The Accession Pedagogy
Power and Politics in Turkey’s Bid
for EU Membership

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ABSTRACT
From 1989, new plans to enlarge the EU caused growing public disenchantment with the future of European integration as a viable model of cooperation among states and peoples in Europe. To manage disenchantment, EU actors designed various policy tools and techniques in their approaches to European peripheries such as Turkey. Among these, they intensified and perfected processes of pedagogy where EU actors assume that they have unique knowledge of what it means to be ‘European’ and that they must teach accession candidates how to become true Europeans. Based on accounts of EU politicians and officials, past experiences of government officials from former EU candidate states and Turkish officials’ encounters with the EU’s accession pedagogy, this article explores the EU’s enlargement policy as a pedagogical engagement and the responses it elicits among Turkish governmental representatives, in order to test the reconfigurations of power between Europe and the countries on its margins.

KEYWORDS
accession negotiations, enlargement policy, European Union, pedagogy, power, Turkey

Two hundred years ago, Napoleon conquered Europe on the battlefields of Austerlitz, Jena and Wagram. Today’s battle for Europe is fought in committee rooms and conference halls. The weaponry has also undergone a significant change: instead of cavalry and cannon, the fate of nations is decided by administrative amendment and constructive compromise.

(Eppink 2007: 26)

Introduction

From 1989, the European Union (EU) faced double challenges in terms of how to respond to the break-up of the Soviet system and the
EU’s future political shape. The concept of enlargement was first pronounced in 1991 as a major EU initiative to tackle these problems. As public disenchantment with EU enlargement grew, especially after former socialist states joined in 2004, EU policymakers moulded their engagement with European peripheries in a policy framework. Dubbed as the EU’s ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004), enlargement purportedly became the key policy instrument to attain the EU’s integrationist political and economic objectives in the wider region by bringing political stability and capitalist dynamism into Europe’s margins.1 Today, the EU often encounters problems in consolidating its political and economic union as it faces differences in political culture and cultures of governing among member and non-member states, while proponents of EU enlargement grapple to maintain public support for its viability.

This diversity in political and state cultures (Hedetoft 2003) and cultures of policymaking by governments and peoples of Europe has long occupied anthropologists and ethnographers of European integration.2 Scholars have scrutinised policy ranging from cultural and media, social and welfare, immigration and citizenship, education, agricultural, industrial, financial and monetary policies in/of Europe and the EU focusing on the relationship between local, regional and national governments’ interactions with their people (see Introduction in this issue). But less attention has been paid to a meta-policy such as EU enlargement, which as a composite policy crosscutting all (other) EU policies is geared towards the management of politico-cultural diversity in Europe. In this article I examine the power and policy relations between elected and assigned representatives of a supranational policy power (the EU) and a nation-state (Turkey), in order to look into the long-term viability of the current terms and conditions of EU enlargement and to provide a critical account of the vision behind it. The notion of pedagogy, I argue, explains best the EU’s policy (and political) engagement with EU candidates during their road to integration. By pedagogy, I mean an uneven power relationship, as in teacher–student, where EU norms, guidelines and laws are imposed as if they were being ‘taught’. As in school, however, some students are more unruly than others and refuse to simply obey or ‘learn’.

A pedagogical approach towards candidate countries reportedly began during the EU’s latest (fifth) enlargement after the fall of the Soviet Bloc. Many EU officials preferred the use of familial metaphors in referring to candidate countries while EU integration was characterised as an ‘initiation to the European family’, a ‘rite of passage’
according to Irene Bellier (2004). But the European Commission, the executive EU organ (hereafter, the Commission), systematised this pedagogical approach when Croatia and Turkey began membership talks in 2005, as much to satisfy existing disenchantments among EU members towards further enlargement as to actually modify either country’s behaviour. The accession pedagogy, a concept I initially adapted from Babul (2010), manifests itself most noticeably in the anti-case of Turkey’s bid for EU membership because Turkish representatives, unlike those of other accession candidates, have put up considerable resistance to playing the role of pupil and often make defiant moves towards policy changes demanded by the Commission that were to put Turkey into accord with EU law and practice.

**The Techno-politics of EU Accession Negotiations**

Acquiring EU membership is commonly a two-part process: candidate countries first go through a techno-bureaucratic procedure in which ‘know-how’ from EU member states and institutions is transferred to candidate countries. Then, parliaments of the EU, its member states, and of the candidate country sign an international agreement, which may require referenda in some of the states involved.

