REPRESENTATION, STRUCTURE AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: AN EXAMINATION OF STUDENT OUTCOMES

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

As we near the 60th anniversary of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, questions still remain about its salience and our ability to provide equal educational opportunities to students of all races and ethnicities. Additionally, scholars and observers alike note the continual shift toward resegregation in American schools, but few have probed exactly why this occurs and the empirical implications of this shift. As such, this dissertation project explores the “new” political domain of school desegregation policy to understand why some school districts are resegregating while others maintain their racial balance, and the substantive implications of this divide for minority students.

The goal of this research is two-fold. First, I investigate the determinants of desegregation policy, arguing that a set of institutional (representation), structural, and management factors best predict a district’s level of racial balance as an indicator of the active pursuit of desegregation. Second, I examine student outcomes and performance under both educational settings—racially balanced and imbalanced—to determine where students fare better and how much the racial context matters to student outcomes. I frame this question theoretically in the organizational theory research on external control, in which I argue that the policy environment, in this case, the racial context as denoted by the level of racial balance, influences the extent to which structure, representation, and management affect outcomes. I compare outcomes under the two policy environments, racially balanced and imbalanced districts, to see their effect on the noted factors and where students fare better.

The general results show that the broad assumption and desegregation literature finding that racially balanced schools are better for minority students is not supported. Minority students can also gain the same if not better outcomes in racially imbalanced districts.
I also find that while the tested predictors play an important role, the policy environment significantly contributes to their role and outcomes. For policy makers and practitioners this means that one way to gain the equality that the *Brown* decision sought is to shift the focus on improving board and teacher representation or management strategies and practices. The dissertation challenges assumptions of political decisions and outcomes that fail to consider the external policy environment.
DEDICATION

To Granny, with love
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I hardly know where to begin because so many people have contributed to my academic career thus far. I am so appreciative of the advice, guidance, encouragement, patience, and love I have received from all of you. To my parents, Larry and Moronica Capers, thank you for being such awesome, supportive people. I say often that the greatest blessing God has given me is you all. Thank you for trusting my decision and supporting me every step of the way. Thanks for the daily check-ins, care packages and listening ears. Your faith and love is priceless. My siblings, Jawan, Kendrick, and Khalin, thank you for being my motivation. My daily goal is to be a positive role model to you all, and I hope that I have made you all proud and set the standard of excellence that you too are capable of achieving. My grandparents—Luther and Anneal Capers thank you for all of your love and prayers. A highlight of my four years here has been chatting with you all on Sundays, sharing my research and politics talk with you, and counting down every trip back home. Although you have transitioned, thank you granny for holding on until you were sure that I finished what you all “sent me to Texas to do!” Many thanks also to all other family members for your prayers, calls, and encouraging words.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Snapshot of the Current State of US Desegregation Policy

In the past 20 years, many US school districts have resegregated to levels beyond those of the Civil Rights Era. Some scholars contend that between 1970 and 1980, the touted “peak” of desegregation efforts, only about 33 percent of African American students attended extremely racially segregated schools, where they made up at least 90 percent of the student population. About 62 percent of African American students of this period attend schools in which they made up at least half of the student population (Clotfelter 2004, 56). Today, it is estimated that 75 percent of African American students and 80 percent of Latino students attend racially segregated schools in which they make up over 50 percent of the student population (Orfield, Kucsera, and Siegel-Hawley 2012). Forty three percent of Latino students and 38 percent of African American students attend schools in which white students make up less than 10 percent of the student population, and another 15 percent of Black and Latino students attend schools with no white student representation (Orfield, Kucsera and Siegel-Hawley 2012).

When these percentages are dissected to explain the actual picture of racial balance, that is, the extent to which desegregated schools are possible given the overall racial makeup of a school district, national survey findings indicate that only about 15 percent of US school districts are racially imbalanced between Black and white student populations, and 16.25 percent between Latino and white student populations with the potential for correction without cross-district remedial measures. These estimates suggest that even if large percentages of minority students attend imbalanced or racially isolated schools, many school districts have resegregated to the point of little return without measures to
attract a more diverse population to the district. Altering the racial compositions of the individual schools within the district is a futile effort for many school districts even considering it; however, many more have the potential to reverse the trend and as the US population continues to grow more diverse, greater opportunities for racially balanced districts are sure to follow.

The observed shift toward more resegregated, racially imbalanced schools has in many parts been political and largely fueled by shifts in the federal government’s opinion on the means and importance of racially balanced schools. In 2007, the Supreme Court essentially ended school desegregation efforts in their *Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education* and *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle* decisions. In both cases, challenges were presented to district policies using race for school assignments. The Court ruled that neither district properly adhered to the “narrowly tailored” guidelines of using race for school assignments, and therefore, must abandon the practice as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The decisions, coupled with the race specific mandates of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, have made it very difficult for school districts to pursue or maintain racially balanced systems while addressing the seemingly more pressing school accountability demands of student performance on high stakes tests, teacher quality, and more rigorous academic standards. Issues of equity and the benefits of an equitable, diverse and balanced learning environment seem to be divorced from the accountability equation.

Yet, some school districts and education leaders have managed to operate both systems. That is, they are able to maintain racially balanced school districts and also meet the accountability demands. On the other hand, many school districts have not, and have instead abandoned the effort of racially balanced school districts “to close the achievement
gap...so that no child is left behind,” (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, PL 107-110 2001).

Since we have moved away from this era of desegregation and into an era of resegregation, it is important to ask two related questions: can students really learn and reach equal achievement levels in racially separate environments; how much does this really matter to the goals of public education today? That is, can we get “equal” outcomes and outputs from these “separate” and “different” environments? Second, why do some districts maintain or continue to pursue racial balance in their districts, given the competing demands of accountability and performance? This dissertation focuses on addressing these questions that should be central to the current education discourse, but are null from many discussions of the state of public education in the US. It investigates the predictors of pursuing racially balanced schools and then examines the extent to which these factors are shaped by the level of racial balance in school districts. I focus on three factors—
institutions, structures, and management—that are known to influence the nature of public education (Meier and Stewart 1991; Weiher 2000; Dee 2004; Polinard et al. 1994; Meier et al. 2005; Brewer 1993; Grissom and Loeb 2011).

The project does not make an immediate determination, contend, or seek to “prove” that racially balanced school districts are better than racially imbalanced school districts, or vice versa. However, it does introduce a test of the “separate but equal” doctrine that seems to have inadvertently become the basis of the current accountability model of public education, in which schools with separate and unequal resources, facilities, support and separated students are expected to produce the same outputs and outcomes. It investigates the extent to which separate but equal education is possible in a comparison of student outcome indicators in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts when previous predictors of student outcomes are considered. Analyses presented in the empirical body
of the dissertation provide policy makers and education leaders with a basis for understanding the differences in racially balanced and imbalanced districts and the implications of those environments for school board members, teachers, and most importantly students. It is also my hope that this work will inform future studies and studies in related policy fields on the important role of policy environments in shaping policy systems, decisions, and outcomes.

**Contributions to Theory**

It is without question that this dissertation seeks to add to the substantive knowledge and debate surrounding the racial composition of schools and the recent shift in accountability focused policies that detract from previous gains in education equity. However, examining the effect of racial balance in school districts allows for interesting theoretical tests and developments. The empirical research of the project hinges on the arguments and propositions of organizational sociologists and theorists. The project merges organizational theory to representative bureaucracy and political institutional structures. It focuses primarily on questions of external control and influence, decision making, and policy implementation, and seeks to demonstrate how these theories and concepts help to more accurately explain policy outcomes often linked to the representation and structure. Here, scholars are challenged to take a more careful consideration of policy environments and their role in shaping the nature of representation and structure. The project also offers a more stringent test of the relationship between organizational theory and public management.

However, contributions are not limited to public administration, policy or political science. The dissertation research also bridges the links between public administration scholarship and the well developed research on school desegregation and the racial
composition of schools. We know a great deal about the implications of racially balanced education for students, particularly African American students. Desegregation scholars and supporters continuously note the short and long term benefits to a racially balanced education system—from improved minority student performance on the indicators of standardized tests, graduation rates, and college attendance rates (Guryan 2004; Wells and Crain 1994; Wells et al. 2004) to long term social and economic implications such as diverse social networks and homeownership in racially integrated communities (Dawkins 1994; Trent 1997). Much of this research, however, lacks an informed discussion about the politics and the political and bureaucratic decision making process that also contribute to varied findings of desegregation policy research. The current project fills this void. It integrates various theories of public administration and political science to provide another view of the desegregation policy story and its current state. This integration also allows scholars of both disciplines to examine the value of policy environments in determining outputs and outcomes. The following chapters discuss how the case of school desegregation is used to test various theories, merge subliteratures, and develop more general theories, while uncovering substantively important information about student outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced schools.

