ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the production of scale as a strategy used to capture political and economic benefits deriving from an ecotourism development project in South Korea. It contributes to understanding how struggles over controlling “nature” deepen the marginalization of those who derive their livelihoods from the land by answering the following questions: 1) How do states deploy scale in creating a new scale of capital accumulation through struggles with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) over controlling an ecotourism project? 2) How do historical relationships determine the processes and outcomes of the coproduction of scale and nature? 3) How do the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, the Jeju Olle Foundation, Jeju people, and tourists struggle over ownership of landscape? In answering these questions, I also answer an overarching question: What does the context of South Korea as a Newly Industrialized Country mean for the outcomes of these struggles?

Evidence from ethnographic fieldwork suggests that NGO ecotourism interventions begin a process of “accumulation by dispossession” that the decentralized developmental state subsequently seeks to control. Because tourists are the source of state and/or NGO political economic power, their needs overtake the economic needs of residents. Local residents find themselves entangled in both state and NGO power struggles while simultaneously attempting to maintain agricultural livelihoods and close kinship relations disrupted by the establishment of the ecotourism project. The outcome of these struggles is the opening of new channels for capital accumulation for outsiders,
leaving proclaimed beneficiaries of the ecotourism project on the political economic margins, as they have been throughout South Korea’s history.

The dissertation contributes to scale theory literature by demonstrating the process through which states reinforce authority on people and land by actively deploying scale while decentralizing. It also contributes to political ecology studies that draw on the simultaneous production of nature and scale by showing how an ecotourism project (1) depoliticizes state support of middle-class capital accumulation through ecotourism and (2) deepens historical uneven development among regions in South Korea. Lastly, the dissertation fills a gap in political ecology studies by examining the political ecological impacts in places where the use value of landscape shifts rapidly from livelihoods to aesthetics due to in-country economic growth. By doing so, the study speaks to debates on the false dichotomy of First and Third World political ecologies. It introduces a new “newly industrialized country (NIC) political ecology” focused on this unique political economic context that generates particular struggles between state/non-state actor struggles over nature.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have dreamed about the moment of writing this part of my dissertation since I began this long – in many different ways – Ph.D. journey. I have to begin with my dear advisor, Dr. Kathleen O’Reilly. Without her, this dissertation could not have begun or ended. Dr. O’Reilly has been more than willing to read my tens of, or maybe hundreds of, shabby dissertation chapter drafts. I know how she reads students’ writings, including mine: extremely focused while reading, and exhausted at the end of reading one due to having spent so much energy. From her comments on my writings, I see Dr. O’Reilly dancing, finding a creative idea or a solid argument. Also I see her pulling hair, despaired of vague descriptions and weak arguments. She never offers flatteries or hesitates turning critical about my work. I realized in later days that such transparency is the reason why her comments are reliable and meant to guide me. I have sat on her critical comments for days, struggling. After several years of struggling though, when I revised my dissertation, I realized that I have always talked to my advisor while writing something. I could imagine Dr. O’Reilly’s comments about a sentence or a paragraph after experiencing her countless comments coming sentence after sentence through track changes in red. And then I surprisingly realized that the habit of virtually communicating with my advisor has formed a system of writing guidance in my brain. The system is made of Dr. O’Reilly’s sweat and blood, if I dare to say so. Although I describe only academic guidance of Dr. O’Reilly, I also received her tremendous support emotionally, personally, and financially. She has claimed herself as an advisor only in profession, but
her support surpassed the definition of an advisor. In my second semester, I still felt that I was not supposed to be here in the department. I ran across Dr. O’Reilly one night at the hallway of my office. I think I thanked her for something, and she replied, “I want to see you thrive.” Now I see Dr. O’Reilly did mean what she said, and also did her best to help me succeed. Maybe I have not “thrived” yet. Nonetheless, I regard myself as a scholar now thanks to my dear advisor, Dr. Kathleen O’Reilly.

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DEDICATION

To my father… 아빠
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In summer 2011, the representative of a Village Women’s Association looked concerned. A tourist came into the snack shop where she and I sat, looked around, and bought a chocolate bar. The representative spied a water bottle stashed in his backpack when he left and said, “These people [tourists] come to the island with snacks and drinks ready. They don’t spend money here. I may have to close this snack shop and the lodge that I run in the village. The tourists are not coming to the village anyway.”

Ecotourism’s contribution to the communities that implement ecotourism projects is of dubious value, despite generating more than 10% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Stronza and Gordillo 2008). In South Korea, ecotourism is one of the decentralized state agencies’ leading strategies for regional development. The government sector spent 2.3 billion USD establishing about 500 trails across the country (2010 to 2012)\(^1\), bringing about a nation-wide “walking fever.” State agencies’ trail establishment was inspired by the success of an ecotourism project on Jeju Island. The Jeju Olle Trail project became a benchmark of regional development programs among policy makers for its contribution to local economic development and to environmental conservation.

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\(^1\) 2012, October 11, Yonhap News
State agency trail establishment was inspired by the success of an ecotourism project on Jeju Island: the Jeju Olle Trail project became a benchmark of regional development programs among policymakers for its contribution to local economic development and to environmental conservation.

Despite the proclaimed goals of the Jeju Olle Trail project, what I witnessed during 16 months of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013 and from Jeju Island statistics depicts an opposite situation. Proclaimed beneficiaries have seemed to give up benefitting from the project, as the opening story suggests, and land use shift has been expedited from green zones to residential and commercial zones due to the rapidly increasing demand to consume Jeju nature.

Relying on the framework of political ecology\(^2\), this dissertation determines the processes in which an exemplary regional development program ended up diverting promised economic benefits from a class proclaimed as beneficiaries. It also determines the processes in which state agencies and an NGO have reconfigured institutional arrangements involved in the Jeju Olle Trail by deploying discursively framed nature, resulting in channeling political economic benefits to the South Korean mainland urban middle class. The very characteristic of particularly framed nature on Jeju Island that attracted the urban middle class to the trail was jeopardized as a result.

\(^2\) Political ecology is defined as multiscalar struggles over “access and control of resources” (Watts 2000:257) that are determined by a “broadly defined political economy” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17).
As these goals well display, this dissertation views the Jeju Olle Trail project as a class project considering its class-selective distribution of benefits. In examining class struggles over discursively and materially determining access and control of the Jeju Olle Trail, the dissertation largely relies on three bodies of scholarship, namely geographic theories on neoliberalized state behavior, the coproduction of scale and nature, and landscape theories in political ecology. Based on these scholarships, the dissertation argues that (1) the state, in collaboration with NGOs, produces and reinforces new regional scales as it decentralizes, thereby maximizing localized state power on its territory; (2) historical enquiry is essential for understanding current uneven development—a process that depends on ecological discourses and practices; and (3) urban elites’ class values (especially environmental aesthetics) are increasingly reflected in NIC rural landscapes, threatening rural livelihoods.

In developing these arguments, this dissertation emphasizes that South Korea is an East Asian NIC. The East Asian “Four Tigers,” Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, have achieved remarkable recent economic growth, especially from the mid-1960s to the 1990s. These countries’ economic growth is often described in a

3 Class is determined in this dissertation by geography, socioeconomic status, and exclusively shared knowledge. By geography, the distinction lies between those from the mainland and those from Jeju Island. By socioeconomic status, classes are based on where they live (urban/rural), forms of labor (white-collar workers/physical labor-intensive workers), and involved industries for livelihoods (service/agriculture and fisheries). By exclusively shared knowledge, classes are defined by class-specific knowledge, including tastes for leisure activities and cultural consumption, opinions about social changes, and information for economic investments. Thus, the following chapters often call these contrasting classes “Jeju people” (or “Jeju rural villagers,” “rural entrepreneurs,” “islanders”) and “the urban middle class” (or “tourists,” “supporters,” “urban entrepreneurs,” “migrants,” “mainlanders”); these terms denote the two classes defined based on the three discussed class distinctions.
relative sense compared to both the developed world (e.g., Storm and Naastepad 2005) and the developing world (e.g., World Bank 1993, the East Asian Miracle). Considering the four countries’ shift of economic status in the world, being apart from one side of the world and moving toward the other side of it, they are called “newly industrialized countries.”

The exceptional economic growth of these NICs caught scholarly attention. Researchers, particularly those from economic geography, urban planning, and development studies, strived to determine the factors that enabled success. Strong leadership of the so-called developmental state in economic development, as well as quality of human capital and social relations through nationality, kinship, school, or regions of origins within and beyond national boundaries, have been pointed out as East Asian particularities that could possibly have enabled the economic development (Kim and Lau 1994, Amsden 1994, Wade 1990). Later studies explore interesting and varied reconfiguration of national economies with shifting leadership of developmental states and its control over industries and social capital due to the global imperatives of neoliberalism (Radice 2008, Kim 1999, Welss 2000). As such, East Asian NICs have shown unique trajectories of socioeconomic development.

4 “Developmental state” is shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneeyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia. This state form originated as the region’s idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West, and despite many problems associated with it, such as corruption and inefficiency, today state policies continue to be justified by the need to hone the nation’s economic competitiveness and by a residual nationalism (even in the contemporary context of globalization)” (Woo-Cumings 1999:1).

5 Douglass (1994) contends that the developmental states in the four countries have distinctive characteristics in determining national economy; thus, it is problematic to define them as a lump sum.
This dissertation suggests exploring how East Asian NICs’ socioeconomic development paths and subsequent dynamic social and demographic shifts have mediated human-environment interactions. McCarthy (2002) demonstrates that political ecology themes\(^6\) equally matter to the First World, yet, it had rarely been under scholarly scrutiny. Thus, he urges political ecologists to turn their attention from then-dominant research interests in the Third World toward an unexplored region, the First World. McCarthy (2002) argues that the First World political ecology contributes to the political ecology scholarship by illuminating “ongoing nature of capitalist development” in relation to determining access and control of resources (page 1298). McCarthy’s suggestion has brought about prolific outcomes for one and a half decades (Robbins and Sharp 2003; Prudham 2004; Schroeder et al. 2006). These studies demonstrate multi-scalar struggles over property rights mediated by contesting ideals about natural resources in the context of an advanced capitalist society. Here, the dissertation introduces another “unexplored” region in terms of political ecology concerns. By focusing on explaining political ecology concerns through the unique socioeconomic developmental paths of East Asian NICs, the dissertation illuminates another layer of “ongoing nature of capitalist development” in the political ecology scholarship (McCarthy 2002). The overarching goal of the dissertation is to determine how NIC-specific characteristics of socioeconomic development determine multi-scalar power

\(^6\) Themes of political ecology, according to Robbins (2004), include: 1) The degradation and marginalization; 2) The environmental conflict; 3) The conservation and control; and The environmental identity and social movement (page 14).
struggles among state and non-state actors, the urban middle class, and Jeju people over access and control of the Jeju Olle Trail.

This dissertation is composed of three independent manuscripts in addition to Research Methods (Chapter II) and Conclusion (Chapter VI). Structurally speaking, the description of methods and study sites in Chapter II applies to all three independent manuscripts. The three manuscripts (Chapters III, IV, V) provide their own literature reviews and arguments. The Conclusion in Chapter VI, along with this Introduction, ties up the dissertation as a single body of argument. Content-wise, Chapter II describes qualitative research methods and the research context of Jeju Island. Chapter III explores how a decentralized and entrepreneurial government at a provincial level has inscribed channels for private capital accumulation by producing a new scale of reinforced state authority using the Jeju Olle Trail project. Chapter IV determines the processes and outcomes of producing particular ideas about nature and determining the spatial arrangement of diverting newly created capital flows from proclaimed beneficiaries and directing them toward the South Korean mainlanders who have historically exploited the proclaimed beneficiaries and nature on Jeju Island. Chapter V examines South Korean class conflicts over rural landscape ownership. Chapter VI concludes the dissertation by articulating how the particular characteristics of East Asian NICs mediate political and ecological processes in the three main manuscripts.
CHAPTER II
STUDY AREA AND METHODS

This dissertation examines the political and economic reconfiguration caused by the simultaneous productions of scale, nature, and landscapes in an ecotourism project of South Korea. It identifies how the new way of producing nature determines a capitalist production of tourism through power struggles, and how the produced nature differs from the historical ways of using nature not only for traditional production activities but also for tourism development. To reach the goal, I collected the interview, participant observation, and archival data from Jeju Island in South Korea, employing ethnographic methods as I discuss below in detail.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I introduce the Study Areas and the nature-based tourism project that the dissertation examines. Second, I discuss research design in relation to the three objectives of the dissertation.

Study Area

Jeju Island, South Korea

The research site is administratively known as Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (hereafter Jeju Island for the island, and JSSGP for the provincial government). Jeju Island is about one fiftieth of South Korea in size, located 450 kilometers south of Seoul in South Korea (See Figure 2.1). Jeju Island is a volcanic island located in
subtropical zone of 126°33´E in longitude and 33°22´29”N in latitude. Jeju Island is a two and a half hour flight to the southeast of Beijing. The climate is mild relative to the South Korean mainland, with an annual average temperature of 12 degrees Celsius. Topographically, the elevation is highest at the island’s center because of Mt. Halla, and it decreases toward the coast. Costal areas with agricultural fields and residential areas accounts for 54% of the island’s total area, where agricultural fields and residential areas are developed. Jeju Island receives an annual precipitation of 2,044 mm (Figure 2.2).

Administratively, the upper and lower halves of Jeju Island belong to Jeju City and the Seogwipo City, respectively. Jeju Island is further divided into twelve districts (eup/myeon) and sub-divided into 96 villages (li). Even though the two administrative units are called “cities,” only one of them would be considered urban. The people of Seogwipo City rely on agriculture and tourism for their livelihoods, while Jeju City is more urbanized and residents make their livings mostly from the service sector. Rural populations throughout the island have made their living through agriculture and fisheries that account for 16 percent of Jeju Island’s Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRPD, Korean Statistics Office 2012).

Tourism has been one of the main industries of Jeju Island due to natural and cultural scenic beauty displayed by rolling mountains, beaches, and agricultural fields. As of 2011, tourism accounted for 39 percent of Jeju Island’s GRDP according to JSSGP estimates. It is both a UNESCO natural and culture Heritage Site and is on the list of

7 Less than 200 km above the sea level.
8 Jeju Special Self-Governing Province webpage, http://www.jeju.go.kr
New7Wonders of Nature. Since the central government strategically incorporated tourism on Jeju Island in the 1960s, Jeju Island has enjoyed a reputation as the most popular tourist destination in the country. However, its tourism dwindled once South Korean citizens could freely travel to foreign countries beginning in the 1990s. In addition, the South Korean public developed the perception that visiting Jeju Island for tourism was equally or more costly, yet, provided less tourist attractions compared to neighboring countries such as Southeast Asian countries. The tourists, however, began to come back to visit Jeju Island in around 2010 with the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail and its emphasis on new ways of seeing nature and culture on Jeju Island, which met the tourists’ demand for alternative tourism.

Figure 2.1 Location of Jeju Island, South Korea
The Jeju Olle Trail

The Jeju Olle Trail is the name of a 425 km-long trail that encircles Jeju Island through 26 routes (See Figure 2.3). Olle is a word from the dialect of Jeju Island, meaning a small private lane in front of a house linked to larger village lanes. As the name implies, the Jeju Olle Trail passes through beaches, small lanes in villages, farm roads and pastures (see Figure 2.4). Among lands used for the trail, privately owned lands account for approximately 30% of the Jeju Olle Trail (Seogwipo City 2012). The project emphasizes tourism development and tourist activities that cause minimal harm to the environment. It also brings benefits to local people by enabling them to generate additional income beyond agriculture and fisheries through running lodges or restaurants along the trail.
The Jeju Olle Trail was initiated by an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) also named the Jeju Olle Foundation. A former journalist named Seo, Myongsuk retired to her hometown on Jeju Island. She then initiated the Jeju Olle Trail project after establishing an NGO named the Jeju Olle Foundation. Jeju residents helped the Jeju Olle Trail in leveling the trail, taking care of trash along the trail, and guiding tourists. Jeju people volunteered, particularly those from rural villages along the trail, because they expected economic benefits from the Jeju Olle Trail tourists’ spending on village-level local accommodations as proclaimed in the goals. Evidence from fieldwork demonstrates that tourists of the Jeju Olle Trail also contributed to the Jeju Olle Trail establishment through personally visiting and promoting the trail, participating in volunteer programs of the Jeju Olle Foundation. They also expressed their opinions about the trail to the Jeju Olle Foundation and also to state agencies under the JSSGP. As such, the Jeju Olle Foundation, tourists and Jeju people were the actors of the political economic struggles in establishing the Jeju Olle Trail and implementing the Jeju Olle Trail-related regional development programs. Because an NGO began to establish the Jeju Olle Trail with contributions from Jeju rural villages and tourists, the project was proclaimed as a “bottom-up approach” largely in South Korea (a Seogwipo City-published report). Yet, state agencies also significantly contributed, by providing the NGO with financial and administrative support in order to facilitate establishment and promotion of the trail. Thus, both state and non-state actors participated in the processes of establishing the trail and implementing the trail-related developmental programs, rather than only non-state actors.
The Jeju Olle Trail generated a reverberation across and beyond the country. The trail attracted a large volume of tourists to Jeju Island based on the ideas of environmentalism and the bottom-up approach bringing economic benefits to rural communities. The success of the Jeju Olle Trail established it as an exemplar of the regional development using tourism. Provinces of South Korea began to competitively use the Jeju Olle Trail as a rural development model. From 2007 to 2012, more than 500 trails were established (Bae, 2012, a report from the Green Environmental NGO). Also, Kyushu Province in Japan also used the Jeju Olle Trail as a benchmark and established the Kyushu Olle in 2012 with the sponsorship from the Jeju Olle Foundation. As such, the Jeju Olle Trail has impacted regional developmental programs among South Korean provinces and a Japanese province.
Research Sites: Four Villages

To determine struggles of political economy in the process of adopting a new form of tourism on Jeju Island, I conducted the research in four villages located in Seogwipo City. I limited the research scope in Seogwipo City (Figure 2.2) because most tourists visited the Jeju Olle Trail routes located in Seogwipo City, and JSSGP state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation focused on bringing benefits to rural rather than
urban residents. I collected the data by village, because regional developmental programs are usually implemented on a village level in South Korea, including the Jeju Olle Trail. Among the villages that the Jeju Olle Trail passed through, I selected four villages for data collection: Shihungli on route 1, Woodo on route 1-1, Wolpyong on route 7, and Murungli on route 12 (Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5 Location of Research Sites

![Location of Research Sites](image_url)

Village Names
1. Shihungli
2. Woodo
3. Wolpyong
4. Murungli

Source: [www.daum.net](http://www.daum.net), Kakao Corporation

Table 2.1 Population and Agricultural Products of Research Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th># of HH</th>
<th>Village Size (ha)</th>
<th>Land use for Agriculture (%)</th>
<th>Main Crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shihungli</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Carrots, Beans, Potatoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodo</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>Peanuts, Garlic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolpyong</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Oranges, Lilies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murungli</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Garlic, Beans, Barley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seogwipo City a. The Eup, Myon, Dong Page, [http://www.seogwipo.go.kr/](http://www.seogwipo.go.kr/)

In order to find out patterns of village-level politics in the adoption of the trail and the competition for economic benefits, I took into account the following criteria in
selecting these four research sites. First, I considered temporal gaps of villages’ participation in the Jeju Olle Trail project (Table 2.1). The temporal gaps enabled me to find out how the Jeju Olle Trail project has evolved as a land/landscape control regime through time. Second, geographical distances among villages were considered (Figure 2.5). Differing geographic conditions such as crops and vicinity to the sea allowed the research to examine different impacts of tourism and regional development programs on farmers and fishers on the East, Middle, West, and annexed Islands. Third, forms of rural livelihoods were considered. The selected rural villages relied livelihoods on agriculture and fisheries, with little tourism facilities before the Jeju Olle Trail was established. With the inception of the Jeju Olle Trail (Table 2.2), tourist facilities including local lodges, snack shops and restaurants have increased (for example, Shihungli from 4 to 14, Wolpyong from 2 to 4, and Murung 2 li from one to 6). It enabled the research to investigate the processes in which capital flows were generated and channeled at a village level. Fourth, I chose villages that explicitly adopted the Jeju Olle Trail, so that villagers’ interaction with state agencies, the Jeju Olle Foundation, and tourists were active and explicit enough for me to observe and examine. Among the four villages, Woodo is an exception of in the third and the fourth considerations. Woodo is selected considering its recent re-routing in July 2013 (when I stayed on Jeju Island) in addition to the criteria 1-2. The re-rerouting provided a unique opportunity to observe power struggles among actors in making decisions about establishing a route. It also represented three routes located in satellite islands of Jeju Island as the firstly designated
one. The last thing to note is that agriculture was conducted for commercial rather than subsistence purposes in the four villages.

Table 2.2 Villages and the Jeju Olle Trail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Trail Route #</th>
<th>Year of Adoption</th>
<th>Village land use along the Jeju Olle Trail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shihungli</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Farm roads, Mountains, Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodo</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>May 2009; June 2013 reroute</td>
<td>Farm roads, Residential areas, Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolpyong</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Farm roads, Village roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murungli</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Farm roads, Residential areas, Village lanes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Collection Methods

McCarthy (2005) calls for adopting ethnography as the research methods to explore multi-scalar power dynamics in human-environmental interactions. Heeding upon the call, I collected data by “doing ethnography” (Wolcott 1994: 42), which is used to find out cultural and social context-specific meanings.

I stayed at Jeju city during 2013, and commuted to research sites in Seogwipo City, partly because of increasing demand for lands and houses on Jeju Island. At the beginning of the research period, I spent several hours each day at village offices and places related to the Jeju Olle Trail (such as cafés and an information center) in the study sites. Since many villagers came and went in those places, I got acquainted with individuals who later introduced me to others. Key informants and community gatekeepers were met in this way.
In-depth and Semi-structured Interviews

I conducted in-depth and semi-structured interviews with rural villagers, local government officials, employees of local NGOs including the Jeju Olle Foundation, and tourists (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Number of Interviews by Social Groups and Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>70s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villagers</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju Olle Foundation Employees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Media, Academia, NGOs)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For villagers, I aimed to understand how the introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail impacted village-level economies and culture. More importantly, I focused on determining multi-scalar tensions at the intra village or municipality levels were created as rural villagers living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail participated in hosting tourists, and how the actors adapt to the shifted social relations of political economy to maximize their respective political and economic interests. To reach the goal, I interviewed those who I encountered in the villages. In doing so, I also ensured to interview village representatives as key informants including village leaders at the time of the Jeju Olle
Trail incorporation as well as current village leaders, village officers, representatives of Village Women Associations and Village Youth Associations.

The second group of interviewees was provincial and municipal level government officials who I interviewed to understand institutionalization processes of the Jeju Olle Trail in state agencies of the JSSGP. These included government officials who took charge of the affairs related to the Jeju Olle Trail in Seogwipo City, Jeju City, and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province to find out how JSSGP state agencies interacted with other actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project. I also interviewed government officials at the county level of state agencies in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail, in charge of organizational restructuring of the Jeju Special-Self-Governing Province, and in a research group for the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Council.

Jeju Olle Foundation employees were the third group. I aimed to found out the stated goals of the Jeju Olle Trail establishment and actual processes of its establishment and promotion, focusing on power dynamics of the actors. Interviewees were determined in preparing 2013 fieldwork including preliminary fieldwork. I interviewed with key contributors of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, namely the director and the previous exploring team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation. I also interviewed Jeju Olle Foundation employees in an information center and at the Jeju Olle Trail booth located at the Jeju International Airport. Even though the number of interviews was relatively small compared to other groups (Table 2.3), the information from this group was critical in determining discursive and material establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail and tourists’ attitudes about it.
I also interviewed tourists, local environmental NGO activists, Jeju residents other than those living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail, and local experts from academia and media. For tourists, I focused on finding out tourists’ perceptions about the Jeju Olle Trail and the ways (or sources) that they developed the perceptions. For other interviewee groups, I aimed to identify opinions about the Jeju Olle Trail among Jeju citizens beyond rural villages. I approached tourists while I was walking along the Jeju Olle Trail or staying guesthouses. Local experts and NGO activists were recruited through snowball sampling technique.

I originally planned to type to record interview data, yet I changed to taking notes the answers and narratives of interview participants in order for convenience to carry and use. I also considered rural elderly population’s reluctance to participate in interviews when I used a laptop to type in answers in a couple of interviews at the initial stage.

**Participant Observations**

The second source of primary data is participant observations. In the four villages, I attempted to establish rapports with villagers for being situated in different social interactions such as among villagers and between villagers and tourists. Through interacting with villagers, I could improve my understanding about village-level power dynamics. In doing so, I behaved based on the belief that my positionality contributed revealing nuanced understanding of social relations, because the researcher’s presence continuously shifted power dynamics among villagers (Rose 1997). I also participated in various Jeju Olle Trail related events such as festivals, voluntary activities, and training
courses. These activities exposed me to the organizational environment of the Jeju Olle Foundation. I was also able to observe how the popular notions of the Jeju Olle Trail were produced, delivered, and subscribed to among the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists (advocates of the Jeju Olle Foundation).

Participant observation was also important source of data collection from migrants. I realized the importance of migrants in the research in the middle of fieldwork, thus, focused more on interacting with them toward the end of fieldwork. Since the importance of migrants emerged at the later phase of fieldwork, I relied more on participant observations and informal conversations, rather than structured interviews. I had numerous opportunities to interact with them without making particular efforts, such as in parent meetings, at flea markets among migrants, and at seminars about Jeju Island and alternative lives. Through observing and interaction with migrants, I emphasized finding out their motivations for migration, attitudes for Jeju nature and people, and means for livelihoods.

I recorded data derived from the participant observations through a series of field notes, and later digitized it for data analysis.

**Archival Research**

Archival research is also a considerable data source in this research. I performed archival research from the *Aweol* library and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province Library on Jeju Island. From the libraries, data regarding Jeju history and regional development such as regional statistics, government reports and research results about
regional development, rural village development case studies, and institutional trajectory and current operations of JSSGP state agencies. I also visited the National Assembly Library located in Seoul in order to determine research trends from academic/non-academic publications about the Jeju Olle Trail since its inception in 2007. Lastly, archival research data also included two books that the Jeju Olle Foundation leader authored, the Jeju Olle Foundation website, tourists’ blogs, various leaflets and reports published by central/Jeju provincial state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation, policy reports published by public and private think-tanks such as the Jeju Development Institute, and South Korean national and Jeju local level media including their digital archives.

Data Analysis

I analyzed the data through the three stages of qualitative inquiry, which are description, analysis and interpretation. I first digitized data from interviews, participation observations and coded the data without any limitation about themes following the “open coding” phase that Charmaz (2006:11) suggested. Then I took “initial memos” of my ideas that link the open coding results. I then identified recurring themes to find out regularity of the themes in the focused coding phase. Lastly, I located the result of focused coding in the research topic, i.e., multi-scalar power struggles among the actors over political and economic benefits from the Jeju Olle Trail. I also reflected how the result of the focused coding is related to the data collected through
archival research, such as the history of Jeju Island and its regional development, other researcher’s findings about the Jeju Olle Trail, and newspaper articles and government published reports about the Jeju Olle Trail. This way, the analysis of data demonstrated how things and people were discursively and materially configured in a way that a regional development program called the Jeju Olle Trail becomes a regime of political economy. In the process of adapting to the shifted political economy, this configuration generated complicated and multi-scalar tensions among JSSGP state agencies, the Jeju Olle Foundation, tourists, migrants, and long-term Jeju rural residents.
CHAPTER III
THE TERRITORIALIZING STATE:
SCALAR STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL OF THE JEJU OLLE TRAIL

Introduction

In South Korea, ecotourism is one of South Korean state agencies’ leading strategies for regional development, based on the successful Jeju Olle Trail. This chapter will examine how states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) struggle over controlling an ecotourism project to capture the political and economic benefits deriving from an ecotourism development project in South Korea. In doing so, I will rely on scale theories for analysis. Working definitions of scale in this chapter are (1) upward/downward levels of state agencies, such as county, city, state, and nation and (2) the geographic boundary of political economy where sociospatial power is materially and discursively established and exercised through contentious social processes. The chapter will demonstrate how the state and non-state actors deploy scalar politics to create new scales of capital accumulation, resulting in marginalization of those who expect benefits from the ecotourism project. It aims to contribute to scale literature by

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9 I am aware of the debate on the ontology of scale in scale theories literature, particularly between Brenner (2001) and Marston and Smith (2001). However, the chapter focuses more on state behavior related to non-state actors through scalar politics, rather than on the concept of scale in and of itself. Considering that scholars adopting scale theories use both definitions of scale, I rely on both definitions in the chapter.
elaborating on the ways that state authority is reinforced through simultaneous and responsive scalar politics between state and non-state actors.

The chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I examine the literature on neoliberal state restructuring and pose a research question specifically based on Perreault’s (2005) argument. In the second section, I define the state restructuring and establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail by the Jeju provincial government as neoliberal experiments based on Peck and Tickell’s (2002) thesis on neoliberal space. In the third section, I demonstrate the discursive and material processes by which Jeju local state agencies and non-state actors created a new scale of political economy through strategic conflicts and collaborations. In doing so, I emphasize how the state established and reinforced its authority in prioritizing the interests of tourists and non-state actors. The fourth section specifically focuses on a scalar strategy called “jumping scales” (Smith 1993), deployed by both state and non-state actors. These actors cross scales to reach the national and global scales, respectively, in order to further their interests at the local level by deploying resources from broader scales. This section will show that both state and non-state actors actively and simultaneously cross scales to increase political power in environmental governance. In the fifth section, I examine capital accumulation as a result of the struggles among state and non-state actors to control the Jeju Olle Trail. The sixth section is a conclusion.
Neoliberal Scalar Politics Between State and Non-state Actors

Neoliberal Scalar Configuration of the State

Scholars interested in both ontology and epistemology of scale are concerned more about the processes by which scales are constructed and institutionalized through power struggles rather than about established scales *per se* (Brenner 2001, Marston 2000). The literature on “politics of scale” (Smith 2008) has proliferated since the beginning of the 21st century. Scale theorists maintain the constructivist perspective rather than assuming scale is ontologically pre-given (Smith 2008; 1993, Swyngedouw 1997, Brenner 2001, Marston 2000). They argue that scale and its spatial arrangements are socially produced through interactions among various actors (See Smith 1993 and Jessop et al. 2008 for a discussion about the relation between scale and other geographical concepts such as space and place, etc.) The actors struggle in the process of achieving desired goals through social interactions. The resultant scale and spatial attributes reflect power struggles. As Swyngedouw puts it, “scaled places are the embodiment of social relations of empowerment and disempowerment and the arena through and in which they operate” (1997:169). Because socially produced scale benefits only certain actors, it is inherently unstable, contentious, and subject to be challenged (Smith 1993). McCarthy, focusing on instability of scale, calls for more attention to ideology and cultural politics in examining politics of scale because they have been much discussed in scale literature (2005: 737). I view the Jeju Olle Trail as a social-
spatial scale where the state and non-state actors discursively and materially struggle to channel benefits toward particular actors in the ecotourism project.

State behaviors are much examined among scholars involved in the politics of scale, as state institutions have gone through extensive neoliberal restructuring, namely decentralization (Brenner 2004, Perreault 2005, Cox 2002). Applying scale theories to the state, Brenner (2004) suggests that scalar arrangement of state agencies (such as national, regional, and local) and their authority is neither pre-given nor fixed. Instead, the state’s spatiality, including scalar configuration, is produced through social relations, reflecting “ongoing processes of political-economic regulation and sociopolitical contestation” (Brenner 2004: 81). Gough (2004) particularly views scalar contestation as class struggles focusing on the state’s role. Shifting scales reflect contradictions of capitalist reproduction where the state opens up possibilities for channeling capitalist accumulation toward a particular class. Classes cope with or resist political and economic arrangement within the shifted scales in order to achieve specific class goals. In this way, shifting scale turns into class struggles.

Incorporating these views into the neoliberal transition of scale, transitioning from the spatial logic of the Keynesian era to the new spatiality in the post-Keynesian era\(^\text{10}\) is not an inherently given process. It reflects class struggles. The state under the

\(^{10}\text{Keynes, an economist in the 1930s, emphasized strong state leadership in all government affairs, including boosting the national economy and providing social welfare to citizens. The US got past the suffering economy of the Great Depression by incorporating Keynes’ ideas (Keynesian era). As the world began to suffer from a dwindling economy again in the late 1970s, Thatcher in England and Reagan in the US significantly shrank the state’s role in government.}
Keynesian era redistributed resources across citizens using centrally focused state authority on the national-level political economy. As the state’s role as an arbitrator of political economy is minimized under neoliberalism, centrally focused state authority is devolved to lower levels of state agencies. Decentralized state agencies increasingly compete among each other, particularly as city-regions to increase competitiveness in the global market. In order to increase competitiveness, decentralized state agencies restructure spatial arrangement of economic activities. Even though decentralized state agencies claim limited intervention to markets, they turn to a stance of stronger involvement, channeling capital flow only to certain classes (Peck and Tickell 2002). The restructuring shifts political economy of capital accumulation, creating class struggles (Harvey 1982).

State restructuring and subsequent rearrangement of economic spatiality can be explained as the state’s efforts to create a new regime of capital accumulation through territorialization by rescaled state agencies. Sack defines territorialization as “the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things, and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographical area” (1983:55). Simply put, territorialization refers to controlling land-based resources, people who use the resources, and the relationships among resource users. Tying the concept of territorialization with the state’s rescaling and city-region establishment, state authority is rescaled to increase its power over resources and relations within a
geographic boundary of a decentralized state; and state authority aims to establish a competitive city-region, as Jessop notes, “to create, restructure or reinforce – as far as it is economically and politically feasible to do so – the competitive advantages of its territory, population, built environment, social institutions and economic agents” (2002:96 from Brenner 2004:173) for creating a new regime of accumulation. The social, political, and economic conditions that require state restructuring vary temporally and geographically. Thus, state spatial strategies should be investigated, focusing on the “historicity” and “malleability” of state institutional organizations and political struggles within and among particular scales (Ibid.).

The downward rescaling of state institutional organizations (decentralization) emphasizing city-regions coincides with the emergence of neoliberalism across the globe (Brenner 2001: 594). Neoliberals combine logics of market extension and competitiveness, rejecting any kind of Keynesian and collectivist developmental strategies (Harvey 2005). Relying on Harvey’s (1989) urban entrepreneurialism, Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that city-regions are involved in interurban competitions. On neoliberal space, they note, “neoliberalism licenses an extrospective, reflective, and aggressive posture on the part of local elites and states, in contrast to the inward-oriented concerns with social welfare and infrastructure provision under the Keynesian era. Today, cities must actively scan the horizon for investment and promotion opportunities, monitoring ‘competitors’ and emulating ‘best practice’ lest they be left behind in this intensifying competitive struggle for the kinds of resources that neoliberalism has helped make mobile” (Ibid.:394). Funds from national and international organizations flow only
to those city-regions that demonstrate potential for economic growth, ignoring social needs. The selective allocation of resources reinforces uneven development across city-regions, intensifying intra-urban competitions. The fund flows and intensified competition among city-regions often result in strengthening or consolidating state authority (MacLeod 2002, Smith 2008).

Just like scale, forms and conditions of city-regions and their spatial strategies for economic growth are historically and locally contingent, and thus, unstable. Neoliberal spaces are characterized as “constantly shifting landscapes of experimentation, restructuring, (anti)social learning, technocratic policy transfer, and partial emulation” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 396). The resultant types of neoliberal spaces are “variegated” despite the general characteristics of neoliberalized city-regions, such as intensified interurban competition, races to the bottom, and political construction of markets. Thus, place-specific and scale-specific investigations are required to determine power struggles in establishing neoliberal spaces (Peck and Tickell 2002: 383).

This chapter explores the variegated neoliberal state restructuring in South Korea, where strong leadership of the developmental state has led rapid economic growth since the 1960s. The developmental state refers to a state agency that strongly intervenes in the private sector of the national economy using centralized state authorities, as shown by Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, etc. These newly industrialized

11 Brenner et al. (2010) discuss neoliberalization processes as variegated, as they systematically produce “geoinstitutional differentiation” (page 184).
12 Harvey (2003:74) in New Imperialism discusses developmental states channeling capital accumulation through strong state intervention in the market (“particularly through East and
countries (NICs) have achieved remarkable economic growth since the 1960s, attributed to the strong leadership of the developmental state. In South Korea, the centralized strong state authority intervened in a wide range of economic activities within the country, from finance and industry to regional development (Kim 2010:103). For example, the *Saemaul* movement was a rural developmental program strongly initiated by the South Korean government in the 1970s. The central government mobilized rural labor and land for rural modernization projects and rewarded those initiatives by village. The central state authority during that time was strong enough to stretch out to the village level and led successful modernization of rural villages. As such, the South Korean developmental state achieved economic growth and modernization of the country by using strong and centralized state authority.

While the South Korean developmental state strived for economic growth, it also deployed strong state authority for political oppression of the citizens. The violent and authoritarian control of South Korea’s developmental state encountered strong citizen resistance beginning in the 1980s, as well as the international imperatives of economic liberalization and state decentralization.

Responding to domestic and international imperatives, the South Korean government embarked on state decentralization with the introduction of the Local Autonomy System in 1991. It aimed to devolve state authority to local-level state

Southeast Asia, that state policies and politics (consider the case of Singapore) have played a critical role in defining both the intensity and the paths of new forms of capital accumulation. The role of the ‘developmental state’ in recent phases of capital accumulation has therefore been the subject of intense scrutiny.
agencies in order to increase the effectiveness of local-level projects while promoting democracy through local citizen participation. To achieve the goal, the system stipulated to establish councils in local administrative units at the provincial level: nine provinces, one special city, and four metropolitan cities (Figure 3.1). Lower administrative units at the municipal level, such as city, county, and district (urban) and town, township, and village (rural), also established councils. These local administrative units began to have elected representatives like governor and mayor in 1995. Despite these initiatives, many South Koreans criticized that local state agencies had yet to achieve actual local state autonomy.

