for bureaucratic incorporation. Studies on bureaucratic incorporation have focused on the service aspect of bureaucracies seeking to meet the needs of immigrants by providing language access or programs to help incorporate the immigrant community. The results in this chapter indicate institutional commitment to meeting language needs does not always lead to bureaucratic incorporation of the immigrant community. In counties with large shares of foreign born populations, incentivizing bilingual abilities increases immigration enforcement potentially leading to the alienation of the immigrant community.

¿Government's Amigos o Rebeldes[10]? The Effect of Philanthropy on Local Immigration Policy Outputs

The final two studies use a multi-method approach to studying the role of the philanthropic community in influencing local immigration enforcement. Together these studies, provide a conceptual framework for understanding how philanthropy seeks to influence public policy especially within the communities they serve. Chapter three is one of the first studies to quantitatively analyze the assumption across the philanthropy literature that foundations use their privileged position and resources to influence public policy. No previous studies have quantitatively tested the role of philanthropic funding on local policy outcomes. The results indicate an association between philanthropic funding and local

[10] Government's Friends or Adversaries?

policy implementation. To test the assumption that foundations influence public policy, I, purposefully, choose a policy output that would be difficult to shape based on the location of foundations in relation to the public policy process and the local implementation of policy. The association found in the results is incredibly small, but illustrates that the philanthropic funders are leveraging their grant dollars in funding nonprofits with services and advocacy aimed at engaging and creating inclusiveness for the immigrant community.

As philanthropic funders are disconnected from directly impacting the public policy process, chapter four examines the role of nonprofit organizations in serving the immigrant community and the effect their services have on policy. This qualitative study provides a understanding on how funding to nonprofit organizations affects not only the level of deportability of immigrants but the policy environment. As nonprofits influence policy targets and advocate for changes in the policy environment, their work leads to changes in local implementation and enforcement patterns. A unique contribution of this qualitative research is it focuses on interviewing recipients of foundation grants related to immigration and granted specifically to immigrant-serving nonprofits. Using a theoretical thematic analysis, the study of foundation grantees shows that nonprofit organizations use their position in the community to influence policy through two strategies. The first strategy is through the creation of "citizenship" for the immigrant community leading to micro-level changes in the population of policy targets. The second strategy focuses on macro-level changes through advocacy efforts to change the policy environment to be more immigrant-friendly. Using both approaches or employing only one, nonprofit organizations can influence policy implementation, but their effect is neither rapid nor uniform.

This multi-method research contributes to the literature on philanthropy in three ways. The first is by being one of the first to empirically test the link between total dollars leveraged within a community and its influence on local immigration policy outputs. This research adds to the literature of one other scholar who empirically tested the relationship between education-related grant making and education policy reform. Its final contribution is the development of a conceptual framework that illustrates the role of the philanthropic community, foundations and nonprofit organizations, and their strategies for influencing public policy. The final contribution is the descriptive analysis and illustration of the grant making patterns related to immigration that goes beyond focusing on grants make for civic engagement of immigrants such as voting registration drives (Brown 2013).

Conclusion

The policy targets of the U.S. federal immigration bureaucracy and by extension of local law enforcement agencies constitute a substantial part of the U.S. population. Currently, about 14% of U.S. population is at risk of being identified for deportation by, simply, interacting with a local law enforcement agent (Krogstad 2014). This dissertation seeks to shed light on how non-governmental institutions can shape the implementation of immigration policy at the most proximate level of government to the policy target. I assess how linguistic connection and the philanthropic community can change the policy environment and discretion exercised by local bureaucrats tasked with the mission of Secure Communities. The influences that these non-governmental organizations exert on policy provide insights into how the idea of citizenship can be shaped from the bottom up rather than from policy down. The findings presented in this dissertation have significant implications for the study of politics and its intersection with immigration policy.

Specifically, it addresses the use of force multiplier tools in achieving federal policy goals and the methods reshaping policy through local community forces. In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of this dissertation in greater detail, consider the generalizability and limitations of my research, as well as provide guidance on future directions.

CHAPTER II

¿HABLAS ESPAÑOL?: LINGUISTIC ACCOMMODATION & THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

"Speaking Mexican" during a campaign event earned, then Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush, criticism from fellow candidate President Donald J. Trump. President Trump's criticism devalued Bush's bilingual skills failing to acknowledge how linguistic abilities help candidates connect with non-English speaking communities. To the detriment of America's economic vitality and national security, she stands as one of the only nations whose citizenry is more likely to be monolingual (Simon 1980; Cutshall 2004).

Although laws are in the books regarding the official languages that should be used for official state documents and institutional settings, many remain symbolic as state governments and public agencies continue to provide bilingual materials to their non-English dominant immigrant community (López & Bialik 2017). The rise of these symbolic laws illustrate a nativist backlash to the changing demographics, increases in the vitality of non-English languages, especially Spanish, and ties to immigration (Barker et al. 2001). Padilla et al. (1991) suggest that this movement has "a wider more far-reaching, and more negative agenda than simply advocating an official English Language policy. (120)." These laws create an environment where language-minorities and their "non-American" identities are at risk of being "disadvantaged, denigrated, and demeaned" (Crawford 1989). Research in representative bureaucracy illustrates the positive effects of increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of our institutions on minority outcomes without disadvantage to the majority (Meier 1993a,b; Mosher 1982; Selden 1997; Keiser et al.

2002; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006). These studies have failed to take into account how language ability plays a role in representation.

Language is foundational to the expression of one's identity representing which identities are important from macro-level institutions down to the micro-level (Miller 2000). The manner in which our social or racial/ethnic identities are, institutionally, constructed and communicated through everyday practices such as which language is spoken or is allowed to be spoken indicate the vitality, status, and power of their respective groups and identities (Barker et al 2001). With increasing demographic changes, and more than 350 languages spoken in the United States (U.S. Census 2015), public organizations will continue to rely on bureaucrats' ability to understand and communicate with their constituents in order to provide effective and efficient services. This research addresses the question: *does increasing bilingualism within our institutions lead to redressing inequitable service delivery to underserved and underrepresented communities?*

A majority of Americans agree that being able to speak English is very important to truly being considered American (Stokes 2017; Newman et al. 2012; Citrin & Wright 2009; Citrin 1990; Citrin et al. 1990 a,b). This view of the American identity, opens the door to the potential discrimination of limited English proficient communities from of denial of services (Westphal 2000) to the questioning of one's citizenship. In light of the devolution of immigration enforcement to local law enforcement agencies, interactions with the state actors who view speaking English as an integral part of the of American identity could lead to increasing deportability of non-English proficient immigrants. Using data from the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration Enforcement and Customs' Secure Communities Immigration Enforcement program, I expand the theory of

representative bureaucracy to test the effect of bilingualism on local immigration policy outputs. The results indicate that institutional commitment to bilingualism is related to the implementation of immigration enforcement, but its effect depends on the linguistic landscape.

Literature Review

Representation is a central value of our democratic society. Not surprisingly, it is expected that our political institutions and public bureaucracies be representative of our society in order to foster inclusivity and unity. From historical barriers to current changes in the demographics of our population, representation within and across all offices of our government and public sectors have fallen short of holding to this value. Central to ensuring the democratic strength of public institutions, the study of representation centers on provides insights into the mechanism to increase political representation (Kastellec 2013; Preuhs 2007; Hero & Tolbert 1995; Pitkin 1967) in order to ensure bureaucratic responsibility and to address the problem of inequitable service delivery to underrepresented and marginalized populations (Kingsley 1944; Mosher 2003, 1982; Krislov 1974; Meier 1975, 1993a; Selden 1997).

The theories of representation center around two mechanisms to facilitate representation, passive and active. In it most fundamental form, representation occurs in a passive manner without need for action on the bureaucrat's part. Passive representation occurs when the social and demographic characteristics of bureaucrats/elected officials are congruent with the clients and populations they serve. With passive representation, the congruence between a population or client's identities and backgrounds serve as the catalyst that allows bureaucrats and elected officials to represent these individuals. By

sharing similar identities or backgrounds with the population they serve, bureaucrats will, also, share similar values and beliefs allowing better understanding of and service delivery to the community with which they share identities (Selden 1997; Meier 1993b; Mosher 2003, 1982; Kingsley 1944; Krislov 1974). With passive representation present, bureaucrats or elected officials with the proper discretionary power can actively engage not only on behalf of, but also directly for, the interests of the individuals whom they serve, when the policy issue at hand is salient to their identity (Keiser 2010; Mosher 1982; Meier 1975).

Using these the mechanisms of representation, scholars have applied the theory of representation across a broad range of policy areas including the political arena (Butler and Broockman 2011; Prenuhs 2007;Pantoja & Segura 2003; Pitkin 1967), education (Grissom, Kern & Rodriguez 2015; Atkins et al. 2014; Roch, Pitts & Navarro 2010; Rocha & Hawes 2009; Pitts; 2005; Keiser et al. 2002; Meier 1993a,b; Meier & Stewart 1992), health (Atkins & Wilkins 2013; Zhu & Walker 2013; Thielemann & Stewart 1996), law enforcement (Hong 2016, 2017; Riccucci et al 2014; Wilkins & Williams 2008, 2009; Theobald & Haider-Markel 2008; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006), welfare (Watkins-Hayes 2006; Keiser et.al 2004), child support (Wilkins & Keiser 2006; Wilkins 2007) and within the nonprofit sector (Gazely, Chang & Bingham 2010; LeRoux 2009; Guo & Musso 2007; Brown 2002 a,b) finding an influence of representation on policy outcomes and service delivery. Lim (2006) doubts the extent to which research has truly shown the direct substantive effects of passive representation translating into active representation.

As part of Lim's (2006) argument, Selden's (1997) research is the foundational study showing the direct effects of active representation through her theoretical argument

that bureaucrats in the Farm Home Administration's Rural Housing Loans program took on the minority representative role and additionally active representation occurred through an administrative role perception. Similar findings can be found for African American substantive political representation. Within the judicial branch, Kastellec (2013) finds that a black judge on a panel with two non-minority judges increases the support shown for affirmative action cases by influencing non-minority behavior. Juenke and Preuhs (2012) find that when there is a minority dimension to issues during legislative voting, minority representatives are able to provide substantive representation through representation that "resembles the trustee model for minority interests (pg. 713)".

Despite, the numerous studies illustrating the increases made in minority outcomes with increased minority presence and action within an organization, inclusivity does not always equate with improved outcomes. Studies across the fields of representation (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Casellas 2007; Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009) are beginning to lay the foundations that discuss the obstacles to the positive effects of representation. Within positions of elected office, Hero and Tolbert (1995) and later re-evaluated by Casellas (2007) find that increased descriptive representation in legislatures by Latinos did not directly equate to substantive representation on legislative voting. The ethnic connection between the elected officials and their Latino constituents, did not influence their voting patterns. Rather partisanship helped pass legislation that was salient to their Latino constituents. Notwithstanding the enactment of legislation for Latinos, partisanship here superseded the representative connection between Latino officials and their Latino constituents.

Another factor impeding the effects of passive to active representation is organizational socialization (Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009). To ensure that street level bureaucrats adhere to implementing their organizational mission, organizations seek to structure bureaucratic decision making by replacing personal identities and values with "a common set of assumptions and way of looking at the world (Wilkins & Williams 2008, 656)." By socializing the world view of bureaucrats, organizations seek to ensure that bureaucratic behavior does not deviate from promoting organizational loyalty and mission objectives (Downs 1967; Meier & Nigro 1976; Simon 1957; Weber 1946; Thompson 1976; Romzek 1990). Specifically, socialization within a punitive context creates obstacles of creating equity within the justice system. Wilkins & Williams find that increasing Latino (2009) and African Americans (2008) representation within local police forces increases the stops of minorities. Instead of decreasing the number of stops for people of color, increasing police officers of color leads to increases in racial profiling. This is a surprising finding with respect to race and punishment, as studies of increased gender representation within law enforcement continues to produce positive outcomes for increased child support payments (Wilkins and Keiser 2006; Wilkins 2007) and the reporting of sexual assault crimes and arrests (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Riccucci et al. 2014). The culture and socialization of their job altered the connection (salience) between themselves as minority bureaucrats and the individuals they stopped through the course of their job (discretion).

Traditionally, the focus on studying representation centers on illustrating the effects of increasing bureaucrat's observable demographic characteristics. There are currently only two exceptions to the traditional supply side of representative bureaucracy (Gade &

Wilkins 2012; Thielemann & Stewart 1996). The advantageous of having a representative bureaucracy can be seen in policy outputs, but do clients have a preference and recognize differences in service delivery by co-identity bureaucrat? In their study, Thieleman & Stewart (1996) examine the relationship between clients' desires to be served by bureaucrats with their similar characteristics. For people living with AIDS, it was especially important for the face of service delivery to match the sexual orientation and gender of client seeking services. Similarly, Gade & Wilkins (2012) focused on a mutable identity of the bureaucrat, a bureaucrat's previous professional experience. The authors evaluated whether Veterans' seeking services from Veteran's Affairs reported a higher level of satisfaction from their service delivery if their rehabilitation counselor was a fellow Veteran. Their results indicate that Veterans were more satisfied with services from a bureaucrat they perceived to be a fellow Veteran. Veteran clients were comfortable asking, during the course of service delivery, if their counselors had previously served in the military. Counselors acknowledged the importance of portraying their professional identity truthfully. Both of these studies, unique to the previous literature, concentrate on understanding how client's feel about representative service delivery. Its not only important for the policy outputs to show increases in service delivery, but the clients must also feel that connection in order to feel comfortable coming to the bureaucracy for services (Soss 1999).

Increased passive representation can help organizations demographically reflect their clients, but this does not ensure clients will be able to communicate or interact with the organization. One marginalized community frequently overlooked is the U.S. noncitizen community (Lucio 2016). The U.S. is home to a foreign-born community of

43.3 million people. Of this 43.3 million, a little more than half at 22.6 million are non-citizen immigrants (CAP & Nicholson 2017). Providing services to the foreign-born community brings a set of barriers, the two most prominent are the citizenships status and language barrier. If representation continues to place a premium on physical traits, then organizations will continue "reifying the dominant language [English] in public discourse [and] ensures that institutions of public life will be remote to those whose orientations encompass other languages (Rodriguez 2001, 135)".

Language

Language is deeply intertwined with racial and ethnic identities as it has "social, cultural and functional features that parallel other ascriptive legal categories but nevertheless require that language be treated uniquely (Rodriguez 2001,140)." It stands alone as a multipurpose tool that can be acquired and deployed with no prerequisite of having the speaker be a member of a particular ethnic identity. Aside from its connections to racial and ethnic identities, language serves to develop understanding and belonging to all who share in its external and internal collective identity (Gravier 2018). Language congruence is not simply the act of speaking a language other than English. Bilingualism allows for the bureaucrats to not just speak another language, but to have cultural knowledge, sensitivity, and responsiveness that helps ease clients (Porras et.al 2014; Cho 2000; Zhou 1997a,b; Church & King 1993). As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in the Hernandez v. New York ruling, "Language permits an individual both to express a personal identity and membership in a community, and those who share a common language may interact in ways more intimate than those without this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense, inhabit two communities, and serve to bring them closer (1991; Rodriguez 2001). Theoretically, with

no limit to the number of languages a bureaucrat can speak, what effect does bilingualism within a bureaucracy have on policy outputs? Specifically, can bilingualism in a bureaucracy provide representation to the immigrant community? If so, does the immigrant community receive the "advantageous" of a non-neutral bureaucracy? This research will build on the theory of representative bureaucracy by incorporating aspects of Communication Accommodation Theory to illustrate how language can serve as active representation the U.S. immigrant community.

Passive representation is linked to a bureaucrat's demographically inherited traits that identify their racial/ethnicity or gender. Language can be suppressed or chosen to be invoked during interactions, it does not meet the requirements to be considered a mechanism for passive representation as it is not a demographic characteristic that is easily observable to clients. For language to produce active representation for non-English dominant clients two conditions must be met, discretion and salience (Meier 1993; Selden 1997; Meier & Bohte 2001; Keiser et al. 2002; Sowa & Selden 2003; Wilkins & Keiser 2006).

Traditionally, scholars have defined salience to indicate a policy issue and its outcome is important to both the bureaucrat and the client. Keiser et al. (2002) argue that a policy is considered salient for women, because of direct benefits to women, the influence of a bureaucrat's gender on the relationship with their client, and the issue has been defined as a women's issue through the political process. Adapting this framework of saliency to linguistic representation, the most important component is the linguistic relationship between client and bureaucrat. Linguistic (in)congruence will alter the relationship between a bureaucrat and client either in a bridging or alienating manner. Dependent on

the mission of the bureaucracy, salience will be related to the direction of the effect of linguistic representation based on the marriage of the first and third component of the framework. If the political process has created a narrative (Ingram & Schnedier 1991; Schnedier & Ingram 1993; Soss 1999; Mettler 2002; Mettler & Soss 2004; Schneider & Sidney 2009) of the non-English language that is being spoken it can influence the direction of benefits for the specific non-English dominant client by the bureaucrat. However, all policies across the spectrum of issues from health to criminal justice system are important to non-English dominant communities. In the case of gender, where the "content of women's issues is fluid and changes over time (Keiser et al 2002, 556)", issues of language create barriers to services and inclusivity making every policy or service not available in an accommodating language salient to the non-English dominant community.

The second condition of active representation is the discretion of the bureaucrat to act on behalf of the client. Discretion is the sphere of influence from which the bureaucrat can deviate or advocate for specific clients. Within the sphere of influence, a bureaucrat has two types of discretion that may interact or contradict each other. The organizational structure of the bureaucracy may afford discretion during service delivery, but this discretion can be altered by the social conditions or socialization that the bureaucrat has experienced outside of the formal rules or span of control (Meier 1993b; Sowa & Selden 2003). For linguistic abilities to influence the outputs of a bureaucracy, a bureaucrat must have the discretion to use their linguistic repertoire to assist clients. The discretion to express their linguistic ability can be motivated by their connection to the community, their personal values, or the shared life experience that is communicated through language, but

can also be limited by formal policies of English official laws or by the dominant vitality of the English language in the bureaucracy.

Next to public schools, local law enforcement agencies are the most proximate bureaucracy with whom individuals will interact most during their lifetime. These organizations function as a mixed-service bureaucracy organized in a hierarchical and quasi-military structure to protect and above all enforce law and order (Sklansky 2005). The core "mission of police is to fight crime, and following this, that individual officers are celebrated and rewarded for making arrests (Epp et al. 2014, 29)." These officers, street-level bureaucrats, enjoy a great deal of discretion when policing their community during traffic stops, investigatory stops, and throughout the course of criminal investigations (Epp, Maynard-Noody, Haider-Markel 2014, Wilkins & Williams 2008, 2009; Sklansky 2005; Vinzant & Crothers1998; Lipsky 1980; Muir 1977; Davis 1975).

Previous research in representative bureaucracy has led to the contradicting results on the influence of racially diversified police forces. Within the U.S., Wilkins and Williams (2008 & 2009) find that increasing Latino and Black officers result in higher racial profiling. Due to organizational socialization, these finding are opposite of the theorized advantageous outcomes for the represented racial group. The authors attribute this to the idea of the blue-wall mosaic or in other words "Blue is blue: the job shapes the officer, not the other way around (Sklansky 2006, 1210; Walker et al. 2012)." Hong (2017) re-visited the issue of representative police forces and their influence on racial profiling finding contradictory results to Wilkins & Williams. Focusing on a ten-year period where the United Kingdom and Wales enacted targeted demographic police reform, Hong finds that increases in the racial composition of police forces reduced the proportion of ethnic

minority citizens "stopped and frisked" within police departments with a preexisting inequity of racial profiling. The focus of these studies centers on racial identities and racialized outputs, but they overlook the intragroup citizenship differences[11]. The outcomes of racial and ethnic representation gloss over the intersection of criminal and immigration enforcement. This opens a new venue for research on how representation of the immigrant community influences immigration enforcement.

Theory

Socialization may impede passive representation, but in order for police officers to do their job, they must be able to communicate during any social or institutional stop. The internal migration patterns of the U.S. immigrant community have begun to expand out of traditional states into new destination states and counties (CAP & Nicholson 2017; Millard et al. 2004). In order for local law enforcement agencies to serve a newly arriving immigrant community or an established one, they must overcome barriers such as cultural practices, fear of deportation, and home country trauma at the hands of police (Farris & Holman 2017; Lewis & Ramakrishnan 2007; Culver 2004; Menjívar & Bejarano 2004; Song 1992; Pogrebin & Poole 1990) to achieve their mission of protecting and serving. One key mechanism that will help facilitate the interactions to work through these barriers is having the proper linguistic ability to communicate and understand one another. Bilingual officers are not a panacea to ending the tension between police and communities, but they are a way to help bridge two communities.

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[11] Wilkins & Williams (2009) discuss the role of racial profiling in the Latino community and its association as a marker enforcing immigration law. The authors do point out that while most of the Latino community is a citizen or has formal status, the Latino community bears the burnt of race-based immigration enforcement.

During patrol or when responding to calls, police officers are trained to assess the situation on hand using the entirety of the information that is available to them. The ability to communicate and interact is vital to prompt assessment of the situation. Herbst & Walker (2001) and Culver (2004) conducted qualitative research on local law enforcement agencies to evaluate whether language was a barrier to accomplishing their duties. Both studies concluded that language is barrier leading to frustration, conflict, and time delays in providing services and fostering relationships with Hispanic communities. In linguistically incongruent interactions, officers were unable to fully assess situations or gain clear and comprehendible information about the suspect, victim, or situation. Officers in an attempt to overcome the language barriers admitted to "muddling through" (334), calling a translator service, or using a bystander, family member, even children to help communicate during their service calls or stops. The inefficiency of each option leads to ineffective service or the break down of relationships. At the time of the research, immigration enforcement was not as intimately intertwined with local policing as it is today. Officers admitted that "after ten to fifteen minutes, when you can't get ahold of anyone to interpret, its wrong but I just say go home. Sometimes I am just stuck in a traffic situation…when I just have to let them go and I don't know I have just left a felon go or not (Culver 2004, 336)." In today's world of immigration enforcement devolution, this situation might end differently.

Officers train using the Reid Method to help them evaluate the level of suspiciousness of individuals based on their verbal and non-verbal cues such as lack of eye contact, hand gestures, stutters or repeated speech interrupters (Johnson 2006). If an officer is unable to communicate because the individual they stopped cannot speak or respond in

English, stutters, or speaks broken English, the result may end up with an arrest that can lead to their deportation, even if no crime was committed during the stop. The author notes one officer expressed frustration in being unable to gather any information after a traffic accident or explain procedure led to an arrest in hopes that maybe someone in the station could translate. “Now see, if I could have spoke with him, he probably wouldn’t be going to jail (Herbst & Walker 2001, 335).”