Outline of Dissertation

Chapter II provides a historical overview of school desegregation to frame the current state of desegregation policy and the rapid retreat toward re-segregated schools. The chapter includes a review of the substantive research on the consequences and implications of desegregated education for minority students. It addresses the legal and political process to eliminating separate schools, and the more recent use of the same process to undermine the provisions aimed at ensuring racially balanced schools. A major
The goal of this chapter is to highlight the unanswered questions of desegregation research, including, "Are minority students in loosely desegregated schools any better off than the students in segregated schools; have we really achieved the vision of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision?"

Chapter III presents the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical chapters and link the supporting theories on which the dissertation project is based. I construct a three-part, integrative framework of public policy at the local level to explain two phases of current desegregation policy. The first phase is an exploration of the bureaucratic actions and factors related to desegregation policy decisions or outcomes, while the second phase examines the relationship between the policy environment and bureaucratic actions to predict education policy outcomes; it probes the consequences of balanced and imbalanced education for minority students. The second phase of research is expanded across the three empirical chapters of the dissertation. Framework components are not tested in a single, causal model, but instead are presented to illustrate the factors that contribute to desegregation policy decisions and the relationship between these factors and the policy environment in predicting district outcomes. The chapter also gives an overview of the literatures that will be discussed in more detail in the later chapters.

Chapter IV begins the empirical exploration in demonstrating how policy environments relate to the structure of political institutions. It explores the relationship between the racial balance of school districts and the electoral structures used to elect school board members to understand the nature of minority representation and student outcomes in districts of varying policy environments. The chapter builds from previous research on the effect of electoral structures on minority representation and policy outcomes and theories.
of institutional environment to deduce hypotheses about how the policy environment could alter the previously observed relationships and outcomes.

Chapter V builds on the findings of the fourth chapter to explore the way that policy environments influence bureaucratic representation. Chapter IV corroborates previous findings on the positive relationship between school board representation and teacher and administrator representation (Stewart, England, and Meier 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991), so in this chapter, I explore the extent to which teacher representation is able to produce substantive outcomes for students, given the policy environment. Using organizational theories of external control, the chapter explains how and why the policy environment may facilitate or impede representation’s ability to lead to substantive benefits for students and translate into different outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts.

Chapter VI, the final empirical chapter, shifts from a focus on the policy environment and representation linkages to consider its effect on public managers. Environmental constraint is not an unfamiliar topic to the public management literature. In fact, much public management and organizational theory research has focused on how public managers handle the environment, either buffering its influence or manipulating it to the organization’s benefit. Recognizing public managers’ unique ability to “manage the environment,” this chapter seeks to explain the management factors most likely to alter outcomes given the level of racial balance in a district. The central purpose of this chapter is to offer an alternative view of policy environments, how they are addressed, and the policy consequences that follow. The chapter also offers a more stringent test of environmental management techniques.

Chapter VII concludes the dissertation project with a summary of the substantive findings and theoretical implications. The chapter provides an overview of insights from
the chapters' empirical analyses that state and local policymakers, district level administrators, and education leaders should find relevant. It also revisits the theoretical framework to emphasize its link to the empirical findings and discuss the more general theory of policy environments' role in shaping public institutions and their outcomes.
CHAPTER II

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES

This chapter is aimed at providing an overview of the historical context of the current project’s research questions, while setting the stage for future research in the area of desegregation policy. Desegregation policy—the process, outcomes, and implications of school desegregation and desegregation efforts—is perhaps one of the most researched or discussed topics of education scholarship, and yet many questions remain about its success and how much it has really contributed to the academic, social, and economic success of minority students. However, as this chapter will make evident, much is written to evaluate the process and speak on desegregation’s contribution to the noted areas, but fewer scholars probe the relationship between the politics of desegregation policy and organizational and bureaucratic decisions, and the outcomes that flow out of this interaction. The chapter is an attempt to highlight such gaps. It begins with a brief journey through the cases leading up to the Brown v. Board of Education decision, the response and events that followed the decision, its gaps and the Supreme Court’s attempt to fill them, and the chapter ends with a discussion of second generation of education discrimination—grouping and tracking practices.

The Road to Brown v. Board of Education

The history of the Brown v. Board of Education decision began long before the case arguments were ever crafted. It began before the case sat before any United States court, and it began before the plaintiffs were carefully selected from multiple southern and border states. The decision is truly built on a series of court victories related to access in higher education and equal pay for teachers dating back to the early 1930s that were carefully pursued and organized to set a precedent for the most landmark court decision in
education, and what some contend the most important court decision in the Supreme Court’s history (Martin 1998, vii). These cases set the political and legal groundwork for the Brown case, and inevitably shaped the decision.

In the mid 1920s, the NAACP developed an original plan to kill segregation indirectly through a series of lawsuits based in education. Although Blacks were discriminated against and segregated on every front, education was used as the mode of attack because it was viewed as “symbolic of all the more drastic discriminations,” and barring Blacks from equal education meant barring them from the subsequent rights and privileges that a quality education affords to citizens (Kluger 1975; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). The lawyers wanted to make segregated education so expensive that it would nearly crush the districts attempting to maintain the system and force them to voluntarily dismantle it (Ashenfelter, Collins and Yoon 2006). The NAACP’s legal defense team began their war on segregation in challenges to segregated graduate and professional schools.

Graduate and professional education provided a good starting ground because the inequalities of education and the effect of segregation were very obvious. There were only two professional schools for Blacks at the time—Howard University’s College of Medicine and Meharry Medical School—and only one “provisionally” accredited law school, Howard University School of Law. No southern Black school provided graduate education at the doctoral level and only a handful of private Black institutions offered some type of

1 Historical evidence indicates that other “black” medical programs existed in the late 19th and early 20th century; they consisted of Howard University Medical College; Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tennessee; Flint Medical College, New Orleans; Leonard Medical School, Raleigh, North Carolina; Louisville National Medical College; Knoxville (Tennessee) Medical College; and the University of West Tennessee Medical Department, Memphis (Lloyd 2006). Only two remained, Howard University’s program and Meharry Medical College, after the 1910 Flexner Report that evaluated all medical programs and established new and higher standards of medical education and training (Lloyd 2006; Lowell 2011). Four black medical schools, Medical Department of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania; Hannibal Medical College, Memphis, Tennessee; State University Medical Department of Louisville, Kentucky; and the Medico-Chirurgical and Theological College of Christ’s Institution, Baltimore, all closed before the Flexner Report (Lloyd 2006).
graduate degree—Howard University, Atlanta University, Fisk University, Hampton Institute, and Xavier University of Louisiana (Patterson 2001, 15; Lovett 2011, 116-117, 374). Not a single higher education institution for Blacks had an engineering program (Lovett 200, xiv). On the other hand, Whites had access to at least 29 schools to earn a professional, law, or graduate degree, and funding for graduate education was restricted to Whites in southern states (Patterson 2001, 15; Lovett 2011, 117).

