

**THE PURPOSE OF PARTY MANIFESTOS:  
RELATING PARTY FUNCTION AND STRATEGY IN PARTY  
MANIFESTOS**

An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis

by

JACQUELINE MALINDA GROVES

Submitted to Honors and Undergraduate Research  
Texas A&M University  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR

Approved by  
Research Advisor:

Robert Harmel

May 2014

Major: Political Science

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	1
DEDICATION.....	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
CHAPTER	
I    INTRODUCTION.....	4
II   THEORY	
Spatial Model and Salience Theory of party competition.....	6
Substance versus packaging.....	8
Aggregation versus articulation.....	9
III  MEASUREMENT AND DATA	
Comparative Manifestos Project.....	11
Global Elections Database.....	13
Measurement.....	14
IV  ANALYTICAL METHODS.....	17
V   FINDINGS.....	19
VI  CONCLUSIONS.....	22
ENDNOTES.....	24
REFERENCES.....	26

## **ABSTRACT**

The Purpose of Party Manifestos:  
Relating Party Function and Strategy in Party Manifestos. (April 2014)

Jacqueline Malinda Groves  
Department of Political Science  
Texas A&M University

Research Advisor: Dr. Robert Harmel  
Department of Political Science

This paper is an effort to determine the purposes of party manifestos (aka platforms), and more specifically how a party's experience in governance determines the strategies they pursue, through the structure of their manifesto, to achieve their party goals. This is an important issue in the field of political science research because, while there have been mass amounts of research dedicated to understanding the contents of party manifestos, there has been very little research concerned with why parties produce manifestos. This paper intends to determine the amount of variation there is among party platforms to the extent to which the party is using the document to give an overview of their entire program for running the government, including all aspects of government policy, or to shore up their support base by focusing on a few key issues. By determining if there is a relationship between a party's experience in government and the strategy they pursue in writing their manifesto, this study hopes to determine why parties focus on the issues they do, and how party strategies, exemplified in manifesto structure, indicate the purpose that party manifestos may serve.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research to my parents. Without their continued support this opportunity would not have been possible.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank Dr. Robert Harmel for his tremendous support and guidance. His teaching has been paramount to the production of this theses and my improvement as a student and researcher.

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Though the field of political parties research has spent much effort investigating explanations for varying content, and changes in content of party manifestos, there has been very little study of cross-national and cross-party variance in why parties develop manifestos and how they are written and subsequently adopted. In other words, until recently, political science research in the field of party manifestos has focused “primarily on why parties choose the positions they do...and whether they fulfill their pledges once in office” (Harmel 23). Missing in this research are questions such as: why do parties create manifestos in the first place? And what purpose does the manifesto serve for the party?

In “The How’s and Why’s of Party Manifestos” (2011), Harmel divides literature concerning the purposes of manifestos into eight categories; the manifesto as direct appeal to voters, as a means of controlling elected officials, as a draft of a legal program, for the indirect mobilization of voters thru interest groups and through the media, for rewarding and arming the activists, for resolving internal disputes and presenting an image of unity, as a tool in building and running coalition governments, and lastly, as a document with multiple purposes. Harmel uses these purposes hypothesized by political party theorists such as Kavanagh (1981), Bara (2005), Reinhart and Victor (2009), and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), etc. to suggest that manifesto “purpose impacts process” and that both impact content (Harmel 2011). Harmel’s “The How’s and Why’s of Party Manifestos” is an introduction to theory building concerning the relation of party manifestos purpose to its process and its content. This study attempts to link party’s

government experiences to the purpose, and hence strategy, for which the party develops its manifesto contents. Specifically concerning the content of a party's manifesto, "variance on the number of pledges may reflect different uses to which parties put their platforms, differences in the systems within which they operate, or differences in party characteristics such as ideology" (Harmel 2011). Harmel (2011) suggests that "when it is the parliamentary organization that holds the majority of power, it might be expected that- to the degree the parliamentary organization can control such content- the manifesto will be more vague and general regarding any policy commitments, thus maximizing freedom of action for the parliamentary group" and therefore focusing on the electorate more than on the membership (Harmel 2011). Furthermore, Harmel states that in the case of a party not currently in government "the document would likely be influenced by the interests of the membership" and thus the focus would be more concerned with constraining the politics of the party in government and less concerned with pleasing and enticing the electorate (Harmel 2011). Therefore, keeping these statements in mind, we propose that a party's experience vis-à-vis government acts as a determinant of the party's function and thus impacts the strategies they pursue in writing their manifesto.

