RHETORIC OF HEROIC LOYALTY: PORTRAYALS OF SCOTTISH JACOBITES
AS REBELS, REPROBATES AND ROMANTICS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

The Scottish Jacobite tradition spans a tumultuous arc of history in which imagery of Highland dress — tartan and kilts — was used to portray Highland Scots as enemies of the British state and as heroes of the British Empire. This dissertation analyzes historical artifacts bearing the rhetoric that accompanied the development and evolution of Scottish identity after 1745. By leveraging Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism and victimage rituals, this research explains how rhetorical portrayals of Scots in tartan — by anti-Jacobites, by critics of George III and by revisionist romantics — transformed and redeemed Scottish Jacobite identity from defiant “otherness” (dangerous renegades and rebels) to integrated Britishness (loyal subjects and servants of the Empire) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

From the Glorious Revolution of 1688 onward, Jacobites, loyal to the deposed James II and his heirs, endeavored to restore their rightful Stuart kings to the throne. Hanoverians portrayed Jacobites as a dangerous and existential threat to the peace, prosperity and perpetuity of a new British way of life. Jacobites were vilified through propaganda that employed cartoons, caricatures and mocking dialogue to belittle Scots loyal to the Stuarts and to undermine their cause. Scottish tartan and associated garb became a visual marker of these usurpers. When their quest was finally crushed at the Battle of Culloden in 1746, defeat was followed by systematic ethnocide — a legislative mandate from London that the Highland identity be recast in a shape that was unquestionably loyal to the crown, absolutely indifferent toward the Stuarts, and forever incapable of waging war except in the service of the king.
Amid diminishing threat of Jacobite insurrection and Britain's increasing preoccupation with global preeminence, Highlanders demonstrated their loyalty to Britain through military service to imperial ambitions. Meanwhile, with growing discontent with perceived corruption and cronyism in the court and governments of George III, anti-Jacobite rhetoric became a principal weapon against the king. This shift — adoption of anti-Jacobite rhetoric against targets other than Jacobites — along with the incubation of a new sense of integrated Scottishness, gave birth to a new identity for Highland Scots that largely constitutes present-day perception of Scotland.
To the King Over the Water
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Wisdom is best taught by distress.” — Scottish proverb

“Common sufferers, in a cause where even to be unfortunate is glorious, the cause of heroic loyalty!” — Robert Burns, December 1789

The Duke of Cumberland’s stoic, pensive pose exudes confidence. His gaze is intent as he stands upright — shoulders back, chin up — grasping his blade at the ready, poised to charge forward and dispatch his mortal foe. His posture reflects offense, not defense. His expression reflects nobility of purpose. His attire reflects British fashions that signify unity over disparity. St. George’s cross flutters in the breeze above the victor of the Battle of Culloden — “the royal British hero” — whose “true valour” and military prowess “maintains” for Britain its liberty and property, the Holy Bible, liberty of conscience, free parliaments and the Magna Charta [sic].

His righteous Sword intrepid William draws,
for British Liberty, and British Laws,
Firmly in front of his Battalians [sic] stands,
They fight, they conquer, for ye Duke commands,
Now, Britain, full Security is thine,
Now cultivate the olive, plant the Vine

Nearby, Charles Edward Stuart, aghast at his defeat, flees from Cumberland with outstretched arms and splayed hands, searching at once for an escape and for his footing.

Note: In 1750 and 1751, Parliament passed legislation adopting the Gregorian calendar and assigning the year 1752 to start on January 1. For publication dates of artifacts analyzed in this manuscript, dates are, where possible, attributed verbatim as printed on the artifact itself. Spelling, capitalization and punctuation also have been preserved to match original archival artifacts.

His terrified eyes and quivering lips look beyond his sheathed dagger; he will fight no more.

His tattered tartan belies his claim to the English throne — he is decidedly Scottish — and the royal Stuart mark on his tammie, a white rose, indicates his allegiance to a bygone past. Rosary beads hang near a flag bearing the papal seal. As king, this “frightened Italian bravo” would have ushered in popery and slavery, monkish legends, the bloody Inquisition, and arbitrary power. In the face of the Duke of Cumberland, he witnesses the action “at a distance, and out of danger” before embarking on “His Ignominious Flight.” The Jacobites are finished.

Britons, behold presented to your View,
In Contrast, the Mock Hero, and the true!
Stealing from Rome to Caledonian Lands,
The young Italian trains his slavish Bands,
But less on these Banditti builds his Hope,
Than Beads & Bulls & Blessings from the Pope

These illustrations and passages of text, in a 1749 engraving titled The True Contrast, are typical of anti-Jacobite sentiment and skepticism in the first half of the eighteenth century.\(^2\) The identification placard on the specimen in the National Library of Scotland describes the piece as “a Hanoverian propaganda engraving, placing all virtue firmly on the Hanoverian side.”\(^3\) Indeed that is true, but more than that, the engraving affirms a unified Great Britain, not separate kingdoms of England and Scotland, and it disparages Charles Edward Stuart as a papist and a coward. It is a representative example of dozens if not hundreds of similar artifacts full of imagery and messages that extol the virtues of a


Figure 1. The True Contrast. 1749. British Museum Satires 2790: 1868,0808.3885. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
free and just Britain under siege by Jacobite agents of Rome. For decades, this theme was a refrain in anti-Jacobite rhetoric.

**Historical Background**

The story of Jacobitism is a complex tale of religion, geography and political intrigue. Born out of Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which James II was deposed and replaced by his daughter Mary and son-in-law William of Orange, Jacobitism is the system of beliefs held by those loyal to James and, later, his descendants with his second wife, as they plotted from France and Rome to reclaim the Stuart crown. Adherents to Jacobitism are known as Jacobites, which is derived from *Jacobus*, Latin for James.

When James II succeeded his brother Charles II in 1685 to become King of England and Ireland, as well as King of Scotland (as James VII), the ecclesiastical legacy of Britain was thrown into turmoil. James was a Catholic convert, and his second wife, Mary of Modena, was devout. Upon becoming king after the death of his brother, James freed imprisoned Catholics and “took the lead in promoting his faith in England.”

James pursued a wide-ranging strategy of Catholicizing England. He was not merely content to ease Catholic disabilities and wait in confidence that given a level playing field the truth of Catholic arguments would triumph. James was determined to do as much as he could to place Gallican-infused Catholics at the center of political power and to give Catholics as much authority at all levels of government as possible. James was following the blueprint established by Louis XIV.

The king’s tolerance of English Catholics was problem enough, but neither the Anglican establishment nor the nobility would accept the prospect of a Catholic-born prince who

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4 Steven Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 163.
5 Ibid., 176.
would be reared as Britain’s heir apparent in a royal palace that was deferential to Rome. “England's natural leaders put aside their party differences and determined to undermine their king’s innovative policies. James was therefore bound to fail.” In December 1688, seven months after the birth of Prince James Francis Edward Stuart, James fled England. The royal household took refuge at a palace in St. Germain, France, where James II would live out his days as a guest of fellow Catholic Louis XIV. The Stuart dynasty continued to rule Britain through James’s Protestant daughters Mary (with her husband, William of Orange) and, later, Anne, until George I acceded to the throne in 1714 as per the terms of the Act of Settlement.

Over the next six decades, the exiled Stuart courts on the continent would, with the help of loyal Jacobites in Britain, make three noteworthy attempts at restoring three rightful, legitimate monarchs to the throne — first James II, then his son James Francis Edward Stuart (The Old Pretender), and finally Charles Edward Stuart, or “Bonnie Prince Charlie” (The Young Pretender). These insurrections, known as “risings” in Jacobite history, came to a boil slowly as political and religious forces shifted across Britain — the first full-throated attempt to restore the Stuarts did not occur for more than 25 years, and only after James’s daughter Anne died without an heir, which left the Stuart line at an end and put George, Elector of Hanover, on the throne. As Paul Monod concludes, the vestige of Jacobitism in the 1690s was “top-heavy with aristocrats, but had little appeal to

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6 Ibid., 179.
7 Parliament ruled that James II had abdicated when he fled England in late 1688. William of Orange and his wife Mary (who was James II’s daughter) were offered the throne by Parliament in 1689, and they ruled Britain as co-monarchs William III and Mary II until Mary died in 1694. William continued to reign alone until he died in 1702, when he was succeeded by Mary’s sister, Anne. In 1714 Anne died without any children, and the throne passed to George, Elector of Hanover, as prescribed by the Act of Settlement 1701, which barred Catholics from the throne.
the common people” — the deposed king’s supporters were powerful only in pockets of Britain where Catholicism was strong. Jacobitism ebbed and flowed, and in its second resurgence, religious faith was less of a concern — by 1714, “Jacobite political argument had coalesced around the ideas of hereditary right and moral reform.” Historians have held open the possibility that the Stuarts, starting with James III, could have been restored if they had abandoned Catholicism — the Act of Settlement 1701 barred Catholics from the line of succession. Failing the restoration of James II’s line, the cause perished with its last pretender, or as one pro-Jacobite essay proclaimed, Jacobitism “expired only when the last of the Stuarts was laid in his foreign grave.”

Monod chronicles “three great waves of Jacobite activity”: 1689–1696, 1714–1723 and 1745–1753. “The first of these generated most of the basic structures of Jacobite political culture; the second was the most widespread and the most dangerous; the third echoed its predecessor with less force, and ended with a whimper when the frustrated Prince Charles Edward Stuart became an alcoholic.” Consequently, “Jacobitism never regained its initiative, although Charles Edward’s vain attempts to revive his forlorn cause did not cease until his death in January 1788. At this point an almost moribund Jacobite political culture collapsed, with the defection of the Scottish Nonjurors as its last act.”

George Jones reached the same conclusion in his 1954 book: “Jacobitism in England
therefore did not have to be uprooted, for the top was dead. In Scotland it died because its human material was gone, but in England no one had the strength, the touch, or the intellect to use the material available.”

Jones, however, affixes blame directly to Charles Edward Stuart. “Every factor influenced England and Scotland to forget the cause, the principle of loyalty behind it, and the ‘old cries’ by which fidelity was manifested. Even the burning of the Pretender in effigy became a spectacle like that of Guy Fawkes, and ceased to mean anything at all. The old man who departed this world in 1766 had no connection with British reality. Only his son was left to believe the cause was living, and that son had killed it.”

Herbert Vaughan points to an earlier death knell for Jacobitism, in 1747, when Henry Benedict Stuart, second son of the Old Pretender and younger brother to Charles Stuart, accepted Pope Benedict XIV’s offer of a cardinal’s hat, which “thus dealt the deathblow to a cause now irreparably lost, the further pursuit of which was bound to bring ruin and misery upon its remaining supporters.”

He argues: “Nobody (except, perhaps, Prince Charles Stuart) realized at the moment the incalculable injury that had been inflicted on the Jacobite Party by such a step, the ensuing results came to be fully appreciated by historians in later times.”

Regardless, and by the time Charles Stuart died, it became clear that the end of hope had come. “The succession of Cardinal York to the Stuart claims in 1788 caused the last enthusiasts to acknowledge only the truth, that Jacobitism was a thing of the past.”

14 Ibid., 246.
16 Ibid.
17 Jones, The Main Stream of Jacobitism, 246.
By some accounts, Jacobites still are working toward their cause — legitimist organizations such as the Royal Stuart Society maintain succession charts that trace the royal pedigrees of the “rightful” Stuart descendants who could make claims to the British throne. In March of every year, on the anniversary of the birth of Charles I, society members gather at his bronze statue in Trafalgar Square in London for a vigil.¹⁸ By and large, however, Jacobitism is dead in the modern era. Nonetheless, its complex history — and the military campaigns fought in its name — leave an indelible mark on Britain and, to a lesser degree, Europe. Appreciation for Jacobitism’s roots provides important context for the extraordinary wars of words that are the subject of this project.

**Research Puzzle**

The research guide for the National Records of Scotland lists Jacobites under the category of “Crime and Criminals.” This fitting label, although perhaps narrow in scope, underscores the decades of anti-Jacobite propaganda published and promulgated by governments and supporters loyal to the monarchs who succeeded James II after 1688. The Scottish Jacobite tradition spans a fascinating and tumultuous arc of history that transcends the circumstances in which it thrived, wilted and later was revived. From the outset of the Glorious Revolution in 1688, Jacobites loyal to the deposed James II endeavored to restore their rightful king to the throne. When their quest was finally crushed at Culloden in 1746, the Jacobites retreated — militarily, emotionally and rhetorically — and their “cause of heroic loyalty”¹⁹ withered on the vines of history as time slowly marched forward. Along with the

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sting of defeat came systematic ethnocide — a legislative mandate from London that the Scottish Highland identity be recast in a shape that was unquestionably loyal to the crown, absolutely indifferent toward the Stuarts, and forever incapable of waging war except in the service of the flourishing and far-flung Empire. In countless artifacts of propaganda and political discourse from the era between the Glorious Revolution and the decade after Culloden, we see the Scottish tartan and associated garb as a visual marker of enemies of the state. Highland Scots did not dress as Britons, and their traditional costume was a manifestation of tradition in real life — and of otherness in the satire that cataloged it. As Linda Colley described the trend: “Highlanders and Lowlanders, cultivated patricians, like the Earl of Bute, and the poorest, most illiterate clansmen were all conflated in a common sartorial foreign-ness.”

Across decades of military and rhetorical engagement, Jacobites were portrayed as a dangerous and existential threat to the peace, prosperity and perpetuity of a new British way of life. Depicted, quite literally, as agents of Rome — as promoters of popery and slavery — Jacobites were vilified by the incumbent regime in London through propaganda that employed cartoons, caricatures and mocking dialogue to belittle Scots loyal to the Stuarts and to undermine their cause. In the years after Culloden, however, the need for anti-Jacobite propaganda faded away. Amid diminishing threat of Jacobite insurrection — and a Britain-sized preoccupation with global preeminence — Highlanders found their role in the firmly united Kingdom of Great Britain. They became, as Colley called them, the arsenal of the empire.

21 Ibid., 115.
In those changing times, and with discontent from perceived corruption and cronyism in the court of George III, anti-Jacobite rhetoric became a principal weapon against the king. This shift — adoption of anti-Jacobite rhetoric against targets other than Jacobites — along with the incubation of a new sense of integrated Scottishness, gave birth to a new identity for Highland Scots that largely constitutes present-day perception of Scotland. Colley rightly points out that Scottishness is not as historically homogeneous as one might imagine. “Even in the early 1800s, for example, and despite the enormous impact of Sir Walter Scott’s heroic evocation of the lochs and glens of the North, some Lowland Scots still automatically referred to their Highland neighbors as savages or aborigines. They regarded them, as they had traditionally done, as impoverished and violent, as members of a different and inferior race, rather than as fellow Scots.”

Perhaps this deliberation is the most fascinating aspect of the long-running deprecation of Scottish Jacobites: Hanoverian monarchs in the nineteenth century — George III, George IV, William IV and Victoria — reigned over the rebirth of Scottish national identity after their forebears had purged it. This cultural negotiation is not as monochromatically hegemonic as one might imagine, however. “It is an open question whether George IV in a kilt and Victoria and Albert at Balmoral are appropriating and subverting a set of values, or whether they are being appropriated and subverted.” But what fueled that evolution of identity? What drove the development of reimagined peoples, places and cultures that defines present-day perceptions of what we know as Scotland? These considerations inspire my research question, which follows.


How did rhetorical portrayals of Scots in tartan — by anti-Jacobites, by critics of George III and by revisionist romantics — transform Scottish Jacobite identity from defiant “otherness” (dangerous renegades and rebels) to integrated Britishness (loyal subjects and servants of the Empire) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?

This research question presupposes three phases of rhetorical agency in portrayals of Scottish Jacobites from 1745 to about 1845. Across those hundred years, depictions and descriptions of Scots, namely as Highlanders who were Jacobites, evolved from derisive antipathy to nostalgic, romantic legend. Starting in the early eighteenth century, salacious prose and satirical portrayals of Scots in tartan dominated discourse about Scotland and its Highlanders. As Margaret Steele highlights, anti-Jacobite pamphleteering, at least in the early days, was a double-edged rhetorical sword. On one side, the royal courts in London effectively cultivated a reputation for James III “as a despotic, bigoted tyrant who would stop at nothing to fulfill his alleged dream of universal adherence to Roman Catholicism.”

Consequently, however, “anti-Jacobite pamphleteering between 1701 and 1720 advanced the cause it sought to undermine by promoting Jacobitism as a viable political force.”

Anti-Jacobite rhetoric developed from “a climate of opinion by which Jacobitism was perceived to be a serious threat to national sovereignty also had the effect of exaggerating the organizational skill and martial prowess of the movement. The polemical writers did their cause a disservice for, inadvertently, they helped to promote Jacobitism as a viable and potent force in Scottish politics.”

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25 Ibid., 140.
26 Ibid., 151.
became coterminous with anti-Catholic sentiment, which peaked during the Jacobite rising of 1745 and “revealed a remarkable degree of anti-Jacobite solidarity in England.” Haydon argues that anti-Catholic sentiment began to recede in the 30 years that followed Culloden, and Catholicism and Jacobitism began to diverge. By 1766, upon the death of the Old Pretender, Rome recognized George III, not Charles Edward Stuart, as the British king. If either Jacobitism or Catholicism posed a threat to the Kingdom of Great Britain after 1766, it did so separately from the other. This mutual exclusion, however, did not apply to the contemporaneous denigration of the Scot who, as a “self-interested immigrant,” had become ensconced in London society and government, much to the chagrin of the English.

Anti-Scottish rhetoric became both a product of and an engine for widespread Scotophobia despite Jacobites’ diminished threat and capacity to wage war. The caustic rhetoric of John Wilkes, through his newspaper, *North Briton*, fueled such sentiment. “Scots, so the Wilkite argument went, were inherently, unchangeably alien, never ever to be confused or integrated with the English.” Anti-Scottish rhetoric from Wilkes and his libertine followers reached a fever pitch when John Stuart, the Earl of Bute, became the first Scottish prime minister of the United Kingdom. Although Bute’s premiership lasted for only a year, 1762–1763, he was seen as a corrosive influence on government for decades to come. “For the politically discontented oppositional groups of this period, the notion of Bute’s power via ‘secret influence’ became a catch-all explanation for the failure

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of their ministries and inability to maintain the king’s favor.” Adam Rounce contends that Bute’s competence, or perceived lack thereof, was irrelevant in light of his ancestry. Bute was a Scot. Consequently, political cartoons of the era portrayed Scots — replete with kilts, tammies and bagpipes — whispering into the king’s ear at court. The Scottish Highlander was indiscriminately portrayed as the nemesis of otherwise virtuous and honorable British liberty.

This anti-Scottish rhetoric persisted late into the eighteenth century but slowly began to decline. Charles Stuart died in 1788; had his brother and heir presumptive, Henry Benedict Stuart, made vigorous claims to the throne, he would have vindicated decades of rhetoric linking Jacobite ideals to the Roman Catholic church. For all practical purposes, however, Henry Benedict demurred.”The succession of Cardinal York to the Stuart claims in 1788 caused the last enthusiasts to acknowledge only the truth, that Jacobitism was a thing of the past.” In the final count, eighteenth-century Scotophobic rhetoric not only defined English stereotypes of whom and what Scots were, but later it also articulated what Jacobites were not — a meaningful threat. Loyalty to the bygone Stuarts had faded from calls to arms. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jacobitism was little more than a fashionable but jocular pose of nonconformity. Concurrently, the militarization of Scotland in service to the burgeoning British Empire reshaped Scotland’s relationship with England, and tartan was at the center of that identity.

Literature Review

Can a solitary sartorial statement transform political discourse? Can it redefine identities? That, according to popular accounts, is what happened when George IV visited Edinburgh in 1822, becoming the first monarch to visit Scotland since the Acts of Union in 1707. This showcase, masterminded by Scott, effectively ended the ageless divide between England and Scotland, and also between the Highlands and the Lowlands. At the same time, it allowed emergence of a renewed, refined identity for Scots — particularly Highland Scots — while ushering in an articulated sense of unity among Scottishness as unique and also a constituent element of British identity. As Barry Brummett finds, “Scott's exercise in sartorial rhetoric was an instant popular success. The peaty aroma of ancient age attached to the tartans at once. Scottish people were quick to take on the tartans as if it has been around for centuries. Not only did the invented link between clan and tartan become a reality from that moment on but also the political challenges of cementing ties between the north and the British monarch were successfully addressed through that ploy.”

Decades of strife over tartan and kilts predate Scott's masterful stunt. The Dress Act of 1746 outlawed wearing of Highland costumes and tartan except in the service of the British military, and that law stood for almost four decades. Cecily Morrison argues that laws that prohibited tartan were instrumental in defining the cloth as an article of identity. “The carrying of guns, the wearing of kilts ... and the playing of bagpipes were outlawed in an attempt to stop further military advances and to destroy the distinctive Celtic culture. These actions had important consequences. They highlighted Celtic otherness

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and gave it such key symbols as the kilt and the bagpipes. Moreover, they increased the antipathy between the Lowlands and the Highlands, rather than between Scotland and England per se.”

Fast-forward two centuries, and Tara Crane et al study the self-actualization resulting from wearing kilts as an outward expression of heritage among Scottish-Americans. “Highland or Scottish ethnic dress can be viewed as such a symbol used to identify oneself as Scottish-American and to identify others as being Scottish-American, thereby facilitating a sense of belonging because of similarities in dress.” Katherine Lloyd’s research on rhetoric of identity in Scottish museums ahead of the Scottish independence referendum also highlights senses of belonging and exclusion. “Identity implies not only sameness, but also uniqueness. In defining our own identity, we draw upon what we have in common with others, while emphasizing the differences.” Lloyd’s findings suggest an expectation among museum visitors in Scotland that traditional notions of nationhood be upheld — the common view was that “museums in Scotland should focus on key historical figures such as Robert Burns and Scottish scientific innovations, rather than stories of cultural difference that were not ‘unique’ to Scotland.” Similarly, Penny Fielding, in assessing the development of rhetoric and dialectic in eighteenth-century Scotland, describes complex rhetorical relationships among ideals of Scottishness and Britishness;

36 Ibid., 155.
these were a product of competing and uniquely independent literacies within Great Britain. “Histories of Scotland generally claim that, at least after the failure of anti-Union politics in 1746, Scots had to wait for the development of a sentimentalized, tartan-clad, Victorian Scotland before any kind of discrete national identity, however improbable, could be posited.”37 That, Fielding argues, did not occur until much later.

Fielding is not alone in her view that the continuum of Scottish rhetorical identity runs longer than many scholars imagine. While highlighting a need for further comparative study of self-identified members of the Scottish diaspora “who appropriate and celebrate myths of Scottish identity,”38 David Hesse responds thoughtfully to three appropriations of Scottish identity published in the past decade and concludes that contemporary international interest in Scottish identity may not necessary constitute an “exceptional phenomenon” as some researchers suggest.39,40,41 Although Hesse dismisses much of Richard Zumkhawala-Cook’s work as unsubstantiated, he finds value in research published by Paul Basu and by Maureen Martin, both of whom observe an almost inexplicable fascination with Scottish heritage among non-Scots who seek to trace — or adopt — Scottish roots. In particular, Martin outlines the complex and disputed evolution of imagined Scottish identity. “The identification of true Scottishness with Highland culture mystifies and

displaces historic Scottish nationhood, shifting it from history and politics to the safer realm of myth and romance.”42

Martin acknowledges that much of our collective, present-day perceptions of Scottish identity are underpinned by nineteenth-century fabrications. “In his orchestration of the 1822 extravaganza for George IV’s visit to Edinburgh, Scott underscored the romance of Highland culture and identified all of Scotland with it.”43 But more importantly, by appropriating Scottish identity onto George IV by parading him through Edinburgh in a kilt, Scott effectively closed a schism that had held Scottishness and Britishness as mutually exclusive. As Caroline McCracken-Flesher wrote, George IV, after his visit to Edinburgh, “was inscribed at the center of Scottish culture, subjected to it, by the Scots, as Jacobites, claiming to be his subjects. And Victoria went one better. She actively situated herself within Scottish culture in preference to that of England. With glorious incongruity, the scion of Hanover and Saxe-Coburg sported the tartan at Balmoral, figured herself as a sentimental Jacobite, and lamented dearly beloved Scott alongside dearly beloved Albert.”44

The image of Victoria in tartan is, itself, defining testimony to the rhetoric of identity and to the enduring significance of tartan as symbolism for Scottishness, whether embodied in rebels or romantics. Questions remain about the link between tartan and identity, and in the perspective from which such identity is adopted. As Hugh Cheape writes, “Highland dress, which had been formal, ceremonial, a military uniform — some would say

42 Ibid., 9.
43 Ibid., 10.
elitist — has moved to chic, casual and popular, and even re-adopted as a form of national identity as well as a style item."^{45} We cannot, however, deny tartan's history.

Key words like *uncouth*, *odd* and *barbarity* typify Highland dress as somehow outré, beyond civilization, when, of course, it was an element in the Celtic civilization of Scotland that was, and is, a source of art of considerable cultivation. The later-invented shibboleth, referred to by Ian Maitland Hume, that the kilt should not be worn south of the Highland line is, in a sense, another version of an attempt to corral the dress into some form of reservation for the eccentric.^{46}

Previous work on the rhetoric of clothing sets a foundation on which a study of tartanry can be constructed. Beverly Gordon's study of “fossilized” dress elucidates the notion of clothing both as a marker of identity and community, and of otherness. Gordon argues that, whether intentional or not, or perhaps as a consequence of circumstances, outmoded fashion can constitute tradition within groups. “In time, the fossilized or old fashioned dress came to be ‘traditional’ and was then perpetuated because of its strong associations. It reinforced group identity and cohesiveness, and seemed to further distance the group from the rest of the ‘outside’ world.”^{47} In a similar vein, Carol Mattingly finds rhetorical significance in the clothing choices made by women, or made for them, as indicators of gender in nineteenth-century America. Ethos, therefore, became a product of clothes. “Dress further restricted women speakers because the way women's bodies were read contributed largely to how their words were heard. Audiences formed impressions of speakers based on the visual, even before the actual delivery of words.”^{48} Mattingly took that

scholarship a step further with her work on clothing and gender among American women in the nineteenth century — she points to a “gendered component of rhetoric” attached to women speakers of the era. 49

Although these studies contribute to greater understanding of the rhetorical significance of clothing, they grapple only with reality — clothes that were worn by real people — and the rhetorical consequences of such acts. In the case of Jacobites and Highlanders, we are concerned not necessarily with what actually was worn, but rather with the rhetorical acts of cartoonists, satirists and novelists whose depictions of Highland dress developed associated meaning that evolved over time. As Lester Olson et al highlight, words and imagery are not mutually exclusive in a rhetorical sense. Rather, “words and images are oftentimes mixed together in rhetorically interesting ways.” 50 In Sonja Foss’s definition of visual rhetoric, not all visual objects necessarily are rhetorical. “The image must be symbolic, involve human intervention, and be presented to an audience for the purpose of communicating with that audience.” 51 I would qualify and extend that definition to stipulate that a visual object need not just communicate — it must attempt to persuade or dissuade. With these constraints in mind, close textual and interpretive analysis of depictions of tartans and tartanry would enable a scholar to decipher the identity (or identities)

developed on behalf of — or imposed upon — various peoples or communities traditionally associated with such garb.

Scholars have assessed the rhetorical praxis of externally imposed identities, which often are a result of hegemonic relationships within a state, or between or among two or more states. Yitzhak Brudny and Evgeny Finkel, for example, argue that Ukraine’s national identity is a product of past Soviet-era subordination to Russia, which developed a “hegemonic imperial identity with an assumption of a privileged status for ethnic Russians.” Consequently, the authors argue, Ukrainians “felt oppressed by the Soviet state and identified themselves in anti-Russian and, therefore, anti-imperial terms.”52 Similarly, Kevin Dunn studies an identity imposed upon the Congo by Western hegemonic news media. “While Westerners are generally uninformed about Congolese history and politics, they feel they know it well because of the powerful images of it encountered everyday.”53 The emergence of such perceived identity does not occur inside a vacuum — Dunn argues that representations that shape outsiders’ understanding, whether accurate or not, have political consequences — “discourses and imagery on the Congo’s identity have directly influenced political policies toward the Congo.”54 Dunn presents a notion of “multiple and competing discourses” that “construct unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented sense of the Self and Other.” As such, “the identity of the Congo, like all identities within the international realm, is socially constructed, conditional and lodged in contingencies

54 Ibid., 5.
that are historically specific, intersubjective, and discursively produced.”

Stuart Hall describes such phenomena as being a product of identities’ ability to exclude. “Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly evoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference.” Hall describes this as an active and ongoing process — becoming, not being — and in the power relationship there is a process by which identities become “the product of the marking of difference and exclusion.”

The rhetorical action at this intersection represents my interest in investigating the various meanings of tartan imagery in the development of Scottish national identity. As Mary Stuckey and John Murphy contend, in the power of naming places, appropriation is theft, and a new meaning relies on the old. “The idea of a nation embodying a people is, as many have argued, a fiction, a creation brought about by a specific sort of historical necessity and specific kinds of rhetorical action.” And so if rhetorical power exists in appropriating or assigning names to places or peoples, then so, too, does rhetorical power in the hands of illustrators and engravers whose images promote understanding that may not necessarily be compatible with reality. If that image is circulated and seen far and often enough, that image can define a truth that may not necessarily be true. Therein lies the significance of tartan from the reign of Queen Anne to that of Queen Victoria — and beyond.

Communication literature contains abundant examples of how clothing constitutes rhetoric — and how rhetoric constitutes identity, whether adopted constitutively from

55 Ibid., 10.
58 Ibid., 76.
within or imposed from without. Scholars have examined how identification among an imagined community can result in shared identity, but researchers highlight holes to be plugged in our understanding of this phenomenon. Kelly Jakes, for example, studies the rhetorical power of song as resistance to German occupation of France during World War II. The organic and decentralized nature of this form of communication makes it conducive to building identity, but Jakes argues that further study is needed to understand the resulting exclusion of others — how does such language “work to constitute one group while barring another”?\(^{59}\) Likewise, Robert Branham argues, national songs can change or reconstitute identities just as readily as they can create them.\(^{60}\) As Jolanta Drzewiecka finds, such a proposition becomes far more complex when the constitutive discourse of identity is occurring across national borders and among peoples whose identities overlap with other communities. “The collective ‘we’ emerges as a shifting formation as the identity of the diaspora, its borders, and who counts as its members is constantly contested and repositioned.”\(^{61}\) Certainly that was the case with Scotland during the 1745 uprising. The novel question in that case, however, concerns the appropriation of tartan as identity alongside religion and politics — and then how that same rhetoric was reapplied later against a second rhetorical target. The idea of clothing as rhetorical device and symbolism is not new, nor is such an act as means of subversion. With clothing, for example, “there are ways a woman can knowingly exploit rhetorical systems have that been coded masculine.”\(^{62}\)

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But what happens when one community uses such rhetoric to foist, in wholesale fashion, an identity on another community? Or, in a more complex vein, how does this occur when a segment of a given community does this to another segment of the same community, whether geographic, ethnic, religious or rhetorically constructed?

The objectification of Muslims, whether as Palestinian refugees, migrants or asylum seekers, constitutes a gamut of rhetorical scholarship. This body of knowledge contributes to my understanding of the dynamics of Scottish Highlanders and Jacobites through their conflict with the British crown and later redemption as an icon of reintegrated British Scotland. As Isabelle Humphries argues, “Palestinians in Israel are viewed as a minority whose national aspirations must be curbed and controlled. Thus the shape and communication of political ideas at a grassroots subaltern level becomes all the more important in any study of communal cultural politics — a politics not represented or observable in ‘higher’ echelons.” Humphries presents the “displaced” Palestinians in Israel as an other inside their homeland, and my research will examine the other status designated upon Scots resisting political and legal union.

In tracing the construction of asylum-seeker identity through contemporary portrayals in the British press, Nick Lynn and Susan Lea identify a dynamic of identity relative to various holders of rhetorical power. They argue that the effective contrast drawn in popular perceptions of this community of other is brought to justify the disregard for “some of the central tenets of British democracy.” Consequently, they call for further

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scholarly work to empower the voices of dissent and counter discourse. “Whilst the social construction of asylum-seekers requires the reconstruction and repositioning of other social groups; it also requires the legitimization of some questionable institutional practices.”\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, Orayb Najjar explores the rhetorical significance of works by famed cartoonist Naji Al-Ali as an assembly line of Palestinian refugee identity. Najjar argues that, rather than belittling Palestinian refugees to disparage them, Al-Ali presented their plight as it was to prevent it from being forgotten or dismissed. “The cartoonist chose to stress the aspects that challenge the marginalization and disallowal of Palestinian identity through a combination of description and resistance to the conditions at hand.”\textsuperscript{66} Jonathan Cohen finds similar rhetorical power in Israeli synagogue pamphlets, which represent a potent and efficient alternative to mainstream media outlets. Although Cohen’s work focuses on modern and emerging technologies, there are striking similarities in the history of publications that carried anti-Jacobite sentiment and, later, anti-government sentiment against George III. The rhetorical power of such media rests in the ability to consolidate group identity. “By supplying frames and counterarguments different from secular mainstream media, synagogue pamphlets help their readers maintain a positive self image and provide a view of social reality that is self-affirming.”\textsuperscript{67}

Contrary to shades of Israeli religious orthodoxy or Palestinians being other in their homeland, Fernando Resende, in assessing the travelogue manuscript of a Muslim

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\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 447.
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religious leader passing through South America, identifies the invention of other identity for Muslims in nineteenth-century Brazil. Resende describes the contrast of clothing as an “oddity” among Brazilians of indigenous or European heritage. This was above and beyond the inherent contrast of religions. “Just like the costumes that could not be worn, the Qur’an was also not an object of consumption. Besides the Arabic writing, whose signs are not commonly shared, the religious connotation implicit in this object made it an exception, something beyond any desire or possibility of consumption.” 68 This dichotomy reflects, in many ways, the portrayals and perceptions of Scottish Highlanders and Jacobites in Britain less than a century earlier — English popular press depicted nonjuring Scots, always in tartan, as Roman Catholic agents of popery and slavery. Just as in Brazil, where African Muslims were presented as other, identity was “invented according to prevailing political interests and by the articulation of religion as a building block of difference.” 69 In both cases, clothing and costumes are a marker of this disparity. Even in modern times, this is not uncommon. Pina Sadar’s 2014 study of representations of veiled women in the British press unmask startling prejudices formed on no basis other than clothing. Sadar’s study discovers that “media depictions of veiled women commonly adhere to four dominant archetypes: as abnormal and alien others; as voiceless victims of patriarchal oppression; as symbols of terrorist regimes; and as folk-devils who are threatening British identity and

68 Fernando Resende, “Inventing Muslims as the Other in Nineteenth-century Brazil,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, Vol. 6 (2013): 185.
69 Ibid.
morbidity.” Further: “Muslim women are represented as ultimate British others and located in diametrical opposition to non-veiled, Christian, white Britons.”