Southern states and many Border States denied Blacks access to public colleges and universities, and instead provided those seeking graduate or professional degrees access to separate schools or funding to attend schools in other states that permitted Blacks to attend their colleges and universities. The NAACP challenged this process. In Murray v. Pearson (1936), the team challenged the University of Maryland’s practice of denying Blacks acceptance into their law program, despite the lack of Maryland law and university rules requiring segregation. The Baltimore City court ruled that Murray be admitted to the University of Maryland’s law school (Kluger 1975, 189-193). Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, a case against the state’s university for refusing Lloyd Lionel Gaines’s application for admission into their law school, was the first case the team tried in the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that offering a privilege to white students and denying it to Black students based on their race was a violation of the “equal protection of laws” that Blacks were entitled to under the constitution (Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 1938; Patterson 2001, 16; Kluger 1975, 211-212). They ordered the University of Missouri law school and the

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2 NAACP lawsuits such as Murray v. Pearson led many states to rapidly improve black access to graduate programs in the mid to late 1930s and 1940s. Some states offer “out of town” graduate fellowships for black applicants. Others created graduate studies at public HBCUs. For example, North Carolina A&T University worked with the University of North Carolina and Duke University to start graduate programs in biology, chemistry, education among others in 1939; Virginia State received aid to offer graduate courses in English, music, and social studies. By 1940, 12 HBCUs offered graduate education to black students (Lovett 2011, 117-118).
state to provide him access to the university for a legal education. This case was significant because it established a precedent for other cases challenging the process in several other states, and the team built on this precedent. They challenged the practice in Oklahoma (Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents\(^3\); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents\(^4\)), and Texas in (Sweatt v. Painter\(^5\)). In each case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Black plaintiffs and required the public institutions to grant Blacks access to their law and graduate programs or provide them with immediate equal access to a Black institution. The Sweatt and McLaurin decisions were particularly significant because they established that the education Black students would receive in segregated Black professional and graduate schools was in no way equal to the education provided at white schools, and therefore a violation of their right to equality under constitutional law. The cases moved the argument, as well as the Court’s decisions away from the blocking of access to the inequality of separate but equal. Justices began to acknowledge in their decisions that “separate but equal” was not a reality, at least at the professional and graduate school level. This was a direct challenge to states’ attempt to establish “fly by night” segregated institutions for Blacks to satisfy the equal protection clause. For the NAACP Legal Defense lawyers, the

\(^3\) Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents overturned the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision that denied qualified black students admissions to all-white state law schools. The Court ruled that the state must provide Sipuel with a legal education that conformed to the “equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” and as quickly as for any other qualified applicant (Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 1948). The state established an overnight “separate and equal” law school for Sipuel in the state capitol (Kluger 1975, 257-259.)

\(^4\) McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents required the University of Oklahoma to admit George McLaurin to their graduate program and provide him with equal access and treatment as other students as required under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doing otherwise restricted his graduate instruction and ability to study and learn his profession (McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 1950; Kluger 1975, 282).

\(^5\) Sweatt v. Painter, decided in conjunction with McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, the Court ruled that the University of Texas Law School and the state’s law forbidding admission of Negros to all-white public institutions was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and required that Sweatt be admitted to the University of Texas Law School (Sweatt v. Painter 1950).
rulings signified that the Court may not have been ready for a full reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson, but some of the justices were clearly rethinking the Plessy decision and also saw the flaws in the "separate but equal" ideology. Historical accounts of the Supreme Court justices during this period suggest that several disagreed with previous ruling and segregation completely, most notably Justices Black and Douglass. Others, such as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson also personally disagreed with racial segregation, but found the legality of Plessy permissible based on precedent and legislative history (Klarman 2004, 291-343; Kluger 1975, 218, 269, 617).

The second strategy to challenging "separate but equal" was to attack unequal teacher pay for Blacks and women. Between 1939 and 1947, they won 27 cases related to the equalizing teachers’ pay. The first success came in the 1939 case, Mills v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education, in which the District Court ruled that Anne Arundel school district’s racial pay system “violated the supreme law of the land,” and ordered them to eliminate the discriminatory system (Mills v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education 1939; Kirk 2009; Kluger 2004, 214). African American teachers began to see a steady increase in their salaries with the help of court action and few non-court related factors such as tighter labor markets in the 1940s (Margo 1990; Kirk 2009). Salaries increased from 50 percent of white teachers' salaries in 1930, to 65 percent in 1945, to 85 percent in 1950 (Kirk 2009).

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6 The NAACP supported Harry Moore’s lawsuit on behalf of John Gilbert to equalize black and white teacher salaries in Florida in 1937, making it their first attempt to challenge salary disparities; however, they lost the case in state court.

7 Other notable cases include Morris v. Williams (1943) and Alston v. Norfolk Board of Education (1940) in which the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits reversed a district court’s decision and ruled that unequal pay for the same services and same qualifications based on race violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment (Alston v. School Board of Norfolk 1940; Margo 1990; Morris v. Williams 1943).
Interesting enough, many of significant victories were won in non-southern, border states. Many southern colleges and universities actually began to move toward separate and equal schools as the NAACP originally predicted, but this decision toward equality was too little and too late. The war against segregation was official, and after a decade and a half of court victories, the NAACP’s legal defense team was ready to launch its largest attack, though Marshall and others were hesitant about the state of the Supreme Court to rule in their favor against the constitutionality of segregation (Kluger 2004, 290-291).

Additionally, it was becoming significantly expensive for the team to argue case after case in individual states. Many of the victories had little effect on the state of Black public education outside of graduate and professional schools and to an extent public education as a whole because state courts were extremely slow in adopting the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions as precedent. Some institutions craftily held to their “separate but equal” doctrine creating separate accommodations for Black students admitted to their law and graduate programs (see Kluger 1975, 258; Patterson 2001, 17). Many states outright disregarded the law and maintained their segregated systems, despite the mandated changes in neighboring states (Patterson 2001, p 19).

In 1950, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense team moved to challenge the constitutionality of segregated schools at every level. They declared that segregation was a direct violation of the constitution and presented inherent inequalities between Blacks and Whites. They introduced their strategy at a NAACP conference that

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8 One exception is the Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College et al. (1950) in which the US District Court ruled that LSU must admit Wilson and future qualified black applicant into their law school, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They maintained that the law school of Southern University, a segregated university for black students, did not afford students the same or equal educational advantages as would be experienced at the Department of Law of LSU (Wilson v. Board of Supervisors 1950). Federal court decisions also led to desegregated law schools at the University of Virginia and the University of North Carolina (Kluger 2004, 288).
summer to be adopted as official NAACP policy; “all future education cases would be ‘aimed at obtaining education on a non-segregated basis and no relief other than that will be acceptable,’” (Kluger 2004, 293). Beginning with *Briggs v. Elliot* case, Marshall and the Defense Fund began to directly challenge segregation, arguing that the differences between Black and white schools were a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also began to use social science research to support their argument. In the *Briggs* case, Marshall and the Defense Fund sought the help of Kenneth Clark, a social psychologist, to demonstrate the damaging effects of segregated education on Black students’ psyche. Clark presented the results of his now famous “doll test,” that showed Black children’s favor and preference for white dolls and hostility and negative characterizations of Black dolls (Kluger 1975, 318). The case moved up to the federal district court level, before being included in the broader *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* case along with four other lawsuits concerning Prince Edward County, Virginia; Wilmington, Delaware; Topeka, Kansas; and the District of Columbia. After nearly five years of strategy development, legal debates and arguments, social science research presentations, and extended Supreme Court contemplation and delay, the NAACP successfully convinced the Supreme Court that “…in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place,” (*Brown v. Board of Education* 1954).

**Now That We Have It, What Do We Do With It? The Response to the Brown Decision**

The 1954 *Brown* decision was an unquestionable victory for minority rights. Or was it? The Supreme Court ruled that separate school facilities for Black and white students was unconstitutional, and therefore, illegal. What the ruling did not do was outline how southern schools running dual systems were to come into compliance with the statute. This was a central question of the reargument deliberations in late 1953 as well as after the
public reading of the decision (Kluger 2004, 619; 732-747). In the year following the original decision, the Supreme Court ruled on Brown II, an implementation decree that did little to help move school desegregation forward. The justices agreed that requiring immediate remedy would be too much for the fragile southern states and was potentially out of their jurisdiction; they instead decided to simply encourage precipitous change (Clotfelter 2004; Kluger 2004, 745-747). Implementation authority was placed in local, southern officials’ hands and apprehensive district court judges were responsible for implementation oversight. School districts were to desegregate with “all deliberate speed” at the “earliest date possible” in “good faith.” Such phrases failed to send a strong, definitive message to southern schools about the Court’s decision to end segregated education in the south. Consequently, southern school districts read this message as a “break” for them in desegregation. It was an “attempt to correct an obnoxious decision,” according to Georgia’s governor at the time, Ernest Vandiver.

