

ON CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES

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1. Introduction

In contemporary American politics the term "conservatism" is used to refer to positions taken by a rather wide variety of more or less well organized groups and movements. There is the right wing republicanism expressed in the writings, speeches and actions of Senator Goldwater. Closely related to Goldwater's positions are those taken by the National Review and its editor William F. Buckley, Jr. Goldwater and Buckley have large followings inside the Republican party, many Republicans appear to be disgusted with "me-tooism" and the acceptance of the welfare state by the Eisenhower administration and the liberal wing in the party. Further to the right there is the radical right groups. These primarily specialize in anti-communism, for instance the John Birch Society, The Christian Anti-Communist Crusade and the Christian Crusade of Billy James Hargis. These groups all have in common a rather obsessive concern with the threat Communism poses, domestically and in foreign policy, but the differences are at least as important as the similarities between, say, the relatively moderate Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the Christian Crusade, based on rural Protestant fundamentalism and the John Birch Society. Senator Thomas Dodd who is a rather frequent speaker at meetings with the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade has voted in favor of "liberal" domestic legislation, the John Birch Society, on the other hand, is staunchly conservative on economic issues. Billy James Hargis' movement with its roots in rural Protestant Fundamentalism surely appeals to a different clientele than the upper middle class John Birch Society.

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There are a number of journalistic accounts of the rightwing movements in the United States, but up till recently no scholarly analyses have been published.¹

In this paper we shall investigate three problems which we think are important for an understanding of contemporary American conservatism.

1. The first problem derives from the recognition that there are a number of different aspects of conservatism. These form a more or less coherent syndrome of attitudes. First there are the traditional economic issues that have divided conservatives and liberals in American politics. These issues have to do with how much the Federal or State Governments should engage in welfare policies for the benefit of individuals and communities. This dimension we call Economic Conservatism. Second, recent rightwing movements have stressed heavily the alleged danger of Communist subversion in the United States. Some groups like the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the Hargis movement and the John Birch Society have made this their central focus, but the conservatives around Buckley and Goldwater also stress this problem. Third, extreme rightwing groups have especially on the local community level, campaigned strongly against public expressions of socialist and atheist opinions, and attempted to purge public libraries of books with "subversive" contents. This dimension we shall call tolerance. Fourth, there is the orientation toward American involvement in the affairs of other parts of the world. This "dimension" was included since the right in American politics traditionally has been isolationist in the sense of opposing American involvement in foreign and especially European affairs.² This attitude they shared with many prominent liberals however (Morris, the LaFollettes and others). More recently few Conservatives have advocated American withdrawal from its foreign commitments,

but Conservatives have been more critical than liberals of certain features of some aspects of these commitments. They have opposed "give away" aid programs, aid to communist countries like Poland and Yugoslavia and to countries pursuing "neutralist" policies. The "radical right" has been conducting a vigorous campaign against the United Nations, in order to "get the UN out of the U.S. and the U.S. out of the UN."

If we want to judge the prospects for the rightwing movement in American politics it is, of course, first of all important to know what proportion of the population would favor the rightwing appeal on various issues. Second, it is important to know how the various aspects of conservatism hang together. For if the correlations between the different aspects in general are low, then we know that, for instance, many people are staunch conservatives on economic issues while not believing that there is much of an internal communist threat. Such people while attracted by the fiscal and economic conservatism of the rightwing will be repelled by the allegations of communist subversion in high and low places. The first question we shall study, then, is the extent to which the four dimensions of conservatism form a syndrome in the population.

2. What we want to investigate is the status politics hypothesis. A number of more or less scholarly writers have maintained that phenomena like McCarthyism and some more recent outcroppings of popular anti-communism reflect status anxiety among various groups in American society. We have been working on this problem as part of work in a general theory of rank processes. In section 9 of this paper we present an elaboration of the hypothesis and some data bearing on it.

3. The third and last problem we shall examine concerns the relationships between party identification and religion and the various conservative attitudes. S.M. Lipset has shown that Republicanism was strongly related to support for McCarthy and other rightwing leaders in recent American history. We shall elaborate on this finding, first by studying how party identification is related to each of the four aspects of conservatism and second by contrasting militants in the two parties with Republicans and Democrats who are less concerned about political affairs.

Before we start analyzing data bearing on these three problems we shall have to describe briefly how indices were constructed to measure the four aspects of conservatism; how an ethnicity index was made; how a sample was selected and the fieldwork executed. We shall also present some data on the relationship between education (used as an indicator of social class) and the four attitude dimensions, and also information about differences in attitudes between different religious groups. This information is, as we shall see, necessary for the analysis in the remainder of the paper.

2. Descriptions of indicators of the four dimensions.

Socio-economic Conservatism. This refers to attitudes hostile to "New Deal type" measures and includes: rejection of Federal spending on local school construction projects and medical care, the view that laws governing labor unions aren't strict enough, and that the Federal income tax should be abolished.

Tolerance of Expression. This dimension is built up of items taken from Stouffer's study of attitudes towards civil liberties issues in the 1950's.³ It includes opinions that speeches against religion and churches and favoring government ownership of industries should be allowed and opposition to removal

of literature favoring government ownership or opposing churches and religion from public libraries. "Tolerance" here primarily refers to a bending to tolerate "leftism" heresies rather than a personality trait. Liberals may, of course, score high on the index while being basically intolerant of people who advocate, say, states rights or racial segregation.

