THE RHETORICAL CRISIS OF THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL:
FORGOTTEN NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL DIRECTIONS

A Dissertation

by

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Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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August 2018

Major Subject: Communication

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ABSTRACT

The accidental opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, dismantled the political narratives of the East and the West and opened up a rhetorical arena for political narrators like the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German leadership to define and exploit the political crisis and put forward favorable resolutions. With this dissertation, I trace the neglected and forgotten political directions as they reside in the narratives of the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German political leadership between November 1989 and February 1990. The events surrounding November 9th, 1989, present a unique opportunity for this endeavor in that the common flows of political communication between organized East German publics, the West German press, and West German political leaders changed for a moment and with it the distribution of political legitimacy.

To account for these new flows of political communication and the battle between different political crisis narrators over the rhetorical rights to reestablish political legitimacy, I develop a rhetorical model for political crisis narrative. This theoretical model integrates insights from political crisis communication theories, strategic narratives, and rhetoric. My analyses then test this model by tracing the narrative trajectories and rhetorical transformations of the narrative enactments by the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German political leadership.

As recent historical research revealed, Helmut Kohl favored what others refers to as the “pre-fabrication model” for German and European unification, which entails the
expansion of West German and European legal, political, and economic systems eastward. Using Sarotte’s research about Kohl’s prefab model as a rhetorical anchor, my reconstructions of the different political crisis narratives reveal how the individual narratives support or weaken Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for German and European reunification. Finally, while the West’s rhetoric of practical politics, economic necessity, and rapid unification offered short-term solutions for political and economic integration, it concealed long-term narrative possibilities for German and European integration. Thus, this dissertation discusses the hidden rhetorical possibility for German and European political integration as they reside within the discourse between the East German opposition groups, the West German press, and the West German political leadership.

Keywords: Berlin Wall, Political Crisis Narratives, Rhetoric
DEDICATION

Für meine Familie.

Die mich lehrte was Zusammenhalt und Durchhaltevermögen bedeuten.

(To my family. For teaching me what togetherness and perseverance mean.)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee. Thank you, Dr. Nathan Crick, Dr. Randy Kluver, Dr. Timothy Coombs, and Dr. Gabriela Thornton for your personal and professional support, encouragement, and guidance. Your insights about rhetoric, strategic narratives, crises communication, and European politics were instrumental in developing the theoretical lens for this dissertation. I extend special thanks to my dissertation advisor, Professor Crick, whose critical, yet supportive voice was vital to both the completion and revision of this project. Nathan, you set the right constraints for me to be creative. Whether it is your advice about academic writing, teaching, or conference presentations, you introduced the right standards for me to grow as a researcher and teacher. Further, thank you Dr. Kluver for introducing me to Alister Miskimmon’s ideas about policy narratives. Your guidance and encouragement to view European politics through a narrative lens, as well as our numerous conversations about the role of Europe and Germany in international politics truly helped me to shape my research agenda. Also, thank you Dr. Coombs for exposing me to Arjen Boin’s ideas about political crisis management and Frandsen and Johansen’s rhetorical arena approach to crisis communication. Your input and support to write about Angela Merkel’s lonely political voice in Europe’s 2015 migration crisis led to a conference paper, which I presented during the best student paper panel in the PR Division at NCA in Dallas. Finally, thank you Dr. Thornton for helping me develop a research interest in European politics and thank you for the numerous insightful and inspiring conversations about European identity politics.
My mom, Dorothea Ehrl, and my best childhood friend Christoph Pöter deserve special recognition in that they researched and located those newspaper articles for me that were not accessible through A&M’s databases. Their efforts were invaluable to the coding process of my data. Also, I wish to thank Christoph Pöter, Robert Engel, and David Fricke for listening to my concerns and doubts and encouraging me to continue despite logistical and psychological obstacles.

I also owe great debts to the communication faculty and staff at Texas A&M University, who not only helped me to navigate A&M’s bureaucracy, but also entrusted me with teaching a variety of lower and upper level communication courses. By providing me the opportunity to teach courses like rhetorical criticism and group communication, as well as international communication and argumentation and debate, the communication department allowed me to grow into the role of a well-rounded instructor of communication.

Finally, I wish to thank my wonderful wife, Paige Calamari Ehrl, who puts up with an academic who is also a German. She puts the world into perspective when I try to explain it from high up in the ivory tower. She often reminds me that there is a world outside of seminar rooms and lecture halls. Thank you for turning an academic into an adventurer and recording our adventures with beautiful photography. You are my most loyal fan.
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES

This work was supervised by a dissertation committee consisting of Professor Nathan Crick, Professor Alan Kluver, and Professor William T. Coombs of the Department of Communication and Professor Gabriela Thornton of the Bush School of Government and Public Service. All work for the dissertation was completed by the student independently. There are no outside funding contributions to acknowledge related to the research and compilation of this document.
NOMENCLATURE

AfD  Alternative for Germany Party
ASNA  Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata
BPB  Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education
CDA  Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU  Christian Democratic Union Party
CSCE  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EEC  European Economic Community
EPC  European Political Cooperation
FAZ  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FR  Frankfurter Rundschau
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany
GDR  German Democratic Republic
LDPD  Liberal-Democratic Party of East Germany
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPD  National Democrats
PDA  Political Discourse Analysis
SED  Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SPD  Social Democratic Party
SZ  Süddeutsche Zeitung
STASI  East Germany’s State Security Service
TAZ  Tageszeitung
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO  Warsaw Treaty Organization
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................ iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... v
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES .............................................................. vii
NOMENCLATURE ......................................................................................................... viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

The East German Public ............................................................................................ 8
The Western Print Media ......................................................................................... 14
The Political Leadership of the West ...................................................................... 16
Dissertation Data ...................................................................................................... 21
Approach .................................................................................................................. 24
Organization of the Dissertation .............................................................................. 32
  Chapter I: Introduction ......................................................................................... 32
  Chapter II: Political Narratives of Crisis: Theory and Definitions ...................... 33
  Chapter III: The Rhetorical Transformation of East German Publics ................. 33
  Chapter IV: Setting the Stage for Rapid German Reunification: The West German
  Print Media as Political Actor ............................................................................. 34
  Chapter V: Rapid Reunification and the West German Rhetoric of Practical
  Politics ..................................................................................................................... 35
  Chapter VI: Conclusion ......................................................................................... 35
Significance of Analysis ........................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER II POLITICAL NARRATIVES OF CRISIS: THEORY AND
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................. 42

  Political Crisis as Crisis of Rhetorical Legitimacy .............................................. 43
  A Rhetorical View of Crisis Events and Situations .............................................. 51
  A Rhetorical Lens for Political Crisis Narratives .............................................. 58
  Fragmented Political Crisis Narratives ............................................................... 74
  West German Political Leaders as Crisis Narrators .......................................... 85
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: A Rhetorical Model of Political Crisis Narratives ............................................ 82
Figure 2: Distribution of Rhetorical Power among Crisis Narrators ..................................... 99
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Research Design..............................................................................................................105
Table 2: Code System Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers.............................................118
Table 3: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches...............123
Table 4: Comparison of Alexanderplatz and Round Table Policy Narratives......................144
Table 5: Code System Political Goals Schöneberg City Hall Speeches..............................152
Table 6: Code System Political Settings in Schöneberg City Hall Speeches.......................156
Table 7: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan Speech........................................................................................................................................166
Table 8: Rhetorical Transformation of Helmut Kohl’s Policy Narrative.................................182
Table 9: Rhetorical Transformation of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Narrative.217
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Every revolutionary movement also liberates language. What up to that point had been so hard to express, now suddenly passes our lips. We are amazed at what we had apparently thought for a long time and now call out to each other. “Democracy—now or never!,” and what we mean is governance by the people. We remember those beginnings in our history that got bogged down or were brutally suppressed, and we do not want to pass up the opportunity inherent in this crisis, since it awakens all our productive energies. . . . And today I saw a truly unbelievable phrase on a banner: 'No privileges any more for us Berliners.' Indeed, language is liberating itself from the official, newspaper-German in which it was wrapped, and it is remembering the words that express feelings” (Speech by East German activist and literary critic Christa Wolf at the Leipzig protest at Alexanderplatz on November 4th, 1989 in East Berlin) (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 49)

The GDR leadership finds itself in transition. The partially renewed leadership would not be equipped to contribute to any negotiations about German-German reunification. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, First Sentence Lead Article, November 10th, November 1989).

Incidentally, there can be no doubt that this is also what the people in the GDR want. They want economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and achieve greater prosperity . . . After free elections in the near future, we imagine the following institutions: a joint governmental committee for permanent consultation and political agreement; joint special committees; a joint parliamentary committee; and many other things in the light of these new developments. What a unified Germany will eventually look like, nobody knows. I am certain, however, that unity is coming soon, if the people of Germany desire it (Speech by the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the German Parliament on November 28th, 1989)

On November 9th, 1989 the Berlin Wall opened and the decade-old symbol of a divided city within a divided Germany within a divided Europe transformed into a symbol of new beginnings. The event opened up new possibilities for Germany’s and Europe’s political future. During the Cold War, opposing ideological and military commitments hindered East Germany and West Germany to interact through diplomacy or other non-coercive means of communication. The building of the Berlin Wall not only
reinforced the division of Germany, which started in 1945 when the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States divided Germany into four occupational zones, but it also led to opposing political, economic, and military systems. In 1949 the French, the British, and the Americans declared independence from the Soviet zone establishing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and in 1955 they allied with NATO. In turn, the Soviet Union declared itself as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and allied with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The opening of the Berlin Wall suddenly disrupted the hardened Cold-War commitments, creating room for new social actors and new political directions for Germany and Europe.

The opening of the Berlin Wall represents the finale of a political drama that involves different domestic and international actors and situations. Weeks and months of oppositional activity by East German environmental, peace, human rights, and other alternative groups climaxed with mass-demonstrations at Alexanderplatz on November 4th, 1989 in East Berlin. With 28 speeches, opposition leaders, artists, and activists expressed their political vision for the future of the GDR and Europe. They entertained the possibility of an independent and democratic German Democratic Republic as well as a German federation, a new constitution, and a unified Germany created though the participation of Germans in West and East Germany. In addition to specific political directions for Germany’s and Europe’s future, they also spoke of the importance of political language. In her protest speech, Christa Wolf—an East German activist and literary critic—argues that political crises not only offer opportunity for new beginnings, but that they liberate language as well. Only five days before the opening of the Berlin
Wall she urges East Berlin protest groups to detach their political language from the discourses of the newspapers and the political leadership. Specifically, she asks Berliners to remember and amplify the emotional meanings of their protest language. At the beginning of her speech she explains that “language is liberating itself from the official, newspaper-German in which it was wrapped, and it is remembering the words that express feelings” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 49). For her, a revolution that brings about new political action and direction requires its own language. The protestors’ language of political independence, confidence, and action gained wide public support in the weeks and months leading up to the fall of the Berlin wall. However, this changed after the events of November 9th, 1989. With the opening of the Berlin Wall, the East German protest discourse of political action, freedom, and independence entered a rhetorical arena in which Western newspapers and politicians tried to advance their own narrative about what happened and what political future Germany and Europe should work toward.

In the early day’s following the opening of the Berlin Wall, the five biggest daily West German newspapers tended to play down the possibility of the GDR’s involvement in the process of German reunification. They depicted GDR’s leadership as not well-equipped to contribute constructively to possible negotiations about German reunification. In his lead article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ), Friedrich Karl Fromme argues that the members of the East German government are not prepared to participate in negotiations for possible German unification. He says that only fundamental change in the GDR would allow for reunification. Specifically, he contends
that the opening of the Berlin Wall should be a memorial for overcoming GDR leadership. While newspapers are often reactive rather than intentional narrators during political crises, their reporting and commentary potentially amplifies, modifies, and even mutes other discourses. By questioning the possibility of East German involvement in the process of German reunification, West German newspapers made it more difficult for voices like Christa Wolf to gain public salience. Inadvertently, these editorials set the stage for Western politicians to advance and defend their narratives.

After solemn remarks by the former mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin on November 10, 1989, the political leadership of West Germany waited to enter the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s political future. On November 28, 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented his Ten-Point Program for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe. In his Ten-Point Plan speech to the German parliament, Kohl’s rhetoric reassures the people of East Germany of West German support. He speaks of unity and prosperity and lays out a plan for German and European unification. On March 18, 1990 the Conservative Alliance Party for Germany, led by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and supported by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, won the first free elections in the GDR. With its political slogan “no more socialist experiments,” they advocated a market economy as well as rapid unification. The conservative Alliance Party for Germany won 48% of the vote and not only expedited the process for rapid unification, but also weakened any discourse about alternative political directions. From
a post-election perspective, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan then sounds less reassuring and empowering after it reinforced rapid reunification as the only option for Germany’s and Europe’s political future. This rhetoric deprived the GDR of its political identity and problematized political integration for East Germans. It thwarted any attempts by East Germans’ to see themselves in the narrative of a truly unified Germany.

While a large population of citizens from the German Democratic Republic favored rapid unification with the Federal Republic of Germany, the rhetorical battle between the East German opposition leaders, the West German news media, and West German politicians created a unification process of unequal partners. Their competing and conflicting discourses opened specific political directions, while foreclosing others. With this dissertation, I turn to the neglected and forgotten political directions as they reside in the projected narratives and communication networks of the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German political leadership. Specifically, I focus on the battle over the political crisis narratives of 1989 as it unfolded in the days before, during, and after the opening of the Berlin Wall. The events surrounding November 9th, 1989 present a unique opportunity for this endeavor in that the common flows of political communication between the public, the media, and the political leaders changed for a moment and with it the distribution and form of political legitimacy. Neither the political leaders of the GDR, nor the political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) legitimized the opening of the wall. Instead, the East German public and the Western media legitimized the opening of the border crossings. Encouraged by the overly optimistic reporting by West German media that the
wall is now open and mass protests in Leipzig on October 9th, 1989, where the East German regime and the USSR resisted to use violence against the protestors, East Germans built up the confidence to risk a trip to the wall (Engel, 2009; Sarotte, 2014a). Further, the fall of the Berlin wall presents an event that suddenly disrupted the hardened Cold-War narrative, opening up room for East Germans to narrate their own possible futures for Germany and Europe.

With this dissertation I argue that in the political crisis narratives of the East German public, the West German news media, and the West German political leadership, which emerged right before and immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, reside rhetorical possibilities for German and European political integration that today’s narratives neglect. While the West’s rhetoric of practical politics, economic necessity, and rapid unification offered short-term solutions for political and economic integration, it concealed long-term narrative possibilities for German and European integration. The existing literature often approaches the events of 1989 from a historical, political, economic or international relations perspective, but not from a perspective of narrative possibilities. We remember the West’s narrative of rapid unification and eastward expansion, but we often forget that the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s political future offered and foreclosed other narratives.

As the binaries of democracy versus totalitarianism and capitalism versus socialism stopped to define the possible political futures for the East and the West, the western political leadership was desperately searching for rhetorical resources to narrate Germany’s and thereby Europe’s political future. Overnight, the Berlin wall stopped to
function as a symbol of economic and military failure, political challenge and
provocation, or solidarity. This opened opportunities for the East German public, the
Western print media, and the political leaders of the West to project new narratives about
the relationship between the East and the West and the future of Germany and Europe.
For the political leaders of the West, the events of 1989 rendered their narratives and
political languages meaningless in explaining the causes, consequences, and cures of this
historical event. The Western print media and the East German public, however, quickly
used the rhetorical vacuum to narrate their versions of the events and its implications for
the political future of Germany and Europe.

The events surrounding the opening of the Berlin wall not only created a
rhetorical vacuum for different narratives, but they also structured the battle over
political crisis narratives between the East German public, the Western print media, and
the political leaders of the West into a pre-crisis, during-crisis, and after-crisis battle.
Before the opening of the Berlin wall, East Germans gained a political voice via mass
demonstrations and social movements. Due to the East German government’s reluctance
to openly coerce and silence these movements, the East German public emerged as a key
narrator for German and European unification in the months leading up to November
9th, 1989. Then, the sudden opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989 created a
fluid political situation, which invited new narrators into the rhetorical arena of 1989
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2007). The Western print media and the Western political
leadership now introduced their own narratives about the process of German and
European unification. It is important to mention, however, that while the Western news
media amplified the optimistic voices of the East German narrative for Western politicians and publics, they are reactive rather than intentional crisis narrators (Lippman, 1927; Lippmann, 1922). The Western print media would report and comment on specific political events and elevate them to the level of public salience, while neglecting others. Thus, depending on the events of the day, the West German print media would play different narrative roles for the East German public and the West German political leaders before, during, and after the opening of the Berlin wall. The political leadership of West Germany entered the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s political directions only weeks after the opening of the Berlin wall. On November 28th, 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented his Ten-Point Program for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe. This not only changed the narrative role of the West German print media, but it also created conflicting narratives about Germany’s and Europe’s future. Over the years, we have accepted the West German narrative of German and European unification as the only 1989 narrative. However, we are forgetting the narrative battles that happened between the East German public, the West German print media and the political leadership of the West.

The East German Public

The peaceful protests in Leipzig on October 9th, 1989 with 70,000 people in attendance and at Alexanderplatz on November 4th with over 1 million protestors not only increased the political pressure on the East German government, but they also enabled different interest groups to speak with a new political voice. The different groups and networks that existed in the years before 1989—environmental groups, peace
groups, migration groups, opposition groups, fellow travelers—not only created new networks of political communication, but also a new language to air their concerns. In the weeks and months after November 9th, 1989, high-ranking German and European politicians continued to use Western definitions of unity, democracy, and freedom to narrate the process of German reunification and European integration, neglecting the political language that East Germans generated in the demonstrations and networks leading up to the night of November 9th, 1989 (Sarotte, 2014a, 2014b). Put differently, while West Germans used spray cans and graffiti to express their demands for political freedom and unity, East Germans risked their lives for it. By ignoring these differences in meanings of political action, the political leaders of the West encroached upon the process of German and European re-unification without incorporating the language of political legitimization that East Germans generated over years and finally expressed publicly.

The political discourse by East German publics, however, offers a language of political confidence and action that the political leaders of West Germany and West Europe often ignores or fails to recognize, even up to this day. European political leaders use the fall of the Berlin wall as a symbol of political and economic freedoms, but it is often difficult to figure out whose freedoms they speak of (Garton Ash, 1990). East Germans hoped that their political efforts would not be in vain, but would help to enhance the process of German re-unification. For East Germans, November 9th, 1989 was a day of political liberation, legitimization, and reform, rather than a day of unification. German unification would happen nearly a year later on October 3rd, 1990.
During the early days of East Germany’s political revolution, reformers spoke of a “third path” when addressing German unification. They tried to avoid the ideologically hardened political oppositions of democracy vs. totalitarianism and capitalism vs. socialism, which defined the Cold-War narrative (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. xix). When speaking of a “third path,” East German dissidents and reformers imagined a future that would transcend the political directions implicit in the Cold-War narrative. They envisioned a Germany driven by mutual political reforms in East and West Germany. The “Third Path” refers to a political and economic future, which integrates principles of socialist distribution into capitalist production processes and avoid eastern authoritarianism as well as western exploitation.1

The Central Round Table meetings, which lasted from December 1989 until March 1990 present the clearest attempt by former GDR leadership and GDR reformers to work toward this “Third Path” (“Weniger als Feigenblätter…“, 2016). On December 7, 1989, the remaining members of the Socialist Unity Party, trade unions, block parties, and the women’s league met with opposition leaders of the popular citizen movements (e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) in East Berlin to discuss the future of the GDR. The members of these weekly Round Table meetings considered themselves as the GDR’s transitional political

1 Historically, the idea of a German “Third Path” is a problematic term in that it reminds people of the German Sonderweg, which referred to conservative political programs of the 1920s. These programs aimed at bolstering Germany’s political and cultural status due to its geographical location and for a lot of people it led to German nationalism and the Third Reich. Not surprisingly, the term caused public resentment and suspect (Gray & Wilke, 1996).
institutions and a watchdog for the GDR.² They aimed to democratize the GDR, craft a new constitution, and initiate free elections. After their initial meeting on December 7, 1989, the Round Table meetings spread to the regional and local level to influence the political directions in local and regional governments. Whereas they hesitated to view themselves as a legitimate political force, the mass demonstrations in Leipzig and East Berlin built up their political confidence and public visibility. Further, the newly formed political networks enabled them to shape the political decision-making processes at the regional and local level. When bringing the round table meeting to the local and regional level, they refused any top-down or hierarchical approach. Instead, local and regional Round tables formed in a spontaneous and independent fashion.

In the early weeks and months after the opening of the Berlin Wall, members of the round tables deliberated different political directions for the reunification process. Those included an independent and democratic GDR, a German federation, a new constitution, and a unified Germany created through the participation of Germans in both East and West (Smith, 1998, p. 3). However, the West’s rhetoric of political responsibility, wisdom, and national and European unity quickly replaced the idealistic language, political initiatives, and deliberations of East German reformers. Especially Helmut Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics overshadowed East German’s discourses of political liberation, reform, and the possibility of a third path (Gray & Wilke, 1996). With his Ten-Point Plan, Kohl outlined his vision of a united Germany and Europe under

² For a comprehensive discussion of the political significance of the Round Tables see (Thaysen, 1990, 2000).
the disguise of close political and economic cooperation with the East. Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan speech to the German parliament on November 28, 1989 functioned as the first step toward what Sarotte (2014a) describes as the West’s pre-fabrication model for Germany and Europe. Kohl’s pre-fab model took “the West’s prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply extended them eastward” (Sarotte, 2014a, p. 8). While Kohl’s pre-fab model or grand narrative for Germany and Europe provided immediate economic stability and prospect, Sarotte does not view this model as the best model for German and European integration. Kohl’s ambitions to advance his grand narrative introduced new issues into the debates between East and West Germany and silenced alternative strategies. Questions of migration from the East to the West, financial aid to the GDR by the FDR, the exchange rate between West and East German marks, and consolidation of political institutions, started to dominate the discourses between political groups of the East and the Kohl government.

West Germans wanted East Germans for the process of re-unification, but not for their political effort and experience (Kelly, 2011). So, while the East German publics offered language and networks for political integration and legitimization, the West operated under the old superior West vs. inferior East dichotomy. Thus, a key difference between public responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall by West Germans and East Germans is that East German publics re-discovered freedom of expression and political power by themselves. East Germans also used terms like freedom, unity, and
cooperation, but they carried different political meanings. These neglected differences in political languages divide Germany and Europe up to this day.

In a 2017 interview with the *Berliner Zeitung*, Thomas Krüger, the leader of Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB), argues that Germany’s political institutions still struggle to break down the cultural and political walls in peoples’ heads. Specifically, he suggests that “[t]here is simply a lack of [political] translators of cultural differences. Then a positive appropriation of institutions becomes more difficult” (as cited in Knight, 2017). Krüger explains that today’s cultural disconnect between East and West Germany is grounded in a deep distrust among East Germans toward state institutions and democratic processes. This distrust manifests itself in voter turnout and election results in East Germany. States in East Germany barely reached 50% in the 2013 federal elections, compared to 63% in former West Germany (Lees, 2014). Also, political parties critical of Germany’s political and economic system are particularly popular and gain wide political support in East German states. Historically, the Socialist Left Party (Die Linke) benefitted from people’s deep distrust toward political institutions. In Germany’s 2009 federal elections, the Socialist Left Party gained 28.5% of the vote in East Germany. In 2013 they dropped to 22.7% (Hagen, 2017). Now, the far-right wing Alternative for Germany Party (AfD), exploits East Germans’ distrust toward democracy and political institutions. They gained 21.9% of the vote in East Germany, compared to only 11.1% in West Germany. For Krüger, East Germans are victims of cultural colonialism by the West, which started with Germany’s reunification process.
The Western Print Media

The Western news media played a key role in the sudden and peaceful collapse of the Berlin Wall on three important occasions (Kelly, 2011; Sarotte, 2014b). During the October 9th protests in Leipzig, a group of protestors secretly recorded the demonstration and smuggled the recording to West German news channels in Berlin. 55-60% of viewers in the GDR who owned a television watched West German News regularly (Dittmar, 2005), which meant that at the night of October 9th, 1989 East Germans saw how the peaceful protest of 70,000 of their fellow citizens intimidated the otherwise violent police force of the GDR. This built up political courage and confidence among the people of East Germany and increased the political pressure on the regime.

Second, at a live news conference on November 9th, Günter Schabowski, who was a spokesperson for the East German Politburo accidentally announced that the borders to West Berlin are now open. With the new travel regulations, the SED regime simply intended to communicate a willingness to listen to the concerns of the East German people, rather than bring about actual political change. However, Schabowski improvised and answered questions from journalists about the new travel regulations without resorting a note that he received right before the news conference from the SED leadership. This note specified when and what travel rules would apply. In connection with the news reporting that followed, Schabowski’s now historic exchange with Riccardo Ehrmann, an Italian journalist with Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ASNA), politically legitimized the opening of the border. “Journalist Riccardo Ehrmann
asked: When will this be effective? Schabowski responded: To my knowledge immediately, without delay” (Triandafyllidou, Wodak, & Krzyżanowski, 2009, p. 69).

With the world media present, Schabowski’s accidental announcement turned into newspaper headlines and a political declaration that the Berlin Wall is now open.

Finally, encouraged by the news that the wall is now open, East Berliners risked a trip to the border crossings. Confused by Schabowski’s comments and overwhelmed by the growing masses, the border guards contacted their supervisors who reported that the wall is still closed. This confused the border guards even further. Under the pressure of the masses, however, the first border crossing opened around 11:00 p.m. at Bornholmer Straße. This happened not via orders from the GDR leadership, but due to individual decisions by the border guards. Opening the crossing at Bornholmer Straße further legitimized Schabowski’s accidental announcement for East Berliners and even for other border guards in that images of people crossing the border at Bornholmer Straße now flooded the air waves. Accordingly, the Western news media not only played a key role in the sudden and peaceful collapse of the Berlin Wall, but it also helped to initiate a process that would legitimize political action from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.

The process of political legitimation through the media continued across Europe. In the days after the opening of the wall, major British, Dutch, Italian and Greek newspapers framed the fall of the Berlin Wall not only as an event of German unity, but also as a historic event for the future of European integration (ter Wal, Triandafyllidou, Steindler, & Kontochristou, 2009, p. 217). However, contrary to the optimistic news
reporting at the night of November 9th, 1989 and due to a lack of specific framing devices for the causes and consequences of political accidents, these European newspapers tended to put the prospects of a unified Germany and Europe into a Cold War narrative. They discussed German and European unity in terms of peace, stability, and the possibility of economic and geopolitical instability, while de-emphasizing East Berliner’s role in this process. Within this Cold War narrative, values like freedom and unity still functioned as values of the West (ter Wal et al., 2009, p. 218).

The Political Leadership of the West

In the weeks and months after the collapse of the wall, high-ranking German and European politicians started to use architectural terminology to narrate the process of German reunification and European integration. In his Ten-Point Plan speech before the German parliament on November 28, 1989, Helmut Kohl explains that “[t]he development of intra-German relations remains embedded in the pan-European process, and that always means in East-West relations. The future architecture of Germany must conform to the future architecture of pan-Europe” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84).

Elsewhere, in a speech at the Centre des Conférences Internationales in Paris on January 17, 1990, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl invoked a metaphor frequently used by Konrad Adenauer and argued that “the German house must be built under a European roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 2012, p. 154). Similarly, in a speech to the European Parliament on November 22nd, 1989 and in his New Year’s speech on December 31, 1989, French President François Mitterand described the process of European integration as “construct,” “construction,” “structure,” and “arrangement,” (Gilbert, 2012).
However, this political language emerged behind closed doors and in political institutions and thereby does not carry the political legitimacy and persuasive momentum as the political languages that transpired within the news media and public discourses of 1989. Also, this vague architectural language raises questions about who the architects of this new European house are and what type of house they imagine and are working toward. In line with Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan speech and his pre-fabrication model for German and European integration, it is hard to ignore the West’s self-assigned role as the key architect for German and European unification. In his Ten-Point Plan speech, which he delivered only nineteen days after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Kohl argues that “. . . there can be no doubt that this is also what the people in the GDR want. They want economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and achieve greater prosperity” (Helmut Kohl's Ten-Point Plan for German Unity).

Kohl and other political leaders of the West used the crisis in the GDR as legitimation to advance their rhetoric of practical politics and economic necessity. The rapid deterioration of the East German economy after the opening of the Berlin Wall put the political leaders of the West at an advantage to shape the public discourse in economic terms. In addition, while East German politicians and leaders of popular citizen movements argued for a constitutional congress that would formulate a new constitution for all of Germany, leading West German politicians proposed to extend the
constitution or Basic Law of the Federal Republic to East Germany. Article 23\(^3\) of the West German constitution, provided the opportunity to simply extend West German constitutional regulations, laws, and institutions eastward. While the West German politicians considered this opportunity to be a great advantage to the people of the GDR in that it would reduce the struggle over constitutional questions and institution-building to a minimum, it would also lead to political and social problems. The western institutions would not fit the conditions of a society in transition. The adaption of the western model created problems within the GDR’s party system, in and between interest groups and citizen movement groups, and within the political system as a whole (Smith, 1998).

However, while the extension of the West’s legal, economic, and political system dominated Germany’s reunification process, this does not imply that these were the only political direction that emerged during the crises. The political leaders of the West started to write a crisis narrative that overshadowed public discourse about possible reforms of the FRG. The possibility of a third path died when Hans Modrow, a popular East German politician, outlined his Plan for a Unified Germany on February 1, 1990 (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. xx). Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German unification as a long-term goal, but Hans Modrow’s plan for a unified Germany, which

he presented at a press conference on February 1, 1990 introduced new terms into the debate about German-German reconciliation. Modrow argued that both German nations should surrender their memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a neutral position within Europe. Helmut Kohl quickly rejected Modrow’s proposal for a neutral Germany, explaining that a reunited Germany could not afford to be isolated in the heart of Europe. In addition, Modrow envisioned a united Germany in which a planned and market economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990). It is not clear why Modrow introduced these specific terms for German unification only three months after the opening of the Berlin Wall. Gray and Wilke (1996) argue that “positioning himself as the leading spokesperson of unification could serve as a preemptive strike that would allow [Modrow] to take the political initiative and create a better bargaining position for the GDR and its citizens in the unification negotiations with the FRG” (p. xx).

However, Helmut Kohl turned Modrow’s proposal into an opportunity to speed up the process of expanding West Germany’s legal, economic, and political systems eastward. The West German economic prosperity of the 1980s in connection with the economic and political crisis in East Germany, allowed Helmut Kohl and other West German political leaders to erode Modrow’s proposal until it conformed with their terms for German-German unification. While Modrow allegedly attempted to amplify and strengthen the East German’s voice in the negotiations for the process of German unification, it backfired and rapidly silenced arguments from the Round Table discussions. Instead of considering and debating alternative political directions with GDR opposition leaders, the Western discourse of rapid reunification and pan-European
unity reduced discussions at the Round Tables and the possibility of a third path to political idealism and naiveté. Thus, the GDR’s first free and democratic parliamentary election on March 18th, 1990 marks the beginning of the end of East German participation in the political decision making process for German reunification.

Yet, in the weeks and months between November and February of 1990, East German politicians and interest groups still resisted the rhetoric of practical politics by the West. Interpreting the opening of the Berlin Wall and the new political directions that this event implied as the result of the West German or West European policies is tempting, but it neglects the rhetorical battles between the East German public, Western news media, and Western politicians over who gets to write Germany’s and possibly Europe’s 1989 crisis narrative.

I will continue to name these three actors in the suggested order to describe the general flows of communication and power in the days and months before, during, and after November 9th, 1989. With their revolutionary rhetoric of freedom, democracy, and unity, the East German public first set the stage for new political directions. Second, the western print media narrated and politically legitimized the events surrounding the accidental opening of the Berlin wall. In a way, the western print media helped to open a rhetorical arena, which invited new narrators to communicate with, against, to, past, or about each other (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010). While the western print media intervened in crisis of 1989, they played different roles for different actors throughout the pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis situation. Finally, surprised by the sudden political vacuum, Western politicians exploited the crisis and introduced their grand
narrative for Germany’s and Europe’s unification process. The flows of communication and power relations between the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German politicians quickly changed in the weeks and months after November 9th, 1989. Through my analyses, we will see how and why these unique power relations between the East German public, the Western print media, and West German political leaders changed.

**Dissertation Data**

With my dissertation, I will focus on public political discourses surrounding the events of November 9th, 1989 by the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German political leadership. These three actors are the key narrators in political crisis situations (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Cross, 2017; Hart, 1993) and thereby possess the rhetorical power to advance claims, define the causes, consequences, and cures of a crisis, assign political and societal roles to actors in a crisis drama, and imply specific political futures.

For my analysis of the development of the East German narrative, I first turn to protest speeches before the opening of the Berlin Wall. Specifically, I will focus on speeches at the protest demonstration on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on November 4, 1989. These speeches represent an important text to analyze the normative dimensions of the public’s narrative. Opposition leaders, artists, and activists formulated their political vision for the GDR. To retrace the trajectory of this East German narrative, I then turn to the central round table meetings. The round table discussions represent the organized public voice of the East German opposition between November 18, 1989 and March 18,
The round tables functioned like a parliament in that they discussed voting rights, party rights and obligations, and debated ideas for a new constitution. While the round table discussions include narrative voices from the former Socialist Unity Party (e.g., trade unions, block parties, and the women’s league) who defended a strong socialist vision for the reunification process, I will focus on the narrative advanced by opposition leaders of the popular citizens’ movements (e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left). Focusing on the conflicting narratives between the former GDR leadership and GDR reformers at the round table discussion would distract from the overall narrative battles between the East German public, the Western print media and the political leaders of the West. The narrative voices of the popular citizens’ movements provide specific policy suggestions for a democratic future between GDR and FRG and thus bares more rhetorical potential for the communicative battle over Germany’s reunification process than a confrontational socialist narrative. With his five volume series Der Zentrale Runde Tisch der DDR (The Central Round Table of the GDR), Uwe Thaysen (2000) presents a comprehensive collections of transcripts and documents for the 16 round table meetings between November 18, 1989 and March 18, 1990. These texts provide direct access to the opposition leader’s struggle to defend and advance their narrative.

For my analysis of the West German media narrative, I turn to news reporting and editorials by five daily West German national newspapers during key political events surrounding November 9th, 1989. The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Die Welt, and the Tageszeitung (TAZ), not only represent Germany’s biggest daily national newspapers in 1989 in terms of regional and national readership, but they also feature both left-wing as well as conservative news (Pürer & Raabe, 2007, pp. 151-155). In terms of textual analysis, I will only choose editorials that feature information about the political situation and directions of the GDR and FRG. A key political moment in this context is an event where the media, the public, or political leaders play an essential role in projecting a policy narrative that implicates political directions for Germany or Europe. The key political events that I identified so far include the peaceful mass demonstrations in East Berlin on November 4th, 1989, which led to the resignation of the GDR government three days later. In speeches to a crowd of over 1 million protestors, GDR opposition leaders aired their criticism and demands for democratic reforms. November 10th, the day after the accidental opening of the Berlin wall represents a second key political moment. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl interrupts his visit to Poland and delivers a speech at a demonstration in front of the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt and mayor of Berlin during the construction of the Berlin wall and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s foreign minister also deliver speeches. The third political event that is relevant to the West German media narrative is Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan speech in front of the German parliament on November 28th, 1989. His Ten-Point Plan lays out a program to overcome the political and economic divisions of Germany and Europe. The press conference on February 13th, 1990 between Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow, who was the last premier of the GDR
represents the fourth and final event. This is a particularly important event in that historians consider Kohl’s and Modrow’s press conference to be the final nail in the coffin of the East’s ambitions to create a unified Germany through the participation of Germans in both the East and the West.

Finally, for my analysis of the West German political leaders, I turn to speeches by Kohl, Brandt, and Genscher in front of the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin, Kohl’s speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on December 19th, 1989, his New Year’s television address, his press conference with Modrow, and his policy statement before the German parliament on February 15th, 1990. Except for the newspaper articles and the round table discussions, all of the aforementioned texts are available in the English language.