A candidate country’s room for manoeuvre during the ‘accession negotiations’ is extremely limited. The candidate must agree with the EU on the timeframe in which it will make its national laws compatible with the EU *acquis communautaire* (the EU’s common body of law; hereafter, the *acquis*). This is often called ‘harmonisation’. ‘Accession negotiations’ are thus a misnomer because candidates have no power to change the *acquis*. They only negotiate how much time they get to keep it at bay before it replaces their national laws (‘transposition’). Moreover, candidates cannot ‘cherry-pick’ the *acquis* by accepting some parts and leaving out others (Ülgen 2005: 13; also see Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008: 63).

Perhaps more importantly, accession negotiations are technically conducted between member states through the Commission’s brokering (Christoffersen 2007: 35; Gottfried and Györkös 2007: 206). In these negotiations, the Commission has to act doubly, as the representative of common community positions and of the candidate country. Throughout its history of institutionalisation, this double occupancy helped the Commission consolidate its representative functions and power. The Commission established the Task Force for the Accession...
Negotiations to deal with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus in 1998. In early 1999, a newly established directorate-general for enlargement with more manpower and financial capabilities subsequently replaced the task force (Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008: 43). Turkey became part of this unit after its conferment of candidacy in December 1999.

Politically, on the other hand, EU enlargement and accession are negotiated publicly because of their ramifications for domestic audiences in EU member states and candidate countries. It is perhaps due to this political meaning of EU membership/accession that the EU and candidate countries keep using the term negotiation in their relations to one another. However, the boundaries between the technical and the political understandings of accession negotiations are much blurrier than any neat identification as private (between state representatives, behind closed doors) and public (openly discussed by many and not just by heads of states, in public spaces). Following Starr and Immergut (1987: 221–2), I take \textit{technical} to refer to issues or activities that are moved ‘out of political discussion or control’, while \textit{political} refers to issues with commonly established boundaries which are ‘opened up into discussion’. In their study of historical changes in health-care policy in certain western European countries and the U.S., Starr and Immergut found that such policies were heavily implicated by competing forces of politicisation and technicalisation between which, in different historical moments corresponding to major crises in society, competing interests generate push-and-pull. In anthropology, the technical–political dynamic has already been interrogated by students of critical development, who see experts’ deliberation of how to render issues technical as \textit{anti}-political, or as a depoliticising effect (Ferguson 1994; Murray Li 2007) that tends to generate an impression that no public contention, but harmony and consensus exist (Garsten and Jacobsson 2013; Müller 2011). Those on the recipient-end of these development programmes are equally prone to manipulating the boundaries between the technical and the political by \textit{politicising} relevant issues as much as they can (see Müller 2011). Hence, one cannot easily identify the technifiers and politicisers in any given developmental process. As any issue at any point is open to the push and pull by both forces, actors from both sides engage in technicalisation \textit{and} politicisation whenever they see it fit their interests.

Since the latest round, EU enlargement and especially the Turkish bid for membership generated greater public contention, or \textit{became politicised}, in member states. To counter this contention, EU actors such
as the Commission developed new methods and instruments. When examined collectively, these policy artefacts constitute the ethos of the EU’s pedagogical engagement with candidates. As I discuss below, technical devices invented along Turkey’s EU accession (also applied to Croatia until it acceded to the EU) often become means for politicisation, which, in the case of the Commission and its enlargement policy, then generates further need for technical intervention by expert-bureaucrats and for tightening the grips of the enlargement policy. Here is an account of how it happens.

The Policy in Action

In the projected course of accession negotiations, the Commission first examines a candidate country’s legal system vis-à-vis the *acquis*, in order to identify and catalogue necessary changes under various ‘negotiating chapters’, and prioritise issues that require immediate and long-term action by candidates — known as ‘opening benchmarks’, the preliminary conditions for substantial negotiations over a chapter to begin and as ‘closing benchmarks’, the final conditions for negotiations to be closed, respectively. Technically, only after candidate countries ‘satisfactorily’ meet these benchmarks do accession negotiations begin (and end). Screening officially began for Turkey and Croatia in October 2005 (Croatia became an EU member in the Summer of 2013, while Turkish membership floundered).

Screening serves two purposes: public servants from the Commission’s directorate-generals (DG) and their candidate country counterparts meet in Brussels twice for each chapter (a) to engage in a comparative legislative assessment, and (b) to develop cultural understandings of one another. Between October 2005 and the end of 2006, around two thousand Turkish officials met with their Commission counterparts for sixty-six screening meetings and one more on the Lisbon Strategy (TEPAV 2006: 3). Screening is over but the legislative assessment and technical preparations for harmonisation and transposition of EU *acquis* into candidate’s national laws continue to be monitored regularly by way of a complex matrix of non-binding ‘soft law’ tools such as progress reports and benchmarks.