In US Border States and regions in which the Black population was relatively small, desegregation happened quietly and peacefully overall, with a few exceptions (Patterson 2001, 72; Clotfelter 2004). For example, in Milford, Delaware after rumored incidents between the few Black students and Whites in the local high school, parents petitioned, boycotted, and threatened violence on the school board against their desegregation efforts,

9Legal scholars debate the intention and meaning of “all deliberate speed” in the Brown II decision. It is contended that the justices realized the limits to judicial power and chose to acknowledge their weakness with this wording (Clotfelter 2004; Patterson 2001). It is noted of Chief Justice Warren commenting that “because we realized that under our federal system there were so many blocks preventing an immediate solution of the thing in reality that the best we could look for would be a progression of action—and to keep it going, in a proper manner, we adopted that phrase,” (Kluger 2004, 747). Scholars also note that the Courts used the phrase as a compromise to those who opposed a time limit to eliminating segregated schools (Patterson 2001). Defenders of the phrase suggest that the Courts used it with full intention of moving school desegregation along, and not to satisfy segregationists. It aimed to give districts time to work out the logistical issues such as redistricting, bus routes, and teacher and student reassignment (Patterson 2001).
and eventually forced the district to end desegregation in its schools (Patterson 2001, 73-75). Several of the Border States and larger cities in these states took prompt steps to desegregate, including those with large Black populations such as Washington, D.C. In fact, by 1956, nearly all of D.C.’s segregated schools were eliminated, though this was short lived (Clotfelter 2004). By the 1955-1956 school term, nearly 70 percent of the Border State school districts had some level of desegregation in their schools and by 1964 this figure rose to 90 percent (McMillen 1994, 7-8; Peltason 1971, 30-31; Patterson 2001, 75, 78).

Interestingly, the initial response to the 1954 Brown ruling in some southern states was met peacefully also. The governors of Alabama and Arkansas at the time both spoke of their states complying with the law, indicating that even if they did not endorse desegregation, they were ready to accept the forthcoming changes in public education. Nevertheless, these responses were short lived and seemed to stumble to local level pressure.

In general, the response to the decree of “all deliberate speed” in desegregating public schools was deliberately slow. Ten years after the initial decision, only about 1.2 percent of African American students in the southern states attended a desegregated school and most schools held Black student enrollment to less than 20 students. The Supreme Court’s decision to place implementation at the local level and oversight at the state and district judicial level seemed like the perfect formula to sidestep the decision. Southern school districts and states responded to Brown II in three main ways. They were defiant and refused to open their doors to Black students. Southern states almost immediately implemented state laws and constitutional amendments that forbade desegregation. Under the motto, “if we can legislate, we can segregate,” states such as Mississippi and Louisiana made it illegal for students to attend racially integrated schools.
Georgia made it illegal to use public funding on desegregated schools (Patterson 2001; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). In Virginia, state leaders authorized closing down any public school ordered to desegregate, and they permitted state-supported tuition grants for white students to attend private schools. Several counties, including Norfolk, Charlottesville, and Warren counties, closed their schools and completely denied Black students an education in public schools in the county. Prince Edward County, Virginia, one of the original plaintiff districts in the 1954 Brown decision, went as far as closing down their public schools from 1959-1964, forcing their students to attend school in neighboring districts.

Others instituted freedom of choice plans that offered Blacks looking to attend all white schools very little choice or opportunity to enroll. Ambitious Black families looking to enroll their students in white schools were turned away due to sudden “overcrowding” in schools or errors in their completed choice forms. This plan resulted mainly in token desegregation in which a handful of Black students were admitted to white schools, while the majority of Black students remained in segregated schools. Pupil placement laws were also implemented as “desegregation” plans that required school districts to assign students to schools based on their preparation, aptitude, morals, conduct, health and “personal standards.” Under these plans, school districts found very few Black students that qualified to attend Whites schools (Patterson 2001). The remaining districts aided segregationists in opening independent private schools to avoid desegregated education.

The Black Community’s response to the decision was not as quick and rosy as one would expect. Support for desegregation was varied and inconsistent, especially in highly segregated areas and areas in which resistance was the strongest. Many parents feared the ramifications of sending their children to white schools. They faced physical and economic
intimidation at the hands of southern Whites, and social intimidation at the hands of southern Blacks. Additionally, families willing to desegregate despite the challenges and barriers had very little local support. Supportive organizations and leaders were bound to lengthy, slow, and costly lawsuits to assist the “desegregating” families. Most importantly, they rarely helped to solve the enforcement problem. Lawsuit victories to enforce desegregation did little to move school districts to actual compliance.

The road to implementing desegregation was not littered with local segregationists’ tactics and resistance alone. The other branches of the federal government were not actively assisting the process either. The Supreme Court seemed to be alone or ahead of its time in addressing minority civil rights. Under President Eisenhower, the executive branch was nearly silent and inactive on the issue, outside of sending federal troops to assist in desegregating Little Rock High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The president refused to directly oppose or endorse court-ordered desegregation. He was often quoted in saying, “the Supreme Court has spoken, and I am sworn to uphold their constitutional process in this country; and I will obey,” and typically gave similar responses when questioned on his stance on school desegregation (Miller 2012, 346; Nichols 2007, 67). The neutral statement sent a message to southern segregationists that desegregation and civil rights was not a priority to him and it left their lawless tactics to undermine desegregation unchallenged. To the Blacks looking for redress Eisenhower’s neutrality said, “I will do what the law requires me do to,” which was to ensure their equal rights to desegregated schools. Regardless of the neutral and confusing rhetoric, President Eisenhower’s actions made it clear that desegregating southern public schools was not on his agenda, ever.

For many Blacks, his inactivity toward desegregating public schools was frustrating. After all, this was a president who considered himself a “racially tolerant” man,
who previously moved on their behalf to desegregate federal facilities like veterans’ hospitals, and even supported the desegregation of Washington D.C.’s public schools. He signed two civil rights bills, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, that were mainly symbolic and had little effect, but were the first to get through Congress since the Reconstruction era (Patterson 2001; Nichols 2007). Despite these moves toward racial equality on other fronts, President Eisenhower was cautious and guarded about court ordered school desegregation. He stood on the personal belief that real change in race relations had to start at the local level and that the Court’s decision was a set back for southern states (Patterson 2001; Nichols 2007, 67).

The legislative branch’s response was significantly worse. Instead of ambivalence, southern legislators outright denounced the Court’s decision. Rooted in a belief that the Supreme Court encroached on the rights of states and their citizens with a misuse of judicial power in their decision to desegregate public schools, the legislators outlined a massive resistance strategy in their “Southern Manifesto,” a formal plan to circumvent desegregation. They also contended that the Supreme Court had acted based on their “personal political and social ideas” to establish the law of the land. All but two of the 22 southern senators and 77 of the 105 southern congressmen signed the document that declared to “use lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation,” (Congressional Record 1956; Martin 1998, 220; Patterson 2001). The lack of federal unity worked in the segregationists’ favor and contributed a great deal to the lack of early progress in desegregation. Furthermore, the federal disputes over school segregation set the stage for the state level response.
With resistance on every front and little support from any of the other federal branches of government, the courts faced an uphill battle to desegregate public schools. Although the Supreme Court issued several additionally decisions to strengthen desegregation enforcement (see *Cooper v. Aaron*\textsuperscript{10}, *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*\textsuperscript{11}), real population shifts occurred with the passage of Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that allowed the federal government to cut financial support to discriminatory schools and the attorney general to sue segregated school districts (Clotfelter 2004; Meier, Stewart, England 1989; U.S. Department of Justice 2012). The following year, Congress signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) that provided southern school districts with various funding opportunities for complying with desegregation orders (Clotfelter 2004; Kluger 2004, 758). They also passed the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974, which prohibited deliberate segregation on the basis of not only race, but also color and national origin (U.S. Department of Justice 2012). Once the Supreme Court received better backing from the other two branches of government, it also moved in the direction of forcefully pushing desegregated education (see *Green v. New Kent County School Board*\textsuperscript{12}, *Alexander v. Holmes*\textsuperscript{13}, *Keyes v. School District of Prince Edward County*\textsuperscript{14}).

\textsuperscript{10} *Cooper v. Aaron*, the Court reaffirmed its *Brown* decision as the "supreme law of the land" and unanimously ruled that Arkansas officials resisting school desegregation did not have the authority or liberty to annual Supreme Court decisions (*Cooper v. Aaron* 1958).

\textsuperscript{11} *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*, decision to close all local, public schools and provide vouchers to attend private schools were constitutionally impermissible as violations of the equal protection clause (*Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County* 1964).

\textsuperscript{12} *Green v. Kent County School Board* questioned the legality of "freedom of choice" programs to implement the *Brown* decision. The Supreme Court ruled that open enrollment or "freedom of choice" plans were not enough toward desegregation and established the school board as responsible for making plans that realistically work. State imposed segregation must be completely removed, "root and branch," (*Green v. Kent* 1968).