Figure 3.1 Administrative System of South Korea (2014)

In an effort to facilitate establishing local autonomy, the South Korean state designated Jeju province as the first special self-governing province in 2006 (among
nine provinces) (Figure 3.1). Another important goal of designating Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP) was to provide momentum for the provincial developmental plan, called Jeju International Free City. Jeju province had difficulties realizing its plan to establish a globally competitive city-region because the provincial government authority was limited to deregulating movement of people, goods, and capital on Jeju Island. Devolving state authority to the provincial level was expected to expedite the envisioned plan (Boo 2009:35).

This study examines the processes by which a provincial government, JSSGP, institutionally evolved as an exemplary decentralization model in South Korea through regulatory experiments and political struggles. In doing so, it emphasizes (1) how a rescaled state agency gained state authority in controlling resources, people, and relationships among resource users through an ecotourism project and (2) how the entrepreneurialism of JSSGP to establish a global city-region has inscribed channels for capital accumulation in its territory in the process of producing a scale of territoriality called the Jeju Olle Trail.

Determining the processes and outcomes by which a decentralized state agency established and reinforced state authority in South Korea contributes to scale theories literature by providing a variegated neoliberalism case from an NIC. The drastic shift of power geometry between highly centralized state authority and highly decentralized state authority creates particularities of variegated neoliberalism in NICs. This chapter explores these particularities generated in the processes by which NIC decentralized
state agencies (1) implemented regional development programs and (2) gained and exercised state authority by implementing developmental programs.

**Dynamic Scalar Politics between State and Non-state Actors**

Scholars interested in the social actor role in neoliberal state restructuring beyond the state have explored non-state actor behaviors in production of scale, along with those of the state. Neoliberal state rescaling is responsible for emergence of these actors, as partnership (Jessop 2002, from Brenner 2004) or governance (McCarthy 2005) is emphasized in state decentralization. Like the neoliberal state, unions (Perreault 2005), progressive social movements (Miller 2000), political parties (Agnew 1997), and environmental NGOs (McCarthy 2005) actively deploy scale in resisting the state’s neoliberal restructuring. Their strategies include the following (from Brenner 2001: 594 and McCarthy 2005):

1. **Jumping scales** to curtail the political influence of the neoliberal state while extending non-state actor power to other scales. Jumping scales is the notion that Smith suggested in his discussion about the Homeless Vehicles in New York (Smith 1993:60), implying activities “at a higher scale” (Smith added “over a wider geographical field” for clarification about scale) aiming for political empowerment. Applying the concept, Perreault (2005) and McCarthy (2005) demonstrate that non-state actors cross to higher scales (i.e., national and global) for political mobilization in achieving goals on local levels.
(2) Reconfiguring relations on local scales, such as socializing local capital through active cooperation among the state, private party, labor, and residents (Cox 1998, Eisenschitz and Gough 1996, McCarthy 2005).

(3) Envisioning radically different scalar arrangement from neoliberal logic of capital accumulation (McCarthy 2005).

(4) Defending and deploying established scales (McCarthy 2005).

These strategies demonstrate that non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs and resource users, have strategically mobilized social relations within and among scales—e.g., business coalitions to stimulate local economy (Cox 1998) on a local level and environmental NGOs stretching toward the global level (McCarthy 2005). The specific purposes vary, yet harnessing scales aims to increase political power in common, resisting, or sometimes contributing neoliberal restructuring of the state. Scales are unstable and are contested as a result.

Perreault’s (2005) analysis of social mobilization resisting neoliberal institutional fix in water governance illustrates well the inherent instability, contestation, and contradiction of scale. He demonstrates that although Bolivian neoliberal restructuring appeared to encourage public participation by facilitating administrative decentralization of state agencies, the state authority as the arbitrator of political economy of water resources was concentrated on the central government. State authority over water rights remained with the central government in order for it to easily privatize water resources. This confusion derived from the questions of struggles for power between localized and centralized state authority. In fact, scalar contradiction is a generic finding among works
exploring the relationship between environmental governance and state neoliberal restructuring. The work demonstrates that state restructuring often fails to empower local actors, sometimes because the higher level of government tends to retain state authority in environmental governance by insufficiently supporting finances and authorities required for lower-level agencies (local governments, NGOs, or local communities) (Brannstrom et al. 2004, Norman and Bakker 2009). Local empowerment is also hampered because higher levels of government retain instead of transfer state authorities that are critical for environmental governance at the higher level of government (Ribot et al. 2006), as the finding of Perreault points out.

Nonetheless, Perreault’s work differs from other works in that the failure of local empowerment is the beginning point where he begins an investigation of non-state actors, while others examine decentralization processes. Perrault shows that the confusion and subsequent uncertainty motivated local irrigators to organize at the national level in order to achieve locally based water governance by defending traditional customary practices. The irrigators could negotiate how and by whom water resources were governed by “jumping scales” (page 280), i.e., the social mobilization of local, national, and global networks. Thus, the Bolivian water governance has been reconfigured through scalar politics caused by neoliberal state restructuring. Here, both state and non-state actors deployed scales: state institutions transformed toward decentralization in a contradictory way to establish particular regimes of capital accumulation; and non-state actors mobilized relations within and among scales to resist state restructuring. However, when Perreault examines irrigator resistance through
strategic mobilization of scale among non-state actors, he seems to assume that the state was inactive in its institutional arrangements. Only non-state actor scalar politics are examined in “negotiating” water rights: “The formation of translocal networks linking peasant irrigators with national and international NGOs, scholars, and political activists allows irrigators to jump scales organizationally, while asserting the importance of the local. This process is bolstered conceptually by the discursive and legal emphasis on usos y costumbres in legitimating peasant claims to water rights. In this way, peasant irrigators are contesting the re-regulation of state and market institutions under neoliberalism, thereby negotiating the rescaling of environmental governance” (Perreault 2005:280).

In this negotiation in which irrigators attempted to increase bargaining power by deploying scale, the state remained static in terms of scalar arrangement after active decentralization processes ceased. Perreault provides insight about scalar politics between state and non-state actors in environmental governance by extending the scope of examination to post-decentralization responses among non-state actors. However, our understanding of state behavior in responding local resistance deploying scalar politics is still lacking. The assumption about static states takes fixed decentralization for granted. Yet in reality, I would argue that the state also mobilizes relations within and among scales like non-state actors for maintaining or expanding its power, even when it achieves decentralization. Perreault’s overlooking simultaneous behavior on the state in response to non-state actors is all the more problematic considering that one of his central theses is “inherent instability and contradiction of institutional arrangements.
under neoliberalism” (2005:268), which assumes inherent dynamics in scalar politics. Thus, the scalar politics between state and non-state agencies need to be examined based on the scalar dynamics of the two parties. The responsive scalar politics of the state are expected to reinforce state regulatory authorities in fostering marketization of economy while retreating from its responsibility for social welfare and environment (Peck and Tickell 2002).

The Jeju Olle Trail project on Jeju Island is emblematic of dynamic scalar politics between state and non-state actors after neoliberal state rescaling. This chapter explores the processes by which the Jeju Olle Foundation (a non-state actor) and JSSGP state agencies (the state) have struggled over controlling the Jeju Olle Trail. In doing so, the study employs the lens of scalar politics, in which both state and non-state actors reach to the national and global scale to achieve their own goals, sometimes through collaboration and other times through strategic tensions.

By examining interactive scalar politics of state and non-state actors involved in the Jeju Olle Trail, the chapter aims to contribute to scalar politics literature by examining how the state and non-state agencies have struggled with simultaneously mobilizing scales. I argue that the state also mobilizes relations within and among scales like non-state actors for maintaining or expanding its power, even when it achieves decentralization. Bringing state actors into relation with non-state actors is critical for understanding how the state’s authority is reinforced during the “roll-back13” of the state (Peck and Tickell 2002). Relying on McCarthy’s (2005) contribution to the politics of

13 Retreat of the state from playing the role as an arbitrator of political economy.
scale literature by identifying environmental NGO behavior in the politics of scale, the 
study examines the scalar politics between the state and environmental NGOs\textsuperscript{14}. In doing 
so, the study will illuminate new dynamism to interactive scalar politics.

\textbf{A Neoliberal Experiment: Jeju Special Self-Governing Province}

\textbf{Jeju Island: A Test Board for Neoliberal State Restructuring}

The attempts of the South Korean government to decentralize by adopting the 
Local Autonomy System in 1991 failed to achieve local autonomy. The central 
government still reserved substantial authority in terms of administration, regulation, and 
finance. Local government discretion was limited as a result, as was civil participation in decision-making processes of local governments (Park 2008: 47).

The inauguration of President \textit{Roh Moo-Hyun} in 2002 provided momentum for 
decentralization in South Korea. The \textit{Roh} administration set “devolution” and 
“diffusion” as the new paradigm for national development (Boo 2012: 27, The 
Decentralization was a relatively unfamiliar concept to South Koreans who were used to 
being controlled by the strong leadership of the central government. The authoritarian 
developmental state made efforts for administrative decentralization in South Korea, but

\textsuperscript{14} I broadly define “environmental NGO” here. Environmental NGO refers to nongovernmental 
organizations that explicitly seek to achieve environmental goals. Yet, the environmental goal 
does not necessarily have to be the only main goal. An environmental NGO as defined here can pursue multiple goals as long as environmental goals are explicitly proclaimed as one of those goals.
insufficient devolution of state authorities and finances resulted in incomplete decentralization efforts.

Jeju Island emerged as an experimental case for decentralization under the Roh administration. For the Roh administration, Jeju Island was a strong candidate with which to experiment with decentralization considering its physical conditions, i.e., geographic isolation and relatively small population (Boo 2009:28-29). The Roh administration designated Jeju Island as the first self-governing province in the country in 2006, calling it Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP). The designation aimed to establish an exemplary model for decentralization with actual devolution of authority and autonomy from the central government. To achieve the goal, JSSGP requested the central government to transfer its authority. By 2014, JSSGP reserved all state authority except military and national security.

Designation of JSSGP also enabled the South Korean central government to use Jeju Island as a test board for economic liberalization in South Korea. With the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loans to the South Korean government and began to pressure the government to restructure the national economy by removing regulations for global capital. Jeju Island can be regarded as the foreground for gradual adoption of neoliberalism by the South Korean government because Jeju province had already adopted a drive for economic liberalization in development policies by implementing Jeju International Free City in 2002 (Boo 2012: 136).

15 The first and the only self-governing province in South Korea so far (as of 2014).
Designating Jeju province as the first special self-governing province in South Korea made Jeju Island a test board for economic liberalization at the national level for the South Korean government. If Jeju province were successful in establishing Jeju International Free City, the national economy would benefit from the foreign exchange earned by Jeju Island. Further, economic liberalization could be adopted by other provinces on the mainland. If it failed, its negative impact on the national economy would be relatively limited compared with the mainland provinces considering the geographic isolation of Jeju Island.

Jeju Island also needed new momentum to revitalize its stagnant regional economy (Kim 2001:13). Jeju Island had struggled with a dwindling tourism industry since the beginning of the 1990s. Its tourism industry was dependent on domestic tourists, yet South Koreans preferred foreign countries (partly because regulation on foreign travel was removed at the beginning of the 1990s). The South Korean public increasingly found Jeju Island less attractive because it was relatively inexpensive to travel to adjacent countries, especially Southeast Asian countries. Jeju province differentiated Jeju International Free City from other globally competitive cities. For tourism, it emphasized nature-based tourism and leisure based on the island’s natural resources, such as scenic beauty and unique geographical features (Boo 2009:33). The plan to establish Jeju International Free City was thus expected to revitalize the stagnant tourism economy at the local level.
Jeju International Free City & Jeju Special Self-Governing Province

Jeju International Free City aimed to establish Jeju Island as a central and competitive city of Northeast Asia by deregulating the movement of people, goods, and capital in order to improve the economic and social welfare of the Jeju people (Jeju Province 2003:49).

Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan sought to improve the economic and social welfare of the Jeju people through implementing Jeju International Free City with seven categories of plans: City of International Exchange, City of Culture and Tourism, City of Knowledge-Base, City of Environmentally Friendly Industry, Welfare City, City of Green Residence, and City of Ecology. The plans were established benchmarking Singapore and Hong Kong and considering the physical geographic features, such as island and location at the center of China, Japan, and Korea. While Singapore and Hong Kong emphasized logistics and finance in establishing global city-regions, Jeju International Free City focused on nature-based tourism development (Kim 2001:14).

The plans aimed to facilitate international economic exchange through infrastructure development (such as increasing air stops among international airlines at Jeju International Airport, establishing the International Logistic complex at the Free Trade Zone, and establishing high-quality foreigner residential zones) and international marketing of Jeju Island (such as allowing visa-free countries to visit Jeju Island, establishing the International Exchange Foundation and Fund, establishing Regulation-Free International Meetings, and reducing taxes and regulations for Zone of Education...
tourism facilities). Particularly, the plan emphasized developing Jeju Island as an International Tourism City through, for example, establishing an organization to attract foreign capital for tourism development.

**Figure 3.2 The Vision of JSSGP in Facilitating Establishment of Jeju International Free City**

- Environmentally Freiendly, and Central City of Northeast Asia
- Foster 3 Core Industries (Tourism, Education, Medical Service)
- Develop Environmentally Friendly High Technologies
- Establishing Ideal Free Market Economy Model
- No Visa, No Tax, No Regulation, With English
- Jeju Special Self-Governing Province Designation

*Source:* The Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2005:2)

While Jeju International Free City was implemented to heed regional as well as national calls, its status as a globally competitive city like Singapore and Hong Kong was far from established because Jeju province had insufficient state authority to implement deregulation policies for attracting domestic and foreign private capital (Boo 2009:34). The designation of JSSGP thus aimed to provide momentum for establishing
Jeju International Free City as a globally competitive city-region (Boo 2009) (see Figure 3.2) by strengthening state authority at the provincial level.

**Table 3.1 Comprehensive Developmental Plans: Periods and Final Approval Authorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Planning Agency</th>
<th>Planning Level</th>
<th>Final Approval Agency</th>
<th>Final Approval Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeju Tourism Comprehensive Development Plan</td>
<td>1973–1981</td>
<td>Minister of Construction</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Jeju-Specific Comprehensive Development Plan</td>
<td>1985–1991</td>
<td>Minister of Construction</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju Comprehensive Development Plan</td>
<td>1994–2001</td>
<td>Governor of Jeju Province</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>2002–2011</td>
<td>Governor of Jeju Province</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Jeju Local Innovative Development Five-Year Plan</td>
<td>2004–2008</td>
<td>Governor of Jeju Province</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Governor of Jeju Province</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju Special Economy Zone Development Plan</td>
<td>2009–2013</td>
<td>Committee of Jeju Special Economy Zone Development</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Committee of Jeju Special Economy Zone Development</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>2012–2021</td>
<td>JSSGP Governor</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>JSSGP Governor</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on Boo 2012: 183*

The designation increased JSSGP’s discretion over provincial affairs. The trajectory of the regional development of Jeju Island in Table 3.1 demonstrates that state authorities on regional development planning and final approval were gradually transferred from the central government to JSSGP when it was established in 2006.
The JSSGP governor’s discretion therefore also increased to expedite the establishment of Jeju International Free City. Detailed areas of increasing the JSSGP governor’s authority aiming for deregulation included “promoting tourism”; “fostering educational environment for Jeju International Free City”; “improving medical service for globalization”; “fostering agriculture, forestry, livestock, and fisheries”; “increasing discretion over land use and development”; “reinforcing the Jeju International Free City Development Center”; and “gradually implementing regulation-free zones” (Boo 2009:196-200). Taking one of the transferred authorities regarding tourism promotion, the JSSGP governor was bestowed the authority to allow foreigners’ investment on casinos, which was under the discretion of a central government agency, the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Authority Transfer Regarding Tourism Promotion For Jeju International Free City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourism Promotion Details</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>JSSGP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of local public corporation for tourism promotion</td>
<td>The Law of Local Public Corporation</td>
<td>JSSGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism business, i.e., casinos and tourist accommodations</td>
<td>Minister of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism</td>
<td>JSSGP governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conference city</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Allowed to be designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>The Law of Tourism Business Promotion</td>
<td>JSSGP governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist attraction</td>
<td>Duty free, not allowed for domestic tourists</td>
<td>Duty free, allowed for domestic tourists on Jeju Island</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boo (2009: 196-197)
These institutional changes demonstrate that the designation of JSSGP increased provincial state authority for accelerating its neoliberal drive to establish a globally competitive city-region, called the Jeju International Free City.

**Jeju International Free City: Targeting Chinese Tourists and Investors**

After designating JSSGP, the Jeju provincial government explicitly targeted China in revising the Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan to the 2nd Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan (2012). To realize the vision of “Jeju, maximizing values of businesses and trade by removing boundaries, and providing satisfaction in tourism, shopping, and lives” the main strategy was “Targeting China” (JSSGP 2011:110). Thus, detailed strategies included tourist attractions for Chinese tourists, such as medical and cosmetic markets (e.g., the Beauty Care Village), reflecting the increasing popularity of Korean cosmetic products and cosmetic surgery among the Chinese.

JSSGP also particularly focused on attracting tourists and investors from China in working to establish Jeju Free International City through the following policies:

1. **Property Investment Immigration Policy.** Since February 2010, JSSGP has endowed South Korean citizenship to foreigners who invested more than 500 million KRW (450,000 USD) on Jeju Island. Foreign investors and their families become eligible for public education and public medical care like South Korean
citizens once they obtain citizenship through investment\textsuperscript{16}. As of December 2014, 1,007 foreigners obtained South Korean citizenship, with Chinese accounting for 99\%\textsuperscript{17}.

(2) Visa-Exempt Policy. Foreign tourists staying less than 30 days on Jeju Island do not need visas. When Jeju Province first established plans for Jeju International Free City in 2002, the Ministry of Law exempted visas for JSSGP for 169 countries. The policy was implemented to enhance movement of people and goods among countries on Jeju Island, thereby facilitating the Jeju International Free City establishment. When Jeju province was designated JSSGP in 2006, the Ministry of Law increased visa-exempt countries to 180, including China. The increase aimed to give impetus to Jeju International Free City, particularly from China. The Korea Immigration Bureau expected that including China in the visa-exempt program would increase foreign tourists on Jeju Island, based on China’s rapid economic growth and increasing demand for tourism (Korea Immigration Bureau 2006).

Other than the policies implemented to facilitate the Jeju International Free City establishment, economic and cultural situations also contributed to increasing Chinese tourists and investments: South Korean television shows had been increasingly filmed on Jeju Island; the Chinese currency, \textit{yuen}, increased its value relative to the Korean \textit{won};

\textsuperscript{16} The Department of Investment Attraction, Jeju Special Self-Governing Province.
\textsuperscript{17} JSSGP and the Korea Immigration Service.
and geographical proximity from China became attractive—one-hour flight from Shanghai and two and a half-hour flight from Beijing.

In summary, the designation of JSSGP implied that Jeju Island was used as a test board for state restructuring of the South Korean government through the devolution of state authority to a provincial level for accelerating economic liberalization pursued through Jeju International Free City. The decentralized state agency thus attained increased state authority to pursue its goal to establish a globally competitive city-region by attracting domestic and foreign tourists and investments.

Creating A Scale of Political Economy

JSSGP became involved in the Jeju Olle Trail establishment in 2007 right after its designation in 2006. Based on JSSGP’s plan to emphasize nature-based tourism in establishing Jeju International Free City, JSSGP implemented the Shintamra Tourism Resource Development Policy. It aimed to identify environmental assets and cultural heritages unique to Jeju Island and to develop them as tourism resources. The Division of Tourism Policy in JSSGP was searching for a non-state initiative that could contribute to achieving the goal. Around that time, the leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation was meeting with local leaders to consult about establishing a trail on Jeju Island. She established the foundation in June 2007 to facilitate the establishment process of the trail and opened the first route after three months in September 2007. The Division of
Tourism Policy provided the Jeju Olle Foundation with financial support of 9 million KRW (8,200 USD) for covering costs of route establishment.

**Bottom-up Approach**

The Jeju Olle Trail establishment aimed to develop a tourism project that brought minimal impact to the environment and economic benefits to local people living adjacent to the trail. As tourists rapidly increased on Jeju Island (Figure 3.3), the Jeju Olle Trail became an exemplary program for regional development across South Korea.

![Figure 3.3 Number of Jeju Olle Trail Tourists](image)

*Data Source: Seogwipo City*

Another reason for its popularity (important for the purposes of this chapter) was that the Jeju Olle Trail was established with a bottom-up approach.
In recent history, South Koreans were forced to keep silent about regional developmental projects by the authoritarian control of the developmental state. After South Korean citizens achieved democracy through the June Civil Resistance in 1987, they began to speak out for their interests in regional developmental programs. Responding to the demands, South Korean state agencies began to attempt to increase public participation in developmental projects (Jeong 2008:3) under a slogan of collaboration between *min* (grassroots) and *gwan* (government).\(^\text{18}\)

Jeju province had also experienced citizen resistance against a series of large development projects\(^\text{19}\) implemented by central and local governments (details in Chapter 4). Boo explains the reasons for Jeju citizen resistance as threefold: (1) Jeju people tended to be excluded from the decision-making process of developmental projects; (2) regional developmental programs caused negative impacts on Jeju people such as encroachment of property rights (i.e., land/building ownership or environmental destruction was not compensated appropriately); and (3) developmental projects that state agencies initiated tended to accompany spatial restructuring of Jeju Island in ways favorable only to the South Korean capital from the mainland while ignoring local people’s benefits (Boo 2012:403-404). As citizen resistance increased, their demand for

\(^\text{18}\) Widely used Korean terms among South Koreans to represent state and non-state initiatives, with English translation in parentheses (not exclusive):

- **Government:** *Gwan* (government), *Gookga* (the state), *Haengjong* (administration), *Nara* (the state), *Jeongbu* (government)
- **Citizens:** *Min* (grassroots), *Mingan* (grassroots), *Gookmin* (national citizens)

\(^\text{19}\) The number of cases where Jeju citizens resisted regional developmental projects was 20 for three years after the June Civil Resistance in 1987.
a democratic approach to developmental programs also increased, i.e., participating in decision-making processes in order to direct programs to benefit local people (*Ibid.*).

JSSGP’s promotion for the Jeju Olle Trail as a bottom-up approach can be understood in the context that JSSGP state agencies accepted the demands of Jeju citizens. A report from Seogwipo City emphasized that the trail was established through the governance between the public and private sector, in which non-state actors led the project and state agencies merely supported it (Seogwipo City 2011). Government officials at the provincial and municipal level whom I interviewed echoed the non-state initiative emphasis. A municipal official said, “The foundation began in the first place….the *mingan* (non-state actors) [established and maintain the trail] at their own discretion…the foundation employees are considerably knowledgeable [about the Jeju Olle Trail], so we are just in a position to learn [from them] (*I90-G12*)”. The foundation director, a main contributor to the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail, also wrote an article arguing that the success of the Jeju Olle Trail would be determined by the contributions of three actors: those who establish the trail (the Jeju Olle

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20 Throughout the dissertation, I use this form of citation for interview data. The former part denotes interview number from the total interviews. The latter part indicates actors groups and numbers within each group; “V” – villagers; “G” – government officials; “F” – the Jeju Olle Foundation employees; “M” – migrants; “T” – tourists; “O” – others. For example, *I90-G12* shows that the data is the 90th among total interviews and the 12th among government official interviews.

21 The actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project examined by the dissertation include Jeju local residents and tourists, as the Jeju Olle Foundation director mentioned. However, this chapter focuses only on the conflicts and cooperation between state agencies in the trail establishment and management and their impacts on Jeju local people living adjacent to the trail. Power dynamics with local residents and tourists will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, as the chapter reveals, state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation indeed both made decisions about the Jeju Olle Trail. Thus, the bottom-up approach in the Jeju Olle Trail project
Foundation), those who live on the trail, and those who walk along the trail (Ahn 2009:1-9). JSSGP state agencies were excluded as contributors. Both state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation agreed that the foundation was the key decision maker in Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs—it exercised the leadership regarding Jeju Olle Trail affairs, and JSSGP state agencies acknowledged its leadership. The agreed leadership, nonetheless, was contested and became a struggle between JSSGP state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation, which I discuss in the following section.

Non-state Initiative for the Jeju Olle Foundation

Financial independence and lacking resources

The strategies by which the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed its leadership in establishing and managing the Jeju Olle Trail\(^\text{22}\) included emphasizing its financial independence from JSSGP state agencies. The foundation leader claimed that the trail was established and maintained only through the “min” (grassroots) effort, without intervention from the “gwan” (government) (Seo 2008). The Jeju Olle Foundation refused state financial support for running the Jeju Olle Trail, even though it suffered from chronic financial difficulties, including providing monthly salaries for a dozen employees (\textit{Ibid.}). The leader explained that the foundation chose to take this difficult path because she believed that maintaining the foundation’s independence was the only

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\(^{22}\) The Jeju Olle Foundation largely claimed its leadership over JSSGP state agencies through environmental considerations in tourism development (Chapters 4 and 5) and financial independence from the state. The latter is the focus of this chapter.
way to adhere to the Jeju Olle Trail philosophy (*Ibid.*). Satisfaction among tourists (discussed in Chapter 5 in detail) was the first priority of the philosophy according to foundation employees, including the director, the previous exploring team leader, and the education team leader. To reach the goal, the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed that it strived to maintain Jeju nature and to identify places with scenic beauty and cultural attractions without state intervention.

The Jeju Olle Foundation’s claim about its financial independence from the state assumes three things: (1) financial independence could assure its independence from JSSGP state agencies in making decisions about the Jeju Olle Trail; (2) state intervention would run counter to the Jeju Olle Trail philosophy, somehow making tourists unhappy, including environmental destruction; and (3) only a non-state actor, the Jeju Olle Foundation, could achieve the goal of satisfying those on the trail.\(^2\)

More background knowledge is needed to better understand the second assumption about state intervention. The Jeju Olle Foundation began trail establishment by criticizing the ways in which central and provincial governments incorporated tourism on Jeju Island through infrastructure building since the 1960s with little environmental consideration (Chapter 4). The Jeju Olle Foundation differentiated its way of tourism development from that of the state by adopting principles for minimum impact to the Jeju environment. Also, the term for state in Korean (*Goockga* [국가]) evokes images of state authoritarianism (Choi 2002). Antagonism with the state was

\(^{23}\) From the keynote speaker of the Jeju Olle Foundation leader at the World Trail Conference in 2012 (www.worldtrail.org/conference/conference2012.php).
shaped while South Korea achieved rapid growth beginning in the 1960s, and it lasted even after the military government lost power in a democratic election held in 1992. The Jeju Olle Foundation drew on the sentiment by highlighting its independence from the state through nationwide media. The state that the foundation resisted was imagined as an authoritarian developmental state in the discourse of the Jeju Olle Trail.

**Multi-scalar politics for financial and administrative support**

At the local scale, the claim of lacking resources seemed to be well received among Jeju villagers, as the foundation leader actively spoke about the foundation’s financial independence and lack of resources, particularly among village leaders who had opportunities to speak with her. A Shinhungli villager, who was the village leader when the Jeju Olle Trail was established, met with the foundation leader many times in person in the process of establishing the first route. He said:

Ms. Seo Myongsuk explained, she requests aids from corporations as far as I understand. [She says] I am conducting such and such projects, and please help me, then [corporations] give some money, then she provides salaries for the employees ‘cause there’s nothing that makes money there. The city doesn’t give money either. Employees were about a dozen…the foundation has financial difficulties…but her achievement is incredible. With [the Jeju Olle Trail, she] goes to Japan, Italy, and earns royalty, and export (I40-V19).

A village leader of Woodo and the vice head of Woodo county reported similar experiences about the Jeju Olle Foundation and its leader. The foundation sent an official letter to the county notifying that the foundation would remove Route 1-1 of the trail when the safety of tourists continued to be threatened by motorcycles along the trail.
Three *Woodo* representatives met with the foundation leader to negotiate the issue. I interviewed a county official in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail, a village leader, and the vice head of the county in order to learn about the process and outcomes of the negotiation and about the Jeju Olle Trail in *Woodo* in general. The vice county head and a village leader said:

The foundation leader was indeed great…[she said] the cost for running the organization is covered by donation…she was making different efforts to establish and develop the trail (I186-G16).

I was surprised that [the Jeju Olle Foundation] was run by donation. The amount of donation, of course, is often short of even giving salaries to employees there. She does it with the sense of duty, which is not possible for us normal people. I couldn’t say anything after I heard that [about her]. We originally planned to establish our own trail in Woodo [if the foundation removed the trail]…that small lady’s skin got tanned in trying hard [to improve the trail]…We went to persuade, yet came back to be persuaded [by the foundation leader] (I107-V70).

My impression was that *Woodo* representatives were impressed by the foundation leader’s efforts, despite financial difficulties, and therefore wanted to give me a positive image of the foundation leader. These quotes demonstrate that the Jeju Olle Foundation leader actively appealed to the actors at the local level about financial independence and difficulties. The appeal tended to be more emotional than rational. In other words, the foundation leader built an image that the foundation (and she) strived only for public interest without taking care of their own conditions. The image of enduring difficulties for public interest provoked sympathy among Jeju people. The Jeju Olle Foundation could therefore increase its bargaining power at the local level.

National-scale discourse was established through media. South Korean media applauded the Jeju Olle Trail for its non-state initiative:
The walking fever that brought about the groundbreaking turning point of the South Korean tourism industry was possible only through the min’s [grassroots] efforts without the aid from the government (2014 May 8, Joong-Ang Daily).

It would not be able to establish a 100 percent satisfactory rest area since the min initiated the gil [walking trails] (a citizen’s comment on the Jeju Olle Foundation webpage).

These quotes illustrate the belief among the South Korean public that the Jeju Olle Foundation would be unable to provide quality of facilities for tourists. It lacks resources for establishing facilities because it is financially and administratively independent from the government.

The Jeju Olle Foundation’s alleged lack of resources made the South Korean public urge JSSGP to support the foundation. A renowned novelist said in an interview that the JSSGP should take the Jeju Olle Foundation’s burden of establishing and maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail (2009 June 27, No Cut News). His urge appears to counter to the foundation’s claim about its financial independence. However, it in fact echoes the Jeju Olle Foundation’s press release upon Route 1 opening ceremony in 2007:

The Jeju Olle Foundation needs utmost support from the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, since the Jeju Olle Trail will be established based on the collaboration with the JSSGP. The JSSGP [should] absorb the cost for establishing the Jeju Olle Trail” (Jeju Olle Foundation press release, 2007).

The coincidence implies that the foundation wanted financial and administrative aid from JSSGP state agencies. The foundation thus deployed multi-scalar public opinion to
pressure and elicit administrative and financial support from a local-scale government, JSSGP, while still emphasizing its financial independence.

Financial independence was critical for the Jeju Olle Foundation because it was the way to defend its control over the trail from JSSGP state agencies while at the same time receiving financial and administrative support from them. In 2010, a department of the Seogwipo City established steps on one of the Jeju Olle Trail routes. The Jeju Olle Foundation made this public through national-scale media by blaming the department (nuanced as the state as a whole rather than an individual department of a municipality) for destroying Jeju nature. The municipality soon removed the steps after facing wide public criticism. The incident established an image for the South Korean public about the Jeju Olle Foundation as striving to adhere to environmental principles against the continuing state effort to increase its control in making decisions about the Jeju Olle Trail. Resisting the state rather than receiving its support implies democratic management of the Jeju Olle Trail for the South Korean public. A quote from the Jeju Olle Foundation website concisely demonstrates how it frames its relationship with the state:

We still defend this gil [walking trails] through wholehearted member donations and revenues from souvenir selling” (source: http://www.jejuolle.org; italics are mine).

By financial independence, the Jeju Olle Foundation did not mean it wanted resources—it wanted control over resources provided by JSSGP state agencies. State
encroachment was being resisted through the rhetoric of financial independence rather than actual financial and administrative support for establishing the Jeju Olle Trail.

Administrative and financial support from the JSSGP received growing momentum as Jeju Olle Trail tourists rapidly increased beginning in 2010.

**Institutionalization**

JSSGP support was insignificant (9 million KRW) when the Jeju Olle Foundation leader began to establish the Jeju Olle Trail, considering the amount of financial support later and the negligible recognition among government officials in the JSSGP tourism division\(^\text{24}\). Nonetheless, the success of the Jeju Olle Trail in attracting tourists to Jeju Island (Figure 3.4, page 49) and subsequent public pressure led to the institutionalization of the Jeju Olle Trail in municipal and provincial state agencies, namely Seogwipo City, Jeju City, and JSSGP.

**Seogwipo City**

Seogwipo City actively invested financial and administrative resources to the Jeju Olle Trail project because it utilized it for its own social and economic development. Seogwipo City’s support began in 2008 when Mayor Park, Yongbu actively adopted the Jeju Olle Trail in order to boost Seogwipo City’s dwindling tourism industry. The mayor met with the provincial governor and brought in 800 million KRW (7 million USD) for exclusively supporting the Jeju Olle Trail. With the budget, the Jeju

\(^{24}\) Only a few provincial officials attended the opening ceremony on September 5, 2007.
Olle Foundation could embark on projects delayed due to lacking financial resources: printing leaflets in foreign languages, training volunteers to be Jeju Olle Trail guides, establishing restrooms, and implementing regional development programs at the village level such as the Grandmother’s Lodge program.

Seogwipo City showed particular interest in implementing regional development programs through the Jeju Olle Trail. Rural development through the Jeju Olle Trail began with the *Halmang Minbak* (Grandmother’s Lodge) program, and other development programs followed, such as training Jeju islanders as hired guides for individual tourists and hiring local people as part-time safeguards and guides through the Olle Keepers program (see Appendix 1 for a complete list). Other than these regular and official programs related to the Jeju Olle Trail, Seogwipo City and JSSGP provided rural villages adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail with funding for village development. Also, Seogwipo City won a competition for regional development projects held by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs and a regional development committee (2.5 million USD). In 2014, Seogwipo City, along with Jeju City and the Jeju Olle Foundation, began supporting villages on Jeju Island to build cafés in the villages adjacent to the trail through the Jeju Olle Residents’ Satisfaction Project. These examples demonstrate that Seogwipo City helped the Jeju Olle Foundation initiate and

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25 Grandmother—*halmom* (할머니) in Korean and *haljang* (할망) in Jeju dialect—is extensively used in Korea. It refers to (1) the mother of one’s parents; (2) an elderly lady; and (3) an appellation of an elderly lady, equivalent to “ma’am.” Based on the second usage, grandmother in Korean does not necessarily imply respect. The Grandmother’s Lodge program in this dissertation refers to the second definition, an elderly lady, therefore meaning a local lodge run by a village elderly lady.
implement developmental programs related to the Jeju Olle Trail. A foundation employee said that it had been interesting for them to find out about many rural development programs titled “– Olle” of which the foundation had not even been aware. This demonstrates that Jeju local stage agencies deployed the Jeju Olle Trail title with and without consultation with the Jeju Olle Foundation. Seogwipo City not only supported the Jeju Olle Foundation through funding trail-related development programs, but also through their own business of regional development by carrying the Jeju Olle Trail’s title.

Along with financial support, the Seogwipo mayor also institutionalized support for the Jeju Olle Foundation within the municipal organization. He established the Slow City Tourism Promotion Team under the Division of Local Economy (today called the Division of Economy, Tourism, and Industry) in 2009 to increase overnight tourists on Jeju Island. The team included Health Specialized Promotion and Slow Commodity Development groups. The latter had three governmental officials who exclusively took care of affairs to support the Jeju Olle Foundation. In 2010, the Slow City Tourism Promotion Team was absorbed into the Department of Tourism Promotion when the next appointed mayor restructured the organization after taking office. Since then, Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs have remained in the Department of Tourism Promotion, with at least two municipal officials assigned for exclusive support of the Jeju Olle Foundation.
Seogwipo municipality provided full support for Jeju Olle Trail establishment. Support was as trivial as introducing village leaders to the foundation exploring team\textsuperscript{26} and providing contact information for landowners. The exploring team established routes and began by exploring villages and mountains multiple times, asking village leaders or seniors to find old village lanes that were not often used and had been forgotten with transportation development. As routes were established gradually, the team received contact information for the municipal officials responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs and asked village representatives to contact private landowners for permission for tourist passage of private land when landowners were not from Jeju Island\textsuperscript{27}. For South Korean citizens, checking landownership of a land parcel costs 1,000 KRW (0.90 USD). The process of identifying landowners and their phone numbers would have been onerous for the Jeju Olle Foundation without support from government agencies. As such, the Jeju Olle Foundation support system institutionalized in Seogwipo municipality facilitated Jeju Olle Trail establishment. The institutionalization enabled the Jeju Olle Foundation to secure needed government support from the very start of trail establishment, with things as simple as establishing whose land the trail could be built on.

The Jeju Olle Foundation and the Department of Tourism Promotion maintained a close and favorable relationship as the interests of both parties coincided. In summer

\textsuperscript{26} A team on the Jeju Olle Foundation working for establishment and management of the Jeju Olle Trail.
\textsuperscript{27} The Jeju Olle Foundation exploring team directly asked Jeju Island landowners.
2011, I interviewed one of the three municipal officials charged with supporting the Jeju Olle Foundation. Discussing the relationship with the foundation, he said:

Yes, very good. I talk with the people from the foundation several times a day either on the phone or in person. I’ve just talked with them on the phone (117-G63).