Even in diverse India, where Islam is a significant minority, Abhik Roy finds evidence that Hindu nationalist rhetoric fuels scapegoating that contributes to construction of an other identity among Indian Muslims. Atop this other identity, Roy argues, Hindu nationalist identity is constructed. “In this communal antagonism, Hindu nationalist leaders often define their members as standing firm against the alien and satanic Muslim community: ‘We’ against ‘They.’” Roy acknowledges that while “some politicians use communication productively to bridge cultural differences and unify people in a community, there are others who, in Kenneth Burke’s words, ‘misuse symbols’ in order to create a schism between one group of people and another.” Roy traces through a linear model of Burke’s purification-redemption cycle and identifies religion as the mode of scapegoating the collective Muslim other in a bid to purify the nation by purging its evil. Here, particularly in calls to violence, we see strong parallels to the case of the Scottish Jacobites, who were parlayed in English portrayals as heathen insurrectionists rather than the legitimate, loyal patriots they imagined themselves to be.

Linda Lumsden offers a compelling look at the limits of such rhetoric. In her study of periodicals published by radical socialists in the years before World War I, Lumsden argues that striking images and extreme rhetoric does not necessarily result in intended

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71 Ibid., 68.
73 Ibid.
outcomes — there are “limits of visual rhetoric to cohere a social movement.” Lumsden points out that a possible shortcoming of the cartoonists’ rhetoric was the presumption of a monolithic audience of white men. Questions of authenticity and legitimacy raised by Lumsden are echoed in Christa Olson’s work on indigeneity and national identity in Ecuador, in which Olson finds competing senses of national identity from different sub-communities of Ecuadorans. “Attending to embodiable topoi within national identities reminds us that rhetorical appropriation happens not only when rhetors usurp arguments, styles, or themes, but also when they adopt statuses, statures, and personas. Often, claims to national authenticity depend on inhabiting particular bodies and territories at the expense of others. Such inhabiting may also require marginalizing other inhabitants.”

As Jacobite uprisings were put down, so, too, was Scottish identity, which was recast and reimagined by the hegemonic voice of a conquering force. Later, it was given new freedom to breathe, and from that space emerged a Scottish identity that was uniquely British while remaining wholly un-English.

The collection of literature discussed here examines and helps to explain the power of rhetoric to construct constitutive identities and also to appropriate identities that marginalize or exclude an other segment of a society or community. But if such rhetorical power exists, can it not also redeem those people as reintegrated members of a larger imagined community? If so, how, by what agency, and through what rhetorical means? My study’s contribution to this niche of knowledge is in this notion that an other identity can

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be reappropriated — perhaps through co-option, perhaps patronizingly — but nonetheless exalted and romanticized. My intent is to demonstrate that tartan was used as a symbol for dramatistic scapegoating by the English — first against France and the Catholic church via Scottish Jacobites, and later against George III via Bute and, later, Henry Dundas, who were synecdoche for Scots. This shift of application of tartan imagery in such rhetoric neutralized the enmity and danger of these icons, which enabled cathartic relief of the Scots as they redeemed their collective national identity as a constitutive member of the British Empire. I will explore rhetorical history to address this paradox: How can rhetoric shift in polarity to be used in multiple, consecutive cycles of redemption?

Jacobite Symbolism

The Scottish Jacobite tradition has enjoyed considerable scholarship over the past four decades, most prominently among historians, and particularly from a perspective looking toward Jacobites from the outside. Although these studies generously stipulate to the existence of a Jacobite “rhetoric,” they generally do not investigate its form or function. Colley, for example, glances past rhetorical phenomena of the Jacobite tradition and discounts any prospect of residual Jacobite sentiment, romantic or otherwise. She masterfully traces the role of Scots in building a British Empire, and she provides ample evidence — empirical and qualitative — of the contributions they made. Similarly, Colley identifies profound implications of the skeptical trust that emerged from Scots’ southern drift and rapid rise in British society. Some Scots, “particularly the most successful, were able to reconcile their Scottish past with their English present by the expedient of regarding
themselves as British.” Colley’s research indicates that in the period of 1747–1753, only eight Scottish members of Parliament held state office in Scotland or England. By 1780, that figure rose to 23.

This success was a departure from the early eighteenth century, during which London politics largely excluded Scots. As Eveline Cruickshanks wrote, “the proscription of the Tory party at national and regional levels was unprecedented and drove the party into the arms of the Pretender, not out of choice, but because they had nowhere to go. This does not mean that every single Tory became a Jacobite, but that the party looked to a restoration of the Stuarts as the only means of escaping from an intolerable predicament.”

With the Whigs in absolute power after the Hanoverian succession, as Allan MacInnes finds, prudent Scots had no choice but to adapt to new political realities. In a more practical sense, Jacobites effectively marginalized and excluded themselves from the mainstream of Whig politics, and thus the determination of their own future, because their “repeated recourse to armed struggle meant that Scottish Jacobites could not be so readily placed within the political structure of party and patronage that operated in England.” MacInnes finds inconsistent and alternating priorities for Scottish Jacobites in the eighteenth century, and “these inconsistencies between British dynasticism and Scottish patriotism were part of the continuous process of redefinition of Jacobitism in Scotland.” Political posturing, and perceived injustice toward Scotland from London, plowed a new furrow for Scottish

76 Colley, Britons, 125.
79 Ibid., 238–239.
80 Ibid., 242.
Jacobites. Their greatest grievance had evolved from legitimacy to liberty. After the Jacobites' final defeat, it was liberty, or rather its repression, that held open the rift between Scotland and England in the waning days of Jacobitism. As Jones observes, “it was force brutally exercised which eradicated loyalty to the Stuarts from the Highlands.”

Meanwhile, as Monod asserts, “the romantic tradition was born before the bodies at Culloden were cold.”

Jacobitism as we know it today was incubated from the souls of the Scottish clans that had given so much to their cause. After their crushing defeat at Culloden and brutal punishment in the years that followed, Jacobites' alternative to political Jacobitism was sentimental Jacobitism, which Colin Kidd argues “was not a phantom continuation of the early eighteenth-century dynastic ideology” — rather, this “neo-Jacobitism was but a mannequin of the original, without the marrow.”

Howard Erskine-Hill finds similar post-Culloden vitality in Jacobitism, namely through the literary works that ensued toward the redefinition of Scottishness. As Jacobitism ceased to be sincere politics, it attracted men such as Burns, who was “receptive to (in his words) ‘the cause of heroic loyalty’ and to the pathos of defeat.” Similarly, Kidd finds, Scott “was discriminating in his championship of Jacobitism. He respected passive Jacobitism.” Scott, like Burns, dabbled in fashionable Whig politics, and his Waverley novels “exemplify both a reconciliation of Whig and

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82 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1.
Jacobite politics, and a recognition of the post-Jacobite utility of the Jacobite myth as a legitimist tool.”

Scott deserves the lion’s share of credit for manufacturing a reconstructed, reinvented, Scottish identity and making Jacobitism palatable in the nineteenth century and beyond — as J.C.D. Clark writes, it was Scott who “redefined Jacobitism to be a thing of the heart, not of the head.” The seeds for this transformation were sown 25 years before the birth of Scott, on whom Hugh Trevor-Roper rests the genius born from the resilience of the Scots themselves. “Before 1745 the Highlanders had been despised as idle predatory barbarians. In 1745 they had been feared as dangerous rebels. But after 1746, when their distinct society crumbled so easily, they combined the romance of a primitive people with the charm of an endangered species.” In the decades that followed, the transformation of Highland identity and tradition occurred through three phases, as identified by Trevor-Roper. First, the Scots exacted a cultural chiasmus against Ireland in which Irish Gaelic and tradition were subordinated to the “mother-nation” of Scotland. Secondly, artificial Highland traditions — “presented as ancient, original and distinctive” — were fabricated and foisted upon the Highlands by enterprising English entrepreneurs. Lastly, those traditions were mediated into the Lowlands and eastern Scotland.

Other prominent researchers point to a need to expand Jacobite studies across diverse disciplines to elucidate greater understanding of Jacobites — and their foes — past

86 Ibid., 73–74.
89 Ibid., 16.
and present. For decades, scholars of Jacobite studies have been fascinated with Jacobites’ use of symbolism and coded communication, however thinly veiled it may (or may not) have been. Perhaps the most prominent of these is Murray Pittock, who confronts the widespread use of “treacherous objects” in Jacobite material culture. Pittock points directly to a need for rhetorical criticism of Jacobite materials, namely because “much of what has been written has been descriptive rather than analytic, antiquarian rather than historiographic.”

Pittock argues that communication was fundamental to the resilience of the Jacobites, “whose ingenuity allowed a degree of openness essential to communication but opaque to law.” By Pittock’s appraisal, since 1970 the “history, literature and culture of Jacobitism, its role in national identities and internationally, have all been examined in much more detail than hitherto.”

Given the episodic fraternal kinship of self-identified Jacobites — and their broad diaspora across geography and time — Pittock points to an increasing need to study the Jacobite tradition from a perspective of culture and identity. “To chart this kind of world we need a further new departure in Jacobite studies, one rooted not merely in a dynastic or national struggle but in the study of an inter- and transcultural phenomenon with elements of a language of symbol beyond text which simultaneously reflects, creates and memorializes text.”

Pittock also delves into the tartan tradition and finds that tartan in the Jacobite era was more closely linked to outward evidence of political sympathies than simple ethnic

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91 Ibid., 45.
93 Ibid.
dress. More importantly, tartan developed as the de facto uniform of the Jacobite army, even among formations located outside Scotland. “It was because tartan was a military and seditious symbol which transcended its origins that it was so dangerous: it was the cloth of the Jacobite patriot, worn with purposive display which was banned, not the banal and quotidian garb of the poor Highlander.”94 But tartan came to represent multiple layers of identification among its wearers — it symbolized loyalty to one idea and simultaneous opposition to another. Pittock proffers that civil conflict in Britain in the 17th century could be the headwater for tartan-as-loyalty: “It may have been at this juncture that tartan began to become more broadly available for adoption as the property of the Stuart party: it was on its way to becoming the rebel and not just the patriot cloth, the mark of the Jacobite who supported the ancient royal line and (after 1707) opposed the Union.”95 And while tartan was an artifact of mutual political partisanship among its bearers, it also was a signifier of enmity in printed portrayals and caricatures by the English from at least the 1730s.96 Pittock leaves this symbolism open-ended, however, without considering the rhetorical transformation that would occur three decades later. Nonetheless, he raises a crucial distinction that separates tartan from myriad other cryptic or coded manifestations of Jacobite loyalty, most of which were unnoticed or unobserved. “If tartan was an exception to this, and fell foul of the law, it was because of its links with explicit military action, which showed that even objects and fabrics could be deemed treacherous if they formed part of

94 Ibid., 90.
95 Ibid., 85.
96 Ibid., 90.
a public act.... Yet in the end, tartan composed the terms of its own memorialization, and became the national dress which its Jacobite users had held it to be.”97

Cheape argues that the prevalence of tartan and other elements of Highland garb represented passive resistance to the “prevailing status quo of government and Hanoverian kingship.”98 Eventually, he writes, the “vengeful government” took notice. “Tartan and Highland dress, bracketed with weapons, had come to be regarded as an outward and visible manifestation of Jacobitism and continuing loyalty to the Stuart dynasty in exile and, so, political treachery and lawlessness.”99 The Act of Proscription that followed the Battle of Culloden led directly to the reshaping and reinvention of Scottish custom and culture. “Highland culture, once a marker of savagery and Jacobitism, was reinvented and made fashionable and gradually came to represent Scotland as whole,” Colin Calloway argues.100 And as Trevor-Roper holds, the kilts worn during the rebellion of 1745 were a recent invention of the English, and clan tartans did not yet exist.101 The proscriptive legislation followed, and “by 1780 the Highland dress seemed extinct, and no rational man would have speculated on its revival.”102 Trevor-Roper also notes the timing and consequence of forbidding Highland dress: “It is ironical that if the Highland dress had been banned after ‘the Fifteen’ instead of after ‘the Forty Five’, the kilt, which is now regarded as one of the ancient traditions of Scotland, would probably never have come into existence.”103 It

97 Ibid., 92.
99 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 24.
103 Ibid., 21.
did, and as Calloway argues, “Highland romance became a core piece of Scottish identity. 'Highlandism' allowed Scots to celebrate their distinctive culture without jeopardizing their political and economic union with England.”

This renewal, coupled with the repeal of the Dress Act in 1782, set the stage for the literary and rhetorical genius of Scott in the early nineteenth century. “So we come to the last stage in the creation of the Highland myth: the reconstruction and extension, in ghostly and sartorial form, of that clan system whose reality had been destroyed after 1745.” Scott, as president of the Celtic Society of Edinburgh, arranged a royal visit by George IV, who became the first English monarch to set foot in Scotland in almost two centuries. Scott’s orchestration of the spectacle, and his ability to prevail upon the Highland clans with charm and appeals to patriotism, made the event a resounding success while elevating Highland dress to fashion and making kilts Scotland’s national dress. “Men who had never dreamed of wearing tartan or kilt now donned both for Scott’s orchestrated display of Scottish heritage and loyalty to the Hanoverian regime.” Scott’s plan worked brilliantly. “Once outlawed as a symbol of treason, Highland dress became a symbol of Scottish military prowess and Scottish identity.” Indeed, pan-Scottish identity was at the center of tartan’s newfound fashion. “Before the royal visit,” as Eric Zuelow argues, “few Lowlanders would have contemplated wearing tartan clothing, a potent symbol of the stark division between

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107 Ibid., 244.
Highland and Lowland culture. Scott’s festival, which invited Lowlanders to dress as Highlanders and Highlanders to dress as Scott believed Highlanders should, changed this.”

Scott’s influence was both forward thinking and retrospective. “From August 1822 forward, Highland clothing — both tartan designs and the kilt itself — were intimately associated with memory of Highland heroics and Scottish national pride, even if the knee-length, skirt-like kilt and clan-specific tartans were a recent invention.” Much of Scott’s contribution to reshaping Scottish identity was based on shifting views of history in which the Stuarts became “the heroes of a tragic drama,” as Monod called them. Indeed, the whole concept of a distinct Highland culture and tradition is a retrospective invention.” As Richard Finlay stresses, however, “Jacobitism was not the same as Highlandism, and although the Jacobites were the subject of much sentimentalization, they did not sit easily in the myth-canon of nineteenth century Scotland. While the Highlanders were rehabilitated, the same cannot be said for the Jacobites.” In some ways, though, the characters of the emerging Jacobite myth were inextricably linked to the new Highland narrative. “Whether from Robert Burns or Sir Walter Scott, Victorian Scots could find in Jacobitism various sorts of consolation and inspiration; but their distance from the historic eighteenth century steadily grew.”

109 Ibid.
110 Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1.
113 Clark, “The Many Restorations of King James,” 22.
Textual Methods and Artifacts

My intent is to produce a rhetorical history of tartan and tartanry by conducting rhetorical analysis of artifacts that contributed to the development of a tartan identity of Scotland in Britain from 1745. This identity was developed from within and externally, and so I look to David Zarefsky’s tines of rhetorical history in which he explicates not only how and why rhetorical history should be pursued, but also the burden on the rhetorical critic to assess artifacts that are not only historical, but also rhetorically meaningful. An antiquarian artifact is not relevant simply because it is antiquarian — it also must have been read, circulated, discussed, acted upon and responded to. With that in mind, Zarefsky finds the most promise in his fourth sense of rhetorical history, which comprises rhetorical studies of historical events.114 In many ways he echoes the sentiments of his intellectual forebears about what rhetorical history is and is not, but Zarefsky’s distillation of the subfield’s merits makes the most succinct case for why rhetorical history remains en vogue and of critical importance. “In this sense of rhetorical history, the historian views history as a series of rhetorical problems, situations that call for public persuasion to advance a cause or overcome an impasse. The focus of the study would be on how, and how well, people invented and deployed messages in response to the situation.” More to the point, Zarefsky argues, “by studying important historical events from a rhetorical perspective, one can see significant aspects about those events that other perspectives miss.”115

115 Ibid., 30.
“But why should rhetoricians do history, especially when there is also a history department?” Zarefsky answers his own question in the prelude to his four senses: “Historical scholarship is an interaction between the scholar and the historical record. Necessarily, then, it is interpretive.” Stephen Lucas contends that “rhetorical critics and historians alike gain their greatest insights through the exercise of creative imagination.” As a result, “rhetorical critics and historians employ essentially similar methods inasmuch as the central task of each is making inferences about probabilities on the basis of limited data.” That constraint itself can be the product of a rhetorical act, if only in the scholar’s silent monologue — the historian may choose not to access all available information, or the material accessed and analyzed may act rhetorically on the historian, influencing his or her own interpretation, perhaps at the expense of other material just as readily available or accessible. As Zarefsky warns, “regarding the selection of some historical materials and not others, it is well to remember Burke’s dictum that a reflection of reality is also a selection and a deflection.” Zarefsky identifies a need for rhetorical historians to move beyond rote methodology and to apply critical lenses to the selection and analysis of material. “Proclaiming an object good or bad on the basis of impulse rather than reason is bad criticism, just as unconscious selection of details is bad history. Good criticism, like good history, is reflective; it offers reasons to sustain judgments.” In that spirit, Lucas intimates that “what differs from study to study are not so much the methods employed, but the

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116 Ibid., 31.
117 Ibid., 20.
119 Ibid., 15.
120 Zarefsky, “Four Senses of Rhetorical History,” 20–21.
121 Ibid., 21.
research questions asked and the skill with which they are answered.”  

This brings me to my final engagement of rhetorical history as a critical method.

The Scottish Jacobite tradition captured and contested one of the richest segments of British history since the Interregnum. Jacobitism was, and in some ways remains, an archetype for loyalty, identification and transcendent devotion. How can the practice of rhetorical history help reconstruct the context surrounding an enigmatic and elusive continuum of narrative, myth and public memory that defies history books and belies labels that relegate a massive social movement to the archives of crime and criminals?

This question is particularly pertinent given that, as Bruce Lenman surmises, “one of the problems facing anyone who tries to recreate the mental values of active Jacobites is that, by and large, those who wrote most did not act, and those who acted wrote little, if anything.”  

Further to that point, Finlay points to the absence of Jacobites from “obvious historical sources” as evidence that “Jacobites did not occupy a central place in Scottish popular historical consciousness.”  

He adds: “One of the failings of the Scottish historical profession has been the failure to engage with historical myths, other than to rubbish them.”  

Monod grapples with a similar concern, which is the onesidedness of materials available for research. “Jacobites may be identified by what they said and did, and by what others said about them. Unfortunately, most of the surviving evidence falls into the latter category — it consists of accusations, allegations and scraps of information from which

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124 Finlay, “Heroes, Myths and Anniversaries,” 120.
125 Ibid., 123.
inferences may be drawn.”126 These ideas converge at the intersection of rhetorical history and metahistory. In Kathleen Turner’s words, “rhetorical history as social construction may be viewed first as the study of rhetorical processes in historical contexts, a study making a distinct contribution to both rhetorical and historical knowledge. ... Through rhetorical history, we can understand how rhetoric has enabled, enacted, empowered, and constrained the central concerns of history: human action and reaction.”127 My approach to answering my research question is to look for key moments and representative anecdotes — à la Zarefsky — in which Scottish Highlanders and Jacobites are constituted in specific ways with regard to tartan. By that, I mean Highlanders and Jacobites — and, later, all Scots — are called into being and positioned as a people by virtue of the tartan they wear. The tartan is symbolic but also representative — it is, simultaneously and separately, synecdoche, a token of consubstantiality and an instance of constitutive rhetoric. As Hew Strachan wrote: “Today’s tourist symbol — the kilted, feather-bonneted piper, instantly recognizable throughout the world as short-hand for Scotland — is still a military symbol, a Victorian reinvention of a Highland way of life preserved largely thanks to its incorporation in the British army.”128

**Theoretical Framework**

My approach to the rhetorical puzzle of Scotland’s tartan tradition will attempt to construct a framework for self-affirming substantiating rhetoric, on which an idea of

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sartorial substantiation is built. These ideas rely on a bedrock of theories by Burke, Maurice Charland and Benedict Anderson, and I have attempted to leverage their thought, along with ideas of other rhetorical scholars, to develop a structure that not only helps explain the transformation of tartan identity — and Scotland's identity — but also helps us to understand the dialectic that fueled that evolution. By considering the discourse from multiple perspectives and considering the ways that different identities and communities were constituted and interconnected, we can see that, through the rhetoric that excluded Highland Scots as an other, that same population was substantiated and affirmed. They existed because of the negative space carved out around them. We will see that in the case of the Highlanders, over time, an other can adopt or adapt to rhetoric of exclusion to reconstitute and reimagine itself, particularly in relation to the hegemonic force that applied an identity from outside — in this case, rhetoric of exclusion becomes substantiating rhetoric that creates because it detracts. Rhetoric that shunned Scots also was the ontological basis for their new identity in the hierarchy of Great Britain in which they were governed. In the case of Scottish Highlanders, and later Lowlanders also, that resulted in sartorial substantiation through which their identity was affirmed by the clothes they wore, and their existence was accepted and recognized in a larger community, both in that moment of time and in the visual rhetoric that preserves their redemption for posterity.

Burke's contributions to rhetorical theory and literary criticism in the twentieth century are perhaps most evident through his dramatistic pentad of the rhetorical scene, which provides a framework for rhetorical critics to evaluate ratios of the pentad's elements in analyzing rhetorical artifacts. But the pentad is only one part of Burke's theoretical basis for rhetorical criticism. As Brummett writes, “Burkean theorists and systematizers have
demonstrated the usefulness of ‘act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose’ to guide critical inquiry. The pentad, however, names only the structure of rhetorical experience. Less familiar are Burke's theories of the functions or processes of rhetoric which the pentadic structure enacts.”129 Beyond the pentad, one such function or process is Burke's victimage ritual, which encapsulates understanding of the cyclical predispositions of humankind to reconcile their existence in a hierarchy of hierarchies, within an order of social orders, in which there is everlasting tension, anxiety and uncertainty. Brummett's distillation of the meaning of “hierarchy” is simple enough: “A hierarchy is a social order that binds people together in a system of rights and obligations.”130 This instinct is innate because, in Burke's words, “man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order), and rotten with perfection.”131 He adds: “The principle of perfection is central to the nature of language as motive. The mere desire to name something by its ‘proper’ name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically ‘perfectionist.’”132 A brief primer on some of Burke's key vocabulary will help our understanding as we move forward. These terms are presented in order of their consequence to our question because they are cumulative and interdependent.

132 Ibid.
• **Social order** is the natural derivative of humans’ existence as symbol-using creatures. Mankind seeks association with others to make sense of the world and give meaning to its mysteries.

• **Identification** is the rhetorical nexus in which rhetors and their audience connect through common purpose, experience or exigency. Even if or when an audience is not connected with a rhetor in this way, a rhetor may persuade the audience to believe they are connected. In this case, the audience is *identified* with the rhetor. “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so.”  

• **Consubstantiality** is the condition in which rhetors and their audience, while being identified with each other — or being persuaded to believe they are — remain unique and distinct, each with their own motives. “In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another.”

• **Hierarchy** results from the identification, persuasion and consubstantiality that occurs within social orders. Social order gives mankind comfort, but hierarchy disrupts that comfort by inducing guilt.

• **Guilt** is the feeling of anxiety or unease that results from the inevitable transgression against the hierarchy, whether from above or below.

• **Victimage**, or scapegoating, is the rhetorical process by which guilt is transferred or offloaded to another, a scapegoat, as a sacrificial vessel to pay for transgressions against the hierarchy.

• **Mortification** is the self-punishment or self-deprecation for guilt; it is less preferable than scapegoating.

• **Redemption** is the rebirth that occurs after guilt is expiated and a new hierarchy or social order is in place.

How does a victimage ritual work? And why does it recur naturally and cyclically?

Indirectly, and perhaps circuitously, Burke answers all of these questions, and his academic progeny help us make sense of those answers. Victimage is a necessary and natural

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134 Ibid., 21.
product of guilt, which is concomitant with hierarchy and systems of social order, which humans naturally seek. “People try to live together harmoniously because social order allays the terrors of social mystery. A mystery, in Burkean theory, is anything strange, foreign, unknown, or separated from ourselves. People are often mysteries to each other because of racial, sexual, national, or economic differences.” This disparity is part of the natural order, and within it rests the complex drama of symbol-using humans. In a system of social order, “participants assume roles, rights, and responsibilities towards other participants. A hierarchy overcomes the natural mystery to which people are heirs by providing grounds for union, for consubstantiality.” As symbol-using creatures, mankind seeks order as a source of comfort and understanding in the world, but with this search for understanding comes unease, or Burke’s sense of guilt, and both are certain. “Hierarchy is simply an inevitable condition — hence, mystery and guilt. The king and peasant are mysterious to one another. King is guilty for being up, and peasant for being down. Every symbol system carries with it the principle of perfection, and we have the compulsion to carry our actions to the perfect ends implied by the system.”

In Burke’s view, social estrangement results from this naturally occurring hierarchy and order, which precipitates mystery and yields social dialectic. “As Burke points out, there are no negatives in nature; they are created symbolically. It is the development of the negative, out of our symbolicity, that allows us to distinguish between what is and what is not, leading us to a sense of

136 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 150–151.
order and hierarchy, and ultimately separating us from our natural condition.”\(^{139}\) In Burke’s words: “If Order, then guilt; if guilt, then the need for redemption; but any such ‘payment’ is vicimage.”\(^{140}\) The word “guilt” is used by Burke “for lack of a better term in the language to communicate the concept they want to communicate.” In this case, “guilt” is intended “to mean more than the usual sense of guilt as a feeling of responsibility or shame for having done wrong. Guilt is that ontological sense of anxiety that comes with being human.”\(^{141}\) W. Ross Winterowd explains that “hierarchy just is, and it creates mystery.”\(^{142}\)

The master motive of rhetoric is “identification,” which is anti-hierarchical. Thus, two conflicting forces — centrifugal and centripetal — create the social structure. If one of the forces becomes predominant, the social structure must fly apart. If we have nothing but awe for those above us, we are intimidated and alienated; if those above us do not try to identify with us, they become autocrats or tyrants.\(^{143}\)

In deference to Burke’s definition of man, we accept that he uses symbols and misuses symbols, and as a consequence, hierarchical order always will result in discord. “Language gives us a cultural matrix within which hierarchies are embedded, and hierarchy results in guilt.”\(^{144}\) Brummett interprets Burke’s theory such that it provides for humans’ universal desire for hierarchy and order, and yet also a certainty that the hierarchy will be violated “through hate, violence, lawlessness, rejection, alienation, or failure to meet responsibilities. This offense against the social order creates in the transgressor the feeling or motive of


\(^{142}\) Winterowd, “Kenneth Burke: An Annotated Glossary,” 151.

\(^{143}\) Ibid.

\(^{144}\) Bobbitt, The Rhetoric of Redemption, 90.
This guilt must be removed for redemption, and this can be achieved through mortification, by which we punish the guilt as it exists within ourselves, or by victimage or scapegoating, in which we assign our guilt to another. Alternatively, rhetors can pursue transcendence through which they pretend guilt does not exist. The syllogism, then, is thus, as written by Burke.\footnote{Brummett, “Symbolic Form, Burkean Scapegoating, and Rhetorical Exigency,” 66.}

Here are the steps In the Iron Law of History That welds Order and Sacrifice:

Order leads to Guilt (for who can keep commandments!)
Guilt needs Redemption (for who would not be cleansed!)
Redemption needs Redeemer (which is to say, a Victim!)

Order Through Guilt To Victimage

(hence: Cult of the Kill)....

Burke’s summary presumes that victimage is preferable to self-mortification. Indeed, as Brummett presents the case, “if the guilt as it exists within ourselves is not punished, then it must be objectified: a representative of the guilt must be found in the external world and punished. This representative is the scapegoat. Scapegoating is a particularly poignant symbolic form because the goat is attacked for its ability to represent the sins of the attackers more than for its own transgressions.”\footnote{Brummett, “Symbolic Form, Burkean Scapegoating, and Rhetorical Exigency,” 66.} A victimage ritual, therefore, alleviates

\footnote{Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 4–5.}
a rhetor’s guilt born of a place in a hierarchy or social order in which some transgression has occurred — a scapegoat bears that burden. “Scapegoating can redeem the guilt from historical and cultural identifications as well as from personal sins. The goat is punished because it represents an historical heritage which gives rise to guilt.”¹⁴⁸ This consideration of history and time gives way to redemption and renewal. “If a guilty past is changed in sacrifice, then a rebirth can be experienced.”¹⁴⁹

Robert Ivie’s imaginative reading and synthesis of Burke’s work resulted in a practical application of victimage toward understanding war and the relationship between belligerents. Ivie drew from Burke’s assertion that “‘guilt’ intrinsic to hierarchal order (the only kind of ‘organizational’ order we have ever known) calls correspondingly for ‘redemption’ through victimage. We are not saying that such should be the case. We are simply saying that...such is the case, in the great religious and theological doctrine that forms the incunabula of our culture.”¹⁵⁰ Ivie applies this concept to the supposition of a peace-loving nation at war — if a nation desires peace but finds itself at war, then the cause — the blame — of this war must rest on someone else. By virtue of being a peaceful nation forced into war, the nation therefore is a victim. Jeremy Engels builds on Ivie’s conception of Burke’s victimage ritual and notes the imperfection of the process. “Both Burke and Ivie draw attention to the ‘curative’ or ‘medicinal’ aspect of victimage. For both, by naming an enemy who is a framed as aggressor and victimizer, it is possible to transform ‘us’ into the victim. Then comes the sacrificial logic, for by sacrificing the scapegoat ‘we’ are

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 67.
¹⁴⁹ Ibid.
¹⁵⁰ Burke, Permanence and Change, 284–285.
able to relieve the feelings of guilt and anxiety associated with symbolic life.”¹⁵¹ But while Ivie and Engels presuppose a singular voice of a political leader leading a victimage ritual on behalf of his or her people, thereby scapegoating something or someone on behalf of “us,” I would argue that the same can be done by constitutive rhetoric. Brummett’s extension of Burke’s theories holds open that possibility.

Rhetorical messages are the way in which one publicly reaffirms participation in hierarchy, the way in which others bring guilt forcibly to one’s notice, the way in which one enacts a means of redemption or avoidance. When guilt is collective within a group or nation, the leaders of the group may, through public rhetorical pronouncements, transcend, bemoan and redeem guilt for the group. Thus, public rhetoric may sometimes be explained by the ways in which it expresses a sense of guilt and enacts a means of resolving or transcending guilt for the public.¹⁵²

Bobbitt makes a similar point. “Burke’s theory of guilt, however, does not distinguish between collective guilt and individual guilt. A discursive form such as the guilt-purification-redemption drama that relies on a sense of collective responsibility for societal wrongs may not be fully effective in an individualistic society.”¹⁵³ What if, in lieu of a single leader, speaking to and on behalf of the audience, the group is rhetorically constituted and vocalized by its own collective rhetoric, or rhetoric that represents the body politic? John Locke’s writings prescribe such a structure to preserve the inalienable freedom of individuals and their own bodies — the body politic is part of a civil society of liberty “that is both individual and collective, one that negates, preserves and ultimately surpasses its

original natural form.”

In his introduction to analysis of American political prints of the era, Olson presents the body politic as a theoretical foundation for the frenetic discourse that represented prevailing opinions and sentiment of the period. “To Locke, the body politic — its moment of inception — could be created only by the joining of wills within a community to protect mutual interests and to achieve mutual aspirations.”

Political prints in the American colonies and in Britain carried many of the same themes, and, in fact, they often were sold across the Atlantic. “During the eighteenth century, political prints had a dual function as a commercial product and as a powerful means to transmit ideas to the public. But political prints were most intimately connected to the pervasive public opinions of the moment, because the printmakers’ ability to capture and express popular sentiments quickly was the key to their commercial success.” The process of political prints capturing, reflecting and reinforcing popular sentiments brings us to Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric, which relies on “the process of recognizing oneself as the subject in a text.”

Recognizing oneself in a text — or an image, in this case — also enables one to recognize those who are not us — the antithesis depicted through “congregation by segregation,” as Burke called it. “The power of the text is the power of an embodied ideology. The form of an ideological rhetoric is effective because it is within the bodies of those it constitutes

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156 Ibid., 9–10.
as subjects. These subjects owe their existence to the discourse that articulates them.”

What if the text — or an image, perhaps — is intended for you to recognize the other as the subject? What if an identity is imposed on a demographic of people whose, to borrow from Burke, “interests are joined”?

Political images in Britain from 1745 through the end of the eighteenth century extolled “union by some opposition shared in common.” By signifying the place of “loyal” Englishmen opposite Scots, the reader was expected to recognize himself, and therefore his role, in the way Charland describes. How does that occur? Anderson’s theory of imagined communities opens a door to an answer to this question. Anderson’s definition raises the prospect of communities as fiction — imagined not necessarily within a realm of possibility, but perhaps extending to the outer boundaries of imagination itself. “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”

It is reasonable to assume, then, that a community can be imagined from outside as much from within. And if from the outside a community can be imagined, its imagined identity can be imposed upon it. I will argue that this is what happened in the evolution of tartan as symbolic of Scotland as a whole.