\textsuperscript{13} *Alexander v. Holmes* clarified the "deliberate speed" wording of the *Brown* decision and ordered schools to desegregate at once. The court ruled that "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
By the 1970-1971 school term, nearly 80 percent of all Black students were attending schools with Whites (Clotfelter 2004, 56).

The Brown decision also failed to speak on the scope of minority rights. The Justices declared that segregation had no place in public education based on the original arguments surrounding legalized Black and white segregation in southern and border states. What was to become of non-southern and non-border states running less overt, but clearly dual systems for Blacks and Whites was unclear. Because northern school districts were de facto segregated, that is, they were not legally segregated but segregated by residential patterns, northern districts remained segregated in the decades following the Brown ruling. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) reported enrollment figures in northern states that showed patterns of de facto segregation that many Southern legislators felt should also be addressed. A series of cases (see Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education15; Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc16) challenged de facto segregation and other discriminatory practices in the north, and federal courts agreed that neither this form of segregation nor any form of discrimination or limits to education equality based on race systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools,” (Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education 1969).

14 Keyes v. Denver School District No 1. expanded the scope of the Brown ruling to also address de facto segregation. The Supreme Court ruled that although no formal law was established mandating segregated schools, the district’s leaders and government agencies in the state were responsible for the segregation in the district. Their policies and practices were designed to keep African American students isolated and must be disbanded. The ruling held non-Southern states responsible for ensuring that their schools were desegregated (schools (Keyes v. Denver School District No 1. 1973; Kluger 1975, 763).

15 Spangler et al. v. Pasadena City Board of Education challenged the racial discrimination in the district and the school board’s use of a neighborhood school policy to perpetuate school segregation and prevent “crosstown” busing. The District Court ruled that the district’s freedom of choice plans were inadequate in reducing racial imbalance and ordered them to establish a revised plan that would desegregate schools at the student and faculty levels (Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education 1970).

16 Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. eliminated the district’s discriminatory hiring and assignment policies of teachers and administrators and attendance zones used to circumvent desegregation. The US District Court judge ordered the immediate desegregation of Pontiac schools and a complete desegregation plan from the school board (Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. 1970).
should be permitted in public schools (Clotfelter 2004, 27; US Commission On Civil Rights 1972). Many northern districts altered their grade systems, established cross-district busing plans, and revised their hiring and promotion procedures to improve the overall racial balance of their districts (US Commission on Civil Rights 1972). The Supreme Court also found the crossing of districts and busing as an acceptable remedy to achieving racially balanced schools in the South in their Swann v. Mecklenburg County (1971) case. As history shows, cross-district busing was short lived; the Supreme Court later overturned their support for cross-district busing to desegregate schools, even in southern states, in the Milliken v. Bradley case.

Third, the Brown decision also failed to clearly identify the reference groups of their decision. Blacks were far from being the only minority group excluded from the privileges of the constitution. Although states with large Mexican American populations such as Texas and California did not have formal laws segregating them from Whites, these students also found themselves systematically placed in separate schools, and yet they seemed to be excluded from the Brown decision (Meier and Stewart 1991, 60; Clotfelter 2004, 22). Separate Mexican schools were aimed at “Americanizing” or assimilating Mexican American students (Bowman 2001). Mexican Americans in Texas were often denied access to secondary schools, but those seeking education beyond elementary school were permitted to learn a trade (Meier and Stewart 1991). In California, the few Mexican students that matriculated to secondary school were allowed to attend mixed schools because there were so few of them, and the cost to run a segregated secondary school was beyond what many districts could afford. In areas with larger Mexican American populations, students could attend mixed schools if a school’s “Mexican quota” had not
been met or the students met the district’s non-academic criteria for entrance such as one’s level of cleanliness (Meier and Stewart 1991; 62-63).

However, the Latino fight for education equality is perhaps just as lengthy as Blacks’. With the support of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Mexican Americans challenged school segregation beginning with the 1930 case, *Del Rio Independent School District v. Salvatierra*. The group argued that by being placed in separate schools, Mexican American students were being denied equal protection of the law. The court ruled that segregating Mexican American students based on their ethnicity was a violation of the Constitution’s equal protection clause, but did not find the school district in question in violation of the law. Instead, they found that the district’s practice of segregating students based on the limited English ability and truancy violations was permissible (Meier and Stewart 1991, 67; *Del Rio Independent School District v. Salvatierra* 1930). In 1945 the group challenged segregated education again based on the premise that it violated the equal protection clause for Mexican American students in *Mendez v. Westminster School District*. This time the courts sided with LULAC and the federal Circuit Court of Appeals prohibited the practice. Although a legal victory for Mexican Americans, actual implementation was futile. Some California and Texas districts still maintained separate schools or some form of segregation between Latinos and non-Latino Whites. In some areas the policy changed slightly to resemble other districts in which students were segregated in elementary grades, permitted to integrated classes in higher grades, but not mixed in extracurricular activities (Cloftelter 2004, 22-23). The lack of implementation guidelines kept the segregation of Latinos alive in Texas and in California well into the 1970s (Meier and Stewart 1991, 67; Bowman 2001).
A handful of other cases (see Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School District\textsuperscript{17}; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District\textsuperscript{18}; U.S. v. Texas Education Agency\textsuperscript{19}) challenged the dual education system for Mexican American students and white students among other education issues such as discrimination in school employment, school finance, and bilingual education. Although challengers experience victories in the court room, the direct impact of their victories was limited and lacked sufficient federal support for any meaningful redress or equity gains. Part of the challenge was being federally recognized as a unique, marginalized group subject to legal protection and desegregation provisions. Originally, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the federal government’s agency responsible for enforcing school desegregation, considered people of “Hispanic” descent as white. This meant that school districts could continue to practice segregation or use discriminatory education policies to subordinate Hispanics and not be in violation of federal law. School districts also saw this as a means to “desegregate” without desegregating. They could group Blacks and Hispanics into the same school, away from non-Hispanic Whites and still legally comply with the Brown ruling. However, this practice changed under two federal decisions. First, OCR changed its policy toward Latinos in 1970, noting that they would deal with discrimination on the basis of national origin;

\textsuperscript{17} Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School District challenged the district’s process of segregating Mexican students through an untested academic grouping process that held Mexican students in the first grade for four years. The court ruled that the grouping was “arbitrary and unreasonable” and should be halted because it was directed solely against Mexican children (Hernandez v. Driscoll Consolidated Independent School District 1957).

\textsuperscript{18} Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District was the first legal attempt to extend the Brown decision to Mexican Americans in which the courts ruled that although there was no formal history of state law requiring segregation, the school district’s dual school system perpetuated traditional segregation and was unconstitutional (Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District 1972).

\textsuperscript{19} U.S. v. Texas Education Agency ordered the Texas Education Agency to assume full responsibility for desegregating public schools in Texas and eliminating dual systems established through ethnic origin assignments (U.S. v. Texas Education Agency 1970).
they shifted their focus from exclusively on Black-white discrimination in the South to multiple group discrimination beyond the South. The second decision occurred in a 1973 case, *Keyes v. Denver School District No 1*, in which the Supreme Court ruled that Mexican Americans were a separate group from non-Hispanic Whites and should be recognized as such for desegregation purposes. They could not be used as “Whites” to desegregate schools. Unfortunately, the *Keyes* decision did not spark as much Latino desegregation as expected, but it marked a broad shift in the government’s view of Americans of Hispanic descent (Bowman 2001).

**Desegregation Policy as It Stands: Entering an Era of Resegregation**

The desegregation picture looks quite differently today. School districts’ decisions to pursue racially balanced schools and the mode to this racial balance are generally shaped by a series of more restrictive court decisions that have eroded the provisions of early desegregation court cases. In the 1970s, the Court began to adopt a more conservative stance after Justice Douglass, cited as the most liberal member of the Court, retired (Kluger 1975). By the mid 1990s, when the entire tide and attitude of the Court had changed, no hard-line Liberal remained on the Court and most were replaced with moderate leaning justices or solid conservatives. Though the Supreme Court is theoretically viewed as the non-partisan interpreters of the Constitution, the stark difference in the new Supreme Court’s decisions on school desegregation cases when compared to the more liberal Warren and Burger Courts suggest otherwise.