## CHAPTER II

### THEORY

#### **Spatial Model and Salience Theory of party competition**

In order to research how political parties determine the content of their manifesto, we must first look at what parties believe to be the purpose of their manifesto. According to the theory of party competition, political parties exist in contest with one another to achieve their goals. A competitive party is defined by Robertson (1976) as “one which (a) is not in permanent opposition or permanent office; and (b) accepts the legitimacy of its major opponent and of the constitutional system” (Robertson 1976). This definition of competitive parties subsumes that future election results are unknown to the party and that, if defeated, the party will resign from office and not attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the successor.

To understand why parties pursue the political strategies they do, one must first be familiar with Anthony Downs' *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957). Regarded as the classical conception of party competition, Downs' theory holds that all political parties have, as at least one of their goals, gaining electoral office, and that a party's ideologies develop out of this goal. These ideologies are expressed through issue positions in party manifestos, which are “the only statement of policy made with authority on behalf of the whole party” (Klingeman, Hoferbert, & Budge 1994). In a competitive party system, political parties must offer solutions to social problems, or issue positions, via their election manifestos. It is up to the electorate to decide which problems and solutions, i.e. issue positions, they would like to see implemented. According to Downs, the party program acts as a cheat sheet to the uninformed voter, allowing

the voter to weigh individual issues and then assess which party's issue positions align best with the voters own beliefs. Downs' theory of party competition posits that parties form their sets of positions to seek the maximum number of supporters. Indeed Downs views parties as vote maximizers who's manifestos are purposed to "shore up current votes and lure additional voters to the party" (Harmel 2011).

In an analysis of party competition, Klingeman, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) adopt Robertson's (1976) modifications to Downs's spatial model of party competition, called salience theory.

Downs's spatial model holds that once a party has gained electoral office, they have a mandate to carry through the policies that had attracted either the majority or plurality of votes. This model rests on the assumption that parties have policy flexibility that enables them to place themselves on any part of the left-right policy continuum. However, Robertson's salience theory acknowledges that parties are constricted by the enduring ideological stances upon which they were founded. These issues "are packaged by ideology, yielding a history of particular actions in government and enduring association with certain groups of supporters" (Klingeman, Hoferbert & Budge 1994). Thus, avoiding renouncing previous policy positions and alienating traditional support groups, political parties will instead emphasize or de-emphasize issues in their programs. In order to maximize votes, parties must seek the distribution of issues that gives the best return in votes over all sections of the population. The more evenly issues are distributed among the major population groups, the higher return in votes. Therefore, when a political party perceives an election to be competitive, then they will pursue a distribution of issues that will give them the highest return in votes.

## **Substance versus packaging**

Furthermore, party manifestos can be thought of as being written for two different audiences.

According to Harmel, Janda and Tan's *Substance vs. Packaging: An Empirical Analysis of Parties' Issue Profiles* (1995), party manifestos are written for both an internal audience of members, activists, leaders, and representatives, and an external audience of voters and media.

Harmel, Janda and Tan first distinguish between party issue changes of identity versus changes of image. Changes in party identity are felt by the party's internal audience, while changes in party image are felt by the party's external audience.