The Commission, in particular the DG Enlargement, evaluates candidate country progress attached to the overall success of enlargement policy by means of EU criteria and accounts of its and candidate country’s policy experts. In the early 2000s, the Commission introduced a
novel technique called ‘open method of coordination’ to ‘calibrate performance’ (Pierini 2001: 7) among EU member states in order to ‘create policy convergence in the Union and to encourage member states to learn from each other’s “best practices”’ (CEU 2000; for a Foucauldian critique of benchmarking as an instrument of neoliberal governmentality, see Walters and Haahr 2005). Paragraph 37 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (CEU 2000) explains that performance tests are designed to help Member States to progressively develop their own policies, involves fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences; periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes.

Beginning with Croatia and Turkey, the Commission applies benchmarking to candidate countries, in order to calibrate their accession performances (also see Tulmets 2010). Although the Commission regularly prepares progress reports for Turkey since October 1998, today accession performances of candidate countries are evaluated in progress reports by means of benchmarks gleaned from ‘best practices’ in the Union. Between differentiation and standardisation, the Commission often applies descriptive sanitation when outlining technical steps and instruments of accession negotiations that are tailored to common procedure and individual performance at the same time, which led one Commission official to characterise progress reports essentially as ‘political documents’ (de Lobkowicz 2001).

Studies of the application of benchmarking in a variety of related contexts reveal various pedagogical qualities. In the case of EUROMED, Schmid (2004: 403) observed that the Commission distinguishes between “good”-performing and “bad” partners’ by ‘persuasion ... [and] not coercion’ (Schmid 2004: 416, also see note 1). Such rhetoric of good–bad partners is familiar to critical ethnographies of development practice in international institutional terrains of the EU, the U.S. and other global powers (see Gould and Marcussen 2004; Harper 2000; Mosse 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2005; Stirrat 2000; Wedel 1998). But pedagogical engagements are not limited to economic development. Coles (2007) found that the EU’s interventions in terms of pro-
moting electoral democracy in European peripheries such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina have this character; Teivainen (2009) further critiques EU practices of promoting democracy via election observation mis-
sions in Latin American countries on the basis that these missions establish power relations between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ that advantage the former.

During my fieldwork in Brussels, I encountered other factors in the EU’s pedagogical conduct that concern the internal dynamics of the Union. First, EU politicians and bureaucrats view benchmarking as a necessary tool to generate internal public support for further enlarge-
ments, especially after the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania attracted a lot of criticism, due to EU institutions’ overly optimistic assessments of how well they were prepared for membership. EU enlargement has become contentious and political, and benchmarking is often exercised as a panacea. A member of the European Parlia-
ment, for example, explained at an event organised to promote Croatia’s membership that some European politicians (including her) feel that they ‘cannot sell further enlargements to [their] constituency without the benchmarking system’, and that they have to convince voters that ‘we are not going to do it the way we did it with Bulgaria’.3

Second, benchmarks are means for making candidates ‘look like they take real leadership in charge of a policy’ (Interview with a national official, 25 April 2008). When introducing (or marketing) his DG’s progress report on candidates, the former Enlargement Com-
missioner told candidate countries that benchmarks are tools to test not only their accession preparation performance, but also their sin-
cerity: ‘If you are serious about accession, you have to achieve to prove it’ (88th Meeting of the European Economic and Social Committee, External Relations Section, 5 February 2009, Brussels).

Third and related, benchmarking introduces a layer of disciplining where candidates must convince the Commission that their reform activities are not fabricated but are real and tangible efforts to meet EU demands, or at least to display a willingness to do so. Usually, a generous legal adoption of EU laws is considered sufficient. In cases of problematical countries whose candidacy is overtly politicised, however, the Commission does not only want changes on paper but also ‘implementation’, or proof of reformed policy application. Reform efforts appear especially unconvincing if they are stretched over time (interview with a Commission official, 2 June 2009). Then benchmark-
ing perpetuates suspicion and mistrust when candidates fail to con-
vince the Commission that they are serious. This is especially so in
the Turkish case where failure to convince the Commission raises suspicions that the government’s EU priorities are different from the EU’s priorities for Turkey — regardless of whether they are founded (and they most often are). In cases of mistrust and suspicion between the Commission and candidate countries, ‘certain portions of the *acquis* [become] economically and socially sensitive, and politically impossible’, as one Turkish governmental representative commented. From the candidate’s perspective, some benchmarks can appear as trivial and facile matters and as real (read: political) obstacles to accession. This Turkish official once exclaimed in awe to his audience: ‘eighty-seven benchmarks for six chapters!’