**Approach**

Narratives not only shape people’s perceptions of the salience of a crisis and thereby guide their responses to a crisis, but they also put political actors on rhetorical trajectories that enable and constrain their actions (Kluver, 2010). Via language, a narrative threads together individual “events into a contextual whole in which an audience is not only affected but somehow implicated” (Crick, 2014, p. 267). Others define narratives in terms of their past-present-future structure to account for causal links between events (Frank, 2010). Yet others highlight the importance of resolution and catharsis (Cross, 2017; Shenhav, 2006). For this dissertation, I ground my definition of narrative in Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle’s research about strategic narratives. They draw upon Kenneth Burke’s ideas of form and the pentad to identify actors,
settings, actions, agency, and goals, while recognizing the importance of temporality. For them “the past (history), the present, and the future (where are ‘we’ going) are tied together through explication of the setting, action, and goal or purpose” (Miskimmon, Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017, p. 7). Further, Miskimmon distinguishes between system, identity, and issue/policy narratives. To analyze the political drama of 1989, I will focus on issue narratives in that they “set out why a policy is needed and (normatively) desirable, and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. Issue narratives set political actions in a context, with an explanation of who the important actors are, what the conflict or issue is, and how a particular course of action will resolve the underlying issue” (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 8). Finally, according to Miskimmon et al., the communicative process involves the formation, projection, and reception of strategic narratives. I will focus on questions of narrative projection: What statements do West German politicians, the West German press, and organized East German publics project about how the process of German unification ought to play out? How do the policy narratives of the East German public, the West German media, and the West European leaders differ? Where do the narrative of the East German public, the West German media narrative, and the narrative of the West European leadership conflict and collide? What are the obstacles that prevent actors to advance their narrative? How are they constraining each other during the early days and months after the opening of the Berlin wall? How does the media environment and networks of 1989 constrain or enable actors to advance their narratives? Why did certain narrative dominate the public debate
during, before, and after the crisis, while others failed? Why did today’s political narrative about the crisis of 1989 prevail in the end?

Unlike Miskimmon et al., however, I am not viewing the different strategic narratives of 1989 through the lens of international relations\(^4\), but through the lens of political crisis communication. Political crises refer to “episodic breakdowns of familiar symbolic frameworks that legitimate the pre-existing sociopolitical order” (Olmeda, 2008, p. 3). By comparing and contrasting the different pentads of the public’s, the media’s, and the politician’s narratives, we will see what aspects of their sociopolitical order the events of 1989 tore down and what new symbolic possibilities opened up. Because the breakdowns in symbolic orders were different for each actor—especially for East German publics—I am curious to see whether the normative aspects of their pentads like the purpose and agency reflect those differences. Also, considering that Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics prevented East Germans to deliberate different political possibilities for the process of German reunification, it will be interesting to explore how this foreclosed the possibility to even develop a crisis narrative that features all aspects of the pentad. Accordingly, it will be interesting to see whether and why certain narratives are incoherent or fragmented.

Miskimmon’s definitions of strategic narratives, narrative projection, and issue narratives serve as the overall theoretical framework for my analyses of the different narratives. However, to further flesh out why Kohl’s grand narrative of practical politics

\(^4\) For a detailed account of the events of 1989 and the process of German reunification through the lens of international relations, turn to Sarotte (2014a).
gained momentum, while the narrative of the East German public struggled to gain momentum, I will turn to Habermas’s distinctions between strategic/communicative action and the system/lifeworld (Habermas, 1984, 1987). This will not only reveal what types of validity claims (i.e., truth, rightness, truthfulness) different actors project, but also how a particular narrative enables or constrains claims of other actors. It allows the reader to see why public statements turn from potentially being oriented toward communicative action into strategic communication, simply because they are perceived through a different narrative. Also, the system/lifeworld distinction will draw the reader’s attention to why narratives embedded in or emerging from the lifeworld legitimize a political system and not the other way around. Finally, I turn to Castells’ (2013) ideas about power, communication, and networks to account for how narratives gained political power and flowed through the communication environment and networks of 1989. How did the communication environment of 1989 enable certain narratives and constrain others? Who controlled what narrative traveled through the important political networks in 1989? What networks legitimized and empowered the different political narratives?

It is obvious, even tempting to argue that due to the vast amount of Berlin wall research, returning to the conflicting public, media, and politician discourses of 1989 will not reveal any new insights. However, my intention is to use the existing historical and international relations literature surrounding the event of 1989 as a starting point to direct the reader’s attention to the communicative battles during the crisis moments right before, during, and after November 9th, 1989. From historical accounts, we know that
the GDR’s first free and democratic parliamentary election on March 18th, 1990\(^5\) stopped any deliberation about alternative political futures and paved the way for rapid reunification and Kohl’s pre-fabrication model (Engel, 2009; Joppke, 1995; Sarotte, 2014a; Smith, 1998; Thaysen, 1990). From international relations research, we know that border openings with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Austria and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs helped to bring down the East German regime and the wall (Gilbert & Large, 2009). Further, we know that years before the opening of the Berlin wall, the USSR and the Americans militarily and politically disengaged from the conflict in Berlin, leaving it up to the East Germans to bring about political change (Engel, 2009; Sarotte, 2014a, 2014b). Finally, the events at Tiananmen square of June 1989 failed to transfer to Europe, establishing a consensus for nonviolence and setting the political stage for protests movements to publicly air their concerns and demands.

The 20\(^{th}\) and the 25\(^{th}\) anniversaries of the fall of the Berlin Wall produced a lot of historical and international relations research that focuses on the end of the Cold War, German-German unification, and the reorientation of global power dynamics (Allen, 2014; Clack, 2009; Engel, 2009; Gerstenberger & Braziel, 2011; Lees, 2014; Schulz-

\(^5\) Polls predicted a victory for the Social Democrats. Like the Round Tables, the Social Democrats favored a slower unification process, a new constitution, and a unified Germany created through the participation of Germans in both East and West. However, the elections revealed a resounding win for the conservative bloc. The Alliance for Germany, which consisted of members of the Christian Democratic Union, the Democratic Awakening movement, and the German Social Union received 48 percent of the vote compared to 22 percent for the Social Democrats. Voter turnout was a staggering 93 percent. Lothar de Maiziere became prime minister for the GDR transition government with Angela Merkel as his spokesperson (“The vote that set the course”, 2010).
Forberg, 2009). However, there is also research that urge us to focus on the long-range cultural and political challenges that the fall of the Berlin wall created for Germany and Europe (Kelly, 2011; Koelle, 2014; Lees, 2014; Silberman, 2011). These authors focus on the stories behind the wall and investigate the events surrounding the night of November 9, 1989 through the eyes of ordinary citizens as well as political figures from East and West Germany. By drawing attention to the forgotten stories from behind the wall and the political and cultural implications for the people of East Germany and Eastern Europe, these authors disrupt the dominant success story of 1989. This research helps to illuminate individual stories from both sides of the Berlin wall, but it does not reveal the political battle that unfolded before, during, and after the sudden and accidental revolution of 1989. Mary Elise Sarotte (2014a, 2014b) is the first who describes the competing conceptions and political directions of post-cold war Europe. She reinterprets the political struggle over different models for the future of Germany and Europe from the perspective of international relations and concludes that other political directions would have been possible for Germany and Europe. She introduced a revolutionary argument into the debate about alternative political directions for a post-1989 Germany and Europe. Sarotte’s research not only encourages researcher to pay closer attention to the competing political directions in the drama of 1989, but she also opened up new areas for Berlin Wall inquiry.

Inspired by Sarotte’s analysis of the competing and conflicting political models for post-1989 Europe and Germany, this dissertation examines the rhetorical battle over the political directions for Germany and Europe. Despite the abundance of Berlin Wall
research, what we still do not know enough about is how and why the strategic crisis narratives of the east German public, the western news media, and west German political leaders enabled or constrained these political directions. Answering these questions will then also reveal the forgotten political crisis narratives of these social actors and add to a deeper understanding of the rhetorical processes that set Germany and Europe on a trajectory of rapid unification and eastward expansion. Further, this approach not only allows us to learn lessons about the processes of narrative projection during political crisis moments, but also to critique whether and how political actors exploited the crisis to advance their narratives, manipulated publics, and obscured reality.

Historians often conclude that the West German and West European media framed the events of 1989 in terms of peace, stability, and the possibility of economic and geopolitical instability. They emphasized the Western definitions of freedom and unity, while de-emphasizing East German’s role in the process (ter Wal et al., 2009, p. 218). On the other hand, the East German public perceived the opening of the wall as an opportunity to reform their political and economic system, while the political leaders of the West viewed the crisis as legitimation to expand their legal, economic, and political systems eastward. What is missing in this discussion is a systematic analysis of the communicative strategies and narratives that helped to bring about these processes and outcomes. From a perspective of rhetoric and strategic communication, it is possible to bring together politics and discourse. Focusing on the public political communication of the crisis of 1989 is crucial to understand how the key narrators of political crisis situations, namely the media, the public, and the political leaders (Boin et al., 2017;
Cross, 2017; Olmeda, 2008), set the political directions for the reunification process. Turning to a crisis moment like 1989 is particularly useful for this kind of endeavor in that the symbolic order that legitimized the pre-existing political practices and networks was suddenly in flux, opening up possibilities for the public, the media, and political leaders to rewrite their strategic narratives. Accordingly, this dissertation will address the following tentative research questions:

RQ1: How do the policy narratives of the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German leadership differ regarding the process of German unification?

RQ2: How do fragmented narratives or internal tensions (i.e., pentadic ratios) in the narratives of the East German public, the West German print media, and West German political leaders produce or fail to produce their desired outcomes for Germany’s reunification process?

RQ3: What forms or political appetites for German and/or European political integration reside in the different policy narratives of the East German public, the West German print media, and West German political leaders?

RQ4: How do the different policy narratives by the East German public, the West German print media and West German political leaders turn claims that are potentially being oriented toward communicative action into strategic communication?

RQ5: How does the communication environment of 1989 enable certain narratives and constrain others? Who controlled what narrative traveled through the important political networks of 1989?
Organization of the Dissertation

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter one will introduce the reader to my dissertation project. Like this prospectus, I will begin with a brief discussion of how the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German political leadership projected competing political narratives about what the wall symbolizes and how people should respond to it. This introduces the reader to the political power of narratives and the role of the public, the media, and political leaders as key political narrators. It will also remind the reader of how the Cold war narrative of East vs. West, democracy vs. totalitarianism, and capitalism vs. socialism resulted from rhetorical battles and not only military threats and economic sanctions. This brings the reader to a discussion of the drama of November 9th, 1989 and how the East German publics, West German print media, and the West German political leadership all played different political roles in the sudden collapse of the Berlin wall. I will then introduce my approach, in which I develop a rationale for analyzing the drama of 1989 through the conflicting crisis narratives of the East German public, the West German print media, and West German political leaders, I will argue why 1989 presents a new political beginning for Germany and Europe and why strategic political crisis narratives present a promising approach for exploring the drama of 1989 and other crisis moments in Europe’s recent crisis-ridden history. Finally, I will explain the significance of my dissertation and outline its organization.
Chapter II: Political Narratives of Crisis: Theory and Definitions

Chapter two will develop the argument that a political crisis implies an ideological crisis over symbols and that narratives help to describe and diagnose this crisis of symbols. Symbols legitimize political actions, but during a crisis political symbols are in flux, opening up a battle between opinion leaders over defining the meaning of political terms. To this end, chapter two will introduce the reader to important theories, definitions, and literature on political crises, narratives, and the rhetorical interactions between the public, the media, and politician in response to crises. As the key narrators of political crises, I will discuss the public’s, the media’s, and politician’s roles in projecting narratives. Drawing primarily upon communication research, chapter two will develop a heuristic lens for analyzing the rhetorical aspects of conflicting and fragmented narratives. Chapter two will also situate my dissertation within the broader discussions of strategic narratives, rhetoric, and political crisis communication.

Chapter III: The Rhetorical Transformation of East German Publics

Via pentadic analyses of speeches by opposition leaders and public discourse by the Central Round Table, this analysis will focus on the development of pentadic ratios within the East German crisis narrative. Being perceived as a people that require democratic and political assistance, this chapter explores how the round table discussions led to more coherent or fragmented narratives. To put it another way, this analysis examines how the East German public’s vision of a united Germany changed over the course of key political events before, during, and after November 9, 1989. This
allows me to draw conclusions about what constrained the public to project their narrative.

Chapter IV: Setting the Stage for Rapid German Reunification: The West German Print Media as Political Actor

Whereas the public, the media, and political leaders all played important roles in the drama of 1989, the media holds disproportionately more political power in defining a crisis than the public or political leaders. The media possesses unique political power, not only because they can disseminate information to large audiences, but because they act as a mediator between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 3). While journalists and news editors are reactive rather than intentional crisis narrators, they still frame events and set the news agenda for the day. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the political world, the media define events for us, so that we inevitably perceive and respond to political events through mental shortcuts or stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). That way, media discourses “define, describe and delimit what is possible to say and not possible to say” (Critcher, 2003, p. 170). Via pentadic analyses of editorials and cover stories of the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Die Welt, and the Tageszeitung (TAZ) during key political events before, during, and after November 9th, 1989, this chapter will flesh out the dominant political directions for Germany and Europe as they reside across these key events. To this end, I will examine tensions within (i.e., pentadic ratios) and across the different media pentads. Further, I will explore how these fragmented or coherent media narratives define the political crisis and...
how they constrain or enable public deliberation of political alternatives for the East German public and West German politicians at these different political key moments. Finally, this analysis address how the fragmented or coherent narratives reflect or distort the political developments and deliberations in East Germany.

Chapter V: Rapid Reunification and the West German Rhetoric of Practical Politics

In addition to analyzing the internal tensions in Kohl’s rhetoric, this chapter applies Habermas’s ideas of validity claims and world relations to flesh out how Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics enables or constrains claims of other actors. From this I will draw conclusions about how Kohl positioned West Germany communicatively to advance his pre-fabrication model and set Germany and Europe on a trajectory for rapid unification and eastward expansion of western legal, political, and economic systems. Habermas’s distinction between the system and the lifeworld will guide me in this endeavor.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

This chapter brings together the individual levels of analysis and retraces how the networks of 1989 and the different narratives themselves constrained each other over the course of the key political moments. To map out the different conflicting and intersecting narrative trajectories, I will start with the victory narrative of the rhetorical battle between the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German political leadership. Popular history and ideological news often regurgitate the crisis narrative of 1989 from the perspective of the victor, namely West German political leaders. By starting with the familiar narrative and working backwards along the
trajectories of the different narratives, it will be possible to flesh out the unfamiliar and forgotten narratives of the drama of 1989. Also, considering that crises direct political and societal actors to new forms of public deliberation to address the underlying social contingencies, I will also identify deficiencies in the interactions between the public, the media, and political leaders to deliberate new forms of political directions for Germany and Europe and recommend strategies for contemporary initiatives to better project crisis narratives. Finally, I will turn to Castells’ ideas about power, communication, and networks to account for how the East German public, the West German print media, and the West German political narratives flow through the communication networks of 1989 and thereby gain or lose political power. I will identify the programmers and switchers that enhanced and diminished the political power of the individual narratives. Castells will help to widen our focus and draw conclusions about the different narratives from a societal perspective.

**Significance of Analysis**

Commonly, historians tend to describe the events of 1989 as the result of structural factors like the border openings with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Austria and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs (Gilbert & Large, 2009). While these conditions aided in setting the stage for the drama of 1989, recent research suggests that the events surrounding November 9th, 1989 not only resulted from Glasnost and Perestroika, but that the interplay between the Western media and the East German public led to the political legitimation of the accidental opening of the Berlin wall. In addition, historians and international relations researchers often treat
the fall of the Berlin war as the end of the Cold war era. Jeffrey Engel (2009) and Mary Elise Sarotte (2014a) are among the first who treat the events of 1989 not as the end of international and European relations and the result of border openings and Glasnost and Perestroika, but as a political beginning for European integration and the international order. They view the events surrounding November 9th, 1989 as a new political beginning that exerts a lasting impact on European politics today and established a new form of political communication. Assuming an international perspective, Sarotte (2014a) argues:

. . . I see 1989 not as an end, but as a beginning. It created the international order that persists until today. The need to understand this nonviolent transition from the Cold War to the present is enormous, because we greatly prefer nonviolence to the alternative (p. xi).

By treating the crisis of 1989 as a political beginning that established new forms for political deliberation and nonviolent German and European integration, my aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the rhetorical processes that set Germany and Europe on a trajectory for rapid unification and eastward expansion. In line with Arendt’s ideas about modern revolutions, I consider the rhetorical battle of 1989 as a battle over new political beginnings. Arendt argues that in the modern era, political revolutions do not imply a restoration of a pre-existing order, but “revolutions are the only political events which confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning” (Arendt, 2006, p. 21). Pre-modern revolutions often implied a return to a pre-existing political order, however, modern revolutions involve the end of an old order and the birth of a new
political beginning. Specifically, Arendt argues that “the modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold . . . “ (Arendt, 2006, p. 28). The aim of modern revolutions is not the replacement of one political system with another political system, but to abolish any division between rulers and ruled. Drawing upon the idea of no-rule or isonomy and the Greek city-state, Arendt argues that neither freedom nor equality are qualities inherent in human nature, but that they are the product of human effort and convention (pp. 30-31). Accordingly, to gain political freedom and equality requires citizens to appear before each other in a political space proper. For Arendt, political freedom and equality is not a private experience but necessitates public action and interaction with others (Arendt, 1958). It is in this political space or space of appearance that language and speech constitute action and the social actors themselves. She argues that it is the “space of appearance, [where] . . . men are together in the manner of speech and action” (Arendt, 1958, p. 199). Elsewhere, she expands upon this idea and argues that “[s]peechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words” (pp. 178-179). Analyzing a modern revolution like the revolution of 1989 through the lens of narratives brings together the aspect of new political beginnings with the importance of political action and language. Hence, viewing the 1989 drama as a new rhetorical anchor for German and European political beginnings opens up conversations about rhetorical strategies used for contemporary EU initiatives and crisis narratives.
If 1989 functions as a political beginning for European political integration, then what are the lessons to learn from it about how the public, the media, and political leaders deliberated or failed to deliberate their political visions for Germany and Europe. After all, public deliberation and rhetoric build political communities of discourse that enable people to act with unity to deal with contingencies and crises. Political crisis situations not only break down the familiar narratives that legitimate the pre-existing sociopolitical order, but they direct political and societal actors to new forms of public deliberation to address the underlying social contingencies. (Aristotle, p. 1357a).

Investigating the drama of 1989 through the lens of competing crisis narratives also draws our attention to the political role of rhetoric, rather than stopping at the structural dimensions of political crisis. Specifically, it is my intention to contribute to a new line of research in European politics, which focuses on understanding the nature and impact of European political crises from the perspective of social construction and narratives. With her 2017 study, *The Politics of Crisis in Europe*, Mai’a Davis Cross examines the role of the international media, European public, and politicians in misrepresenting the EU’s resilience to deal with crisis situations. While she draws our attention to the importance of the social construction of a crisis via the interactions between the media, the public, and politicians, she operates with a definition of political crisis narratives that primarily focuses on international media framing and the causes and consequences of recent European crises. She identifies narrative tensions at the global level (e.g., Public-Elite, East-West, North-South) across the Iraq crisis (2003), the Constitutional crisis (2005), and the Eurozone crisis (2010-2012). However, with my
analysis I will introduce a rhetorical lens to the research of political crisis narrative, which not only allows researchers to explore the tensions within individual crisis narratives and compare them to crisis narratives of other key crisis narrators, but also to compare them to the societal tensions at the global level. This approach also allows me to go beyond the descriptive level of political crisis analysis and point to specific rhetorical strategies and political terminologies to project narratives.

Finally, this dissertation contributes to what Miskimmon et al. (2017) call the study of communicative and reflexive action of strategic narratives. At the level of communicative action and strategic action this dissertation will flesh out what validity claims the different crisis narratives accommodate or reject. Further, my analysis examines whether the different narratives guard against criticism for all Habermasian world relations and thus invite communicative action or whether they lack a world relation and thereby invite strategic communication. This makes it possible to discuss and explain the prospects of a democratic reunification process from the perspective of the East German public’s, the West German media’s, and West German politician’s claims and type of communication and not only in terms of global political, economic, and societal tensions. At the level of reflexive action my dissertation helps to flesh out the strategic moments in which the East German publics, the Western media, and West German politicians target the tensions in other actor’s narratives, while presenting their narratives as coherent. By analyzing the drama of 1989 at the level of communicative/strategic and reflexive action, I hope to further flesh out the discursive
patterns that enabled or foreclosed the possible political directions for German and European unification.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL NARRATIVES OF CRISIS: THEORY AND DEFINITIONS

A political crisis implies a crisis over symbols. Political crises disrupt the symbolic order that legitimized the pre-existing socio-political system, opening a rhetorical arena for opinion leaders to shape a new symbolic order. During a crisis, political symbols like security, freedom, and unity are in flux and activists, media reporters, and government officials, redefine the meaning of those symbols. By responding to a crisis, they reinforce existing symbols or shape symbols to fit the situation. The way that the public, the media, and politicians order political symbols often conflict and contradict each other, resulting in different interpretations, evaluations, and reactions to a political crisis. To account for how these different political actors arrange political symbols during crisis moments, this chapter will bring together theories and definitions from the area of rhetoric, political crisis communication, and strategic narratives. The goal is to introduce a narrative perspective of political crisis communication, which explores political crises not as a series of events and statements, but as a dynamic transformation of symbols modifying one another (Burke, 1942, p. 15).

Assuming a rhetorical view of political crisis narratives, the following sections will introduce definitions that are not only relevant to the present project, but will generate new ideas for research and theory building. To help set the tone for a rhetorical perspective of political crisis narratives, I will begin with a discussion of political crises and rhetorical legitimacy. This discussion will flesh out the relationship between
symbolic orders and disorder and political legitimacy. Then I will explore and define narratives. Specific attention will be dedicated to the relationship between frames and narratives. This will be followed by a detailed discussion of policy narratives and crisis resolutions. Finally, I will end this chapter with a discussion of the interaction between politicians, the media, and the public.

**Political Crisis as Crisis of Rhetorical Legitimacy**

Political crisis is a vague term within the area of international political crisis communication (Auer, 2016). While crisis theories in the area of organizational crisis communication offer ways to discuss the relationship between crisis types, crisis responsibility, organizational legitimacy, and choice of verbal response (T. Coombs, 2007), the debate about political crises lacks clear definitions. This is surprising in that crisis not only defines politics and policy making (Cross, 2017), but political actors, situations, and responses differ significantly from communication by private organizations. Political crisis communication is inherently a public endeavor (Arendt, 1958, 2006). In democratic systems, to gain and maintain political power, politicians depend on legitimacy and trust of the public. Due to this democratic obligation to the public, politicians are under constant media scrutiny during crises. To address the lack of clear definitions of political crisis, I will define political crises from a rhetorical perspective, focusing on the discursive dimensions of legitimization and opportunity exploitation. This way, I am following Hart (1993) who argues that “crisis is a key issue for crisis analysts, [t]o answer it, analysts will need to examine the role of language, symbols and communication in the formation of collective perceptions” (p. 46).
Political crises are crises of legitimacy. Max Weber put forward an influential definition of political legitimacy, which suggests that a political system is legitimate if people believe and follow its rules. If people recognize the legitimacy of authorities to collect taxes, then they will pay their taxes without the widespread use of violence or incentives. It is people’s belief in the existence of a legitimate political order or process that elicits and guides their actions. He argues that “[t]he basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber, 1968, p. 382). Specifically, Weber suggests that political legitimacy derives from people’s belief in and adherence to tradition, a ruler’s charisma, and the rationality of the rule of law. For Weber, it is possible to describe any modern political system according to these defining qualities of political legitimacy. While tradition, charisma, and legality are all sources of political legitimacy, Weber assumes that, eventually, all Western powers would legitimize the power-relation between citizens and the state through rational-legal means. In his view, “the most usual basis of legitimacy is a belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedures” (Weber, 1968, p. 131). Weber grounds his definition of political legitimacy in the assumption that people’s beliefs in a political order (i.e., Legitimitätsglaube) create social and political regularities and power relations, which are firmer than those resulting from self-interest or habitual rule-following (Weber, 1968, p. 124). Accordingly, to support a political system, which suffers from weak political legitimacy, it is necessary to ensure political and social continuation, which guard
against or reduce the impact of crises. In the end, Weber’s definition implies a
teleological understanding of political legitimacy. Improving a state’s institutional
capacities and state-society relations leads to more political legitimacy.

While Weber’s definition of political legitimacy recognizes the importance of
people’s perceptions of political legitimacy as a source of political action, it turns a blind
eye to people’s individual standards for evaluating political legitimacy (Bielinski, 2017).
Citizens not only derive political legitimacy from tradition, charisma, and the rule of
law, but they ask themselves how politicians and political institutions should run a
country. Those standards for political legitimacy are rooted in people’s norms, values,
and social symbols. Political legitimacy then arises not from people’s general
recognition of the legitimacy of authority and rules, but from rules that are in line with
people’s ideas about political legitimacy. Even when tradition, charisma, and the rule of
law break down due to crisis, people’s demands for political legitimacy endure. During
political crises, the challenge for politicians is then not to restore legitimacy via
traditions, personality cult, and laws, but to evoke people’s values, norms, and social
symbols that align with their demands for legitimacy. A misalignment between people’s
values, norms, and symbols and policies often originated the political legitimacy crisis.
A political crisis not only disrupts people’s perceptions of rules and authority, but it
contests societal values, norms, and symbols. It is this system of norms, values, and
symbols that lends a political system legitimacy. It ensures continuity and credibility of a
political system. To explore how rulers and ruled attempt to rhetorically reestablish
political legitimacy during moments of crisis, it is necessary to develop a definition of
political legitimacy that not only accounts for normative dimensions of legitimacy, but also recognize the interaction between the state and society in reeggiesing political symbols during crisis.

Weber’s typology would lead us to conclude that liberal democracy and communism are different versions of charismatic legitimacy, or that communist systems comprise a unique combination of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy. While Weber’s ideas help to explain social and political order and disorder in terms of people’s perceptions and sources of authority, it would draw our attention away from discussing political crises as crises of legitimacy and the rhetorical interaction between state and society as a key necessity for political legitimacy (Nash & Scott, 2008). David Beetham introduced a definition of political legitimacy that not only allows us to describe different degrees of political legitimacy, but also accounts for the interaction between state and society. He describes political legitimacy not in terms of its sources, but in terms of its state-society relations and interactions. For example, when we speak of legitimacy deficit, we refer to a situation in which people’s beliefs and values only weakly support politics and policies. Whereas we speak of delegitimization when people withdraw their recognition and consent. Specifically, Beetham argues the following:

A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs. This may seem a fine distinction, but it is a fundamental one. When we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people’s
beliefs, how far it conforms to their values or standards, how far it satisfies the
normative expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment of the
degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the
beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making
a report on people’s ‘belief in its legitimacy’. (Beetham, 1991, p. 11)

This concept of political legitimacy directs our attention to political legitimacy as
a societal rather than individual or institutional dimension, which demands an analysis of
society’s norms, values, and symbols. If legitimacy arises out of social interactions and
deals with whether political decisions and directions are desirable or appropriate within a
system of norms, values, and symbols, then it is essential to examine the role of
language and communication in legitimation processes during crisis moments (Biegoń,
2016; Schneider, Nullmeier, & Hurrelmann, 2007). Questions about political legitimacy
as a social construct can then be answered by turning to public discourse (Beetham,

Beetham’s ideas are especially important when describing political systems that
are transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems due to crisis. While a
totalitarian regime like East Germany relied on party monopoly and Marxist-Leninist
traditions to maintain political legitimacy and build a political future, modern democratic
governments ensure their credibility and continuity by engaging in public interactions
with society. Their political legitimacy depends on norms, values, and symbols like
unity, freedom, transparency, public debate, and balanced media coverage. Inevitably, a
democratic form of government will engage in state-society interactions to maintain or
regain its legitimacy. Accordingly, for this dissertation, political legitimacy is defined as discursively constructed norms, values, and symbols by which rulers and ruled assess politics and policies. A political crisis potentially delegitimizes the power relations that exist within the discursive interactions between and among key political narrators and opinion leaders. Whether it is a state-breakdown, a (transnational) ethnic conflict, revolutionary upheavals, terror attacks, intergovernmental conflicts, or economic recessions, these macro level crisis events threaten the socially accepted values, norms, and symbols that ensure political legitimacy. Depending on the magnitude, duration, and reason of the crisis, a crisis will not threaten or disrupt the entire system of values, norms, and symbols and thereby delegitimize the entire political system. Rather, crises events like the opening of the Berlin wall draw people’s attentions to values relating to unity, freedom, and (economic/political) security, whereas the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2005, for example, threatened freedom of speech and religion.

Crisis events then bring about a political crisis when they disrupt the discursively constructed legitimacy between state and society. When this discursive link between state and society is under threat, then it is difficult for politicians and publics to set directions for the future. Hence, for any public political discourse to be effective, it is important to (rhetorically) establish or reestablish a legitimate socio-political order. It is important to recognize that legitimacy not only lies at the heart of any socio-political order, but it lies at the heart of any political crises. While others locate political legitimacy in institutions or the perceptions of legality during crisis situations, I
approach political crisis and political legitimacy from a rhetorical perspective. It is the rhetoric and discourses between media, politicians, and publics that establish and reestablish the socio-political order and its legitimacy. By approaching political crises from the perspective of rhetoric and public discourse, it is possible “to look behind ‘official’ actions and rationales and to probe deeper into issues of authority, legitimacy and power that are inextricably connected to the way in which crises are defined and handled . . . ” (Hart, 1993, pp. 46-47).

While a symbolic perspective of political crisis as crisis of legitimacy directs our attention to the role of symbols for the formation of collective perceptions, it does not mean that crisis narrators like the media, politicians, and publics are all interested in restoring a healthy state-society relationship during crisis. Opportunity exploitation is another key dimension of political crises (Hart, 1993, p. 41). This often involves rhetorical battles over the definition of the situation, its causes, and consequences. Was the fall of the Berlin wall a crisis of German solidarity? A crisis of mass emigration from the East to the West? A crisis in geopolitics? A crisis of communism? Or an opportunity for German and European Unification? An opportunity for Western expansion eastwards? What caused the opening of the Berlin wall and what will the political future of Germany and Europe be like? To answer these and related questions, people often turn to political opinion leaders. Defining the crisis situation is then essential for political opinion leaders and crisis narrators to rhetorically legitimize any future directions or obscure alternative directions. If the dominant narrative does not support a specific political direction for the country, it will be difficult for political crisis narrators to not
only establish or reestablish legitimacy between state and society, but also to exploit the crisis to introduce and advance specific directions for a political future. Thus, selecting and enacting specific crisis narratives not only defines people’s perception of a crisis, but also invites support for policies and politics.

The rhetorical exploitation of a political crisis often involves an “or else” statement or implications (Arsenault, Hong, & Price, 2017, p. 190). By its nature, policy narratives work toward a specific short-term or long-term goal. Whether it is rapid German-German unification, the expansion of NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC) eastwards, or the weakening of the Warsaw Pact, West German and European policy makers explicitly and implicitly exploited the political vacuum in 1989 by presenting their resolution to the crisis as the only reasonable alternative. Helmut Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics implied that the pre-fabrication model is the only real political direction for German-German unification or else East Germany would miss its opportunity to free itself from the political and economic grip of the USSR. However, opportunity exploitation and specifically or else statements and implications work together with political legitimation. Or else statements depend upon whether people trust their leaders and share the desirability of their policies. Political crises orient people toward resolutions, but crisis narratives must enact imaginable political futures before presenting them as the only possible solution. Thus, rhetorical exploitation of a political crisis and or else statements and implications must be rooted in the discursive legitimacy in a society to exert political power.
To further illustrate the importance of language, symbols, and communication for a rhetorical perspective of political crisis communication, I will now turn to the rhetorical dimensions of crisis events. Events are essential to a discussion of political crisis communication in that key crisis actors attribute causes and consequences to events (W. T. Coombs & Holladay, 1996) and thereby select and enact a specific crisis narrative. It is the rhetorical response to an event that defines the crisis situation and opens the door for new possibilities and directions.

**A Rhetorical View of Crisis Events and Situations**

A political crisis starts with an event or a series of events that invite rhetorical responses. Seeger and Sellnow (2015) argue that “describing an event as a crisis is a rhetorical act that calls for some immediate action to alleviate the potential threat” (p. 12). The event threatens the existing discourse of political legitimacy and thereby demands a crisis narrative that would help to return to the old narrative or enact a new narrative that coordinates the interactions between state and society (Heath, 2004, p. 168). The search for a new narrative of political legitimacy then presents a rhetorical exigency in that it demands crisis actors to deliberate directions for a possible political future (Bitzer, 1968). The event is so significant that crisis narrators cannot simply turn to familiar means and methods to resolve the situation, but must turn to public deliberation and discourse for help and support. They are not sure about how to communicate the nature of the crisis and how to resolve it. Aristotle argues:

*The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us . . . The subjects of our deliberation are such as seen*
to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation. (Aristotle, 2007, p. 1357a)

The political crisis of the opening of the Berlin wall constitutes a rhetorical situation in that the political future after October 9th, 1989 is in doubt and demands key opinion leaders and crisis narrators to deliberate political possibilities for Germany’s and Europe’s reunification process. Only through the discursive interaction between key crisis narrators is it possible to explain the crisis event and enact a crisis narrative that helps to return to a narrative of political legitimacy and order. Similarly, Crick (2014) argues the following:

. . . rhetoric always responds to disruptive events that reveal gaps in our habits, laws, beliefs, and relationships by creating and publicizing a discourse that gives a new meaning to situations, audiences, beliefs, and actions in order to promote certain possibilities over others within the context of choice and judgment. (p. 254)

Further, by drawing upon Dewey’s and Bentley’s transactional perspective of rhetoric and Orwell’s ideas about political situations, Crick explains that rhetoric transforms fluid events into situations. Situations do not exist in the absences of rhetoric. Public discourse by the media, politicians, and publics construct a situation by threading

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together isolated events into a coherent whole. Actions, actors, settings, and motives that already captured people’s attention through direct experience or media reporting are put together to suggest possible solutions to the situation. Only by rhetorically transforming isolated event into situations is it possible to act toward it. An isolated crisis event or series of isolated crisis events do not invite or demand political action. It is the rhetorically constructed crisis situation that opens room for political action and directions. However, to act out and entertain new directions for political action, it is necessary for actors to see themselves implicated in the rhetorically constructed situation.

Crick (2014) explains that for an event to count as a disruption of a socio-political order—a crisis—the audience must be rhetorically implicated in the crisis situation and its resolution. For an audience to accept that an event threatens the existing narrative of political order and legitimacy, the audience must step into the character role of the crisis narration. If the audience is not the type of audience that the crisis narrative demands, then it will be difficult to encourage collective political action and reestablish legitimacy. Hence, public statements for social and political reform and action rest upon narrative identification.

The idea of narrative identification also entails that crisis narrators might attempt to *drag* other political crisis actors into the narrative or exclude them depending on what events and issues they make salient. For example, if the dominant discourse between media, politicians, and publics depicts a new common democratic constitution between East and West Germany as an important first step toward German reunification, then this
invites democratic political decision makers into the narrative, but would exclude all former East German officials. This dominant narrative would lead people to say: “Why are we hearing from former East German officials. They play no role in democratic decision making”. By making the issue of democratic German-German unification salient, this leading crisis narrative would not only invite democratic political actors to play the role of crisis managers, but it would also warrant their statements as contributions to a democratic solution.

For a narrative to effectively construe an event as a political crisis situation and orient people toward a politically desirable resolution, it is necessary to enact narratives that invite people to assume specific roles in the narrative. A political crisis narrative should not only explain what happened, when it happened, why it happened, who made it happen, and how people should respond to it, but also why does this event threaten political legitimacy, what means and values should be used to restore political legitimacy, who should and shouldn’t act, and what socio-political order are we now working toward? Only when these and related questions dominate the discursive interactions between the media, politicians, and publics can we speak of a rhetorical crisis situation and political crisis narratives. Hence, by rhetorically responding to events that are in the public’s eye and connecting them into a coherent whole, crisis narrators bring into existence a situation.

This position should not be confused with Vatz’s (1973) position who argues that “utterance strongly invites exigence” (p. 159). While crisis narrators evoke a crisis situation by tying together confusing events that demand explanation and deliberation,
they do not entirely control the significance of a situation. Rather, their efforts to bring together disconnected puzzling events that bare the potential of threatening the socio-political order are rhetorical enactments of other narratives. Statements by key political crisis narrators like the media, political leaders, and publics shape political crisis narratives, but they do not originate them. For instance, in a speech to the German Parliament on November 28th, 1989, Helmut Kohl said: “[The East Germans] want economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and achieve greater prosperity (Gray & Wilke, 1996). These statements about economic freedom and prosperity are enactments of broader narratives, specifically Cold War narratives of peace and prosperity and economic liberalism in general. Kohl’s statements enact an existing narrative and thereby invite East German’s to assume the role of liberalists and democrats to work toward greater personal freedom and economic prosperity. While crisis narrators can connect events in new ways, draw attention to specific events and issues and thereby implicate or exclude actors, actions, settings, plots, and themes they are constrained by broader narrative forms that already suggest how events are put together and what the events will lead to.