As of 2015, two municipal officials on the Tourism Commodity Team take care of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs (one of whom exclusively takes care of the affairs). The Tourism Commodity Team is situated in the Seogwipo municipality under the Department of Tourism Promotion, which is under the Division of Economy, Tourism, and Industry (Figure 3.4).

**Figure 3.4 Structure of the Division of Economy, Tourism, and Industry in Seogwipo City**

* are mine, representing departments that have taken charge of Jeju Olle Trail – related affairs  
**Source:** Seogwipo City c, Organizational Structure

28 Seogwipo City has four divisions and 35 departments.
The affairs of the two officials are as follows: “To implement the Jeju Olle Residents’ Satisfaction Project”; “To support Jeju Olle relevant events and festival”; and “To implement Olle relevant projects.”

The above processes demonstrate that financial and administrative support was actively institutionalized in Seogwipo City through the leadership of the municipality. The institutions created at the establishment phase of the Jeju Olle Trail still remain in the municipal structure. In the institutionalization process, the Jeju Olle Foundation and the Seogwipo municipality maintained a favorable relationship.

**Jeju City**

After the Jeju Olle Foundation finished establishing the Jeju Olle Trail in the southern part of Jeju Island from the east to the west, the foundation began developing the trail in Jeju City in 2009, at which time Jeju Olle Foundation support was institutionalized in Jeju City.

Unlike in Seogwipo City, the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City struggled over institutionalization. A Jeju City official in charge Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs explained the tension to me in 2013. He said that the economy of Jeju City was less dependent on tourism in the first place. In addition, Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs did not fit with his other duties. The affairs were also somewhat irrelevant within the departments carrying unique functions in the municipality (I90-G12). Another official in the same position

29 Source: www.seogwipo.go.kr
(municipal officials rotate their positions in Jeju City) provided me with another reason for the tension between the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City. He said:

I personally think that the Jeju Olle Foundation takes too much pride…We are under the situation where the Jeju Olle Foundation has the property rights on the ‘Jeju Olle’ that the gwan [government] cannot publish leaflets to promote the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation takes all the leadership, and the gwan is passive (I16-G2).

The official was disgruntled through the whole 30-minute interview. These interviews demonstrate that Jeju City officials had maintained an uncomfortable relationship with the Jeju Olle Foundation because of inconsistency in affairs and the dominant attitude of the foundation.

This uncomfortable relationship resulted in Jeju City’s reluctance to support the Jeju Olle Foundation. Municipal officials and departments avoided Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs, tossing them throughout the municipality. An official on the Village-Making Team (under the Department of Autonomy Administration) had taken care of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs, along with other responsibilities. The affairs were also transferred to the Department of Urban Landscape and then back to the Village-Making Team by 2013 when I conducted an interview with the municipal official in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail. As such, the tension between the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City brought about complicated trajectories for institutionalizing support for the Jeju Olle in Jeju City.

The Jeju Olle Foundation was also dissatisfied with the support from Jeju City. The foundation’s understanding about the reason for tension coincided with Jeju
municipal officials: the Jeju Olle Trail brought less benefit to Jeju City’s local economy. The foundation director was disgruntled enough to say to me:

   Jeju City does only what [the Jeju Olle Foundation] asks. [The foundation] says this, then [Jeju City] does this, and [the foundation] says that, then [Jeju City] does that (I78-F3).

She explained that the Jeju Olle Foundation was dissatisfied because Jeju City was not actively supporting the foundation. She took the example of Seogwipo City, which provided support with at least two municipal officials taking exclusive charge of Jeju Olle Trail affairs in the Department of Tourism Promotion with administrative financial power in the organization. In order to elicit more active support, the Jeju Olle Foundation met with Jeju City’s mayor at the end of 2012 and complained about the “lack of infrastructure [administrative and financial government support] that an administration should have (I78-F3)” for supporting the Jeju Olle Foundation. The foundation continued that it would remove all routes located in Jeju City. In response, the mayor gave the Jeju Olle Foundation what it asked: to transfer Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs to the Department of Tourism Promotion and to designate a municipal official with exclusive charge of the trail. The request was officially granted when Jeju City conducted organizational restructuring in 2013. These struggles show that the Jeju Olle Foundation attempted an institutional shift to elicit more financial and administrative support from Jeju City and exercised power over Jeju City for institutionalizing the Jeju Olle Trail.

As of 2015, Jeju City has seven divisions and 39 departments. The Department of Tourism Promotion (under the Division of Culture, Tourism, and Sports) and the
Department of Local Economy (under the Division of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Livestock) are responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs. Three municipal officials take charge of the affairs in each department. Their responsibilities include the following: “To implement the Jeju Olle Residents’ Satisfaction Project,” “To support [the Jeju Olle Foundation] administratively and to implement Olle Keepers”; and “To establish and maintain facilities on the Jeju Olle Trail” (http://www.jejusi.go.kr).

**Jeju Special Self-Governing Province**

The JSSGP provincial government began supporting the Jeju Olle Foundation in December 2010. Institutionalization aimed to arbitrate between organizations responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs in Seogwipo City and Jeju City. More importantly, 2010 was when tourists of Jeju Island and the Jeju Olle Trail increased rapidly (the number of tourists visited Jeju Island increased from 26,4359 in 2009 to 78,7708 in 2010, a 198% increase; see Figure 3.6). Thus, the JSSGP provincial government embarked on institutionalization responding to (1) the need to arbitrate Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs among provincial agencies and (2) the Jeju Island tourist increase, aiming to facilitate it further.

The provincial government first established a Task Force (T/F) team composed of chiefs of relevant provincial departments, such as Urban Landscape, Agriculture Distribution, and Transportation, in order to facilitate JSSGP support for Jeju Olle

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30 Administrative support also implies financial support when it comes to state agency support in South Korea.
Foundation from all possible directions. For example, the department taking care of transportation increased public transportation facilities near the Jeju Olle Trail by establishing bus stops or arranging bus routes to pass the trail. The T/F team held meetings quarterly with participants including chiefs of JSSGP, the Jeju Olle Foundation, and a provincial official in charge of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs from the Department of Environmental Resources.

**Figure 3.5 Annual Increases of Jeju Island Tourists (%)**

![Graph showing annual increases of Jeju Island tourists from 2007 to 2014]

*Data Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association, Total visitor volume by month*

The provincial official exclusively in charge of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs was designated by JSSGP to support the Jeju Olle Foundation at the beginning of its institutionalization process. Along with participating in the T/F team, provincial officials implemented various projects to support the Jeju Olle Foundation even after the team
was restructured. Projects included establishing the Olle Call Center\(^3\), running a Jeju Olle Trail information booth at Jeju International Airport, providing funds for the Jeju Olle Academy,\(^3\) etc. JSSGP provincial government support over a wide range demonstrates that the government actively institutionalized supports for the Jeju Olle Foundation in its organizations.

The support system in JSSGP remained in the Department of Environmental Resources under the Division of Clean Environment until marketing affairs were transferred to the Department of Tourism Promotion. The Jeju Olle Foundation insisted on being supported through the Department of Environmental Resources, even when a newly elected governor suggested transfer to the Department of Tourism Promotion in 2012. The foundation found, however, that the Department of Environmental Resources lacked power and finances, so it requested transfer to the Department of Tourism Promotion. The Jeju Olle Foundation director said:

We made organizational arrangements [about how Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs were taken care of among different agencies] at the end of last year. Before, it was in the Environmental Resources Department. So, its voices were little heard in terms of [marketing the Jeju Olle Trail]. The Tourism [Department] has lots of budgets, but the Environment [Resources Department] has little. It was not powerful in the provincial government. So, the programs that we implemented showed little progress (I78-F3).

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\(^3\) As the Jeju Olle Trail became increasingly popular, Jeju Olle Foundation employees had to answer many phone calls from tourists inquiring about the trail. As continuing calls interrupted Jeju Olle Foundation employee work, JSSGP established the Olle Call Center for exclusively answering tourists’ questions.

\(^3\) The Jeju Olle Academy is an educational program that the Jeju Olle Foundation implemented. Anyone who wants to learn about Jeju Island (i.e., history, language, nature, food, flora, and fauna) can participate in the program.
JSSGP accepted the request from the Jeju Olle Foundation. When the provincial government restructured in July 2013, the Department of Tourism Policy (under the Division of Culture, Tourism, and Sports) took responsibility for domestic and international marketing while the Department of Environmental Resource Management (under the Division of World Environmental Hub Promotion) maintained such supports as facility establishment and maintenance. Making “organizational arrangements” for the Jeju Olle Foundation in the JSSGP provincial government and in Jeju City shows that the Jeju Olle Foundation actively expanded its power in JSSGP state agencies by deploying institutionalization processes. Thus, the support system for the Jeju Olle Foundation was institutionalized in JSSGP state agencies through tensions and collaborations between state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation, depending on conflicting or coinciding interests.

Jeju local state agencies’ wide range of involvement (Figure 3.6) shows that the Jeju Olle Foundation support system was institutionalized so that the state became inextricably intertwined with the Jeju Olle Trail project through financial and administrative state support. The institutionalization process naturalized state agency involvement in creating the political, economic, and material scale of the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation received needed support to establish and maintain the organization and landscapes, and JSSGP state agencies facilitated tourism and regional development through involvement in the Jeju Olle Trail project. Thus, both the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies collaborated to institutionalize the Jeju Olle Trail project.

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33 The JSSGP provincial government had 13 divisions and 44 departments.
Foundation and JSSGP state agencies attained political and economic gain by being involved in the new scale of the Jeju Olle Trail.

**Figure 3.6 Supports of JSSGP State Agencies**

- **JSSGP**
  - Jeju Olle Trail booth at Jeju International Airport
  - Jeju Olle Call Center
  - International Network of Trails
  - Jeju Olle Academy

- **Jeju Tourism Organization**
  - International Marketing

- **Jeju City**
  - Olle Keepers
  - Establishment Cost Reimbursement\(^{34}\)
  - Jeju Olle Residents’ Happiness Project

- **Seogwipo City**
  - Olle Information Centers (4)
  - Olle Keepers
  - Rural Development Programs
  - Establishment Cost Reimbursement
  - Jeju Olle Residents’ Happiness Project

- **Common**
  - Restroom and rest area facilities
  - Jeju Olle Trail cleaning
  - Route establishment costs

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\(^{34}\) The 9 million KRW was the beginning of Establishment Cost Reimbursement. Since then, Jeju City and Seogwipo City have provided 50 million KRW (45,000 USD) per route to cover establishment costs.
Reproducing the Non-state Initiative Discourse

In the institutionalization process, JSSGP provincial agencies began to discursively embrace Jeju Olle Foundation’s resistance against the state. Municipal- and provincial-level officials that I interviewed invariably said that the Jeju Olle Foundation takes the leadership and the state agencies only provide financial and administrative support to facilitate the Jeju Olle Trail project:

In [Jeju] Olle [Trail] history, the foundation has developed [the trail], and [the state] has only supported (I10-G1)

The Jeju Olle [Foundation] does everything like route establishment. As it became popular, and honestly tourists of the trail are also tourists visiting Jeju Island, so the Jeju provincial agencies have taken care of the Jeju Olle Trail related affairs in the form of administrative support. Actual programs and such is a non-state initiative” (I43-G7).

A Seogwipo City-published report (2011) also said, “lead from a non-state actor, and mere support from the state.” Thus, JSSGP state agencies reproduced the non-state initiative that the Jeju Olle Foundation strived to claim while actively institutionalizing the support system in governmental organizations.

The Jeju Olle Foundation made decisions about Jeju Olle Trail establishment, maintenance, and marketing as a result, despite JSSGP state agencies’ financial and administrative contributions. This attitude corresponds with the description of the state as “mere supporter instead of leader” from the above-mentioned Seogwipo City report (2011). For example, Seogwipo City built four Jeju Olle Information Centers on the Jeju Olle Trail and employed local residents. The employees were recommended by and

35 2011 Report of Seogwipo City
worked with the Jeju Olle Foundation; the only time throughout a year when the employees worked with Seogwipo City was when they renewed their annual contracts with the city. Evidence suggests that the Jeju Olle Foundation ran the Jeju Olle Trail-related agencies that were established and financed by JSSGP state agencies—or at least closely supervised the direction of them.

In sum, JSSGP state agencies have become inextricably intertwined with the Jeju Olle Trail through institutionalization of financial and administrative support for the Jeju Olle Foundation. Even though local state agencies have gone through power struggles with the Jeju Olle Foundation, they ended up embracing the leadership of the foundation, including its resistance to the state. In addition, JSSGP agencies discursively deployed the non-state initiative in promoting its Jeju Olle Trail-related businesses. In this way, JSSGP state agencies became allegedly a “mere supporter” to the South Korean public.

A Scale of Territorialization

A Non-state Initiative

Setting a non-state actor at front through emphasizing the non-state initiative (mingan judo in Korean) eased the financial and administrative burden of the JSSGP in the following ways:

First, South Korean private landowners tended to allow public access when a non-state actor, such as NGOs and rural villagers, requested it rather than when state agencies did. It was because South Korean citizens experienced and witnessed the
developmental state’s inadequate compensation for buying lands to be used for infrastructure development decades ago. They became sensitive about state implemented developmental projects and shifting property rights related to the projects. Setting a non-state agency at the forefront enabled JSSGP state agencies to avoid confrontation with the resistance from property owners in receiving permits for public access. A JSSGP official said:

Village owned land or individually owned land is included in the *olle-gil* [the Jeju Olle Foundation]. If the *Hangjeong* [administration, or the state] did it, people would have asked money. But as a nongovernmental party did it, people here generously allowed public access to the lands (I10-G1).

Negotiating property rights with private property owners would have been an onerous or even impossible task for the state, considering the development history of South Korea.

Second, compensation from the state is costly and administratively complicated, whereas a nongovernmental party can avoid or provide at a minimal level. As Jeju Olle Trail tourists increased, some farmers suffered losses and harms to their crops by passing tourists (Chapter 5). The Jeju Olle Foundation compensated the estimated loss for the fields used for subsistence, according to the foundation. On the matter, a provincial government official said:

Those kind of compensation [do not have to be] based on laws…At the beginning [of the Jeju Olle Trail], [tourists] picked many oranges and [the Jeju Olle Foundation] compensated some then. The *shi* [city] could not do it. [The foundation] did it using its own money gained through donation. It is because compensation in civil cases should be based on precise estimates and legal judgment. There is no such thing for a government official to make an arbitrary compensation…we explained the foundation about the situation, and the foundation said that they’re going to do it then (I10-G1).
It is possible for a nongovernmental party to provide arbitrary, orally agreed, minimal compensation for crop loss in return for public access to the land. When it comes to the state, however, the process of compensation turns administratively more complicated and financially more burdensome. Thus, a non-state actor, the Jeju Olle Foundation, negotiated with landowners and farmers in order to enable public access for free or with minimal compensation. In fact, few farmers seemed to be compensated, although the compensation provided for subsistence farming was mentioned in an article by the foundation director (Ahn 2009).

Thus, the Jeju Olle Foundation and local state agencies used the non-state initiative strategy to relieve the state’s burden in negotiation and compensation for the public access to privately owned land. Thus, the non-state actors’ involvement in the scale of the Jeju Olle Trail enabled the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies to apply a non-state standard to the compensation of granting public access to privately owned lands. As a result, the non-state initiative facilitated on the one hand and obscured on the other hand the state territorialization of local state agencies, which I discuss in the following section.

**State Authority Over Jeju People and Land**

Once created by a non-state initiative and states’ institutionalizing support, the Jeju Olle Trail became the site where JSSGP state agencies exercised state authority on Jeju people.
A restaurant owner’s story well illustrates the state’s increasing control over resources and people. During my preliminary fieldwork in summer 2011, I visited a noodle restaurant located at the end of Route 1 because a tourist I had spoken with reported that he saw a sign to block Jeju Olle Trail tourists there. “Private Property. Not the Jeju Olle Trail” was written in blue paint on the road passing by the restaurant. When I entered the restaurant and explained that I was researching the Jeju Olle Trail, the restaurant owner welcomed me with a chair and a cup of coffee. He had built the building on his land and opened a restaurant. He was unhappy that he had not been consulted when the trail was established on the land that he owned. He was afraid that his property became public (either state property or a public road) when he left his land to be used for people on the trail. He wrote the sign in blue paint in order to draw attention from Seogwipo City and the Jeju Olle Foundation and force a negotiation. His claims included (1) to ensure his property rights on the land and (2) to provide incentives for using the private property. He said:

I’m the one who is taking costs…the Jeju Olle Foundation benefits a lot from the Jeju Olle Trail as the state does this and that. They are not paying anything for using the land that are not their own…the foundation should come to find me first, and the municipality…the foundation began [the Jeju Olle Trail], but as the trail gained popularity, Gwan manages it. Gwan does everything eventually. I’m sticking to [Seogwipo City] because I know that (I8-V6).

The restaurant owner cared more about Seogwipo City than about the Jeju Olle Foundation because he assumed that his ownership could be threatened by the state, and it was capable of ensuring the property ownership and providing incentives. Moreover, as his behavior caused inconvenience for tourists and some villagers, a local police chief
visited the restaurant owner and said that an individual could not block the Jeju Olle Trail like that, according to the property owner. Later the police chief apologized for his comment after finding out that it was a private property.

The case of the restaurant owner has the following implications: Jeju people perceived that (1) private property rights could be threatened, as this property was included in the Jeju Olle Trail; (2) the state could threaten private property, yet it played the role of arbitrator with the authority to prevent loss and compensate for it; and (3) even though the Jeju Olle Foundation implemented the Jeju Olle Trail, JSSGP state agencies were deeply and actively involved in controlling the Jeju Olle Trail, possibly more influentially than the Jeju Olle Foundation. Similarly, JSSGP state agencies perceived that roads included in the Jeju Olle Trail became public beyond individual control. Then the state became the most likely arbitrator on the land included in the trail, as it turned de facto public. The perceptions of Jeju people and JSSGP state agencies demonstrate that the state increased its control over the lands along the Jeju Olle Trail and over the people on it, which is defined as “territorialization” by Sack (1983).

The case of the restaurant owner also illuminates the ways in which JSSGP state agencies achieved territorialization. In the process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, landowners sometimes changed their mind in allowing public access to their land (or later realized that their lands were included in the Jeju Olle Trail, like the restaurant owner). The landowners asked for either detours or economic/administrative incentives. When I interviewed the provincial official taking charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in JSSGP, I asked his opinion about the restaurant owner’s case. He answered:
It seems that he asks [state agencies] and [the Jeju Olle Foundation] to come [for negotiation], but when [state agencies] got to be involved, they necessarily ask benefits in return [for using private lands] such as to establish decks or something…When [state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation] noticed those signs, we make detours (I10-G1).

JSSGP state agencies understood that most landowners claim that their lands aim for economic benefits. In those instances, they declined the requests from private landowners and detoured the trail without any exception. The previous Jeju Olle Foundation exploring team leader explained the reason:

If it appears that we complain even slightly about a private landowner’s blocking his land, other landowners, without having any issues, become nervous. ‘I shouldn’t have allowed [public passage on the land]?’, something like that. So we retreat [detour] whenever landowners say 'no' in order not to establish a precedent. And we also detour when they ask some [incentives] too for the same reason…if we do not defend our principle, and allow even a little bit of it, we cannot handle [the requests] later (I77-F2).

Maintaining a strict attitude in negotiating with landowners about property rights enabled the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies to reduce financial and administrative burden. It particularly relieved the burden of JSSGP state agencies because they were expected to take responsibilities for financial and administrative burden as an arbitrator for lands along the Jeju Olle Trail. The reduced burden of state agencies also implies that landowners shouldered the cost of using private lands for public use. In other words, landowners were indirectly asked by state authorities to allow public access to their lands without any return for tourists to enjoy the scenic beauty of Jeju Island. The state exercised its authority in resolving land disputes to prioritize the interests of the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists over Jeju landowners.
JSSGP state agencies likewise exercised authority in politically curtailing decision-making rights at the village level. In 2011, the Jeju Olle Trail exploring team visited a village leader to discuss the Jeju Olle Trail passing through the village. The village leader refused it because his first condition to implement a program in the village was villager benefits. The village leader said:

I refused without telling why and asked them what the benefits were for the village, [then they answered] ‘Nothing,’ then what these people [tourists] would leave here, [then they answered] ‘Nothing.’ There was no reason to accept it (I46-V21).

His stance was unusual compared to other village leaders who competed to bring the Jeju Olle Trail to their villages because they sought economic benefits from tourist spending. The village leader also refused the offer because he or the village wanted to be out of the framework of the Jeju Olle Trail in promoting regional development. He continued:

[The Jeju Olle Trail] becomes the property of the foundation and the leader named Seo Myongsuk or something. [Then the village lanes] would end up becoming her private property. Probably that was the foremost reason why I disagreed having it here. I did not want [village lanes] to be under the ownership of the foundation (Ibid.).

The village leader wanted to ensure that the village would receive credit for the regional development, rather than becoming one of many villages under the control of the Jeju Olle Foundation.

The village leader confessed that he experienced significant external pressure for refusing the Jeju Olle Foundation’ offer. People in higher positions called him to ask about the reasons. The village organization even received an official letter from the eup
(the smallest administrative unit over village) where the village belonged. The letter requested that the village organization conduct a survey among villagers to ask about agreement/disagreement on adopting the Jeju Olle Trail. The village leader insisted on not adopting the Jeju Olle Trail without conducting the survey. The trail route ended up passing through a neighboring village.

This village had been known for its wetland. The village leader sought to establish something unique to the village using the wetland. His efforts bore fruits: in 2013, the Ramsar Convention designated the village as the first example village of the Ramsar wetland in the world. A central government official from the Ministry of Environment told the leader that he did the right thing to defend the wetland against the Jeju Olle Trail (and the Jeju Olle Foundation). The village leader’s story demonstrates that JSSGP state agencies focused on completing a new scale to attract tourists through the Jeju Olle Trail using their authority. Environmental and cultural assets of villages were considered to promote the Jeju Olle Trail for the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists and were not considered based on the aspirations and political rights of villagers to make use of those assets on their own.

In sum, political and economic struggles took place in the newly created scale, the Jeju Olle Trail. Jeju local state agencies played a role of arbitrator among themselves, the Jeju Olle Foundation, local residents who sought benefit from the Jeju Olle Trail, and domestic and international tourists, and thereby, channeled political and economic benefits using state authority. While prioritizing the interests of tourists and

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36 An international treaty established in 1971 to facilitate ecological sustainability of wetlands.
the Jeju Olle Foundation at the expense of the interests of Jeju local people, JSSGP state agencies reinforced their authority within the newly created scale of the Jeju Olle Trail.

**Crossing Scales of State and Non-state Actors**

**Jumping to the National Scale**

The Jeju Olle Foundation strived to reinforce financial and administrative support from JSSGP state agencies while checking them for exercising control over the Jeju Olle Trail. In other words, the main control of the Jeju Olle Trail remained with the foundation even though the foundation and JSSGP state agencies collaborated for establishing and maintaining the trail.

Then, a murder of a female tourist provided a chance for the Jeju provincial government to increase its control over the trail. In summer 2012, a female tourist in her 40s left a guesthouse located at the beginning point of a Jeju Olle Trail route early in the morning by herself. She was found murdered a few days later. Police found that a village man living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail murdered her. The South Korean public was terrified by the fact that the murder happened on the most popular trail in the country. Moreover, female tourists often visited the trail alone because an increasing number of guesthouses on Jeju Island provided affordable and safe tourist accommodations, unlike other provinces in South Korea. The South Korean public also believed that the Jeju Olle Trail was safe somehow, possibly because the Jeju Olle Foundation promoted it as a site for nature-based mediation.
The family of the victim sued the Jeju Olle Foundation for not having provided tourists with crime warnings when it promoted the trail. The family also sued JSSGP for insufficient institutional support for tourists’ safety. The family’s rationale for the indictment was that the Jeju Olle Trail became a public space, for which the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP had responsibility regarding tourists’ safety (2014 November 7, Halla Daily). The court decided that neither the Jeju Olle Foundation nor JSSGP had responsibility for the accident. The family appealed the court’s decision, but lost the suit again because a public road’s safety is determined by its physical condition, such as a fissure on the road, and the murder was not caused by such defects (Ibid.).

JSSGP, though, began to claim responsibility for tourist safety after the murder. The Jeju Olle Trail passes through small mountains and agricultural fields where population traffic is very low, so tourists began to feel insecure walking along the Jeju Olle Trail after the murder, particularly female tourists walking alone. Responding to the growing concern in November 2012, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Council (JSSGPC) launched a motion for the “Ordinance on Trail Management including the Jeju Olle Trail.” It aimed to (1) reinforce ecology-based tourism in JSSGP and (2) provide tourists with quality service (JSSGPC 2012:2). The ordinance identified JSSGP as manager of the Jeju Olle Trail, giving the governor the most discretionary power, including establishing and changing trail routes (Act 3, 5 & 6) (Ibid.:5-6).

The Jeju Olle Foundation and its advocates strongly criticized JSSGPC’s motion. The Jeju Olle Foundation submitted an official opinion opposing the ordinance.
letter that attached the results of a legal consultation on the motion, the foundation accused JSSGP of unilaterally taking the control from the Jeju Olle Foundation:

…it means that the Jeju Olle Foundation transfers the control over the Jeju Olle Trail, for which the Jeju Olle Foundation have strived in establishment, management and marketing, to the Jeju Governor. It not only violates the principle of legal delegation but also impinge the basic right of the Jeju Olle Foundation (The opposition letter submitted to the JSSGPC, 2012: 4)

Jeju Olle Trail advocates at the national level, as well as local-level media, heavily criticized the JSSGPC motion, comparing the attempts to “theft.”

I went to the JSSGPC in order to find out its response to the public criticism and the status of the legislation. I interviewed a researcher who had charge of the legislation process in his office. When I asked him about the criticism, he shook his head, saying:

We (the JSSGPC) were frightened about how [the Jeju Olle Foundation] responded, even with legal consultation. We’re not going to proceed the ordinance further for now because it’s unnecessary (I42-G6).

Then he began to explain about a motion of the National Assembly. Since 2010 when the Jeju Olle Trail gained popularity across the country, about 500 other trails had been established through 2012 following the Jeju Olle Trail’s example. The rapid increase of trails and concentration of budget spending solicited the need for managing trails in systematic and consistent ways. Responding to the need, 15 members of the National Assembly proposed a motion about the state’s management of walking trails. As the JSSGPC encountered public criticism, it investigated the similarities between the

motions of the JSSGPC and the National Assembly. The JSSGPC found that the motions significantly overlapped in terms of the definition of walking trails, responsibility of the central and provincial governments, planning, establishment of committees, and support for nongovernmental actors (JSSGP 2012:1). Facing strong opposition against its own ordinance, the JSSGPC decided to wait because it did not have to independently legislate the ordinance. The motion of the National Assembly would be applied at the provincial level based on the umbrella power of legislations passed through the National Assembly when it became effective in the near future.

The political struggle over controlling the Jeju Olle Trail illustrates that both the state and non-state actors interactively and simultaneously crossed scales to expand their power in controlling the trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation crossed scales to reach the national-scale South Korean public and media in seeking public pressure on the Jeju provincial government. The Jeju provincial government, on the other hand, jumped scales upward to reach the National Assembly to legislate the state’s control and expand its territorialization of the newly created scale, the Jeju Olle Trail. However, its jumping scale differs from that of the Jeju Olle Foundation and the irrigator’s union described by Perreault (2005). The latter actively worked to reach higher scales, such as the national and global scale. On the other hand, the Jeju provincial government did not act; rather it decided to simply wait until the decision from the national-scale government became effective to reach the provincial scale.

JSSGP’s institutionalization of the Jeju Olle Foundation support system can be understood in the context of its continuing efforts to reinforce state authority at the
provincial level in establishing Jeju International Free City, as the following section demonstrates.

**Jumping to the Global Scale**

The Jeju Olle Foundation’s continuing efforts to internationally promote the Jeju Olle Trail coincided with JSSGP’s long struggle to establish a competitive city-region since it adopted the Jeju International Free City Plan in 2002. Thus, the JSSGP government further reached the global scale by deploying the Jeju Olle Foundation.

**Globalization as a goal**

The Jeju Olle Foundation targeted the global market even though it had gained popularity among the South Korean public with the aid of local and national media. The foundation says on its webpage:

> Even though it’s somewhat inconvenient for the trail walkers, the spirit of the Jeju Olle, which conserves the environment and interacts with people continuously spreads out to the whole country, and the world ([Source: Jeju Olle Foundation a)](source).

Reaching the global market has been one of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s critical goals from the beginning of the Jeju Olle Trail establishment.

The foundation director also remarked on the Jeju Olle Foundation’s contribution to JSSGP:

[The Jeju Olle Foundation] is preparing for selling Jeju Island in earnest this time. Actually [JSSGP] shouts out [Jeju International Free City and] the capital of something, actually Jeju Island is little known [globally]…[Jeju Island] was absolutely far from being prepared to [attract and host] foreigners. Through the
success of the Jeju Olle Trail, the JSSGP realized the problems and began to prepare for attracting foreign tourists…. (I78-F3)

The director went on to the rationale of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s attempt to reach the global market saying:

This trail is [too beautiful] to enjoy only among South Koreans. That’s why [we strive for] globalization…Foreigners, that’s the idea we’ve had since the very beginning [of the trail establishment] (Ibid.).

The director’s comment reflects her belief that the Jeju Olle Foundation’s strive for globalization would not only sustain itself, but would also facilitate JSSGP’s globalization initiative that had been implemented through provincial development plans such as Jeju Free International City and the World’s Environmental Capital.

**Endeavors for globalization**

The Jeju Olle Foundation initiated international events in an attempt to expand to the global market (Table 3.3). For example, the foundation began to annually hold the World Trail Conference in 2010. The conference aimed to share knowledge about trail management among international trail organizations. The conference is an example of the foundation’s strongly pursuing strategies to facilitate knowledge sharing and promotion of member trails among international organizations.
Another example is the Jeju Olle Foundation’s establishment of the World Trails Network, with 44 trail organizations from 18 countries including South Korea\textsuperscript{38}, as well as the establishment of the Asia Trails Network in 2013 with members from China,

\textsuperscript{38}Aiming for “growing to a sustainable ethos for trails and the promotion of a walking culture which connects communities and walkers to both culture and nature,” from \url{http://www.worldtrail.org/network/network.php}, accessed 11/21/2014.

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Table 3.3 Jeju Olle Foundation’s Endeavors For Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Endeavors</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Financial Sources</th>
<th>Accomplishments for globalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| World Trail Conference | 2010 (Fifth in 2014) | To share knowledge about trail management among international trail organizations | - 2010–2015: Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy (MTIE); Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology; JSSGP; Jeju Leading Industry Development for Economic Region  
- 2016: JSSGP (expected) | - 2013: ATN  
- 2015: Expected establishment of the WTN |
| Jeju Olle Walking Festival | 2010 (Fifth in 2014) | To promote the Jeju Olle Trail among people from all over the world | - Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Sports; JSSGP; Seogwipo City; Jeju Tourism Organization; Jeju Tourism University (2014) | The Asia Walking Festival (2014) |
| Friendship Trail | 2011 | To facilitate trail knowledge and tourists among different countries | Not applicable | Established relationships with trails in six other countries including Australia and Canada. A sign of one trail was posted to another trail to show an established relationship. |
| Affiliated Trail | 2012 | To provide consultation for establishing other trails domestically/internationally | Not applicable | Based on Jeju Olle Foundation's consultation, Kyushu Province in Japan opened 12 routes; royalty of 20 million KRW (18,000 USD) was paid to the Jeju Olle Foundation. |
Japan, and South Korea\textsuperscript{39} (this network was the stepping stone for the international trail organization). The Jeju Olle Foundation envisioned the headquarters of an international trail organization on Jeju Island and playing the role of first chairman of the organization. These examples demonstrate that the Jeju Olle Foundation strived to reach the global market by deploying the Jeju Olle Trail.

**Leveraging Local Financial Support through Globalization**

The Jeju Olle Foundation sought to expand Jeju provincial government’s financial support by promoting the Jeju Olle Trail in the global market. A JSSGP provincial official who took charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in the Department of Tourism Policy informed me that the Jeju Olle Foundation had requested that the department cover the cost for hosting the World Trail Conference\textsuperscript{40} in 2016. The Department of Tourism Policy positively considered supporting the cost, along with providing costs for managing the headquarters of the international trail organization envisioned by the Jeju Olle Foundation. In South Korea, state agencies cover costs for startup and management of international organizations established within the country. Thus, the Jeju Olle Foundation is likely to receive governmental funds to run the organization’s headquarters.

\textsuperscript{39} Organization’s countries of origin: Japan (3); China (1); South Korea (11)  
\textsuperscript{40} I will continue using the example of the World Trail Conference, as it shows well the Jeju Olle Foundation deploying global-scale efforts to elicit financial/administrative support, and it is the most notable globalization program implemented by the Jeju Olle Foundation.
Receiving governmental support for organization management was critical to decision-making of the Jeju Olle Foundation because the foundation actively and discursively claimed its independence (based on financial independence) in controlling the Jeju Olle Trail without intervention from state agencies. Here the foundation showed paradoxical behavior: it insisted on financial independence from state agencies for organization management when it established and promoted the trail at the national scale; yet it solicited costs for the same purpose when it came to reaching the global scale. The paradox depending on scale can be derived from conflicting/coinciding interests between the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies. At the national scale, the foundation strived to defend its decision-making rights, particularly focusing on environmental considerations in the establishment process. In doing so, it claimed that state involvement would encroach on its decision-making rights regarding environmental impact. The foundation also elicited financial and administrative support from JSSGP state agencies using this discourse. At the global scale on the other hand, trail establishment was already completed, so concerns about state control negatively impacting the environment could no longer be influential. Whether JSSGP state agencies were mere supporters or key players in promoting the Jeju Olle Trail was not important at the global scale. There was no media to circulate discourse at the global level in the first place. Reaching the global market, moreover, was the priority for JSSGP’s regional development plans (e.g., Jeju Free International City and the World’s Environmental Capital). Thus, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s endeavor for globalization could be understood as a contribution to JSSGP’s development drive to reach the global market.
As both parties’ goal coincided, which was to “sell the Jeju Olle Trail to the global market,” as the foundation director said, they could exchange financial support for running the international organization and promoting Jeju Island, along with the Jeju Olle Trail, at the global scale. Thus, reaching out to attract the global scale (1) gave the Jeju Olle Trail an international presence; (2) established a regional organization on Jeju; and (3) brought JSSGP and the Jeju Olle Foundation together.

**Channeling Capital Accumulation**

**Urban Entrepreneurs**

In the establishment process of the Jeju Olle Trail, the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies collaborated, particularly when implementing rural developmental programs (detailed in Chapter 4). The initiative for rural development drew many rural villages to compete to participate in the programs by running local lodges and restaurants along the Jeju Olle Trail. The participants did generate additional income for about a year in 2010. Tourists subscribed to discourse that the Jeju Olle Foundation produced and rushed to the Jeju Olle Trail, attracted by natural scenic beauty and progressive ideas embedded in it, such as environmentalism and democratic management of the trail.

Mainlanders further migrated to Jeju Island seeking alternative lives. Figure 3.7 shows that Jeju Island’s immigration rate notably increased after the 2007 establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail, compared to other provinces in South Korea. Urban residents
migrated more to Jeju Island than rural residents (Figure 3.8). Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 implies that JSSGP receives rapidly increasing immigrants from urban areas in other provinces located on the South Korean mainland. Jeju migrants increasingly began tourist businesses along the Jeju Olle Trail, such as guesthouses and cafés. Jeju Olle Trail tourists chose to stay in those accommodations instead of local lodges since migrants catered to the tastes of the urban middle class. Thus, capital accumulation was channeled to urban entrepreneurs instead of Jeju local people, who were the intended beneficiaries of the Jeju Olle Trail project (detailed in Chapter 4).

**Figure 3.7 Annual Trends of Immigration from Other Provinces:**
*Other Provinces vs. JSSGP, 2008 - 2014*

*Data Source:* Korean Statistical Information Service
Chinese Capital on Jeju Island

Foreign tourists visiting Jeju Island increased by more than five times after the Jeju Olle Foundation established the Jeju Olle Trail\(^{41}\) (from 54,1274 in 2007 to 3,328,316 in 2014\(^{42}\)). Among them, the increase of Chinese tourists is particularly notable. The number of Chinese tourists increased by more than 15 times in seven years (176,878 in 2007 to 2,859,092 in 2014). What is interesting (Figure 3.9) is that the increase in domestic tourists began to slow down after the 2012 murder of the female tourist on the Jeju Olle Trail, while the total tourist increase rate maintained. The rapidly

\(^{41}\) South Korean scholars, JSSGP, and media agree that the Jeju Olle Trail contributed to the increase of foreign tourists (2013 October 9, *Chosun Daily*; Shin and Jeong 2014; 2012 February 6, Newspaper of Travel).

\(^{42}\) Source: The Jeju Tourism Association
growing number of Chinese tourists\textsuperscript{43} filled the widening gap between the number of total and domestic tourists. As a result, the tourism industry of JSSGP continued growing. While Jeju tourism industry’s annual growth rate was 1.9\% in 2008, it jumped to 10.2\% in 2013. The tourism industry also increasingly contributed to the growth of the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) of JSSGP, from 7.3\% in 2007 to 41.1\% in 2013\textsuperscript{44} (Jeju Division, The Bank of Korea 2014:38).