Belief in a domestic Communist threat. This includes beliefs that "many" Communists are teaching in public schools and colleges, that there are "many" Communists in the American government as well as in the interviewee's city of residence, that the American Communist Party is a "great danger", that the danger of Communist subversion in the U.S. is "more dangerous" or "equally dangerous" compared with the threat posed by Soviet foreign policy. As is well known, various groups continuously and frantically warn the public against Communist subversion from within.

Internationalism. This includes beliefs that the United States should give economic aid to poor countries even if these are unable to pay it back or even if they are not as committed to anti-communism as the U.S., rejection of the view that the U.S. ought to leave the United Nations and rejection of the view that the U.S. would be better off if it were less concerned with the affairs of other countries.

It should be noted that we have only tried to measure "concrete" political attitudes. It has been pointed out that traditional Conservatism, descending from the writings of Edmund Burke and others, contains assumptions about the essential and inherent frailty of human nature. It is a separate problem not to be dealt with here to what extent this "human nature conservatism" correlates with conservative attitudes on concrete issues. Some prominent American liberals are presumably human nature conservatives.⁴

In retrospect we regret not having a measure of a dimension we might call "aggressiveness in foreign affairs". One end of that dimension is Senator Goldwater's "Why not Victory" program: the aim should be the defeat of communism, not an uneasy indefinite coexistence. The other end of the dimension favors coexistence and compromise.

3. Index Construction.

3.1 Attitude indices.

The items that were to go into an index were first correlated with one another. Inspection of the resulting tables convinced us that the items were sufficiently related to be combined into indices, and that the "marginals" were sufficiently different to get the sample differentiated along the dimensions. Index scores were then formed for each of the four dimensions by counting the number of items endorsed in the "right" direction. For instance, a person who got score value four on Conservatism had thus endorsed four out of six possible Conservative positions. The Conservatism scores thus ranges from zero to six. The Perception of an Internal Communist Threat index contains five items, and the individual scores can therefore vary between zero and five. The Internationalism index contains four items and the individual scores vary between zero and four. The Tolerance of Expression index, finally contains four items, and individual scores vary from zero and four. Table 1 gives the totals in the sample for each score on the four indices:

Table 1. Distribution of Scores on Indices

Score	Conservatism	Belief in a Domestic Communist Threat	Internationalism	Tolerance of Expressio
0	59	188	19	28
1	115	119	44	30
2	125	85	100	84
3	93	31	97	80
4	52	25	202	240
5	17	9	-	-
6	-	5	-	-

Total number of respondents (462)

As we see the extreme positions are relatively rare. Reading the second and fourth columns, for instance, there is no evidence of any widespread "Red Scare" and intolerance in this population.

3.2 The Ethnicity Index.

Much American politics has been based on ethnic groups, and some studies of "status inconsistency" have shown ethnicity to be an important rank dimension. Ethnic groups in America have traditionally been ranked according to prestige. Bogardus and others using the social distance scales have found that these rankings are very stable and uniform over quite a long period of time.

An ethnicity index was constructed to enable us to rank the respondents with respect to ethnicity. The procedure consisted of rank ordering the countries to approximate the results obtained by Bogardus and others in their use of the social distance scale. Weights were then arbitrarily assigned to each type of country of birthplace. In this way each respondent was assigned seven weights with the total score being his relative ethnicity score. That is, the weights of the birthplaces of the respondent, the parents, and the four grandparents were summed to obtain the total score. The rank ordering of the countries and the resulting distribution was highly skewed with three generation Americans, the distribution was collapsed into five groups.⁵

<u>Weights</u>	<u>Countries</u>
1	United States
2	England, Scotland, No. Ireland, and British Canada
3	Ireland, France, French Canada, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries
4	Italy
5	Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland
6	All other European countries
7	All other countries

4. Research Procedures.

The field study was conducted during the first three weeks of February, 1962, in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties in California. The interviewers were undergraduate sociology students, who were given intensive theoretical as well as practical interview training, using a pretested questionnaire.

The sample was stratified, to insure equal representation, by income and geographical mobility. Census tracts were chosen on the basis of the average value of the dwelling units in 1960, and divided into three categories, upper, middle and low. Purposefully we chose tracts that contained a small proportion of apartment houses; non-whites; and Mexican-Americans or Japanese-Americans. The tracts were then stratified by high and low geographical mobility for each economic grouping. Informants, real estate dealers, and police administrators supplied information that aided in this aspect of the study design.

From precinct voting registration lists, 520 names were randomly selected. This represented approximately 25 percent of all housing units in the sample area. Personal letters informed the chosen participants of the study and requested their cooperation. It was decided to sample with replacement as the need arose. To correct losses in the original sample due to migration and refusals, a new sample of 127 more names were chosen. In addition, a house sample was conducted in certain tracts due to local conditions.

Negroes and Orientals who happened to get included were omitted from the sample. Our sample is obviously not a probability sample of the Peninsula "caucasian" population, and we never intended it to be one. We wanted the different socio-economic and educational groups reasonably well represented, since we knew that these factors were important for the questions relating to politics and family cohesion we wanted to study. The sample clearly contains a higher proportion of people with college educations than "normal" even for the San Francisco Bay area.

5. Attitude correlates of Education.

Some of the components of liberalism have often been found to be related to education. Stouffer found that on his index of Tolerance, containing the items which we here refer to as Freedom of Expression, the more educated subjects are, the more likely they are to respond in a tolerant direction. And various measures of "authoritarianism" have been found to be related to education. Table 2 reports the means of our four indices within six educational groups.

Table 2. Mean Scores on Conservatism, Tolerance of Expression, Internationalism and Belief in a Domestic Communist Threat within six Educational Groups.