Burke’s (1968) insights about rhetoric and form suggests that rhetorical enactments of common political plots, settings, actors, actions, motives, and themes (i.e., political topoi) arouse and then satisfy audience expectations about crisis events. To evoke a political audience response to a crisis event, it is important for crisis narrators to be aware of the political appetites that their rhetorical enactments create. Helmut Kohl’s aforementioned enactment of the Cold War narrative of peace and prosperity evoked and
satisfied West Germans’ desire to stop Europe from entering into another war. A rhetorical enactment of the Cold War narrative of the economic failure of the East would have possibly elicited an appetite of political caution and suspicion toward German-German unification. Thus, rhetorical enactments that attempt to thread crisis events together into a coherent narrative carry with them the political forms or expectations of larger political narratives. Interestingly, Burke’s insights about narrative forms also suggests that crisis actors can anticipate other actor’s reactions to new events. Burke (1969b) explains:

Perhaps the ‘ultimate’ order comes most natural to narrative forms. . . . in narrative, it is so implicit that we may not even discern it. For instance, if the fate of our hero is developed through a succession of encounters, each of these encounters may represent a different ‘principle,’ and each of these principles or states may so lead into the next that the culmination of one lays the ground for the next. (p. 197)

As the media, politicians, and publics narrate crisis events, they enact narratives. This way, a new event only registers as a political crisis event if it is a rhetorical enactment of a broader narrative. Only within the boundaries of a narrative is it possible to link isolated events into a coherent narrative. In addition, as a new event enters the political crisis drama, actors rely on familiar crisis narratives to not lose their right to act within it and rationalize their public statements. Crisis narrators who do not enact narratives that are grounded in the existing political culture risk delegitimizing themselves and writing themselves out of the crisis narrative.
So far, we established that political crisis events disrupt rhetorical legitimacy, which resides within the discursive interactions between state and society. The disruption of political legitimacy leaves key crisis narrators searching for a narrative that reestablishes socio-political order and warrants their public statements and directions for a political future. Their search for a new narrative of order and continuity constitutes an exigency that demands key crisis narrators to make sense of the event or events that disrupted the old narrative. Their rhetorical efforts to explain the crisis events transforms isolated events into a situation, which invites societal actors to play specific political roles and work toward a political future. Their efforts to transform fluid events into tangible situations include rhetorical enactments of familiar but broader narratives, which arouse and satisfy audience’s appetites for how events evolve into a situation. Freedman (2006) argues that “[narratives] do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current” (p. 22). As different actors thread together isolated events differently, we end up with different definitions of the situation. Was the opening of the Berlin wall an economic burden for the West, a humanitarian challenge due to mass East-West migration, an opportunity for German and European unification, or a chance for the West to extend its geopolitical power? As different definitions of a situation offer specific roles, responsibilities, and resolution, key political narrators fight over the definition of the crisis situation, which often results in conflicting narratives, counternarrative, and fragmented narrative. But before we turn to a discussion of fragmented narratives and political legitimacy, we will
first develop a rhetorical definition of political crisis narratives. and rhetorical definition of crisis events.

A Rhetorical Lens for Political Crisis Narratives

The literature about rhetorical crises during political crises tends to focus on the success and effects of crisis responses like framing and rituals (Boin et al., 2017; Boin, McConnell, & Hart, 2008; Boin, t Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Hart, 1993). Specifically, Boin, Hart, and McConnell treat crises as a way for governments and opposition leaders to successfully survive the blame games and framing contests during political crises. While they view a political crisis as a breakdown of people’s symbolic orders, they pay attention to effective crisis management and strategies by which governments and critics exploit a crisis event to defend and gain political reputation and advance policies. Their theory of crisis exploitation examines the impact of crisis rhetoric on political support for office-holders and public policies. Drawing upon Entman’s definition of frames7, they suggest that a political crisis should be conceived as a framing contest between political actors concerning the severity, responsibility, and implication of crises (Boin et al., 2009, p. 82). During and after a political crisis, “[c]ontestants manipulate, strategize and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 82). While they view frames as rhetorical enactments of broader political narratives, they

7 According to Entman, framing means to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, p. 52).
remain at the level of framing analysis and do not put them into the context of the narrative trajectories that exist pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis.

Other researchers of political crisis communication (Cross, 2017; Kuipers, 2006; Seeger & Sellnow, 2015) also speak of political crisis narratives and turn to frames as their unit of analysis. For Cross, narratives refer to how politicians, the media, and the public socially construct causes and consequences of a political crises. She defines a narrative in terms of society’s perceptions of the causes and consequences of a crisis event. Cross traces a meta-narrative across three recent EU crises in terms of how the international newspapers like The Economist, TIME Magazine, and the International Herald Tribune framed the causes and consequences of the Iraq Crisis (2003), the Constitutional Crisis (2005), and the Eurozone Crisis (2010). While she argues that “there is a metanarrative in the international community’s understanding of the EU, which is deeply flawed and detrimental to the goals that Europeans share in common” (p. 20), she does not explicate the relationship between frames and narratives and operationalizes narratives only in terms of their constructed and perceived causes and consequences.

From a rhetorical perspective, it is important to not only distinguish between frames and narratives, but also to discuss how these elements of political crisis communication interact with each other. Miskimmon et al. (2017) argues that “… narratives have a structure that sets them apart conceptually from framing or branding—although both framing and branding can be seen to trigger or evoke narratives” (p. 7). Further, Miskimmon et al. (2017) explains that policy frames are compared to existing
policy narratives and audiences evaluate whether the new policy frame aligns with existing narratives (i.e., frame-narrative alignment). Thus, for a policy frame to be politically impactful, it must be anchored in a broader narrative that people are familiar with. (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 111). For Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013), framing is a way for political leaders and journalists to shape public opinion, but “frames as an analytical unit lack the temporal and causal features narratives necessarily possess” (p. 7). To put it differently, understanding narratives help us to understand frames as rhetorical enactments of narratives. While the media, political leaders, and publics frame individual elements of a narrative (i.e., actors, settings, action, means, goals), these frames do not necessarily feature past causes or future outcomes.

As the media, publics, and political leaders narrate crisis events, they not only activate different narratives, but also suggest possible resolutions with each rhetorical enactment. In a way, each rhetorical enactment of a political crisis foreshadows possibilities for a political future. Burke suggests that “a given terminology contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‘perfectionist’ tendency for men to attempt carrying out those implications” (Burke, 1966, p. 31). Elsewhere, Burke explains that language and narratives generate a persuasive momentum or appetite which tends toward satisfaction (Burke, 1968, pp. 31, 124). Applied to political crisis communication, this means that crisis discourse implies possibilities for political action and resolutions. Further, the language used during political crises imply specific policies that crisis narrators will follow through regardless of their outcomes. Drawing upon Burke, Kluver (2010) explains:
The terms, or language, we use to define a situation have built into them an implied trajectory, or an end, by virtue of the characteristic of humans that Burke calls a terministic compulsion. The compulsion to act according to a terministic screen, or visions constrained by our language, meaning that we act out of the implications of our terms, regardless of the consequences. (p. 73)

Using Miskimmon’s and Burke’s ideas about narratives as a starting point, this section will introduce the reader to the rhetorical elements of narratives. After discussing the rhetorical elements of narratives, I will bring in the above-mentioned ideas about political crisis, rhetorical legitimacy, and crisis events. Guided by Burke’s idea that “the most characteristic concern of rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political ends . . . “ (Burke, 1969b, p. 41), this section will develop a rhetorical lens of political crisis narratives.

Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) draw upon Foucault’s ideas about discourse to develop their definition of strategic political narratives. Specifically, they explain:

We take a Foucauldian conception of discourse as a set of meanings and practices that contain rules about what is say-able and know-able and that creates roles which actors fill. Discourses do not feature a causal transformation that take actors from one status quo to another as narratives do. Actors can only form and project narratives based upon the discourses available to them in the historical situation, so discourses have a structuring effect upon narrative action. (p. 7)
What is important here is not only the Foucauldian idea that discourse opens or closes off knowledge and speech, but it is that narratives feature identification as well as temporal and causal transformation. Accordingly, a narrative perspective of political crisis discourse makes it possible to identify actors, settings, acts, means, and goals, while also recognizing relationships between past, present, and future.

At a press conference on November 9th, 1989 in East Berlin, Günter Schabowski surprised journalists with his announcement that the Berlin wall is now open. Journalists rushed to pay phones and wire services to report the news to their news networks. West German TV channels included the news in their evening programs, which encouraged East Berliners to walk up to the border crossing at Bornholmer Straße. East Berliners asked the border guards what was happening. Unable to reach their supervisors, the border guards referred to TV and radio reports about Schabowski’s announcement and decided to let East Berliners cross into West Berlin. In the days after the accidental opening of the Berlin Wall, politicians, journalists, and citizens asked themselves: “What happened, why did it happen, and where are we going from here?” West German and European politicians answered these questions by declaring it an event of freedom and unity and suggesting rapid German-German unification. They used this political crisis to expand their legal, economic, and political systems eastward, which eventually led to the rapid unification of East and West Germany and the advancement of the European Union.

This brief narrative of political events surrounding the opening of the Berlin Wall not only identifies key actors, actions, settings, means, and goals associated with the
opening of the Berlin Wall, but it also suggests causal and temporal transformation of events. In addition, the accidental opening of the Berlin Wall opened new rhetorical opportunities to enact political crisis narratives that answer the questions of what happened, why did it happen, and where are we going. Thus, the past, present, and future are expressed through the discursive interplay between actors, actions, settings, means, and goals.

Drawing upon Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad, Miskimmon, Roselle, and O’Loughlin (2017; 2013; 2014) define narratives in terms of actors, settings, acts, actions, tools, and resolutions. The following summary fleshes out the rhetorical elements of narratives and offers examples that relate to the political context of the opening of the Berlin Wall and specifically to the present inquiry.

- **Characters/Actors (Agent):** Actors possess agency or the means to carry out acts that are important to a narrative. Political crisis actors include several different interest groups like policy makers, political parties, opposition leaders, social movements, and newspapers. Political crisis actors are different from political crisis narrators. As key political crisis narrators, political leaders and publics can write themselves as well as other actors into a narrative by speaking to the popular news frames of the media⁸. Actors that lack societal significance or popularity might appear in a narrative as actors, but will be denied rights to

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⁸ For a detailed discussion of news frames from a rhetorical perspective and how enactments of a narratives transform into newsworthy statement in the media, please turn to (Jamieson & Campbell, 2001). Jamieson and Campbell also speak to the process by which societal actors influence the media and thereby write themselves into the media’s narratives about political events.
authorship of the narrative. Within the context of domestic political communication surrounding the opening of the Berlin Wall, actors include East German political opposition groups represented at the Round Table Meetings (e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) and West German policy makers like Germany’s chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. These actors potentially function as actors and/or narrators. Whoever is included or excluded in a political crisis narrative reveals who is considered important or irrelevant to possible resolutions of the crisis. Further, political crisis narrators do not create actors from scratch, but the existing political narratives (e.g., Cold War narratives) attribute specific interests, qualities, and abilities to an actor. In a way, narratives ascribe political identities to actors that induce limitations and shape people’s public perceptions of these actors. Thus, political actors are rhetorically charged when entering a narrative, creating opportunities and constraints for political crisis narrators. Finally, as political actors exist within the interplay of different discourses, their identities are subject to changes in these discourses.

- Setting/Environment/Space (Scene): Within the context of political crisis communication, settings refer to the discursive constraints and opportunities for political crisis actors to enact narratives. Settings refer to depictions of political systems. During the Cold War, political systems were largely depicted in realist
term (Kennedy, 1988; Waltz, 2010), describing the Cold War world as a battle over limited power resources and the effective and efficient use of the available resources. According to a realist view of the political system in 1989, political order would best be achieved via balancing and containment of power. Further, settings refer to crisis situations. Was the fall of the Berlin wall a crisis of German solidarity? A crisis of mass emigration from the East to the West? A crisis in geopolitics? A crisis of communism? An opportunity for German and European Unification? An opportunity for Western expansion eastwards? A new political beginning for German and European integration or just the beginning of the end of communism and the Cold War? Similarly, within a democratic system narrative, the opening of the Berlin wall suggests political and economic liberation, whereas within a communist system narrative, the opening of the Berlin wall suggests political failure. As with actors, political crisis settings carry rhetorical constraints, opportunities, assumptions, and rationales. These rhetorical limitations also define what issues actors will be able to discuss and what policies they can propose to address these issues. Finally, the language used to describe a political setting shapes an actor’s political motives. For Burke (1984), motives do not reside within people but are “distinctly linguistic products” (p. 35) that reside in language. Specifically, Burke explains “. . . man’s words for motives (e.g., duty, love, revenge, faith, devotion, preference) are merely shorthand descriptions of situations. One tends to think of a duality here, to assume some kind of breach between situation and a response. Yet the two are identical. . . .
[t]he situation was our motive, and our word for the motive characterizes the situation” (Burke, 1984, p. 220). Thus, rhetorical depictions of Germany’s political system and the crisis situation of the opening of the Berlin Wall imply constraints and opportunities for crisis actors and narrators, as well as specific political motives.

- **Conflict/Action (Act):** Political acts structure narratives in terms of past, present, and future. Political actions drive and shape a narrative as they potentially invite reactions from other actors. Opposing actions possibly reinforce existing policies or lead to a conflict of political directions. Like actors and settings, actions do not exist independent of a narrative. The qualities of the political actor and the definition of the political system and crisis situation determine what political actions are possible. Depending on the enacted narrative, a political act limits or enables a corresponding reaction. Burke (1968, 2003) argues that narrative acts are inherently dialectical. A political action entails resistance. For example, during his speech at the Centre des Conférences Internationales in Paris on January 17, 1990, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl invoked a metaphor frequently used by Konrad Adenauer and argued that “the German house must be built under a European roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 2012, p. 154). The metaphor not only suggests Kohl as one of the key architects for German and European unification, but also implies that a unified Germany would live under the *military roof* of NATO. As the military muscle against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, NATO defines the security elements of the
European roof. Any political action against NATO would be rendered as an offense against European and German integration. In the political setting of 1989, any opposition to divorce from NATO or Europe’s political and economic agreements (e.g., European Economic Community EEC, European Political Cooperation EPC) would risk German and European political, economic, and military vulnerability. On February 1, 1990 Modrow proposed a plan for German-German unification where both German nations should surrender their memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a neutral position within Europe. This enactment of a narrative of military neutrality invited reactions from the existing Cold War narratives, which Kohl enacted shortly after Modrow argued for German neutrality. The self-ascribed qualities of Kohl as an architect for German and European integration, the metaphor of a Germany under a European and NATO roof, and international system at the end of 1989 thwarted Modrow’s political action and implied conflicting political trajectories. Accordingly, actions not only structure a narrative in terms of causality and temporality, but they also invite corresponding reactions.

- **Tools/Behavior (Agency):** How do the political agents act? By what means do they act? What instruments do they use to carry out their acts? While the qualities of the actor, settings, and acts, limit what tools are available, political agency for the present analysis specifically include policies and political legitimacy as it resides in values, norms, and symbols like peace, prosperity, security, liberty, equality, unity, human rights, and even bravery and dedication.
Theories within the area of international politics often distinguish between hard power and soft power instruments. Hard power resources refer to military and economic tools, while soft power tools denote the perceived attractiveness of political culture, values, and policies (Nye, 2004). Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle’s (2013) definition of narrative tools, however, transcends the distinction between hard and soft power. They contend that “strategic narratives . . . bridges the gap between hard and soft power concepts . . . [t]he use of military and economic instruments can be understood to be part of a narrative projection of a state” (p. 75). Hence, within the structure of a political crisis narrative, tools of political power exist in relation to the actor and the possible crisis resolution that they promise.

- **Resolution/Suggested Resolution/Goal: (Purpose):** The rhetor’s account of the resolution is particularly important for political crisis narratives in that people expect to return to a narrative of political order and legitimacy. The suggested solution should offer an imaginable and actionable future that rests upon legitimate state-society relations. As a crisis disrupts the routine narrative of political legitimacy, people await a narrative that transforms political chaos into order and continuity. A political crisis narrative without a clear resolution would not only disappoint in reestablishing political legitimacy and foreclose any opportunity to rhetorically exploit the situation, but it would also fail to function as a policy narrative. By its nature, political discourse carries with it an expectation to address the future. A political crisis narrative that lacks a short-
term or long-term resolution would struggle to rhetorically define a crisis situation. Within international politics of the Cold War, goals by Western nations included nation building, regime change, and the containment of Soviet geopolitical expansion (Craig & Logevall, 2012). Via the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the US aimed at rebuilding Europe’s political and economic systems, while defending it from communist influence. Between 1989-90, international policy makers competed over different models for rebuilding Europe and creating a new transatlantic architecture (Sarotte, 2014a). They competed over possible resolutions or goals for a post-Cold War narrative. Hardliners within the Soviet government wished to return to the four-power agreement of 1945, before subsequent layers of Cold War modification opened room for political maneuvering by Germany (e.g., Détente). The old Allied Control Commission should dominate all proceedings in divided Germany. Sarotte (2014a) refers to this as the “Restoration Model” (p. 7), which represents a realist vision for Germany’s political future. The ultimate goal was to divide and thereby weaken Germany and Europe, in line with the idea that a divided power is a weak power. In opposition to the hardliners within the Soviet government, Mikhail Gorbachev favored a “Heroic Model of Multinationalism,” creating a common European home with many rooms. States under this model would retrain their own political orders, but cooperate via international economic and military institutions. The goal was the construction of an improved socialism in East Germany. Interestingly, the East German dissident movements argued for
a similar resolution in that they imagined political and economic modernization to exist side by side with socialism. The French President François Mitterrand proposed a political order where both Germanies would maintain its own sovereignty under a common national roof. This two-states in one Germany model or “Revivalist Model” aimed at creating a Europe of confederations. Moscow’s “Restoration Model”, Gorbachev’s “Heroic Model of Multinationalism”, and Mitterrand’s “Revivalist Model” would not speak to the concerns of European policy makers (e.g., How should East Germany be integrated into Europe economically, politically, militarily, and culturally?) or adapt to the rapidly changing political landscape between 1989 and 1990. In the end, Helmut Kohl developed the winning resolution in early 1990—the “Prefabrication Model”. Kohl suggested to extend the West’s domestic and international economic, military, and political institutions eastward. The West German Basic Law, the Deutsch Mark, the European Community (EC), and NATO’s mutual defense guarantee (i.e., Article 5) all allowed for eastward expansion. Thus, the winning resolution of Germany’s reunification process occurred under the existing West German/European structures.

While this meta-narrative of the process of German reunification introduces the reader to key actors, settings, actions, tools, and resolutions, these are only examples to illustrate the relationships between and among key elements of the political crisis narrative of 1989-1990. Further, this meta-narrative relies upon different historical accounts of what happened, rather than how the political crisis of 1989 unfolded
rhetorically. Sarotte (2014a), Engel (2009), and others explain how Kohl’s resolution defeated alternative resolutions from a historical and international relations perspective, however, the present analysis explores this battle from a rhetorical perspective.

Burke (1969a) speaks of ratios and dominant terms to describe how narrative elements influence each other. There are numerous ways in which the different relationships between narrative elements or ratios enable and restrict a specific crisis resolution (Kneupper, 1979). Does the rhetorical nature of the political setting of 1989 require a specific type of politician? (setting-actor ratio). What political actions are possible within the political setting of 1989? (setting-action ratio). How does Helmut Kohl describe the political and economic setting of East Germany so that it warrants his prefabrication model as the only resolution? (setting-resolution ratio). Do the rhetorical depictions of the political actions by East German publics demand the setting be a certain way? (action-setting ratio). Does Kohl’s appeals to unity and freedom demand him to be a certain politician? (agency-actor ratio). To answer these and related questions, it is necessary to not only identify the ratios or what goes with what, but also to ask questions like: “What is it about the political setting of 1989 that demands a certain political actor, action, tool, and resolution?” To discover the relationship between narrative elements, it is important to analyze ratios as manifestations of the political values, norms, and symbols that existed during 1989.

As different crisis narrators draw upon different political values, norms, and symbols to narrate an event, we often end up with conflicting narratives. This is not due to a narrative’s internal structure, but because the ratios are rooted in different political
cultures and symbols. With his prefabrication model, German Chancellor Kohl won the battle over creating a post-1989 resolution for Germany and Europe. For him, the political setting of 1989 required the expansion of Western institution eastwards and rapid reunification. The political culture of the Cold-War informed Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics. Within the setting of 1989 as a new political beginning, the Round Table meetings in East Germany considered deliberations between East and West Germans over alternative political futures as the right action within the setting of a bottom-up political revolution. Thus, narratives not only differ and potentially conflict in terms of individual elements, but also regarding the political culture that informs the relationships between narrative elements.

Miskimmon, Roselle, and O’Loughlin (2017; 2013; 2014) distinguish between international system, identity, and policy/issue narratives. International system narratives include Cold War narratives and War on Terror narratives, for example. At the level of international political systems, these narratives define how the world works, who its players are, and what global political future we are working toward. The Cold War narrative divided the world into democratic, communist, and non-aligned systems. Within this Cold War narrative, states and policymakers functioned as protectors of ideology and territory. On the other hand, identity narratives describe a nation’s political identity, its values, and goals. Is East Germany a nation committed to human rights? Is West Germany a nation that acts out of self-interest or humility? Is West Germany a political conqueror or a rescuer? While international system narratives, identity
narratives, and policy/issue narratives are rhetorically linked, this analysis focuses on policy narratives. Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle (2017) explain:

... policy narratives set out why a policy is needed and (normatively) desirable, and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. Issue narratives set political actions in a context, with an explanation of who the important actors are, what the conflict or issue is, and how a particular course of action will resolve the underlying issue. (p. 8)

By analyzing the normative dimensions of narratives, policy narratives highlight the importance of the suggested resolution in a narrative. As a political crisis demands a narrative that reestablishes political order and legitimacy, policy/issue narratives help to reveal why specific political futures are chosen over others.

One reason for why political crisis narrators choose one policy narrative over another is because they approach the crisis event from different terminologies. The attribution of actors, settings, action, tools, and resolution will be different depending on the crisis narrator’s language. In a way, the desirable policies available to a crisis narrator reside within that narrator’s language, which also means that a shift in terminology would potentially open new political futures that the old terminology concealed. Burke (1932) explains how our language shapes our views of a crisis situation and limit our ability to discover alternative resolutions. By approaching a personal crisis like losing a job from different vocabularies, we act one way rather than another:
...one man, dismissed from a job, but having a Marxian “configuration of meanings,” will fit his particular fate into a larger social progress, and so feel resentment rather than humiliation, and may perhaps organize an ominous hunger march; another, similarly dismissed, and with only the older pioneer configuration, the doctrine that ability will out, takes his dismissal simply as evidence that he was insufficiently endowed, and so may slink out of existence with a few. (Burke, 1932, p. 312).

As a result, each crisis event and each reaction to a crisis event is interpreted by the media, political leaders, and publics through their idiosyncratic narratives.

In summary, political crisis narratives potentially differ in terms of how crisis narrators attribute actors, settings, actions, tools, and resolutions to an event, how they relate these elements to warrant a crisis resolution (i.e., ratios), and what political culture and language these ratios represent. However, policy narratives not only differ regarding the pentad, the ratios, and political culture and language, they also differ in terms of their level of narrative probability or fragmentation.

**Fragmented Political Crisis Narratives**

Political leaders, journalists, and publics are narrative critics. They engage in rhetorical battles over the who, what, where, when, why, and how of events and how the answers to these questions should relate to each other. However, they also argue over what language should be used. Burke (1969a) explains:

Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation
he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. (p. xv)

In the process of these language battles, crisis narrators potentially fail to develop complete and coherent narratives. Maybe political crisis narratives lack elements or fail to relate elements in meaningful ways. Maybe political crisis narrators ground their crisis responses in a political culture and language that is foreign to their target audience. As crisis narrators try to thread together fluid crisis events into narratives of political order and legitimacy, they may connect events in a way that violates the integrity of a narrative.

Fisher (1984), suggests that people evaluate reality against narrative integrity. For Fisher, narrative integrity rests on three key assumptions: (1) narrative fidelity, or a narrative’s correspondence to reality, (2) narrative probability, or a narratives internal coherence, and (3) good reason or a narrative’s values. Narrative fidelity examines whether the narrative “rings true” for an audience. For Fisher (1987), narrative fidelity addresses the following questions: “Does [the narrative] provide a reliable guide to our beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions? . . . are the central conclusions of [the narrative] reliable/desirable guides for one’s own life? (pp. 175-176). For example, does the political crisis narratives of 1989 imply a desirable political future for East Germans? What are the “truth qualities” of the 1989 narrative for different audiences? (Fisher, 1985, p. 349). As West German political leaders and the West German press enacted narratives during the 1989 crisis, East German publics had the chance to test their ideas about German-German reunification against these narratives and the implied crisis
resolutions. Specifically, people consider a narrative’s fidelity in terms of its consequences and desirability (Fisher, 1987, p. 48). This not only speaks to the normative dimension of policy narratives, but Fisher’s idea of narrative fidelity further fleshes out the rhetorical power of a crisis resolution for narrative identification. If an audience sees itself implicated in the narrative resolution of a crisis, then it is likely to desire it. For example, between December 1989 and February 1990, Hans Modrow enacted a policy narrative that envisioned German-German unification as the vehicle to achieve political and military neutrality for East Germany. Rather than narrating German-German unification as a desirable resolution without preconditions, Modrow evoked a desirability for military and political neutrality. In the end, his suggested crisis resolution lacked narrative fidelity or political desirability. As a political crisis continues until a resolution reestabishes order and legitimacy, it is essential that crisis narrators do not omit or minimize the significance of the suggested resolution in a political crisis narrative. Thus, higher levels of narrative fidelity would manifest themselves in pentadic ratios that involve or highlight the suggested resolution. The absence of depictions of desirable political resolutions to the 1989 crisis would not only mean that the narrative does not register and function as a policy narrative, but it would also weaken narrative identification overall.

On the other hand, narrative probability includes an assessment of whether the elements of a narrative hang together and whether the narrative is free of internal contradictions (Fisher, 1985, pp. 349, 364). A political speech or newspaper editorial that only includes details about the actor, action, and setting of an event fails to address
questions about the why and the how of the event and thereby fails to narrate possible futures. While narrators can limit themselves to transform only specific elements of a crisis event into a narrative, their audiences expect them to offer a coherent and complete crisis narrative that resembles other narratives, depicts reliable actors, and presents a logical set of events. If narratives lack “material,” “characterological,” and “argumentative,” coherence, then people are less likely to see themselves implicated in a crisis resolution. Material coherence describes the relationship between raw events and discourse, or the way that crisis narrators depict those events. Specifically, it refers to an audience’s tendency to compare narratives by the media, political leaders, and organized publics to similar narratives. An inquiry into the similarities between narratives political revolutions available to East Germans around 1989 and Kohl’s prefabrication narrative would be another project in and by itself; however, it draws our attention to reasons for discrepancies between the policy narratives by East Germans, Western politicians, and the Western press. In addition, narrative fragmentation can also happen at the level of narrative actors. Fisher argues that (1987) “coherence in life ... requires that characters behave characteristically ... without this kind of predictability, there is no trust, no community, no human order” (p. 47). A democratic actor will continue to be democratic, while an authoritarian actor will continue to be authoritarian. Depictions of coherent political actors evoke political predictability, whereas fragmented political actors suggest an ambiguous political future. Finally, argumentative or structural coherence refers to the order of events in a narrative. How does the narrative flow from one event to another? Narrative probability manifests itself in strong links between narrative elements
and consistent depictions of narrative elements. Only when crisis narrators depict narrative elements in a coherent and consistent way and relate them in a way so that they imply a desirable future is it possible to speak of high levels of narrative probability. The elements should be internally consistent and build upon each other in a way to point toward a resolution to the political crisis. This would enhance narrative identification by suggesting political predictivity.

While Fisher’s ideas about narrative fidelity and probability are important to facilitate narrative identification, and draw our attention to a narrative’s internal inconsistencies, the assumption of good reasons is particularly important to develop the idea of fragmented political crisis narratives (Caldiero, 2007; Heath, 2004). Good reason refers to people’s culture, history, values, and experiences. Specifically, Fisher argues that “[t]he ground for determining meaning, validity, reason, rationality, and truth must be a narrative context: history, culture, biography, and character” (Fisher, 1984, p. 3). West German politicians, journalists, and East German publics may agree on the probability and fidelity of a 1989 narrative, but disagree over the good reasons for German-German unification. The history, culture, and character that a bottom-up political revolution like the opening of the Berlin wall evokes for West German politicians and journalists is different than for people in Eastern Germany. This distinction between narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons is particularly important in that organized East German public generally supported German-German unification as a desirable, reliable, and predictable crisis resolution, but doubted the process of integrating East German’s political culture into West Germany’s political
culture. This way, narrative identification is generally a question of degree; however, Fisher’s idea of good reasons specifically draws our attention to the significance of good reasons for the 1989 battle over political narratives and crisis resolutions. East Germans were not doomed to buy into or out of narratives. Recent research suggests that Kohl’s prefabrication narrative activated political desirability and predictability, but failed to address issues regarding political cultures (Gerstenberger & Braziel, 2011; Hockenos, 2008; Kelly, 2011; Koelle, 2014). Hence, it is not only due to external conflicts between and among narratives that people do not see themselves implicated in a crisis narrative and crisis resolution, but also due to internal inconsistencies, especially along the lines of good reasons.

Further, Fisher argues that rational discourse favors informed and educated audiences, but the application of good reason in a narrative allows all audiences to participate in the creation and execution of narratives (Fisher, 1984, p. 9). Narratives allow non-experts or publics to enter the rhetorical construction of a future political order, whereas rational and logical discourse restricts narrative participation and identification to experts. Developing non-fragmented policy narratives is a rhetorically powerful tool in that it not only invites political experts as well as political non-experts to work toward a specific (common) future, but it also allows experts to appear to facilitate inclusive political discourse, while they can strategically exclude voices and political possibilities from the narrative. This way, Fisher’s assumption about narrative fidelity, probability, and good reason as key conditions for narrative integrity and identification further warrants a narrative perspective of the rhetorical battle between
West German political leaders, the Western press, and the East German public over possible political futures for Germany.

Similar to Burke’s idea of symbolic action (Burke, 1942, 1966), Fisher’s narrative paradigm refers to “a theory of symbolic action, words and or/deeds, that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, and interpret them” (Fisher, 1984, p. 2). A fragmented political crisis narrative along the lines of political desirability, political predictability, and political culture does not offer political equipment to envision or work toward a political future. Considering that the goal of a political crisis narrative is to reestablish political legitimacy, it is particularly problematic if a narrative’s elements and ratios fragment internally or among each other. Whether political crisis narratives lack elements or fail to depict and relate elements in a way to invoke political desirability, predictability, and culture, it weakens narrative identification. In turn, this lessens a narrative’s chance to shape or reestablish political order and legitimacy. Fisher’s narrative theory helps to supplement Miskimmon’s et al. idea of policy narratives by revealing that it is not only due to external conflicts between and among narratives that people do not see themselves implicated in crisis narratives and crisis resolution, but also due to internal inconsistencies. Specifically, by extracting political desirability, predictability, and culture out of Fisher’s assumptions about narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons is it possible to see how within the context of political crises, narrative integrity tends to move toward crisis resolution. To put it another way, political crisis narratives as equipment for political action are more inviting if they suggested desirable, predictable, and culturally resonant crisis resolution.
In summary, Fisher’s narrative theory further supports the argument that narratives function as “equipment for [political] living” (Burke, 1941). Fisher’s assumption about narrative fidelity further fleshes out the importance of desirable crisis resolutions. A crisis narrative should offer a reliable and desirable guide for political action. To this end, it is important that political crisis narratives evoke and highlight a desirable and reliable crisis resolutions. People would not see themselves implicated in a crisis resolution if a narrative lacked desirable crisis resolution. This desirability manifest itself in pentadic ratios that emphasize suggested resolutions. On the other hand, narrative probability supports the argument that narrative identification depends on strong rhetorical links between and among narrative elements. Specifically, if narrative elements do not build upon each other to highlight the normative dimensions of a policy narrative, then it will be difficult for audiences to predict a political future or even envision it. This way, high levels of narrative probability rhetorically enhance political predictability. Finally, it is good reasons that lets political leaders, journalists, and publics act as narrative critics and engage in rhetorical battles. To put it another way, Fisher’s idea of good reasons directs our attention to the rhetorical battle over political legitimacy as it resides in political culture, history, values, norms, and symbols. Discussing Fisher’s ideas of narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons within the context of policy narratives and crisis resolutions helps to link a lack of narrative integrity to a decline in political legitimacy and desirability, which is necessary to propose reliable crisis resolutions and future directions.
In line with Burke and Miskimmon et al., Fisher considers narratives as a guide for (political) action. Through internal and external narrative identification it is possible for a policy narrative to carry political power. In turn, this means that any statement only carries political power if it enacts a desirable policy narrative. Specifically, with each statement, crisis narrators enact a crisis narrative that aims at aligning the crisis-shaken symbols and values in a way to imply a desirable and reliable political future.

By bringing together the key insights from our discussion so far, the chart below illustrates my rhetorical approach to political crisis narratives.

![Figure 1: A Rhetorical Model of Political Crisis Narratives](image)

Figure 1: A Rhetorical Model of Political Crisis Narratives
A legitimate political order allows policy makers to propose desirable directions for a country’s future. By rhetorically enacting political futures that are grounded in political legitimacy as it resides in values, norms, and symbol systems, policy makers reify the existing political order. As political crises disrupt the symbolic order that legitimized the pre-existing political order, it weakens policy makers ability to propose desirable and reliable political futures. Whether it is revolutionary upheavals, terror attacks, intergovernmental conflicts, or economic recessions, the crisis is so significant that political symbols and values like unity, order, equality, freedom, and solidarity now point to a new, but ambiguous political future. Pre-crisis political narratives put these symbols and values into a coherent whole that pointed to a desirable and predictable future, but a political crisis demands a realignment of political symbols and values. A policy narrative is a rhetorical vehicle to realign political symbols, reestablish legitimacy, and imply a crisis resolution that helps to restore symbolic order. The search for a new narrative of political legitimacy is driven by policy makers’ need to enact politically legitimate and desirable directions for the future. To legitimize a new political future, policy makers must turn to public discourses for help and support. The old narratives of political order do not explain the impact and implications of the crisis, which requires policy makers to turn to public deliberation and discourse. Other political narrators, specifically organized publics and the media generate discourse by commenting on the fluid crisis events and attempt to rhetorically transform them into a situation. The battle over who gets to define the situation is important in that it defines the political problem that a policy narrative attempts to resolve. Was the 1989 political
crisis an opportunity for German-German unification or a faux pas of the East German leadership? Whoever defined the crisis situation is well-positioned to advance a specific policy narrative. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that “[i]t is fairly evident that which ‘narrative’ of the crisis come to prevail will strongly affect which strategies and policies win out and what the effects of the crisis and the long-term outcomes are” (p. 6). Thus, a policy narrative as an answer to the ambiguous future that the crisis left behind, not only reifies the definition of the situation, but also reestablishes legitimacy by aligning political symbols and values in a way that implies a desirable crisis resolution.

