

WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTION IN SPORT:
PERCEPTIONS, ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

The increased prevalence of whistleblowing in sport has precipitated the need to understand the antecedent conditions that underpin whistleblowing intentions. The act of whistleblowing centers on reporting an illegal (or unethical) act by an observer who possesses inside information of the wrongdoing. Sport offers a unique lens through which to study whistleblowing since the context does not follow traditional models of the practice, particularly regarding the antecedent conditions. Employing qualitative methods grounded in the *Theory of Planned Behavior*, *Cognitive Dissonance Theory*, *Attribution Theory*, *Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior*, and *Cognitive Moral Development* theoretical frameworks, the ideas that whistleblowing antecedent conditions in sport are self-serving and based on non-altruistic intentions were evaluated. As well, by applying benefit-to-cost differential and affiliation models, this research bridged the gap in the literature by initially revealing the complexities of whistleblowing among a sample of collegiate sport executives. Moreover, the qualitative measures aided in developing testable hypotheses on the relationship between antecedent conditions (e.g., altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement) and whistleblowing intentions while also providing potential barriers that impede the whistleblowing process. Sport-specific theory on ethical decision-making was strengthened contributing to a better understanding of the whistleblowing in sport.

DEDICATION

To my Mother, Sandra Goldsmith. Thank you for being my biggest supporter, my best friend, and now my angel. You continue to inspire me. I am forever grateful. I love you more than all the stars in the sky ... plus infinity.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The impact of ethical wrongdoing in our society, and its subsequent ramifications, has pervaded multiple segments of everyday life (Near & Miceli, 1995). As evidenced by Edward Snowden leaking classified National Security Agency (NSA) documents, to General Motors falsifying safety information, to the Penn State University sexual assault scandal, organizational wrongdoings have permeated sport, general business, and governmental organizations. The dissemination of these wrongdoings is done through a form of whistleblowing, or "... the disclosure by organization members (former and current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action" (Near & Miceli, 1985, 525). The emphasis of motivations for whistleblowing is typically limited to the whistleblower trying to right an ethical wrongdoing. However, blowing the whistle may also be an individual's attempt to see change in policy or practice within an organization (Near & Jensen, 1983).

The prevalence of whistleblowing can be seen in organizations worldwide as decriers of big business have become more aware of unethical behavior and general wrongdoing within their organizations (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). The increase in social awareness of ethical wrongdoings or illegal actions has risen considerably since the 1970s, when (at that time) there was fear that the cost of disseminating negative information outweighed any ethical consideration of righting a wrong (Keil, Tiwana, & Sneha, 2010). In the 1980s, however, whistleblowing as a prosocial practice became

more accepted since statutes began appearing that protected the whistler-blower from litigious recourse (Keil et al., 2010). Still, the antecedent conditions of whistleblowing are impacted by numerous barriers, concerns, and associated risks to the whistleblower, which can collectively minimize or greatly enhance the likelihood of a whistleblowing intention (Near & Miceli, 1995).

Overview of the Problem

Near and Miceli (1995) elucidated the ethical concerns and social stigmas surrounding whistleblowing, which centered on power, credibility, retaliation, organizational climate, and anonymity. Keil, Tiwana, and Sneha (2010) explained the “mum-effect,” or the reluctance to disseminate bad news, while Seifert (2006) couched whistleblowing in the idea of perceived social justice. Key constructs of whistleblowing, in a business management setting, are well defined and somewhat consistent among researchers. However, the body of research on whistleblowing may not truly predict intention beyond the motive of prosocial behavior. Past whistleblowing research has not been able to adequately extend beyond description to explanation of the antecedents that lead to one’s intention to blow the whistle. Additionally, few studies have offered empirical evidence to support the various antecedent conditions of the whistleblowing process proposed by researchers. Moreover, and despite the prevalence of whistleblowing in this context, even fewer studies have examined the construct and its potential impacts in the sport industry.

Sport has seen an increase in high-profile whistleblowing cases over the last fifteen years. Incidence in sport corruption has seen a rise in match fixing, bribery,

corruption, doping, performance-enhancing drugs, discrimination, academic fraud, sexual abuse, physical abuse, and misuse of trade secrets. Further, it is not just the athletes and professional organizations that these unethical and illegal behavior effects. Fans and associated organizational partners (e.g., corporate sponsors, media) expect purity and fairness within sport. These unethical actions defraud these external stakeholders of time and money. Despite sport offering unique and relevant cases from which to study whistleblowing, there are only a handful of research articles using sport as the context for whistleblowing behavior. To the researcher's knowledge, this dissertation is the first attempt at creating a sport-centric whistleblowing model to understand the antecedents and moderating variables (i.e., benefit-to-cost differentials) towards whistleblowing intention, while also providing a retrospective content analysis on sport whistleblowing cases over the last fifteen years. Thus, an investigation into the antecedents, benefit-to-cost differential, and outcomes associated with whistleblowing in sport are necessary.

Content Analysis

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) describe a summative content analysis as, "... a study design that starts with identifying and quantifying certain words or content in text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or content" (p. 1283). The purpose of the summative approach is to explore content using identifying keywords before and during data analysis stemming from the interest of researchers or review of literature (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).

As such, secondary literature was used to perform a content analysis from select whistleblowing cases in the sport industry. Babbie (2004) deemed the study of recorded human communications, "... among the forms suitable for study are books, magazines, web pages, poems, newspapers, letters, email messages, bulletin board postings on the Internet, laws and constitutions, as well as any components or collection thereof" (p. 314) to be the primary elements of a content analysis. The researchers looked for underlining meanings of the text (Babbie, 2004).

The summative content analysis was conducted by coding text into categories. Two researchers independently coded the data. The lead researcher was familiar to the research topic and represented an insider assessment. A second researcher who was less familiar with the research topic offered an outsider assessment. Then using a conceptual analysis technique the categories were examined. Sport whistleblowing cases spanning the last fifteen years were analyzed conceptually to determine the potential antecedent conditions for whistleblowing intention (see Table 1).

Table 1: Whistleblowing in Sport Content Analysis (select cases)

Year	Whistleblower	Organization	Situational Characteristic(s)	Action
2003	Trevor Graham	BALCO	Personal Advancement	Graham, a former USA track and field coach, anonymously phoned the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency making them aware of undetectable anabolic steroids being distributed to world-class athletes. He then sent in a used syringe containing residue of the PED to authorities. This led to a federal investigation of Victor Conte and BALCO, which had been distributing steroids from 1988-2002 in one of the largest steroid scandals ever reported. Graham stated that he was not a part of the distribution of PEDs but was later sent to prison for perjury. It was later stated that Graham wanted to be known as the "mastermind of chemistry" in providing illegal drugs to athletes.
2003	Abar Rouse	Dave Bliss & Baylor University	Prosocial Behavior	Rouse, a men's basketball assistant coach, secretly audio recorded then head coach Dave Bliss's attempt to cover-up an investigation into the payments of tuition of slain student-athlete, Patrick Dennehy. Bliss, who violated NCAA bylaws and paid for the student athlete's tuition, instructed his assistant coaches and players to lie to investigators. He also threatened to fire Rouse if he did not comply with his directives. Rouse was effectively blackballed from collegiate coaching for his actions. Bliss resigned as head coach and was given a 10-year "show-cause" penalty by the NCAA.
2005	Jose Canseco	Major League Baseball	Revenge; Personal Advancement	Canseco, a former major league baseball player, was widely considered the face of the "steroid era" and was an outcast amongst the baseball community. In 2005 Canseco wrote a book, 'Juiced,' in which he claimed that 85% of MLB players used anabolic steroids. Canseco also named multiple players with many denying the allegations. MLB commissioned the 'Mitchell Report' aimed at uncovering any player who used steroids. The report justified many of Canseco's claims. He subsequently wrote another book, 'Vindicated,' following the report.

Table 1: Continued

Year	Whistleblower	Organization	Situational Characteristic(s)	Action
2006	James Gundlach	Auburn University	Altruism	Gundlach was an Auburn University sociology professor who internally reported his suspicions of academic fraud violations within his department. He later externally whistleblow to the New York Times alleging that the athletic department was skirting National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) requirements for their student athletes. He claimed to have done so for altruistic reasons. Gundlach retired from his professor position a few years after the scandal.
2006	Lloyd Lake	Reggie Bush & University of Southern California	Revenge	Sports agent Lloyd Lake sued Bush and his family for not repaying roughly \$300,000 in gifts after Bush declined to hire Lake as his agent once turning professional. Lake in effect blew the whistle on the improprieties to the NCAA. Bush was later stripped of his Heisman Trophy and USC was put on four years' probation.
2007	Eric Mangini	Bill Belichick & New England Patriots	Competitive Advantage	New York Jets head coach Eric Mangini, a former assistant coach, had inside knowledge that the Patriots were illegally filming coaches signals from their own sideline, which is against NFL rules. Mangini was a participant in this rules violation while under the Patriots employment but quickly sent notice to the league when he was no longer affiliated. Dubbed 'Spy-gate', the league fined Belichick \$500,000, the Patriots \$250,000, and stripped them of a first round draft pick.
2007	Ron Wilson	Teemu Selanne	Competitive Advantage	Wilson, a former coach of Selanne, knew that Selanne regularly used illegal sticks to enhance his performance. Selanne claims that he gave Wilson a stick as a gift year's prior. Wilson reported the violation to the league office during a playoff round where his team was facing Selanne's. Selanne was forced to use a regulation stick.

Table 1: Continued

Year	Whistleblower	Organization	Situational Characteristic(s)	Action
2010	Floyd Landis	Lance Armstrong	Revenge	<p>Landis, a former teammate of Armstrong, blew the whistle on Armstrong after he himself was caught blood doping. Landis admitted that he had doped at the behest of Armstrong and was angered that Armstrong was not being honest. Armstrong maintained that Landis only blew the whistle because his contract was not renewed. Armstrong would later admit to the allegations and was stripped of his seven Tour de France victories and order to pay millions in restitution.</p>
2010	Mississippi State University boosters	Cam Newton & Auburn University	Competitive Advantage; Revenge	<p>Newton, a college quarterback, was coming off a junior college championship and looking to transfer to an D1 - FBS school. Mississippi State booster, Kenny Rogers, went on a Dallas radio station and alleged that Newton's father was selling his son's services to the highest bidder. Newton was suspended amid an investigation that his father solicited roughly \$180,000 violating NCAA bylaws. The case eventually was closed without enough evidence to substantiate the claims.</p>
2010 - 2012	Anonymous & Sean Pamphilon	New Orleans Saints	Revenge; Personal Advancement	<p>In 2009 there was an anonymous report from an NFL player that the New Orleans Saints were giving bonuses to their own players who intentionally intended to injure opposing players. An investigation ensued and enough evidence was found to confirm the report. However, the Saints remained adamant that there was no wrongdoing. Pamphilon, a documentary filmmaker, released audio to Yahoo Sports of assistant coach Gregg Williams instructing his players to hurt the opponents. Among other sanctions, the Saints were fined, head coach Sean Payton was suspended for the season, General Manager Mickey Loomis was suspended for 8 games, and Williams was banned from the NFL.</p>

Table 1: Continued

Year	Whistleblower	Organization	Situational Characteristic(s)	Action
2010 - 2014	Bonita Mersiades & Phaedra Almajid	FIFA & Australia & Qatar	Prosocial Behavior	Mersiades, part of the 2018 Australian World Cup bid, and Almajid, part of the 2022 Qatar World Cup bid both blew the whistle on corrupt and unethical behaviors they had inside knowledge of during the bidding process. Both women were shamed publicly and threatened for their leaks of internal information. Almajid was threatened legally unless she retracted her statements publicly, which she later did. This case is ongoing.
2012	Aaron Fisher & Mike McQueary	Jerry Sandusky & Penn State University	Prosocial Behavior; Personal Advancement	Fisher, also known as victim 1, reported sexual assault and rape charges against former PSU football coach Jerry Sandusky. McQueary, an assistant PSU football coach further testified that he was witness to Sandusky molesting children and reported the behavior to officials within PSU. Sandusky was sentenced to life in prison while the administrators, athletic department officials, and head coach Joe Paterno were either fired or stepped down from their positions.
2013	Christopher Cerbone	Catholic Diocese of Sacramento	Prosocial Behavior	Cerbone, a high school football coach, learned of alleged sexual hazing amongst some of his players. He reported the misconduct to the school principle and was fired a few weeks later after an investigation. A court ruled in his favor and the diocese reached a settlement with Cerbone for \$4mm.
2013	Porter Fischer	Biogenesis of America	Revenge; Personal Advancement	Fischer, a former marketing director for Biogenesis of America, leaked documents to MLB detailing specific players receiving performance-enhancing drugs. In an attempt to start a federal investigation, Fischer also leaked the documents to Miami New Times reporters. He did so over because of claims that owner Anthony Bosch owed him \$4,000. For his help in the investigation Fischer received \$5,500 from MLB.

Table 1: Continued

Year	Whistleblower	Organization	Situational Characteristic(s)	Action
2014	Anthony Gearon Jr.	Atlanta Hawks	Personal Advancement	Gearon Jr., a minority owner of the Atlanta Hawks, leaked a phone-recorded conversation of his General Manager making racially insensitive remarks. He also provided a 2012 email from majority owner, Bruce Levenson, to Yahoo Sports detailing racially charged comments on fan attendance. Results of the leak resulted in the Hawks being put up for sale.
2014	Mary Willingham	University of North Carolina	Prosocial Behavior	Willingham, a learning specialist, reported academic fraud allegations amongst student athletes that had been ongoing from roughly 1993 to 2011. Willingham resigned from her position due to her feeling punished for revealing the fraud. She eventually would sue UNC asking for her job back but agreed on a settlement of \$335,000 (roughly three years' salary plus legal fees). The NCAA is still conducting an investigation of UNC.
2015	Ryan Grigson	Bill Belichick & New England Patriots	Competitive Advantage	Grigson, the General Manager of the Indianapolis Colts, blew the whistle on the Patriots prior, during, and after a 2015 playoff game alleging that the footballs being used by the Patriots were under-inflated offering the team a competitive edge. The investigation is ongoing.
2015	Chris Janes	Jackie Robinson West Little League Team	Prosocial Behavior	Janes blew the whistle on a little league team from Chicago because of "blatant cheating." It was found that the little league players were not from the zoned residence area in which the team is based and were recruited as local "ringers." The team was subsequently stripped of their championship and placed on probation.

Purpose of Study

Influenced by the lack of research on whistleblowing in sport, the purpose of this dissertation is to develop a unified model for whistleblowing intention in sport with particular attention focused on antecedent conditions (e.g., motives), benefit-to-cost differential, affiliation, severity of rules violations and ethical wrongdoing, and moral and ethical considerations. The main thesis is that the antecedent conditions (e.g., altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement) for whistleblowing in sport are somewhat different from mainstream business, thereby warranting further investigation into this unique context. The outcome of this research should enhance sport management scholar's theoretical and practical considerations of the phenomenon. The following overarching research questions were developed to guide this investigation:

1. What is the perception of whistleblowing in sport?
2. What are the antecedents conditions that influence whistleblowing intention in sport?
3. What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence whistleblowing intention?
4. How does one's affiliation with an organization influence intention to whistleblow?

Research Paradigm

Aristotle claimed the mark of an educated mind is to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. This idea aligns with Mintzberg (2005):

So we need all kinds of theories – the more, the better. As researchers, scholars, and teachers, our obligation is to stimulate thinking, and a good way to do that is to offer alternate theories – multiple explanations of the same phenomena. Our students and readers should leave our classrooms and publications pondering, wondering, thinking – not knowing (p. 356).

The researcher's aim was to help aid in explaining a measure of truth for the phenomena of whistleblowing and assist in the subsequent transformability of that knowledge to the aggregate (i.e., other scholars, students, etc.). The only way we are better able to understand the world around us to is answer the “so what” questions in research. In order to accomplish this, researchers need to borrow and adapt from existing theory in order to extend or create new theory.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) posit that we refer to “... a systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods, as a paradigm” (p. 15). It is important for the researcher to acknowledge a chosen paradigm(s) within their study. Accordingly, the studies contained in this dissertation were framed using the interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), postpositivist paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), and critical theory paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) to assist in acknowledging researcher bias, worldview, and assumptions. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that while it may be impossible to do so, researchers should try and explain as many potential biases as possible. Not everyone follows the dogma of one particular paradigm on an everyday basis. A multiple paradigm approach, while unconventional, explains more researcher biases, and subsequently, can allow for multiple validity checks. However, the researcher most closely aligns and writes mainly from the

interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm based on the nature of a multiple-case study approach.

It is important for the researcher to acknowledge any biases that may have influenced their research paradigm. Sport fandom involves high levels of emotional and affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 2005). As such, a sport fan that is also a scholar may find it difficult to separate their fandom from their research, especially when the topic (e.g., cheating scandals, performance enhancing drug use) is something to which they feel a visceral reaction. Scholars are taught to study and research in a cognate area that they find interesting at the earliest level of their doctorate training (Charmaz, 1994). If they become engaged in a particular research theory and context it should then make for a sustainable line of research, which in turn should help add valuable information to the aggregate of the sport management field.

This researcher became aware of whistleblowing when the ‘Penn State scandal’ hit Happy Valley in State College, Pennsylvania in November 2011. As a native Pennsylvanian whose Mother attended Penn State University, the scandal was of tremendous interest. Once the scandal was made public it was hard to not form a negative opinion and bias towards the university for how they handled the allegations, subsequent cover-up, and media.

This researcher also partook in many conversations and debates with proud Penn State alumni who argued that authorities handled the situation properly and that the actors (e.g., Jerry Sandusky, Joe Paterno, and PSU officials) in the case were being made

scapegoats. It was difficult to rationalize their views on the situation as it went counter to the researcher's own. This researcher, more than once, tried to put himself in the whistleblower's state of mind in an attempt to figure out why there was no follow up report of the alleged crimes to the proper authorities. This researcher then weighed his personal morals and ethics and imagined the cost-benefit analysis that the whistleblower must have performed to determine his whistleblowing intention.

This particular case arguably had more to do with state and federal law than most whistleblowing cases that are seen at the professional or collegiate levels. However, the case did allow for this researcher to experience a range of emotions, form potential biases, understand how multiple people can experience the same situation from various, conflicting viewpoints, and how long established social norms (e.g., social class, race) can influence the handling of even the most heinous crimes.

The prevalence of whistleblowing in sport has seen a discernible increase over the last few years. It should be noted that the researcher's interests in moral and ethical scenarios as they relate to decision-making informs his research. Due to these interests and the bevy of cases that are being reported it should come as no shock that the researcher chose to investigate whistleblowing in sport as his cognate area.

Epistemological Paradigm

Due to the uniqueness of whistleblowing it would be shortsighted and dishonest to not acknowledge the many potential biases of the researcher. Unless the researcher is going through a whistleblowing scenario and journaling the experience it is unlikely that all of the emotions and experiences are going to be relayed with accuracy. It is

particularly salient to note that even asking potential whistleblowers to predict future actions (hypothetical versus actual) has limitations in that people aspire to be ethical without allowing for or ignoring social and institutional constraints. Therefore, the researcher must use law reviews, literature, and second-hand accounts of whistleblowing cases to adequately explain the experiences. The approach of using multiple epistemological lenses minimizes the systematic beliefs of the researcher lending credibility to the study. However, the interpretivist paradigm is the primary paradigm used to frame the study.

By using the interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm, the researcher allows for respondents to see the same thing differently, which in turn, explains multiple realities. These realities are socially constructed through human interaction and are based solely on the individual's perspective. Baxter and Jack (2004) stated, "... constructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one's perspective" (p. 545). As whistleblowing behavior ranges from self-serving to prosocial behavior to altruism, it is important to recognize that each potential whistleblower, if put in identical scenarios, may view and act on that scenario differently.

The postpositivist paradigm, or "... modernist phase", allows for reality to be quantified, measured, and categorized (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 8). Effectively, researchers can measure reality with the proper methods, procedures, theories, and facts, which in turn, confirm hypotheses. The act of whistleblowing extends beyond grounded theory as it involves scripted processes carried out by the whistleblower and is supported

by United States legal statutes that protect whistleblowers from retaliatory actions. This allows for hypotheses to be tested through existing case law for effectiveness.

The critical theory paradigm also recognizes multiple realities but maintains that dominant (e.g., white, protestant, and male) constructions promote inequities. This is particularly salient in whistleblowing as much of the whistleblowing literature has examined the subject from a business-centric or legal perspective where dominant constructions hold the power over those who are marginalized leading to a lesser likelihood of reporting of immoral, unethical, and illegal wrongdoings. It is through these paradigm assumptions, and the lens of the researcher, respondents, and reviewers/readers that validity can be checked and the findings be deemed credible.

Design

The most accurate way to understand the antecedent conditions to whistleblowing is through a mixed-method design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza 2009), since such designs help improve casual inferences (Rudd & Johnson, 2010). Mixed-methods are superior to cross-sectional, self-reported surveys or scenario-based studies, since they make it difficult to truly examine the antecedent conditions of whistleblowing because the antecedent conditions may change before, during, and after the act is carried out. Miceli and Near (1984; 1989) used cross-sectional, self-reported data but were not able to truly predict intention. A weakness in the literature on the whistleblowing process is that many of the assumptions have yet to be empirically tested (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011).

Despite these validity concerns, the conceptual model will be tested using qualitative and quantitative measures. In Study 1 (Chapter III), interviews with collegiate executives were performed to establish possible antecedent conditions, or motives, to whistleblow. Additionally, the interviews explored the levels of severity of possible violations and how the reporting of those violations is handled both internally and externally to set up future studies. Lastly, interviews probed how ethical and moral character relates to whistleblowing. A subsequent quantitative approach will be used to test the antecedent conditions found in the qualitative study but will not be included in this dissertation.

Dissertation Format

This dissertation is composed in a journal article format and is organized in the following manner. This current section (Chapter I) serves as an overarching introduction to research inquiry. The conceptual article (Chapter II) provides an extended literature review on whistleblowing, theoretical frameworks on behavioral intention, and antecedent conditions to whistleblowing (e.g., motives). In Chapter III, the researcher conducted a qualitative inquiry into possible whistleblowing antecedent conditions, potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations, the role of affiliation, and how negative antecedent conditions influence reporting practice, all within a sport context. Chapters II and III are self-contained chapters, which will be completed journal articles. In Chapter IV, the researcher provided an aggregate of the two studies highlighting their contributions made within sport management literature, practical implications of the research, and offered a future research agenda.