M. Lane Bruner’s scholarship contributes to understanding the why beyond the how of these phenomena — “collective identities are negotiated through the clash of multiple and conflicting discourses” because the key consideration is agency, which manifests as an incessant and dichotomous negotiation over time. “Rather than assuming that national

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159 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 143.
identity is a purely ‘natural’ process from the bottom up, or a purely manipulative process from the top down, national character is most appropriately conceptualized as a constant tension between motivated interpretations of the past and motivated versions of the present and future.”\textsuperscript{164} As a result, collective identities are “historically developed and politically consequential symbolic constructions citizens are enmeshed in.”\textsuperscript{165} Bruner’s theory confronts this problem from a perspective of intra-nation or intra-community identity. His ideas on power, however, have residual value toward examining a hegemonically imposed identity developed by outside rhetorical actors. “To determine the politicised forms of public memory embedded in hegemonic articulations of national identity, the rhetorical critic analyses speeches, texts, discourses and so on, that are dramatically rejected by publics based upon the premise that these rejected articulations transgressed codes of the unsayable governing unifying national fictions.”\textsuperscript{166} An imagined community — or an imagined sub-community — can find a voice of constitutive rhetoric that engages in the victimage ritual in the same way a national leader might. This organic, collective voice is reflected in the dominant discursive themes of the day and is a product of a rhetorical critical mass — anti-Scots rhetoric, in this case — that evolves toward a purge of guilt via a scapegoat in the form of another imagined community. These discursive themes need not necessarily be transmitted by spoken or written word. Robert Hariman and John Lucaites, for example, thoughtfully trace the ways in which visual rhetoric can become artifacts of performing civic identity. Their ideas advocate for the considerable value and rhetorical

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 90–91.
power held within images that circulate and communicate in a way that affirms a sense of recognizing oneself, as Charland describes. “Because the public is a body of strangers constituted solely by the acts of being addressed and paying attention, it can only acquire self-awareness and historical agency if individual auditors ‘see themselves’ in the collective representations that are the materials of public culture.”\textsuperscript{167} Hariman and Lucaites provide that a visual image “provides the audience with a sense of shared experience,” which is tantamount to Burke’s definition of identification. But while I interpret Burke’s theory to apply in one-to-many communication, the ideas of Hariman and Lucaites, in concert with the work of Charland and Anderson, provide for many-among-many identification via artifacts of visual rhetoric. Visual icons “reflect social knowledge and dominant ideologies; they shape understanding of specific events and periods; they influence political action by modeling relationships between civic actors; and they provide figural resources for subsequent communicative action.”\textsuperscript{168} This consensus reinforces Burke’s treatise on social order and hierarchy. “Because humans by nature respond to symbols and patterns, symbolic forms have the \textit{rhetorical} ability to induce cooperation by the public.”\textsuperscript{169} A given slab within a hierarchy may understand a common exigency or identify a mutually threatening aggressor — this may be done by visual iconography that transmits or retransmits existing social knowledge — and by nature as symbol-using animals, rhetorical actors engage discursive energy that produces a sense of mystery and guilt and induces a victimage ritual. “Hierarchic guilt would otherwise threaten to drive the nation toward some form of self-

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 366.
\textsuperscript{169} Barry Brummett, “Symbolic Form, Burkean Scapegoating, and Rhetorical Exigency,” 64.
mortification. Victimage rhetoric resolves this potential difficulty by offering redemption through the identification of a suitable and plausible scapegoat.\textsuperscript{170}

As with individual rhetors, an imagined community can act as a rhetor to partake in dramatistic rhetoric. In Burke's theory, rhetoric acts on people as people enact rhetoric — the terministic screen reflects and deflects. Given that, dramatistic guilt can serve to constitute an imagined community, which in turn can engage in mortification, scapegoating or transcendence to seek redemption from guilt. If a new hierarchy marks the beginning and end of this cycle, then, too, an imagined community's sense of contextual relationship would change or dissolve altogether in that moment. In this way, an imagined community is, taken together, a symbol-using organism that can become obsolete or irrelevant as a consequence of the symbols it uses. If constitutive rhetoric can define a community or group whose interests are joined, then, too, rhetoric can define an other based on common enmity. If $A$, like $B$, perceives a threat from $C$ and $D$, then $A$ and $B$ are identified with one another because they share mutual concerns. At the same time, $A$ and $B$ effectively have negatively identified $C$ with $D$, and therefore $A$ and $B$ have imposed an identity on $C$ and $D$. This identity is independent and exists regardless of whatever identity or identities $C$ and $D$ imagine for themselves. From a first-person view, one can embody a discourse, to borrow from Charland, to imagine a community and one's membership in it; this agency is a product of rhetoric that defines one's mutual ideology with others. Similarly, a collective of people, constituted by the circulating images in which they identify themselves, can imagine itself opposite another community — two communities

are imagined from within one rhetor’s worldview. The rhetoric that creates or amplifies “we” also defines “they,” which constitutes a second rhetorical agent in the same nexus of consubstantiality. If “we” can effectively mitigate the otherness of “they,” a community has the ability to define a bigger, broader “we.” In the case of Scottish Highlanders, and particularly Scottish Jacobites, Hanoverians (“we”) successfully used imagery of tartan and kilts to promote imagination of a homogeneous community of other (“they”) as threats to British freedom. This rhetoric was so effective that Britons later appropriated that identity of otherness on George III and his government. In doing so, rhetorical actors reimagined a larger British community of which Scots were a part, although still different. This rhetorical refrain over two decades effectively neutralized anti-Jacobite rhetoric for purposes of defining a Scottish enemy within. In this newly imagined community, Highland Scots were seen as full members, and this was demonstrated in George IV’s appearance in a kilt in Edinburgh in 1822. By donning a kilt and parading through Edinburgh, George IV made “they” part of “we” — and vice versa.

In its organic form, tartan was the default dress of men in Scotland’s Highlands. In the threat of Jacobite rebellion, tartan was portrayed as a mark of the enemy — a passé relic of brutal, dangerous men clinging to a bygone time. That threat dissipated, but the brilliantly effective rhetoric against tartan was renewed in London, where it typified resentment toward Scottish interlopers — first among them being Bute, the Scot who rose to prime minister of Great Britain less than two decades after the final Jacobite uprising was put down on the moor at Culloden. For at least two decades, satirical imagery of tartan was implemented as a principal form of criticism of the governments of George III — tartan came to represent not Scottish enemies of British freedom, but rather undue
influence on the king's majesty athwart the interests of the English people. While the lens was focused on England, Scotland was establishing a new form of itself thanks to the increasingly prominent role of its people in military and government service. This integration of Scotland as part of Great Britain via service to the Empire was a direct result of the British government romanticizing the unique cultural, sartorial and martial traits of the Scottish Highlands through visual material that glorified Scots' roles in securing victory in the Napoleonic Wars and expanding imperial borders. Highland dress — tartan — was the rhetorical constant in this process, and where the fabled plaid fabric once was the mark of rebellion against the established hierarchy, it eventually came to represent a way that Scots could be both Scottish and British. This phenomenon, which I call *sartorial substantiation*, empowered Scots with a tangible, tactile manifestation of their identity that mirrored the images that glorified their contributions to the Empire. Tartan affirmed Scots' loyal existence — first as martial agents of the Hanoverian crown, and then as the people of a unified nation of Scotland where tartan once was taboo south of the Highland line. From the late eighteenth century onward, Scots increasingly embraced an identity in which Scottishness was complementary with Britishness, and they had the rhetorical power of their dress to affirm their uniqueness in that equation. Tartan substantiated Scots' Britishness while also delineating their exclusion from Englishness.

*Application*

In the 1745 rebellion, Highland Scots, although they had taken up arms against the Hanoverian regime, were not themselves Britain's enemy. Rather, as fellow Britons — as dwellers of the island nation of Great Britain — Scots were a scapegoat for the aggressions of a foreign-born interloper who acted as an agent of France and the Catholic church.
English rhetors necessarily constituted Scots as part of the collective, imagined British “we” in order to lop them off as the scapegoat for rebellion perpetrated by fragments of Scotland. Highland Scots’ sartorial identity set them apart. Although England, alongside Wales, could easily imagine its community as unique and separate from Scotland, so, too, could the Scottish Lowlanders imagine themselves as a separate community from the Highlands—tartan was not endemic in the Lowlands. Nonetheless, all three communities were imagined together in a British community, which was symbolized by its common legislature and single crown. Anti-Jacobites were required to scapegoat the Highland Scots in order to avoid an impulse for mortification of themselves. “Did we invite this treachery?” they might have asked. “Did we cause this furor?” Without the Scots as a scapegoat, Britons would be compelled to consider and, ultimately, through mortification, punish their own actions, namely their earlier disloyal criticism of the Hanoverian court and its government for the quagmire of the War of the Austrian Succession. Not only did the Jacobite uprising in 1745 provide a distraction from that calamity, but it also enabled a pivot in which Britons could voice support for the king as their free nation thwarted another threat—Highland Scots marching toward London with the support of France. As David Proctor echoes Ivie, “war rhetors rhetorically create these people as an enemy by depicting them as coercive, irrational, and aggressive.” Tartan was the through line of that rhetorical effort.

Ivie traces how an identity of “savagery” can be applied to an enemy in order to justify a rhetor’s victimage ritual of purging guilt born of war. In condemning an enemy’s savagery, “the usual strategy is to construct the image indirectly through contrasting

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references to the adversary’s coercive, irrational, and aggressive attempts to subjugate a freedom-loving, rational, and pacific victim.”

Ivie’s notion of savagery, however, is predicated on the enemy’s externality — a deliberate aggressor provokes a peace-loving people, thereby making them a victim of their own prejudicial war. For Britain during and after the Jacobite uprising, however, the savage enemy came from within — Scottish Jacobites participated in an uprising in their own country against their own king. As such, anti-Jacobite rhetoric in 1745 and 1746 largely employed the Burkean comic frame by depicting tartan-wearing Jacobites in caricature. “Caricature is the rhetorical instrument for converting necessarily mistaken adversaries whose wrongs (even terrible wrongs) are a function of foolishness and stupidity into diabolical and thus menacing enemies who perpetrate vicious crimes against humanity.”

Bobbitt reminds us that, “for purposes of persuasion, purification is the most important part of the guilt-purification-redemption cycle. It is the fulcrum of the process of movement from guilt to redemption. Redemption is a temporary state at the end of the cycle before it repeats.” Redemption, or rebirth, results in a new hierarchy or social order, and as we have examined through Burke’s theories, any kind of hierarchy will result in guilt. To that end, guilt can be assuaged for limited time before it emerges again. In that time, nonetheless, Bobbitt, in quoting Burke, argues that symbolic rebirth can be derived from a “positive view of life” that can be drawn from “a feeling of moving forward, towards a goal.”

Certainly that was the case for Highland

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175 Ibid.
regiments in the service of the crown. We must not forget, however, that laws passed during and after the Jacobite uprising in 1745 left few options for livelihood among Highland Scots. As their culture was being suffocated — and their tartan dress was outlawed — their mortification was not absolutely voluntary. An essential consideration here is that "Burke's emphasis on suffering through mortification (self-inflicted suffering) ignores the fact that suffering need not be self-inflicted to be purificatory — as a matter of fact, suffering at the hands of others is often more purificatory than mortification."  

The evolution of anti-Jacobite rhetoric evolved as follows.

Using imagery of tartan, anti-Jacobite rhetors in 1745 and 1746 constructed and assigned an identity of enemyship to Jacobites and Highlanders. This rhetoric employed satirical caricature of Highland dress to externally constitute Highland Scots as a menacing threat to Britain and its values of Protestantism and individual liberty. *Scots were scapegoats for Jacobites and their key supporter, France, as a Catholic pretender sought to claim the throne of Great Britain.*

In the face of increasing influence of Scots, particularly Bute, rhetors in England adapted and reapplied this new tartan-based identity to Scots in England, and successively, the governments of George III. By using the identity of tartan established through the Jacobite uprising, rhetors caustically criticized the king and his governments’ policies through appeals to rampant Scotophobia. *Scots became scapegoats for King George III, his government ministers and their policies.*

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176 Ibid., 92.
After Britain lost the colonies in the American war for independence, the nation turned its attention to colonial interests in the East, in which Scots played an increasingly significant role in governance and administration. Highland Scots were deployed throughout the Empire, and through their loyal military service they engaged in mortification for the sins of their rebellion in 1745. Through their self-victimage, Highland Scots were redeemed and reborn as loyal Britons, and their tartan became a symbol for bravery, heroism and romance.

I will argue that substantiating rhetoric — as an impersonal voice, unattached to any individual, on behalf of an imagined community with a common purpose — can invoke Burke's guilt-redemption cycle. By “impersonal,” I mean a corpus of rhetoric that is not centrally controlled and is circulated according to popular demand in the time, place and community that it reflects. It generates and reinforces its own truth according to what its audiences believe and accept. I rely on this market determinism to indicate which rhetorical voices were most readily received, and the cumulative voice of that rhetoric constitutes the rhetorical guideposts on which audiences act and react. This market feedback loop guides the ongoing discourse of the issues at hand. By synthesizing this approach with Anderson's notion of imagined communities and with Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric, I will identify this substantiating rhetoric at its intersection with hierarchical tension that results in Burke's guilt-redemption cycle. Guilt is inherent in human nature, according to Burke, and in a hierarchy, guilt is felt on both sides of the equation — or, as Bobbitt explains, "Just as those ‘Up’ in the hierarchy are guilty of not being ‘Down,’ those ‘Down are guilty of
not being 'Up.” Both parties, or all parties, in a tension-inducing hierarchical structure involuntarily seek a remedy to assuage their guilt or anxiety.

In 1745 and 1746, Hanoverian loyalists in England used satirical prints and broadsides depicting tartan-clad Jacobite rebels as synecdochic scapegoats for the French, the pope and the Catholic church as the Jacobite rebellion threatened to upset the hierarchy of the Anglo-Scottish union. The rhetoric of this propaganda bound Englishmen, among whom there were relatively few devoted Jacobites, together with their hereto-unpopular Hanoverian king against a threat from an ancient rival, France. It was a masterful execution of dialectic in Burke’s principle of a scapegoat: “unification by a foe shared in common.” The Hanoverian loyalists were redeemed, and uncertainty was quashed, when the Jacobites were finally defeated in April 1746. Thus began a new hierarchical order in which England, through the agency of the Duke of Cumberland, expanded its hegemony over Scotland and began to dilute and disassemble Highland culture and customs. This included the Act of Proscription that outlawed Highland dress, including tartan kilts, and a pervasion of English schools in the Highlands that sought to tame and civilize the wayward Highlanders through the education of its next generation. “Indeed, in the Highlands, before the ban, everyone wore tartan whether rich or poor. Rather, the ban was intended to prevent Highlanders from readily identifying each other, and from the tartan and Highland dress serving as a symbol for rebellion.” Meanwhile, Lowland Scots invaded London with their literacy, learning and industrial enterprise — just as the English were defining a new

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hierarchical structure through dominance over the Highlands, Lowland Scots increasingly were absorbing positions in politics and the press, which precipitated turbulence in the ideological purity of Hanoverian society. After 1760, the rising political prominence of the Earl of Bute—a Scottish nobleman and George III’s closest advisor—was a flashpoint for the popular press in England. In satirical prints and periodicals Bute became the face of George III’s “corrupt” government, and English publishers and printers savagely satirized him as the king’s “favourite” and as the source of all England’s ills. These images stirred discourse “through the embodiment of symbolic resources that are available throughout the print media or by emphasizing what cannot be said well or at all in print.” Bute was synecdochic for Scots, many of whom found tremendous success in London. The commercial and political success of Scots in English society drew ire from Englishmen at the margins of society, and the xenophobic voice of their constitutive rhetoric scapegoated Scots as outsiders when, in fact, they were countrymen of the same United Kingdom. In Burke’s words, these rhetorical actors, “deprived of an outlet for their ambitions, and with no other conception of effort to replace these, turn in their disgruntlement to a hatred of Jews, foreigners, Negroes, ‘isms,’ etc., as a ritualistic outlet.” As C. Allen Carter writes in explicating Burke: “The society from which we choose our roles is not a neutral arena but a pyramid of status, and the narratives with which we frame our lives reveal to us our own eventual demise. The result is anxiety, widespread and deep, and a search for scapegoats. All the ethical, hierarchical, and mortal tensions must somehow be relieved.” Visual

180 Hariman and Lucaites, “Performing Civic Identity,” 366.
images can achieve that, as Cara Finnegan notes in examining the way elites can seek to “alleviate their anxiety” by seeking affirmations of an identity that articulate “the ‘natural’ dominance” of their community. Indeed, the Anglo rhetoric of Scotophobia persisted for three decades, long after Bute had fallen from power, and it ended only when Britons came to understand the value of Scots to the Empire. Only then could tartan come to represent British loyalty rather than Scottish treachery.

Highland Scots, for their part, engaged in five decades of Burkean mortification and atoned for their rebellion by taking up arms in service of the British Empire. As Britain’s military and imperial conquests expanded, so did Scots’ role in their success. “Probably the turning point in these strained relations came to an extent during the American War of Independence and then, finally and emphatically, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The vital contrast here was with Ireland, the more awkward neighbour. Between 1776 and 1783 the Scots were enthusiastically loyal to the British crown.” Just as language is symbolic action, action also can be silent rhetoric — Scots’ loyalty to imperial interests affirmed the ways in which they were portrayed, and their portrayals continued to constitute Scots through their own self-identification of their redeemed role in Britain. As Bobbitt explains, simplifying Burke, “mortification rids one of guilt because one has thus suffered for (paid for) one’s sins.” The prolonged mortification of Highland Scots was unspoken rhetoric typified by subservience and sartorial symbolism — native

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185 Bobbitt, The Rhetoric of Redemption, 47.
Highland tartan, outlawed in Scotland except in service to the crown, emerged as an icon of Highlanders’ martial prowess as they became imperial sentinels. Lowlanders, especially from nobility and landed gentry, took up colonial and imperial administrative posts throughout the Empire, and as eventually the sun would never set on the British Empire, nor would Scots ever be out of its reach. The symbolic action of Scottish people in the second half of the eighteenth century erased the guilt and tension that had plagued Anglo-Scottish relations since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and, in some ways, centuries before.

I acknowledge that my approach is, to a degree, a departure from Theoretical scholarship presented in this framework. When Ivie, for example, refers to “images of savagery,” he refers to conjured images in the mental vision of the rhetor’s imagination. Or Brummett’s interactions among the “many skeins” that weave the fabric of humanity’s social interaction, “symbols and patterns” are not necessarily meant to connote visual images. Bobbitt, who gracefully grapples with the sophisticated nuances of Burke’s theories, refers to “listeners” and “audiences” his speech analysis. But while speeches and oratorical utterances can be recorded and replayed or reread time and again, they are fleeting and episodic. The language — the rhetoric — goes as quickly as it comes, and the listener, the audience, is left with only the memory and interpretation of what was said. Visual rhetoric, on the other hand, is enduring. Its permanence, imprinted on paper or carved in stone, can be observed in a passing glance or with endless study. Visual rhetoric does not cease, does not stop, when redemption and rebirth occur. Whereas speech and oratory require active delivery of rhetoric — images, symbols and icons are passive but persistent. It is my intent

to relate the study of visual rhetoric with Burke’s theories of guilt and redemption, and
by doing so I hope to make some contribution, however small, to the body of knowledge
surrounding the way we communicate and persuade. As Burke exhorts: “If action is to be
our key term, then drama; for drama is the cumulative form of action.... But if drama, then
conflict. And if conflict, then victimage. Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing
problem, that comes to a culmination in tragedy, the song of the scapegoat.”
Perhaps in addition to the song, there is an image of the scapegoat, too, drawn in ink at the hand of
a deliberate, symbol-using rhetor seeking to assuage his guilt or the guilt of his imagined
community constituted in that rhetoric.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter II considers portrayals of Jacobites by their anti-Jacobites, particularly
in illustrations that scapegoat Scots by developing tartan as synecdoche for danger
and rebellion. This chapter looks closely at engravings and broadsides that developed,
exaggerated and imposed an identity of outside otherness upon Scots through satirical
rhetoric that used imagery of tartan to constitute Scots as other.

Chapter III assesses the consequences of how images of tartan were re-appropriated
in the popular English press from approximately 1760 to the mid 1780s to criticize migrant
Scots who sought a role in the increasingly integrated kingdom. These images scapegoat
Bute and Dundas as a way to criticize the political follies of George III and his governments.
Although Bute served only one year as prime minister, tartan imagery continued to

1989), 125.
represent corruption and undue influence in the royal court for another two decades, and satirical images of Dundas persisted through 1812.

Chapter IV examines a shift in agency through which essayists, novelists and contemporary artists describe and depict a new Scottish Highlands identity in harmony with nature and at peace with its newfound place in the British realms. The works of literary figures such as Burns and Scott, and imagery painted by Sir David Wilkie, among others, contributed to this adaptation. More importantly, however, the increasingly prominent role of tartan-wearing Scottish military units in the service of the British Empire contributed to a Scottish identity that was more closely integrated with Great Britain.

Chapter V concludes and summarizes my analysis of this evolution of identity as constructed by rhetorical actors over a century. I will argue that portrayals of Scottish Highlanders and Jacobites evolved from imagery of tartan representing rebels and renegades to being the essence of romantic myth. As Cheape describes it, tartan “is a national symbol for all Scotland and a cultural icon for Scotland and ‘Scottishness’ throughout the world.”\(^{188}\) My rhetorical analysis of the rhetoric of tartan will explain how and why that is possible while considering the ongoing guilt-redemption cycle in which Scotland finds itself today.

\(^{188}\) Cheape, Tartan, 7.
CHAPTER II
TARTAN IS WORN BY POPISH BARBARIANS

“Dogs that bark at a distance ne’er bite at hand.” — Scottish proverb

Ye Jacobites by name, give an ear, give an ear,
Ye Jacobites by name, give an ear,
Ye Jacobites by name,
Your fautes [faults] I will proclaim,
Your doctrines I maun [must] blame, you shall hear.
— Robert Burns, “Ye Jacobites by Name”

Early Jacobite risings, particularly the 1715 and 1719 rebellions, had unique traits despite similar outcomes, but the 1745 rebellion stands alone as the single greatest opportunity, albeit squandered, for the Stuarts to have reclaimed their throne. The 1745 Jacobite uprising lasted only eight months, but it was a rhetorically rich ordeal, and its aftermath redefined Scotland, particularly the Highlands, as well as the identities of its peoples. The Highland Scots loyal to the Stuarts were, by degrees of association, loyal to the interests of France and of Rome, and if they were capable of organizing a military campaign in support of a Stuart pretender, they could undermine the Hanoverian government to a point of weakness that could be exploited by the French. Just as William of Orange had ridden into London to public praise and acclamation as James II fled to France, it was not unthinkable that the same could occur with a handsome and charismatic Stuart prince as he marched an army from Scotland to London. Effective rhetorical strategies were necessary to counter this threat and consolidate popular support for the Hanoverian regime.

This chapter focuses on the imagery of broadsides, engravings and etchings circulated during and after the most storied of the Jacobite risings, the “Forty-five,” as it was known. These artifacts tell a story of how anti-Jacobite and pro-Hanoverian publishers and printers affixed new rhetorical meaning to tartan and Highland dress by linking it to the depravity of Catholicism and to England’s centuries of conflict with France. My analysis of the anti-Jacobite rhetoric of the 1745 rebellion identified fear appeals, compound metonymy and a binary of identities created by constitutive rhetoric that portrayed loyal Britons united against Scottish Highlanders, who were hegemonically constituted as dangerous, popish other. Tartan would become synecdoche for a Catholic plague that represented England’s greatest threat, and eventually Highland dress would be outlawed altogether after the final Jacobite rising was put down once and for all.

Supporting Literature

Just as Charland discovered among the Québécois a rhetoric that constituted “the kind of people that warrants a sovereign state,” anti-Jacobite rhetoric constituted loyal English society united against a common threat to their religion, liberty and economic prosperity. As Charland wrote, “rhetorical claims for a sovereign Quebec are predicated upon the existence of an ideological subject” — the people of Quebec, who were constituted as unique and separate from other Canadians — and “this identity defines inherent motives and interests that a rhetoric can appeal to.” By definition, constitutive rhetoric is both inclusive and exclusive, but it also is dynamic. Although Charland acknowledges this condition, he stops short of assessing the negative space formed when a community

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191 Ibid., 137.
imagines itself, and constitutes itself rhetorically, as a separate subset of a larger community or constituency—“not only is the character or identity of the ‘people’ open to rhetorical revision, but the very boundary of whom the term ‘people’ includes and excludes is rhetorically constructed: as the ‘people’ is variously characterized, the persons who make up the ‘people’ can change.”

But whereas the peuple Québécois rhetorically separated themselves from a larger constitutive body, anti-Jacobites did the opposite: They used rhetoric and identification to excise Jacobites and Scots, particularly Highlanders, as a cancerous appendage from the body public of Britain. As in Charland’s conception of a dynamic Québécois identity, anti-Jacobite rhetoric held open the door for mutual identification and inclusion among readers who shared the campaign’s anti-Catholic, anti-France, anti-absolutism viewpoints, and certainly some Lowland Scots identified with these tenets. Indeed, “just as enthusiastic Jacobites regarded 1707 as an effective recruiting sergeant, presbyterian [sic] Scots (which meant the vast majority in the Lowlands) saw the Union increasingly as the best defence against the potential horrors of a Catholic Stuart restoration. The more menacing Jacobitism became, the more were these fears reinforced.” Nonetheless, the cultural and geographic demarcations in much of the anti-Jacobite rhetoric in circulation at the time excluded Scotland wholesale without accounting for nascent or nonexistent Stuart support outside the Highland clans. Regardless of individual clans’ support, or lack of support, for the Stuart claimants, the Highlands were constituted as one bloc, and its inhabitants were

192 Ibid., 136.
imagined by anti-Jacobite rhetoric to universally wear tartan, play bagpipes and march in unison to the orders of the Stuart pretenders.

Sarah Stein elegantly entwines Burke's theories with the innovation of constitutive rhetoric developed by Charland, who holds that “identification occurs through a series of ideological effects arising from the narrative structure of constitutive rhetoric.”194 As Stein explains, “audiences are not considered to exist outside rhetoric as the subjects of its address, but rather to ‘live inside’ the rhetoric that constructs them.”195 We understand that “freedom is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written. Furthermore, because the narrative is a structure of understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative's consistency.”196

Building on Charland and Fernando Pedro Delgado via Helen Tate, we can see a rhetorical enterprise in which anti-Jacobite printers established a continuum of constitutive rhetorics that “position subjects toward political, social, and economic action”197 in support of a national military effort to suppress the Jacobite threat. Patriotic rhetoric and fear appeals were the fuel for this engine of narrative, which gathered and drove anti-Jacobites toward a sense of community, shared identity and mutual enmity toward Jacobites. “This collective identity transcends the individual body and will. It is in the telling of a narrative history that it becomes possible to conceive of past and present individuals as one collective engaged in the same quest.”198 As Tate writes, “Charland’s analysis suggests that in the struggle to name

194 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 147.
196 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 141.
198 Ibid.
and rename, define and redefine who we are and who others are, we are likely to find an identity constituting narrative, one implied by the act of naming and renaming.\(^{199}\)

Across the Atlantic Ocean not long after the 1745 Jacobite rebellion, the English colonies in North America would experience their own identity dilemma as they attempted to extricate themselves from Hanoverian rule. As Engels demonstrates with a heuristic extrapolated from Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense*, three steps are required to create enmity: name your enemy, demonstrate that your estrangement with that enemy is irreconcilable, and then escalate your dispute. “To motivate, rhetors deploy the discourses of fear, paranoia, and anxiety to focus their audience’s thoughts on how best to defend themselves and their families from the enemy, and how best to exact hurt on the enemy if the chance arises.”\(^{200}\) An apt example is Benjamin Franklin, who “threatened colonists with destruction in 1754 if they did not unite to meet their enemies: ‘JOIN, OR DIE,’” he wrote.\(^{201}\) The evolution of anti-Jacobite rhetoric employed these tactics: Britain’s enemy was identified as a Catholic prince pretender with France and the pope at his side, and then fear, paranoia and anxiety about Catholicism were heaped upon rhetoric that rejected the prospect of Britain’s return to the Catholic faith. This conflict was escalated through rhetoric that portrayed tartan-clad Jacobites as the enabling force behind the Catholic pretender’s royal ambitions. Tartan became metonymy for Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Catholic machinations of France, and anti-Jacobites based their narrative on fear of autocratic monarchy and Catholic primacy. As Floris Müller et al find that films can induce fear of *other* among those in an imagined

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\(^{199}\) Ibid.


\(^{201}\) Ibid., 217
community, “in such a fear appeal, cognitive and affective cues are both essential to form a persuasive media text.” As Michael Pfau argues, however, these emotional responses are predicated on a preexisting set of beliefs or predispositions. “Some emotional states necessarily entail a cognitive component — one must have particular beliefs, or perceive events in particular ways, in order to experience the emotion.” Further, Pfau reminds us of fear’s Aristotelian constraints: The object of fear must be presented as a nearby threat, and the rhetorical audience must perceive some imminent and personal threat from that object of fear. “In other words, in order to feel fear in the Aristotelian sense, one must believe that a destructive or painful event or object is likely to affect oneself, and that the object of fear is near at hand — both temporally and spatially. In this respect, appeals to the cognitively oriented emotion of fear are not to be contrasted simplistically with more rationally oriented appeals.” Anti-Jacobite rhetoric did this by providing geographic and spiritual context visually — the king of France, the pope and the usurper Stuarts were illustrated on British soil, restoring national Catholicism and suppressing British liberty. As Fred Casmir illustrates in his analysis of fear rhetoric, effective rhetors can marginalize people inside their community by pointing to those people’s liability in enabling or empowering an outside enemy, and sometimes that can be done by weakening the structures within.

“Thus a rhetoric of fear depends not only on arguments but on a whole chain of interrelated physical, emotional, and intellectual ‘means of persuasion.’”

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204 Ibid., 221–222.

Finally, we must consider the rhetorical capacity of images themselves, as well as the manner in which they were distributed and their contents digested. Olson explains that while newspapers and paper currency were the primary forms of print communication in the American colonies in the eighteenth century, broadsides were the medium of most impact in Britain. “In the form of broadsides — large, single sheets that could be quickly mass-produced and distributed in response to issues of the moment — political prints were sold across the counter in print shops, passed from hand to hand in the street and in public forums, displayed prominently in local coffeehouses and pubs, and, in certain instances, shipped abroad to America and France for sale there.”

This civic experience in consuming visual rhetoric in Georgian Britain is an important consideration. As Hariman and Lucaites intimate, “the most complicated relationship between the photographic image and public opinion occurs because images communicate social knowledge.” Images also rely upon and build upon social knowledge. The quick, easy production and distribution of political broadsides, coupled with their affordable cost and salience to the time, cannot be overlooked. As Hariman and Lucaites hold for iconic photographs, the political broadsides in British culture were artifacts of the everyman’s political outlook because they were “accessible, undemanding images suited to mass-mediated collective memory.”

**Historical Context**

By early 1745, almost two decades into the reign of George II, Britain was deeply entangled in the pan-European conflict now known as the War of the Austrian Succession.

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208 Ibid., 2.
Aligned with the Protestant Dutch and the Catholic Habsburgs, who ruled the Holy
Roman Empire and much of central Europe, Britain was again in conflict with its perennial
enemy, France. In May 1745, forces of Britain and its allies fought under the command of
Britain's Prince William, Duke of Cumberland and third son of George II, at the Battle of
Fontenoy, where they met a devastating defeat at the hands of France. Britain's involvement
in the war already was unpopular among the people, and the loss at Fontenoy fueled
the British press in its mocking criticism of the coalition Broad-Bottom government for
inept leadership. In particular, there was deeply held skepticism about the government's
inexplicable priority for diplomacy and military involvement in mainland Europe at the
expense of British interests — public perception was that the Broad-Bottom government
was pursuing Hanoverian interests, not necessarily British interests, as a consequence of
George II's personal union as King of Great Britain and Elector of Hanover. Britain, it was
thought, was engaged in war in Europe because of George II's concerns for Hanover, not
Britain. By late 1744, “popular and press attention had been refocused on the question
of Hanoverian control of British foreign policy.”

209 These criticisms were compounded
by George II's untimely journey to Hanover in the midst of the military crisis. Robert
Harris argues that anti-Hanoverian press attacks “fell on a receptive readership at least in
London, and did have an impact” as evidenced by anti-German toasts proposed by guests
at the anniversary dinner of the Westminster Society of Independent Electors, and by the
strenuous attempts of Tory pamphlets to defend the party's efforts to purge Hanoverian

influence from the Broad-Bottom ministry’s war leadership. Two months after the Battle of Fontenoy, however, Charles Edward Stuart would sail from France to Scotland to begin raising a Jacobite army, and the British press that had mercilessly dogged the Broad-Bottom government would, almost overnight, shift its rhetoric to a nationalist, patriotic tenor. “Viewed from almost all angles, therefore, the press and popular reactions to the war in the first half of 1745 provided very few grounds for optimism regarding the likelihood of a rapid rallying of support for the Hanoverian regime at the outset of the Jacobite Rebellion.”

Yet, despite the deteriorating position of Britain and her allies during the first seven months of 1745, and despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the Broad-Bottom ministry’s conduct of the war, most elements of the political nation were to demonstrate their loyalty to the Hanoverian regime at some stage during the Jacobite Rebellion. Furthermore, all those papers which had been prominent in the attacks on the Broad-Bottom ministry were to join with almost all the other elements of the London press in supporting the wave of defensive loyalism that overtook popular opinion towards the end of September.

Two basic features of this loyalist effort stand out. The first is the depth of support among London’s various essay papers, newspapers, and periodicals for the Hanoverian regime. All of London’s papers, not least those which under normal circumstances avoided all political controversy and contained no political comment, contributed to the deluge of anti-papistry and anti-Jacobite polemic that streamed from London’s presses during the height of the rebellion.

It is important to note that, even before the 1745 rebellion, London printers already were depicting tartan. “This was long known by the enemies of Jacobitism: tartan was a Jacobite signifier from at least the 1730s in English prints.”

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210 Ibid., 188.
211 Ibid., 192.
212 Ibid., 193.
213 Pittock, Material Culture and Sedition, 90.
Figure 2. Malcolm McPherson. 1743. British Museum O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 1: 1851,0308.521. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
were depicted in tartan in the service of the British army. Broadside portraits of Malcolm McPherson and Farquhar Shaw, both engraved in 1743, elegantly depict the Scotsmen in tartan kilt and tammie; on both, the soldier’s ammunition pouch is engraved with the royal monogram, “G R” — George Regnant — and they wear and hold military weapons.\footnote{Malcolm McPherson. 1743. Etching, engraving. O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 1. British Museum, London: 1851,0308.521.} Although these engravings depict stoic, serious soldiers, it is the caption that tells the story. Shaw’s portrait reads: “Belonging to the Highland Regiment who was Shot in the Tower: 18 July 1743 for desertion.”\footnote{Farquhar Shaw. 1743. Etching, engraving. O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 1. British Museum, London: 1851,0308.579.} Rather than be dispatched abroad to fight in the unpopular War of the Austrian Succession, many of the regiment’s soldiers mutinied and attempted to return to Scotland. The execution of deserters may seem unremarkable until we compare the visual style of these portraits with the images of tartan-clad Scots that would appear in the following year. These Highland soldiers are portrayed in a serious, considered manner — they are not caricatures. When the Forty-five began, however, Highlanders were universally satirized and caricatured in broadsides that associated Scots with despotic France and Catholicism. This departure in style and message reflects the rapid realignment of London printers’ sense of loyalty in the face of the Jacobite threat. It was perhaps easy to criticize Hanoverian policy for military conflict on the continent, but a nearby and formidable threat warranted a change in rhetoric.