Insiders’ accounts demonstrate how benchmarking politicises accession negotiations. The first chapter opened under the Turkish and Croatian accession negotiations was on science and research. This chapter was supposed to be an easy one, for it did not require opening benchmarks. Although the draft common position prepared by the Commission proposed to open and provisionally close this chapter, the French representative argued for a closing benchmark. The Commission disagreed, saying that such a closing benchmark could not simply be invented (Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008: 364). Discussions continued with this representative arguing against a provisional closing by referring to the evolving nature of the *acquis* in view of common expectations that accession negotiations with Turkey would take longer. Meanwhile, others reiterated their governments’ usual objections to Turkey. Representatives of remaining member states found the solution by changing the common end clause from ‘the EU may return to this chapter at an appropriate moment’ to ‘the EU will, if necessary, return to this chapter at an appropriate moment’ (Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008: 365, original emphasis). It was only when the political interests were tamed by a technical will that the chapter was closed to negotiation in June 2006.

Negotiations over the taxation chapter show further insights into the highly politicised nature of (economic) interests in the EU. Going against EU competition law, Turkey sought to protect the interests of its recently privatised *raki* (liquor) industry by charging a high excise tax on (mainly imported) alcoholic beverages with high alcohol content such as whisky, which became an opening benchmark for Turkey. In response, Turkish authorities proposed a timeline to even out different taxation levels between the mentioned drinks by 2018, while still demanding for *raki* an exemption similar to the Greek Ouzo. When the Commission negotiated the Turkish proposal with member

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sates, some members objected on the basis that 2018 was too distant. A few referred to a similar case where Croatia was asked to fulfil a closing benchmark. The Commission tried to negotiate the opening of this chapter by assuring member states that in case of non-compliance their final offer to Turkey would reflect that (Internal meeting notes of the EU Council Working Party on Enlargement, 5 June 2009). After all, benchmarking accommodates best the negotiations of member states’ political and economic interests. Nevertheless, there are always other ways to circumvent such enforced policy changes: the Turkish government requires duplicate testing and double licensing from spirit importers, which continues to trouble negotiations on the taxation — even though this chapter was subsequent to Turkish proposal opened to negotiation — and the free movement of goods and competition chapters (DG Trade 2010; Misrahi 2010).

The EU’s community *acquis*, too, can become a pedagogical instrument. During the latest enlargement, the EU *acquis* contained about 80–90,000 pages of legal text. In the current round, it contains over 120,000 pages. As with any dynamic body of law, the *acquis* evolves as the Union moves towards further political and economic integration. From the perspective of enlargement, one of the interesting effects on candidate countries is the increase in elements of the *acquis* with which they are expected to comply. The large corpus of the *acquis*, a great source of mystification for various observers, is a great cause of grievance for candidates. With its large volume of common law, the EU appears to critics even more bureaucratic than Turkey, whose heavy bureaucracy has only [sic] 70,000 pages of legislation (Akdogan 2008: 5)! As a first step to legal approximation and alignment, translating the EU *acquis* into a candidate country’s official language requires resources. In some cases it can take as long as the accession process. But as one Commission official pointed out to me, translating the EU *acquis* and aligning national regulations to it is one thing; providing correct interpretations of it and making it legible by national-level officials in the candidate countries is quite another (Interview with a DG Trade official, 4 February 2009). This arduous task requires attention to an EU perspective that is geared towards satisfying 28 member states. Yet national politicians and legislators in candidate countries also face contention that arises because the *acquis* appears to threaten their state identity and governance culture and, through the process of pedagogy, to turn them into de facto special partners (Interview with a DG Internal Market and Services [MARKT] official, 28 May 2009).
The mismatching of law/policy and practice long concerned anthropological studies of law and policymaking (see Moore 2000). In my case, apparent disagreement between law on paper and in practice does not necessarily refer to actual discrepancy. It rather indicates the opening up of a space for politicking, while the *acquis* becomes a ‘field of law’ in EU-candidate country relations. In Bourdieu’s terms, the field of law, or ‘juridical field’, is both ‘the order of objective relations between actors and institutions in competition with each other for control of the right to determine the Law’ (Bourdieu 1987: 816), as well as ‘the site of [such] competition’ (Bourdieu 1987: 817). Any so-called rift assumed to exist between the codification and interpretation/implementation of the law refers to different forces that envision technical/political interpretations of what the law and the policy ought to be (also see Anaya in this issue). Within the juridical field such as the EU *acquis* and its transposition into Turkish law, this kind of a rift is another name for ‘confrontation among actors possessing a technical competence which is inevitably social and which consists essentially in the socially recognised capacity to interpret a corpus of texts sanctifying a correct or legitimised vision of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 817).

