STATUS ORGANIZING PROCESSES

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I. Introduction

This chapter reviews theory and research on status organizing processes. A status organizing process is any process in which evaluations of and beliefs about the characteristics of actors become the basis of observable inequalities in face-to-face social interaction. The key concept in the study of status organizing processes is the status characteristic, any characteristic of actors around which evaluations of and beliefs about them come to be organized. Examples include age, sex, race, ethnicity, education, occupation, physical attractiveness, intelligence quotients, reading ability—but there are many others. In the present article we review (a) the current state of the theory of such processes, (b) relevant theoretical research (as of September, 1979), (c) a selection of the relevant applied research, with particular reference to sex, race, and physical attractiveness, and (d) some of the interventions that have been developed to reduce undesired consequences of the process.

The phenomenon with which a theory of status organizing processes is concerned is most commonly observed in the study of problem-solving groups whose members differ in status characteristics significant in the larger society. Such groups do not create a social organization de novo, out of the interaction of their members, but instead maintain external status differences inside the group.

That informal problem-solving groups evolve inequalities in participation, evaluation, and influence was shown by Bales in the early fifties (Bales, 1950; 1953; Bales, et al, 1951; Bales & Slater, 1955; Heinecke & Bales, 1953). Roughly speaking, what he found was that groups
of strangers who were equal in status to begin with evolved inequalities in opportunities to participate, in participation (particularly in performance-outputs), in evaluations of performance-outputs, and in influence over the group's decisions. These inequalities were highly intercorrelated and hence can be conceptualized as forming a single observable power-prestige order. Once it had emerged, this power-prestige order was quite stable. Research of roughly the same period by Sherif and earlier by Whyte showed that this power-prestige order was in fact self-reinforcing, with evaluations of particular performance outputs depending on previous evaluations of members of the group independent of objectively measured performance (Harvey, 1953; Sherif, White & Harvey, 1955; Whyte, 1943).

Bales' research was largely concerned with the emergence of status orders in groups that to begin with were as alike as possible in statuses significant in the larger social structure. But for informal problem-solving groups that are initially unequal, a very different result was found: Inequalities significant outside the group were maintained inside the group: The power-prestige order of the group correlated with external status differences; more important, it appeared to be "instantaneously" created instead of evolving out of the face-to-face interaction of the members of the group. It did not seem to make much difference what kind of status differentiated the group: The same effect was found for age, sex, race, occupation, ethnicity, education, and organizational rank. It did depend to some extent on how well members of the group knew each other; the effect decreased as the prior acquaintance of the members of the group increased (Heiss, 1962; Leik, 1963). But, most im-
Portantly, it did not make any difference whether or not the status characteristic had any prior, established association with the goal or task of the group (Caudill, 1958; Croog, 1956; Hurwitz, Zander, & Hymovitch, 1960; Mishler & Tropp, 1956; Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1958; Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956; Torrance, 1954; Zander & Cohen, 1955; Ziller & Exline, 1958.)

In the present chapter we view this phenomenon from an "expectation-states" point of view. Expectation-states theory was originally developed as an attempt to provide an explanation of Bales' finding that problem-solving groups of status equals evolved stable, intercorrelated inequalities. According to this explanation, "expectations" about future performance arise out of the task-related interaction of members of the group. Once they have emerged, these expectations determine the different types of subsequent task-related interaction--both what takes place and what is seen to take place--in such a way that the expectation-states are confirmed, hence maintained, by the very interaction that depends on them (Berger, 1958; Berger & Snell, 1961; Berger, Conner & McKeown, 1969; Berger & Conner, 1969, 1974; Fisek, 1968, 1974). That stable inequalities are instantaneously created by external status differences can be explained simply enough if one assumes that expectation-states not only arise out of interaction but are also created by prior beliefs about and evaluations of the characteristics possessed by members of a group who are strangers but differ in external status (Berger, et al, 1966).

An "expectation-states" point of view has four distinctive features: (a) It views the mechanisms that produce the effects of a status or-
ganizing process as arising from the process itself. The apparent
stability of the process is due to the fact that the conditions of its
change are themselves functions of definitions of the situation (as op­
posed to locating the stability of the process in the actors). This
implies that the process must be activated by conditions in the actors'
situation (and hence, under specifiable conditions may not be activated
or may even be deacti­vated). It is a "social process" approach and, as
such, is situational. (b) Expectation-states are properties of
relations, not actors as persons. Because they are relative, the
behaviors typically associated with, say, blacks (or females) are not
invariant features of blacks (or females) as persons but arise only in
the appropriate relational contexts; the point being that blacks (or
females) behave quite differently in the presence of blacks (or females)
than in the presence of whites (or males). (c) Expectation-states are
assumed to arise out of social interaction. In common with most other
approaches to status characteristics, it is therefore taken for granted
that the meaning of such characteristics is not given in nature: The
social objects they create are socially constructed realities. (d) An
expectation-states point of view argues that the properties of status
organizing processes are quite general. The more important status
characteristics, like sex and race, have been typically treated as if they
were distinct phenomena, giving rise to distinct literatures on sex roles
and race relations. This tends to overemphasize their idiosyncratic,
sometimes accidental, features and to underemphasize fundamental
properties that they share with other, sometimes less important,
characteristics like physical attractiveness. We argue in the pre-
sent review that one theory of status organizing processes applies to a wide range of superficially different phenomena. (For a description of the application of the expectation-states approach to other areas of investigation, see Wagner, 1978.)

The earliest expectation-states explanations of the effects of a status characteristic were concerned with the effects of a single diffuse status characteristic, i.e. the kind associated with very global evaluations and expectation-states, such as the belief that "intelligence" is correlated with "race". This is perhaps the most complex kind of status characteristic known. On the other hand, the earliest formulation of how such complex characteristics work was limited to the simplest kinds of social situations in which just two interactants collectively engaged in a single, unitary task (a task requiring one unidimensional ability).