**Anti-Jacobite Rhetoric**

The beginning of the 1745 rebellion is due much of the credit for the rhetorical onslaught that accompanied the numerous battlefield engagements. Harris reports that as

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Figure 3. Farquhar Shaw. 1743. British Museum O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 1: 1851,0308.579.
© Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
late as September 21, 1745, leading London opposition newspapers *Old England Journal* and the *Westminster Journal* were still criticizing the Broad-Bottom government’s handling of the war on the continent. On that very day, the Battle of Prestonpans — the first major encounter of the 1745 rebellion — ended with the Jacobites victorious over Hanoverian forces, an outcome that “sent shock waves of alarm throughout the nation, firmly dispelling the view that the Jacobite army was an ill-equipped and ill-disciplined force that represented little threat to the regular soldiery of the British state.”\(^{216}\) As a result, “the widespread hardening of anti-Jacobite feeling following the battle was reflected across the gamut of the London press, which almost immediately responded to the Jacobite victory by a very significant increase in the volume of anti-Jacobite polemic printed in most papers.”\(^{217}\) The wide circulation of anti-Jacobite rhetoric is rather impressive considering the relatively limited means of production, distribution and dissemination of the era, not to mention low literacy rates.\(^{218}\) Factor in a small window of time — from August 1745 until the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 — and we see evidence of an extraordinarily potent campaign of political rhetoric that painted the whole nation of Scotland as *other* while building support for war at home. Pro-Hanoverian publishers demonized Jacobites by portraying, literally, an unholy alliance of Catholic slavery, suppression of liberty, and uncivilized savagery — all represented by Scots in plaid clothing. The Hanoverian monarchs who followed the Stuarts


\(^{217}\) Ibid.

\(^{218}\) Lawrence Stone, “Literacy and Education in England 1640–1900,” *Past & Present*, No. 42 (1969): 125. Stone’s estimates suggest that overall national literacy rates were less than 50 percent at the time of the 1745 rebellion. “During the century after 1675 literacy in the south and midlands grew very slowly indeed, and in this area it only picked up again after about 1780, producing a spurt which drove the national average for adult male literacy up to two thirds by 1840.”
“knew that religion was their strongest card and they played it to the full.”

In the anti-Jacobite works published in late 1745 and 1746, tartan is worn by popish barbarians.

A prototypical example of such pro-Hanoverian rhetoric is *A Hint to the Wise or The Surest way with The Pretender*, an engraving published in 1745. The image is simultaneously satirical and romantic — it exalts the noble English troops as “Liberty’s only Friends” while mocking their Jacobite foes. English troops appear confident, polished and steady. Their smart uniforms and tricorne hats exude professionalism that matches their assertive stance on the battlefield. Across the moor, Charles Stuart and his army of ragtag Highland clansmen, clad in tartan and tammies, are rocked back on their heels, timid and unsure of the fate that awaits them. The opposing forces are phalanxes for Lady Britannia, who leans forward, suggesting momentum, and Satan himself, who backs away while glancing furtively to the side. Britannia stands several paces ahead of the English troops bearing a banner, “Liberty Secured, Grievances [sic] redressed,” as she holds the liberty cap above her head. Satan, meanwhile, paces near the Jacobites with his own banner, “Popery & Slavery,” as he laments: “This Bitch is still opposing my schemes.” The crown and scepter of the Scottish crown jewels are cast onto the ground, apparently abandoned by the interlopers as they prepare to flee a decidedly superior force. Bonnie Prince Charlie exclaims: “We have then no chance for it.” His lieutenant urges, “Let’s away back to the Highlands Laddies,” as another observes, “All England is up in Arms.”

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Figure 4. A Hint to the Wise or The Surest way with The Pretender. 1745. British Museum Satires 2675: 1849,1003.75. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
A Hint to the Wise carries the key visual icons that became endemic to anti-Jacobite rhetoric: Charles Stuart is presented as a coward and an agent of both Satan and the Roman Catholic Church — the message invokes fears that the Stuarts would rule as absolute monarchs, thereby enslaving Britons who lived in liberty under the Hanoverian regime. But this image and many like it carry a portfolio of subtle messages indicative of the complex political environment surrounding the Forty-five. For example, the dialogue between British troops and ministers of the Broad-Bottom government reflects public trepidation regarding the ministers’ ability to effectively lead a war effort. “Wont you fight for your Liberties?” one minister asks. A soldier replies: “You told us lately we had none.” Another asks: “Have you made it worth fighting for”. Meanwhile, another minister asks the troops, “What are your Spirits Sunk?” “Yes they are Sunk,” a soldier replies. As the soldiers march closer to Britannia, though, they proclaim:

“Our Spirits are no longer Sunk.”
“Our Courage is at once revived.”
“We’re now united as one Man.”
“Lets march this hour against the Rebels.”

Across the heath, the print also carries a message for fledgling Jacobites — therein lies the “hint to the wise” — for those who were contemplating their loyalties. Hidden behind the tartan-clad troops is a group of men, labeled as Jacobites, who prepare to retreat as they see the formidable force their army faces. “Tis well we did not appear yet,” one Jacobite observes as another exclaims: “The Game is lost.” A wise man, it is implied, would rethink his Jacobitism before it was too late. In the background behind both factions of the conflict we see further religious themes, these more nuanced than the obtuse “popery” drumbeat typical of the genre. The Catholic priests behind the Jacobites shout and jeer in
a way to suggest plans for renewed Catholicism in Britain: “Convert Buters & Beggars,” one priest urges, as if to suggest that compulsory Catholicization would start with society’s lowest, least powerful caste. Another enjoins: “Root out Hereticks [sic],” a reference to old days of bloody Catholic inquisition. Meanwhile, Father Graham, Charles Stuart’s confessor, points across to the Church of England and declares: “I owe success to their Neglect.”

On the Hanoverian side, Anglican clergymen kneel behind the banner bearer for the Church Militant as they pray for the safety of their soldiers and the redemption of the Jacobite “stray’d sheep”—“Lord Smite these Philistines,” one churchman implores. Their message is indicative of resolve but also sympathy; the author invokes the wrath of God against the rebels but at the same time tips his hat toward kinship and sympathy. The phrasing of the speech bubbles, along with the overall dynamic of the print, suggest an understanding of misled men who have been deceived into supporting the Stuarts. The Englishmen who behold the entire scene are incredulous as they shrug in disbelief of the standoff before then.

“What a pass these Men have brought us to,” one man observes. Another pleads with the Jacobites: “The more free if more Loyal.” The author is careful to link common Englishmen with the church itself by depicting the observers’ concern for the clergymen: “Careful Shepherds!” a man shouts.

Other prints offer perspectives of Britain’s dystopian future if the Stuarts were restored. In *The Plagues of England or the Jacobites Folly*, also published in 1745, France is portrayed as a force behind the Jacobite rebellion. The print depicts a scene in the

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221 Father Graham appears in a different broadside, *The Procession or the Popes Nursling riding in Triumph* (see Figure 6), and is named on the print as Charles Edward Stuart’s confessor.

Figure 5. *The Plagues of England or the Jacobites Folly*. 1745. British Museum Satires 2659: 1868,0808.3779. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
future in which the Stuarts have reclaimed the throne, and Charles is joined on the dais by the pope and Satan, who caresses Charles’s chin as tartan-clad subjects kneel before them. The French king plays the violin while famine-straddled folly embraces Britannia, whose shield falls to the ground. The liberty cap is gone. Fire-breathing dragons terrorize crowds of people from the sky above, and British industry, depicted with a spinning wheel and an apiary, is forgotten and ignored. It resembles a prophetic scene of End Times, and the implication was that, for Britain, it would be. By supporting the Jacobites — or failing to support the Hanoverians — the future of Britain would be doomed to a Catholic king beholden to Catholic France, and the Jacobites’ folly was to believe that anything else was a possible outcome of a Stuart restoration. Indeed, the Frenchmen storming from the prison are shouting: “The English are fools.”

Father Graham, the mythical confessor to Prince Charles, stands like a parade marshal in the foreground of another print, The Procession or the Popes [sic] Nursling riding in Triumph, an anti-Jacobite broadside published in October 1745.223 “Now shall our Smithfield Fires Blaze again,” the priest says with a satisfied grin — Smithfield was the historical site for execution-by-burning of religious reformers and dissidents, including hundreds ordered to death by Mary I (Mary Tudor, or “Bloody Mary”) during her attempt to roll England back to Catholicism two centuries earlier. The print is among the most visually complex examples of anti-Jacobite rhetoric, and it also contains perhaps the greatest range of iconography and religious symbolism of any from the era. The imagery heralds the triumphant accession of Charles Stuart, depicted as King Charles III, as he arrives in a

Figure 6. *The Procession or the Popes Nursling riding in Triumph*. 1745. British Museum Satires 2658: 1868,0808.3768. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
carriage drawn by donkeys, wolves and tigers. “By the Sword I’ll govern,” the king says while holding a staff with a fluttering banner: “I’ll purge the Land of Hereticks [sic],” it declares. The pope sits to his left in the carriage and steadies the standing Charles while reminding him: “50 years boarding ye Father besides Nursing & Educating his Children.” The exiled Stuarts, it is implied, owe a debt to the papacy and to their religion, and Catholic conquest of Britain is repayment. Louis XV of France leans forward into the reins and cracks a whip over the team of beasts pulling the carriage: “For Universal Monarchy,” he announces. At the front, a donkey is ridden by a blindfolded peasant; behind him, a barbarian clad in animal skin straddles a wolf, and behind him, Satan rides a tiger. Although the French king holds the reins from the driver’s seat of the carriage, it is the devil who controls the coach’s movement — by sitting in front of Louis and holding the reins of the donkeys and wolves, Satan is able to cancel or overrule France’s influence by giving his own command to the forward-most animals pulling the carriage. The harnesses bear instruments of torture as ornaments, and the leather straps are emblazoned with words evoking vestiges of Britain’s last dark days of Catholicism: papal bulls, indulgences, fines, tortures, excommunications and deaths by fire. The wheels of the carriage, identified as hereditary right and absolute monarchy, roll over the broken bodies of a magistrate and an Anglican priest. The beasts of burden trample on constitutional covenants of British civilization: the Habeas Corpus Act and Act of Toleration, the Magna Charta [sic], the bank and the exchequer. Meanwhile, Catholic priests stand as footmen at the back of the carriage and hold a large mast depicting a scene from the days to come: a general inquisition with pyres — “Burning the Bishops” and “Burning the Bibles” — as the Church of England goes up in smoke. An adoring crowd of Jacobites throngs the carriage to collect royal appointments.
The Procession is unique among anti-Jacobite prints examined in my research because it contains a comprehensive narrative — written in “strongly anti-Catholic terms,” as a British Museum curator described it — to explain the image’s iconography and visual rhetoric. The print’s narrative text offers context: “The Car is drawn by Asses Wolves & Tygers, rode by Ignorance, a Fury and the Devil, which are emblematical of Popish Errors Rage & Infernal Cruelty.” The necessity of this explanation is evident by the complexity of the print’s imagery, which covers a gamut of rhetorical themes and historical threads. To be sure, the print contains myriad references to contemporary knowledge and universal understanding of the era, but it also alludes to historically significant milestones of Britain’s past. The 1745 rebellion occurred two centuries after England last had recognized Catholicism as the national religion, and a decade before that, during the reign of Henry VIII, Catholic monasteries were dissolved with their lands and assets expropriated to the crown. Anti-Jacobites held that this deed was to be undone by a Catholic Stuart king, and in The Procession, a monk, standing in an abbey window, unfurls a banner listing monasteries that were seized during the Reformation — many of these properties were given to loyal nobles, who converted them to stately country homes. “A Priest from the Window of a College presents a list of Church & Abby Lands claiming the resumption of them for the use of his Brother,” the print’s narrative explains. Charles’s brother, Henry, was a cardinal in the Catholic church, and this trope elegantly links the threat of Jacobitism — the imminent danger of a Jacobite king — to the survival of fundamental mores of English life evolved over the previous two centuries. An Englishman who neither knew nor understood these

Ibid.
nuanced aspects of history could easily decipher the impending changes associated with a Stuart restoration. As the print’s narrative summarized: “The Bible which is dear to us as Protestants, & the Acts of Parliament which are the Bulwark & Security of our Liberties as Subjects are trampled under foot to shew wee [sic] are to have no longer enjoyment of or protection from them.”

The Procession also portends ominous geopolitical implications of a Stuart restoration — Britain instantly would be aligned with Catholic France and Spain, and the print suggests concessions that Charles would make as king in thanks for French and Spanish support of his endeavor. Spaniards, depicted with thin mustaches and brandishing ornate rapiers, wave their hats in celebration of newfound trade domination — “No Navigation in the West Indies,” one says as another boasts: “Tame the Proud Britons.” Another Spaniard celebrates the reclamation of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean naval base at Port Mahón, both of which Britain controlled at the time. Frenchmen in the crowd celebrate: “Cape Breton restored,” in reference to the Nova Scotia island in North America captured by the British during the War of the Austrian Succession — the print imagines a future in which a thankful Charles has returned the island to France. The emerging British Empire would be thwarted if not undone entirely at the meddling hands of France and Spain, who would control Charles. “The French and Spaniards which attend the triumph, exult in prospect of the several advantages which will arise to their Kingdoms when the British Crown becomes dependent on them,” the print’s annotation explains. The specter of victorious Jacobite and a triumphant Charles held that Catholicism would come to dominate British life in the same way as promulgated by Mary I, and Catholic France and Spain would enable that calamity. Britons, unless they joined the association to resist
this threat, would face this dark future. Six stanzas of verse printed above the engraved image tell this story and how its outcome can be avoided; the final four couplets enjoin Britons to stand united.

Possest of your Rights, they will lead you a Dance,
And England must then be a Province of France;
French Laws & French Customs, & despotick Power
Like Vultures will prey, & like Vultures devour.

Cape Breton we’ve conquer’d, Cape Breton we’ll keep,
Nor suffer our Foes to cajole us asleep;
And Jemmy’s Adherents we’ll bring to ye Block,
The Nation’s united as firm as a Rock.

Although the anti-Catholic rhetoric of *The Procession* is particularly sophisticated relative to the religiosity of most other artifacts of anti-Jacobite rhetoric, it is not a unique trope. What is unique about this print, however, is that it contains no imagery of tartan. The absence of kilts, tammys and other elements of Highland dress suggests a future in which Scots and Jacobites have wholly inherited Britain’s political future and adapted it for themselves. Being British would be subordinated to being Catholic in the kingdom of the restored Stuarts.

Anti-Jacobite prints employed varying degrees of subtlety in their messages, but some were explicit in what Britons should expect from a new Stuart monarchy. A rather macabre broadside, *The Pope’s Scourge, or an exact Portraiture of a Popish Pretender*, suggests an era of inquisition under Charles as king.225 Charles, wearing a Roman uniform with tartan leggings and a tartan cape, has cut down the banners of liberty and property as

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Figure 7. The Pope's Scourge, or an exact Portraiture of a Popish Pretender. 1745. British Museum Satires: 1898,0520,170. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
he declares: “‘Tis time for Vengeance.” In the background, monks watch a man burn at the stake—“Turn or Burn,” warns their banner. On the other side, tartan-clad Highland soldiers wave their blades in the air and hold their shields forward. “No promises to be made good to Heretics,” declares their flag. This imagery, although classified as satire in archives, is less satirical than most other prints of the era—its vivid depiction of brutal Catholic vengeance appears under the papal coat of arms. Also, unlike other prints, this broadside does not depict Hanoverian forces, which typically were glorified in contrast to the Jacobite rebels. Instead, the scene is darker and more explicit—the king’s sword, emblazoned with “Slavery,” is being withdrawn from its sheath, which bears “SUPERSTITION.” Although the odd hat and fine mustache painted on Charles are mocking, they do not offset the evil tone of the image, nor do they dilute the message of fear that clearly was the intent of the print. Like The Procession, this print invokes the reader’s imagination of the future—Father Time holds the mask removed from the prince’s face, and thus time itself is shown to reveal the true character of Charles Stuart. The couplet printed above the image draws the reader toward caution and skepticism regarding the prince’s true intentions.

By Arts delusive Tyranny began,
Time mov’d the Mask, and Shew’d the real Man

It cannot be coincidence that, as Charles Stuart marched his Jacobite army through Scotland its ranks grew, but after he crossed into England in the fall of 1745—at the same time as such satirical prints maligning France were being published—he found only tepid support. Monod argues that English Jacobites’ fear of France overrode any sense of devotion to the Stuarts. “The Tory Jacobite leaders had encouraged a French landing; they saw the ’45 as a wild attempt on which only a reckless gambler would have staked
his life. The staid, circumspect Anglican Jacobite gentry were alarmed, confused and often terrified by it.”

The drought of conscripts left Charles Stuart with insufficient numbers to face the oncoming Hanoverian forces, and this ultimately led to his retreat back into Scotland that same winter.

**Jacobites and the Rhetoric of Fear**

The depiction of a possible future under a Catholic Stuart king, therefore, allows readers to imagine consequences of not supporting the incumbent Hanoverian regime. If we look at anti-Jacobite propaganda as an early form of advertising, we can apply Stein’s adaptation of Burke and Charland toward more thoroughly understanding the anti-Jacobite strategy of persuasion through identification. In the case of anti-Jacobite imagery, we see constitutive rhetoric as an inverse relationship or equation — anti-Jacobite printers and publishers sought to affirm and promote popular support for the Hanoverian crown and its forces — a rhetorical construction of “we” — while separately but simultaneously imposing an identity of other — dangerous “they” — on Scots through harsh rhetoric of exclusion. Scots were different, the rhetoric urged: They lacked the refinement, grace and sophistication of the English, and the ways of the Highlanders were incompatible with civilized English society. The anti-Jacobite refrain was a three-pronged message warning of absolute monarchy backed by France, compulsory Catholicism, and forfeited liberty and property. Taken as a collective, anti-Jacobite prints associated with the 1745 rebellion generally did not address the legitimacy of George II or the House of Hanover, but their

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message was explicitly sharp regarding Charles Stuart — he was a pretender and a papist, and both traits made him a dangerous threat to British prosperity.

The examples described in this chapter demonstrate that anti-Jacobite rhetoric played heavily to fears of absolute, autocratic monarchy and enforced Catholicism — Britons would be less free, it was implied, under a renewed Stuart dynasty than under the Hanoverian kings. “Behind a popish king, therefore, there stalked the Inquisition, the Jesuits, and the full apparatus of Catholic persecution. Nor did the ramifications of the imposition of a Catholic monarch stop there. Britain would also be subjected to the rule of Rome, and the Church lands that had been sold off during the Tudor period would be seized.” Anti-Jacobite rhetoric also carefully and regularly reminded audiences of France’s tacit role in supporting the 1745 rebellion — Charles Stuart had sailed from France with the French king’s support, and the threat of a French invasion of England was never outside the realm of possibility. “In the event of the Jacobites dislodging the Hanoverians, Britain would inevitably become a province of France.” To that point, fear of French invasion had manifested in satirical prints in 1744, long before the Forty-five rising was in motion. In *Court and Country United against the Popish Invasion*, published in March of that year, images of tartan and Jacobites are altogether absent. French courtiers cower in the shadows of George II’s throne room as they rue the unraveling of their plans: “Dam [sic] their unanimity,” one cries, as others lament being “Detected,” “Discovered,” “Ruin’d” and

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227 Harris, A Patriot Press, 209.
228 Ibid., 211.
229 Ibid., 212.
“Undone” by the English. At the king’s feet, ermine-clad noblemen pledge to protect Britain with their lives as the merchant class pledges its fortunes to the nation’s defense. On either side of the throne’s pedestal hang paintings, one depicting four playful “English Bull Dogs” and the other of English bulldogs “United against the Enemy” as they intercept “The Pope’s Bull” as he charges.

These rhetorical strategies reflect the structure and pathos of rhetoric of fear. “Simply stated, fear arousal depends on the triggering of already existing emotional reactions.” To a degree, this strategy worked: “What is revealing ... is that in those six months between July and December 1745 in which the Jacobite army was advancing, and when a Stuart restoration might — just — have been on the cards, large numbers of men from commercial as well as landed backgrounds took an active part in raising money and in taking up arms on behalf of the existing order.” Centuries of intermittent military conflict France would have been on the minds of the English people, if for no other reason than the most recent War of the Austrian Succession. More importantly, however, Court and Country United projects a message of stability and unity in the king’s government, whatever the case may have been. The Broad-Bottom government was a delicate coalition, and as its handling of the War of the Austrian Succession soon would show, a French invasion, coupled with a Jacobite rebellion, likely would have been the undoing of Hanoverian Britain.

This unanimity, however specious in appearance, was but an imaginary one, and we shall soon find the pretended patriotism of ministers and placemen giving way to their personal interests and jealousies in the very midst of the dangers which threatened their country. The question of national rights and liberties, which wise men saw involved, was looked upon as a secondary

232 Colley, Britons, 85.
matter by those whose only banner was political or religious party, or the
still more unworthy one of place and emolument.233

Anglicanism had been the settled religion in England since shortly after the death
of Mary I in 1558. Mary’s half-sister and successor, Elizabeth, undid her sister’s work to
advance an aggressive and prosecutorial brand of Catholicism, and she restored the Church
of England as the state religion. James II’s warmth to Catholics, beyond his own Catholic
faith, ultimately led to his downfall, which affirmed Britain’s commitment to its own form
of Protestantism. It is no surprise, therefore, that fear of losing religious freedom was the
prevailing message of appeals to the English public in anti-Jacobite propaganda published
during the Forty-five. England’s last dalliance with state-sanctioned Catholicism in the
sixteenth century had been a brutal and oppressive nightmare, and George II held the title
of Defender of the Faith and headed the Church of England by virtue of his crown. To
defend the king, therefore, also was to defend England’s church and religion. Anti-Jacobite
rhetoric was centered on anti-Catholicism as much as anything else — Britain, it was
understood, must resist Jacobites in order to resist a popish invasion, whether by Scots from
the north or by the French from the south. To be sure, there were Catholics in England at
the time, but they had different legal standing from Anglicans, and they were expected to
recognize the primacy of the Church of England. The papacy, therefore, was the target for
rhetorical estrangement as pro-Hanoverian printers and publishers sought to undermine
support for the Jacobite rebellion.

233 Thomas Wright, England Under the House of Hanover: Its History and Condition During the Reigns of the
Figure 8. Briton’s Association against the Pope’s Bulls. 1745. British Museum Satires 2661: 1868,0808.3771. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
Briton’s [sic] Association against the Pope’s Bulls, published in October 1745, highlights geographic, cultural and religious boundaries by depicting Hanoverians and Jacobites on either side of the River Tweed, which cuts across the Scottish Lowlands and was a historically significant border between Scotland and England. On the north side, tartan-clad Jacobites are tending the pope’s bulls as they graze along the riverbank. The bulls carry stone tablets bearing edicts from Rome (papal bulls) as a Catholic clergyman rides at bull that exhales “excommunication” and “The fire of Purgatory.” A young tartan-clad Jacobite awkwardly attempts to wrangle a bull bearing scrolls of Catholic liturgical traditions bound together by Catholic prayer beads: absolutions, confessions, indulgences, infallibility, pardons and penance [sic]. Behind the papal bulls, Jacobite soldiers express their reticence for their cause. “I’ll go home,” one says as another remarks, “Good plunder.” Nearby, Satan stands in the pope’s crown and leather boots with spurs. He holds forward a whip as if to threaten the Jacobites into continued service. “Betray ... I’ll tell France Spain & the Pope,” he warns. Across the river, British soldiers stand ready to fight for “King & Country, Shop & Farm” as Britannia watches over them. “The true spirit of Liberty,” Britannia observes of the king’s loyal soldiers as she rests beside Neptune, who rises from the sea with his trident as if to suggest his favor in thwarting a French or Spanish invasion. “You gall the Enemy,” he tells Britannia.

The publication of this print coincides with the approximate time that the Jacobite army crossed from Scotland to England, and the depiction of the natural river barrier between the Jacobites and England suggests that the impinging Scots have been kept at

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bay — or that loyal Hanoverians possessed the ability to hold them off. Important to this message is the image of Edinburgh Castle, which sits on an imposing rock high above the River Tweed in the background of the print. Despite the Jacobite army’s quick capture of Edinburgh in September 1745, they never took the fortress of Edinburgh Castle, which remained in the hands of Hanoverian troops and impervious to the Jacobites. Edinburgh Castle under Hanoverian control, therefore — in history and in anti-Jacobite rhetoric — represented a pox on the ambitions of Charles Stuart and his Jacobite army. This duality of messages simultaneously appeals to fear of a Catholic invasion while building hope and esprit de corps among Englishmen who were anxious about the future or contemplating their loyalties. It could be argued, however, that it was not appeals to loyalty that won over Hanoverian subjects; rather, intense fear of Catholic conquest drove would-be supporters away from Charles and his loyal followers. “The political consequences of antipapistry appear to have been considerable, to judge from the efficacy of anti-Catholic propaganda in foreign wars; and the Gordon Riots show that this was still an issue in the 1780s. It is safest, perhaps, to conclude that attachment to Catholicism really damned the Stuarts in the eyes of most Englishmen. This conclusion is reinforced by the traditional English hatred of France.”

This rhetorical strategy reflects contemporary scholarship on fear appeals that achieve persuasion through a combination of affective cues, which use representations to induce fear of the consequences of a given behavior, and cognitive cues, which identify a

source of danger and demonstrate how to avoid it.\textsuperscript{236} Anti-Jacobite rhetoric represented the prospect of Catholic Britain in a yoke with France and Spain in service to the pope himself, and it held that Englishmen who joined the Jacobite cause were directly culpable for the unraveling of liberty, justice and prosperity enjoyed under the Hanoverian dynasty. The source of this threat was Charles Stuart, a usurper and pretender — entranced by Satan — whose throngs of tartan-clad acolytes would march upon London and install their false monarch. The only way to avoid this fate was to band together with like-minded English patriots in defense of their rightful king. Anti-Jacobite rhetoric was consistent in its use of fear in this regard — it presented the Jacobite forces as a grave threat to Britain and its ruling elite, but it also portrayed unfavorable and potentially dire consequences for common Englishmen. The threat of the Stuart pretender, backed by France and the Roman Catholic Church, was existential to not only the liberty of the English people, but also to their religious freedom. As Pfau argues, “fear \textit{can} be a deliberative emotion and some fear appeals are capable of assisting the citizen body in its recognition of, and confrontation with, contingent events; yet not all kinds of fear appeals will function in this capacity.”\textsuperscript{237} This \textit{civic fear}, as Pfau calls it, can induce civic deliberation, but that outcome is not assured. “Specifically, a deliberative outcome can only occur under circumstances in which the ‘civic fear’ appeal acts upon a citizenry that is already disposed to react properly to compelling contingencies — a citizenry possessing the virtue of courage.”\textsuperscript{238} Imagery and discourse in anti-Jacobite prints employed precisely this tactic — they promoted the patriotic virtues of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[237] Pfau, “Who’s Afraid of Fear Appeals?” 224.
\item[238] Ibid.
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Englishmen, even if patronizingly, alongside the denigration of the Catholic usurper and his litany of foreseen treachery. “The ideal civic republican citizen, then, squarely recognized the objects of his fears (contingent events) and faced them, whether through arms or deliberation, with courage.”

Rhetoric of Identity and Enmity

Anti-Jacobite propaganda effectively imposed a negative Catholic identity on Scots and Jacobites, who, by and large, were not Catholic. This particular curiosity of anti-Jacobite rhetoric demonstrates its inherent sensationalism while at the same time explaining its effectiveness: Catholicism was portrayed as dangerous to Britain when, in fact, there was little religious ideology, certainly scant Catholicism, behind the 1745 rebellion from the beginning. These “commonplace motifs,” to borrow Olson’s terminology, hammered away at the imagined bogey men of France and Catholicism. To be sure, Charles Stuart was a professed Catholic, but the extent of his faith was neither known nor scrutinized by the masses. “By the 1740s two things had happened. In the first place, English Catholics had shed their Jacobite image, so that Catholicism and Jacobitism were no longer synonymous. Second, Catholics had declined as a force, both absolutely and relatively, both in numbers and in the power bases they controlled.” Nonetheless, anti-Catholic rhetoric was deployed as anti-Jacobite rhetoric, and it served as a rallying cry for unification of disparate factions of English politics and popular press. As in the maneuvers described by Engels,

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239 Ibid., 225.
240 See McLynn, “Issues and Motives in the Jacobite Rising of 1745,” 102–103. “In Scotland, Catholicism existed only in small pockets.... Catholicism was regarded as an insignificant matter by the authorities in Scotland, who were much more exercised by the Episcopalian, and with reason, for the unofficial census of 1755 revealed only 16,500 Catholics within a total population of nearly one and a half million.”
anti-Jacobites named and estranged a perceived enemy, against which they fomented anxiety and animosity through blatant fear appeals. Further, however, the publication and distribution of anti-Jacobite propaganda was a product of the publishers’ sense of belonging to an imagined community — they saw themselves as patriotic proponents of British liberty under siege by a foreign pretender of an unwelcome faith.

However much they may have disliked the personnel and politics of Hanoverian Britain, most English people seem to have viewed the imposition of a Catholic monarch supported by Catholic foreign powers as a worse evil. Amongst other things, this, as has been argued elsewhere and as is disclosed by the anti-Jacobite press campaign of the ’45, reflected the existence of a broad-based consensus in favour of the constitution as established by the Revolution and the Act of Settlement.243

The Glorious Revolution, the Act of Settlement and the Acts of Union — all of which occurred in a span of only 20 years — redefined Britain and the internal relationships among its constituent parts. More to the point, in fact, the Acts of Union created Great Britain and consolidated the separate crowns of Scotland and England. “It had been the threat posed by France, and by French support for the Stuart dynasty, that had dictated the Act of Union in 1707 and the formal construction of Great Britain in the first place. Since then, recurrent wars with France had made it possible for the different countries, social classes and ethnic groups contained in Great Britain to have something in common — whether it was fear, or aggression, or a powerful sense of embattled Protestantism.”244

243 Harris, A Patriot Press, 217.
244 Colley, Britons, 328.
By the midpoint of the eighteenth century, Scotland’s place in Great Britain would be a foil for anti-Jacobite rhetoric as Britishness was constituted as Protestant Englishness while Scottishness was Catholic, popish, barbaric other — and tartan was its marker. There were, in effect, two voices, two rhetorical threads, in anti-Jacobite propaganda surrounding the 1745 rebellion. On one hand, anti-Jacobite rhetoric was patriotic and pro-Hanoverian — it was a stream of messages of loyalty and affirmation. And while Scots and Jacobites were satirized as scapegoats, the visual imagery in contemporary depictions of Hanoverian figures, namely the Duke of Cumberland, is far more majestic. This was quite a turnaround in sentiment given the unpopularity of the duke's handling of the War of the Austrian Succession. Prints that linked Jacobites to France and Catholicism were sarcastic and satirical, but in many prints glorifying Cumberland, Scots were not caricatured. They often were depicted as haggard and craven, to be sure, but that was the most visible contrast between Scots and the Hanoverian loyalists — the style of illustration was the same. Two broadsides from 1746 and 1747 typify this style. His Royal Highness William Duke of Cumberland, published in London five months after Culloden, contains a portrait of Cumberland from the waist up; it is situated in an oval frame with Britannia standing to Cumberland's right and the cherub Victory on his left. Below the portrait of Cumberland sprawls a dying Highlander, his sword shattered. The ribbon under Cumberland's portrait reads: “Thus to expire be still the Rebells Fate, While endless Honours on brave William wait.” Another depiction of Cumberland at Culloden, published a year later, depicts a Scot with a broken broadsword beneath Cumberland's horse. Cumberland is in command.

Figure 9. *His Royal Highness William Duke of Cumberland &c &c &c.* 1747. British Museum O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 33: 1870,1008.2532. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
with “a View of the routed Rebel Army.”

Even as late as 1771, after Cumberland’s nephew George III had taken the throne, broadsides were being produced to commemorate the victory at Culloden. Scotch Pride Humbled depicts Highland soldiers in tartan as they yield to Culloden and his officers.

Despite earlier discontent toward George II and his Hanover-centric government, the English took to their printing presses and pamphlets to shore up support for the king’s army. The Loyal Associators in the Year of our Lord MDCCXLV, for example, is uncommon among anti-Jacobite prints because it does not depict the Jacobite enemy, nor does it use imagery of tartan. Instead, the image presents a legion of Englishmen, in rank and file, as they stand ready to defend their nation. Although their uniforms are identical — tricorne hats, ruffle shirts, ubiquitous red coats — their faces reflect a spectrum of diversity. Young men and old men, skinny men and fat men. Some look experienced and confident, gazing determinedly ahead, but others peer to the side or stare into nothingness, as if to indicate their novice inexperience. Nonetheless, they are bound together by a common threat, and the image of a handshake, encircled by a snake with the sun radiating from behind, bears their purpose: “For King & Country.” The text beneath the image reads as follows.

An Unnatural Rebelion [sic] being rais’d in Scotland, in Favour of a Popeish Pretender, Several Worthy Gentlemen, Eminent Merchants, Tradesmen, &c. Form’d an Association to Defend the Person of His Most Sacred Majesty King George, together with the Rights and Liberties of a Free Born People, In Commemoration of which Glorious and Loyal Act, This Plate is engraved
Figure 10. The Loyal Associators in the Year of our Lord MDCCXLV. 1745. British Museum Satires 2664: 1868,0808.3775. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
On the other hand, anti-Jacobite rhetors played to the audience’s fears that, finally, after almost 60 years, an effective Jacobite army was encroaching on London. The reality of another revolution was within view, and defeat would bring Catholic rule along with royal prerogative and divine right that had been purged with the head of another Stuart king, Charles I, in 1649. Anti-Jacobite rhetoric effectively invoked the military prowess of France, and Spain to a lesser degree, which had emerged as competing imperial and colonial forces. Anti-Jacobite rhetoric promoted a certainty that George II was the nation’s greatest hope in the face of this treachery. “In the heady and rather saccharine renditions of nationalist sentiment that poured out in these months, George II served as a cynosure for national sentiment in a way rarely demonstrated by a Hanoverian monarch before the 1790s and certainly not demonstrated prior to this time.”