In the Commission’s legal agenda, laws are to be simultaneously known, understood and practised. In its 2001 Turkey report, it explained:

> As is the case in previous Reports, ‘progress’ has been measured on the basis of decisions actually taken, legislation actually adopted, international conventions actually ratified (with due attention being given to implementation), and measures actually implemented. As a matter of principle, legislation or measures, which are in various stages of either preparation or parliamentary approval, have not been taken into account. This approach ensures equal treatment for all the candidate countries and permits an objective assessment of each country in terms of its concrete progress in preparing for accession. (CEC 2001: 7)

Here, the exact emphasis on the ‘actuality’ of progress that was common to all candidate country reports of the time (and still is) is certainly due to the fluctuations in the market of hope in which candidate countries including Turkey try to bid. Yet, the meaning of actuality remains at best ambiguous, if not contested. Every year during report preparation season, Turkey’s governmental representatives shower their Commission counterparts with prospective progress indicators, however unconvincing they may be.

In reality, candidates do not have to comply *fully* with the *acquis* or they actually run the risk of ‘overtransposition’ by doing it too much.
by the book (Interviews with a DG MARKT official, 28 May 2009 and a DG Taxation and Customs Union official, 26 January 2009). In fact, overtransposition, as Woolfson (2007) observed with respect to Baltic states, can be quite unsettling and begets deeper social and economic troubles for candidate governments. It is this nuance between sufficient transposition and overtransposition that seems to trouble Turkish officials the most.

**Comparative Pedagogies and Defiant, Yet Disintegrating Turks**

Critical pedagogy scholars have called attention to the difference between pedagogy (from Greek παιδός, genitive παιδός; paidos and ἁγω (ἀγω) literally means ‘the leading of the child’) and education (from Latin educare, ‘to raise up’ and ‘to lead out’) to explain how actors perceive and position themselves and others in this relationship. Capturing this difference between education and pedagogy, Too (1998: 5) argues that the concept of pedagogy changed in the twentieth century to include rather than exclude the pedagogue, or the maker of the rules of education. Learning from best practices of one another proves the invitation of the pedagogue into the pedagogical network. To this I add the active but not-so-voluntary participation of the pupils, since the EU’s accession pedagogy requires active participation of candidates in this learning process, wherein power relations are, from their perspective, recast to their inconvenience.

Studying a series of diplomatic exchanges between Hungary and the Commission at the early onset of Hungarian accession negotiations, Bőrőcz (2000: 871) concluded that the essence of the EU’s strategy is ‘integration without inclusion: participation in the production systems, and appendance to consumption markets of EU corporations without the attendant political, economic, social and cultural rights conferred by European Union citizenship’. As such, the accession pedagogy institutes an unmistakable hegemonic relationship. It confers a trainee status on candidates, whereby the premise is that the EU as instructor has much to teach. It dictates that candidates must provide quick responses to EU demands in the form of reforms and permit full disclosure to and detailed inspection by EU institutions, even after the candidate country accedes to the EU: Bulgaria and Romania continue to be monitored by the EU during their post-accession for the requirements in the area of justice and internal affairs that they did not fulfill before joining the EU.
This performance measurement ultimately produces an unequal relationship of power between already-member countries and those that seek membership. One Commission official recounted to me a scene that took place in a technical meeting during the latest enlargement round wherein a German (member state) representative easily undermined a Hungarian (then a candidate country) representative’s account on past Hungarian practices, for these were clearly not best practices evident from Hungary’s seeking of EU membership, which created a rather unpleasant situation for the Hungarian representative (Interview with a DG Enterprise and Industry official, 5 March 2009).

In terms of relations between them, the accession pedagogy puts candidates in a race against each other. This creates a deep sense of failure when progress is found wanting. However, different candidate countries engage with the accession pedagogy differently. Hungarian elites, for instance, tried to tame this political asymmetry by saying, ‘If we want to develop a modern country, a normal country, then the implementation of European rules is not against our national interest. If our economy is absolutely integrated into the internal market, then their rules are our rules’ (Gottfried and Györkös 2007: 205, my emphasis). According to Böröcz (2000: 871), Hungary’s tacit agreement to and even internalisation of this power asymmetry was an important factor in its success in acquiring membership. As Jacoby (1999) also argues, tacit agreement on the EU’s pedagogy for the Central and Eastern European countries clearly depended on their confessions of weaknesses and failure, beginning at the screening phase.