CHAPTER II

WHISTLEBLOWING IN SPORT: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Introduction

Concerns over ethical wrongdoings carry potentially heavy implications for social interactions and the attributions that workers and employees assign to businesses (Near & Miceli, 1995). In particular, the recent spate of whistleblowing has provided ammunition to critics characterizing big business as morally corrupt (Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). The litany of ethical wrongdoings has been witnessed across both high and low profile businesses (Mesner-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Transposing this discussion to sport, many organizations are equally as culpable in perpetuating society's stigmas. For example, cheating scandals, academic fraud, performance enhancing drug use, improper benefits, physical and mental abuse by coaches on athletes, organizational cover-ups, and a lack of institutional control are some malfeasances witnessed in sport.

Over the past thirty years, ethical issues have propagated a marked increase in both awareness and reporting of moral, ethical, and illegal wrongdoings. Prior to this time, Keil, Tiwana, and Sneha (2010) noted that society possessed a fear that the costs of disseminating pejorative information outweighed the cost of righting a wrong – appropriately termed, “the mum effect” (p. 193). Later, whistleblowing became more accepted since legal statutes to protect whistleblowers began appearing (Keil et al., 2010). Despite this, whistleblowing still carries negative social consequences (Near & Miceli, 1995) such as humiliation, assassination of character, formation of “anti-you”

group, and loss of job (Ahern & McDonald, 2002; Brodie, 1998; Fletcher et al., 1998; Wilmot, 2000). Additionally, those who are on the receiving end of the whistleblowing act often try to delegitimize the claims based on negative social connotations and questioning of the whistleblower's antecedent conditions (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009).

Prior literature has focused largely on whistleblowing predictors from a prosocial (Brief & Motowildo, 1986; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Hersh, 2002; Near, 1989; Staub, 1978; Tevino, 1986) and altruistic (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Leeds, 1963) perspective. For example, Dozier and Miceli (1985) theorized that whistleblowing should increase if the action will make a positive difference for an organization or society at large. However, much of the informing general management and psychology whistleblowing literature centers on the below summary:

1. Whistleblowing process (Kaptein, 2011; Miceli & Near, 1984; Near & Jensen, 1983; Near & Miceli, 1985, 1996; Street, 2011)
2. Effectiveness of statutes (Dworkin & Near, 1987; Near & Dworkin, 1998; Near & Miceli, 1995)
3. Financial gain (Bowles & Poliana-Reyes, 2012; Callahan & Dworkin, 1992; Carson, Verdu, & Wakutch, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1994; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991)
4. Ethical beliefs (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Chiu, 2003; Greenberger, Miceli, & Cohen, 1987; Jensen, 1987; Miceli & Near, 1998; Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thorton,

- 2010; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Starkey, 1998; Trevino & Victor, 1992; Zhang, Chiu, & Wei, 2009)
5. Wrongdoing (King, 1997; Lee, Heilman, & Near, 2004; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004)
 6. Organizational justice and misconduct (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994; Seifert, 2006; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thorton, 2010)
 7. Retaliation (Cassebatis & Wortley, 2013; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1989, 1992; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012; Miceli, Rehg, Near, & Ryan, 1999; Near & Miceli, 1986; Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008)
 8. Loyalty (Duska, 2007; Larmer, 1992)

Whistleblowing

Defined as "... the disclosure by organization members (former and current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action" (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525), whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act done by a person who has (or had) privileged access to data or information (Jubb, 1999). In the aggregate, the act of whistleblowing is viewed in terms of the actor and the conditions for the act. From the actor standpoint, Near and Miceli (1996) put forth the idea that three social actors are required for organizational whistleblowing to occur: (1) the wrongdoer(s), who commit

the alleged wrongdoing, (2) the whistleblower(s), who observe the wrongdoing, define it as such and report it, and (3) the recipient(s), of the report of wrongdoing. From the conditional standpoint, Judd (1999) maintained that six elements are involved in any whistleblowing case: (1) action, a disclosure, (2) outcome, on public record, (3) actor, person who has access to the data or information, (4) subject, about legality or wrongdoing, (5) target, which implicates the organization, and (6) recipient, the external entity.

Whistleblowing has traditionally been examined from a policy and legal approach with little consistency among cases (Near & Miceli, 1985). The lack of consistency has as much to do with the vagueness of whistleblowing phenomena as it does with each whistleblowing case being unique (Near & Jensen, 1983). The uniqueness of whistleblowing makes it difficult for researchers to generalize the whistleblowing process (Near & Jensen, 1983). Even with organizations trying to strategically plan to prevent wrongdoing to minimize financial, legal, and perceptual damage in the court of public opinion, it is nearly impossible to safeguard against employee and employer ethical wrongdoing (Kaptein, 2011). Also, a decision whether or not to blow the whistle can be socially influenced (Gundlach et al., 2003).

The whistleblowing process is hard to predict and lacks sound, consistent theory (Near & Miceli, 1985). The elements of the whistleblowing process, however, are somewhat consistent. For example, Near and Miceli (1985) theorized that the whistleblower must have been either a current or former member of the organization who does not have the power to right the wrongdoing. The whistleblower can choose to

be either anonymous or not and choose whether or not to blow the whistle, none of which should alter whistleblowing effectiveness.

Near and Miceli (1995) defined the effectiveness of whistleblowing as, "... as the extent to which the questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least partly because of whistleblowing and within a reasonable time frame" (p. 681). Based on change theory and power theory, individual predictor variables of the characteristics of the whistleblower (e.g., credibility, power, anonymity), characteristics of the complaint recipient (e.g., credibility, power), and characteristics of the wrongdoer (e.g., credibility, power) lead directly to the outcome variable of the organization's willingness to change and lead to the termination of the wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 1995).

Near and Miceli (1985) posited that there are four decisions made by the whistleblower when determining whether or not to blow the whistle. The first decision is to decide whether the act is illegal, immoral, or unethical (decision #1). The level of severity is a factor that plays a situational role in this decision. If the whistleblower decides to act and report (decision #2) then the organization has to make a decision on how to handle the news (decision #3). The organization has to investigate and determine the level of severity and if the claim has substance (Near & Jensen, 1983). The organization could decide to enact change and right the wrongdoing, ignore the claim, or decide something in between (decision #4).

In addition to the level of severity, the type of wrongdoing is significantly related to whether or not an actor decides to blow the whistle (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004). The level of egregiousness of the wrongdoing is a predictor to both

whistleblowing intention and level of retaliation (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004). Near and Miceli (1985) made a point to not place emphasis on the level of severity. Doing so allowed for the whistleblower to report on unethical actions rather than just a legality issue. Accordingly, wrongdoing can also be a part of an observer's cost-benefit analysis where the severity of the wrongdoing is weighed against the observer's personal risks (Cassebatis & Wortley, 2013; Gundlach et al., 2003; Heink, 2008; Keil et al., 2010).

As federal and state statutes offer whistleblowers protection against employer retaliation and provide a financial reward, whistleblowing is occurring with more frequency. However, there are many barriers that prevent potential whistleblowers from coming forward including fear of retaliation from employers and fear of challenging an organizational hierarchy's actions (Kaptein, 2011; Miceli et al., 2009; Near & Jensen, 1983). Near and Jensen (1983) predicted that organizations retaliate to a whistleblowing act in a rationalistic, strategic, or random manner.

Cassebatis and Wortley (2013) hypothesized that whistleblowers believed that they should blow the whistle as a duty to their organization. They also hypothesized that the whistleblower believed their organization valued the reporting of the unethical or illegal act. Both hypotheses were confirmed. Additionally, they tested the role of egregiousness and how it impacted reporting which showed that whistleblowers took into consideration the level of severity.

Kaptein (2008), using the Corporate Ethical Virtues Model, tested eight dimensions (e.g., clarity, congruency of local and senior management, feasibility,

supportability, transparency, discussability, and sanctionability) to examine the influence of organizational culture in promoting or impeding reporting practices. The results indicated that perceived positive and negative attributes of culture do not accurately predict whistleblowing intention. Miceli & Near (1992b) claimed that women are less likely than men to whistleblow likely stemming from perceived power within the organizational environment. However, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found the opposite through their meta-analysis. This was further supported by Keil et al. (2010) that females are more likely than males to not only have an unfavorable reaction to the perceived wrongdoing but also following through on whistleblowing intention.

Ethical Decision-Making

Most potential whistleblowers go through a process of ethical decision-making, which is defined as, "... a decision that is both legal and morally acceptable to the larger community" (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Whistleblowers are presented with a moral issue, or the ethical wrongdoing, where the action will affect others (Jones, 1991). In turn, the whistleblower then becomes a moral agent, or the person who makes the moral decision (Jones, 1991). The moral agent may consider individual moderators (e.g., ego strength, field dependence, and locus of control) and situational moderators (e.g., immediate job context, organizational culture, and characteristics of the work) when going through a decision process (Trevino, 1986). Cottone and Claus (2000) posited that the moral actor must go through a decision analysis prior to intention. This decision analysis is, "... a step-by-step procedure enabling us to break down a decision into its components, to lay them out in an orderly fashion, and to trace the sequence of events that might follow

from choosing one course of action or another” (Cottone & Claus, 2000, p. 276). As such, prior to blowing the whistle, whistleblowers need to weigh intrinsic (e.g., personal gratification) and extrinsic rewards (e.g., financial incentives), against possible consequences of whistleblowing. As well, individuals assess a “... benefit-to-costs differential” (Keil et al., 2010, p. 787) when faced with a whistleblowing choice.

When individuals are faced with the choice to whistleblow, they are essentially conducting a cost-benefit analysis (Miceli & Near, 1992a). Keil et al. (2010) buttressed this idea by introducing the phrase “...benefit-to-costs differential,” (p. 788) which is the net difference between perceived costs and expected benefits of whistleblowing. Much of the whistleblowing literature has examined the subject from a business-centric, legal perspective since whistleblowing typically initiates from employees who stand to be financially rewarded or socially revered for their behavior (Avakian & Roberts, 2011). However, if the observer senses adverse consequences will result or face the possibility of being ostracized, there is less likelihood of action being taken (Avakian & Roberts, 2011). Regardless, personal and situational factors will have an effect on the decision making process (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).

Effectiveness of Statutes

To combat the retaliatory nature of organizations against whistleblowers, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 were introduced and passed to provide protection for whistleblowers. There are over 32 states that now have whistleblowing protection in addition to the federal statutes. The effectiveness of the statutes is mixed amongst researchers. For example, Dworkin and

Near (1987) provided evidence that whistleblowing statutes were not having the overall desired effect as they are either not perceived as effective, considered too complex, or not truly protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. In fact, Near and Dworkin (1998) suggested that most businesses do not have proper compliance programs and offer little protection to whistleblowers. Furthermore, Miceli et al. (1999) found that even with statutes in place to protect whistleblowers, retaliation has increased steadily in incidences over the last twenty years from 16 % to over 33 %. As a result, in 2002, the National Whistleblower Center called for more protections to be given to whistleblowers (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004).

Using a discriminant analysis to test the effectiveness of federal and state statutes, Miceli and Near (1984) examined the relationship among beliefs, organizational position, and whistleblowing status. A key finding was that without the courts guaranteeing potential whistleblowers guaranteed anonymity, observers of wrongdoing were unwilling to whistleblow for fear that it would affect their careers. This is interesting because under federal whistleblowing statutes a whistleblower, if correct in the unethical or illegal reported wrongdoing, would be guaranteed to keep their job. This result indicates that a whistleblower values a high career trajectory over the assurance of keeping their job.

Traditional Whistleblowing Antecedents

Financial Gain

It is not uncommon for whistleblowers to face retaliatory acts once the act is carried out. Miceli and Near (1985) described how retaliation against a whistleblower,

once the whistle has been blown, could lead to the whistleblower feeling ostracized, dismissed, devalued, and demoted (Gundlach et al., 2008). Financial reward acts as an extension of legal recourse serving as incentive to make a whistleblower “whole” (i.e., replacing loss of income) after righting the illegal or ethical wrongdoing (Callahan & Dworkin, 1992). Financial gain is the amount of money to be gained for an act or service rendered. Callahan and Dworkin (1992) posited that money acting as a motivator is in direct correlation to how the potential whistleblower values money.

The federal government also safeguards against the loss of job for whistleblowers (Dworkin & Callahan, 1992). The federal False Claims Act (1986) was developed to protect whistleblowers and ensure that they are properly compensated for their actions. There has been a pronounced increase in whistleblowing since the False Claims Act was revised emphasizing larger rewards (Miceli & Near, 1994). A potential danger to offering a financial reward to a whistleblower is that they may incorrectly report a violation in order to receive the financial reward, whistleblow in order to save from being fired from their job, or withhold information and hide the fraud until the time the rewards reach the highest financial incentive level (Carson, Verdu, & Wokutch, 2008; Schmitt, 1995).

Altruism and Prosocial Behavior

Leeds' (1963) described altruism as a voluntary, unselfish act that is not done for self-serving reasons and results in good. In all likelihood, a potential whistleblower will conduct an internal cost-benefit analysis (Miceli & Near, 1992a). By conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the actor eliminates the possibility that the whistleblowing act will be

altruistic. Dozier and Miceli (1985) contend that satisfying all three criterion of Leeds' (1963) definition of altruism is difficult.

Dozier and Miceli (1985) theorized that whistleblowing in a general business management setting is likely done as a form of prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is defined as, "... positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons. But unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves" (Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 825). Prosocial behavior is akin to altruism in that it allows for the whistleblowing act to be for the good of others, satisfying Leeds' second, and arguably most important, criterion for altruism. The main difference altruism and prosocial behavior is that prosocial behavior allows for the whistleblower to gain a reward for their whistleblowing act, oftentimes in the form of financial security (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).

Ethical Beliefs

Jensen (1987) defines ethics as, "... the human concern for the degree of rightness involved in making intentional and voluntary choices in conduct touching on such moral values as justice, goodness, and truthfulness, and which carries the potential for significantly affecting other people" (p. 322). Dozier and Miceli (1985) alleged that whistleblowers reported wrongdoings under one or more of three normative ethical stances, "... (1) utilitarian theory (e.g., costs and benefits), (2) theory of rights (e.g., individual entitlement), or (3) theory of justice (e.g., distributional effects of the action) (p. 828). Ethical judgment was found to have more of an influence on whistleblowing intention rather than actual reporting (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

Ethicality is, "... used to refer to a judgment about correctness of a behavior or process with reference to contextually normative values" (Cassemetis & Wortley, 2013, p. 630). Brennan and Kelly (2007) posited that due to ever-changing societal norms, it is impractical to classify whistleblowing as, "politically or socially acceptable but also that not whistleblowing is to be complicit with the wrongdoers" (p. 63). Miceli, et al. (1999) posited that it is becoming more unfeasible for companies to adhere to ethical and lawful practices.

There is a lack of consensus as to how personal predictors, such as age, gender, tenure, and demography, differentiate potential whistleblowers from non-whistleblowers (Cassemetis & Wortley, 2013). Rothschild & Miethé (1999) found no supporting evidence to create a consistent profile for potential whistleblowers based on personal indicators. Additionally, it is difficult generalize whistleblowing predictors based on ethics as ethics are culturally specific (Chui, 2003). However, Miceli and Near (1996) and Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that there were some personal characteristics, namely gender and tenure, that allowed assumptions to be made regarding whistleblowing behavior.

Organizational Justice and Misconduct

Distributive (e.g., fairness of outcomes), procedural (e.g., fairness of process), and interactional (treatment from superiors) comprise the three dimensions of organizational justice. These dimensions have the potential to influence whistleblowing intention (Seifert et al., 2010). The whistleblower is reporting an act of civil disobedience (Near & Miceli, 1985).

Miceli, Near, Rehg, and Van Scotter (2012) found that perceived organizational support played a key role in reporting behavior. The actions of the managers to make the employees feel supported can lift morale and encourage reporting of unethical behavior. However, inaction to these reports can lead to demoralization. Demoralization is, “manifested in the extent to which employees perceive they are supported in the organization” (Miceli, et al., 2012, p. 927). However, regardless of the organizational support, managers still may take an employee’s proactive stance as a nuisance, which could have an adverse effect on the employee’s career (Miceli, et al., 2012). The act of blowing the whistle itself should not be considered deviant but may be perceived that way by organizational stakeholders.

Victor and Cullen (1988) found that organizations are able to wield a positive influence on reporting unethical behavior by controlling the ethical climate. An ethical climate is defined as “the prevailing perceptions of typical organizational practices and procedures that have ethical content” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 101). If the ethical climate encourages reporting behavior then the employees will have a sense that it is part of their job. Miceli and Near (1995) even suggested that some companies promote reporting behavior as a “code of ethics” (p. 691).

Retaliation

In the words of Aeschylus, “No good deed goes unpunished.” Whistleblowers have seen retaliatory responses rise from 16 % (1980) to 21 % (1983) to 33 % (1992) (Miceli et al., 1999). The fear of reprisal has led to non-reports from employees with some quitting their jobs in an effort to minimize their career damage (Casal & Bogui,

2008; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013). However, contrary to what the movies and sensationalized media reports will have you think, retaliation against whistleblowers is not universal (Near & Miceli, 1996).

Rehg (1998) defined retaliation against whistleblowers as, "... an outcome of a conflict between an organization and its employee, in which members of the organization attempt to control the employee by threatening to take, or actually taking, an action that is detrimental to the well-being of the employee, in response to the employee's reporting, through internal or external channels, a perceived wrongful action" (p. 17). Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) found that whistleblowers both experience and are threatened with retaliation after whistleblowing. Retaliation includes: coworkers not associating with the whistleblower, coworkers not socializing with the whistleblower, withholding information needed to successfully perform job, verbal harassment or intimidation, poor performance appraisal, denial of award or promotion, and assignment of less desirable duties (Near, et al., 2004). In addition to retaliation, isolation, and loss of employment, Chui (2003) reported, "... that 90 per cent of whistleblowers lose their job or are demoted" (p. 66).

Mesmer-Mangus and Viswesvaron (2005) place, "whistleblowing retaliatory predictors into four categories: (1) characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken by the whistleblower in reporting organizational wrongdoing, (3) situational or environmental variables related to the organization, and (4) characteristics of the wrongdoing or wrongdoer" (p. 282). There are predictors of retaliation based on demographic characteristics such as pay, age, education, tenure, gender, and race (Near

& Miceli, 1996). Job situation characteristics (e.g., performance, role) also predict retaliation.

The retaliatory response to internal whistleblowing is reported at a staggering (approximately) 66 % (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Whistleblowers may choose to externally report to minimize the retaliatory effects from their employers (Cassebatis & Wortley, 2013). Rehg et al. (2008) posit that external reporting occurs due to one of three reasons: (1) the act is so intolerable that the whistleblower does not want to risk management not doing anything about it, (2) going public will ensure protection, and (3) to get back at the organization as a form of organizational justice (p. 227). However, Miceli & Near (1986) found that whistleblowers that reported via an external channel experienced more severe retaliation. If management reacts in a retaliatory manner towards an employee and vocalizes it to the rest of the employees they can be doing so to ward off any other potential reports (Miceli & Near, 1986).

Cassebatis and Wortley (2013) found that fear of reprisal were more commonly found to be a deciding factor for non-whistleblowers than whistleblowers. The researchers rationalized that retaliation was a consideration that was taken into account via a cost-benefit analysis prior to the whistleblowing act. Gundlach et al. (2003) accused management of offensive impression to give the employee a threat of retaliation to dissuade the whistleblowing. Conversely, the threat of reprisal could have an adverse effect on the whistleblower by serving to strengthen their resolve and encourage whistleblowing behavior (Miceli & Near, 1992).

Loyalty

Loyalty is closely aligned with tenure. Tenure can be loosely defined as, “loyalty and competence over time” (Cassematitis & Wortley, 2013, p. 618). Larmer (1992) claims that, “... duties of loyalty and confidentiality are to their employers and that whistleblowing cannot be justified except on file basis of a higher duty to the public good” (p. 125). Loyalty takes many different forms in whistleblowing (Hersh, 2002; Jensen, 1987; Judd 1999). The whistleblower has to weigh whether it is more important to be loyal to the organization for which they work or to society as a whole. Miceli and Near (1986) posited that loyalty to an organization allows for an employee to rationalize turning a blind eye to the unethical or illegal act. Duska (2007) found that whistleblowers are often represented as disloyal employees and that whistleblowing went “... against the duty of an employee towards a company” (p. 156). Duska (2007) argued that there is a moral difference between persons and corporations.

The whistleblower needs to take into consideration family, friends, and coworkers (Hersh, 2002). Rothschild and Miethe (1999) view whistleblowers as disloyal traitors who go against organizational norms. Grant (2002) calls whistleblowers “saints of secular culture.” Bouville (1989) felt that whistleblowers had to decide to, “betray one’s humanity or one’s company” (p. 579). However, the level of organizational commitment, according to Somers and Casal (1994), has little effect on whether one is willing to whistleblow.

Aggregate Whistleblowing Summary

In sum, the whistleblowing process is unique to each case and changes based on the characteristics of the whistleblower, level of perceived severity, and organizational climate. Likewise, in any whistleblowing situation an ethical decision is going to be made. That decision is based on both applied and situational ethics. Likely, that decision will be informed by an internal cost-benefit analysis. Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985) argued that regardless of the ethical decision-making model one subscribes to it is important to note that, “ethical decision-making models do not make ethical decisions but describe a process for examining a situation” (Cottone & Claus, 2000, p. 278).

The level of wrongdoing informs an observer of an unethical or illegal wrongdoing. The perceived level of severity coupled with the observer’s morals and ethical disposition will determine whistleblowing intention. An observer’s personal and moral ethics are unique to each case of whistleblowing. Altruism can act as an overriding theme serving as a whistleblowing motive. Likewise, prosocial behavior can act as either an overriding theme (e.g., primary motive) but also as an underpinning theme (e.g., secondary motive) in the whistleblowing process. However, there is no consensus that personal predictors can be generalized in whistleblowing intention.

The effectiveness of whistleblowing protection has come a long way in the last thirty years but still falls short in many areas. First, the federal statutes are vague and typically deal with large whistleblowing cases. Second, the state statutes are inconsistent in both continuity of protections and application, as well as judgments rendered in cases.

However, too often when organizational misconduct occurs there is inadequate protection to ward off retaliatory acts against the whistleblower (Rehg, et al., 2008).