Additionally, an election manifesto consists of both 'content' and 'packaging'. The content of the platform is essentially the identity of the party, while the packaging of issues in the platform is the image of the party. The content of a manifesto speaks to the internal audience and the packaging of the manifesto speaks to the party's external audience. It follows that "a given party identity can be packaged in many different ways—all equally acceptable to the membership, but not all equally inviting to the electorate" (Harmel, Janda & Tan 1995). Therefore, manifesto writers attempt to pick the best packaging for the issue content. According to Robertson's salience theory, particular issue positions taken by a party, i.e. content, are unimportant to the electorate because "electors are not particularly concerned with the means adopted to solve the problems which oppress them but rather with the resolution of the problem along the lines they want" (Budge & Farlie 1977). In other words, voters are not concerned with how the social problem will be resolved, but instead that it will be resolved in a manner that they agree with. Therefore, while the electorate is unconcerned with the actual content of the platform, they are concerned with the packaging of the content, or, in other words, the amount within a platform

allocated to the voter. As stated previously, a party who perceives that an election is competitive will pursue a broad distribution of policies in order to entice undecided voters to the party.

Therefore, the party will generalize the policies in their political programs. While not changing the substance of their program, they do package the content of their program in a format that is the most appealing for the undecided voter.

### **Aggregation versus articulation**

The existing literature generally takes for granted that Political parties function to educate, articulate, aggregate, and recruit support for governmental leaders. Aggregation refers generally to “the process of gathering, combining, and accommodating different interests into policies pressed upon the government” and specifically within the context of political parties, aggregation refers to the idea that parties bring together groups of people from all different issues or interests (Almond & Powell 1966). In other words, political aggregation is the extent to which a party draws its supporters evenly from all major social groups. Articulation, on the other hand, refers to a political party’s ability to take the interests of their supporters and package them in a way to deliver them to government.

According to our theory, if the party is in government currently or has been in the past, it will pursue the aggregation strategy. The party will want to prove that it is committed to a broad range of issues in order to aggregate a large number of supporters. This subsumes that a party believes it has an opportunity to once again be in government. Therefore, the party perceives the election as competitive and will package the content of their program in a way that appeals to a broad range of voters. These more “institutionalized” parties have had more opportunity than

their younger counterparts to “formulate an agenda of specific policy objectives broad and deep enough to constitute a truly policy-oriented manifesto” (Harmel 2011: 16). Parties that are not or have not recently been in government will pursue the articulation strategy. They will want to articulate a few main issues in order to shore up and mobilize their parties’ support bases.

Therefore, our formal hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis: Parties that are in government currently or have been in the recent past will pursue the strategy of aggregation when creating their manifestos, while those new to government or not in government in the recent past will pursue the articulation strategy when creating their manifestos.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **MEASUREMENT AND DATA**

#### **Comparative Manifesto Project**

The primary research design of this thesis is the cross-sectional and cross-national analysis of political party manifestos. In order to measure the dependent variables of issue articulation and issue aggregation we have used the Comparative Manifestos Project data collected by the Manifestos Research Group. The objective of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is to measure policy positions of parties in any democratic election since World War II. Specifically, the CMP has focused on parties within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Union, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. The data are based on a quantitative content analysis of party manifestos for more than fifty countries covering all free democratic elections since 1945, wherein the Manifestos Research Group classified each sentence of each party program into one of fifty-six unique policy categories. The Manifestos Research Group has employed a two-step process for producing this data. First, the coders unitize the manifesto. This consists of cutting the manifesto into quasi-sentences, or in other words, coding units that contain exactly one issue statement. Second, the coders must assign the quasi-sentences to one of the fifty-six issue categories that are grouped in seven different policy areas. The CMP developed this coding category system with the intention that the codes can be comparable between parties, countries, elections, and across time.

The data employed in this study consist of the percentage of sentences in a manifesto dedicated to each of the fifty-six issues in an individual case. The parties and their platforms included in

the Comparative Manifestos Project data constitute the cases researched. For analytical purposes the case is the party; however, for data collection purposes, the case is the party platform. The assumption of this study is that one can infer the strategy that a party is pursuing in a given platform based the Comparative Manifestos Project data. The percentage of sentences related to each of the fifty-six policy categories that comprise the manifesto will illustrate if the party to whom the respective manifesto belongs is concentrating on a few issues (articulation) or on a broad range of issues (aggregation).