\textbf{Figure 3.9 Number of Jeju Tourists by Origin: 2001 – 2014}

\textbf{Source:} Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association

\textsuperscript{43} The countries of origin among foreign tourists are categorized as Japan, China, Hong Kona, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, other Asian countries, the US, and other western countries. Among these countries of origin, China is singled out because (1) Chinese tourists account for 86\% of total foreign tourists and are therefore the most influential on the Jeju economy; (2) JSSGP’s regional developmental plans particularly targeted Chinese tourists, so the Chinese tourist increase could be understood as the outcome of JSSGP’s development initiatives; (3) examining the relationship between (1) and (2) is one of the main goals in demonstrating scalar politics of JSSGP for territorialization.

\textsuperscript{44} The rate of an industry’s contribution to GRDP growth refers to how much an industry’s change contributed to a change in GRDP. The rate of all regional industry contribution to the GRDP sums up to 100. The annual GRDP growth of JSSGP was 0.5\% in 2007 and 1.6\% in 2013.
Chinese investment also rapidly increased around this time while the contribution from other foreign countries remained constant. Foreigners own 16.4 km², accounting for 0.89% of the total area of Jeju Island. JSSGP argued that the percentage of foreign ownership was too minimal to shift the Jeju economy. However, critics from academia and civil society demonstrated growing concerns about the rapid increase of foreign land ownership on Jeju Island. Their concern was derived from the following: (1) the total area of Jeju Island, including mountains and public roads, cannot be traded at the market; (2) recent land purchase by Chinese capital was very selective to represent the scenic beauty of Jeju Island; and (3) the aggressiveness of Chinese capital in purchasing lands and building tourist facilities generated perceptions among the South Korean public that Chinese capital threatens overall landownership on Jeju Island.

Chinese-owned land on Jeju Island increased from 1,415,657 m² in 2011 to 8,338,532 m² in 2014 (Table 3.4). What is notable in Table 3.4 is the growth. Other countries like the US have significant size, but it is steady. On the purchased land, Chinese investors began building large resorts targeting tourists on Jeju Island (Figure 3.10). Among 38 tourism development projects on Jeju Island as of March 2015, nine projects were implemented by foreigners, mostly from Chinese capital. The amount of projects implemented by foreigners accounts for 37.8% (Table 3.5).

South Korean scholars and media expect the increase of Chinese tourists and investment to result in marginalization of Jeju residents, including recent migrants, because Chinese tourists visit Jeju Island in particular patterns. A majority (75%) of Chinese tourists visit Jeju Island in groups (Seo et al. 2013). A South Korean weekly
### Table 3.4 Foreigner Land Ownership on Jeju Island, 2011 – 2014 (m²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/Countries</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td>3,940,496</td>
<td>3,693,663</td>
<td>3,741,114</td>
<td>3,723,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Americas except the US</strong></td>
<td>405,486</td>
<td>394,441</td>
<td>352,849</td>
<td>313,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK, France, Germany</strong></td>
<td>138,170</td>
<td>138,760</td>
<td>140,409</td>
<td>145,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other European countries</strong></td>
<td>385,913</td>
<td>385,602</td>
<td>380,093</td>
<td>379,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>2,224,712</td>
<td>2,214,396</td>
<td>2,140,055</td>
<td>2,337,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td>1,415,657</td>
<td>1,929,408</td>
<td>3,149,791</td>
<td>8,338,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Asian countries</strong></td>
<td>825,119</td>
<td>827,822</td>
<td>841,098</td>
<td>1,085,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>180,885</td>
<td>224,306</td>
<td>225,372</td>
<td>302,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9,516,438</td>
<td>9,808,398</td>
<td>10,970,781</td>
<td>16,626,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Department of Tourism Industry, JSSGP*

### Table 3.5 Foreigner Tourist Facilities Development, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Project Amount (100 million KRW)</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Countries of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teddy Valley Golf &amp; Resort</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>China Teddy Ltd.</td>
<td>China; Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legend History Park</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>18,451</td>
<td>Ramjeong Development Ltd.</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Moosoo</em> Creek Park</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2,537</td>
<td>Jeju China Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Yerae</em> Leisure-Type Residential Zone</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>25,144</td>
<td>Berzaya Jeju Resort Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polo Horse Riding Resort</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>Korea Polo Country Club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Iho</em> Park</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>4,212</td>
<td>Jeju Bunma Iho Land Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju Health Care Town</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>10,130</td>
<td>Chinese Green Land Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Star</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Gokwang Jeju Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Baek</em> Communication Jeju Resort</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>Baek Communication Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Department of Tourism Policy, JSSGP*
magazine on current issues criticized this tourist behavior on Jeju Island in an article titled “10,000 Chinese tourists a day on Jeju Island, nothing but window dressing” (2013 July, Hankyore 21). A larger majority (80%) of the group tourists travel Jeju Island through Chinese travel agencies: large travel agencies attract tourists in China and send them to small Chinese travel agencies\(^4\) located on Jeju Island. Chinese travel agencies on Jeju Island hire Chinese tour guides fluent in Korean, who are a Chinese minority having originated from Korea (calledchosunjok in Korean). The travel agencies also make itineraries for the Chinese tourists to stay at hotels run by Chinese. This pattern

\(^4\) There were more than 20 travel agencies owned and run by Chinese in Jeju Island (Total: 165 in 2013).
exacerbates the chronic problem of the Jeju tourism industry in which 62% of business interests among hotels is leaked out to the South Korean mainland and foreign countries (Seo et al. 2013:30). Itineraries also include shopping centers and duty-free shops where Chinese tourists spend 40% of total costs for Jeju travel. The duty-free shops on Jeju Island are dominated by a few large South Korean corporations such as Samsung. Their business interests remarkably surged in recent years: 63 (2007) to 83 (2008) to 122 (2009) to 107 (2010) to 169 (2011) to 260 (2012) (numbers are in million USD) (Seo et al. 2013:30). Also, Chinese capital has increasingly purchased shopping centers and hotels on Jeju Island. Chinese tourists on Jeju Island use tourist facilities dominantly owned and run by Chinese because they feel more comfortable in those facilities than in others run by South Koreans (Chosun.com Economy, September 2014). At the same time, some tourist business owners avoid Chinese tourists because of the wide perception that Chinese tourists are noisy. As a result, benefits from Chinese tourists visiting Jeju Island tend to be directed at Chinese capital and South Korean large corporations instead of local businesses such as travel agencies, souvenir shops, and lodges.

Local businesses that cannot access benefits include tourism businesses started by recent migrants to Jeju Island. The urban entrepreneurs already experienced difficulties in their businesses because of a decrease in South Korean tourists. In addition, a new wave of tourists from China has brought little benefit to the urban entrepreneurs. Lee (2013; in 2015 January 27 Pressian) points out that increasing tourism revenue accrued from Chinese tourist increase is likely to benefit Chinese
investors. He argues that the increasing revenue from Chinese tourists benefits Chinese investors while marginalizing South Korean urban entrepreneurs who recently migrated to Jeju Island. As such, JSSGP has strived to attract Chinese tourists and investors in its attempt to establish Jeju International Free City on Jeju Island. JSSGP’s globalization endeavor, however, resulted in benefitting only Chinese investors and a few large South Korean corporations, when the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed to have strived to revitalize the Jeju local economy, whether beneficiaries ended up being Jeju villagers or urban entrepreneurs.

Tying JSSGP’s endeavor for establishing Jeju International Free City with the Jeju Olle Foundation’s goal of reaching the global market, JSSGP support for the Jeju Olle Foundation can be understood in the context of JSSGP’s globalization drive. A JSSGP official said that contributing to Jeju Olle Trail establishment is one of the ways in which JSSGP strived to establish the World’s Environmental Capital. The comment implies that JSSGP viewed the Jeju Olle Trail as competitive in the global market. Thus, when JSSGP restructured its organization with a new governor taking office in 2014, it maintained support for Jeju Olle Foundation marketing in the Department of Tourism Policy while removing support for Jeju Olle Trail cleaning from the Department of Natural Resources. In doing so, JSSGP reinforced the global marketing of the Jeju Olle Trail, including the Jeju Olle Foundation’s globalization initiatives listed in Table 2. The institutional shift of JSSGP and the JSSGP official’s comment, demonstrate that JSSGP

46 Another version of the global city-region that the JSSGP envisions, emphasizing on natural resources on Jeju Island (2011 – 2014).
actively supported the globalization initiative of the Jeju Olle Foundation, which coincides with JSSGP’s endeavor for globalization.

**Conclusion**

This chapter aims to determine the processes by which decentralized state agencies reinforced authority while emphasizing the rollback of the state under neoliberalism by examining an ecotourism project on Jeju Island, South Korea. In examining the behavior of a decentralized state, the study relies on scale theories, as well as level and boundary struggles of political economy.

*Through simultaneous and interactive scalar politics* in a non-state-initiated project, the state consolidated the scale of political economy in a way to reinforce state control rather than passively waiting for the political and economic outcomes that a non-state actor would bring about. The highly political and complicated process both confirms and advances Perreault’s argument. On one hand, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s upward reaching toward a national scale coincides with the finding of Perreault in which non-state actors at the provincial scale rely on knowledge and organizational power at the (inter-) national scale. Both reach upward scales, seeking to resolve local issues by leveraging power from higher scales. On the other hand, JSSGP’s strategic scale-crossing toward the national-level government advances Perreault’s finding in which the state remains static about non-state actors’ resistance to it after the active decentralization process ceases. The findings of this chapter demonstrate that the state is
also simultaneously jumping scales (Smith 1993) in response to non-state actors’ resistance to it.

The processes of collaborations and tensions between state/non-state actors, including jumping scales, are complicated and nuanced because of the particularities of NICs. The chapter examines a regional development program implemented by a unique form of neoliberal state on Jeju Island: hybridization of NIC’s developmental state and the decentralized state agency with a generic feature of neoliberal downward rescaling. This chapter thus provides a case for place-specific and scale-specific “variegated neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002).

The way in which JSSGP consolidated the scale of the Jeju Olle Trail through territorialization reflects the behavioral pattern of an NIC developmental state in pursuing regional development, i.e., strong leadership of the state in regional development (Park 2008). More specifically, when the Jeju Olle Foundation established the trail, the Jeju provincial government sometimes intervened in the process to urge rural residents to participate in the project, promoting it as a regional development program. Once the trail was completed, JSSGP state agencies arbitrated conflicts on the trail, particularly land disputes because the South Korean public began to regard the trail as public property. In addition, the state facilitated its authority in reinforcing process in the trail by providing regional developmental funds for rural villages adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail, just like the way the South Korean developmental state pursued rural development in the 1970s. Then, the JSSGP could be called a “decentralized developmental state.” This behavioral pattern suggests that NICs might face difficulties
in realizing citizens’ participation in resource management, even when they desire it, because of already established institutions that reflect strong intervention of the state in resource management.

However, the process of reinforcing state authority differs between the centralized and decentralized developmental state. The centralized developmental state alone took a strong and authoritarian leadership position in regional development programs in the 1970s. The Jeju provincial government, on the other hand, used tactics such as deploying non-state actors in initiating the Jeju Olle Trail and jumping scales for reinforcing state authority instead of directly taking the leadership like the developmental state. The difference might have been caused by the global imperative for a democratic approach to resource management and a growing criticism among South Korean citizens about state authority.

The jumping scales of a decentralized developmental state and setting non-state actors at the front of developmental programs matter. They reveal that decentralized state agencies seek to reinforce state authority under the influence of neoliberalism, just like what was believed and criticized about the centralized state authority of the developmental state. In doing so, decentralized developmental states claim the opposite, i.e., devolution of state power and public participation at the local level. Decentralized state agencies rather actively (yet subtly) utilize non-state actors, such as NGOs and citizens, for initiating neoliberal developmental goals. Then they take the controlling power, reinforcing state authority in pursuing neoliberal developmental goals. However, a decentralized state agency’s attempt for jumping scales implies that neoliberal
downward state restructuring provides insufficient political power for it to handle local resistance and to increase control over natural resources and people in a way to implement its developmental goals. Even the most decentralized province in South Korea, JSSGP, suffered from lacking state authority when the central government devolved a wide range of specific state authorities based on special laws established for its designation. In sum, the case of the Jeju Olle Trail illustrates that decentralized developmental states seek to reinforce state authority just as centralized developmental states did. When decentralized state agencies encountered local resistance, they deployed power from higher scales, further reinforcing their authority.

The comparison of centralized and decentralized developmental states demonstrates that the state continues to reinforce its authority for implementing developmental goals as it claims either centralized or decentralized authority.
CHAPTER IV
HISTORY, ECO-SCALAR FIX, AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Introduction

This chapter explores how particular ways of rescaling nature contribute to capital accumulation for the urban middle class, deepening historical marginalization of local people. It emphasizes how simultaneous production of scale and nature in the process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail shifted the power dynamics of environmental governance in ways that channeled capital flow to particular social groups.

Recently, political ecology has become engaged with scale literature. In examining the Jeju Olle Trail, this chapter relies on studies about the production of nature and the simultaneous production of scale, particularly the eco-scalar fix. In doing so, it suggests longitudinal examinations of the coproduction of scale and nature in order to determine persistent structural threads of capitalist political economy.

The chapter begins by elaborating on key ideas of the production of nature and scale in political ecology. Next, it discusses the history of Jeju Island, focusing on how nature had been used in the relationship between Jeju people and outsiders from the South Korean mainland. Third, the chapter examines the Jeju Olle Trail establishment as a rescaling process of Jeju nature, resulting in reconfiguration of political economy. Fourth, the chapter shows capital flow shifting due to an influx of migrants on Jeju
Island, resulting in an emerging landscape of neoliberal capitalism. The conclusion is the final element of this chapter.

Simultaneous Production of Nature and Scale

Production of First Nature

There is no first nature in a capitalist society (Smith 2008). “First nature" refers to nature unaltered by human activity (nature altered by human activity is called “second nature”). Smith’s (2008) thesis is that first nature is only produced as untouched by humans for capital accumulation. For Smith (2008), first nature can be differentiated from second nature only in its resultant form of human alteration. He states, “If we must, we can let this inaccessible nature support our notions of nature as Edenic, but this is always an ideal, abstract nature of the imagination, one that we will never know in reality. Human beings have produced whatever nature became accessible to them” (Ibid.:81). Thus, first nature untouched by humans does not actually exist; it is only produced.

Human remnants and intentions in producing first nature are discursively and materially hidden in order to elicit consumption from those who imagine produced nature as untouched. In other words, first nature is produced as part of second nature to generate profit (Ibid.:78). Smith takes Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks as examples of “supposedly unproduced nature,” which are in fact produced “in every conceivable sense” (Ibid.:80). He goes on to describe them as “neatly packaged cultural
experiences of environment on which substantial profits are recorded each year” (Ibid.:81). The purpose of producing first nature is capital accumulation in the capitalist mode of social production, according to Smith.

Social institutions such as state, market, and classes are configured for the combined control of first nature production and class-selective distribution of the capital generated there from. In a capitalist society, these institutions determine a structure of political economy that sustains and facilitates capital accumulation for the higher classes at the expense of the laboring class. If first nature is produced to serve interests selectively among classes, it becomes a concept of political action (Smith 2008:90). Examining produced first nature from a political perspective, then, begs the questions of “how we produce nature” as “socially necessary” and “who controls this production of nature” (Ibid.:89, emphasis in original). The struggle over the production of first nature is thus involved in defining what nature could do to compensate for social deprivation. Relying on these ideas about the production of first nature and examining its material and discursive power struggles will enable us to determine particular social arrangements of institutions for resource use that facilitate capital accumulation.

Based on Smith’s (2008) thesis of the social production of first nature, this chapter investigates how the state, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and Jeju people have politically struggled in framing47 nature on Jeju Island. In doing so, the chapter focuses on examining how Jeju Island’s nature is produced as first

47 I use framing interchangeably with producing, meaning both material and discursive arrangement of nature made by social groups who seek political and economic benefits from particular forms of nature.
nature in relation to social and economic contexts at the regional and national levels, along with who benefits from the produced first nature. The chapter will answer the following questions: (1) What is deemed “deprivable” in the social and economic development of South Korea and Jeju Island?; (2) How is nature on Jeju Island framed in a way to remove social deprivation?; (3) Who controls the production of Jeju nature in particular ways?

Questions remain, though, regarding the mechanisms and forms of producing nature and channeling capital derived from nature in particular ways. To answer them, I turn to scale theories. Spatial frameworks suggested by scale theories deepen our understanding of nature production under capitalism, as the following section describes.

**Historical Eco-scalar Fix of Produced First Nature**

“Scale” is defined in this chapter as a *spatial boundary* of political economy in the production of nature. I am aware of the criticisms about the term’s fuzziness, as some scholars use it as levels of political economy, interchangeable with administrative levels such as local, regional, provincial, national, and global (e.g., Perreault 2005), while others employ the term to refer to a spatial boundary (e.g., Cohen and Bakker 2014). Marston et al. (2005) criticize the former use because of its lacking contribution to our understanding about mechanisms of political economy beyond the level provided. The latter use has also been criticized because scale as a spatial boundary contributes little to our understanding beyond other spatial concepts such as space and place.
Despite these criticisms, I argue that scale does contribute beyond those “replaceable” concepts like level, space, and place when we focus on the “continuous” “shift” of administrative levels and spatial boundaries in the process of political and economic struggles. For example, crossing “levels” might be interchangeable with crossing “scales.” However, when we choose the latter, we are able to emphasize the tactics of continuously shifting levels of administration as an expression of ongoing political and economic struggles over the production of nature. A similar goal would be achieved when we use scale to refer to spatial boundaries over space, where we would emphasize that the boundaries of a particular space of political economy are changing rather than assuming a static boundary. Considering the dynamics implied by the term “scale,” I employ it in examining spatial shifts of political economy in the Jeju tourism industry through the production of nature.

In an effort to untangle complicated socioeconomic and political processes of producing nature, many political ecologists have examined sociospatial scalar configurations of nature (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003, Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; McCarthy 2005). They examined Smith’s (2008) capitalist social institutions that produce nature through the lens of scalar politics. These works accept generic characteristics of scale agreed upon by scalar theorists: scale is socially constructed (Smith 1993); thus, it is unstable and contested (Marston 2000, Brenner 2001); and various entities such as state (Brenner 2001; 2004, Cox 1998) and non-state (Perreault 2005; Agnew 1997; McCarthy 2005) actors struggle to drive the construction process in ways to meet the demands of particular class groups while decreasing others’ political
and economic benefit proportions. In these generic characteristics of scale, political ecologists incorporate nature\footnote{Nature, in whatever form, usually refers to socially produced nature among political ecologists.} to examine how it complicates and nuances scalar politics. Neumann argues that incorporating “the environment – environmental politics, non-human actors, and biophysical processes\footnote{Among different uses of nature Neumann listed, the chapter focuses on environmental politics rather than environmental agencies.}—is the unique contribution of political ecology to scale theory literature (2009: 2) because scale literature often emphasizes scalar politics solely belonging to humans without accounting for the role of nonhuman actors, such as agencies, in determining the processes and outcomes of political struggles among human actors. Thus, McCarthy argues the inseparability of society and nature in explaining scalar politics, saying, “the ‘scalar dimensions of social spatiality’ are thoroughly enmeshed with, and enabled and constrained by” the “contested production of socionatures” (2005:735). Here, nature and scale are simultaneously produced through struggles to determine political economy. This simultaneous production of scale and nature provides valuable analytical insight to the case of the Jeju Olle Trail project. Relying on this idea, this chapter determines the political and economic processes and outcomes that the spatial shifts (the production of scale) resulting from the Jeju Olle Trail brought about in the Jeju tourism industry through deploying particularly framed Jeju nature (the production of nature).

Recent work by Cohen and Bakker (2014) is especially illuminating in this regard because it specifically describes the processes and outcomes in which scalar politics are rendered ecological using a concept called the “ecological-scalar fix.” The
eco-scalar fix is defined as “a process of rescaling and reorganizing externalities, or both, and thereby displacing conflicts and crises, often through the construction of (purportedly ‘natural’) ecological scales, which simultaneously depoliticize and repoliticize governance” (Cohen and Bakker 2014:5). Cohen and Bakker adopt the concept of the eco-scalar fix to a recent land use rescaling suggested by the provincial government of Alberta. Alberta implemented the Land Use Framework that rescaled administrative decision-making units to seven regions, aligning them to fit with 12 watersheds in the province. At the time, Alberta suffered from pollution, poor coordination among governmental agencies, and rapid population change related to uneven development among industries (manufacturing and oil extraction) and regions (central and northern). By deploying an ecological scale in rescaling the structure of the regions’ political economy, the provincial government discursively rendered the scalar shift to appear as an environmental innovation rather than as a response to social and environmental crises caused by the particular pattern of capitalist production. Rendering the problems of political economy as ecological was possible because nature “depoliticizes” the deeply political process of rescaling by obscuring politics within it.

Even though the rescaling was promoted as an environmental innovation, its outcomes turned out to be deeply political. Asymmetric power among water and land regulatory agencies resulted in prioritizing economy over the environment. Environmental degradation and uneven development were discursively reduced to be resolvable through the scalar shift, which was naturalized because a scale of political economy was aligned to a scale of ecology; and as a result, the state reterritorialized
Alberta through the eco-scalar fix. Based on the perspective to view scale and routes of capital mobility following Swyngedouw (2000), Cohen and Bakker argue that politics can be controlled by rendering them ecological through “the creation of ‘new’ and ‘natural’ governance scales designed to solve political or economic crises” (2014:15).

Cohen and Bakker’s (2014) eco-scalar fix resembles Smith’s (2008) thesis of the production of nature, in that nature (the “ideology of nature” to use Smith’s term) is used for resolving social and economic problems resulting from the capitalist mode of production. I discuss above that produced first nature is imagined as supplementing social deprivations caused by the capitalist mode of production, as described by Smith. Cohen and Bakker (2014) also demonstrate that the Alberta provincial government increased its political and economic control over its territory by aligning a scale of political economy to a scale of ecology. In this way, the provincial government also internalized ecological and social crises caused by capital accumulation. So Cohen and Bakker and Smith agree on the role of nature in obscuring crises caused by the capitalist mode of production.

However, the ontology of nature differs between Smith and Cohen and Bakker. For Smith nature is imagined, while for Cohen and Bakker nature is material based on ecology. Smith has little concern for ecology, and Cohen and Bakker show little interest in ideas embedded in water basins. Thus, nature in the former is representational, and nature in the latter is material, although clear demarcation cannot be made. Smith’s nature could be called “ideal nature” while that of Cohen and Bakker could be called “ecological nature.”
This difference provides the Jeju Olle Trail case with room to determine how scale and nature are coproduced when nature is defined by idea rather than being based on ecology. In the Cohen and Bakker (2014) research, scale provides a useful framework to understand spatial circulation of capital derived from ecology-emphasized nature. Considering the usefulness of scale as an analytical tool to examine capital mobility related to the production of “ecological nature,” the concept of scale could also contribute to revealing the capital mobility derived from the production of “ideal nature.” The coproduction of scale and nature and resultant capital mobility are by no means confined to ecology-emphasized nature. However, the scholarship interested in the coproduction of scale and nature mostly examines it with ecologies (Swyngedouw 1997), leaving the relationship between scale and ideologies of socially produced nature poorly understood. This chapter fills the void by applying the concept of scale to the production of first nature in a tourism project on Jeju Island.

This chapter incorporates history (lacking from the Cohen and Bakker piece) to better understand the complicated dynamics of political economic struggles resulting from rescaling the nature-based tourism on Jeju Island. Batterbury and Bebbington (1999) remind us that expanding temporal scales is useful in examining how human and environment interactions have evolved under a particular social context. Smith similarly

50 Scale is used in this chapter as a spatial boundary.
51 The trend of examining social nature based on material nature, like ecology, reflects the material and institutional turn in political ecology in the early 2000s from the focus on representational and cultural politics (environmental imaginaries) in determining access and control of nature. The first and second edition of Peet and Watts in 1996 and 2004 provides approximate timing of the turn.
emphasizes incorporating history in explaining the social process of nature production, saying, “…when this immediate appearance of nature is placed in historical context, the development of material landscape presents itself as a process of the production of nature” (2008:50).” Both political ecologists and Smith argue the significance of examining the history of resource uses.

Of course, a fragmented piece of history has its own merit. For example, Swyngedouw (2003) examined the processes in which the Spanish government reproduced state territory through a nationwide hydrological project during its modernization period (early 20th Century). The eco-scalar fix nicely fits this work because the Spanish government sought to resolve environmental (limited water resources) and social (decay of Imperialism and growing social tensions) crises through establishing scaled waterscape, facilitating hydraulic technocrats to gain power. The work is illuminating in that it demonstrates how the process of the coproduction of scale and nature consolidates power among national elites and hydrological technocrats on the ground in permanent ways.

 Nonetheless, a snapshot examination of resource uses at a single historical time segment might be incapable of capturing slowly and sporadically evolving human-environment interactions through the coproduction of scale and nature. Understanding the evolution of scale and nature is significant because it enables us to identify key factors in resource use by comparing different policy impacts on resources across different time periods. Batterbury and Bebbington note that a historical approach to

52 Hollander (2005) for example.
resource management brings the environment as an agent in economic development processes instead of being a mere byproduct of the processes (1999:284). Linking the environmental agency with history, many political ecologists have proved that historical analysis is a viable and fruitful approach to resource use when the environment is located at the center of examination (Hollander 2005, Robbins 2006). I argue that incorporating historical resource use and related uneven development into examining the eco-scalar fix enhances its potential as an analytical framework for environmental governance.

This chapter will contribute to the coproduction of scale and nature scholarship by following a longitudinal process of eco-scalar fix over time. It will achieve this by examining the eco-scalar fix of the Jeju Olle Trail determining the use of Jeju nature at one segment in a time period. It will then locate it historically to identify how the particular way of simultaneously producing scale and nature is different from another way of production in terms of resource use and resultant benefit distribution.

Environmental History and Tourism Incorporation

Exploitation from the Mainland: 12 CE to 19 CE

Jeju Island was an independent country called Tamna until 1105 CE, when the Koryo Dynasty (10 to 14 CE, located on today’s South Korean mainland) annexed it. Since then, nature on Jeju Island had been historically used for agriculture and fisheries production for Jeju residents and the central government on the mainland. The Koryo
and Chosun (14 to 19 CE) Dynasties on the mainland had harnessed the differences within the natural environments. Because the temperature of Jeju Island is higher than the mainland, the dynasties received special products, such as seafood and horses, through tax duties levied on Jeju residents. Other than receiving special products, people on the mainland (mainlanders hereafter) regarded Jeju Island as a remote, abandoned, and isolated place to send political exiles. While paying taxes to the mainland dynasties, Jeju residents struggled to survive on the island. The environment was harsh because volcanic ash soil stretched to agricultural land, and strong winds blew year-round. To combat the wind, Jeju farmers removed stones from barren agricultural fields mixed with basalt before and after planting crop seeds; they used the removed stones to build walls and fences around fields, houses, and fishing areas. The physical and location conditions of Jeju Island restricted islanders’ economic and political opportunities, which was already limited because of the island’s harsh natural environment. Meanwhile, mainlanders economically exploited Jeju Island’s nature and people by taking the fruits of the islanders’ work. The natural environment on Jeju Island was the only the source of special products and was at the same time the obstacle to their production.

**Genocide: The Jeju April 3 Incident, 1947 – 1954**

Jeju people’s feeling of marginalization relative to mainlanders was reinforced due to genocide, occurred from 1947 – 1954. After being decolonized by Japan in 1945, Korea became an ideological battle site between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Koreans were divided among followers of the respective ideologies. On April 3 1948, 350
communists on Jeju Island attacked police stations and the government sympathizers across Jeju Island. The attack was to resist the repression of the South Korean government. The troops sent from the mainland launched counterinsurgency operations that turned into the genocide on Jeju Island. Jeju people witnessed that the troops asked non-armed Jeju citizens if they knew particular suspected communists who lived nearby. Jeju villagers who were either hesitant in answering or said they did know communists were killed. The genocide that swept Jeju Island for eight years killed one tenth of the Jeju Island population in the 1950s. The uprisings and resulting massacre are called the Jeju 4.3 Incident (*sasam sakon* in Korean).

The Jeju 4.3 Incident has been largely ignored and forgotten in mainland South Korean society (Kim 2000:461). It was because the Conservative party had been dominant in the country since the government establishment after the Korean War (1950 – 1953). Thus, the anti-Communist ideology had been dominant in South Korea. In 2000, the President Kim Daejoong from the Democratic Party legislated a special law. The law aimed to investigate the Jeju 4.3 Incident and thereby recover impaired reputations of victims. Based on the investigation, in 2003, the South Korean President, Roh Moohyun, acknowledged state responsibility for the massive massacre and officially apologized to bereaved families and Jeju citizens.

53 The victim numbers significant differ among sources ranging from 15,000 to 65,000 (the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Incident: 364). The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incidents (NCITJA3I) assessed the number as 25,000 – 30,000 (The Report of the Jeju 4.3 Incident Truth Investigation: 367).

Due to experiences and memories about the brutal genocide committed by “outsiders,” Jeju people became afraid of speaking with strangers, particularly mainlanders. A Jeju mother wrote in a poem in the 1980s, “Son/just say that you don’t know/when a stranger asks about anything/just say that you don’t know.” The poetry shows how the trauma from the genocide was inscribed on Jeju people. Since the tragedy, Jeju Islanders have called mainlanders as “Yukjigut (a mainland thing),” turning extremely exclusive against mainlanders. Jeju villagers are still very cautious and reluctant to talk about themselves to mainlanders.

Within ten years of the genocide, Jeju people experienced ironic changes of their identity relative to mainlanders. The changes were caused by Jeju Island’s rapidly shifting socioeconomic conditions. The central government strategically incorporated tourism on Jeju Island since 1963. At this time, Jeju people predominantly depended on agriculture and fisheries for their livelihoods. Jeju Island later became the most-visited tourist destination in South Korea as mentioned above. Incorporating tourism on Jeju Island was ironic because Jeju people were put in a position to host mainlanders regardless of their feelings of isolation, inferiority, fear, and marginalization that were accumulated through history. It was ironic also because mainlanders were encouraged to enjoy Jeju Island as tourists after an historical period of natural and cultural destruction wrought by the mainland government. And the Jeju Olle Trail project continued and even strengthened the paradox, as the chapter will show.

The violent upheaval of the Jeju 4.3 Incident might have eased the central government’s tourism incorporation on Jeju Island. A record shows that the U.S. military
estimated at the early phase of counterinsurgency operations that 70% of the Jeju population was leftists (Hq. 6th inf Div, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 512, March 14, 1947 from NCITJA13: 120). In less than a decade after the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the central government of rightists selected Jeju Island as one of the very first regions for developmental program implementation. Counterinsurgency theories demonstrate that counterinsurgency operations often work for political control (Galua 2006; Hippler 2006). Relying on this thesis, the counterinsurgency operations during the Jeju 4.3 Incident indiscriminately cleared leftists, their families, and their sympathizers from Jeju Island and thereby could have contributed to the central government’s tourism incorporation on Jeju Island without much resistance.

The Developmental State–incorporated Tourism: 1960s to 2006

Developmental state–led industrialization

Beginning in the 1960s, the South Korean developmental state established and implemented regional development plans based on strong leadership of the central government. The developmental programs aimed to expedite industrialization and economic development of the country (Kim 1998:270). In order to effectively achieve this goal, the developmental state established industrial zones in the regions where existing regional specificities were expected to contribute to industrial development in the country. For example, the developmental state established the Gumi Export Industrial Zone under the Law for Facilitating Export Industrial Zone Development (1964) because the southern coastal city Gumi had a location advantage for export. The developmental
state, however, could deploy only limited resources to invest in regions across the country, so it focused investment only on three categories of region based on developmental potential: those with existing infrastructure; those with industrial potential for export; and those with rich natural resources, including Jeju Island. Through these strategies, the developmental state expected that growth would spread to neighboring regions (called the “growth pole strategy”55), even though the state had only limited resources.

The developmental state also actively deployed the private sector to compensate for the lack of financial resources for industrialization (Kim 2010). Samsung, Hyundai, and other corporations rapidly grew as they implemented industrialization projects with various privileges provided by the developmental state (i.e., tax exemption or regulation exceptions). The South Korean developmental state exercised strong leadership in selective regional development to facilitate national industrial development. In doing so, it harnessed resources from the private sector, resulting in capital accumulation for large corporations.

55 The growth pole strategy refers to a developmental strategy in which limited resources are invested on a specific area such that the developmental effect could spread to neighboring areas. States of developing countries typically employ the strategy in order to maximize effectiveness of limited resource use. Even though the growth pole strategy is known as an effective way of achieving rapid economic growth through a systematic and hierarchical approach, it is criticized for bringing about inequality among regions and for lacking diversities among regions after development.
Tourism incorporation on Jeju Island

The developmental state took the leadership position for regionally developing Jeju Island by strategically incorporating tourism in order to utilize its rich and unique natural resources. The initial goal of tourism incorporation was to contribute to national industrialization by earning foreign capital from tourists (Lee 1987:45). The developmental state was the explicit control tower of tourism development on Jeju Island: state agencies from the central government, such as the Ministry of Construction and the Blue House\textsuperscript{56} Tourism Development Board, made decisions about whether or not and how natural resources on Jeju Island were used for regional development and which strategies and infrastructure were used. The strong leadership of the developmental state in tourism development on Jeju Island continued through sequential developmental plans until the beginning of the 2000s.

The developmental state established sparsely distributed tourist destinations across Jeju Island. Seven locales with natural and cultural tourism assets\textsuperscript{57} were designated as tourism zones under the Jejudo Tourism Comprehensive Development Plan in the 1970s. These sparsely distributed tourism zones were collaboratively established by the public and private sector, although the developmental state took the leadership role. Upon designating the tourism zones, the developmental state established tourism infrastructure across the island to improve access to it, such as Jeju International Airport, ports for domestic and international ferries, and roads encircling and running

\textsuperscript{56} Equivalent to the US White House
\textsuperscript{57} Tourism zones included Jungmoon International, Jeju City, Seogwipo City, Mountainous, Marine, Cave, and Cultural.
through the island and tourism zones. After establishing tourism infrastructure emphasizing sparsely distributed tourism zones, the developmental state attracted the private sector to establish commercial tourist facilities, such as hotels and golf resorts.

### Table 4.1 Capital Investments for Establishing the Joongmoon Tourism Zone: 1978 – 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Development Initiative</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Capital Investment (USD)</th>
<th>Capital Investment (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Road, electricity and communication, water supply</td>
<td>3,775,579</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Tourism Corporation</td>
<td>Land acquisition, golf course and rest facilities</td>
<td>55,375,444</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Tourism marine village, botanic garden, tourism facilities including hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>173,905,800</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Revised from Korea Tourism Organization (2007:253)*

For example, in establishing the Joongmoon Tourism Zone\(^{58}\) located in Seogwipo City, state agencies\(^{59}\) (25.3% of total investment) established infrastructure such as roads and water supply systems to facilitate tourism development in the zone. Private capital (74.6% of total investment), on the other hand, built hotels and facilities to attract tourists to the zone (Table 4.1). In order to attract private capital investment, the developmental state provided investors with financial and administrative privileges such as tax exemptions or government loans from the Tourism Promotion and Development Fund.

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\(^{58}\) The most popular tourism zone on Jeju Island.  
\(^{59}\) Korea Tourism Corporation was a government agency in South Korea until the 1990s.
Differentiating roles of the public and private sectors in spatially establishing tourism zones aimed that private capital compensated for the limited financial capability of the developmental state. More importantly, private investment was expected to spread developmental effects from the tourism zones to surrounding regions. The idea, based on the growth pole strategy, was that tourist facilities established by the private sector would induce economic activities such as creating jobs, not only in the tourism zones but also in neighboring regions. The developmental effects would thus contribute to the larger regional economy of Jeju Island rather than being contained to the zones. Economic activities derived from the private sector also implied that capital was accumulated by running tourism business in the zones with financial and administrative privileges provided by the developmental state. In sum, sparsely distributed tourist destinations were collaboratively established by the developmental state and the private sector. The developmental state contributed to the private sector’s capital accumulation by setting up financial and administrative privileges and by establishing the infrastructure used for tourism development on Jeju Island.

The developmental state’s plans for tourism incorporation were well received by Jeju residents. Jeju Island had historically been on the margin of central government attention until the South Korean developmental state began tourism incorporation.

60 Regarding financing developmental funds, investment from the private sector significantly contributed to implementing developmental plans. For example, in implementing the new Jejudo Tourism Comprehensive Development Plan (1973 to 1981), the central government, the Jeju local government, and the private sector invested 48.5%, 4.4%, and 47.1% (respectively) of the total budget need for implementation (The Institute of National Territory Development 1983).
making the investment from the central government exceptional to Jeju residents. The Jeju governor at that time expressed his excitement in a newspaper article:

Jeju residents believed that the central government had ignored Jeju Island for thirteen years since the establishment of the South Korean government [after the Korean War, 1950 to 1953]. We are witnessing now that the revolutionary government is resolutely excavating numerous hidden secrets. Indeed, Jeju citizens are unprecedentedly watching the revolutionary government. The tourism industry will be the most important industry on Jeju Island along with fisheries (1962 October 16, Kyonghyang Newspaper)

Jeju residents welcomed the investment for regional development from the state. The investment was particularly meaningful to Jeju residents because the island had long been socially and politically marginalized compared to the mainland.