Expanding the theory of representative bureaucracy to include language representation follows that in situations where officers are hired, incentivized, and encouraged to use their linguistic abilities, departments will produce positive policy outcomes for the immigrant community. The magnitude of the effect of linguistically diverse department maybe dependent on the linguistic landscape of the community. As previously stated linguistic differences during service provision increase saliency and officers have the discretion when on call as to whether, according to Communication Accommodation Theory, maintain the linguistic divergence or linguistically converge to provide adequate services (Dougherty et al. 2010; Giles & Ogay 2007; Giles et al. 1977). Within linguistic landscapes (Cenoz & Gorter 2006; Barker et.al 2001; Landry & Bourhis 1997) where the vitality of the English language remains dominant, the discretion to accommodate linguistic differences will yield the largest positive effect for the immigrant community. In communities where the linguistic landscape has multiple vital languages, in addition to English, such as Spanish, Mandarin, or Tagalong, etc. it is unlikely that accommodation will influence immigration outcomes as strongly.

The positive influence on policy outputs occurs when during the interaction of bilingual officers with non-English dominant individuals. During a stop, call, or taking the

statement of a victim, a bilingual officer has the discretion to decide between two linguistic strategies. The first is accommodation through language congruence, the officer is able to speak the non-English language of the individual and so chooses to conduct the rest of their interaction in that language. In the previous example from research, the officer was not bilingual and could not get the necessary information on the identity of individual at the scene of an accident. He was unable to discern whether he was talking with the victim or the suspect. Additionally, the individual was unable to understand the basic questions asked pertaining to his identity causing the officer to prematurely arrest him. If an officer can respond and interact in the language of the immigrant, the chances of frustration and premature arrests that could lead to increases in immigration enforcement decrease, especially in communities that have smaller immigrant populations. This scenario yields the most positive outcomes for the immigrant community and relationship building between police departments and the broader immigrant community. During an interaction, language congruence opens the lines of communication reducing the fear and possibility of deportation, fostering trust between the officer and immigrant, and increasing the chances of future co-production in community safety (Porras et.al 2014).

The second communication strategy that can be employed by bureaucrats is linguistic divergence indicating either natural or intentional language incongruence during an interaction (Giles & Ogay 2007; Dougherty et al. 2010; Giles & Johnson 1987) For example, an officer continues to speak in English despite the immigrant being unable to speak proficiently in English. In this case, an officer may or may not be able to speak in the language of an immigrant and chooses to maintain the interaction in English. During these interactions, an immigrant's probability of being considered suspicious increases if

they are attempting to communicate in their non-dominant language with an officer as issues of fear affect the smoothness of their speech patterns. Due to the Reid method of detecting "suspicious" individuals, if an immigrant with limited English proficiency attempts to converge with the officer's English language, their inability to communicate clearly in English without stuttering or stammering can stereotype them as "suspicious" immigrants, criminal or undocumented, even if they were not committing a crime before they were stopped. In today's climate of heightened concern over immigration and push for stricter enforcement, lack of English abilities and bilingualism in law enforcement can lead to increased stereotyping of noncitizens resulting in arrests assisting fulfill their mission of immigration enforcement.

Diversity of linguistic landscape is tied to the size of its immigrant population. In communities with diverse linguistic landscapes, bilingualism within the workforce is more likely to be readily available, incentives and use of this skill will not have as strong of an effect in policy outputs. A diverse linguistic landscape represents not only a vitality among non-English languages but a policy target rich environment. In communities with a high foreign born population, policing is likely to help immigration enforcement despite bilingual officers being able to communicate and assess situations because they are more likely to come across non-citizen members of the immigrant community. In these communities, in order to protect the trust that is being built with the immigrant community, bilingual officers are more likely to contribute to increasing the focus on high priority criminal immigrants rather than immigrants with misdemeanors or simple civil immigration violations. In these counties, bilingual officers would be more likely to prioritize arresting immigrants who pose a real threat to the safety of their community,

over immigrants who are low priority and non-threatening. With overzealous enforcement, despite being able to speak with the officers, it is unlikely that the immigrant community would seek out help or report crimes due to the fear of getting caught in the ever increasing immigration force.

Therefore, in counties with bilingual officers who can converge their language to match the language of an immigrant, bilingualism will be related to a decrease in the arresting of deportable immigrants and will shift priority to identifying criminal immigrants that pose a threat to the community over non-criminal immigrants with civil or misdemeanor violations. The strength of the effect will be dependent upon the linguistic landscape of a community. In communities with a growing immigrant population where English remains dominant, the influence of bilingual officers will be stronger than in communities with a large population of immigrants. In these counties, immigrants have replenished their linguistic vitality and are a larger share of the population causing outcomes to be based on policing rather than misunderstanding or stereotyping on non-English speakers due to language incongruence.

Based on traditional representative bureaucracy and the findings of Wilkins and Williams (2008, 2009) and Hong (2017), hypothesis one will test the basic theory of representative bureaucracy by focusing on the two largest racial/ethnic groups representative of the largest immigrant communities, Hispanic and Asian[12].

[12] I acknowledge that grouping the pan-ethnic identities into one racial/ethnic category overlooks their cultural differences, but for the purposes of this research, it was the only to be able to capture the Hispanic and Asian identity.

H1: Increasing the passive representation of Hispanic and Asian officers will influence the total level of immigration enforcement and the outputs for each priority level identification of deportable immigrants.

Hypothesis two focuses on testing linguistic representation. This hypothesis, unlike the previous one, illustrates theory of representative bureaucracy through language congruence in interactions without focusing on their racial/ethnic identity. By not focusing on racial identity, I make the assumption that linguistic representation can occur without any racial/ethnic prerequisite of the bureaucrat or bureaucracy. The first hypothesis is a test of passive representation linked to the benefits of increasing the representation of racial minorities in local law enforcement agencies without making any assumptions of their linguistic abilities.

H2: As a linguistic landscape begins to diversify, bilingual law enforcement agencies will be related to the decreased immigration enforcement, and increasing the effectiveness of identifying deportable criminal immigrants.

Data and Research Methods

To empirically evaluate the role of linguistic congruence on policy outcomes, the level of analysis chosen is the county level where deportation inputs for ICE are identified from the interior of the U.S. For this analysis, data from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey of 2007 and 2013 is matched with the county level interoperability reports from the Secure Communities Program. These two datasets serve as the foundation of a panel dataset for the years 2009 through 2014 that included county level policy environment variables from the U.S. Census Bureau's publically available data.

By participating in Secure Communities, local law enforcement agencies experience a pressure to overemphasize their regulatory mission at the expense of their service mission (Marrow 2009). This balancing act leads to policy outcomes that are inversely related to each other. In increasing their immigration enforcement, local law enforcement agencies may be neglecting policing duties or if the local agencies prioritize their core mission of policing to create a safe community, they could be considered "ineffective" force multipliers. As the outcomes have the potential to influence each other, a traditional Ordinary Least Squares Regression would not be able to account for the interdependent nature of the policy outcomes. In order to control for the possibility of correlation among the error terms of the immigration policy outputs explored, a Seemingly Unrelated Regression with clustered standard errors[13] is best fit for analyzing the influence of linguistic representation simultaneously on two different policy outputs affecting the lives of the immigrant community (Zellner 1962; Moon & Perron 2006).

Policy Outcomes: Immigration

From the policy outputs reported, two sets of measures are constructed that evaluate local law enforcement's balancing act and the second set that further measures effective policing in prioritizing criminal offenders. A summary of the policy measures can be seen in Table 1 found in the appendix. The first immigration policy outcome measures the strength of local agency to act as a force multiplier for the federal government. The goal of Secure Communities was to locate deportable immigrants from the interior of the

[13] Analysis with year-fixed effects were run and the relationships hold. These models were excluded from the results shown because of the multi-collinearity in the year 2009 that omits it from the analysis. In having only 282 counties across less than 30 states, state-fixed effects were not included due to the limited variation both within and across states

U.S as inputs for ICE's deportation regime. To capture the strength of the force multiplier in identifying deportable immigrants, the total number of matched deportable immigrants is divided by the total noncitizen population. This measure captures how many immigrants per capita are being identified as deportable. Communities with a higher noncitizen population[14] can be considered as an environment "rich" in policy targets. The larger this measure, the stronger a county acts a force multiplier. On average, a county had a noncitizen per capita identification of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.04. Most counties were not strong multipliers. There are exceptions, the highest value in the sample data had about a noncitizen per capita identification of deportable immigrants of 1.27[15].

Despite having deportation priorities focusing on immigrants with felony convictions, Secure Communities disproportionately identified at higher rates immigrants with misdemeanor convictions. Representative bureaucracy helps redress the inequities in policy, so a disparity ratio is operationalized as the total low priority immigrant identifications to high priority immigrant identifications. A lower the disparity ratio represents a local law enforcement agency focusing on policing over immigration enforcement. The average county sheriff in our sample data had a disparity ratio of about 3 immigrants with a standard deviation of about 4 low priority immigrant matches to every 1 high priority immigrant match. At highest end, counties with a focus on immigration

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[14] Noncitizen population includes both documented and undocumented immigrants, but does not include the foreign born naturalized citizens. Each yearly measure comes from the 5-year estimates of the American Community Survey.

[15] This was Cameron Parish, LA. Its noncitizen population had a great deal of variation from 2009 through 2014. In 2012, ACS reported no noncitizens and sComm reported 7 total matches. In 2014, the noncitizen population was 11 and sComm reported 14 total matches. Controlling for this county in the model, does not change the results.

enforcement were identifying about 78 low priority immigrants to every one high priority immigrant.

Whether Secure Communities was an effective priority enforcement program is out of the scope of this research, understanding the effect of linguistic representation on each priority level outcome is not. To investigate in more detail, the balancing act between policing and immigration enforcement each of the three priority levels are individually analyzed to understand if the effects of representation differ when assessing priority policy outcomes. The two priority population of deportable immigrants of interest, high priority deportable immigrants and low priority deportable immigrants, are measured as the noncitizen per capita rate of total priority level immigrants identified[16]. Law enforcement agencies viewing immigration enforcement as a secondary mission by focus their attention to policing and creating safe communities will be more effective in identifying high priority matches. While departments with a large low priority per capita immigrant matches indicate a focus on immigration enforcement over policing.

Representation in Local Law Enforcement Agencies

To capture the various measures of representation, this research uses the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Survey from 2007 and 2013. Administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics roughly every 3 to 4 years, the LEMAS survey is a cross sectional nationally representative sample of state and local law enforcement agencies, including sheriff's agencies. Each survey contains roughly around 3,000 agencies with

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[16] For High Priority Per Capita= Total Number of Matched High Priority Immigrants/ Total Number of Noncitizens
For Low Priority Per Capita= Total Number of Matched Low Priority Immigrants/ Total Number of Noncitizens

response rates over 85%[17]. Each survey period has a sheriffs' sample size[18] of 951[19] in 2007 and 895[20] in 2013. The LEMAS survey contains a core set of questions related to the administration and management of law enforcement agencies such as the personnel, expenditures, operations, pay and incentives. Each survey contains a unique one-time subset of questions pertinent to current issues within law enforcement. For this research, the special topics of interest were found within 2007 survey only. The question of interest was the number of personnel, sworn and civilian, that were bilingual. As a proxy for this question, both surveys included a question on the commitment of the agency to provide incentive pay for officers with bilingual abilities. This is just as important as the number of bilingual officers. Incentivizing pay for bilingualism shows institutional commitment to incorporating and improving relations with the immigrant community (Marrow 2009; Jones-Correa 2008 a,b; Lewis & Ramakrishnan 2007) and increases discretion on the part of officers in their line of duty. The second set of variables important to this research found on both questionnaires focused on personnel, total officers by race and the racial composition of the sheriff's department.

To create a panel dataset covering the tenure of Secure Communities, the two cross sectional datasets were merged to find overlapping sheriffs departments responding in both years. This yielded a total of 285[21] usable sheriff's surveys roughly about 30% to 32% of

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[17] 91.8% in 2007 and 86% in 2013.
[18] Surveyed Sheriff's departments were identified using a stratified simple random sample. Stratums are based on the number of sworn personnel.
[19] 87% response rate
[20] 80% response rate
[21] Originally it was 312 sheriffs' departments surveyed in both years, but only 285 departments answered the key variables in both surveys. The variables that were not

each sample. For each of the variables of interest, except for bilingual incentive pay, a linear ratio imputation[22] was used to fill in the years of 2009 through 2012 and 2014.

To test the traditional hypothesis of representative bureaucracy, the variables pertaining to the total number of Hispanic, Asian, and total officers reported by race, total employees (sworn and civilian, full and part-time) are retained for analysis. From these variables, I operationalized the percentage of Hispanic and Asian officers, as these two racial and ethnic groups represent the two top ethnic immigrant groups in the United States. In the sample data, from 2009 through 2014, the average percentage of Hispanic officers is about 6% with a standard deviation of about 11.6%. Asian officers constituted a much smaller percentage of sheriffs' departments, on average the representation of Asian officers constituted less than 1% of sheriffs with a standard deviation of 1.30%. Table 2 contains a summary of the local law enforcement representation statistics.

To test the if language diversity can act as a mechanism of representative bureaucracy, two variables are operationalized. The first variable of interest that comes from the LEMAS survey is a dummy variable that captures the commitment of a sheriff's department to hire bilingual officers. Both surveys contained a version of the following question[23]:

As of January 1, 2013, which of the following include INCENTIVES for FULL-TIME SWORN personnel? Check either 'yes' or 'no' for each item. Incentives include either

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answered in both budget (25 departments) and Hispanic and Asian Officers (1 department each).

[22] For example, for the 2009 total officers= (2007 value*.8) + (2013 value*.2), for 2012 value= (2007 value*.2) + (2013 value*.8)

[23] For 2008 the wording stated: *Does your agency authorize or provide any of the following for sworn personnel? (2008) – Bilingual ability pay*

increased salary or additional paid leave.

- *Bi-lingual or Multi-lingual ability*

Of the counties in the sample, 18.25% of the sheriffs' departments offer incentive pay for bilingual abilities. Linguistic institutional commitment is a dummy variable coded with a 1 if the sheriff's department has a pay incentive and zero if they do not. The 2007 value was inputted as the value for the years of 2009 through 2011 and the 2013 value for the years of 2012 and 2014. Between the two survey time periods, 9 counties switched to having an incentive pay representing roughly about 3 percent of the data and about 5 percent or 13 counties removed their incentives for bilingual abilities. In 2007, the survey asked a question about the total number of sworn officers that were certified bilingual in our sample, the average department had about 4% certified full time officers with a standard deviation of about 11%. For sheriffs' departments' with incentive pay, the average percentage of bilingual officers increased to about 6.42% compared to the average 3.42% percent of bilingual officers in departments with no incentive pay. In the sample data, there were between 50 departments with incentive pay from 2007 to 2011 and 54 departments with incentives for bilingualism from 2012 to 2014.

The second variable needed to test the relationship between linguistic representation and immigration outcomes does not come from the LEMAS survey, but from the American Community Surveys five year estimates. Linguistic landscape is operationalized as the percentage of foreign born population[24] with larger immigrant

[24] Linguistic landscape includes all over-all foreign born population, naturalized and noncitizens. Naturalization changes an immigrant's deportability, but does not erase their ability to speak in their native tongue.

communities indicating more language diversity[25]. The higher the foreign born population in a county, the more likely that English is not the only vital language with more non-English languages spoke across public, private, and social spaces. In the sample data, linguistic landscape was not very diverse, on average, the foreign born population was about 8% with a standard deviation of about 7.66%.

Controls

This research views immigration policy outcomes as bureaucratic organizational performance. The following empirical analysis uses a basic model that controls for bureaucratic implementation and enforcement of immigration policy by including controls for organizational capacity and policy environment (Brewer and Seldon 2000; Boyne 2003; Boyne & Meier 2009). Table 3, found in the appendix, contains a full summary of each of the control measures.

For bureaucratic capacity, the model controls for the capacity of the local sheriff and the local police departments within the county. For the sheriff capacity, from the LEMAS Survey, using the same linear imputation from the variables of interest, total operating budget and total employees are included. Scholars (Jaeger 2016; Farris & Holman 2017) have identified that a local sheriff's budget is related to their compliance in enforcing immigration policy. To control for total human capital of a sheriff's department, the logged total employees both civilian and sworn officers is used.

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[25] Although the percentage of foreign born population does not describe the demographic differences in the population or how many languages are in the population, it still indicates how vital bilingualism in public organizations is needed. A landscape is diverse even if only one other non-English language is by immigrants.

To control for the influence of the local city police departments have on the level of enforcement, the total capacity of local law enforcement officers (total employment of the county, city, and sheriff law enforcement) and the total operating budget for police protection are logged normalize distribution. Both measures are, unfortunately, not reported at each county level. Rather, the Annual State and Local Government Employment Survey reports aggregates all local totals up to the state level reporting it as one measure. Despite not having individual county estimates, the measure is kept to help control for the the co-production of public safety across localities.

Policy outputs depend on the inputs into the organization and policy environment in which bureaucrats operate. To control for the most basic level of inputs into both local and federal enforcement bureaucracies, I control for the total submissions of fingerprints within a county. As previously mentioned, total submissions illustrate the total number of recorded attempts to reduce crime or identify immigrants by recording each arrest processed into county jail. Because of the wide variation and the over dispersion of structural zeros, the final operationalization of submissions logged.

In order to control for the influence of the policy environment, a set of controls capturing the social, political, and economic climate affecting immigration enforcement are used in each model. The first set of controls accounts for the policy targets and non-policy targets of the community. According to past research (Cox and Miles 2013; Wong 2012), the activation and enforcement of sComm occurred in counties with high levels of specific populations, Hispanics and noncitizen. In addition to Hispanics being the face of immigration, historical immigration narratives focused on the Asian population within the United States (Daniel 2005). In addition to Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian populations,

included in the model is the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic African Americans. The final social measure captures the level of education with a county. As the percentage of individuals with less than a high school education increases it is expected that so will the pressure for immigration enforcement.

Historically and contemporarily, immigration policy has never remained a politically neutral issue with both sides of the aisle arguing for different enforcement and reform typically fueled by rhetoric concerning economic distressed caused by immigration. Anti-immigration rhetoric spikes during times of crisis with the Republican party calling for stricter immigration policies (Chand & Schreckhise 2015; Koulish 2010; Daniels 2005; Tichenor 2002; Welch 2002). Due to the differences among political parties, controls for the restrictive political economy of immigration enforcement (Calavita 2010, 1996, Ngai 2004; Tichenor 2002) are expected to increase the inequalities in policy outputs. Partisanship is operationalized as the percentage of votes[26] in the 2008 and 2012 election for the Republican candidate (i.e., McCain in 2008 and Romney 2012).

To account for economic conditions that might influence a push for stricter immigration enforcement, six variables are included that cover financial stability, non-homeownership, employment conditions, use of public benefits. Financial stability of a county is captured by using the logged median income in 2016 constant dollars. The percentage of non-homeowners is included as a measure of economic vitality in community. As unemployment rates increase, narrative of the immigrants taking American

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[26] Voting percentages at the county level were collected from the Data.gov website that is managed by the U.S. General Administration, Technology Transformation Service. The website is follows the Project Open Data schema that requires all datasets to report: title, description, tags, last update, publisher and contact name.

jobs is used to bolster support for stricter immigration enforcement, as such the rate of unemployment is included. The final set of economic variables focus on controlling for the narrative of immigrants as public charges (Moloney 2012). The percentage of the population that is on public assistance is included expecting that take up rates of public assistance increases so will the immigration enforcement in a community.

Results

Within the context of Secure Communities immigration policy outputs, this research tests two main hypotheses, a traditional passive representation and an extension of the theory by focusing on linguistic representation, using two seemingly unrelated regression models each containing two sub-models related to the balancing act of local law enforcement agencies. The traditional representative bureaucracy hypothesis predicts increasing the passive representation of Hispanic and Asian officers will have an influence on immigration policy outputs, but does not predict the effect of the direction.

The results in Table 4 indicate support for traditional representative bureaucracy hypothesis where by increasing the passive representation of racial/ethnic groups is related to immigration policy outputs. Interestingly, the effect of passive representation differs based on which racial/ethnic group is of focus. Increasing the passive representation of Hispanic officers has a statistically significant relationship in decreasing the department's force multiplier effect and decreasing the disparity in enforcement. A ten percent increase in the share of Hispanic officers, almost one standard deviation above the mean, is related to decreasing the total per capita identifications of deportable immigrants 20% within a county, all else being equal. This same increase is related to an 8% decrease local law

enforcements' immigration enforcement disparity ratio between the identification of deportable low to high priority immigrants.

Passive representation of Asian officers and immigration outcomes reveals relationships different from the effects of Hispanic officer representation. Representation by Asian officers is unrelated to the force multiplier effect of a department, but increasing their share of officers is statistically related to decreasing their disparity in enforcement by identifying a lower ratio of low priority immigrants to high priority immigrants. All else being equal, a one percent increase, about a one standard deviation increase, is related to a 4% decrease in the identifications of low priority deportable immigrants to high priority immigrants within a county.

Based on the analysis in Table 4, support is found for linguistic pay incentives on Secure Communities immigration policy outputs, but not for policing. The results indicate that institutional commitment to linguistic representation decreases the per capita total matches of deportable immigrants. There is no relationship between bilingual incentive pay and disparity in enforcement patterns.

Figure 4 illustrates the results of the marginal effects of pay incentives across a changing linguistic landscape. Increases in the percentage of the foreign population within a county increases the vitality of foreign languages spoken. The marginal effect of having an incentive of bilingual pay decreases the percentage of per capita matching from 19% to 88% in counties with a foreign born population of 5% or lower, but as the share of immigrants increases the opposite relationship emerges. The shift in the direction of the relationship is unexpected. In counties with a foreign born population over 16%, incentives for bilingualism are statistically significant and related to increasing the percentage of per

capita matches of deportable immigrants from a 27% to about a 74% increase. There is no support for the hypothesis that incentive pay for bilingual abilities is related to easing disparities in enforcement across any share of the foreign born population.

Secure Communities was a priority enforcement program seeking to identifying deportable immigrants based on their risk to community safety. If an immigrant's criminal record contained a felony conviction their threat level was the highest and as such force multipliers were to focus on identifying high priority immigrants for deportation. The second policy priority outcome encompasses the two remaining levels of deportable immigrants, level two and three. Table 5 contains the second set of models focusing on evaluating the effect of linguistic representation on sComm's main two priority levels.

For traditional representative bureaucracy, the results indicate opposite relationships for Hispanic and Asian officers. This analysis reveals an important distinction not seen in Table 2.4 in the relationship between Asian officer representation and their negative influence on the disparity in identification enforcement. The effects of passive representation by Hispanic officers is further supported by the results reported in the two sub-models in Table 5. As Hispanic representation increases, there is a 2% percent decrease in the low priority matching per capita and about a 2% decrease in the per capita identification of high priority deportable immigrants. The opposite relationship is found for the effect of Asian representation in sheriff's departments. Increases in the share of Asian officers has a positive and statistically significant effect on increasing both priority level per capita matches with a larger effect on high priority immigrants than low priority immigrants by 4%. A one percent increase in Asian officers is related to an 7% increase in

the identification of low priority per capita deportable immigrants and an 11% increase in the identification of the high priority deportable immigrants per capita.

Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effects of linguistic incentive pay on immigration policy outputs. Similar to the relationships observed in Figure 4, in counties with foreign born populations at or lower than 10%, linguistic incentives reduce the per capita matches of both low and high priority deportable immigrants. For low priority immigrants, the marginal effect decreases identification from 88% at the lowest population share to about a 19% decrease at a peak of foreign born population share of 10% foreign. For high priority per capita deportable immigrant matches it is from 88% to about a decrease of 14% across the same share of foreign born population. It is important to note that the effect of linguistic representation is not statistically significant for high priority per capita matches at higher shares of foreign born individuals in a county, but there is a positive effect on low priority immigrants. As counties have an increasing foreign born population of more than 26% the marginal effects of bilingual pay incentives increase the per capita identification of low priority deportable immigrants by 25% all the way up to about 50%.

Implications and Discussion

This research makes two contributions. Its most important, is it extends the theory of representative bureaucracy to include linguistic representation. The second contribution is moving out into a new policy area, immigration policy, and focusing on the punitive policy outcomes for marginalized community with limited English proficiency and limited to no political rights. The results contribute not only to the literature on representative bureaucracy, but to the literature on bureaucratic incorporation. The results of this research

provide insights into how the effects of representation follow two paths dependent on the size of the target population.

Passive Representation

The hypothesis for traditional representative bureaucracy was partially supported revealing interesting results. Hispanic representation is related to decreasing Secure Communities policy outputs and redressing the disparity in immigration enforcement by local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, increases in Hispanic officers relates to decreasing identifications across both per capita priority levels. Increased Hispanic officer representation is associated with a slightly larger decrease in the identification of per capita matching of low priority immigrants than high priority immigrants. No support was found for the effect Asian officer representation on increasing the total policy outcomes of Secure Communities, but is related to decreasing the disparity ratio between the identification of low to high priority deportable immigrants. Upon further analysis, the effectiveness of Asian representation is actually increasing the identification of per capita matching within both priority levels. There is larger effect on high priority matching per capita by 11% and 7% increase in the identification of low priority per capita matches. Representation of the Hispanic community within local law enforcement agencies leads to a focus on policing rather than on immigration enforcement with the opposite being true of representation of the Asian community.

The results of this research indicate that Hispanic representation in local law enforcement decrease the strength of the agency to act as ICE's force multipliers across all immigration policy outcomes and redressed the disparate patterns of identification in enforcing Secure Communities for the most vulnerable immigrants. Asian representation

may not increase the overall strength of a local law enforcement agency to act as ICE's force multiplier, but they do increase the identification of both per capita priority level identifications with a 4% difference between the levels. Asian officers are related to increasing the policing of the immigrant community. The results of Hispanic representation provide support for the results found by Hong in UK police departments, but the results of Asian representation fall in line with the results found by Wilkins and Williams (2008, 2009) where increased representation by Asian officers leads to increased immigration enforcement for selected Secure Communities policy outcomes. In the era of immigration devolution, the results suggest that organizational socialization follows different patterns for different racial groups.

One possible explanation for the differing patterns of passive representation between the two racial/ethnic groups of officers and immigrants can be explained using social identity theory as it intersects with the social constructions of immigrant policy targets (Ingram & Schneider 1991; Schneider & Ingram 1993). Social identity theory posits that individuals being associated with a specific group can do one of three things, accept the association, work to get out of the group, or change the view of the group depending on how the groups position in the socio-political hierarchy (Tajel & Turner 1979). For Hispanics, their social identity is intertwined with the social construction of an immigrant. The narrative paints the picture of that Hispanics as criminal "illegal" immigrants and vice versa (Abrego et al. 2017; Ewing et. al 2015; Hartman et.al 2014; Chavez 2001, 2013; Newman 2013; Vasquez 2010; Daniel 2005; Huntington 2004). I view the results to suggest that in enforcing Secure Communities, Hispanic officers would continue to perpetuate this narrative in the minds of individuals with more deportations

being associated with Hispanics potentially causing similar racial affronts to their community like those described by Romero (2006) after the 1997 "Chandler Round-up" immigration raid. Instead, as the results indicate, Hispanic representation in a local law enforcement shows that Hispanic officers decrease the identification of removal immigrants especially those that pose no threat to the community. Using social identity theory, this occurs because Hispanic officers are trying to change the view that immigrants are criminals, especially, Hispanic immigrants as criminals.

Linguistic Representation

With immigrant patterns of settlement changing from traditional immigrant destinations to new destinations, so too are the linguistic landscapes. A linguistic landscape captures the strength of non-English languages' vitality as the share of the foreign born population changes. Linguistic landscapes with high immigrant populations will have higher vitality of non-English languages than in areas with lower immigrant populations. Vitality indicates the breadth and depth of the frequency of a language spoken in all areas of public and private life within a community. As linguistic landscapes begin to change, public organizations will need to have the proper linguistic representation in order to serve the non-English dominant clientele.

The theoretical arguments about linguistic representation extend the central argument of representative bureaucracy to include language as a form of active representation. Linguistic congruence occurs in situations where a bureaucrat converges their spoken language to meet the language spoken by their client. In the cases of language accommodation through language convergence, limited English dominant clients are likely to experience better policy outcomes and more efficient and effective service delivery than

in cases were there is language divergence during bureaucratic interactions. The argument theorized that the strength of effect of linguistic representation would depend on the linguistic landscape, but would produce positive service delivery effects for the limited English proficient community. The results found support for a relationship, but not, always, in the hypothesized direction. This research was unable to test the effect of the passive representation of bilingual officers, instead it focused on examining the role of institutional commitment to increasing language representation during service delivery by offering pay incentives for bilingual abilities. The results indicate in communities with small foreign born populations, commitment to linguistic accommodation decreased the total per capita identification of deportable immigrants from a county. While, communities with a foreign born population share above 10% experience a positive marginal effect increasing the total per capital identification of deportable immigrants. Linguistic representation results in local law enforcement agencies acting as a force multiplier in counties with higher foreign born populations than in counties with small or growing immigrant communities. No support was found for the hypothesis that institutional commitment to linguistic representation leads to readdressing disparities in immigration enforcement.

The second set of models further evaluated the theoretical arguments by focusing on each individual priority policy outcome. The findings suggest similar relationships between institutional commitment to linguistic representation and priority level per capita outcomes. There is one important difference the marginal effect of linguistic representation in higher shares of foreign born populations increases the identification of only low priority deportable immigrants, but has no effect on high priority identifications. The effect

of the relationship is similar to the first set of models where the marginal effect of linguistic representation has a negative effect by decreasing the per capita priority level matches across foreign born populations under 10%, and a positive effect in increasing the per capita priority level low priority immigrant matching when the foreign born population reaches about 26% and higher.

The implications of this research should not be viewed as indicating bilingualism be barred from institutions in counties with a large immigrant population. Despite finding that in these counties with a large immigrant population, incentivizing linguistic skills relates to increasing a majority of Secure Communities policy outcomes. Additionally, this research only looks the punitive context and does evaluate the effect of bilingualism on the service mission of local law enforcement agencies. It is possible that local law enforcement agencies in counties with smaller immigrant communities, seek to incentivize bilingual abilities as a way to create trust and legitimacy in communities with arriving immigrant communities. Having local law enforcement agents use translators or have them "muddling through" can prevent effective service delivery across any linguistic landscape. Linguistic representation can still facilitate client's reaching out to the bureaucracy for services as suggested by the finding in Gade & Williams (2012) and Thielemann & Stewart (1996). As communities continue to live in a heightened state of deportability, bilingual officers with their linguistic abilities will remain best equipped to communicate with the immigrant community during any bureaucratic interaction from policing to service.

America has become the "graveyard for languages" (Rumbaut 2009; Lieberson et.al 1975). As a nation more likely to be monolingual, the value of linguistic skills differs across communities. A possible explanation of the change in the direction of the

relationship is that in established traditional destination states, nativist views like those articulated by Huntington (2004) affect the socialization of local law enforcement officers. Rather than viewing bilingualism as an asset for connecting to the community, bilingualism is viewed as a "nuisance" representing un-American values that should not be accommodated in public organizations. The blue wall mosaic serves as an explanation for the linguistic representation amplifying a local law enforcement's force multiplier effect. According to ethnolinguistic theory (Giles & Johnson 1987), "little cognitive effort may be involved in maintaining one's own dialect or language within the private and "safe" confines of home and other cohesive in-group settings, but it is another mater as to whether this strategy will generalize to the immediacy of intergroup encounters (70)." As García-Bedolla (2003) notes that Latinos experience an identity paradox with language as it denotes their cultural identity and connects them to their immigrant community, but also serves as a social stigma when immigrants and bilingualism are not viewed upon favorably in the larger social context. Bilingual officers may have no problem speaking a different language at home and when encountering immigrants in a social setting, but when in uniform they are still police officers tasked with enforcing Secure Communities. When communicating with their "brothers in blue" and carrying out their policing directives, the language is English. In these cases, socialization trumps viewing bilingualism as cultural connection, but deploy their bilingualism to promote the mission of the organization where Secure Communities prioritizes the regulatory over the service.

Limitations & Future Directions

As a nation, as leaders, and as communities, the decision will have to be made as to whether bi/multilingualism is a burden to phase out in immigrant children or human capital

on which to build a stronger multi-cultural democracy (Ruiz 1984). Scholars (Padilla & et. al 1991; Baker et al 2001) have illustrates the range of benefits bilingual agents bring to organizations and clients such as increasing the appropriate medical services to limited English proficient clients or their children (Tsai et al. 2004; Quesada 1976; Malgady & Constantino 1998; Traylor et al. 2010; Brach & Fraserirector 2000; Malgady & Zayas 2001; Perez-Stable et al. 1997; Ferguson & Candib 2002; Fernandez et al. 2004; Fiscella et al. 2002; Flaskerud & Liu 1990; Yeh et al. 1994), extending markets into new communities (Callahan & Gándara 2014; Angouri 2013; Duchêne 2011; Thomas 2008), and exploring the academic benefits of bilingualism for children's educational and cognitive development (Callahan & Gándara 2004a,b; Mitchell 2012; Wong & Hughes 2006). With the exception of a handful of studies, understanding the role of the bilingual bureaucrat within public administration and policy has largely remains underdeveloped.

This research works to fill the gap on how bilingualism functions to induce active representation within public organizations. Rather than testing the direct link between bilingual bureaucrats and outcomes, this research tested the macro-level mechanism that helps induce the hiring of bilingual bureaucrats and changes the overall characteristics of the bureaucracy. The assumption is that this mechanism will lead to the advantages laid out in the theoretical arguments. As previously mentioned, ideally, the analysis would have provided a direct test of the level of bilingual representation and its influence on policy outcomes. Unfortunately, the data on the certified bilingual officers was only available in a subset of the 2007 LEMAS questionnaire 3 years before Secure Communities began. Future research would benefit from having adequate measures of bilingual bureaucrats to fully test theory of language representation. According to the research in Callahan &

Gándara (2014a,b), studies do not always measure bilingualism in organizations and individuals effectively often overlooking gender characteristics or proficiency levels. In not having data that properly details a gender breakdown of officers and civilian police department employees, the next step is to collect data on the levels of proficiency in the non-English language, which non-English language is spoken, and the gender of the bureaucrat.

Conclusion

While President Trump may have dismissed Jeb Bush's use of language accommodation to make a community feel included in the political process, this March, a local police department in Texas hired it first female deaf officer whose linguistic abilities allow her to provide police services or render aid in four different sign languages to the deaf community (Powell 2018). Creating incentives for linguistic skills in local public institutions aids in providing better service delivery to non-English dominant communities. In the case of immigration enforcement outcomes during the Secure Communities, active representation occurs by creating incentives for linguistic abilities to be used during service or protection provision. Language is a form of representation and should be seen as such throughout all institutions of government. Creating language laws may serve the purpose of streamlining "efficiency" by only producing official documents, conducting business, or hosting meetings in English, but will lead to ineffective and alienation of citizens and communities alike who are non-English proficient or dominant. It is in the best interest of democracy to encourage culturally responsive and representative institutions of government, not just demographically but linguistically too.

CHAPTER III

¿GOVERNMENT'S AMIGOS O REBELDES?:THE INFLUENCE OF PHILANTHROPIC FUNDING ON IMMIGRATION POLICY OUTCOMES

In 2017, the Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees (GCIR) spearheaded a collaborative effort with 200 U.S. foundations to issue a statement illustrating support for the millions of immigrants and refugees living in the United States. In their joint statement, the foundations recognized their commitment to "creating healthy communities, promoting diversity and inclusion, building a vibrant democracy, and advancing equity and equality for all people, regardless of gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, gender expression, immigration status, and national origin (GCIR 2017). " As overt discriminatory nationalism increases, the statement stood as a signal to public officials and the broader community that the American philanthropic sector was taking a political stance against the new administration's immigration policy and rhetoric.

Uniquely positioned in our American democracy, foundations hold private resources they leverage to promote their private values within the socio-political environment (Anheier & Daly 2006). The independence and mostly unregulated nature of foundations, primarily private and family, allow them to exert influence across the domain of public policy from reform to the delivery of good and services. Most research on foundations qualitatively examines the roles and strategies (Anheier & Hammack 2010; Hess 2005; Dowie 2002; Reckhow 2012) used to influence changes in policy reform in line with their values and mission, leaving, largely, unaddressed how funding influences current local policy outputs in communities receiving the foundations' monetary resources.

Furthermore, attention centers to traditionally important policy issues of education and health, leaving immigration policy underdeveloped.

The 2016 presidential election brought to the forefront extensive negative rhetoric targeting immigrants and their migration to the U.S. Although not a new phenomenon, the presidential rhetoric expressed in 2016 was radically different from the narrative and policy positions of the Obama administration. From 2008 through 2014, a time of heightening deportations, the philanthropic sector granted about 1.85 billion dollars for immigrants and immigration-related services. With the government failing to pass comprehensive immigration reform or provide funding for integration programs, what is the influence of immigration-related philanthropic funding on local punitive immigration policy outputs?

Adapting the theoretical framework of strategic giving (Frumkin 2008), this research argues that grant making related to immigrants or immigration services can help initiate social change and alter more than policy reform. Grant making by foundation helps fund changes in the deportability of immigrants within the community served by nonprofit grantees. These changes result in affecting local policy outputs. Through the funding of nonprofit organizations, foundations' influence is like a "Russian nesting-doll," occurring through inter-linked organizations (Brown 2013, 91). To understand the influence of the philanthropic sector's "nested dolls," this research takes a multi-method approach. This research contributes to the literature by quantitatively and systematically analyzing the influence of foundations' grant making patterns on current policy outputs using a newly constructed dataset on immigration-related grant making and county immigration policy implementation. Specifically, I test the link between philanthropic influence on punitive

immigration policy outcomes because of the difficulty in stopping deportations. The outcomes of a policy implemented across the U.S. and tied to everyday policing is hard to influence as grants for nonprofits are far removed from directly influencing the actions of the street-level bureaucrats. It was an intentionally rigorous test to see if total grant dollars leveraged influence in policy. Albeit an extremely small effect, I find support that philanthropic giving assists in reducing the identification of deportable immigrants within counties.

The next chapter will unpack foundations' indirect influence on local policy outputs through qualitative interviews with the nonprofit grantees. The following section reviews the current qualitative work on foundation's influence on policy. Following the literature review, I develop a theoretical framework on the role of strategic giving and its effects on punitive immigration outputs. Next, I examine the relationship between funding and policy outputs with a quantitative analysis testing the theoretical framework. I conclude the first part of this multi-method research with a discussion of the results and implications.

Literature Review

As separate institutions from their private and government counterparts, foundations and nonprofit organizations are vital to service delivery for underserved and marginalized individuals and communities (Steuerle and Hodgkinson 2006). As autonomous organizations free from constituencies and government, foundations and their "philanthropists have not typically engaged directly in politics without the cushion of intermediaries (Reckhow 2012, 13)." This independence allows foundations the freedom to extend funding to nonprofits for issue advocacy or public service provision in intentional

and individualistic ways aligning with their missions and values (Frumkin 2008; Anheier and Hammack 2010; Nielsen 2001). In this manner, philanthropic giving by foundations helps create cultural legitimacy (Hwang and Powell 2009), raises the prominence of issues and service providers, and the encourages by the broader public to support their desired actions and positions (Hammack and Anheier 2010).

Research on the U.S. philanthropic foundations' role in reform focuses on a handful of major foundations historical to contemporary influence in evolving issues and initiating change within the policy areas of education, healthcare, and social welfare policy (Anheier and Hammack 2010). The majority of this research is conducted through a qualitative lens to evaluate their strategies in depth and follow their influence leading to policy reform or the initiation of private-public partnerships. Stemming from this line of research, scholars have attempted to classify foundation's roles into strategic patterns and actions by examining foundations influence as intermediary organizations (Scott and Jabbar 2014), institutional entrepreneurs (Quinn, Tompkins-Stange, and Meyerson 2013) and responsive actors (Mosley and Galaskiewicz 2015). As a mechanism of accomplishing their mission, foundations act as innovators or institutional entrepreneurs that promote innovation and fund research for market interventions, think tanks, policymakers, and the broader public (Clemens and Lee 2010; Scott and Jabbar 2014).

A handful of studies have approached the study of foundations, qualitatively. The studies by Mosley and Galaskiewicz (2010, 2015) do not look at how funding influences policy outputs. Instead, they seek to understand how responsive foundations are to changes in their policy environment. Prior work placed foundations as catalysts for change but did not discuss how foundations responded to shifts within their policy environment. Mosley

& Galaskiewicz examine the role of 1,000 largest philanthropic foundations by analyzing their patterns of giving from 1993 to 2001. Using data from the Foundation Center, they tested their theoretical arguments about foundations charitable and social innovation role by analyzing the relationship between state-level welfare funding and population need. The results indicated an inverse relationship between foundation funding for welfare related activities and welfare policy salience. Their results illustrated foundations' funding responsiveness is dependent upon local conditions rather than national agenda focus. Foundations were more generous within states that were experimenting with their welfare policy and spending more on waivers and non-cash assistance programs. Their patterns of giving reflected a social innovation role, but only when looking at in-state grant making. For grant making out of state, large foundations played a smaller scaled charitable role in helping alleviate high non-marital birth rates. Although foundations are considered to help serve a population at risk, the results of the studies by Mosley and Galaskiewicz indicate that local foundations efforts are not always driven by alleviating social needs.

Reckhow (2012) provides the first systematic analysis of the top 15 grant making foundations by analyzing the factors that influenced their grant making patterns. Additionally, by using social network analysis and qualitative interviews, she explains the policy consequences their funding had on two of the largest school districts in the United States. Her multi-method approach provides a quantitative analysis that points to foundations grant making patterns motivated by centralized power structures and organizational capacity of the nonprofit sector rather than by a charitable orientation. She finds that school districts with a centralized locus of power such as superintendents or mayoral control received higher amounts of funding. With the centralization of power,

foundations can identify points of entry by which to use their grant dollars and grantees to influence education reform. Whereas school districts with an active school board democratized power and made policy reform more difficult to achieve. Centralization of power not only shaped the political reform process, but had implications for the ability of foundations to help introduce or raise the prominence of new actors engaged in advocacy. As a means of achieving their end goal of education reform, foundations leveraged their monetary resources in school districts with a highly developed and professionalized nonprofit sector. The third sector's characteristics illustrate their ability to create a system of advocacy that would maximize the funding from foundations to lobby for education reform. In studying the New York and Los Angeles school districts, she explains that although foundations may have achieved reforming the education system, reform is not permanent. The permanence of foundations' influence is shaped by the actors that helped reform the system. Using policy feedback, she explains that in school districts where funding was granted to centralized power structures, reform occurred at a faster pace. However, the policy victory experienced did not always recieve positive policy feedback leading to the possibility of undoing "policy reform victories." In contrast, funding in the LA School District was allocated among education organizations who worked on advocacy campaigns and on policy recommendations. By funding advocacy organizations and nonprofits over the school district, policy changes, while slower, had time to build support and legitimacy to provide long-term, gradual, "policy victory." Reckhow's research is one of the first scholars to address the influences on grant making patterns and their consequences on lasting policy reform, quantitatively. However, lacking from her research

is how the funding that flowed into school districts influenced the current education outcomes of students.

The influence of philanthropic foundations in public policy revolves around two central narratives describing a strategic role where grant making is driven by a charitable desire to alleviate social needs or as social innovators seeking to find solutions to social problems. In both narratives, government, for a multitude of reasons, has not been able to provide the adequate solution or address the needs of the community (Hammack & Anheier 2010; Fleishman 2007; Sandfort 2008). By concentrating on the end goal of policy reform, researchers unintentionally overlook the influence that their grant making which supports the "framing of issues, developing public will, supporting advocacy organizations, and funding policy implementation and evaluation (Ferris 2003, 5)" exert on current policy outcomes. This research seeks to bridge the gap by building upon the qualitative research by systemically examining the effect of foundation giving on local policy implementation and outputs.

Theoretical Development

"Philanthropy translates the private expressive desires of donors into public action aimed at meeting needs…enabling communities to solve problems and allowing individuals to express and enact their values (Frumkin 2008, 21)". Foundations, their donors, and their grant officers may view themselves as policy entrepreneurs or policy change agents. In one of the most recent examples, the Chan Zuckerburg Initiative was funded with the intention to alleviate the U.S. education system's inability to provide the proper educational strategies for students. To address this issues, the Chan Zuckerburg Initiative will invest their funds aiming to develop strategies and viable approaches to "whole-child

personalized learning" (Herold 2018). Another example is the recent realignment in the mission and funding priorities of the Ford Foundation's, the nation's second largest foundation. In refocusing on alleviating the causes of structural inequality and doubling its total giving, the foundation seeks to create change by building a "social-justice infrastructure" within the nonprofits and leaders they fund (Daniels 2015).

Alongside vocalizing support, one of their strongest methods of influencing policy outcomes and reform comes from the granting of monetary resources. Grant making allows foundations the ability to indirectly affect policy at a local level by providing funding to intermediary, nonprofit, organizations engaging in direct service delivery to constituents and advocating across all levels of government and society to achieve the goals that align with the foundation mission.

Theoretical Modification

As a way of creating lasting social systemic change, foundations have turned more to "results-oriented giving" (Frumkin 2008; Ferris & Williams 2010; Reckhow 2012). Frumkin (2006) extends the basic theoretical assumption of philanthropic policy influence by viewing grant making as a strategic tool used instrumentally to achieve the greatest impact. Expressive giving is at the core of all philanthropy as it symbolizes "uncomplicated benevolence that takes the simple form of a gift (Frumkin 2008; 157)." Without knowing the intention of every foundation, I construct my arguments with the assumptions that foundations grant funding to accomplish change or alleviate a social problem. Going beyond satisfying the personal, charitable goodwill of donors, instrumental giving views grant making as a mechanism to fund the implementation of solutions to address problems in the community or society (Frumkin 2008; Sandfort 2008; Fleishman

2007). With this assumption, I argue that foundations providing grants related to immigrants or immigration policy are seeking to help immigrants' integration process or advocate for immigration reform. By providing funding to either cause, foundations will indirectly affect local policy outputs associated with the current implementation of immigration policy enforcement.