<u>Level of Education</u>	Economic Conservatism	Tolerance of Expression	Internationalism	Perception of Commu- nist Threat	Number of Respondents
Finished grade school or less	1.40	2.40	2.21	1.14	(42)
Some high school	2.02	2.64	2.66	1.49	(61)
Finished high school	1.98	2.82	2.79	1.51	(119)
Some college	2.31	2.96	3.03	1.33	(96)
Finished college	2.19	3.68	3.22	.95	(78)
Graduate work	1.97	3.56	3.27	.45	(64)

Let us first study the first column, dealing with Economic Conservatism. That the least educated group is the most liberal one of these welfare issues is of course not surprising. The group with a graduate education is on the average more liberal than other college graduates.

For the Tolerance of Expression scores our data, as did Stouffer's, shows a consistent increase with level of Education. The same is true for the Internationalism scores. On the Belief in a Domestic Communist Threat index the lowest education group have a lower average score than the three higher groups, but people who have finished college, and especially those with some graduate training, have very low scores.

Using the contingency tables, Educational level sorted against the individual scores of the four indices, we have computed rank correlation coefficients (Kendall's tau⁶). They were all quite low:

between Education and Conservatism, .052; (partly because this relationship is curvilinear);

between Education and Tolerance of Expression, .308;

between Education and Internationalism, .281; and

between Education and Belief in a Domestic Communist Threat, .206.

6. Religious affiliation as a correlate to attitudes.

Economic Conservatism. A traditional affiliation with the Democratic party might be thought to contribute to making Catholics more liberal on domestic New Deal type economic issues than Protestants. We already know that Education (being an indicator of social class) is (up to a point) positively related to economic conservatism. Since Catholics, in our sample, on the average have had less education than Protestants we have to control for Education if we want to study the relationship between religious affiliation and economic Conservatism. This is done in Table 3.

Table 3. The relationship between church affiliation and Economic Conservatism. Mean Economic Conservatism Scores among Protestants, Catholics and "Others".

<u>Educational level</u>	Protestants	Catholics	Jews and Agnostics
Grade school and some high school	2.03	1.23	1.70
Finished high school	2.02	1.69	2.36
Some college	2.61	1.88	1.92
Finished college and graduate work	2.32	1.82	1.61

Within each of the four Educational groups, Protestants are clearly more Conservative on economic issues than Catholics.

Tolerance. Catholic doctrine is traditionally less tolerant of deviations from "the correct" view point than most American versions of Protestantism. We would therefore expect Catholics on the average to score lower on the Freedom of Expression index. Again, we have to control for Education, Catholics have on the average less education than Protestants and this factor is negatively related to the Freedom of Expression score.

Table 4. Mean scores on the Tolerance index for the three religious groups within four educational groups.

<u>Educational level</u>	Protestants	Catholics	Jews and Agnostics
Grade school and some high school	2.51	2.53	2.80
Finished high school	2.84	2.62	3.07
Some college	3.09	2.38	3.46
Finished college plus graduate school	3.64	3.18	3.67

In three of the four Educational groups Protestants have on the average higher scores on the Freedom of Expression index than Catholics. Also, on each Educational level, the non-Christians have the highest score.

Table 5. Mean scores on Internationalism for the three religious groups within four Educational groups.

<u>Educational level</u>	Protestants	Catholics	Jews and Agnostics
Grade school and some high school	2.60	2.10	1.80
Finished high school	2.84	2.86	2.36
Some college	3.10	2.79	3.23
Finished college and graduage work	3.21	3.18	3.30

Internationalism. Among the lowest Educational group, Protestants are on the average more internationalist than Catholics, and the non-Christians have as a group the lowest score. Among those who have finished high school, there is no difference between Protestants and Catholics and the "Others" are still the least internationalist of all. Among those with some college, Protestants have higher scores than Catholics. College educated Jews and Agnostics have higher scores than each of the two Christian groups. Among those with graduate school training there is virtually no difference between the three groups.

Perception of Domestic Communist Threat. Catholics hardly perceive any more internal Communist threat than Protestants when we control for education, as

Table 6. Mean scores of Perception of an Internal Communist Threat among the religious groups.

<u>Educational level</u>	Protestants	Catholics	Jews and Agnostics
Grade school and some high school	1.16	1.23	1.20
Finished high school	1.51	1.52	2.36
Some college	1.31	1.83	.54
Finished college and graduate work	.85	.82	.48

Table 6 shows. Only one group of Catholics, those who had "some college" were clearly higher on this index than the corresponding group among the Protestants. Again, the third group is very heterogeneous: Reading the first row we see, that there is virtually no difference between the Jews and Agnostics and the two main religious groups. Non-Christians who had only finished high school have a higher score than any other group, and those who have at least some college have much lower scores than any other group.

7. Church Attendance and attitudes.

Table 7 reports how high and low church attendance is related to the four attitude indices among Protestants.

Table 7. Mean scores of the four indices among Protestants with respect to high and low church attendance. Education held constant.

	High Education		Low Education	
	high church attendance	low church attendance	high church attendance	low church attendance
Conservatism	2.51	2.37	2.02	2.01
Belief in a domestic Communist threat	1.00	.99	2.66	1.43
Internationalism	3.26	3.14	2.83	2.67
Tolerance of expression	2.77	3.53	2.34	2.83
	(49)	(103)	(47)	(94)

Among people with low education, high church attendance makes for higher incidence of belief in a domestic Communist threat. High church attendance makes for lower tolerance scores.

8. How related are Conservative Attitudes.²

We now turn to the question of the relations between the four attitude dimensions. We first test the hypothesis that economic Conservatives more often than liberals see signs of internal Communist subversion in the United States.