This early formulation has been extended in several stages to specific as well as diffuse status characteristics (Berger & Fisek, 1969, 1974); to multiple as well as single characteristics (Berger & Fisek, 1969, 1974); to multi-person as well as two-person interactions (Berger, et al, 1977); and to the effects of referents (objects of orientation) as well as interactants (Berger, et al, 1977). At the same time, progressive reformulations of the theory have also made it more precise (by embodying a formal model into the theory), allowing derivations and predictions of differences between differences (and hence of the effects of different kinds and amounts of status information) as well as the simple order effects predicted by the earliest formulations (Berger, et al, 1977). The present chapter describes status characteristics from the point of view of the most recent formulation of the theory.
II. The Theory of Status Characteristics and Expectation-States

A. The Concept of a Status Characteristic. A status characteristic is a characteristic of an actor that has two or more states that are differentially evaluated in terms of honor, esteem, or desirability, each of which is associated with distinct moral and performance expectations, i.e. with stabilized beliefs about how an individual possessing a given state of the characteristic will perform or behave. A status characteristic may have any number of states--but absolute values do not count in the theory. All characteristics, evaluations, and expectations are relativized, hence actors are simply said to be higher, the same, or lower than other actors, and for any pair of actors states are simply dichotomized.

Expectation-states are said to be specific if they are about how an individual will act in a clearly defined and specifiable situation. They are said to be general if they are not restricted to any specifiable situation. Thus "logical ability" is specific, "intelligence" is general. This gives rise to a distinction between two kinds of status characteristics, specific or diffuse. A characteristic is a specific status characteristic if (a) it involves two or more states that are differentially evaluated, and (b) associated with each state is a distinct specific expectation state. For example, reading ability may function as a specific status characteristic. We distinguish different levels of the characteristic which are differentially evaluated; and we associate with it beliefs about how individuals possessing the different states will perform on specified tasks. A characteristic is a diffuse status characteristic if (a) it involves two or more states that are
differentially valued, and (b) associated with each state are distinct sets of specific expectation states, each itself evaluated, and (c) associated with each state is a similarly evaluated general expectation state. Thus sex, for example, is a diffuse status characteristic if for a given population (a) the states male and female are differentially evaluated; (b) males (or females) are assumed to be more mechanical or more mathematical than females (or males), so that distinct sets of specific expectation-states are associated with the states of the status characteristic; (c) males (or females) are assumed to be more intelligent than females (or males), so that distinct general expectation-states are associated with the states of the status characteristic.

It should be noticed that the requirements placed on the specific expectations associated with a diffuse status characteristic are less strict than those placed on its general expectations. General expectation-states must be consistent with the states of the characteristic but specific expectation-states may or may not be consistent: In some groups being female may be less valued than being male, yet certain virtues may be associated with being female rather than male, e.g. females may be thought to be kinder and gentler (see section IV, A). Furthermore, it should be noticed that the specific expectation-states associated with valued states need not be symmetric: That is, the concept does not require that a positive virtue associated with the more valued state be matched by a corresponding vice associated with the less valued state.

B. Scope of the Theory. By an "expectation-states" interpretation
of the effect of a status characteristic is meant the assumption that status characteristics determine expectation-states, i.e. stabilized beliefs about future conduct which, in turn, determine behavior in such a way that the expectation-states initially created by a status characteristic are maintained by subsequent interaction. This interpretation of the effects of a status characteristic has been applied primarily to the task-related behavior of task-oriented groups. This limits the scope of the present chapter in three ways: First, we deal only with groups engaged in tasks, i.e. actions in which there is (a) a goal, (b) some idea of the difference between success and failure in achieving the goal, and (c) some idea that the contributions of group members affect success and failure in achieving it. Second, we deal only with groups, i.e. sets of two or more individuals who think of themselves as jointly responsible for the outcome and who are therefore oriented toward a collective decision. Third, we study primarily the power-prestige order of the group, an order that includes only the task-related activities of the members: (a) the opportunities given to members to perform (e.g. by being asked questions, or simply by being looked at); (b) the performance-outputs of the members (such as opinions, suggestions, or information relevant to the task); (c) the evaluations of these performance-outputs communicated by the members; and (d) influence, i.e. resolution of disagreements in the favor of one rather than another member's views.

All three of these limits are to be taken only as conditions defining the scope of the theory and its applications. We do not claim that these are laws of the theory. These conditions identify only what the
theory does and does not attempt to explain. It is in fact known that the amount of differentiation, extent of intercorrelation, and stability of the power-prestige order does increase with the extent of collective task-orientation (Berger, 1958) and that the non-task-related activities of the group (joking, laughter, hostility, tension, sentiments of attachment) are to some extent independent of, and are hence presumably the outcome of a process distinct from the status organizing process of the group (Bales & Slater, 1955; Lewis, 1972; Bonacich & Lewis, 1973); but the present state of the theory does not incorporate these ideas and does not attempt to cover these aspects of group behavior.

However, the present chapter does cover any kind of status characteristic, any number of status characteristics, any number of interactants (providing they are part of the face-to-face interaction of the group), some other kinds of status elements (such as goal-objects, i.e. rewards), and some other kinds of objects of orientation (such as referents).

C. Salience of a Status Characteristic. The states of a status characteristic possessed by two individuals, say p and o, may be directly or indirectly related to the outcome states of a task. Consider the following examples: (a) If p and o possess respectively high and low mathematical ability and their task is to solve mathematical puzzles, then states of mathematical ability are directly related to the task. (b) If p is male and o is female and they believe that sex is related in a consistent manner to mathematical ability and are working on mathematical tasks then the status characteristic, sex, is also, though indirectly, related to their task. To cover both kinds of cases, the
theory of status characteristics speaks of a path of task relevance: A path of task relevance is a status-task connection between the actor and the task that links the status characteristic possessed by the actor to an outcome state of the task, either success or failure. Such a path of relevance provides the actor with information about how well s/he can expect to perform at the task, given the characteristic s/he possesses and information about how it is related to the task. Paths of task relevance have various lengths. In case (a), above, we have a shorter path than in case (b), though both connect the actor to the task. Other kinds of paths are possible. Particularly interesting, for example, are cases of paths of relevance involving referent actors, objects of orientation who are not interactants. For example (3), if the interactants p and o₁ are black and there exists a referent actor o₂ who is also black and is known by p and o₁ to possess the high state of the ability relevant to the task they face, then race is connected to the task by a path of relevance created by the referent.

Such paths of task relevance are one of the two ways in which status characteristics, whether specific or diffuse, become salient, i.e. come to be admitted as usable cues in the immediate social situation. Basically, the theory assumes that they are treated as information about a situation that the actor has to define in order to be able to act. If the interactants are connected to the task by a path of task relevance, then the status elements and the relations between them become significant in the task situation. Thus, in case (c), the fact that p and o₁ are black and the fact that o₂, who is also black, possesses the high state of the task ability comprise status information that
becomes salient to the actors. The theory assumes that status states become salient whether they discriminate between interactants or not, provided a path connects the interactants to the group's task. Thus, in examples (a) and (b) the status characteristic discriminates between p and o₂—that is, they possess different states of it. In case (c) the characteristic equates p and o₁.