First, this study has used the Manifesto Project Dataset to determine the amount of variance that exists in the dependent variable. The CMP's data are downloadable through the website [www.manifesto-project.wzb.eu](http://www.manifesto-project.wzb.eu). IBM's SPSS Statistics 22 has been employed for statistical analysis of the full Manifesto Project Dataset. In the case of some variables, the Manifesto Research Group has separated variables into a positive and a negative variable. For example, the variable *Foreign Special Relationships* has been coded in the Manifesto Project Database as *Foreign Special Relationships: Positive* for favorable mentions of countries with which the manifesto country already has or seeks a special relation with, and *Foreign Special Relationships: Negative* for negative mentions of countries with which the manifesto country has special relations with. As this study is concerned with a party's aggregation and articulation of issues, positive and negative variables have been transformed into one "total variable" using SPSS statistics. The positive and negative variables of *Foreign Special Relations*, *Military*, *Internationalism*, *European Community/Union*, *Constitutionalism*, *Protectionism*, *Welfare state*, *Education*, *National Way of Life*, *Traditional Morality*, *Multiculturalism*, and *Labour Groups* were each transformed respectively into a new total-variable.

The total-variables were then combined with existing variables of the CMP dataset into seven composite issue categories: *Non-Domestic*<sup>1</sup>, *Limiting Government*<sup>2</sup>, *Governance*<sup>3</sup>, *Economy*<sup>4</sup>, *Welfare and Quality of Life*<sup>5</sup>, *Scope of Government*<sup>6</sup>, and *Group Interest*<sup>7</sup>. In order to condense the data into a manageable dataset, we have limited the scope of the study to established western European democracies and Anglo-American democracies excluding presidential systems. Therefore, the scope of the study has been limited to sixteen countries, all democracies as of the 1950's with no sustained period without democracy after that point. The cases include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.

### **Parliament and government composition database**

Secondly, in order to determine my independent variable, party experience in government, we have used cross-national election data from the parliament and government composition database (ParlGov). The database stretches from the 1940's to today and contains data on elections and governments for all EU and most OECD members. The goal of ParlGov is to successfully provide an infrastructure that includes information on government composition, election results and party positions. The database contains data on nearly 1400 parties, 680 elections with 5800 election results. Additionally, the database includes 2300 cabinet parties and 960 governments. We have hypothesized that parties that are in government or have been in government in the recent past will pursue the strategy of issue aggregation within their manifesto, whereas parties that have not been in government will pursue the strategy of issue articulation. In order to measure a party's involvement in government, this variable has been operationalized as whether

or not the party has been in government in the election prior to the writing of the platform or in the national election before that one. This means that in order to determine whether or not a party is aggregating or articulating issues in their manifesto, we have used ParlGov to determine whether the party in question held a cabinet position in one or two elections prior to the to the manifesto being studied (*ingovt*). We have operationalized whether or not a party has been in government in this way because although a party might not currently be in government they may still perceive themselves as competitive and therefore package their manifesto content in an aggregative manner. Additionally, ParlGov has been used to determine, for each party's manifesto, when the last time that party was in government (*lastyringovt*) and whether the party has never or ever been in government (*everingovt*). These three variables have been added to the SPSS CMP datasheet.

### **Measurement**

The ParlGov data have been added to SPSS using the variable *ingovt* (in government last two cycles). This variable has been created using the country cabinet data from ParlGov. If the party has held a cabinet position within the previous two election cycles or within the last five years, they receive a code of 1.00 (yes). If the party has not been in government within previous two election cycles and has not been in government for the last five years, it receive a score of .00 (no). For example, using the Social Democratic Party of Denmark's (SD) manifesto written for the November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1966 national parliamentary election, using the ParlGov's database, we were able to determine that the SD party held a cabinet position after both the 1962 and 1964 national elections. Therefore, the SD manifesto for 1966 received a code of 1.00 because the party held a cabinet position within at least one of the previous two elections, or within the last five years.