First signs of the Court’s retreat became evident in their decision in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*. The case did not center on racial segregation within school districts specifically, but instead on the equality of school finance, a central issue of the early Defense Fund cases and their original tactic in ending segregated
education. The Supreme Court decided 5-4 that tax revenue differences leading to unequal access to education resources was not a violation of the equal protection clause (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 1972; Kluger 1975; Patterson 2001). In the majority opinion, Justice Powell argued that “the equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,” dealing a severe blow to one of the major goals of desegregated education. The Rodriguez ruling almost ensured that schools would be unequal. A second retreat case of the 1970s, Milliken v. Bradley, involved the Black citizens of Detroit suing Governor William Milliken for the state’s lack of effort addressing schools’ racial imbalance through de facto segregation. The Court ruled that achieving racial balance stopped at school district lines and prohibited inter-district busing. For metropolitan areas, this meant that suburban schools did not have to accommodate students from the racially segregated inter-city schools. The majority opinion held that because suburban school districts had not acted to cause Detroit’s racially imbalanced schools, they were free to maintain their community schools; the court was not permitted to reach across or extend district boundaries. This decision was the first in a series of decisions that directly weaken the provisions of Brown v. Board of Education and the subsequent decisions that strengthened it. It was a direct reversal of the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision that allowed cross district merging and busing measures to achieve racially balanced schools. During the 1980s, the Burger to Rehnquist Court continued the subtle retreat of school desegregation in related affirmative action cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education20.

20 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education questioned the layoff practice used in Jackson, Michigan that provided special protections from layoffs for minority teachers in the name of societal discrimination and role model effects for minority students. The Court ruled that because the district failed to have a significant past of
The retreat was made more evident in the 1990s with decisions on issues of attendance zone realignments, white flight, and the length of the desegregation process. In their decision on the length of mandated desegregation plans, the Supreme Court ruled that once a district received "unitary status," indicating it has eliminated segregation and achieved racially balanced schools in its district, it is no longer responsible for addressing racial balance (see Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell 1991). In other words, a district is “free of any obligation to maintain racially balanced schools,” (Clotfelter 2004, 32). They followed this decision with their ruling in Freeman v. Pitts, which stated that a district is not responsible for addressing de facto segregation in schools when it is related to changes in residential patterns. This decision essentially reversed the Green v. New Kent County decision. In 1995, they solidified their stance in the decision on Missouri v. Jenkins, ruling that Missouri was no longer responsible for remedying substandard education and racial imbalance in Kansas City due to changes in the district's demographics. The US District Court responsible for overseeing Kansas City desegregation efforts ordered the district to fund a series of programs and establish a magnet program in an effort to improve the performance level of the schools and consequently attract out of district white families to the inner city schools. The Supreme Court found fault with this procedure, however, arguing that the District Court had exceed its remedial powers; their “interdistrict goal was beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation identified by the district;” and that the Constitution ensured equal opportunity not equal results (Missouri v. Jenkins 1995; Kluger 2004, 772; Chemerinsky 2005). It became increasing clear that for the employment racial discrimination, the racial classification layoff provision violated the equal protection clause (Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 1986; Powell 1987). The decision reduced preemptive efforts to address employment segregation and discrimination.
more conservative Supreme Court, racially separated and imbalanced schools were perfectly acceptable as long as policy makers were not mandating it or deliberately discriminating against certain groups. The collective decisions of the 1990s signaled to lower courts that the days of forcing desegregation orders were done, and many school districts were prematurely relieved of their mandatory desegregation plans.

The shift has made it extremely difficult for school districts looking to voluntarily hold onto or establish desegregation plans to find federal support when challenged. For example, Charlotte-Mecklenburg lost its battle to maintain a successful desegregation policy that used race in student assignments after the federal courts ordered an end to its desegregation efforts (see Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 2001). Most recently, the Supreme Court has taken an additional stab at desegregation in limiting voluntary desegregation plans. They have decided that voluntarily desegregation plans that use race as a deciding factor in school assignments are unconstitutional. In Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, the Supreme Court ruled that the district’s plan to use race as a determinant of school assignment and its requirement of school populations between 15 and 50 percent African American was a violation of the equal protection clause; their use of race to prevent racial imbalance did not meet the Court’s standard for a “constitutionally legitimate use of race,” and the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to be a race-conscious plan (Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education 2007). Similarly, their Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle decision argued that the use of race as a tie breaker for school assignments intended to maintain racial diversity was a violation of the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it did not meet the Court’s standard for a “constitutionally legitimate” use of race, and failed to include the “narrow tailoring” they require in establishing race conscious programs. While some supporters of
the decisions such as Justice Kennedy contended that race should still be considered in
central schools to ensure equal educational opportunities, others like Chief Justice Roberts
argued that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race,” (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 2007). The “color blind”
logic of alleviating racial discrimination and racial balance in public schools has not only
colored the way in which desegregation is pursued today, but has also shaped mass
attitudes toward racial inequalities. It discourages the consideration of systematic and
structural discrimination and causes of inequality among races. It also hampers any
significant effort to address inequalities using targeted methods.

**The Role of the Executive and Legislative Branches**

However, the judicial branch is not alone in its attack on desegregated education.
The executive branch has always been slow on supporting it, and efforts to significantly
limit its provisions have made the policy difficult to implement. Beginning with the Nixon
Administration, much effort was taken to eliminate busing and reduce federal funding
toward desegregation. Nixon often made special provisions for southern school districts to
delay required “full compliance” with the Johnson established laws and deadlines
(McAndrews 1998). Under Regan, desegregation was deemed a costly, unpopular failure.
The Regan Administration argued that all students were better served in local community
schools that were closer to home and subject to parental oversight, despite the known
disproportionately negative effect it would have on minority students in segregated
communities. School districts and states experienced significant cut backs in federal
funding used to remedy segregation, and inevitably the entire funding appropriation was
cut for the Department of Education under Regan (Kluger 2004, 768). The support for
neighborhood schools and hostility and doubt surrounding desegregated education
continued through the 1990s and eventually turned into a reform effort of school choice as the preferred solution to equity concerns in public education (Orfield and Eaton 1996; Schofield and Hausmann 2004).

In reducing the amount of federal funding aimed at maintaining racial balance, the legislative branch has also aided in reversing the Brown decision and weakening desegregation policy. As recent as this fiscal year, the federal government continues to throw a cold shoulder to desegregated education. The 2012 Education Appropriations Bill strictly prohibits the use of any federal funds to “transport teachers or students in order to: (1) overcome racial imbalance in any school, or (2) carry out a racial desegregation plan,” (2012 Education Appropriations Bill, Sec. 301). Section 302 is more specific; it:

(Sec. 302) Prohibits the use of funds to require, directly or indirectly, the transportation of any student to a school other than the school nearest the student’s home, except, for a student requiring special education, to the school offering that special education, in order to comply with title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Declares that such a prohibited indirect requirement of transportation of students includes the transportation of students to carry out a plan involving the reorganization of the grade structure of schools, the pairing of schools, the clustering of schools, or any combination of grade restructuring, pairing, or clustering. Exempts the establishment of magnet schools from such prohibition.

The explicit exclusion of funding for any portion of desegregated education clearly indicates the legislative branch’s stance on it. One implication of this statue is that states and/or districts that value school diversity and desire to maintain or pursue desegregated education, must fund the process alone. Poorer districts, those most likely to be racially imbalanced, are forced to choose between funding racial balance efforts (i.e. busing,
magnet programs) or “more pressing” education goals. For wealthier, suburban districts, also most likely to be racially imbalanced, there is little incentive or real reason to attempt racial balancing.