However, a status characteristic can become salient without a path of task relevance. In their search for social cues, interactants will focus on status elements, whether specific or diffuse, that provide a basis of discrimination among them, provided only that they are not explicitly dissociated from the task components in the situation. There is an important difference between the two salience principles of the theory, however: Where there is no path of task relevance, only discriminating characteristics become salient. We do not assume that an equating characteristic that is not connected by a path to the task will become salient.

Where status characteristics are salient, they have become available for processing in the situation. That an individual's state of a status characteristic is perceived or known does not make it salient. If both p and o are black, for example, they presumably perceive racial similarities and are aware of their states of the status characteristic, but it does not automatically follow that race defines their situation. On the other hand, if p is black and o is white, race becomes salient even though it may have nothing to do with their immediate situation. P's knowledge of self has not changed; it is only the structure of p's situation that has changed.
D. Completing the Definition of the Situation

(1) The Burden of Proof Process. As a result of the saliency process, some status states may be connected by paths of relevance to the task's outcome; but some states, those that discriminate between p and o, may be salient and yet not be linked to the outcome of the group task. Even where a path of relevance exists, it may be so extended—involving so many and such indirect links—that it provides only weak information on which to base expectations for self and other. The theory of status characteristics assumes that in such cases, interactants will behave as if such status elements are relevant, thus putting the burden of proof on anyone who would show otherwise. In other words, unless their inapplicability is demonstrated, status characteristics and status advantages will as a matter of normal interaction be applied to new tasks and new situations.

This burden of proof process operates whether the status characteristics are specific or diffuse. In the case of diffuse status characteristics general expectation states (such as "intelligence") associated with the states of the status characteristic become connected with the task ability involved in the immediate situation. States of specific status characteristics are associated with ability at specific types of tasks. Success or failure at specific types of tasks induces in the actors expectations for more general problem solving abilities, which are in turn seen to imply success or failure at the group's particular task. For example, the ability to solve mathematical problems may imply the ability to solve problems in general, including the problem that is confronting the actor. In general, then, through the burden of proof
process, expectations are created on the basis of status characteristics that are applied to the immediate situation even though that situation may have no prior association with the status characteristic.

(2) The Strength of the Expectations Created by Paths of Relevance. Paths of relevance differ in length. Those created by the burden of proof process, for example, may be less direct than those created by already existing paths. The more closely linked a state of the characteristic possessed by p or o is to the group's task, the shorter the path of relevance is said to be. It is reasonable to assume that the shorter the path of relevance the stronger will be the actor's expectation state based on a given status element. Put another way, the shorter the path of relevance between a status element and the task, the more information it provides the actor that s/he can use in defining the immediate social situation.

(3) Sequencing of Definitions of the Situation. Salience, paths of relevance, and the burden of proof process provide p and o with information required to define their immediate task situation. But suppose there are more than two actors. In this case, the theory assumes that the definition of the situation proceeds stepwise: i.e. any two interactants, p and o, will fully define their status situation as they interact with each other. If p's partner o is replaced by a formerly inactive person, further definition occurs if possible and necessary to their interaction. More important, the theory assumes that for each interactant, definitions achieved vis-a-vis the other in the past remain when a new interactant is engaged in the same situation. The status-task information that p developed with o₁ will continue to operate while it
is further elaborated and organized in interaction with $o_2$, just so long as the situation itself is the same.

E. Translating Status Definitions into Behavior

   (1) Aggregating Expectation-States. The salience and burden of proof process defines the status situation for the interactants. But how is this status information translated into their behavior?

   Each status characteristic the actor possesses is connected to the task by a path of relevance. The task significance of these paths may differ: Some may establish expectancies for success at the task, while others evoke expectancies for task failure. Furthermore, some of the status-task links are closely tied to the task and as a consequence establish stronger expectancy bonds for the actor; others are further removed from the task and their expectancy bonds are correspondingly weaker. Thus the actor may possess multiple status characteristics, some of which have positive and some of which have negative task significance, and these status items may differ in the strength of the bond by which they connect the actor to the task.

   The basic idea of the theory is that the actor functions like an information-processing mechanism, combining all units of status information to form aggregated expectation-states for self and other. The assumptions of the theory describe how this aggregation of status characteristics takes place. Basically, the process is governed by the principle of organized subsets—the actor first organizes information within consistent (like-signed) subsets and then combines the valenced subsets. The "signs" to which the principle refers derive from the paths' connecting status elements to either positive or negative task
outcomes (success or failure). Within like-signed subsets information is built up in accord with an attenuation principle: the strength of the subset increases in proportion to the strength of the paths being combined but the strength produced by adding additional status items is a decreasing function of the strength of existing items in the subset. Thus each subset is assumed to be an organized structure of status information. If there is inconsistent status information, there will of course be two such subsets. If the task demands in the situation are strong, the actors are impelled to make use of all the relevant status information, and the theory assumes that the actor combines the values of the positive and negative subsets in forming expectations for self and other. For example, if exactly the same amount of negative as positive status information is available to the actors, the two organized subsets cancel each other out, producing equal-status interaction. Subsets of different strengths still combine. However, according to the mathematics of the theory's formal model, conflict in expectations will reduce the effect of all the expectations in the situation when aggregated (Berger, et al, 1977, p. 128).¹

¹The principle of organized subsets is a theoretical social psychological principle. It argues that the "real" components in a defined status task situation are the homogeneous subsets. It makes a combining effect an operation on these subsets. Combining is due to strong task demands in the situation. However the same principle should allow us to deal with balancing, ambivalence, and oscillation as outcomes of situations in which there is inconsistent status information. Whether we get any of these as compared to combining is a consequence of situational factors and not the operation of different information-organizing principles.
(2) **Expectation Advantage and the Power-Prestige Order.** The observable power-prestige order of the group refers to the distribution of chances to perform, performance outputs, communicated evaluations, and influence among its members. A position A is higher than a position B in this order if A is more likely than B to receive action opportunities, make performance outputs, and have performance outputs positively evaluated but is less likely to be influenced in the case of disagreement with another. The greater the difference in likelihoods of initiating and receiving these behaviors, the greater the distance between positions A and B. The power-prestige order of the group is assumed by the theory to be a direct function of the expectation-states of the actors, and the distance between positions A and B is assumed to depend on the relative expectation advantage of the actors in these two positions. The expectation advantage of the actor, say p in the position A, is simply the aggregated expectation state p holds for self minus that which p holds for the actor in position B. Aside from quantifying the magnitude of the difference, this concept embodies the idea that the relative expectation position of the actor is significant in determining his/her power-prestige position.