The following sections will now discuss the interaction between politicians, the media, and the public in the process of enacting political crisis narratives. While my analysis will reveal the intricacies of these different narratives, the existing historic accounts about the fall of the Berlin wall allow me to formulate assumptions or general tendencies about how the West German political leadership, the West German press, and organized East German publics threaded together and responded to the crisis events of 1989. Special attention will be dedicated to differences in rhetorical power and the political communication environment of 1989. Why was it rhetorically possible for the West German press to initially treat the events at the night of November 9th, 1989 as a political revolution and involuntarily legitimized the opening? Why was it so difficult for organized East German publics to voice their demands and concerns via the national press? What enabled the political leadership of West Germany to narrate the crisis of 1989 as legitimation to expand their legal, economic, and political systems eastward?
West German Political Leaders as Crisis Narrators

In 1989, people in East and West Germany predominantly relied on political leaders to articulate their concerns and demands. While political leaders in 1989 depended on the press to enact crisis narratives to a broader audience, it was the vertical flow of political communication that bestowed special rhetorical powers upon political leaders in 1989. A crisis event occurs, politicians respond, and the media mediate it to the public. This hierarchical or hegemonic news model dominated the Cold War era, especially when politicians discussed policy issues (Entman, 2003, 2004). During the Cold War, political communication generally followed a vertical or cascading model of political communication (Entman, 2003). This vertical flow of communication allowed political leaders of West Germany to relatively freely narrate political directions for a post-Cold War order and ascribe cultural and political desirability to a specific policy. Entman (2003) explains:

Ideas that start at the top level, the administration, possess the greatest strength. The president and top advisors enjoy the most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation. (p. 420)

Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle (2017) agree with Entman’s vertical model of political communication when they argue that “. . . ‘frames’ [as enactments of

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9 While Entman’s vertical model of political communication helps to describe the power relations between political leaders, the media, and the public during the Cold War in regard to policy narratives, today’s political communication environment often works like a rhetorical arena where hierarchical power relations begin to flatten (Frandsen & Johansen, 2007, 2010, 2011).
narratives] move from policy elites to media to publics” (p. 42). Further, when other top-level politicians (e.g., foreign ministers, interior ministers) enact similar narratives with their public statements, then this further reinforces the initial narrative and weakens any enactment of counter-narratives from the media or the public. Initial enactments of policy narratives by other political leaders gain and sustain rhetorical power if other political elites collectively enact the initial narrative. Conflicting policy narratives among political leaders would make them vulnerable for criticism by the press and organized publics.

Initially, the opening of the Berlin Wall represents an exception to this general flow of political communication in that the public and the media legitimized the opening of the Wall on November 9th, 1989. While it is often difficult for the public or even the media to send policy narratives upward Entman’s vertical model of political communication, the revolutionary moment of November 9th, 1989 disrupted the rhetorical power relation between political leadership, the media, and the public for a moment. In authoritarian regimes like the GDR, enactments of policy narratives rarely travel upward through the media. The GDR government ensured that mass-protests in the spring and summer of 1989 would not be broadcast in East Germany. Yet, media systems in democratic Cold War societies also limit contraflows of counter-narratives due to the demands of a rapid news cycle and a lack of detailed knowledge among journalists (Entman, 2003). With his 10-Point Program for overcoming Germany’s and Europe’s division on November 28th, 1989, Helmut Kohl started to reestablish the traditional flow of policy narratives. However, it is not only the vertical flow of political
communication which creates a power relationship between the political elites, the press, and publics that favors political leaders.

During crisis moments, people turn to political leaders for answers and solutions. This way, political leaders are initially freer in defining the situation than the media or the public. They are key crisis narrators in convincing others of the nature and impact of the crisis situation. Specifically, East Germans relied on the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of West Germany to express their demands and reservations for a German and European future. After a crisis situation has manifested itself in the public discourse, political leaders become the key narrators for proposing and advancing a crisis resolution. Boin, Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (2017) argue:

In times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders: presidents and mayors, local politicians and elected administrators, public managers and top civil servants. We expect these policy makers to avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand. They should lead us out of the crisis; they must explain what went wrong and convince us that it will not happen again. (p. 1)

People’s expectations for political leaders to resolve the crisis not only puts pressure on them to act, but within the vertical flows of communication in the media environment of 1989, it also privileges the role of political elites as crisis managers and narrators. They are intentional with their policy statements, whereas the press and organized publics are responsive in that they usually follow, criticize, or protest their policy suggestions. Politicians could potentially exploit this role and define the crisis situation in their favor. In addition, while publics are distracted by the crisis and
overwhelmed by the ambiguity of events, politicians can narrate futures that are only in the short-term interest of the population (Klein, 2007). A political crisis that shakes a nation’s value and symbol systems like the fall of the Berlin wall, also allows political leaders to disregard normal legal and political procedures to resolve the crisis. Along the lines of the ends justify the means, people’s demands and desires for a crisis resolution warrant political leaders’ actions. To put it differently, political leaders can propose and implement a crisis resolution in the name of a false sense of reliability and desirability (e.g., “Economic security … isn’t this what we all want”). On the other hand, if leaders enact an undesirable policy narrative, then the crisis could intensify, enhancing the risk of losing legitimacy and the chance to propose reliable crisis resolutions (Boin et al., 2017; Boin et al., 2008; Boin et al., 2009).

While this dissertation focuses on the rhetorical battle over policy narratives between organized East German publics and the West German press and policy makers, it is important not to neglect that policy narratives exist within broader narratives like the European narrative of integration and cooperation and the Cold War narrative (Miskimmon et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). The West German political leadership could not enact policy narratives that would run contrary to existing narratives10. Within the Western Cold War narrative of peace and prosperity, politicians enacted policy narratives that established political order in terms of state sovereignty and Western cooperation. The key drivers of this international political

10 See Ellul’s discussion about the internal and collective characteristics of political communication and propaganda (Ellul, 1972, p. 38).
system narrative included George Kennan’s containment policy, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan, which aimed at stopping the spread of communism and Soviet expansive tendencies through economic and military measures. At the European level, this implied that German policy narratives would advance European economic and military cooperation and integration as a means to support the West’s international narrative, or else risk political and economic vulnerability. Any enactment of political crisis narrative of the Cold war would thereby be constrained by expectations about European sovereignty and economic cooperation and integration.

In summary, the vertical flow of political communication during the Cold War privileged West German politicians to enact desirable policy narratives as resolutions to the 1989 crisis. While political leaders like Kohl and Genscher depended on the media to reach a mass audience, they had the advantage to enact policy narratives and introduce specific directions for the future of Germany and Europe. As the political crisis situations of 1989 created shared contingencies for East and West Germans, people turned to politicians as the political and cultural compass for the future of Germany and Europe. Finally, whereas the Cold War flow of political communication and uncertainty of the 1989 crisis situation favored the West German political leadership as crisis narrator, West German politician’s crisis rhetoric was still constrained by the Cold War narrative of European sovereignty and economic cooperation and integration.
The West German Press as Crisis Narrator

Neither the political leaders of West Germany, nor the organized East German publics or the press of West Germany shaped the crisis narratives of 1989 on their own. The interaction between and among the West German political leadership, the West German press, and organized East German publics constructed the conflicting policy narratives for a post-1989 Germany and Europe. By enacting different policy narratives, assigning political and societal roles to actors in the crisis drama, and implying a specific political future, they all—voluntarily or involuntarily—constructed different political crisis narratives. The West German press played a significant role in this co-creation of meaning in 1989 in that East and West German publics as well as West German politicians would turn to the national press to get information about the crisis.

Whereas the press does not announce political directions or policy alternatives, it does hold disproportionately more rhetorical power in shaping public perceptions about policies than organized publics of East Germany and the Western political leadership. As the largest daily West German national newspapers between 1989-90, the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Die Welt, and the Tageszeitung (TAZ), had unique rhetorical political power, not only because they could disseminate information to large audiences, but because they acted as a mediator between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 3). As the world people deal with politically is “out of reach, out of sight, and out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 29), it is the role of the press to create a political world for publics to act upon. In the process of mediating between the outside
political and the political pictures in people’s heads, the press inevitably narrates events and issues in a shortened way. In the great blooming and buzzing confusion of the political world of 1989, the West German press reduced the political events and issues for a large portion of the German population to mental shortcuts or stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). These stereotypes or political pictures in people’s heads often mislead people in their dealings with the outside political world. Even in democratic political systems, stereotypes create a gap between the outside political world and political pictures in people’s heads. Specifically, Lippmann (1922) argues that “[t]he key problem of democracy and democratic decision making results from a gap between fiction and reality . . . because the pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside” (p. 30). The political pictures in people’s heads are summaries or generalizations of political crisis events and issues that people read about and ultimately act upon. Whatever policy narratives the press enacts possibly registers as the world of political action. Lippmann (1922) explains that “… whatever we believe to be true pictures, we treat as if it were the environment itself” (p. 4).

The press is a key crisis narrator in the early hours and days of a crisis, especially when publics demand information about a crisis in order to act and react. While the press plays a key role in defining a situation as crisis, their influence on policy narratives begins not before they include official sources in their reporting and framing. Specifically, when the press incorporates quotes from politicians to build credibility they inevitably enact policy narratives for the broader German population. Even though journalists and news editors are reactive rather than intentional crisis narrators, they still
enact narratives by referencing and quoting policy makers and policies. Via the process of framing, the press activates or enacts specific narratives while deactivating or silencing others. That way, political press discourses “define, describe and delimit what is possible to say and not possible to say” (Critcher, 2003, p. 170). Further, by triggering specific narratives through news framing, the West German press could—intentionally or accidentally—invoke the desirability and reliability of specific narratives, while playing down the desirability and predictability of other policy alternatives. Thus, via news framing, the West German press could support specific political directions for German and European integration, while potentially opposing others.

News frames and agenda setting enable journalists and news editors to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Yet, whereas media agendas and news frames trigger or activate a narrative, it is important to remember that narratives are structurally different from frames (Miskimmon et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). News frames do not exert rhetorical power by themselves, but they gain their rhetorical power from the enactment of other narratives and narrative identification. News frames as enactments of narratives exert rhetorical power by activating existing narratives and encouraging identification with the desirability and reliability of the narrative. That way the media plays a key role in shaping a political crisis narrative and its implied political possibilities for other political actors like the public and political leaders.
Finally, the West German press in 1989 operated within a media system that tended to reflect the governing political philosophy of Western societies. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963) argue that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structure within which it operates (p. 187). This means that Germany’s largest daily newspapers tended to reflect the Federal German Republic’s political philosophy of democracy and European and German integration and cooperation to contain the spread of communism. In a way, the West German press tended to develop its reporting in opposition to the communist media system of the GDR where the press functioned as an instrument of the Social Unity Party of Germany (SED). While the West German media system grew out of the enlightenment, the East German media system followed Marxist ideas about the relationship between the press and society. Seibert et al. (1963) argue that communist and libertarian media system “line up almost diametrically opposite in their tenets” (p. 5). Elsewhere, Seibert et al. (1963) explain that the communist and the libertarian media systems are “incompatible” (p. 105) and that nothing can be “farther from Soviet thinking than our concept of the press as Fourth Estate” (p. 116). Specifically, Seibert et al. (1963) explain:

The concepts of man are wholly different—on the one side, man as a mass, malleable, unimportant in himself, in need of Promethean leadership; on the other side, man as intelligent, discriminating, perfectly able to purchase by himself in a ‘free market of ideas.’ The concepts of the state are nearly opposite—on the one hand, an elected democracy conceived as governing best when governing least; on the other, a self-appointed dictatorship, conceived of as
‘caretakers’ of the people against untrue or misleading ideas. The concepts of truth are correspondingly different—on the one hand, something to be arrived at by argument and confrontation of evidence; on the other, something to be derived by straining events through a ready-made theoretical sieve. (p. 145)

Along these lines, Szpunar (2011) argues that “an ideal needs an Other” (p. 16). This means that the West German media system, which operated according to libertarian and social-responsibility ideals developed and defended its identity in opposition to the communist media system of the GDR. These general differences in media systems between East and West Germany do not imply that Germany’s biggest daily newspapers inevitably framed all their stories in opposition to the communist media system, but it suggests general influences on their news reporting and style. Thus, not only does the general flow of political communication during in 1989 amplify the rhetorical powers of West German politician and the West German press, but the interactions between the press and the political system enhanced the rhetorical powers of the FDR over the GDR in general.

**East German Publics as Crisis Narrator**

*The East German public* is not a single entity, but comprises different social movements, networks, and groups. The popular citizens’ movements included groups and networks like Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany,
and the United Left. Under the symbolic protection of the Protestant Church, these social movement groups organized peaceful demonstrations throughout the East. It started with Monday night candlelight marches in Leipzig in the spring of 1989. In September, the Leipzig marches grew in numbers and from October through early November, protests spread to other cities. These efforts culminated in a mass demonstration of over 1 million people at Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on November 4th, 1989. Only three days later, the entire GDR government, the Social Unity Party (SED), and the East German politburo resigned. Via a common protest culture, political language, and horizontally-organized networks, East German publics engaged in collective political action and delegitimized the political regime of the East. However, while opposition leaders in East Germany expressed their ideas for the future of Germany and Europe in mass demonstrations throughout the spring and summer of 1989, the events on November 9th, 1989 demanded a vertical approach to political action. Their grassroot movements lacked hierarchical organization, clear division of labor, and centralized leadership, which is key to exerting political power via public discourse (Gladwell, 2010). Gladwell argues that political demonstrations and movements are not a natural enemy of the status quo. Specifically, he reasons that “[n]etworks aren’t controlled by a single central authority . . . decisions are made through consensus, and the ties that bind people to the group are loose” (Gladwell, 2010, 11). The East German leadership (SED) tolerated the Protestant Church because they were convinced that under the economic and cultural system of communism, people would soon realize that religion is obsolete.
To exert political power, it is important for activists to channel their concerns and demands through an organizational structure that allows them to speak with a politically authoritative voice. The Central Round Table meetings, which lasted from December 1989 until March 1990 present the clearest attempt by the former GDR leadership and GDR reformers to organize their political voice in a vertical or hierarchical way.

Yet, it is important to recognize that while hierarchical organization, division of labor, and centralized leadership is important to speak with a single political voice, the East German citizen movements and later the Round Table Meetings aimed at exerting political power through communicative action within the public spheres of Germany’s civil society or lifeworld (Olivo, 2001, p. 207). Specifically, they considered self-organized democratic participation and discussions as a means to cut across political lines and influence the Germany’s reunification process without succumbing to the instrumental and strategic communication that dominated institutionalized politics. The citizen movements and the Round Table Meetings operated under the assumption that exerting political power via communication happens from the outside. Institutionalized political communication involves bargaining and power politics, whereas political communication by publics spheres exerts political power through civic responsibility, equal access, democratic participation, and rational public debate (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1989; Habermas, Lennox, & Lennox, 1974). Under normal conditions the rhetorical political power of the citizen’s movements and later the Round Table Meetings would be tied to the question of whether they remained a citizens’ movement or transitioned to a political party (Padgett, 1993). However, the crisis situation of 1989
potentially opened up political spaces for East German public spheres and specifically
the Round Table Meetings to play the role of policy makers.

Habermas argues that during crisis situations it is possible for public spheres to
exert political power within the political system without surrendering its independent
voices. Within democratic political systems and civil societies, it is possible for public
spheres to play a significant role in the policy making process during crises despite its
structural disadvantages. Specifically, Habermas (1996) explains:

. . . in a perceived crisis situation, the actors in civil society thus far neglected in
our scenario can assume a surprisingly active and momentous role. In spite of a
lesser organizational complexity and a weaker capacity for action, and despite
the structural disadvantages mentioned earlier, at the critical moments of
accelerated history, these actors get the chance to reverse the normal circuits of
communication in the political system and the public sphere. In this way they can
shift the entire systems mode of problem solving. (pp. 380-381)

However, the political powers that a crisis situation offers for public spheres is
often counteracted by political leaders’ tendencies to exploit the crisis to legitimize their
policies. During the political crisis of the 1989-1990, political leaders contemplated
rapid German-German unification, the expansion of NATO and the European Economic
Community (EEC) eastwards, and the weakening of the Warsaw Pact. Helmut Kohl’s
rhetoric of practical politics implied that the pre-fabrication model is the only real
political direction for German-German unification or else East Germany would miss its
opportunity to free itself from the political and economic grip of the USSR. In the wake
of the Central Round Table Meeting, West German politicians had to ask themselves how self-organized political voices would fit into the larger political system, policies, and party politics of the West. This way, the demands by the Central Round Table meetings to slowly reform Germany’s political system worked against West Germany’s and West Europe’s aspirations to grow economically and militarily. Within this tension, the East German citizens’ movement attempted to formulate its vision for the future of a reunited Germany. At the heart of this tension lies the question of whether West Germany’s politicians would have been willing to surrender their monopoly of political power and develop a closer relationship with independent members of East Germany’s civil society. While members of the roundtables build relationships with members of West German political parties to solve problems regarding East Germany like the dissolution of the East Germany’s State Security Service (STASI), their involvement in the discussions about the future directions of Germany and Europe ended quickly (Olivo, 2001, p. 213). Hence, the interactions between the Central Round Tables and political parties enhanced their rhetorical power in areas concerning East Germany, but not for policies regarding German and European integration.

The political crisis of 1989 potentially allowed the East German public to organize themselves into a self-sustaining multipartisan political voice for Germany’s reunification process and beyond. But within the interplay between political leaders of the West and the West German press, their rhetorical political power to articulate new political possibilities for Germany depended on their ability to associate with political leaders of the West. In addition, it depended on their ability to navigate the tension
between strategic political communication and communicative action without surrendering their independent role as mediator between the public and the state. The West German press would possibly function as a way to influence the West German government’s ideas about German and European integration. Entman (2003) argues that “[i]f the news creates impressions that the idea is held widely and intensely by large swaths of the public, it can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and activities” (p. 420). However, during the crisis drama of 1989—due to reasons discussed earlier—the distribution of rhetorical power between organized East German publics, the West German press, and West German politicians as crisis narrators resembles the following figure.

Figure 2: Distribution of Rhetorical Power among Crisis Narrators
Methodology

Guided by critical theory, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and specifically Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) are interdisciplinary methods to examine language as a form of political action and deliberation (Dunmire, 2012). PDA researchers not only assume that discourse maintains social and political power relations, but also that it opens rhetorical room for political actors to deliberate possibilities for change.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) explain:

. . . political discourse analysis views political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, and as involving more specifically practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, argumentation that can ground decision. In deciding what to do, agents consider both reasons that favour a particular line of action and reasons against it, as well as reasons in favour or against alternatives, i.e., they deliberate over several possibilities of action. (p. 1)

While CDA examines the role of language in the struggle over political power, ideology, and the normalization of discourses in general, PDA draws our attention to the possibilities that discourse and deliberation offer for political action. When the political future is vague and the right way to act is fluid, political actors turn to discourse and deliberation for help (Aristotle, 2007). What political possibilities are represented and how they are represented in the discourse and deliberations affect the political actions and policies. In a way, political actions and policies follow from the available discourse and deliberations during a crisis situation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 8). This not only explains the rhetorical battles between crisis narrators over winning acceptance for
their crisis narratives, but also that the available crisis resolutions and policies for the political future of Germany and Europe are embedded and even hidden in the available discourses.

Further, PDA directs our attention to the broader macro-level social and political conditions that shape micro-level processes of political action and deliberation between key political actors like political leaders, the press, and organized publics. As political crisis discourses exist within specific political, economic, social, historical, and linguistic contexts (i.e., macro-level), crisis actors are limited in their abilities to enact desirable policies (i.e., micro-level). Political crisis discourses are fundamentally about advancing policy statements to restore political order and legitimacy to implement crisis resolutions and shape the political future. This processual nature of political crisis discourses, however, requires a method that accounts for the use of language as a form of political power, action, and deliberation as well as the transformation of political deliberation over future political directions.

The critical lens of Political Discourse Analysis in conjunction with Narrative Analysis allows us to examine the transformation of desirable policy narratives, while paying attention to rhetorical power relations and inequalities. When crisis narrators enact a crisis narrative, they bring together the micro-level meanings (i.e., individual speech acts) with macro-level meanings (i.e., existing political narratives/public memory/social knowledge), but their rhetorical enactments also exist within the broader power relations between political leaders, the press, and organized publics (see Figure 2). Habermas’s ideas about instrumental, strategic and communicative action, the
lifeworld and the system as well as Castells’ insights about power, communication, and
networks account for how narratives gained and maintained political power and political
power relations. While Habermas’s critical lens often leads researchers to only consider
how institutionalized political discourse colonizes public spheres (Souto-Manning, 2014,
p. 160), narrative analysis extends this one-way flow of power politics to account for the
complex interaction between key political crisis narrators. It is important to understand
the transformation of communication power in the rhetorical interplay between
politicians, the press, and publics. Habermas and Castells inform the Political Discourse
Analysis aspect of this analysis, while Burke, Miskimmon, and Fisher represent the
theoretical foundation for the Narrative Analysis aspect of the present inquiry. Bringing
together PDA and Narrative Analysis helps us to consider the relationship between
rhetorical transformation of parts and wholes, while recognizing its existence within the
power relations between politicians, the press, and organized publics. I will now explain
how my analysis chapters combine narrative analysis and Political Discourse Analysis.\(^{12}\)

The following three case studies retrace the different policy narratives developed
by West German politicians, organized East German publics, and the West German
press, while recognizing the disproportionate distribution of rhetorical political power
between these crisis narrators. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German
foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher embody the key narrators for policy narratives

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\(^{12}\) For a detailed discussion about the methodological relationship between Critical Discourse Analysis,
Political Discourse Analysis, and Narrative Analysis see (Dunmire, 2012; Janks, 1997; Souto-Manning,
2014).
by the West German political elite. Evidence for their policy narratives included all public statements (e.g., press conferences, parliamentary speeches) that predominantly featured enactments of the desirability and reliability of a specific future for Germany and Europe. Data for the West German press’s narrative included editorials, lead articles, and frontpage articles that mentioned propositions for the political future of the FDR, GDR, and Europe. As the press responds to, rather than initiates policy announcements, I selected the data from newspaper editions after political leaders from the FDR and the GDR made their announcements. Evidence for the policy narratives by organized East German publics predominantly included texts related to the Central Round Table discussions and statements by East German opposition leaders at demonstrations. To demonstrate how the policy narratives and specifically the proposed crisis resolutions changed throughout the rhetorical interplay between and among the crisis narrators, I focused on discourse between November 4th, 1989 and February 15th, 1990. While a lot of political events between November 1989 and March 1990 featured power politics, where parties reinvented themselves, crafted new constitutions, argued for early elections in the GDR, and forged new political alliances, this analysis focused on the rhetorical enactments of crisis resolutions by key political voices during 1989-90.

While guided by narrative elements and ratios as codes for policy narratives, I analyzed the different discourses at each political event following an open coding method. As themes emerged, I grouped them according to political actors, actions, settings, tools, and resolutions. I regrouped and recoded these narrative elements until I reached a satisfactory level of data saturation. This way, I let the data guide me in
reconstructing the enactments of policy narratives for each event. Specifically, the discourse at each event was treated as an enactment of a policy narrative. An event like the Alexanderplatz demonstrations on November 4th, 1989 not only featured diverse speeches by 26 different speakers, but their speeches also include several different pentads. The term emerging most frequently or the dominant term in a speech then determined the overall orientation of the speech. If a speech had 7 pentads and action emerged 4 times as the dominant term in these pentads, I would identify action as the controlling term for the speech. Then, I compiled a list by speakers at an event to determine the dominant terms for each speaker at the event to discover frequencies, differences, and similarities across speeches for the event. By synthesizing political discourse around political events, it is possible to not only retrace the trajectory of policy narratives by dates, but also to recognize the relationship between events, rhetoric, and situation. Other political crisis narrators in 1989, especially political leaders in the FDR and GDR reacted to the Alexanderplatz protest speeches not in terms of individual speeches, but as a political crisis event that constituted a political situation of unrest. As the selected political events represent key moments in the deliberations about the political future of Germany and Europe and a resolution to the political crisis, the political discourses at these events transform into enactments of policy narratives. Thus, by enacting different policy narratives at different political events, key political representatives of the West German political elite, organized East German opposition groups, and the West German press shaped the rhetorical crisis resolution for the 1989 drama.
The conclusion then addresses how and where the individual crisis narratives conflicted and what enabled and constrained certain narratives to gain or lose communicative power. Table 1: Research Design maps the general design for the present analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts:</th>
<th>Political Enactments of Crisis Resolutions:</th>
<th>Issue/Policy Narratives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West German Politicians:</strong></td>
<td>• Nov. 4: Protest Speeches at Alexander Platz</td>
<td>Why is a policy desirable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nov. 10: Speeches at Schoneberg City Hall</td>
<td>• Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nov. 28: Kohl’s 10-point plan speech to the German parliament</td>
<td>• Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dec 7: First Round Table meetings between GDR and the opposition</td>
<td>• Settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dec 18: Second Round Table meetings</td>
<td>• Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dec 19: Kohl’s speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden</td>
<td>• Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Jan. 1: Kohl’s New Year’s television address</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Jan. 11: Hans Modrow’s State of the Nation Address</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Feb 1: Hans Modrow proposes a step-by-step plan for German unification and neutrality</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Feb 13: Joint press conference Kohl &amp; Modrow</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Research Design
CHAPTER III

THE RHETORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE GDR’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE

This chapter traces the rhetorical transformation of the GDR’s political discourse, specifically the discourse by GDR opposition movements and GDR reformers. By first analyzing the policy narrative enacted by speakers at the Alexanderplatz demonstration, it will be possible to reveal what narrative elements are present and what political futures the speakers enact by relating actors, actions, settings, tools, and goals. As the Alexanderplatz demonstration happened five days before the opening of the Berlin wall, its discourse establishes a rhetorical baseline against which the discourse by the round tables can be compared. How does the opposition movement’s policy narrative change from the Alexanderplatz demonstration to the first meeting of the round tables? What narrative elements remain? How do the relationships between narrative elements change? Each analysis will start by contextualizing the political event. This will help to understand to what extend the two policy narratives function as a response to the rapidly changing political and economic situation in the GDR or whether they follow their own logic. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the overall policy narratives from the Alexanderplatz speeches and the minutes and negotiation transcripts of the Round Table meetings.

**Alexanderplatz Demonstration**

In 1985, Gorbachev introduced his Glasnost and Perestroika programs. Glasnost—meaning transparency or openness—introduced freedom of expression and
information to the former Communist bloc and transformed the Soviet Union politically. Perestroika, which implies reconstruction, aimed at bringing the East up to par economically with the West. Before Gorbachev introduced Glasnost and Perestroika, the East German government would act in line with the Soviet leadership. However, this suddenly changed after 1985. Disappointed in Gorbachev’s political reforms, the GDR leadership banned magazines from the Soviet Union, especially if they included speeches by Gorbachev. Instead of containing public criticism, this act of political disobedience by the SED provoked public protests (Kelly, 2011). Screaming “Gorbi!” and carrying banners that read “Gorbi, help us” at demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and East Berlin during the spring and summer of 1989 functioned as criticism of the SED regime. East Germans and East Berliners, specifically those who refused to migrate to the West, demanded political and economic changes. Within the context of Glasnost and Perestroika, these people started to view the SED not as a political extension of the USSR, but as a party of political and economic oppression. To them, Glasnost and Perestroika offered political and economic possibilities to reform East Germany from within, rather than leaving it behind like thousands of East Germans who migrated to West Germany between 1961 and 1989. Thus, the SED’s rejection of Glasnost and Perestroika led GDR remainers to develop their demands and concerns not in opposition to the USSR, but in opposition to the SED and its resistance to political and economic change.

While other Eastern European countries started to implement Gorbachev’s reform programs between 1985 and 1989, which politically and economically
empowered their citizens, the GDR leadership used the symbolic and political power of the Berlin wall to develop its socialist identity in opposition to Glasnost and Perestroika (Bruner, 1989; Mueller, 1999). Initially built to regulate the flow of refugees to West Germany and deter GDR citizens from leaving, the Berlin wall defined East Germany’s political and economic exceptionalism. It allowed the East German leadership to politically and economically oppress its citizens. Specifically, it enabled them to repress any attempts to mobilize and publicly criticize or reform the SED and East Germany’s socialist system (Hirschman, 1993). However, this changed in the spring and summer of 1989. The events in the spring and summer of 1989 would enable East German publics to transform from a secret opposition movement operating under the protection of the Lutheran church into organized public movements. In May of 1989, Hungary demilitarized its border with Austria, which allowed East Germans to escape to West Germany through Austria. As Hungary and Poland began to dismantle the physical and ideological legacy of the iron curtain throughout the summer of 1989, East Germans built up a political confidence that manifested itself in a significant increase of demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and walkouts by East Germans who wished to reform the GDR, rather than leave. Between January and August of 1989, the average number of protest participants fluctuated between 700 and 900 per week. However, between September and early November, the average number of demonstrators rose from 1,000 to 400,000 per week (Mueller, 1999, p. 535). In addition, recent research refutes the assumption that after the opening of the Berlin wall the number of protestors per week declined. While opposition movements in the GDR stopped using the communicative
infrastructure of the Lutheran church (e.g. public announcement boards, phones, church events and services) to air their concerns and demands, the total number of protestors increased between December 1989 and March 1990. The number of mass demonstrations declined, but the overall number of protestors at the local and regional level increased (“Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig e.V.”, 2018). The slow transformation from protest movements under the protection of the church to public movements reached its peak at a mass demonstration of over 1 million people at Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on November 4th, 1989.

At Alexanderplatz, 26 speakers including opposition leaders of the popular citizen movements, representatives of the GDR regime, artists, novelists, actors, and dissidents expressed their concerns and demands for political and economic reform. Specifically, their most frequent demands ranged from a new constitution for the GDR, the rule of law and a new political culture to transparent dialogue between the GDR leadership and its citizens and a renewed or democratic socialism for the GDR. Ulrich Mühe, Gregor Gysi, Jens Reich, Friedrich Schorlemmer, Tobias Langhoff, and Christoph Hein all explicitly referred to the rule of law and the GDR’s constitution, which in theory, but not in practice guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of assembly (Timmer, 2000). Ulrich Mühe and Gregor Gysi specifically referred to article 27 and 28 in the East German constitution, which implies free speech and the freedom to assembly. The protestors never overtly demanded the opening of the Berlin wall, nor a possible German-German reunification. While 5 out of 26 speakers explicitly communicated domestic goals like labor union reforms, constitutional reform, SED
restructuring, and the legalization of social movements, most speakers put forward
abstract goals like a new political culture, democratic socialism, political dialogue, and
the rule of law. Members of theaters in East Berlin organized the Alexanderplatz
demonstrations in response to the violent crackdown on peaceful protestors during the
40th anniversary celebrations of the GDR on October 7th, 1989, but only a few speakers
directly addressed the issue of police brutality and violence. Instead, the speakers used
this opportunity to express their ideas about the ends and means for a renewed GDR.
The East-German television televised the three-hour-long demonstration live.

*The Alexanderplatz Crisis*

As the Alexanderplatz demonstration presents the first legal demonstration in
GDR’s history, it threatened the symbolic order or rhetorical legitimacy of the GDR
leadership and weakened its efforts to narrate desirable and reliable political futures. Are
demonstrations now legal in the GDR? Does this mean that freedom of speech and
assembly is the new order of the day? What is the relationship between demonstrators
and the police? And what is the relationship between state and society? While the
assaults and arrests of the peaceful demonstrators during the 40th anniversary of the
GDR constituted an obvious rhetorical exigency for the demonstrators, the
Alexanderplatz speeches are not a direct response to police brutality and violence. Only
Eckehard Schall, an actor and theater director with the East German Theater Company,
Gregor Gysi, an attorney and political reformist, and Marianne Birthler, an East German
actress explicitly mentioned policy brutality and violence. Eckehard Schall explains: “It
is indisputable that there were peaceful protestors and violent police officers;
troublemakers on both sides. But I find that police brutality weighs even heavier and evokes painful memories. Now, we all must learn how to deal with each other anew” (Schall, 1989). On the other hand, Gregor Gysi argues that “ . . . our goal must be that the police protect protestors and thereby lives up to its name as the police of the people” (Gysi, 1989). Birthler explains: “We are here because we have hope. At this very square we gathered hope, imagination, audacity, and humor. This hope, which has finally been growing in the GDR over weeks was bludgeoned at the evening of October 7th” (Birthler, 1989). While Schall, Gysi, and Birthler are the only speakers that implicitly and explicitly reference police brutality, most speakers’ responses reveal a different rhetorical exigency that arose out of the GDR’s unwillingness to reform its cultural, political, and legal structures. The Alexanderplatz speakers used the first legal GDR demonstration to respond to the political urgencies and doubts which built up over years of political inaction by the GDR leadership.

19 out of 26 speakers articulated desirable goals that either related to a new political culture, a new political order and system, legal principles and norms, or domestic goals. Most frequently these 19 speakers demanded reforms to the GDR’s political culture. The second most frequently expressed goals involved demands regarding the GDR’s political order or system, while the third most frequently mentioned goals included demands relating to the legal principles and norms. Finally, only 3 speakers articulated specific domestic goals like reducing the number of water guns and increases in average wages.
The most frequent goals within the area of political culture include democracy by the people for the people and maintaining GDR’s political culture. For instance, Friedrich Schorlemmer, a theologian and founder of the East German movement Democratic Awakening considers democracy by and for the people as a desirable goal in that the absence of that goal would lead to dictatorship. Specifically, Schorlemmer explains:

But to make sure that nobody can ever again pass off errors as the truth without being challenged, we need total democracy that is not based on the indisputable claim to truth or leadership of a single group. Never again. Therefore: democracy now or never. Without the active solidarity of all democratic forces, we will not succeed in building a sustainable democracy; the fragmentation of democratic forces is always the hour of the dictators. We will still have to pass through low ground, we will not distinguish ourselves with remarkable prosperity. But maybe with more friendliness and warmth (Schorlemmer, 1989).

Schorlemmer envisions a sustainable democracy by the people that counteracts any authoritarian tendencies. For Schorlemmer, democracy and democratic leadership works through open disputes. Further, Schorlemmer’s statements also hints at a common goal-tool ratio. Schorlemmer’s vision of a sustainable democracy demands disputes over the truth, solidarity, hard work (i.e., “We will still have to pass through low ground”), and economic endurance. However, the way he articulates democracy as the goal or solution for the GDR’s problem with political oppression (i.e., “we need that total
democracy,” “democracy now or never,” “sustainable democracy”) reveals the desirability of democracy for and by the people.

Manfred Gerlach, head of the liberal-democratic party of East Germany (LDPD) imagines a future for the GDR that retains its political heritage. He wishes for the GDR not to lose its ideas for political action and possibilities. Specifically, he argues that working toward maintaining GDR’s political intellect will ensure political representation:

Just as our country must not lose its intellectual potential, so it must not lose its rich political scope . . . as liberal democrats we consider social movements to be effective if the ideas, thoughts, and suggestions of all people are represented. Our thoughts and ideas for political action should be maintained. (Gerlach, 1989).

The maintenance of the GDR’s political culture is an important and desirable goal for Gerlach and three other Alexanderplatz speakers in that it not only guarantees representation of political diversity, but it also promises effective social movements.

The most frequent goals within the area of political order and system include demands for new political structures and a renewed socialism for the GDR. For example, Friedrich Schorlemmer argues for a peaceful bottom up solution for the GDR. Schorlemmer explains:

Anyone who yesterday was still convinced that the Chinese solution was the correct one, must declare today—and with genuine commitment—that this is not an option for the GDR, otherwise the fear will remain. We now need a democratic structure from the bottom up. The government must listen to the
people and not the people to the government. We will no longer let ourselves be
patronized. (Schorlemmer, 1989)

By reminding the audience of the Tiananmen square macaque, where Chinese
police used physical violence against students, Schorlemmer articulates a peaceful
political future for the GDR. Specifically, he desires a political future where a “bottom-
up” democracy averts public anxiety and political oppression. The desirability of his
solution for the GDR derives from possible empowerment of the people and peaceful
relationships with the GDR leadership.

Markus Wolf, a dissident of the GDR leadership also argues for a new political
order, but specifically asks for a renewed socialism. He also hints at the common goal-
tool ratio in that the goal of a renewed socialism requires public debate for him. Wolf
explains:

Thousands of decent and hardworking communists expect a clear solution. Many
who have already fought for solutions proposed wide ranging directions and
fundamental reforms for a renewed socialism. These directions now belong in the
public discourse. This way, it will be even clearer that my party [SED] does not
lack courageous and engaged people at every level. (Wolf, 1989).

Like other Alexanderplatz speakers who speak of democratic socialism or a
renewed socialism, Wolf does not define what renewed socialism means. It remains a
desirable but abstract political direction and solution. However, Wolf hints at a common
relationship between ends and means. To him, the attainability and desirability of
fundamental reforms and renewed socialism depends on public discourse. He also
implies that one of the reasons why the GRD’s socialism lacked public support is because people considered SED members as despondent and failing to engage people at every societal level.

While demands for new political structures and a renewed socialism for the GDR represent the dominant goals in regard to a new political order for the GDR, 2 out of 26 Alexanderplatz speakers explicitly demand democratic socialism. Stephan Heym, an East German writer argues:

Socialism—not the Stalinist kind, but the right kind—the kind which we finally want to develop for our sake for the sake of Germany; this socialism is not conceivable without democracy. Democracy, a Greek term, means the governance of the people. Friends, citizens, let us exercise this form of governance” (Heym, 1989).