Whistleblowing in Sport

Hersh (2002) stated that whistleblowing has many different management theories to guide qualitative inquiries but many of those theories has yet to be empirically tested. Further, while there is research, albeit limited, on whistleblowing in sport, no empirical models have been tested in this context. The research also contains facets of the aforementioned concepts established in this prior literature, which may not be best suited for studying whistleblowing in a sport context.

Sport is especially germane to this discussion since the context aligns with traditional business models (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011); leading to the assumption that sport is simply an extension of big business. From a bottom-line fiduciary perspective this is true. However, sport does somewhat distance itself from traditional business models in that employees (e.g., athletic staff, coaches, and athletes) and consumers (e.g., boosters, fans, students, etc.) are highly identified with the sport team (e.g., professional) or university (e.g., collegiate) and exhibit high levels of emotional and affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 2005). When considering the more recent whistleblowing cases (e.g., New Orleans Saints ‘Bounty-gate’, New England Patriots ‘Spy-gate’ and ‘Deflate-gate’, University of Southern California and Reggie Bush, Atlanta Hawks and Michael Gearon Jr., and the ‘Penn State Scandal’), the antecedent conditions appear different from that of mainstream business. Whistleblowing is more likely to occur if the whistleblower feels

victimized rather just a witness to a wrongdoing (Giacalone & Promislo, 2010). For example, the antecedent conditions in the foregoing examples appeared to center on revenge, personal advancement, and/or competitive advantage. However, the lack of empirical data leaves these observations open for discussion.

While the outcomes of whistleblowing in sport can be considered prosocial behavior (e.g., the act rights an illegal or ethical wrongdoing, or rules violation), the concept also seems to operate under the guise of situational ethics. Internal (e.g., administration, coaches, and players) and external (e.g., fans and boosters) stakeholders (Richardson & McGlynn, 2014) are part of a “win at all costs” environment where prosocial behavior is an underpinning theme while other antecedent conditions act as overriding themes. In essence, whistleblowing can be used as a calculated strategy intended to gain an advantage either professionally (e.g., personal advancement) or within the confines of the game itself (e.g., competitive advantage) rather than simply righting of an ethical wrongdoing through prosocial behavior. As such, there is an inherent pressure placed on coaches and players (e.g., internal stakeholders) by management, fans, and boosters (e.g., external stakeholders) to potentially wait to whistleblow and in effect delay the prosocial behavior (Benford, 2007; Richardson & McGlynn, 2014; Zagacki & Grano, 2005).

In general management whistleblowing literature, empirical research indicated that internal reporting is the preferred means of reporting (Near & Miceli, 1996). External reporting is only done when the internal option is unknown or suspected retaliation will occur (Near & Miceli, 1996). In collegiate sport there seems to be a

difference in antecedent conditions between reporting within the university (e.g., self-reporting) and outside of the university (e.g., whistleblowing). Collegiate sport operates under the guise of amateurism despite the fact it follows traditional business models by incorporating sponsors and corporate stakeholders (McCormick & McCormick, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). Reporting practices are different depending on if the whistle is blown either internally (e.g., self-reporting) and externally (e.g., whistleblowing). The chosen channel acts as a means to minimize, or maximize, potential harm to an organization (Richardson & McGlynn, 2010).

The antecedent conditions for internal reporting could be self-serving or prosocial in nature. When engaging in unethical or rule violating behavior athletic departments may expend more time hiding the illicit activities in order to not get caught (Zimbalist, 1999). In turn, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) deems the penalty is less harsh if the infraction is self-reported. It is reasonable to assume that self-reporting is more likely aimed at minimizing the potential penalty that is associated with the wrongdoing rather than getting caught and facing a harsher penalty. This moves the intention to report the unethical act away from exhibiting altruistic or prosocial behavior.

External reporting (e.g., to the media or a governing body) typically comes in the form of whistleblowing. The external report could come from either an internal or external stakeholder with first-hand knowledge of infraction (Near & Miceli, 1985). Employees act as an inside source having first-hand information, thus becoming “critical” (Miceli, et al., 2008, p. 2) and “increasingly important,” (Miceli & Near, 2005,

p. 100) to whistleblowing cases (Kaptein, 2010). If affiliated with the organization, the stakeholder could be someone who failed to internally report the wrongdoing or attempted to report internally and were blocked by those in higher job positions. Miceli and Near (1989) noted that there are a several factors as to why someone would fail to internally report/whistleblow, including fear of organizational retaliation, alienation, or potential loss of employment.

Another possible stakeholder could be someone who is in direct competition with the organization that is participating in the wrongdoing. For example, Coach “X” has inside knowledge that opposing Coach “Y” has consistently committed rules violations when recruiting. As a result of these blatant violations Coach “X” lost out on multiple recruits to Coach “Y”. If Coach “X” whistleblows regarding these rules infractions then the player who was improperly recruited (e.g., committing a rules violation) would likely not be able to sign with Coach “Y” and the university who committed the wrongdoing. Hypothetically, the whistleblower could wait until the timing is right, and when the information best suits their needs; report the infraction, oftentimes for their (oft self-serving) gain. In turn, instances such as these largely discount the possibility of the whistleblowing intentions being solely altruistic.

Sport-Focused Whistleblowing Model

While prosocial behavior may be a fairly common motive for employees in a traditional business context (Dozier & Miceli, 1985), the antecedent conditions for whistleblowing should be somewhat different in the sport world. For example, although many would argue that the socially constructed phenomenon of sport instills altruistic

values and morality (Stoll & Beller, 2000; Vermillion, 2007), it also produces a wide array of deleterious behaviors that are magnified by the media (e.g., cheating, academic scandal, drug use, institutional cover-ups, gambling, improper benefits, etc.). And like any context where the financial stakes are particularly high, deviant behaviors are likely to manifest, particularly in collegiate sport (Benford, 2007; Humpreys, 2012). This is based on the concept that sport possesses some unique characteristics such as the high visibility of players, coaches, and teams, strict conduct regulations, increased commercialism, corporate sponsorships, and lofty endorsement deals (Flowers 2009; McCormick & McCormick, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). As well, higher levels of emotional and affective attachment are associated with internal and external sport stakeholders making sport behavior more unique than that of traditional business (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 2005). In addition to all the underlining causes and reasons in the aforementioned, there are three additional elements that make sport a unique context for the whistleblowing phenomenon.

First, most whistleblowing cases in sport deal with rule-breaking and/or unethical behavior, as opposed to illegalities, which merit criminal investigations in the business world. The sporting world has been riddled with scandal as a result of various whistleblowing cases in recent years (e.g., Miami University, Reggie Bush and USC, Cam Newton and Auburn University). University athletic departments are beginning to see a marked increase in whistleblowing, both internally and externally, from their coaches, faculty, staff, and athletes for unethical behavior (Benford, 2007; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011).

Second, as previously mentioned, altruism is likely not the underpinning motive for whistleblowing in sport. Previous literature suggested that the three altruism criteria proposed by Leeds (1963) are unlikely to be met in any whistleblowing case (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). However, Dozier and Miceli (1985) maintained that whistleblowing could be performed as prosocial behavior, which is closely aligned to altruism, with the prosocial behavior allowing for the whistleblower to intend to gain personal rewards. Whistleblowing, in general, should be seen as a prosocial behavior as long as it rights a wrongdoing. From a legal standpoint, both the business and sport contexts offer the whistleblower the same protection against losing their livelihood after a whistleblowing report is filed at the federal and state level. The key difference between the two contexts is that prosocial behavior could result in a possible monetary reward in the business world but not in the sport setting. Most notably, in business there are federal whistleblowing statutes that were put in place to increase willingness to whistleblow by offering a financial reward (Callahan & Dworkin, 1992). On the contrary, while sport is considered a business there is no monetary reward for a whistleblower in sport. Additionally, based on the evidence of major whistleblowing cases in sport, whistleblowing is done externally (e.g., to the media or a governing body) for self-serving purposes, such as gaining a competitive advantage (e.g., New England Patriots 'Spy-gate'), getting revenge against a former employer/team/or teammate (e.g., Jose Canseco and Major League Baseball), and/or for personal advancement (e.g., Atlanta Hawks and Michael Gearon Jr.).

The third and most salient factor is organizational affiliation. Whistleblowers typically have inside information about the organization and report the wrongdoing either internally, to management (e.g., athletic department compliance office), or externally, to the law or media outlet (e.g., ‘Penn State Scandal’). Understandably, the majority of organizations would prefer the internal reporting channel to minimize public exposure (Near, 1989). It should be noted that research has indicated that both reporting methods (i.e., internal and external) do not significantly differ and both would have a similar cost-benefit analysis for the observer (Dworkin & Near, 1987). In sport, however, external complaints tend to be observed when the whistleblower is no longer affiliated with the university or an athlete (e.g., Reggie Bush, New England Patriots ‘Spy-gate’, and Jose Canseco). Oftentimes, the whistleblower is someone who was complicit in the wrongdoing while working within the organization but due to strong attachment to the organization decides not to whistleblow out of loyalty (e.g., New Orleans Saints ‘Bounty-gate’) (Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that external whistleblowing is done for self-serving reasons that extend beyond prosocial behavior.

Theoretical Framework

Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development

Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development (1969) theorizes that when one is faced with an ethical dilemma the actor falls into one of six categories that inform their moral decision-making. In level three (e.g., conformity and mutual expectations) of Kohlberg’s (1969) model, actors try to live up to the behavior of those close to them

(Trevino, 1986). This explains why being affiliated could lessen the likelihood of whistleblowing intention when a wrongdoing occurs. However, when the actor is no longer affiliated they move back into the second level (e.g., instrumental purpose and exchange) of Kohlberg's (1969) model and can report the wrongdoing, more than likely for self-serving reasons. As seen with many recent whistleblowing cases (e.g., New Orleans Saints 'Bounty-gate', New England Patriots 'Spy-gate' and 'Deflate-gate', University of Southern California and Reggie Bush, and Jose Canseco and Major League Baseball) the actor deemed the wrongdoing acceptable, or not worthy of reporting, during the time they worked for the organization. However, when the observer was able to garner self-serving benefits after leaving the organization, they reported the wrongdoing. In these cases, whistleblowing acts were tactical ploys and the prosocial behavior of righting an ethical wrongdoing became the lesser motive. Therefore, it is reasonable to surmise that as long as the actor is currently affiliated with an organization, the whistleblowing act of a known wrongdoing is less likely to occur.

Attribution Theory

Attribution theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) is another lens through which to view one's behavioral control as it relates to whistleblowing. Attribution theory is framed as the way one combines, gathers, and interprets information in order to form a causal judgment (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 23). A causal judgment as it relates to whistleblowing would be the relationship of an event (e.g., whistleblowing) and a secondary event (e.g., the subsequent social consequences). When the first event is carried out it is understood what the ramifications will be on second event. This idea is

important because it helps explain one's disposition, or current behavior, while also predicting future behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), since attribution theory helps explain one's actions. Attributions can be both internal and/or external. An internal attribution could be an employee justifying losing their job by believing they are not as qualified or skilled as whoever is replacing them (e.g., a coach of a team that had a losing season). External attributions using the same example would be the coach blaming their superiors for lack of institutional support, for example, a coach who believes they were not given enough time to build a contending team.

Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory

A popular attribution theory that can frame perceived behavioral control in relation to whistleblowing is Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). This theory further explains the applicability of Attribution Theory. Cognitive Dissonance occurs when there is disconnect between two cognitive elements. There is typically uneasiness or discomfort with a person being aware of their negative action. Therefore, to create consonance, a person will attempt to justify their negative action in order to gain self-acceptance of the negative act. Festinger (1957) referred to these elements as, "... the things a person knows about himself, about his behavior, and about his surrounding" (p. 9). An example of this might be a strength and conditioning coach who has knowledge of an athlete who is taking performance-enhancing drugs, which are illegal in collegiate sport and can lead to suspension. In order to justify not reporting this information, the coach claims he could cost the athlete his scholarship and potential livelihood if he reports on it. Justifying the non-report allows the coach to feel at ease

with his negative action. A similar example could be, a compliance officer in a university's athletic department who witnessed a student-athlete cheating on an exam (unethical act) before traveling to a game *and* decided not to report the act, knowing that it could lead to that athlete being suspended. To justify not reporting the unethical act (e.g., whistleblowing), the employee justifies the decision based on the game being worth millions of dollars to the university at-large and that the suspension of the player would adversely affect that outcome. As a result of justification and affirmation of the negative decision (e.g., behavior) increasing, dissonance becomes less stimulated.

Theory of Planned Behavior

Ajzen (1991) theorized that, “as a general rule, the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance” (p. 181). Simply, intention is the amount of effort put in to performing a behavior. The Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), an extension to the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), attempted to explain behavioral intentions under volitional control (e.g., the person's ability to perform or not perform the behavior at will by focusing on the antecedents that lead to intention). Ajzen (1991) noted that in order to better predict behavior, attention should be paid to the following three antecedents: (1) attitude toward the behavior, (2) subjective norms, and (3) perceived behavioral control, which leads to intention and then possible behavior. The key difference between TRA, and the TPB, is the TPB allows for perceived behavioral control, the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior as an antecedent to intention. This addition is important because it is possible to have a favorable attitude towards an object and positive social pressures, but be unable

to perform a behavior. In whistleblowing, this can be seen by someone who feels morally or ethically obliged to whistleblow (e.g., a favorable attitude) and is encouraged by their organization's mission statement of support in reporting the unethical act (e.g., positive social pressures) but who ultimately fail to report the incident (e.g., unable to perform the act) because of the outcome of a personal internal cost-benefit analysis. Essentially, the actor may feel that the outcome of the whistleblowing act doesn't outweigh the feeling of being compelled to report the wrongdoing regardless of positive social support.

The TPB can be used to show how antecedents to behavioral intention shape that behavior, as attitude shapes intention. Zaichkowsky (1985) noted when studying involvement, attitudes change based on antecedents. Therefore, it is reasonable to surmise if attitudes can change based on antecedents then the subsequent behavior resulting from antecedent change will be influenced. In the case of whistleblowing, for example, the initial reaction by the actor towards an illegal or unethical wrongdoing could be to engage in prosocial behavior, which will dictate their behavioral intention to whistleblow. During this time the actor may place positive values on the antecedents of attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. However, each antecedent that predicts behavior intention can change due to potential negative barriers (e.g., perceived alienation from coworkers or fear of reprisal in form of retaliation from a boss) as more thought is put into the potential outcomes of the whistleblowing act.

Antecedent conditions in sport appear different than that of mainstream business, seemingly centering on revenge, competitive advantage, or personal advancement while functioning as a form of self-serving gain rather than altruistic or prosocial behavior. In order to better understand the TPB as it relates to whistleblowing, it is crucial to define and explain each of the TPB antecedents that lead to intention, which will ultimately shape the behavior. Attitude toward the behavior (e.g., behavioral belief) is comprised of an individual's favorable or unfavorable assessment towards the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). This can be seen in the sport context as the moral and ethical considerations of an individual towards a perceived rule breaking, unethical, or illegal act/behavior.

Subjective norms (e.g., normative beliefs) are, "... concerned with the likelihood that referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of performing a given behavior" (Ajzen, 1991, p. 195). Loyalty, or distain, towards an affiliated organization oftentimes plays a key role in one's subjective norms. This normative belief shapes whether the act of whistleblowing behavior is met with approval or disapproval and influences intention.

Lastly, perceived behavioral control (e.g., control beliefs) is the amount of ease or difficulty that the person believes there to be when determining whether to perform a behavior (Ajzen, 1991). It is expected that perceived behavioral control in whistleblowing be done via an internal best cost-benefit analysis where expected gains and perceived costs are evaluated to inform the ease or difficulty to whistleblow. Regardless of an actor's desire to engage in prosocial behavior, the cost-benefit analysis will dictate the readiness of these actors to determine their behavior. It is likely that

actors with fewer barriers and/or less costs to gains are likely more willing to whistleblow than actors who face potential barriers and/or perceive their costs to outweigh their gains.

Ajzen (1991) further determined that the presence or absence of resources, generally found through second-hand information, would have a direct effect on the willingness to perform a behavior. Understandably, fewer obstacles and more resources allows for greater perceived control. The associated negative implications and social consequences of whistleblowing are omnipresent when considering intention to whistleblow. The fewer perceived barriers (e.g., organizational support) and the organization's history towards those who whistleblow will allow for greater perceived control.

Conceptual Model

The act of whistleblowing centers on reporting an illegal (or unethical) act by an observer who has inside information of the wrongdoing. Sport offers a unique lens through which to study whistleblowing since the context does not follow the traditional whistleblowing model, particularly regarding the antecedent conditions of the practice. In studying the increased incidence of whistleblowing in sport, it is vital to understand the antecedent conditions that underpin whistleblowing intentions. As seen in Figure 1, and given that data on whistleblowing in sport is limited, a conceptual model for whistleblowing in sport is preliminarily presented. The model is especially focused on the antecedent conditions that may lead to a whistleblowing intention. Additionally, since the actor is likely to consider the possible ramifications of the act, a cost-benefit

analysis (e.g., affiliation and ethical disposition) should assume a mediating role in the model. While there are many antecedents for possibly blowing the whistle in sport, the content analysis gleaned five antecedent conditions that act as themes suggested of having a most positive relationship on whistleblowing intention.




Figure 1: Whistleblowing in Sport Conceptual Model

Altruism

Altruism is defined as, “... a behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others that meets three criteria: (1) the act is an end in itself and is not done for self-serving reasons; (2) it is a voluntary act; and (3) the act results in good” (Leeds, 1963, p. 230). Using Leeds’ (1963) altruistic criteria, in order for the whistleblowing act to be purely altruistic, there would be no relationship with cost-benefit analysis. There are few cases of whistleblowing in sport that are reported from a purely altruistic perspective. This is

evidenced by the impression that many of the known whistleblowing cases are reported after the whistleblowers affiliation with the organization has been terminated.

Additionally, within both professional and collegiate sport there is an inherent pressure to not challenge the organizational (or social) norms making it difficult to make the decision to whistleblow without, at the very least, conducting an internal cost-to-benefit analysis (Richardson & McGlynn, 2014).

Altruism can be best explained through the use of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Lee, Lee, and Kang (2003) found that certain adults have a predisposition for altruistic behavior. If an actor is altruistic by nature then it should be fairly easy for them ascertain the correct course of action in order to right an ethical wrong. As such, the actor would then promptly proceed through the three antecedents of planned behavior. The attitude toward the behavior of whistleblowing meets Leeds' first criteria in that the actor would positively value righting an ethical wrong, thus carrying out the act for a non-self-serving reason. An altruistic person, having high moral character and moral motivation, would have strong beliefs in their subjective norms. In this case it is the individual's perception of the whistleblowing behavior in order to help others. An altruistic actor would be solely concerned with performing the act voluntarily (criteria two) in order to help another (criteria three) resulting in ease of performing the behavior (e.g., perceived behavioral control).

A recent example of an (self-reported) altruistic whistleblowing behavior dealt with collegiate athletics. Auburn University professor, James Gundlach, who would internally blow the whistle to his sociology department and the athletics department,

alleged academic fraud. When both departments took inadequate action, Gundlach externally blew the whistle to the New York Times (New York Times, 2006). Gundlach was upset over what he felt was the athletics department eluding the NCAA and students receiving preferential treatment and unearned grades. He claimed to have reported externally to right this ethical wrong. Gundlach received no compensation or reward for his actions claiming them to be altruistic in nature and retired from his position a short time later. Thus, the following proposition was constructed:

Proposition 1: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they exhibit altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior can serve as the overriding theme.

Prosocial Behavior

Despite Leeds' (1963) assertion that to be altruistic you cannot conduct a cost-benefit analysis or intend to receive a form of reward, it can be argued that regardless of one's selfless intentions of whistleblowing, considerations prior to the act are considered. Dozier and Miceli (1985) posited that whistleblowing is done as prosocial behavior because it is extremely difficult to satisfy all three criteria for altruistic behavior. Staub (1978) offered an alternative to altruistic behavior that focused on satisfying the most important criteria, doing a good deed or act. Differing from Leeds, Staub (1978) allowed for the actor to accept a reward for the good deed. For the purposes of this dissertation, prosocial behavior is defined as, "... positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons but unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves" (Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 825).

A person could be guided to whistleblow by their personal ethics and also want to report the act for no other reason than to right the wrongdoing but it would be hard to convince a rational thinking person that the whistleblower did not even consider the cost-benefit ratio prior to blowing the whistle (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). A more likely explanation would be that the whistleblower was exhibiting “positive deviance”, or the act of an intentional behavior that departs from the norm to right an ethical wrong in a moral manner (Vadera et al., 2009). Gundlach, Douglas, and Martinko (2003), through their social information processing theory, proposed that only if the potential whistleblower believes the benefits of whistleblowing outweigh the costs would they be more apt to whistleblow. Prior to making a decision it is normal to evaluate a situation to weigh the pros and cons, conduct a cost-benefit analysis, and/or look at the situation from an ethical standpoint (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). That is not to say that the entire cost-benefit process does not happen quickly and without ample thought but the fact that it happens aligns the behavior as being prosocial instead of altruistic.

It is important to note that collegiate sports have (more) stakeholders involved within the organization (e.g., faculty, students, and staff) who may not have a vested interest in the success of the athletic programs but who are still privy to inside information. The stakeholders then could have less affiliation, which affects whistleblowing intention, than that of professional sports. However, even if there is no personal vested interest in the success of the athletic programs the actor may take other factors into consideration. Swartz and Watkins (2003) offered that one would take into

account the relationship of many actors (e.g., organization, subordinates, colleagues, peers, and family) when deciding whether or not to whistleblow.

Brief and Motowidlo (1986) defined a behavior as prosocial in theory if it satisfied three tenets: “(1) a member of an organization performed the act, (2) the act is directed toward an individual, group, or organization, and (3) the act is performed with the intention of promoting welfare” (p. 711). If in the aforementioned James Gundlach scenario, the whistleblowing case that dealt with collegiate athletics and academic fraud, failed a tenet of altruism (for example, maybe he had a self-serving reason to whistleblow) the act would still be considered prosocial behavior. The act came from a member of an organization, was directed towards that organization, and was performed to promote welfare (e.g., righting an ethical wrongdoing). Thus, the following proposition was constructed:

Proposition 2: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they exhibit prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior acts as the overriding condition.