The status characteristics theory can be used to analyze many different specific status-task situations and to describe and predict the status-based behavior that will occur in these situations. In addition, as Humphreys & Berger (1979) have shown recently, certain general and powerful theoretical assertions are implied by the theory. Among these is the idea that if the status information in the situation is equally relevant to the group's task, the greater the inconsistency of this
status information the smaller the degree of differentiation it produces. This status inconsistency and equality principle, among others, has been an important basis for intervention research (see Section V).

III. Theoretical Research on Status Characteristic Theory

An extensive body of empirical research tests the principles and derivations of the status characteristics theory. Before examining some of this research, two general points should be made. First, any piece of research we consider makes use of more than one principle that is part of the status theory. Often three or four principles are involved. If the research provides support for a particular theoretical result, it provides support for all the theoretical principles required for the result. Consequently, we will frequently cite the same study as providing support for different principles. On the other hand, if the research does not support a predicted result, one or all the principles required to generate the result are in question. Therefore, we also may cite the same study as not supporting a number of different principles. Second, a detailed examination of all relevant research is not attempted here (for such analysis of relevant research up to 1977, see Berger, et al, 1977).

A. Salience. In general, the salience principles of the theory have not been extensively tested. In particular, the "discrimination principle" has typically been assumed to operate as formulated. Such experiments as bear directly on salience principles concern themselves with equating characteristics. A series of experiments by Webster (Webster & Berger, 1975; Webster, 1977), demonstrate that the power and
prestige position of actors differentiated on the task characteristic was unchanged when they were also equated on status characteristics not connected to the task. From this result he inferred that such equating characteristics do not become salient. In a study that replicated Webster's results, Kervin (1975) also showed that the power and prestige position of actors differentiated on the task characteristic is modified when they are equated on characteristics connected to the task. This suggests that equating characteristics that are task relevant do become salient in the actor's status situation.

8. Burden of Proof. Evidence exists for the operation of burden of proof processes in a variety of status situations. With respect to diffuse status characteristics, Moore (1968) and Zelditch, et al (1975) provide evidence for the operation of the process for educational status; Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1972) for military rank; Zeller and Warnecke (1973) for educational attainment; Freese and Cohen (1973) for age; and Webster and Driskell (1978) for race. With respect to specific status characteristics, Kervin (1975) provides evidence for the operation of a burden of proof process where there is a single specific characteristic, Freese (1974, 1976) and Freese & Cohen (1973) where there are multiple specific characteristics consistently allocated, and Parcel & Cook (1977) where there are multiple specific characteristics that are both consistently and inconsistently allocated. Finally, evidence suggests that a burden of proof process will operate on a diffuse status characteristic even when it is inconsistently allocated with specific status characteristics: Zelditch, et al (1975) have shown this where educational status is inconsistently allocated with the task
characteristic; and Freese (1974) has also shown this where age is inconsistently allocated with two specific status characteristics in an experiment involving referent actors. In an earlier experiment involving only interactants, Freese & Cohen (1973) find that only the specific status information is organized by the burden of proof process when such information is inconsistent with the diffuse characteristic of age. However, Webster & Driskell (1978), partially replicating the structure of the Freese & Cohen experiment but using race as a diffuse status characteristic, find support for the argument that the burden of proof process operates on the diffuse status characteristic in the presence of inconsistent specific status information.

C. Paths of Relevance. Relatively few experiments have investigated paths of relevance, but these few are of interest. If the paths linking the actors to the task create the same type of task expectancy, then the greater the number of such paths the greater is their effect on an actor's power and prestige position. The results from an experiment by Berger, Fisek, & Freese (1976) and the experiment by Kervin (1972) provide direct support for this conception. Kervin's experiment also directly supports the argument that the length of a path of relevance is inversely proportional to its impact on an individual's power and prestige position. This experiment enables us to compare the power and prestige position of an actor differentiated on the task characteristic (a path involving the shortest possible length) with one differentiated on a characteristic indirectly relevant to the task characteristic (a longer path). Greater differentiation occurs in the first case than in the second. However, the findings in two experiments, (Moore, 1968; and
Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972) only partially support of this idea. In both experiments there is one set of conditions in which subjects are differentiated on a characteristic that is not initially connected to the task, while in a second set of conditions the characteristic is explicitly task connected. Under the assumption that relevance paths are shorter in the latter conditions than in the former, differentiation should be greater in the latter than in the former. Moore's results provide support for this prediction for low-high but not high-low subjects, while Berger, et al's research finds support for high-low but not low-high subjects. In an experiment involving both (a) conditions where the actors were differentiated on characteristics not relevant to the task and (b) conditions where they were differentiated on the task characteristic, Zelditch, et al (1975) found actor differentiation to be greater where relevance paths were shorter. (For other research on paths of relevance, see Berger & Wagner, 1975.)

D. Combining Multiple Status Characteristics. Given that there are multiple status characteristics connected to the task, the status characteristics theory claims that these will be combined and that the individual's behavior will be a result of this combined effect. For example, if a male laborer interacts with a female professional on a task not related to sex or occupational differences, their behavior is nevertheless predicted to be based on expectations they form by combining gender and occupational status information. Another possibility in this situation (one popular in sociological theories) is that individuals will engage in status "balancing", simplifying inconsistent multiple status situations so as to maximize their individual status positions. In the
given example, the male will define his status situation in terms of the sex differences alone, while the female will define her situation solely in terms of the occupational differences.