The United States has two bureaucracies whose mission focuses on the U.S. immigrant community. The United States Citizen and Immigration Services focuses on admittance and formal processing of visas, permanent residency, or naturalization services. While its sister bureaucracy, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, focuses on the removal of foreign-born individuals who meet the criteria for deportation such as immigrants with a criminal history, visa overstayers, and individuals with undocumented entry into the country. Except for minor grants awarded to nonprofits for citizenship information, neither bureaucracy focuses directly on immigrant integration (De Graauw & Bloemraad 2017) thereby affecting their level of deportability.

The theory of leverage focuses on the tools that foundations use to fund the process of addressing social issues. Focusing on grant making as the tool of leverage, foundations who provide a more substantial the amount of money nonprofits provide a significant larger amount of for nonprofit organizations to engage in alleviating social issues. Instrumental giving is grant making based on the decision of funding nonprofits or programs believed to provide funding for the most adequate solutions to addressing their choice of social issue. Focusing on immigration, instrumental giving to nonprofit organizations can be given to fund three major nonprofit programs and services: citizenship services, integration programs, and government advocacy. Each instrumental

grant category funds different solutions for addressing problems faced by the immigrant community or advocating for immigration reform. The first two grant categories address micro and meso level changes in the immigrant community and the third focuses on macro-level changes. Each instrumental giving pattern will be related to influencing the immigrant community's level of deportability and chances for identification as deportable.

Foundation funding for citizenship services to the immigrant community focus on helping change the political status of immigrants. In these cases, funding to nonprofits will help address the individual's level of deportability. For example, an individual who is a permanent resident looking to apply for naturalization may not find the adequate help at USCIS. So, they turn to their local nonprofit offering citizenship courses and help with the application process. Another example would be that of an undocumented immigrant looking to gain formal status within the U.S. Similar to the previous permanent resident example, this individual can turn to their local nonprofit providing citizenship and or legal services for residency applications. In both cases, grant funding for immigrant/immigration citizenship services changes the deportability level of immigrants by adjusting their formal political status. Changes from resident to naturalized citizen provide the most significant level of change in an individual's deportability compared to status adjustments from undocumented to documented. Thus, status adjustments culminate in decreasing the size of the deportable target population. By decreasing the deportable target population, increasing grants targeted for citizenship services will be related to a decrease in the identification of deportable immigrants.

H1a: As grants targeted for citizenship services increases, there will be a decrease in the size of the deportable immigrant community. Thus, foundation funding will be related to decreasing the identification of deportable immigrants.

With no formal bureaucratic organization focused on helping immigrants integrate into life within the U.S., nonprofits have stepped in to fill the void with financial help from foundations. Foundations have legitimized this underserved and marginalized community with limited to no sociopolitical citizenship through their grant making for immigrant services and immigrant-serving nonprofits. In this way, the philanthropic sector provides non-naturalized immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, with what Bosniak (2008) terms the "citizenship of noncitizens," by including immigrants in their service provision extending them the opportunity to access basic life necessitates without regard to formal political status. With an unmet need for services and policy reform, foundations' grant making supports nonprofits in creating environments and relationships where the immigrant community is unafraid to seek out services and engage compared to an environment where immigrants fear of deportations isolates them from reaching out to local government for aid (Cordero-Guzman 2005; Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010). De Graauw (2016) details how nonprofits within San Francisco not only advocated for changes in local policies but worked alongside local government to help with the incorporation of immigrants into their local communities. With nonprofits unable to expend more than 20% on political efforts, nonprofits have used their administrative capacity to create advocacy alliances for collaboration efforts across sectors and targeted issue framing to change the perception of immigrants needing services (De Graauw 2016). Although this illustrates a particular case in San Francisco, the strategies explored resonate

to the broader community of immigrant-serving nonprofits across the U.S. looking to close the gap between immigrants and local governments that might expose them federal scrutiny by providing a range of services from language training to health care access (Andersen 2010; Blooemrad 2006; Cordero-Guzman et al. 2008; de Graauw 2004;2016; de Leon et al. 2009; Gleeson 2012; Jones-Correa 2008a,b; Modares and Kitson 2008). Integration services and programs are often facilitated through collaborating organizations seeking to not only integrate immigrants, but address the larger community's perspective of immigrants as non-members of the community. The multi-method approach from service to advocacy focuses on providing holistic changes to an immigrant's deportability from the micro all the way up to the macro-level. In this way, increasing the funding for integration will be related to decreasing the identification of deportable immigrants.

H1b: Increasing grants associated with integration services will be related to decreases in the identification of deportable immigrants.

The last instrumental pattern of giving captures funding for solutions related to government advocacy such as policy advocacy at all levels of government to policy education campaigns in the community or with political actors. Funding for government-related activities is different from grants made to integration and citizenship because funding in those areas is explicitly given to support programs and services for the immigrant community. In both cases, the outcome is to Americanize them which will have an adverse effect on their level of deportability. It is unlikely that a foundation with an anti-immigrant stance would give funds to nonprofits providing integration or citizenship programs to immigrants. While grant making to support nonprofit lobbying of government can lead to stricter or tightening of immigration policy or enforcement. Brown (2013)

points out that despite the surge in pro-immigration funding by foundations, the growth of the Tea Party in 2008, spurred grant making by conservative foundations to promote anti-immigrant rhetoric pushing for policies aimed at making immigrants' ability to reside in the U.S. difficult to the increased border enforcement. The policy change cycle is not immediate and the window for change even smaller, increasing grants related to macro-level changes will be related to influences in policy implementation. However, as this instrumental category is a catch-all for immigration policy advocacy, no direction is stated as grants can be given both maintain the status quo of current laws or to induce reform.

H1c: Increasing grants related to government will affect the identification of deportable immigrants.

If as one of their end goals, foundations seek to build thriving communities (Frumkin 2008), then funding will also be related to the types of immigrants identified for deportation. Immigrants with criminal backgrounds involving felony crimes pose a threat to community safety and well-being. While identifying immigrants who are part of the community and pose no threat may lead to community instability as identification creates fear of interacting with state actors and subsequently the possible deportation of immigrants (Shoichet 2018; Nichols et al. 2018; Warren & Kerwin 2017; Leyro 2013; Hagan et al. 2011; Abrona et al. 2010; Mendoza & Olivos 2009; Watson 2014). So, foundation funding relating to integration and providing legal services for immigrants that pose no threat to the community would lead to reducing their deportability at a higher level compared to high priority deportable immigrants. Immigrants with felony convictions might have a more difficult time being able to qualify for naturalization or they may not even seek out aid from the nonprofit community. As such, funding for integration or

citizenship would be unlikely to influence the identification of high priority per capita immigrants. Therefore, foundation funding would help reduce the disparity in over-identification of low to high priority immigrants as grants related to social or political citizenship increase. As previously mentioned, it is unlikely that conservative or anti-immigrant foundations would provide funding for integration programs and citizenship services, but they would fund nonprofits that advocate for anti-immigrant legislation or strict immigration policy. So, funding for government advocacy would be related to increasing the identification of high priority immigrants over low priority per capita immigrants. Additionally, increasing the funding related to government advocacy will increase the level of identification high priority deportable immigrants unlike the negative effect of funding for integration and citizenship services on the per capita identification of low priority immigrants.

H2: Increasing grant funding targeted for citizenship or integration services, is related to reducing the enforcement disparity between low and high priority deportable immigrant identifications. Funding for government advocacy is unrelated to affecting the enforcement disparity.

H3: While government advocacy grant funding will be related to increasing high priority immigrant identifications, increasing grant funding targeted for citizenship or integration services will negatively affect the identification of low priority immigrants and be unrelated to the identification of high priority immigrants.

Data & Research Methods

To test the theoretical arguments about on relationship between philanthropic funding and immigration policy outcomes, a newly compiled dataset spanning the tenure of Secure

Communities under the Obama administration was joined with grant making data collected by the Foundation Center. The dataset contains information for the 48 continental states and the District of Columbia.

The data collected for this analysis comes from three main sources. The dependent variable, the measure for policy outcomes, is obtained from semi-annual interoperability reports released by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations. Grant information was purchased from the Foundation Center for the years of 2008 to 2014. The final sources of data for the control variables comes from U.S. Census' datasets: American Community Survey's (ACS) five-year estimates and the yearly U.S. Census of State and Local Government. This research employs a seemingly unrelated regression analysis (SUR) with clustered standard errors[27] by county to analyze the effects of philanthropic funding on immigration policy outcomes. As the policy outputs are mutually exclusive, unlike a traditional Ordinary Least Squares Regression, SUR is able to control for the interdependent nature that can lead to the possibility of correlation among the error terms (Zellner 1962; Moon & Perron 2006).

The first set of models will evaluate the influence of giving on the overall immigration policy outcomes and its influence on redressing disparities in enforcement. The second focuses on philanthropic influence on individual priority level outcomes. Each

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[27] Models with state fixed effects and year fixed effects are not reported, but were run. The relationships between philanthropic funding and policy outcomes remain unchanged when state fixed effects or year fixed effects are included. Year fixed effects are not included because of multi-collinearity experienced between the year 2014 and a variable measuring prosecutorial discretion.

model analyzes each instrumental giving strategy as a mechanism affecting immigration outputs. It should be noted that not every county received grant funding for immigration.

Policy Outputs: Immigration

The first immigration measure focuses on measuring the strength of local agency to act as a force multiplier for the federal government. The goal of Secure Communities was to locate deportable immigrants from the interior of the U.S. To capture the strength of the force multiplier in identifying deportable immigrants, the total number of matched deportable immigrants is divided by the total noncitizen[28] population. This measure captures how many immigrants per capita are being identified as deportable by the local sheriff's department. The larger this measure, the more strongly a county acts a force multiplier. On average, a county had a noncitizen per capita identification of 0.07 with a 0.40 standard deviation. Table 6contains the summary statistics of each policy output.

Despite having deportation priorities, Secure Communities disproportionately identified higher rates of immigrants with only misdemeanor convictions or a civil violation of unlawful presence on their records rather than identifying and deporting individuals with felony criminal records. To measure the influence of philanthropy on creating equity in policy outcomes, I operationalized an enforcement disparity measure as the ratio of low to high priority deportable immigrants identified. In the sample data, the average disparity in enforcement is about 2 low priority immigrants to every one high priority immigrant with a standard deviation of about 3 low priority immigrants.

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[28] Noncitizen population contains the counts of all persons foreign born that are not naturalized citizens.

The last two measures capture the influence of philanthropic funding on the individual immigration priority policy outcomes. As the mission of foundations is to create healthy and thriving communities, grant funding will influence the priority policy outcomes of Secure Communities differently. The two measures are operationalized by taking the total number of immigrants identified in each priority level over the total number of non-citizens in a county. The average county had a high priority per capita measure of 0.04 with 0.18 standard deviation. On average, the low priority per capita identification was slightly more than double the high priority per capita at 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.37.

Philanthropic Funding

Grant making data comes from the Foundation Center[29]. The data was purchased with the parameters to receive all grants that were made with the words "immigrants", "immigrants and migrants", "undocumented immigrants", and "immigration" within the nonprofit population or grant activity fields. The Foundation Center provided about 27,000 grants related to immigration. For this sample, from 2008 to 2014, U.S. foundations made close to 26,000 grants domestically related to immigrants or immigration-related services.

As foundations leverage their private resources to help fund nonprofits promoting their private values, immigration-related giving was not a top funding priority of the philanthropic community. During the era of Secure Communities (2008 through 2014),

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[29] Reckhow (2012) notes that she collected 990 forms rather than use the Foundation Center data based on Greene's (2005) observation that the Foundation Center data is biased. The bias occurs as the Foundation Center categorizes grants based off of reports and self-classifications from their reporting foundations. The idea is used here because it is optimal and indicative of instrumental giving for immigration especially if the foundation has coded the grant themselves.

there was an average of 81,000 grant-making foundations in the United States which gifted a little over 378 billion dollars across nonprofits for a range of policy issues. From this $378 billion[30], only 1.85 billion in philanthropic grants were designated for immigration-related services within the forty-eight continental United States and the District of Columbia. Figure 6 shows the yearly aggregated funding related to immigration from 2008 through 2009. With the economic downturn in 2008, the first four years of funding steadily show giving between $232 million to $246 million. In about 2012, giving related to immigration begins to pick up with the highest amount awarded in 2014 at $335 million. Each of the years after 2011 increased an average of $30 million for total giving related to immigration. Foundations awarded the nonprofit community with $84 per non-citizen over a seven-year period. Yearly, nonprofits operated with an average of 11 philanthropic dollars for every non-citizen in their community, an amount that is unlikely able to provide long-term integration services and much less for legal services to attain political citizenship. Figure 7 shows the total aggregate funding received by U.S. counties from 2008 to 2014. The average county received about $84,000 dollars in total for immigration-related giving with a standard deviation of about $1.3 million. The figure illustrates a pattern of unequal funding distribution where many communities with immigrants received even less per immigrant if any funding at all. To operationalize grant making for each year, all individual grants are coded into one of the three instrumental categories, based on their overriding grant activity. Then, the individual grant amounts are adjusted into 2016 constant dollars and aggregated up to the county level by category. Table 3.2 contains the

[30] All dollar amounts have been adjusted for inflation and represent 2016 constant dollars.

summary statistics on each instrumental funding category. Each county receives a value for all three instrumental categories, but if the county received no philanthropic funding that value is zero.

Using the information provided by the Foundation Center, I coded each individual grant into respectively into one of the three instrumental categories that best matched their overriding grant activity. Each grant received up to five activity codes illustrating the various programs or services the grant will help fund, but operationalization was based on the separate variable provided by the foundation center that identified the overriding grant activity providing the top description for the basis of the grant[31]. Based off the theoretical arguments, I created the following instrumental grant funding categories based off the *overriding grant activity*:

1. ***Immigration Services (Citizenship Services)****: Immigrant Rights, Immigrant Services, Immigration & naturalization, Immigration Law*
2. ***Integration Services (Social Citizenship):*** *Education, Health, Human Services, Community Development, etc.*
3. ***Government Advocacy:*** *Freedoms, Rights, Community Policing, National Security, Police Agencies, Customs & Border Control, etc.*

Based on yearly giving patterns, foundations averaged larger grant funding allocations for instrumental funding focused on providing integration services for the immigrant community over citizenship services or government advocacy. The average county received about $39,000 for integration services with a standard deviation of under

[31] For a full description of all grant activities, see Appendix B.

$500,000 compared to average $24,000 with a standard deviation of less than $480,000 for citizenship services. Government advocacy had the lowest average funding of about $20,000 with a standard deviation of about $411,000. Figure 8 illustrates philanthropic foundations' yearly instrumental patterns of giving. Each of the instrumental categories fluctuates in their total share of funding, but integration services continually remained the largest share awarded. Beginning in 2010, the share of funding for integration begins to decreases with both political citizenship and advocacy equally expanding their total share of funding.

Controls

This research views immigration policy outputs as bureaucratic organizational performance. The following empirical analysis will use a basic model that controls for bureaucratic implementation and enforcement of immigration policy by including controls for organizational capacity and policy environment (Brewer and Seldon 2000; Boyne & Meier 2009). Table 8 contains the summary statistics for the control variables included in all the models.

To control for the capacity of local law enforcement agencies in identifying deportable immigrants, I include a measure of the size of the total police protection that includes the total employment of officers within county and city law enforcement officers. The local law enforcement presence, unfortunately, is not reported at each county level. Rather, the Annual State and Local Government Employment Survey reports aggregates up to the state level all local law enforcement agencies budgets and personnel. The second measure is the aggregated total operating budget of local law enforcement agencies. Jaeger (2016) and Farris & Holman (2017) have identified that local sheriff's budgets are related

to their willingness to comply with ICE. Both measures are used to help control for bureaucratic capacity to enforce immigration policy and are logged to normalize distribution.

Policy outcomes depend on the inputs into the organization and policy environment in which bureaucrats operate. To control for the most basic level of inputs into both local and federal enforcement bureaucracies, I control for the total submissions of fingerprints within a county as it illustrates the total number of recorded attempts to reduce crime or identify immigrants. Because of the wide variation and the over dispersion of structural zeros, the final operationalization of submissions is logged.

In order to control for the influence of the policy environment, a set of controls capturing the social, political, and economic climate influencing immigration enforcement are in each model. The first set of controls accounts for the policy targets and non-policy targets of the community. According to past research (Cox and Miles 2013; Wong 2012), the activation and enforcement of sComm occurred in counties with high levels of specific populations, Hispanics and noncitizen. In addition to Hispanics being the face of immigration, historical immigration narratives focused on the Asian population within the United States (Daniel 2005). As the two foremost policy target populations, as these populations increase in a county, they will cause an increase in the disparity of enforcement between low priority to high priority matches within a county. In addition to Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian populations, included in the model is the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic African Americans. The final social measure captures the level of education with a county. As the percentage of individuals with less

than a high school education increases it is expected that so will the pressure for immigration enforcement.

Historically and contemporarily, immigration policy remains polarized with both sides of the aisle arguing for different enforcement and reform typically fueled by rhetoric concerning economic distressed caused by immigration. Anti-immigration rhetoric spikes during times of crisis with the Republican party calling for stricter immigration policies (Chand & Schreckhise; Daniels 2005; Tichenor 2002; Welch 2002). Due to the differences among political parties, controls for the restrictive political economy of immigration enforcement (Calavita 2010,1996; Ngai 2004; Tichenor 2002) are expected to increase policy outcomes. Partisanship is operationalized as the percentage of votes[32] in the 2008 and 2012 election for the Republican candidate (i.e., McCain in 2008 and Romney 2012). The years from 2008 to 2010 contain the 2008 percentage and the years from 2011 through 2014 have the 2012 voting percentage.

To account for economic conditions that might influence a push for stricter immigration enforcement, six variables are included that cover financial stability, non-homeownership, employment conditions, and use of public benefits. Financial stability of a county is captured by using the logged median income in 2016 constant dollars. The percentage of non-homeowners is included as a measure of economic vitality in community. As unemployment rates increase, the narrative of the immigrants taking American jobs is used to bolster support for stricter immigration enforcement, as such the

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[32] Voting percentages at the county level were collected from the Data.gov website that is managed by the U.S. General Administration, Technology Transformation Service. The website is follows the Project Open Data schema that requires all datasets to report: title, description, tags, last update, publisher and contact name.

rate of unemployment is included. The final set of economic variables focus on controlling for the narrative of immigrants as public charges (Moloney 2012). The percentage of the population that is on public assistance is included expecting that take up rates of public assistance increases so will the immigration enforcement in a community.

Results

Scholars have long focused on illustrating the role of foundations in influencing policy reform. A role that often takes years of resources and advocacy to see the desired policy change accomplished at any level of government. However, not all philanthropic funding targets changing current policy. Philanthropic foundations allocate their grants with a broad mission of helping create healthy thriving communities by helping address social problems. This line of research leads to the theoretical argument that philanthropic dollars' influence policy outcomes. Based on the analysis of the three different patterns of instrumental funding, the results provide support for the hypotheses that philanthropic funding is related to policy outputs. Additionally, support for the theory that variation in instrumental funding influences policy outcomes differently based on how the policy outcomes relate to their mission is also supported.

Philanthropic Funding & Secure Communities

Table 9 displays the results of the analysis of each respective instrumental funding category on total per capita enforcement and the enforcement disparity ratio. Grant activities of every grant in the dataset were coded into three categories that address different aspects of an immigrant's life affecting their deportability and identification for deportation. The first category focuses on influencing the political status of immigrants. This category captures all grants awarded to help change the individual political status of

immigrants. Support for the influence of instrumental giving is found for total enforcement and redressing issues in immigration enforcement. A one percent increase in funding for political citizenship negatively influences immigration enforcement per capita by 0.02% and decreases the disparity in identifying more low priority deportable immigrants to high priority deportable immigrants by 0.007%, all else being equal.

The second category of instrumental giving based on grant activity captures integration of immigrants into their larger community. This category provides social citizenship by creating programs and services that help ensure immigrants have access to meeting their most basic life necessities. Not only does integration encompass addressing the basic needs of immigrants to participate fully in all spheres of public and private life, but it also seeks to alter the policy environment to ensure community is receptive to an established or arriving immigrants. Funding these activities changes the policy environment, where more receptive immigrant environments are less likely to pressure local law enforcement agencies to enforcement immigration. If federal immigration policy is enforced, local law enforcement agencies will prioritize immigrants posing a threat to the community over not community members that are non-threatening low priority immigrants. Funding related to integration services has a statistically significant and negative relationship with the per capita total enforcement and leads to a reduction in the enforcement disparity. A one percent increase in integration services decreases the total enforcement per capita in a county by 0.04% and decreases the identification of low priority to high priority deportable immigrants by 0.01%.

The final category captures funding related to government advocacy. This category embodies the spirit of engaging in macro-level policy process from community education

issue campaigns to political advocacy by nonprofits. In aggregating grant making up to the county level, the political orientations of foundations and nonprofits are muddled. It is hard to detail the exact direction of the effect funding should exhibit on policy outputs. For example, a conservation foundation granting to a conservation, anti-immigration nonprofit will be advocating for anti-immigrant legislation or stricter immigration reform opposite of the strategy of progressive, pro-immigrant foundations and nonprofits. However, conservative foundations are unlikely to award funding for the immigrant community to access services or programs that help them attain formal political citizenship or integrate into the community. As such, funding to government can influence immigration policy outcomes in either direction. The results indicate that instrumental giving related to government activities has a statistically significant and positive influence on total per capita identification of deportable immigrants, but is negatively associated enforcement disparity ratio, helps redress the disparity in immigration enforcement. A one percent increase in funding for government activities, increases the total per capita enforcement within a county by 0.05%. This is the largest influence of funding across all three categories of instrumental giving by grant activity. While very small, a one percent increase in government funding is related to closing the disparity between the identification of low priority immigrants to high priority immigrants by 0.01%, all else being equal.

The previous analysis illustrated that funding related to creating political and social citizenship negatively influence the total per capita enforcement and helps create equity in identification patterns. Probing the relationship between instrumental funding and sub-policy outcomes, Table 10 contains the results of instrumental funding's influence on

priority level identification outcomes. Instrumental giving for social and political citizenship services has a negative effect on each priority level output with a slightly larger influence on the per capita identification of low priority immigrants compared to the effect on per capita identification of high priority deportable immigrants. Increasing funding related to political citizenship by one percent decreases the identification of low priority per capita immigrants by 0.02% and high priority per capita immigrants by 0.01%. Social citizenship funding has a stronger effect on the outcomes than does political citizenship funding by 0.01% for each priority level outcomes. All else constant, a one percent increase in the philanthropic funds for social citizenship decreases the per capita identification of low priority deportable immigrants by 0.03% and high priority immigrants by 0.02%. It is surprising that funding for government, regardless of the threat level posed by immigrants, increases the identification of both priority level per capita outcomes by 0.05%.

Implications and Discussion

Identifying which issues to prioritize, to what extent, and where to devote time and resources will constantly remain vital questions in the minds of foundations. Some foundations may have narrow and direct missions, others have broad and overarching missions allowing them the freedom to address a variety of social issues and policy problems as they see fit.