**Nature: from agriculture and fisheries to tourism**

Jeju Island reserves unique natural and cultural landscapes as it has been socially and geographically excluded from the mainland for centuries. In designating tourism zones, the developmental state emphasized the exoticness of Jeju nature and culture. A newspaper article described Jeju Island in this way:

Jeju Island is an island, known with three abundances: women, stones, and wind. And it is a particularly unique island as it is also known with three absences, which mean no beggars, no thieves, and no gates to houses wherever you go. [Jeju Island], isolated to the far South from the mainland, contains exotic natural and cultural characteristics, and thus looks unlike our country’s landscape. The mountaintop of the Halla Mountain covered with snow…looks like one from Switzerland…and large prairies remind us of a ranch in the Southern USA rather than Korea (1969 August 23, Daily Economy).

This excerpt was published in 1969 after the developmental state began tourism incorporation on Jeju Island (1964). It reflects the perspective that nature and culture on
Jeju Island were foreign to mainland tourists. Jeju natural landscapes were compared with western countries like Switzerland and the southern US, where a majority of South Korean citizens in the 1960s had never been. The cultural aspects of abundances and absences were also unfamiliar to mainlanders. Through this type of imagery, Jeju Island was marketed as exotic and unique to South Korean citizens. Once on the island, tourists stayed at hotels and resorts and enjoyed the natural and cultural exoticness in the sparsely distributed tourism zones, such as caves, traditional villages, and mountains.

However, the natural and cultural attractions on Jeju Island were exotic only for tourists and investors from the mainland. For Jeju people who had lived on the island for generations, the natural environment was mundane, part of everyday life. For example, removing numerous whinstones out of agricultural fields was purposeful, not exotic. Farmers used the removed stones for various purposes such as building fences (Figure 4.1A) and making grain grinders. On the other hand, whinstone was unique in shape and material for mainlanders. After collecting local stories about whinstone, mainland investors used it to promote tourist facilities (e.g., souvenirs or hotel-entrance statues; Figure 4.1B), thereby generating value from marketing something mundane as exotic. As such, Jeju nature began to be regarded as the source of capital because of its exoticness to mainland tourists and investors. For decades since the incorporation of tourism, Jeju people have felt relative deprivation in witnessing mainlanders turning nature into tourism resources\(^\text{61}\). Those living on Jeju Island for generations believe that

\(^{61}\) I define “resource” as material subjects that create value, resulting in capital accumulation among social groups.
Figure 4.1 Whinstones Used For Different Purposes (Jeju people vs. Mainland Capitals)

A. Fences On a Village Lane

* Whinstones: Jeju whinestones are porous stones made out of volcanic activities that formed Jeju Island. Whinstones are one of the three representative symbols (stones, wind, and women) of the uniqueness of Jeju nature and culture.

B. Jeju Tourism Symbol located in front of a Resort

* White arrows: fences and Jeju symbols built using Jeju whinestones

* Pictures were taken in Summer 2011
the created value from Jeju nature contributed to capital accumulation only for mainland investors because mainlanders own most hotels and tourists facilities on Jeju Island62. Despite this decades-long suspicion, the actual tourism leakage63 was estimated recently: Estimations show that 55% of Jeju tourism revenue (2005) and 62% of revenue from hotels (2010) were transferred out of Jeju Island (The Bank of Korea Jeju Branch 2014). I met many people on Jeju Island who talked about their anger or grief because of the tourism leakage. On a beautiful weekend, for example, I was waiting for my then four-year-old son at a local library, where he was enrolled in a reading camp. A woman approached me and initiated conversation. She was a farmer, also waiting for her daughter, and I asked how tourism on Jeju Island impacted her:

Honestly, there’s been nothing left for [Jeju people]. People from the mainland have very good eyes. They know how to make money—even out of stones rolling on the street here (1207-V158).

This demonstrates the feeling of deprivation among Jeju people. She implied that Jeju people have always known the whinstone to be there and considered it simply an obstacle to agricultural production or a material to overcome natural challenges. They used the stones based only on how their material characteristics could contribute to production and living. But mainland investors saw beyond mere extraction of nature for agriculture and fisheries; they marketed uniqueness and exoticness and achieved capital accumulation from Jeju nature. Witnessing this, Jeju people felt relative deprivation.

62 1990 October 14, Hankyorae  
63 Revenues from tourism businesses in a region are transferred to other regions rather than being circulated within the region of tourism to contribute to the region’s social and economic development.
The mainlanders’ capital accumulation from selling nature framed in a particular way, however, was insignificant compared to their capital accumulation from land speculation.

**Capital accumulation through land**

The private sector, mostly large corporations, began land speculation on Jeju Island as it participated in tourism development. Large corporations purchased land in and around tourism zones at low prices from Jeju farmers and Jeju local government agencies for establishing tourist facilities. For example, the Korean Tourism Organization forced 11 *Joongmoon* households (whose residents lived there long before establishment of the tourism zone) to sell their land at 10,000 KRW/m$^2$. Several years after the transfer of ownership, the land price soared to 28,000 KRW/m$^2$, at which point (1988) the Korean Tourism Organization sold 13,265 m$^2$ to Korean Condominium Ltd. at less than a half the property value in order to encourage private capital investment on the land.

Similarly, a coastal village farmer witnessed his neighbor selling land at a very low price because, being mixed with sand, the soil was almost useless to farmers. Soon after large corporations bought this type of land for its scenic beauty, the central government constructed roads or tourist destinations nearby. Property values then soared by tens and hundreds times in several years because coastal hotels and restaurants were

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64 1974 July 13, *Kyonghayong Newspaper*
65 1991 November 11, *Dong-A Daily*
66 1990 November 8, *Kyonghyang Newspaper*
built as the accessibility of the remote regions improved. Less than half of purchased lands were reportedly used for tourism development while the other half were left idle. Whether corporations established tourism facilities or not on the purchased lands, property values continued to increase as Jeju Island gained a reputation as one of the most visited tourist destinations in the country.

The property value increase due to tourism development demonstrates that large corporations in the private sector achieved capital accumulation as a result of being involved in tourism development on Jeju Island. The developmental state provided information about areas included in developmental plans in order to encourage private capital investment. Large corporations purchased land from farmers and state agencies. As the developmental state improved infrastructure around the land, property values rapidly increased, and large corporations achieved significant capital accumulation.

Witnessing property value increase on Jeju Island, individual investors began to participate in intensive land speculation, culminating in late 1980s. Because property values increased when road or industrial zones were established nearby, property brokers strived to have information about city and county plans in advance of plan

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67 1983 February 5, Dong-A Daily
68 The central government attempted to regulate large corporations’ land speculation. The Ministry of Transportation ordered large corporations to resell the purchased lands not yet used for tourist facilities to the farmers who previously owned the lands (1976 November 6 and 8, Kyonghayng Newspaper). In order to avoid government regulation on land speculation, purchased lands were often under the ownership of wives and children of capitalists. For example, 18 of 28 forest areas over 50,000 pyong (3.3 m²), which had changed landownership while tourism was incorporated on Jeju Island, was owned by a woman (1973 August 29, Kyonghyang Newspaper).
69 The number of tourists on Jeju Island had increased by 10% annually since 1976 when Jeju Island had been completing tourism development through sequential plans (1993 June 16, Dong-A Daily).
implementation\textsuperscript{70}. They illegally bought the information from architecture companies or government officials involved in planning processes before plans became public and attracted individual capitalists to invest for land speculation\textsuperscript{71}. Jeju residents witnessed land prices rapidly increase while outside investors were continuously involved in land speculation. Since property trades were made only among brokers and investors, Jeju local residents often were ignorant about who bought properties and for how much. By the late 1980s, more than 19\% of privately owned land was owned by mainlanders, either by large corporations or by Seoul-based elites such as doctors, judges, and highly positioned government officials\textsuperscript{72}.

While investors from the mainland purchased lands on Jeju Island based on future developmental plans, Jeju farmers sold their generation-owned lands without knowledge of the developmental plans. A leader of a village located close to one of the most popular tourism zones said, “The majority of village lands were sold to mainlanders. My father’s generation thoughtlessly sold it because they were ignorant then.” A woman diver at a coastal village offered me a similar story:

You know the guy called **? He worked for the KBS [the largest broadcasting company in South Korea]. He might have been in a position to know about the sites targeted for development, so he bought the land along the coast here for almost nothing, and soon sold it for a half-million KRW. He then bought the land in Jeju City where the ** sauna is today. Yes, he’s made good money through land here, not like us (I100-V63).
These stories from Jeju rural villages demonstrate that Jeju people recognize the financial opportunity missed by their previous generation because they were not aware of future development plans. They regard that mainland investors had the information about development plans and were crafty enough to use it for capital accumulation. As a result, Jeju residents feel relative deprivation and anger.

**Local resistance for a local citizen–initiated development plan**

Jeju residents began to strongly resist the central government\(^3\)–led regional development as a result of the accumulated dissatisfaction over the distribution of benefits from tourism development on Jeju Island. In 1991, local NGOs and the provincial government of Jeju Island conflicted over the *Jejudo* Development Special Law\(^4\). The central government attempted to legislate it to further develop tourism based on the provincial government–established developmental plans. Proponents of the law argued that the plan should be implemented because the Jeju provincial government established it. They assumed that the Jeju provincial government was in a better position than the central government to resolve uneven benefit distribution (mostly from property values) revealed through previous development plans. On the other hand, Jeju local

\(^3\) I differentiate the central state from the developmental state, even though both terms refer to the South Korean central state. I differentiate the terms because the central government was no longer called the developmental state once the rapid economic growth of the country ceased by the late 1980s. Moreover, South Korea adopted decentralization in the mid-1990s, so the power of the central government in the national political economy relatively decreased compared to its power during the rapid economic growth period (mid-1960s to late 1980s). I call it the central state since the 1990s because the developmental state is a term specifically referring to the government leading the rapid economic growth of South Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s.


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NGOs argued that the plan focused only on tourism and ignored agriculture and fisheries, which about half of Jeju residents relied on. They went on that the tourism-centered regional development destroyed the natural environment of Jeju Island, threatening the livelihood of local people and benefitting only large corporations and individual capital investors from the mainland as the values of acquired properties rapidly increased. Jeju local NGOs distrusted the Jeju governor to turn benefits to Jeju residents. The Jeju governor, who was given most discretion in the *Jejudo* Comprehensive Development Plan, was appointed by the central government. Local NGOs regarded that the Jeju governor would represent the interests of the central government and mainland investors instead of Jeju residents. They argued that discarding the established plan and creating a new one was essential for achieving regional development reflecting Jeju residents’ aspirations and benefits.

Even though the point of contestation was with the provincial governor’s intention for benefitting Jeju residents, actual ownership of the properties included in the *Jejudo* Comprehensive Development Plan emerged as the key evidence to resolving the debate. Jeju local NGOs requested that the provincial government disclose land ownership information of the targeted development site to examine how benefits would be distributed from the plan. The provincial government refused because of private property protection and for fear of discouraging private capital investment on Jeju Island. Jeju local NGOs then investigated on their own the ownership of the properties included in the development plan. They found that about 100 mainlanders owned 100%,

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75 1993 April 23, *Hankyorae*
57.6%, and 63% of the three developmental zones designated for development\textsuperscript{76}. Moreover, they found that some mainlanders had bought the land while the Jejudo Comprehensive Developmental Plan was being established\textsuperscript{77}, lands on which further residential or commercial development was possible\textsuperscript{78}. The rest of the land, that owned by Jeju residents, was designated a green zone, reserving natural amenities for surrounding residential or commercial zones. This spatial distribution implied that land owned by Jeju residents provided natural scenic beauty for the developed properties of the mainlanders. Jeju landowners expected to be excluded from the benefits of property value increase because their increase would be limited compared with the mainlander-owned lands. This exclusion was enabled by state zoning because Jeju resident land was designated green, meaning the source of benefits instead of their destination.

The central government decided to drastically revise the Jejudo Development Special Law. Because of strong resistance from Jeju residents, the beginning of Article 1 in the section outlining the law’s purpose changed from, “In order to establish Jeju

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Category} & \textbf{Zone} \\
\hline
Urban & Residential \\
& Commercial \\
& Industrial \\
& Green \\
Managerial & Conservational \\
& Production-related \\
& Planning \\
Agricultural & Agricultural \\
Natural & Environmental conservation \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{76} 1993 May 4, \textit{Dong-A Daily}
\textsuperscript{77} 1993 May 1, \textit{Hankyoreh}
\textsuperscript{78} Land Zoning Categories (\textit{Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport})
Island and surrounding areas as the world-class tourist destination through the Jejudo Comprehensive Development Plan, and to improve residents’ living conditions…” to “Regarding establishment and implementation of the Jejudo Comprehensive Development Plan through Jeju residents’ initiative toward improving residents’ welfare…” The revised Jejudo Development Special Law emphasized Jeju residents’ participation in establishing and implementing developmental plans to resolve uneven distribution of benefits and to mitigate environmental destruction because of tourism development.

The processes in which tourism was incorporated on Jeju Island for regional development and industrialization had the following outcomes and implications. First, capital was accumulated from “rediscovered” Jeju nature. Before tourism incorporation, Jeju nature was considered a burden and limitation by Jeju people and was only economically exploited by mainlanders through taxes and natural products such as seafood and cattle. Mainlanders typically avoided visiting the isolated island because it was regarded to have a lower quality of life due to remoteness and consequent cultural and social lags compared with major cities. Jeju nature then turned into a tourism resource through the developmental state’s tourism incorporation on Jeju Island.

Tourism incorporation provided an opportunity for mainland investors to view Jeju nature beyond agriculture and fisheries. They made use of the scenic beauty and exotic flora and fauna (a mainlander-specific perspective) to attract people to the tourist facilities they ran. Framing Jeju nature in this way—in a way that Jeju residents did not participate in—resulted in excluding them from benefitting from their own nature.
Second, the developmental state–led tourism established the industry to continuously transfer significant benefits outside the region for decades after tourism incorporation. As examined above, the developmental state supported mainlanders’ capital accumulation by providing infrastructure and various financial and administrative incentives in order to attract their investment to Jeju Island. Infrastructure and facilities were established by the state, but the private sector mostly owned the facilities generating capital from tourism. Tourism revenue was accumulated and transferred to mainland investors instead of being circulated on Jeju Island for social and economic development of the region. This tourism leakage has been a chronic problem in the Jeju tourism industry since the beginning.

Third, structural and pervasive corruption related to land speculation expanded capital accumulation for mainland investors. Since the incorporation of tourism, Jeju residents were excluded from shared information about future developmental plans because they were in the position to sell land at low prices. Also, they lacked capital to participate in land speculation compared to mainland investors because Jeju Island was historically one of the least developed regions in the country.

Fourth, about three decades after tourism incorporation on Jeju Island, Jeju regional developmental plans were contested on the basis of “development” and “just distribution of benefits.” Jeju residents first welcomed regional developmental plans because they expected to achieve social and economic development as Jeju Island received capital investment from the central government. However, they found after a couple of decades that Jeju nature and lands only benefitted investors outside the island.
Jeju residents therefore resisted the government-led developmental plans and claimed to participate in establishing and implementing plans in order to enjoy benefits derived from nature and culture on Jeju Island.

As a result of these configurations of political economy, the developmental state’s tourism incorporation extended the historical relationship between the mainland and Jeju Island. Mainlanders continued to exploit Jeju nature and people, even though the forms and mechanisms of consuming nature changed.

**Eco-Scalar Fix: The Jeju Olle Trail**

Tourism has maintained its status as one of the main elements of Jeju Island’s regional economy since the central government’s incorporation. The tourism industry leaped in the late 2000s (tourism made up for 27% of gross regional domestic product in 1994 and 32.8% in 2010, JSSGP⁷⁹) through the momentum of the Jeju Olle Trail ecotourism project.

**Rediscovered Nature through a Scalar Shift**

*Scale: from intermittent locales to a line*

In the process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, a non-state actor framed Jeju nature for tourism development instead of the developmental state. Before the trail was

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⁷⁹ Annual Statistics from the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (http://www.jeju.go.kr); Percentage of the Product from tourism out of the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP).
in the late 2000s, the central state had planned and implemented tourism development programs for almost 50 years. However, an NGO (the Jeju Olle Foundation) initiated and built the Jeju Olle Trail. Moreover, the Jeju Olle Foundation
emphasized that its initiator was a person from and familiar with Jeju Island. With Jeju Island being the home of the founder, trail establishment was regarded as a local initiative of tourism development, which set the Jeju Olle Trail apart from previous tourism development projects initiated by state actors.

Spatial distribution of tourism development also differed between the Jeju Olle Foundation and the developmental state. The former established tourist destinations with spatial discontinuity (intermittent tourism zones) while the latter did it with continuity. The yellow circles on Figure 4.3 show intermittent tourist destinations, which have been expanded from the tourist zones established by the developmental state. The roads represented as lines on Figure 4.3 connect the intermittent locales. The island-encircling roads were established in order for driving tourists to enjoy sea views along the coast. The roads crossing through and around Mt. Halla, located in the middle of the island, were established to shorten tourists’ travel distance from Jeju International Airport to tourism zones and coastlines at Seogwipo City. Hotels and resorts were also established at intermittent locales along coastlines and on mountainous areas with scenic beauty.

Unlike the intermittent locales, the Jeju Olle Foundation designed the Jeju Olle Trail for tourists to walk along and enjoy unexplored nature and culture on Jeju Island (line encircling Jeju Island on Figure 4.2). The foundation strived to find representative locales with scenic beauty, mostly along the coast, and linked the locales to complete a trail line (Figure 4.2). The Jeju Olle Foundation describes the spatial distribution of the trail and its efforts to complete it on its webpage:

[The Jeju Olle Foundation] linked disconnected roads, found forgotten lanes, and called disappeared lanes. The roads and lanes became the Jeju Olle Trail. While
driving a car is a tourism that *sparse points* on [tourist destinations], the Jeju Olle Trail is a tourism that *links the spots through a long line*. [Tourists] will discover the inner skin of Jeju when they walk the Jeju Olle Trail. They could not see [the inner skin of Jeju] when they hurriedly left [the island] after driving *among sparse spots* ([http://www.jejuolle.org](http://www.jejuolle.org)).

The Jeju Olle Foundation claimed that the spatial distribution shift from discontinuity to continuity (what they called “from the point-type to a line-type”) changed the tourism paradigm on Jeju Island and further across South Korea. By particularly contrasting continuity with discontinuity, the Jeju Olle Foundation implied that Jeju Olle Trail tourism differed from that developed by the state. In other words, changing the distribution of tourist destinations was a spatial expression of Jeju Olle Foundation resistance against the developmental state.

The Jeju Olle Foundation further claimed that the change in spatial distribution shifted and expanded the scope in which Jeju residents economically benefited from tourism development. The developmental state established the political economy structure of the Jeju tourism industry to benefit mostly mainlanders and some involved Jeju residents. The state’s distribution of tourist spots was sparse, and tourists didn’t venture from them, meaning money was spent only where the state had set up locales. On the other hand, the spatial distribution of the trail actually caused people to expand their visits and spending to locales in more rural villages, like snack shops, restaurants, and lodges. The Jeju Olle Trail also shifted tourist behavior from driving to slowly walking, further encouraging spending along the trail. In order to ensure benefits for rural villagers, the Jeju Olle Foundation made sure to locate beginning and ending points of the trail on rural villages. This spatial change of tourist destinations and subsequent
capital circulation on Jeju Island was called the “revitalization of regional economy’s capillary,” meaning smaller economies in rural villages benefit from tourist spending.

Healing through nature

In establishing the Jeju Olle Trail as a continuous and collective tourist destination, the Jeju Olle Foundation defined its role for environmental conservation along the trail line, criticizing the state’s environmental destruction in the process of tourism development. Before the trail was established, nature beyond the state-designated tourism zones could be transformed in any way to improve access to tourist destinations (e.g., building roads and tourist facilities). The Jeju Olle Foundation strongly criticized construction-driven tourism development for having destroyed forests and natural coastlines on Jeju Island. The foundation leader called construction companies, committee members favorable to construction, and government employees the “triangle of construction mafia” (Seo 2010:244). She also called Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP) the “Construction Special Self-Governing Province,” saying that it reminded her of a “ceaselessly dashing terminator” (*Ibid.*:246-247), referring to the heartless, evil, inextinguishable film character. She lamented that the terminator was continuously covering Jeju Island with concrete at a “crazy speed” (*Ibid.*:252). The leader also wrote about her experience of the terminator during the establishment of Route 7: near completion of the route, she saw on it several red flags

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80 An Education Team Leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation at a lecture to introduce the Jeju Olle Trail to trainees of the 14th Intensive Course (November 17 2013).
along the coastline, meaning JSSGP was about to begin building a road there. She wrote the following response:

…what the hell; a road on this quiet beach, which is interrupted by coastal cliffs? Isn’t this too much?...We are fighting against the Spanish Armada and there is no way for us to win (Ibid:250).

She went on to say that the places not yet reached by development dirt were buried under heavy equipment such as “a couple dozen dump trucks (Ibid.: 247).” The writings of the foundation leader well demonstrate that the Jeju Olle Foundation blamed the developmental state for environmental destruction (Seo 2010). They also show that the leader took seriously how the developmental state had impacted Jeju nature.

From the Jeju Olle Foundation perspective, Jeju nature along the Jeju Olle Trail was seen as undestroyed by the state’s tourism development on Jeju Island. The foundation established imagery to connect unexplored natural and cultural attractions of Jeju Island, such as locales with scenic beauty beyond the existing tourist destinations and old lanes historically used by rural villagers. The quote above has new emphasis from this perspective:

[The Jeju Olle Foundation] linked disconnected roads, found forgotten lanes and disappeared lanes. The roads and lanes became the Jeju Olle Trail. While driving a car is a tourism that sparsely points on [tourist destinations], the Jeju Olle Trail is a tourism project that links the spots through a long line. [Tourists] will discover the inner skin of Jeju when they walk the Jeju Olle Trail. They could not see [the inner skin of Jeju] when they hurriedly left [the island] after driving among sparse spots (http://www.jejuolle.org).

The Jeju Olle Foundation suggested that the developmental state built roads disconnectedly, fragmenting the wholeness of Jeju nature. The roads also disconnected
people and nature, which used to be linked via lanes. Through the lanes, village women used to visit neighbors, village boys used to feed cows, and village kids used to plunge into the sea to play. These lanes were forgotten and disappeared as the developmental state built roads everywhere. Losing the lanes meant losing the link between people and nature and the opportunity to enjoy the authentic nature of Jeju Island. “The inner skin of Jeju” suggests that the Jeju Olle Trail demonstrates Jeju nature and culture beyond the typical images of Jeju Island. Describing the Jeju Olle Trail locales as unexplored and unknown by tourists implies that the Jeju Olle Foundation was not targeting tourism development and that nature and culture remained undestroyed.

The Jeju Olle Foundation also claimed its efforts to minimize impacts of tourism development on Jeju nature. For example, the foundation adopted Environmentally-Friendly Guidelines for Trailblazing and Maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail (Annex 2), which outline specific ways for the trail to avoid environmental impact, such as using only shovels rather than heavy equipment in leveling (Seo 2010:18). Through this document, the foundation indirectly criticized the ways in which state agencies developed tourism on Jeju Island. By contrasting heavy equipment (bad) with shovels (good), the Jeju Olle Foundation emphasized its guardian role of Jeju nature.

Emphasizing the naturalness of the Jeju Olle Trail separate from state influence redefined what Jeju nature was expected to offer tourists. For several decades before the

81 The description is based on the foundation leader’s book (Seo 2008; 2010).
82 2009 March 19, dongA.com
83 See Annex 2 for details about the Jeju Olle Foundation’s Environmentally-Friendly Guidelines for Trailblazing and Maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail.
Jeju Olle Trail was established, tourists consumed Jeju nature framed as exotic by the developmental state through images like tropical trees along the beach and whinstone statues. The Jeju Olle Foundation emphasized instead the mental healing of urban residents within Jeju nature. In an interview, the founder said the trail’s success was because:

The South Korean society was too tired rather than the foundation did something to be praised. Isn’t it a ‘Fatigue Society’? We would not want to admit it, but we are pressured to live upon excessive competitiveness, standardization, and the gaze from others. The South Korean society successfully achieved rapid economic growth; yet, the mentality to respect diversity has not developed commensurate with it…On the Jeju Olle Trail, we could walk only on our own pace. No one is being chased by others or a crazy schedule. We then had a feeling that we had lost for a while. Nature soothes us…The Jeju Olle Trail is a trail of healing in a sense that it provides the energy of healing based on Jeju nature (2012 October 29, Hankyorae).

The foundation leader diagnosed South Korean citizens with lost generosity toward others and selves because of single-minded pursuit of economic growth. She suggested that urban residents pause for a while to breathe and look around. She urged them to realize their tiredness in living amid intense competition, pointing out that fatigue is unnecessary, considering that South Koreans were presumably less tired—even never tired—when they lived slower lives before state-led developmental programs.

Competition has gained intensity day by day since the rapid economic growth began, so the leader suggested that urban residents restore something lost by leaving urban settings and walking along the trail. Jeju nature (and the Jeju Olle Trail) was advertised as being

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84 A book titled Fatigue Society became popular among the South Korean public in 2012. A German-based philosopher argues that today’s individuals are extremely weary in the process of self-exploitation. The author argues that capitalist social structure caused the self-exploitation.

able to reorient tourists tired of busy urban lives, to rescue wrecked urban residents, because it was untouched by the developmental state, the “terminator” of beautiful nature and peacefulness and slowness of life.

The discourse regarding Jeju nature illuminates one of the ways in which South Koreans perceive society, nature, and the relationship between them. Even though South Korean society achieved rapid economic growth, South Koreans lost nature and intimacy with others in the process. And nature along the Jeju Olle Trail offered compensation for this social deprivation. Nature along the Jeju Olle Trail is pure, having the capability for mental healing of urban residents because it is beyond the impacts of rapid economic growth. The developmental state caused the social deprivation, and the Jeju Olle Foundation restored the purity and wholeness of Jeju nature and people in it through the Jeju Olle Trail.

The discourse was highly influential among urban residents. Tourists visited the trail expecting to access unmodified Jeju nature through the trail line:

I wanted to reflect on what’s going on around me. Everything up there was so fast that I couldn’t focus” (I24-T3).

“I just wanted to take some rest from work. My friend suggested me to visit [the Jeju Olle Trail] saying that Jeju nature would work for me” (I25-T4).

One college student visited the Jeju Olle Trail because his mother suggested that he reflect on his tendency to emphasize only outcomes, ignoring the importance of processes. Another college student wanted to “pause” and consider “what kind of teacher” he wanted to be through walking in Jeju nature:
Having a chance to think deeply here [on the trail], I think I am getting what my 

mom wanted me to realize. I guess nature here helped me *focus*” (I12-T2).

I read the book of the founder Seo Myongsuk. I’m graduating from a college of 
education soon. I wanted to pause for a while and wanted to think in Jeju nature 

about what kind of teacher I would want to be” (I32-T7).

Like these two, some tourists expected to experience self-reflection in Jeju nature 

untouched by modernization. And some tourists sought companionship, wanting to find 
other “good people” in a place where “no one would be bad”:

We all are good people here. No one would be bad when they want to walk along 
this beautiful nature” (I5-T1).

What’s this noise on [the Jeju Olle Trail]?” (A woman in her 40s when a trainee 
of the Jeju Olle Academy complained about schedule delay to a Jeju Olle 
Foundation employee on Route 8).

As the quotes show, tourists visit the Jeju Olle Trail imagining Jeju nature. The 

wholeness of Jeju nature along the trail is imagined to contribute to healing the weary 

mentality of the urban middle class. Tourists expect that the trail will enable them to 

focus on self-reflection while walking without being interrupted from other tourists or 

noise, like hectic urban lives.

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86 The urban middle class is defined as the main socioeconomic and demographic group of 
tourists determined by the MCST (2010:105). Details are discussed in Chapter 5.
Migration to Jeju Island

As Jeju nature was “rediscovered” through the Jeju Olle Trail and thus gained popularity across the country, the mainland urban middle class increasingly migrated to Jeju Island looking for alternative ways of life. Migrants aspired to live and educate their children close to Jeju nature, which Jeju Olle Trail tourists had experienced and spread through personal blogs and other media.

Figure 4.4 Population of Jeju City and Seogwipo City: 1985 – 2010

![Population Graph]

Source: Korean Statistical Information Service b.

By the time the Jeju Olle Trail became popular, Seogwipo City had experienced a decreasing population and dwindling regional economy, unlike Jeju City (Figure 4.4). The tourism change boosted the population on Jeju Island, along with the advent of Low

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87 The Director of the Jeju Olle Foundation used the term “rediscovered” when she explained what the Jeju Olle Trail had achieved.
Cost Carriers influencing the popularity of Jeju nature (discussed in Chapter 5) and a celebrity singer’s migration to the island\textsuperscript{88}.

JSSGP state agencies implemented policies to increase the rural population on Jeju Island in a way to revitalize the regional economy. Policies included providing funds for purchasing farming houses and fields with a 2\% interest rate; providing information for settling down in Jeju rural villages; and financial support for children’s education, farming equipment purchase, and pensions. The Jeju Olle Foundation leader also explicitly encouraged migration. In a chapter from her book titled “Why don’t you migrate to Tamna\textsuperscript{89}?,” the leader discusses opinions of Jeju migrants she had met (Seo 2008: 342-344), an artist and a white-collar middle class man from the mainland. They gave up well-established jobs and social relations and came to Jeju Island because they were tired of their hectic lives on the mainland. They described Jeju Island as a “paradise” (Seo 2008: 342). The artist continued his work based on Jeju nature while offering free art lessons to local children. The white-collar man ran a tourist accommodation along the coastline near Route 7. The leader wrote that she decided to move to Jeju Island after meeting these migrants, with advantages including the following:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item A South Korean celebrity migrated to a Jeju rural village. The singer was very popular and influential among younger generations through her songs, entertainment, and later social media. Images from her everyday life were often disclosed through media and social media, causing the younger urban middle class to migrate to Jeju Island for a lifestyle change to enjoy the bucolic life.
\item The name of the independent ancient dynasty of Jeju Island before it was annexed to the mainland in 12 CE.
\end{itemize}
Housing costs are one tenth of Seoul’s, and fresh food is everywhere…a coastal trail is a free outdoor gym where you can enjoy the best landscape while doing weight training and walking. Hospitals, culture centers, health centers, and libraries can be reached within 10 to 20 minutes (Ibid.: 343).

She ends the chapter by suggesting:

Why don’t you migrate to Tamna? Why don’t you change your residence to heaven while you are still alive? (Ibid.: 344).

As the imagery of Jeju nature shifted from exotic and unique to unexplored and healing, migration to Jeju Island rapidly increased (Figure 4.5), reinforced by state policies and celebrity migration. State agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation leader aimed to increase the island’s population, particularly that of Seogwipo City, to boost the dwindling regional economy.

**Figure 4.5 Number of Migration to Rural Areas, Jeju Island: 2008 – 2013**

![Graph showing the number of migration to rural areas, Jeju Island, from 2008 to 2013.](image)

*Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (2014:17)*
Capital Flow Reconfiguration

From Excitement to Disappointment

As the Jeju Olle Trail gained rapid popularity across the country, tourists rushed to Jeju Island to experience mental healing from Jeju nature, which was expected to revitalize the dwindling tourism industry of Jeju Island. The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism estimated the production inducement effect caused by the Jeju Olle Trail: the number of tourists would increase from 460,000 in 2010 to 1.7 million in 2015, and each tourist would bring 550,000 KRW (540 USD) to the economy (MCST 2010: 135-139). This trend was expected to continue growing.

In an attempt to secure villager benefit from tourist spending, the Jeju Olle Foundation encouraged rural villagers to open local lodges and restaurants, keeping them modest. When the trail was first established, the leader visited a lodge run by a grandmother, who was worried that her house was too small and unadorned to host tourists. The foundation leader told her that, actually, the simpler the better in attracting tourists. Her ideals on this matter are revealed in her writing:

… we need to approach like Olle. Like Olle? In a nutshell, ‘as naturally as possible.’ Just as we did not construct the Jeju Olle Trail [through concrete and heavy equipment], we might as well leave houses untouched. Urban residents, tired of asphalt and commercial signs, had a crush on the Jeju Olle Trail that Jeju nature was left unrefined. If we open local lodges with Jeju people’s modest life styles as they are, tourists would feel much more comfortable… I witnessed favorable reactions among tourists about the Jeju Olle Trail, so I was certain that the authenticity of Jeju Island is the factor to attract tourists. (Seo 2010:213)

90 The grandmother’s daughter (I113-V75) offered the story in August 2013.
The Jeju Olle Foundation leader applied the principle of naturalness to tourist businesses, believing that the plain authenticity of Jeju nature attracted tourists to the Jeju Olle Trail because they made them more comfortable, prompting memories about what they have lost since childhood and what they lack in their urban lives. To leave facilities unrefined and unprocessed, the Jeju Olle Foundation, in collaboration with Seogwipo City, only provided local lodges with new wallpaper, beddings, and curtains, which maintained old and traditional forms of houses.

Rural villagers welcomed the Jeju Olle Trail going through their villages due to expected economic benefits. For example, village snack shop “S” became a popular place to go through mentions on tourist blogs as it was designated the ending point of Route 7. And with the rush of tourists, village residents living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail witnessed that local lodges were fully booked and began to open new businesses to benefit from the influx of tourists. Additional income was generated for the Jeju rural people who were mostly farmers and fishers. For example, before Route 1 began from Shihungli, there were no local lodges. The addition of the trail to the village caused seven village households to open lodges. In 2009, a rush of tourists came because a popular television program was filmed on the Jeju Olle Trail. Some village households renovated or built rooms in farming houses for tourist lodging. These lodges attracted tourists through low prices for accommodation and through sincere services. Tourists could stay one night with 15,000 KRW (14 USD). Lodge owners also served quality, local-style meals at very low prices. A Shihungli lodge owner said that he sometimes even took tourists to local karaoke to entertain them. With full lodges, owners sometimes
asked their neighbors to host tourists. Local business owners went well out of their way to attract Jeju Olle Trail tourists and enjoyed the additional income.

The capital from tourists directed toward rural villages was enlarged by developmental funds from state agencies. Acknowledging the potential of the Jeju Olle Trail to boost the regional economy, JSSGP state agencies collaborated with the Jeju Olle Foundation to facilitate regional development through the Jeju Olle Trail. More specifically, they provided developmental funds for programs designed and implemented by the Jeju Olle Foundation (Annex 1). Rural villagers enjoyed the incoming capital from these funds as well as from tourist spending.

The tourist rush had ceased by the time I first visited in summer 2011. Some villagers explained it as a result of the foot-and-mouth disease that caused several routes to be temporarily closed. Others said that most tourists who wanted to walk along the trail had walked the trail at least once since it gained popularity in early 2010. I continued visiting the village during summer 2012 and the whole of 2013, during which time business at the lodges only worsened. For example, a Village Women Association representative spent 20 million KRW (18,000 USD) to renovate a small building of her house to open a lodge, expecting to generate additional income as her neighbors had. However, by the time the lodge was ready for tourists, visits had declined. She had only hosted about 20 guests since opening the business several months before.

In addition to local lodges, village snack shops also experienced decreasing sales, even those that existed before the Jeju Olle Trail was established. The Village Women Association representative also initiated a snack shop on the trail, beginning with 15
village investors and ending as the only investor. The other investors left bearing losses as the business became worse. Tourists’ tendency to spend little during their journey on the trail hit the snack shop businesses the worst. I found that six of seven village snack shops in the research site were inactive: two were closed (including the one run by the representative); and four failed to attract any tourist spending from my view \(^{91}\) (I only saw tourists taking rests on benches located in front of the snack shops while drinking water and sometimes having snacks that they had in their backpacks). Jeju residents complained about this behavior:

[Olle tourists] are *penny-pinchers*. They never spend money here. They buy snack and water from big marts in the city and come here just to walk” (I40-V19).

These people [tourists] come to the island with snacks and drinks ready. They don’t spend money here” (I108-V71).

The term “penny-pincher” demonstrates Jeju residents’ disappointment with tourists’ spending \(^{92}^{93}\). Jeju residents expected tourists to spend generously in rural villages along the Jeju Olle Trail, but it turned out that tourists were thrifty enough to bring their own drinks and snacks to the trail. Tourists had a tendency to spend less while they walked along the trail partly because of the ways in which Jeju nature and villages along the trail were imagined. The Jeju Olle Foundation had discursively established an ideal of Jeju nature and rural villages as remote and untouched by development endeavors, so tourists

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\(^{91}\) The 7\(^{th}\) snack shop was an exception in terms of worsening businesses among village snack shops. The shop became popular as Route 7 ended there. The Jeju Olle Foundation always took the shop as an example of the Jeju Olle Trail’s benefit to the regional economy.  
\(^{92}\) Many interviewees expressed this impression about tourists.  
\(^{93}\) The Jeju Olle Foundation has always emphasized a travel pattern that brings minimal impacts to the environment.
expected that they would not be able to find places to buy drinks or snacks on the trail. A previous village leader was disgruntled to report, “[Tourists] expect that there’s nothing on the trail. That’s why they prepare everything before they begin to walk.” And without tourists’ spending money on the trail, Jeju residents could not economically benefit:

I can’t say how much [Olle tourists] contribute to my business here. It’s so little that almost impossible for me to count” (I52-V26).

I may have to close this snack shop and the lodge that I run in the village (I108-V71).

The discrepancy between Jeju residents’ expectations about tourist spending and tourists’ actual spending resulted in disappointment among Jeju residents and posed threats to the businesses expecting to generate additional income. Another factor that Jeju rural villagers believed to contribute to the loss of their “good time” was the decreasing number of tourists visiting villages:

Good time’s gone now (I86-V55)

Tourists are not coming to the village anyway. About a year ago, they made a line to walk the Jeju Olle Trail. I don’t know where all tourists have gone. Maybe the days of the [Jeju Olle Trail] ended (I108-V71).