Heym clearly distinguishes the idea of a democratic socialism from the GDR’s idea of party monopoly and Stalinist traditions. By differentiating between Stalinist socialism and democratic socialism, Heym rhetorically introduces new political possibilities and directions into the Alexanderplatz discourse (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Rather than narrating political possibilities from within the available GDR discourse, which was traversed by Marxist-Leninist propaganda and anti-Gorbachev, specifically anti-Glasnost and Perestroika discourse, Heym and others introduced truly new political directions to the public deliberations about the GDR’s political future. Thereby, Heym also started to rhetorically delegitimize the existing political system of the GDR. The symbols, values, and norms associated with Marxist-Leninist traditions are difficult to
reconcile with democratic forms of governance. However, Heym’s idea of a political future for the GDR is “not conceivable without democracy”. By distancing himself from a Stalinist version of socialism to maintain political legitimacy in favor of democratic socialism, Heym defines a political goal that threatens the symbol and value system that the GDR rests upon. Christoph Hein, an East German novelist echoes Heym’s desire for a new political order and system by demanding that “[t]he structures of this society must be changed if it is to become democratic and socialist, and there is no alternative to this” (Hein, 1989).

While the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political order and system include a range of different goals or solutions (e.g., new political structures, renewed socialism, democratic socialism, decentralization of political power, and liberalization from oppression, European integration), 11 out of 26 Alexanderplatz speakers ask for a new political order for the GDR from within. Despite the differences in individual goals, most speakers who articulate goals for a new political order and system for the GDR desire a political future that reforms rather than replaces the existing order. Like Heym’s and Hein’s demands for a democratic-socialism, the GDR should work toward a political future from within.

The most frequent goals within the area of legal principles and norms include rule of law/constitution and lawful demonstrations. Tobias Langhoff (1989), an actor with the East German theater envisions a political future where GDR politicians are publicly prosecuted for their judicial wrongdoings and the outcomes of investigations should be made public. Others reference article 27 and 28 of the East German
constitution, which in principle implies free speech and the freedom to assembly. These speakers criticize the SED for not living up to its own laws (Mühe, Gysi, 1989). The desire for political publicity, transparency, and accountability runs through most statements regarding demands for a renewed rule of law. For Gregor Gysi, a revised rule of law in connection with the legal protection of social movements offers politicians and people of the GDR an opportunity to rebuild their relationship. As an attorney and political reformist, Gregor Gysi’s speech features the most references to legal reforms. For instance, he argues:

Any abuse of power needs to be eliminated or at least severely penalized. We need to revise our right to vote and reform the GDR’s constitutional court . . . Without going into detail, I would like to say that we need a new relationship between politics and the rule of law and a completely renewed relationship with the truth. And the question about the legalization of social movements should be promptly decided in line with the constitution. (Gysi, 1989).

In addition to Gysi, 8 out of 26 speakers demand a renewal of the GDR’s legal principles and norms. Table 2: Code System Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers summarizes the codes for the political goals of the Alexanderplatz speakers.
Table 2: Code System Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Culture</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy by the people and for the people</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining GDR’s political culture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy through hard work</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewing political culture</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and Accountability</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating room for moral courage</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue as constant element of state-society relations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Independence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A united GDR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Order/System</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A renewed Socialism for the GDR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Political Structures</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom or Liberalization from Oppression</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization of political power</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialism for Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European integration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Principles and Norms</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law/Constitution</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful and lawful Demonstrations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Goals</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The number of statements that the Alexanderplatz speakers dedicated to goals relating to the area of political culture implies a disruption of the symbolic order that legitimized the GDR’s pre-existing political order. For the first time, GDR opposition movements legally articulated their goals in public, which in and by itself presents a rhetorical situation. However, by deliberating different political goals for the GDR, the speakers also rhetorically disrupted the GDR’s existing political order and symbols. As political crises upset the symbol and value system that legitimized the pre-existing order, the Alexanderplatz speakers disrupted the GDR’s symbol system along the lines of
political culture, political order, and legal principles and norms. Manifested in the range of articulated political goals, the deliberation of or search for a new political culture, political system, and legal principles created a political urgency for the GDR. This way, the Alexanderplatz demonstration present a political crisis which demanded new rhetorical guidance and transformation. The existing GDR narrative, which foreclosed political opportunities for political and legal reforms would not accommodate or support demands by organized political voices other than the SED. However, the Alexanderplatz speakers did not see themselves represented in the existing GDR narrative. It not only restricted them from articulating alternative political directions for the future, but it also hampered them from playing a legally recognized public role in the political culture of the GDR.

While the speakers hint at the role that protestors and politicians should play in a renewed GDR, they are not entirely clear about what policy narrative to enact. The speakers’ deliberation of different goals is indicative of a search for political directions rather than a clear definition of the who, what, where, when, why, and how. This is not surprising as the GDR’s political symbols relating to political culture, political order, and legal principles and norms are in flux at this moment and demand rhetorical realignment. For example, the Alexanderplatz speakers began to redefine the meaning of socialism for the GDR. They spoke of “democratic socialism” (Heym, Hein, Schall, Schabowski, Tschirner, & Wolf, 1989). Throughout the existence of the GDR, the SED attempted to rally people around a myth of leadership, party patriotism, and a version of socialism that derived it’s meaning from a comparison with the socialism of the USSR.
However, as the mass demonstrations in the summer of 1989 and the Alexanderplatz speeches indicate, it was difficult for the East German leadership to rally people against the USSR and its version of socialism. While the wall allowed the SED to develop and enforce its version of socialism as a state, it problematized its efforts to build a political culture or nation. The SED regime rallied people around a myth of leadership, but in the absence of clear nationalistic symbols, the East German opposition movements seized the opportunity to define its own political culture and political system. Further, the SED’s not only attempt to define GDR socialism in opposition to the USSR and thereby develop its own political identity, but its very existence as a German state separate from the Federal Republic of Germany rested on its definition of political symbols. By redefining the GDR’s socialism in democratic terms, the Alexanderplatz speakers attacked the GDR’s reason for existence as a separate from Germany and the USSR. It questioned the sovereign character of the GDR (Mueller, 1999, p. 532).

In addition, the Alexanderplatz speakers discussed the rule of law as empowerment for the people rather than in terms of Marxist-Leninist traditions and the GDR leadership. For instance, Jens Reich, a GDR biologist and essayist argues that “[w]e must seize our constitutional law, not just here at this demonstration, also in front of our supervisors, our co-workers, teachers, authorities, simply everywhere. And we must support everyone who practices this law (Reich, 1989).

Manifested by the high number of demands for a new political culture, political order/system, and legal principles and norms, it is the lack of political opportunity, directions, and resistance by the GDR leadership to change which guided the
Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political future. To address these limitations without invoking the existing narrative of GDR exceptionalism and Marxist-Leninist tradition, the Alexanderplatz speakers started to define the political crisis situation of the GDR in terms of a lack of alternative political futures for the GDR. As the Alexanderplatz demonstration represents the first legal demonstration in GDR history, they started to loosely define the political and legal situation of the GDR to suggest possible solutions. They began the process of rhetorically transforming isolated political events and issues into a crisis situation in which GDR citizens would work toward a new political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms. By starting to define the political crisis situation in terms of a lack of cultural, political, and legal goals for the GDR, the Alexanderplatz speakers not only rhetorically opened room for political action and directions, but also invited GRD citizens to play a specific political role. The new political, cultural, and legal goals articulated by the speakers implicated the East German public as self-aware, active, and confident actors in the GDR’s political process. Schorlemmer (1989) argues:

We now literally need everyone. It is true, our country is ruined. Pretty much ruined. It is true, we have lived a dull, oppressed, dependent existence—for so many years. We came here today more open, standing taller, more self-aware. We are finding ourselves. We are ceasing to be objects and becoming subjects of political action. We can be proud.

Whereas the goals relating to political culture, political order/system, and legal principles and norms dominate the overall discourse of the Alexanderplatz speakers, the
goals do not exist independent of the other narrative elements. The following section will now explore the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms in relation to other narrative elements. Specifically, the following section will draw attention to the tools that the Alexanderplatz speakers see as necessary to reach the aforementioned goals.

*Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches*

Most Alexanderplatz speeches feature pentadic ratios where goals control the other terms of the pentads. Among those ratios, the goal-tool ratio emerged as the most frequent ratio. Despite a variety of different specific goal-tool ratios, the overall tendency for most Alexanderplatz speaker is to depict a specific goal as an element from which the tool follows. 15 out of 26 speakers consider tools relating to political discourse as tools for new political beginnings, whereas 8 speakers see tools involving peaceful protests as tools to retain and/or renew the GDR. Finally, 4 speakers regard solidarity and courage as tools to eliminate political oppression and 2 speakers articulate self-organization and political representation as tools to achieve a new political culture for the GDR. As the Alexanderplatz speeches feature a wide range of goal-tool ratios, Table 3: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches summarizes the number of goal-tool ratios and groups them according to their overall themes.
Table 3: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches

Within the group of discourse as a tool for new beginnings, dialogue and disagreement as a tool to achieve new political directions and possibilities emerged as the most frequent goal-tool ratio. Christa Wolf, an East German activist and literary critic defines political dialogue as a tool that leads to new political directions via disagreement and political tension. For Wolf, new political directions and possibilities require dialogue of continuous political effort and argument.

We never talked as much in our country as during these past few weeks, never with such passion, with so much scorn and sadness, and yet so much hope, as well. We want to make use of every day. We do not sleep, or sleep very little. We make friends with people we did not know before, and we fight in a hurtful way with others we thought we knew. That is what we now call “dialogue”. We demanded it. Now we are almost sick of the word. And yet we have not really understood what it means. We stare suspiciously at many a suddenly outstretched
hand, into many a face that was previously so blank. It is good to be suspicious, it is better to be in control. We are turning around old slogans that oppressed and injured us and are returning them to sender. We fear being used. And we fear declining an honest offer. Our entire country exists in this tension. We know, we have to practice the art of not letting this tension devolve into confrontation. These weeks, these possibilities are given to us just once—through us ourselves. (Wolf, 1989).

The possibility of new directions for the GDR not only demands continuous political effort and dialogue, but Wolf specifically suggests that these new political possibilities originated from the dialogue that the opposition movements generated themselves (i.e., “through us ourselves”). Wolf locates the tools for new political possibilities and directions in the public’s efforts to engage in dialogue rather than political institutions. Further, the idea of “turning around old slogans that oppressed and injured us and returning them to sender” implies two-way political communication in which organized GDR publics gain a political voice. In a way, Wolf suggests that argument-driven dialogue requires organized East German publics to gain a political voice. Without a political voice, the public will never “be in control”. It is this voice that would not only allow the social movements of the GDR to engage in argument-oriented dialogue, but this type of dialogue would also help to reveal new political directions for the GDR. Thus, to reach the goal of opening new political directions for the GDR, the social movements should resort to tools of argument-oriented dialogue.
The Alexanderplatz demonstration not only included speakers from the popular citizens’ movements, artists, novelists, and actors, but also representatives of the GDR leadership. Günter Schabowski, a spokesperson of the SED echoed aspects of Wolf’s goal-tool ratio. Specifically, he considers a new political beginning for the GDR as dependent upon a political culture of dialogue:

Let’s agree to a culture of dialogue for all of us! What moves us communists at this hour, in light of and in sight of thousands of protestors? Bitter things have been said today. It concerns us, and also me. Only those who listen and understand this warning can conceive of new beginnings. We all want a GDR of which everyone says: This is our country! . . . And we will use the productivity of disagreement. I want to say it again very clearly: We are willing—and we sedulously learn—to deal with disagreement, to live with the spices of political debate. And we will use these forces of disagreement. (Schabowski, 1989)

Schabowski construes the Alexanderplatz demonstration as a warning to the GDR. As a representative of the SED it is not only surprising that he recognizes the speakers’ demands for a new political culture, system, and legal principles, but also that he considers their public criticism of the GDR leadership as a tool for new beginnings. Only people who understand the demonstrators’ demands can imagine new political directions for the GDR. In addition, if the new political future of the GDR rests upon the “forces of disagreement” and the “spices of political debate,” then Schabowski also implies that GDR’s social movements should play an important political role. This way, he grants the Alexanderplatz speakers and demonstrators a political voice. Finally, like
Christa Wolf, Schabowski suggests dialogic political communication as a tool to work toward a new political order. It is only those who listen who can use the forces of disagreement. Hence, for Schabowski the solution of new political beginnings requires two-way flows of political communication, granting organized GDR publics a political voice, and living with political debates and disagreement.

Within the group of discourse as a tool for new beginnings, language as a tool to achieve political reform and liberation from political oppression emerged as the second most frequent goal-tool ratio. Gregor Gysi, an East German attorney and political reformist considers language as a vehicle to not only initiate changes within the SED but also to bring together socialism and democracy. He explains:

The party must renew itself. These are no ordinary times, which is why we can’t wait for the next ordinary party convention. Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. We already adopted new terms into our language, which I have nothing against. But from the Russian language we only adopted the word Datscha [i.e., country cottage]. I think it is time to adopt two other words; namely Glasnost and Perestroika. And if we practice the meaning of these words, then we will succeed in bringing together the GDR with socialism, humanism, democracy, and the rule of law. (Gysi, 1989)

Like most Alexanderplatz speakers, Gysi turns to discourse and language for renewing and rebuilding the GDR from within. He suggests that a tighter link between words and deeds will bring about reforms to the SED and finally reconcile the differences between GDR’s political system and democracy. For Gysi, the new political
beginning for the SED and the GDR in general requires people to adopt the language and practices of political transparency, openness, and freedom of expression (i.e., Glasnost) and Perestroika, which implies political and economic reconstruction. He defines language as a tool that exists within the realm of political action. Words without deeds do not carry meaning for him. It is through the tight link between words and deeds that the tool of language gains its rhetorical power to eventually bring together the GDR with (real) socialism, humanism, democracy, and the rule of law.

Other Alexanderplatz speakers echo Gysi’s goal-tool ratio and his idea that language is political action. Markus Wolf argues:

On October 7th, Mikhail Gorbachev gave us new hope, and that evening we had a bloody incident. Ever since then our people have reclaimed speech for themselves on the streets and squares of this country. But now this dialogue must not exhaust itself. Words must be followed by deeds. (Wolf, 1989)

Like Markus Wolf, most Alexanderplatz speakers who enact goal-tool ratios demand language as a tool to achieve new political beginnings. They speak of language as a tool that originated through social movements and demonstrations in East Germany. Wolf specifically speaks of speech that people reclaimed for themselves. This further supports the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands to rebuild the political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms of the GDR from within.

In summary, the Alexanderplatz demonstration presents a political crisis for the GDR not because members of theaters in East Berlin organized the demonstration in response to the violent crackdown on peaceful protestors during the 40th anniversary
celebrations of the GDR on October 7th, 1989 or because it was the first legal GDR demonstration, but because it disrupted the symbol and value systems that legitimized the GDR’s political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms. This weakened the SED’s rhetorical power to continue to narrate desirable and reliable political futures for GDR citizens from within the Marxist-Leninist symbol and value system. The rhetorical exigency arose from the Alexanderplatz speakers’ discourse about new political cultures, systems, and legal norms for the GDR. Most speakers articulated desirable goals for GDR’s political culture and political system that guarantee an active political role for GDR citizens in the process of rebuilding East Germany’s political culture from within. While the Alexanderplatz speakers developed rather abstract goals which speak to the desirability of a new political culture, political system, and legal norms, these goals mostly demand tools that imply political symbols and values. The dominant goals concerning a new political culture for the GDR require a new political language, debate, and dialogue. The dominant goals regarding a new political system require deliberations about power relations and developing a political voice via peaceful protests. Finally, the political values of publicity, transparency, and accountability run through most statements regarding demands for a renewed rule of law. As political legitimacy exists within discourse about political values and symbols, the Alexanderplatz demonstration started to delegitimize the GDR’s political narrative along the lines of political culture, political order, and legal principles and norms.

The 26 Alexanderplatz speakers included opposition leaders of the popular citizens’ movements, representatives of the GDR regime, artists, novelists, actors, and
dissidents who articulated a range of different goals. However, as most speakers
developed goal-tool ratios by which new political beginnings demand new political
discourse, it is fair to say that the Alexanderplatz speakers started to enact a policy
narrative where a desirable and reliable political GDR culture demands argument-
oriented dialogue, language as a form of political action, and peaceful and lawful
demonstrations. Whereas only a few speakers explicitly enact the remaining elements of
this collective policy narrative, it is worth-mentioning that 6 out of 26 speakers speak of
the GDR remainers as the actors within this narrative. For example, Jan Joseph Liefers
(1989) argues that the people who remain should decide who rules the GDR and
Friedrich Schorlemmer (1989) explains: “In the fall of 1989 we rose up out of ruins and
turned toward a new future. Now it is worthwhile being here, it’s getting exciting, stay
here. We now literally need everyone”. Others describe the remainers as self-aware,
active, and confident political actors (Wolf, Hein, Heym 1989). 5 out of 26 speakers
explicitly depict the setting as a crisis caused by GDR politicians and the SED, while the
other descriptions of the setting range from a country in doubt and skepticism to the
streets as a political stage and political corruption. Interestingly, Christa Wolf (1989)
specifically speaks of a bottom-up revolution and political systems as value systems. She
explains: “I would speak of a ‘revolutionary renewal’. Revolutions start from below,
below and above exchange places in the value system, and this change sets a socialist
society standing on its head back on its feet”. Whereas Christa Wolf is the only speaker
who explicitly depicts the political and societal setting as a revolution, she further enacts
a policy narrative where reaching the goal of a new value system for the GDR demands political action from below.

The Alexanderplatz speakers never overtly demanded the opening of the Berlin wall, nor a possible German-German reunification. Instead, they enact an alternative democratic vision for the GDR that largely requires reforms to GDR’s political culture from within. This is rather remarkable in that they articulated these alternatives within a political system and culture that offered few alternatives. The Alexanderplatz speakers developed this political discourse and language by themselves. This genuine grassroot discourse grew from within the citizen movements. Guided by values like solidarity, publicity, courage, hard work, and transparency the speakers searched for alternative public political discourse. Through this discursive search or public deliberation, the speakers enacted a policy narrative in which they play the role of independent, confident, and engaged political actors or GDR remainers who are recognized and protected by the GDR constitution and rule of law. Through political dialogue and deliberation, they will rebuild and maintain GDR’s political culture and system from within. Induced by the GDR leadership, this drama is set in a political crisis which invokes an atmosphere of skepticism about the future of the GDR as well as a spirit of revolutionary possibilities.

**Round Table Meetings**

After the opening of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, the round table discussions aimed at dealing with the lack of political directions and leadership in the GDR and attempted to reconcile the old and new political tendencies within the GDR. On December 7, 1989, members of GDR’s former communist organizations like the
SED, trade unions, block parties, and the women’s league met with opposition leaders of the popular citizen movements (i.e., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) for the first time to discuss the future of the GDR. During their first meeting they decided to dissolve the GDR’s Office for National Security or Stasi, debated the possibility of new elections for the East German Volkskammer (i.e., GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber) on May 6, 1990, deliberated the importance of the rule of law, and agreed to draft a new constitution for the GDR.

Former members of GDR’s communist organizations used the roundtable meetings to distance themselves from the GDR’s Marxist-Leninist tradition and specifically the SED (Yoder, 1999, p. 71). During the months leading up to the national election, GDR citizens witnessed the beginning of new political influences that acted upon the political discourse by the GDR opposition movements represented at the round tables. While the old GDR constitution officially recognized other political parties, these parties remained under the control of the SED. These bloc parties included the CDU

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13 Due to the worsening situation of the GDR’s economy, the round tables eventually moved the date for the first free elections in the GDR forward to March 18, 1990
14 At its first meeting, the Round Tables formed a special working group to draft a new constitution for the GDR. While this working group presented the draft at the final meeting of the Round Tables on March 12, 1990, the new GDR constitutional draft never exerted political power as the GDR eventually accepted the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Further, after GDR’s first free election on March 18, 1990, which the conservative Alliance Party for Germany won by a landslide (48%) compared to parties that developed out of the citizen movements (e.g., Party of Democratic Socialism 16%, Green Party 2%), the newly elected GDR Volkskammer refused to even consider the Round Tables’ constitutional draft. For a detailed discussion of the history of the Round Table Draft, please turn to (Quint, 1997, pp. 28-34).
(Christian Democrats), LDPD (Liberals), NDPD (National Democrats), the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the German farmers party. In December of 1989, one by one these bloc parties dissociated from the SED and its Marxist-Leninist tradition and started to embrace the possibilities of party pluralism. They formed new parties and forged new political alliances (Yoder, 1999, p. 72). However, while the process of developing a plural party system helped GDR bloc parties to distance themselves from the SED and GDR leadership, it worked against the realization of the citizen movements’ democratic ideals to reach a new GDR political culture, system, and legal norms through dialogue and deliberation. Members of the GDR’s citizen movements imagined realizing their goals independent of power politics.

At their first meeting, the East German Round Table members defined themselves as a politically independent watchdog and problem solver for the people of the GDR. Despite differences in political ambitions, the bloc parties attempted to build a new party system in the GDR while representatives of the citizen movement hesitated to strive for political power (Olivo, 2001, pp. 180-181), the members of the round table spoke of themselves as a collective political actor with common interests. Specifically, they explain:

The participants in the Round Table are meeting out of profound concern for our country, which has fallen into crisis, for its autonomy, and for its long-term development . . . Although the Round Table cannot serve a parliamentary or governmental function, it wants to provide the public with proposals for overcoming this crisis. It demands from the Volkskammer and the government
that it be promptly informed and consulted about important decisions on legal, economic, and fiscal policies. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 92-93)

This self-ascribed role as independent political actor who generates political solutions via debate and dialogue further supports the enactment of the opposition movement’s policy narrative at Alexanderplatz. Just as the Alexanderplatz speakers imagined demonstrations and dialogue as a necessary tool to ensure political accountability and transparency, so too imagine the members of the round table a political future where they maintain their independent political voice. Depriving organized GDR citizens of their independent political voices to deliberate political alternatives and publicly scrutinize political leaders would render their goals impossible.

While the Central Round Table meetings present the clearest attempt by the former GDR leadership and GDR reformers to organize their political voices, the citizens movement’s discourse to maintain their political independence foreshadows a decline in the political power of their discourse. As Gladwell (2010) argues, independent political discourse is not a natural enemy of the political status quo or engine for political change. To exert political power, it is important for social movements to channel their concerns and demands through an organizational structure that allows them to speak with a politically authoritative voice. By not speaking with an authoritative political voice, the round table discussion would risk their goals and demands to appear less desirable and reliable in the public perception. After the opening of the Berlin wall, the idealistic and revolutionary goals and tools of the citizen movements had to be developed anew. To advance their original policy narrative and retain the relationship
between goals and tools, the round tables had to reconsider their role as independent
political voice within a changing GDR system. The political vacuum of the opening of
the Berlin wall offered an opportunity for GDR citizen movements and new political
parties to adjust their goals and tools and redefine their political persona. However,
despite the political vacuum that the opening of the Berlin wall created, the members of
the GDR citizen movements as they are represented at the Round Tables continued to
articulate solutions that are grounded in earlier discourse about the future of the GDR.
Almost a month after the opening of the Berlin wall, we see that members of the citizen
movements at the round tables hesitated to surrender their idealistic goals for a renewed
political culture, system, and legal principle for the GDR.

Specifically, the discourse at the first round table meeting reveals that members
of the citizen movement hesitated to relinquish their role as independent, confident, and
engaged political actor of the GDR who are recognized and protected by the rule of law
and the constitution. The members of the first round table discussion not only dedicated
a large portion of their suggestions to the rule of law and the maintenance of GDR’s
culture and interests, but the way they articulated their goals requires the rule of law,
political independence, and direct citizen participation. Despite the opening of the Berlin
wall, their demands for a new constitution, rule of law, and maintenance of GDR’s
culture are tied to new political beginnings for the GDR, rather than new beginnings for
Germany or Europe, which echoes the dominant goal-tool ratio of the Alexanderplatz
discourse (i.e., Discourse as a tool for new political beginnings in the GDR). In their
meeting notes on the rule of law, which make up the largest portion of the meeting
minutes, they demand that “[t]he government of the GDR is called on to define a legal framework to support the activity of independent citizens’ committees” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”). In addition, they demand:

The government is called on to form a special department of investigation for the clarification of instances of abuse of office and corruption. This department of investigation will be placed directly under the Prime Minister for the duration of its activity. The functions of this department of investigation will be made publicly known. (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”)

Most of their demands regarding the rule of law address the GDR government as the political authority, which further speaks to the round table’s hesitancy to relinquish their original intentions to reform GDR’s political culture, system, and legal principles from within. They advise the GDR government to fight government corruption and political misconduct via a rule of law that is grounded in the existing or revised legal framework of the GDR:

Any person who has engaged in abuse of office or corruption will be held responsible on the basis of the prevailing [emphasis added] penal code. In implementing preliminary proceedings or criminal proceedings, the provisions of the existing [emphasis added] code of criminal procedure will be applied. This necessarily means issuing arrest warrants, but not ordering illegal house arrests. (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”)

In a way, the members of the first round table meeting appear to be preoccupied with refining and completing the policy narrative that some of their members started to
articulate at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. Rather than replacing the existing political culture, order, and legal norms, the members of the Central Round Table still aimed at reforming the GDR from within.

Most passages in the first round table minutes include goals that can be subsumed under the three groups of goals that emerged in the Alexanderplatz speeches, namely a new political culture, system, and legal norms. However, the meeting notes and transcript of the round table meeting focus on the rule of law as the key goal for the GDR, rather than the political culture. This is an interesting shift in that the members of the round table recognized the political urgency to legitimize their demands and concerns through laws. But despite the shift from cultural to legal goals, the members of the round table still deliberated political solutions from within their idealistic and revolutionary discourse. While the Alexanderplatz discourse predominantly features goal-tool ratios where a revised GDR rule of law and constitution emerged as a group of goals relatively independent of speakers’ demands for a new political culture, at the first round table meeting a revised rule of law for the GDR now functions as a tool to maintain GDR’s culture and interest. As a lead-in to the section on the rule of law, the members of the round table explain: “In their efforts on behalf of the rule of law and the safeguarding of the interests and culture of our people, the participants in the Round Table call for immediate government measures on the following questions” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”). Further, they demand that “[t]he government of the GDR is called on to define a legal framework to support the activity of independent citizens’ committees” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7,
Thus, whereas the members of the round table meetings dedicate most of their discourse to a discussion of a GDR constitution and rule of law, they remain on the narrative trajectory which they invoked at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. The relationship between narrative elements changes, specifically the rule of law and the desired political culture for the GDR, but the members of the round table meetings continue to enact solutions to the crisis from within the discourse of a sovereign GDR.

In line with the enacted policy narrative at the Alexanderplatz demonstration, the members of the round table demand rights for citizens to directly participate in the GDR’s political decision-making process. Specifically, they ask for political representation for citizens and opportunities for the public to vote for their constitution via a referendum. In the meeting notes, the members of the first round table discussion explain:

[The Round Table] will appoint a working group with proportional representation that will get started immediately and will include additional citizens as needed. The participants in the Round Table agree that approval of this new constitution will take place in a referendum in 1990 following the Volkskammer elections. (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”)

By offering an opportunity for the GDR public to not only execute their interests through direct popular vote, but also participate in the law-making process of drafting the constitution (i.e. “. . . will include additional citizens as needed), the round table enacted a truly different democratic possibility. Via their deliberations and agreements at
the first round table meeting, the members of the citizen movements and members of the
former GDR leadership enacted the role of politically active and engaged citizens. They
wrote the role of active citizenship into the policy narrative of the round table and
thereby invite GDR citizens who wished to actively contribute to the GDR’s policy- and
law-making process. The tendency to redefine the power relations between state and
society from the bottom up is not only reminiscent of the Alexanderplatz policy
narrative, but it now attributes more political agency to GDR citizens. Finally, it not only
fits within the set of goals which ask for a new political order and system, but it
specifically addresses the goal of decentralizing political power within the GDR.

The meeting notes and transcript of the first round table meeting predominantly
includes language of political urgency and crisis. Specifically, a setting-goal ratio
emerged as the dominant ratio for the first meeting on December 7, 1989. They
articulate their demands and goals regarding a GDR constitution, rule of law, and free
elections in response to the urgency of the new political situation. Statements like “the
participants of the Round Table call for immediate [emphasis added] government
measures,” “The participants in the Round Table agree to start developing a draft of a
new constitution immediately” [emphasis added], and “the chief public prosecutor of the
GDR must immediately [emphasis added] guarantee that all tips, information, and
communications are pursued on the basis of § 95 of the code of criminal procedure” or
“the constitutional amendments required for holding new elections are to be developed
without delay [emphasis added]” suggest that the members of the round table are not
only aware of the political urgency that surrounds their discussions, but that this urgency

138
or crisis demands their goals to be a specific way. The political crisis created by the opening of the Berlin wall pressured the only organized political voice of the GDR, namely the round table to offer solutions for a quick way out of the crisis. While the self-ascribed role as an independent political watchdogs and voice of the people of the GDR helped to articulate a wide range of goals for the political future of the GDR before November 9th, this role hampered them to envision and suggest expedient solutions for the acute political and economic crisis caused by the opening of the Berlin wall. To put it differently, despite the opening of the Berlin wall and the possibility of German-German unification, the round table discourse lacks enthusiasm for German and/or European unification. The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio, however, the members of the round tables speak of an urgent political situation within the GDR and do not consider the exigency that a possible German-German unification created.

Whether it is the importance of a new rule of law, direct political participation by GDR citizens, a new GDR constitution, the maintenance of GDR political culture or the election of a new Volkskammer, the members of the round table discuss these goals as a desirable and reliable political future for the GDR. While their language of political urgency suggest that they are aware of the importance to present quick solutions to the people of the GDR, their narrative enactments indicate that a search for a new political culture, system, and legal norms still functions as a tool for new political beginnings within the GDR. They speak of the importance of creating citizen committees to aid in the policy- and law-making process of the GDR and “turn[ing] to the public with proposals for overcoming the crisis” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7,
Like the Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round tables never overtly demanded a possible German-German reunification. Instead, they enact an alternative democratic vision for the GDR that largely requires reforms to GDR’s legal system including a revised constitution and a rule of law that uphold the political values of transparency, accountability and representation. To a large extent, the members of the round tables continued to enact the policy narrative that the Alexanderplatz speakers invoked. They narrate themselves as independent watchdogs and problem solvers that see deliberation and direct public participation as a tool to establish a new rule of law and legal norms for the citizens of the GDR. Their ultimate goal is to maintain the political culture of the GDR, however, they see a revised rule of law and GDR constitution as a necessary short term goal to legitimize their political heritage long-term. Also, while their discourse of political urgency suggests that the members of the round table are aware of the need to present quick solutions to the GDR public, they still consider deliberations over new political and legal directions as the right way to navigate the political exigency of 1989. Compared to the enactment of the policy narrative by the Alexanderplatz speakers, the round table narrative implies a stronger actor. Yet, the members of the round table do not enact themselves as masters of their political settings. A politically independent actor who relies on political discussion between and among citizens and politicians to reach its goals will struggle to quickly adapt to new political circumstances. The members of the round table enact a political setting of urgency and necessity, but they fail to write themselves into the narrative as an adaptive political actor. Finally, while the members of the round tables depict the setting as a political
crisis for the GDR, they do not see the crisis as a political opportunity for Germany as a whole.

**Conclusion**

The Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables enacted policy narratives that allowed GDR citizens to imagine themselves as active participants in reforming the political culture, political system, and legal norms of the GDR. They both enact a narrative that does not consider German-German unification as a goal or setting. Instead, they dedicate most of their discourse to enact a narrative where the GDR reforms itself via citizen participation, dialogue, and deliberation. The Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables enacted a policy narrative in which they play the role of independent, confident, and engaged political actors who are recognized and protected by the GDR constitution and rule of law. While in the Alexanderplatz narrative the actor is hardly developed, the round table discussions bring the engaged yet independent political actor to the forefront. This is perhaps not surprising in that the opening of the Berlin wall put political pressure on the round table meetings to articulate desirable and reliable solutions to the crisis, but also to define themselves as a legitimate political actor.

The Alexanderplatz speakers gained political legitimacy by responding to the GDR’s unwillingness to reform its political culture, system, and legal norms. They earned their rhetorical rights to narrate an alternative political future for the GDR by developing a strong goal-tool relationship. For example, the goal of a democratic socialism necessitates dialogue and deliberation as well as self-organization. Further,
they developed their political legitimacy in opposition to the political inaction of the GDR leadership. However, the opening of the Berlin wall created a new rhetorical arena where the members of the round table had to earn their political legitimacy and rhetorical rights anew. Highlighting their political identity as a politically independent actor who depends on political discussion between and among citizens and politicians to reach its goals appears to be the round tables attempt to (re)gain political legitimacy in the weeks after the opening of the Berlin wall. In addition to the demands for a new constitution, free elections, and the maintenance of GDR’s political culture via a revised rule of law, the roundtable’s enactment of an independent political actor further supports the Alexanderplatz narrative. Their discussion of actors, goals, tools, and settings remain within the discursive boundaries of the Alexanderplatz narrative. While there is a noticeable shift in importance of the actor and the relationship between setting and goals, the round table policy narrative does not significantly divert from the narrative trajectory of the Alexanderplatz discourse.

The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio. The members of the round table articulate their demands and goals regarding a GDR constitution, rule of law, maintenance of GDR culture, and free elections in response to the urgency of the new political situation. To articulate desirable and reliable solutions in a situation of political urgency requires an actor who is in control of the setting. Yet, the members of the round table discussions narrate themselves as an actor that is neither expedient nor adaptable. They describe themselves as an actor who is driven by political principles, rather than the situation. This not only lessens the likeliness for narrative identification and thereby
heighten the risk for the round tables to appear as undesirable and unreliable political actors, but their goals are possibly perceived as problems rather than solutions to the political crisis.

It is worth-mentioning that the round table’s reluctance to surrender their political ideals and principles indicates a truly new democratic alternative to deliberate political futures. Opportunity exploitation is often a trademark of western style politics (Boin et al., 2017; Boin et al., 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Hart, 1993), which demands a policy narrative where political parties manage and exploit situations. For example, the round table itself as a group of social movement representatives and aspiring politicians not only institutionalized the idea of political process through disagreement, but also practiced the idea of political reconciliation. The round tables suggested for the public to play an active role in the policy- and law-making process of the GDR via popular vote. In turn, this implies that under the round table draft for a new GDR constitution, German-German unification should have been decided through public referenda. This way, the round table truly represented the political values of representation and public debate that over years built up in the streets of the GDR. Thus, despite its shift in narrative elements and ratios, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table discourse enact what I would refer to as a human/defensive rights or egalitarian narrative that reforms political culture, order, and legal norms from within the GDR, while retaining its political independence.

Table 4: Comparison of Alexanderplatz and Round Table Policy Narratives summarizes the key similarities and differences between the Alexanderplatz and the
Round Table narratives. The relative significance of narrative elements is indicated by font size and the dominant ratios between narrative elements are illustrated through arrows pointing from the dominant term to the term that is controlled. If narrative elements are largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or emerged only rarely in the discourse, then they remain at the normal font size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alexanderplatz Demonstration Policy Narrative</th>
<th>Round Table Discussions Policy Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors:</strong> Independent, confident, active GDR citizens</td>
<td><strong>Actors:</strong> Round Tables as politically independent and principled watchdogs and problem solvers for GDR citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action/Conflict:</strong> Demonstration as action against the GDR’s unwillingness to reform/GDR’s political inaction</td>
<td><strong>Action/Conflict:</strong> Principled debates and deliberations as an alternative to opportunity exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> Political Crisis/Revolutionary possibilities</td>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> Political Crisis/Urgency/Political Vacuum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tools:</strong> Dialogue/Deliberation/Language</td>
<td><strong>Tools:</strong> Direct citizen participation in policy- and law-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals/Resolutions:</strong> New political culture for the GDR from within and under the protection of the rule of law</td>
<td><strong>Goals/Resolutions:</strong> GDR constitution, rule of law, maintenance of GDR culture, free elections, constitutional referendum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Comparison of Alexanderplatz and Round Table Policy Narratives

While neither the Alexanderplatz speakers nor the members of the round table explicitly articulate German-German unification as a desirable or reliable solution to the exigency surrounding the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the opening of the Berlin wall, these two narratives imply potential directions for the unification process between East and West Germany. For example, if Germany’s reunification process followed the round table suggestions for direct citizen participation as a tool for solving the crisis,
then East Germans and West Germans would vote for the political and legal future of the GDR and the FRG in open referenda. Specifically, they would vote on a common German constitution, rather than adapting the West German Basic Law. The distance between the state and society would be narrowed by focusing on the goal-tool relationship, rather than highlighting the importance of political actors for bringing about a specific solution. Policy- and law-making processes should be guided by a language and dialogue that liberates itself from the newspaper language and discourse of power politics. Further, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table narratives direct our attention to the possibility of building disagreement as an engine for societal progress into political deliberations without surrendering political independence. If these implied political directions had been followed through, then it would have challenged the traditional distribution of rhetorical power as outlined earlier. From the analysis of the political discourse of these two key events it is fair to say that the GDR remainers, political parties as well as GDR opposition movements are hesitant to surrender their idealistic and revolutionary principles. They are not the rhetorical master of the situation, which is a trademark of western style politics. The rhetorical game of opportunity exploitation works against the policy narratives by the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the Round Tables. As stand-alone narratives, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table policy narratives reveal new political directions, however, these narratives exist within the interplay of narratives by the West German political elite and national newspapers.