There is a reasonable body of theoretically relevant experimental information on this problem, although it is by no means exhaustive. A series of experiments by Berger & Fisek (1970), Berger, Fisek & Crosbie (1970), and Tress (1971) assigned subjects the states of two specific characteristics that were relevant to their task. Assignment of states varied from complete consistency to complete inconsistency. It was found that the greater the status consistency the more extreme (high or low) the individual's power and prestige position—a result which implies that the status characteristics were combined in determining the actor's behavior. An experiment by Kervin (1972), also involving two specific characteristics relevant to the task, provides related results. He found that when an individual possessed the high states of the two status characteristics, he had a higher power and prestige position than when he possessed the high state of only one characteristic or when he possessed states of two status characteristics that were inconsistent (high on one and low on the second). This provides direct evidence that both consistent and inconsistent status information is combined. In a second experiment, Kervin (1975) found that individuals who held the high state of the task characteristic had a higher power and prestige position than those who held the high state of the task characteristic and also believed that they were equated with their partners on status elements connected to the task. This indicates, as predicted by the theory, that the differentiating and equating characteristics in this situation were
combined in determining the actor's behavior.

In an experiment by Freese (1974) involving interactants and referents, where the actor and referents possessed states of the diffuse status characteristic inconsistent with specific status characteristics and none of the characteristics were initially task connected, the effect of the diffuse status characteristic on the individual's power and prestige position decreased as the number of referents with inconsistent status information increased. This result implies that all the status information from all the referents available in a given situation is being combined. In the experiment by Zelditch, et al (1975), individuals differentiated on the task characteristic held more extreme power and prestige positions (high and low) than those differentiated on the task characteristic who also believed that they and their partners possessed educational statuses inconsistent with their task statuses. These results also support a combining effect.

On the other hand, an experiment by Freese & Cohen (1973) appears to provide clear support for a status "balancing" or simplifying effect. These investigators found that the power and prestige positions (high and low) of individuals differentiated on two consistent specific status characteristics not initially task connected, were the same as those of individuals similarly differentiated who also believed they and their partners possessed age states inconsistent with their status on the specific characteristics. This suggests that the expectations of these individuals were not a result of the inconsistent information on age and on specific status characteristics. The failure in this case to observe a combining effect may be due to problems connected with
principles describing (a) how aggregated expectations are formed; (b) how the burden of proof process operates; or (c) how saliency even applies to this situation. However, as already noted, in an experiment by Webster & Driskell (1978) that replicates in part the status structure of the Freese & Cohen study, the combining effect was found. The power and prestige positions of individuals differentiated on two specific status characteristics, initially not task connected, were found to be higher than those of individuals who believed they and their partner held racial status inconsistent with their statuses on the specific characteristics. Such a result clearly implies that the inconsistent status information is being combined in determining their power and prestige position. In view of the Webster-Driskell findings, further research is necessary to account for the Freese & Cohen results.

IV. Applied Research

Many social characteristics satisfy the definition of a status characteristic. One chapter cannot review them all. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to review only one application. Since a theory of status organizing processes must apply to a diverse range of phenomena. We have chosen three characteristics—sex, race, and physical attractiveness—in order to exhibit the process in its full generality.2 In each case, we first review some of the evidence that

2Status characteristic theory has also been applied to the operation of ethnic differences (Cohen and Sharan, 1977; Yuchtman-Yaar & Semyonov, 1979; Rosenholtz & Cohen, forthcoming) and of reputed differences in reading ability in classroom situations (Stulac, 1975; and Rosenholtz, 1977).
each is a status characteristic--i.e. that its states are differentially valued and associated with distinct sets of specific and general expectation-states. If it is a status characteristic we should find that people with the higher state of the characteristic are given and take more opportunities to perform, are evaluated as performing better (for the same performances), and have more influence than people with the lower state of the characteristic.

A. Sex as a Status Characteristic

(1) Evidence that Sex is a Status Characteristic. Evidence that sex is a diffuse status characteristic rests on (a) the high level of agreement among males and females on the traits that differentiate males from females, (b) the more favorable overall evaluation of males, and (c) the larger number of favorable traits attributed to males than females. McKee & Sherriffs (1956), for example, administered a lengthy adjective check list to college students, asking them to indicate which adjectives better described males and which were more applicable to females. The respondents differentiated males and females with a high level of agreement. To another group of students they administered the same check list, asking that they indicate whether each adjective was a favorable or unfavorable personal attribute. Both men and women assigned a significantly larger number of unfavorable ratings to adjectives associated with females. Finally, students were asked to evaluate the work, merit, or value of males and females "overall". Over 90% of males and 80% of females considered "males" superior to "females" overall.

Distinct sets of specific and general expectation-states differentiate the sexes. Among the specific expectation-states
associated with sex differences, males are believed to be more mathematical, scientific, mechanical, and skilled in business affairs; females more artistic, literary, and skilled in domestic affairs. (See Bem, 1974, and Broverman, et al, 1972, for the most complete inventories of sex-role stereotypes.) Among the general expectation-states associated with sex differences, general performance expectations stand out: Males are believed to be more intelligent (Fernberger, 1948), more logical and rational (Ward & Balswick, 1978) than females. But interpersonal and moral expectations also differentiate males from females: Males are believed to be more responsible than females (Bem, 1974) but females are thought kinder, more patient, more understanding, gentler, and more tender (Broverman, et al, 1972; Ward & Balswick, 1978). Male and female judgments of masculinity and femininity are highly correlated (Rosenkrantz, et al, 1968, found correlations of .95 and .96) and are independent of race, religion, education, and marital status (Broverman, et al, 1972; Hershey, 1978). Sex role stereotypes are neither perfectly consistent nor perfectly symmetric: Certain positive expectation-states are associated with females (they are neater, more literary and more artistic) and some positive states attributed to them have no corresponding negative state attributed to males (though females are gentle, it is not necessarily assumed males are harsh). Therefore one neither expects nor finds a unidimensional factor structure underlying sex-role inventories. Bem (1974) has argued that there are two orthogonal factors; and Broverman, et al (1972), who label these factors "competence" and interpersonal "warmth", even argue they are complementary; but Pedhazur & Tetenbaum (1979) found a four- instead of a
two-factor structure in a factor analysis of Bem's sex role inventory.