**Shifted Capital Accumulation**

While Jeju rural villagers believed that the number of tourists decreased, it actually at least maintained through 2013 during the fieldwork (Figure 4.6). In this section, I will explain the changing flows of tourists.
Tourists from the mainland urban middle class were enthusiastic about staying at local lodges and eating at local restaurants when the Jeju Olle Trail first became popular. After that, though, they began to choose guesthouses and cafés located along the Jeju Olle Trail over local accommodations. These new forms of tourist accommodations on Jeju Island were the alternatives for making a living among migrants from the mainland. Since most migrants left their jobs from the mainland, they strived to find ways of making a living. A JSSGP official estimated about 30% of the rapidly increasing

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94 Jeju migrants in general chose natural and cultural amenities of Jeju Island over economic prosperity in cities. Migrants tended to lower their economic expectation when they moved to Jeju Island because industrial structures differ between cities and Jeju Island. Jeju Island had a much lower proportion of the manufacturing industry and a higher one in the agriculture and fisheries industry, which was reversed in cities. Thus, it was difficult for migrants to find similar kind of job that they had from cities. Even when they found one, the salaries tended to be lower
migrants in Jeju rural areas chose agriculture while the rest ran business such as small hotels, guesthouses, and cafés.\textsuperscript{95}

The typical socio-demographic status of migrants who began new businesses on Jeju Island (hereafter “urban entrepreneurs”) was the urban middle class\textsuperscript{96} from the mainland of South Korea. For example, a female math teacher in her mid-30s migrated to Shihungli from a satellite city of Seoul with her husband. Other urban entrepreneurs whom I met were from mainland cities and had jobs like broadcasting producer, wife of a policeman, and cartoon artist. These migrants “moved to Jeju Island after quitting a promising job,”\textsuperscript{97} making them white-collar or middle class individuals.

Urban entrepreneurs typically bought farming houses in rural villages and built guesthouses with brand-new facilities, including dining halls and book cafés for tourists’ convenience. This form of guesthouse, a combination of guesthouse and café or western-style restaurant, was increasingly common on Jeju Island by 2011 and more so in 2013. The math teacher migrant and her husband bought land on a village lane and built a guesthouse and an Italian restaurant. The guesthouse boasted nice facilities such as air conditioning, shower rooms, and clean beds and beddings. Another Shihungli guesthouse had two buildings used for dormitory-type accommodations for men and women. A café next to the guesthouse had a decent interior, although it was small with three or four tables in it. It was used a place for socializing among the tourists staying at the

\textsuperscript{95} 2015 February 6, Hangyerae
\textsuperscript{96} Specific characteristics in Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{97} 2015 March 28, OhMyNews

because overall income level was lower on Jeju Island than cities. Many migrants opened guesthouses and cafés that they could begin without particular skills.
guesthouse. Tourists interacted with each other having breakfast or beer at the café, sharing their experiences and information about routes of the Jeju Olle Trail and acquiring company for walking the trail.

Guesthouse owners and employees\textsuperscript{98} brought popular, often foreign, cultural trends from the mainland, mostly Seoul, to Jeju Island. They incorporated the trends in food, beverages, interiors, and services. Taking an example from my observation at a guesthouse, the walls of the guesthouse buildings were painted with characters from a western tale, the “\textit{Wizard of Oz}.” The guesthouse provided continental-style breakfast and sometimes barbecue parties at night upon tourists’ demand. One morning, I stopped by the guesthouse gathering room before heading for the Jeju Olle Trail and saw two women tourists sitting on barstools at the café counter. A barista stood over the counter in a black shirt and black pants; he was explaining to the tourists about different kinds of coffee as they watched coffee brew from a Dutch device. Accommodations like this catered to the mainland urban middle class with decent facilities, tourist socialization, and opportunities for cultural exploration of foreign cultures\textsuperscript{99}.

Tourists were satisfied with the facilities and services provided by the guesthouses. They expressed satisfaction about the amenities provided; e.g., one female college student said:

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{98} They used a Seoul accent and wore liberal styles such as short pants, long skirts, and tank tops that I would not expect to find in rural villages of Jeju Island. Rural villagers wore more conservative-style clothes, such as long sleeves and long pants convenient for agricultural and fisheries labor. Guesthouse workers’ ages ranged from late 20s to early 40s. Their attitudes seemed confident instead of worrying about tourists’ satisfaction about facilities.

\textsuperscript{99} Which was only available in large cities in South Korea including, but not exclusively, Seoul, Incheon, and Busan.
I’ve stayed at several guesthouses through this travel. The guesthouses are clean and cool. Some guesthouse runners provide fieldtrip to near mountains everyday early in the morning. I have fun here (I27-T6).

Tourists particularly enjoyed the “new culture” of the guesthouses along the Jeju Olle Trail. The tourist went on:

I like this new culture of guesthouse. I felt unsafe when I traveled other provinces, because I had to spend nights at motels or lodges [not like in guesthouses on Jeju Island]. Of course, Jeju nature is so beautiful. My friend recommended me to visit the Jeju Olle Trail…. I decided to come because I heard many tourists are coming alone here to the Jeju Olle Trail and staying at guesthouses, interacting with each other. I went to the barbecue party last night, and I scheduled today’s trail with other oppa [elder brother] and unni [elder sister] that I met there. They are very nice to me, and I heard that many people [tourists of the Jeju Olle Trail] still keep contact with each other after going back home in Seoul. I think we will be like that, too (Ibid.).

As she described, tourists enjoyed foreign culture amenities like barbecue parties$^{100}$ and the resultant socialization with other tourists, going so far as to call each other “oppa” and “unni$^{101}$.” Furthermore, the environment of socialization made them believe that guesthouses were safe compared to other tourist facilities such as motels and lodges. The new type of services provided by migrant accommodations provided to the mainland urban middle class safety, a new culture of tourism, and quality of tourism.

These facilities and cultural attractions provided by urban entrepreneurs sharply contrasted with those provided by Jeju rural entrepreneurs. I stayed at one of two rooms

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$^{100}$ Koreans use the term “barbecue party” borrowed from English. It is written “바베큐파티” in Korean. Barbecue party in South Korea has a nuance of foreign culture in terms of the ways to grill meats, use of utensils etc.

$^{101}$ Korean women widely use the terms “oppa” and “unni” regardless of age groups. They use the terms for intimately referring to older males and females, respectively.
at a local lodge in summer 2011, and my experience illustrates why local accommodations were not viable compared to those of urban entrepreneurs. First, the types of meals differed: one had Korean traditional-style and one had foreign-style. On the first day of my stay at a rural accommodation, the woman running the lodge asked me if I wanted to have dinner from her house. I agreed, and she brought my Korean-style dinner to her living room. It was good and cheap. Tourists traveling to experience nature and culture different from home would not have been attracted to this style of food. Second, the environment was different: one had village hosts and observers and one had socialization among tourists. For dinner at the rural lodge, I sat at the center of the living room floor while the lodge owner’s neighbors sat at the corner. I felt rather awkward being surrounded by the village women, who were curiously staring or glancing at me until I finished dinner. Afterward, I went back to my room, the only guest that day. Being in this type of environment contrasted with that of the guesthouses, where tourists freely and casually interacted with each other over beer and food. Third, facilities differed: one had conventional facilities long used as farming households and one had brand-new facilities laid out for accommodations. In my room in the rural lodge, there was a fan, but it was not enough to provide cool air for a tired tourist in the hot and humid climate of the island. Bugs and mosquitoes often interrupted my sleep during the night. The room’s unpleasant condition sharply contrasted with the amenities I enjoyed at guesthouses. Lastly, tourist accommodations run by rural and urban entrepreneurs differed in terms of safety, as the female tourist mentioned. While I was staying at the local lodge, the husband of the female rural entrepreneur stayed at home alone during
days. As the only guest at the lodge, I felt unsafe in the room during these times. I felt
safe when I stayed at guesthouses, though, because the rooms were separated by gender,
and there were always people in the guesthouse, whether employees or guests. As an
urban mainlander tourist, my experience of local lodges was unfavorable overall, and the
experiences contrasted with the tourist accommodations run by urban entrepreneurs.

Tourist accommodations run by mainland urban middle class migrants are often
located on the Jeju Olle Trail among farming houses, so competition between
guesthouses and rural lodges is direct. For example, the “Legend of OZ” guesthouse and
the Italian restaurant guesthouse are located within a 1- to 3-minute walk of the lodge
run by the Village Women Association representative. While the representative
struggled with the business, the Italian guesthouse runner said she was very grateful that
tourists liked the guesthouse and restaurant. Rooms were fully booked during summer
2013. Urban entrepreneurs clearly won the competition.

As sales decreased, rural entrepreneurs gained anxiety. The Village Women
Association representative said that she was happy for the migrants’ success in business,
but her facial expression looked more confused than happy. What explains the
inconsistency between the woman’s representative’s facial expression (confused) and
what she said about her feeling (happy)? On one hand, she felt nervous about outsider
intrusion to the village. She also felt jealous of the migrants for having better tourist
accommodation businesses. She might even have felt that their entry to the village
tourism market, moreover in her close neighborhood, threatened her own business. On
the other hand, she had to be diplomatic. As a representative of a Village Women
Association, she had to be cautious expressing her personal feelings toward me, an outsider examining the Jeju Olle Trail. Rural villagers felt their businesses threatened because urban entrepreneurs intruded on their territories and excelled in the same market (even if the rural entrepreneurs tried to hide their feelings).

**Adapting to Urban Middle Class Tastes**

Jeju rural entrepreneurs had to implement changed business environments caused by the transition of tourist flow from rural to urban entrepreneurs. Rural entrepreneurs attempted to adapt to increased competition due to migrant influx through (1) quitting the tourist business and returning to agriculture and fisheries for livelihoods; (2) turning to long-term stay lodges and lowering prices; and (3) competing with urban entrepreneurs by imitating them in an effort to cater to urban middle class tastes.

My assumption in examining the strategies employed by Jeju rural entrepreneurs is that catering to urban middle class tastes determined the success of urban entrepreneurs and caused Jeju rural entrepreneurs to struggle. This assumption stems from my stay at a local lodge in January 2013, at which time the owner was struggling with business. Even though it had been renovated, the lodge was still traditional Korean-style. When I revisited the lodge in summer 2013, there were paintings on the wall, and several young tourists were resting in the yard. Villagers informed me that the lodge owner rented the lodge to a migrant, who changed the interior and decorations of the lodge to guesthouse-style. After that, tourists returned, proving that urban middle class taste makes the difference in business between urban and rural entrepreneurs on Jeju.
Island. Based on this assumption, I discuss below the strategies adopted by rural entrepreneurs to adapt to the changed business environment.

Some rural residents adapted to the environment by simply giving up additional income derived from running local lodges or restaurants on the Jeju Olle Trail. Most local lodges targeting Jeju Olle Trail tourists actually shut down by the time I collected data in 2013. For example, one day I entered a house located on an inner village lane of Shihungli. The house gate had a local lodge sign, but I opened the door to find a young man lying on the living room floor, giving me the impression that I was an unexpected stranger to the house. He informed me that his parents used to run the lodge but were in the field for agriculture then. I ran across a similar situation when I interviewed a previous Shihungli village leader. The leader’s lodge had been relatively well known as tourists posted their experiences on online blogs and the Jeju Olle Foundation leader had written about it. As tourists increased, he built a couple more rooms within his house to expand the sales from increased guests. But when I interviewed him at his house, there was no sign of tourists staying there and he looked distressed, saying that he had to go out to the field. He was going out because he knew that no guests would be coming to stay there. His business was not viable anymore. Like this one, many local lodges that invested capital and labor to initiate a tourism business gave up the business as customers drastically decreased.

Other Jeju villagers attempted to adapt to the changed environment by changing their business. For example, some local lodges turned to extended-stay setups, where guests stayed and paid rent on a monthly basis that was lower than what tourists had paid
on a daily basis. Demand was sporadic for this type of stay\textsuperscript{102}, so the additional income was less than what they had generated from Jeju Olle Trail tourists. A grandmother had begun a local lodge as the Jeju Olle Foundation encouraged her. Her neighbor who worked for the lodge for months (I4-V4) told me that the grandmother made more than a couple million KRW (thousand USD) around 2010. When I visited the grandmother’s lodge in 2013, there were no tourists staying there. The grandmother showed me a room and asked for 500,000 KRW (450 USD) for monthly payment, saying that there were sailors who would want the room and would pay higher rent (I assumed this was a marketing strategy). Through the grandmother’s lodge and two other extended-stay lodges, I learned that tourists no longer stayed at local lodges. Instead, sailors, researchers, or new migrants sporadically stayed at them for temporary housing. Local lodge runner income, therefore, significantly decreased.

Although Jeju rural entrepreneurs were indirectly forced to give up benefits from Jeju Olle Trail tourists in the process of adapting to the changed business environment, the last group stayed in the tourism business, risking competition with urban entrepreneurs from the mainland. The existing local tourist business owners employed strategies to increase competitiveness: utilizing, mimicking, and learning knowledge about the urban middle class from the mainland.

\textsuperscript{102} I do not mean either that local lodges were full everyday all year round. There were seasonal fluctuations. Nonetheless, neighboring villagers agreed that the lodge runners made significant money (I4-V4; 150-V24; 148-V22). At the same time, though, villagers used the past tense such as “once,” demonstrating that lodge runners’ businesses of extended-stay guests (three of seven guesthouses in Shihungli) were inactive. I also witnessed the inactiveness during my stay at one of the three lodges for a month.
First, Jeju residents utilized labor and knowledge of the mainlanders familiar with the urban middle class. For example, Wolpyong renovated a building located on the Jeju Olle Trail\textsuperscript{103} that had previously been used by the Village Association for selling agricultural products. The association decided to renovate the building into a café to generate additional income for villagers, based on the persuasion of a young female novelist from the mainland. The novelist embarked on the renovation by bringing young artists, including photographers, painters, a cook, public project artists, and a traveler to the village from the mainland. The artists decided to participate because they expected solid income and places to stay on Jeju Island as they planned to migrate there. The artists were seriously committed to the renovation using their specialties. After the renovation was completed, the café was decorated with candles, wooden tables, Wolpyong village–related brochures, and flowers. Menus included Jeju local food and beverage (e.g., Jeju oranges) modified to cater the urban middle class. After awhile, the villagers and young artists began to conflict over menus and work ethic, and young artists including the novelist left the village. The vacancies of café workers whose salaries were provided by the provincial government were filled with villagers. As such, rural entrepreneurs made use of external labor and knowledge in an effort to equip their tourism businesses with urban middle class tastes.

Another strategy that Jeju rural entrepreneurs adopted to increase competitiveness was imitating urban entrepreneurs. Jeju Olle Trail Route 6 passed

\textsuperscript{103} I closely witnessed the renovation process because I used the building as my base for data collection from Wolpyong.
through a coastal line of a rural village called Bophwan\textsuperscript{104}. On the trail, two snack shops were located next to each other, with a village lane located in the middle. I entered the snack shops one by one and interviewed the owners. The female owner of the shop on the right was in her mid-40s and had lived on Jeju Island for her whole life. She said that her sister transferred the shop ownership after making significant money from it in 2011. Once she took it over in 2012, though, she failed to generate the income that she expected. She was dissatisfied with tourists who made the restroom dirty and wasted water and toilet paper while spending little money at her snack shop. On the other hand, the female migrant owner of the snack shop on the left said that the business was fine. She also ran a guesthouse from the second floor of the snack shop building. In her late 20s, she had little to report in terms of troubles experienced since beginning the business a couple years earlier. When I was about to finish the short interview (about 15 minutes), she hesitantly reported about “nothing important”:

Oh, there’s one thing… It’s nothing important or anything, but…neighboring snack shops like the one at the next-door watch how I do here and follow whatever I try. I don’t know why they do that, but it bothers me a little (I87-M3).

Then the young migrant took an example. She introduced popular bread called “Olle Bread” in her snack shop, and it became a best seller. Soon after, the migrant found that

\textsuperscript{104} Bophwan is beyond the research scope. However, I included it in the chapter considering its significance to the argument of the chapter. In fact, my research scope is loosely defined. I lived everyday lives as a temporary migrant for a year on Jeju Island. The region where I stayed was moreover not one of the research sites. However, I was almost always focused on Jeju Olle Trail, even during my everyday life. Thus, along with the data collection process in the research sites, what I learned through everyday life significantly contributed my understanding about people, culture, and nature of Jeju Island, and its relation with the Jeju Olle Trail.
the snack shop next door was also selling it. She did not think to mention what bothered her until the last minute, but someone copying her was important enough to include. It was important for the urban entrepreneur even though she said that she was unaware of “why they do that” because she felt that the behavior could threaten her business. Facing direct competition, Jeju rural entrepreneurs observed how urban entrepreneurs ran tourism businesses and imitated them because as members of the urban middle class themselves, the mainland entrepreneurs had better knowledge and sense about the ways to attract tourists from their same demographic group.

The last strategy that Jeju rural entrepreneurs adopted was to learn skills to meet the demands from the urban middle class. As cafés were established to cater to urban middle class tastes, rural entrepreneurs fell into a position where they “had to” acquire the skills to satisfy tourists. Rural entrepreneurs “learned” the “secrets” of making “good” or “Dutch” coffee from the urban middle class who were willing to teach the skills. A villager barista of the renovated Wolpyong village café and a village official of Murung 2 li said:

I learned this from [the traveler]. He said that the secret was to pour only some drops of water first and pour the rest of water after 30 seconds. You can’t pour all water at once, because coffee taste would not be good if you do that (I102-V65).

105 The specific example from the snack shops can be generalized to tourism businesses in discussing mimicking as marketing strategies, because two of four rural village associations began to run guesthouses to generate the funds for village affairs. The guesthouse concept was foreign to Jeju residents until mainland urban entrepreneurs increasingly opened them on Jeju Island. One of the two guesthouses run by village associations had facilities belonging to the imported guesthouses in terms of characteristics, such as bunk beds in rooms, a dining hall in the middle, and brand-new shower facilities.
I didn’t know what Dutch coffee was before, let alone how to make it. I just made some here in the café because I had to, but it wasn’t good, of course. [An entrepreneur who closely supported the village] tasted the coffee that I made and gave me some tips to make good Dutch coffee. I tasted the coffee that he made, and it was totally different. I think now I know how to make a good Dutch coffee (173-V46).

After relying on fisheries and agriculture in their rural life, these villagers took on the job of making gourmet coffee to target urban middle class tourists and generate income. The villager baristas looked like job trainees due to their serious and careful attitudes in making coffees. The inconsistency between what rural entrepreneurs faced in tourism businesses and what they had expertise in lowered confidence among them. Jeju rural residents could make good traditional Korean foods such as “rice wine” and “rice cake,” but they had to work to adopt foreign cultures in tourism businesses. A previous leader of Murung 2 li said in an interview:

[A migrant] took charge of the café. We do not know how to make mainlanders laugh and cry. We are only good at making traditional rice wine or rice cake. We are good at those (167-V41).

By “laugh” and “cry,” the village leader meant attracting tourists through catering to them based on knowledge of their preferences and deficiencies. Even though Jeju rural villagers were confident about their culture, they were less so that of the clientele.

Lacking skills resulted in poor sales. I visited Wolpyong village café in winter 2013 when I completed the fieldwork. The menu had changed to sushi and noodles, representative street foods of South Korea. Outside the café, an employee was selling fish bread, also a representative South Korean street food. There were remnants of the urban middle class in the interior, but the location had instead become a snack shop for
villagers lacking cash to spend. Jeju rural villagers failed to receive expected return from their efforts to generate additional income from Jeju Olle Trail tourists. Only feelings of deprivation and inadequacy were left for the villagers.

**From Ethnography to the Coproduction of Scale and First Nature**

The process in which the Jeju Olle Trail was established was highly political. The contentious and political coproduction of scale and nature was the key thread over which actors of the Jeju Olle Trail governance struggled. The Jeju Olle Foundation shifted spatial distribution of tourist destinations (production of scale) and reframed Jeju nature on the shifted scale as authentic (production of first nature). The coproduction of scale and nature contributed to the Jeju Olle Trail being imagined as resolving the social deprivations caused by the South Korean developmental state, namely rural and urban uneven development and lost composure among the urban middle class due to the excessively competitive environment of the society. The discourse about what the coproduction of scale and nature offered to the South Korean society largely appealed to the urban middle class. The urban middle class, the source of economic, and thus political, power in the Jeju tourism industry began to strongly support the Jeju Olle Foundation. Public support strengthened the Jeju Olle Foundation’s power in making decisions regarding the Jeju Olle Trail. As the power structure was reconfigured toward the Jeju Olle Foundation, other actors such as provincial state agencies and rural villagers reoriented themselves within the power regime while attempting to influence
the simultaneous production of scale and nature. The Jeju Olle Foundation’s power in making decisions regarding the Jeju Olle Trail was consolidated as a result.

The outcome of the political coproduction of scale and nature through the Jeju Olle Trail was economic and again political. Jeju rural residents strived to participate in producing scale and nature to cater to urban middle class tastes and expected the generated capital to economically benefit them. However, the particular ways of catering to urban middle class tastes through the coproduction of scale and nature resulted in reconfiguring political economy at the village level in favor of urban entrepreneurs. Attracted by what Jeju nature was imagined to offer and changing other institutional and infrastructural conditions, the urban middle class increasingly migrated to Jeju Island and participated in the capitalist competition of the tourism industry. They excelled in catering to taste because it was their own taste, and capital generation ceased for Jeju rural entrepreneurs. Complicated political processes of competition began as rural entrepreneurs were involved in cooperating, mimicking, and learning to supplement deficiencies of certain factors of capitalist production such as labor (knowledge) and capital, which belonged to the urban middle class. Cooperation among classes soon turned into conflicts over the capital derived from the outcome of the cooperation. Thus, rescaling the production of first nature brought about not only the shift of capital mobility, but also class struggles over deploying factors for capitalist production (labor and capital) from the produced nature among each other. Jeju rural entrepreneurs, although ending up marginalized, were savvy enough to seek ways to take benefits from
the dynamically shifting environment of political economy due to the coproduction of scale and the first nature.

**Conclusion**

Relying on the scholarship of respective and simultaneous production of scale and nature, particularly on the eco-scalar fix incorporated with extended temporal scales, this chapter demonstrates that longitudinal examination enables us to see the continual marginalization of Jeju people through shifting ways of the production of the first nature and scale. In other words, locating the rescaled Jeju nature in the historical context of Jeju Island in terms of how it has been used for economic development reveals that the alternative way of tourism development only exacerbated regional disparities and environmental destruction. Mainlanders’ exploitation of Jeju people and Jeju nature since the Chosun Dynasty has been extended through the developmental state’s nature-based tourism development and the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail. The coproduction of scale and nature was critical in extending the marginalization because it set the stage (generated capital flows and channeled capital circulations) for political and economic struggles in favor of a particular class.

In conclusion, the Jeju Olle Trail case demonstrates that the historical enquiry incorporating eco-scalar fix is a useful analytical framework in articulating political and economic reconfiguration caused by discursive and material rescaling processes of using natural resources. Examining emerging landscapes of Jeju Island adopting the eco-scalar
fix also provides insight on the neoliberal shift of a regional development pattern on Jeju Island, considering (1) the retreat of the state’s role as a political and economic arbitrator in regional development; (2) increasingly and persistently evolving forms of commodification (and value) of first nature; and (3) significantly increased contribution of migrants’ private capital to the emergent landscapes.
CHAPTER V

COMPETING OWNERSHIP OVER TRANSITIONING RURAL LANDSCAPES
IN A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY

Introduction

Olle Tourists can come and enjoy this place, they really don’t have to report (to state agencies) when there’s something that they are uncomfortable about. But they just did right away. Tourists filed civil complaints saying that there was clutter at the coast. I was fined several times. [Tourists] actually messed the trail up here by defecating everywhere! This is how we, Jeju people, live our lives. I don’t know why tourists see these things that we need for livelihoods and everyday lives negatively. Other [tourists] complain [to] us that farm roads are paved, saying Olle trail shouldn’t be like that. They think the Olle trail as theirs! (I49-V23)

This quote about the Jeju Olle Trail, given in summer 2013 by a disgruntled ship repairman who ran a shop along the coast in Shihungli, illustrates the ongoing conflict over landscape representations in the recent rural landscape transition of South Korea.

As demand has increased among the South Korean urban middle class for rural scenic beauty, environmental and aesthetic ideas have competed with, and sometimes overridden, the idea about rural landscape as being a mere outcome of production activities. This chapter examines landscape transitioning in purpose from a mere outcome of traditional production activities, like agriculture and fisheries, to an object for tourism due to the preconceived idea of anti-modernism embedded in natural and

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106 Landscape is defined collective images of different land uses determined through power struggles over access and control of the images.
cultural landscapes. More specifically, through examining mixed and conflict-laden interactions among landscape viewers, the chapter determines processes and outcomes of class struggles over the ownership\textsuperscript{107} of rural landscapes in South Korea, a newly industrialized country (NIC).

South Korea, like other NICs such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, has achieved rapid economic growth in recent decades. Its population demonstrates an explosive demand for rural landscapes as places for leisure and alternative ways of life. For leisure, urban residents have increasingly chosen trekking within rural landscapes\textsuperscript{108}, and some have even migrated to rural villages after living in cities for about three decades since the rapid urbanization of South Korea. These urban residents perceive rural landscapes as nature and culture unaltered by development, while rural long-term residents perceive them as simply the backdrop of their traditional production activities. Short-term residents (or tourists) and long-term residents in rural South Korea tend to conflict due to these differing perceptions about what rural landscapes should look like, as the ship repairman’s concerns highlight. After the interactions of these social groups, rural landscapes may look the same as they ever did, but the ideas embedded in them are

\textsuperscript{107} The struggles over landscape ownership entail class conflicts over both representational and material landscapes in this chapter. While representational landscape means how landscape is imagined as an abstraction, material landscape indicates concrete, visible, and touchable components of landscape such as stones, plants, fences etc. Determining representational and material landscapes are inextricably intertwined processes. ‘Landscape ownership’ in this chapter is defined as the entitlement to define landscape representations, to decide material components of landscapes, and to enjoy landscapes that are formed through the reiterating interaction of representations and material components of landscape.

\textsuperscript{108} 2015 September 25, Kyonghyong Biz N Life
significantly contested and shifting as a result. As landscape representations shift, political, economic, and cultural reconfiguration of an NIC’s rural societies ensues.

This chapter employs what has been learned from both the First and Third World regarding the relationship between landscape and social struggles. And while the studies provide useful insights, neither First nor Third World political ecologies address the problems with shifting the definition of rural landscape because of increased demand. Because NICs have achieved rapid economic growth in recent decades, different paces of historical and socioeconomic development have been demonstrated. What is specific to NICs in how social groups struggle over landscape representation and in how the interactions are materially reflected in rural landscapes?

The chapter examines and relies on insights gained by political ecologists and cultural geographers interested in the social dynamics of landscape change, particularly in examining the specifics of landscape transition in NICs. It explores the processes in which rural landscape ownership is determined through class struggles. Jeju Island in South Korea that experiences a rapid transition of rural landscapes, both in representations and materiality, due to increasing demand for rural amenities from the public. This chapter will examine the processes and outcomes of contested property rights over rural landscapes on Jeju Island among Jeju rural villagers, tourists, and the Jeju Olle Foundation.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses NIC applications from First and Third World cases examined by political ecologists regarding struggles over landscape access and control. It then discusses the ways in which landscape studies
under cultural geography could offer insights to the political ecology of landscapes in NICs. Second, the chapter demonstrates that the Jeju Olle Trail is an urban middle class project. Third, relying on landscape studies, the chapter determines discourses entitling South Korean urban middle class tourists to intervene in and determine rural landscapes. Fourth, the chapter identifies NIC-specific themes of conflict over landscape views between urban middle class tourists and local farmers and fishermen. Fifth, the chapter determines the outcomes of landscape transition by discussing the changes in NIC-specific social problems. As a conclusion, the chapter advances the idea of an NICs political ecology.

Toward NICs Landscape Political Ecology

Landscape in the Third and First World Political Ecology

Before McCarthy (2002) urged political ecologists to turn their attention to the First World, political ecologist insights about struggles over landscape access and control derived dominantly from the Third World (Neumann 1998, Fairhead and Leach 1996, Zimmerer 1991). Political ecologists, who share their interests in resource access and control determined by broadly defined, multi-scalar political economy (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Watts 2000), demonstrate that national elites, international agencies, and colonial histories established ideals embedded in landscapes of the Third World. Competing representations of landscapes tend to marginalize local people by obliterating their labor on landscapes or by impacting local livelihoods. For example, Neumann
(1998) examines the colonial history of Arusha National Park in Tanzania and its relation to the current state power exercised over the Maru people by denying their customary rights to access livelihood sources located in the park. He reveals that the state power, in conjunction with international agencies, maintains the western construction of Africa established by colonial perspectives. It views African nature as distinct from culture. Thus, remnants of local culture such as religion, livelihoods, and labor were all erased from the park to conform to western imageries about African nature. Even though the park was established as a park to enable the public to enjoy natural landscape and to attract foreign tourists, local residents have been disenfranchised in the process. Political ecologists demonstrate that constructing particular representations and materiality of landscapes is contested and is contingent to multi-scalar political economy and histories in the Third World.

There are commonalities between the Jeju Olle Trail project and cases from the Third World, such as national elites’ imposition of landscape ideals (an urban middle class view in case of the Jeju Olle Trail) and the disturbance of local livelihoods caused by the imposition. However, there also exist important inconsistencies between the Third World and the case of the Jeju Olle Trail. First, the disturbance to livelihoods is not as severe as in the Third World such that it hampers local subsistence (differing economic status). Second, the remnants of colonial histories seem to dominate definitions of rural landscapes more in the Third World compared to South Korea. South Korean citizens often find the state’s remnants on rural landscapes disturbing (differing historical paths). Third, although customary rights do exist in South Korea, property rights are mostly
formal rather than informal, impeding arbitrary exercise of state power on properties (institutional arrangements). Fourth and most importantly, not all culture was obliterated from South Korean rural landscapes. For example, in Neumann’s case, all cultural aspects were removed to conform to the western ideal about African nature as primitive. On Jeju Island, though, tourists dismissed the materiality reflecting industrial development such as paved roads while appreciating the unaltered nature and unpaved village lanes on Jeju Island. This difference derives from the fact that ideals about rural landscapes are contingent to the socioeconomic, political, and historical paths of particular regions (differing landscape ideals as a combination of the above three). These differences between the Third World and South Korea hinder our understanding about struggles over ideas about rural landscape and its impact on rural residents on Jeju Island. Therefore, now I turn to lessons learned from the First World.

William (1975) sets up a foundation for political ecologists interested in how conflicting rural landscape ideals intersect with material changes in the First World by examining pervasive ideals of rural landscapes embedded in their increasing public demand in England in the 1970s. In doing so, he investigates a long history of romantic ideals about the country as opposed to the city, which was also imagined as an archetype of social, economic, and political distortions. He argues that the increasing public demand for idyllic landscapes of the country in order to escape ugly city development stems from the romanticization of rural landscapes obscuring the brutal realities of social exclusion and exploitation, prevalent as much in the country as in the city, as well as relationships pertaining to landscape ideologies.
Relying on William’s seminal work, some political ecologists have responded to McCarthy’s call by turning their attention about conflicting ideals of landscapes to the First World (Walker and Fortmann 2003, Robbins et al. 2012, Cadieaux et al. 2013). They examine conflicts caused by increasing population influx to rural areas in the 1970s and 1980s and note that particular ideas about rural landscape increasingly pursued by urban residents began to generate value. Robbins et al. (2012) explicitly demonstrate that rural landscapes generate value, rendering them susceptible to political and economic struggles. They examine how an informal collective governance regime in rural Montana effectively regulated property developments to lessen externalities to landscape quality, yet at the same time, threatened public amenities with deregulation tendencies in planning. Robbins et al. (2012) also demonstrate, however, that not all rural landscapes generate value, an observation previously written by Williams (1975), who notes that only rural landscapes presenting rural qualities unhampered by ugly development (thus containing unspoiled natural scenic beauty) are perceived as valuable. Only when rural landscapes have those characteristics, they are public resources that generate values. Walker and Fortmann articulate this idea, saying, “economic and cultural value is being placed…on aesthetic and environmental values109 (such as ‘view shed’ or ‘rural quality’)” (2003:471). Rural landscape becomes a resource as it gains pursuable value with aesthetic and environmental ideals, instead of as mere outcome of traditional rural activities.

109 Following Walker and Fortmann, this chapter calls the rural landscape pursued by urban residents “aesthetic and environmental landscapes.”
The transition of rural landscape from a mere display of rural livelihoods mixed with natural backgrounds to a resource causes struggle over access and control among resource users. Walker and Fortmann (2003) document such struggles from a case in Nevada County, California. Long-term residents and in-migrants conflicted over landscape visions of the traditional natural resource–based “production” and aesthetic landscape “consumption.” Newcomers wanted to see the environmental and rural landscape that drew them to migrate, and long-term residents saw this view of common landscape as a threat to their property rights and as a potential hindrance to their economic gain deriving from development, growth, and traditional production activities occurring on their land. They also felt that the environmental and aesthetic view of landscape threatened their identity as a social class relying on traditional ways of making a living. Through this piece, Walker and Fortmann (2003) well demonstrate that social classes struggle to define how landscapes should look, depending on the perspective of the landscape, which engenders political tensions between the classes because social, economic, and cultural dominations are at stake.

These studies from the First World provide useful insights for understanding struggles and conflicts on the Jeju Olle Trail. Actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project have also struggled over the benefits derived from a particular representation of landscapes, i.e., the environmental and aesthetic view of landscapes. At the same time, they have also experienced the contested representation of rural landscapes between the traditional
“production” view and the aesthetic “consumption” view. Studies from the First World also reveal that the ownership of aesthetic and environmental landscape is undefined. For example, Robbins et al. (2012) approach Montana’s landscape as a commons from which social actors struggle to take benefits. Walker and Fortmann (2003) also argue that undefined landscape ownership renders the ideas of landscapes and the subsequent material outcomes particularly contentious because it is hard to define the legitimacy of claimants. In addition, landscape is a kind of resource often comprising various landholdings, but value lies in the total space rather than the individual landholdings (Walker and Fortmann 2003:471), making benefit distribution difficult. Defining landscape and distributing benefits become deeply political processes. Employing insights gained from First World landscape studies, this chapter examines class struggles over access and control of rural landscapes on Jeju Island, focusing on the idea that defining landscape ownership is not easy.

Despite the useful insights from First World cases, they also bear limitations to explain social processes over defining landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail. Scholars tend to examine ongoing struggles between migrants and long-term residents several decades since the migrant influx to the country began (Cadieux 2011, Adam and Gosnell 2011), meaning there already had been struggles and adaptations among social groups, including contestations on landscape views. So the First World cases might be useful in explaining what South Korea will experience in the future after decades of competing

\[^{110}\text{For the debate on the dichotomy between the landscape representations of production and consumption, see Neumann (2011:845).}\]
landscape representations, yet they fail to fully explain the conflicts along the Jeju Olle Trail that began quite recently (differing economic status and subsequent development of the environmental and aesthetic view of landscapes, as William argues). This chapter documents the power dynamics created in the initial phase of introducing an environmental and aesthetic view of landscape to rural villages. It will therefore broaden our understanding of dynamic conflicts over landscapes in different phases. The First World cases differ from the South Korean case also because of different social groups introducing and practicing the view of landscape. In First World cases, individuals, such as people seeking alternative lifestyles or property developers, introduced the view, utilized the view, and struggled to realize the view. On the other hand, in South Korea, a group of cultural elites introduced the environmental and aesthetic view of landscape with support from the state; urban middle class tourists subscribed to the view imposed by cultural elites and practiced it on rural landscapes. The idea imposer and idea practitioner, then, are not necessarily consistent in the case of the Jeju Olle Trail. Differentiating these actors is critical to my argument because it determines the subjectivity of the ownership about the environmental and aesthetic landscapes.

In sum, the shift of rural landscapes in South Korea reflects the socioeconomic qualities of both the global north and the global south. More specifically, they face demand for economic development (the global south) and environmental and aesthetic ideas (the global north) from the same rural landscape. By examining these struggles, this study speaks to debates on the false dichotomy of First and Third World political ecologies (e.g., Schroeder et al. 2006). It introduces a new "NICs political ecology" of
landscape focused on the unique political economic context generating from particular struggles between social classes over rural landscapes.

**Exclusion and Ownership**

Landscape studies in cultural geography also provide insights about critical characteristics of landscape, including exclusion. Cultural geographers view landscape as “ways of seeing” (Cosgrove 1985, originated from Berger 1972) or as a “screening process.” “Ways of seeing” originated from a bourgeoisie perspective of landscape as entertainment. Historically, the components of accumulated histories and labor were removed from landscape pictures in order for bourgeoisies to focus on the bucolic picturesque beauty of the countryside. Based on this view, cultural geographers have examined landscapes as being produced through class struggles and subsequent social exclusion. For example, Duncan and Duncan (2001) demonstrate that landscape as an aesthetic production, which produced and enhanced social distinction for a suburb of New York City. Environmental and aesthetic views on landscape reflected and realized the ideologies of planners and bourgeois residents, including anti-urbanism and anti-modernism, through the zoning process. Landscape as a “screening process” means it reflects a particular class ideal and renders it especially conducive to social exclusion. Landscape is a “scene” reflecting elite possession and social control of land and erasing the real messiness of everyday life that fails to confirm to the class ideal (Mitchell 2003: 186). Social groups with the potential to contaminate the aesthetic landscapes are annihilated from them (Mitchell 2003). Mitchell (2003) demonstrates that homeless
people in New York City were banned from public spaces so as not to spoil the intended aesthetic landscape. When a public space is interpreted as landscape, filthiness of the homeless is the reason to legislate against their presence at public spaces. In this sense, “messiness” of certain components of landscapes is defined within a particular society context. Here, defining the aesthetic landscape view reflect class ideals simultaneously determine the messiness based on its unconformity to the ideals. The social groups creating messiness in the landscape (and their behaviors) were removed from it. And because of the lack of political power of the excluded groups, resistance was not likely. Whether for seeing or screening, landscape definition makes it prone to social exclusion.