During the era of Secure Communities, there was an average of 81,000 grant making foundations in the United States. The philanthropic sector targeted less than 0.50% of their total giving for the immigrant community. At the same time, local law enforcement agencies matched more than 2 million non-citizens, legal permanent residents, visa

holders, or undocumented immigrants, with deportable offenses and provided their information to Immigration and Customs Enforcement Secure Communities Program (IDENT 2014). The theoretical argument developed focuses on funding affecting policy outputs through the total grant dollars leveraged to the nonprofit sector across the United States. In the next chapter, I argue the nonprofit community uses the funding as a means to provide the immigrant community with programs and services for their integration and attainment of formal citizenship. Although the results indicate an association between philanthropic funding and policy immigration outputs, they are at best a prediction of what can happen in the long term, but I would not expect philanthropic funding to have immediate influence on the deportation regime within the U.S.

In comparing the magnitude of the three categories, theoretically it was expected that funding for immigration services would have the highest influence on outcomes, because it focuses on changing the policy target's political status of deportable to non-deportable citizen. The greater the amount of grant funding for political citizenship allows nonprofits the means to increase their legal services for the immigrant community. This instrumental funding creates opportunities and helps fund deportability changes on the micro-level among the immigrant community. However, the influence of this instrumental funding category on policy outcomes relates to the smallest influence across all of the funding categories. The micro-level changes to deportability do not occur rapidly or on a large scale. Rather the individual change supported by grant funding, causes small individual incremental changes in the size of of the policy target population. As nonprofits serve as intermediaries for immigrant incorporation into the larger society by providing social citizenship leading to integration beyond political citizenship through segmented

assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997a,b; Nee & Alba 2012), integration funding targets change across more than one structure in the policy environment leading to the largest impact. The results suggest funding for integration services relates to the largest negative impact on local immigration enforcement and assists in reduces the disparity in enforcement. A 25% increase in integration funding relates to a 1% decrease in total per capita enforcement and a 0.25% decrease in the enforcement disparity ratio.

Not only did giving for social citizenship have the largest impact across enforcement outcomes, these funding patterns and funding for political citizenship also created protection for high priority immigrants. I find increasing a county's funding for integration services relates to a 0.75% decrease in low priority identifications and a 0.50% decrease in identification of deportable high priority per capita immigrants. The rhetoric around immigration has typically centered on perpetuating the narrative of "criminal and highly threatening" immigrant. Secure Communities continued to perpetuate this narrative of "criminal" immigrants undeserving of immigration reform by framing deportations on the basis of "criminal" acts. In examining the priority categories closely, not all high priority immigrants identified or deported committed felony aggregated assaults. State sentences that incarcerate immigrants for more than 364 days are considered felony convictions if the individual is a non-citizen (Keenan 2007). These individuals who serve at least 365 days in jail for a misdemeanor at the state level are considered by ICE and the federal government as a high priority "criminal" offender. With foundations seeking to improve communities and focus on addressing social problems, high rates of deportation, especially of embedded and non-criminal immigrants, would lead to destabilization of communities.

Foundations are inherently political, and do not always grant with the intention of advocating for pro-immigration reform (Brown 2013). It is unlikely conservative, anti-immigrant foundations would provide grants instrumentally for programs or services to help aid immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants. It is more likely that these foundations would provide instrumental grant making to lobby government to ensure no pro-immigration reform occurs or for tougher anti-immigration policy reform. The results indicate instrumental funding for government advocacy is associated with the largest increase in total per capita enforcement. A 25% increase in grant funding for government advocacy leads to a 1.25% increase in the total per capita identification of deportable immigrants within a county, and the same increase in both priority per capita identification outcomes. Despite philanthropic foundation's dedicating funding to immigration related advocacy, no national reform has occurred leaving in place IRIRA's the criteria for exclusion which increased the deportability of the immigrant community by expanding the types of crimes eligible for deportation. Additionally, the clause allowing retroactive application of IRIRIA allowed for an even larger number of immigrants to be eligible for deportation. So long as advocacy fails to aid in passing pro-immigration reform, the population of policy targets eligible for deportation continues to grow increasing immigration outputs. At the state level, advocacy may help pass pro-immigrant legislation, but state-level legislation does not offer protection from identification or deportation.

Foundations might have deep pockets, but the funding in them is finite especially for an issue that is not a top priority only gaining salience during elections or wide-spread immigration protests (Brown 2013). The bureaucracies tasked with identifying and removing immigrants at the borders and across the interior of the United States will dwarf

any amount of philanthropic funds awarded to nonprofits for immigrants' political or social citizenship.

Limitations & Future Research

This research aimed at providing not just an empirical test of the influence of philanthropic funding on policy, but at developing a theory of foundation influence on the public policy process. The limitation of this research exists in overgeneralizing the motivation of strategic and instrumental giving to all foundations' grant making. Not all foundations are motivated to give in the same manner. With different types of internal structure and funding, foundations motivations, strategies, and reasoning for giving will vary. At the end of the day, it is hard to theorize the intention of the foundation to give and what they hope their resources will produce. More work needs to focus on studying foundations' black box of grant making to work towards creating a theory that speaks to similarities across philanthropic foundations.

It also made major assumptions about the the intermediaries influence on the outcomes. This work served as a first foundational systematic analysis of total grant dollars leveraged, the next should systematically examine these relationships using a mediated structural equation model to be able to test each link in the theory. Future research should focus on testing the direct influence of philanthropic funding on redistributive immigration outcomes related to political and social citizenship. For example, polls indicate that a majority of Americans believe that in order to truly be considered "American" individuals must have status and ability to speak English (Stokes 2017). A next step, in this research, is collecting the number of applications for permanent residency and naturalization and analyzing the influence of philanthropic funding on the size of the application pool for

each type of formal political status within a county. Additionally, gathering information on the backlog of applications, both on the duration and size of backlog, would allow a more direct test of the influence of foundation funding related to influence immigration and citizenship. Most cases that appear before an immigration judge are rarely granted stays from their deportation. Statistics reported by the EOIR indicate that during the years of 2010 to 2014, immigrants appearing before a judge were removed on average between 70 and 75% of the time (EOIR 2015). Foundation funding may not be able to help the identification of deportable immigrants, but by funding legal representation during immigration court proceedings, foundations might have a larger impact on keeping an immigrant in the country by helping them attain a stay or extension in their ability to reside within the U.S. over protecting them from being identified as deportable.

Lastly, similar to Reckhow's work on school district funding, the data gathered lend itself to further exploration about what characteristics of a community or nonprofit increase the likelihood that immigration funding will be awarded to them. This would allow states and counties experiencing new immigrant settlement the ability to help speed up the process of immigrant incorporation to creating systems of bureaucratic incorporation (Marrow 2009; Lewis & Ramakrishan 2007; Jones-Correa 2008 a,b) that can enable protection from the current deportation regime.

Conclusion

American philanthropic organizations from large private foundations to smaller more grass roots community based organizations have constructed a strong, vibrant, independent sector focused on addressing social problems and building community. Through its targeting of monetary resources, instrumental and expressively, philanthropic foundations

have engaged communities, individuals, elected officials to the larger political structure to influence public policy (Babcock 1998). Despite the extensive detailed historical analysis of foundations' strategies and roles, research understanding the systematic leverage of total philanthropic dollars' influence on local policy outcomes remains underdeveloped. During the time period of interest, the U.S. experienced a massive expansion of the federal deportation regime into the most interior of our communities, leaving the philanthropic sector to once again step in and help improve the marginalization and inhumane treatment of the U.S. immigrant community (Cohen 2009). This research was one of the first to systematically examine the influence of philanthropic dollars on punitive policy outcomes. The next chapter will, qualitatively, examine the mechanisms supported by philanthropic foundations. I examine how these nonprofit mechanisms relate to altering the deportability of the immigrant community its relationship with immigration enforcement policy outputs.

Whether foundations award grants to merely satisfy the altruistic tendencies of their donors or as way of initiating social change, their funding has implications for local policy outcomes beyond reforming current policy. Philanthropic grants constitute a base part of the operating budgets for nonprofit organizations. The funding foundations provide the nonprofit community may not be an extremely large part of the nonprofit organizations' budgets, but it remains a vital part of the keeping nonprofits programs and services open to the immigrant community. The quantitative analysis in this chapter revealed an association between funding and influence in punitive policy outputs, but it does not reveal the ways that nonprofits mediate and create citizenship for non-citizens. To further explore the foundations' "nesting doll" influence, the next chapter will examine the direct mechanisms funded by foundations, nonprofits and the programs that lead to a direct influence on

policy targets and the policy environment within which Secure Communities is implemented.

CHAPTER IV

FOUNDATION'S DON'T FUND REVOLUTIONS, BUT THEY DO FUND THE RESISTANCE

In April 2018, the state of Connecticut passed bill extending in-state college financial aid to undocumented immigrants (Gomez-Aceves 2018). During the passage of the Connecticut measure, the gallery was full of immigrant organizers from the state's regional United We Dream Network who had worked tirelessly for the past five years advocating for undocumented immigrants' inclusion and access to higher education. United We Dream, national office, received a total of $7 million in philanthropic grants from seven foundations in New York, Texas, and California from 2010 to 2014. The twelve grants awarded were to help this immigrant serving nonprofits build alliances, establish networks, and advocate for issues affecting immigrant youth (including higher education), and expanding support systems for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applications. Although, the national was the major recipient of philanthropic grants, the philanthropic funding it was awarded played a role in Connecticut's United We Dream's advocacy.

The devolution of immigration enforcement to local law enforcement agencies (Provine et al. 2016; Decker et al. 2009) and government services to local third sector organizations (Salamon 2012; Eikenberry 2006; Clemens 2006; Grønberg & Paarlberg 2001) has created the ideal place for foundations to indirectly affect local policy outputs by financing mediating organizations. In their positions within the community, nonprofits are ideally positioned to address the needs of immigrants unconstrained by bureaucratic red tape (De Graauw 2008; Douglass 2001; Thayer & Scott 2001). Although the philanthropic

community is unable to grant formal political citizenship, a right reserved to the federal government, their charitable work seeks to influence the direction of public policy from implementation to outcomes. The philanthropic sector provides a framework for the integration of the immigrant community, documented and undocumented alike. This framework helps confer citizenship and promotes receptive environments to promote democratic inclusion and incorporation, in light of government's gridlock on comprehensive immigration reform and its historic stance on barring the incorporation of immigrants through social policy benefits (Bloemraad & De Grauuw 2012).

Building on the quantitative analysis, this chapter focuses on the role of the nonprofit community in affecting local policy outputs. This part of my multi-method approach will provide insights into the theory developed in the previous chapter about the use of philanthropic funds by the nonprofit community. Research is rich on the role nonprofits play as intermediary organizations facilitating immigrant integration to political incorporation (Brown 2013; de Graauw 2007, 2008, 2014, 2016; Martin 2012; Leitner & Strunck 2014; Wilson 2013; Villalón 2010; De Leon et al. 2009; Handy & Greenspan 2009; Hung 2007). Yet, the link between foundation funding and immigration policy outputs remains underdeveloped. This research uniquely contributes to the literature by conducting semi-structured interviews with grantees that received philanthropic grants during the era of Secure Communities. Using an inductive theoretical thematic analysis, this research is one of the first to study grantees of foundations and their work as it relates, ultimately, to the affecting the deportability of immigrants within the community.

Theoretical Background

Foundations' monetary resources alone cannot change the public policy process, but through the intentional distribution of their resources, philanthropic foundations can equip the nonprofit organizations implementing programs and services aimed at helping community members in need. With no attached constituency and no immediate ability to lobby, foundations must rely on nonprofits ability to serve as mediating institutions that bridge "the individual in his private life and the large institutions of the modern society (Kerrine & Nehaus 1979, 11)." As organizations within the third sector of society, nonprofits contribute to the American democracy by developing civically engaged members, educating the public on issues, and creating a voice for the underrepresented (Salamon 2012; Boris & Steuerle 2006; Warren 2003; Clemens 2001).

Theories abound focusing understanding the relationship of the nonprofit sector with the community and government (Ott 2001; Salamon 2012; Smith & Grønberg 2006). Furthermore, as organizations operating within communities and serving those in need, nonprofits have a unique insight into the private problems of their community unaddressed or aggravated by government. With the devolution of public goods and services to the nonprofit community, nonprofits have become integral in service delivery that has gained them access to networks and influential actors allowing them the ability to advocate and promote the needs of their members (Smith & Grønberg 2006).

The theoretical approach most appropriate to describe the role of immigrant-serving nonprofits is the civil society and social movement model. The civil society and social movement model (CSSM) argues the role of the nonprofit community is both revolutionary and reactionary as a consequence to government's creation of public policy

that has negatively affected members of society, re-defined their membership and rights, and reallocated benefits and punishments. With regards to contemporary immigration policy and the immigrant community, government's passage of IRIRA along with the devolution of immigration enforcement fuels the rise of hostile rhetoric and environments for the immigrant community. With only the DACA program providing a new temporary protected status for a sub-set of the immigrant population, government has largely failed to provide a pathway to citizenship for 14% of the U.S. population. No pathway for citizenship and no programs for immigrant integration has left a void for service delivery that the nonprofit community has continually stepped up to help provide.

Following the theoretical arguments of CSSM, the role of immigrant-serving nonprofit organizations stems as a consequence to the years of punitive immigration and social policy that has harmed not only the lives of immigrants but their ability to reside within U.S. communities. As a result, immigrant-serving nonprofits are vital actors engaging in not only service provision to promote integration but also revolutionaries advocating for reform within our social and public spheres of life for pro-immigration policy. In their positions within the community, nonprofits might face constraints to providing complete inclusionary service delivery, regardless of proper documented status, due to limited budgets or as they are the recipients of government grants. Philanthropic foundation funding provides the nonprofit community with the freedom to provide services and advocacy without red tape or restrictions to their membership. According to CSSM, nonprofits' provision of services from health to legal aid and as policy advocates leads to influencing public policy. Yet, this view leaves unclear how nonprofits engage in the public policy process leading to influence on the policy outputs within their community.

In the previous chapter, the analysis revealed that a negative association between the total philanthropic grant dollars leveraged within the county and immigration enforcement outputs. One possible explanation to the size of the effect is that there is not enough philanthropic funding to alter the deportation regime and of the funding that is given it indirectly affects enforcement policy outputs. This explanation will be probed further in this chapter to provide a more detailed view of the relationship between philanthropy and public policy. As the central actors and organizations engaging with the immigrant community at the local level, the nonprofit perspective provides greater insights into how funding can influence immigrants' deportability in a way that the quantitative analysis is unable to illustrate.

Research Design

This research concentrates on understanding the link between immigrant-serving nonprofits and local immigration policy outcomes. My research is unique compared to previous research on immigrant-serving nonprofits, as it is the first to focus on interviewing recipients of foundation grants. I choose to interview nonprofit grantees as a way to link the indirect influence of philanthropic foundations on public policy outcomes. To provide insights into the role of nonprofits in influencing policy, the dataset of interviews for this research is analyzed using a theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). I acknowledge that the interviews are conducted years after the grants were received. To overcome the limitation of not having interviews in the years immediately following the grant making, I assume that nonprofits typically function and provide similar services across time with modifications to the services to increase their impact. It is unlikely that nonprofits would dramatically change their service provision if they are

focused on one particular sub-group of individuals like immigrants. Advocacy efforts may improve, and speaking to them between 3 to 8 years later would discuss the new methods of advocacy with the same underlying goal of serving the immigrant community. There is one significant difference that is obvious between when the grants were received and the time of the interviews, the presidential administration. On the minds of many service providers, especially legal services, was the possible termination of the DACA program.

In conducting this research, I did not set out to find a way to maximize the impact of the philanthropic funding on immigration policy outcomes. Implementation and enforcement of immigration policy rest in the hands of bureaucratic agents shaped through many intersecting notions of power and social constructions of their mission and policy targets. I make no assumptions about the ability of nonprofits to protect the immigrant community from deportation, as they have no power to guarantee political citizenship to their members. My work seeks to help generate additional data as a means of producing a more concise and richer understanding of the role and influence that the philanthropic sector exerts on the policy environment and the public policy process.

This research did not seek out to prove or disprove any of the hypotheses previously generated by the literature. Rather, the focus is on providing a conceptual framework that offers insights into how foundation grantees provide services and advocacy to the immigrant community. Additionally, to understand how these programs and services affect the immigrant community's deportability. To accomplish this, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 43 nonprofit organizations across 12 counties. The counties of interest were selected based off of the size of their foreign-born population. Counties with a foreign born population of more than 17% were selected for two reasons. First, it

coincides with traditional destination states which are more likely to have immigrant-serving nonprofits (Hung 2007; Gleeson & Bloemraad 2013). Furthermore, a high foreign-born population is considered a high policy target population as it is more likely to have a higher percentage of noncitizens. The one exception is the District of Columbia. As the nation's capital and hub for federal advocacy, it is important to include the perspectives of national nonprofit offices. Additionally, from 2008 through 2014, the District of Columbia was the number one funded county. The counties included in the sample all received philanthropic funding higher than the average $4 million granted to the 14% of the U.S. counties receiving philanthropic funds. These twelve counties are all in the top 60% of funded counties. Each of the counties where interviews took place received philanthropic funding during the era of Secure Communities, but not all nonprofits interviewed received funding during this time[33]. The following are the counties selected by state for interviews[34]:

- California: Alameda, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco
- District of Columbia
- Illinois: Cook
- Texas: Bexar, Brazos, Harris, Hidalgo, Dallas, Travis

The sample of nonprofits was created using the grant data from the previous chapter and Guidestar. The nonprofit organizations invited to participate in the interviews were

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[33] This occurred as a function of not having grantees declining or not responding to interview request. So, using Guidestar, I searched the nonprofits in the counties of interest based on the keywords of "immigrants." Guidestar provided a search results based off the nonprofits whose mission statements contained the words "immigrants."

[34] Summary Statistics containing financial information and Secure Communities policy outputs by interview state and county can be found in the Appendix B.

selected because they identified as immigrant-serving nonprofits in grant dataset or received a grant for immigration services. An email invitation with a phone call follow-up was sent to all immigrant-serving nonprofits or nonprofit grant recipients with a grant activity of immigration services. Of the 43 responding nonprofits, I conducted semi-structured interviews with nonprofit directors, Executive Directors or Directors of Program & Services. The sample of interviewed nonprofits is 43 organizations, but I conducted 50 interviews. The majority, 68%, of the directors interviewed were women. The interviews lasted an average of an hour with most of them conducted at the nonprofit or a location close to the nonprofit office.

The selection of nonprofits for this research deviates slightly compared to previous research on immigrant or migrant-serving nonprofits. Previous research selected their cases by focusing on organizational specific traits such as the ethnic composition of leadership, the name of the organization (ethnic sounding), or the percentage of immigrant/migrant clientele (De Graauw 2016; Martin 2012; Hung 2007; Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Cortes 1998). I do acknowledge that previous research's selection based off the specific organizational traits displaying an ethnic connection to the immigrant community would provide a larger sample of nonprofits to study. Instead, I relied on pre-aggregated grant making dataset from my previous analysis to ensure the link between the quantitative and qualitative analysis. In most cases, my coding scheme overlaps the coding schemes in previous research especially for immigrant-serving nonprofits as they prioritize serving the immigrant community displayed by listing immigrants or immigrants and migrants as the top served population and having leadership with ethnic or immigrant identity in positions of leadership. All organizations interviewed were registered 501(c)(3) organizations.

Unlike the previous research which limits their work to nonprofits with total annual revenue of $25,000, I did not begin with this limitation when selecting nonprofits for participation. I removed this limitation based on the assumption that grassroots nonprofits for immigrants may not always meet the total revenue requirement, especially in areas where the community is lower income (Roth & Allard 2016; Roth et al. 2015; Gleeson & Bloemraad 2013). The 43 interviews conducted are not meant to be a nationally representative sample, but I am working with the assumption the interviewed immigrant-serving nonprofits share similarities with broader immigrant-serving nonprofits across the U.S., especially in traditional-destination states, as there is now national conference on immigrant integration since 2009 (De Graauw & Bloemraad 2017).

Of the nonprofits interviewed, 81% are recipients of philanthropic grants anytime between 2008 through 2014 with 71% of the interviewees identified in the dataset as immigrant serving nonprofits. Only two of the nonprofits were one time recipients and the rest being awarded multiple grants throughout the years. Table 11 provides details on amount of grants awarded by instrumental grant category across the interviewed counties from 2008 through 2014. Figure 9 illustrates the funding percentage of the 900 grants received by instrumental category for all nonprofit grantees' interviewed. Compared to the previous chapter where yearly funding concentrated on providing for integration services, the interviewees' received the most funding for political citizenship services with government advocacy coming in second at 24%. The funding for integration services was not far behind receiving about 21% of the funding awarded to 35 nonprofits interviewed.

Table 12 illustrates the total aggregated financials from 2009 through 2014 for the nonprofits interviewed. During the tenure of Secure Communities, the sample of nonprofits

was fairly established at an average of 24 years of service with an average total revenue stream of about of $21 million. Not all the nonprofits receive government funding, of the nonprofits interviewed half of them did not receive government grants or contract fees. The average aggregated government funding to the nonprofits interviewed was $10 million and their total contributions received was a little more than 16 million dollars. The larger, more established nonprofits served as re-granting organizations. From 2009 through 2014, an average close to $2 million was re-granted to smaller nonprofits. These nonprofit grantees received an average of about $2.47 million from 2008 through 2014, of this total funding $1.38 million was awarded for political citizenship services. These nonprofits served an average foreign-born population of about 25% and a noncitizen population of about 15%. The Secure Communities era left its mark on these counties with an average disparity ratio from 2008 through 2014 of about 3 low priority deportable immigrants identified to every 1 high priority deportable immigrant identified. A total enforcement per capita of about 0.10. These counties had a low priority per capita identification rate of 0.07, about double rate of high priority per capita identifications. Compared to the 14% of all U.S. funded counties, the selected interview counties had higher enforcement outputs. For the selected counties, total enforcement per capita identification was higher by 0.07 and both per capita priority levels increased by 0.05 compared to the average of all funded counties. The enforcement disparity ratio was the same in both samples. While it is alarming that these counties had high enforcement outputs, they also had more than six times the average foreign born population and seven times the non-citizen population.

Qualitative Analysis

To produce a holistic view of philanthropic influence on local immigration policy, I took a multi-method approach. In the chapter before, I systematically analyzed the quantitative data to see how total dollars leveraged within a county would influence local immigration policy outputs of deportable immigrants identified by local law enforcement. Although, the findings suggest an association between total grant dollars and immigration outputs, a clear picture of the mechanisms within the community that translate into reducing enforcement policy outputs remains unclear. This part of the research will explore this relationship by speaking with grantees. These interviews provide a complementary explanation to the results identified in the previous chapter. The interview data was collected after the preliminary quantitative analysis was conducted.