It is important to note that Caretaker cabinets in government for a year or less were not included in the calculation of *ingovt*.<sup>8</sup>

Next, in order to determine aggregation and articulation of issues, a new variable in the SPSS dataset was generated. The dichotomous variable *Aggart66* was generated to measure the manifesto's that were aggregative and those that were articulative. In *Aggart66*, the articulative manifestos have been operationalized as those that devoted two-thirds or more of the manifesto content to one of the seven composite issue category variables. *Aggart66* aggregative manifestos were operationalized as those spending less than or equal to twenty percent of their manifesto on any one of the seven composite issue category variables. A party spending less than twenty percent of their manifesto on any given category suggests that the party is attempting to address many different issues in order to appeal to a broad range of voters. The *Aggart66* variable was produced in SPSS statistics. For *Aggart66*, articulative platforms were coded with a .00, aggregative platforms were coded with a 1.00, and manifestos that were neither aggregative nor articulative were coded with a 2.00. For *Aggart66* an articulative manifesto would be one that 66.67% or more of the manifesto was devoted to just one of the seven composite issue categories. For *Aggart66* the aggregative manifesto is one where no more than 20.0 percent of the statements were devoted to any one of the seven composite issue categories.<sup>9</sup> This process resulted in 105 aggregative manifestos and 26 articulative manifestos. Parties that fit neither of these "ideal type" categories were dropped from the data set for the remainder of these analyses.

The *Aggart66* variable allows us to determine whether a specific party within a specific year has pursued a strategy of aggregation or articulation within their manifesto. Using this variable, an example of an aggregative manifesto would be the Danish Communist Party of Denmark's manifesto of February, 1977. This Danish Communist Party of Denmark's manifesto spent no more than 14.40% of the manifesto on any one of the seven composite issue category variables. 7.20% of the manifesto was dedicated to non-domestic issues, 1.80% on limiting government, 1.80% on governance, 14.40% on economy, 12.60% on welfare and quality of life, .00% on scope of government, and 5.40% on group interest issues. An example of an articulative manifesto would be the Progressive Party of Iceland's June, 1959 manifesto. This manifesto spent .00% on non-domestic, 3.70% on limiting government, 86.50% on governance, 4.90% on economy, 1.20% on welfare and quality of life, .00% on scope of government, and 2.40% on group interest issues.

Therefore, the data for this study comes from both the Comparative Manifestos Project database and Parliament and government composition database. Using information from these two databases, we have built a new database suited for the needs of this study. This data includes manifesto data that has been coded into fifty-six different issues from national parties of sixteen countries ranging from the 1940's to present. Additionally, these issue categories have been condensed into seven broad composite issue category variables. For each party, information such as whether they were in government within the previous two election cycles or the last five years has been added. Dichotomous variables for aggregative and articulative manifestos are also included.

## CHAPTER IV

### ANALYTICAL METHODS

In order to test the hypothesized relationship between party experience and party strategies pursued in writing a manifesto, crosstabulation was performed. Crosstabulation was used to test the hypothesized relationship because of its ability to provide a basic picture of the interrelation between two variables. Specifically, using SPSS statistics a crosstabs two by two table, *Aggart66* by *ingovt*, was run. Only “ideal type” aggregation (1.00) and articulation (.00) cases were used in *Aggart66*. The third category, manifestos that were aggregative neither aggregative (1.00) nor articulative (2.00), was dropped from the crosstabulation because our theory does not address what occurs if a party pursues neither aggregation nor articulation. Therefore, the crosstabs table was two by two; whether the party was in government (1.00) or out of government (.00) and whether the party pursued aggregation (1.00) or articulation (.00). This allowed us to determine whether there was a relationship between a party’s participation in government and the strategies pursued in manifesto writing.

According to our hypothesis, after running cross tabulation on the variables *Aggart66* and *ingovt*, we expected to find that parties coded “in government” would pursue aggregative manifestos and parties coded “not in government” would pursue articulative manifestos. In order for the hypothesized relationship to be statistically significant, a chi square test was run in the cross tabulation. The Chi Square Test determined whether the hypothesized relationship was statistically significant at the .05 level using the one tailed test. In other words, for a relationship between variables to be significant at the .05 level means that less than five times out of one

hundred this relationship would have occurred by chance. Additionally, the one tailed test was used because our hypothesis was concerned not only with finding a relationship between our variables, but also the direction of the relationship between the variables.