(2) **Consequences of the fact that sex is a status characteristic.** If sex is a status characteristic, we should find that males both are given and take more opportunities to perform, are evaluated as performing better (for the same performances), are more often rewarded for their performances, and have more influence than females. Careful investigation of chances to perform are not common. A field study by Zimmerman & West (1975) found that in mixed-sex dyads males interrupt females but females never interrupt males and that there significantly more interruptions occur in mixed-sex than in same-sex dyads. Eskilson & Wiley (1976) gave leaders of 3-person groups information that followers did not have and found that male leaders were asked for this information more often than female leaders. Males also had more performance-outputs than females. (For sex differences in participation, see also Curtis, et al, 1975; Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956.) When the quality of performance is held constant, evaluation of male performance is more positive than evaluation of female performance. Among the best-known of such investigations is an experiment by Goldberg (1958) in which female college students were asked to evaluate the quality of a scientific article (on the subject they were studying) that was attributed to either a male or female author. The article was judged significantly better when attributed to a male. When females perform better, their performance is more often attributed to luck or the ease of performing the task; male success is more often attributed to ability (Deaux & Emmswiller, 1974; Feather, 1969). Given a disagreement, females more often yield to influence than males: A
typical study of this kind (Whittaker, 1965) found that in ambiguous perceptual tasks females were influenced more than males, and all subjects were influenced more by male than by female confederates. In fact, when the confederate was female Whittaker found that all subjects shifted away from the judgments of the confederate, males diverging more than females. Megargee (1969) has shown that such effects are independent of individual differences in predispositions to dominate. After testing subjects for dominance, Megargee observed emergence of leadership in same- and cross-sex groups and found that "dominant" subjects emerged as leaders in same-sex groups but in mixed groups "dominant" females would not exert leadership even over less dominant males.

The magnitude of the effect of sex differences depends on both the nature of the task and the composition of the group. The more appropriate the task is to females the greater their participation. Females tend to express less confidence than males in their future performance, even on tasks where they are known to do as well or better than males (cf. research reviewed by Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974, pp. 154-156), but Milton (1959) found that females increased performance-outputs significantly as the content of the problems on which they were working became increasingly appropriate to females. March (1953) found that the difference between husband and wife participation in political discussions decreased as the issues they discussed became increasingly local, which March attributed to the greater female-appropriateness of local issues. The effect of composition has usually been that mixed-sex groups show sex differences that are not
found in comparing all-male to all-female groups (Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Taylor, et al, 1978; Tuddenham, et al, 1958; Wiley, 1973); but exceptions exist (e.g. Adams & Landers, 1978). To explain these exceptions, Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill (1977) argue that independently of the performance-expectations attached to sex differences, both males and females believe it is legitimate for males but illegitimate for females to compete for status. Females are therefore reluctant to exercise leadership even in all-female groups. In support of this view, Eskilson & Wiley (1976) found that female leaders legitimated by test scores showed significantly greater task performance than female leaders chosen by lottery while male leaders were not affected by the legitimacy manipulation.³

B. Race as a status characteristic

(1). Evidence that race is a status characteristic. Probably the earliest important study of racial and ethnic stereotypes was Katz & Braly's (1933): They asked 100 white Princeton undergraduates to give the traits, selected from a list of 84 adjectives, that they considered

³ Movements such as women's liberation may of course have important implications for the research described in this section. It can be argued that major efforts to produce social change are increasingly successful, particularly among younger age groups. (The same can be said for black power, hence for the future of race as a status characteristic—see section IV-B.) As section V (below) will indicate, we believe that status characteristics are quite fragile and can change rapidly. We believe that real changes are taking place. But it is worth pointing out that the instantiation of the theory for a particular time, place, and collectivity is a separate issue from the validity of the theory. If sex and race cease to be status characteristics by 2080, then the theory will no longer apply to them, and if a characteristic that is not now the basis of status distinctions emerges as a status characteristic by 2080, the theory, which does not now apply to it, will be applicable to it in 2080.
most characteristic of each of ten groups (Germans, Italians, Negroes, Irish, English, Jews, Americans Chinese, Japanese, and Turks). (They could add additional traits if they found the list inadequate.) After completing this task, subjects (S's) were asked to select the five traits most typical of each group. The five traits most frequently chosen as typical of "Negroes" were "superstitious", "lazy", "happy-go-lucky", "ignorant", and "musical". The five most frequently chosen as typical of white "Americans" were "industrious", "intelligent", "materialistic", "ambitious", and "progressive". Bayton (1941) repeated Katz & Braly's investigation with a sample of 100 black undergraduates and found similar stereotypes. Although blacks included "intelligent" among the first ten traits attributed to Negroes, they were more agreed on the intelligence of whites (mentioned by 63% of them) than blacks (mentioned by 20%). Bayton (1941) asked the same undergraduates a month later to characterize their fellow students (all black) at Virginia State College. The resulting stereotype was quite different from their previous stereotype of "the Negro". But this had not affected their stereotype of "the Negro". Bayton, et al, (1956) found that the traits assigned to whites by both blacks and whites were more favorable than those assigned to blacks. Subsequent research provides additional evidence that race is a status characteristic. In studies by Hartsough & Fontana (1970), Sigall & Page (1971), Brigham (1972), Lerner & Karson (1973), and Zimet

Bayton, et al (1956) argue that the stereotype of the Negro is determined by class, not race. More probably they demonstrate that class and race characteristics are combined to form different stereotypes for "white" and "lower-class white", for "Negro" and "upper-class Negro".
& Zimet (1978), subjects' attributional judgments of traits and personality characteristics displayed an unfavorable view of blacks and a positive view of whites.

(2) **Consequences of the fact that race is a status characteristic.** If race is a status characteristic, we should find that whites both are given and take more opportunities to perform, are evaluated as performing better (for the same performances), and have more influence than blacks. Katz, Goldston, & Benjamin (1958) found that in biracial groups performing problem solving tasks whites initiated more interaction than blacks, and both whites and blacks talked more to whites than to blacks, even though S's were matched for intelligence and made to display equal ability at the task. Cohen (1972), using junior high schoolboys and controlling for height, SES, and attitude toward school, found that whites initiated more interaction, exerted more influence, and were evaluated as having the best ideas, being most able to guide and direct the group, and being the best leaders more often than blacks. This effect depends on racial mixture: The behavior of blacks with blacks is different from that of blacks in a white frame of reference. Katz, Henchy, & Allen (1968), for example, found that black elementary school pupils performed better for black than white testers. (See also Hatton, 1967; Katz, Epps, & Axelsson, 1964; Katz, Roberts, & Robinson, 1965).