The semi-structured interviews were analyzed using a theoretical thematic analysis to provide further detail into service delivery and advocacy as mechanisms alter immigrants' deportability and affecting immigration enforcement outputs. The transcribed interviews are coded first by searching for two structural codes based on the previous literature that defines the roles of nonprofits as service delivery and advocacy. Once the interviews were coded based on the two structural codes, these sections of the interviews grouped and searched for the underlying concepts that affect the immigrants' level of deportability on a micro and macro level. The final stage links the themes through direct manifestation or through an interpretative connection that associates the work by nonprofits to changes in immigrants' deportability (Saladaña 2015).

Nonprofits as Intermediaries of Change

As meso-level (De Graauw 2016) mediating institutions, immigrant-serving nonprofits are distinctively positioned to create social change for the immigrant by using micro and macro-level strategies within the policy environment. Their position allows them the ability to reach across society and into the larger socio-political arena bridging the spheres of public and private life to initiate changes in immigrants' deportability within their local community. These nonprofits create essential connections with the immigrant community built on trust and culturally responsive service delivery that may not always be present in non-immigrant serving agencies. As one director describes, "*a lot of the feedback on the existing agencies [domestic violence shelters] is they didn't understand [the community] especially the legal issues, but [also] the cultural issues. There was no linguistic competency or ability to serve survivors. Without [serving] the immigrant rights, they didn't have a good experience, not as in bad, but they [immigrant survivors] just didn't feel like their needs were met*[35]." With their connection to the immigrant community, as their link to vital programs and services, nonprofits can create micro-level changes within each immigrant's level of deportability through the process of integration. Integration occurs by providing immigrants with access to attaining political citizenship and through the social citizenship conferred to them by the nonprofit. Social citizenship represents an acceptance by the local community that allows immigrants the ability to have access to the most basic life necessities without living in a state of heightened deportability or fear.

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[35] Executive Director

Nonprofits acknowledge that " *programs might not necessarily move at the rate [needed] to be able to make a difference everywhere we want to [change]*[36]." As such, the second strategy targets social change by affecting the macro-level structures through advocacy efforts aimed at issue awareness or policy reform pressuring state actors to support anti-immigrant legislation or enforce immigration laws at the local level. As institutional actors with networks across the public and private spheres of community, nonprofits can engage in strategic coalition building and advocacy. Their advocacy efforts focus not only on policy change but on *"building democracy in America [by] empower[ing] immigrants…rather than coming down from on-high with all the answers*[37]." This empowerment seeks to ensure that immigrants' experiences become part of the narrative and the solution. No one other than the immigrant community truly understand how the current political system affects their lives. Through empowerment of immigrants, this advocacy seeks to change the dominant policy narrative, "*a major component is shifting around who…[the] immigrant and refugee communities are, and really humanizing the experiences broken policies impact…Because so often, these stories are always framed as [the] good versus [the] bad immigrant*[38]." The advocacy efforts target changes in the environment and policy narrative to garner broad community support to reduce the focus on immigrants' deportability and immigration enforcement leading to a push for immigration reform with a path way to citizenship.

Nonprofits as Service Providers

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[36] Executive Director
[37] Director of Legal Services
[38] Director of Advocacy

Unlike government agencies that are more selective in their service delivery, nonprofits extend citizenship to all of the immigrant community regardless of status. Bosniak (2008) discusses citizenship as a socially constructed concept given life through government and society. She illustrates citizenship as a concept with hard edges and a soft center. The hard edges represent political citizenship, the formal status to reside in the United States through naturalization or residency along with the rights and responsibilities that come with the respective status. Immigrants can only receive formal citizenship through the approval of their applications by a bureaucrat in the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Yet, nonprofits serve as complementary agents in the process by helping immigrants with their status adjustments from documented to naturalized or undocumented to documented. The soft part of citizenship is the membership created and extended through the work and advocacy that nonprofits engage in and on behalf of immigrants to help integrate immigrants or create inclusive communities on their behalf. Social citizenship, provides immigrants with access to basic life necessities, opportunities for self-development to advancement, and legitimacy as individuals and members of the community. The political and social citizenship provide legalization and integration into the broader community that provides micro-level changes in their policy target status. Together these synergistic citizenships help alter the size of the policy target population leading to a reduction in enforcement outputs.

Political Citizenship

Many nonprofits offer programs that help provide legal advice for status adjustments to labor rights representation. All nonprofits that offer legal services have expressed that their caseloads demands are more extensive than the supply of attorneys or certified legal

representatives available to assist in providing aid. Most nonprofits have waitlists and are only able to do intake forms and provide general information or referrals to other nonprofits or immigration attorneys. These legal services have risen in popularity due to their reduced prices compared to that of private immigration attorneys. With all the services provided by nonprofits, the political citizenship programs are acknowledged as the the best protection to avoid deportation. As one director of legal services noted, "*I include those [pro-immigrant] perspectives when I talk to people in public meetings, but I'd be deluding myself if I think that's going to be overarchingly effective. The most empowering thing I do for the kids is I win them [formal naturalization, permanent residency, asylum] status."*

From current rhetoric to immigration enforcement directives, the dominant policy narratives serve to villainize the members of the immigrant community. Immigration law is complicated, and when cases involve residents with a record or undocumented immigrants applying for residency or naturalization, the process becomes even more complicated. While government grants may prohibit nonprofit organizations from serving the undocumented community or immigrants with criminal records, philanthropic funding allows nonprofits to exercise discretion and create inclusivity in their membership, regardless of status. Without the proper immigration status, no level of integration will be able to stop local law enforcement from identifying immigrants and ICE deporting immigrants that do not pose a threat to the community.

With the current backlog of applications across sectors, nonprofits help ease the administrative burden by helping ensure accurate applications are submitted, and immigrants prepare for all portions of the residency and naturalization process as a means

of reducing the probability of a denied naturalization or residency application. With today's climate, nonprofits are seeing "*more complicated cases in [our] workshops.*" The director explained further the imperative nature of knowing the full history of individuals. "*People are coming in who have more tickets, more violations, more things we need to be aware of...given this president sharing everything now is just really crucial because withholding anything would definitely be counted against you. So as an attorney, if I know it now, we can try to deal with it and get the assistance they need as opposed to having it [withheld information] come up during the interview, then they are stuck*[39]*."* At best, immigrants are allowed to leave their interview, but as Gilbert (2008) points out that immigrants denied naturalization because of a past criminal record can be processed for deportation at the time they are being interviewed by USCIS representatives. Additionally, USCIS does not have to provide detailed explanations for denied applications and immigrants are rarely able to challenge the outcome in immigration court. Although it cannot speed up the process, it can reduce barriers to attaining naturalization. The legal services provided by nonprofits, especially to low-income immigrants, reduces the chances of denial and deportation for any incorrect or withheld information. Ultimately, nonprofit organizations are targeting a status change as they "*look for the ability for our families to be able to thrive and [in] giving them the tools via services, education, or empowerment…we're not looking for assimilation but we do want [the] ultimate protection from deportation, citizenship. We want people to be able to vote, so we are pretty active in*

[39] Executive Director

trying to find legal permanent residents [that are eligible] to become citizens. It's a big piece of what we do in terms of our immigration legal services.[40]"

Social Citizenship

The first five years of arrival for immigrants are the most important to establishing their path to integration. A period, during which even documented, and especially undocumented immigrants, do not have access to any public benefits only those provided by nonprofits (De Graauw & Bloemraad 2017). Social citizenship, provides immigrants with access to basic life necessities, opportunities such as self-development to social advancement, and legitimacy as individuals and members of the community. At the heart of social citizenship is the path to integration for immigrants. As one Executive Director views their role in the community, "*We want Thais who are economically disadvantaged to access opportunities for economic mobility and be able to really become self-sufficient… we do comprehensive, wrap around social and human services addressing the needs of low-income not just Thais. We're sort of multipurpose and what I call an ecosystem for social change*.[41]"

Immigrants access multiple services at their local nonprofit from language courses to workforce development, and family-focused services such as food pantries, youth development programs for their children. These services all help provide immigrants with access to mobility across the various measures of integration: social, economic, and cultural (Jiménez 2011; Jones-Correa 2011; Nee & Alba 2012). Integration is not a unidirectional process, but a bidirectional process between immigrants and the receiving

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[40] Director of Legal Services
[41] Executive Director

community. The community encompasses all institutions from private to public, and nonprofits help facilitate the interaction with immigrants to promote inclusivity and advancement initiating the process of integration. One director mentioned, in regards to their strategic expansion from refugee serving to incorporate more of the immigrant community, *"the health and social services are open to everyone... we have a health fair in partnership with local clinics and universities to address basic health issues to mental health issues. In partnership with the local community college, we have instructors coming here, to provide a range of education, so if an individual wants [to get] their GED, we can provide that, but we also do [provide] ESL…to more empowerment and entrepreneurship [courses], so with adult education, we can certify individuals to open up businesses*." Through their service delivery nonprofits attempt to resolve the tensions between their community norms and the norms of the immigrant community (Gilbert 2008). This serves as a stepping stone for immigrants to be able to understand the broader American culture and their community's norms as a way of helping them live, work, and socially engage with other members of their broader community.

By joining the political and social citizenship that nonprofits extend the immigrant community, nonprofits work to create individual micro level changes. Although the process is not instantaneous, the micro-level change seeks to protects immigrants from deportation through a formal change in their official political status. In the end, this micro-level change alters the size of the population of deportable immigrants. The second change occurs as nonprofits empower and work to help immigrants reshape the immigrant narrative within the community and the broader policy environment. To reshape the narrative, nonprofits help provide immigrants with the necessary skills, education, and

leads them to be civically engaged as a way of showing their commitment to their community and life as an American. This integration process helps immigrants not only portray but actively engage and promote qualities of "good moral character." In order to attain naturalization, immigrants must meet the requirement of "good moral character," but this decision is ultimately left to the bureaucratic agent of USCIS. Through their entire repertoire of programs and services, the immigrant-serving nonprofit community works to help ensure that immigrant and their families are preparing and establishing a successful life in their communities by providing them with the skills and qualities deemed as American. As one Executive Director reflected on the mission of their partnership with local businesses to help the immigrant employees gain English Language training, he hoped that employers would understand and promote the view that "*my immigrant workforce is contributing to my bottom line, learning English, and becoming American that's the apple pie outcome of immigration, if you're against that well you got issues*." In his view, his nonprofit was engaging not only immigrants in the community but their employers to show that the immigrant community is not only of "good moral character," but they are providing to the local economy and incorporating into the community. As such, why should they be denied a path to citizenship?

It is important to note that although integration and assimilation produce a negative image of immigrants becoming "American," the nonprofits I visited encouraged immigrants to value their cultural knowledge and continue to be proud of it. These nonprofits helped the members of their organization to not only learn the key cultural qualities of being considered "American" such as English and self-sufficient, but not at the expense of their first cultural identity. One director mentioned a community room where

monthly events were held to celebrate cultural holidays or have cultural days to explore immigrants' heritage with the broader community and immigrants' extended family.

Nonprofits as Advocates

In their position as mediating institutions, nonprofits are situated best to serve as the bridge connecting the community with the larger socio-political structure that has defined their deportability. In this role, nonprofits are institutions of advocacy reacting to proposed or current changes in policy, but also as revolutionaries empowering and motivating immigrants to serve as advocates. Most, if not all nonprofits, engaged in advocacy efforts. If nonprofit directors responded in the negative when asked if they worked to advocate for their members, they elaborated with a response that equated advocacy to political lobbying. For the handful that viewed advocacy as lobbying, they made sure to mention they did not engage in advocacy efforts as it would threaten their 501(c)(3) status.

Scholars have defined advocacy in multiple ways (Almog-bar Schmid 2014), but at its core suggests activities that pertain to defining, educating, and promoting issues in attempts to mobilize or alter the public policy process. Advocacy is fundamental to helping produce policy changes through reform or the creation of new public policy (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom & Vergari 1996; Mintrom & Norman 2009; Sabatier 1988; De Graauw 2007; Le Roux & Goerdel 2009; Chin 2017; Schmid et al. 2008; Vaughan & Arsneault 2008; Kingdon & Thurber 1984). Achieving immigration reform with a path to citizenship would provide the largest impact to the immigrant community, but with no reform insight, advocacy efforts have prioritized local policy and education campaigns targeting all members of the community and political actors to affect immigrants' level of deportability.

Nonprofits strategically engage in narrative reframing by working to alter the current socially constructed negative immigrant narrative which portrays the immigrant community as criminals who are undeserving of a pathway to citizenship, but should be punished with deportation. According to the theory of the social constructions of policy target populations (Schneider & Ingram 1993; Ingram & Schneider 1991), in order to gain public support to promote pro-immigrant immigration reform, the narrative must be reshaped to show the immigrant community as one deserving of assistance. As such nonprofits through their micro-level changes within immigrant community and their integration programs work to reshape the narrative from "bad hombres" to immigrants as contributing members of society who deserve a formal pathway to citizenship. Engaging in advocacy efforts at the local level entail garnering support and narrative reshaping to help promote state-level legislation that improves the quality of life for the immigrant community and reduces state mandated local cooperation with the federal bureaucracy, in addition to their public education campaigns on the impacts of punitive immigration enforcement. At both the state and the national level, nonprofits are depending on a strategy of policy feedback (Cambell 2012; Soss 1999; Soss & Schram 2007; Mettler & Soss 2005; Mettler 2005). Through the education issue campaigns and testimonies within public agencies and legislatures, nonprofits organizations provide citizenry and bureaucratic agents with feedback on policy as a means to motivate them to vocalize and support pro-immigration policy reform rather than anti-immigrant legislation. For example, specifically working with law enforcement, one director states "*we are doing more legislative advocacy…but we are [also] dealing with trying to engage local law enforcement to understand the U-visa system in order to get the needed signatures for*

[survivor] applications. They [law enforcement] have several misconceptions that [if they sign] they're helping [promote 'illegal"] immigration when, in fact, the [U-visa certification] component is designed to help law enforcement reach the criminal offenders[42]."

Drawing on the work of De Graauw (2016) who points to administrative, strategic issue framing, and collaboration across the sector as strategies to help create policy changes for the immigrant community, I found similar themes in my interviews. These advocacy strategies are not just working to help pass new policy, but are working to create a new policy environment that is more receptive and welcoming to immigrants. In targeting policy and the environment, nonprofits are working to produce feedback that helps change the perspective and political positions of the community. The more that immigrant nonprofits can provide the right education to immigrants about their rights and promote pro-immigrant issues and perspectives alongside that of citizens, it is more likely that changes in deportability will occur at the macro-level. Advocacy feeds back to help create pro-immigrant policies, reduce the pressure and promote discretion by law enforcement when working with and policing immigrants, and changing the negative immigrant narrative and stereotypes associated with immigrant status.

Administrative & Policy Advocacy

For more than a decade, immigration reform has remained one of the yearly policy discussions, but reform has remained an elusive act. The federal government remains the only level of government able to extend formal political citizenship, but states and local

[42] Executive Director

governments retain the right to pass legislation influencing immigrant's ability to reside and quality of life within their jurisdictions. In the absence of immigration reform, nonprofits refocused advocacy efforts to levels of government most proximate to the lives of immigrants. Nonprofits are focusing their advocacy efforts to push for policy changes across a spectrum of issues that effect the life of an individual from criminal justice to access to health. The policy areas targeted by the immigrant-serving nonprofit community do not solely focus on immigration reform, but intersect with immigration policy. Changes across policy areas such as health care, criminal justice, and environmental regulations can all impact the visibility of immigrants and increase their level of deportability. One example within criminal justice policy, a group of nonprofits was able to successfully reform legislation on mandatory sentencing that affects immigrants in a more punitive manner than citizens. As previously mentioned, immigrants facing a state misdemeanor sentence of more than 364 days increases their deportability drastically (Keenan 2007). An immigrant's state misdemeanor has now become a felony conviction on their criminal record due to their lack of U.S. citizenship. This "felony" conviction now labels this immigrant as a high priority deportable immigrant. At least within California, one director recounts their policy reform victory, "*we had a law recently that changed the sentencing, the [misdemeanor] mandatory sentencing, [from 365 days] to 364 days, so we are trying to get that replicated in other states. We are trying to make sure that these little tweaks that can have a massive impact go into effect in as many places as possible, and work with local government, [and] the local school board on policies.*[43]" The criminal justice system

[43] Development Director

and our immigration regime are intimately intertwined, but are not set up to protect the immigrant community or their rights. With IRIRA's unprecedented expansion of crimes that serve as the basis for inadmissibility, the change in the law in California affects the deportability of an immigrant by ensuring that their state charge is unaffected by IRIRA's creation of a "criminal offender" by amplifying a low level crime (Bello 2016). This law reduces the size of the population eligible for deportation by not allowing a state misdemeanor conviction to translate into a felony based on immigration status. The goal is to advocate across more states and localities to pass a similar law, but this might remain unattainable without financial support from foundations. This particular organization produces material to educate lawyers and service providers about the intersection of immigration and the criminal justice system. "*We work with attorneys, immigration attorneys…and more broadly organizations and individuals who serve immigrants. Basically, immigration law is so complicated and so dynamic that any human mistake can get people deported. So we want to make sure that doesn't happen. We want to make sure that everyone who serves immigrants is aware of all the opportunities and the risk that immigrants face, and can therefore, as an attorney, serve them better*[44]."

Furthermore, not all public defenders are trained or know to understand how taking a plea deal can affect the status and eligibility of immigrants. Increasing the funding to nonprofits with legal clinics promotes training as well as expands the number of attorneys that can provide pro or low bono legal services to all immigrants regardless of their status before a court of law. Legal aid clinics can only provide representation to documented

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[44] Development Director

immigrants, but foundation support provides assistance for undocumented immigrants to receive legal representation.

Nonprofits may have begun targeting their advocacy efforts towards their state and local governments, but this has not stopped the collaboration across regions. In fact, nonprofits that have a national office in D.C are more likely to have that office engage the most in federal level policy reform and tap their regional offices as sources of information about what issues need to serve as focal points for advocacy alongside the recommendations to advocate for at the national level. With one region office open and another set to open in a different state, this director of legal services stated, "There's a lot of coordination and information sharing between local office service staff, so what they're seeing on the ground in their communities is being collected in examples and stories to do policy advocacy at the federal level, but sometimes in support of local and state too[45]."

Representation & Collaboration

The final two pieces of advocacy efforts led by nonprofits go hand in hand. The idea that policy creates politics, but only for those whose voices are heard, leaves out the disadvantaged and marginalized communities. As bridges, nonprofits not only create the opportunities for their members to engage with policymakers and the broader community but create the programs that lead to the empowerment of the immigrant community to use their stories and their lived experiences as campaigns to change their communities. With a lack of political power to cast a vote as part of the official electorate, nonprofits and their staff use their positions to cultiate relationships and networks in order to help open lines of

[45] Director of Legal Services

communication and drive policy reform. As one director put it, "*This is what you do, you become a commissioner, you cash in personally, I cashed in for the movement, and said, "I want you [the mayor and commissioners] to work on immigration, you should work on DACA." I pitched the mayor. I pitched his senior staff, I helped do a meet-and-greet with immigrant rights groups, who had mostly all been with (publically supportive of) his opponent*[46]." This nonprofit Executive Director helped bridge not only a partisan divide, but promoted that the mayor view undocumented immigrants as part of his electorate. Using more of a co-production method, another Executive Director expressed her work as "*working very closely with the Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs…we're on panels for them, we advise them, we provide consultations, they come to all of our different community town hall meetings…there's no funding [there], but there are opportunities for collaboration and co-sponsorship*[47]*."* In both cases, each director used their networks and connection to bridge the community with actors holding political power to shape policy.

In almost all nonprofits that had high advocacy efforts, acknowledged that in order to produce the proper policy reform, immigrants' perspectives must be heard. At the end of the day, the policies will be affecting their lives, but the people making them are unlikely to understand the immigrant experience. Advocacy cannot occur without advocates. Nonprofits serve as critical organizations to empowering and developing the civic voice of immigrants. Many nonprofits had programs to individually develop the leadership abilities of immigrant women and men to act as canvassers, protest leaders, and promotoras of information clinics such as Know Your Rights or worker/labor rights. Some nonprofits

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[46] Executive Director
[47] Executive Director

offering legal services even helped naturalized immigrants become accredited with the Board of Immigration Appeals. This accreditation in recognized nonprofits allows non-lawyers to represent clients before U.S. immigration agencies, such as USCIS, ICE, and Immigration Courts (NYIC 2018). Not only do immigrants volunteer to be leaders in their community by providing information to fellow community members, but it comes full circle by training underrepresented individuals to effectively uplift their voice into the policy process that formally excludes them having the ability to elect officials passing legislation at all levels of the government. Policy advocacy spans all issue areas and uses the lived experiences of the community to discuss the current impact and possible impact that might occur in the event of the proposed policy change. For example, prior to the election the promotoras in this organization were conducting community outreach focusing on providing immigrants with information on naturalizations. After the election, they mobilized by expanding their base of advocates and vamping up their Know Your Rights Presentations and family planning in light of possible deportation. Along with their work for protection from deportation, the promotoras prepared to provide testimony in support of legislation that was about to sunset negatively affecting the life of their children. "So we had a campaign for a healthy Illinois, Our Healthy Illinois Coalition to reinstate and refund and assure that undocumented students, undocumented children, could continue to receive health insurance. Because we have our leaders that are trained in this, they were the spokespeople. So, you have these documented and undocumented moms meeting with their legislators and talking about their children's diseases. Even though they [their children] are undocumented, they deserve to be able to see the doctor if they don't, they could potentially have life-threatening complications. Meeting with legislators and being

able to actually share compelling testimonials [is important], but also to try to get the general support through media. Our state is supposed to be a welcoming state, and so you need to have these types of folks that are strong, that aren't afraid of talking about their immigration stories to be able to get the general public support to pass bills like All Kids.[48]"

Implications & Discussion

During an interview with an Executive Director who did not receive any foundation grants from 2008 through 2014, he expressed "*foundations don't fund revolutions…that would lead to their self-destruction*." In the big picture, if foundations provided enough funding to throw a wrench in the U.S. deportation regime, it might in fact lead to their destruction. Government could seek policy change revoking their charitable status, restructuring their 501(c)(3) status, or possibility limiting their financial contributions to the nonprofit community, especially in today's political climate. Kerwin et al. (2017) notes that immigrant-serving nonprofits "working within the existing statutory and administrative frameworks of federal policy…achieved steady and significant gains in legal status for large numbers of immigrants over the past four years (1)." Despite, the limited resources that nonprofits work with everyday, this research adds to Kerwin et al. (2017)'s finding. I argued that immigrant serving nonprofits follow the civil society/social movement model to engage their community as a means of creating social change. I find support for this view as the immigrant serving nonprofits, I interviewed, are optimizing the resources they have and cultivating their membership to continue pushing for social change. With their

[48] Director of Programs

work in integrating the immigrant community, their advocacy efforts from policy to diffusing and reconstructing the immigrant narrative, nonprofits are continuously working to reduce the size of the policy target population and reduce efforts by law enforcement to enforce immigration. The nonprofit community is developing civically engaged leaders focused on altering the social relationship to create solidarity and support in favor of the immigrant community.