We already know that Education is related to both economically conservatism and the extent to which people believe that there is an internal Communist threat. Therefore, if we want to study the relationships between economic Conservatism and such beliefs we have to control for Education. As Table 8 shows, there is within four of our five Educational groups a tendency for people to see more internal Communist threats the more economically Conservative they are.

Table 8. Mean scores on the Perception of an internal Communist Threat index, related to different degrees of Conservatism among five Educational categories.

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Conservatism Score</u>				
	0	1	2	3	4 or higher
Grade school plus some high school	.64	1.19	1.56	1.60	1.44
Finished high school	1.72	.96	1.50	1.88	1.60
Some college	.55	1.42	1.20	1.68	1.50
Finished college	.14	.79	.65	1.39	1.09
Graduate work	.11	.42	.27	.80	.73

Reading the first column we see that the least Conservative group believes very little in an internal Communist threat. In neither row does the Communist threat score increase steadily with the Conservatism score, but there are several "reversals".

We remember from Table 6 that people who are neither Protestants nor Catholics but who have at least some college on the average see little Communist subversion. These people are also lower than the Protestants on the economic conservatism index. It is then possible that the irregular relationship portrayed in Table 8 can be made clearer by studying the relationship between the two dimensions for each one of the three religious groups. Table 9 presents the Kendall rank order coefficient (tau) between economic conservatism and the perception of communist subversion among Protestants, Catholics and Others. (Tau between the two variables for the total sample in .159).

Table 9. Rank order correlations between economic conservatism and perception of communist subversion among Protestants, Catholics and Others.

Protestants	.109 (N = 294)
Catholics	.125 (N = 100)
Jews and Agnostics	.419 (N = 51)

Conservatism and perception of communist threat are quite strongly related among the non-Christians. In the two Christian groups the relations are still positive but weak.

Let us now turn to the relationship between Conservatism and Internationalism. We see that in our data a general tendency for people with at least some college to be more internationalist the less Conservative they are, although there are some reversals to this trend.

Table 10. Mean scores on Internationalism related to different degrees of economic Conservatism within five Educational groups.

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Conservatism scores</u>				
	0	1	2	3	4
Grade school plus some high school	2.00	2.34	2.79	2.93	1.78
Finished high school	2.83	2.50	2.82	3.00	2.67
Some college	3.27	3.58	3.00	2.79	2.68
Finished college	3.86	3.47	3.47	2.91	2.67

This positive correlation of Liberalism with Internationalism is virtually absent in the two lower educational groups, however.

We already know that Catholics tend to be more economically conservative than Protestants and also that Catholics, on the average tend to be less tolerant than Protestants toward public expressions of deviant opinions. In studying the relationship between Conservatism and Tolerance we have again separated the three religious groups from one another. Also, since both economic conservatism and tolerance are related to level of education we decided to control for this factor. We computed tau and arrived at the following values:

Table 11. Partial tau between economic conservatism and tolerance with education held constant in three religious groups.

Protestants	-.002
Catholics	.117
Jews and Agnostics	-.097

As we see, the only positive correlation (and a low one) is found among the Catholics. Among Protestants and Others economic Conservatism makes no difference as far as tolerance is concerned.

A similar analysis was pursued for economic conservatism and internationalism. We know that Catholics are less conservative and less internationalist than Protestants and others. Therefore we separated the religious groups in the analysis. Also, Education affects both conservatism and internationalism.

Table 12. Partial taus between economic conservatism and internationalism with education held constant in three ethnic groups.

Protestants	-.111
Catholics	-.073
Jews and Agnostics	-.201

Does belief in communist subversion within the U.S. tend to make people intolerant toward deviants in politics and religion? There is a negative correlation between perception of communist subversion and tolerance as the first column of table 13 shows. However, both perception of subversion and tolerance are related to level of education. Therefore the relation between the two factors to better shown by the partial correlation in which education is held constant. These figures are given by the second column in the table.

Table 13. Relation between Perception of Communist subversion and Tolerance.

	<u>tau</u>	<u>Partial tau, holding education constant</u>
Protestants	-.145	-.129
Catholics	-.186	-.147
Jews and Agnostics	-.178	-.101

Holding education constant, we still get negative correlations, although they are not very strong. (The reason why we get somewhat stronger relationships in the two Christian groups than among the others may be that some Christians view anti-religious agitation as giving aid to the Communists.) We remember from table four that of the two Christian groups the Protestants were on the average more tolerant than Catholics, and that non-Christians, also on the average, were more tolerant than either Christian group, holding education constant. Note that the correlation coefficients in the second column of table 13 show the same ordering of magnitude: Catholics, Protestants, Agnostics plus Jews. That is, the likelihood that perception of Communist subversion will lead a person to intolerant views depends on how widespread such views are in the social groups he values.

As a conclusion to this section we can say, then, that the four dimensions of conservatism by and large are only weakly correlated with one another.

We believe that this is very significant for anyone who wants to understand American politics. We think that this finding taken together with those in table 1 means that at least the population we have studied is relatively immune against extreme conservative agitation. For we have said that the rightwingers combine economic conservatism with drummed up charges of communist subversion, hostility and intolerance against people suspected of political or religious heresies and hostility toward the UN and countries suspected of being "soft on communism".

However, most people who are conservative on economic issues are not ready to accept most of the charges of communist subversion, do not believe in suppression of deviant opinions and are quite internationalist in the foreign policy orientations. And many people who do think that there is a lot of communist subversion are not willing to suppress heresies. So many people who agree with the radical right in some respects will be found to disagree with it in others. This prevents the extremists, say candidates taking the Birch Society position from getting very many down the line followers. People who are attracted by some of these themes are alienated by others. ("Specialized" rightist groups, however, dealing for instance in anti-communism alone, without taking a stand on any other issues might have somewhat better chances to succeed.)