Coates (1972) found that white evaluations of black performance were determined by race independently of actual performance. Coates had adult white subjects "train" white or black children in a perceptual discrimination task, controlling the evidence of performance given to the
S's. S's trained the children by giving feedback on each of 96 problems, ranging from very positive ("Great, you're really catching on") to very negative ("That's bad, you're not doing very well"). After the experiment, S's also gave overall evaluations of the personality traits of each child. White male adults were significantly more likely to evaluate the performance of a black child negatively than they were to so evaluate an equivalent performance by a white child. The same effect was not found for white female adults. But both male and female adults rated the personality traits of black children more negatively than those of white children, despite the absence of behavioral differences between the two.

When S's are given bogus feedback about their own performance, Friend & Neale (1972) have found that whites are more likely than blacks to attribute both success and failure to internal factors, such as ability and effort; blacks are more likely to attribute them to external factors, such as luck or the difficulty of the task.

C. Physical attractiveness as a status characteristic

(1) Evidence that physical attractiveness is a status characteristic. Miller (1970) instructed male and female undergraduates to view photographs that had been pre-rated for attractiveness and to record their impressions of the person in the photograph on 17 adjective scales. For 15 of the 17 scales, photographs pre-rated as attractive were associated with the more positive pole of the scales (e.g. more confident, happier, more perceptive). For 13 of the 17 dimensions, judgments of attractive male and attractive female photos did not differ significantly. In other words, there was a distinctive image of the
attractive, independent of sex. But differences between attractive and unattractive photos were greater, on the average, for females than males, suggesting that judges regarded attractiveness as making more difference for females than males. Miller found few differences between male and female judges. Females were more likely to mention that both males and females who were attractive were pleasure-seeking. Among female judges Miller found both more, and more interesting, interactions with sex of photo. Female judges saw the unattractive males as more curious and more careful than even the most attractive female, and they found attractive males more candid and also more pleasure-seeking than attractive females.

Miller's findings have been corroborated and extended by Dion, et al (1972). Compared to persons (in photos) of lesser attractiveness, attractive persons were rated by undergraduates as more socially desirable on a number of traits, more likely to gain high prestige occupations, more likely to be competent spouses and have happier marriages, and in general as likely to be happier. Dion, et al, therefore conclude that "what is beautiful is good". Further studies by Dion (Dion, 1973, Dion & Berscheid, 1974) show that stereotypes of physical attractiveness begin to form early: They can be elicited from pre-schoolers. And the beautiful are not only assumed to be good, they are also thought competent: Clifford & Walster (1973) found that teachers of fifth-graders expected attractive children to have both greater academic potential and better social relationships than unattractive children. Additional evidence that differential states of physical attractiveness produce differential evaluations is provided by Strane & Watts (1977), Sigall & Landy (1973) and Byrne, et al (1968).
(2) Consequences of the fact that physical attractiveness is a status characteristic. Because research on physical attractiveness depends heavily on photographs we have not been able to locate any studies of chances to perform or performance-outputs. But both sexes have been found to evaluate performances by attractive people more highly than the same performances by unattractive people. Landy & Sigall (1974) found that subjects evaluated an essay written by a college woman as significantly better when she was attractive; essays with no attached photo were intermediate; essays written by an unattractive female were evaluated as significantly worse. By varying the quality of the essay, Landy & Sigall found that attractiveness had an even greater impact on poor than on good essays. Cross-sex effects on influence have been reported by Mills & Aronson (1965) who found that attractive female confederates were more effective than an unattractive confederate in influencing a male audience and by Horai, et al (1974), who found that females agreed more with communications written by an attractive than an unattractive or unpictured author. Same-sex effects are more mixed: Snyder & Rothbart (1971) found that male subjects were more affected by an attractive male confederate than by an unattractive or unidentified communicator, but Dion & Stein (1978) found no same-sex effects among fifth- and sixth-grade subjects who were given monetary incentives for influencing the behavior of their peers. Attractive males were more influential than unattractive males with females, and attractive females were more influential than unattractive females with males; but attractiveness had no effect on same-sex peers.
V. Responses to Intervention

The theory of status characteristics and expectation-states can be used to suggest ways of reducing the effects of irrelevant status characteristics. It has been used, for example, to reduce the effects of sex, race, and unidimensional stereotypes of academic ability based on reading skills in schools. The three principles of the theory that have been most often exploited for this purpose are (a) the inconsistency-equality effect; (b) the effect of associations between characteristics possessed by referents on expectancies for interactants; and (c) the effect of status characteristics on significance of evaluations by various sources.

Most interventions have been based on the combining principle: According to this principle, inconsistency in status characteristics increases equality—given a fixed number of status characteristics equally relevant to the task outcome, the greater the inconsistency of these characteristics the less the differentiation among the actors in the group (see Humphreys & Berger, 1979). Modifications of a diffuse status characteristic often involve training individuals in inconsistent specific status characteristics because these combine with a diffuse status characteristic to dampen its effect on the observed power-prestige order of a group. Cohen & Roper (1972), for example, taught black grade-school pupils how to build a radio, then taught them how to teach another pupil to build a radio, thus creating two specific status characteristics inconsistent with pupil conceptions of race. They further strengthened this training by having the blacks then train white pupils to build a radio, establishing the relative superiority of the
blacks. (They did not attempt to convince the whites that whites were inferior at the task.) Finally, they informed some of their S's that the skills involved in building the radio and teaching others to build it were relevant to the criterion task they performed last, a game called "Kill the Bull", which required four pupils to make repeated decisions on the direction of travel on a board with fourteen turns to reach the goal, the number of squares advanced being determined by the roll of a die. Cohen & Roper found expectation-training of blacks alone not sufficient to change the observed power-prestige order of biracial groups on the criterion task, but training that modified both black and white expectations produced a significant increase in equality. This effect was strengthened by making the relevance of the training to the criterion task explicit, except for an unexpected effect on the less active black: The emphasis on relevance of the training increased the participation of the more active black but decreased the participation of the less active black. Overall, however, the effect of the inconsistent status information increased equality (see also Cook, 1975; Cohen & Sharan, 1977; Pugh & Wahrman, 1978).

Stulac (1975) demonstrated a successful intervention against the domination of reputedly better reading children in a laboratory setting. Utilizing dissociation and independence of status information, Stulac specified the relevance of four distinct abilities to a new task. She explained to "higher" and "lower" readers that a person who was good at one of these abilities was unlikely to be good at the other abilities; she also told them that reading skill was unrelated to these abilities. In groups receiving this treatment, reputedly "higher" readers were far
less likely to dominate the interaction on a criterion task following the new task than in groups allowed to perform the new task without these special instructions.