With the growing minority population and limited federal support in upholding the principles and decrees of the Brown v. Board of Education decision and subsequent supporting cases, racially separated schools are no longer a thing of the past. Resegregation, the process of returning to racially segregated schools, is on the rise, especially for Latino students (Orfield and Eaton 1996). Even some of the most successfully desegregated districts (i.e. Wake County, North Carolina and Charlotte, North Carolina) are abandoning their plans and returning to neighborhood schools (Boger 2003; Zucchino 2010). Racial minorities and others supporters of racially balanced schools have begun to turn to local political venues to address the woes of racially imbalanced schools (Smith, Kedrowski, Ellis 2004). As the chapter demonstrates, desegregation implementation has always occurred at the local level, while political leverage at the federal level manipulated the process. Today, this relationship has changed and implementation along with political leverage and policy design rest at the local level. This venue shift has increased the importance and salience of local actors, particularly, school board members, administrators and teachers in shaping desegregation efforts and its implications for student performance and outcomes. As such, it is equally important to investigate the manner in which the actors influence this process, and also to consider how the racial composition of schools may influence their behaviors and policy outcomes.
Why Even Do This? The Benefits of Desegregated and Segregated Education

Contrasted

Desegregating public schools was important to ensure that all students had fair and equal access to a high-quality public school education and an equal opportunity to the “American dream,” (Patterson 2001). In a society where equality is the law of the land, it was only fitting that the educational system was also equal; therefore, desegregating public schools was a way to ensure equality was being met (Crain 1968). As one African American parent stated about allowing her students access to desegregated schools, “Sitting next to a white child does not ensure that my child will learn, but it does ensure that he will be taught” (Crain 1968, 112). By desegregating schools, minority students were given access to a quality educational experience—access to the same teachers, facilities, and education resources necessary for successful learning and academic achievement. Civil rights advocates and others who supported school desegregation did not intend for it to be the cure of all education or racial issues, but it was intended as a step toward successful racial acceptance, respect, and integration (Orfield and Eaton 1996, 104; Armor and Rossell 2002). Mixed schools were seen as the best way to reach the American dream of equal opportunity (Patterson 2001, xvii). As Thurgood Marshall often noted in his arguments for desegregated education, separating Black students was as harmful to the students as the resource inequalities in public education. Isolating them deprived Black students of association and competition with Whites, further perpetuating the assumption that Blacks must be incompetent, inadequate and inferior (Patterson 2001, xvii). The students were unable to develop an adequate sense of self worth in segregated schools (Crain 1968, 112).

The expectations of desegregation proponents and supporters were met to an extent; students in racially diverse or “white” schools tend to have a larger percentage of
qualified teachers, a more rigorous academic climate, college bound peers, and access to resources not afforded to students in racially segregated schools (Southworth and Mickelson 2007). Students in segregated “minority” schools, on the other hand, are more likely to have a larger percentage of unqualified teachers, more poor, homeless, or non-English speaking peers, fewer academically advanced classmates and fewer courses to prepare them for college (Southworth and Mickelson 2007; Goldsmith 2011). Overall, students in segregated schools tend to achieve less; they attain less education and hold lower prestige occupations compared to their counterparts in White concentrated or racially balanced schools (Goldsmith 2011; Dawkins and Braddock 1994; Wells and Crain 1994).

The anticipated peer effects or social benefits of desegregated education are also frequently cited in explaining the necessity of desegregation. In fact, peer effect is the most widely discussed mechanism in which desegregated education links to student achievement (Coleman et al. 1966; Card and Rothstein 2007; Goldsmith 2011). Beginning with Coleman and his colleagues’ (1966) path breaking evaluation of school desegregation, scholars argue that peers influence students; students become like their peers with frequent interaction and indirect socialization. Peer expectations, attitudes, and achievements often color students’ perceptions of their own attitudes, expectations and achievements. Additionally, minority students are able to develop and/or share the same networks of white students to gain invaluable knowledge for current and future academic success (Wells and Crain 1994). Proponents suggest that as lower income, minority students are exposed to middle class students’ beliefs, behaviors, and networks related to achievement and the normative climate of achievement that Whites create, disadvantaged students also adopt these beliefs and behaviors. The peer socialization and assimilation of
each environment differs, leading to differences in outcomes. Consequently, students in racially balanced schools adopt the pro-school attitudes, behaviors, and networks of their middle class peers, while the attitudes of students in racially segregated schools reflect the less positive attitudes of the low income or working class peers that their environment fosters. Much of the empirical research supports this theory; students with more diverse peer groups tend to have better performance outcomes, while those with larger minority peer groups tend to have lower outcomes (Coleman et al. 1966; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Guryan 2004; Goldsmith 2009; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2009).

Additionally, segregated schools restrict students’ interracial contact, necessary to break down stereotypes and biases against different groups. It denies students the opportunity to learn first hand about different people and cultures and perpetuates inequality (Goldsmith 2011). Even major corporations such as General Motors, Microsoft, Merck, and Shell Oil have spoken out in support of diversity efforts and the benefits of an education in more balanced, diverse schools and universities for their companies and in improving social relations in society as a whole (Kluger 2004, 777-778).

Some scholars note that there are some benefits, however, to students attending racially segregated schools, and challenge the widely held assumption that minority students will always “do better” in racially balanced schools or schools with greater populations of white students. For example, there is evidence that being in a school with a proportional population of Latinos has a positive effect on Latino achievement, more so than being in a racially balanced school with white students (Goldsmith 2003). Goldsmith (2004) finds that Black and Latino students in segregated schools have more positive and optimistic attitudes about school and this positive attitude is related to reductions in the Black-white and Latino-white achievement gaps. Minority students in racially segregated
schools were more likely than Whites to have high educational aspirations and occupational expectations. Advocates of neighborhood schools, even if it is at the expense of racially balanced schools, often argue that neighborhood schools have the potential to provide a better education to students because the students are closer to home and the funds used for transportation could be used to enhance educational experiences (Orfield 2005). There is also an argument that less racially balanced but neighborhood assigned schools foster greater parental involvement and offer them some control over their child(ren)’s education (Colwell and Guntermann 1984).

Research on early Black education under the segregated system highlight the cultural benefits that students gained in separate schools. Although Black schools lack resources and adequate facilities, they also had much community support and institutional policies that helped Black students learn and succeed, despite their limited environment (Anderson 1988, 3). Historical accounts of students educated in segregated schools also report students’ satisfaction with the supportive, encouraging, and rigid atmosphere of segregated schools compared to the hostile, unwelcoming and isolating environment of desegregated schools (Anderson 1988, 3). Teachers and administrators were seen as “parent-like” figures with complete autonomy to shape student learning and discipline; segregated schools addressed the “psychological and sociological needs of clients,” (Anderson 1988, 3-4). African American critics of school desegregation argue that desegregation destroyed African American’s sense of community. As previously mentioned, some Blacks were resistant and also fought to maintain segregated schools (Anderson 1988, 4). These accounts of education in segregated schools are distinct from the arguments of Brown and the understood general consensus of Black families.
Consequences of the *Brown* Decision and Its Retreat

The expansive body of school desegregation literature across all fields generally focuses on the successes and failures of the policy through an examination of its effects on various outcome measures such as academic achievement, intergroup relations, and quality of life. Though the evaluative literature on the policy has been mixed, more scholars find positive long and short term benefits than negative consequences to desegregated education (Mickelson 2001; Schofield and Hausmann 2004).

**Academic Consequences**

The literature on school desegregation's effect on African American students' academic achievement is highly debated and inconclusive. Early work on African American students' academic success immediately after formal desegregation showed that Black students educated in desegregated schools were more likely to have higher test scores, more likely to graduate from high school and more likely to attend a desegregated college (Crain 1971; Crain and Mahard 1978; Braddock 1980; Reber 2004). More contemporary and sophisticated analyses yield similar results. Scholars continue to show a positive relationship between racially balanced or desegregated schools and minority students' academic achievement on standardized tests (Wells et al. 2004) and graduation rates (Guryan 2004) and negative relationships between minority students' academic performance and more imbalanced, racially isolated schools (Caldas and Bankston 1998; Mickelson, Bottia, and Lambert 2013).

Yet some scholars find limited short term benefits to racially balanced schools, and conclude that desegregation does not have a significant effect on Black students' achievement (Cook 1984; Cook and Evans 2000; Rivkin 2000). Cook (1984) suggests that scholars touting the positive effect of desegregation are overstating their findings; he finds
that desegregation has no effect in particular subjects like mathematics and very small
effects on reading. Rivkin (2000) assess the effect of peer relationships, African American
students’ exposure to Whites, on academic attainment and finds little evidence of it having
a positive effect on African American students’ academic attainment. Instead, he concludes
that focusing on the quality of schools versus the “reallocating of students among schools”
is more effective in improving academic achievement. Similarly, Cook and Evans (2000)
contend that little of the Black-white difference in National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) scores can be linked to the racial composition of schools. They suggest
that changes within schools—“a narrowing of the score gap of students with the same level
of parental education in the same school,” is responsible for the observed gap reduction
(Cook and Evans 2000). Researchers like Reber (2010) point to the differences in school
finance and expenditures to explain changes in Black students’ high school graduation
rates, over explanations of exposure to white students or the overall racial composition of
the school. Ryabov and Van Hook (2007) find socioeconomic composition, not the racial
composition of a school, to have a significant effect on Latino students’ outcomes. Their
findings support early notions of the benefits of minority students’ access to more wealthy
and privileged white students with greater external resources, networks and culture
(Coleman et al. 1966; Cook 1984). However, they also show that today, these assumed
benefits are not limited to white students; in fact, race is less important and any student of
a middle class or higher background has a positive effect on student achievement.