At long last, the German-born king was seen as thoroughly and patriotically British. This perception was essential to the establishment of Highland Scots as different, as a threat to English freedom. Anti-Jacobite rhetoric not only imagined and wholly constituted Highland Scots as Jacobite rebels — regardless of a given clan’s affiliation or loyalty — it also imagined Great Britain in the image of England, led by a wise and noble king who would protect and promote the liberties of Englishmen. “Successful new constitutive rhetorics offer new subject positions that resolve, or at least contain, experienced contradictions. They serve to overcome

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or define away the recalcitrance the world presents by providing the subject with new perspectives and motives.”

This was the narrative refrain of propaganda against Jacobites.

With these attributes in mind, it is clear that anti-Jacobite rhetoric was predicated on identification. Myriad messages sought to provide a platform on which readers could see themselves — the imagery and associated dialogue propagated a sense of unity among the English people against the Jacobite threat. Together, these messages implied, Englishmen — and all lovers of liberty — could thwart the threat of France and the Jacobite army if they would unite behind their king and country. This common cause to defend Britain and resist Jacobite ambition became their collective identity, and from within it, they imposed a separate identity of other on Jacobites. Olson finds that British printers used the same strategy to construct an identity for the American colonies at approximately the same time. “The single most salient use of the image representing the British colonies in America was to portray colonial culture as foreign and therefore inferior to British culture. The nature of this inferiority was amplified in various ways, but the ideas that the colonies were alien and uncivilized were central.” The phenomenon of pro-Hanoverian anti-Jacobitism is particularly fascinating when weighed against the context of time that bookends the 1745 rebellion. As has been demonstrated earlier, the rapid pivot of the popular press from mocking criticism of the king’s government to full-throated patriotic zeal athwart the Jacobite threat defied expectations. By extension, however, in that process of establishing mutual identification, kinship and constituency among anti-Jacobites, rhetors also effectively assigned identity to Jacobites themselves — anti-Jacobite propaganda became

250 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 142.
251 Olson, Emblems of American Community, 15.
a binary in which anti-Jacobites were imagined and constituted in one way, and Jacobites were imagined and constituted in another. By virtue of Scotland's hegemonic relationship with England, however, the duality of identities in this rhetorical binary resulted in assignment and application of Scottish identity by anti-Jacobites. In the negative space from which Jacobites were exhumed from the imagined community of Britain, Highland Scots were substantiated not only as an enemy, but also as a separate community with no further obligation to remain connected to Britain. The complex truth of the circumstances — that some Highland clans remained loyal to the crown and were resisting the Jacobite rebellion — was immaterial in a rhetorical onslaught that lumped all of the Highlands together outside the British community of civilization and liberty.

**Britannia and the Rhetoric of Patriotism**

Lady Britannia is an almost universal icon among anti-Jacobite visual rhetoric. An ancient icon of Roman-era Britain, Britannia generally is depicted with a shield emblazoned with the St. George's cross, which doubles as the flag of England, and she carries a trident or spear on which the Cap of Liberty often is draped. This iconography is a staple of Britain's patriotic visual rhetoric even today, and its significance in response to the threat of an invading Jacobite army cannot be overlooked. In some cases, Britannia is presented as the nation’s vanguard, standing in front of advancing British troops as she confronts her foe, often portrayed as Satan. In other cases, Britannia is depicted as a mystically maternal figure, ensuring Britain’s historical alliances and overseeing the fate of the elements and the seas. Herbert Atherton, in his seminal work on Britain’s satirical prints, writes that Britannia faded away with Roman Britain until the early seventeenth century, “when she stirs only
faintly, as a decorative item on a few frontispieces.” Britannia slowly begins to appear on British coinage, but “she does not become established until the middle decades of the eighteenth century, when, in a time of aggressive nationalism and empire, she lent herself to patriotic song and a quickened sense of national destiny.”

Britannia represents the nation; whether that nation is England or Great Britain varies with the subjects and intent of the prints. As a rule, the cross of St. George and saltire of St. Andrew decorate her shield, though on a rare occasion it displays the royal coat-of-arms.... Many prints on the Forty-five and a few of the anti-Bute prints of a later time deliberately isolated Britannia from her delinquent northern children, by leaving the saltire of St. Andrew off her shield.

Despite a range of roles in which she is portrayed, Britannia almost always is presented with the same accoutrements and garb, including the liberty cap. James Epstein and, separately, Yvonne Korshak present thorough analyses of the symbolic significance of the liberty cap in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely in England, France and North America. In particular, Korshak points to the prominence of the liberty cap in satirical prints of the John Wilkes era, especially in William Hogarth's satirical depiction of Wilkes, and later in colonial North America, where the liberty cap came to be seen “everywhere as a symbol of the struggle for freedom, although not necessarily, at first, for independence. It was placed at the top of liberty trees and liberty poles and appeared on seals and flags.” This adaptation would inspire widespread use of the liberty cap as a symbol of the French Revolution that would come two decades later. “The cap held by the

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253 Ibid., 91.
254 Ibid., 92.
'French lady’ was actually American before it was French, although its loss of importance in the American symbolic repertoire and its persistence abroad have made it appear to be specifically French.” Nonetheless, these adoptions of the liberty cap represented revolution in both cases, and at least 30 years after its prevalence in imagery of anti-Jacobite propaganda. Epstein examines the icon’s meaning in early nineteenth-century England, where the liberty cap was employed by “plebeian radicals” who fomented social unrest in England in the early nineteenth century. “For loyalists the ‘meaning’ of the cap of liberty was unmistakable: it was the symbol of revolution, the ensign of French anarchy, the sign under which the Jacobins had orchestrated the terror of 1793–4. It represented the antithesis of British constitutional ‘liberty’ and patriotism.” If the liberty cap was a symbol of revolution in America and France late in the eighteenth century, and of political radicals in England in the early nineteenth century, what did it mean as a fixture on Britannia’s trident in 1745 and 1746? If we assume that the liberty cap's symbolic significance in America, France and, later, England, evolved from the germination of a single, fixed meaning at an earlier point in time, we can infer that Britannia and the liberty cap represented continuity of the Glorious Revolution in which the Stuarts were deposed. Anti-Jacobite propaganda, therefore, effectively dismissed the Forty-five as not a revolution, but rather as an insurrection against an ongoing and otherwise perfect revolution begun in 1688 when James II fled to France. Britannia was the guardian of this new era of redemption. Her shield was emblazoned with the cross of St. George, which was and is the flag of England.

256 Ibid., 64.
The flag of Great Britain, which comprised an overlay of St. George’s cross and the saltire of St. Andrew, had been in use since the time of James I. (The current Union flag, or “Union Jack,” of the United Kingdom superimposes the saltire of Ireland’s St. Patrick onto the flag of Great Britain.) The absence of the flag of Great Britain as Britannia bears the solitary cross of St. George in some anti-Jacobite propaganda conveys a tacit message: Scotland and its wayward clans are secondary to the righteous people of England, in whom freedom and religious virtue have been invested. As Susanne Reichl posits in her study of the flag of the United Kingdom, “flags in general are very powerful symbols of identity; a crowd of people flying the same flag generate a sense of belonging among themselves: The flag becomes an expression of a collective experience, a way of constructing communities.”

This holds true particularly in fragmented modern vestiges of the United Kingdom — the Union flag is seen as inappropriate for cheering on England’s national team in sporting competitions in which England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each field their own team. As Reichl argues, “the flying of flags at public events can be seen as a symbol of a collective experience, a symbol of group identity.” Certainly then, too, it could be used to establish an other that was to be feared for its differences. This subtle demarcation of Englishness and otherness in anti-Jacobite rhetoric illustrates the outlook of Hanoverian loyalists as they sought to quell the threat of the Jacobite army and its Catholic usurper.

British broadside printers portrayed Britannia differently depending on the subject at hand. Britannia is depicted athwart the Highlanders in anti-Jacobite rhetoric, and

259 Ibid., 210–211.
260 Ibid., 211.
she often is depicted as a guardian over British troops fighting the rebels. In prints that contend with the American colonies, Olson finds, Britannia’s image is used to symbolize the connection between Britain and the colonies. “In some prints, the colonies were portrayed as the limbs of Britannia, a choice that stressed more emphatically than any other image of the period that British and colonial interests were interrelated to such an extent that survival required the unity of the empire.”

This disparity indeed highlights the importance of Britain’s economic interests, but it also highlights the way that Britons — or Londoners, perhaps — viewed the colonies versus Scotland. If Britannia, or some part of her, signifies the colonies and their relationship to Britain, but Britannia meanwhile is depicted leading the fight against Scots, we can infer that the inhabitants of the colonies were seen as British in a way that Scots were not. This is further evidence of the ways in which Britons imagined their community — which excluded Scots, or at least Highlanders. British printers went to great lengths to constitute the colonies as part of “we” — especially as the future of the colonies became uncertain — but rhetoric of the same era constituted Scots as dangerous other, cast out and separate from Britain.

**Rhetoric of Legitimization**

If we look to Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric and consider it against the historical circumstances on which it is based, we must confront the relational structures of constitutive rhetoric and the world around it. The Québécois constituted themselves as a subset of a whole, or, rather, a culturally and linguistically sub-community of Canada. Quebec was presented as an independent child, grown into adulthood and independence.

\[261 \text{ Olson, } \textit{Emblems of American Community}, 17.\]
This rhetorical constituency was *secondary coalescence*. Anti-Jacobites, on the other hand, constituted themselves as the whole, the *parent* community, while rhetorically separating members of a subset constituency — their rhetoric was *exclusionary* of a wayward stepchild, Scotland, that had rebelled against its parents, its religion and its community values. “Jacobitism was rarely perceived as a positive doctrine by those who subscribed to it. There were sincere men in the movement who aimed solely to restore the Stuarts, but more often the motivation for Jacobite sentiment was more various and mundane. The warp and weft of Jacobitism was far from uniform.”262 Whereas authorization “involves the affirmation

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or imposition of an identity through structures of institutionalized power and ideology, whether local or translocal,\textsuperscript{263} Figure 11 illustrates Theory that communities can be rhetorically constituted by an inclusive minority or by an exclusive majority.

Imagine, though, that you are a Jacobite on the other side of this equation. Your mindset reflects the messages embedded in anti-Jacobite rhetoric, albeit with a contrastingly positive outlook: You do support a return to Catholicism via a pious and honorable king who is a rightful claimant to the throne of his hereditary homeland. “Whereas English Jacobitism tended to be a negative phenomenon — a cause for those who disliked the system of politics but had little positive to recommend as an alternative — in Scotland Jacobitism was a positive force and a real political alternative.”\textsuperscript{264} If this is the case — you do not dispute or disagree with the political intimations of anti-Jacobite rhetoric — then you and your like-minded Jacobites are constituted, \textit{legitimized}, by the very rhetoric that seeks to undo your momentum.

Scotland by 1745, then, presented many features favorable to Charles Edward's adventure: a virulent nationalism, opposed to the Act of Union; an episcopalian northeast a priori committed to the House of Stuart; and the Jacobite clans of the Highlands, determined to preserve their way of life but confronted with both a short-term and long-term threat. The short-term menace was personified by the Campbells; the long-term by the growth of Scottish capitalism after the Act of Union.\textsuperscript{265}

Indeed, one could argue that the way of life in the Highlands was captured in ironically accurate detail in many of the satirical prints of the day. The sheer volume of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{264} McLynn, “Issues and Motives in the Jacobite Rising of 1745,” 110.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Ibid., 116
\end{itemize}
anti-Jacobite rhetoric reflected to Jacobites the serious threat they posed. Anti-Jacobite rhetoric was substantiating rhetoric in this case — it acknowledged the Jacobites' existence and therefore affirmed their purpose. Despite the ramshackle nature of the rebellion and its operations, the printing industry in London gave it a certain credibility that the Jacobites themselves might have been unable to find otherwise. This history underscores the findings of Hariman and Lucaites: “Political identity grows out of the social practices of particular peoples in specific places as they become known to themselves in the communicative media that articulate a culture. Visual icons are particularly well suited to communicate this social knowledge that is the foundation for political affiliation.”

The Highlanders’ faith aside, it was their absolute belief in hereditary right that fueled their allegiance to Charles Stuart, and their contempt for the Acts of Union empowered their march toward London. “Almost the only obvious advantage Charles Edward Stuart had on his side was the War of Austrian Succession and its various consequences. For all that, he came within an ace of toppling the Hanoverian dynasty in a campaign which exposed the essential rottenness of the British political system and the hollowness of its apparent triumphs. The ’45 revealed the most appalling decadence and weakness in the face of a tiny force of invading irregulars.” The substantiating rhetoric that reacted to the Jacobite threat served to reinforce its existence.

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266 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, 32–33.
CHAPTER III

TARTAN IS WORN BY OPPORTUNIST USURPERS

“A place at court is a constant bribe.” — Scottish proverb

“The SCOTTISH minister has indeed retired. Is his influence at an end? or does he still govern by the three wretched tools of his power, who to their indelible infamy, have supported the most odious of his measures, the late ignominious Peace, and the wicked extension of the arbitrary mode of Excise?” — North Briton 45, April 1763

The 1750s were both fortuitous and unkind to the Scots. As the Duke of Cumberland prosecuted Jacobite rebels deep into the Highlands as retribution for the 1745 rebellion, opportunistic Scots emigrated south toward London, bringing their enlightened learning in law, letters and economics. Emigration of Scots to England, particularly from higher social classes, was not new, but an uptick began after the Forty-five was put down, and the sudden and significant ingress of Scots into England irked many segments of English society, particularly those whose existence already was on the margins of community.

This chapter will apply Burke’s theory of guilt and redemption to explain the manner by which Scottishness — Scottish national identity — was taken to greater levels of rhetorical degradation than had been seen even throughout the Forty-five, during which printers and publishers used tartan imagery to align Jacobitism and its proponents with an existential threat from France and the Catholic church. The effects of this uprising and its aftermath were long-lasting. As T.M. Divine writes, “Culloden and its brutal aftermath did not entirely end the tensions within the Union. True, the gravest threat to the relationship


269 John Wilkes, North Briton 45, in The North Briton: Revised and Corrected by the Author (Dublin: James Williams, 1766). Archived at shelf mark NG.1561.c.1 in the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
had been finally eliminated but, on the other hand, English suspicions of crypto-Jacobitism as a peculiarly Scottish disease lived on for some time.\textsuperscript{270} To this point, the Militia Act of 1757 established volunteer militias to protect England and Wales but excluded Scots, who were not seen as to be trusted with weapons. Scots, it was held, were not wholly and loyally British. My analysis will consider the emergence of Scottishness within Britishness and assess the new and essential role of tartan imagery in satirical polemics against Scots as we examine the rhetorical evolution of guilt, scapegoating and redemption of Scottish identity in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. This timeline will lead to a new era in which Scotland is reintegrated and reimagined in the British community.

In Burke’s theory of dramatism, hierarchies control the terrors of mystery but do not eliminate them. As Brummett explains, “insofar as everyone is somewhat different from everyone else, mystery is inescapable. And insofar as groups of people have values, commitments, and lifestyles that are markedly different from those of other groups, the mystery is threatening.”\textsuperscript{271} In such tightly integrated relationships, dependencies and shared existences, violations of hierarchy are innate, and such violations constitute guilt in Burke’s taxonomy of symbolic action. “Guilt is an awareness that the carefully woven fabric of identifications upheld in hierarchy has been torn through what one has done or thought. Guilt is a powerful motive because it threatens a lapse into uncontrolled mystery. Guilt must be expiated, and the person or group must achieve redemption that leads back to a secure hierarchy (reinstatement of the old or establishment of a new one).”\textsuperscript{272} In

\textsuperscript{270} Divine, “In Bed with an Elephant,” 5.
\textsuperscript{271} Brummett, “Burkean Scapegoating, Mortification, and Transcendence in Presidential Campaign Rhetoric,” 255.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
Hanoverian England long after the 1745 Jacobite rebellion, the mystery of Highland Scots remained largely unexplained. The inexplicable Highlanders had rebelled against not only the incumbent dynasty in an effort to overthrow the monarch, they also attempted to supplant England’s settled religion. The near success of these encroachments left lingering anxiety in Britain for many years, and legislation such as the Act of Proscription and the Heritable Jurisdictions Act, along with the garrisons of British troops deep in the Highlands, are evidence of that unease. The crown, with support of Parliament, effectively sought to dismantle Highland culture and life in the late 1740s, and the simultaneous influx of Scots into England gave pause to Englishmen whose solidarity with George II had ensured victory against the Jacobites.

Brummett explains that Burke provides for mortification and scapegoating as ways to assuage, mitigate or eliminate guilt. Mortification “involves open confession of one’s ‘sins’ and actual or symbolic punishment of them.”273 Conversely, scapegoating, also known as victimage, “requires the guilty to find and punish some person or object which represents their own guilt. Victimage is a poignant resolution to guilt because the goat is punished, not so much for what it has done, but for its ability to represent what the guilty themselves have done.”274 What was England’s guilt? What was its transgression against the hierarchy that must be repaired? We should recognize from now that the rhetorical actors to be discussed here were not necessarily seeking to transfer guilt for anything they had “done or thought,” to borrow from Brummett, except by extension they were acting out against their imagined community’s transformation to a different kind of community. The guilt was

273 Ibid., 256.
274 Ibid.
England’s. The purveyors of anti-Scot rhetoric had no guilt of their own except the guilt of their nation, which was expanding its imagined borders to be more inclusive of its northern realm. England’s transgression was its acceptance of Scotland in constituting Great Britain and Britishness, and in the minds of some Englishmen, who imagined their community as wholly English and exclusive to outsiders, this change in hierarchy and social order constituted considerable guilt that had to be purged. From the midpoint of the eighteenth century, and especially after Bute became head of the British government, rampant Scotophobia tore through England like rhetorical wildfire.

The rise of imagery satirizing Scots coincided with a transformation in Scotland’s relationship with Britain. The broadsides, engravings and etchings that scapegoated tartan-wearing Scots as the source of English ills were, in essence, a resentful chronicle of Scotland’s rising equity within Great Britain. The commercial and political success of Scots in London proved they no longer needed to imagine their community as secondary to the English, and the English no longer could maintain their grasp on London as an exclusive province of the English alone. London was the cosmopolitan capital of Britain — and the center of a global empire in which Scots were playing an increasingly prominent role. Yet that perspective was hard earned. So tenuous was Scots’ position in London society at times that Scottish pride was their only recourse to the guilt of inferiority in the face of rampant Scotophobia. “The problems faced by the Scots elite in establishing high-profile careers at the heart of the British establishment stimulated periodic outbreaks of old-fashioned Scottish chauvinism in response.”

Portrayals of Scots as heathen opportunists persisted

endlessly, and propagandists such as John Wilkes poured fuel to the flames. “The hatred of Scots among Wilkes's London mob in the 1760s is well known; and after the ’45 there was great popular hostility towards Jacobitism, which was associated with ‘popery’ and France. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that by this time Jacobitism was already a defeated cause.” Nonetheless, Bute became synecdoche for the whole of the Scottish scourge — Highland Jacobites and Lowland opportunists alike. Indeed, as John Brewer declared, “few politicians can have been maligned, insulted and manhandled” as was Bute. “Whether Bute was serving the king (1761–3) or out of office, he was attacked by the mob, threatened with assassination, vilified in pamphlets, prints, newspapers, songs, plays, and handbills, and effectively rejected as a potential ally by all the leading politicians of the day except for the none too political respectable Henry Fox.”

Bute was ravaged in the press, and although his position provided him an opportunity for rebuttal through a Tory party newspaper — The Briton, edited by a fellow Scot, Tobias Smollett — its circulation was a fraction — only 10 percent — of the readership enjoyed by the North Briton. Bute could not overcome the recent history of Jacobite rebellion and the residual rhetoric that had portrayed Scots as wanton despots who supported divine right, absolute monarchy and state-sanctioned Catholicism. “These cartoons were savagely racist in tone, portraying Scots as greedy mendicants growing rich on England’s rich pastures. Bute himself was satirised in one ribald print after another as

278 Ibid., 3–4.
279 Jack Lynch, “Wilkes, Liberty, and Number 45,” Colonial Williamsburg Journal (2003). Lynch reports that the circulation of North Briton was as high as 2,000 copies per issue, while the official Tory newspaper, The Briton, distributed about 200 copies per issue.
the well-endowed seducer of the mother of George III, which was explicit sexual symbolism for the intolerable penetration of England and the Empire by ragged swarms of Scots crossing the Border in search of places and pensions.”

Whether those attributes of Scots were accurate was immaterial — the rhetorical campaign against Jacobites during the 1745 rebellion left lingering impressions of Scots in the minds of Englishmen. “The connexion between these Scottish characteristics and Bute was exploited to the full by the opposition press, and especially by Wilkes, whose North Briton hammered away week after week at the interchangeable depravity of the Scots nation and the king’s favourite. Bute’s unfortunate surname, Stuart, was used to imply his support of the Jacobite cause, to affirm his belief in the tenets of Catholicism and his political connexions with France.”

While in office he was probably the most unpopular minister that ever served an English monarch. He was le parvenu montagnard, the upstart Highlander, as a contemporary pamphlet called him, who was regarded as bringing from Scotland all the evil traditions of the Stuart race. When he retired, he was still the object of unscrupulous abuse and unfounded slander. For long years after his fall, he was pictured as the evil genius of the sovereign, ever whispering traitorous counsels in his ear, and prompting him to every kind of unconstitutional proceeding. He was made the scapegoat for the blunders of ministers who were in reality his bitterest opponents.

J.A. Lovat-Fraser, whose biography of Bute predates Burkean theories by a few decades, affixes the perfect term, “scapegoat,” to Bute’s reality. He was the perfect scapegoat for a restive nation attempting to shake off its new inclusiveness of anything that did not conform to existing norms of Englishness. Among these, K.W. Schweizer writes, were Catholicism, Spanish and Irish deference to the papacy, and, most alarming, French ideals.


of royal autocracy. Scots, by extension of the anti-Jacobite rhetoric of the 1745 rebellion, represented all of these threats.

In the capital, as Brewer has shown, Bute was a focus of discontent — political, social, economic — by radical and moderate opinion alike, yet what ultimately became perhaps the major ground of attack, enabling the opposition press to mobilize public opinion against him with incredible effectiveness, was his nationality. Indeed, Bute's Scothood was a rallying cry as powerful as that of “favourite” and both epithets worked in tandem: Bute's policies were used to confirm popular conceptions of the Scots while the prevailing view of the Scots was used to malign Bute.283

Bute, portrayed in Highland garb of plaid tartan, became a fixture on satirical prints that hailed Scots as a renewed threat to English liberty.

Carter elucidates Burke's proposition of scapegoating with political situations in which the scapegoat target could shift or change from one week to the next. In those cases, the name of the scapegoat did not matter “as long as the guilt-ridden masses had some scapegoat on whom to heap their own sense of sin.”284 We can see this same rhetorical phenomenon in artifacts of visual rhetoric of eighteenth-century Britain, in which Scots were vilified in 1745 and 1746 for their attempts to foist a Catholic usurper upon them in place of their beloved Hanoverian king. Less than two decades later, the mocking imagery of tartan was used to excoriate a Hanoverian king amid public uproar toward perceived corruption and favoritism. Englishmen of the mid-eighteenth century marked Scots as the source of their ills regardless of whether their brethren to the north represented any real or tangible threat. Scots were different, and Scots belonged to a different community.

collective, constitutive voice of Scotophobic Englishmen refused to imagine themselves as part of any community shared with Scots. Carter points out Burke’s deference to Aristotle’s maxim of persuasion by antithesis, and that is precisely the strategy employed by Englishmen in synecdochic scapegoating of Scots in the second half of the eighteenth century. England was the antithesis of Scotland, the whole of which was represented by one man: Bute. “The scapegoat is thus in some ways a matter of terminology or a figure of speech, a figure of speech by which all live and by which some die.”

**Scotophobia: Scotland the Scapegoat**

As a result of Bute’s political prominence, portrayals of tartan-wearing political manipulators persisted for decades in satirical prints criticizing George III’s governments and policies. “Bute’s tenure was brief but its impact on images of Scots was very long lasting.” The jackboot and thistle became part of the visual lexicon, as did gauche representations of rumors of inappropriate relations between Bute and the Queen Mother. Political satire of the late eighteenth century carried a common thread of tartan-clad Scots or bagpipe-playing antagonists as evidence of Scots’ continued influence in British politics. As Gordon Pentland argues, the persistence of Bute, or at least Scots, in satirical caricature of George III’s government reflected widespread skepticism toward Scots’ rising status in English society. “The incredible longevity of anti-Bute iconography suggests that anti-Scottishness played a more prominent role in English political culture than is usually implied. Into the 1780s the graphic conventions concerning ‘Scottish influence’ retained a

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285 Ibid., 21.
prominent if diminished place in political prints. More than twenty years after Bute’s short premiership, he could still appear in graphic form.”287 This despite the fact, that, “by 1766 Bute was not only regarded as beyond the pale by most politicians, he was — in a political sense at least — persona non grata with the king.”288 Yet Bute’s likeness would continue to represent not only Scots but also the government’s policies.

Scots’ presence in politics continued to increase, as did their influence and prosperity, and Scots in London readily adopted English customs and conventions as they moved toward integrated Britishness.

From the mid-eighteenth century most Scottish commentators were to subscribe to the view that the histories of English institutions, liberties and economic developments mapped out the pathway to the successful liberal modernity enjoyed by contemporary Britons — including, somewhat belatedly, the people of Scotland. In other words, there was a widespread belief, a fundamental tenet of North Britishness, that Scots were reaping the benefits that generations of Englishmen had sown.289

Not only, however, were Scots seen as leeches on the superiority of Englishness, but Scots were seen as endangering that very supremacy, which was wholly English, not British. “The kind of Englishness in Wilkes’s campaign,” Rounce argues, “is an important example of resistance to the concept of Britishness in the eighteenth century.”290 The reimagination of a British community that comprised aspects of the subsidiary communities of England, Wales and Scotland was antithetical to the British identity held by many Englishmen of the day. “Especially after 1745, English-Britishness was also developed in opposition to

287 Ibid., 84.
289 Kidd, “North Britishness,” 363.
the Scots, or rather, to particular images of Scotland and Scottishness, which saw them as a political, cultural and social threat." As Paul Langford concluded, "with the sole exception of the French, no other nationality was so despised and derided in the vast array of caricatures turned out by the London press." In the second half of the eighteenth century, the imagined community of Britain, in which England historically held precedence, was being redefined by an interchange of cultures and peoples — imagined communities all — that largely had existed separately until then. Although Scotland and England had shared a common sovereign since 1603 and had been politically integrated since the Acts of Union in 1707, they had maintained their separate, unique identities. The influx of Scots into England forced a reconsideration of what Britishness meant, and this was anathema to an established hierarchy and social order that had suited English interests for centuries. “Indeed, in a number of ways the Scots were every bit as much of an ‘other’ as the French, and this raises intriguing questions about just what kind of oppositions furnished a nascent British identity.” This is Burke’s antithetical “union by some opposition shared in common” at work. 

Who was behind such vehement anti-Scot propaganda? In short, according to Pentland, “the architects of anti-Scottishness were to be found among groups which occupied marginal positions in English culture.” The totality of the matter is more complicated, of course. Pentland’s assessment of Wilkes finds that it was learned Scots,

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not Bute, who were the target of anti-Scott rhetoric. “The fact that many of the targets in the *North Briton* and in Churchill’s poetry were literary rather than political figures demonstrates that much of his anti-Scottishness was inspired by the patronage and cachet enjoyed by Scottish men of letters.” Even among anti-Bute propagandists of the era, mainstream status was uncommon, and “the engravers, printsellers and publishers who executed and circulated anti-Bute printed material were drawn from similarly marginal groups within their own trades.” Pentland points out that engravers who dealt with political rather than artistic matter were “on the margins of the artistic and cultural community of London” — and “Wilkes’ supporters tended to be drawn from practised polemicists, men outside of the most powerful and profitable groups in the trade.” This is an important consideration in the context of Burke’s hierarchical pyramid. Effectively, successful Scot publishers, of whom there were many, inserted an additional rung within the social order of London’s publishing community. The “lucrative end of publishing, printing and bookselling was well furnished with émigré Scots” and the foremost among them “stood at the centre of an elaborate network of printers, publishers and booksellers, many of them Scots, which was precociously successful in accumulating copyrights, winning royal patents and launching the most commercially successful writers.” Not only had Scots successfully taken up station in England — they also had displaced the printers and publishers who would come to satirize and scorn Scots as uncivilized, untamed and unsuited for positions in British society. As Philip Connell contends, “Bute’s extensive financial subsidies to

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296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
journalists, poets, and men of letters also suggested that the Wilkite exposure of ‘corruption’ and ‘placemen’ could find direct application to the contemporary literary culture.\textsuperscript{299} Indeed, the anxiety and guilt resulting from this revolution of social order required remedy. English printers and publishers, therefore, scapegoated all of Scotland for England’s ills. In reality, though, they were using the organ of free press and xenophobic paranoia in an attempt to restore the social order with which they were comfortable — Scots were the scapegoat for government policies that imported Scots en masse in the first place. Ironically, or perhaps predictably, anti-Scot printers used rhetoric of other to exclude Scots who were not only fellow countrymen, but also fellow tradesmen. Seemingly they could not imagine such community of either case.

There are thus compelling reasons to see the anti-Scottish aspects of Wilkesite campaigns not as the regrettable bedfellows of a political movement that was about ideas of liberty, but as integral to a movement which was in part a cultural revolt by marginalised Grub Street literati and engravers who, in targeting Scots, attacked the success and, crucially, the patronage enjoyed by “foreign” rivals.\textsuperscript{300}

Intrigue of the publishing trade contributed to the propaganda driving Scotophobia in England. Pentland distills this tension down to “cultural conflict” and draws on evidence of the sources used for satirization of Scots. Printers drew heavily on imagery from pro- and anti-Jacobite prints published decades before, and they adopted a “visual shorthand” of tartan to link Bute — and thus all Scots — to Charles Stuart.\textsuperscript{301} “This shorthand demonstrates the synergies between political prints and popular politics, where Wilkesite


\textsuperscript{300} Pentland, “Images of Scots in Political Prints,” 77.

\textsuperscript{301} Robin Nicholson, \textit{Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Making of a Myth} (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 2002).
mobs also used a pared down symbolism, burning effigies adorned with garter and plaid."  

Diana Donald, in a book that surveys the political and visual landscape of the era, argues that “the reduction of a powerful person to a satirical cipher can be experienced as an act of destructive power: and the cipher becomes an independent reality, which can be manipulated and endlessly reproduced by its creators.”  

“This idea of endless reproduction suggests iterative and recursive instances of Burke’s guilt-redemption cycle within a larger cycle of the same. As Carter points out, citing Burke, “The scapegoat is a process, not a thing. It often stirs up hatred for outsiders because its method is ‘unification by a foe shared in common.’”  

If we stipulate to the hypothesis of constitutive rhetoric being able to relieve guilt on behalf of an imagined community, and we see that this process is ongoing for many years, we can imagine, for instance, a recurring litmus test that gauges the effectiveness of this scapegoat rhetoric. In other words, when the collective rhetor — a mob armed with printing presses, in this case — sees that redemption has not been attained and guilt has not been assuaged, the scapegoating process starts anew. Prints of anti-ministerial imagery enjoyed wide circulation “through constant recycling, especially as reduced versions on cards.”  

Donald finds that the dialogue of speech balloons evolved as the imagery’s meaning was reimagined discursively. “The spectators participated in the business of interpretation and fresh invention, with the more literate members of each circle bridging the prints’ messages to the rest.”  

Atherton’s research shows that although printing was

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303 Diana Donald, The Age of Caricature (New Haven, Conn.: Published for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art by Yale University Press, 1996), 51.  
305 Donald, The Age of Caricature, 52.  
306 Ibid.
concentrated in London, distribution was far and wide in terms of geography and social classes. Although prints were affordable, large-scale production was not common in part because of the limits of printing technology of the time. Nonetheless, appetite for news via broadside prints was rapacious, and a consumer of this rhetoric might be just as likely to view it in a printer’s shop window than to buy a copy. “Prints of some quality — even satires — were not looked at like a newspaper and then cast away. They were, after all, ‘art’, and therefore enjoyed some value as collectors’ items, to be framed, bound or used as wallpaper.”307 The large number of artifacts now in the British Museum, purchased from estates and collectors over the past century, affirms this finding — people kept the broadside prints they bought, and from this we also can deduce their value to consumers of news. Atherton also considers the content of these productions, among which satire was the market leader. “A finely executed engraving with ornate embellishments, erudite allusions, and Latin (or even French) inscriptions, would hardly be intelligible to the semi-educated or illiterate.”308 Political propaganda relied on imagery in part because it was “less susceptible to prosecution and retaliation than was the printed word” — but also because it was easier to understand among the audiences that so heartily demanded their output.309 Truth, however, was of little import. “The most common device of propaganda in the prints, therefore, is that of simplification, and the distortion or suppression of facts. Truth is usually found in the nuance; these satirical studies made little allowance for the shade of difference.”310

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307 Atherton, Political Prints in the Age of Hogarth, 64.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid., 66.
The popularity and rhetorical power of visual prints of the era creates a curious consideration alongside their relative impunity from charges of libel or slander: From 1760 until 1820, the only constant in these times was George III, and it bears consideration that after a time Bute became a scapegoat not for Scots, but for the king himself. “The earl's instruction and advice governed George's reactions to men and measures from 1755 until 1763. Even after Bute's influence waned following his resignation as First Lord of the Treasury, the lingering suspicions at Whitehall and Westminster that the king still listened to him in preference to others complicated relations between George III, his ministers, and Parliament.”\textsuperscript{311} As a consequence of his historically close relationship with the king, in satirical and critical prints, Bute became synecdoche for the royal court. He was, effectively, the king's rhetorical whipping boy, and he remained so long after he had faded from power.

Although Whig governments dominated British politics for the most of the eighteenth century, Scots continued to bear the scapegoat's blame for Whig policies unpopular among the British people and press. “Adversaries are portrayed as unspeaking brutes who know no respect for human liberty,” Ivie writes of the scapegoat. “They would force all others to conform to their will and/or ideology. In short, they symbolize the perfect enemy of freedom. The image of the savage aggressor becomes even more ominous, however, when rhetors continue to develop a distinction between the enemy as irrational and the victim as rational.”\textsuperscript{312} Frederick North, also a Tory but not a Scot, faced immense criticism in the popular press during his 12 years as the head of government, yet in many critical prints


\textsuperscript{312} Ivie, “Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War,” 288.
both Bute and North are depicted. “Unlike most of Europe, Britain had no censorship and its political press was both more sophisticated and more widely distributed than that of any other European nation”—and, even more important in the case of anti-Bute rhetoric, “certainly the obscenity and scurrility found daily in English cartoons, ballads, plays and pamphlets would never have been tolerated by continental rulers.”