Conceptualizing a reputation for reading ability as a specific status characteristic (and providing evidence for that argument), Rosenholtz (1977; forthcoming), building on Stulac's research, devised a special curriculum to modify the generalizing effect of reading status in fifth and sixth grade classrooms. Students performed a series of tasks, each representing one of three new abilities. It was found that students evaluated these new abilities as independent of each other. The combination of this new status information with their original reading status produced, on a criterion task, significantly less domination of poorer readers by better readers as compared to untreated controls.

The theory of status characteristics, of course, has strongly emphasized the situation-bound character of the status process. From this it follows that results of one intervention do not necessarily generalize readily to other tasks or other persons. If the theory is right, this is a serious barrier in the way of effective interventions. However, one important idea about transfer of effects in the theory has been exploited by Lockheed & Hall (1976) and Pugh & Wahrman (1978) to show how such training can be made more lasting in its effect. The "sequencing" principle of the theory describes the development of a status situation out of pair-wise interaction. The theory conceives actors as interacting in pairs. Expectations are created out of the interaction of the given pair, information about referent actors enters in as part of the frame of reference that defines the situation of the
pair. If at any phase the persons interacting change, a new process evolves forming expectations for the new pair of interactants. The displaced interactant becomes a referent for this later interaction. At each stage of evolution of a changing status situation, providing the task and conditions of interaction remain the same, the definitions achieved vis-à-vis others who have already acted remain when the individual engages a new interactant. The formation of new expectations, therefore, is in part determined by the past interactions of the members of the group, who form referents for subsequent interaction. By training males and females to believe females were superior at a task, Pugh & Wahrman (1978) modified expectations based on sex enough to equalize male and female rates of influence during interaction. The investigators then had the S's return the next day. Each was given a new partner. No further training was given. All S's began immediately on the criterion task. Pugh & Wahrman found the modifying effects achieved with the original partners to be significant in interaction with the new partner: The females continued to have more resistance to influence, and the males continued to have less resistance to influence with their new partners (see also Lockheed & Hall, 1976).

The Pugh-Wahrman effect is due to the continued significance of past interactants as referents in forming expectations about new interactants. But the effect of referents is more general than this. They can be introduced in many ways and expectations about them can be created in many ways. Their importance has been exploited by several interventions in which "modeling" effects are produced by referents. Thus Lohman (1972) first exposed black junior high school pupils to
information given on TV about blacks who were performing competently on a task involving whites. Black pupils then worked on the same task. This intervention, among others that Lohman used, significantly increased both the participation rates and the influence of the black pupils on the criterion task. The referent associated high competence with the low state of the diffuse status characteristic (see also Bridgeman & Burbach, 1975, Cohen & Roper, 1972, Robbins, 1977). One by-product of this effect, of course, is that group "climates" are among the conditions that affect the effectiveness of expectation training. Thus, Cohen, et al, report strong effects not only of expectation training but also of the organizational arrangements in a summer school Center for Interracial Cooperation. Balancing black and white administrators in the school produced a strong contextual effect on all pupils regardless of training (Cohen, et al, 1976).

Many interventions have made use of a different branch of expectation-states theory concerning actors as sources of evaluations; this research is linked closely to research on status characteristics by the fact that the higher the status of an evaluator, the greater is the likelihood of becoming a source and thus influencing an individual's self-evaluations relative to another (Webster & Sobieszek, 1974).

In a series of experiments designed to change children's expectations as a function of teacher's evaluations, Entwisle & Webster (1973, 1974) demonstrated that not all teachers serve as significant sources of evaluation for their pupils. Their expectations of black pupils, for example, were not changed by white teachers' evaluations of white teachers but were changed by those of black teachers. In inner city
schools (in Baltimore) made up mostly of blacks, Entwisle & Webster found little effect of treatments by white teachers but found significant effects in all-white schools with lower SES compositions. Repeating the expectation manipulation in inner-city black schools produced positive results when blacks were used as teachers. Special controls for practice and pure "attention" effects (i.e. teacher's attention to the pupil) showed that the effect, where produced, was due to effects of the source on expectation-states, not practice or attention, nor was the effect due to simple reinforcement of activity levels.

Entwisle & Webster's most recent intervention (1978) makes use not only of the source theory but also of the burden of proof process of the status characteristic theory, which together suggest another kind of "transfer" effect that can be used in interventions. In general, the villain of the piece in most studies of status characteristics is the generalizing of irrelevant status. This transfer effect happens with both diffuse and specific status characteristics (cf Kervin, 1975; Freese, 1976). Thus, when pupils with low reading ability face an arithmetic class for the first time, they are likely to believe they will do poorly at arithmetic. In the theory of status characteristics this is explained by assuming that performance on the specific task associated with a specific characteristic induces expectations about more general problem-solving abilities, and that these expectations are applied to new problems or tasks. Entwisle & Webster capitalize on this usually undesirable process by indirectly raising expectations for a classroom ability by manipulating expectations for another, unrelated task. They found that performance at one unrelated task (planning a
meal) raised expectations for performance of another (the story-telling task), though the effect was smaller than that from direct manipulation of story-telling ability.

Note that like Cohen & Roper (1972), Entwisle & Webster (1978) show that the relevance of the manipulated ability to the task is directly proportional to its effect in reducing the differentiation of status unequals.

The interventions so far attempted by no means fully exploit the possibilities suggested by the theory of status characteristics. The theory describes a process that can be changed by changing any one (or more) of the conditions that determine its operation. For example, the salience of status characteristics can be affected by the linking of equating status elements to the task. The way the structure of expectations is completed can be affected by associating characteristics with referential actors and by publicly dissociating characteristics that are irrelevant. The resultant structure can be affected by increasing inconsistency in the status information given members. And the transformation of the structure into behavior depends, in part, on the type of commitment of the members to the task of the group (see Morris, 1977). Some of these conditions, e.g. referential associations and inconsistency, have been used to modify the status organizing process; some have been attempted without success, e.g. mere dissociation of status characteristics (see Pugh & Wahrman, 1978), though this may be largely a question of finding the right technique; and some have not yet been attempted at all. Therefore it is clear that although the theory has
already served as a basis for successful interventions, its full usefulness in the modification of status-organizing processes remains to be realized.
LITERATURE CITED