Revenge

Revenge is defined as, “... the infliction of harm in return for perceived wrong” (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992, p. 25). According to Bies, Tripp, and Kramer (1997), perceived personal harm or violation to one’s social order is a cognitive and behavioral response. These emotions include feeling ostracized, dismissed, devalued, and demoted (Gundlach et al., 2008). Much of the revenge literature has centered on antisocial behavior (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998) and feuding (Kim & Smith, 1993). In

theory, those who feel wronged go through similar emotions as a whistleblower would (e.g., cost-benefit analysis and ethical considerations). If a former employee feels as though they were wronged, cheated, or let go/fired without just cause, they may feel the need for revenge (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).

The sport landscape is littered with feuds between organizations (e.g., WWE and MMA, over which is the true sport), universities (e.g., Texas and Texas A&M, over which is premier football program in Texas), teams (e.g., New England Patriots and the New York Jets, over Spy-gate), coaches (e.g., Bill Belichick and Eric Mangini, over Spy-Gate), and players (e.g., Jose Canseco and Alex Rodriguez, over steroid accusations) alike. With these feuds there oftentimes comes the desire for revenge.

Getting a measure of revenge via whistleblowing is best-explained using Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). When someone is contemplating an act of revenge there is likely disconnect between two cognitive elements. The actor knows that his action of revenge likely has some sort of perceived negative outcome associated causing the actor uneasiness. To justify whistleblowing, the actor must defend his negative action, in this case whistleblowing, not for prosocial behavior but in an attempt to seek revenge, to affirm the decision.

A recent example of whistleblowing used as an act of revenge centered on former Major League Baseball (MLB) player, Jose Canseco. Canseco was upset that he was made the singular scapegoat of performance-enhancing drug use in MLB (e.g., defense of negative action) and sought revenge by blowing the whistle on other steroid users (e.g., perceived negative outcome) by describing the sweeping drug use in professional

baseball in his book, “Juiced” (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Another example is former assistant coach of Iowa men’s basketball, Bruce Pearl, who taped a phone conversation with a recruit he felt he lost to a rival program because of improper benefits. Pearl taped the call and turned the evidence over to the NCAA as revenge for losing the star recruit (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Based on the foregoing, the following proposition was constructed:

Proposition 3: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek revenge. Seeking revenge situationally acts as the overriding condition, while prosocial behavior as the underpinning condition.

Competitive Advantage

Competitive Advantage is defined as the “... unique position an organization develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource deployments” (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990, p. 90). According to Ronde (2001) competitive advantage is nothing more the willingness or unwillingness to share trade secrets. If you are able to keep your information to a select few then you are less likely to cede your competitive advantage.

Simply, the best way to keep a secret is not to tell it to anybody. Ronde (2001) noted however, “... it might be necessary to share trade secrets with suppliers or consultants in order to obtain the right input or the best possible advice” (p. 391) and therein lies the rub as it relates to sport. In sport, coaches spend many hours a day together working on game plans, sharing practice ideas, and trade secrets. Also, coaching staffs face attrition with coaches regularly moving from one organization to another. Coaches also may be complicit in helping bend or break the rules due to the

pressure to produce results (Chen & Tang, 2006). With an increased emphasis on wins and losses a coach is considered successful if they have winning seasons (Richardson & McGlynn, 2014). Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that coaches would share each other's secrets in order to gain a competitive advantage.

The sporting world consists of many hypercompetitive individuals who are, "... manipulative, aggressive, and exploitative in their transactions" (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1990, p. 368). Ryckman, et al. (1990) described how highly competitive people in athletics adopt a win at any cost mentality. Day (1984) and Porter (1985) postulated that you achieve an advantage of higher performance as the result of competitive advantage and superior performance.

Competitive advantage in sport typically deals with obtaining resources on the opposing team, university, or organization and using those resources to position yourself to make a more favorable outcome in comparison to your opponent (e.g., Spy-gate). "If the coach's own behavior is not congruent with the espoused values, coaching becomes a manipulative process, dependent ultimately upon coercion" (Burdett, 1998, p. 146). Coaches in both collegiate and professional sports have shown a willingness to circumvent the rules (e.g., Deflate-gate), take part in unethical wrongdoings (e.g., University of North Carolina academic scandal), and use information about the opposition in order to gain or maintain a competitive edge (e.g., Ron Wilson).

Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development (1969) serves as a theoretical guide for moral decision-making as it relates to competitive advantage. A recent example of a whistleblowing in order to gain competitive advantage centered on Eric Mangini, then

coach of the National Football League's (NFL) New York Jets. Mangini was a former assistant coach for New England Patriots under head coach, Bill Belichick. During his tenure with the Patriots, Mangini was privy to inside information and practices of the Patriots. He knew that it was common practice for the Patriots to videotape coaches' signals during pre-game warm-ups and during games. Mangini, who knew of these wrongdoings while a member of the Patriots, never blew the whistle during his time with the organization. Mangini exhibited behavior consisting of conformity and mutual expectations (e.g., level three of Kohlberg's model) where actors take on the behavior of those close to them (Trevino, 1986), in this case, Belichick. However, in 2007, Mangini became the head coach of the rival Jets. As a game against the Patriots approached, Mangini decided to blow the whistle on the Patriots, and his former mentor turned division rival, in order to ensure that the Patriots no longer were able to have the competitive advantage on his team (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Mangini exhibited behavior consisting of instrumental purpose and exchange (e.g., level two of Kohlberg's model) enabling him to report the wrongdoing, more than likely for self-serving reasons.

Another example is former coach of the Anaheim Mighty Ducks and San Jose Sharks, Ron Wilson, who whistleblew on his former player, and now rival, Teemu Selanne. After a game-winning goal was scored against Wilson's team, he correctly claimed that Selanne was using an unauthorized or approved NHL hockey stick. It was made known that Wilson had prior knowledge of Selanne's preference of use of this kind of stick from his time coaching him and only whistleblew when he needed to win a

game, effectively restoring the competitive advantage (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010).

Thus, the following proposition was constructed:

Proposition 4: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek competitive advantage. Seeking competitive advantage situationally acts as the overriding condition, while prosocial behavior as the underpinning condition.

Personal Advancement

Whistleblowers in both sport and big business are offered whistleblowing protection from the federal government in form of ensuring that actors will not lose their job for correctly whistleblowing (Dworkin & Callahan, 1992). However, that is the only whistleblower protection similarity between the two. Sport whistleblowers are not afforded the same financial reward as those in Fortune 500 companies. For example, in the collegiate sport setting, reporting violations or ethical wrongdoings is considered part of job expectancy and other than the possible recognition of the prosocial behavior by their peers there is little else that is afforded to the whistleblower.

Yet, the motive to whistleblow in sport draws parallels to that of big business in that a whistleblower can use the fraud information to their advantage as a form of personal advancement. White and Singletary (1993) suggested that professional advancement is considered a marker of success in one's profession. While similarly, Boyd and Grumpert (1983) and Burch (1986) suggested that motivations of entrepreneurship found that individuals seek independence, opportunity, personal rewards, and financial gain (Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997). Grouping these

concepts for purposes of this dissertation, the working definition for personal advancement is, "... the process of improving your career for personal gain within an organization in order to get a more important position" (Boyd and Grumpert, 1983; Burch, 1986; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997; White and Singletary, 1993).

As noted by Boyd and Grumpert (1983) and Burch (1986), financial gain is a motivation tied to personal advancement. The working definition for financial gain, a potential byproduct of personal advancement, is, "... the amount of money to be gained for an act or service rendered" (Miceli & Near, 1994). Other than being a byproduct of personal advancement, financial gain in sport has seen increased prevalence in collegiate athletics in the form of partnerships where money is exchanged (an NCAA rules violation), thereby violating a key tenet of amateurism. The whistleblowing is reported usually when a partnership ends and one side, usually the actor who gave the financial benefits, feels as though the business arrangement did not yield them a proper return on the investment. In the sports context, financial gain is typically limited to the interactions of sports organizations or agents with coaches and athletes (e.g., SMU death penalty). For example, a player is signed (unofficially) by an agent while still in college and receives compensation during his collegiate career. However, the player never signs with that agent or reimburses him once his collegiate career ends. That agent, knowing the arrangement is an NCAA violation, may be compelled to whistleblow on the player for financial gain (e.g., recouping payments and damages). This happened to Heisman Trophy award winner, Reggie Bush, of University of California. Bush had a failed partnership with an agent who provided him and his family improper benefits while in

college. The agent sued Bush for financial reimbursement and damages after Bush failed to sign with the agent after he became a professional football player. Another recent example of a financial gain as a whistleblowing act centered on OJ Mayo, then a USC basketball player, and Louis Johnson, a former associate of Mayo. Johnson claimed to have inside information on Mayo and alleged that promoter Robert Guillory gave Mayo \$30,000 and other improper benefits while Mayo was in high school and college (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010).

An example of personal advancement when framed using Attribution Theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), is the whistleblowing scandal surrounding the NBA's Atlanta Hawks and minority owner, Michael Gearon Jr. The Hawks had been losing the owners of the franchise money for years. With the recent record selling price of the Los Angeles Clippers, a forced sale of the franchise due to owner Donald Sterling's racist remarks, Gearon Jr. set to make a power play to either personally advance within the ownership group or force a sale of the franchise to reap financial gain. While on a conference call with the majority and minority owners, General Manager, Danny Ferry used insensitive racial terminology to describe attributes of free agent, Luol Deng. Gearon Jr. was secretly recording the phone conversation as a means to continue to gain, gather, and interpret information forming a casual judgment. Gearon Jr., who was not a fan of Ferry's, also uncovered a racially charged email on the same topic from majority owner, Bruce Levenson. Gearon Jr. warned that if this information were to be made public it could cripple the organization. Later that week it was found that Gearon Jr. leaked the email to the press. In this case the causal judgment as it relates to relationship of an

event was the leaking of information (e.g., external whistleblowing). Gearon Jr. knew the social consequences and ramifications (e.g., the secondary event) of leaking the information. The team has since been sold. Thus, attribution theory helps explain Gearon Jr.'s actions and behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Based on these cases, the following proposition was constructed:

Proposition 5: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek personal advancement. Seeking personal advancement situationally acts as the overriding condition, while prosocial behavior as the underpinning condition.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

As previously stated, cost-benefit analysis, or benefit-to-cost differential, is the net difference between perceived costs and expected benefits of whistleblowing (Keil et al., 2010). Gundlach et al. (2003) proposed that potential whistleblowers will only whistleblow if they believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Vader et al. (2009) argued that once a transgression happens and a potential whistleblower makes a decision to whistleblow they may seek out additional information. The potential whistleblower may also weigh the implications and consequences, to their work and non-work identities, which in turn will guide on their decision whether or not to whistleblow (Verada et al., 2009).

Henik (2008) showed that role models, partners, and significant others act as 'organizational loyalty disruptors' and may help facilitate whistleblowing intention. The

existence of organizational loyalty disruptors helps explain that there is a cost-benefit analysis that takes place in potential whistleblowers helping shape their intention.

An example of how performing a cost-benefit analysis, with loyalty as a component in the decision making process, can be seen in the whistleblowing case against Men's Basketball Head Coach Dave Bliss and Baylor University. Abar Rouse, an assistant coach, secretly audio recorded Bliss actively trying to cover-up his rules violations. He turned the evidence over to Baylor and the NCAA leading to the eventual resignation of Bliss from his coaching position. Seemingly, Rouse had determined that the benefits outweighed the cost when he turned over the evidence. However, as a result of his actions Rouse was essentially blackballed from ever coaching again in the collegiate ranks. Duke coach Mike Krzyzewski, who is well respected as an ethical figure within college sports, has stated that he would never hire, and would fire, any coach who secretly recorded him for breach of trust. Rouse later would attempt to sue his attorney for leaking his accounting of the events leading to speculation that if he had known the repercussions of his actions that he may have made a different decision.

The researcher maintains that observers, based on human nature, conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to making a decision on whistleblowing intention. That being the case, a cost-benefit analysis is employed for non-altruistic and self-serving reasons.

Thus, the following propositions were constructed:

Proposition 6: In sport, whistleblowing intention increases when the individual perceives the differentiation of expected benefits outweighing the perceived costs.

Proposition 7: In sport, whistleblowing intention decreases when the individual perceives the differentiation of perceived costs outweighing the expected benefits.

Future studies should be conducted to test the reliability and validity of the proposed model. A qualitative inquiry should be performed to examine the whistleblowing in sport phenomenon (e.g., the “how” and “why”). Additionally, the qualitative inquiry should investigate whether the antecedent conditions and role of cost-benefit analysis proposed in the conceptual model act as the suggested themes having a most positive relationship on whistleblowing intention. A study testing how “cost-to-benefit differential” acts as the mediating relationship between whistleblowing factors and whistleblowing intentions should be performed (Kiel, et al., 2010).

Further, these findings should help frame future studies where the results will allow future research to delineate what role the perceived severity of how rules violations or unethical acts play on whistleblowing intention in sport. Also, the findings should help inform how perceived severity of unethical acts influence the likelihood of internal and/or external reporting practices of whistleblowing intention in sport. Lastly, it will allow for the investigation of the relationship between personality characteristics and perceived severity of how rules violations or unethical acts relates to whistleblowing intention in sport.

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will be performed to assess the model fit and the discriminant validity of the constructs. After the model has been revised and accepted on the front end and convergent validity is supported, testing will be conducted for the moderating effect of affiliation and ethical considerations would have on

whistleblowing intention. A later study to determine whether the perception of personal characteristics of a whistleblower has a positive, negative, or no effect on the outcomes (e.g., punishment) after the whistle has been blown will be piloted. A final study would look at the credibility and power an individual has within an organization to see if those characteristics deter whistleblower intention through internal channels.

CHAPTER III

INQUIRY INTO WHISTLEBLOWING IN COLLEGIATE SPORT: PERCEPTIONS, ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Introduction

Whistleblowing is a term popularized by Ralph Nader in the early 1970's as a means to take the place of terms like "snitch" in an attempt to assuage the negative connotations of reporting unethical acts. Whistleblowing is defined as, "... the disclosure by organization members (former and current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action" (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525). Whistleblowing is viewed in terms of the 'social actor' and the conditions for the act (Near & Miceli, 1996). Three social actors: (1) wrongdoer, (2) whistleblower, and (3) recipient of wrongdoing report are needed for organizational whistleblowing to take place (Near & Miceli, 1996).

Whistleblowing is often examined from a legal or policy perspective yielding some fairly inconsistent litigious rulings without much precedent being set in the courts (Near & Miceli, 1985). Such inconsistencies have led to a number of ways to view whistleblowing, prompting scholars to offer tailored definitions and a multitude of theories to explain the concept.

Much of the published data show that the whistleblower is someone who has (or had) an affiliation with an organization, and also possesses inside information on the accused (Near & Miceli, 1987). When the actor (i.e., possible whistleblower) has information regarding an unethical or illegal act, they will conduct an internal cost-benefit analysis (Keil et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1992a). Expectancy theorists claim

that blowing the whistle is a function of the actor believing in a high likelihood for change because of the act, yielding mainly positive outcomes (Near & Miceli, 1985). Intuitively, however, this seems unlikely since there are almost always ramifications from reporting a wrong or unethical act (Near & Miceli, 1985).

Even with statutes to protect the whistleblower from termination or unfair treatment in the workplace, there is still the possibility of societal retaliation, which makes the decision to whistleblow increasingly difficult. Additionally, while immediate monetary compensation (in some cases) may be provided to the whistleblower, it is difficult to assess whether this benefit outweighs any longer-term costs of the action. As a result, this juxtaposition makes it more difficult to compensate a whistleblower for all the risks possibly incurred and muddies the theoretical waters for both defining and assessing the antecedents of the phenomenon.

Among the most meaningful frameworks used to describe whistleblowing is the theory of Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior, which was defined by Brief and Motowidlo (1986, p. 711) as:

“... a behavior which is (a) performed by a member of an organization, (b) directed toward an individual, group, or organization with whom he or she interacts while carrying out his or her organizational role, and (c) performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organization toward which it is directed.”

Street (2011) opined that assessing whistleblowing from a prosocial perspective would allow whistleblowers to be viewed as either disgruntled or highly loyal and ethical employees. As a result, the manner in which the employee is defined will influence their antecedent conditions to whistleblow. Organizational affiliation should then assert a

moderating influence on a whistleblowing intention through prosocial behavior and organizational commitment. Similarly, Kohlberg's (1969) Cognitive Moral Development Model can be used to assess one's moral development when determining an individual's intention to whistleblow (Street, 2011). Coupled with prosocial behavior, Kohlberg's (1969) Cognitive Moral Development Model offers a fairly complete picture for determining a whistleblowing intention. Additionally, Ajzen (1991) posited that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are needed to determine intention and actions in order to not only to predict, but also explain human behavior. Miller (1956) concluded that only a select few beliefs are recalled at any given moment despite people having numerous beliefs toward a specified behavior. Ajzen (1991), building on this concept, postulated that, "... it is these salient beliefs that are considered to be the prevailing determinants of a person's intentions and actions" (p. 189). Thus, differentiating the salient beliefs (i.e., behavioral, normative, and control) help better predict intention.

Despite the accumulation of whistleblowing literature over the past thirty years, there has been a surprising lack of research using sport as a context. Using sport as the research context is extremely salient with the increased unethical, illegal, or rules violation behavior that has been brought to the mainstream in recent years. In order to understand the complexities of whistleblowing in sport, a qualitative approach was deemed appropriate to examine the whistleblowing phenomenon (i.e., the how and why), which is intended to lead to transferability of knowledge (Yin, 2003). The researcher conducted a detailed multiple-case study approach using semi-structured interviews

among a sample of collegiate sport administrators. This research method helped to expose the perception of whistleblowing in sport amongst high-level practitioners. Thus, this study addressed the following overarching research question:

RQ1: *What is the perception of whistleblowing in collegiate sport?*

The researcher hypothesized that the sport context offered a different set of antecedent conditions for whistleblowing intention than that of traditional business perspectives. As such, this qualitative method also aided in identifying the antecedent conditions for whistleblowing in sport leading to a set of testable hypotheses on the relationship between antecedent conditions and whistleblowing intentions (i.e., the what, when, where) to be examined in subsequent research. Thus, the views expressed by the participants assisted in answering the following research question:

RQ2: *What are the potential antecedent conditions that influence whistleblowing intention in a collegiate sport context?*

Lastly, akin to the findings of previous whistleblowing studies, the researcher opined that potential whistleblowers conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to engaging in the act of whistleblowing. The study's aim was to explain the role of cost-benefit analysis by identifying potential factors, including the role of affiliation, which may influence whistleblowing intention in sport. The investigation also aimed to determine if any of those factors are unique to sport. For this reason, the researcher constructed the following research question to address these considerations:

RQ3: *What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence whistleblowing intention?*

Method

Research Design

Qualitative research is used as a means to *explore phenomena* (Newman, Ridenour, Newman, & DeMarco, 2003). As such, using Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a guide to a naturalistic, qualitative research approach, multiple-case studies were conducted in this investigation. Guba and Lincoln (1981) describe a case study as "... a snapshot of reality" or "a slice of life" (p. 370-371), which has been formally defined as "... an intensive or complete examination of a facet, an issue, or perhaps the events of a geographic setting over time" (Denny, 1978, p. 24). A case study allows for transferability of knowledge by providing thick description, communication of multiple realities, and a unique vehicle to transport a reader to the inquiry setting (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

In order to meet the goal of replicating findings across cases, a multiple-case study design was used (Yin, 2003). Stake (1995) suggested that a collective case study is analogous to multiple-case studies analyses because more than one case is being examined (Baxter & Jack, 2004). This allowed the researcher to draw comparisons between cases by exploring the differences within and between cases (Yin, 2003). Building on criteria established by Yin (2003) and Miles and Huberman (1994), Baxter and Jack (2004) proposed that a rigorous case study needs the following:

- (a) propositions (which may or may not be present)
- (b) the application of a conceptual framework;
- (c) development of the research questions (generally "how" and/or "why" questions);
- (d) the logic linking data to propositions; and
- (e) the criteria for interpreting findings (p. 551).

The context of whistleblowing in sport has yet to be researched in any great depth. This qualitative inquiry was juxtaposed against a conceptual model and a set of propositions that aimed to answer a set of research questions (e.g., “how” and “why”) in a unique setting (e.g., sport), which allowed for criteria to be interpreted. Thus, this research method satisfied Baxter and Jack’s (2004) criteria for a rigorous case study. Previous investigations into whistleblowing have mostly been conducted using a business management-centric perspective. Examining whistleblowing via a sport context using a “blank slate” mindset allows for unique findings (Merriam, 2009). Baxter and Jack (2004) suggested that a case study, “... supports the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena” (p. 544). Thus, this comprehensive qualitative approach was deemed an appropriate method as it strives for exploration, pursues intellectual interest in a phenomenon, and has as its goal the extension of knowledge (Merriam, 2009).

Site and Sample

Due to limited research on whistleblowing in sport, this research endeavor involved two phases. The first phase was comprised of gathering and analyzing secondary information (e.g., academic literature, whistleblowing case law, popular press articles, reports, and other whistleblowing documents). These documents were gathered from the NCAA major infractions database where reported violations are housed. Additionally, following Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach, “... designed to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide a thorough theoretical explanation of social phenomena,” (p. 5) an exhaustive review to find professional,

collegiate, and high school whistleblowing cases was performed. Academic literature and whistleblowing case law were explored for any apparent violation themes or possible motivations. The documents were summarized and collated in a spreadsheet for subsequent analyses. This led to a content analysis, which provided the background for generating the interview protocol and assisted with interpreting the collected interview data from the key organizational informants.

The second phase involved in-person or recorded phone interviews with collegiate sport administrators. To select the most appropriate sample, a purposive stratified approach was used, where key informants were drawn from a cross-section of collegiate levels (e.g., Division I - FBS, Division I – FCS, and Division II). Table 2 shows the data collection plan and key informants. This method is preferred over random sampling because the typical case does not often yield the richest in information (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The sampling technique allowed the researcher to select a smaller number of rich cases to gain a deeper understanding of whistleblowing. The selection of respondents encompassed Athletic Directors, Associate Athletic Directors, Directors of Compliance, Assistant Compliance Directors, and Faculty Athletic Representatives. This process continued until an adequate representation (and strata) of individuals and universities had been achieved.

