



- This Case Study presents the diagnostic, machine assessment, and risk management methods performed following a sudden change in vibration condition to a 36MHP steam turbine. The turbine is the driver for the ethylene plant's 4-stage charge compressor that is the heart of the plant's process.
- The triggering event—an increase in vibration from less than a mil to 4.5 mils occurred at a time when the Gulf Coast region was recovering from the impact of Hurricane Rita. Ethylene supplies were short as plant's struggled to return to operation, and businesses were concerned with the impact to downstream customers.
- The methodology described allowed continued safe operation of the plant for (8) months, until the opportunity to perform corrective maintenance became available.





• This is a view of the main charge gas compressor deck showing the steam turbine and the 3-case, 4-stage layout of the machine train.



- Overall sequence of events...
- Plant startup was completed the second week in October following Hurricane Rita, within a week after startup, the charge compressor turbine experienced a sudden increase in vibration, the highest amplitude observed at the OB bearing/exhaust end of turbine.
- Speed was decreased on the machine, and a review of the available vibration data was performed, as well as a determination of the machine's sensitivity to speed changes, e.g. imbalance, rub, and change in vibration levels.





- Review of the Bently System 1[®] vibration data produced the following observations:
- Constrained orbits (both ends of machine)
- Higher amplitudes at exhaust end of rotor
- Predominantly 1X component
- Most likely a mechanical issue, broken component (shroud band, etc.) and possibly lodged, creating a rub and thermal bow in shaft



- Rotor showed 4.5 mils direct amplitude
- Interlock scheme set at 2 for alert (1 vote in), danger at 6.5; 1 alert vote + 1 danger vote on same bearing needed for interlock
- Considered potential failure modes of system and hazards associated with possible failures:
- Turbine protected from excessive damage by interlock; moved danger from 6.5-10 mils (based on severity chart); 10 mils within bearing clearances, provide margin for potential spike.
- Concerned with peripheral systems and potential hazards; governor oil/fire, stainless instrument tubing failure, etc.
- Decided to operate machine on speed control--typically operated on suction pressure control—to reduce likelihood of "moving/shifting" the rub, possibly worsening or interlocking the machine and not being able to bring back up through criticals.



- An initial round of patrols were completed to identify likely failure candidates based on high-cycle, high amplitude characteristics.
- Performed weekly off route CSI field measurements and visual checks on peripheral components adjacent to machine
- Had fatigue crack in governor oil supply; applied a leak clamp
- Had a crack in the gland seal line at the turbine exhaust end



- Noticed trend relationship of vibration and ambient temperature—lower ambient temperature, lower amplitude.
- Provided Refrigerated air at both bearings at specific locations; result "racked" case/bearing enough to reduce rub contact and thermal bow associated with rub.
- Installed chiller for lower temperatures as summer/hotter temperatures approached.



Discovered (2) blades missing in the 8th row, broken at the root; roughly 40 degrees apart



- Heavy rub marks on shroud; damaged tip seal, diaphragms where FOD passed through remaining steam path.
- Largest piece of missing blading discovered (wedged against diaphragm) was roughly the size/volume/shape of a level teaspoon of material.



Photographs from failure analysis report from Dresser showing origin of initiating crack



- Had performed monthly turbine washes 2/02 thru 5/03 to re-establish efficiency; corrosion/corrosion products the result of these washes. Washes were necessitated by poor water quality caused by excessive condenser leaks.
 Condenser has been replaced.
- In removing the blading from the 8th and 9th rows, the corrosion deposits were prevalent in the 8th stage.

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| S | ummary |
| • E ris | Event presented opportunity to use diagnostic tools to assess the sk potential |
| • (| Controls then implemented to mitigate identified hazards |
| • S cu | Safe operation was continued for (8) months during critical period fo Istomers/business following Hurricane Rita |
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| 2007 36th Turboma | uchinery Symposium |

- Make use of all available machine condition information to provide detailed risk assessment
- Ran (8) months by managing risk during critical period

Slide 15 (Supporting Info for Slide 7)



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