The civil society/social movement model addresses each component separately, service and advocacy. On the ground, the mechanisms of service provision and advocacy are deeply intertwined. These roles are not mutually exclusive. The strategy to combine advocacy and service delivery illustrates nonprofits engaging in a systems change rather than focusing on each component individually. Dual-mission nonprofits are better positioned to serve the immigrant community as they target not just the problems currently faced, but in the structures that have allowed the problems to persist (De Grauuw 2016; de Leon et al. 2009; Cordero-Guzmán 2005). In order to create the right social movement and develop the capacity of the community to support the movement, nonprofits view their role as a "*holistic [approach] model…It is critical to provide those direct services that can help individuals find safety, find justice, break cycles in their families and communities. But we also want to be working on systems [of] advocacy and trying to get broader community, policy makers, different systems, like law enforcement, to understand these issues better, as well, [as] to change laws, to change minds, and to change practices*[49]*."*

[49] Executive Director

If foundations and nonprofits want to engage in social change for the immigrant community, foundations need to show a stronger commitment to the nonprofit community. The monetary resources gained from government contracts limits who they are able to serve and their program revenue will only allow for so much expansion. Foundation funding is integral to helping produce protection for immigrants inside and outside sanctuary communities. If foundations are genuinely committed to helping change immigration policy, they should begin to invest in long-term commitment nonprofits beyond the large bureaucratic nonprofits. Grassroots nonprofits are the key to serving immigrants afraid of exposing themselves in this highly politicize climate calling for increased deportations. These smaller organizations are located closer and understand not only the immigrant identity but the racialized immigrant identity.

Limitations & Future Research

There are three limitations to this research. The first is this research does not take into consideration the gendered nature of immigration enforcement (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). There are gendered immigrant experiences that are overlooked by the focusing generally on the immigrant identity. Nine out of ten deportees are male (TRAC 2014) leaving behind families without the support of the male breadwinner (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). The gendered nature of enforcement will impact the types of services that are needed by immigrants in the community especially those of mixed-status families. The process for policy feedback and changes in the individual immigrant's deportability might take different paths and lengths of time to achieve dependent on an immigrant's gender. The second, similarly, by discussing immigrant-serving nonprofits role in helping the immigrant community, this research does

not address any of the socio-political process and histories among the different immigrant groups or how immigration policy, services, and enforcement affects the different ethnic immigrant groups. To an extent, there is an oversimplification and generalization of the role of nonprofit organizations in influencing immigration policy outputs.

Prior research in immigrant-serving nonprofits by Martin (2012), took the approach of observing the "hidden" work undertaken by nonprofits. She was able to capture the hidden intricacies and the intersectional nature of the issues faced by the immigrant community by volunteering and interacting with members of the nonprofit. Participant observation offers a richer detail into philanthropies influence on local immigration policy outputs that I was unable to capture by interviewing only the nonprofit administration. By interacting with members and observing the work that nonprofits engage in to create community, provide services, and influence the lives of immigrants would further provide insights into the mechanisms and strategies that are being deployed by the nonprofit organizations as ways to offer citizenship and sanctuary to their immigrant community.

The next steps to build on this research should include quantitative analysis of the interview data. The thematic method allowed for greater depth in illustrating the roles and work of nonprofits, it also serves as a limitation as it does not provide further quantitative analysis to measure which strategy provides the most substantial influence on policy.

Conclusion

Although foundations don't fund revolutions, they are financing the armory by which nonprofits act as revolutionaries and reactors targeting micro, meso, and macro level changes to influence the deportability of immigrants. This research contributes to the growing literature on philanthropy and immigration integration by developing a conceptual

framework on the mechanisms that connect philanthropy to public policy. The work that the philanthropic sector engages in takes time and resources to reach their end goal of influencing public policy. As the work of United We Dream illustrates, policy victories to create inclusive communities can occur, but will not happen over night. At the end of the day, foundations and nonprofits must choose whether they are working to create social change or provide immediate services. Their decision will impact the way their path to influencing public policy from implementation to outcomes.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In his first week as president, Donald Trump reinstated one of the worst deportation programs in history. A policy move touted as helping secure the U.S. from the dangers of the "illegal bad hombres." While advocates and activists alike have worked tirelessly to help protect the immigrant community, Congress has continuously failed to provide support through any legislative action. With partisan divides standing between any immigration reform, the goal of comprehensive immigration reform has spurred an awakening as communities and organizations have mobilized at the local level to combat the effects of the federal immigration agenda. Leading to the question, what is the effect of local institutional efforts to deter the devolution of immigration enforcement? How does local effort shape the boundaries of citizenship and deportability within local communities?

To increase the effectiveness of the federal immigration bureaucracy in identifying immigrant "criminal offenders," the U.S. implemented a policy tool that created a multijurisdictional patchwork of immigration policy (Provine et al. 2016; Varsanyi et al. 2012; Decker et al. 2009). The devolution to the local level allows new actors to influence the implementation of policy by altering the environment and policy targets' deportability. Deportability represents a state defined by an individual's lack of formal citizenship where any interaction with government or community can lead to their exclusion from the U.S. (De Genvoa 2002). In linking local law enforcement agencies with Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities has amplified the deportability of all immigrants living inside the borders of the United States.

In the era of immigration devolution, this dissertation provides insights into how non-governmental institutions can influence local policy implementation and outputs. This dissertation contains two separate quantitative studies and one qualitative study focused on understanding how non-governmental institutions redefine citizenship and deportability, and its subsequent effect on immigration enforcement by local law enforcement agencies. First, I define institution as an established practice conveying identity, norms, values, and shaping power relationships within a community, in this case, language. The second definition of a non-governmental institution is an organization established to serve the community outside the bounds of the public sector, specifically the philanthropic sector.

The first chapter centers on the intersection of representative bureaucracy and language as the means of expanding the boundaries of inclusion. Language is a social institution that conveys identity, culture, and values that shape power dynamics between individuals during interactions. In sharing a linguistic identity, individuals share a community identity and life experiences. For individuals with limited English language proficiency, their linguistic identity increases their deportability. Specifically, their deportability increases, significantly, as they encounter law enforcement agents who view their inability to speak the language of the "Americans," as a cue connecting them to the criminal immigrant narrative. An "illegality" stereotype that can be overcome when officers are able to communicate in the immigrant's non-English language. By facilitating language convergence, officers are working to decrease the deportability of the immigrant by treating them as members of their community. I extend the theory of representative

bureaucracy to include language as a means for active representation. By combining the Local Law Enforcement Administration and Management Survey with the Secure Community Program reports, I test my theoretical argument of language as active representation leading to decreases in immigration enforcement and policy outputs. I not only test the effects of linguistic representation, but include a test of traditional passive representative bureaucracy. To test the effect of traditional representative bureaucracy, I include a measure of the racial and ethnic representation within a sheriff's department from two of the largest immigrant groups within the U.S., Hispanic and Asian officers. The analysis reveals that passive representation by Hispanic and Asian officers influence policy outputs in opposite directions. Hispanic officers reduce the implementation of Secure Communities, while Asian officer representation promotes priority level enforcement. The second and most important contribution was the empirical test of language representation. Language communication theories articulate that language is important when there is a diverse linguistic landscape. The findings illustrated that commitment by the bureaucracy to promoting linguistic accommodation provides bureaucratic incorporation of the immigrant community in areas with a growing immigrant community. The same does not occur in communities with larger population shares of foreign born individuals. In traditional destination communities (communities with larger foreign born populations), linguistic accommodation increases the implementation of immigration policy by local law enforcement. By focusing on a punitive policy, this research illustrated that linguistic representation may not always extend membership to the immigrant community.

The latter part of this dissertation evaluates the role of the philanthropic sector in influencing public policy. I took a multi-method approach to understand how philanthropic

funding shapes local policy outputs. I selected one of the most punitive local immigration outputs, the identification for deportation. My work contributes to the field of philanthropy and public policy by providing an empirical analysis of the role of philanthropic funding on public policy outputs. This multi-method research provides one of the first attempts to theoretically develop a model explaining the role of philanthropy in public policy by joining the theories of instrumental strategic giving to illustrate the role of philanthropic funding and the Civil Society and Social Change theory to explain the role of the nonprofit actors pushing for social change. Previous research focused on providing historical accounts on the role and strategies utilized by philanthropic foundations as a means of helping reform traditional policy issues such as health, education, or social welfare. Unlike any previous systematic analysis, my research used a new dataset on philanthropic grants made to immigrant-serving nonprofits or grants for immigration or immigrants. The descriptive analysis of the funding illustrates a geographic pattern to funding concentration along the coasts of the U.S. Most of the funding for immigration-related services concentrates in traditional-destination states and counties except funding related to policy advocacy granted to the District of Columbia. Foundations prioritized integration services by providing grants for activities that help give immigrants access to basic life necessities such as education, health, workforce development, even afterschool youth development programs. The empirical analysis revealed that counties receiving philanthropic grants had an average noncitizen population about 4% larger than counties who did not receive any funding. Furthermore, the average Secure Communities local policy outputs were lower for funded counties than unfunded counties. The regression analysis provided some support for the theoretical arguments. The effects of philanthropic funding in helping reduce the

per capita identification of deportable immigrants are minimal at best. Foundations wanting to influence immigration policy would have to increase the funding to counties by more than 100% to see a significant influence on the reduction of identifying deportable immigrants for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This funding shift is highly unlikely as immigration-related funding is not a top policy priority. In many cases, for the foundations providing the grants, funding for the immigrant community comes as a by-product of funding other policy issues such as women's health or education.

Due to their position in society, foundations are outside of the policy process. To gain influence on policy, foundations provide grants to nonprofit organizations working within communities. To provide a more detailed conceptual framework, the second part of my multi-method research focuses on analyzing semi-structured interviews with foundation grantees. Using a theoretical thematic analysis, I constructed a conceptual framework illustrating the tools that nonprofits use to alter the deportability of immigrants. By focusing on the micro-level, nonprofits use their service delivery to help integrate immigrants into their broader community and help them attain formal political citizenship status. At the meso and micro-level, nonprofits' use their advocacy efforts to focus on altering deportability by changing the policy environment to be more receptive to the immigrant community and provide support for pro-immigrant legislation by re-framing the 'illegality' narrative. Together, nonprofits' service delivery and advocacy roles, help create legitimacy and promote the social inclusion of the immigrant community decreasing immigrants' deportability.

Limitations and Future Directions

The three studies in this research provided the groundwork to study the intersection of non-governmental institutions and punitive policy outputs, specifically immigration. Although the studies contribute to the fields of public administration, public policy, and the philanthropy and nonprofit literature, their generalizability is limited to large counties. I made the effort to ensure representation, but each chapter contains a selection bias dependent on size of the county and budget of the sheriffs' departments and counties which receive large sums of philanthropic funding. For the sheriff's data, the 285 departments that overlapped in both surveys, although randomly drawn from a stratified sample, share representative characteristics such as population size, demographic characteristics, social characteristics with a portion of U.S. local law enforcement agencies. In the qualitative analysis, the counties were selected based on the size of the noncitizen population and variation across political climate. These two selection criteria allow for generalizability to similar traditional destination counties and counties on the verge of having established immigrant communities. Furthermore, I focused on understanding the role of pro-immigrant nonprofits. By concentrating on immigrant serving nonprofits, I did not explore the role of anti-immigrant nonprofits and foundations work. This creates the image that all nonprofits are focused on providing political citizenship or integration across the communities with the United States, but this is not the case. In extending this research, to compare the strategies of new and old destination states, interviews should focus on counties with a growing immigrant population and the nonprofits serving the immigrant community. Additionally, I focused on punitive outputs of local immigration enforcement, this limits the effect of the nonprofit community to only one level of policy process. The

next steps should focus on understanding how the philanthropic sector influences the size of the applications for naturalization and permanent residency, along with the work of the nonprofit community in deportation defense hearings and in legal service provision once immigrants are detained.

Additionally, the implementation of Secure Communities does not provide a clear indication of precisely the jurisdictional local law enforcement agency. Secure Communities outputs are reported at the county level where detainers are issued to the sheriff's department running the local county jail. By focusing only on the sheriff's department, the co-production of enforcement by local city and state law enforcement agencies becomes overlooked. In the data for the analysis, I was only able to control for a small set of bureaucratic capacity. As outputs are a direct function of the ability of the bureaucracy tasked with implementing policy, this provides a limitation to the analysis. Future research is needed to parse out the co-production function of all local law enforcement agencies within a county to adequately understand the effect that different non-governmental institutions can exert on the policy implementation process within local communities.

Contributions and Policy Implications

Throughout my interviews, directors expressed concern over the hateful rhetoric targeting their members. They acknowledged that in previous administrations their role in the community allowed them the ability to be on the offensive and push policy and programs in favor of the immigrant community. The new administration has made the pro-immigrant philanthropic community pivot to implement a defensive strategy as means of protecting the small wins provided by the Obama administration. While their concern was heightened

they understood that no matter what administration is in place the immigrant community is always under attack, even in sanctuary states and counties, as long as American immigration policy focuses on punishment rather than integration.

This dissertation contributes to the policy literature and the immigration literature by focusing on the role of non-governmental institutions in exerting bottom-up influence on the public policy process. Federal immigration policy reinforces the inclusivity of U.S. citizenship. For all immigrants without formal citizenship status, policy, state actors, and political rhetoric further demonstrate their exclusion from the American polity and community. In sharing a linguistic connection, street-level bureaucrats can exercise during discretion their interactions with the immigration to alter the implementation of an exclusionary policy by viewing immigrants as part of the community rather than focusing on their 'illegality.' In this way, linguistic connections provide a bridge between the state and the policy targets that helps create inclusion rather than increasing deportability of the immigrant community. A bridge that provides the ability to reshape was citizenship, and deportability means within the local community even if it stands at odds with the federal policy.

The second contribution is to the field of philanthropy and the nonprofit literature. I show that the philanthropic community mobilizes to redefine the boundaries of citizenship in the community. By promoting their view of citizenship, the philanthropic community engages the policy process in an adversarial and complementary way to the federal immigration bureaucracies and the policies they enforce. Young (2000;2009) and Najam (2000) discuss the relationship between government and non-governmental organizations based on the divergence between each entities' means and end goals. Foundations seeking

to use their philanthropic dollars to help immigrants incorporate into their communities and attain proper political documentation would fall along the continuum of an adversary to Immigration and Customs Enforcement Secure Communities policy outcomes as funding relates to the protection of "deportable" immigrants even those considered to be high priority, deportable immigrants. On the other side of the continuum is the supplementary relationship between the philanthropic community. In their supplementary role, the philanthropic community promotes integration by providing social citizenship through programs and services for the immigrant community in place of the inaction by the government. By offering legal workshops ensure applications for permanent residency or naturalization are correctly filled out, nonprofits work complements the work of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services by reducing their administrative burden.

Research has discussed the way that state policy feedbacks back to influence citizen civic participation and views of their position in society. This research contributes to the public policy literature by discussing how bureaucratic characteristics alter the implementation and outputs of punitive policy. The results contribute to the literature discussing the role of street-level bureaucrats in altering public policy outputs. Additionally, it provides insights into the role that the philanthropic sector plays in altering the implementation of policy, policy environment, and the effects it has on the policy target population.

Conclusion

As the current administration continues to take a hardline on immigration and expand the policy targets eligible for deportation, this dissertation provides insights into how language and community institutions function to redefine and alleviate local pressure for

immigration enforcement. As citizens, as community members, and as advocates, reforming public policy is not the only route to combating the immigration climate and enforcement. This dissertation provides support for community advocacy and bureaucratic incorporation as avenues by which local action can intervene in the public policy process. It addresses how the philanthropic community is working to combat local enforcement and removal of immigrants from the community.

With its unprecedented level of deportations, the first era of Secure Communities caused devastation across the immigrant community. The executive order establishing Secure Communities of the Trump administration provided no bounds or priorities by which to guide its implementation and enforcement. It did the opposite. President Trump expanded the grounds for deportability from only immigrants with criminal convictions to any immigrant is an accused "criminal." My research serves to show the power of non-governmental institutions in shaping policy and empowering those excluded from the political system to take part in the reshaping of public policy through the feedback process from citizen to state.

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APPENDIX A



Figure 1: Secure Communities Activiation from 2008 through 2013

Data comes from ICE Interoperability Report December 2014



Figure 2: Secure Communities Yearly Total Matches

Data comes from ICE Interoperability Report December 2014



Figure 3: Secure Communities Yearly Enforcement Disparity Ratio

Data comes from ICE Interoperability Report December 2014

Table 1: Secure Communities Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Enforcement Per Capita (Force Multiplier)	.02	.04	0	1.27
Logged Total Enforcement	-5.10	2.43	-13.31	.22
Total High Priority Matching Per Capita	.005	.012	0	.25
Logged High Priority Matching Per Capita	-5.95	1.98	-13.30	1.09
Total Low Priority Matching Per Capita	.02	.04	0	1.18
Logged Total Low Priority Matching	-5.20	2.26	-13.30	1.79
Disparity Ratio (LPR to HPR)	3.10	4.19	.27	77.5
Logged Disparity Ratio	.76	.79	-1.29	4.35
Total Matches in the County	639	25,123	0	44,750
Total High Priority Matches in the County	177	711	0	12,193
Total Low Priority Matches in the County	472	1,882	0	37,269
Total Submissions in the County	10,755	26,827	0	422,814
Days as Secure Community Partner	529.30	726.28	-1,179	2,256
Observations	1710			

Table 2: Local Law Enforcement Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Hispanic Officers (%)	5.78	11.64	0	100
Asian Officers (%)	.64	1.30	0	9.22
Total Sheriff's Budget (000)	64,853.2	191,979.2	98.21	2,890,999
Total Sheriff's Department Employees	567	1235	2	17,199
Observations	1710			

Table 3: Controls Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Population	4,084,395	807,516	696	9,974,203
White (%)	71.54	18.73	1.04	99.1
Black (%)	11.06	12.64	0	67.33
Asian (%)	2.86	3.96	0	32.92
Hispanic (%)	12.01	14.10	0.13	98.63
Foreign Born (%)	8.47	7.66	.06	41.7
Total Noncitizen Population	38,952	135,749	0	1,957,868
Unemployment	8.67	2.68	0	18.35
Below Poverty (%)	33.71	9.16	7.55	74.24
Median Income	$56,279.15	$ 14,665.07	$ 24,082.15	$138,152.4
Population with Low Education (%)	14.16	6.216	1.82	55.12
Republican (%)	52.62	13.18	13.02	87.07
Population on Public Assistance (%)	2.36	1.22	0	10.29
Non-homeowners (%)	30.418	8.16	8.86	68.02
Total Local Law Enforcement Employees	34,440	28,272	1,649	99,730
Total Local Law Enforcement Budget (000)	$3,818.03	$3,951.36	$138.47	$15,822.82
Observations	1710			

Table 4: The Effect of Incentive Pay for Bilingual Skills on Immigration Policy Outputs

	Force Multiplier		Disparity Ratio	
Hispanic Officers (%)	-0.02*	(0.005)	-0.008*	(0.03)
Asian Officers (%)	0.04	(0.03)	-0.04*	(0.02)
Bilingual Incentive Pay	-1.00*	(0.32)	-0.004	(0.16)
Population Foreign Born (%) (Logged)	-1.02*	(0.08)	0.11*	(0.04)
Interaction	0.46*	(0.13)	0.02	(0.07)
Sheriff's Department Characteristics				
Submissions (Logged)	0.51*	(0.01)	0.19*	(0.005)
Days as sComm Partner	0.0006*	(0.00009)	-0.0002*	(0.00003)
Prosecutorial Discretion	-0.78*	(0.08)	-0.43*	(0.04)
Sheriff's Budget (logged)	-0.005	(0.08)	-0.07	(0.04)
Sheriff's Total Employees (logged)	0.28*	(0.11)	0.06	(0.05)
Local L.E.A Characteristics				
Total Employees (logged)	0.04	(0.23)	0.52*	(0.12)
Total Budget (logged)	-0.05	(0.21)	-0.46*	(0.11)
Community Characteristics				
Total Population (Logged)	-1.01*	(0.06)	-0.01*	(0.03)
White Population (%)	0.07*	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.01)
Black Population (%)	0.07*	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.01)
Asian Population (%)	0.11*	(0.03)	-0.03*	(0.01)
Hispanic Population (%)	0.11*	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.01)
Unemployment Rate	-0.02	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.01)
Median Income	-0.27*	(0.21)	0.34*	(0.11)
Education (%)	-0.02*	(0.008)	0.004	(0.004)
Republican (%)	0.003	(0.003)	0.004*	(0.004)
Public Assistance (%)	-0.05 +	(0.03)	-0.02	(0.01)
Non-homeownership (%)	-0.0006	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.002)
Border County	1.16*	(0.26)	-0.15	(0.13)
Constant	-6.44*	(3.24)	-1.09	(1.66)
Observations	1710		1710	
R^2	0.82		0.55	

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$



Figure 4: Immigration Policy Outputs using SUR Analysis

Table 5: The Effect of Incentive Pay for Bilingual Skills on Immigration Priority Level Policy Outputs

	High Priority Matching		Low Priority Matching	
Hispanic Officers (%)	-.02*	(0.004)	-0.02*	(0.004)
Asian Officers (%)	0.11*	(0.03)	0.07*	(0.02)
Bilingual Pay Incentive	-0.88*	(0.27)	-0.88*	(0.24)
Population Foreign Born (Logged)	-1.02*	(0.07)	-0.92*	(0.06)
Interaction	0.33*	(0.11)	0.35*	(0.10)
Sheriff's Department Characteristics				
Submissions (Logged)	0.37*	(0.007)	0.55*	(0.008)
Days as sComm Partner	0.0001	(0.0001)	-0.0001	(0.0001)
Prosecutorial Discretion	0.30*	(0.07)	-0.14*	(0.07)
Sheriff's Budget (logged)	0.05	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.07)
Sheriff's Total Employees (logged)	0.14	(0.09)	0.21*	(0.08)
Local L.E.A Characteristics				
Total Full-Time Employees (logged)	-0.36*	(0.19)	0.16	(0.17)
Total Budget (logged)	0.30+	(0.18)	-0.16	(0.16)
Community Characteristics				
Total Population (logged)	-0.91*	(0.05)	-0.95*	(0.04)
White Population (%)	0.08*	(0.02)	0.06*	(0.02)
Black Population (%)	0.07*	(0.02)	0.05*	(0.02)
Asian Population (%)	0.13*	(0.02)	0.10*	(0.02)
Hispanic Population (%)	0.11*	(0.02)	0.09*	(0.02)
Unemployment Rate	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.03*	(0.01)
Median Family Income (logged)	0.41*	(0.18)	-0.07*	(0.16)
Education (%)	-0.02*	(0.007)	-0.01*	(0.006)
Republican (%)	-0.003+	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)
Public Assistance (%)	-0.05*	(0.03)	-0.08*	(0.02)
Population Non-Homeowners (%)	- 0.004	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.004)
Border County	0.90*	(0.22)	1.05*	(0.19)
Constant	-7.50*	(2.74)	-6.41*	(2.47)
Observations	1710		1710	
R^2	0.80		0.87	

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$



Figure 5: Priority Level Per Capita Identification of Deportable Immigrants using SUR Analysis