Table 2: Participant Demographics

Name	Gender	Job Title	Conference Affiliation	NCAA Affiliation
Raylan	Male	Compliance Director	SEC	Division I - FBS
Winona	Female	Compliance Director	NE-10	Division II
Loretta	Female	Compliance Director	Ivy League	Division I - FCS
Boyd	Male	Assistant Compliance Director	Big Ten	Division I - FBS
Ava	Female	Assistant Compliance Director	Big 12	Division I - FBS
Rachel	Female	Director of Athletics	Ivy League	Division I - FCS
Ellstin	Male	Athletic Director	Big Sky	Division I - FCS
Tim	Male	Associate Athletic Director	ACC	Division I - FBS
Art	Male	Faculty Athletic Representative	SEC	Division I - FBS
Wynn	Male	Faculty Athletic Representative	SEC	Division I - FBS

Data Collection

A qualitative approach to study the experiences and perceptions of key collegiate sport administrators was conducted. Data were collected using semi-structured, in-person or recorded via telephone, one-on-one, open-ended interviews by the researcher with the respondents taking place over a four-week period. Dexter (1970) described an interview as "... a conversation with a purpose" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 268). The researcher was trained by a lead researcher (i.e., university professor) prior to conducting any interviews.

It is vital, if possible, that the researcher have live, in-person visible contact with the respondent during the interview. However, if the respondent was unavailable for in-person contact for the interview a phone interview was conducted. Two interviews were conducted in-person while the remaining eight interviews were conducted via phone. The researcher audio-recorded the interview, in addition to using field notes, to collect data and observations. There was no *a priori* time limit for the interviews, which allowed the respondents ample time become comfortable with the researcher in order to freely and openly expound on their responses. However, each interview was tentatively scheduled to last between 25-60 minutes, and occurred at multiple venues (e.g., coffee house, office suites) or via phone call at the respondent's convenience and choosing. On average each interview lasted 50 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 120 minutes and the shortest interview lasting 15 minutes. Respondents were briefed prior to the interview, given the interview protocol, informed of consent procedure, and given the scope and nature of the interview. Interviews were collected until the researcher either finished the interview protocol or information became redundant meeting the criteria for theoretical saturation (Merriam, 2009). The interviewer then summarized any major findings or perceived categories to the respondent for verification (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Data Analysis

The interviews were semi-structured to allow for response consistency and comparative analyses (see Table 3). Following Strauss and Corbin's (1990) method for coding Grounded Theory data, which "... should explain as well as describe" (p. 5),

the analysis followed a step-wise process. Each interview lasted approximately 15-120 minutes, was transcribed verbatim, and analyzed in sequence as the data collection was completed. Additionally, field notes were transcribed the day of the interview by the interviewer to add to the richness of the data. During this phase, all respondents were given a pseudonym, and any personal identifiers (e.g., name, university, etc.) were changed.

Data were analyzed using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). A natural setting demands that a respondent act as a human instrument, which is grounded in characteristics such as responsiveness, adaptability, and knowledge base expansion to help build on tacit knowledge (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To become better acquainted with the data, and to develop an initial understanding of the phenomena of interest, the researcher reviewed field notes and transcripts. A three-step series of successive approximation analyses was used in order to achieve higher accuracy for transcripts: (1) code the data by drawing out the smallest element of understanding called a “unit of data” or “incident”; (2) compare units of data and clustering them into sub-categories based on similarities (i.e., the researcher should try not to draw on tacit knowledge of the topic); (3) succinctly compare and cluster sub-categories into larger categories to properly address the phenomena.

Table 3: Interview Guide, Sample Selection, and Sample Interview Questions

Method	Informant	Sample Size*	Example Questions
Interviews	Athletic Director/ Associate Athletic Directors	Three (3)	Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case? What motivates whistleblowers? Do you see whistleblowing as positive or negative? Does someone's organizational position dictate their motives? Would you reward a whistleblower?
Interviews	Compliance Directors/ Assistant Compliance Directors	Five (5)	What is the whistleblowing process? Who would you report to first in a whistleblowing case? Would you personally meet with a whistleblower to gather information? Do players, coaches, and managers have different motives for reporting or not reporting a violation?
Interviews	Faculty Athletic Representatives	Two (2)	Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case at the player, coach, or manager level? How would a player, coach, or manager be viewed within the organization if they blew the whistle? Who would be the first point of contact for a violation?

Trustworthiness

Prior to an interview, the researcher met, or corresponded, with the informants to discuss the interview protocol, obtain informed consent, and to formally explain the purpose of the study. At the conclusion of the interview, the interviewer “played back” any major, salient points given by the respondent. Several validity and reliability procedures were used in an attempt to ensure the trustworthiness of the study.

Validity and Reliability

Establishing and conveying validity and credibility in qualitative research can be a perplexing issue for any researcher (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Creswell and Miller

(2000) noted that validity, in qualitative inquiry, has been referred to as authenticity, goodness, adequacy, trustworthiness, plausibility, validity, validation, dependability, and credibility. Regardless of the semantics, it is vital that researchers establish procedures to verify validity within their studies.

For this discussion, validity is defined as, "... how accurately the account represents participants' realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them" (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 125). Creswell and Miller (2000) developed a two-dimensional framework in which procedures are governed through: (a) the lens researchers choose to validate their studies; and (b) researcher's paradigm assumptions. To assist in acknowledging researcher bias, worldview, and assumptions an aggregate of qualitative validity procedures (see: Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 1996; Merriam, 1998) were used.

The purpose of this study was to understand (not predict) participants' whistleblowing antecedent conditions and intentions. While multiple paradigm validity procedures were used, due to the nature of the research consisting of multiple-case studies, the interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm was deemed the most appropriate in guiding and informing the study. The constructivist paradigm is a social reality construction (Searle, 1995) and it, "... recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn't reject outright some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and object" (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 10).

Interpretivist (e.g., Constructivist) Paradigm Validity Procedures

In order to draw in the reader, and have them experience the interview in as great detail as the researcher, the researcher needs to employ thick, rich description in the narrative. Denzin (1989) considers thick, rich descriptions to be "... deep, dense, detailed accounts," (p. 83) used to accurately describe the setting, participants, and themes to further establish credibility (Creswell & Miller, 2000). A true collaboration between the researcher and the participant allows for such descriptions to describe each participant's reality. Due to the nature of this study, there is no need for prolonged engagement in the field.

Additionally, the researcher agreed with Tetlock's (1999) approach to search for disconfirming evidence as a form of validity is impractical. Change is slow moving and preconceptions are based in a variety of belief systems, which often are not easily changed. Case studies may capture some disconfirming evidence but without mass replication there is not enough data and it only gains limited insight. In the aggregate it fails to support transferability.

Postpositivist Paradigm Validity Procedures

Triangulation is a validity procedure used through the lens of the researcher where there is a, "... search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form a theme or category in a study" (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 126). Triangulation was met by validating units of data across multiple sources (e.g., interviews) by multiple researchers to analyze the data allowing for better triangulation of the findings (Denzin, 1978). Member checking is when the researcher uses the lens of

the study participants as an additional validity check method. Lincoln and Guba (1985) considered member checks, which consist of taking data and interpretations back to the respondents for confirmation, to be the "... most crucial technique for establishing credibility" (p. 314). Each respondent was asked to check the narrative of the interpretations. Also, the researcher summarized themes and repeated them back to the respondent throughout the interview as the data was collected. Additionally, an audit trail was utilized by having an external scholar who has no affiliation to the study review the narrative, field notes, and reflexive journals of the researcher.

Critical Theory Paradigm Validity Procedures

Perhaps the most important validity check is establishing researcher reflexivity. By disclosing the paradigms used in the conceptualization of the study, the researcher is acknowledging interviewer assumptions, beliefs, and biases prior to analyzing the data, thus, the findings are likely to be more trustworthy. The research paradigm section in Chapter I directly acknowledged the researcher's personal beliefs, assumptions, biases, and perspectives on the topic of whistleblowing to assuage concerns on trustworthiness.

Research Context

Respondent's Job Descriptions

The respondents for this study consisted of three groups of individuals in power positions within universities in the NCAA. Due to their position, each respondent had access to information of rules violations and illegal activities that may occur or perhaps have occurred within their respective university athletic departments. As such, these respondents would either be the ones reporting a violation/whistleblowing or be the

recipient of information from the reporter/whistleblower. For example, Athletic Directors are tasked with the administrative operations of running an athletic department. Informant Ellstin described his job as:

I am responsible for all the daily duties, daily administrative tasks associated with running a Division 1, 21 sport athletic program with 80 employees and 540 student athletes.

Informant Tim is an Associate Athletic Director whose job responsibilities differ from those of Informant Ellstin, showing the differences across various levels of administrative roles within athletic departments:

I am in charge of overseeing ticket sales, marketing, corporate sponsorship, university licensing, game day experience, and other communication instruments such as email, social media, website.

Compliance Directors act as NCAA rules monitors and enforcers for their university's athletic department. Informant Winona had a hard time describing her day-to-day job responsibilities and mentioned that each day brings a different challenge.

Informant Raylan, a Director of Compliance, depicted his job responsibilities as a policy and administrative position:

It entails, really, working with the athletics department and trying to maintain institutional control aspects of NCAA rules and regulations ... institutional control could be in education, it could be in monitoring, putting together policy and procedures, and self-reporting violations to show that you have control over in the Athletics Department.

The Assistant Compliance Director position manages all facets of student-athlete welfare. Informant Ava echoed Informant Boyd in their job responsibilities:

My primary responsibilities are initial eligibility, admissions for all student athletes, transfer eligibility, and then waiver filing, monitoring, game day monitoring, recruiting monitoring and education.

Faculty Athletic Representatives serve as the liaison between the athletic department and university administration (e.g., university president). Additionally, they serve as the representative of their university within their affiliated conference.

Informant Art told of how his position has changed over the past 30 years and how he now deals primarily with the compliance office. Informant Wynn felt that his position dealt more with professional development and stated:

A lot of its professional development and understanding our job, which is student athlete welfare, integrity, institutional control and things that we do.

Role of Ethics Among College Executives

A common theme among all respondents was that each believed that in order to be successful in their job that they need to hold themselves to a high ethical standard. Ethics is defined as, "... the human concern for the degree of rightness involved in making intentional and voluntary choices in conduct touching on such moral values as justice, goodness, and truthfulness, and which carries the potential for significantly affecting other people" (Jensen, 1987, p. 322). Accordingly, ethics has served as an informing role in the decision-making process of reporting practices at the collegiate level while the lack of ethics has contributed to things such as institutional cover-ups. When a rules violation or illegal action occurs, those that have knowledge of the act are immediately thrust into an ethical dilemma of whether or not to report the action. The decision-making behavior will have a direct impact in setting the societal or organizational norm informing future actions. Thus, it is important that people in power positions be able to make unpopular decisions and sacrifices (i.e., personal and organizational) for the greater good of the public (Alpern, 1982).

Informant Ava imagined that all people believed themselves to be inherently good. Informant Winona noted that her ethical disposition sometimes leads her coworkers to dislike her:

People don't like me...I like to consider myself ethical and... I will report stuff... I try to do what's right, let's put it that way.

Informant Wynn, who notably was in a room alone during the phone interview, was unsure how to describe his ethical disposition:

I don't know. I'm the most ethical guy in this room right now; I know that...that's the one thing I don't ever compromise on is integrity...almost to a flaw.

Informant Ellstin, however, noted that while he took pride in his ethical disposition, he also claimed that all human beings would categorize themselves as ethical:

I don't think there is a single human being on the planet that would characterize themselves as unethical. There's money launders in jail that still think they are good people. There are drug dealers and all those that think they're good people, so I'm no different.

There was some disagreement as to whether or not the respondent's ethical character always matched behavior. Informant Boyd felt that there was an important difference between a work environment and personal environment. He implied that the ethical code and rules put in place for the work position were held to a higher standard than that of someone's personal life:

In a work setting I would say so. I think you have to be kind of the same way all the time. I would say in everyone's personal life there are areas where they might veer a little bit from how they would be at work when they're not in a professional sense. I would say I might make a different ethical judgment in my personal life than I do at work ... where everything's cut and dry. It's a violation or it isn't, it's right or it's wrong, it's yes or no. It's much more black and white at work.

Informant Ava agreed with this assessment and admitted that her ethical character does not always match her behavior. Informant Tim elaborated further on this:

I think I'm human just like everybody else. I think there's times you got to take a step back and remind yourself that you're making a mistake and try to learn from it everyday, but like everybody else, I'm human. I have down days just like everybody else and things that I wish I did differently.

From a professional standpoint, Informant Winona felt that there is a lot of pressure on her position, and amongst athletic administration, to compromise their personal ethics in order to appease student-athletes:

I'm not into cheating. I hate that. It irritates me. I think more people need to step up and I think there's a lot of pressure on schools, professors, especially at the D1 level to just pass somebody. I have a huge problem with that.

Most respondents did not feel that they ever had their morals or values compromised because of their position within athletics. Informant Winona claimed that she has never been "asked" but it was implied in conversation she should "sweep something under the rug." Informant Boyd was the only respondent who maintained that he regularly is asked to compromise his moral values:

I'd say coaches do that constantly. Even though it's probably one of the least fun parts of the job, I can also appreciate it a little bit. They win and they recruit because they push people to their limits. They are going to try to push you to your limits to try to gain an inch, whether it's less penalties, no penalties, anything. From our end, if you take the stance of no, then there's no budging ever, then it makes it a lot easier.

It is important to note that the perspectives and actions of the respondents can help predict potential intentions of reporting/whistleblowing behavior. As a general rule, "... the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance" (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). All respondents held firm in being ethical at work

and felt that their work disposition mirrored their behavior. It is reasonable to surmise that when faced with a major scandal (e.g., rules violation or illegal action) that the respondents in power, decision-making positions will act ethically.

Whistleblowing versus Reporting in Collegiate Sport

Sport is an industry that has numerous governing agencies (e.g., NCAA, NFL, MLB, etc.) that oversee organizational mission, policymaking, membership, eligibility, and regulatory power. These organizations enforce rules (e.g., NCAA bylaws) and impose sanctions (e.g., rescinding player eligibility or banning athletes from events) for rules violations (e.g., gambling, cheating, academic fraud, and performance-enhancing drugs). Each governing agency has its own rules and regulations that guide their respective sport. As it relates to reporting practices and whistleblowing, professional and Olympic sport differs from the NCAA. Professional and Olympic sport reflects more traditional business methods in the dissemination and reporting practices of illegal activities and rules violations. The NCAA, however, has mechanisms in place that make the delineation of reporting and whistleblowing more muddled.

The NCAA also differs from professional sport in that the athletes are students with amateur status. Goldsmith, Carroll, and Bopp (2014) argued that, "... the notion of amateurism has taken on an entirely new meaning; a designation that idealistically stresses participation rather than profession, education and opportunity...and love of the sport rather than financial incentives" (p. 43). As the NCAA has grown in size, so has the need for more rules, which have become increasingly complicated. Informant Art

believed that the growth of the NCAA and the subsequent expansion of the rules led to the need for a compliance department:

Everything really started changing when Proposition 48 came out. That was a change in the academic requirements. We developed over the years the basic philosophy that the student athletes had to earn the right to be on the field through their academic progress. That started the changes from Proposition 48 on through the changes that followed to where we have it now, where they have to have certain percentages in order to be able to be on the field or on the court. Things got more complicated. You go back 20 years, we had a compliance coordinator. Now we have a compliance coordinator with a staff of 6 people now. At the same time the NCAA structure has changed and more responsibility has been put at the school level to see that things are run right.

Trying to distinguish reporting of violations and whistleblowing within an NCAA context is difficult as there is no clear-cut differentiation. The respondents generally agreed on some common characteristics used to separate the two. Informant Boyd noted that the big difference between whistleblowing and reporting a violation is whether it is reported internally or externally. As long as it is reported internally, he felt it would then be part of the reporting process that the compliance department, and the coaches, and athletic organization should deal with, and then eventually report the NCAA. However, if the report is leaked to the media, or comes from external stakeholders, it would then be considered whistleblowing. He also made it clear that:

We've never even used the term "whistleblowing" in any meeting that we've ever had. It's always been "reporting."

Informant Raylan tried to differentiate reporting and whistleblowing with involvement:

Reporting of a violation, to me, is, if you're involved in it and you come up and report yourself, that's more reporting of violation; or it's discovered in the process, and as a compliance monitoring mechanism, we discover something. That's more of a reporting violation, as opposed to, "I wasn't involved in this, but I saw it go on," and to me, that's the whistleblower. If somebody comes up

and tells us, "Hey, I saw this coach doing this, and I think it might be a problem," then that's more of a whistleblower.

Informant Wynn believed that within collegiate athletics reporting violations is part of the job responsibility for all involved:

Yeah, reporting a violation's a mandate. A whistleblower, it could be one in the same in a given situation ... something just might not look right and might not feel right, you don't if it's a rule violation or not; you just want to say something. Now, if you obviously know that it's a rule violation and you say something then it is whistleblowing, as well, according to my definition.

Informant Winona believed that in order for the action to be whistleblowing it needed to be a major, or illegal, violation:

One's really NCAA rules and the other one's just well, I think ... it's more involved with I don't want to say rules but ethics, maybe it is rules. I'm not sure if I'm coming clear, but it's black and white, here's the rule, here's what you didn't do, we've got to report it, boom. That could affect your jobs most times. If it's minor, no. Something like a whistleblower, I think that term is used with something that's explosive, if you will. Huge ... like a Penn State thing. You know what I mean? Like a North Carolina thing. That affects so much more. So many more people. It could be somebody's career whether it's the whistleblower or the other people. Ruins reputations of institutions, I mean a violation could too but those things happen depending on what the violation is.

Informant Ellstin agreed with Informant Winona that the nature of the violation dictated whether the action was whistleblowing or reporting:

I think it depends on the nature of the violation. Just because when I think whistleblower, I think more of a major, large, illegal issue.

If, as Informant Ellstin and Informant Winona alluded to, the difference between whistleblowing and reporting is the level of egregiousness of the violation, then it is important to understand the difference between major and minor violations at the NCAA-level. Informant Boyd depicted a major infraction as:

Major infraction would be ... we actually had someone from the NCAA come and speak to us recently, and they said that there were, say, 120 current, ongoing pieces, and over 20% of them are academic. Since my work is a lot of academic work, institutions changing grades. Institutions, the North Carolina case, changing grades, putting kids in fake classes, altering transcripts, altering transcripts at junior colleges before they come here. That would be a major infraction, anything that lacks institutional control, per se, extra benefits on a large scale, money transfers, anything tangible with monetary value: cars, apartment rent being paid, things like that; anything that is also not a product of being one individual occurrence.

Informant Boyd further explained that minor infractions were:

Minor recruiting, violation of impermissible contacts, things that were accidental. We get those all the time. For instance ... some of these sound stupid but they just are. A coach gets tips on their phone and butt dials a freshman in high school and can prove it, or the freshman or sophomore in high school texts the coach but the coach doesn't have their number and responds with a, "Who is this?" By just responding, it's still a violation and we still report it.

Informant Loretta felt that major violations are what give the NCAA a bad reputation:

Those are definitely the worst of the worst. Right now, those kinds of violations are the absolute bad actors. Where there isn't a single violation, but hundreds of violations piled on top of each other.

For the purposes of this study, whistleblowing was defined as, "... the disclosure by organization members, either current or former, of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action" (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525). The person who blows the whistle is reporting the illegal or rules violation act, whether it is internally or externally.

Internal whistleblowing comes from someone within the member institution/organization and they are reporting the act to someone in a position of power. External whistleblowing occurs when the act is reported to an outside source (e.g., media or governing body). An example of whistleblowing in a collegiate sport context is a

'\$100 handshake' from a booster to a collegiate athlete, or academic fraud, where the illegal activity or rules violation is reported. When asked to provide an example of whistleblowing in the sport industry seven respondents mentioned the 2014 University of North Carolina academic fraud case. In addition to the UNC case, Informant Boyd mentioned a lesser-known academic fraud case:

To me, North Carolina is the most obvious one. I guess one that may be lesser know, but they're all made public, would be most recently there was an instance at Adams State University and BYU ... about manipulation of transcripts ... it was a coach or administrator at Adams State that was taking classes for recruits all across the country and giving them credits from their junior college ... with having that information, that institutional staff member reported it.

However, not every respondent believed we are entering into an era where there is going to be an increase in major rules violations or illegal practices in collegiate sport.

Informant Ellstin felt that major rules violations within collegiate sport are no longer occurring with the same frequency of the past. However, he claimed that major rules violations are collegiate sport-specific:

Maybe I am naive; I think the days of a booster buying a student a car are behind us. Just because it's so easy to catch them ... but when instances like that happen, they are not doing it on the women's soccer team, they are doing it for the football star.

The respondents also had mixed opinions as to which level of sport (e.g., NCAA or professional) had the higher prevalence of whistleblowing behavior. Informant Ava leaned toward professional sport due to it being what she believed is an entertainment industry. Informant Boyd also felt that professional was more likely due to corporate structure:

I would say professional, because I think that college, I mean institutions, are based in large part on integrity ... professional athletics are much more business-like, much more corporate. I think there's a couple more barriers for universities.

Informant Raylan and Informant Ellstin feel that collegiate athletics sees higher prevalence in whistleblowing due more rules and regulations and a larger number of stakeholders:

I think there are more rules, regulations, guidelines and I think there are more people external to the organization involved. If you are a professional organization, you've got your team and you've got your ticket holders and that's about it, maybe some corporate sponsors. For us, we've got all those things plus boosters, plus the provost office, plus the deans, plus academic advisors, plus, plus, plus. There are more rules and more involvement from outside, people outside the athletic department.

Findings and Discussion

This section presents the findings against the context of related research in whistleblowing in collegiate sport.

RQ1: *What is the perception of whistleblowing in collegiate sport?*

The two unique themes that emerged from the data, when discussing the act of whistleblowing, were: (1) whether the act is moral and ethical, and (2) whether the whistleblowing act was considered a positive or negative.

Whistleblowing as a Moral and Ethical Act

The perception of an organization's ethical climate is defined by typical practices and procedures on issues of an ethical nature (Victor & Cullen, 1988). The encouragement of these practices creates a "code of ethics" within the work environment (Miceli & Near, 1995, p. 691). Each respondent considered whistleblowing to be a moral and ethical act, though some mentioned being desensitized to the magnitude and severity

of the rules violations or illegal behavior that is reported. For example, adhering to organizational policy drives Informant Tim's ethics, and if those policies are abused then he felt that the ethical action is to report/whistleblow:

If there's circumstances where there's policies being broken and then there's others who know that and suppress it, then absolutely in that circumstance I think it's a positive thing to be able to do that.