15 See my discussion of Entman’s vertical model of political communication (p. 85-89).
CHAPTER IV
RAPID REUNIFICATION AND THE WEST GERMAN RHETORIC OF
PRACTICAL POLITICS

This chapter traces the narrative trajectory of the FRG’s political discourse, specifically the discourse by FRG political leaders at key political events between November 1989 and February of 1990. The political discourse includes policy statements, political speeches, and press conference statements by West German politicians. As key narrators for German and European politics and policies, this analysis turns to public political discourse by the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. While the FRG’s political and policy discourse will be presented in chronological order, this is not to suggest that the narrative trajectory developed in a linear or causal fashion. The goal is to explore Kohl’s and Genscher’s enactments of policy narratives not as a series of events and statements, but as a dynamic transformation of symbols modifying one another. What policy narrative does Kohl and Genscher enact with their speeches? What narrative elements do their speeches include or exclude? How do they address the topic of German-German unification and European integration? What is the relative significance of the narrative elements? And how do the relationships between narrative elements transform from one speech and speech event to another? Each analysis will start by contextualizing the political event and speech. This will help to understand to what extent Kohl’s and Genscher’s enactments of policy narratives function as a response to the rapidly changing political and economic situation in Germany and Europe or whether they
follow their own logic. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the individual narrative enactments across the different political events and discuss them through Habermas’s ideas of strategic and communicative action. Thereby the reader sees how the West German policy narrative developed within the rapidly changing political environment between November of 1989 and February of 1990.

Speeches at Schöneberg City Hall West Berlin

One day after the accidental opening of the Berlin wall, the former mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt,¹⁶ the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher addressed a rally of 30,000 people at the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin. Before delivering their speeches, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher sang the third verse of the German national anthem together, which triggered mixed reactions from the audience. Further, while Berliners welcomed their former mayor with applause—he embodies all the memories of the Berlin wall—Helmut Kohl received whistles and boos from people who opposed German-German unification. For East Germans, November 9th, 1989 represented a day of liberation, legitimation, and new political beginnings, rather than a day of unification. German unification would happen almost a year later on October 3rd, 1990. The former mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt clearly represents a different political figure to East and West Berliners than the West

¹⁶ Willy Brandt had delivered a historic speech against the decision to build the Berlin wall at Schöneberg City Hall in 1961. A member of the Social Democratic Party of West Germany, Willy Brandt is often remembered for his efforts to overcome Cold-War divisions and improve relations with East Germany and Eastern Europe (i.e., Ostpolitik). Further, he is remembered for expediting the rapprochement between East and West Germany and Western and Eastern Europe for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the West German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Yet, despite their differences, the following analysis synthesizes Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher’s, policy discourses for the Schöneberg City Hall speeches in that they all advocate European and German unification to varying degrees. With the booes and whistles, Kohl and Genscher realized that they had to fight for their rhetorical rights and political legitimacy if German-German unification ought to remain a political option.

Whereas the Alexanderplatz demonstrators responded to the exigency of the GDR’s unwillingness to reform its cultural, political, and legal structures, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher articulate goals and solutions for the future of Germany and Europe which suggest that they are responding to the post-WWII and Cold War exigency of building a common Europe and German community of “freedom,” “peace,” “self-determination,” “democracy,” “security,” and “happiness”. Whether it is Brandt’s rhetoric of rapprochement and Ostpolitik, Genscher’s demand for free GDR elections and freedom of movement, or Kohl’s support for basic human rights, they see the political crisis of the opening of the Berlin wall as an opportunity to continue to work toward democracy and security within Germany and Europe. In a way, the all-pervasive urgency to militarily, economically, and politically rebuild Western Europe and break open the Cold War divisions, implies a view of the opening of the Berlin wall as an opportunity for Genscher, Kohl, and Brandt. Helmut Kohl explains:

The people of the GDR have a right to the free expression of opinions, to a truly free press, to the free formation of labor unions, to the free founding of parties and, of course, according to the United Nations Charter and basic human rights,
to free, equal, and secret elections. Our fellow countrymen and countrywomen are in the process of fighting for these freedoms, and in this they have our full support . . . Berliners, the spirit of freedom is taking hold of all of Europe: Poland, Hungary, and now the GDR. The right to self-determination is a basic right of every human being and every nation. We demand this right for everyone in Europe. We demand it for all Germans. I appeal at this hour to all our fellow countrymen and countrywomen: we now want to be one at heart, to shape the future together in solidarity, to stand together now and collectively provide help to those who need help. We want to follow this path with a warm heart and with cool reason. (Gray & Wilke, 1996)

Kohl articulates goals that are in line with the Alexanderplatz speaker’s human rights or egalitarian narrative, however, his goals lack the defensive and egalitarian nature of the Alexanderplatz narrative. While Kohl, Genscher, and Brandt express democratic and egalitarian political goals, they do not articulate them to defend the political culture of the GDR but embed them within an all-German or European context. Only Genscher explicitly argues that “[w]e don’t want to replace the patronization in the GDR with unsolicited advice” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 67). While he recognizes GDR citizens as independent political actors, this statement loses significance in a speech that predominantly speaks of European integration and cooperation. Any references to GDR citizens as independent political actors remain implicit and vague or are discussed within the context of German-German and/or European cooperation and solidarity. For instance, Kohl explains:
Berliners have gathered for over forty years to demonstrate for peace and for the freedom of this city. They came in order to give expression again and again to the message of peace, the message of good will, the message of willingness to cooperate. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 64)

While Kohl speaks of the GDR citizens’ desire to cooperate, he, nor Brandt or Genscher explicate what they mean by cooperation, rapprochement, solidarity, or reconciliation. Likewise, they embed abstract goals like freedom, peace, self-determination, and human rights within metaphors of a common path or journey. Kohl argues:

I state here once again in the name of the Federal Republic of Germany that we are willing to support this process to whatever extent possible for us. We naturally support, out of a sense of moral responsibility for the unity of our German nation, a GDR that progresses in reforms with the goal of freedom [emphasis added], of concrete assistance for people in all areas of society. If these reforms are instituted and if the GDR progresses along this path [emphasis added], then our fellow countrymen and countrywomen who are now thinking about leaving the GDR will remain in their traditional homeland. They want to find their happiness at home. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 65)

Kohl reasons that the idea of GDR happiness and homeland is contingent upon a path to freedom. Diverting from this path not only implies unhappiness and potentially a foreign notion of home and homeland, but it also means that the FRG would withhold assistance for rebuilding the GDR. The FRG’s moral responsibility to help the GDR is
tied to Kohl’s understanding of a path to freedom. In a way, Kohl articulates an if-then or even or-else statement regarding possible cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. If the FRG and the GDR agree on a common path to freedom then this ensures common cooperation and the maintenance of the GDR as a traditional home for GDR citizens. With this if-then statement, Kohl communicates the possibility of retaining the GDR as a “traditional homeland” for East Germans while also introducing vague conditions for German-German cooperation and aid by the FRG to rebuild East Germany. As it is typical for if-then or or-else statements in political crisis discourse, they reduce the number of possible alternative solutions. Kohl’s discourse implies that the path-to freedom and German-German cooperation is the only desirable and reliable solution out of the crisis.

Overall, Brandt, Genscher, and Kohl use vague and abstract language regarding specific goals for how the GDR would integrate into West Germany and Western Europe. Table 5: Code System Political Goals Schöneberg City Hall Speeches summarizes the themes and codes for the political goals that Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher articulate in their speeches at Schöneberg City Hall.
### Themes and Number of Codes Political Goals: Schöneberg City Hall Speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedoms, Peace, Self-Determination, Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free elections for GDR citizens</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement and travel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Participation/Bottom-up reforms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Common European Community</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common European happiness</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European security</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European democracy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Possible) German-German Unification/Rapprochement</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Code System Political Goals Schöneberg City Hall Speeches

Despite Kohl, Genscher, and Brandt’s 26 statements regarding political goals, their discourse rather focuses on the context or political settings of the opening of the Berlin wall. Neither Brandt, Kohl, or Genscher addressed the accidental circumstances and confusion that led to the opening of the Berlin wall or put the opening of the Berlin wall within the context of the political reform processes in the GDR, the efforts by opposition movements, or the mass demonstrations during the spring and summer of 1989. Further, instead of addressing the GDR’s attempts to reform the GDR politically and economically, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher depict the opening of the Berlin wall as a historic event that exists independent of these political developments. For example, while it was too little too late, with the announcement of new travel regulations at the night of November 9th, the SED regime intended to communicate a willingness to listen to the concerns of the East German people. Neither the political efforts and developments by the East German leadership nor the opposition movements emerge in Brandt’s, Kohl’s, and Genscher’s speeches. Instead, their language embeds the accidental opening of the Berlin wall into the setting of a common German and
European future and a *logical or natural* continuation of Europe’s post-World War II history.

Enactments of settings emerged as the dominant narrative element in the Schöneberg City Hall speeches. The two most frequently enacted settings include Europe’s political history post-World War II and a common German and European future. For example, as Berlin’s former mayor who experienced and publicly opposed the building of the Berlin wall in 1961, Willy Brandt explained:

Those who today are still quite young and those who will come after us will not always have an easy time understanding the historical context in which we are embedded. For that reason, I want to say not only that before the division ends—I spoke out against it angrily, but also with a feeling of helplessness, in 1961—we have many things to accomplish, but I also want to remind us of the fact that all this did not just start on the thirteenth of August, 1961. The German misery started with the terroristic Nazi-remeine and the war it unleashed. That terrible war that transformed Berlin, like so many other German and non-German cities, into mountains of rubble. The division of Europe, Germany, and Berlin grew out of the war and the inability of the victorious allies to come to an agreement. Now what belongs together is growing together again. Now we are experiencing, and I thank God that I have lived to see it, how the two part of Europe are growing together again. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 62)

Here, Brandt depicts Europe’s post-WWII history in terms of division and unification and implies that a united Europe and Germany is a historically *natural*
situation. Brandt enacts a setting where, historically, Europe belonged together and is now growing together *again*. Brandt invites GDR citizens into a political setting that implies a return to unification. For Brandt, the opening of the Berlin wall offers an opportunity for Berlin, Germany, and Europe to finally grow together despite the artificial political and military divisions that Great Britain, the United States, France, and the USSR created after World War II. Brandt’s language creates a setting where German and European unity represents the historical context for what happened on November 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1989. He enacts a political setting which embeds the audience in Germany’s and Europe’s history of unity and division, while implying a united Germany and Europe as a natural setting. Along those lines, Willy Brandt speaks of European and German history as a natural force, which seeks unification, rather than division. Specifically, he equates history with the repetitive movements of tides. Drifting with the tide of European and German history implies a natural political development, while swimming against the tides of European history would translate into abnormal political progress. Brandt further reinforces the idea of a natural setting by using language from the domain of nature. Focusing on Berlin, he argues:

> The winds of change, which have been sweeping across Europe for quite some time, could not pass Germany by. I was always convinced that this division reinforced by concrete, this division by means of barbed wire and a death strip, swam against the tide of history. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 61)

Viewing the events surrounding the opening of the Berlin wall through the language of nature and movement not only evokes the impression of continuity but also
inevitability. Any abnormal political countermovement would upset the European and German tide of history and winds of change and succumb to its forces. Enacting the political setting of the opening of the Berlin wall through a nature metaphor implies European and German unification as a natural and even inevitable development. As settings are the dominant narrative elements in the speeches at Schöneberg City Hall, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher enact a policy narrative which deemphasizes other elements of their policy narrative.

By narrating the events of November 9th through language of political continuities and historical trajectories, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher rhetorically deprive GDR citizens of their political agency or tools. As the speakers enact a setting of Europe’s post-WWII history and a common German and European future, it is difficult for GDR citizens to imagine themselves as independent political actors who actively shape the political future of Germany and Europe. Table 6: Code System Political Settings in Schöneberg City Hall Speeches summarizes the themes and codes for the political settings that Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher articulate in their speeches at Schöneberg City Hall.
### Themes and Number of Codes Political Settings: Schöneberg City Hall Speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Political History Post-World War II</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Common German-German and European future</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the World are watching</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A European path/journey</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a community of learning and collaboration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new beginning for Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Berlin Crisis as a Test of Political Prudence</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Berlin Crisis as a Creative Chance</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home/Homeland for the GDR entails a unified Germany</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Code System Political Settings in Schöneberg City Hall Speeches

By not addressing the accidental circumstances and confusion that led to the opening of the Berlin wall, or the mass demonstrations during the spring and summer of 1989, or the political efforts by the GDR opposition movements, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher avoid implicating political actors of the GDR as active and independent agents in their policy narrative. Within the setting of European political history and the natural trajectory toward a common German-German and European future, GDR citizens and GDR opposition movements are limited in their ability to reform the GDR from within. The dominant settings of the Schöneberg City Hall speeches demand political actors, tools, actions, and solutions to exist outside of the revolutionary language of the GDR citizen movements and opposition groups. A natural European political history that seeks unification does not offer rhetorical room to articulate goals like democratic socialism or solutions that come from non-institutionalized political groups like the round tables. Whereas Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher address the GDR audience at Schöneberg City Hall as “fellow citizens” and depict them as “one of us,” they
rhetorically deprive them of their earned political identity. They not only avoid enacting settings that would politically empower GDR citizens and GDR citizen movements, but they also ascribe political roles that constrain GDR citizens’ political independence and identity.

Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher see GDR citizens as wise political actors who respond to the new geopolitical developments in Europe and Germany with caution, care, and circumspection. Kohl explains:

During this difficult hour in the history of our country it is important to remain prudent and act wisely. To act wisely means not to follow radical slogans and voices. To act wisely now means to see all the dimensions of the geopolitical, European, and German development. Anyone like us who, since we have just returned here from Warsaw, was able to experience what the reform process in Hungary and Poland made possible, knows that we now have to find a way, step by step and with circumspection, into a common future. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 65)

For Kohl, wise GDR citizens turn their attention outward toward dimensions of geopolitical European and German politics. This not only ignores the GDR citizen movements’ efforts to develop an independent voice via mass demonstrations and public deliberation, but it also fails to recognize the key goals and solutions that GDR opposition groups deliberated through their public discourse. The Alexanderplatz speakers as well as the members of the Round Table meetings focused on internal problems like maintaining the GDR’s political culture, developing a renewed socialism
for the GDR, and reforming the existing rule of law and constitution of the GDR. By suggesting that GDR citizens should assume the role of a wise political agent who turns his or her gaze toward external issues and goals not only lessens the likeliness for narrative identification, but Kohl risks that his enactment of a wise political GDR actor appears as undesirable and unreliable.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher further reinforces this enactment of the GDR citizens as political agents for Europe by construing them as people who the international community is watching closely. With the eyes of the world upon East Berlin and East Germany, GDR citizens see themselves through the eyes of the world and the European community. This way, Genscher narrates the GDR people not as citizens of East Berlin or East Germany but narrates them through the political expectations of the international community. It evokes the impression that GDR citizens should live up to the world’s expectations regarding the geopolitical situation in Europe. Specifically, Genscher argues:

Dear fellow citizens, in these hours the world is watching our country and this city. Our fellow citizens in the GDR have placed the fate of the Germans at the top of the agenda of international politics. Many of our neighbors are asking us what we Germans want. They are asking the question about the Germans’ future. I would like to tell them that the Germans first of all want to live in peace with all their neighbors and that they want to live in freedom. No nation in the world, no nation in Europe has to fear for itself if the gates between West and East are
now opening, if freedom and democracy are realized. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 67)

As West Germany’s foreign minister, it is perhaps not surprising that Genscher articulates political actors and settings from a foreign policy perspective. However, he enacts GDR citizens as political actors who are responsible for the future or fate of all Germans. By rhetorically putting the future of all Germans in the hands of GDR citizens, Genscher empowers them while also enacting an actor who should work toward freedom, peace, and democracy in Europe, rather than the GDR. Like Kohl’s enactment of a wise political actor who sees all the geopolitical dimensions of the opening of the Berlin wall, Genscher asks GDR citizens to assess the future of Germany and Europe through the eyes of other Eastern European countries. Inspired by Glasnost and Perestroika, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic began to dismantle the physical and ideological legacy of the iron curtain throughout the summer of 1989. However, contrary to the Central Round Tables and the GDR citizen movements, the Polish and Czech opposition movements would not shy away from institutionalizing themselves and play the game of power politics. The GDR opposition movements refused to seek and accept political power and responsibility. This grew out of their general antipolitical and antigovernment position, but also out of their lack of political experience (Olivo, 2001, p. 180). In this connection, Kohl’s appeal to the GDR opposition groups to join the political movements in Hungary and Poland is a little bit misguided. He asks GDR opposition leaders to “[j]oin in that spirit of reform that today, in Hungary, in Poland, is securing the future of these people! Free the way for the rule of the people, by the
people, and for the people” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 65). Enacting a political role that implies the political responsibility of deciding the future of German and Europe not only fails to speak to the GDR opposition movements’ identity as political reformers rather than rulers, but it also conflicts with their self-ascribed role as independent political watchdogs and problem solvers. Thus, rather than enacting GDR citizens as political actors in their own rights, Kohl and Genscher narrate GDR citizens as politically powerful European and international agents within a political setting that deprives them of their political independence and identity that they earned in the streets in the summer and fall of 1989.

The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio in the Schöneberg City Hall speeches. While Brandt puts forward the goal of German-German rapprochement and a new Ostpolitik, Genscher’s demands free GDR elections and freedom of movement, and Kohl imagines a German and European future of peace, freedom, and basic human rights, they all see these goals as the result of the historical situation of the opening of the Berlin wall. Willy Brandt explains: “A lot will depend on whether we-we Germans on both sides prove ourselves equal to the historical situation. The rapprochement of us Germans, that is what is important” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 61). Elsewhere, Kohl explains that Germany cannot afford to let a political vacuum develop, which entails political cooperation between East and West Germany.

As the first immediate public response to the accidental opening of the Berlin wall by Western political leaders, the Schöneberg City Hall speeches establishes another important rhetorical baseline against which the discourse of Kohl’s rhetoric of practical
politics and rapid unification between November 1989 and February 1990 can be compared.

**Helmut Kohl's Rhetoric of Practical Politics and Rapid Reunification**

Between November 10th, 1989 and February 15th, 1989, Helmut Kohl delivered several policy statements including his 10-point plan speech to the German parliament on November 28th, his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on December 19th, his New Year’s Eve television address, and finally his policy speech to the German parliament on February 15th. With each statement, Kohl builds toward a narrative of practical politics and rapid reunification. He enacts a policy narrative that further reinforces Europe’s natural history of unity as one of the key political settings for what happened on November 9th, 1989. He builds upon the enactments which he, Willy Brandt, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher introduced with their Schöneberg City Hall speeches. The “path to freedom” transforms into a “road” to German-German and European unity and there is a shift from abstract political language to a rhetoric of economic necessities. While his 10 Point-Plan speech to the German parliament, his speech at the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche), and his New Year’s TV address reveal a reluctance to speak of rapid German-German unification, his later speeches changed toward a rhetoric of practical politics. Before tracing this dynamic transformation of symbols in Kohl’s rhetoric, this section will first contextualize Helmut Kohl’s policy statements. Special attention will be dedicated to the historical context surrounding German and European integration. This will help to understand how Kohl’s enactments of policy narratives function to gain and maintain his rhetorical rights to define the
situation, whether it is a response to the rapidly changing political and economic situation in Germany, Europe, and the world, or whether they follow their own logic.

Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German unification as a long-term goal, but Hans Modrow’s plan for a unified Germany, which he presented at a press conference on February 1, 1990 introduced new terms into the debate about German-German rapprochement. Modrow argued that both German nations should surrender their memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a neutral position within Europe. Helmut Kohl quickly rejected Modrow’s proposal for a neutral Germany, explaining that a reunited Germany could not afford to be isolated in the heart of Europe. In addition, Modrow envisioned a united Germany in which a planned and market economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990). It is not clear why Modrow introduced these specific terms for German unification only three months after the opening of the Berlin Wall. Gray and Wilke (1996) argue that “positioning himself as the leading spokesperson of unification could serve as a preemptive strike that would allow [Modrow] to take the political initiative and create a better bargaining position for the GDR and its citizens in the unification negotiations with the FRG” (p. xx).

However, Helmut Kohl turned Modrow’s proposal into an opportunity to speed up the process of expanding West Germany’s legal, economic, and political systems eastward. The West German economic prosperity of the 1980s in connection with the economic and political crisis in East Germany, allowed Helmut Kohl and other West German political leaders to erode Modrow’s proposal until it conformed with their terms for German-German unification. While Modrow allegedly attempted to amplify and
strengthen the East German’s voice in the negotiations for the process of German unification, it backfired and rapidly silenced arguments for political independence of the GDR, referendums as common political tools for political decision making, and a GDR constitution. Instead of considering and debating alternative political directions with GDR opposition leaders, the Western discourse of rapid reunification and pan-European unity reduced discussions about a democratic socialism to political idealism and naiveté.

With each policy statement between November 1989 and February 1990, Helmut Kohl rhetorically builds toward a policy narrative in which a united Germany represents one room in “a common European house” built by responsible European actors.

With his Ten-Point Plan, Helmut Kohl outlined his vision for overcoming the political and economic divisions in Germany and Europe after the opening of the Berlin wall. While Kohl alludes to the FRG as a responsible helper for a possible German-German unification process and the importance of practical politics, ratios relating to goals, settings, and tools emerged as dominant narrative elements. Specifically, the goal-tool ratio and the setting-tool ratio emerged as the dominant ratios. Kohl sees the goal of German and European integration as contingent upon political treaties and institutions. Whether it is Kohl’s argument that the abolishment of institutionalized socialism is necessary to achieve German-German and European integration, or that “[t]he centrally planned economy must be dismantled” to create conditions for German unification, the goal of returning to Europe’s natural state of unity requires political agreements and institutions, rather than new political deliberation and independent political watch dogs.
Kohl sees European agreements and institutions as the appropriate tools to build a common Europe and Germany. For example, Kohl argues:

The CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] process is a key element of this pan-European architecture. We want to promote it by utilizing the upcoming forums:

- the human rights conferences in Copenhagen in 1990 and in Moscow in 1991;
- the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Bonn in 1990;
- the Symposium on Cultural Heritage in Cracow in 1991;
- and last but not least, the next follow-up meeting in Helsinki.

There we should also think about new institutional forms of pan-European cooperation. We can well imagine a common institution for the coordination of East-West economic cooperation, as well as the creation of a pan-European environmental council. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 84-85)

While Kohl tends to turn to path, road, and journey metaphors to describe the political setting in his speeches between November 1989 and February 1990, he frequently uses metaphors from the domain of architecture to describe the goal of German-German and European unification. At the end of Kohl’s road to German unification there is a “common European house,” which rests upon a foundation of pan-European agreements and institutions. Within this narrative, the goal of East-West cooperation demands pan-European tools and thereby would render the GDR’s political tools like self-organization, deliberation, dialogue, and language irrelevant. This goal-tool ratio also implies that a tool only counts as a tool if it helps to build or construct a
common German-German and European architecture. Tools like dialogue and deliberation or even referendums, as the Round Tables suggested, lack the architectural design, which would complement and extend the construction metaphor of a common European house. To put it another way, the language of a common European house built through pan-European agreements and institutions only invites language and narrative elements from those domains.

Depicting the goal in terms of a pan-European construction also allows Kohl to describe the GDR’s opposition movements and Round Tables as one of many and thereby lessen the desirability and reliability of their suggestions. Within Kohl’s goal-tool ratios the GDR’s suggestions for the future of Germany and Europe exist alongside other political suggestions and voices from other European neighbors. Demands by the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the Round Table meetings to develop a new political culture for the GDR from within under the protection of a revised rule of law now exist within the goal of a pan-European architecture and pan-European cooperation. In his Ten-Point Plan speech before the German parliament on November 28, 1989, Helmut Kohl specifically explains that “[t]he development of intra-German relations remains embedded in the pan-European process, and that always means in East-West relations. The future architecture of Germany must conform to the future architecture of pan-Europe” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84). Kohl continues to articulate the goal of European and German-German integration throughout the winter of 1989 and spring of 1990. For example, in a speech at the Centre des Conférences Internationales in Paris on January 17, 1990, Helmut Kohl argued that “the German house must be built
under a European roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 2012, p. 154). Language from the domain of architecture and construction helped the goal-tool ratio to dominate Kohl’s 10-Point Plan speech to the West German parliament and limit the enactment of tools and actors that would not contribute to the construction of a pan-European house of treaties and institutions. Table 7: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan Speech summarizes the number of goal-tool ratios and groups them according to their overall themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European/German Integration requires Treaties and Institutions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms demand a proper political system</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European unity demands abolishment of institutionalized socialism</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New political institutions necessitate free elections</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German integration demands a new GDR constitution</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism requires a legitimate GDR government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-German Cooperation demands common institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Unity demands Practical Politics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification demands the freedom of movement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Unity necessitates free elections in the GDR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan Speech

As Helmut Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common European house supported by pan-European treaties and institutions only invites language from those domains, it is not surprising that Kohl depicts GDR citizens as members of a European community and family. Instead of using the political language of the East German citizen movements and round table meetings who describe themselves as politically independent problem solvers for GDR citizens and watchdogs of the GDR government, Kohl enacts them as actors within the European project. Further, he enacts them as actors who exist along
other East and Central European countries, which will eventually be integrated into the European community or family. Frequently, Kohl enacts the GDR and other Eastern European countries not only as members of a European community and family but specifically as members of an economic community. Kohl explains:

The European Community is now called upon to approach the reform-minded states of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe with openness and flexibility. The state and government leaders of the EC member states decided this a short time ago at their meeting in Paris. The GDR is, of course, included in this. The Federal Government therefore approves the speedy ratification of a trade and cooperation agreement with the GDR which would give the GDR wider access to the Common Market. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84)

This not only confirms the Cold War narrative of economic expansion and Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common European house supported by pan-European agreements and institutions, but it also functions as a first rhetorical step toward what Sarotte (Sarotte, 2014a) describes as the West’s pre-fabrication model for post-1989 Germany and Europe. Kohl’s pre-fab model took “the West’s prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply extended them eastward” (Sarotte, 2014a, p. 8).

Along the lines of the prefab-model and Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common European house supported by pan-European agreements and institutions, Kohl depicts the FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper for the process of rebuilding the GDR. By focusing on the crisis of mass emigration from the East to the West and the economic
crisis in the GDR, Kohl depicts the FRG as a helper in need. Specifically, he argues that “[t]he Federal Government is willing to provide immediate concrete aid where it is presently needed. We will send humanitarian assistance and medical supplies as long as this is wanted and considered useful” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 82). While statements about the GDR and the FRG as political actors do not dominate Kohl’s 10-Point Plan like his statements about goals and settings, it foreshadows a common enactment that reemerges throughout Kohl’s policy statements between November 1989 and February 1990. In his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on December 19th, 1989, Kohl enacts GDR and FRG citizens as family members. While he embeds this enactment within the setting of Christmas, it nevertheless supports his metaphor of a common German-German and European house. Specifically, he said:

Dear friends, we are only a couple of days away from Christmas—the celebration of peace. Christmas, that is the holiday for family and friends. Especially in these days, we in Germany feel ourselves to be a German family again. All of us felt this during these weeks and days. Let me remind us all of the moving images we saw in the middle of Germany in September, in October, in November—of those images that showed how friends and relatives met each other again; we waited for that for over forty years. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 101)

While the language of friends and family members supports Kohl’s rhetoric of reunification as a natural development within Europe’s post-WWII history, it reduces the role of GDR citizen movements to political helpers rather than initiators. Via the Alexanderplatz speeches and the round table discussion, the GDR citizen movements
defined themselves as actors operating outside of power politics, but Kohl does not treat them as exceptional. Instead, he tends to enact them as actors that are not particularly political. Within the language of friends and families, a common European road, and European cooperation and community, the GDR citizen movements do not emerge as powerful political actor. Occasionally, Kohl depicts the GDR opposition groups as courageous fighters for freedom. In his New Year’s Eve address he argues that “[w]e can be proud of our fellow countrymen and countrywomen for their courageous engagement for freedom, human rights, and self-determination. Their prudence, their persistence, and their political judgement are exemplary” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 106-107). Largely, however, Kohl enacts GDR citizens and the GDR opposition movements within the context of European cooperation and the European family. In his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on December 19th, 1989, Kohl enacts the GDR demonstrators and citizen groups within the context of Glasnost and Perestroika and other freedom movements within Eastern Europe. Kohl specifically explains:

    We are thankful that we can experience this now. All this did not happen by itself. Many people helped bring it about, not least of whom were the citizens on the streets and squares of the GDR. But in the outside world many also helped. And I have good reason for mentioning Michail Gorbachev’s politics of perestroika, which also created these possibilities, the Solidarity freedom movement in Poland, the reformers in Hungary. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 101-102)
Accrediting Michail Gorbachev and the politics of Glasnost and Perestroika for bringing about the political possibilities in East Germany not only weakens the political role of the GDR citizens movements, but it also depicts them as not exceptional. Yet, other than the freedom movements in Poland and Hungary, the citizen movements in the GDR insistently hesitated to surrender their political ideals and principles and play the game of power politics. This grew out of their general antipolitical and antigovernment position, but also out of their lack of political experience (Olivo, 2001, p. 180). By not recognizing the difference between citizen movements in East German and Eastern European, Kohl’s rhetoric neglects the political potential that the East German built up over years. Instead, he treats them as politically not exceptional and applies a one size-fits-all rhetoric to their political efforts.

In addition to the goal-tool ratio, the setting-tool ratio emerged as the second dominant ratio in Helmut Kohl’s rhetoric. This ratio developed throughout his 10-point plan speech to the German parliament on November 28th, his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on December 19th, his New Year’s Eve television address, his press conference with Modrow on February 13th, and finally his policy speech to the German parliament on February 15th. Between November 1989 and January 1990, Kohl often highlighted the setting of a divided Germany and Europe that requires German-German solidary, Western policies and institutions, and German-European cooperation. However, with his February speeches Kohl starts to enact the political setting as an economic and humanitarian crisis that necessitates aid by the FGR. The economic crisis triggered by the opening of the Berlin wall demands economic
reforms for Kohl. During his press conference with Hans Modrow on February 13th, 1990, Kohl explains:

The economic crisis of the GDR cannot, in our view, be overcome if the GDR resists fundamental reforms. Therefore, the former economic difficulties can only be removed quickly with a market-oriented and, at the same time, socially supported process of transformation; that is the only way in which the flow of private capital can begin and new businesses and jobs that will be promising in the future can be created. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 137)

Instead of deliberating a range of tools to address the economic crisis in the GDR, Kohl narrowed it down to a market-oriented economy. While Hans-Modrow and members of the round tables envisioned a united Germany in which a planned and market economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990), Kohl enacted an economic crisis that requires Western tools to bring about a solution. This not only allowed Kohl to further develop his rhetoric of rapid unification as a desirable and reliable response to the urgency of an economic crisis, but it also enabled him to further support his pre-fabrication model. An urgent economic crisis allows Kohl to suggest economic tools that work quickly. Advocating for his pre-fab model fits well into this setting-tool ratio as it allows for rapid solutions to the urgencies. While developing tools through deliberation and direct citizen participation like a constitutional referendum supports the GDR citizen movements’ goals for a renewed GDR political culture, it would entail a slow reunification process. Depicting the political situation—specifically the economic situation—as urgent demands (rhetorical) tools that bring about quick relief.
Likewise, Kohl enacts the emigration situation as an urgent issue that necessitates quick political responses. At his press conference with Hans-Modrow on February 13th, 1990, Kohl not only defines the setting as an economic crisis but also a humanitarian crisis. Kohl explains:

Without a doubt, we are facing a great humanitarian challenge. But I am certain that we can master it. The talks with Prime Minister Modrow and his delegation were business-like, open, and on the whole characterized by the mutual wish to send some signs of hope to the people in the GDR. They took place against the background of a situation that, above all as a consequence of the ongoing stream of immigrants, has clearly come to a head. The number of immigrants in 1989 amounted altogether to about 340,000. Since the beginning of this year another 85,000 were added. For that reason I made two things clear in our talks today. First, our repeatedly expressed willingness to help on a short-term basis wherever this is urgent and necessary, especially for humanitarian reasons. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 135)

Defining the immigration situation in the GDR and FRG as a humanitarian crisis enabled Kohl to enact his political tools as humanitarian necessities. This also allowed Kohl to reinforce the FRG’s political role as a responsible helper who acts in the interest of the people in the GDR. In his press conference with Hans-Modrow, Kohl highlighted urgency more than in his earlier speech, which not only gave him a rhetorical momentum to argue for the extension of Western policies and institutions eastwards, but
it also put political pressure on the East German political leadership to present tools that quickly address the economic and humanitarian urgencies of the situation.

While enactments of goals, settings, and tools emerged as the dominant narrative elements in Kohl’s 10-point plan speech to the German parliament on November 28th, his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on December 19th, his New Year’s Eve television address, and his press conference with Modrow on February 13th, his policy statement to the German parliament on February 15th largely enacted the GDR government and citizens as actors who act in the interest of Kohl’s pre-fabrication model. So far, Kohl infrequently depicted GDR citizens as members of a European community or family within Europe’s natural reunification process post-1945. Elsewhere, he enacted the GDR as one among many other East European countries like Poland and Hungary that gained an advantage from Glasnost and Perestroika. Whereas these different enactments of the GDR as political actor remained quite insignificant in Kohl’s policy narrative in his policy statement to the German Bundestag, the GDR now plays the role of responsible political actors who advance Kohl’s vision of Europe as an economic community. He transforms the GDR government and the round tables into advocates or opinion leaders of his pre-fabrication model for European unification. While he continues to enact a setting of economic urgency, GDR political actors now play the role of one of many helpers on the German and European road to economic recovery. Specifically, Kohl explains:

The situation has become more critical. The political parties and groups in the GDR at the so-called Round Table passed on to the Federal government a
position paper for the talks between the Prime Minister and myself in which they referred a situation, which is characterized by fast-paced destabilization. If the Modrow government, as I expected after the talks held in Dresden before Christmas, had already introduced the necessary laws for the protection of investments before January, as did Hungary, then we would already have a completely different situation in the GDR where investments are concerned. Those in positions of responsibility in the GDR—the government, the Round Table—have the power to send the proper signals so that the economic recovery can begin. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144)

Here, Kohl continues his rhetoric of economic necessity and urgency, but he specifically enacts the GDR government and round tables as powerful actors who should communicate the importance of quick economic reforms to their citizens. In a way, they should act as opinion leaders who advocate Kohl’s model to extend Western economic policies and institutions eastwards. Kohl further reinforces this enactment of the GDR government and the members of the round tables by following up his earlier statement with an or-else statement. He argues that the FRG’s efforts to introduce West Germany’s currency and economic system to the GDR would be in vain if the GDR failed to communicate it well to their citizens. Kohl explains:

If, for whatever reasons, these decisions are not probably communicated, then all financial assistance, even to the tune of billions of marks, will be without the desired effect. Therefore, it remains true: the introduction of the D-mark in the
GDR and the inducement of market-oriented reforms in the GDR are one and the same side of the coin of economic success. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144)

As the election date for the first free GDR elections is only a little over a month away when Kohl delivered his speech to the German parliament on February 15th, 1990, it is perhaps not surprising that he dedicated a large portion of his speech to the enactment of the GDR as an important economic actor, helper, and opinion leader. While political leaders from West Germany were not allowed to campaign for East German political parties (Olivo, 2001), Kohl enacts important GDR policy makers like Hans-Modrow and the Round Tables as narrative allies or opinion leaders within his policy narrative of rapid eastward expansion. In a way, Kohl attempts to convince East German citizens to vote for his pre-fabrication model in the first free elections of the East German Volkskammer (i.e., GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber), by enacting them as helpers and key economic actors for German reunification. Elsewhere in his speech, Kohl argues that the economic potential of the GDR would help to solve economic problems together with the FRG, specifically those created by the unification process. Kohl further supports his enactment of the GDR as an important economic actor by avoiding depicting them as a financial burden for the reunification process. Not only does that dispel any doubts about the GDR being a financial burden, but it also solidifies the GDR as a real economic asset to the FGR. Specifically, Kohl argues:

But it also seems important to me that the extent of the economic challenges with which we are now dealing be viewed soberly. In population the GDR does not quite reach the number of people in the state of Northrhine-Westphalia. If we
take economic strength as the basis, the Bundesbank assumes that we are dealing with the power of a medium-sized state in the Federal Republic—let’s say, for example, Hesse. President Pohl has also pointed to the fact that the capital created within a single year in the Federal Republic of Germany corresponds roughly to the entire savings in the GDR. I am not mentioning these comparisons in order to minimize the problems; that is far from my intent. But they also should not be limitlessly exaggerated. The challenges have to be seen as they really are, namely, anything but simple, but eventually solvable for a country like the Federal Republic of Germany and to be mastered together with the GDR. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144)

This enactment of the GDR as a valuable economic actor not only implies the GDR as an important collaborator in the economic reunification process, but it also implies unification as an economically desirable and reliable future for the GDR. While it runs contrary to Modrow’s idea of a Germany where a planned and market-oriented economy exist side by side, a future in which the GDR functions as a relevant economic actor for Germany evokes a desirability to join the FRG and work toward a common economic future.