Some qualifications have to be added to this conclusion: 1. The relationships found presumably hold for the particular "historical situation" in which they were collected, characterize by for instance a rather "normal temperature" in the cold war. It may well be, for instance, that the tendency for perceived communist subversion to lead to intolerance may increase if the cold war gets appreciably hotter. And the relationship between economic conservatism and internationalism may conceivably be affected by how well the American economy is doing. 2. It can also be argued that the correlations are low because many people often do not think through their political opinions very much. Opinions are often "offhand" reactions to specific events. A person who is a liberal on most questions might for instance, get upset about foreign aid if he hears about waste and inefficiency. If he is very interested in politics and if he has a thought through position on the topic he is less likely to let such an episode affect his overall evaluation of foreign aid than if he only infrequently thinks about and informs himself about foreign aid. Similarly a

politically not very interested person who is mostly a Conservative may get enthusiastic about a particularly successful venture in foreign aid and be swayed in a positive direction. It may be that the overall correlations between the different dimensions of Conservatism would increase if a substantial proportion of the politically apathetic during a more than usually vigorous election campaign got more interested in politics. If their attention were called to various issues in a more systematic and persistent fashion would they then become more consistently Conservative or Liberal? We believe that they would. It has been found that attention paid to issues and salience as such issues contribute to the development of some consistency between party allegiance and positions on opinion items.⁷ Also, in our own data we can show that people who feel involved in politics tend to be more consistently Conservative or Liberal than others. These data are reported in table 14. As a measure of involvement we have used the responses to a question whether the respondent ever gets as "worked up" about politics and public affairs as about problems in his personal life. The "high involvement" category comprises people who said "often" or "sometimes" and "low involvement" are those who said "rarely" or "never".

We see that the correlation is higher among the highly involved in 16 out of 18 comparisons. In several cases the difference is quite great. Comparing highly involved Democrats, Republicans and Independents we see that the Democrats and Independents are considerably more consistent than the Republicans. We shall later (table 19) see that the highly involved Democrats taken as a group is very liberal and that highly involved Republicans, again taken as a group, are quite Conservative. If attention, salience, and involvement contribute toward making attitudes consistent, why should this effect be greater among liberals than among Conservatives?

3. There are clearly other factors besides attitudinal relationships that determine the success in a given area of an extremist political movement. The role of the political organizations and the leadership they can provide is obvious. As Wolfinger points out, the radical right has been most successful in states where the regular Democratic and Republican party organizations are fragmented into cliques and factions. This is an interesting hypothesis that should be systematically investigated: it should be amended to take into account the role of other voluntary organizations as well, such as labor unions, churches, civic organizations and so on.⁸

Table 14. Correlations (Kendall's tau) between attitude dimensions among people with high and low involvement in politics and public affairs.

Involvement	Republicans		Democrats		Independents	
	high	low	high	low	high	low
<u>Correlations between:</u>						
Economic Conservatism and Perception of Communist Threat	.101	.052	.292	.212	.289	.145
Economic Conservatism and Internationalism	-.106	-.026	-.362	-.006	-.309	.056
Economic Conservatism and Tolerance	.056	.058	-.307	-.035	.235	.326
Perception of Communist Threat and Tolerance	-.237	-.128	-.410	-.100	-.410	-.076
Internationalism and Tolerance	.207	.007	.367	.188	.576	.048
Perception of Communist Threat and Internationalism	-.141	-.046	-.212	.054	-.417	-.179

9. The status politics hypothesis and conservatism.

In this section we shall analyze some data that bear on the status politics explanation of conservatism in American politics. Briefly stated, this theory asserts that strongly conservative attitudes occur among groups that while low

on some rank(s) are trying to emphasize that they in some other respect have a legitimate claim to a middle class or higher rank. A worker, for instance, whose parents were middle class (a "skidder") may use conservative attitudes to stress that he "really" belongs in the middle class in spite of his occupation. Similarly, a person who has a low ranking job may want to stress that he is of old Yankee stock and not a newcomer. He may do this by becoming a stout Republican associating the Democratic Party with ethnics and immigrants. Upwardly mobile people may take on very conservative attitudes in order to refuse any impressions that they are disloyal to their new station in life. We have already discussed these hypotheses at some length in a companion paper.⁹ Our conclusion was, briefly, that on theoretical grounds alone rank discrepancy may result in conservative radical or entirely nonpolitical attitudes depending on how Ego perceives his own ranks in relation to those of others, and on how certain other factors influence him. Some self-made men, for instance, may become ruggedly conservative, but others identify with their class of origin and feel an obligation to help its cause from their new station and thus become liberals. Therefore, if we analyze survey data on conservatism and study rank discrepant groups, we may not find them to be any more conservative than other groups, simply because those people who have chosen a conservative response are balanced by others who have become liberals because of rank discrepancy.

We shall look at three combinations of ranks in order to see if we can evaluate the status politics hypotheses using our data. The combinations are: ethnicity and occupation; occupation and education; and father's occupation and own occupation.

Let us, then, first look at ethnicity and occupation.

A line of thought that one finds in the literature is that people from "low" ethnic groups with high occupational status compensate for resulting

"status anxiety" (presumably induced by a fear of being snubbed because of their "low" ethnic origins by the established upper and middle class) by emphasizing their Americanism, and by overconforming with the norms in their social status groups. This makes them ready for radical rightist attitudes. Let us see how members of our two highest status groups, classified with respect to ethnicity, fall on the four indices.