Informant Wynn pointed out that potential consequences of the act should not drive whistleblowing intention:

I think it's [whistleblowing] positive. If it's unethical, it should be reported and dealt with and the consequences are what they are. If it's unethical, at least there's some transparency there. You shed light on it, people look at it, and then they realize no one should be discouraged.

Informant Boyd has come to accept that unethical, illegal, and rule violating behavior occurs regularly while maintaining that whistleblowing on that behavior is still ethical but it is just harder to report:

You kind of assume all these terrible things are going on. To me it would be harder to report because in your mind, I think you might be predisposed to saying that's the norm.

Whistleblowing as a Positive or Negative Act

Within collegiate sport there is disagreement as to whether whistleblowing is a positive or negative act. Each respondent was hesitant to fully commit in one direction. Whistleblowers, using only their own opinions and moral compass, allege that the reported act is for the greater good (Hersh, 2002). A whistleblower must decide whether the ethical or illegal wrongdoing is so egregious that it needs to be reported publically. Essentially, it tests a potential whistleblower's moral and ethical conscience against their organizational loyalty (Jensen, 1987).

Interestingly, the assumption of ‘what is good for the organization is good for the public’ has been frequently debated (Jensen, 1987). A potential whistleblower has to decide if the right to organizational privacy outweighs the public’s right to know (Hersh, 2002). For example, in the New Orleans Saints whistleblowing case, some members of the Saints football team and coaching staff were complicit in a scheme that paid players to injure opponents. Each player and coach who was privy to the scheme had to weigh whether or not the public (e.g., the NFL and NFL fans) should be made aware of the unethical wrongdoing. Assume that the whistleblower made their concerns known internally to management and that management remedied the situation. It could be argued that the issue, if handled internally by the organization, did not need to be made public. If it were made public it could bring harsher penalties and damage the organizations reputation, which it did to the Saints. If the situation has been remedied, then the potential whistleblower would have to weigh the cost associated with making the issue public. The question becomes; what is more important, righting the ethical wrong internally but in turn there is no mention of it outside of the organization, or making the public aware of the ethical wrongdoing and potentially damaging the organization and those associated?

Informant Winona struggled, like many of the respondents, in fully believing that whistleblowing is either a positive or negative act, and noted that even when the act yields positive results it oftentimes brings negative collateral damage to the organization and whistleblower:

It’s a little bit of both, I would say. To me I think it’s a positive because these things need to be found out. It’s a negative because it just makes a lot of people

and places look bad, and it's never a positive in terms of ... a lot of people get hurt.

Informant Boyd passionately provided examples of why whistleblowing is a positive act in keeping the athletic culture ethical in nature:

I think from the positive side, our goal as the compliance office, as compliance officers, in general is that when you catch things in the earliest moment and immediately fix, report, investigate, change the culture of how it occurred, it's a huge positive.

However, Informant Boyd also warned of the downside of whistleblowing and provided an example of a whistleblowing case. He pointed out that those involved in the major rules violation were not the ones punished and that the major fallout affected stakeholders that were not involved:

Take USC where the Reggie Bush-gate comes out. Reggie Bush had to give back the [*Heisman*] trophy, but that was five years later, and the coach that was involved with everything flees the scene and he has no punishment. The people that should really be punished or held accountable for their actions can't be because they're already gone from campus and aren't associated. I think that that's a big negative. Since there aren't legal ramifications, there's no way to actually punish the, for lack of a better word, criminal. A lot of the current employees, current staff, and current players that have to pay the price.

Most respondents showed some uneasiness in praising a whistleblower, noting that not all whistleblowing acts are done for positive reasons. Informant Ellstin experienced the downside of whistleblowing when his university was improperly involved in a whistleblowing case that had no merit causing a negative reaction toward the act. In turn, this made him weary of whistleblowing. There is now a need to know more information before making a judgment and ethical decision when dealing with the whistleblowing issue. This effectively takes up more time allowing for uneasiness for all those involved in the claim:

The lesson that I learned from that is, if I am ever going to participate in something where I am going to consider myself to be a whistleblower and come forward with some information that I believe is pertinent where a university staff member or group of staff members acting unscrupulously or unethically, I better be correct. I need to have my facts and I need to know what's going on.

Informant Boyd even went as far as to say that he is not sure that he would report a violation or whistleblow on another university. According to Bowie (1982), this type of behavior is not unusual as corporations often have their own sets of codes of ethics.

Informant Boyd would mention that:

There's kind of an unwritten code or agreement that you work with the compliance office at the other university. Kind of the code is, if you're aware of something ... you tend to know somebody at every school over time, at least enough to call them and say, "Hey, remember I met you at Denver" or something. You give them a call or if it's something else you send them the email with the facts and here's what we found and here's the proof behind it. Then ultimately, it's that university's job to review it.

Overall, the perception of whistleblowing was seen as a moral and ethical act resulting in a positive outcome. On the whole, whistleblowers were also considered morally and ethically motivated in reporting practices. The respondents mentioned that most reporting/whistleblowing has prosocial elements that ultimately right an illegal or unethical act. The act of whistleblowing was generally seen as positive as long as the whistleblower did not falsely report. There was consensus that as long as organizational policy was followed that there was no difference in the reporting channel (e.g., internal or external). There was no consensus as to which is the best or most effective way to report a wrongdoing, though the preferred method was internally. The major takeaway was that it did not matter which of a whistleblower's antecedent conditions influenced

whistleblowing intention as long as there is integrity and transparency in the reporting/whistleblowing process.

RQ2: *What are the potential antecedent conditions that influence whistleblowing intention in collegiate sport?*

Respondents identified five major themes as potential whistleblowing antecedent conditions that influence whistleblowing intention. These include altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement. An overview of these antecedent conditions and their relation to existing research is presented in Table 4. Miceli et al. (1992a) categorized whistleblowers as having high moral character and self-efficacy. Altruism and prosocial behavior serve as positive, ethical antecedent conditions for whistleblowing behavior using intentional and voluntary ethics to determine the degree of rightness in decision-making. However, not every motive to whistleblow is prosocial in nature.

It is extremely difficult to always be morally and ethically sound, and to do the right thing, because there are other factors or situational factors to consider. Vickers (1995) separated whistleblowers into two categories: (1) watchdogs and (2) protesters. Watchdogs "... discover and expose wrongdoing to avoid safety or financial problems" while protesters, "... publicize more general problems rising from their employer's activities and may therefore be politically motivated" (Hersh, 2002, p. 249). This allows for revenge, competitive advantage and personal advancement to serve as potential negative whistleblowing antecedent conditions.

Table 4: Definitions for Whistleblowing Antecedent Conditions

Antecedent	Informing Sources	Definition
Altruism	Leeds (1963)	A behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others that meets the following criteria: 1. The person who engages in giving treats it as an end in itself. He anticipates no other satisfaction or gain than the pleasure of contributing to the welfare of others. 2. The person gives voluntarily. He is acting beyond the call of duty and not fulfilling stipulated role obligations. 3. On balance, the person "is doing good" as judged by the recipient spectators to the action (p. 230)
Prosocial Behavior	Dozier & Miceli (1985); Staub (1978)	... Is positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons. But unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves (p. 825).
Revenge	Stuckless & Goranson (1992)	... The infliction of harm in return for perceived wrong" (p. 25).
Competitive Advantage	Reed & DeFillippi (1978)	... Unique position an organization develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource deployments (p. 90).
Personal Advancement	Boyd & Grumpert (1983); Burch (1986); Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger (1997); White & Singletary (1993).	... The process of improving your career for personal gain within an organization in order to get a more important position.

Altruism

Altruism is defined as, "... a behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others that meets three criteria: (1) the act is an end in itself and is not done for self-serving reasons; (2) it is a voluntary act; and (3) the act results in good" (Leeds, 1963, p. 230).

Altruism is best explained using the Theory of Planned Behavior where intention is seen through: (1) attitude toward the behavior (e.g., favorable ethical attitude towards whistleblowing to right an ethical wrongdoing), (2) subjective norms (e.g., positive

social pressures), and (3) perceived behavioral control (e.g., whistleblowing behavior) (Ajzen, 1991).

A recent example of a self-reported, altruistic whistleblowing behavior dealt with collegiate athletics. James Gundlach, an Auburn University sociology professor, internally reported his suspicions of academic fraud violations within his department (e.g., a voluntary act not done for self-serving reasons that resulted in good). Later, Gundlach whistleblow externally to the New York Times. He alleged that the athletic department was skirting NCAA requirements towards their student-athletes (New York Times, 2006). Gundlach claimed to report the wrongdoing simply because it was the right thing to do.

Informant Raylan, while not directly confirming that he believed in altruism, stated that personal ethics should serve as a motive to drive whistleblowing behavior:

Personal ethics, their own integrity. That's looked upon highly at [redacted]. It's one of our core principles of the university, integrity.

Informant Boyd felt that there are people who are motivated by only doing what is ethical:

There are people that just, that's how they feel when something comes across their desk or they become aware of something, you report it and that's it. If you're doing it from a positive manner, there's little reward other than knowing that you did the right thing.

Informant Wynn firmly believed in altruistic acts as a driving motive for the way to live life:

... you can do a lot of right with your altruistic compass, and just living a life like that. There is a right and wrong, you should do the right thing.

A person with a predisposition for altruistic behavior, has high moral character and moral motivation, and thus understands appropriate ethical behavior (Lee, Lee, & Kang, 2003). Illustrated best through the use of the Theory of Planned Behavior to explain intention, an altruistic person satisfies all three tenets of Leeds (1963) criteria. Personal ethics and integrity serve as the guiding principles in altruistic whistleblowing behavior.

Extant literature stated that altruism, based by Leeds (1963) criteria is difficult to adhere to. However, the respondents felt that using a personal altruistic compass to guide behavior should be everyone's driving motive. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they exhibit altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior influences whistleblowing intention and can serve as the overriding antecedent condition.

Prosocial Behavior

It is extremely difficult to satisfy all three criterion of Leeds' (1963) definition of altruism (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). Instead, many theorists subscribe to tenets of prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is defined as, "positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons. But unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves" (Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 825). Behavior is prosocial in theory if the three tenets are satisfied: "(1) a member of an organization performed the act, (2) the act is directed toward an individual, group, or organization, and (3) the act is performed with the intention of promoting welfare" (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986, p. 711). A recent example of prosocial behavior acting as an antecedent for whistleblowing

behavior dealt with high school athletics. Christopher Cerbone, a high school football coach (e.g., a member of an organization performed the act), learned of alleged sexual hazing amongst some of his players, where the act was directed toward an individual, group, or organization. He reported the misconduct to the school principal of the Catholic Diocese of Sacramento and was fired a few weeks later after an investigation. Cerbone said that he reported the unethical acts in order to proactively correct the situation (e.g., the intention of promoting welfare). A court ruled in his favor and the diocese reached a settlement with Cerbone for \$4mm.

Unlike altruism, the motive of prosocial behavior can result in the actor receiving a form of compensation or reward. In sport, that reward is oftentimes simply just the whistleblower getting peace of mind. Ultimately, the driving force behind the motive for whistleblowing behavior is a person's code of ethics. For example, Informant Wynn and Informant Loretta believed that a person's morals and ethics are involved in any form of whistleblowing behavior. Informant Loretta held that the motive to right the ethical wrong was, "to know that you're following your own moral compass." Informant Ava countered this and claimed that ethics are usually situational.

Informant Winona felt that a whistleblower's reward would be:

I think a lot of it might be ethics. This is just not right. Let's do what's right. This is not fair, this is not right. I think it's just maybe peace of mind.

Informant Tim felt that validation for doing the right thing was a potential reward:

I think first and foremost, they feel like they're doing the right thing. I think that's most critical. I think beyond on that, validation over time that they were doing the right thing and that they feel like they're making change for the future for somebody else. I think those are really important.

Prosocial behavior is the byproduct of a person who exhibits strong personal morals and ethics. A person who whistleblows from a prosocial standpoint promotes positive change in an ethical or moral manner (Vadera et al., 2009). Unlike altruism, prosocial behavior allows for the whistleblower to perform an internal cost-benefit analysis and seek reward for their actions. Brief and Motowildo's (1986) framework for Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior posited that persons within an organization perform the whistleblowing act to promote welfare. In sport, prosocial behavior is more likely to occur than altruism because of the cost-benefit analysis consideration (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).

Respondents noted that their own ethical compass guided them in carrying out their job responsibilities. However, they also acknowledged that relationship factors (e.g., family, perception, affiliation, and job security) were considerations in their reporting practices. Those considerations prompted the need for an internal cost-benefit analysis. Most respondents felt that the only reward a whistleblower should get is the self-satisfaction for performing an ethical act and positive praise from coworkers and superiors. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they exhibit prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior influences whistleblowing intention and acts as the overriding antecedent condition.

Revenge

Revenge is defined as, "... the infliction of harm in return for perceived wrong" (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992, p. 25). In sport, revenge serves as a motive by the actor, who feels that they have been wronged, in an attempt to balance the scales of justice.

The best way to understand revenge as a whistleblowing antecedent is through Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). When an actor is trying to get a measure of revenge they inherently know that the action has some negative element and an associated negative outcome. These revenge acts cause disconnect between two cognitive elements (e.g., revenge as an antecedent and whistleblowing as the outcome), which can give the actor a sense of uneasiness. In order to get revenge the actor will justify the act by whistleblowing under the guise of prosocial behavior.

A recent example of revenge acting as a motive for whistleblowing behavior dealt with professional cycling. Floyd Landis, a former cycling teammate of Lance Armstrong, blew the whistle on Armstrong after being caught for blood doping. Landis admitted that he had doped at the behest of Armstrong and was angered that Armstrong was not being honest (e.g., justification for whistleblowing) when claiming to be clean of performance-enhancing drug use. Armstrong maintained that Landis only blew the whistle on him because his contract was not renewed by Armstrong's cycling team (e.g., revenge motivation). Armstrong would later admit to the allegations and was stripped of his seven *Tour de France* victories and ordered to pay millions in restitution.

Informant Winona and Informant Loretta surmised that revenge serves a whistleblowing motivation when there is dissention in the workplace:

There could be tons of motivations that aren't necessarily on the up and up. I would imagine there might be others who want revenge or don't like someone and want to get them fired.

Informant Wynn spoke of revenge serving as a motivation when someone who used to be affiliated with the university and is fired or no longer welcome within the athletic program:

I guess they got a bad deal, right? That's clearly a motivation; retaliation the other way and they're trying to stick it to them.

Informant Ava opined that, "... people who are bitter and want their chance to shine" use revenge as motivation. Informant Boyd looked at things from a booster or agent perspective and speculated that revenge acts as the antecedent condition for whistleblowing:

I think from outside of campus, if there's a booster or someone that's giving extra benefits, they kind of have a relationship with the student athletes whether they were a recruit or current student athlete. Student athletes start to go back on them, the way that the booster or the permissible benefits provider expected, then all of a sudden, they might have a reason to report anonymously about the kid. Or if a kid wants to transfer, then you have something to harm them.

The desire to seek revenge against an opponent or former affiliate can serve as a powerful antecedent condition. Using whistleblowing in an attempt to get revenge usually means that there is an unethical, illegal, or rule violating condition that can be reported or exposed. Thus, there is an element of prosocial behavior that occurs as a byproduct of the whistleblowing act. A whistleblower may use Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957) to justify their negative intention (e.g., revenge) because of the associated positive outcome (e.g., exposing the wrongdoing).

The respondents noted that there are many stakeholders, both internal and external, who potentially could use revenge as an influencing antecedent condition in whistleblowing behavior. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with

whistleblowing if they seek revenge. Seeking revenge situationally acts as the overriding antecedent condition, while prosocial behavior serves as the underpinning antecedent condition influencing whistleblowing intention.

Competitive Advantage

Competitive Advantage is defined as the "... unique position an organization develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource deployments" (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990, p. 90). In order to gain an advantage on your competition the actor needs to have inside information on illegal, unethical, or rule violating behavior committed by the opposing team. Then they would need to whistleblow prior to the sporting event occurring in an effort to level the playing field. Using Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development (1969), behavior is matched with actions. Level three of Kohlberg's model (e.g., conformity and mutual expectations) occurs when the behavior of the actor takes on of the traits of close to them (Trevino, 1986).

A recent example of competitive advantage acting as an antecedent for whistleblowing behavior dealt with the NFL. Ryan Grigson, the general manager of the Indianapolis Colts, mirrored the behavior of team owner (e.g., conformity and mutual expectations), Jim Irsay, an outspoken owner who champions fair play. Grigson blew the whistle on the New England Patriots prior, during, and after a playoff game alleging that the footballs being used by the Patriots were purposefully altered and under-inflated. This in turn offered the Patriots team a competitive edge. By blowing the whistle, Grigson hoped to take away the Patriots advantage.

Competitive advantage was the most common negative motive given as to why someone would whistleblow in sport. Superior performance is achieved as a result of competitive advantage (Day, 1984; Porter, 1985). Informant Rachel believed that an actor could whistleblow to gain a competitive advantage but that there was also an element of righting a wrong. Thus, competitive advantage could serve as an overriding antecedent condition while prosocial behavior would serve as an underpinning antecedent condition.

Informant Loretta felt that if a whistleblower perceived an advantage for the opposition then the motive to whistleblow would be to even the playing field as opposed to gaining an advantage:

I think it's anything from a perceived advantage of some kind. For coaches, it's probably more about competitive fairness and competitive equity and what they perceive other people are cheating.

Informant Ava was more forceful in stating that she believed that the whistleblowing behavior would be vindictive allowing for revenge to act as the overriding condition and competitive advantage acting as the underpinning condition:

To hurt a program they don't like. Hindering them in some way. Thinking that if we do this, and we tell on them, we'll get a competitive advantage to some extent.

A majority of the respondents felt that coaches are most likely to use competitive advantage as a whistleblowing motive. Informant Wynn believed that competitive advantage reporting was most often on the recruiting trail:

Competitive advantage, that's one. Negative recruiting, for sure, then they could say, "Hey, you guys cheat." If the coach gets caught doing that they can take them off the list ... if they're recruiting the same athlete, that's a huge competitive advantage that they get taken off the trail, plus it just levels the

playing field. If someone else isn't cheating, they don't want somebody else cheating.

Informant Art narrowed it down to coaches' hubris on missing out on signing a recruit:

You're talking about the coaches. The motivation is they lost a student athlete to the school they didn't think they should lose it to. "I think something bad must be going on, how could that kid choose that university over mine."

Informant Ellstin figured that coaches' whistleblowing on opposing coaches is commonplace:

Absolutely. It will be the coach at Tennessee calling in and turning in ... calling the NCAA direct to turn in the coach at Alabama, you better believe it. I think that happens darn near daily.

There is a win at all costs mentality among highly competitive people (Rychman, et al., 1990). Informant Boyd told of how coaches will strategically whistleblow in order to gain a competitive advantage prior to big games:

I know we also get a form of whistleblowing from coaches from other schools or constituents from other schools where it'll be the week before a bigger game, or something like that, and something great happens to our team. All the sudden you get some reports from, you know, an opposing school trying to say this, that, and the other about, "so and so's receiving this" or "so and so's driving this car" and things like that. There [are] a lot of negative motives.

Informant Raylan did not limit the whistleblowing behavior to coaches. He extended the idea that fans, as stakeholders, would report violations if they knew it would offer their favorite team a competitive advantage:

Sure. It can be they lost out in a recruiting battle, it can be they lost out on a game, and they felt like playing an ineligible player. There could be all kinds of motives, but mostly it's a competitive motive of either they lost out on something, or they want to win something, and so that's the motive, I think, of the general fan out there of reporting against another school.

Informant Boyd posited that rivalry schools look at whistleblowing against one another as not only a competitive advantage but also as a reward:

If you're an Alabama fan that lives in Auburn, Alabama and then you see something going on with one of their student athletes or groups and you report it, your reward is that your rival now will have suffered the consequences.

The desire to seek a competitive advantage against an opponent can serve as an effective antecedent condition, especially with highly competitive people in athletics who want to win at all costs (Ryckman, et al., 1990). Using whistleblowing in an attempt to get a competitive advantage usually means that there is an unethical, illegal, or rule violating condition that can be reported or exposed. Thus, there is an element of prosocial behavior that occurs as a byproduct of the whistleblowing act. A whistleblower may use Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development (1969) where the coach takes on the traits of their peers and conforms to industry standards and expectations of needing to do anything to win (Trevino, 1986).

The respondents noted that they felt coaches use any means necessary to seek an advantage including reporting unethical acts and violations. Additionally, one respondent noted that he felt that coaches might sit on information until the optimal time to expose the wrongdoing as a form of competitive advantage. This leads to the assumption that not all whistleblowing behavior is influenced prosocially. In fact, whistleblowing influenced by negative antecedent conditions may consist of the whistleblower compromising their own personal morals and ethics by delaying the release of the wrongdoing until it best serves them. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek competitive advantage. Seeking

competitive advantage situationally acts as the overriding antecedent condition, while prosocial behavior as the underpinning antecedent condition influencing whistleblowing intention.

Personal Advancement

The concept of personal advancement consists of advancement and financial gain. Personal advancement is, "... the process of improving your career for personal gain within an organization in order to get a more important position" (Boyd and Grumpert, 1983; Burch, 1986; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997; White and Singletary, 1993). Financial gain, a potential byproduct of personal advancement, is, "... the amount of money to be gained for an act or service rendered" (Miceli & Near, 1994). Personal advancement acts as a motive when a whistleblower uses knowledge of an unethical act, illegal act, or rules violation in order to advance within their employment or financially gain from reporting. Personal advancement is best framed using Attribution Theory where causal judgment of an event and a secondary event is carried out with an understanding of the ramifications of the first event on the second event (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The whistleblowers would understand in advance what the subsequent social consequences (e.g., secondary event) are prior to the act of whistleblowing (e.g., first event) and chooses to whistleblow anyway.