Among those who sit through the accession experience, this sense of failure is more common than expected. It directly reflects on the rift between being and becoming European (see Bellier and Wilson 2000). Unlike the Hungarians, the Czech negotiators openly reflected on this rift and the pedagogical management of ‘negotiations’ by EU actors:

It was psychologically difficult to become a pupil in the European classroom. The Czechs were not willing to assume the role of exotic tribesmen only recently accustomed to civilisation, which was attributed them by some of the more ignorant commentators of the West. At the same time, many were unready to acknowledge that in several aspects that they badly needed to take some political lessons in democracy and economic policy, among other matters. (Telicka and Bartak 2007: 144)

The Czechs and Hungarians thus tried to domesticate the EU’s accession pedagogy by analogising EU members’ interests with their own. More recently, Iceland walked out on the negotiating table when the EU officials asked Icelanders to stop overfishing and to accept
strict fishing quotas. Icelandic negotiators were arguing that their fishermen have ‘more experience in fishing’ than those in the Union and that they ‘could teach Brussels best practices’ with regards to fisheries policy (Euractiv, 23 August 2013).

If the process of engaging in accession negotiations with the EU carries its own pedagogy to discipline candidate governments — hastily dubbed as ‘Europeanisation’ — Turkey has proven to be a much more difficult case because its political, governmental and economic elites defy the EU’s pedagogical approach. Nowhere does this more clearly manifest itself than in those parts of the accession process wherein the pedagogical agents from the EU present some expected reforms as technicalities, while their Turkish counterparts try to politicise them, and vice versa.

In Brussels, the Turkish response to accession pedagogy is widely recognised. As she reflected back on her native country’s negotiations with the EU in comparison to Turkey’s approach, one Slovenian official told me: ‘When we were negotiating, we just accepted. We were always the first to make it [pass laws, meet benchmarks] before even the Commission has written it down. You [Turkish representatives] can argue’ (Interview with a national official, 23 October 2008). A Dutch Commission official agreed. Using a rather grotesque analogy to compare Turkey’s approach with previous candidates, off-the-record she confided that, ‘as if we [the EU] are the dog-jumpers at a circus, if we would have told some countries to jump, they would have jumped’ (Interview, 23 April 2008). A British official remarked, ‘[A new member state] says, “Come and please run our country because you do it better”. Turkey doesn’t say that. I don’t think that they ever will’ (Interview, 25 May 2009). Another member state representative compared Turkey and Croatia in terms of their negotiating style:

They [Turkish representatives] say that there are countries in the Union that don’t want Turkey in. Croats’ approach is more technical. Turks don’t understand that it’s not an equal relationship, but that’s the nature of the affair. People in the Union use the same approach [as Turkish representatives], so they don’t like that. Sometimes it’s about national interests: in order to take something you give something. (Interview, 24 January 2009, emphasis added)

Evidently, the accession process is an exchange but not one among equals, for power is deeply embedded. The process does not even add up to a real ‘negotiation’. Yet, from observation I can tell that agents of Turkish accession try to make this process a negotiation with demands that the EU recognise Turkey on par with the Union, that

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it ‘give something, in order to take something’ from Turkey, and acknowledge the latter’s failings only vis-à-vis its achievements in progress reports and during evaluations of whether benchmarks are sufficiently fulfilled.

Some Turkish officials politicise negotiations by spinning an identity talk about their country’s statal, governmental and cultural identities. In response to my queries about how Turkey could demand ‘equality’ in a negotiating platform wherein the main premise is to maintain pedagogical relations, a Turkish official responded that:

People from other representations [of new member states] tell us that they easily established structures [necessary for EU membership]. But they didn’t have structures at all! What they did was to get out of a system, to flatten it out and to institute structures just like that! It’s not the same for us. We have a long-standing state tradition. They [the EU] demanded transparency; we opened ourselves all the way. You know that decisions are made behind closed doors at home [Turkey]. Our job is much harder because we have to make reforms by integrating new structures onto an existing system. (Interview, 16 April 2009, my translation)

A demand for equality is thus ultimately a psycho-political trope.

Consider another example. In a TV interview, one Turkish politician and former opposition Deputy summed up a common sentiment that runs deep among the Turkish ruling elites in the following way:

The EU cannot treat Turkey differently than it treats a Romania or a Bulgaria. It should treat us according to the same criteria it treats other candidates. It cannot make us the EU’s social laboratory to test its emergent policies like the policy on foundations. The EU doesn’t have a common Union policy on foundations, which it might ask us to comply with. We ask, which law on foundations does it dictate to us to comply with? First it should come up with a common policy then demand us to comply with. We say that we have a better policy on foundations than what they dictate on us. This is a very subjective area, we have a policy which we argue suits us better. They should first treat us equally then would we sit on the table to negotiate. The EU should not see us like a Bulgaria: that country did not even have a law on trade, so the EU was able to open a blank page for them. It didn’t matter for the Bulgarians which model they were asked to comply with. We are different; we have a practice of doing this business for seventy, eighty years. It can’t treat us like it treated Bulgaria or Romania. (emphasis added, my translation; ‘Ankara Kulisi [Backstage Ankara]’ CNNTurk, 23 May 2010)

Apart from several soft racist remarks directed at former-socialist countries — a certain gift of Cold War politics — this Turkish politician (and others I was told about) sees accession negotiations as a threat to existing Turkish ways of governing, ways which he is deeply convinced work. In
terms of policy behaviour of lawmakers such as this politician, resistance to EU reforms enveloped with accession pedagogy follows there.