Yet some rhetors, notably Wilkes, quickly found the outer limit of free expression in Britain, and his use of Bute, along with his successors, as the king’s proxy for criticism was thinly veiled. In particular, Wilkes held unmitigated contempt for Bute’s peace treaty ending the Seven Years’ War, and North Briton 45 decried George III’s speech praising the treaty. As a result, Wilkes was briefly imprisoned in the Tower of London in addition to being censured by Parliament. Wilkes was seen as a hero of free speech, and in his support, Wilkes’s throngs of supporters printed broadsides and handbills carrying anti-Scot engravings. Despite charges of libel, blasphemy and sedition over a number of his works, Wilkes and his North Briton remained wildly popular, and the collected works were republished in 1763 as a supplement titled The Butiad, or Political Register; Being a Supplement to the British Antidote to Caledonian Poison. (Caledonia is the Roman-era name for Scotland.)

Post-Bute governments’ handling of later foreign affairs fiascos presented opportunities for rhetorical scapegoating of Scots for North’s policies in North America. The contentious Quebec Act of 1774, for example, vastly expanded the Province of Quebec and permitted free practice of the Catholic faith by its people. Quebec, as a New France colony until 1763, was predominantly Catholic, and the people of Quebec were expected

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to swear an oath of allegiance to the British king and Church of England. This proposition was unpalatable in Quebec, and as the prospect of losing the American colonies loomed large, North’s government determined to enfranchise the Catholic people of Quebec. The legislative measure caught British newspapers off guard. “Much to their surprise, and, for some, anger, the legislation endeavoured to concede some ground to the realities of Quebec society, and abandoned the hope of anglicizing the French population within a generation.”314 As the threat of conflict with the colonies became increasingly evident, Britain had taken the strategic step of shoring up support in the northern reaches of America by empowering new Roman Catholic subjects to occupy local government and administrative posts. “The issue of catholic [sic] emancipation was the hottest political potato in British domestic politics, and would remain so for the next fifty years. Yet here were the government and its supporters endorsing a civil and religious policy that no catholic in Britain, or its most immediate catholic domain, Ireland, enjoyed.”315 It is particularly ironic that Catholicism would be embraced in British-held Canada by a Whig government three decades after the Hanoverians fought a civil war to purge the threat of popish slavery from their own island nation. Here again, then, Scots, represented by Bute, were held as the scapegoat for unpopular policies of North’s government. As Philip Lawson’s research finds, a “press storm” of a propaganda campaign against the Quebec bill began in May 1774 and lasted for four or five months. As Lawson conveyed, the sentiment in London was thus: “If the government is able to get away with it in the colonies who will stop it in

315 Ibid., 596.
Figure 12. *The Mitred Minuet*. 1774. British Museum Satires 5228: 1868,0808,10061. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
The Treaty of Paris that ended the war was negotiated under Bute's leadership and was widely seen as conciliatory to French interests. To later concede British customs and laws to accommodate former French subjects was unpalatable in Britain, and passage of the law prompted the publication of *The Mitred Minuet*, which depicts Anglican bishops holding hands and dancing around the “Quebec Bill” as North watches while Bute plays the bagpipes at his right side and the devil is poised above them. North wears a smile of satisfaction, and his outstretched arm points as if he is giving instructions. North, who led the British government from 1770 to 1782, is known as the minister who lost the Americas. If not for Bute’s treaty to end the Seven Years’ War in 1763, in which Canada was ceded to Britain, the British government would have lost its entire foothold in North America after the American war for independence.

Colonial considerations became part of the civic dialogue driven by satirical prints. Take for example *By his Majestys [sic] Royal Letters Patent*, an engraving published in late 1780 in London; its subtitle is “the new Invented Method of Punishing State Criminals.” Bute stands atop a stone monument wearing a tartan kilt, a feathered tammie and thistle on his lapel. In each hand, he holds a whip above his head as he straddles an addled and childlike George III, who is wearing an ermine capelet and staring into the distance with a clueless grin as Britannia’s appendages are pulled in three different directions by three horses, “Tyranny,” “Venality” and “Ignorance” — Britannia’s left ankle is tethered to a post.

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316 Ibid., 592.
Figure 13. By his Majestys Royal Letters Patent. 1779. British Museum Satires 5580: 1868,0808.4516. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
“Court Influence,” which North hugs, apparently sobbing. Tyranny and its rider are galloping in the direction of America. Venality and its rider, carrying a mace, are galloping toward Spain as Ignorance and its rider leap onto the path to France. On the left edge of the print, Britannia is presented as a winged angel floating toward heaven — over her left shoulder she holds a staff bearing the liberty cap. Accordingly, Britannia, and therefore British liberty, has been killed by the malfeasance of the king’s court and government, which remain under undue influence from Bute. Mary Dorothy George, who completed authoritative research cataloging the satirical prints in the British Museum, interprets the winged figure as liberty fleeing to America; she notes that many prints of that decade carried that theme. “America in these prints, as in much contemporary literature, is the land of liberty and virtue. England that of corruption and slavery — Liberty taking flight to American being a familiar theme.”

I would hesitate to disagree with such a historical luminary as George, but as the horse Tyranny is on the road to America, I do not believe liberty can be headed there as well. In either case, however, Scots remain the scapegoat — the Burkean “vessel” — two decades after Bute resigned from the premiership, and the foreign policy failures of North’s government are reflected in this single image.

John Stuart, Third Earl of Bute

George II died in 1760 and was succeeded by his grandson George III, who inherited a nation deep in debt as a result of successive conflicts coupled with endless ambitions for military might and imperial expansion. George III was a reluctant heir to the throne, as John Bullion recounts, citing letters written in 1757 from Then-Prince of Wales to

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his “dearest friend,” Bute, who was the prince’s private tutor and closest confidant. “In June 1757, George vowed to Bute that he would only accept the throne if he could reasonably hope to realize two goals. The first was ‘restoring my much loved country to her ancient state of liberty’ — and ‘seeing her in time free from her present load of debts and again famous for being the residence of true piety and virtue’ was the other.”320 As George III acceded, so did Bute’s star rise. Bute was 25 years George’s elder and a friend of George’s father, Prince Frederick; consequently, Bute held remarkable sway over the young king, who believed he could not reign without Bute at his side. Bute was George III’s “dearest friend,” and when the Prince of Wales became King George III, “the prince’s affection and respect raised Bute, an obscure though well-connected Scottish nobleman, to the highest offices of state and to the absolute pinnacle of power.”321 Bute, as George’s tutor, had helped the young royal craft a plan to “transform the present system of government” and revitalize fiscal policies by reducing national debt and extending excise taxes.322 “Bute had supplied the prince with a dream which kindled his ambitions and energies. George recognized that Bute was his inspiriting agent. That recognition impelled him to feel a keen sense of affection and gratitude to the earl.”323 As king, George valued his relationship with Bute and relied upon his advice and counsel toward a goal of wholesale political reformation in Britain. “When George wholeheartedly adopted Bute’s dream as his own, and Bute’s plans as the means of implementing that vision, he made a deeply felt commitment that sustained

322 Ibid., 48.
323 Ibid., 46.
the friendship through thick and thin from 1755 into the mid-1760s.”\textsuperscript{324} This kinship did nothing to help allay public perception that Bute was a royal favorite, regardless of his credentials or suitability for the office to which he rose.

Despite the king sharing an ideological vision with Bute, and their grand plan to modernize British politics and balance the treasury free from corruption, their ambitions were met with open hostility. Political opponents seized on this relationship, and thus began a firestorm of rhetoric that not only would ultimately remove Bute from office — it also would harness skepticism of Scots in recent memory to malign the king and his governments’ policies. “As Bute and George III attempted to replace political faction with the Bolingbrokean notion of a ‘Patriot King,’ their opponents interpreted this as a drive toward absolutism, relying on the troubled recent history of the Stuart kings as proof. In other words, propagandists exploited Bute’s nationality to justify their dislike of his politics.”\textsuperscript{325} These propagandists built on assigned identity of Scots to disparage Bute and George III, and in doing so they escalated the identity of enmity that existed in the iconography of traditional Highland garb. “Everything associated with Scotland was now mercilessly satirized — the tartan, the kilt, the bagpipes — even haggis — and of course, the famous ‘itch,’ while doggerel rhymes about the Scots were chanted in the pubs and coffee houses.”\textsuperscript{326} As explored in the previous chapter, anti-Jacobite rhetoric surrounding the 1745 rebellion linked Scots to France and Rome by portraying tartan-clad Highlanders as agents for these transgressors against British liberty. The sustained propaganda campaign against

\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 50.  
\textsuperscript{325} Rounce, “Stuarts without End,” 22.  
\textsuperscript{326} Schweizer, “English Xenophobia in the 18th Century,” 19.
Bute — which totaled more than 400 satirical prints\(^{327}\) — built on that identity by linking Bute’s policies to Jacobite predilections for absolute monarchy and continental influence.

“Such propaganda, ostensibly against Bute and his supposedly secret, Machiavellian influence, ensured that attacks upon his native land continued as an accompaniment.”\(^{328}\) In effect, propagandists established a synecdochic scapegoat chain: Bute was a Scot, Scots were Jacobites, Jacobites supported the Stuarts, and the Stuarts were financed by France and the Holy See. “During the 1760s the number of Scots holding state office rose dramatically and it was easy to suspect that Lord Bute was favouring his own kind.”\(^{329}\)

Brewer carefully catalogs Bute’s unfortunate legacy and provides ample evidence of the circumstances that would lead to him becoming a scapegoat. “Hatred of Bute, like the adulation of his political antonym Wilkes, provided a focal point, an outlet for many disparate grievances. Hard-bitten chauvinism, high bread prices..., trade disputes and resentment against the wealthy were all inextricably bound up with overtly political mob action.”\(^{330}\) Schweizer writes that though much of this hostility stemmed from a variety of causes — economic, social as well as political — “in the final analysis, it was Bute’s nationality with all its contemporary implications and associations, which formed the common denominator.”\(^{331}\) As Donald points out, prints attacking Bute “were the products of an authentic popular culture which has to be understood by its own lights.”\(^{332}\) The attributes mentioned here — including Bute’s Scottishness and his inauspicious last

\(^{327}\) Rounce, “Stuarts without End,” 23.
\(^{328}\) Ibid.
\(^{329}\) Divine, “In Bed with an Elephant,” 5.
\(^{331}\) Schweizer, “English Xenophobia in the 18th Century,” 21–22.
\(^{332}\) Donald, The Age of Caricature, 50.
name—compounded concern that George III’s desire to depart from his grandfather’s style of monarchy represented a regression in Britons’ liberties. “Patriotic Scotophobia of this kind had a relatively diffuse appeal within the lower and middle ranks of English society in the decades after 1745, and was quickly seized upon by the unscrupulous opposition campaign led by” Wilkes.333 There was no mistaking the increased patronage of Scots in public office and influential positions of industry and commerce. “In such ways hostility to the Scots and opposition to Bute worked in tandem; Bute’s conduct was used to confirm the popular conception of the Scots, and the prevailing view of the Scots was used to belabour Bute.”334 As the old adage says, perception is reality, and perception of Bute’s corruption was widespread, thanks in part to scathing popular press as well as Bute’s own strategic follies. “The press played an important contributory role in this almost universal rejection of Bute,” who was seen as a political opportunist.335 “As popular xenophobia converged with the defence of England’s ‘ancient liberties’, Wilkite political prints championed Magna Carta as the last bulwark against Scottish corruption, and popular songs reviled Bute’s role as a ‘Scotch Yoke’ imposed in defiance of John Bull’s ancient ‘Charter.’”336 Bute’s failure to recognize the implications of his actions in a resentment-rich press environment contributed not only to his scandalous reputation, but also his political failures. “The visual and the verbal developed in easy connivance. Bute was ‘booting out’ the English or distributing government ‘booty’...”337

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335 Ibid., 11.
337 Donald, The Age of Caricature, 50.
That was precisely the image proffered in *The Jack-Boot, Exalted*, an etching published anonymously in September 1762 at the height of anti-Bute ferocity. The image of a boot is a reference to Bute’s name, sometimes pronounced “boot,” and it became a visual refrain alongside tartan in countless prints of the time. The image depicts Bute standing inside a large jackboot — only his head, shoulders and arms show above the top of the boot. The boot has a spur with a large rowel and is wrapped in a flowing riband. It is anointed with a star of the Order of the Garter, England’s highest order of chivalry, to which Bute was appointed in 1762; the badge of the Order of the Garter bears the cross of St. George, the patron saint of England. The prominence of this badge at the center of the image cannot be coincidence — that a Scot would be given this honor certainly would only have ripened the resentment toward Bute. The boot itself stands on a pedestal, perhaps in place of a throne in the palace throne room, and heavy drapes hang behind it. Bags of gold coins rest in front of the boot, and behind, the British lion cowers, hanging its head, tamed by the incumbent Scottish minister. Bute is depicted with a pensive yet commanding expression as he holds a whip in his right hand to beat away political opponents, and from his left hand he throws coins to eager tartan-clad Scots on the right half of the image. “Joy to your Lairdship & gude Days to us all,” one of the Scots says with outstretched hands. “By my Saul these are brá Doings for our Lowlanders,” says another, perhaps a Lowlander wearing English fashion. Tartan not only is the dress worn by these usurpers; one Scot lifts the folds of tartan fabric from his kilt to form a purse to catch gold coins. Tartan is depicted, quite literally, carrying away English gold. The Scots are portrayed as unkempt, ungroomed and ill fed.

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Figure 14. *The Jack-Boot, Exalted*. 1762. British Museum Satires 3860: J,1.47. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
On the other half of the image, a Highland soldier raises his sword to sweep away English politicians, who scowl at the scene before them. “Shall an Englishman bear this?” one asks. Another, apparently an ousted Whig minister, replies: “I saw how it would be and retir’d in due Time.” Another laments: “I have bid Adieu to all but my God & my King.” Finally, in the center of the image, an Englishman kneels in supplication, crying out, “Be not Vain because I kneel, ’tis not to thee, but to a Superior Power.” This plea suggests two possible meanings — that Englishmen recognized Bute’s position, appointed by the king, despite his personal qualities, or perhaps that Englishmen recognized God as superior to politicians and royals regnant alike. This entire scene unfolds before the French ambassador — in London to negotiate the Seven Years’ War treaty — as he pulls back the throne-room drapes with a smile. The print contains five stanzas of verse to describe the “Jack-Boot,” and the final six couplets appear as follows.

A Head It has of human guise  
A Body too, with Arms likewise  
In One Hand he a Whip doth hold  
In t’other Sums of british [sic] Gold  
Which he with partial care dispenses,  
Among his Clan as Recompenses.  
For what? Lord knows, but ostentation  
Because they’re of his own dear Nation  
But ah the Whip is laid on those  
Poor Southern Men he thinks his Foes  
Who quietly give up their Places  
To Hungry Caledonian Faces.

In a way, much of this rhetoric is vintage anti-Scot propaganda from 1745 and 1746. The Scots are depicted as depraved and unsophisticated as they scavenge like hungry dogs. France is portrayed as playing a role behind the scenes, and English virtue and liberty are
under siege. The key difference is that whereas anti-Jacobite rhetoric forecast and imagined a future in which Bonnie Prince Charles and the pope ruled Britain together, anti-Bute rhetoric presents an image of an enemy already on the inside — and it worked. “The tactic of fanning hostility to the Scots with hatred of Bute, and vice versa, very swiftly produced results. Anti-Caledonian clubs were formed in London’s taverns and the Scots (like the Jews before them) were booed and jeered in Theatre.”\textsuperscript{339} Donald’s assessment of contemporary attitudes supports the idea that anti-Scot rhetors constituted themselves as an imagined community separate from evolving English-cum-British identity.

In the still-embryonic political culture of the Wilkes era, the ubiquitous jackboot and other popular symbols of a hated ministry served to raise the collective consciousness and to generate a sense of strength and solidarity. Their repetition is a sign not of poverty of invention, but of a clever political strategy. This is the art of the excluded, of politics seen from below, but it expresses an insolent contempt for the mighty rather than a sense of powerlessness.\textsuperscript{340}

The idea of “seen from below” is essential in understanding hierarchy as the catalyst for guilt-redemption instincts. “To shore up our sagging self-esteem, we seek someone to blame for our moral corruption, our social inadequacy, our sense that life is slipping, inexorably, away.”\textsuperscript{341} The Burkean sense of mutual guilt — top and bottom — is affirmed in Rounce’s findings regarding Scotophobia in eighteenth-century England. “Scottish ‘weakness and poverty’ are couched in such vague terms as to suggest a sense of moral evaluation beyond the simply economic. The quietly triumphant tone is not hard to interpret — the English erred in giving Scotland a Union it did not deserve, and it is

\textsuperscript{339} Brewer, “The Misfortunes of Lord Bute,” 21.
\textsuperscript{340} Donald, \textit{The Age of Caricature}, 51.
\textsuperscript{341} Carter, \textit{Kenneth Burke and the Scapegoat Process}, 18.
only natural for Scotland to exploit such weakness.”\textsuperscript{342} Further to Rounce’s argument: “It is not the business of propaganda to make nuanced distinctions, but in one sense, the first problem of defining Wilkesite Englishness can be seen in this early example, where fear of Scottish domination is an expression of English insecurity. What then, exactly, is being defended, other than a mythic, isolationist Englishness that would hardly be compatible with England before 1707, let alone after it?”\textsuperscript{343}

In \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, Burke writes of a patrilineal dimension to scapegoating and rebirth — “the alienating of iniquities from the self to the scapegoat amounts to a rebirth of the self. In brief, it would promise a conversion to a new principle of motivation — and when such a transformation is conceived in terms of the familial or substantial, it amounts to a change in parentage.”\textsuperscript{344} This recursive nature of scapegoating is reflected in the rhetoric of anti-Scot activities of the Wilkes era. Their desire to purge England of their Scottish brethren was tantamount to a desire for Britain to be reborn in their vision of England. Anti-Scot rhetors, therefore, would be the parents of their own reincarnation, facing again a social order and hierarchy that would again need to be purged of guilt. Despite all this, and as Colley contends, the common thread among Britons — English, Scottish and Welsh — was Protestantism, which, coupled with major military conflicts over 140 years, allowed an “artificial” British identity to develop. There was a smattering of Catholics in the Highlands, and even in England with immigration from Ireland, but Great Britain was and remained a Protestant nation. So vexing was

\textsuperscript{342} Rounce, “Stuarts Without End,” 25.
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{344} Burke, \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, 407.
Catholicism to Britain that the prohibition of Catholic monarchs, first passed as part of the Act of Settlement in 1701, was not overturned until Parliament passed the Succession to the Crown Act in 2013. For more than three centuries, the line of succession, by law, barred not only Catholic members of the royal family from inheriting the throne, but also any royal who was married to a Catholic. In times past, Colley writes, “the most common slang adjective for Catholics was ‘outlandish,’ and this was meant literally. Catholics were beyond the boundaries, always on the outside even if they were British-born: they did not and could not belong.”

This common identification is central to Burke’s dialectic of the scapegoat — scapegoating cannot happen without it. And so while anti-Scot Englishmen would recoil at the idea of being lumped together with Scots, little did they realize that they already were. Their common Protestantism, despite the Catholicism of the Jacobite pretenders, bound them together as Britons. The scapegoat, therefore, “is profoundly consubstantial with those who, looking upon it as a chosen vessel, would ritualistically cleanse themselves by loading the burden of their own iniquities upon it.” In order for Anglophile Britons to act on Scotophobic beliefs, they first had to acknowledge, even subconsciously, that they shared at least some overlap in the social order of the imagined communities they occupied together.

**Henry Dundas, Westminster’s Man in Edinburgh**

Between 1774 and 1783 there were almost 140 print shops and publishers in London. As in the decade before, criticism of Scots was good for business. In the same

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fashion that the Earl of Bute was lampooned in the 1760s for favoritism toward Scots over Englishmen, two decades later another Scot, Henry Dundas, later titled the Viscount of Melville, was criticized for his favoritism among Scots. As a close confidant of William Pitt during his first premiership, Dundas became Westminster's man for Scotland — “the phrase ‘Dundas Despotism’ alluded not so much to the repression of democratic aspirations among the ordinary people of Scotland as to the power exerted by Henry Dundas within the tiny political nation.”348 From 1784 to 1806, Dundas controlled revenue as well as church and judicial appointments in Scotland. “Dundas is, of course, notorious for his use of East Indian patronage in Scots politics.”349 Although public perception was that Dundas's affairs were rife with corruption, Brown points out that Dundas controlled only a fraction of the East India Company's dealings. “It is fair to say, however, that this fragment, perhaps an average of a dozen jobs a year in his personal gift between 1784 and 1801, was put to good use in his Scottish operations.”350 Political observers, namely those making satirical prints, did not overlook this system of patronage, and satirical prints critical of Dundas began appearing as early as 1783. Unlike fellow Scottish scapegoat Bute, however, for Dundas, tartan often was but a subtle sartorial flourish accenting his otherwise English dress — he was depicted as an ally of Pitt and an agent for his government's policies. In The Board of Controul [sic], an etching produced in 1787, Dundas is portrayed at a table alongside Pitt and other policymakers as haggard Scots approach to ask for jobs in imperial India.351 The

349 Ibid., 272.
350 Ibid.
Figure 15. The Board of Control. 1787. British Museum Satires 7152: 1868,0808.5631. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
leader of the band of Scots presents a letter to Dundas. “Almighty Sir,” the letter begins, “We your Countrymen & Kinsmen make humble application to be appointed Governors or Directors, in your India Department — but should that be incompatible with your present Engagements should be happy rather than not be employed under so mighty a Chief, to go in any capacity: however low trusting to your gracious favor....” As M.D. George notes in her analysis of this print, although the Scots are caricatured with exaggerated features, Dundas and his allies are not.\textsuperscript{352} We can infer from this that Dundas is seen as having risen above the depravity of Highland Scots — his appearance suggests that he has assimilated with his English colleagues at the center of Britain’s governing elite.

A 1794 satirical print titled \textit{Progress of a Scotsman} reinforces this idea. It depicts the cultural and political development of Dundas from backward, tartan-clad Scot to English sophisticate. Dated April 1794, the hand-colored etching portrays Dundas in 15 separate scenes, which begin “on a journey from the Highlands to Edinburgh.”\textsuperscript{353} In the first image, Dundas is a primitive barbarian — he has only his modest tartan clothes, a blue bonnet and a walking stick. As the scenes progress, Dundas’s fortunes improve, and in the final scene he is depicted in English clothes wearing the coronet of his peerage rank as he sits on a modest throne. Dundas satires over two decades carry forward the incessant scapegoating of Scots for their role in British politics, but many of the prints in which Dundas is the subject also reflect his transcendence from the Burkean guilt associated with his Scottish heritage. There are, to be sure, many prints satirizing Dundas in tartan, but in some caricatures, Dundas


Figure 16. Progress of a Scotsman. 1794. British Museum Satires 8550: 1868,0612.1247. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
was almost indistinguishable from his English contemporaries. Although some images of Bute had presented him in a tailcoat with the badge of his chivalric order, Bute-era satires often carried some other visual icon — tartan or a thistle, perhaps — to signify his Scottishness. In *A Specimen of Scotch Modesty*, published in 1798, Dundas is portrayed in 12 isolated yet ornately illustrated scenes chronicling his political career. In only one of those scenes, where he is depicted in his nightgown, is tartan used as part of his attire. This is another example in which Dundas is not caricatured but rather depicted as if he might be in a portrait — the print carries a solemn tone. The marked difference in style suggests that Dundas was a man to be taken seriously — his political career certainly lasted longer than Bute’s — and perhaps the criticism of him was less convenient than the circumstances surrounding Bute’s rampant unpopularity. Dundas was portrayed in a wide range of styles, but unlike Bute, who was seen as a power behind the throne, Dundas was aligned with the leading politicos of the day, and in some instances is shown addressing the king directly. Bute often was shown whispering in the king’s ear from behind.

Dundas did not escape his share of the satire of tartan scapegoating. A May 1804 print, *The Scotch Neptune displaying a Signal to Friends in the north!!*, satirizes Dundas’s recent appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty. Dundas is portrayed in tartan and a blue bonnet as he holds a trident from the window of the “admiralty” — he gestures toward dozens of tartan-clad Scots running eagerly to him from “Edin buro” while he shouts, “Come alang my bra lads” and names some of the men. Even after Scots had helped put

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Figure 17. A Specimen of Scotch Modesty. 1798. British Museum Satires 9169: 1868,0808.10351. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
Figure 18. Scotch-Harry’s News; or Nincumpoop in high Glee. 1792. British Museum Satires 8094: 1868,0808.6198. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
down the 1798 Irish rebellion, lingering resentment toward southward Scots manifested itself in political satire of the day. Among the images in which Dundas is depicted in tartan, much of the tartan iconography is considerably different from those depicting Bute, even in prints contemporary with each other. Whereas images of Bute often outfitted him in full Highland dress, sometimes primitively, Dundas frequently was depicted wearing English-style clothes with a tartan cowl or scarf around his neck or shoulders. Also, prints of the era increasingly were colored by hand, and the addition of color to the images made them more playful. One such example is *Scotch-Harry’s News; or Nincumpoop [sic] in high Glee*, which depicts Dundas in 1792 replete with a cravat and powdered wig—plaid tartan is draped over his shoulders.\(^{356}\) Another fine example from 1792 is *The Dagger Scene; or The Plot discover’d*, which depicts the moment at which Edmund Burke dropped a dagger on the floor of Parliament in protest of the proposed Alien Bill to admit French refugees into Britain during the French Revolution.\(^{357}\) The print depicts Dundas seated next to Pitt; both wear breeches, stockings and tailcoats, but Dundas is again draped in tartan. Prints published over the coming decade sometimes outfitted Dundas in full Highland costume, and this gradual shift in the presentation of Scots as scapegoats not only reflects their increasing integration into British society, but also the sartorial substantiation of tartan-clad British soldiers fighting for king and country.


Figure 19. The Dagger Scene; or The Plot discover’d. 1792. British Museum Satires 8147: 1851,0901.633. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
In the collection of satirical prints cataloged by the British Museum, Dundas last appears in tartan in 1812, seven years after he had retired from public office. Bute, on the other hand, was last seen in June 1784 in *A Peep Below Stairs A Dream* as he is led into the flames of hell. Bute died in 1792, and the fading prevalence of his likeness in satirical prints in addition to the depictions of Dundas without tartan in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century signal a rhetorical shift to which we can assign Scots’ rising prominence in Britain’s imperial endeavor.

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CHAPTER IV

TARTAN IS WORN BY BRITISH HEROES

“Gude claes open a’ doors.” — Scottish proverb
“Good clothes open all doors.”

“There is no better antidote against entertaining too high an opinion of others than having an excellent one of ourselves at the very same time.” — Sir Walter Scott, Waverley

It remained illegal to wear Highland attire in Scotland except in the service of the king’s army until the Dress Act was repealed in 1782. And for those Highland soldiers who had chosen that career, Highland dress was not negotiable. There remained a difference between Highland regiments and Lowland regiments, which today are constituted as simply Scottish regiments, and in 1779 Highland soldiers mutinied at Leith, near Edinburgh, when they were ordered to join a Lowland regiment and forgo their kilts. David Stewart of Garth, whose famed 1822 book, Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland, recounted the ordeal. “The soldiers having refused to comply, an attempt was made to enforce the orders. The Highlanders flew to arms, and a desperate affray ensued.” Ten men were killed and 31 were injured. Yet Stewart presents the Highlanders’ request as reasonable and conveys accounts of their defense. “A great number of the detachment represented, without any order or mutinous behavior, that they were altogether unfit for any other corps than Highland ones, particularly that they were incapable of wearing breeches as part of their dress.”

ones in this slice of history played a substantial role in British forces fighting against the American colonies during their war for independence, and despite the outcome of that conflict, by the 1790s, as new Highland troops were raised to support the needs of the Empire, we begin to see evidence of Scotland’s renewed place in the British Empire. “The transformation of the regiments into icons of national valour occurred quite quickly suddenly at the end of the Revolutionary War.”362 As one London newspaper reported at the start of that decade: “It is extremely politic in Administration to indulge the troops that may be raised in the Highlands, with their ancient dress; to this the Highlanders have ever been partial, and permission to wear it will be a strong incentive to forming Highland regiments. Their natural hardiness, and their known bravery, will ever make them valuable troops.”363 Another newspaper, True Briton, reported a similar sentiment a few years later, in 1793: “The three Highland Regiments now about to be completed promise to do credit even to spirit of that martial Country.”364 That London newspapers would publish such passages is evidence of the Scots’ success in sartorial substantiation. They had passed the Rubicon — tartan was no longer dangerous to Britain. Indeed, it would continue to be an important part of British military identity for centuries to come.

If tartan had been a visual marker of Scots’ threat to the United Kingdom, how could it possibly become a symbol of pride and prestige for Scottish men in service to the same nation? Could the prospect of donning a “handsome uniform” comprising a kilt, doublet and a feather bonnet be enough to entice a young Scot to enlist in the service

363 Public Advertiser (London), Issue 17560, October 16, 1790, 2.
of his queen and country?[^365] That was precisely the rhetorical strategy employed by the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, an infantry regiment first raised in Scotland in 1793. A handbill, printed in 1891 and bearing red type, served as a recruitment notice for the fabled British army unit and appealed to young Scots with the many perquisites of military life — and first among those was the privilege of wearing tartan.

YOUNG MEN between 18 and 25 years of age, who are strong, healthy, and of good character, can join the above famous Highland Regiment. They will there find good comrades and comfortable service. In addition to wearing a handsome uniform — **kilt, doublet, and feather bonnet,** — they are offered **good pay, quick promotion, excellent food and lodging, light work, lots of spare time, amusements, education, and frequent change of station.**

Any eligible young man wishing to wear the Feather Bonnet and Kilt of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders should apply to the nearest Recruiting Sergeant.[^366]

From one perspective, this pitch is perfectly sensible — a sincere and almost carefree effort to recruit Scots to a celebrated Scottish regiment in the loyal service of Her Majesty's army. Military uniforms of Highland dress seem only fitting for such a unit. But if we examine a broader continuum of history and consider that, in the century prior, Highland dress was proscribed and outlawed throughout Scotland — if for no other reason than its tangible ties to Highland military prowess and an indelible link to the Highland way of life — the incongruity of this recruitment notice becomes more evident. In the context of this dissertation, therefore, one must ask: By what means did tartan emerge as an admirable — even enviable — sartorial flourish of soldiers serving the very crown that had persecuted their ancestors? And how did that development enable or contribute to the

[^366]: Ibid. Capitalization, spacing and bold type here match the original.
adoption of tartan as a national symbol of Scotland? These questions beg another: What is the relationship between tartan and Scottish national identity? Just as the previous chapters have demonstrated, imagined communities can share a common rhetorical voice in the guilt-redemption cycle, and in the case of Scotland’s place in Britain in the early nineteenth century, we see evidence that Scots had earned a sibling status alongside England — a little brother, perhaps — loved but still secondary in a realm governed by agnatic primogeniture. At multiple points over the previous century, Britain and Scotland had redefined the hierarchy and order of their Anglo-Scottish union, and the acceptance of Scots as Britons represented a monumentally transcendent purge of English guilt for its relentless marginalization of Scotland in the eighteenth century.

Numerous historical accounts of the Scottish tartan tradition — and, in a larger sense, of the identity of the Scottish people — espouse romantic, mythic and legendary story lines of how tartan was rehabilitated alongside Scottish culture and national identity from the early nineteenth century onward. This scholarship, while compelling in terms of economic, literary, military and sociocultural circumstances, among others, fails to connect the rhetorical rebirth of tartan with its historical vestiges. Further, as Pentland contends, “there was no smooth and uncomplicated progression whereby images of Scots moved from depicting famine-stricken, uncivilised barbarians to loyal Britons with more than a splash of provincial colour.”367 A freestanding historical narrative is insufficient in isolation from the broader rhetorical trajectory of tartan over the previous century. In the previous chapters we have traced how in the first half of the eighteenth century an identity

was imposed on Highland Scots from the outside via rhetorical hegemony that employed imagery of traditional Scottish attire. In the four decades that followed, that identity was applied in mocking criticism of Britain’s ruling elite in London itself as Britons condemned perceived corruption and inequity. By the early nineteenth century, however, we see evidence that Scottish fortunes had turned — Scots had, in fact, earned a leading role in the ever-expanding British empire, and their military feats became the stuff of legend. As James Hoban Jr. writes: “Ceremonial rhetoric that honors change contains temporal and spatial patterns similar to those in rites of passage. First occurs a separation from an old status, then follows a period of transition or marginality during which the subject is between statuses, and finally comes an integration into a new hierarchical position that concludes the ceremonial pattern.”

In the story of tartan, we see the English press in the 1740s establish and impose an identity on Highland Scots in which tartan is a mark of enmity — this is the separation and departure from tartan’s old status as Highlanders’ ancient dress. Later, in a period of transition, imagery of tartan is used as the axis of satire to rail against George III and his government, which was seen as rotten with corruption. Finally, Scotland — from its separate Lowlands and Highlands — begins to become reintegrated as a distinct, unique but subordinated part of Great Britain, and it is folded into a new hierarchical position within the United Kingdom. “The effect, then, of rhetorical rituals of rebirth rests on the dialectical interaction of psychological changes an public displays of transition.” The Burkean notion of dramatistic redemption is imbued with an expectation of the rhetor’s

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369 Ibid., 285.
innate desire to rhetorically right his wrong. The Highland Scots did that. As Divine writes, “With security on the northern border firmly established and underpinned by the proven loyalty of the Scots, Westminster could virtually afford to let Scotland go its own way within the parameters of the Union.” In the tartan narrative, the restoration of Scottish national identity, illustrated over three centuries through tartan as Scotland’s universal symbol — as synecdoche for Scotland itself — reflects a protracted ceremonial rebirth. The pages that follow contain analysis of narrative that trace the romantic redemption of tartan in Great Britain since late in the nineteenth century.