A recent example of competitive advantage acting as a motive for whistleblowing behavior dealt with USA track and field. Trevor Graham, a former USA track and field coach, anonymously phoned (e.g., first event) the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency making them aware of undetectable anabolic steroids being distributed to world-

class athletes. He then sent in a used syringe containing residue of the PED to authorities. This led to a federal investigation (e.g., secondary event) of Victor Conte and BALCO, which had been distributing steroids from 1988-2002 in one of the largest steroid scandals ever reported. Graham stated that he was not a part of the distribution of PEDs but was later sent to prison for perjury. It was later stated that Graham wanted to eliminate his competition and be known as the ‘mastermind of chemistry’ in providing illegal drugs to athletes:

Informant Winona spoke of a situation where someone reported rules violations in an effort to advance within the athletic department:

I think it was for personal gain. I don’t know if it was financial but I think it was more for personal ... “I want to be in athletics and I want to stay in coaching.”

Informant Rachel noted that coaches have intense pressure to win, which in turn helps their advancement within their field. She gave a scenario where a coach may decide not to whistleblow in order to keep a player eligible to give the team a better chance to win:

Maybe the coach would much prefer to have the student athlete play in the game that day. They think, "Well, maybe I could always report this in a few weeks, if it still seems like a problem."

Informant Ellstin told of a scenario where a whistleblower was expecting to be fired and whistleblew on multiple violations in an effort to be protected from losing his job, and thus secure financial gain:

At the end of the day, he was playing a little bit of a game. He knew he was about to get fired so he attempted to identify himself as a whistleblower and then file multiple lawsuits against the university. I believe there were only a couple of those things that were proven to be actually correct. He sued me, he sued the AD, he sued the president, sued the vice president, sued human resources, sued everybody and drug it out for almost a decade.

The desire to seek personal advancement within one's industry can serve as a motivating antecedent condition, especially when financial gain is the end result of the advancement (Boyd & Grumpert, 1983; Burch, 1986). Using whistleblowing in an attempt to personally advance within an industry usually means that there is an unethical, illegal, or rule violating condition that can be reported or exposed. Thus, there is an element of prosocial behavior that occurs as a byproduct of the whistleblowing act. A whistleblower may use Attribution Theory where prior to whistleblowing, the whistleblower knows the expected social or organizational consequences of the act (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The whistleblower can then use this information in numerous ways. The whistleblower could apprise the person they are informing on and use the knowledge as a form of blackmail. Additionally, they could use the information to report to someone who has the power to terminate the person who committed the wrongdoing.

In addition to using whistleblowing as a form of personal advancement and financial gain, the respondents noted that it is not uncommon for people in athletics to perform any act necessary in order to keep their job. All levels of athletics have a relatively high turnover in employment with each change in upper administration having trickle down effects for lesser positions. When there is a change in the organizational structure, the arriving administration may feel the need to replace the former administrations staff with people that they are more familiar with. One respondent dealt with a whistleblowing case where the whistleblower reported suspected violations merely as a means to keep his employment. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek personal advancement. Seeking personal

advancement situationally acts as the overriding antecedent condition, while prosocial behavior serves as the underpinning antecedent condition influencing whistleblowing intention.

RQ3: *What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence whistleblowing intention?*

Three major themes, each with subthemes, were identified as potential barriers that could influence whistleblowing intention. These barriers are the contemplated considerations within an individual's cost-benefit analysis. These themes include social-situational, employment, and loyalty. Ethical judgment is related to whistleblowing intent; however, the action of whistleblowing is not (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). This shows that even if the potential whistleblower believes there has been a transgression and feel that they should report, there are considerations taken into account that could lead to non-reporting behavior. Thus, it is important to understand the barriers to whistleblowing intention. A visual map of the findings was made to as a guide to show types of barriers, major themes, and subthemes. Additionally, it serves to provide transparency of the analysis process using quotes from interviews along with observations from collegiate administrators (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002) (See Table 5).

Table 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis: Themes, Subthemes, and Barriers

Subthemes		Major Themes		Type of Barrier
Family Negative Perceptions	⇒	Social-Situational Factors	⇒	Personal
Job Security Previous Handlings	⇒	Employment Factors	⇒	Organizational
Organizational Athletes Fans	⇒	Loyalty Factors	⇒	Affiliation

Cost-Benefit Analysis

When facing a decision to whistleblow, many individuals will conduct an internal cost-benefit analysis weighing the potential implications and consequences of their behavior to their work and non-work identities (Verada et al., 2009). The net difference between the perceived costs and expected benefits of the whistleblowing behavior should yield the intention outcome (Kiel et al., 2010). It is likely that whistleblowers will only perform the whistleblowing act if they believe that the expected benefits outweigh the costs (Gundlach et al., 2003).

Henik (2008) posited that emotion (e.g., anger, confusion, and fear) impacts various stages of the whistleblowing process. How stakeholders perceive a whistleblower impacts the decision-making process. Henik (2008) found that, "... role models, partners, and significant others act as organizational loyalty disruptors that facilitate decisions to blow the whistle altering individuals cost-benefit analysis and perceived value conflicts" (Vadera et al., 2009, p. 566). Affiliation (e.g., loyalty),

organizational (e.g., job security), and personal (e.g., family, friends, and coworkers) considerations all factor into a cost-benefit analysis.

A recent example of a whistleblower that performed a cost-benefit analysis is former New York Jets head coach Eric Mangini. Mangini, a former assistant coach of the New England Patriots, had inside knowledge that the Patriots were filming coaching signals from their own sideline, which is in violation of NFL rules. Mangini was a participant in the rules violating acts while under the Patriots employment. While he was employed and became aware of these actions, his cost-benefit analysis yielded the result of not blowing the whistle, implying that the perceived costs (e.g., being perceived as a snitch, potentially losing employment) did not outweigh the expected benefits (e.g., righting an ethical wrongdoing). However, once Mangini took a head coaching position with the rival Jets, he quickly sent notice to the league detailing the rules violations and unethical behavior. This time the expected benefits (i.e., winning the game, gaining a competitive advantage) outweighed the perceived costs (i.e., potentially losing trust of rival coaches) and his cost-benefit analysis yielded the result of blowing the whistle. Dubbed 'Spy-gate', the league fined Bill Belichick, New England's head coach, \$500,000, the Patriots \$250,000, and stripped the team of a first round draft pick. However, the Jets fired Mangini a few years later and his whistleblowing behavior damaged his reputation around the league, thereby making it difficult to gain the trust of players and coaches and limiting his potential employment opportunities.

Nine of the informants for the study believed that a whistleblower conducts a cost-benefit analysis prior to their decision-making intention. Informant Ellstin felt that

in order to make an intelligent decision, a cost-benefit analysis needs to be performed but he would look for an alternative avenue to disseminate the information to avoid being labeled a whistleblower:

I think if they're smart they do [a cost-benefit analysis]. I would look for a way for the information to become public without me being labeled the whistleblower.

Informant Raylan noted that only fools would report without taking the situational factors into consideration:

I think I'd be foolish to think that some don't go through that. I think many of them will probably analyze this. "Do I need to report this? Should I report this?" I think that's in everybody's nature ... do they want to put themselves in the middle of something, and call someone out?

Informant Wynn referenced the UNC whistleblower's cost-benefit analysis process taking years before she decided to whistleblow:

Yeah, of course [she went through a cost-benefit analysis], because it took her forever to come out ... several years later before she did.

Informant Ava was the lone respondent who dissented claiming that whistleblowers are too caught up in the moment to think rationally:

I think they're in the moment. I think usually they're so pissed off that even if they did try to weigh the pros and cons, they'll never fully understand what could potentially happen in the fallout.

Informant Winona, who works for a small Division II university, claimed that the pressure to report compliance issues at a Division I FBS university keeps her from leaving her job:

That's why; see it would never work at Division 1. I couldn't do this at Division 1, I should say. I would not to do compliance at Division 1.

There are many potential barriers associated with whistleblowing that influences intention outcomes. A whistleblower needs to contemplate all relevant information against the implications and consequences of the whistleblowing act (Verada et al., 2009). Personal, organizational, and affiliation considerations all factor in to the cost-benefit analysis. Personal considerations include how internal and external stakeholders will perceive the whistleblower. The whistleblower also needs to account for how the act will affect their family, friends, and coworkers. Organizationally, the whistleblower needs to consider how it will affect their current employment. In order to gauge how it will affect employment the whistleblower can refer to previous handlings by the organization in similar cases. A final consideration stems from the affiliation of the whistleblower. In order to remain loyal to an organization, to teammates, or as a fan, the whistleblower may decide to ignore the unethical or illegal acts.

Most respondents maintained that it is vital that the potential whistleblower conduct a cost-benefit analysis. One respondent mentioned that a person would be foolish to not perform one. However, respondents noted that there is no timetable for which to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis could be performed over an extended period of time and the considerations (e.g., barriers) within it could change as well. In sport, whistleblowing intention increases when the individual perceives the differentiation of expected benefits outweighs the perceived costs. Conversely, whistleblowing intention decreases when the individual perceives the differentiation of perceived costs outweighs the expected benefits.

The aforementioned antecedent conditions (altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement) presented in RQ2 act as the expected benefits in a cost-benefit analysis leading to whistleblowing intention. The three themes (e.g., factors), and subthemes, listed below act as the perceived costs (e.g., barriers) dissuading whistleblowing behavior.

Social-Situational Factors

The most frequently reported barrier for whistleblowing intention was social-situational factors. The major two emerging themes recognized under social-situational factors were: family considerations and negative perceptions of whistleblowers.

Family Considerations. The whistleblower must take into consideration the outcomes of a whistleblowing behavior could have on their family and friends. Family, friends, and coworkers can all be adversely affected in a whistleblowing case (Hersh, 2002). Informant Tim speculated that the whistleblower and those close to them become targets:

I think emotionally it's draining on them and their family. I'm sure just like with anybody else, they can lean on something and having a target on you relative to being questioned on your integrity and your support of your organization can be really, really hard for people. I'm sure it burns bridges with some who may feel differently or see things differently and it's really hard. I can see it being really stressful for that individual.

Informant Boyd feared that fans could become aggressive towards the whistleblower and their family:

Even if you're an external stakeholder, if you live in the community, if you live in a college town, it's certainly not only college towns, but especially in a college town there's a threat of the fanatical fans that are willing to do anything. If you have children, what's going to happen to them in school? What are you going to

do now for money? What are your neighbors going to say or do? There's a lot of negative ramifications for doing it.

Negative Perceptions of Whistleblowers. How someone is perceived within their family, circle of friends, workplace, and community can have a major effect on the whistleblower (Hersh, 2002). Unfortunately, the most common perception of a whistleblower seems to be negative. Informant Wynn stated that the perception of the whistleblower depends solely on the culture. Yet, he stated that, "... the world whistleblower is negative, very negative." Informant Loretta feared that being labeled a whistleblower would tarnish one's reputation while Informant Winona thought that being a whistleblower means one's name gets, "... dragged through the mud." Informant Ava suggested that a whistleblower would gain a legacy as someone who was not loyal:

I think a lot of times the person who reports it is often held like in a negative light. They brought down this program. Rather than, they did the right thing by pointing that out.

Informant Winona agreed:

I think ... not loyal. I don't know. It depends ... again, within your department they probably think you're not loyal to your department. Maybe they think you're not loyal to the school.

Informant Boyd suggested that the whistleblower could become the university villain:

If you come forward with it and your name is attached to it and it's not found to be true, you come across as being against, you're a negative ... even if it's found to be true, you can be found to be a villain, where you're out to get the university. I would hope that from a faculty member, they would still be viewed with respect but I guess that would depend on the individual. A student, I mean, they're the villains of the entire campus at that point.

Informant Ellstin succulently described the danger of being a whistleblower:

A whistleblower is a negative thing to most people. I'm identified as a whistleblower and I go try get another job, I'm a boat rocker, I'm a trouble

maker, all those things. I would not want to be identified as a whistleblower.

Employment Factors

The second most frequently reported barrier for whistleblowing intention was employment factors. Two subthemes were recognized under employment factors: (1) job security and (2) previous handling of whistleblowing cases.

Job Security. All the respondents at various points in the interviews mentioned job security as a major consideration acting as a barrier to whistleblowing behavior. While laws are in place to protect certain whistleblowers, the reality is that in sport those protections offer little comfort. Hersh (2002) remarked how whistleblowers faced "... more close monitoring by supervisors, negative performance evaluations, being ignored by co-workers, and losing their job or being forced to retire" (p. 250). Informant Loretta and Informant Winona mentioned future employment and current job security as considerations. Informant Winona also predicted that, "... if it's a coach, [they] may not get a job at a different institution."

Informant Ellstin admitted hesitation in hiring a whistleblower:

It's almost akin to filing lawsuits, so if I'm hiring somebody, let's say I'm hiring a new director of sports medicine, and in my quick Google research, Yahoo research, whatever, I find out that they have a lawsuit pending against their current employer. Honestly, I am probably not employing them even though that lawsuit may have complete merit and validity, because that concerns me. It would be the same with a whistleblower.

Informant Boyd noted that the whistleblower isn't just putting their own job in jeopardy but also potentially those that they work with:

Certainly the negative is, whether it's right or wrong, after whistleblowing occurs and it's found to be true, a lot of people now, their careers are crushed. Specifically, head compliance officers [are] likely to lose their job if there's

anything going on, whether they had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it or not. If it's academic based a lot of academic counselors from the athletic side could lose their job. The campus counselors could lose their job. That person that blows the whistle could either lose their job, certainly I would doubt if they'd legally be able to be fired for that, but they certainly could be asked to resign with some kind of package because of their requiring to be removed from that community.

Informant Boyd thought that managers who whistleblow are put in the most difficult situation:

A manager on the team ... put in a harder position because anything that they report is going to be viewed as breaking trust or not being part of the team with the coaches that they work for.

Informant Art believed that a student-athlete who blows the whistle would have a hard time keeping their scholarship:

There are all kinds of barriers for people within athletics that are vulnerable to being put off the team or scholarship not renewed and things like that, yes. There are things there.

Informant Wynn and Informant Winona both mentioned the UNC whistleblowing case and the effect that it had on the whistleblower. Informant Wynn noted that the whistleblower's reputation is tainted in addition to losing her job:

She doesn't work there anymore, besides losing your job ... that's the culture that we have set up or they have set up, not in my department, but yeah, obviously, the fear is retaliation ... I mean, they smeared that woman's reputation.

Informant Winona felt sympathy for and commended the UNC whistleblower who faced the stark reality that once you blow the whistle your life will invariably change:

I give this person a lot of credit for doing that and probably she will probably be more affected than the athletic department or any of those people that were involved there, which is sad. You know what I mean? I'm in the industry, I'm in the business, but that's my opinion.

Previous Handling of Whistleblowing Cases. The willingness of others to whistleblow in the future depends on the culture set forth by previous perceived experiences (Hersh, 2002). The climate that is established in handling reporting practices and whistleblowing sets the tone for employee's behavior. If the organization is proactive and rewards, not punishes, the whistleblower there is a higher likelihood of the reporting behavior. Subsequently, if the work environment chides at reporting practices, then whistleblowing behavior will likely decrease.

If an organization sets a precedent of questionable practices, it gives an indication that retaliation may occur against whistleblowers (Near et al., 1986).

Informant Raylan pointed to a work environment that lauded reporting:

Concern or pressures that they maybe face in their job of how things have been handled within their area when something's been done in the past, as far as turning in small or large issues, and how their supervisors have handled it in the past. Those are likely some barriers that people might face.

Informant Boyd surmised that if the environment is pressure packed and results oriented and someone throws off the balance by whistleblowing that there could be internal backlash:

There can be pressure from colleagues. If you're a faculty member in an academic department and you report it, what happens if six other people in the department knew about it? Not only are they upset with you because they probably feel that you didn't need to do it, but now their jobs are on the line because it could come out that they previously knew.

Loyalty Factors

Affiliation plays a strong role in whistleblowing intention (Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009). Jensen (1987) and Judd (1999) both considered whistleblowers to have multiple loyalties, which include organizational loyalty, family, friends, teammates, and

the greater public. Each play a role on the ethical dilemma in the decision-making process of whistleblowing intention (Hersh, 2002). While the least reported barriers for a whistleblowing intention were affiliation factors, three subthemes were recognized under affiliation: (1) organizational affiliation, (2) athlete affiliation, and (3) fan affiliation. Accordingly, strong attachment to the organizational affiliation can act as a mediating variable in whistleblowing intention. As a barrier, affiliation at the organizational-, fan-, and athlete-levels has a strong influence on behavior. Basically, the actor could deem the wrongdoing acceptable or not worthy of reporting during the time they work for the organization out of perceived loyalty.

Organizational Affiliation. Organizational affiliation is limited to those who are internal stakeholders and have a direct connection to the athletic program. Winfield (1994) felt that employees should resign if they felt their ethical concerns overrides their duty to the organization. Informant Wynn claimed that internal stakeholders, even if their job is to remain ethical and unbiased, allow affiliation to super cede and influence intention:

Even internal, man, some of these guys drink the Kool-Aid. They may not even know that they're drinking the Kool-Aid and that they don't see things a certain way, but they're biased. You just say, "Oh, that's fine, we're great." No, man, you're looking at it through clouded lenses.

Informant Boyd suggested that affiliation is the only thing that keeps people from blowing the whistle:

If you have no affiliation with the university or organization, then what would ever keep you from reporting something or coming forward with anything?

However, Informant Raylan felt the opposite and stated that the more involved one is with the university, the more likely they are to whistleblow:

I'd say as a determining factor, if they're more involved with the institution, then they're more likely to blow the whistle, I believe. Yeah, they're more involved and more invested, and I'd say more involved and more invested, and it's like they have a personal stake in this thing. They have a pride in [redacted], and the integrity, and the ethics, and that institution succeeding, so they have an investment for the right reasons, and so they're more apt to say, "No, when we win, I want to win it the right way and not have any of these problems."

Athlete Affiliation. Athletes who participate in team sports typically feel camaraderie with teammates strengthening the bond of affiliation. If an athlete were to whistleblow they could face extreme backlash for their actions within the locker room. Loyalty can dissuade a whistleblower from reporting the unethical or illegal act (Miceli & Near, 1986) in order to not be considered disloyal (Duska, 2007). Informant Raylan imagined that it would be hard for an athlete to violate the trust of the team:

It'd be very hard for that student-athlete to come forward, and if they knew it is at such a level that it's going to jeopardize their remaining season, the employment of a coach that may be very liked.

Informant Boyd assumed that there would be anger from the team leading to alienation:

I would think that there would be a lot of internal turmoil, anger, negativity towards the whistleblower. From the player side, you're breaking away from the team. That's what the model constantly is in college athletics. We're a team. Don't let outside forces in. If you were to veer from the team to get the coach in trouble, another player in trouble, anything like that, I mean, you're going to be outcast.

Informant Winona described how the teammate could be treated:

You could be shunned by teammates, by coaches, by classmates, by peers, by people you work with.

Informant Ava said that the athlete would be known as a “snitch” instead of whistleblower, while Informant Boyd pontificated on the next steps an athlete would take if they were to whistleblow:

I could see it being a situation where the player feels like they need to transfer because there’s just not a level of trust. From a coach and team perspective, anyone that’s doing something to hurt the team is going to be chastised, directly or indirectly punished for it.

Fan Affiliation. Fans are as invested as any stakeholder but for entirely different reasoning. Fans are external stakeholders who use sport as entertainment as opposed to employment. Fans are consumers with high levels of identification with a sport team (e.g., professional) or university (e.g., collegiate). In turn they exhibit high levels of emotional and affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 2005). For example, Informant Ava felt that fans are less likely to whistleblow against their own university because they are competitive. However, Informant Art thought fan affiliation played a key role in whistleblowing intention:

I suspect less likely [to blow whistle against own university]. I think the emotion carries a day with a lot of the people who are not directly involved with the university but that’s just my gut feeling.

Informant Wynn predicted that fans, due to their affiliation, are more likely to blow the whistle against a rival:

I mean people are loyal and they’re more likely to whistleblow against a rival or an opposing opponent than they are their own institution.

Informant Boyd said that based on affiliation, fans are willing to not blow the whistle against their own team in order to win.

Sadly, I would say the majority of fans or students on campus may have the perception of, "I don’t care, I just want to win games," and if a student, or a

faculty member, or a staff member, or anyone internally does something to negatively affect whatever team, then even though they did nothing wrong, they're going to be viewed as the bad person, not the student athlete.

Even with the most stout ethical and moral compass and influencing antecedent conditions, barriers still exist that can dissuade whistleblowing intention. There are a number of retaliatory acts that deter whistleblowing such as "... organizational steps taken to undermine the complaint process, isolation of the whistleblower, character defamation, imposition of hardship or disgrace upon the whistleblower, exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites, and other forms of discrimination or harassment" (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 285). Whistleblowers need to take into account social-situational, employment, and loyalty factors.

The family, friends, and coworkers will be affected after the whistle is blown. One respondent thought that the entire process would be draining on a family while another commented that that it could affect the community. Additionally, internal and external stakeholders invariably will view the whistleblower differently. One respondent predicted that the whistleblower would be viewed as the person who brought down a program, effectively becoming a villain. The whistleblower should consider their current and future employment and can do so based on previous handlings of whistleblowing cases. One respondent admitted that he would probably not consider hiring a whistleblower. Lastly, the whistleblower likely will consider what role loyalty has on their whistleblowing intention. Affiliation has a strong effect on whether or not someone would blow the whistle. One respondent went as far as to claim that affiliation is the determining factor in whistleblowing intention. Regardless of the barriers, the

whistleblower will blow the whistle if they feel the expected benefits outweighs perceived costs but not without serious considerations as to what affect those perceived costs would have on their personal lives, their position within an organization, and how it affects their affiliation.

Limitations

There were several limitations to the current study. Assuaging these issues in the future will improve research inquiry in this particular area. First, the general issue with all whistleblowing cases centers on actual versus hypothetical cases. It is uncommon for a whistleblower to detail their experiences before, during, and after the whistleblowing process. There is a timeline change after the fallout of a whistleblowing case with hindsight always being 20/20. As a result, whistleblower experiences may change during each phase of the whistleblowing process and change even further years after the case is resolved. If the whistleblower is interviewed during one phase and was treated positively then they will report one perception. However, if their coworkers later treated them differently, their responses may be quite different.

It is likely that there is little consistency throughout the process. There is a danger of the whistleblower fictionalizing the events as well, including the initial antecedent conditions for whistleblowing and the factors involved (Hersh, 2002). As a result, the closest researchers can get to answers is through the shared experiences of whistleblowers and by putting respondents through hypothetical whistleblowing cases. Yet, even hypothetical scenarios do not prepare a respondent from the ever-changing

variables that influence real-life behavior making it difficult to discern what findings are factual while in a laboratory setting (Miceli, et al., 1992).