In both statements, comparing oneself (Turkey) to others (EU member states and former candidates) concretises Turkish difference. But the construction of that difference can come out quite instrumentally and in unexpected and contradictory ways, especially when it is a quite deliberate effort by politicians and government officials to unsettle established EU norms regarding a policy issue. After his participation at the informal meeting of the EU energy ministers held in Brussels, the then Turkish energy and natural resources minister criticised the Union for holding back the opening of the energy chapter with claims that technical obstacles to further progress exist. In reference to the Cypriot reservations, the minister stated that energy talks were encumbered with politics and require a political solution. (Cyprus is an EU member with which Turkey does not have diplomatic ties due to the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island). In his own words, the minister was quoted to say:

Technically, we are already with Europe in terms of electricity and natural gas systems. In the field of energy, we have better facilities than most EU member states ... For that reason, it is not right to link the failure of not opening the energy chapter to technical reasons. The reasons are only political. Let me put it this way: They [the EU] have to come to a point where they can both heed the reservations of a small member state [Cyprus] and also find a solution. This is not our problem but the EU’s ... I think there is no option other than that we open this part of the chapter [on renewable energies], because Turkey is part of the solutions to the energy-related problems facing EU member states. So, this issue [that there are technical impediments] is not sustainable and it should certainly be solved politically. (Today’s Zaman, 9–11 September 2010)

This statement strongly supports my argument that politicisation can be a mutual interest to both parties of Turkey’s accession talks whether they want to stall or advance membership.

Resistance to the EU’s accession pedagogy manifests itself in some cases as a coping strategy. Euroscepticism and/or pessimism towards the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU member state are common to Turkish public officials in Brussels. Their role is to facilitate accession talks, yet they face a dilemma of facilitating European integration while doubting it, and their desperation is part and parcel of the general public opinion in Turkey. The Eurobarometer (2009) survey published during my fieldwork in Brussels recorded that only 38 per cent of the people in Turkey trust the EU, with 43 per cent having a positive image of the Union. Results of the German Marshall Fund’s Transat-
Atlantic Trends 2009 survey that came out at around the same time indicated even more dramatic numbers: 32 per cent had a positive image of the Union, and a third (34 per cent) said that they felt they share common Western values. While 48 per cent believed that Turkey’s EU membership is a good thing, 65 per cent thought that membership was not likely to happen; compared to 54 per cent in the EU who believed that Turkish membership is inevitable. Both surveys made the headlines and circulated during public meetings between officials and experts from both sides that I observed in Brussels.

Turkish officials I spoke with found the EU accession a very stressful process, which makes working at the Turkish delegation in Brussels a much-disliked job. While officials understood and responded to accession pedagogy as a mechanism that, echoing Fabian (1983), denies ‘coevalness’ to Turkey; for them, accession pedagogy brought about a sense of denial of co-location with their EU counterparts. Instead of accruing a sense of equality between officials from both sides that are located in the same time zone and at interconnected political geographies, accession pedagogy made Turkish officials feel extreme subjection. Many Turkish diplomat-bureaucrats I spoke with in Brussels fondly reminisced about being stationed in a Middle Eastern country before coming to Brussels. They related the hardships of working as a representative of a country that is an EU outsider and of working in Brussels where Turkey’s Europeanness, they felt, is constantly questioned by technical procedures of accession negotiations. Internalising such feelings of subjection and exclusion, some easily resort to reproducing Turkey’s difference from EU member states and other candidate countries with essentialising statements like ‘Turkey is European, but Turks are not’ (Personal communication with a Turkish diplomat, my translation, 25 March 2008). A collective feeling of being outsider among bureaucrats (and within the Turkish public) gives way to a new form of nationalism that is highly Eurosceptic and geared towards ameliorating a national ego bruised by failed promises of political (and economic) integration into the EU (see Firat 2013). Officials thus become more attentive to discursive idioms of identity talk in Europe. During my fieldwork in Brussels, I observed that Turkey intrigues many governmental representatives from EU member states when they take a job on its membership, whereas their Turkish counterparts feel the opposite. By resorting to commonly available identity discourses, Turkish bureaucrats and politicians ultimately defy the EU’s accession pedagogy — albeit ironically at the expense of delegitimising their country’s EU membership. In a sense, they are
cutting off their nose to spite their face. As the reform process quickly peaked after candidacy in 1999 and steadily slowed after the opening of negotiations in 2005, Euroscepticism blended with increased apathy among Turkish officials soon created an unspoken barrier between them and their EU counterparts. As a result, Turkish public officials are disintegrating from, rather than integrating to, Eurocracy.