Table 6: Secure Communities Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Deportable Immigrants Identified	122	1,073	0	51,745
Total Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita (Force Multiplier)	0.07	0.40	0	40
Total Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita (Logged)	-4.37	1.96	-13.31	3.69
Total High Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified	35	335	0	16,239
Total High Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita	0.04	0.18	0	5.62
Total High Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita (Logged)	-4.96	1.79	-13.31	1.73
Total Low Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified	90	786	0	37,269
Total Low Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita	0.06	0.37	0	36
Total Low Priority Deportable Immigrants Identified Per Capita (Logged)	-4.42	1.86	-13.31	3.58
Identification Disparity Ratio (Low to High)	2.49	3.26	1	83
Identification Disparity Ratio (Logged)	0.54	0.77	-2.33	4.42
Total Number of Non-citizens	6,672	46,321	0	1,957,868
Observations	18,586			



Figure 6: Foundations' Total Immigration Related Giving 2008-2014

Data:The Foundation Center



Figure 7: Foundations' Total Immigraiton Related Giving by County 2008-2014

Data: The Foundation Center

Table 7: Philanthrophic Funding Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total County Aggregated Immigration Related Funding	$83,627	$1,285,147	$0	$56,488,577
Total Funding for Immigrant-Serving Nonprofits	$49,320	$735,418	$0	$28,212,654
Total Grant Funding for Immigration Services	$23,916	$478,416	$0	$26,603,126
Total Grant Funding for Integration Services	$39,339	$498,533	$0	$22,259,190
Total Grant Funding Related to Government Lobbying	$20,371	$411,506	$0	$20,268,575
Total Grant Funding for Immigration Services (logged)	0.46	2.23	0	17.10
Total Grant Funding for Integration Services (logged)	0.73	2.82	0	16.92
Total Grant Funding Related to Government Lobbying (logged)	0.33	1.92	0	16.83
Observations	18,586			



Figure 8: Foundations' Total Yearly Instrumental Giving by Grant Activity

Data: The Foundation Center

Table 8: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total State Aggregated Philanthropic Funding Received (000) (logged)	13.29	1.37	9.80	16.20
Aggregated Local Law Enforcement Agencies' Budget (logged)	4.89	1.07	2.17	7.37
Aggregated Local Law Enforcement Agencies' Employees (logged)	9.61	1.01	6.84	11.51
Days in Secure Communities	339.65	703.94	-1179	2256
Total Submissions (Logged)	-0.40	3.48	-4.61	8.35
Non-Citizen Population (%)	2.75	3.58	0	37.95
White Population (%)	78.80	19.29	1.04	100
Black Population (%)	8.89	14.51	0	86.76
Asian Population (%)	1.05	1.99	0	33.36
Hispanic Population (%)	8.14	13.15	0	98.63
Unemployment Rate	8.11	3.61	0	36.11
Non-Homeowner Population (%)	27.18	7.64	5.27	77.45
Less than a High School Education Population (%)	16.21	7.18	0.69	55.12
Public Assistance Population (%)	2.39	1.52	0	24.83
Republican (%)	58.36	14.26	6.50	95.86
Median Income (Logged)	10.77	0.24	9.87	11.84
Observations	18,586			

Table 9: The Effect of Instrumental Funding By Grant Activity on Immigration Policy Outcomes

	Total Enforcement Per Capita		Disparity Ratio	
Grant Funding for Immigration Services	-0.02*	(0.007)	-0.01*	(0.003)
Grant Funding for Integration Services	-.04**	(0.006)	-0.01**	(0.002)
Grant Funding Related to Government	0.05**	(0.008)	-0.01**	(0.003)
State Philanthropic Funds	-0.07**	(0.02)	0.01	(0.01)
Bureaucratic Capacity				
Total L.E.A Budget (logged)	0.57**	(0.07)	-0.41**	(0.03)
Total L.E.A Employees(logged)	-0.78**	(0.08)	0.40**	(0.03)
Days in Secure Communities	0.0005**	(0.00003)	-.0001**	(0.000)
Total Submissions (logged)	0.22**	(0.01)	0.17**	(0.002)
Prosecutorial Discretion	0.005	(0.04)	-0.17**	(0.01)
Community Environment				
Non-Citizen Population (%)			0.03**	(0.002)
White Population (%)	-0.03**	(0.002)	-0.003**	(0.001)
Black Population (%)	-.02**	(0.002)	-0.002*	(0.001)
Asian Population (%)	-.10**	(0.008)	-0.03**	(0.003)
Hispanic Population (%)	-0.04**	(0.002)	-0.004**	(0.001)
Median Income (logged)	-2.79**	(0.07)	0.22**	(0.03)
Public Assistance (%)	-0.05**	(0.01)	-0.02**	(0.004)
Education (%)	-.005*	(0.003)	-0.005**	(0.001)
Unemployment	-0.08**	(0.004)	-0.006*	(0.002)
Non-homeownership (%)	-0.04**	(0.002)	.003**	(0.001)
Republican (%)	0.01**	(0.001)	.003**	(0.001)
Border County	0.65**	(0.14)	-0.22**	(0.06)
Constant	35.42**	(0.93)	-3.39**	(0.37)
Observations	18,586		18,586	
R^2	0.42		0.42	

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.001$

All Grant Amounts are Logged

Table 10: The Effect of Instrumental Funding By Grant Activity on Priority Level Policy Outcomes

	High Priority Per Capita		Low Priority Per Capita	
Grant Funding for Immigration Services	-0.01*	(0.006)	-0.02*	(0.007)
Grant Funding for Integration Services	-0.02**	(0.005)	-0.03**	(0.005)
Grant Funding Related to Government	0.05**	(0.007)	0.05**	(0.007)
State Received Philanthropic Funds	-0.04**	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)
Bureaucratic Capacity				
Total L.E.A Budget (logged)	0.79*	(0.07)	0.41**	(0.07)
Total L.E.A Employees (logged)	-1.05**	(0.07)	-0.70**	(0.07)
Days in Secure Communities	0.0001**	(0.0000)	0.0003**	(0.0000)
Total Submissions (logged)	0.07**	(0.005)	0.24**	(0.005)
Prosecutorial Discretion	0.58**	(0.04)	0.42**	(0.040)
Community Environment				
White Population (%)	0.02**	(0.002)	-0.03**	(0.002)
Black Population (%)	-0.02**	(0.002)	-0.02**	(0.002)
Asian Population (%)	-0.07**	(0.008)	-0.09**	(0.009)
Hispanic Population (%)	-0.04**	(0.002)	-0.04**	(0.002)
Median Income (logged)	2.92**	(0.07)	-2.16**	(0.08)
Public Assistance (%)	-0.03	(0.01)	-0.05**	(0.01)
Education (%)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)
Unemployment	-0.02**	(0.004)	-0.09**	(0.004)
Non-homeownership (%)	0.05**	(0.002)	-0.04**	(0.002)
Republican (%)	0.007**	(0.001)	0.01**	(0.001)
Border County	0.82**	(0.13)	0.64**	(0.13)
Constant	37.22**	(0.89)	32.89**	(0.88)
Observations	18,586		18,586	
R^2	0.44		0.50	

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.001$

All Grant Amounts are Logged



Figure 9: Philanthropic Allocations by Instrumental Funding based on Grant Activity

Data source: The Foundation Center

Table 11: Nonprofits & Grant Activity 2008-2014

County	Number of Grants	Political Citizenship	Integration Services	Government Advocacy	Immigrant Serving	Refugee Serving	Nonprofits Serving Immigrants
Alameda	34	33	1	0	1	0	0
Los Angeles	127	70	13	44	6	0	0
San Diego	75	8	24	43	3	0	1
San Francisco	231	171	43	17	2	0	0
District of Columbia	198	67	33	164	4	1	2
Cook	97	33	57	7	2	0	4
Dallas	49	0	49	0	1	0	0
Harris	24	22	2	0	2	1	0
Hidalgo	59	18	20	21	3	0	0
Travis	27	2	10	15	1	1	0
Total Grantees	921	424	252	311	25	2	6
Not Grantees					4		4

Table 12: Financial Background of Interviewees & Grant Funding from 2009-2014

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Revenue (000)	43	21,365	31,419	0	158,692
Expenses (000)	43	20,188	30,203	0	157,879
Program Expenses (000)	43	17,712	27,969	0	147,313
Government Funding Recieved (000)	43	10,277	25,721	0	144,227
Contributions Received (000)	43	16,486	27,892	0	153,682
Grants Paid (000)	43	1,677	5,396	0	28,061
Philanthropic Funding					
Total Grant Amount (000)	35	2,471	5,746	4	31,581
By Nonprofit Population Priority					
Immigrant Serving (000)	35	2,293	5,784	0	31,581
Serving Immigrants (000)	35	37	120	0	498
By Grant Activity					
Political Citizenship (000)	35	1,379	4526	0	23,731
Integration (000)	35	507.70	764	0	3,527
Government (000)	35	584	1,217	0	6,567
Secure Communities Outputs					
Disparity Ratio	10	3.03	1.08	1.44	4.81
Total Enforcement per Capita	10	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.17
High Priority Matches per Capita	10	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.05
Low Priority per Capita	10	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.12
Foreign Born Population (%)	10	25.40	7.25	13.35	35.41
Noncitizen Population Population (%)	10	14.87	3.94	8.362	21.7
Nonprofits with Philanthropic Grants	35				
Nonprofits without Philanthropic Grants	8				

Data Source: The Foundation Center

Aggregated Yearly Financials from 2009-2014

All amounts are aggregated totals & 2016 constant dollars

APPENDIX B

Table 1: Instrumental Funding: Political Citizenship

Immigrant rights
Immigrant services
Immigration and naturalization
Immigration law

Table 2: Instrumental Funding: Government Advocacy

Census	Freedom from slavery
Democracy	Freedom from violence and torture
Foreign policy	Freedom of association and expression
International development	Housing law
International economics and trade	Human rights
International exchange	Individual liberties
International peace and security	Justice rights
International relations	Juvenile justice
Multilateral cooperation	Labor rights
National defense	Law
Public affairs	Legal aid
Public/private ventures	Legal services
Campaign finance	LGBTQ rights
Election regulation	Media justice
Corrections and penology	Minority rights
Counterterrorism	Organized labor
Elections	Prisoners' rights
Public administration	Public interest law
Public integrity	Public policy
Public safety	Reproductive rights
Public transportation	Right to free movement and asylum
Public utilities	Rights of the aged
Child abuse	Sexual abuse
Child advocacy	Social rights
Children's rights	Tenants' organizations
Civic participation	Voter education and registration
Community organizing	Voter rights
Conflict resolution	Women's rights
Courts	Youth organizing
Crime prevention	Civics for youth
Crisis intervention	Civil protection
Cultural rights	Free goods distribution
Disabled persons' rights	Marriage equality
Dispute resolution	Patients' rights
Diversity and intergroup relations	Community policing
Due process	Freedom of religion
Economic justice	Right to privacy
Environmental justice	Freedom of information
Equal opportunity in education	National security
Law enforcement	Customs and border control
Police agencies	Gun control
Prison alternatives	Democracy & civil society development

Table 3a: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services

Gift distribution	Gender and sexuality studies
Unknown or not classified	Humanities
Archives and special collections	Information and media literacy
Artist's services	International studies
Arts and culture	Parent-teacher involvement
Arts exchange	Alumni relations
Arts services	Anthropology
Cultural awareness	Business education
Dance	Engineering
Design	Ethnic studies
Ethnic museums	Latino and Hispanic studies
European football	Libraries
Festivals	Linguistics
Folk arts	Mathematics
Historic preservation	Nature education
Historical activities	Outdoor education
History museums	Political science
Music	Poverty studies
Performing arts	Public arts
Photography	STEM education
Spoken word	Safety education
Theater	School athletics
Art museums	School-based health care
Arts administration	Science
Boating	Social work education
Children's museums	Sociology
Folk and indigenous music	Teacher education
Maritime museums	Vocational education
Orchestral music	Agriculture
Digital collections	Agriculture for youth
Opera	Animal welfare
Painting	Biodiversity
Performance art	Community food systems
Playwriting	Energy resources
Science museums	Farm bureaus and granges
Scouting programs	Farmlands
Sculpture	Gardening
Visual arts	Land resources
Vocal music	Livestock and ranching

Table 3b: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services

Adult education	Natural resources
Adult literacy	Sustainable agriculture
Adult numeracy	Wildlife biodiversity
Basic and remedial instruction	Agricultural cooperatives
Bilingual education	Air quality
Black studies	Bird preservation
College preparation	Environment
Community college education	Food security
Computer literacy	Organic farming
E-learning	Agriculture, fishing and forestry
Early childhood education	Animal training
Education	Climate change
Education services	Energy efficiency
Educational management	Forest preservation
Elementary and secondary education	Fossil fuels
Elementary education	Hazardous waste management
ESL and second language acquisition	Recycling
Graduate and professional education	Renewable energy
High school equivalency	Rivers and lakes
Higher education	Solid waste management
History	Water pollution
Interdisciplinary studies	Water resources
Labor studies	Biomedicine
Languages	Communicable disease control
Law education	Community mental health care
Literature and writing	Dental care
Medical education	Developmental disability services
Middle school education	Diseases and conditions
Multicultural education	Exercise
Out-of-school learning	Family counseling
Adoption	Racquet sports
Food banks	Combat sports
Food delivery	Cycling
Housing rehabilitation	Architecture
Adolescent parenting	Clean water supply
Adult day care	Community and economic development
Job benefits	Community beautification
Orphanages	Community development finance

Table 3c: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services

Parent education	Family disability resources
Performing arts education	Health
Philosophy	Health care access
Population studies	Health care administration and financing
Psychology and behavioral science	Health care clinics
Public libraries	Health care management
Reading promotion	HIV/AIDS
Secondary education	Holistic medicine
Sexual education	Hospice care
Social sciences	Hospital care
Special needs education	In-home aid and personal assistance
Student retention	Independent living for people with disabilities
Student services	Maternal and perinatal health
Traditional knowledge	Medical support services
Tutoring	Mental health care
Undergraduate education	Mental health counseling
University education	Nursing homes
Urban studies	Nutrition
Vocational post-secondary education	Occupational health
Women's studies	Out-patient medical care
Adult and child mentoring	Patient-centered care
American studies	Preventive care
Arts education	Public health
Charter school education	Rehabilitation
Child educational development	Reproductive health care
Cooperative education	Specialty hospital care
Educational exchanges	Substance abuse treatment
Educational testing	Surgery
Environmental education	Abortion
Addiction services	Transitional living
Cancers	Vision care
Children's hospital care	Welfare
Community health care	Youth pregnancy prevention
Diabetes	Abuse prevention
Family planning	Supportive housing
Health insurance	Utility expense assistance
Home health care	Buddhism

Table 3d: Instrumental Funding: Integration

Hygiene	Catholicism
In-patient medical care	Christianity
Internal medicine	Evangelicalism
Kidney diseases	Interfaith
Managed care	Islam
Nursing care	Judaism
Orthopedics	Methodism
Asthma	Presbyterianism
Autism	Protestantism
Breast cancer	Religion
Depression	Religion for youth
Diagnostic imaging	Theology
Drug safety	Baptist
E-health	Episcopalianism and Anglicanism
Ebola	Lutheranism
Electronic health records	Orthodox Christianity
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases	Spirituality
First aid training	Banking
Geriatrics	Consumer protection
Gerontology	Credit unions
Heart and circulatory system diseases	Economics
Hematology	Financial counseling
Immune system diseases	Financial services
Liver diseases	Home financing
Medical specialties	Microfinance
Mental and behavioral disorders	Public finance
Obesity	Social enterprise
Palliative care	Business and industry
Pediatrics	Business promotion
Pharmacies	Benefits planning
Physical fitness	Development finance
Prenatal care	Foreclosure prevention
Residential mental health care	Health care financing
Retirement housing	Housing loss prevention
Single parent support	Antidiscrimination
Smoking	Bullying
Substance abuse prevention	Basic aid emergency aid
Toxic substance control	Basic and emergency aid
Traditional medicine and healing	Disaster relief

Table 3e: Instrumental Funding: Integration

Child care	Philanthropy
Child development	Rural development
Child welfare	Sustainable development
Dining services	Urban development
Domestic violence	Urban planning
Domestic violence shelters	Urban renewal
Economics for youth	Venture philanthropy
Employment	Voluntarism
Entrepreneurship	Bicycling and pedestrian-oriented development
Family services	Neighborhood associations
Foster care	Community recreation
Home ownership	Intergenerational mentoring
Homeless services	Advocacy journalism
Homeless shelters	Communication media
Housing for the homeless	Constituency journalism
Housing services	Investigative journalism
Human services	Journalism
Human services information	Media development software
Human services management	Mobile media
Infant care	Publishing
Job counseling	Radio
Job creation and workforce development	Technology
Job retraining	Television
Job services	Web media
Job training	Websites
Patient social services	Audio recording
Public housing	Internet
Rent and mortgage assistance	Media democracy
Senior services	Citizen journalism
Services for offenders	Content management software
Sexual assault victim services	Data management software
Shelter and residential care	Information and Communications

Table 3f: Instrumental Funding: Integration

Community improvement	Natural history museums
Community service	Food sovereignty
Community service for youth	Environmental health
Economic development	Transport and storage
Foundations	Urban sprawl
Goodwill promotion	Disasters
Housing development	Disasters and emergency management
Leadership development	Food aid
Nonprofits	Non-natural disasters
Paratransit	Victim aid
Parks	Disaster preparedness
Camps	Disaster reconstruction
Fishing and hunting	Earthquakes
Golf	Fire prevention and control
Skiing and snowboarding	Floods
Sports	Storms
Sports and recreation	Special population support
Equestrianism	Tourism
Media access and policy	Museums
Temporary accommodations	Information communications technology
Vocational rehabilitation	News and public information
Women's services	Social media
Youth development	Telecommunications
Youth mentoring	Film and video
Youth services	Interactive games

Table 4: California Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding

Variable	Alameda	Los Angeles	San Diego	San Francisco
Nonprofits Interviewed	1	7	4	2
Average Age	40.50	23.57	15.50	22.50
Financials $				
Average Total Revenue	37,931.39	18,943.05	9,027.39	28,670.31
Average Total Expenses	38,425.43	18,814.86	9,164.73	25,079.50
Average Program Expenses	31,287.85	17,814.80	8,163.11	21,906.09
Average Government Funding	3,233.80	10,330.41	5,630.98	519.66
Average Contributions Received	4,826.89	14,737.84	7,804.40	22,547.44
Average Grants Paid	0.00	91.17	380.23	9,952.12
Philanthropic Funding $				
Number of Grants Received	34	127	75	231
Total Foundation Funding	148.70	8,889.73	2,993.35	33,942.46
Total Immigrant Serving NP	148.70	8,889.73	2,509.56	33,942.46
Total Refugee Serving NP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Other NP Funding	0.00	0.00	483.79	0.00
Total Political Citizenship	137.70	4,448.45	837.80	24,560.34
Total Integration	11.01	1,698.22	910.60	2,815.11
Total Government	0.00	2,743.06	1,244.95	6,567.01
Secure Communities $				
Noncitizen %	14.83	19.11	12.27	13.62
Foreign Born %	30.69	35.34	23.16	35.41
Disparity Ratio	3.12	2.68	2.32	1.44
Total Matching Per Capita	0.08	0.10	0.17	0.08
High Priority Per Capita	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.03
Low Priority Per Capita	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.05
Activation	2010	2009	2009	2010



Figure 1: California Interviewees' Philanthropic Funding Allocations

Data Source: The Foundation Center

Table 5: District of Columbia Interview Summary Statistics & Grant Funding

Variable	District of Columbia
Nonprofits Interviewed	6
Average Age	20.5
Financials $	
Average Total Revenue	14,932.11
Average Total Expenses	14,514.19
Average Program Expenses	11,524.38
Average Government Funding	1,222.93
Average Contributions Received	13,435.53
Average Grants Paid	618.238
Philanthrophic Funding $	
Number of Grants Received	198
Total Foundation Funding	24,931.18
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding	20,042.51
Total Refugee Serving NP	3,599.40
Total Other NP Funding	50.696
Total Political Citizenship	14,773.41
Total Integration	4,201.24
Total Government	5,956.54
Secure Communities	
Noncitizen %	8.36
Foreign Born %	13.35
Disparity Ratio	4.19
Total Matching Per Capita	0.10
High Priority Per Capita	0.02
Low Priority Per Capita	0.08
Activation	2012



Figure 2: District of Columbia's Interviewees' Philanthropic Funding Allocations

Data source: The Foundation Center

Table 6: Illinois Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding

Variable	Cook
Nonprofits Interviewed	6.00
Average Age	26.25
Financials $	
Average Total Revenue	24,702.27
Average Total Expenses	21,889.11
Average Program Expenses	18,715.42
Average Government Funding	9,797.43
Average Contributions Received	14,497.30
Average Grants Paid	105.52
Philanthropic Funding $	
Number of Grants Received	97
Total Foundation Funding	7,278.93
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding	6,516.66
Total Refugee Serving NP	0.00
Total Other NP Funding	762.27
Total Political Citizenship	2,840.14
Total Integration	4,293.20
Total Government	145.59
Secure Communities	
Noncitizen %	11.44
Foreign Born %	20.98
Disparity Ratio	4.81
Total Matching Per Capita	0.04
High Priority Per Capita	0.01
Low Priority Per Capita	0.04
Activation	2013



Figure 3: Cook County's Interviewees' Philanthropic Funding Allocations

Data source: The Foundation Center

Table 7: Texas Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding

Variable	Dallas	Harris	Hidalgo	Travis
Nonprofits Interviewed	1	3	3	2
Average Age	14.50	33.83	26.83	18.00
Financials $				
Average Total Revenue	5,470.30	40,652.56	61,131.96	8,214.72
Average Total Expenses	4,818.59	37,511.13	60,122.75	8,192.27
Average Program Expenses	3,800.52	31,927.16	55,707.34	7,564.73
Average Government Funding	0.00	23,627.34	51,199.72	1,941.14
Average Contributions Received	5,282.80	36,022.87	55,989.31	7,764.32
Average Grants Paid	0.00	14,878.68	303.57	21.97
Philanthropic Funding $				
Number of Grants Received	49	24	59	27
Total Foundation Funding	669.11	219.95	5,412.86	2,004.92
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding	669.11	192.97	5,412.86	1,936.25
Total Refugee Serving NP	0.00	0.00	0.00	68.67
Total Other NP Funding	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Political Citizenship	0.00	198.74	472.85	1.06
Total Integration	669.11	21.21	2,656.28	493.42
Total Government	0.00	0.00	2,283.73	1,510.45
Secure Communities				
Noncitizen %	17.14	17.04	21.72	13.20
Foreign Born %	23.08	24.95	29.19	17.91
Disparity Ratio	3.15	4.12	1.80	2.67
Total Matching Per Capita	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11
High Priority Per Capita	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03
Low Priority Per Capita	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.08
Activiation	2008	2008	2009	2009



Figure 4: Texas' Counties Interviewees' Philanthropic Funding Allocation

Data source: The Foundation Center