Settings emerged as the second dominant narrative element in Kohl’s policy statement before the German parliament on February 15th, 1990. All of Kohl’s enactments relating to settings in this speech revolve around the setting of economic and social security. While Kohl also enacts this setting through the metaphor of a common European and German road, this road does not end at a European house with many
rooms, but Kohl draws attention to the prosperous and secure economic situation in the FRG and implies how a market economy would bring about this situation in the GDR as well. Within this setting economic prosperity and social security, it is possible for Kohl to enact other narrative elements as desirable and reliable. Whether it is Kohl’s enactment of an economic setting where the GDR travels on a safe road to a market-oriented economy, or the tightly knit social safety-net which saves the GDR from high unemployment rates, Kohl enacts a desirable and reliable social and economic future for the GDR by depicting the actors and goals of German unification against the setting of economic and social security. It allows him to imply rapid German unification as a desirable and reliable goal, while describing the GDR as helper and advocate for Western policies and institutions. Kohl explains:

[GDR citizens] worry about whether traveling the road to a currency union and an economic community might not cause them to be pushed off to one side. I take these concerns, harbored especially by older citizens and by those who are threatened with unemployment, very seriously. However, I can assure the citizens of the GDR: a social market economy always also means social balance and social unity. To achieve this, the government of the Federal Republic is prepared to cooperate immediately [emphasis added] in erecting a modern order for the workforce and society. According to our experiences, the first step needs to be the further development of the social security systems for the elderly and the unemployed. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 145)
Here, Kohl rhetorically extends the FRG’s setting of social balance and social unity generated by a market-oriented economy eastward. He rhetorically prepares GDR citizens for the extension of a market-driven economy, which implies the setting of economic and social security. Elsewhere in his policy statement, Kohl suggests that what helped the FRG to overcome its political and economic challenges after World War II will also bring about a solution for the GDR to deal with its political and economic problems. While Kohl speaks of different tools that helped the FRG to rebuild itself politically and economically after the World War II, he discusses them within the metaphor of traveling toward a market-oriented economy. It is Kohl’s attempt to rhetorically invite the GDR to join the FRG in traveling on this road together that influences and even weakens other narrative elements in Kohl’s speech like tools and goals, rather than the other way around. Specifically, Kohl explains:

What is now important is that we remain on track politically and economically. Steering a clear course toward a social market economy is of central significance for the Federal Republic, but also for Germany as a whole. If in these days we stick to the fundamental principles that brought the Federal Republic of Germany from the economic null point after the Second World War into the leading group of industrial nations in the world, we can master the challenges of the nineties. 

(Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 146)

For Kohl, within the setting of a market-driven economy it is possible for the GDR to master the challenges of the future together with the FRG. However, it is important for GDR citizens to remain on track and steer a clear course toward a market
economy. In a way, the language from the domain of traveling brings the setting to the foreground in Kohl’s rhetoric of rapid unification and economic necessity. It brings the other narrative elements in line with Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.

Finally, while enactments of actors and settings emerged as the dominant narrative elements in Helmut Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament on February 15th, 1990, he articulated political goals or solutions which indicate that he not only gained his rhetorical rights to define the situation, but also that he attempted to establish political legitimacy for his political crisis narrative. Helmut Kohl’s speech enacts rapid unification and economic cooperation as desirable and reliable resolutions to the political crisis in East Germany. As he is not allowed to support East German parties in the run up to the elections of the GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber (i.e., Volkskammer) on March 18th, 1990, his rhetorical legitimacy solely resides within his rhetorical interaction with the East German citizens between November 1989 and February 1990. Kohl reached out to political opinion in the GDR\(^\text{17}\) and enacted them as key political and economic allies in his narrative of German and European integration. Yet, for East German voters, the legitimacy of Kohl’s narrative of rapid reunification and economic necessity rests upon the rhetorical desirability and reliability of his policy narratives. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that he enacts the upcoming East German elections in terms of political values, norms, and symbols that evoke East Germans’ appetite for a democratic political order. Specifically, he argues:

\(^{17}\) Kohl met with the members of the round tables and the Modrow government between November 1989 and February 1989 to hear their ideas for a German-German reunification process.
General Secretary Gorbachev and I were in agreement about the fact that the Volkskammer elections scheduled for March 18 will be a key factor. In light of the campaign platforms with which the clear majority of all the parties and groups in the GDR have established themselves, I would reiterate my firm conviction—and the General Secretary did not contradict this—that the result of this election will not only be a democratically legitimate and, we hope effective government, but also a government policy with the clear aim: “unity as soon as possible!” The General Secretary and I further agreed that not only the campaign and the elections have to take an orderly course, but also that the process of unification must be embedded within a stable European framework. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 142-143)

As the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables both desired a democratically elected government, Kohl enacts a goal that is rooted in their discourse about the future of the GDR. But he enacts this goal within the process of rapid German-German unification and Europe’s political system. He grounds his rhetoric of rapid unification in the desirability for a democratically elected GDR government, but it also functions as one decision within Europe’s expansion toward the East. Further, he enacts Mikhail Gorbachev, and thereby Glasnost and Perestroika, as narrative allies in his efforts to gain rhetorical legitimacy and bring about rapid reunification. As political legitimacy exists within the rhetorical reification of political values, norms, and symbols, it is key for Kohl to enact a post-1989 policy narrative that introduces and influences the GDR’s values, norms, and symbols so that they are more willing to accept West German
policies post-GDR election. To put it another way, Kohl could reference and rely on his rhetorical legitimacy from before the GDR election to publicly legitimize suggestions and implementation of additional political measures post-GDR election. Thus, by rhetorically enacting rapid German-German unification as the (natural) aim of a democratically legitimate GDR government, Helmut Kohl rhetorically legitimizes his pre-fabrication model through the voices of Mikhail Gorbachev and the voters of the GDR. This hedges against the impression of the FRG as a political and economic colonizer of the GDR.

Table 8: Rhetorical Transformation of Helmut Kohl’s Policy Narrative summarizes the key similarities and differences between Kohl’s policy statements between November 1989 and February 1990. The relative significance of narrative elements is indicated by font size and the dominant ratios between narrative elements are illustrated through arrows pointing from the dominant term to the term that is controlled. If narrative elements are largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or emerged only rarely in the discourse, then they remain at the normal font size.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Action/Conflict</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schöneberg City Hall Speeches (Nov. 10)</td>
<td>- GDR citizen movements as political actors of European unity; Deprived of their political independence - Wise and careful political actors focused on external political issues</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kohl’s 10-Point Plan Speech (Nov. 28)</td>
<td>- FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper - GDR citizens and citizen movements as members of a European (economic) family rather than political actors</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kohl’s Speech at the Church of our Lady (Dec. 19)</td>
<td>- FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper - GDR citizens and citizen movements as members of a European community (one among many)</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohl’s New Years TV Address (Jan. 1)</td>
<td>- FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper, not colonizer - GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for Kohl’s pre-fab model - GDR citizens as wise actors focusing on external issues</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Conference with Hans-Modrow (Feb. 13)</td>
<td>- FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper, not colonizer - GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for Kohl’s pre-fab model - GDR citizens as wise actors focusing on external issues</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohl’s Policy Statement to the Bundestag (Feb. 15)</td>
<td>- FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper - GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for Kohl’s pre-fab model - GDR citizens as wise actors focusing on external issues</td>
<td>(- Careful and responsible political actions)</td>
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Table 8: Rhetorical Transformation of Helmut Kohl’s Policy Narrative
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<tr>
<th>Settings:</th>
<th>Tools:</th>
<th>Goals:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- United Europe and Germany as a natural situation and development</td>
<td>- Circumspection, Political prudence, Pan-European Treaties, Multilateralism</td>
<td>- Building a common European community of freedom, peace, self-determination, democracy, and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Europe’s history of unity and division</td>
<td>- Western/Pan-European treaties, institutions</td>
<td>- Common European House/European Architecture - Confederalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Road to European and German-German Unity</td>
<td>- European cooperation</td>
<td>- Solidarity, Peace, and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Europe’s post WWII history of peace and unity</td>
<td>- Market-oriented economy for quick humanitarian help</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Economic Crisis</td>
<td>- (Economic) German-German and European cooperation</td>
<td>- German and European unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Immigration Crisis</td>
<td>- Market-oriented economy for quick humanitarian relief</td>
<td>- Expansion of Western institutions and policies eastward (pre-fab model)</td>
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Table 8: Continued
Conclusion

Helmut Kohl and other political leaders of the West used the crisis in the GDR as legitimation to advance their rhetoric of practical politics, rapid unification, and economic and humanitarian necessity. The rapid deterioration of the East German economy in connection with the influx of immigrants to the FRG after the opening of the Berlin Wall gave the political leaders of the West an advantage to shape the public discourse between November 1989 and February 1990. While during the winter of 1989, Helmut Kohl enacted strong rhetorical links between the setting of a united Europe and Germany as a natural development, the goal of building a common European community, and political prudence and pan-European agreements as tools, this changed toward the end of December 1989 and early January of 1990. In line with his pre-fabrication model, Kohl highlighted the setting of a road to European and German-German unity, which eventually transformed into a safe, but quick and urgent road to West Europe’s market-oriented economy. Kohl often articulates these different roads to German unity with reference to Europe’s post WWII history of division, peace, and unity. Along those rhetorical shifts in settings, Kohl built up his enactments of the GDR as an economic helper and opinion leader for German and European unification, while depicting the FRG as a responsible and humanitarian aid to the GDR.

Whereas the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables enacted policy narratives that allowed GDR citizens to imagine themselves as active participants in reforming the political culture, political system, and legal norms of the GDR, Helmut Kohl and other West German political leaders tend to rhetorically deprive
the East German citizens and citizen movements of their political independence and identity. Instead of enacting GDR citizens through the political language of the East German citizen movements and round table meetings who describe themselves as politically independent problem solvers for GDR citizens and watchdogs of the GDR government, Kohl enacts them as friends and family members within the European project. He enacts them as one among many other East European social movements that acted upon Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs. This further deprives East German opposition movements of their political exceptionalism, which they earned through self-organization and a new form of political deliberation and discourse. Finally, in his speeches shortly following the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl rhetorically equips GDR citizens with political prudence and pan-European treaties to build a common European house. In his February speeches, however, he enacts GDR citizens as economic helpers who use the tools of a market-oriented economy to not only bring about quick humanitarian relief, but also to adapt Western policies for social security and economic prosperity. This shift in rhetorical tools in conjunction with the setting-tool ratio as one of the key ratios in all his policy statements rhetorically legitimizes Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.

After the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl had to develop and defend his ideas for the political and economic future of Europe against the restoration model by USSR’s hardliners, France’s revivalist model, and Gorbachev’s heroic model of multinationalism (Sarotte, 2014a). In the early days after the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl favored French President François Mitterand revivalist model, which aimed at creating East and
West Germany as two sovereign states within a confederate structure. Each of the Germanies would maintain its own political and social order, but would share a common confederate roof. In the end, Kohl favored the pre-fabrication model, which not only entailed the extension of the western legal, economic, and political systems to eastern Europe, but it also aimed at embedding the GDR in European and international agreements like NATO, the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Political Cooperation (EPC). West Germany’s political leaders argued to use the West’s prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply extending them eastward. Compared to the restoration model by USSR’s hardliners, France’s revivalist model, and Gorbachev’s heroic model of multinationalism, the prefab model aimed at harmonizing both domestic and international institutions in Eastern Europe and the GDR. Kohl’s speeches between November of 1989 and February of 1990 prepared the GDR and the FRG rhetorically for embedding the GDR in European and international agreements. Not only does Kohl enact the GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for his pre-fab model within several European rather than specific German settings, but in his later speeches he depicts the GDR as wise and responsible actors who focus on external or European issues. Finally, Helmut Kohl’s and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s statements enact GDR citizens as political agents who are watched closely by Europe and the world, which further construes them as European and international political actors. With the rhetorical eyes of the world and Europe upon the GDR, Kohl and Genscher’s statements enact

186
GDR citizens as agents for European and international political future of the GDR, rather than a truly German-German future.

Despite this West German political discourse, which paved the rhetorical road to German-German unification, Helmut Kohl enacted the FRG not as a political colonizer of the GDR, but as an economic and humanitarian helper and facilitator. This contradicts Kohl’s pre-fabrication model,18 which is why it is tempting to simply view Kohl’s narrative of practical politics and rapid reunification as a way to politically colonize the lifeworld and public sphere of the GDR via his pre-fab model. However, discussing Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative through the Habermasian ideas of colonization, system, lifeworld, and communicative action should not draw our attention away from the communicative dimension of the process. It is all too tempting to highlight the institutional colonization of the German Democratic Republic through the expansion of western legal, political, economic, and military systems to Eastern Europe. Whereas others (Olivo, 2001) often focus on how the FRG exploited the crisis of 1989 to institutionally colonize the GDR, a rhetorical lens for political crisis narratives allows us to redirect our attention to the rhetorical colonization as it played out in Kohl’s discourse.

The West German political leadership introduced power politics and institutionalized political communication into the GDR, while the East German citizen

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18 Between November of 1989 and February of 1990 Kohl’s narrative enactments change slightly, which is why it is difficult to speak of Kohl’s policy narrative as one grand post-1989 narrative. Yet, due to its overall tendency to build toward and support the expansion of Western-style systems to the East, I will refer to it as Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative.
movements aimed at building intersubjective political communication and maintaining
the GDR’s public sphere. Independent political networks, direct democratic
participation, and public deliberation reflect Habermas’s idea of communicative action,
but do not translate well into a parliamentary party system and electoral politics. GDR’s
citizen movements envisioned a political culture where political change happens via
communication from outside of the political party system. Conforming to a political
culture of strategic bargaining and personality and power politics works against the
GDR’s demands for communicative action. The political crisis situation between
November of 1989 and October of 1990 not only opened institutional opportunities for
the GDR and FRG to change its political practices, but it also revealed new rhetorical
opportunities to enact the GDR and East German public spheres in new ways. Thus, the
following considerations will briefly focus on how Kohl’s enactments of the GDR
actors, actions, settings, tools, and goals failed to rhetorically protect the GDR public
spheres from the language of his pre-fabrication narrative. While Kohl’s pre-fabrication
model implied the institutional colonization of the GDR’s lifeworld, it did not
necessitate a colonization of their political language. Instead of articulating narrative
elements through the language of the GDR citizen movements, Kohl enacted a narrative
that exists outside of the political language that GDR opposition groups developed in the
spring and summer of 1989. While Kohl’s pre-fab narrative speaks to the immediate
economic and humanitarian urgencies and anxieties of GDR citizens, it induces Western
German and European interest without clearly enacting the GDR’s political actors,
settings, tools, and goals as political alternatives in their own right.
The Alexanderplatz speakers enacted a new political culture for the GDR from within and under the protection of a new constitution and rule of law. Likewise, the members of the round table meetings desired a new GDR constitution, maintenance of GDR’s political culture, free elections, and a constitutional referendum. Both are key representatives of East Germany’s citizen movements who enacted themselves as independent yet engaged and confident political actors. With his speeches, Helmut Kohl dedicated a lot of statements to the depiction of the GDR and GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for Kohl’s pre-fab model. This does not reflect an understanding of the Alexanderplatz speakers’ narrative enactments in that they deemphasized the importance of themselves as actors and emphasized the role of dialogue, deliberation, and language to build a new political order from within the GDR. It was only with the opening of the Berlin wall and the problem of power politics that the citizen movements, specifically the members of the round tables started to highlight themselves as an independent and principled watchdog of the GDR government and self-organized problem solver for the people of the GDR. Further, they enacted the political crisis and political vacuum after the opening of the Berlin wall as a warrant for drafting a new constitution and improving the rule of law to maintain GDR’s interests. Speaking to this shift from an idealistic goal-tool radio to a deterministic setting-resolution ratio, would have preserved the original momentum of the GDR opposition movements’ rhetoric and guard against enacting their goals and tools via the success-oriented
language of institutionalized political communication. To put it differently, as the definitions of the individual narrative elements between Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the GDR’s citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative differ significantly, there is no common definition of the crisis situation and the desired resolution, which is key to harmonize different plans of action. Habermas argues:

In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action. (Habermas, 1984, pp. 285-286)

To rhetorically harmonize the egalitarian narrative by the GDR citizen movements with Helmut Kohl’s pre-fab narrative would first require similar enactments of key narrative elements and ratios. However, Kohl never really negotiated the meanings of the individual narrative elements and ratios, or incorporated the GDR’s language into his policy narrative. Settings, actors, and goals emerged as the dominant narrative elements in Kohl’s discourse, with the setting-tool ratio as the leading relationship. This differs significantly from the goal-tool ratio by the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the central round tables. While in the first free elections in

19 While the GDR citizen movements opposed power politics and institutionalized political communication, they aimed at building a new political culture for the GDR that is protected under a new rule of law and a new constitution. Future research should explore these demands through Habermas’s discourse theory as he outlines it in Between Facts and Norms.
the GDR on March 18th, 1989, 48% of GDR voters voted for the Alliance for Germany, which supported rapid reunification and memberships in pan-European and international treaties, Kohl’s narrative enactments do not preserve the political directions articulated by the GDR citizen movements. The political directions that the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the roundtables articulated grew out of a desire to reform the GDR from within. Whether it is their enactments of a democratic socialism or a politically independent and principled watchdog of the GDR government, all grew out of a deeply rooted distrust toward the abuse of political power. By not enacting a narrative that recognizes the citizen movements’ distrustful attitude toward government and instead enacting a policy narrative from the domain of Western political language possibly contributed to a lack of mutual political and cultural understanding between former members of the GDR opposition movements and today’s (democratic) political parties and institutions. The citizen movements’ desires for a new political order are embedded in a different language about political culture and systems.

In a 2017 interview with the *Berliner Zeitung*, Thomas Krüger, the leader of Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB), argues that Germany’s political institutions still struggle to break down the cultural and political walls in peoples’ heads. Specifically, he suggests that “[t]here is simply a lack of [political] translators of cultural differences. Then a positive appropriation of institutions becomes more difficult” (as cited in Knight, 2017). Krüger explains that today’s cultural disconnect between East and West Germany is grounded in a deep distrust among East Germans toward state institutions and democratic processes. This distrust manifests itself in voter turnout and
election results in East Germany. States in East Germany barely reached 50% in the 2013 federal elections, compared to 63% in former West Germany (Lees, 2014). Also, political parties critical of Germany’s political and economic system are particularly popular and gain wide political support in East German states. Historically, the Socialist Left Party (Die Linke) benefitted from people’s deep distrust toward political institutions. In Germany’s 2009 federal elections, the Socialist Left Party gained 28.5% of the vote in East Germany. In 2013 they dropped to 22.7% (Hagen, 2017). Now, the far-right wing Alternative for Germany Party (AfD), exploits East Germans’ distrust toward democracy and political institutions. They gained 21.9% of the vote in East Germany, compared to only 11.1% in West Germany. For Krüger, East Germans are victims of cultural colonialism by the West, which started with Germany’s reunification process (Knight, 2017). While further research is necessary, the present results support Krüger’s argument from the perspective of rhetorical colonization.
CHAPTER V

SETTING THE STAGE FOR RAPID GERMAN REUNIFICATION: THE WEST

GERMAN PRINT MEDIA AS POLITICAL ACTOR

This chapter traces the narrative trajectory of the political discourse by West German daily newspapers between November 1989 and February of 1990. The discourse includes front-page articles and editorials in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), which represent two of the biggest daily national newspapers in the FRG between 1989 and 1990 regarding regional and national readership (Pürer & Raabe, 2007, pp. 151-155). The selected front-page articles and editorials address the key political events in West and East Germany analyzed so far, including the Alexanderplatz demonstration, the round table meetings, and Kohl’s numerous policy statements between November 1989 and February 1990. While the FAZ represents a centrist-conservative newspaper, the SZ generally attracts left-leaning audiences. Accordingly, the FAZ’s commentaries and editorials often reflect a conservative or center-right position, while the SZ’s editorials generally offer center-left positions. During the 1980s, the FAZ’s as well as the SZ’s readership included highly educated readers (Fletcher, 1991). The FAZ and the SZ not only grew out of a desire to rebuild a democratic post WWII Germany via a politically independent press, but they also gained financial independence from political parties. Advertising for jobs and businesses generated most of the FAZ’s and the SZ’s revenue in the 1980s and 1990s. This way, the FAZ and the SZ represent a sample of what Hallin and Mancini (2004) refer to as Europe’s democratic corporatist media model, which generally encourages
journalistic autonomy, diversity, and professionalism, but also features low levels of advocacy-journalism. To put it differently, whereas the FAZ largely supports socially softened free-market ideologies, the SZ tends to lean toward ideologies of social responsibility. Despite their differences in political leanings, as newspapers in west Germany and western Europe, the FAZ and the SZ generally reported about East Europe in a way that expressed an interest in overcoming the Cold War and specifically the German-German division (Mueller, 1999).

The Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round table meetings, as well as the German Chancellor and the German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher played an important role in enacting the political crisis drama between November 1989 and February 1990. Yet, as the West German daily press disseminated information to larger audiences than GDR demonstrators, citizen movements, and FRG politicians, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) exerted a lot of rhetorical and political power in defining the political crisis drama for the West German public. They amplified and/or distorted narrative elements introduced by other political crisis narrators. Specifically, they suggested the salience of specific narrative possibilities and resolutions, while deemphasizing and foreclosing others. In turn, this likely increased or decreased the narrative reliability and desirability of the egalitarian narrative by the GDR citizen movements and Kohl’s pre-fab narrative. As news discourses not only define, describe and delimit what is possible to say and not possible to say, but also how people discuss a specific political event or issue (Critcher, 2003; McCombs, 1997), it is key to trace how the FAZ and the SZ enacted the political events
by the East German citizen movements and West German politicians, specifically regarding the process of German-German and European unification.

As the FAZ and the SZ desired to rebuild a democratic post WWII Germany via a politically independent and objective press, it is to be expected that in the event of a political crisis like the opening of the Berlin wall, their news stories follow the news standard of describing the who, what, where, how, when, and why for the reader. This journalistic standard roughly corresponds to the narrative elements of a policy narrative (i.e., Actor, Action, Setting, Tools, Goals) and thereby makes it possible to treat the FAZ’s and SZ’s news articles and editorials as enactments of policy narratives. Further, in the event of political crises, journalists in Western countries tend to “seek information about scope or harm, cause, blame, responsibility, and remedial efforts” (Seeger & Sellnow, 2015, p. 20). They “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). While journalists are generally guided by these journalistic standards, there are a few journalistic idiosyncrasies that are worth-discussing before revealing the results of this analysis. These journalistic habits are important to account for when reconstructing news stories as policy narratives.

First, during the 1990s the West European press tended to frame European politics largely in terms of conflicts, us vs. them, and winners and losers (Smetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In a way, these are rhetorical traces of the West’s Cold War narrative, which dominated the West’s political discourse between 1947 and 1991.
Second, in the great blooming and buzzing confusion of the political world of 1989, the West German press inevitably filtered the events through mental and cultural shortcuts or stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). These shortcuts are summaries or generalization that journalists intentionally or accidentally create through word choice, sentence structure, metaphors, expressions, lead and concluding paragraph, headlines, photo captions, page placement, and quotes. While the following analysis relied upon the headlines and body text of front-page articles and editorials as the unit of analysis, quotes are particularly interesting in that they potentially amplify the political voices of specific crisis narrators and simplify or silence others. Further, to evoke the impression of balanced news reporting, journalists often quote opposing political voices. In effect, this generates conflict frames and only adds to the impression of an uncertain political future. While conflict frames and opposing quotes suggest political disagreement and possibly political deliberation, they lack or minimize information about narrative desirability and reliability. Thereby, depending on the framing devices, the FAZ and the SZ disproportionately heightened the salience of political actors and resolutions due to their use of direct quotes. Likewise, other framing devices like metaphors lend themselves to magnifying or diminishing the importance of political settings and thereby influence the perceived desirability and reliability of a crisis resolution. For example, by describing the influx of immigrants from the GDR to the FRG through the language of a humanitarian crisis evokes a sense of urgency, which implies rapid political and economic solutions. Third, when the press enacts a policy narrative where readers only hear about the implementation and adoption of a policy, while leaving out details about
the political, cultural, and economic consequences, then it minimizes the role that GDR and FRG citizens play in the political process of German-German unification. It rhetorically transforms citizens into consumers of political decision-making, rather than into active political participants. Consequently, readers would underestimate the degree to which citizen participation impacts the political decision-making process of German-German and European unification. Finally, within West Germany’s democratic political system with a social-market economy, political symbols like security, freedom, democracy, and legitimacy are self-affirming and thereby not only support the FRG’s political system, but also imply the legitimate expansion of western systems to the east. To put it differently, West German readers of stories about GDR citizen movements and round tables would interpret them from within the ideologically hardened political binaries of democracy vs. totalitarianism and capitalism vs. socialism, which warrants the implementation of western economic and political systems. Instead of interpreting the political efforts by the GDR citizen movements and round tables in their own rights, Cold War narratives functioned as a filter for political efforts by the GDR citizen movements and turned them into enactments within it.

As a key rhetorical amplifier and political narrator for the people of the FRG, the FAZ and SZ reflected, selected, and deflected the enactments of policy narratives by the GDR citizen movements and round tables, as well as the West German political leadership in different ways. While the FAZ’s and the SZ’s reporting and commentary of the political discourse will be presented in chronological order, this is not to suggest that the narrative trajectory developed in a linear or causal fashion. The goal is to explore the
FAZ’s and SZ’s enactments of policy narratives not only as a reenactment of the GDR citizen movements’ egalitarian and Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, but also as a dynamic transformation of symbols modifying one another. How do the FAZ and the SZ support or distort the rhetorical enactments by the Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round tables, and Helmut Kohl? Or do they follow their own narrative logic? What is the relative significance of narrative elements compared to Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the egalitarian narrative by the Alexanderplatz speakers and members of the central round tables? And how do the relationships between narrative elements transform compared to how they changed in the other narratives? This will help to understand the differences and similarities between and among the different policy narratives. Further, it will allow to reveal how the different policy narratives influenced each other, where different narrative elements conflict, and why Kohl’s pre-fab narrative won the battle over the rhetorical rights to define the situation and legitimize his crisis resolution. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the FAZ’s and the SZ’s narrative enactments across the different political events.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

As the Alexanderplatz demonstration happened on Saturday November 4th, 1989, the FAZ reported about it on Monday November 6th. Enactments of settings, actors, and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories for that day. Specifically, the FAZ front-page news stories as well as the teasers, editorials, and op-eds predominantly discussed the Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches within the setting of an unstoppable political reform process in the GDR and Eastern Europe. Each
story which addressed the mass demonstration at Alexanderplatz also mentions other political reform processes in the GDR and Europe. The headline of the lead article reads “Mass exodus, Reform Agreements, Demands: Hundreds of Thousands cross the Czech border into the FRG/Hundreds of Thousands demonstrate in East Berlin” (1989, November 6, FAZ). The article opens by describing the Alexanderplatz demonstration as a peaceful event and expression of the GDR citizens’ demands for human rights. The remainder of the lead article discusses recent political developments in the SED as signs for fundamental reforms in the GDR. Following the introductory remarks about the Alexanderplatz demonstration, the article discusses the resignation of numerous SED members, the easing of travel restrictions with Czechoslovakia, and the SED’s intentions to initiate important political reforms. While the front-page news stories suggest the inevitability of political change in the GDR through the salience of GDR reform initiative and the influx of immigrants into the FRG, the op-ed on the FAZ’s front page specifically speaks of the political reform process as an unstoppable process. Not only does the author depict the GDR’s political and economic system as a system “born yesterday,” but specifically he argues:

This weekend, the days of the ‘sublime leaders’ as Stefan Heym called them in his thoughtful speech, were counted. . . . Yesterday’s rulers, or those who will soon belong to them, are not willing to share their power. Some might be flirting with the idea to reignite the old machinery of political oppression. But the erosion of political power is too far along. Whoever now resorts to tools of the past risks further protest . . . No matter how the SED looks at it: The
democratization of this run-down system, where politicians complain about a lack of phone lines—one reason among many—is inevitable. (1989, November 6, FAZ)

The language of inevitability in conjunction with the detailed reporting about the resignation of SED members, the easing of travel restrictions with Czechoslovakia, and the SED’s intentions to initiate important political reforms all enacted a political setting of an unstoppable political reform process in the GDR. Further, as political discourse naturally tends to deal with the future, enacting the GDR’s political and economic system through a language of the past evokes a rhetorical momentum for change and reform.

While the enactment of the GDR’s political setting as an unstoppable political reform process dominated the FAZ’s front-page articles and op-ed, the setting of political possibilities emerged as the second dominant setting. Specifically, the authors of the editorials and op-eds enacted the Alexanderplatz demonstrations as a political opportunity to contemplate different directions for Germany’s future. In one of the front-page stories titled “A German Opportunity?”, the author explains:

After the dramatic events in East-Germany over the weekend, which heralded the end of the communist party monopoly in the GDR, the frequently repeated statements by the Soviet leadership about its former satellite states to take matters into their own hands became more important . . . What will happen if the people of a renewed GDR decide to join the FRG? (1989, November 6, FAZ)

200
The author of this opinion editorial answers this question by suggesting that an integrated GDR in Western Germany with economic ties to the USSR would allow the USSR to build its influence in Western Europe. Likewise, he advocates that slow or rapid German-German unification and Germany’s integration in European agreements would be in the interest of the USSR in that it would allow the USSR to access European markets. Elsewhere, he discusses the importance of a slow unification process, due to the cultural, political, and economic differences between the GDR and the FRG. While enactments of the unstoppable political reform process in the GDR and political possibilities or opportunities emerged as the dominant enactments for political settings, the FAZ’s front-page articles included a range of political settings. A few articles enacted the influx of immigrants from the GDR to the FRG as an urgent humanitarian and economic setting, while others focused on the Alexanderplatz speeches as a historical moment. Yet other, discussed the recent developments in East Berlin and East Germany within the context of Glasnost and Perestroika and international and European agreements and treaties.

Among the enactments of actors, the FAZ front-page news stories as well as the teasers, editorials, and op-eds predominantly enacted the GDR as the winner of a possible German-German reunification process. While the Alexanderplatz speakers are occasionally depicted as confident, courageous, and self-critical actors who demand free elections and human rights, most stories quickly direct the reader’s attention to the political role of the GDR for a possible reunification process. In the article titled “A German Opportunity?”, the author argues:

201
The GDR would benefit from German-German reunification in every aspect—including the rights and access to the European common market. Besides, the GDR could commit the newly born German state to invest in East Germany . . .

Integrating the GDR not only into West Germany but also into strong international political structures would minimize their exposure to threats from the East and strengthen Germany’s position as a mediator between West and East Europe. (1989, November 6, FAZ)

Enacting the GDR as the winner of German and European unification not only highlights German-German unification as a desirable and reliable goal for the future, but it neglects to distinguish between the numerous GDR opposition groups who deliberated alternative futures for the GDR at the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the GDR as a whole. The rapid cycle of news events, lack of immediate access and detailed knowledge, and editorial and journalistic practices often result in general rather than specific enactments of political actors. However, while the Alexanderplatz speakers enacted themselves as independent political actors who aimed at changing the GDR from within, discussing them as winners of a possible German-German reunification process rhetorically reduces them to representatives of the GDR, which is simply another political player within the process of Europe integration. Even though the Alexanderplatz demonstration represented the first legal demonstration in GDR history, the FAZ largely used this event as lead-ins to discussions about German and Europe unification and enacted the demonstrators as representatives of the GDR as a political agent of European integration.
The FAZ’s front-page news stories as well as the editorials, and op-eds largely enacted the abolition of the SED’s monopoly on political power and free elections as the key resolution to the political crisis in the GDR. In an article titled “Bonn’s Political Parties collectively demand free elections in the GDR: The SED must surrender its Party Monopoly/The Demonstration in East-Berlin as a historical event,” the author explains:

The GDR political leadership is well advised if they surrender its party monopoly, which the people of the GDR inherited this weekend. They should realize that in the future their claim to leadership will depend on the outcomes of free elections. (1989, November 6, FAZ)

Like the enactments of the Alexanderplatz speakers as representatives of the GDR and the GDR as a beneficiary of the German-German unification process, by discussing political resolutions at the level of GDR’s political leadership rather than at the level of citizen movements diverts attention away from resolutions articulated by speakers at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. Only two days after the biggest and first legal demonstration in GDR history, all front-page articles, editorials, op-eds, and teasers neglected to explicitly mention the Alexanderplatz speakers’ intentions to rebuild a new political culture for the GDR under the protection of a new rule of law. Likewise, the goal of a democratic socialism for the GDR would not be enacted in any of the front-page articles. These political goals rhetorically disappeared in discussions about goals at the level of political leadership, specifically in enactments about the abolition of the SED’s party monopoly.
Enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Willy Brandt’s, Helmut Kohl’s, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s speeches at the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin on November 10, 1989. The FAZ’s front-page on November 10, 1989 featured a range of political settings including the influx of immigration from East to West Germany, an ambiguous path to German unification, the opening of border crossings in East Berlin, European integration, international agreements and treaties, the opening of the Berlin wall as a historic European moment, and the opening of the Berlin wall as an urgent humanitarian necessity. Among those enactments, the opening of the border crossings in East Berlin and European integration emerged as the dominant narrative settings in articles that referenced Brandt’s, Kohl’s, and Genscher’s Schöneberg City Hall speeches. In the lead article titled “Concrete and Barbed Wire don’t divide any longer: New Border Crossings/Demonstration in front of Schöneberg City Hall/Ten Thousands pour into West Germany/Reunion Moments,” the author describes how East and West Germans greeted each other at the border crossings in East Berlin and at the Brandenburg gate and mentions what border crossings will open within the following days. It is not surprising that reencounters between people from East and West Berlin and the openings of border crossings in East Berlin emerged as the dominant narrative settings at the day after the accidental opening of the Berlin wall. Yet, as with the quick rhetorical transformation of the Alexanderplatz speakers from demonstrators to political representatives of the GDR as an agent of European integration, several front-page articles shifted from an
enactment of the opening of border crossings to enactments of European integration and treaties.