**Conclusion**

Evident from their internal negotiations and public statements, the EU actors consider their pedagogical approach as necessary to ‘integrate’ European peripheries in a short period of time (also see Jacoby 2004: xii). But the Turkish political and bureaucratic elites risk accession in order to renegotiate significant terms and conditions of accession negotiations that establish the EU’s hegemonic power in key policy areas within the region.

Especially in countries like Turkey that are ‘caught up’ in the accession process, the reality of being an outsider is magnified by the pedagogical management of their accession process. The significance of the Turkish case does not lie with this growing Eurosceptic nationalism, however, for Euroscepticism was widely observed in almost all EU member states and candidate countries (see Ashbrook 2010; Harmsen and Spiering 2004; Ilieva and Wilson 2011). Rather, the significance of the Turkish case lies with the fact that Euroscepticism blended with new forms of nationalism never before led a country so consistently to resist EU reforms on grounds of national interests. I should also add that it becomes increasingly hard to establish whether such nationalism among high-level Turkish Eurocrats emerges as a response to the EU’s accession pedagogy or simply as a factor in it. What matters most is how the accession pedagogy and Eurosceptic nationalism as a response to it are structurally enabled by policy negotiations.

Therefore, this article does not aim to construct a reading of EU–Turkey relations from a governmentality perspective (Foucault 1991) that ascribes to the EU the role of master teacher, and to Turkey that of the unruly pupil in the European classroom. Nor do I wish to give the impression that Turkish politicians and bureaucrats are Giddens’s (1991) ‘reflexive subjects’, heroically ‘answering back’ to the Brusselisation of their country. I believe that their defiance of this form of power is because the accession pedagogy alienates them from Brussels’s politico-cultural human tapestry. Their resistance comes from
the fact that power invested in accession pedagogy implicates and turns them into outsiders in constant need of supervision. Otherwise, these policy elites have no problem with accession pedagogy, since Turkish elites have long been practising pedagogy in matters of state–citizen relationships (see Kaplan 2006).

Accession pedagogy by and large works in the everyday life of EU policy negotiations by redefining member states’ and candidate countries’ national interests. More commonly than admitted, such redefinitions result in conflict and resistance. Whether this conflict turns into antagonism or whether one interest prevails over the other, is always politically determined. The accession pedagogy between the EU’s political, administrative and legal organs and those of candidate countries should be carefully investigated by anthropologists because this form of relationship in today’s Europe nurtures particular understandings of culture, power and policy. From a macro perspective, it arguably produces a new form of political and economic dependency wherein the norms and forms that govern the EU are expected to produce ‘positive’ developmental outcomes in its peripheries. Enlargement policy gives primacy to EU norms, which are presented as technical blueprints over which no contention need exist in European publics. But the processes of adjusting to EU norms in law, economy, society and policy creates tensions in both member and non-member countries, where its gradual effects are understood as relinquishing democratic sovereignty to a supranational order run by distant technocratic powers in Brussels. Anthropological investigations of norms and forms of different reconfigurations of power with emphases on experiences and practices of actors and agents, one to which I aimed in this article, illuminate those interstices of power that could enable an escape from such forced antagonism and its surrounding politics for those who wish to do so.

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Notes

1. Coining the term first in the 1990s to describe the sources for the U.S.’s world hegemony, Nye (2004: x) defined soft power as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payments’. For Nye, a country’s attractions arise from its culture, political ideals and policies. In his conservative politics, hard power of a country (military force) should complement its soft power in order to maintain its local, regional, global hegemony.

2. Hedetoft (2003: 38) defines ‘political culture’ as the ‘rules, norms, values and practices according to which politics and the use of power plays itself out — or ideally should play itself out — in the interaction between state and nation’, and ‘state culture’ as the sharing of a common political culture among state officials which over time becomes a shared way of doing, thinking, feeling, identifying and expressing that is exclusive to this group.


4. Briefings on Turkey–EU relations by two different Turkish officials from Turkey’s permanent delegation to the EU to a non-governmental audience (17 December 2009). The same points were iterated during my earlier interviewing of one of these officials (29 May 2009, Brussels).

References