## CHAPTER V

### FINDINGS

The hypothesized relationship of government participation and manifesto strategy was not supported. Interestingly, after running the crosstabulation command in SPSS, the column percentages show that there is a relationship between the variable *ingovt* and *Aggart66*.<sup>10</sup> However, the data supports the finding that there is a significant relationship in the opposite direction from that hypothesized, as demonstrated below in Table 1. For this study, in order for our hypothesis to hold, we expected to see that a higher percentage of *Aggart66* manifestos coded .00 would not have been in government in the last two election cycles or five years and that a higher percentage of *Aggart66* manifestos coded 1.00 would have been in government in the last two election cycles or five years. The column percentages demonstrate that the opposite relationship has occurred within our dataset. The crosstabulation shows that out of parties that have been in government recently 71.9% of these manifestos have been aggregative whereas out of parties that have not been in government recently 86.5% of these manifestos have been aggregative. Therefore, parties that have not been in government recently have been more likely to produce aggregative manifestos than those in government recently. Additionally the crosstabulation shows that out of parties that have been in government recently 28.1% of these manifestos have been articulative whereas out of parties that have not been in government recently only 13.5% of these manifestos have been articulative. These data suggest that parties in government recently are more likely to produce articulative manifestos than are parties that have not been in government recently.

**Table 1. Articulative or Aggregative by In Government Last Two Cycles Crosstabulation**

**Articulative or Aggregative \* in government last two cycles? Crosstabulation**

			in government last two cycles?		Total
			no	yes	
Articulative or Aggregative	Articulative	Count	10	16	26
		% within in government last two cycles?	13.5%	28.1%	19.8%
	Aggregative	Count	64	41	105
		% within in government last two cycles?	86.5%	71.9%	80.2%
Total		Count	74	57	131
		% within in government last two cycles?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Simply from looking at the crosstabulation table, a substantial difference was evident between the dependent variable percentages. A Chi-Square Test was run on the crosstabulation to determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the variables *Aggart66* and *ingovt*. As seen in Table 2, the Chi-Square Test demonstrates that there is a statistically significant relationship between *Aggart66* and *ingovt*, however in the opposite direction of our hypothesized relationship. The one-sided test revealed a .032 chance of this relationship occurring randomly. Therefore, the relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2. Articulative or Aggregative by In Government Last Two Cycles Chi-Square Tests**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.289 <sup>a</sup>	1	.038		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	3.423	1	.064		
Likelihood Ratio	4.264	1	.039		
Fisher's Exact Test				.048	.032
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.256	1	.039		
N of Valid Cases	131				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.31.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

This study has not supported our hypothesis. However, the testing of this hypothesis has interestingly revealed a statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Our hypothesis relied on the thinking that parties use manifestos as a reflection on past experience. By this thinking, a party who has not been in government recently would use their platform to please their support base instead of broadening their platform to entice votes from a broad array of the population. Additionally by this thinking, a party who has been in government recently would use their manifesto to touch on a broad range of issues. However, our findings support the opposite, that a party not recently in government is more likely to pursue a strategy of issue aggregation than is a party recently in government. Additionally, a party recently in government is more likely to pursue a strategy of issue articulation than is a party not recently in government.

From these findings it can be proposed that parties may not treat manifestos as a reflection of past actions, but instead use manifestos as a projection of future actions. Harmel and Svasand (1997) hypothesize that minor parties may influence major party's identity by causing them to change their main social or ideological positions. Their study reasons that rather than reacting to actual electoral performance, a "party may have been (pro)acting to make its stable situation even better" (Harmel & Svasand 1997). Furthermore, Harmel and Svasand conclude their study by stating that parties can not only "see parties on two sides of them at once, but they can also presumably look to the future as well as the recent past" (Harmel & Svasand 1997). By

acting in response to a perceived future threat of a party either in or out of government, the party in government may be using their manifesto proactively rather than retroactively.