Table 15. Mean Scores on Economic Conservatism among the two highest status groups: Members classified with respect to ethnicity.

	<u>Ethnicity</u>				
	high	medium high	medium	medium low	low
Managers and directors of large concerns and professionals	2.14	2.41	1.96	2.10	0.6
Managers and directors of small concerns, technical and managerial workers	2.29	2.86	1.94	1.93	2.1

The picture is quite irregular, but there is certainly no evidence that the upper status groups of "low" ethnic origin is more conservative than upper groups of high ethnic origin. Nor is there in our data any evidence that upper status people of low ethnic origin perceive more Communist subversion than other upper status groups nor are they less tolerant of expressions of deviant views. On the internationalism index the lower ethnics are on the average, somewhat more isolationist but the tendency is very weak. However, judging from our data, the ethnics with high social status hardly seem to provide an especially good recruiting ground for the rightwingers.

Some writers suggest that in the working class those of old American or Anglo-Saxon origin sometimes embrace extreme Conservative attitudes as a way of asserting the only high rank they have against "foreigners". (It is not clear why embracing conservatism saves them rank, except symbolically by enabling them to identify with the American past.)

Looking at our data we find first of all that the higher their ethnicity, the more economically conservative people are on the average, and also, as expected, that the higher their occupational status the more economically conservative people tend to be regardless of ethnic rank. In line with this, workers of high ethnic rank tend to be more conservative than workers of low ethnic rank but also less conservative than people who are middle class and higher within the same ethnicity category. This, of course, is not a status politics finding, but reflects cross-pressures: occupational rank pulls them in the liberal direction, but they are also members of families and religious groups that in American society are traditionally Republican and conservative. A status politics hypothesis, on the other hand, would have predicted that workers with high ethnicity should be at least as conservative as middle class groups of corresponding ethnicity, and possibly even more conservative, as a result of overconformity with the norms of the high ethnic group.

Turning to perception of communist threat we find a similar pattern: workers of high ethnicity see more threat than workers of lower ethnic background but less than middle and upper class people of high ethnicity. Among workers, ethnicity does not appear to be related to internationalism. The Tolerance score is somewhat lower among workers of high ethnic rank among others but this is probably also a crosspressure result, since in the data taken as a whole ethnicity is positively and occupation negatively correlated with Tolerance.

Analyzing the combination ethnicity and occupational rank we thus find no evidence supporting the status politics hypothesis.

Let us now turn to the combination Education-Occupation. From the point of view of status politics the interesting groups are those with high occupational status but little formal education and those with much formal education

but low occupational status. Unfortunately, the former group is too small for a convincing analysis: only seven persons with grade school have achieved responsible white collar jobs or higher statuses. These people are on the average more conservative on economic issues than the others with similar educational backgrounds. However, they are on the average less economically conservative than people with similar occupational statuses but more education. These findings do not lend any support to the status politics hypothesis, but probably reflect cross-pressures. These "self-made" people should according to that line of thought strongly emphasize "rugged-individualism" as a way of playing down their lack of education: believing that the qualities and occupational achievements of the individual alone count, not education or (by extension) welfare policies and state intervention.

On the other three dimensions the seven do not seem to take particularly conservative positions either.

The other deviant group, consisting of those with college education who work as or are married to artisans, skilled workers or foremen or as semi- or unskilled workers, is also very small, eleven persons. (Six persons with post-college training belong in this occupational category, they are excluded from the analysis.) According to the cross-pressure hypothesis this group ought to be more conservative than others in the same occupational category but less conservative than others who have gone to college. The group, in fact, is on the average more conservative than other workers, but it is on the average more conservative than others who have been to college. This might, then, be a status phenomenon: these people may have taken on conservative attitudes in order to conform with what they believe the norms to be in the higher social strata in which they feel that they "really belong". Unfortunately, by virtue of the nature of our data this explanation, however, remains basically untestable.

We would have to investigate whether there are any other factors (Protestant fundamentalism, strong Republican family tradition and so on) that might account for the conservatism of this group. To observe directly a factor like status anxiety might be difficult in a survey interview: at any rate, no direct data on status anxiety were gathered in this survey.

We now come to the problem whether social mobility makes people conservative. It has been alleged that upwardly mobile people tend to get conservative because they are anxious to conform with what they take to be the values of the social strata they have moved into, and that downwardly mobiles are conservative because they hand on to vestiges of their original class position. If this is true then we would expect that:

upwardly mobiles are at least as conservative as the non-mobile members of the stratum they have moved into;

downwardly mobiles are at least as conservative as the non-mobile members of the strata they have moved out of.

However, sometimes more than this seems to be implied by the status politics explanation of contemporary conservatism in the United States. Overconformity with middle and upper class norms is said to be frequent among the upwardly mobile. If this were true then we should expect that upwardly mobiles are more conservative than non-mobile members of the class they have moved into.

Empirical test of these hypotheses is complicated by the existence of cross-pressures. Many upwardly mobiles maintain contacts with their milieu of origin and are influenced by parents, siblings and other relatives and friends who have remained in the lower stratum. This may counteract tendencies to move in a conservative direction.

We have combined occupational strata in the following way: Managers of large and small concerns, professionals and responsible white collar workers into an

"upper" category, and "mass" white collar workers, artisans, foremen, skilled, semiskilled and unskilled workers into a "lower" group.

We shall present the data separately for Protestants and Catholics, since the two religious groups differ on some of the dimensions of conservatism and since Catholics are overrepresented among the upwardly mobile.