**Imperial Scots**

A consumer of anti-Scots rhetoric in eighteenth-century England would be hard pressed to imagine the heroic romanticism with which imperial Scottish military regiments are endowed today. Even according to some historians such as Finlay, Scots’ imperial service is little understood in the modern era. “Few areas of Scottish history have been as neglected as the contribution made by Scots to British imperialism, in spite of the fact that nineteenth-century Scotland rejoiced in its self-proclaimed status as a nation of ‘empire builders.’” But whereas imperial expansion provided Scots with opportunities to invest sweat equity in rejoining the flock of civilization in Britain, it complicated, in many ways, the development of Scottish national identity. We acknowledge here that there were two distinct senses of Scottishness at the time of Culloden — the Highland clans clung closely to their centuries of tradition, which were guided by kinship and the kirk (church). Lowland

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Scots, on the other hand, were more urbanized and less regimented in familial dynasticism. Highland Scots and Lowland Scots consequently imagined themselves as part of different visions of Scottish community. The Highlanders’ vision of themselves and their culture began to unravel in the effects of the Act of Proscription and Cumberland’s terror across the Highlands — the outcome of the Forty-five was an adjustment of social order and hierarchy in which Highland Scots were brutally repressed as their way of life was undone by the Highland clearances. Although some Scots already were serving the Hanoverian crown at the time the Jacobite rebellion was put down, the Scottish military regiments, complete with tartan uniforms, became the only choice other than immigration to North America for Highland men to escape the boot on their throat. “For both individual Scots and the nation as a whole, the Empire had provided them with the opportunity to rid the historic curse of poverty and backwardness and propel Scotland into the ranks of the prosperous nations.”

The crown sought to reappropriate Highlanders’ clan loyalty and marshal it as loyalty to the crown through military service. According to Bruner, such measures are not unusual. “Collective identities, constructed primarily in response to economic exigencies or historical traumas, are generally tools of the state in the consolidation of power. However, rather than simply being tools, they are also historically developed and politically consequential symbolic constructions citizens are enmeshed in.” For men of the Highland clans who had challenged the incumbent Hanoverian regime, service to the Empire — a new loyalty — was the path to redemption.

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372 Ibid., 17.
373 Bruner, Strategies of Remembrance, 91–92.
The Highlands were represented as an imperial kindergarten where the inhospitable terrain and harsh climate had shaped a hardy breed whose loyalty and courage knew no bounds. The nineteenth-century cult of Jacobitism was constructed around these perceptions and the steadfastness of the Clans to the Pretenders cause in the eighteenth century was forgiven because it was believed to be innate loyalty which was now being used to good effect in the service of the Empire.  

Finlay argues that this militaristic imperialism provided a focus for Scottish identity and “helped to unify an increasingly divided nation.” By “nation,” however, Finlay refers not to Great Britain — his observation is of Scotland itself. John MacKenzie argues that the Union with England had “turned Scotland into a stateless nation, clinging to its church, law, banking, and educational systems, while it underwent a long process of anglicization.” Without the Empire, however, it is difficult to imagine how Scotland’s redemption might have occurred. Indeed, from a rhetorical standpoint, the Empire provided opportunities for Scots to be depicted as loyally British, and thanks to their tartan uniforms, their origin was unmistakable. “Although Scots in fact constituted a lower proportion of the British army than their population warranted, they are everywhere in the visual record.” An engraving published in 1793 depicts A Scotish [sic] Piper of an Highland Regiment in ornate detail. This engraving is not a caricature; it is a rather romantic vision of the regimental bagpiper of the Highland regiments at the time. The image has two distinguishing characteristics, however, that warrant a closer look. First, as J. Telfer Dunbar remarks, the piper bears a

374 Ibid., 16.
375 Ibid., 13.
377 Ibid., 727.
Hanoverian cockade on his bonnet — an unmistakable symbol of allegiance to the British crown. Secondly, the pennant or flag waving from the chanter (horn) is St. George’s cross rather than the saltire of St. Andrew or the Union flag. The image suggests that the Highland regiment is in the service of English interests.

Remarkable is the contrast between images of noble Scottish warriors against the miserably trite satirical depictions of Scots in the 1740s and later. Take, for example, two prints published in London in 1784. In *Secret Influence Directing the New Parliament*, Bute is depicted in tartan, crouched over the throne of George III and endorsing a factional impasse in Parliament. “Damn the Commons,” Bute says. This print, as M.D. George surmises, is “an interesting indication of the persistence of the legend of Bute’s secret influence.” In contrast, *Scotch Eloquence or the Determination of a Loyal Kingdom*, produced only a few months earlier, depicts a noble Highland soldier as he draws his sword to protect a crown — which is inscribed “This I’ll ever defend [sic]” — from the advances of opposition members of Parliament, who are depicted as the regicidal vestiges of the Cromwellian interregnum. In the background is a large pyramid, an icon of conquest, which represents the British occupation of Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian War. These images represent the typical style of the era — monochrome engravings with exaggerated forms. This change in trope by a solitary voice in favor of the Scots presaged their rhetorical redemption in the popular press and in works of fine art over the coming years. Three

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Figure 20. Secret Influence Directing the New Parliament. 1784. British Museum Satires 6587: 1868,0808.5306. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
Figure 21. *Scotch Eloquence or the Determination of a Loyal Kingdom*. 1784. British Museum Satires 6391: 1868.0808.5117. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
decades later, Scottish soldiers would be illustrated in ornate and colorful detail at the vanguard of regiments vanquishing Napoleon's forces at Waterloo. These images enabled Britons to overcome lingering mistrust toward Scots and to imagine them as increasingly integrated members of the British community. That feeling would increase and solidify over time. “The British Empire facilitated and promoted the popular perception of the Scots as a martial race and militarism was an essential component of nineteenth-century expansionist nationalism.”

Yet Scottishness was able to stand on its own. In an 1807 etching titled *Highlanders*, soldiers are depicted at rest, although not at peace. This example, published in London, does not depict the Highland soldiers at war, but it communicates the solemnity and seriousness of their duty, and it does so without providing any sense of place — the reader can imagine the troops anywhere in the Empire. An example from a few years later demonstrates why that was possible. In *Sir Arthur Wellesley discovering the Body of Tippoo Saib*, British soldiers discover the body of an adversarial ruler who died resisting the British in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War on the Indian subcontinent. A Highland soldier is depicted in the foreground of the scene alongside British troops. Many images depicting Highland regiments portray Scots alongside British regulars — tartan kilts and uniforms of breeches fighting together in common purpose. This Burkean identification — through a shared enemy — explains an essential development of Britishness. “Can our conflicts only be transcended by our unifying against a common foe? Can our identities only form around

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Figure 22. *Highlanders*. 1807. British Museum: 1849,1208.604. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
Figure 23. Sir Arthur Wellesley discovering the Body of Tippoo Saib. 1812. British Museum: 1872,1214.283. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
a scapegoat? Burke’s answer is yes. In fact, in every corner of the world just such a story has been and is being told.”\textsuperscript{386} In the case of the British Empire, as Colley wrote: “If we look at Great Britain in this way, as an invented nation that was not founded on the suppression of older loyalties so much as superimposed on them, and that was heavily dependent for its raison d’être on a broadly Protestant culture, on the threat and tonic of recurrent war, especially war with France, and on the triumphs, profits, and Otherness represented by a massive overseas empire, a great deal becomes clear.”\textsuperscript{387}

**Renegotiated Identity, Reimagined Communities**

Historians such as Colley have written extensively about Britishness and its complex arrangement of shared and discrete identities. A “Four Nations” view of the United Kingdom, which accounts separately for the national but interrelated identities of England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, is perhaps appealing “quite independent of its scholarly value. Such an approach can reduce Britishness to the interaction of four organic and invariably distinct nations (or three if Ireland is left out of the story).”\textsuperscript{388} This phenomenon becomes even more complex when Scotland is considered for its mutually unique Lowlands and Highlands and their own historically fragmented regional identities. Colley writes that Highlanders and Lowlanders were different ethnicities altogether — “Highlanders could view both Lowland Scots and the English as foreigners. By the same token, the inhabitants of northern England had (and still have) far more in common with their Lowland Scottish


\textsuperscript{387} Colley, “Britishness and Otherness,” 327.

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid., 313.
neighbors than with the inhabitants of southern England.” This ethnic and cultural fragmentation of these imagined communities within Scotland reflects little of our present-day understanding of the nation, and it represents a rhetorical puzzle for understanding how Scots came to share a common ethos. “In practice, men and women often had double, triple, or even quadruple loyalties, mentally locating themselves, according to the circumstances, in a village, in a particular landscape, in a region, and in one or even two countries. It was quite possible for an individual to see himself as being, at one and the same time, a citizen of Edinburgh, a Lowlander, a Scot, and a Briton.”

How, then, could Scots come to imagine themselves as part of a singular Scottish community, and how did they imagine that community in relation to Britain? As Finlay points out, “it is a value-laden judgement and assumes that Scottish nationalism must be intrinsically hostile to the British state. Yet, for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century there was no sense of contradiction in being both Scottish and British. Indeed, they were mutually reinforcing.” Historians are in almost universal agreement that Scotland’s increasingly prominent role in the British Empire is owed most of the credit for this shift, and while that makes sense from a macro-level view, the dialectical nuances of that evolution require further analysis. In particular, we must recognize that Highlanders and Lowlanders rhetorically constituted themselves differently if by no other means than their sartorial preferences. From the outset of the Forty-five, satirical press in England externally constituted Highland Scots as separate, different and other. Although the Highlands

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389 Ibid., 315.
390 Ibid.
were ruled by an ancient custom of clan loyalty above all else, Highlanders ultimately put their national interests ahead of mythic tradition. Service to the British Empire, delivered primarily by Highland regiments deployed around the globe, constitutes Scots’ mortification and atonement for their sin against Britain. In Burkean terms, Highland Scots sought redemption for themselves by delivering their martial prowess on imperial fronts worldwide. As Calloway finds: “Scots not only found a place in the British Empire but also played a large role in running it. The growth of a ‘British’ identity, a common language, and shared political institutions helped Scots unite with English in pursuit of similar economic goals and imperial aspirations. Highland Scots confronted (and sometimes preserved) cultural differences, but most eventually joined the common endeavor.”

When considered as one chronicle rather than as independent narratives — and when assessed alongside the tribulations of Scottish national identity itself — the devolution and resurgence of Scottish identity constitutes a specimen of Burke’s guilt-redemption cycle, which renews repeatedly as Scotland develops its new British identity. From the late eighteenth century through the first three decades of the nineteenth, Scots underwent two significant transformations that became the bedrock of Scotland’s rebirth within Great Britain. First, as mentioned before, Highland Scots’ military service to the Empire assuaged their guilt for the 1745 rebellion — the Highland clans mortified themselves in exchange for respect, camaraderie, and the dignity of their tartan uniforms and weapons. Over time, this gesture reshaped the hierarchical order in which the Highland “savages” had been shunned by Lowland Scots and the English alike. In the same spirit, Lowland

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Scots demonstrated dramatistic transcendence — they imagined themselves as separate and independent from the Highland Scots whose treasonous rebellion had resulted in Scotland’s outcast status in Britain. Lowland Scots took no responsibility for the Jacobite rebellions, and therefore they had no guilt for which to atone. Highland Scots earned their British credentials by contributing throughout the Empire’s farthest reaches. Lowland Scots were the gears of Britain’s Industrial Revolution, and their emigration to England allowed them to earn their own British stripes over time. “This was an age of significant population increase and there were simply many more younger sons for whom careers had to be found commensurate with inherited social status. In that sense the Empire came as a godsend for the genteel but often impoverished landed gentry of Scotland. There was no barrier on entry placed on these Scots, even at the highest levels of colonial administration.”

Separately but simultaneously, Highlanders and Lowlanders came to imagine themselves as Britons as well as Scots, and this allowed both communities to also imagine themselves as part of the same Scotland. By confronting the guilt associated with the hierarchy of their circumstances — Scottish other — Highlanders and Lowlanders created their own identity as Britons, and at the same time, Britons came to see them as Scots of the same Scotland. Divine presents the Irish rebellion of 1798 as flagging evidence of Scotland’s new status — and demonstrated fidelity — as an honorable British sibling.

It was at this time that the Irish committed the ultimate betrayal as the rebellion of 1798 gave the French the real chance of an effective flank attack at the hour of England’s greatest peril. The contrast with the Scots could not have been more dramatic. Already over-represented among the officer class in the field armies, 52,000 Scots also joined the ranks of the volunteers. With

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Figure 24. View from Mont St. Jean of the Battle of Waterloo. 1816. British Museum De Vinck Collection 1909–1967 9554: 1873,0712.792. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
around 15 per cent of the British population, this amounted to 36 per cent of all the volunteer soldiery in 1797, 22 per cent in 1801 and 17 per cent in 1804. Scottish loyalty and the Scottish contribution in blood to final victory had cemented the Union by 1815. 394

From Irish rebellion to the Napoleonic Wars and exotic locales around the world, Highland Scots became a visibly unique presence in Britain’s imperial ambitions. Their colorful tartan uniforms set them apart. An 1816 aquatint print, View from Mont St. Jean of the Battle of Waterloo, portrays the Highlanders in vivid color at the forefront of the battle as the Duke of Wellington prepares to charge upon the French forces. 395 The Highlanders, dressed in Gordon tartan and bearskin hats, are tightly clustered, their bayonets pointed to the sky. The close proximity of the Highland regiment to the leader of the British forces signifies their importance in not only the outcome of the battle, but also their place among British forces. The coloring of the print draws attention to the Highlanders — there is a visible contrast between them and Prussian forces nearby. A simpler monochrome engraving published the same year depicts the Highland regiment standing firm at Waterloo despite the fallen tartan-clad soldiers on the ground, and although the image itself is less dynamic and exhibits less depth, it communicates the ideal that Scots were a phalanx for British engagement of French forces. 396 Their valor did not go unnoticed in London. In addition to broadsides that honored Scots among the victors, a book that detailed the Waterloo battle carried a frontispiece titled Heroes of Waterloo that depicts a Highland

394 Ibid., 6.
Figure 26. *The Battle of Waterloo*. 1816. British Museum Reid Collection 1871 4539: 1978,U.3244. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
Figure 25. Heroes of Waterloo. 1816. British Museum: 1873,1108.249. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
regiment commander at the right hand of the Duke of Wellington as Britannia, Victory and Europa attend to them and allied military leaders.397

Olson established for us that broadside printers in London were motivated by market demand, and therefore we can infer from the existence of these prints that there was a desire to commemorate Britain’s grand victory over Napoleon at Waterloo. The prominence of Highland soldiers in tartan throughout this imagery cannot be coincidence — nor can the explicit label of “British” applied to the victors. In these cases, Highland regiments also were British regiments, and that is indicative of the complex constellation of identities they experienced. Similarly, the visual rhetoric of such broadsides affirmed to Londoners and beyond that Highland Scots had earned the right to be called British, regardless of whether they wanted to or chose to call themselves that. As Hariman and Lucaites remind us, “public images provide a distinctively effective means for both displaying and negotiating the various combinations making up political identity.”398

Through the images inspired by the Battle of Waterloo, Scottish soldiers could be depicted in tartan worn by British heroes. The sartorial substantiation of Scots — their willingness to adapt and reappropriate the identity of other that was imposed upon their country and people generations before — made possible the redemption of Scotland through the heroic military acts of its men in Highland dress because, if not for the tartan which they were depicted wearing, the imagined communities of Britain would have been unable to know that any difference was necessary in the ways they constituted themselves. If not for tartan uniforms of the Highland regiments, Scotland may very well have never been redeemed.

398 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, 10.
A Royal Visit

If tartan is synecdoche for the modern sense of Scotland, then it is because King George IV himself became synecdoche for fashionable tartan after his famous visit to Edinburgh in 1822. The king, who inherited the throne from his father, George III, in 1820 after almost a decade of regency, became the first British monarch to visit Scotland since Charles II more than 170 years earlier. The royal visit was a national affair that became a grand spectacle, and its enduring legacy was the legitimization of tartan as Scotland's national dress. It was, in effect, a national catharsis, an unspoken but publicly visible reckoning of Britain's tumultuous century past. It was mutual guilt assuaged. The Scots acknowledged Britain's Hanoverian king as their own, and the king, for his part, affirmed his own Scottish heritage alongside Scotland's unique identity at the core of converging Britishness. The Scots imagined the king as one of them, and thereby they were able to imagine their community, their country, as an honored part of another. Robert Mudie, a Scottish newspaperman who observed the king's visit, wrote of the crowds gathered at the Palace of Holyroodhouse: “They seemed to consider the entrance of his Majesty within the palace as completing the solemn inauguration of him as King of Scotland,—as the actual revival, under a modified form, of the Scottish monarchy,—and an open recognition of all their public rights.”

This dramatic pageant — attended eagerly by Lowlanders and Highlanders alike — signified Scotland's redemption from guilt and the remaking of social order. "They were to line the Royal Mile between Edinburgh Castle and Holyrood Palace, and, as Scott instructed them in the program he wrote for the event ... gentlemen were

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not permitted to wear anything but ‘the ancient Highland costume.’ Freed from the sins of rebellion, Scots were able to constitute their nation of people through their unique dress, which was now shared by Lowlanders and Highlanders alike. Even more importantly, Scots could now imagine their community of Scotland in harmony and concert with the English — Scots could imagine themselves as equal parts Scottish and British, for neither was mutually exclusive of the other.

In parallel, Scots, particularly Highland Scots, were able to constitute themselves uniquely among others — their distinctive patterns of clan tartan provided a signature form of sartorial constitutive rhetoric whereby each clan could coalesce around a shared identity while upholding their parent identity of Scottishness. No two clan tartan patterns were alike, but each shared the attributes of a plaid pattern spun in wool and worn around the waist. If tartan was reborn as visual evidence of Scottishness during the royal visit in 1822, then, too, clan tartans enabled Scots to subscribe to their British identity without sacrificing their venerable Highland kinship. As Calloway writes, “Scots retained a distinctive identity and sometimes a distinctive Highland, regional, clan identity within a larger ‘British’ allegiance.” Not far removed from a time when Lowland Scots imagined themselves as part of a community wholly separate from Highlanders, Scottish identity became coterminal with the Highlands, with Highland traditions, including tartan, becoming universal symbols for Scotland as a whole.

Artwork by Wilkie, who was appointed the king’s limner in the Royal Household in Scotland in 1823, recorded two distinctly different visual accounts of tartan-clad George

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400 Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders, 244.
401 Ibid., 233.
IV visiting Edinburgh. Present-day perception of George IV’s homage to Scotland is a product of Wilkie’s famous portrait of the king in full Highland costume, dated 1829. The king commissioned the portrait himself and sat for Wilkie seven times before the painting was complete. The finished work was debuted at the Royal Academy of Arts in London in April 1830, just two months before the king died. It is, in a word, regal — even according to the bibliographic description by the portrait’s custodian, the Royal Collection Trust. “The King gazes fixedly to the left in a pose of readiness for action, his right hand in a closed fist, his left resting on a Highland sword.”

His outfit, purchased from an Edinburgh merchant, comprises all the trappings of a rightful Scottish monarch — “royal Stewart tartan for the jacket, shoulder plaid and kilt, a baldrick, a pair of Highland pistols, a Highland dirk, purse, and powder-horn.” Despite his final product on canvas, Wilkie himself apparently was not convinced of the king’s regal pose. “He looked ‘like a great sausage stuffed into the covering,’” historian E.A. Smith wrote, quoting Wilkie’s own commentary on painting the king. “It took three hours to dress him, ‘to lace up all the bulgings and excrescencies.’”

Wilkie’s earlier sketch of the tartan-clad king, drawn the same year as his visit to Edinburgh, was less charitable and depicts the king as an outlandish oaf whose attempts at wearing his Scottish heritage were contrived and insincere. In An incident during the visit of George IV to Edinburgh, drawn in 1822, the king looks woefully out of place. His appearance served to highlight not only his difference place in social hierarchy, but also his existence outside the imagined community of Scotland. In Wilkie’s sketches, George IV was, in effect, other

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403 Ibid.
404 E.A. Smith, *George IV* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 269.
Figure 27. George IV. 1829. Painted by David Wilkie. Royal Collection Trust / © Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2016. RCIN 401206.
in a nation over which he reigned. “Whilst Scots from throughout the country were urged to come to Edinburgh dressed in tartan, King George IV made an impression by wearing a kilt that was too short — well above the knees — and pink tights to hide his bare legs. Wilkie later painted a flattering full-length portrait of the king in kilt, which shows him slimmer and without tights.” Regardless of which image of George IV in tartan most closely reflected reality, the symbolic significance of the gesture cannot be denied. His effort to connect with his people, to reach from up to down, was profound. A poem, “George the Fourth’s Welcome,” captured the nation’s spirit ahead of the visit: “Scotland’s got her King again; Welcome, Royal Geordie!”

In rhetorical terms, two other Wilkie illustrations from the era are significant in discourse regarding Scotland’s national identity. The first, The Honours of Scotland, depicts the rediscovery of the Scottish crown jewels in 1818. The regalia had not been seen for more than a century — it was effectively obsolete after the Acts of Union in 1707 — and its location was unknown. Scott petitioned the prince regent for permission to search for the crown jewels, and on February 4, 1818, “Scott and a group of Officers of State forced open two sealed doors and a great oak chest, in which they found the regalia wrapped in linen and in perfect condition.” In Wilkie’s drawing, Scott and his comrades appear surprised at their findings while at the same time satisfied. The rediscovery of the Scottish crown jewels a century after they were locked away symbolizes, in some fashion, newfound

406 Mudie, A Historical Account of His Majesty’s Visit to Scotland, 55.
vitality for Scots. The Jacobite rebellions and subsequent Scotophobia in England had made Scottishness taboo, and at the same time the Scotland's royal insignia were shuddered away in darkness, out of sight and out of memory. Wilkie's illustration of the rediscovery of the crown jewels represents Scotland's rediscovery of itself — no longer was it consigned to England's shadow. Instead, Scotland was being redeemed. This tale continues in another Wilkie illustration, *The Honours of Scotland Being Shown to George IV*, which depicts Scottish officials presenting the crown jewels to the king at the Palace of Holyroodhouse in 1822. Unlike Wilkie's drawing of the king parading through Edinburgh, the king is depicted in a military uniform with striped blue trousers, medallions on his chest, a sash across his breast and a bicorne hat on his head — he appears tall, trim and confident. He sits upright with his neck outstretched as his arms rest complacently on the chair. To the king's left, Scottish men, wearing ornamental tartan, watch as a supplicant kneels and bows before the king while ceremonially holding forth the Scottish crown. This drawing illustrates Scots' deference to their British king, and it symbolizes their reconciliation with the strife-ridden eighteenth century. Not only was George IV the first monarch to visit Scotland in almost two centuries — he was the first to do so since the Acts of Union that politically integrated Scotland and England. The presentation of the Scottish crown jewels to the Hanoverian king was, ultimately, a grand gesture of Scotland's submission to its mother nation, the United Kingdom. Wilkie's depiction of the king's gracious magnanimity in this moment reflects the new political reality of the era — one in which Scotland was, all at once, separate, integrated and unique.

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George IV’s visit to Edinburgh brought out the best in Scotland. More than 300,000 people turned up in Edinburgh for the king’s visit. As was written in a first-hand account of the preparation for a potential royal visit, “the joyful enthusiasm, which pervaded Scotland at the this time, was manifested in the different counties by meetings in all of them” as Scots made arrangements to receive the king. From the warm welcome of the king at Leith to the tableau of tartan-clad Highlanders and Lowlanders alike, Scotland embraced its Britishness by exhibiting the greatest attributes of Scottishness — loyalty and fealty among them. This, Brune argues, should be expected when “public belonging” is at the center of rhetorical acts of national identity. “National identities articulated by state leaders, while clearly constrained by hegemonic strategies of remembrance and oppositional voices, proactively contribute to the construction, maintenance, and transformation of those identities.” He continues: “Furthermore, national identities are created and transformed through strategies of remembrance where the goals is oftentimes to maximize ‘national’ or group self-interest rather than to build just more democratic states or a more harmonious global community.” Any words that George IV uttered — or could have uttered — during his trip to Scotland would have paled in rhetorical power to his donning Scottish tartan for the public to see. Ironically, perhaps, George IV was the closest to the idea of a patriot king Scotland had yet seen — certainly more so than the prospect of Charles Stuart. George IV did more to unify Scotland — and, consequently, Britain — than any of his predecessors, and although he was not wildly popular at home in England, Scots saw him as, in many ways,

409 Zuelow, “The Royal Visit, Tourism and Scottish National Memory,” 35.
410 Mudie, A Historical Account of His Majesty’s Visit to Scotland, 35.
411 Bruner, Strategies of Remembrance, 97.
412 Ibid.
an embodiment of their own hopes and aspirations for Scotland. In Colley’s assessment of Bolingbroke’s treatise, the patriot king must be “the vital centre of politics, the father of his people.” Although the previous king, George III, and his éminence grise, the Earl of Bute, professed a plan to be that kind of king in the 1760s, that dream perished in the popular press before it could be put into action. For George IV, however, despite whatever misgivings the public may have had about him, particularly in England, his visit to Edinburgh was a Bolingbrokean moment — he was, or became, the people’s king in Scotland. And regardless of the authenticity of his attire or accoutrements in Edinburgh in 1822, his visit was a watershed milestone for Britain. “With the re-creation of Jacobitism as heroic romance, the royal genealogy became a convenient vehicle to express the paradox of ancient martial Scottishness that was both innate to civilized England and thrillingly alien to it. The Hanoverian succession represented modern England, but the Scottish Stuart thread in the royal line was a reminder of an earlier precommercial order.”

The events surrounding the visit of George IV to Edinburgh served to purify guilt on both sides of the border. As Burke observed, a king feels guilt because he is at the top of a hierarchy, and those at the bottom likewise feel guilt because of their position. Identification is the only remedy, and on behalf of the English, the king demonstrated appreciation for Scotland’s value to the United Kingdom. On a personal level, by wearing a kilt and partaking in ceremonial festivities in the Palace of Holyroodhouse — the traditional seat of the Scottish king’s royal court — George IV established mutual identification with his Scottish subjects. As The Times reported in London during the king’s visit: “His Majesty

413 Colley, Britons, 47.
414 Martin, The Mighty Scot, 10.
appeared at the levee in a full Highland uniform, of what is called the Stuart tartan. It is a dress which requires a tall and robust figure to produce advantageous display, and the general opinion at the levee was, that this martial and picturesque dress was never worn to more advantage: he wore the Highland broad sword, pistols, and philebeg, and had quite a martial air.”

By acknowledging his distant Scottish heritage through the wearing of tartan, the king demonstrated his kinship with Scotland and its people. Conversely, through a spectacular display of tartan in honor of the king's visit, Scots acknowledged the Hanoverian king's legitimacy, the lineage of which was central to the Jacobite rebellions. This consubstantiality not only transcended a historically bitter and ancient divide between Scotland and England, but it also served to integrate Lowland and Highland Scots, who historically had seen each other as different citizens of the same country. “Highland culture, once a marker of savagery and Jacobitism, was reinvented and made fashionable and gradually came to represent Scotland as a whole, and Scotland's history of resisting British dominion now became a noble tradition.”

Although the Jacobite question had been settled for decades by the time of George IV’s visit to Edinburgh, the Act of Proscription that outlawed Highland dress had been repealed only 40 years earlier. We should consider this from a more threatening perspective: George IV arrived in Edinburgh in 1822 to great fanfare and cheering from tartan-wearing Scots, some of whom were old enough to have been prosecuted for wearing the same garb 40 years earlier. “Once the political and military threat of the Jacobite rebellions had been removed, the ‘wildness’ of the Highlanders’ language, culture and clan system exerted

415 The Times (London), Issue 11643, August 21, 1822, 2.
416 Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders, 240.
a strange attraction on people who had formerly despised them.”

George IV was not immune. The significance of the king appearing in Scotland while wearing a kilt — made in the traditional Stewart tartan pattern, no less — cannot be overestimated.

**Invented Tradition or Tradition Reborn?**

Trevor-Roper’s contentious book chapter on the Highland identity of Scotland proposes that “the whole concept of a distinct Highland culture and tradition is a retrospective invention.”

Trevor-Roper traces the ethnic heritage of Highlanders to Ireland — he argues that “Hebridean culture was purely Irish” and that its people were a product of “Irish overflow.” Many Scots object strenuously to those findings, and some scholarly work is incredulous at the idea that the kilt — in its modern form, at least — was created by entrepreneurial Englishmen. Hume, for example, disputes Trevor-Roper’s criticism on simple grounds of logic: “Who is to say that by its very adoption, such tradition has not indeed become genuine?”

In a more forensic approach, Matthew Dziennik laments Trevor-Roper’s “controversial work” and its premise that “the identity of Scotland was derived from self-serving inventions purporting to represent Gaelic culture.”

Cheape’s criticism is thinly veiled: “In his contribution to the debate, Trevor-Roper delivered a

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417 Calloway, *White People, Indians, and Highlanders*, 244.
418 The Scottish Register of Tartans uses the spelling Stewart instead of Stuart in reference to the historic royal tartan pattern that is the personal tartan pattern of Queen Elizabeth II.
419 Ibid., 16.
420 Ibid., 15.
smug coup de grâce to soi-disant Scottish national pride with the story that the kilt was ‘invented’ by an Englishman.”

Even today, prominent Scottish historians challenge Trevor-Roper’s Anglo-centric chapter, and while it is clear that his interpretation of the tartan tradition touched a nerve, the truth probably is somewhere in the middle. It is undisputed that the present-day Scottish kilt is a truncated form of the ancient Highland philabeg, which consumed far more fabric — enough that it could be used as blanket. In that sense, and given Trevor-Roper’s thorough research into the weaving and manufacturing industry behind the tradition, it is reasonable to proffer that entrepreneurial Englishmen invented a precursor to the kilt that was widely adopted in Scotland after 1822. This was largely thanks to Scott’s monumental role in earning buy-in from clan chiefs for “clan tartans” as the foundation for Highland dress, and based on that accounting of the tartan tradition, we can find evidence of a complete cycle of Burke’s guilt-mortification process. In addition to being an acclaimed author whose literary invocations of pastoral Scotland became romantic legend, Scott was a Lowlander, an Edinburgh lawyer, with a unique and influential link to England. In the case of individuals such as Scott, Dziennik holds that “Anglo-Lowlanders were able to adopt Highlandism because it had been constructed by elites with whom they shared similar interests and purposes — namely, the political and cultural inclusion of Scotland into the British state.”

This idea germinated in Highland societies in London and Edinburgh beginning in the late eighteenth century, and from the social elite it was diffused across Britain and social classes. Although George IV’s visit to Edinburgh is notable

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for the imagery of his appearance in tartan, he had previously appeared in a Highland costume in 1789 at a masquerade ball in London. For his visit to Edinburgh, however, the rhetoric of space was different. In Charland's terms, then, the British community and its subcommunities were reimagined — and realigned — to reflect newfound favor for Scotland as a partner for the nation's imperial ambitions. “The Highlands had national associations because certain interests within the region wanted it to be so.” 

If we look at this transformation through a Burkean lens, we see England's sense of guilt manifest in its scapegoating of Scotland. Whereas Highland dress had been linked with Jacobite militancy and danger to the kingdom in the eighteenth century — to the point, in fact, that it was prohibited by law for almost four decades — the newly invented tradition of Highland dress, adopted by Lowlanders and Highlanders alike, symbolized and glorified Scotland's new identity, new place, new role in Britain. “Highland dress was a visual declaration of modernity: a visual declaration of a gendered, refined, outward-looking and imperially connected society. Highland elites, particularly those who wished to gain personally from the increasing fiscal-military outlay of the imperial state, recognized the value of the region's inclusion in the British nation, and used the imagery of Highland dress to advance these processes.”

Although Scotland's identity — as a standalone ideal and in relation to Britain — continues to evolve, George IV's sartorial rhetoric during his visit to Scotland served to emancipate Scots from their identity as other among Britons. The king's time in Edinburgh represented many things for Britain, but above all it was a form of redemption.

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425 Ibid.
426 Ibid., 120.
for Scotland — a renewal of its rightful place alongside England in the United Kingdom. By Robin Nicholson’s estimation, “the visit of George IV to Scotland in 1822 — masterminded by Walter Scott — not only reinforced the self-worth of the Scottish nation, but unleashed a frenzy of self-invention which saw Edinburgh awash with more tartan than it had seen since 1745.”427 By donning a kilt and holding court at the ancient Scottish seat of the Palace of Holyroodhouse, the king demonstrated that Scots could identify with him, and this was a crucial nod of recognition of Scotland’s tremendous demonstration of loyalty through imperial military service. Given the nefarious meanings associated with tartan in the previous century — and its outright illegality in Scotland from 1746 to 1782 — the rhetorical importance of a British monarch appearing in his northern realm in traditional Highland dress cannot be overstated. “George IV’s visit made the new Highland regalia fashionable and made kilts Scotland’s national dress.”428

The history of tartan offers little room for dispute about its significance as a national symbol. Likewise, there are few doubts about when and why tartan emerged as a transcendent marker of Scottish identity. There is want, however, to understand how this came to be, and perhaps a proper starting point is to stipulate that tartan did not become the symbol of Scottish national identity. Rather, it is in a state of becoming — a state that is both fluid and transient because, as Burke foretells, the guilt-redemption process is cyclical, not linear. Nicholson, like most other scholars of the subject, directly links Scotland’s renewed British identity to the country’s vast contributions to economy and empire. “The renewed

428 Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders, 243.
self-confidence of a Scotland fully playing its part in the industrial and imperial successes of Great Britain offered a potential for re-invention that few wished to counter. To be sure, Scotland played a remarkable role in charting an enlarged imperial British map. By many accounts, Scotland’s military contributions alone defined its value to the nation. This in addition to the stunning economic success of Scotland, whose industrial capital of Glasgow came to be known as the “Second City of the Empire” with Scotland as the Empire’s workshop. Scotland and its people benefited from imperial ambition. What often is overlooked in this regard, however, is that this progress was the product of a gradual inversion of Scotland’s past hegemonic and colonial relationship with England — in particular, in the decades during which Scotland earned its greater sense of worth. As the arsenal of the empire, as Colley called the Highlands regiments — and as a fully initiated realm of Great Britain — Scotland became a worldwide purveyor of the inequity, intolerance and xenophobia from which it had suffered at the hands of Hanoverian troops who garrisoned Scotland after final uprising was quashed in 1746. Tartan uniforms set them apart from other regiments of imperial forces, thereby making the Scottish kilt a visible token of the Highland Scots’ new place in the realm.

Scottishness, Englishness and Britishness

The rapid adoption of Englishness by Scots was cause for alarm among leading Scottish cultural figures in the early nineteenth century, and some leaders feared that Scotland was prone to wholesale Anglicization. “The Scots in this view were steadily becoming invisible as a people as their ancient traditions, identities and institutions were

diluted by the corrosive effect of close association with the world’s most powerful state.”