It is uncommon to have access to a whistleblower during their entire experience and longevity studies are difficult to conduct with whistleblowing. To assuage these concerns, and enhance the findings, it has been suggested to study non-whistleblowers (Dozier et al., 1985). Due to the lack of whistleblowers available to speak within a sport setting, interviewing respondents in an athletic department position was deemed optimal. The respondents were in power positions and were privy to all reporting and whistleblowing occurrences within their institution. Interviewing these respondents was deemed the most appropriate way to inquire about the perception of whistleblowing, the perception of whistleblowers, to understand possible antecedents to whistleblowing intention, and identify the potential barriers of whistleblowing intentions.

A second limitation dealt with data collection. There is a culture of secrecy in sport where whistleblowing and the reporting of illegal, immoral, and unethical acts and rules violations are taboo. University lawyers and/or coworkers advised more than 40 potential respondents to decline speaking on and/or off record because whistleblowing was the interview topic. This is an issue with all whistleblowing research where response rates for surveys are extremely low (Barnett, Cochran, & Taylor, 1993). Some respondents felt that the interview questions may be too invasive for elaborate answers to be given. Three respondents made it known at various points in the interview to remind the researcher that they needed to be careful with their answers and asked that any personal identifiers and university affiliation be redacted from the transcripts and

manuscript. The only way to remedy this would be to find university athletic officials who are willing to be transparent.

A third limitation was that none of the respondents were actually whistleblowers themselves. However, one respondent was directly involved in a whistleblowing case and was able to adequately explain the process. All of the respondents have dealt with reporting practices as part of their job. There was some initial confusion on the difference between the terms whistleblowing and reporting at the NCAA-level. Many respondents asked for a clear definition of whistleblowing and then later would self-categorize the different types of NCAA violations (e.g., major and minor) as a way to separate the competing terms. Additionally, many respondents were reticent to speak specifically on past whistleblowing cases because of their lack of knowledge on the case. Instead, they wanted to speak purely in their dealings with whistleblowing/reporting. When the respondents had no direct relations with an aspect of whistleblowing they asked to speak in hypotheticals only. However, many respondents pointed out that since they have never been in the actual situation, they were merely predicting what their behavior would be. As such, interviewer selection bias and the potential findings may have occurred unknowingly (Miceli et al., 1992a). To this end, the researcher recommends that more interviews be conducted with similar positioned respondents who have experience with a whistleblowing case.

A fourth limitation dealt with whistleblowing antecedents in a sport setting. First, it is important to note the antecedent conditions to commit a violation are very different than the antecedent conditions for reporting one. The negative antecedents typically

directly relate to the person(s) or organization(s) that wronged the whistleblower prior to the whistleblowing act being carried out. Additionally, the antecedent conditions of the actor may not be explicitly stated as their motive. Whistleblowers are typically characterized as highly moral and ethical giving off the impression that the whistleblowing action was done with prosocial intention (Miceli, et al., 1992a). However, the true motivation can only be gleaned through the details of the whistleblower, the scenario, and history between the whistleblower and those who were reported. Unfortunately, very few whistleblowers directly state their true reasoning for blowing the whistle leading to the assumption that prosocial behavior serves as the motive.

A fifth, and final, limitation is that there are transferability issues. A multiple-case study method is a great tool for inquiry and initial investigation (Hersh, 2002). However, while the relatively small sample size is adequate for a qualitative study, the findings are in many ways too isolated to the experiences of the respondents and are unable to be transferred across a population. The perspectives and themes also may be solely dependent on the researcher, thus limiting the findings to only one interpretation (Elliston, Keenan, Lockhart, & Van Schaick, 1985). Also, respondents were limited only to collegiate sport. To mitigate these concerns there is a need to empirically test the propositions, conceptual model, and for cost-benefit analysis.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

“There are many unresolved questions about the factors that encourage and impede whistleblowing, organizational responses, and the legal and other measures required to fully protect both whistleblowers and the subjects of unsubstantiated allegations” (Hersh, 2002, p. 260). The goal of this dissertation was to help answer some of the unresolved questions about the factors that Hersh (2002) alludes to in a sport-centric context. There is very little whistleblowing literature using sport as a context yet there has been an increase in publicized scandal in sport stemming from whistleblowing behavior. In Study 1, a sport whistleblowing model was conceptualized, stemming from an extended general management whistleblowing literature review and whistleblowing in sport content analysis. Findings established possible antecedents and cost-benefit analysis barriers. In study 2, interviews were conducted with collegiate administrators to investigate the perception of whistleblowing behavior and whistleblowers. The secondary goal of study 2 was to further establish possible sport whistleblowing antecedents, cost-benefit analysis barriers, and affiliation factors to be empirically tested in future studies. Lastly, the researcher was able to probe how ethical and moral character relates to whistleblowing.

Cunningham asserted that, “... the best theories are the ones that help people make sense of the world around them” (2013, p. 2). Thus, in order to better predict and understand phenomena the primary purpose of theory is to provide an insightful explanation of the relationship of how things work and why. French writer and poet,

Antoine de Saint Exupéry, said that a “goal without a plan is just a wish”. Similarly, research without good theory is just an opinion. Doherty explained that, “... theory is the foundation of efforts to generate new knowledge and understanding of phenomena” and that “... scholars need to explain and predict, and ultimately to control” (2013, p. 7). Fink (2013) noted that theory needs to be insightful and that there is no one singular theory that can explain all phenomena’s. Therefore, context is imperative. Mintzberg commented on the evolution of theory stating, “... a good theory is one that holds together long enough to get you to a better theory” (2005, p. 365).

Chelladurai (2013) noted that in the early years of sport management there was no consensus among scholars of how the field would be defined and what aspects of sport would fall under the proverbial umbrella. I believe we are just now starting to exit our infancy phase and are beginning to move forward as a mature, stand-alone discipline. In order to do so, however, we must start create what Corley and Gioia called “scholarly currency” (2011, p. 12). Cunningham implored that we use the uniqueness of sport to further define our discipline (2013, p. 3). As support, Doherty stated, “... the strength of an academic discipline is its distinct body of knowledge that is not covered by another discipline” (2013, p. 5).

In order for the field of Sport Management to continue to grow and develop as a stand-alone discipline it is vital that we unearth distinct bodies of knowledge to separate us from other disciplines (Doherty, 2013). Studies conducted from multiple paradigms are needed to be to shape our research (Frisby, 2005). In 1996, Slack reported in his “Zeigler” writing that 65% of sport management articles were based in physical

education research. In the fifteen years that have followed one might think the sport management field only dealt with college athletics and professional sports (Pitts, 2001). As sport management researchers, there is an overwhelming need to justify our place within the social sciences by focusing too much on the positive aspects of sport to highlight that sport is unique to the extent and that much of the sport research glorifies sport (Frisby, 2005). At the same time we also are hypercritical attacking social ills (e.g., greed, corruption, racism, sexism) exacerbated by sport (Frisby, 2005). Chalip (2006) offered that an advantage to sport management being a young discipline is that scholars are able to build the foundation and shape its future (p. 1). By developing a unified model for whistleblowing, and applying a cost-benefit paradigm, the proposed model is the first attempt to collectively interpret and classify the antecedent conditions for whistleblowing in sport. Chalip's (2006) sport-focused model, "... calls for researchers to be inspired to search for theory grounded in sport phenomena with an objective to create new theory to contribute to the sport management practice" (p. 3). Notwithstanding the novelty of the research and the timeliness of the endeavor, the contribution of a new model that differs from borrowed business theories, or as Chalip (2006) would call them 'home disciplines', will contribute to the body of knowledge in Sport Management.

While some theory within this dissertation is borrowed from existing knowledge of the 'home disciplines,' this conceptual article serves as a first attempt to explain whistleblowing in a sport context. This whistleblowing work will help advance ethical theory in sport from infancy to a mature stand-alone area with a sport-specific

framework. Furthermore, antecedent conditions for whistleblowing in sport are presented as different from mainstream business and offer a salient new way to understand the practice.

Finally, practitioners will gain valuable insight into the perceptions of sport whistleblowers from a variety of viewpoints and multiple organizational contexts. In sport, there are issues with bribes, performance-enhancing drugs, academic fraud, etc. where it is beneficial to be proactive and get out in front of the story. Being proactive will in turn minimize damage, save more jobs, and save universities more hassle than if they were reactive. UNC seemed to be a bit reactive while Penn State was absolutely reactive. You do not hear about some other universities who have had similar issues because they were more proactive.

Informant Raylan agreed and noted that schools who are proactive, self-police, and self-impose penalties are the ones who are benefitting most and being perceived as ethical:

Yeah, absolutely. You look at schools that, they have a whole lot of secondary infractions, and they're being proactive and self-policing themselves, and that shows that their systems are engaged, and they're functioning, they're discovering these problems, and that hopefully avoids major ones. It's not saying they're discovering everything that's out there, because you can always have a rogue student-athlete, a rogue booster, a rogue coach, a rogue ... all kinds of people, and they can sell it, the best of them.

Informant Wynn and Informant Raylan both work for universities that have hotlines to report rules violations and unethical behavior of coaches and student-athletes.

Informant Wynn touted his university's hotline:

I told you we have that hotline. In our field of athletics, the coaches often tell on each other. They'll see someone out recruiting and all of a sudden there's a

picture taken of that coach that's unapproved, that aren't supposed to be talking you underage, or she's underage. I've seen these, actual photos of someone, so some other university turning them in. That's more for different reason; they're trying to eliminate the competitive advantage; stick it to the competitor.

Informant Raylan felt that more universities should have these reporting systems, as it would help crack down on unethical and rules violating behavior while also protecting the whistleblower.

We have the benefit of doing things anonymously here, as well, through [redacted] and stuff, so you only had to put yourself in the middle of it; you can just call your attention to it, and we wouldn't know who that whistleblower was. Somebody blew the whistle, and we had to look into it.

Future Research

This qualitative inquiry is the first step in a research agenda that will investigate and test the conceptual model of whistleblowing in sport. Antecedents, in addition to numerous social psychological theories have been applied to the whistleblowing phenomenon in the literature. However, many of these theories have yet to be tested empirically (Hersh, 2002). There is also a need to test how personality traits and the severity of the wrongdoing influence whistleblowing intention (Hersh, 2002; Miethe, 1994). As such, a subsequent quantitative study will consist of using cross-sectional, self-reported surveys in a sport setting. Plans to pilot test the antecedent conditions of the conceptual model, and establish content validity, will consist of participants in both the collegiate (e.g., Athletic Directions, Compliance Directors, and Faculty Athletic Representatives) and professional ranks (e.g., coaches, athletes, and front office executives). Each participant will be given a survey with two scenarios (e.g., NCAA minor and major violations) and asked to rate the severity of the violation and indicate

whether or not they would report a violation internally, to the compliance director, or externally, to the NCAA or media. Additionally, the respondents will be asked to complete a survey to assess personality characteristics. Lastly, the respondents will be primed with three negative vignettes as precursors to the same two aforementioned scenarios to assess if their intention to report the violation is altered. If feasible, collecting real world data through an experimental design would be optimal.

As there are many stakeholders in sport, a multi-dimensional approach, identifying both potential internal and external whistleblowers in a sport-centric setting, will be tested to see if the whistleblowing outcomes are correlated between the groups. Additionally, in order to understand the relationships of whistleblowing antecedent conditions and whistleblowing intention, a quantitative approach is appropriate to examine the role antecedent conditions play in the whistleblowing intention in sport. Further, a quantitative approach will test for the role that perceived severity of rules violations or unethical acts have on whistleblowing intention in sport. Lastly, testing will be done to examine how perceived severity of how rules violation or unethical acts influence likelihood of internal and/or external reporting practices of whistleblowing intention in sport. This research method will allow for testing of hypotheses on the relationship between antecedent conditions and whistleblowing intentions.

There has been a lack of research on loyalty and affiliation as factors in whistleblowing (Miceli, et al., 1992a). These studies will allow for future testing of various aspects of whistleblowing in sport including cost benefit analysis, affiliation, and situational ethics. Some studies include testing whistleblower stakeholder perceptions

via a quasi-experimental design, a mixed-method study on fan (external) and athletic department (internal) whistleblowing practices, testing the whistleblowing model with SEM/CFA, and using the SRFPS Model for ethical decision making in whistleblowing practices.

Conclusions

The results of this research have bolstered sport-specific theory on ethical decision-making while also contributing to our understanding of the whistleblowing phenomenon in sport. These findings will allow future researchers to: (1) understand the perception of whistleblowing in sport, (2) better understand the antecedent conditions that underpin a whistleblowing intention, (3) gain insight into the role that antecedent conditions play in the whistleblowing intention in sport, (4) understand the potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence whistleblowing intention, and (5) understand how one's affiliation with an organization influences the intention to whistleblow.

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APPENDIX A

WHISTLEBLOWING INQUIRY CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Whistleblowing and Violations Reporting Inquiry

You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Andrew Goldsmith, a researcher from Texas A&M University. The information in this form is provided to help you decide whether or not to take part. If you decide you do not want to participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits you normally would have.

Why Is This Study Being Done?

The purpose of this study is to bridge the gap in literature within sport and reporting violations (whistleblowing) to contribute a stand-alone, sport-specific research focus moving away from borrowed theory of other disciplines. Influenced by the foregoing, and the lack of research on this topic in sport, the purpose of this study is to develop a unified model for whistleblowing motives in sport and provide several testable propositions for future researchers to consider.

Why Am I Being Asked To Be In This Study?

You are being asked to be in this study because you belong to the target population.

How Many People Will Be Asked To Be In This Study?

15 people (participants) will be invited to participate in this study locally. Overall, a total of 45 people will be invited.

What Are the Alternatives to being in this study?

The alternative to being in the study is not to participate.

What Will I Be Asked To Do In This Study?

You will be interviewed by the principal investigator about your knowledge of reporting violations (whistleblowing) in sport. Your participation in this study will last from 35-60 minutes.

Are There Any Risks To Me?

The things that you will be doing are no greater than risks than you would come across in everyday life. There will be no risks, including physical, criminal, social, financial, economic, and psychological. There are minimal risks associated with breach of privacy or confidentiality. Although the researchers have tried to avoid risks, you may feel that some questions/procedures that are asked of you will be stressful or upsetting. You do not have to answer anything you do not want to.

Will There Be Any Costs To Me?

Aside from your time, there are no costs for taking part in the study.

Will I Be Paid To Be In This Study?

You will not be paid for being in this study.

Will Information From This Study Be Kept Private?

The records of this study will be kept private. No identifiers linking you to this study will be included in any sort of report that might be published. Research records will be stored securely and only Andrew Goldsmith will have access to the records.

Information about you will be stored in computer files protected with a password.

Information about you will be kept confidential to the extent permitted or required by law. People who have access to your information include the Principal Investigator and research study personnel. Representatives of regulatory agencies such as the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) and entities such as the Texas A&M University Human Subjects Protection Program may access your records to make sure the study is being run correctly and that information is collected properly.

Audio Recordings

Since audio recordings are optional, participants must consent to audio recordings or decline but still consent to participation in the interview. Please initial your choice below:

_____ I give my permission for [photographs/audio/video recordings] to be made of me during my participation in this research study.

_____ I do not give my permission for [photographs/audio/video recordings] to be made of me during my participation in this research study.

Who may I Contact for More Information?

You may contact the Protocol Director, Andrew Goldsmith to tell him/her about a concern or complaint about this research at 484-894-7026 or andrew.goldsmith@hlkn.tamu.edu. You may also contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Matthew Walker at 850-491-4446 or matt.walker@hlkn.tamu.edu.

For questions about your rights as a research participant; or if you have questions, complaints, or concerns about the research, you may call the Texas A&M University Human Subjects Protection Program office at (979) 458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu.

What if I Change My Mind About Participating?

This research is voluntary and you have the choice whether or not to be in this research study. You may decide to not begin or to stop participating at any time. If you choose not to be in

this study or stop being in the study, there will be no effect on your relationship with Texas A&M University.

Any new information discovered about the research will be provided to you. This information could affect your willingness to continue your participation.

By participating in the interview(s) you are giving permission for the investigator to use your information for research purposes.

Thank you.

Andrew Goldsmith

APPENDIX B

DISSERTATION MATERIALS

Whistleblowing Inquiry Interview Protocol

Interview Guide, Sample Selection, and Interview Questions

*Note: Please be honest with your answers. If you are uncomfortable answering any question, please inform me and we can move on.

1. What is your official job title?
 - a. What kinds of work do you do?
 - b. How long have you been in this current position? In the field?
 - c. Describe to me what a normal workday entails.
 - d. Describe to me your current university and how it relates to NCAA sports.
 - e. If you have worked at other universities, can you tell me the similarities and differences as it relates you your job and reporting practices?
2. Who do you interact with on a daily basis for this work? What kinds of people? In what areas?
 - a. Do you ever come into contact with university boosters/donors?
3. Walk me through a scenario where you needed to report an NCAA violation?
 - a. Who do you report to first?
 - b. Do you trust that once you report to a higher-up that your reporting will be carried out?
 - c. Do you have a follow up procedure?
4. How does the type of violation effect your reporting?
 - a. What do you consider a minor/secondary infraction? Typical penalty?
 - b. Major infraction? Typical penalty? (level 1,2,3,4 system)
5. How do you feel the size of the university affects reporting of violations?
 - a. Have you ever faced pressure to ignore a violation? By whom?
 - i. How do you feel the type of sport dictates reporting?
6. Do you know what whistleblowing is? (if no, I will explain it)

- a. If yes, can you give me an example of whistleblowing in the sport industry?
 - b. Is there a difference in your mind between reporting a violation and whistleblowing? If so, what is the difference?
 - c. If you reported a violation internally but were blocked by members of your institution from seeing your report go through, would you externally report? Why or why not?
 - i. Does the type of violation dictate your intention to whistleblow?
7. Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case?
- a. Can you describe the university or NCAA protocol and policies from start to finish?
 - b. What kinds of the resources do you have available to you in the event of a whistleblowing occurrence?
 - i. Were you made aware of United States whistleblowing laws during your hiring process of your university or by the NCAA?
8. Who would you report to first in a whistleblowing case?
- a. Is there a clear chain of command? Explain the chain of command and the reasoning behind it. If no chain of command, why is there not one?
 - b. Would you personally meet with a whistleblower (lead) to gather information? If no, who meets with the whistleblower?
 - c. Who is privy to the whistleblowing information? Why are some people omitted?
 - d. More likely to occur in the collegiate ranks or professional levels? (provide examples)
9. Walk me through a whistleblowing case that you have experienced?
- a. If you have never experienced a whistleblowing case can you walk me through one that you have first or secondhand knowledge of?
 - b. What was the final outcome of the whistleblowing case?
 - i. Did you agree with the outcome?

- c. Do you consider the outcome to be in line with your moral and ethical character?
10. Based on your experience what are possible motives for someone to whistleblow?
- a. Do you think a potential whistleblower weighs the pros and cons before deciding whether or not to whistleblow?
 - i. What considerations or barriers do you feel would sway a potential whistleblower against blowing the whistle?
11. Do you feel players, coaches, and managers have different motives for reporting or not reporting a violation? If yes, please explain the differences.
- a. How would a player, coach, or manager be viewed within the organization if they blew the whistle?
 - b. How would someone benefit from reporting a violation?
 - c. How would reporting a violation negatively impact the whistleblower?
12. Do you see whistleblowing as positive or negative? Please explain.
- a. Do you consider whistleblowing an ethical or moral act? Please explain.
 - b. How would you describe your moral and ethical character?
 - i. Does your character always match your behavior? Please explain why or why not?
 - ii. Have you ever compromised your ethical and moral values due to your job? Have you been asked to?
13. Do you feel that someone's organizational position dictates their motives?
- a. Do you feel that whistleblowing behavior is altered by someone's affiliation with the university? How so?
14. How are whistleblowers publically portrayed to the media at large?
- a. What is the internal perception of the whistleblower?
15. Would you reward a whistleblower? If so, how?

APPENDIX C

HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL LETTER

DIVISION OF RESEARCH
Research Compliance and Biosafety



DATE: March 09, 2015

MEMORANDUM

TO: Matthew Walker
TAMU - Health And Kinesiology - Center For Sport Management Research

FROM: Dr. James Fluckey
Chair
Institutional Review Board

SUBJECT: Expedited Approval- Initial Review

Study Number: IRB2014-0259D
Title: Whistleblowing in Sport
Approval Date: 03/09/2015
Continuing Review Due: 02/01/2016
Expiration Date: 03/01/2016

Documents Reviewed and Approved:

Title	Version Number	Version Date	Outcome
Participation Script	Version 1.0	01/15/2015	Approved
NCAA Violations Scenarios	Version 1.0	01/15/2015	Approved
Moral Motivation	Version 1.0	01/15/2015	Approved
Survey Questions	Version 1.0	01/15/2015	Approved
Whistleblowing Interview Protocol	Version 1.0	01/15/2015	Approved
NASSM - Dissertation Proposal	Version 1.0	08/06/2014	Approved
Whistleblowing Inquiry - Interview consent.	Version 1.1	01/15/2015	Approved
Testing Whistleblowing Intention in Sport	Version 1.1	01/15/2015	Approved

Document of Consent:

- Written consent in accordance with 45 CF 46.116/ 21 CFR 50.27 for Interviews
- Waiver approved under 45 CFR 46.117 (c) 1 or 2/ 21 CFR 56.109 (c)1 for online survey only.

This research project has been approved. As principal investigator, you assume the following responsibilities:

750 Agronomy Road, Suite 2701
1186 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-1186
Tel. 979.458.1467 Fax. 979.862.3176
<http://rcb.tamu.edu>

APPENDIX D

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Born in Easton, Andrew Goldsmith grew up with his two brothers in Pennsylvania. He received his Bachelor of the Science in Sport and Recreation Management from Temple University. Upon completing his degree he took a position with the Philadelphia Eagles working in Publication and Web Design. He later moved to Indiana, PA to further his education and graduated from Indiana University of Pennsylvania with his Master's degree in Sport Science with a concentration in Sport Studies in 2007. He then moved to Brooklyn, NY where he took a position at Adelphi University as the Assistant Director of Fitness, Recreation, and Aquatics. In an effort to pursue a PhD in Sport Management, he moved to Mississippi (the University of Southern Mississippi), Florida (University of Florida), and Texas (Texas A&M University). He completed his PhD at Texas A&M University in 2015. He is, and always will be, a Philadelphian at heart.