Let us first look at the data for the Protestants. Comparing the first and third rows of table 15 we notice that upwardly mobiles are about as conservative on economic issues as non-mobiles in the upper stratum. Comparing with the fourth row shows that mobiles are more conservative than the strata they came from. Upwardly mobiles are very much like the stratum they came from on perception of communist infiltration. On Tolerance and Internationalism they are more like their new than their old stratum.

Thus, the upwardly mobiles do not, as a group, seem to overconform with traditional upper stratum economic conservatism.

Except for perception of communist infiltration, the upwardly mobiles simply seem to take on the orientations prevalent in the stratum they have moved up into. On the dimensions of tolerance and internationalism this moves them in a liberal direction. Upwardly mobiles may take on their new attitudes in order to appear respectable, the status politics theory may be right in this. But upward mobility cannot, as far as our data go, be used to explain McCarthyism and other rightwing phenomena in contemporary American politics.

Let us now turn to the data about the Catholic group. As table 17 shows they show much the same pattern as those in table 16.

Table 16. Mean scores on the four attitude dimensions among mobile and non-mobile Protestants.

Parent's occupational class	Respondent's occupational class	economic	Com.	Toler-	Interna-
		conservatism	Threat	ance	tionalism
Upper	Upper	2.14	.96	3.45	3.10
Upper	Lower	2.25	1.61	3.17	2.56
Lower	Upper	2.10	1.29	3.28	3.25
Lower	Lower	1.87	1.26	2.67	2.60

Table 17. Mean scores on the four attitude dimensions among mobile and non-mobile Catholics.

Parents occupational class	Respondent's occupational class	Economic Conservatism	Perceived Communist Threat	Tolerance	Internationalism
high	high	1.61	1.43		2.78
low	high	1.67	1.29		3.16
low	low	1.42	1.54		

Upwardly mobile Catholics are, on economic issues, a little more conservative than the working class people, and about as conservative as the non-mobile upper group. All three groups are appreciably less conservative than the corresponding groups of Protestants, as a comparison with table 16 shows. Upwardly mobile Catholics are if anything lower on perceived communist threat than the other Catholics.

Taken as a group, then, the upwardly mobile Catholics in our sample is not particularly rightwing.

This finding is of course, rather devastating for the status politics argument. Upwardly mobile Catholics, many of whom also have rather low ethnic ranks, should according to that theory have a good many reasons for demonstrating their respectability by stressing conservative attitudes, and express aggressions toward the communist scapegoat. If this group were a good recruiting ground for conservatives it should surely have higher average scores than it does. Downward mobility. Only the Protestant group contains enough cases to enable us to say anything about the downwardly mobiles. Comparing rows two and one in table 16 we see that the "skidders" maintain the economic conservatism of their stratum of origin that they, as a group, see more internal communist threat than the three other groups and that they are less internationally liberal than the stratum they came from. On tolerance, however, they are more like the upper groups than the lower groups.

These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that downwardly mobiles hang on to vestiges of their prior class position in order to appear different from the other lower stratum people.

10. Party identification and conservative attitudes.

In this section we shall study the relations between party identification and scores on the four different dimensions of conservatism. As we shall see, the picture that emerges is quite complicated. Let us first look at Economic Conservatism.

We have already seen that the overall relationship between Education and Economic Conservatism is curvilinear. In trying to understand this finding we divided the sample with respect to party identification into Republicans, Democrats and Independents. We then found that the curvilinearity is due to the Democrats and Independents. Among Republicans there is a steady rise in the scores on Economic Conservatism the higher the educational level of the groups. On each educational level, the Republicans have on the average a higher score on Economic Conservatism. Partly as a result of the curvilinear relation between education and economic conservatism, we find that the difference in scores between Republicans and Democrats increase steadily as we study progressively higher educational groups. (See table 18, column one.)

Table 18. Differences in index scores (Republicans minus Democrats) on different Educational levels.

<u>Educational level</u>	Economic Con- servatism	Perception of Communist Threat	Tolerance	Internationalism
Grade school	.73	-.23	.23	.21
Some high school	.54	.03	.83	.26
Finished high school	1.11	.09	-.33	.10
Some college	1.31	.35	-.19	-.54
Finished college	1.45	.68	.29	-.49
Graduate school	1.98	.33	-.10	-.51

Democrats who have gone to college see on the average less internal communist threat than corresponding groups of Republicans. (Table 18, column two.) But in the three lower educational groups there is by and large no difference between Democrats and Republicans on this dimension. On tolerance there is no consistent difference between Republicans and Democrats. On internationalism, finally, Democrats who went to college have higher scores, but in the lower educational groups Republicans tend to be on the average slightly higher.

To sum up the information in table 18, we can conclude that on three dimensions, Economic Conservatism, Perception of an internal communist threat and Internationalism, Republicans tend to be more Conservative than Democrats and that this difference is much more pronounced in higher than in lower Educational groups. One dimension, tolerance does not show this pattern, however.

If Republicanism predisposes people to conservatism, and if Democratism predisposes people to reject conservative positions, then militant Republicans ought to be more conservative than other Republicans and militant Democrats ought to be less conservative than other Democrats. This hypothesis is tested in table 19. (As an indicator of political militancy we used the question "Do you ever get as worked up about politics and public affairs as about things in your personal life?".)

Table 19. Mean scores on the four attitudes dimensions among Democrats and Republicans, classified with respect to involvement in politics and public affairs.