Adopting insights from landscape studies is an already established tradition among political ecologists interested in power dynamics over landscapes (following Williams 1975, Neumann 1998; Walker and Fortmann 2003; Neumann 2011; Cadieux et al. 2013). Political ecologists have shown how particular ways of seeing determine social exclusion through screening processes of what is displayed on landscapes initiated or facilitated by a multi-scalar political economy, such as state authorities (Braun 1997, Fairhead and Leah 1996), international organizations (Neumann 1998), or formal (Walker and Hurley 2004, Cadieux et al. 2013) and informal (Robbins et al. 2012) decision-making organizations at a local level. Let me revisit the above-discussed Neumann (1998) as an example. Neumann examines how landscape studies articulate “ways of seeing” as a means for social exclusion (pages 15-25) and incorporates the idea in his case study from Tanzania. The colonial bourgeoisie historically established the landscape view of Arusha National Park as a primitive and uninhabited nature, and state
and international agencies effectively excluded the Maru people by incorporating a Western landscape view. Neumann’s study shows that political ecologists have demonstrated that political organizations with legal authority or organizational power facilitate or enforce landscape screening and subsequent social exclusion. However, how individuals or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without any legal authority materialize landscape ideals is poorly understood in literature. How do individuals with conflicting landscape ideals interact when they encounter? How do individuals claim their rights to landscape that derive from others’ property in an effort to materialize their views on landscape?

A notion specific to landscape from cultural geography, the sense of landscape ownership that Lefebvre (1991) suggests, helps answer these questions. Lefebvre contends, “the power of a landscape does not derive from the fact that it offers itself as spectacle, but rather from the fact that, as mirror and mirage, it presents any susceptible viewer with an image at once true and false of the creative capacity which the subject (or Ego) is able, during a moment of marvelous self-deception, to claim as his own” (1991:189). Williams also discusses the sense of ownership among landscape viewers, using the term “landlord” and focusing on his “real invention” of Nature (1975:124). Even though agricultural fields and mountains are not their own, landscape viewers such as tourists tend to feel a sense of ownership over what they see once the resources are viewed as “landscapes.” In other words, landscape uniquely enables viewers to transgress legal and customary property rights through self-deception about ownership. I would argue that this sense of ownership offers an insight particularly meaningful to
political ecologists interested in access to and control of resources. The concept particularly informs this chapter because it highlights the contested representations and materiality caused by its undefined ownership. I explore how tourists on the Jeju Olle Trail acquire a sense of ownership over the Jeju rural landscapes through discourses that the Jeju Olle Foundation have produced with the aid of regulative authority of Jeju provincial government, as well as how they express this sense in their interactions with Jeju people, essentially competing over defining landscapes. Linking the idea of screening with the sense of landscape ownership, landscape screening becomes a process of materializing the imagined ownership of landscapes. This chapter investigates the processes and outcomes in which the urban middle class screened rural landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail, focusing on conflicts between the “certified owners” (tourists) of landscapes and the “actual owners” (rural residents) of resources derived from the landscape. It determines how discourses of NIC social problems resulting from rapid economic growth facilitate excluding particular behaviors of rural residents from rural landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail.

By emphasizing struggles over the representation and materiality of landscape at the individual scale (face to face), this chapter contributes to amenities landscape literature. By doing so, it also responds to Bunce’s (2008) call for exploring how people who live and work on shifted rural landscapes experience aesthetic and environmental landscape.
South Korea, a Newly Industrialized Country

South Korea achieved rapid economic growth under the strong leadership of the developmental state. Beginning in the 1960s, the national economy grew annually for two decades by 8.4%, earning it the moniker “the miracle of Han River.” Based on this growth, South Korea joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranked 30th among 185 countries across the world in 2014 (World Bank database). The growth in South Korea can be attributed to the growth-pole strategy, which the developmental state employed for efficiency, i.e., achieve maximum industrialization with minimum resource input. Developmental plans thus often focused on industrialization in urban areas, which simultaneously resulted in urban sprawl.

Even though the plans successfully brought about rapid economic growth, they also caused social problems by prioritizing economic growth focusing on urbanization over social welfare and the environment. The problems included, notably, environmental degradation and rural-urban uneven development (Cadien and Kim 1990, Eder 1996). The South Korean public believed that urban residents suffered from environmental degradation, such as lacking green space and poor air and water quality caused by rapid urbanization (Choi 1997). The public also believed that infrastructure and living standards in rural areas lagged behind urban areas for having been excluded and only
used\textsuperscript{111} to facilitate industrialization without any returns, despite the government’s expanded spending for rural social and economic development. Once the developmental state achieved rapid economic growth through a strong industrialization drive through the 1980s, the South Korean government invested significantly in rural areas for infrastructure improvement and boosting the rural economy, spending 2 billion USD from 1992 to 2013 (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, cited from Lee 2011:4). This spending was relatively large considering its proportion in the national budget compared to other countries. 6.7% was spent for boosting the Agriculture and Fisheries industry in South Korea, while 2.7% and 3.6% were spent in the United States and Japan (2006). However, as a result of rapid urbanization and marginalized rural economy, the South Korean rural society has continued to experience unfavorable social and economic conditions relative to urban residents. The ratio of rural household income over urban household income decreased from 80.1% in 1998 to 66% in 2009, and the number of houses built 25+ years ago in rural areas was recorded at five times more than in urban areas (Lee 2011: 12).

South Koreans perceive that the tendency of the developmental state to pursue rapid economic growth still remains. This feeling includes the tourism industry, which has been criticized for focusing only on numbers of tourists and tourist facilities rather than on quality of experience. The public regarded this quantitative approach to resemble the ways in which the country achieved industrialization and modernization, caring only

\textsuperscript{111} For example, the Low Crop Policy implemented by the developmental state (1960s) enabled the urban economy to structurally exploit the rural economy by maintaining low crop prices.
about quantitative growth of the economy. Thus, demand increased in the 2000s for improved quality of leisure experiences (Lee 2008: 500-501), as did public demand for alternative tourism, such as unaltered nature and social intimacy, often imagined as typical characteristics of rural areas.

Since 2007, the Jeju Olle Trail project has gained increasing popularity among the South Korean public because of the ideals incorporated in the rural landscapes of Jeju Island. By enabling tourists to access to the previously unintroduced natural and cultural landscapes of Jeju Island, the Jeju Olle Foundation spiked urban residents’ nostalgia about rural intimacy and nature, which were claimed to be lost in South Korea since its economic growth and rampant infrastructure establishment. The Jeju Olle Trail landscapes were claimed to provide alternatives to the tourism industry by retrieving nature and social intimacy lost in the process of rapid industrialization and modernization (Chapter 4).

The Jeju Olle Trail: Village-Level Politics Over Property Rights

Rural Villages on the Landscape of the Jeju Olle Trail

The Jeju Olle Foundation designed the Jeju Olle Trail to encircle Jeju Island, passing along coastal lines, over small mountains, and along village lanes. In rural

112 By this time, the advent of Low Cost Carrier (LCC) in South Korea facilitated domestic travels. Jeju Island, which lost its reputation as a tourist destination due to increased foreign travels, most benefitted from the LCCs. The LCCs lowered flight fare from the mainland to Jeju Island by more than half (prices dropped to about 50,000 KRW (45 USD) from about 110,000 KRW (100 USD).
villages particularly, the Jeju Olle Trail passes along farm roads among agricultural fields and greenhouses, over small mountains used as cow pastures, and through residential areas (Figure 5.1).

In Shihungli (Route 1), the Jeju Olle Trail begins at the intersection of a farm road and a village road. Route 1 continues on a farm road about 1-meter wide toward two small mountains. Pastures and agricultural fields of Shihungli villagers are located on the mountains. The trail continues to the coastline of the village after passing through a neighboring village. In Woodo (Route 1-1), the Jeju Olle Trail encircles the island. It passes along the coast, where many restaurants, farm roads, and residential areas are located and where female divers plunge into the sea to catch abalones and shells. The Jeju Olle Trail located in Wolpyong (Route 7) passes through the village port and the coastline on farm roads between orange and flower greenhouses (gray shiny rectangles on the map) and on village lanes scattered with several houses. Lastly, in Murung 2 li, the Jeju Olle Trail passes through farm roads between large garlic and orange fields and village lanes among rural houses.

By passing through corners of Jeju rural villages, the Jeju Olle Trail enables people to visit unexplored areas by tourists, being that they include residential areas and locations for fisheries and agriculture. Walking along the Jeju Olle Trail located on village lanes and coastlines, tourists can communicate with rural villagers and learn how people on Jeju Island live every day, along with enjoying scenic beauty that has not been “processed” for tourists, diverging from the tourist destinations established during the country’s development and modernization era.
Figure 5.1 Village Land Uses Along the Jeju Olle Trail

1. Shihungli:
   Route 1

2. Woodo:
   Route 1-1

3. Wolpyong:
   Route 7
The rural villagers encountered by Jeju Olle Trail tourists have been dominated by those over 50-years-old with an average household income of 37,700 USD in 2014 (Korean Statistical Information Service). This average income is higher than the national average (30,900 USD), but their average household debt at 48,000 USD is double the national average (24,600 USD), demonstrating the highly unstable status of the Jeju rural economy.

Village-level Politics

When the Jeju Olle Trail was established, rural villages adjacent to the trail received opportunities to generate income by hosting tourists (Chapter 4). The economic expectation of rural villagers made the Jeju Olle Foundation’s job of establishing the trail easy, despite the fact that about 30% of the Jeju Olle Trail was on privately owned...
property\textsuperscript{113}. Many village representatives on Jeju Island began to compete with each other to locate the trail in their villages because of the expectation to receive economic benefits. Furthermore, for village leaders, adopting the Jeju Olle Trail in their villages was a good chance to improve their performance as a village representative because their achievements were often measured by the number of developmental projects they won, such as building and renovating village halls. Reputation within a village was critical to village leaders in South Korea, particularly in rural villages on Jeju Island originating from kinship-based relationships. Indeed, about a half the village leaders that I interviewed (total of nine) mentioned that their villagers’ opinion about their performance mattered to them, so they tried to win as many developmental projects as possible. Adopting the Jeju Olle Trail in their villages was critical from an economic and political standpoint.

In trying to adopt the trail, village representatives made mistakes in that they did not necessarily request every property owner’s permission to allow public access to the private lands along the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation also committed similar mistakes when it established the trail based on information provided by village leaders. Thus, many property owners reported that there was no prior notice or process to persuade or inform them of the trail passing through private lands; some were not even aware that their lands were included in the trail. However, the Jeju Olle Foundation publicized that it spent significant time and efforts in meeting with and persuading

\textsuperscript{113} A 2011 estimation of Seogwipo City (Source: A report of Seogwipo City, titled, “The Status of Private properties on the Jeju Olle Trail”)

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private property owners along the Jeju Olle Trail to allow tourist access\textsuperscript{114} (Ahn 2009).

The foundation also claimed its efforts to minimize the negative impact of tourists walking along agricultural fields, pastures, and other private landholdings. For example, it claimed it put signs on privately owned lands for tourists’ caution and annually compensated property owners for economic loss from not being able to cultivate fields holding the trail. Village leaders and the Jeju Olle Foundation hastened the Jeju Olle Trail project in rural villages because they lacked awareness of property rights and were eager for performance, resulting in private properties being included in the trail without owner consent.

For the cases in which the Jeju Olle Foundation exploring team did obtain property owner permissions, it utilized strong social ties among Jeju natives and at the village level. Once the team decided the potential path of a new route, it inquired with property owners through social ties, as said by the exploring team leader:

\begin{quote}
We then ask around about property owners’ names and villages. With those, we can easily contact owners through social ties [across Jeju Island], like somebody’s brother, or somebody’s village uncle (I77-F2).
\end{quote}

When contacted, property owners tended to orally permit public access because of the strong social ties.

While the competition for potential economic benefits among village leaders facilitated private land inclusion in the Jeju Olle Trail, village-level social pressure

\footnote{\textsuperscript{114} There seemed to be a growing awareness of the property rights issue within the Jeju Olle Foundation through trial and error because it checked with property owners in establishing routes at a later phase.}

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caused by economic expectations contributed to parts of the trail remaining on private lands. Since villagers enjoyed economic benefits from the influx of tourists for at least a year (refer to Chapter 4 for details), property owners faced criticism from their neighbors for being selfish when they attempted to eliminate the trail from their lands. For example, a rancher asked the municipal government to provide him with incentives for using his land for the Jeju Olle Trail. Seogwipo City and the Jeju Olle Foundation refused his request and detoured the route off his ranch. The rancher later furiously complained that his neighbors criticized him for “closing the entire segment when the local government refused to accept his request for money." The rumor in the village was that the rancher sought only his own interest, “selling” his neighbors, i.e., bringing disadvantages to his neighbors. Losing his reputation among neighbors mattered to the rancher because he was born in the village and his three kids went to school there. Like this rancher, most rural residents on Jeju Island are natives and want to maintain local ties among neighbors, avoiding situations that could harm their relationships. Indeed, many villagers, including those with properties along the Jeju Olle Trail, reported that they left their lands or village-owned lands to seek the broader interests of the village and the province:

We regardless think that the Jeju Olle Trail is good for village development. By development, I mean to promote the village so that many people visit the village and spend money here (I122-V82).

(Landowners) can block the trail along the port, but most of them cannot do that. We, Jeju people are generous, so we can’t block. Not generating troubles among

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115 Citizen’s complaints uploaded on 6/14/2012, on the Seogwipo City webpage (http://www.seogwipo.go.kr/contents).
villagers is good. Less than 2% of village households work in the service industry. The trail is good only for those people. There’s nothing good for us (making livelihoods beyond the service industry) (I82-V52)

I do not block the trail because it’s good for the village and the province (I102-V64).

The quote “not generating troubles among villagers is good” is particularly telling. It demonstrates Jeju people’s tendency to avoid community conflicts, thereby facilitating property owners’ oral concession\textsuperscript{116} about public access to their properties. If a landowner claimed ownership from the Jeju Olle Trail, it would cause social trouble with other villagers, Jeju Olle Foundation employees, and provincial and municipal officials, as shown in the rancher’s case.

Concerns were heightened in this arena with landowners from the mainland. As discussed in Chapter 4, mainlanders own a significant portion of Jeju land, particularly lands with scenic beauty that made good candidates for the trail. Jeju villagers reported that mainlander often refused to include their lands on the trail or wanted to be excluded from the trail because they were socially unconnected from Jeju Island. Villager representatives put it like this:

Compensate the loss (caused by using lands for public purposes), there are many this kind of people, especially outsiders. People from this region rarely do that, but outsiders do (I40-V19).

I contacted with a Seoul owner when establishing the trail in the village, and the person said no. So we had to choose another way. These are mainly outsiders. They can be so definite in saying no, because they are outsiders, who are speculators for development. (Local) corporations or villagers here do not behave

\textsuperscript{116} The Jeju Olle Foundation leaders informed that the foundation provides hard copy of landowners’ concession only upon landowners’ request (I78-F3; I77-F2).
like that. Because they have to meet us anytime later, they maintain favorable attitude, such as donating lands for village uses. But outsiders neither release their lands even we offer compensations nor allow using the lands for the Jeju Olle Trail (I89-V56).

The village representatives’ remarks contrast mainlanders attitudes to those of Jeju people in dealing with the issue of including privately owned lands in the Jeju Olle Trail: mainlanders easily reject donating their lands for the trail, and Jeju people have trouble doing the same or asking for compensation because of their community ties. This vulnerability allowed exploitation of private property owners.

Of course, not all property owners with lands along the trail immediately allowed public access to their lands; there were indeed property owners who wanted to exclude their lands regardless, for example on Routes 7 and 8. However, the above-discussed cases illustrate that Jeju property owners were unable to easily exercise their property rights over their own lands when their neighbors and the province were believed to benefit from tourists’ passing through them.

The Jeju Olle Trail was established through struggles over cost/benefit distribution revolving around property rights. The local struggles provide a critical starting point for understanding competing representations and materiality of landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail because they demonstrate that private properties, along with otherwise-owned lands, comprise the landscape of the Jeju Olle Trail. The struggles also show that property rights were highly contested at the local level in the process of trail establishment. Most importantly, the local struggles highlight that tourists were not only uninvolved with the struggles, but also had no property rights along the Jeju Olle Trail.
An Urban Middle Class Project

Urban Middle Class Targeting the Urban Middle Class

On the afternoon of November 2, the final ceremony of the 2013 Jeju Olle Walking Festival was held on an elementary school playground located in Jeju City. Tourists in colorful outdoor clothing who had walked along Route 16 all day long entered the playground one after another, exploring the several tents set up for souvenirs and dinner and settling on the ground in the center of the playground to enjoy the ceremony. A psychologist popular among the South Korean public began performing onstage; in a calm tone, she spoke of warm childhood memories that had been lost in today’s society. Then she began playing a piano and asked the audience to sing along to an old popular children song about a girl in the countryside missing her elder brother who had left for Seoul to make money.

To the right of the stage, another group of people watched the stage and the tourists. They contrasted with the tourists: village grandmothers, children, and farmers stood (not sat) in a corner (not the center) of the playground wearing everyday clothes (not outdoor looks). They did not sing with tourists.

The slogan of the 2013 Jeju Olle Walking Festival was “Communicate on this trail!” proclaiming that festival programs aimed to facilitate tourist communication with Jeju local people (www.jejuolle.com). However, it seemed that the festival was just for the South Korean urban middle class without communicating with Jeju local people.
Tourists and Jeju people were not only spatially separated, but also looked very different from each other in appearance, attitude, and posture.

**Tourists**

Jeju Olle Trail tourists were likely to be middle-aged, college-educated, white-collar professionals from the metropolitan area of Seoul. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism in 2010 reported that tourists in their 40s to 50s accounted for 55.6%; college-educated and white-collar professionals were 76% and 38%, respectively; and 73% of tourists were from the metropolitan area of Seoul (MCST 2010: 103-105). A tourist spent 355 USD on average per visit, which was 50 USD more than spending by island tourists with purposes other than the Jeju Olle Trail. The report suggested that marketing strategies targeted urban dwellers of South Korea (*Ibid.*: 104). Research defines average Jeju Olle Trail tourists as urban middle class\(^\text{117}\), most of whom are satisfied with their visit; a survey conducted by Seogwipo City found that 99% of tourists wanted to revisit the trail (cited from Ahn 2009: 12).

**Volunteers**

As the Jeju Olle Trail gained increasing popularity across the country, the Jeju Olle Foundation received wholehearted support from the South Korean public, particularly among the urban middle class (Chapter 3). Their support included

\(^{117}\) Urban middle class is defined as households with an income between 50% and 150% of the median income in South Korea, which in 2013 roughly 38,000 USD, making the middle class households living between 19,000 and 57,000 USD (SBS 2014).
participating in volunteer and educational programs of the Jeju Olle Trail (Appendix 1). I joined the Jeju Olle Academy in both basic and intensive courses in 2013, as well as volunteer activities for cleaning the Jeju Olle Trail. I describe volunteers that I met in the programs in order to define their general characteristics:

- **Mr. CH: male in his 60s, from Seoul**

Mr. CH recently retired from a higher managerial position in a large automobile company. He was from an affluent family and was well educated (he graduated from one of the top three universities in South Korea). Mr. CH began to be involved in the Jeju Olle Foundation through the 13th basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy in 2013. Since then, he actively participated in events held by the Jeju Olle Foundation such as the Clean Olle Campaign and *Acarzabong* (Appendix 1).

- **Ms. RT: female in her 40s, from Seoul (migrated about 20 years before)**

Ms. RT was a wife of the owner of one of the largest rental car companies on Jeju Island. She was from Seoul and migrated to Jeju Island after she married to her husband, who was from the island. Ms. RT enjoyed meeting new people in different volunteer activities related to the Jeju Olle Foundation. She had also gotten involved in the Jeju Olle Foundation through the Jeju Olle Academy.

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118 The Jeju Olle Academy is a program in which participants can learn about culture, language, nature, food, and flora and fauna on Jeju Island. The academy has two courses, basic and intensive. When I took the courses in 2013, the basic and intensive courses cost 60,000 KRW (52 USD) and 110,000 KRW (95 USD), respectively.
• **Mr. SW: male in his 40s, from a suburban city of Seoul**

Mr. SW ran a restaurant in a suburban city of Seoul after having been a teacher. We met in the basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy, and he appeared at every Jeju Olle Foundation event I participated in.

• **Mr. LS: male in his 30s, from Seoul**

Ms. LS was a doctor who had recently migrated to Jeju Island from Seoul. He was initially attracted by the Jeju Olle Trail and then enjoyed walking along other trails established across the country. He was active in Jeju Olle Foundation volunteer activities, such as taking charge of the Clean Olle Campaign and acting as vice representative of the Jeju Olle Academy, for which he also lectured on emergency care in the basic course.

• **Ms. MN: female in her 30s, a migrant from Seoul**

Ms. MN worked in the office of a marine logistics company for almost 20 years before she took a month leave and traveled to Jeju Island. She quit her job upon her return and migrated to Jeju Island without a particular reason for choosing it for the second chapter of her life. After taking the basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy, Ms. MN actively sought volunteer opportunities with the Jeju Olle Foundation.

These volunteers and trainees of the Jeju Olle Foundation were mostly from the urban middle class of South Korea in terms of socioeconomic status even though there
were some Jeju residents. These urban middle class volunteers supported the Jeju Olle Foundation for management of the trail and landscape maintenance. More specifically, they used their skills and knowledge to contribute to the trail project through programs like the Jeju Olle Academy alumni organization or tour guides. Once the trail was established with aid from numerous Jeju villager volunteers (labor unacknowledged by the Jeju Olle Foundation) (as discussed in Chapter 4), the urban middle class also contributed to maintaining the environmental and aesthetic landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail through cleaning programs such as the Clean Olle Campaign on a monthly basis (labor acknowledged by the Jeju Olle Foundation). The latter group of volunteers established and maintained the landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail based on the ideals of environmental and aesthetic landscapes proposed by the Jeju Olle Foundation.

**The Jeju Olle Foundation**

In 2013, The Jeju Olle Foundation had 10 – 11 employees who were mostly from the urban middle class of South Korea. The foundation leader herself was a successful journalist, who describes in her book (2008) urging one of her colleagues to leave a journalist job and join the Jeju Olle Foundation. The colleague eventually came to Jeju Island and took the position of Jeju Olle Foundation director. Another member was an environmental activist protesting against large construction projects that destroyed the environment through cutting mountains, etc. She left her NGO job in Seoul and joined the Jeju Olle Foundation with an offer from the foundation leader to be the education team leader. Two other employees I met had master’s degrees, one from the United
Kingdom and one from the United States. Having a degree from a developed country tends to guarantee an urban middle class job in South Korea, but one of them actually left her decent job in Seoul to join the Jeju Olle Foundation.

These key figures of the Jeju Olle Foundation who left their urban middle class jobs in Seoul understood urban middle class tastes and the marketing that would “hook” urban middle class tourists—they also knew how to circulate the marketing through media to reach the urban middle class, as the following section demonstrates.

**Environmental and Relational Nostalgia**

The Jeju Olle Foundation leader evoked environmental and relational nostalgia when she established discourses about rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail for promotion. She communicated that leaving her hectic urban life, surrounded by buildings and trapped in business relationships, for Jeju Island, where she walked in nature and related with grandmothers (*hallmang* in Jeju dialect), restored her physical and mental wellness. In her book (2010), the leader describes herself as a typical South Korean middle class urban resident who had lost precious old memories of childhood in striving to achieve the rapid modernization and development of the country. Nature and social relations had not been destroyed during her childhood on Jeju Island. This rhetoric evoked the urban middle class’s nostalgia about the environmental and social ideals of the Jeju Olle Trail, implying that tourists could enjoy undestroyed or retrieved nature and social relations on the trail.
The Jeju Olle Foundation battled physical evidence of modernization to achieve the ideals of the Jeju Olle Trail. During the rapid industrialization period, modernization swept the country regardless of urban and rural areas, with paved roads being prime evidence. The foundation struggled to avoid them and retrieve “old village lanes that had been forgotten even among villagers” (the foundation exploring team leader) because they symbolized nature and social intimacy lost in modernization. By battling physical remnants of modernization, the Jeju Olle Foundation implicitly claimed to correct this one of two main problems caused by the country’s rapid economic growth. The other problem was rural-urban inequality, which the trail also corrected, according to the Jeju Olle Foundation. The foundation claimed that the trail directed tourist spending to rural villages that had received less benefits from the country’s industrialization process (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The foundation’s goals of environmentalism and rural benefits, then, coincided with correcting the environmental destruction and social inequality caused by South Korea’s economic development and modernization process.

In pursuing its goals, the first priority of the Jeju Olle Foundation was to satisfy tourists (Seo 2010), even before meeting their expectations about the scenic beauty and cultural uniqueness of Jeju Island. A team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation said the following on the matter:

*I think the most important thing, that I’m still dissatisfied with it now, is condition of the trail. You would enjoy scenic beauty once you feel comfortable…I realized that cars were the enemies of those who walk…[cars] threaten walkers’ safety and hamper them focusing (I77-F2).*
The team leader implied that the Jeju Olle Foundation utilized unpaved village lanes because paved roads were uncomfortable for trailers to walk on. Tourist satisfaction was also the primary driver for generating additional income for rural villages adjacent to the trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation leader and director said in a keynote speech and article that tourists felt warm because villagers who benefitted from the Jeju Olle Trail project welcomed them (Seo 2012; Ahn 2009). The team leader also mentioned the following:

We made the [length] of a route to seem about right for an ordinary person to walk for a day. We also located villages at beginning and ending points of a route. It was because tourists walking along the trail would conveniently take a rest there, and villagers could communicate with tourists...some villages complained when the trail did not pass, but I did not negotiate...because our first principle was ‘would those who walk on the trail be satisfied’ (Ibid.).

These examples reveal that rural villagers should be economically satisfied with the Jeju Olle Trail in order for them to host tourists in a favorable manner. Minimal environmental impacts and local benefits were seen as the way to maximize tourist satisfaction, which was the foundation’s top priority:

The first principle in determining a route was, the dominant principle was this. ‘Would a person who walks on this trail be satisfied?’ [We] just strived to meet the goal rather than wanted to show something [special] (Ibid.).

It is important to understand this as the priority of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail because prioritizing tourist satisfaction, as opposed to other proclaimed goals, namely, rural development and environmental conservation, implanted and enhanced the perception about landscape ownership among tourists.

Certified Ownership

As a result of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s emphasis on tourist satisfaction, along with the representations of landscapes promoted through media, tourists visited the Jeju Olle Trail with particular imageries of the trail and rural villages. They imagined the trail would lead them to Jeju nature through unpaved roads and that rural villagers would host them. So some tourists were displeased to find discrepancies between what was imagined and what was actually encountered. They expressed their feelings to Jeju local villagers, which came off as having an attitude of ownership. An orange farmer was disgruntled by the tourist criticism, saying:

"tourists talk to us as if they are the owners of this road (I82-V52)."

This attitude of ownership also made rural villagers confused and depressed, as said by the orange farmer’s neighbor:

"I don’t know why tourists complain to us about the problems of the trail. I don’t like it (I133-V93)."

These farmers felt that it was unfair to receive tourist criticism because they did not establish the trail. At most, they provided knowledge and labor in the establishment process, and the Jeju Olle Foundation used that knowledge to design a trail conforming to a preconceived ideal.

The tourist ownership attitude was most explicit when they treated Jeju farmers and fishermen as “tourist helper or something.” Another orange farmer reported his experience of taking a rest after working in the field: he was sitting on a bench located in
front of a snack corner where tourists also rested on Route 7 and was asked for tourist help.

It seems that they think us as a tourist helper or something. They not only asked me to show directions of the trail, but also asked me to call taxis for them (1136-V96).

The farmer thought tourists did not have the right to “order” him like a servant, especially because farmers and fishermen did not receive benefits from tourist spending. In other words, the farmer found tourists presumptuous in behaving with an attitude of ownership, revealing their assumptions that rural villagers’ labor and emotions could be left uncompensated and that villagers had no other sources of livelihood beyond hosting tourists.

The Jeju Olle Foundation actually formed this ownership attitude among tourists. The ways in which it targeted urban middle class tourists in marketing the environmental and aesthetic view of landscapes implanted the “self-deception” of the ownership of landscape and beyond. The Jeju Olle Foundation explicitly entitled tourists as “certified owners.” On the webpage of the Jeju Olle Foundation, it solicits donation from tourists:

The Jeju Olle Trail is open to everybody without any entrance fees. In order to expand and maintain the Jeju Olle Trail, we need more owners. With your donation, the Jeju Olle Foundation is making and maintaining the most beautiful and peaceful trail in the world. Please become the owner of the Jeju Olle Trail by registering as a supporting member of the Jeju Olle Foundation (www.jejuolle.com).

In a similar context, the government official in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP) for about two years attributed the success of the trail to the “entitling” of tourists:
In my opinion, the reason why the Jeju Olle Trail has been so successful is that the Jeju Olle Foundation leader has drawn a lot of people [to the Jeju Olle Trail], as supporters. ‘You’re the owner of the Jeju Olle Trail just because you are walking on it.’ Then the people become supporters or volunteers [of the Jeju Olle Trail], and feel a lot more entitlement of ownership, and want to participate in the Jeju Olle Trail later again. Once you know what it is like to become an owner through festivals or something, then you would want to come down here again for the next year’s festival. Beginning festivals, tourists later come in even during non-festival period. [And] they feel kind of obliged to walk along the Jeju Olle Trail when they talk with other people about it. It seems to me that [the Jeju Olle Foundation] makes tourists as owners of the Jeju Olle Trail, sometimes they also feel obliged to write a positive review on the internet, it just touches people in that way (I43-G7).

The official’s quote implies that tourists are entitled to feel not only ownership of the trail, but also responsibility for maintaining its environmental and aesthetic beauty.

Tourists¹²⁰ having ownership implies that (1) tourists behave as they want on the Jeju Olle Trail; (2) tourists take responsibility for what happens on the Jeju Olle Trail; and (3) tourists have the right to intervene and correct local behavior if they feel something is different (wrong) from their view of the “right” landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail.

The feeling of ownership and the accompanying rights and responsibility over trail landscapes can be explained by Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of the “self-deception” about landscape ownership. Property rights belong to Jeju individuals, villagers (village-owned lands), and Jeju citizens (municipality/province-owned lands), but tourists can

¹²⁰ I do not intend to argue that all tourists behave as owners. Indeed, villagers also reported that tourists have treated rural villagers with respect and have shown a sense of responsibility for the environment of Jeju Island.
easily imagine it as theirs because landscape ownership, even for private properties, is undefined.

The Jeju Olle Foundation implanted and enhanced the self-deceived perception of ownership among tourists by issuing certified ownership on what does not belong to it. It owns neither the properties on which it located the Jeju Olle Trail nor the landscapes viewed from the properties. The foundation only appropriated landscapes for itself by establishing environmental and aesthetic ideals of landscapes and “sold” the landscape ownership to tourists. By doing so, it achieved political and social gains (nationwide reputation and political influence on Jeju Island, as discussed in Chapter 3).

Because of the self-deception of ownership, tourists participate in “screening” Jeju Olle Trail landscapes through their encounters with local people along the trail, which are often in conflict with the ideals presented to them about the environmental and aesthetic landscapes, as the following section demonstrates.

**Landscape, Contested Ideas About Livelihoods and Modernization**

Jeju Olle Trail tourists and Jeju local people have often conflicted as a result of the discrepancy between tourists’ expectation and their reality, as well as the tourists’ certified ownership issued by the Jeju Olle Foundation. The conflicts demonstrate competing discourses of modernization and environmentalism, livelihoods and leisure, and rural and urban cultures.
Leisure vs. Livelihoods

The impact to farming by the Jeju Olle Trail differs among rural villages, depending what part of village lanes were included. Murung 2 li villagers reported few conflicts because they encounter tourists less than other villages due to their larger garlic fields and farm roads. A Murung 2 li grandmother whom I helped select garlic seeds told me that she sees some tourists coming and going from a distance, but she actually does not have much chance to encounter them while working (I197-V148). Like the grandmother, other Murung 2 li farmers had to neither sit with tourists and listen to their complaints nor wait until tourists give way for agricultural tractors on narrow farm roads.

Income levels also contributed varying interactions among tourists and villagers. Larger field sizes also imply a higher income of these farmers (also depending on crop values). A village officer of Murung 2 li reported:

Villagers here earn quite a lot of money, unlike in other villages. Many of them are rich farmers. Their annual incomes are comparable with, or even more than, those managers’ in large corporations, like 100 million KRW (90,000 USD) (I97-V60).

The representative of the Village Youth Association explained that Murung 2 li villagers would therefore care less about potential earnings from tourist spending (I75-V47). He said that farmers, in addition, are very busy due to field size, so busy that most of them
find it easier to buy lunch from restaurants, implying further that they would by no means have time to run lodges or restaurants for insignificant earnings.\footnote{Instead, the 	extit{Murung 2 li} Village Association was actively involved in the Jeju Olle Trail project through the “1 Village and 1 Corporation” program implemented by the Jeju Olle Foundation.}

As a result of fewer encounters with tourists and less dependency on (or expectation about and following disappointment from) tourist spending, 	extit{Murung 2 li} villagers showed favorable attitudes in general toward tourists. Another grandmother in 	extit{Murung 2 li}, who was making chili paste when I visited her house, said that she liked to see tourists walking along farm roads wearing outdoor clothes splashed with a variety of colors. She said:

How beautiful [tourists] are walking on colorful clothes! I feel refreshed by only looking at those young (177-V44).

Contrast to 	extit{Murung 2 li} villagers who were favorable to tourists, villagers from 	extit{Shihungli}, 	extit{Wolpyong}, and 	extit{Woodo} reported significant conflict with tourists because the trail passes narrow farm roads between agricultural fields and vinyl greenhouses. The villages tend to experience tourists’ interruption to their production activities. Tourists want to interact with villagers by saying hello or by asking questions, which not only interrupts production activities but also makes villagers tired, as a peanut farmer in 	extit{Woodo} said, “I feel so tiresome with increasing tourists here (1157-V116).” Questions, which vary from the kinds of crops and harvesting periods to crop prices, have
significantly bothered farmers to the extent that a female farmer of a plant used for medicine called bangpoong, complained,

The Jeju Olle Trail tourists in a row were asking same questions over and over again, that I could not precede working on the field. I even wanted to write the [same] questions and answers on a board and post it. I liked tourists coming here at first, but it was not one or two people, I just could not work (I53-V27).

Other farmers also said many curious tourists in a row delayed agricultural production by hindering work focus. Even though tourists ask simple, short questions out of plain curiosity or for learning purposes in their leisure activities, the questioning turns into considerable time spent for farmers.

Tourists in these villages have also caused farmers to lose agricultural products because they pick crops such as potatoes, carrots, and oranges in quantities from a product to a box of products. A Shihungli woman villager reported her neighbor’s experience of tourist theft:

I saw a grandmother in my neighborhood was angry because one of the boxes of potato that she left at the edge of her field was gone while she was harvesting in the field (I51-V25).

An orange farmer from Wolpyong similarly reported that he produced about 10,000 kg of oranges on average from his field of 0.33 ha. Among the total product, he had lost 150 to 200 kg, which he assumed to be caused by tourist theft. Even when the quantity was insignificant to total production, the farmer felt frustrated over the theft. Farmers tried to resolve tourist theft at the village level, as the orange farmer reported:

I lost some oranges from the field several times. I reported it to the Village Association, and it was discussed among village representatives. But nothing happened after the discussion. I ended up putting a camera and Japanese Cedar
fences around the field to prevent [Jeju Olle Trail tourists from picking oranges (I128-V88).

Crop theft also negatively impacts future yield because tourists lack knowledge of agricultural techniques. Another orange farmer said:

Tourists pick oranges out of curiosity, but they don’t know about farming. We have particular ways to pick oranges to sustain production in coming years. The orange tree branches fail to produce later when oranges are picked up so randomly (I134-V94).

The village leader acknowledged the theft issue, but the Village Association decided to “digest the issue within the village” (I128-V88;I89-V56) rather than appealing to other actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project, such as provincial state agencies or the Jeju Olle Foundation. So the farmers, then, bore the costs of both lost crops and prevention efforts because the village is politically less influential compared to state agencies, the foundation, or tourists.

Agriculture has also been hindered by tourists because they do not give way for tractors and cars on farm roads, delaying production and frustrating farmers. Delay could critically impact crop growth or harvest, especially during busy seasons of agriculture:

Tourists do not step aside on the farm road when we’re busy. It’s really frustrating. Are they taking responsibility when we ruined this year’s farming? (I188-V143)

These people even ignore the sound of honking horns from behind. I don’t know if they were thinking or whatever (I101-V64).

Those who walk along the trail think that [farm roads] are theirs. Not as the roads [established] for farming (I189-V144).