This phenomenon is, in and of itself, evidence of Burke’s idea that rhetoric acts on rhetors and their audiences. “Words are ‘terministic screens’ that both select and deflect. They not only describe, they prescribe.” Scots so eagerly wanted to imagine themselves as equal, as legitimate Britons, that they came close to losing all imagination of Scottish heritage. As Scott recounted in the conclusion to Waverley in 1814, the generation that surrounded his upbringing in Scotland were those Scots “who still cherished a lingering, though hopeless, attachment, to the house of Stuart.” Their time had passed.

There is no European nation, which, within the course of half a century, or little more, has undergone so complete a change as this kingdom of Scotland. The effects of the insurrection of 1745, — the destruction of the patriarchal power of the Highland chiefs, — the abolition of the heritable jurisdictions of the Lowland nobility and barons, — the total eradication of the Jacobite party, which, averse to intermingle with the English, or adopt their customs, long continued to pride themselves upon maintaining ancient Scottish manners and customs, — commenced this innovation.

For understanding of this, we can look to Bobbitt’s application of Burke’s guilt-purification-redemption cycle to identify rhetorical rebirth born from segregation that resulted in a sense of inferiority. Whether such identity is internally constituted or externally applied, such rhetoric substantiates a community that imagines itself as subaltern to another and will, according to Burke’s definition of hierarchy, seek to change its status.

“Indeed, in important ways Scots had begun to behave like Englishmen and, according

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433 Ibid., 1083.
to Langford, by 1820 were well on the way to being regarded as 'provincial' rather than 'alien.'

We can derive from this attitude an opportunity to extrapolate from Bobbitt's model to identify similar circumstances in Scots' status as second-class Britons. Kidd, among others, refers to them as "North Britons," who, he argues, overlooked England's hypocrisy to maintain commitment to English ideals. "A healthy scepticism did nothing to diminish the widespread sense of relief that, through the Union, Scots had, by a stroke of good fortune, had entailed upon them the hard-won birthrights of Englishmen." Despite Scots' dutiful service, the rhetorical marginalization of their culture from 1745 until almost 1800 left them seeking acceptance and identification with their more sophisticated brethren to the south. In the end however, Scots' perceived backwardness became part of their great charm. Whereas a sense of inferiority precipitated guilt in Bobbitt's example, Scots drew vigor from their sartorial substantiation as they preserved and integrated their old traditions with their emerging self-awareness of their Britishness. Sir John Sinclair, in his 21-volume *The Statistical Account of Scotland,* published from 1791 to 1799, documents the life of Scots in that time. In his report on the parishes of Lochgoilhead and Kilmorich in the western Highlands, he describes the men of the region. "The inhabitants in general, except those who carry on the fishing, continue to wear the Highland dress, the bonnet, the phillabeg, and tartan hose; even the authority of an act of Parliament, was not sufficient to make them relinquish their ancient garb." In Moulin, in the Perthshire Highlands, Sinclair finds that the passage of time has "sufficiently evinced, that industry and good order are not

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434 Pentland, "Images of Scots in Political Prints," 93.
435 Kidd, "North Britishness," 382
incompatible with the rise of the Gaelic, and of tartan philabegs.” Highland dress became an outward expression of Scotland’s sense of modernity, particularly as Highland elites saw opportunity for financial windfall associated with Scotland’s endeavors in imperial interests. As Dziennik concludes, “an image which could represent a distinctly Scottish contribution to the Union was required. This was found by emphasizing the rugged primitivism of the Scottish Highlands and portraying the region as a repository of noble virtue and martial prowess.” These leaders “recognized the value of the region’s inclusion in the British nation, and used the imagery of Highland dress to advance these processes.” Anglicization was not the only threat to Scottishness, and from the 1760s to the 1850s, “Scotland experienced unprecedented economic growth and the fastest rate of urbanisation in Western Europe.” This rapid redistribution in population, in addition to industrialization, “challenged prevailing assumptions about Scottish identity.” To preserve some semblance of ancient Scottish heritage, Scots had to be invited to imagine themselves as distinctly Scottish despite Scotland’s increasing prominence next to England in the Empire. “Indeed, what is most remarkable is that so much of what we now regard as integral and accepted features of modern Scottish identity were created, invented, renewed or strengthened in the very period when the death of Scotland was widely predicted by many thinking Scots.” As Colley writes, “far from succumbing helplessly to an alien identity imposed by

439 Ibid., 120.
others, in moving south they helped construct what being British was all about.”\textsuperscript{443} But Scots did not simply adopt Britishness and make it their own; Britishness did not exist outside their contributions to it. “The lack of a comprehensive ‘British’ identity for the Anglo-Scottish core of the Empire was matched by the lack of a properly comprehensive ‘imperial’ identity.”\textsuperscript{444} The key, however, as Colley and Pentland argue separately, was the convenient availability of \textit{other} against which Britons could unite. “The growth of Britishness under the stimuli of war and global empire and the subscription to its values by Scots had softened national differences and their expression.”\textsuperscript{445} At the same time, waxing warmth for Highlandism and Balmorality among British elites — including Queen Victoria — enabled and encouraged Scots to embrace their primitive past. “Romanticism and changing ideas about Scotland were transforming it from a barren wilderness to a primitive playground in the minds of English men and women. The writings of Scott and the activities of George IV and, more importantly, Queen Victoria provided a sanitised and increasingly marketable image of Scotland — one which could not easily furnish the kind of hostile representations of the 1760s.”\textsuperscript{446} Nonetheless, Victoria’s sentimentality toward Scotland’s storied past influenced commercial interests of her time. As \textit{The Times} reported in October 1844: “The demand for tartan dresses, which has been on the increase for several years, has received a vast impulse by the visits of Her Majesty to Scotland.”\textsuperscript{447} So potent, in fact, was the tartan mystique that in 1842 two hucksters, known as the Sobieski Stuarts, were able to peddle

\textsuperscript{443} Colley, \textit{Britons}, 126.
\textsuperscript{444} Kidd, “North Britishness,” 378
\textsuperscript{445} Pentland, “Images of Scots in Political Prints,” 93.
\textsuperscript{446} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{447} \textit{The Times} (London), Issue 18737, October 9, 1844, 5.
a fabricated registry of ancient clan tartans across Scotland. Their leather-bound volume, 
*Vestiarium Scoticum*, was later proven to be a hoax, but not until after clan chiefs and Scotland’s weaving industry had already appropriated the book’s contents as real.

Scots purified their own guilt by donning traditional garb for military expeditions around the world. In doing so, they relieved their anxiety about being subordinate to the English, and they demonstrated their renewed willingness to stand as a unique people of a proud nation, one that Victoria herself embraced. “The best-loved monarch of modern times built a residence at Balmoral on Deeside and, after 1848, spent the autumn of each year on holiday there. By comparison she visited Ireland only four times in her entire reign.”448 Similarly, English elites eventually forgave themselves for their endless evisceration of Scotland, and through this transcendence they invested themselves in the emotional appeal of Scotland’s rustic vigor. “The quintessential image of a Scottish national dress and identity is that of the male kilted Highlander, a stereotypical and anachronistic figure adopted in the early nineteenth century in the full flood of European Romanticism.”449 In the decades after George IV visited Edinburgh, tartan became fashionable not only among indigenous Scots, but also among Englishmen who could claim even a skosh of Scottish ancestry. “The fact that Victoria showed such fascination with the Highlands and was sometimes even heard to proclaim herself a Jacobite at heart was found to have a major effect. Highlandism had now been given wholehearted royal approval and tartan recognised as the sartorial badge of Scottish identity.”450 Victoria liked the Highland bagpipes so much

that she established a position of Highland piper in the royal household. Her piper, Pipe Major William Ross, was featured on the cover of sheet music for *The Scotch Polka* in 1854. Dressed in the formal uniform of his Highland regiment, Ross is depicted playing the bagpipes in quiet pastoral scene. Every monarch since the time of Victoria has had a royal piper, and even today, the press office of Buckingham Palace acknowledges the role of the Queen’s Piper in the royal household.

**Modern Vestiges**

Burke’s theory of rhetorical scapegoating, mortification and redemption from guilt describes a cyclical pattern instead of a linear process. As such, assuagement from guilt is finite, even if it persists across multiple generations of society. In looking at the cultural and symbolic significance of tartan as a mark of identity in contemporary Scotland, Hume leverages the scholarship of Randi Storaas, who assessed the symbolic significance of codified Norwegian dress parallel to the country’s bid for independence in the early twentieth century. Hume concludes that the banning of tartan effectively erased its rhetorical power as an icon of rebellion. “By the time the dangers of Jacobitism were considered to be past, and whereas previously the wearing of tartan had been held to be such a potent symbol of Highland culture and identity (and by definition probably Jacobite and anti-government), the banning of its wear had fragmented the solidarity” of symbolic identity through dress. This observation supports my argument that, in order to wear

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454 Hume, “Tartan and the wearing of the kilt,” 60.
Figure 28. *The Scotch Polka*. ca. 1854–1860. British Museum O’Donoghue Collection 1908–25 1: 1922,0710.537. © Trustees of the British Museum. Reproduced with permission from the British Museum according to the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.
tartan, Scots had to imagine themselves as pawns of the British Empire in their prolonged mortification for the 1745 rebellion. “The paradox is, that once permitted for general use again, Highland dress emerges with very different symbolism. Now it was associated with British imperial success.”\textsuperscript{455} That success, too, eventually would lead Scots to once again confront and challenge their place in the social order of Great Britain.

Bobbitt’s conceptualization of Burke provides meaningful understanding of the power and limits of the guilt-redemption cycle. Central to understanding it, however, is contending with the temporality of redemption. “For purposes of persuasion, purification is the most important part of the guilt-purification-redemption cycle. It is the fulcrum of the process of movement from guilt to redemption. Redemption is a temporary state and the end of the cycle before it repeats.”\textsuperscript{456} In the words of William Rueckert, redemption is a “moment of status, the still moment following the fusion and release of a symbol-induced catharsis, or the still moment of vision when, after the furious activity of dialectic, a fusion at a higher level of discourse takes place to produce a perceived unity among many previously discordant ideas and things.”\textsuperscript{457} At the time of George IV’s visit to Scotland, the nation’s conflict with England was defined by hierarchy, which, according to Burke, is central to guilt. By examining historical scholarship we can identify at least four epochs at which Scotland has undergone this cycle. In the early nineteenth century, Scotland experienced purification and redemption as it cast off its Jacobite legacy in favor of full-throated British imperialism. At the same time, England, too, assuaged its

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{456} Bobbitt, \textit{The Rhetoric of Redemption}, 61.
\textsuperscript{457} William Rueckert, \textit{Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 137–138.
guilt for subjugating Scotland for centuries — it extended an arm to lift Scotland as a brother, as a peer. A century later, in the aftermath of the Great War (World War I), Scots began to rue their role in Britain’s imperialism as they saw that they had become martial agents on behalf of the same hegemony that once had been applied to them. By the late twentieth century, after 200 years of lockstep unity with England, Scotland sought greater independence, which resulted in a devolved government and the restoration of the Scottish Parliament, which had been adjourned since Scotland’s Act of Union in 1707. This relief of hierarchical pressure was short lived, and less than two decades later, in 2014, Scotland held an independence referendum that narrowly maintained the nation’s presence in the United Kingdom. Now in the wake of “Brexit” — the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union — Scotland stands on the precipice of another attempt to alleviate its new impending sense of hierarchical tension. Just as Scotland copes today with intermingling and sometimes conflicting senses of identity, Scott lamented the same two centuries ago as he contemplated the fading prevalence of a forsaken sense of Scottishness. “This race has now almost entirely vanished from the land, and with it, doubtless, much absurd political prejudice — but also, many living examples of singular and disinterested attachment to the principles of loyalty which they received from their fathers, and of old Scottish faith, hospitality, worth, and honour.”

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458 Scott, Waverley, 1084.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

“The Englishman greets, the Irishman sleeps, but the Scotchman gangs [goes] till he gets it.” — Scottish proverb

“In this staggering disproportion between man and no-man, there is no place for purely human boasts of grandeur, or for forgetting that men build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss.” — Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change*

The transformation of tartan’s symbolism alongside Scottish national identity is a fascinating tale of sacrifice, subterfuge, enmyship, racism and romantic heroism. The evolutionary timeline of this identity is granular such that it enables us to imagine other possible outcomes. What if the Scots had not been needed in the service of the Empire? Or perhaps the difference was more subtle: What if Scots had served as colonial administrators and civil servants but not in the military? What if Highland dress had not become the uniform of some of the army’s most elite regiments? Would Scotland’s place in Britain be the same as it is today? Would tartan be a universal symbol for Scottish identity, culture and pride? In my view, it is easy to speculate that it would not. Imagery of tartan not only allowed Scots’ detractors to constitute the Scottish people as *other*, but the same imagery allowed Scots to constitute themselves as one nation rather than of separate Highlands and Lowlands. In the same spirit, tartan was essential for Scots constituting themselves — and the English *permitting* Scots to constitute themselves — as loyal Britons in an age of Empire. Without Highland Scots’ atonement and mortification for rebellion, Highland culture

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likely would have withered and died, smothered by English paranoia of further Jacobite rebellion after 1746.

Divine attributes a certain Scottish durability to the deliberate, considered action by Scots who preserved and propagated Scottish identity through reimagination of its traditions and achievements. Although tartan may not have risen in prominence without imperial conquest, and perhaps Scots would not have earned their military prestige, Scotland, at least in Divine’s sense, would have endured nonetheless. “The nation was unified with the kingdom of England in 1603 and with the English state in 1707 but the distinctiveness of Scotland endured because the crucial forms of institutional and social identity proved much more robust than the pessimists predicted.”

There was a desire among Scots to promote Scottishness on equal terms with Englishness — to occupy the same rung of hierarchy. As Kidd argues, “Scots were not beguiled by the glories of England’s exceptional historical achievement of liberty, a well-balanced constitution, and commercial success. North Britons were convinced of the scale of the English historical achievement, but they did not succumb to the extravagant puff which English commentators expended on its behalf.” Scottish national identity was destined to be its own, and Scots’ accomplishments in literature, law, economics and industry were proof positive that it could. Still, there was the historical discord with England to overcome. Mortification through the Highlanders’ imperial military service slowly closed that rift. A new social order was born.

The redemption and rebirth of Scotland within Great Britain and the United Kingdom in the early nineteenth century is undisputed, and its impact is still felt today.

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The romantic visions of Highlandism and Balmorality are pleasant to the eye and easy to digest, especially after recent decades of monarchy that have exhibited tender deference to Scottishness. It cannot be coincidence that the queen’s husband, Prince Philip, bears the title Duke of Edinburgh. And there are countless images of the queen driving, hunting and relaxing at Balmoral and throughout the Scottish Highlands. Prince Charles, as heir apparent, bears the ancient Scottish title Duke of Rothesay in addition to his position in the English peerage, and he, too, is spotted from time to time wearing a formal outfit of tartan. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the obvious evidence of further guilt-redemption cycles within Scotland — or at least surrounding it — in the past two centuries. Let us remember here a key stipulation of Burke: Guilt can be kept at bay for only a limited time. Human nature is to seek order; order begets guilt; guilt requires purification for redemption. As symbol-using animals, we always will be looking for ways to purge our guilt because we always will seek social order to allay the mysteries of the world. Scotland, despite its glorious, romantic rebirth into the United Kingdom, soon came to grasp with the colonial hegemony for it was the martial agent. And the guilt associated with that reality began to permeate Scotland’s ongoing reconciliation of its place in the imagined community of the British Empire. “In a world in which racism and imperialism are to be abhorred, it is perhaps more easy to live with a vision of the past which presents Scotland as a victim rather than an aggressor. However, like it or not, the imperial legacy still pervades Scottish society.”463

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Waning Empire and The Great War

Scotland was great for the Empire, and the Empire was great for Scotland. All good things must come to an end, though, and in the early decades of the twentieth century the Empire slowly began to morph geographically and contract economically after its peak in the 1920s. Scotland maintained an imperial outlook and even hosted an imperial exhibition in Glasgow in 1938, but under the surface, turmoil was brewing with regard to Scotland’s relationship with Britain and the Empire. Scotland lost 74,000 men in World War I, and unofficial estimates put the death toll at more than 110,000. 464 “Despite final victory, World War I was a human catastrophe on an enormous scale for Scotland. At the start of the conflict national euphoria was the mood. By 1918 this had degenerated into dark pessimism.” 465 Scots increasingly were beginning to imagine their presence in other communities, namely America, Canada and Australia — historical records indicate that more than 2.3 million Scots emigrated away from their homeland between 1825 and 1938. 466

World War I was not the only portent for ominous times in Scotland. “That slaughter of the nation’s young men of all social classes was then followed by the collapse of the markets for Scottish heavy industry in the late 1920s and thereafter, together with a remarkably and high level of emigration which, for the first time since census records began, caused an actual fall in Scottish population.” 467 This exodus was exacerbated by Scots’ varied sense of belonging to the imperial manifesto, and Finlay contends that imperialism contributed to a

466 Divine, “The Break-up of Britain?” 169.
sense of indifference born of convenience. “The failure of Scottish nationalism to manifest itself into a major force in mid-nineteenth century Scottish politics can be accounted for by the ability of the Scots to re-invent their national identity in ways which accommodated themselves to the British state and Empire.”

The Empire began to change after World War I, and that reality reawakened a sense of nationalist independence among Scots — the Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934 — and in the interwar era there was a reckoning of Scotland’s imperial past. Whereas, once upon a time, “whatever their own individual ethnic back-grounds, Britons could join together vis-a-vis the empire and act out the flattering parts of heroic conqueror, humane judge, and civilizing agent,” that was becoming less the case.

Despite all of this, Finlay argues, “most Scots are happy to consign the imperial adventure to British history, by which they usually mean English history.” This denial of culpability for empire and shift in agency is Burkean transcendence from the guilt associated with the very promulgation of empire, and perhaps the Scots were justified in doing so. “Indeed, today one might be forgiven for thinking that Scotland was more of a colonised rather than a colonising nation as the Scottish imperial past has been buried under numerous theories of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘internal colonialism’ which purport to show that the relationship with England has been parasitic to Scottish interests.”

MacKenzie, however, places the blame squarely on the Scots.

The Scots reaped what they had sown; like their tartan-clad soldiers, they had been mercenaries in an essentially alien enterprise. The law of the Empire and its administrative institutions were overwhelmingly English.

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471 Ibid.
Even the emblems of cultural distinctiveness were worn at the instigation of the English.... By this view, the Scots become eternal victims able to escape their cultural and political thralldom only with the end of the Empire and the development of socialist nation. ⁴⁷²

By that logic, Scots, even in their redemption from the offenses of two centuries earlier, remained secondary to England in the hierarchy of the United Kingdom. It is a poetic and elegant illustration of Burke's genius — that after purging one guilt, man soon finds himself suffering from another. Scots had earned their place in the Empire but, ultimately, the Empire was using Scotland to promote its potency. By the end of World War II, Scots were savvy to this game, and those “committed to the imperial vision of Scottish national identity found it difficult to readapt such notions to the changed circumstances of the inter-war era. For many in Scottish society the Empire was now irrelevant and, furthermore, trends within the Empire itself seemed to be moving away from the old imperial ethos.” ⁴⁷³

**Home Rule and Devolution**

Divine's research finds that Englishmen outnumbered Scots by more than five to one at the time of the Acts of Union in 1707. Almost two centuries later, in 1901, the population was 10 Englishmen for every Scot. “England has always been the senior partner in the relationship,” Divine writes. “Yet, despite the obvious possibilities for domination, assimilation or even exclusion by the senior partner, the Union of the two countries has survived for nearly three hundred years.” ⁴⁷⁴ That has not always been a certainty, and it certainly cannot be now. Since the late nineteenth century, Scots, even in small numbers,

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⁴⁷³ Finlay, “The rise and fall of popular imperialism in Scotland,” 19.
have called for autonomy in government. The debate over Irish home rule reignited calls for Scottish home rule in the 1880s. “But this was no radical attempt at separation or even federalism. The aims of the Home Rulers were essentially both modest and moderate. They sought to devolve Scottish business to Edinburgh in order to make the sovereign Parliament in London more efficient.”

The rhetoric in favor of Scottish home rule would smolder for another century, and at many points, it was nearly extinguished. The formation of the SNP in 1934 demonstrated that not all Scots were in favor of perpetual union. “Indeed the emergence of the SNP came about in large part because of the growing indifference to Home Rule on the part of the more established Liberal and Labour parties.”

We can infer from this shift in partisanship a failure among Liberal and Labour leaders to engage in the purification desired by their Scottish electorate who were dissatisfied with the status quo of Anglo-Scottish hierarchy, and the amassing of two million signatures for the Scottish Covenant of 1949 demonstrated Scots’ unease about their place in the Union. “Scotsmen are campaigning for home rule and their own Parliament in Edinburgh,” an Associated Press story reported in early 1950. “Too much governmental authority, they complain, is being concentrated under the Socialist Government.”

The Scottish Covenant reads as follows.

We, the people of Scotland who subscribe to this Engagement, declare our belief that reform in the constitution of our country is necessary to secure good government in accordance with our Scottish traditions and to promote the spiritual and economic welfare of our nation. We affirm that the desire for such reform is both deep and widespread through the whole community, transcending all political differences.

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475 Ibid., 2.
476 Ibid., 14.
and sectional interests, and we undertake to continue united in purpose for its achievement.

With that end in view we solemnly enter into this Covenant whereby we pledge ourselves, in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.478

As Divine notes, “this was not a nationalist document but rather one that aspired to constitutional reform within the framework of the United Kingdom.”479 Much like the peuple Québécois, Scots used this covenant to constitute themselves as uniquely loyal within the United Kingdom — they were proud Scots seeking a change in social order, but they also professed their loyalty to Britain. The Scottish Covenant rekindled interest in home rule from before World War I, and although the 1950s were equitable for Scots — even with the independence of India and Pakistan — a sense of Scottish nationalism persisted. By the end of the decade, downward indicators in Scotland’s economy fueled a drive for devolution. “The long period of Britain’s post-war relative decline against international competitors, which lasted from the 1960s to the 1990s, had begun. The balance between ‘Scottishness’ and ‘Britishness’ now shifted. The rise of the SNP, the new and pragmatic interest in devolution by Westminster and a fresh vitality in Scottish culture were all signs of the times.”480 By the 1980s, there were clarion calls for a recalibration of the Anglo-Scottish hierarchy. “The Scots had not voted for Tory radicalism and many began to feel that they were now suffering from an electoral dictatorship. That experience put more steel into the

478 Ibid.
Scottish electorate and their politicians. Any ambiguity about the relevance of a Scottish Parliament to the future of the nation quickly receded.”

Although Burke does not seriously contend with unfinished redemption cycles, Bobbitt examines “the implications of the redemption drama as a cultural form without assuming that the cycle must play itself out.” He theorizes that cultural form “is the discourse as much as are the words, and it provides a pattern for viewing the situation and shaping future action. Thus, guilt-purification-redemption is a form in which the gratification of a felt need for redemption from guilt is satisfied through purification.”

Essentially, Bobbitt argues, “we engage in a Sisyphean struggle to bridge the unbridgeable. The redemption drama may contribute to a trained incapacity toward trying to enact utopian visions of community instead of accepting a world of difference and imperfection.” As an alternative, “we can shape our own ethical-moral norms and decide upon the steps to be taken when those norms are violated. We do not have to be trapped in a guilt-purification-redemption form of experiencing and acting.”

The failure of advocacy for Scottish home rule throughout most of the twentieth century constituted unaddressed guilt, and the consequence was defiant affirmation of Scottish identity. In answering the question “What is Scotland?” Martin highlights the momentous scene at the opening of the new Scottish Parliament on May 12, 1999. Winnie Ewing, a prominent Scottish nationalist and SNP member for decades, was the oldest member elected to the new Scottish

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481 Ibid.
482 Bobbitt, The Rhetoric of Redemption, 95.
483 Ibid., 96.
484 Ibid., 98.
485 Ibid.
Parliament and had the privilege of serving as its chair. She proclaimed: “I want to start with words I’ve always wanted either to say or hear someone say: The Scottish Parliament, adjourned on the twenty-fifth day of March in the year 1707, is hereby reconvened.” Her assertion was met with enthusiastic approval across Scotland. “Ewing’s rhetoric of continuity articulates the feeling (in England as well as Scotland) that Scottish identity had been submerged, but not obliterated, in the British state. Devolution and its discourse have put a spotlight not only on Scotland, but also on Great Britain, highlighting the need to reexamine old assumptions among scholars about the essentially unitary character of British identity.” As time would prove, Scots did so themselves, and they continue to do so today as they reconsider their imagination of their identity and seek to constitute themselves in ways that improve Scotland’s place in social order.

**Independence and Brexit**

Divine, writing in 2006, rightfully predicted that the new Scottish Parliament would provide relief from hierarchical guilt only for a limited period. “To conclude that the Union is now secure and that the devolved parliament as presently constituted is the ‘settled will’ of the Scottish people would be to go too far.” The new social order of devolved government could not and would not offer the range of authority necessary to satisfy the increasingly Scotland-oriented identity of Scots. Indeed, a mere five years later, the SNP wrested control of the Scottish Parliament from the Labour Party on a platform of promises to hold a national referendum on Scottish independence. The referendum in September 2014

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delivered a clear mandate — more than 55 percent of voters favored Scotland remaining in the United Kingdom. This outcome is particularly curious: Scottish voters elected the SNP to control Holyrood based on a platform of promises to field a question of Scottish independence, and within three years voters declined that opportunity despite a widening sense of Scottish national identity.

In 2004, around three-quarters of Scots felt “exclusively” or “mainly” Scottish, a significantly higher proportion than the equivalent measures in England and Wales. These “Scottish” loyalties are especially common among the younger generation. But that need not mean that political independence is inevitable. It may be yet another manifestation of the Union’s historic capacity not only for flexibility but for giving full and easy scope for the Welsh, English and Scots to express their cultural and ethnic identities within a UK framework.489

I do not dare take so bold a leap as to offer an absolute explanation for this outcome in Burkean terms, but the parameters and outcome of Scotland’s independence referendum suggest that Scots were capable of imagining themselves as “exclusively” or “mainly” Scottish within a larger imagined British community. Indeed, in legalistic terms, Scots have the luxury of rhetorically constituting themselves in two ways — their representative government in Edinburgh cultivates national discourse on Scottish issues and policies, especially education and health care, and then Scotland is represented by a separate bloc in Parliament in London. By “bloc” I do not imply any sense of homogeneity or faction, but, rather, I simply observe that rhetorical dialogue on Scottish affairs occurs at two levels and in two conversations where overlap may exist. Through their members of Parliament in London, Scots have a say in the affairs and policies of the United Kingdom, and separately,

489 Ibid., 16.
through the Scottish Parliament, they have exclusive province over devolved Scottish prerogatives. This “West Lothian Question” of legislative fairness has been a source of consternation over the years, but for the purpose of studying Scottish national identity, we can conclude that Scotland largely can have its cake and eat it, too.

This phenomenon becomes more complex in light of the recent “Brexit” referendum, in which the United Kingdom elected to leave the European Union. Scotland voted decidedly in favor of remaining, but the nation’s overall vote was 52 percent in favor of separation. Response from Scottish leaders was swift. Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s first minister and leader of the SNP, quickly declared that Brexit was untenable for Scotland — and that the referendum’s outcome opened the possibility for another Scottish independence referendum. “The UK-wide vote to leave the EU is one that I deeply regret. It remains my passionate belief that it is better for all parts of the UK to be members of the European Union. But the vote across England and Wales was a rejection of the EU. And it was a sign of divergence between Scotland and large parts of the rest of the UK in how we see our place in the world.”

As Brummett explains of Burke’s guilt-redemption theory, social orders and hierarchies can be overlapping and interrelated. “Any individual belongs to numerous hierarchies, and hierarchies may be interlocking or embedded within each other.” Certainly that is the case for the United Kingdom and its constituent parts. Northern Ireland and Scotland maintain unique social identities separate from but concurrent with their Britishness. These identities, alongside Englishness, have been, for the

491 Brummett, “Burkean Scapegoating, Mortification, and Transcendence,” 255.
past four decades, associated with Europeanness as the United Kingdom marked its place in the European Union. This identity is not an artifact of geography — it implies, in Sturgeon’s words, “the world’s biggest single market — and the jobs and investment that depend on it.” The identity of the European Union, Sturgeon said, includes “freedom to travel, live, work and study in other European countries. And we voted to renew our reputation as an outward-looking, open and inclusive country.” While the rhetorical scapegoating of Europe by pro-Brexit leaders such as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove led to a purification of the United Kingdom’s hierarchy-induced guilt by way of leaving the European Union, it created a future certainty of new social order and hierarchy to come, and therefore more mystery, anxiety and guilt for Scotland.

Some scholars were prescient of this eventual outcome. “Today, the Continent stands in the same relationship. Scots institutions are often seen as more akin to those of the Continent than of England, and the Scots social ethic continues to surface at British elections, a phenomenon emphasized by the divergent electoral behaviour of the Scots since 1979. The new cry of ‘Scotland and Europe’ seems remarkably similar to the old cry of ‘Scotland and the Empire.’” That observation was written in 1993 during the devolution debate, and it largely holds true again today. Sturgeon’s comments suggest that Scots would choose Europeanness over Britishness if that meant stronger Scottishness, and once again, Scotland faces a dilemma for how to purge its hierarchy-induced guilt. Meanwhile, new tensions between England and Scotland have emerged as the Brexit outcome fuels divisive rhetoric in this period of uncertainty. Scottish leaders’ open defiance of Brexit, along

492 Sturgeon, “Remarks on the EU referendum result.”
with their rhetorical flirtation with renewed attempts at independence from the United Kingdom, have stiffened sensitives to the question of Britishness versus Englishness versus Scottishness. By way of anecdotal evidence, The Scotsman recently reported of online uproar after supermarket giant Tesco replaced the Scottish flag with the Union flag on packages of Scottish strawberries sold in the chain’s stores. “Following an outcry from Scottish customers on social media, the retailer’s customer service staff claimed the company had received several complaints from customers in England who had questioned why the St George’s flag did not feature on berries harvested south of the Border,” the newspaper reported. The article directly cited a post on Tesco’s Twitter account. “English customers criticised us why we do not apply the English flag on English berries and why we do for Scottish berries,” Tesco had posted. In response to Tesco, “one Twitter user, Eileen Brown, wrote: ‘Tesco used to mark Scottish produce with saltire (our flag). Now you use Union flag. Please say why. Is it #casualracism?’” We can anticipate further such dialogue in the months and years ahead as Britain contends with its momentous decision, but unlike the devolution debate — and even the more recent independence referendum — Scots will have more and greater communication tools with which to explore and negotiate their Scottishness, Britishness and Europeanness. And more is at stake because the communities in which Scots choose to imagine themselves — and those from which they imagine their exclusion — will have everlasting impact on the nation’s future. No matter how Scots


495 Tesco (@Tesco), Twitter post, August 22, 2016, 10:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/Tesco/status/767780433014685696.
choose to constitute themselves as they contend with the upheaval of their social order after Brexit, there will be, invariably, some new form of hierarchy that allays mystery but from which guilt will emanate. Or as Burke wrote: “A dramatistic view of human motives thus culminates in the ironic admonition that perversions of the sacrificed principle (purgation by a scapegoat, congregation by segregation) are the constant temptation of human societies, whose orders are built by a kind of animal exceptionally adept in the ways of symbolic action.”

**Final Words**

In 2009, during my third trip to Scotland, I took a guided day trip into the Highlands by bus. After the tour was completed and we were en route back to Edinburgh, the tour guide — an elderly Scottish gentleman wearing a kilt — began telling jokes to pass the time. “What does a Scotsman wear under his kilt?” he asked in a thick Scottish brogue. He paused. “Socks and shoes,” he said dryly. His monologue continued, and after a while he began talking about kilts again. “I encourage you to buy a kilt if you like — buy any kind you fancy,” he said. “But, please, if you buy a kilt, please buy one that's made in Scotland.” Even the hallowed tartan kilt — the indelible symbol of Scottish identity — had fallen prey to the globalized market economy, and the Scotsman leading our tour group was not keen on imported kilts being sold to unwitting foreign tourists. In a way, I believe, this anecdote represents the totality of the tartan tradition: From the middle of the eighteenth century, tartan was rhetorically linked to an *other* identity of savagery, disloyalty and rebellion backed by France. That trope was carried forward in the following four decades to scapegoat

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George III and his governments’ policies, and almost in an instant, as Scots demonstrated their martial prowess and unquestioned loyalty, tartan was at the forefront of images depicting Scottish soldiers’ heroic acts of bravery in defense of the Empire. As Englishmen came to imagine Scots (and themselves) as British, and Scots imagined themselves as such, tartan became a convenient but rhetorically powerful way for Scots to constitute themselves as unique from the English amid the increasing threat of homogeneity from Anglicization. The added benefit of the tartan tradition was that Scots not only could constitute themselves as Scottish by wearing tartan — and separate themselves from the English — but the specifically unique pattern of that tartan also allowed them to reflect their own clan membership and heritage at the same time. This rich history is the result of centuries of strife, and status was hard earned. It is only fitting, then, that Scots would want the sartorial symbol of their identity to be made in none other than Scotland. The confounding truth, however, is that the global diaspora of people with Scottish roots is as diverse and widespread as the purposes for which new and unique tartan patterns can be registered. Scots are not constrained to Scotland, and nor is their tartan identity.

Cheape, a noted Scottish historian, labels tartan an “enduring symbol” — but he stops short of defining absolutely what that symbol represents. Its connotations, however, are unmistakable. “Tartan, with its highly visual and recognisable qualities, always carries strong associations — it is family, kinship (real or imagined), brotherhood, nationhood, a sense of place, uniform, a matter for celebration.”\footnote{Cheape, Tartan, 7.} Many of these links align with the significance of tartan examined across the previous chapters, and Cheape’s sentimentality
toward tartan is matched only by his knowledge of its history and legacy. The present trajectory of tartan is that, among Scots in Scotland, tartan reflects national pride and identity, whereas among the descendants of Scottish immigrants who settled around the world, tartan is a form of quaint homage to imagination of an ethnic past. Scotland has embraced that fascination for shared Scottish ancestry, and the government’s Scottish Register of Tartans is enrolling new tartan patterns that reflect shared identity that also overlaps with Scottish lineage. “Tartans are sought out, invented and adopted by commercial interests, corporations, American states, sports and football clubs, even by parliaments,” Cheape writes. “These are the new clans.”498 And while tartan — officially registered or not — is a convenient and visually attractive way to acknowledge one’s heredity, tartan’s true power resides in the imagination of its wearers. If they can imagine themselves as part of the ageless clan of Scotland, tartan becomes, by virtue of its constitutive power, an artifact of the rhetoric of heroic loyalty.

498 Ibid., 13.
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