	<u>Democrats</u>			
	Get worked up about politics	<u>often</u>	<u>sometimes</u>	<u>rarely</u> <u>never</u>
Economic Conservatism		.84	1.41	1.41 1.45
Communist Threat		.46	1.07	1.41 1.17
Tolerance		3.69	2.97	3.09 2.06
Internationalism		3.38	2.95	3.16 2.95

Get worked up about politics	<u>Republicans</u>			
	<u>often</u>	<u>sometimes</u>	<u>rarely</u>	<u>never</u>
Economic Conservatism	3.20	2.74	2.52	2.42
Communist Threat	2.00	1.22	1.06	1.30
Tolerance	3.55	2.83	3.19	2.88
Internationalism	2.55	2.75	2.95	2.98

Let us first look at the scores on Economic Conservatism among Republicans and Democrats. We see that Republicans who say that they often get as worked up about politics as about something in their personal lives are indeed more conservative than other Republicans and that the conservatism score gets lower as militancy decreases. Among the Democrats, the most militant group is the least conservative. The hypothesis is thus supported as far as Economic Conservatism is concerned. Looking at the second dimension of conservatism, perception of internal communist threat, we notice a similar picture. Among Republicans the score goes down with decreasing militancy, except for a reversal among those who never get as worked up about politics as about something in their personal lives. Among Democrats, the most militant group has the lowest score and the score tends to rise with decreasing militancy with a reversal among the least militant group. The other two dimensions, however, do not behave in this fashion. On Internationalism one could possibly see a weak tendency in the direction of the hypothesis, the most militant Republicans have a lower score than other Republicans and the most militant Democrats a higher one than the Democrats. However, the differences are small. On Tolerance, finally, the most militant groups in both parties get the highest scores.

Appendix: A note on extreme attitudes.

We attempted to construct an index of radical rightist attitudes by combining items from the indices of Economic Conservatism, Internationalism and Perception

of internal Communist threat. The four items selected were: The U.S. ought to quit the U.N., the Income Tax should be abolished. There are many Communists in Government and there are many Communists in the city in which the respondent lives. We had hoped to get large enough groups endorsing three and four of these statements to make an analysis possible. However, only three persons endorsed three items, 26 two items and 73 one of the items. A full-fledged member of the John Birch society ought to endorse all four items, judging from public statements made by leaders of that organization. Our findings thus show that consistent radical rightist opinions are rare in our population. It may be of some interest to show exactly how the respondents were distributed on the four items.

Table 20. Distribution of those who endorsed at least one item on the Radical rightist index.

		Quit UN	Abolish Income Tax	Many Communists in Government	Many Commu- nists in city of residents
endorsed three items (3)			x	x	x
endorsed two items:					
	5	x	x		
	5	x		x	
	6		x	x	
	1		x		x
	9			x	x
endorsed one item:	13	x			
	34		x		
	17			x	
	9				x

NOTES

1. Raymond Wolfinger et. al.. "The Clientele of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade," paper read at the 1963 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City is a survey study of participants. The San Francisco Bay Area School of Anti-Communism, held in the beginning of 1962. Most of the articles in The New American Right (ed. by Daniel Bell, Criterion Books 1955) are speculative without the benefit of empirical data. Nelson Polaby ("Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," Political Studies) has taken issue with many of the constructions of Bell et. al.
2. See Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse. (Collier Books, New York, 1961.)
3. Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. (Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1955).
4. McClosky has tried to study the relations between "human nature Conservatism" and personality characteristics. See Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review, vol. 52 (March 1958), 27-45. A discussion of this kind of Conservatism among liberals is found in Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism. Beacon edition, Boston, 1957 (Epilogue). The relations between "human nature liberalism" and other aspects of liberalism are investigated by Christian Bay and Patricia Richmond in an unpublished study, Man the Liberal Animal.
5. The distribution of scores in the sample is as follows:

<u>Ethnicity Scores</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Groups</u>
5	185	I
6	22	II
7	65	
8	18	
9	39	III
10	12	
11	15	
12	3	
13	23	IV
14	2	
15	17	
16	1	
17	13	
19	8	V
20	4	
21	6	
22	2	
23	1	
25	15	
26	1	
29	1	
30	7	
35	2	
Total	462	

6. Kendall's tau is conveniently described in Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, (McGraw Hill, New York, 1956), 211-229. See also a paper by Robert H. Semmels, "A Similarity between Goodman and Kruskal's tau and Kendall's tau. With a partial interpretation of the latter," Journal of the American Statistical Association, December 1962, 804-812.
7. William N. McPhee, Bo Anderson and Barry Millholland, "Attitude Consistency," in Public Opinion and Congressional Elections, (ed. by W.N. McPhee and W. Glazer, The Free Press of Glencoe Ill., 1962.)
8. A "model" of the success of an extreme right or leftwing organization in a community can be outlined as follows:
 1. Support for extremist policies depend on the distribution in the population of various aspects of extreme attitudes and the correlations between these aspects.
 2. Whether support can be translated into policies depends on how widespread the support is and on the stands taken by the relevant voluntary organizations.
 3. The relevant organizations can pursue similar or different policies on an issue. The less divided they are the more influence they have in toto.
 4. The effectiveness of a stand taken by an organization depends on size of membership and internal cohesion.

Voluntary organizations here refers not only to political organizations but also to any other organization that takes an interest in civic affairs. It would be worthwhile to investigate how the outcome of various community conflicts have been affected by the balancing of these factors. And interesting but rather incomplete discussion of some of these issues and some references to case materials is found in James S. Coleman, Community Conflict, (Glenco, Ill. The Free Press, 1957).
9. Bo Anderson and Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Rank Equilibration and Political Behavior", (MS, Stanford University, 1963, to be published).