Other farmers reported inconveniences in agricultural production caused by tourists:
I had to pick up trash on the mountains where I had my cows for grazing. Some trash such as wet tissues are not decomposable in soil, and it can harm cows when they happen to eat them along with weeds (I40-V19).

We have to be extremely cautious when we sprayed agricultural pesticides. They are highly toxic in most cases. Farmers wear protective clothes in doing the job, but tourists just wear outdoor look clothes. So if pesticides reach tourists, it can cause them serious injuries (150-V24).

When the Jeju Olle Trail became very poplar after being broadcasted in ‘One Night and Two Days’¹²²,’ there were many complaints among villagers. In the morning when farmers went out to fields to begin work, fields were white all over because of the tissues that tourists dumped after defecation in fields. Who would want to begin working in there in the morning? (I114-V76)

These incidents demonstrate that tourists are insensitive to farmers sharing their roads with them. The insensitivity can be explained by the fact that (1) tourists are mostly from the urban middle class and are therefore rather ignorant about rural activities and (2) for urban middle class tourists, the Jeju Olle Trail was established for their leisure through marketing efforts emphasizing self-reflection (Chapter 4), so they are in no way focused on their potential impact to agriculture. Sharing farm roads with tourists even caused financial loss for a villager in Shihungli. An old woman who passed away in 2012 in her late 70s accidently hit a tourist walking along a farm road. Her daughter not only had to buy new pants for the tourist, but also had to pay him about 600 USD as settlement money. A farmer also reported that her neighbor was very angry because his tractor turned over when he tried to avoid tourists on a farm road. Yet he had nowhere to go and ask for compensation (I51-V25). Damages caused by villagers have been compensated

¹²² One of the most popular TV shows in South Korea in 2012.
out of their pocket, but villagers have in no way been compensated for loss caused by
tourists. Concessions are made by villagers alone:

Those who go to fields should be careful. Would those on the Jeju Olle Trail [be
careful]? It’s revered somehow…(I189-V144)

The bitter rancher who stated this felt that tourists should be the ones to be careful and
make concessions, not the farmers, because farm roads have been village-owned for
hundreds of years and the Jeju Olle Trail was established recently without any change in
property ownership. Farmers have also experienced emotional distress because they feel
they have no control over the tourists’ disrespect for their livelihood. The tourists seem
to consider the livelihood landscape as mere background for leisure activities.

The conflicting purposes of the landscape have also brought about social and
cultural impacts to rural villages on the Jeju Olle Trail. First, some farmers were
frustrated when they saw tourists enjoy leisure activities by walking along the Jeju Olle
Trail:

I felt irritated when tourists talked loudly or sang songs on the trail. I was
working! (I135-V95)

I don’t like seeing them pass by my field wearing colorful clothes when I am
working hard (I174-V132).

These quotes imply that farmers feel relative deprivation by comparing their situation
with that of tourists. Tourists frivolously pass by where farmers are seriously working
hard, demonstrating a social distance between citizens of the same state caused by the
Jeju Olle Trail.
The comparison between tourists and farmers has also brought about farmers’ fear for being disrespected by tourists because of what farmers eat or wear. An old peanut farmer in Woodo furiously expressed his feeling about the inconvenience:

I cannot have lunch now on the field. These people are staring at me eating lunch, so I have to eat lunch [delivered] from a restaurant for 7,000 KRW [6 USD]!” (I157-V116)

Before tourists arrived, the farmer brought a lunch from home, but felt pressured to buy lunch because of tourists’ gaze on his humble lunch. Tourists may have just been curious, but their gaze caused lack of privacy and shame. As for clothing, the previous leader of the Village Women Association said that she hoped tourists enjoyed their visit to Jeju Island, but she was:

Just a little bit worried that they would look down on us villagers because of how we wear [when they encounter us in the village].” (I96-V59)

Villagers wear work clothes and are often dirty and sweaty by the end of a day of hard work. Before the Jeju Olle Trail was established on the village road in Wolpyong, villagers did not have to worry about how they looked because they would have only encountered their kinship-based neighbors. Clothing style was nothing to hide or worry about. However, the tourist influx meant that villagers encountered outsiders during work who wore colorful, nice outdoor wear that sharply contrasted with work clothes. Trail establishment caused private spaces among kinship-based villagers to turn

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123 Rural villages on Jeju Island were established based on kinships. In fact, three brothers called “Goh,” “Boo,” and “Yang” became the ancestors of people on Jeju Island, according to the legend about Jeju Island’s establishment. Thus, people on Jeju Island today call their seniors “uncle,” regardless of gender and family relationships.
into public landscapes, and villagers began to feel encroached upon by and inferior to outsiders about how they look and what they eat. And tourists felt that they were entitled to watch private spaces for learning purposes as invited guests and certified owners.

The conflicting purposes and expectations from a single landscape and resulting class struggles among farmers and tourists well illustrates the social, economic, and cultural marginalization of Jeju rural villagers living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail.

**Environment vs. Development**

**Trash: conservation vs. livelihoods**

The Jeju Olle Foundation had much emphasized that it achieved landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail through practicing environmental conservation. It applied environmentally friendly principles (Chapter 4) in the process of establishing the trail, but once the trail was established and large numbers of tourists started visiting, maintaining the landscapes along the trail became an issue.

Removing trash became an urgent matter to resolve because media reported that trash was spoiling the natural landscape of Jeju Island. The leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation once investigated the trail in order to determine what kind of trash was dominant on the Jeju Olle Trail and wrote about it in her book (2010: 218-226). She initiated the “Clean Olle Campaign,” walking the trail herself starting from Route 1 and picking up trash for 10 days. She found that the trash along the Jeju Olle Trail was dumped by both tourists and rural villagers, making both parties responsible, unlike tourists alone as reported by media. More popular routes had more tourist trash, and less
popular routes had farmer and fishermen trash. In investigating and removing the trash, the leader gathered supporters to help:

The participants who hated trash in the beginning turned to be delighted when they found trash...later they ran towards trash [to pick up] when they found large volume trash shouting, ‘That’s mine!’ “Oh, it’s a jackpot!” A sense of obligation to pick up trash turned into an enjoyment of restoring clean nature, and the hard labor of repeated bending waist turned into a game among participants. On the Jeju Olle Trail, even trash was [an enjoyment]...(Seo 2010:221)

The excerpt, showing volunteers having fun picking up trash, implies that the Jeju Olle Foundation leader regards trail tourists to be environmental guardians. They were willing to use their time and labor in restoring nature and landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail that had been spoiled by residents and tourists. These supporters and tourists actively participated in “maintaining” the trail through other programs that the Jeju Olle Foundation implemented such as a reward system called the “Clean Olle.” They also individually corrected the practices of garbage disposal in rural areas when they encountered them.

Due to these environmental efforts, Jeju rural villagers had to keep “trash” produced in the process of making livelihoods invisible from tourists. A good example is the experience of the ship repairman discussed in the introduction. He runs a small shop for ship repair along his village’s coastline, and equipment and ship bodies have often been outside his shop. Jeju Olle Trail tourists saw these items as trash and registered civil complaints. The repairman worked hard to avoid possible fines levied by the government. He had to adjust the way he made his living to conform to the new ideals of landscapes brought by the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation decided what the
landscape should look like, and the particular perspective about landscape was institutionally supported by JSSGP state agencies, which had maintained close collaboration with the Jeju Olle Trail. Levying fines to the ship repairman with the introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail reveals that the state essentially facilitated the requirement for rural villagers to accept inconveniences to achieve the desired environmental and aesthetic standard about landscapes on the Jeju Olle Trail.

In sum, as environmental guardians with institutional support from the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies, tourists and supporters feel responsibility for nature and landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail, which has been spoiled by rural villagers’ livelihoods. Before the trail was established, though, the landscapes of Jeju Island were merely outcomes of these local livelihoods. Rural villagers certainly disposed of garbage from work and everyday lives in illegal ways (e.g., dumping or burning trash on coastlines and farm roads), but received little attention before the trail was established. At that point, rural livelihoods began to be regarded as threats to environmental and aesthetic landscapes. Tourists regard agricultural fields for crops and ships for fisheries as environmentally sound and aesthetically beautiful, but the processes involved in such livelihoods (e.g., pesticides, plastic vinyl, and ship repair) are ugly and harmful to the environment, thus needing to be removed by the guardians.

Rural villagers’ practices for livelihoods are not necessarily right for the environment, but these examples demonstrate the struggles over landscape maintenance. Rural villagers and tourists have competed over how and what to define as legitimate landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail, with villagers claiming landscape as an outcome of
rural livelihoods and tourists viewing it as a background for leisure activities. By defining the practices of rural livelihoods as harmful to the environment and aesthetics of the Jeju Olle Trail, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s aspiration for landscape on the trail gained more legitimacy, especially with the attitudes of ownership and guardianship.

**Roads: conservation vs. modernization**

Road pavement is an indicator of modernization and development in South Korea\textsuperscript{124}. As South Korea expedited industrialization beginning in the 1970s, the central government strived to increase pavement rates. In 2012, paved roads on Jeju Island accounted for 87.28\% of total roads, ranking it 9\textsuperscript{th} among 16 South Korean provinces (Korean Statistics Office). So after understanding the Jeju Olle Trail to be untouched by the modernization drive of the country because it was established through “finding hidden lanes, linking disconnected lanes, bringing back disappeared lanes, and making new lanes\textsuperscript{125},” tourists are often surprised to find that a significant part of the trail is paved. A woman working at the Jeju Olle Trail Information Booth at the airport reported on what she does when tourists first arrive to prepare them from being disappointed:

> There are tourists who visit the trail expecting that they could comfortably walk…pretty routes along the coast, TV showed only those routes, they expect all [routes] are like that…So I say, ‘the Jeju Olle Trail is never pretty from the beginning to the end. There are dirty, boring parts too…then you will encounter pretty parts…’ I do so particularly to the old…people imagine pretty and comfortable trail rather than paved ones. Pretty roads along the coast than paved roads (I184-F4).

\textsuperscript{124} Pavement rate is widely regarded as a development indicator in international development organizations such as the World Bank, \textsuperscript{125} http://www.jejuolle.org/?mid=10, accessed on 9/24/2014
A snack shop owner along the coastline of Route 1 witnessed further,

Tourists who walked the trail many times said that there were too much paved roads. For them, it’s fine up to the small mountain there, but after that, the roads were paved. Tourists didn’t like it…it they said the landscapes were good, but the pavement created distraction (I45-V20).

The roads distract tourists because they expect them to be composed of dirt or stones. Along with the above-described landscape materials, pavement has irritated those who subscribe to Jeju Olle Trail discourse because it is regarded as a product of modernization and industrialization, which are supposed to be foreign to the environmental and aesthetic landscapes particular to the Jeju Olle Trail.

Pavement, though, was actually an achievement for villagers. Small lanes and farm roads located in villages were paved during the 1970s as part of the “New Village Movement,” in which labor and resources were systematically mobilized to modernize underdeveloped living conditions in rural areas under the strong leadership of the central government. The movement reached virtually all rural villages of South Korea. Under the slogan, “Diligence, Self-help, and Cooperation,” the developmental state urged rural villagers to voluntarily participate in its every endeavor for rural development, from changing roof materials from straw-thatched to slate to expanding village and farm roads. Expanding roads was the paragon of this self-help movement because the government provided cement, and villagers organized themselves to expand existing narrow and unpaved lanes. The villagers successfully mobilized land and labor in order to improve commonly used resources, even sacrificing private properties in many cases
for the new roads. Landowners were rather willing to participate because they could contribute to their town’s development and property values were much lower back then. Cars and farm tractors could enter village and farm roads, and villagers could walk without worrying about mud after rain.

With the introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail, though, these achievements of villagers displayed on landscapes fell in status to something wrong and ugly. For example, the exploring team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation blamed rural villagers for erasing the physical representations of nature unaltered by development and the social intimacy from rural landscapes of Jeju Island due to their eagerness for unnecessarily excessive modernization. The exploring team leader used Gotjawal as an example of excessive modernization. Gotjawal refers to four forests scattered on Jeju Island with significant biodiversity due to its unique combination of flora and fauna. It is often referred to among environmental activists as the “lung of Jeju Island.” The exploring team leader said:

There are many paved roads in Gotjawal, many that go used only a couple of times in a year…[In order to increase accomplishment of village leaders after taking the positions,] village leaders just paved roads there because they couldn’t find [appropriate places] to spend developmental funds once received from the state (177-F2).

According to the leader, the eagerness and political calculations of jumping on the development bandwagon removed the precious nature and culture unaltered by modernization from landscapes. He also meant that the Jeju Olle Foundation was taking on the formidable task of retrieving what was lost in the process of modernization.
The conflict over pavement is another illustration that tourists were dissatisfied in being unable to enjoy nature and nostalgia as expected from the Jeju Olle Trail and that rural villagers were also dissatisfied with tourists only viewing the landscapes from environmental and aesthetic perspectives.

**Expedited “Modernization”**

The conflict over landscapes with paved roads implies different experiences of modernization between urban and rural regions in South Korea. Urban regions in South Korea have rapidly modernized in terms of infrastructure development and ways of living. Roads are extensively paved, and apartment and office buildings have been densely established and renovated in cities. 98.8% of roads were paved in six metropolitan cities and one special city in 2014 (Korean Statistical Information Service). After a couple of decades enjoying modern conveniences, urban residents became sick of living surrounded by concrete (or at least wanted to leave it behind from time to time). South Korean urban residents increasingly sought opportunities to be closer to nature, giving way for the success of the Jeju Olle Trail.

On the other hand, rural residents still aspired for modernization. Because of the developmental state’s uneven developmental strategies among rural and urban spaces and among sectors during the industrialization period, rural residents had received less attention (investment) from the government. A road pavement rate of 79.6% (2014) in
is an indicator of this lacking attention. Thus, rural residents sought to increase modernization with support from the government, even determining the capability of a village leader by how many developmental projects they implemented through competitions.

For rural villagers, the Jeju Olle Trail project was one of these developmental projects that would provide funds for villages (Chapter 3), and Village Associations requested financial support from state agencies to improve convenience, not only for villagers, but also for tourists. Villagers also received developmental funding by appealing to the Jeju Olle Foundation. Because the foundation had bargaining power with state agencies, it could influence them to channel developmental funds toward particular villages. I found this tendency in Wolpyong (a village café), Shihungli (dispute over building an information center), and Murung 2 li (a village café). Lastly, utilizing the title of the Jeju Olle Trail helped Village Associations get selected for developmental projects held by different levels of government agencies. For example, Murung 2 li, along with a couple of neighboring villages, was selected as the recipient of a 4.4 million USD developmental fund by winning a village-level competition held by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs. The winning project title was the “Murung Paradise Olle Regional Project,” emphasizing that the villages located near the Jeju Olle Trail would contribute to improving the environment along the trail. Multiple village leaders confirmed that including “Olle” in the title of the project could have contributed to being

126 The largest administrative unit for rural areas in South Korea.
selected as the winner. These villages adopted the Jeju Olle Trail as a developmental project, using it as leverage to attract more developmental funds from state agencies.

Drawing state-provided developmental funds explains why rural villagers decided to endure negative economic and cultural impacts caused by environmental and aesthetic landscape ideals and tourist attitudes of ownership instead of expressing their distress as the actual owners of landholdings generating landscapes as a totality. Many villagers perceived that the Jeju Olle Trail contributed to the village or provincial level (indirect advantage) rather than individual levels (direct advantage), so they were willing to accept the trail regardless of costs they would have to endure.

The ways in which villages implemented developmental projects after using the Jeju Olle Trail as leverage ironically conflicted with the environmental and aesthetic landscape ideals pursued by the Jeju Olle Foundation, tourists, and foundation supporters. The changes brought about to the village landscapes were all building constructions that, of course, used the “concrete” that bothered many tourists. Wolpyong Village Association built a building and recently renovated an agricultural produce shop into a café. Murung 2 li also built a building as a footbath hall for tourists and recently renovated it into a café. Also, by the end of 2013, Murung 2 li landscape was occupied by several constructions of buildings such as agricultural produce storage, a hall to teach Jeju dialect to tourists, and a village hall that were built in implementing the winning project. These constructions were all accomplished with developmental funds and the support of the Jeju Olle Foundation and the state, but they are also the “hardware” development, being criticized because of environmental and aesthetic landscape ideals
(by the Jeju Olle Trail education team leader). Even though the foundation has claimed to focus on “software” establishment for rural and tourism development, the Jeju Olle Trail ended up facilitating many hardware buildings.

The increasing popularity of the Jeju Olle Trail across the country also contributed to the hardware construction along the trail beyond rural villages because the demand for residential and commercial lands on Jeju Island rapidly increased. In fact, Jeju Island became the most competitive auction market in the country in recent years (2015, July 16, Korean Economy). Furthermore, commercial and residential building construction rose above the national average after the Jeju Olle Trail began to gain popularity in 2009 (Figures 5.2 and Figure 5.3), boosting the economies of interior design businesses. Interior design businesspersons that I met on Jeju Island in 2013 agreed that they struggled to meet increasing demands because of lack of employees.

**Figure 5.2 Change of Residential Building Area from Previous Years: South Korean Provinces vs. Jeju Island**
As such, the environmental and aesthetic ideals incorporated on Jeju Olle Trail landscapes paradoxically brought about increasing construction because of increasing demand for the natural landscapes of Jeju Island. Jeju Island was developed in such a way to establish a site of consumption and residence among the urban middle class. The two main goals of the Jeju Olle Trail—providing tourist satisfaction and an environmental and aesthetic landscape—failed because of the social problems caused during the rapid industrialization of South Korea. The social inequality between rural and urban residents created by an uneven development strategy actually increased as the urban middle class rushed into rural areas of Jeju Island and took the tourism benefits away from Jeju rural residents (Chapter 4). And the environmental degradation caused by modernization actually increased with the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail. So
instead of resolving the problems of environmental degradation and social inequality, the Jeju Olle Trail project reproduced, expanded, and intensified the social problems caused during the rapid industrialization and modernization of South Korea.

Conclusion

South Korea, as an NIC, is experiencing the transition of rural landscape purposes from a mere outcome of traditional production activities like agriculture and fisheries to an object for tourism due to the preconceived ideal of anti-modernization embedded in natural and cultural landscapes.

This chapter examines class conflicts occurring in this process of landscape transition. An NGO called the Jeju Olle Foundation established environmental and aesthetic ideals of rural landscapes on Jeju Island and endowed the urban middle class with landscape ownership. Subscribing to both the promoted ideals and endowed ownership, the South Korean urban middle class discursively and materially claimed its entitlement to rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail. Even though the rural landscapes could be seen as aesthetically pleasing “natural” landscapes, the landscape ideal required further modification of actual rural landscapes. Rural villagers were asked to take the cost of landscape modification by shifting their ways of making livelihoods. In addition, the landscape discourse—subscribing urban middle class negated rural villagers’ developmental achievements because of anti-modernization embedded in the landscape ideal. This process erased history, lived experience, and labor for livelihood
from the landscape and incorporated and enhanced environmental and aesthetic aspects of the landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail.

By exploring class conflicts over landscape ownership and pertaining power struggles, this chapter also illuminates the spectrum of “the public.” The public commonly owns landscape and has the right to imagine and modify landscape as it aspires. But a question arises as Harvey asks, “But whose rights and whose city? (2003: 939).” In this vein, the chapter suggests to consider whom or what the public comprises. Is the public, in the form of a collective entity, entitled as a legitimate controller of landscape? The public by no means can be defined uniformly throughout the span of social classes within it, though. This chapter determines the processes and outcomes of defining the citizenship of landscapes by examining the spectrum of the public and differentiating social groups included in the concept of the public. In doing so, it explores how undefined landscape ownership complicates landscape politics on Jeju Island. By doing so, the chapter also responds to McCarthy’s (2005B) call for examining membership of the commons to make it “truly just and sustainable.”

Examining the processes of particularizing the public as resource users in favor of one social class over another also poses a question about “making resources a commons,” beyond landscape127. In general, scholars and activists are concerned that larger and socioeconomically vulnerable populations tend to lose their access and control over resources such as open space because of privatization (McCann 1999). Scholars and

127 I would still argue that political struggles over landscapes are especially pressing, considering increasing demand for rural amenities across the world, beginning with the First World in the 1970s and moving toward middle-income countries like NICs.
activists thus tend to advocate for public access to privatized resources, often employing Lefebvre’s idea of the “right to the city.” However, there are cases in which resources are privately owned or bound by another’s property rights, like landscape, and have not been used for profit. As public demand for resources increases, private property right holders can face increasing pressure in any form, such as requests from the state or kinship to grant public access to their properties, as shown by the case of the Jeju Olle Trail. This process of “commonization\(^{128}\)” as opposed to privatization looks progressive. It appears to realize just resource use by expanding resource users to “the public.” Yet property rights among another span of the public might be infringed by the guised and informal enclosure. The commonization could be a process of exclusion rather than inclusion in that sense, as McCarthy points out (2005). The case of the Jeju Olle Trail demonstrates the processes in which particular representations and the materialization of a landscape excludes certain public groups in the process of including other public groups, if we regard it as an experiment of applying the rights of the city\(^{129}\) to the countryside. Baraclough (2013) proposes to expand the scope of this concept and explore possible places of discrimination and disempowerment, so this chapter provides a timely case study to begin our exploration of the right to a new realm of the city.

The class struggle over landscape examined in this chapter also reflects particular characteristics of NICs, which determine struggles over access and control of rural landscapes and thus demonstrate unique socioeconomic development paths that

\(^{128}\) Making landscape common

\(^{129}\) Purcell (2002) argues that Lefebvre’s definition of the city is “stubbornly vague.” (page 8).
simultaneously demonstrate socioeconomic characteristics from the Third and First Worlds. The uniqueness includes state involvement in developmental plans, formalized property right institutions (i.e., \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} property rights that are mediated by social relations instead of courts), temporality of increasing demand for rural landscapes for leisure purposes, contrasting attitudes about modernization and industrialization between rural and urban residents, and the developmental path of rural economy in national economies. These particularities of NICs inform political and economic struggles over representations and materialization of rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail in South Korea.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation determined the processes and outcomes in which state and non-state agencies, tourists, and local residents struggle over political and economic benefits derived from the Jeju Olle Trail project in South Korea. It focuses on contested property rights about lands and landscapes along the trail.

The overarching goal of the dissertation is to determine how NIC-specific socioeconomic characteristics in South Korea mediate in a critical way the social processes revolving around class struggles, particularly between the urban middle class (tourists and investors from the mainland) and the Jeju rural working class. Notable characteristics of NICs include rapid economic growth based on the strong leadership of the so-called the developmental state, accompanied by the state’s political oppression on its citizens and ensuing citizen demand for democracy, green spaces, and social equities. These characteristics, though, have been ever-changing in NIC societies for decades after achieving economic growth. The changes reflect domestic and international imperatives: the neoliberal ideology that swept the globe resulted in a decentralization of state agencies and deregulation of the economy in South Korea like in other regions; the citizens’ political awareness about democracy has augmented; and citizens’ socioeconomic conditions have far improved compared to the 1960s when the developmental state embarked on developmental plans, meaning to the tourism industry that they gained purchasing power to afford their pursuit of green spaces. Based on this
view of NIC characteristics that bear ongoing changes, the three main chapters of the
dissertation examine how the shifts have mediated actors’ multiscalar struggles over
access and control of the Jeju Olle Trail that has brought about class-differentiated
outcomes.

The first main chapter, titled “The Territorializing State: Scalar Struggles for
Control of The Jeju Olle Trail,” describes the processes in which a decentralized state
reinforces state authority through scalar politics. Scalar struggles are defined as contests
between state and non-state actors beyond the scales at which they are typically
identified as acting (e.g., the state acts at the scale of the state, typically). These actors
create new scales in order to create new territories of engagement. State and non-state
actors strategically leverage power at the scales they believe to offer them the greatest
advantage in the struggle. By creating new scales, non-state actors have new venues
from which to oppose the state. For example, Perreault (2005) describes the process that
a local union reaches out toward lawyers and activists at the international scale to boost
the union’s power in negotiating water rights with the state (See also Agnew 1998). The
state's goal for deploying other scales’ power is often territorialization. The
“territorializing state” refers to a state agency that actively builds up its authority for
controlling land-based resources and resource users within its administrative and spatial
boundaries. It is this territorializing state that non-state actors maneuver to oppose.

One of the scalar tactics that the state often employs for territorialization is
governance. Governance is defined as a system of resource management in which state
and non-state actors collectively make decisions at a scale of involved actors’ resource
use. The key idea here is that resource management is devolved to users such as NGOs, the private sector, and local communities, instead of the state. However, in many cases, state authorities turn out to be still reinforcing by the state’s tactic of reaching out higher scales of state authority (Brannstrom et al. 2006). Non-state actors' acts of governance often end up being controlled by the state. The idea of the state devolving power to resource users becomes controversial because of the inconsistency. Governance is then merely rhetoric for consolidating state power, thus, reinforcing the territorializing state. The Jeju Olle Trail case demonstrates this paradoxical process.

The state's intervention in the Jeju Olle Trail project was obfuscated by the rhetoric of governance. While participating in governance of the Jeju Olle Trail along with the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju village associations, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province agencies also employed the strategy of “jumping scales” (Smith 1993). In order hide its efforts to control and monitor lands and people on the Jeju Olle Trail, the JSSGP jumped scales by allowing the National Assembly and the Jeju Olle Foundation to take the lead in JOT governance, ahead of itself. Unlike Smith’s original use of jumping scales, the scale jumping of the JSSGP was done without any direct appeal to the National Assembly and the JOF. Through stealthily scalar politics, JSSGP agencies successfully leveraged the power needed to territorialize the Jeju Olle Trail, as well as its territory, Jeju Island. JSSGP agencies reinforced state authority through the Jeju Olle Trail project in contradiction to the rhetoric of a bottom-up approach.

By focusing on state behaviors in scalar politics, the chapter theoretically contributes to scalar theories literature. Current work assumes that the state does not
shift scales after active decentralization processes cease. Instead, non-state actors deploy resources from higher scales ("jumping scales," e.g., Cox 1998 and Perreault 2005) to resist state restructuring. However, the state must continually act to stabilize scales that are destabilized by non-state actors (Brenner 2001; Smith 2008). The chapter shows that state actors also actively deploy scalar politics in the same way that non-state actors do when resisting the state. Thus, the chapter argues that decentralized state actors collaborate with non-state actors to reinforce the state's authority at a newly created scale.

The chapter also takes up the idea of 'variegated neoliberalization' (Brenner et al. 2010). Variegated neoliberalization is defined as the processes of creating hybrid forms of neoliberalism particular to historical and geographical contingencies. In this chapter, the strong leadership of the developmental state is emphasized as the local historical and geographical particularity. The South Korean developmental state partially explains actually practiced neoliberalism on Jeju Island. In a similar way, the 4.3 Jeju Incident (i.e., the massacre during the Korean War) partially explains actually practiced neoliberalism on Jeju Island. The chapter reveals that the JSSGP evolved as a "decentralized" (generic to neoliberalism) "developmental" (particular to NICs) state as a result of the neoliberal drives of the Jeju Olle Trail project.

The second chapter employs the thesis of the production of first and second nature (Smith 2008) and the eco-scalar fix (Cohen and Bakker 2014) in analyzing the processes and outcomes of regional developmental programs on Jeju Island. First nature refers to pristine nature untouched by humans. On the other hand, second nature means
nature altered by, or intentionally left beyond the reach of human activities for capitalists’ value creation. 'Eco-scalar fix' refers to often the state’s rescaling the spatial arrangement of natural resource control. The goal is to resolve social and environmental crises caused by a mode of capitalist production.

The chapter demonstrates that Jeju tourism development initiatives by state and non-state actors alike brought about economic marginalization for some local residents through consecutive eco-scalar fixes. In the 1960s, the South Korean developmental state framed Jeju nature and culture (people) as exotic when it incorporated the tourism industry on Jeju Island. The developmental state’s discursive establishment of Jeju nature and culture as being exotic was the production of first nature. The ideal of exotic Jeju nature and culture spiked tourists’ curiosity about Jeju Island and facilitated the circulation of tourist capital. In the process of tourism incorporation, the developmental state configured the tourism industry and related property ownership in ways to channel capital accumulation mainly to mainlanders. Jeju people who provided labor and resources for the capital accumulation were excluded from the benefits of tourism.

In order to “fix” the benefit distribution problem, the Jeju Olle Foundation spatially rearranged the tourism industry. It selected locales of scenic beauty and linked the points to set up a line of tourist destinations. Jeju nature and culture along the trail were framed as authentic and undestroyed Jeju nature because they were located beyond the developmental state’s endeavor for tourism development. The Jeju Olle Foundation produced a new first nature, i.e., nature untouched by the state, through the eco-scalar fix. The spatial rearrangement expanded capital flows because tourist visits to the island
increased. Further, it supposedly channeled the capital flows toward previously marginalized Jeju people. Nonetheless, capital flows eventually went to mainlanders because tourists spatially relocated themselves to newly established tourist destinations and dominated village-level tourism industries. The developmental state’s regional development initiative on Jeju Island resulted in diverting tourism benefits from Jeju people.

Therefore, the alternative eco-scalar fix through the production of first nature only extended mainlanders’ historical exploitation of nature and people on Jeju Island. The chapter reveals that the Jeju Olle Trail project failed to fix the social crises, despite contradictory claims. The project instead consolidated and expanded the historical marginalization of Jeju people that the developmental state caused.

The chapter has theoretical contributions to literature on the simultaneous production of nature. Studies of the coproduction of scale and nature have tended to employ a snapshot approach in examining how social, economic, and political crises at particular time spans appear to be resolved through rearranging spatial scales of ecologies (Cohen and Bakker 2014; Swyngedouw 2003). These studies overlook possible productions of scale and nature at other time spans and their relationships with a production of scale and nature at a particular time span. This oversight is a serious lacuna in understanding human-nature interactions considering that the coproduction of scale and nature is a slowly evolving process that requires time to bring about social impacts. In addition, a creation of scaled nature necessarily evolves from existing discursive and material arrangement of nature, so a historical understanding can deepen
our understanding about the nature-society relationship. The chapter incorporates the historical structure of political economic exploitation of Jeju nature by the South Korean mainland state. By doing so, it emphasizes a longitudinal approach in examining the simultaneous production of scale and nature to enhance the analytical power of the eco-scalar fix.

The third main chapter, titled “Competing Ownership Over Transitioning Rural Landscapes in A Newly Industrialized Country,” examines how the newly scaled tourism industry caused class conflicts over representations and materiality of landscape. I define landscape as collective images of different land uses determined through power struggles over access and control of the images. By “transitioning,” I specifically mean rural landscapes that experience shifting goals of viewers, from mere outcomes of agricultural practices to objects of beauty, healing, and conservation. The chapter demonstrates that Jeju people created an agricultural landscape that served their livelihood needs. The South Korean urban middle class, however, divorced from livelihood production and instead desired an aesthetic landscape.

In examining the conflict between Jeju people and the urban middle class over landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail, the chapter particularly emphasizes contested ownership. Landscape ownership is defined as the entitlement to define landscape representations, to decide material components of landscapes, and to enjoy landscapes that are formed through a reiterative interaction of representations and material components of landscape. Having actual (de facto and de jure) and perceived ownership respectively, Jeju people and the urban middle class competed to realize incompatible
ideals of rural landscapes. More specifically, Jeju people aspired expedited modernization on rural landscapes while the urban middle class wanted to enjoy natural and cultural landscapes untouched by modernization.

The chapter bears theoretical implications. It suggests expanding Lefebvre’s “the right to the city” to the countryside. As Barraclough (2013) also found, the chapter finds that struggles over access to public spaces in the countryside present different patterns from those in cities. I call this struggle 'the commonization of resources’—the disenfranchisement of marginal classes from lands (and landscapes) they have rights to. By illuminating that those with property rights have been marginalized, the chapter suggests rethinking the ways to determine rights over access and control of the common spaces differentiated among spectrum spans of the public.

The chapter also makes a theoretical contribution to the resource geography literature that emphasizes the particular materiality of resources. Resource geographers have demonstrated that the particular materiality of resources critically determines the political economic struggles over access and control of resources (Birkenholtz 2007 on water; Hollander 2005 on ETC sugar; Prudham 2005 – Douglas Fir; Véron 2006 – air). For example, drawing on Polanyi’s (1957) idea about nature as a fictitious commodity, Bakker (2003) shows that the fluidity of water limits its commodification, thereby influencing social relations related to its commodification.

Despite of these endeavors among resource geographers, the materiality of landscape has not been scrutinized yet. By the materiality of landscape, I mean the often-undefined ownership of land and landscapes. As Walker and Fortmann (2003)
persuasively demonstrate, struggles over landscape visions are particularly political because landscape values derive from the totality of individually and privately owned properties. In other words, often-undefined landscape ownership facilitates struggles over landscape visions. More importantly, the outcomes of landscape politics are also material. Classes conflict over different forms of rural capitalism and related social controls, along with rural landscape ideals (Walker and Fortmann 2003). Likewise, the case of the Jeju Olle Trail demonstrates that the deeply political process of determining access and control of landscapes revolved around contestations over property rights and over forms of rural capitalism. I suggest further exploring about how undefined landscape ownership enables and constrains class-dependent access and control of landscapes.

Lastly, the chapter fills a gap in political ecology studies by examining the political ecological impacts in NICs where the use value of landscape shifts rapidly from livelihoods to aesthetics due to in-country economic growth. This overlaps with the overarching goal of the dissertation, which challenges a problematic dichotomy of First and Third World political ecology. It demonstrates that because South Korea has social and economic characteristics mixed between the two sides of the “World” as a result of a social shift caused by rapid economic growth, the case of the Jeju Olle Trail does not fit in the First-Third World dichotomy widely accepted in political ecology scholarship after McCarthy’s (2002) suggestion.

Through the dissertation, I suggest an NIC political ecology. As mentioned in the Introduction, NICs have been a research interest in the discipline mainly to identify
driving forces that have enabled remarkable economic growth in short period of time. Once those forces are identified, NICs seem to have failed to intrigue researchers. This dissertation suggests expanding research areas about NICs from narrow economic concerns to a political ecology realm, as well as expanding geographic boundaries of political ecology (First/Third). By examining political ecology concerns (i.e., multi-scalar struggles over access and control of resources) in one of the NICs, the chapter illuminates a new “World” to explore.

Besides these theoretical contributions, the dissertation findings have the following policy implications. I discuss them by scale of impact.

**Community**  The research suggests that rural citizens should be actively engaged in driving regional development programs in ways to reflect their true aspirations, instead of uncritically inviting or being subjected to development projects. Detailed discussion of rural population aspirations, fears, and struggles experienced due to ecotourism enables local voices to be heard.

**Province**  Historical analyses of regional development programs based on local nature enables research to identify provincial government policies and behaviors in environmental governance that channel economic and political benefits toward external sources rather than proclaimed beneficiaries. The research findings will aid in determining forms of provincial government policy intervention that ensure sustainability of local livelihoods and democratic decision-making processes, considering geographic, historical, cultural, and social particularities of locales.
State The research findings will inform the South Korean government's efforts to improve pending legislation on trail management. Inspired by the Jeju Island project’s success in boosting a regional tourism industry, other state agencies have established 500 trails across the country, spending 2.3 billion USD. Yet, an absence of systematic and consistent management of the established trails has resulted in environmental destruction and little local economic benefit. Closely examining the exemplary project’s (i.e., the Jeju Olle Trail) resource governance, processes, and outcomes will provide the South Korean central government with the knowledge necessary to systematically manage trails. The knowledge will also serve provincial-level governments to improve management of established trails.

Global The Jeju Olle Trail ecotourism project is gaining popularity as an exemplary regional development program beyond South Korea, both in First (Japan) and Third (Indonesia) Worlds in Asia. Understanding failures as well as successes of ecotourism will provide possible trajectories to Asian countries seeking to achieve regional development through ecotourism. Ecotourism projects such as the Jeju Olle Trail require little in start-up costs because trails are established with existing natural landscape, so they have the potential to spread to neighboring developing countries seeking rural economic development. For these reasons it is critical to understand the successes, failures, processes, and outcomes of ecotourism implementation and widely disseminate the results.
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## ANNEX

### Annex 1. The Jeju Olle Foundation Implementing Rural Development Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Implementing organization</th>
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</table>
| Halmang Lodge          | • 5 lodges designated in a village  
                           • Curtains, beddings, and wall papers were provided to lodges          | Seogwipo City                           |
| 1 Village 1 Corporation| • 1 Corporation from the mainland established a relationship with 1 rural village along the Jeju Olle Trail  
                           • Corporations supported villages  
                           • Example: a hospital located in Seoul annually examined residents of a village | The Jeju Olle Foundation                |
| Olle-Keeper            | • Villagers regularly walks around trails within a village to help tourists  
                           • Municipal governments pay for the service on an hourly basis        | Seogwipo City; Jeju City                |
| Olle-Guide             | • Villagers serve as paid-guides after being trained by the Jeju Olle Foundation  
                           • Tourists pay for the service                                        | The Jeju Olle Foundation               |
Annex 2 Trailblazing Jeju Olle Trail Routes and Maintenance

- Avoid the asphalt road as much as possible
- Looking for the old trails which disappeared
- Using a definitely eco-friendly method when making a new trail
- Getting the width of a trail not to exceed 1 meter
- Getting a variety of manpower including the army and civilians at a time when making a new trail or doing repairs (Marine Corps, Special Forces, and Jeju Coast Guard, etc. participate in Jeju Olle Trail spontaneously)
- In principle, Jeju Olle Trail doesn’t expropriate a private land but mediates with the interested party so that Jeju Olle Trail can pass through
- A route passes through at least 3 villages*