Following this logic, parties who have never been in government or have not recently been in government may be seeking to gain many supporters in order to win enough votes to enter government. By this reasoning, these parties may seek issue aggregation rather than issue articulation. Furthermore, parties in government currently or in the recent past may have the luxury of solely addressing their support base. Their issue stances may be widely known and therefore may not need to be addressed within the manifesto. Following this logic, parties in government may instead pursue the strategy of issue articulation in their manifesto. So while parties are still using their platforms strategically, they are doing so differently from what we had originally hypothesized. Therefore, further study should be given to this newly discovered relationship between party experience and party platform strategy.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The composite issue category Non Domestic was created by combining Foreign Special
- <sup>2</sup> Using the same process to create the issue category variable Limiting Government, I combined variables Freedom and Human Rights, *Democracy*, and Constitutionalism total.
- <sup>3</sup> The composite issue category variable Governance consists of the variables Federalism, Centralization, Governmental and Administrative Efficiency, Political Corruption and Political Authority.
- <sup>4</sup> Economy consists of the variables Free Market Economy, Incentives, Market Regulation, Economic Planning, Corporatism/ Mixed Economy, Protectionism total, Economic Goals, Keynesian Demand Management, Economic Growth: Positive, Technology and Infrastructure, Controlled Economy, Nationalization, Economic Orthodoxy, Marxism Analysis: Positive, and Anti-Growth Economy: Positive.
- <sup>5</sup> Welfare and Quality of Life consists of the variables Environmental Protection: Positive, Culture: Positive, Equality: Positive, Welfare State total, and Education total.
- <sup>6</sup> Scope of Government consists of the variables National Way of Life total, Traditional Morality total, Law and Order: Positive, Civic Mindedness: Positive, and Multiculturalism total.
- <sup>7</sup> The composite issue category Group Interest consists of the variables Labour Groups total, Agriculture and Farmers: Positive, Middle Class and Professional Groups, Underprivileged Minority Groups, and Non-economic Demographic Groups.
- <sup>8</sup> Two additional variables were produced using ParlGov. The variable *lastyringovt* (last year in government) has also been produced using data from ParlGov. This variable looks at the election date for which the manifesto was written and determines the last time the party had been in government prior to the election date. For example, looking once again at the Social Democratic Party of Denmark's manifesto written for the November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1966 national parliamentary election, using ParlGov's data we have determined that the last year the Social Democratic Party of Denmark was in government leading up to the 1966 national election was the previous year, 1965 and therefore SD was given a code of 1965. We created a variable to determine whether or not the political party in question had ever been in government. This variable was named *everingov* (ever in government) and was produced using ParlGov's data on country cabinet makeup. Political parties who had never been in government were coded .00 (never) and parties that had been in government at least some time in their lifespan were coded 1.00 (ever). If a political party's only time in government was as a member of a caretaker cabinet, then they have been coded as never having been in government.
- <sup>9</sup> To create *Aggart 66*, *Aggart66.0* was created to measure articulative manifestos that devoted sixty percent or more to a particular issue group. *Aggart66.0* was generated by the command

“transform, compute variable, *Aggart66.0*=0 if (NonDomestic $\geq$ 66.67) or (LimitingGovernment $\geq$ 66.67) or (Governance $\geq$ 66.67) or (Economy $\geq$ 66.67) or (WelfareAndQualityOfLife $\geq$ 66.67) or (ScopeOfGovernment $\geq$ 66.67) or (GroupInterest $\geq$ 66.67)”. In order to produce the aggregative variable, *Aggart66.1* was generated by the command “transform, compute variable, *Aggart66.1*=1 if (NonDomestic $\leq$ 20.00) & (LimitingGovernment $\leq$ 20.00) & (Governance $\leq$ 20.00) & (Economy $\leq$ 20.00) & (WelfareAndQualityOfLife $\leq$ 20.00) & (ScopeOfGovernment $\leq$ 20.00) & (GroupInterest $\leq$ 20.00)”. This generates the dichotomous variable *Aggart66*. The same commands used to produce *Aggart66.1* were used to produce the aggregative variable for *Aggart60*, however articulative manifestos were measured as those devoting 60.00% or more to one of the seven composite issue categories.