The opinion editorial on the FAZ’s front-page for the day after the opening of the Berlin wall begins by describing the accidental opening of the border crossings on November 9th, 1989 as a “natural political event”. But for the rest of the op-ed, the author enacts the opening of East Berlin’s border crossings as “a historical event within Europe’s history of political integration” (1989, November 11, FAZ). Elsewhere, the op-ed argues that “[i]n principle, Brussels can welcome German reunification as long as it fits within the overall design of European treaties and integration” (1989, November 11, FAZ). This enactment of the opening of the Berlin wall and German unification within the setting of European integration functions as a political pre-condition for the GDR to integrate into West Germany and Europe. This way, it supports Helmut Kohl’s architectural rhetoric of his pre-fabrication narrative. Within Kohl’s narrative, the GDR only functions as a political architect for a common European house if it adapts pan-European agreements and a market-oriented economy. The author of this op-ed narrates German-German unification through the eyes of European institutions and within the context of a European architecture. This not only pre-determines the political future of the GDR, but it opposes the Alexanderplatz speakers’ enactment of the setting as revolutionary possibilities. The setting of European treaties and integration rhetorically restraints the GDR opposition movements to political possibilities that are in line with Kohl’s pre-fab narrative.
In addition, the FAZ’s front-page on November 10, 1989 featured a range of political goals and resolutions including a new political leadership for the GDR regime, maintaining socialism for the GDR, freedom of speech and assembly and human rights, and democratic socialism. Socialism for the GDR emerged as the dominant goal. While one article briefly enacted the goal of a democratic socialism for the GDR, the lead article and the op-ed extensively discussed the GDR’s intentions to uphold socialism in the GDR despite the GDR’s political and economic crisis. In an article titled “Modrow: It is all about the Socialism in our country,” the author opens the article by quoting a speech by Hans Modrow, which he delivered on national TV a day before the Alexanderplatz demonstration. The quote reads:

During these times of crisis, it is about the survival of socialism in our country . . . the ‘Wende’ [i.e., turn or turning point] was initiated by people in the streets and we must not forget the Leninist principle that if a party fails to acknowledge its mistakes it will lose its power to rule. (1989, November 10, FAZ)

The article continues by discussing different initiatives by the SED to introduce political reforms while maintaining their idea of GDR socialism. This way, the FAZ’s front-page directed the reader’s attention to goals articulated by the old GDR leadership, rather than the GDR citizen movements or the Alexanderplatz speakers. By highlighting the goals of the old SED leadership, it minimized the voices and demands by the GDR citizen movements and Alexanderplatz speakers and reduced the desirability and reliability of any resolutions proposed by the social movements of the GDR. As the FAZ often neglects to distinguish between the numerous GDR opposition groups who
deliberated alternative political resolutions for the GDR at the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the GDR as a political actor for German and European integration, it appears likely that the frequent enactments of defending GDR socialism as a goal for GDR’s political future creates a distorted and fragmented reenactment of the settings, goals, and actors of the egalitarian narrative by the GDR citizen movements. As news discourses not only define, describe and delimit what narrative elements dominate, but also influences how people reconstruct and reenact narrative enactments, the FAZ’s font-page coverage of the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the Schöneberg City Hall speeches and demonstration only partially supported the Alexanderplatz speakers’ egalitarian or human rights narrative. By enacting the Alexanderplatz demonstration within the context of German-German unification as an unstoppable political reform process and the architectural design of European integration, the FAZ’s front-pages for these dates helped set the rhetorical stage for Kohl’s prefabrication narratives. While Helmut Kohl received whistles and boos for his remarks at the Schöneberg City Hall demonstration, the lead article in the FAZ only mentioned that briefly at the end of the article, which let it disappear in numerous enactments of the opening of border crossings.

Enactments of settings, goals, and actors largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech to the German parliament on November 29, 1989. The FAZ’s front-page featured a range of political settings including the influx of immigration from East to West Germany, the bad political and economic situation in the GDR, European integration and architecture, and
the German unification process as a process within the European project. Among these settings, German unification as a process within the European project and European integration and architecture emerged as the dominant narrative settings. In the lead article titled “Kohl’s Ten Points for a German-German Path: After free elections in the GDR/A community of treaties/Confederation/The SPD agrees,” the author extensively quotes statements from Hans-Jochen Vogel who was a member of the West German parliament and member of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The author dedicates almost two of the four columns of the lead article to Vogel’s support of German-German unification as an important step toward European unification.

Specifically, the author quotes Vogel saying: “The process of German unification is tied to the process of European unity. Whoever attempts to go it alone risks German and European unity” (1989, November 29, FAZ). Elsewhere, the lead article summarizes Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech as follows:

At the core of Kohl’s 10-point speech was a step-by-step outline for overcoming the inner German division and linking it to the development of European integration. Kohl sees this as a prerequisite to overcome the inner German division. The design of Germany’s future must fit into the overall architecture of Europe. (1989, November 29, FAZ)

These direct quotes from Helmut Kohl’s speech and Hans-Jochen Vogel not only reenact Kohl’s idea of a road to European and German-German unity, but they also dispel doubts about the West German position toward the reunification process.

Historically, the SPD functioned as the opposition party to Helmut Kohl’s Christian
Democratic Union Party. However, by mentioning support from the SPD side by side with quotes from Kohl’s 10-Point Plan evokes the impression that West German political leaders unanimously see European architecture as the political setting for German-German unification. Toward the end of the lead article, the author not only quotes passages from Kohl’s 10-Point speech that refer to the expansion of Europe eastwards, but also explains that Helmut “Kohl considers the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the centerpiece of Europe’s design” (1989, November 29, FAZ). By reenacting and highlighting the institutional dimensions of Kohl’s 10-Point Plan, the lead article foreshadows Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for the reunification process.

Enactments of goals generally emerged as goal-tool relationships. Whether it is the op-ed which suggests that the German-German road demands free elections in the GDR or the editorial which advocates that confederalism requires close collaboration between the GDR and the FRG, goals and tools are enacted through the language of institutionalized German and European politics. In an op-ed titled “Looking Ahead,” the author speaks of political commitments, a European community of treaties, GDR sovereignty via a parliamentary party system, and “politics of contracts and deal making” as tools to reach German and European unification. This not only opposes the GDR citizen movements’ hesitation to play the game of power politics, but it also hints at the political and rhetorical dilemma for the GDR opposition movements in Germany’s reunification process. At the Alexanderplatz demonstration, Christa Wolf argued that “. . . language is liberating itself from the official, newspaper-German in which it was
wrapped, and it is remembering the words that express feelings” (Wolf, 1989). Further, their desired goal of a new political culture from within the GDR demanded the tool of political dialogue, deliberation, and language. Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan speech and the FAZ’s reporting and commentary enacted a goal-tool ratio where German and European integration depends upon institutionalized politics and treaties. This offers hardly any rhetorical room to advance a goal-tool ratio that introduces the development of new forms of society-state interactions as a reliable and desirable tool for Germany’s and Europe’s political future.

Whereas enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page articles and op-eds regarding Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech, one opinion editorial enacted the GDR’s citizen movements as political groups who lack competent politicians. In an op-ed titled “Only Truth Liberates,” the author argues the following:

Today, there are hardly any men or women left in the GDR who were not involved with the SED and could take on the political tasks of the future . . . This is why it is so difficult for political organization like the block parties as well as the New Forum and the Social Democratic Party to find people who have the makings of good politicians and enjoy the trust of the people. (1989, November 29, FAZ)

The SED’s party monopoly limited the emergence of party pluralism, however, by depicting GDR block parties and the New Forum and the Social Democratic Party, which grew out of the GDR citizen movements, as politically inexperienced and inept actors, the author applies western standards for what a good politician means. GDR’s
citizen movements envisioned a slow process for German-German unification. Their self-ascribed identity as politically independent and engaged watchdogs and problem solvers exists in conjunction with a slow process of German rapprochement. A policy narrative which suggested a slow German-German reunification process would have opened rhetorical room for GDR opposition groups and newly emerging political parties to defend their political identities. Kohl’s pre-fab narrative of rapid reunification allowed enactments of GDR citizen movements as politically inexperienced actors.

Enactments of actors and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding the first round table meeting on December 8, 1989. While these enactments often emerged within the settings of German unification inside of European structures and a Europe’s history of cooperation, settings would not dominate the reporting or commentary about the first meeting of the GDR round tables. All FAZ’s front-page articles that discussed the first meetings of the round tables either enacted them as an independent political player or described the GDR as a prudent and careful political actor in the reunification process. In the lead article titled “The GDR Government urges the Public to practice Prudence: The first round at the round table/Drafting a constitution,” the author quotes directly from the self-definition that the members of the round table formulated at their first meeting. The lead article dedicates one out of four columns to quotes from their self-definition. Specifically, the article includes the following quote:

Although the Round Table cannot serve a parliamentary or governmental function, it wants to provide the public with proposals for overcoming this crisis.
It demands from the *Volkskammer* and the government that it be promptly informed and consulted about important decisions on legal, economic, and fiscal policies. It defines itself as part of the civil control in our country. It is planned that its activities will continue until free, democratic and secret elections are held. (1989, December 8, FAZ)

While the lead article reenacts the members of the round tables through their own political voice, only two other articles reference the first meeting of the round table. The rest of the front-page articles deal with foreign policy issues including talks between the French President François Mitterand and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as domestic issues about German-German collaboration. Kohl’s enactments of the round tables as a political actor often neglects to enact them through their own language. Often Kohl enacts them as members of the European family by comparing them to other round tables and citizen movements in Eastern Europe. In Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, the round tables appear as one among many, while the lead article in the FAZ narrates them in their own right. Yet, despite the prominence of the first round table meeting in the lead article, the front-page for this day rather focused on foreign policy actors and possible cooperation between the FRG and the GDR.

Finally, while the FAZ’s reporting and commentary of Kohl’s speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) and his New Year’s Eve address follows a familiar pattern of highlighting the setting of European agreements, German-German cooperation, and German unification within the context of European integration, the FAZ’s coverage of Kohl’s and Modrow’s joint press conference and Kohl’s policy
statement to the German parliament rhetorically solidifies Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative.

Enactments of settings largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Modrow and Kohl’s joint press conference on February 14, 1990. The FAZ’s front-page included familiar settings like German reunification within Europe’s architecture and the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR. However, one setting emerged that depicts a political tension between the GDR and the FRG regarding Germany’s reunification process. In the lead article titled “Kohl and Modrow are not Making Progress on their way to a Currency Union: Unification is possible/The bitter defeat of Socialism,” the author describes Modrow’s demands for a slow unification process, while explaining that the GDR, FRG, and USSR agree about Germany’s reunification process. Specifically, the author writes: “After meeting the Chancellor, Modrow said that we are nearing German unity, but the necessary steps should be carried out in increments. The GDR contributes to the unification process with the bitter defeat of socialism” (1989, February 14, FAZ). This is followed by a description of a recent meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, which enacts a setting of political agreements between the GDR, FRG, and the USSR, while also leaving room for the GDR to decide for itself how the reunification process should unfold. Embedded in a metaphor of a common road or path to German unity, the author writes:

Kohl said about his meeting with Gorbachev last weekend: Gorbachev cleared the path to German unity, this deserves our gratitude . . . Between the GDR, FRG, and the USSR there are now no differences of opinion about the German
question. Germans must now decide for themselves under what political rule, in what timeframe, at what pace, and under what conditions this unity should be achieved. German unity is not a question of unilateral decisions but must be embedded in Europe’s overall architecture. (1989, February 14, FAZ)

Modrow’s concerns about rapid German-German reunification rhetorically disappear in the broader setting of agreements between the GDR, FRG, and USSR. The GDR opposed the introduction of Glasnost and Perestroika to East European countries in 1985 and had distanced itself politically and economically from Moscow to develop its own understanding of socialism. Implying a setting of a political consensus between the GDR, the FRG, and the USSR diminishes any inner German disagreements about German-German unification. While the article quotes Modrow saying that German unity comes at the expense of GDR’s socialism, Kohl’s quote about political agreement between the GDR, FRG, and USSR minimizes these concerns.

Kohl is also quoted for saying that German unification is not a question of unilateral decisions. This quote evokes the impression that slow as well as rapid reunification are equal options for Germany’s future. It creates a political setting for Germany’s reunification process that exists within a tension of unanimous agreements about German unification at the level of foreign politics and vague agreements about it at the domestic level. Kohl minimizes this tension in his pre-fab narrative not only by highlighting the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR, but also by continuously enacting a setting of a united Germany within a united Europe. .
Finally, enactments of settings also dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament on February 16, 1990. In an op-ed titled “Unity or Dispute,” the author describes GDR citizens not only as supporters of German unification but suggests a political setting where the GDR and the FRG agree about German unification. Specifically, the op-ed echoes Kohl’s setting of an agreement between the GDR, FRG, and USSR that is free of differences of opinions. The author argues:

More than ever do Germans in the GDR want unity. There is a growing consensus within Western countries, even among those politicians who until recently doubted the entire enterprise. Why should Western politicians give up on a united Germany, now that the Soviet leadership included a united Germany into its political plans for the future. (1989, February 16, FAZ)

Here, the setting of political agreements or consensus exists at the level of foreign politics and the GDR lives within these agreements. This further reinforces Kohl’s pre-fab narrative in that it minimizes the narrative elements of actors and tools within the citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative. While the FAZ occasionally amplifies the political voice of the GDR opposition movements and depicts them through their own language, the reporting and commentary of Kohl’s and Modrow’s joint press conference and Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament further supports the narrative elements of settings and goals.

Table 9: Rhetorical Transformation of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Narrative summarizes the key similarities and differences of the FAZ’s narrative
regarding political events between November 1989 and February 1990. The relative significance of narrative elements is indicated by font size. If narrative elements are largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or emerged only rarely in the discourse, then they remain at the normal font size. While the table for Kohl’s pre-fab narrative indicated the relationship between specific narrative elements, the format of newspaper articles does not allow to determine clear overarching narrative ratios for front page news articles. If a row for a narrative element remained empty, then this means that the element was not sufficiently developed in the articles or only implied.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Alexanderplatz Demonstration (Nov. 6)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Schöneberg City Hall Speeches (Nov. 11)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Kohl’s 10-Point Plan Speech (Nov. 28)</strong></th>
<th><strong>First Round Table Meeting (Dec. 8)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Press Conference with Hans-Modrow (Feb. 14)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Kohl’s Policy Statement to the Bundestag (Feb. 16)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Actors:**  
- GDR as a beneficiary of the German-German unification process  
- GDR opposition groups as representatives of the GDR as a European political actor | **Actors:**  
- People in the streets of the GDR | **Actors:**  
- GDR citizen movements and new political parties are inexperienced | **Actors:**  
- Members of round tables as independent and prudent political actors | **Actors:**  
- GDR and FRG citizens as supporter of unification  
- GDR citizens as prudent political actors | **Actors:**  
- GDR and FRG citizens as supporter of unification |
| **Action/Conflict:**  
(- …) | **Action/Conflict:**  
(- Defend GDR socialism) | **Action/Conflict:**  
(- Careful and responsible political actions) | **Action/Conflict:**  
(- Deliberate alternative political solutions) | **Action/Conflict:**  
(- …) | **Action/Conflict:**  
(- Vote for Unification friendly parties in the upcoming Volkskammer election) |

Table 9: Rhetorical Transformation of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Narrative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Settings:</strong></th>
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</table>
| - Unification as an unstoppable political reform process  
- Political possibilities for Europe | - Opening of border crossings in East Berlin  
- European integration/GDR fitting into the European design | - German unification as a process within the European project  
- European architecture | - Europe’s history of cooperation  
- European architecture | - Consensus GDR, FRG, and USSR about German unity (foreign policy level)  
- Vague agreement at domestic level | - Consensus GDR, FRG, and USSR about German unity (foreign policy level) |

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Tools:</strong></th>
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</table>
| - Free elections in the GDR | (…) | - Institutional Politics  
- Kohl’s 10-Point Plan  
- Closer Cooperation between GDR and FRG | - Pan-European treaties and institutions (OSCE)  
- Kohl’s 10-Point Plan | - Early elections in the GDR | - Early elections in the GDR |

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Goals:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Abolition of the SED party monopoly | - Maintaining Socialism for the GDR | - (Con)federalism  
- Expansion of Western systems eastwards | - New Constitution for the GDR  
- German future with a European future | - German Unification within Europe | - (Rapid) German Unification |

Table 9: Continued
The Süddeutsche Zeitung

The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) largely echoed the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung enactments of Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative by frequently enacting German unification as a process within a European architecture, depicting GDR citizens and politicians as supporters and helpers of German-German rapprochement, and describing early elections as a means for (rapid) German reunification. The SZ’s front-page news stories as well as the teasers, editorials, and op-eds frequently enact settings, goals, and actors that support Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, while they enact narrative elements from the GDR opposition groups’ egalitarian narrative less frequently. Despite these overall similarities, a few important differences emerged regarding the relative significance of narrative enactments and the depictions of the GDR round tables and citizen movements as well as Kohl’s path to German-German unification. The following explanations will focus on those enactments which differ significantly from the FAZ’s reenactment of Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative. It is important to remember that while the FAZ largely supports socially softened free-market ideologies, the SZ tends to lean toward ideologies of social responsibility. This possibly influenced their reporting and commentary regarding the key political events between November 1989 and February 1990.

Enactments of settings, goals, and actors largely dominated the SZ’s front-page stories on November 6th, 1989. While the SZ front-page news stories predominantly discussed the Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches within the familiar settings of mass immigration and the easing of travel restrictions, it enacted goals that highlighted
the importance of creating conditions for GDR citizens to remain in the GDR and rebuild the GDR from within. Like the FAZ, the SZ’s front-page stories enacted the political goal of abolishing the SED party monopoly, however, the goal of creating livable conditions for GDR citizens in the GDR emerged as another dominant narrative element of the news discourse for that day. In the lead article titled “Mass Demonstration and Mass Immigration: Mass Exodus is not a solution to the German question,” the author quotes a speech by Helmut Kohl which he delivered to the German Red Cross a few days before the Alexanderplatz demonstration:

Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that letting 150,000 people immigrate to Western German this year could not be a proper solution to the German question. . . . At the federal convention of the German Red Cross in Bonn, Kohl said: ‘We want that those who can stay—under conditions that make life worth living—should get the chance to do so. Our fellow citizens in the GDR should get the opportunity to find their happiness. (1989, November 6, SZ)

Elsewhere, the author writes that “leading politicians, among them Chancellor Helmut Kohl, said that we must create conditions in the GDR which allow for people to stay in their homeland” (1989, November 6, SZ). These enactments of political goals help to set the stage for Kohl’s 10-Point Plan and his early suggestion to build a united Germany under a confederate roof, but it also draws our attention to a political future for the GDR from within. Thus, instead of dwelling upon the abolition of the SED or the building of a European community as a political goal, the SZ’s enactments of political goals evokes the impression of the GDR as a sovereign state.
As the FAZ and the SZ historically feature low levels of advocacy journalism, it is not surprising that their enactments of political actions remain at the descriptive level, rather than trying to inspire or motivate their readers to act on behalf of their commentary or reporting. Yet, there are a few enactments of political actions that catch the reader’s eye. Quoting statements by Hans-Jochen Vogel who was a member of the West German parliament and member of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the author explains:

The SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel asks GDR citizens who intend to leave the GDR to reconsider their decision. The SPD respects people’s decisions to leave but ‘We ask everyone who thinks about leaving the GDR to carefully consider whether you wouldn’t want to support the process of democratization at home, from within the GDR’. (1989, November 6, SZ)

This supports the often-implied enactment of political prudence and even the enactment of GDR citizens and citizen movements as careful and responsible political actors, but it is rather direct and explicit than abstract. The front-page articles in FAZ for that day do not include these quotes from Kohl and Vogel. The action for GDR citizens remains rather implicit, while the SZ amplifies it in its front-page discourse.

While the SZ’s lead article for the Schöneberg City Hall Speeches featured familiar enactments of opening of border crossings, German unification with European integration, and people in the streets as political actors of change in the GDR, the op-eds disproportionately highlighted the economic uncertainty and challenges due to the possible influx of immigrants into the FRG. Quotes by Brandt, Genscher, and Kohl
about German unification within a European design appear frequently, but they are often followed by questions about the economic costs of German unification. Specifically, these opinion editorials raise questions about the effect of immigrants on employment rates and residential construction. Compared to the FAZ’s front-page stories, the SZ enacts a rather detailed setting of economic demands and challenges due to an influx in immigration. The authors of these op-eds discuss in detail how the German economy should react toward a possible influx in immigrants from the GDR, but also from Poland and Hungary.

Enactments of political settings, goals, and actors dominated SZ’s front-page reporting and commentary regarding Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan speech on November 28th, 1989. Among the SZ’s enactments of political settings, the West’s political consensus regarding German-German unification stood out in comparison to the FAZ’s enactments of settings. The lead article as well as op-eds enacted an agreement among West German political parties and Western European countries about German reunification. The subheading of the lead article reads “As an intermediate step Kohl consider the creation of a confederation/SPD: Kohl’s plan is our plan/Kohl coordinated his plan with western powers and Moscow is informed” (1989, November 29, SZ). Specifically, in one of the op-eds the author writes:

All parties agreed with Helmut Kohl that the first step should be immediate assistance to the GDR . . . For the SPD, the parliamentarian Voigt said that between Kohl’s plan and the SPD’s plan are ‘no conceptual differences’.
According to Voigt, now there is a realistic chance for a new European unification and thereby also a German unification.

While the FAZ largely enacts the setting of political agreements or consensus about Kohl’s 10-Point Plan and German unification at the level of foreign politics, the SZ discusses this political consensus at the level of political parties. Despite a few enactments of Kohl as a political actor who single-handedly initiated the discussions about German unification without consulting other parties and the West German Green party who opposed Kohl’s 10-Point Plan, the SZ front-page generally enacts a political setting where most West German parties support German unification and Kohl’s 10-Point Plan. This not only builds the narrative confidence of Kohl as the initiator and facilitator of German-German unification, but it also sets the stage for Kohl to carry out German unification according to his 10-Point Plan.

Finally, enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the SZ’s front-page stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Modrow and Kohl’s joint press conference on February 14, 1990. The SZ’s front-page included familiar settings and goals like German reunification within Europe’s architecture, a united Germany under a confederate roof, and the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR. However, one goal emerged that suggests rapid unification not initiated by Helmut Kohl but by Hans Modrow. In one of the front-page stories titled “Kohl: Quickly realizing a Community of Treaties,” the author writes:

Modrow proposed a German-German treaty, which should be agreed upon before the Volkskammer election in May. Modrow said that ‘the process for radical
reforms in the GDR are irreversible’. Kohl agreed to this accelerated process for
inner German treaties because he was very impressed by Modrow’s dramatic
description regarding a looming disorder in the GDR. (1989, February 14, SZ).
Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German unification as a long-
term goal, but Hans Modrow’s suggestion for a German-German treaty threatened
Kohl’s and the FRG’s narrative role as a responsible and humanitarian helper. Thereby,
it opened an opportunity for Kohl appear as only reacting to Modrow’s suggestions,
rather than initiating them. This further supported Kohl’s role as a reliable and desirable
facilitator of German-German unification. What is surprising is not that Kohl exploited
the situation, but that the depiction of him in the SZ after the joint press conference with
Modrow let him appear as only responding to what Modrow suggested, when in reality
Kohl followed his 10-Point Plan ever since he gained widespread support for it at the
end of November of 1989.

**Conclusion**

The FAZ and the SZ (re)enacted policy narratives that generally supported
Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative, while minimizing the Alexanderplatz speakers’
and the Round Table egalitarian narrative. While the rapid cycle of news events and
editorial and journalistic practices influence the salience of narrative elements and their
relationships, the FAZ generally tended to reenact Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative,
specifically by including quotes that highlight the setting of German unification within
European treaties and integration. Further, despite occasional conflict frames regarding
disagreements between Kohl and Modrow, the enactment of a political consensus
between the GDR, FRG, and USSR allowed Kohl to win the battle over the rhetorical rights to narrate Germany’s political future. It transcended the inner German disagreements about the details of German unification and thereby rendered them as insignificant within the setting of European and foreign politics. FAZ’s reporting and commentary suggested that Modrow sought to answer questions regarding the sovereignty of the GDR and German-German cooperation at the level of domestic politics, while depictions of Kohl’s solutions imply that the German question should be answered within wider European structures. This difference in enactments regarding the political setting for German unification set the stage for Kohl to further advance his pre-fab narrative and implement his 10-Point Plan. By consistently enacting a European setting for the process of German unification, Kohl created a rhetorical demand or appetite for a European resolution. The narrative enactments of the Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round tables, and Hans Modrow remained at the level of party politics and Germany’s domestic issues. The enactments of political settings followed their own logic or narrative trajectory without really incorporating enactments from other narratives.

The FAZ and the SZ both amplified these differences in political settings, goals, and actors, however, the SZ tended to focus on domestic settings, goals, and actors over European and international narrative elements. Specifically, the SZ selection of quotes by West German politicians often restricted the enactments of settings and actors to the domestic level. Further, the SZ’s commentary and reporting regarding the Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches at the Schöneberg City Hall evoked the
impression that Helmut Kohl and other west German politicians are mostly interest in helping the GDR to help itself. This portrayed Kohl as an even more responsible and prudent politician than the enactments in his speeches and the FAZ’s reporting and commentary suggest. In a way, the SZ’s tendency to reenact Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative and the GDR citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative at the domestic level worked in tandem with the FAZ’s focus on German reunification at the foreign policy level. The FAZ generally enacted Kohl as a responsible initiator and facilitator of German reunification at the level of European politics and foreign affairs, while the SZ tended to depict Kohl as a prudent politician of German unification at the domestic level.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible become inevitable. (Friedman, 1962, p. 42)

This dissertation explored the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s political future and the narrative possibilities that it revealed and concealed. The accidental opening of the Berlin wall on November 9th, 1989 created a political and rhetorical vacuum for key political crisis narrators like the East German public spheres, West German political leaders, and the West German national press. At key political events between November 1989 and February 1990, these narrators enacted a range of narrative elements that implied different alternatives for the future of Germany and Europe. Through narrative analyses of political discourse by representatives of the GDR citizen movements, policy statements and speeches by Helmut Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Willy Brandt, and front-page news article by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, this dissertation traced the similarities and differences of these narrative trajectories and compared them to Mary Elise Sarotte’s historic account of Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for the future of German and Europe after the opening of the Berlin wall. Sarotte’s revolutionary examination and explanation of the opening of the Berlin wall inspired me to analyze how and why the
strategic crisis narratives of the East German citizen movements, the Western German national press, and West German political leaders rhetorically enabled or constrained Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.

To this end, I developed a rhetorical lens for political crisis narratives, which integrates insights from political crisis communication theories, strategic narratives, and rhetoric. This rhetorical lens treats individual statements by crisis narrators as enactments of broader narratives, which potentially help to reestablish political legitimacy. To rhetorically rebuild political legitimacy, it is key to not only transform fluid crisis events into situations that imply the audience as working toward a crisis resolution, but also to win and defend the rhetorical rights to define narrative elements. This then enhances the rhetorical desirability and reliability for a specific crisis resolution. Helmut Kohl’s enactments of political actors, settings, tools, and goals increased the desirability and reliability for early elections in the GDR and rapid German unification within the architecture of European agreements. While members of the round tables and the Alexanderplatz speakers articulated a slower process of German unification, Kohl’s enactments of settings at his joint press conference with Hans-Modrow and his policy statement to the German parliament eventually solidified his settings-tools and settings-goals ratios, which further set the stage for his pre-fabrication model. It is important to remember that even though Kohl’s rhetorical enactments accompany his decision to extend West German and European legal, political, and economic systems eastward, this does not mean that it triggered it. It rhetorically legitimized his foreign policy in the political vacuum that opened between November
1989 and February 1990 and limited the goal- and tool-driven discourse by East German opposition groups. To put it differently, while Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics and European architecture rhetorically legitimized his 10-Point Plan and later his rapid reunification policies, the discourse only suggested a perfectionist tendency but did not dictate it.

Kohl’s enactments of German reunification within European integration implied tools, goals, and actors that exist outside of Modrow’s and the GDR opposition movement’s narratives. The East German revolution movements and their demands for a new political culture under the protection of a new constitution and rule of law existed within a narrative trajectory of moving away from the iron grip of the SED’s party monopoly and Marxist-Leninist traditions. Set within domestic politics and guided by tools of new political dialogue and deliberation, the narrative trajectory of the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the Round Tables remains at the political level of the GDR and possibly at the level of a confederation with the FRG. While Modrow’s enactments of goals at his press conference with Kohl offered new possibilities for the future of Germany, Kohl’s settings-driven narrative already gained widespread support and political legitimacy. Up until Hans Modrow’s press conference with Kohl, the GDR’s political discourse implied a setting of slow domestic rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG. Helmut Kohl’s narrative, however, enacted a narrative that involves European and international treaties and free-market ideologies. This conflicts with an egalitarian narrative that involves direct local and regional political decision-making processes like referendums. International and pan-
European treaties as well as foreign ventures defy narratives that rest upon idealistic political goals. Although the East German Round Tables sought to develop a new constitution for an independent and egalitarian GDR, their focus on the relationship between goals and tools, rather than settings-goals ratios restrained them to developing political futures within the GDR and not extend their communicative power beyond their own political networks.

While reluctant to institutionalize themselves and play the game of power politics, the East German opposition movements and Round Tables exercised what Manuel Castells (2013) refers to as counterpower. By playing the role of politically independent watchdogs and problem solvers for the reunification process, East German public spheres aimed at reprogramming the political network of the GDR and possibly the FRG and introduce new switches between networks. For their egalitarian narrative to exert political power and legitimize their demands for a new political culture from within, the Round Tables and opposition movements had to build or program a political network that would exist within the larger network of western party politics. Network programmers and switchers are social actors, but they exert power by operating in and linking different political networks. This way, they do not necessarily belong to only one social group, organization, or institutions. Political alliances are not enough, rather, it is the network itself that would allow for GDR opposition groups to spread its interests and values via their human rights narrative. This means that for the GDR Round Tables to program its political network, they required other political programmers and switchers to enact their political ideas and demands. Whereas the GDR round tables involved
members from different areas of the GDR’s civil society, they often existed in social networks that operated outside of institutionalized political networks. Members included people from environmental groups, peace groups, migration groups, opposition groups, as well as small political parties. While these groups (i.e., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) envisioned different goals for the political future of the GDR, they all opposed rip and replace approaches for rebuilding the GDR. The values and interest of this loosely organized political network rested on the implicit agreement that the future of the GDR should emerge from within.

While this shared interest loosely linked the different opposition movements in the GDR, it also isolated them within the reunification process. Kohl’s pre-fabrication model implied pan-European and international treaties, which imposed political networks that aimed at rebuilding the GDR as a member of the European military and economic network. The (independent) political power of the GDR Round Tables would not exist in its own right in these networks, but would diminish in the broader goals and values of the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steal Community, and NATO. Further, whereas the GDR opposition groups attempted to program a political and cultural network through direct citizen participation in legal and political decision-making processes, Kohl’s pre-fabrication model largely implied economic and military networks. As the pro-unification and pro-Europe Alliance for Germany party received 48 percent of the GDR vote in the March 18 elections, which consisted of members of the Christian Democratic Union, the Democratic Awakening movement,
and the German Social Union, it further reinforced the goals and interest of the economic and military networks of Western Europe and Germany. Driven by concerns about the economic and military future of the GDR, the political networks by the Round Tables appeared less desirable and reliable to the electorate. The communicative power resided within the economic, military, and political networks of the West. In addition, the first free elections in the GDR created opportunities for upcoming East German political parties to forge new alliances. This further weakened the Round Tables ability to build a politically independent network that advocates for a GDR constitution and the maintenance of GDR culture under the protection of a revised rule of law.

As political power exists within relationships or connections between and among networks (Castells, 2013), the West German political leadership not only relied on its network connections to European treaties and institutions, but also its links to West German media. The FAZ and the SZ not only grew out of a desire to rebuild a democratic post WWII Germany via a politically independent press, but despite their differences in political leanings, the FAZ and the SZ generally reported about East Europe in a way that expressed an interest in overcoming the Cold War and specifically the German-German division (Mueller, 1999) and thereby programed Kohl’s network. It is this imbalance in network-making power that further weakened the impact of the East German opposition movements’ egalitarian narrative. The narrative did not flow through the networks that would have enhanced its impact with the German and European reunification process. Despite the importance of networks and relationships between and among different networks for the production and diffusion of desirable and reliable
political crisis narratives, communication remains key to the process of rebuilding political legitimacy. It is not only the networks of NATO, the EEC, the ECSC, West Germany’s political party and media system that won the battle over the economic and military futures after November 9th, 1989, it is also the language that defines the goals and values of these networks that lead to a specific vision for the future. Without the interaction between and among the different networks vis-à-vis narratives it would be impossible to differentiate the diverse interest among social actors and identity desirable and reliable political futures out of a crisis situation. Narratives codify values and goals of a network in a way that encourages deliberation between and among the different members of a network. To exert political power, a network must resort to communication or narratives, which not only exposes that network’s values and goals to public scrutiny and deliberation, but also reduces its ability to dominate society solely on the basis of network programmers and switchers. It is the influence over the communication process or narratives that legitimizes the values and goals of a network.

For people and governments to succeed in dealing with a political crisis means to draw important lessons for the future (Boin et al., 2017). This not only means that a government revises its ways of dealing with a crisis or introduce new norms for assessing a crisis, but it implies that a government learns how to learn. While Boin largely discusses lesson drawing at the institutional level, a perspective of political crisis narratives draws our attention to rhetorical crisis learning. Initiated in 2013 and implemented in 2014, the EU Parliament and the EU Commission formed a Cultural Committee of European artists, intellectuals, and scientists to develop a new narrative
for Europe. This cultural committee then submitted their declaration, “A New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe,” to the then European Commission’s President José Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The cultural committee assumed that an official declaration of a European narrative channeled through political institutions and the political elite would bring into existence a new cultural narrative and political culture. Evidently, this initiative favored a top-down approach to polity building and failed to flesh out the rhetorical possibilities for European narratives for enduring political and cultural integration. The “New Narrative for Europe” project developed as an ad hoc “reaction to the economic and financial crisis since 2008 and the EU’s related apparently deepening legitimacy crisis” (Kaiser, 2015, p. 374). The declaration of the New Narrative for Europe initiative draws upon historical events like the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the first and second World Wars, the fight against Communism, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the 2008 financial crisis. Rhetorical crisis learning would help to recover the forgotten political languages that remained after a crisis and harness the rhetorical resources and possibilities for European initiatives to build pan-European political culture.

The founding fathers of the European Union used terms like a “United States of Europe” and “European Family” to create a transnational narrative of solidarity and community. These terms, however, disguise that the EU started out as an economic community, rather than a political community. Advanced by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman after WWII, the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) replaced the production of weapons for war with the production of weapons for
economic integration. Through the Schuman Plan and later the Treaty of Paris, European political leaders from France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries facilitated a common market for steel and coal, which led to growth in international trade, modernization of production, and improved living standards. Other economically driven agreements and treaties followed, as for example the European Economic Community (EEC). While these agreements helped to encourage economic ties between and among EU member states and expedite the expansion of the EU, the lack of political integration problematized the development of transnational political narratives. Between 1945 and 1989, European policy-makers anchored Europe’s economic narratives in appeals to peace and prosperity and the need to transform Europe into a new global player. This economic narrative of European integration problematizes Europe’s ambitions to politicize itself.

Examining the languages of political action generated by the East German opposition movements turns our attention to the hidden narratives of German-German and German-European integration and the importance of narratives as a tool to facilitate and hinder political integration. The rhetorical resources that political crises leave behind offer the opportunity to set new rhetorical anchors for narratives of European political integration. The opening of the Berlin wall as a rhetorical anchor for a narrative of European political integration draws our attention to the importance of recognizing demands for independent and egalitarian political cultures. It would direct us to language of political action that minimizes the importance of political actors in favor of crisis resolutions. Further, it would inspire to enact settings that integrate narrative elements of
domestic politics with enactments of pan-European and international settings. Finally, it would help to appreciate the importance of communication for the process of reestablishing political legitimacy and the role that rhetorical power relations play. While my analyses demonstrated that enactments of democratic ideals like self-organization, public deliberation, and political independence resist narratives of power politics and political institutionalism, the forgotten language and political directions that remained from the rhetorical crisis of the fall of the Berlin Wall offer rhetorical possibilities for new enactments of European and German political integration.

While the recent negotiations between the US and North Korea focused on issues of denuclearization, the situation also raises questions about the political rapprochement between North and South Korea. Future research should examine the rhetorical role that setting-driven narratives play in the political discourse about reunification between North and South Korea. Who’s narratives remain at the level of domestic politics and who highlights the importance of international treaties? What rhetorical role does the rule of law play? And what type of political culture do the two nations envision for the future of North and South Korea? There are rhetorical lessons to learn from the hidden narratives of 1989.

Due to logistical reasons it was only possible to obtain digitalized copies of the front-pages of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Future research should include other forms of newspaper discourse to further explore the political role of the western press in Germany’s reunification process.
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doi:10.1080/03637758509376117


243


247