<sup>10</sup> We measured articulative manifestos at two different percentage levels to ensure the validity of this study. A slightly less restrictive variable, *Aggart60* was generated as well. The only difference between *Aggart60* and *Aggart66* was what was considered to be an articulative platform. For *Aggart60*, the articulative platforms have been operationalized as those that devoted sixty percent of the manifesto or more to one of the seven composite issue categories. For both *Aggart60* and *Aggart66* the aggregative manifesto is one where no more than 20.0 percent of the statements were devoted to any one of the seven composite issue categories. A crosstabulation table with a Chi Square test was run on *Aggart60* as well. This test was significant at the .05 level.

<sup>11</sup> Some may wonder whether the inclusion of two-party systems (Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand until 1996) would have significantly affected these results, given that all parties of two-party systems, whether recently in government or not, could be expected to be aggregative. Following the logic of Budge and Farlie 1977, political parties “will be less partisan when they think the election is competitive, and more partisan when they consider themselves bound to win or lose”. Thus, in a two party system, both parties will pursue aggregation in order to collect more supporters than the other party, whereas in a multiparty system, both aggregation and articulation strategies will exist because the system allows for parties with a narrow focus and a small group of specific supporters to gain parliamentary office. However, our analysis suggests that two-party systems reveal no special tendency on the part of the parties to be aggregative.

## REFERENCES

- Almond, Gabriel, and G. Bingham Powell. 1966. *Comparative politics: A developmental approach*, Anonymous Anonymous . Boston: Little Brown Books.
- Bara, Judith. 2005. "A Question of Trust: Implementing Party Manifestos." *Parliamentary Affairs* 58 (3).
- Brancati, Dawn. Global elections Database [computer file]. New York: Global Elections Database [distributor], Date Accessed 1/20/2014. Website: <http://www.globalelectionsdatabase.com>.
- Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie. 1977. *Voting and party competition: A theoretical critique and synthesis applied to surveys from ten democracies*, Anonymous Anonymous . London: John Wiley & Sons.
- Dowdle, Andrew, Scott Limbocker, Song Yang, Karen Sebold, and Patrick Stewart. 2013. *The invisible hands of political parties in presidential elections: Party activists and political aggregation from 2004 to 2012*, Anonymous Anonymous . Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. "The Development of Political Ideologies as Means of Getting Votes." In *An economic theory of democracy*, Anonymous : Harper and Row, 96. 1957. "The Statics and Dynamics of Party Ideologies." In *An economic theory of democracy*, Anonymous : Harper and Row, 114.
- Harmel, Robert. 2011. "The How's and Why's of Party Manifestos: Some Thoughts for a Cross National Research Agenda." ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, St. Gallen, Switzerland.
- Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svasand. 1997. "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway." *Party Politics* 3 (3):315
- Janda, Kenneth and Robin Gillies. "Social Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Political Parties: A Cross-National Analysis." 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco Hilton Hotel, San Francisco, California.
- Janda, Kenneth, Robert Harmel and Alexander Tan. 1995. "Substance vs. Packaging: An Empirical Analysis of Parties' Issue Profiles." 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Hilton and Towers, Chicago, Illinois.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, Anonymous Anonymous . New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Ian Budge, and Richard Hofferbert. 1994. "A Revised View of Party Competition." In *Parties, policies, and democracy*, Anonymous . Boulder: Westview Press.
- Political parties of Europe* 1983. , Anonymous Anonymous , ed. Vincent E. McHale. Vol. v. 1. Albania-Norway. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political parties; organization and power*, Anonymous [Modelli di partito: Organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici]. Trans. Marc Silver, eds. Suzanne Berger, Albert Hirschman and Charles Maier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reinhardt, Gina Y. and Jennifer N. Victor. 2009. "Competing for the Platform: The Politics of Interest Group Influence on Political Party Platforms." 105<sup>th</sup> Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada.
- Robertson, David. 1976. *A theory of party competition*, Anonymous Anonymous . London: John Wiley & Sons.
- Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika with Lacewell, Onawa Promise / Schultze, Henrike (2013): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2013b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- Ward, Stephen, and Wainer Lusoli. 2004. "Digital Rank-and-File: Party Activists' Perceptions and use of the Internet." *British Journal of Politics and International*