Unfortunately, race and socioeconomic status remain highly correlated and Blacks and

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21 Cook and Evans (2000) do find the differences in test scores related to changes in school quality, though only marginally important to the overall white-black test score difference, is largely due to the worsening of quality of poor, inner city schools with a white student population of less than 20 percent in which black students are more likely to attend.
Latinos are most likely to fall into the lower status categories, suggesting that the racial composition of schools remains a relevant factor to consider in district policymaking and predicting student outcomes.

A handful of scholars note that the limited short term benefits evolve into significant long-term effects that often help improve life for Black students. For example, Kaufman and Rosenbaum (1992) and Dawkins (1994) show that graduates of desegregated schools are more likely to go to college and pursue 4-year bachelor degrees. Similarly, Johnson’s (2011) research on the socioeconomic and health outcomes of children born between 1950 and 1970 as measures of attainment, finds that school desegregation helped to significantly increase Black educational attainment and earnings among a host of other social factors. On the other hand, Goldsmith (2009) finds that students in predominately Black or Latino schools have lower levels of later academic attainment. They are less likely to earn a high school diploma or its equivalent and any form of postsecondary education in their lifetime, compared to equally disadvantaged students in predominately white schools.

**Racial Composition of Schools and the Achievement Gap**

Beyond observing the effect that the level of racial balance in a district or school has on minority students’ academic performance and educational attainment, scholars also consider its effect on the growing gap between Blacks and Whites and Latinos and Whites in general academic achievement. Advocates of desegregated education, such as Orfield and Eaton (1996) and Kozol (2005) often note that the achievement gap of the “active desegregation era” was lower than the gap observed today. Others, such as Jaynes and Williams (1989) and Grissmer, Flanagan, and Willamson (1998), also attribute the reduced achievement gap of the 1970s and 1980s to desegregation. The more recent trend of
accountability in education reform has re-heightened the rhetoric and salience of gaps in achievement among racial groups, but some argue that it has also taken focus away from desegregation efforts and racial equality in school districts (Daniel 2004). Although accountability systems have helped student achievement in general, this effect has not translated into a reduction in the achievement gap between Black and White students, and has shown only modest reductions in the Latino-white gap (Hanushek and Raymond 2005). These findings, as well as claims of its negative effect on policies aimed at addressing school equity via racial balance, has led some interested scholars to probe other factors related to the racial achievement gap, including the racial composition of schools.

Hanushek and his colleagues provide much evidence that the growing gap between Black and white academic achievement is not based on ability alone. Instead, they show that the gap is often tied to the racial composition and quality of one’s school. In a study on the relationship between school racial composition and the achievement gap in Texas public schools, they find that balancing the Black enrollment of all imbalanced schools would close “over 10 percent of the seventh grade22 Black-white test score gap,” (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2009). An additional study on the distribution of the Black-white achievement gap showed that high-achieving African American students suffer the most from racially unbalanced schools; the achievement gap widens the most for them between grades 3 through 8 in schools with larger Black populations (Hanushek and Rivkin 2009). Reducing this Black student population and improving the quality of teachers to the state’s average could eliminate nearly 20 percent of the growth in the Black-white achievement gap from grades 4 to 8 (Hanushek and Rivkin 2009). Card and Rothstein

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22 Their sample includes students in grades 5-7 in all Texas’s public schools.
(2007) reach a similar conclusion in their study of segregation’s effect on students’ SAT scores. They show that moving from completely segregated schools to completely balanced schools could raise Black students’ relative SAT scores about 142 points and reduce the Black-white difference in scores by nearly 70 percent (Card and Rothstein 2007).

Their findings are not unique. Instead, they are very much consistent with the previously discussed research focusing solely on Black or Latino achievement, as well as early research used to eradicate “separate but equal” schools. For example, both Margo (1986) and Orazem (1987) show that school quality and school characteristics had a significant effect on the racial differences in student performance, prior to the Brown decision. Orazem’s (1987) study of pre-Brown student achievement found that school quality and school characteristics accounted for nearly 40 percent of the large racial gap in average test scores, while Margo (1986) showed that equalizing school characteristics would have narrowed the early achievement gap between Blacks and Whites, but family characteristics and school attendance had a larger effect on this relationship. Nevertheless, critics of this research continue to argue that the racial composition plays little to no significant role in the achievement gap. They point to individual, school and academic cultural factors (i.e. quality teachers, challenging and innovative curriculums) to explain the gap in achievement among racial groups (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003).

Social Consequences

Some, such as Coleman et al. (1966) and Crain (1971), attribute the academic gains of Black students in desegregated schools to their social environment. The research shows evidence of a relationship between desegregated education and greater social and psychological competence (Crain 1971). Being in an environment of diverse abilities and social backgrounds is a positive indicator of academic success (Crain 1971).
Scholars have also found long term social implications and benefits to desegregated education. Contact theory, an argument of more positive intergroup attitudes occurring when face to face interactions between members of differing, antagonistic groups increases, is often used to explain why desegregated education is socially beneficial to all students over segregated education. Early proponents of desegregation used the theory in assumptions that desegregating schools would also change racial attitudes and reduce racial isolation outside of school; the empirical literature supports this contention. Students attending desegregated schools tend to have more positive perceptions of other races, are more tolerable of other groups, and have preferences for desegregated schools (Scott and McPartland 1982; Orfield and Eaton 1996). Blacks who have attended desegregated schools are more likely to also live in integrated neighborhoods, attend desegregated colleges and universities, work in integrated environments, and have integrated social networks compared to their segregated peers (Dawkins 1994; Trent 1997; Crain 1971). Interactions of this proportion have also been linked to decreased homicide rates (Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig 2009).

**Economic Consequences/ Quality of Life**

Related to these academic and social implications are the long term economic benefits associated with attending desegregated schools. Through their educational attainment and social network benefits, Black graduates of desegregated high schools typically have higher occupational prestige and higher incomes compared to peers from segregated schools (Crain 1970; Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon 1992). Ashenfelter, Collins and Yoon (2006) find that desegregation helped to reduce the significant income gap between non-southern Black men and southern Black men, especially on incomes conditional on educational attainment. Southern Black men educated after desegregation
had higher incomes than those educated before the *Brown* decision. They are also more likely to work in white-collar, professional, or “nontraditional Black” jobs in the private sector, while Black graduates of segregated schools are more likely to hold government or blue collar positions (Wells and Crain 1994; Crain and Strauss 1985). These occupational differences are often related to higher incomes and greater economic stability.

On the other hand, some scholars are skeptical of the relationship between school desegregation or segregation and future earnings and income. Neal and Johnson (1996) suggest that almost all of the Black-white gap in wages is attributed to ability differences, not racial differences. Rivkin (2000) finds that mandatory desegregation plans offer limited benefits to one's future earnings, challenging the scholarship on the benefits of certain desegregation plans and racially balanced educational environments.

Based on these outcome focused studies, scholars assessing the successes and failures of school desegregation have come to mixed conclusions. In general, many findings indicate successful outcomes for students, demonstrating gains in equal access to quality education (Wells and Crain 1994). Yet, limitations to this access within schools in the form of student grouping and tracking, and loopholes in district plans that reduce their implementation and effectiveness have led some to question desegregation's noted success (Eyler, Cook and Ward 1983; Clotfelter 2004).

**The Rise of Second Generation Discrimination**

Within school segregation is a long known process used to subvert desegregation even before racially balanced schools became the law of the land. As early as the 1940s, scholars note the use of within school techniques to separate racial groups. For example, many California schools created “schools within schools” for Mexican students, keeping them academically and socially isolated from Whites (Clotfelter 2004; Meier and Stewart
The use of within school segregation became more prevalent after the Brown decision, in which many districts found themselves struggling to meet parental demands for separation between the races, while also complying with federal law (Southworth and Mickelson 2007). The most widely used means to achieve both goals—separation and desegregated education—was grouping and tracking students based on ability, though most tracking systems were highly correlated with race (Southworth and Mickelson 2007; Buttaro et al. 2010; Mickelson 2001). Some school districts began tracking almost immediately after desegregating. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district began using racially driven tracking shortly after desegregating, leading the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to withhold funding (Smith 2004). Others gradually moved into the process as the proportion of minority students to white students grew. For example, a study of Milwaukee public school suspension rates within the first two years of desegregation revealed that schools experiencing more desegregation-related population changes also had disproportionately higher Black suspension rates (Larkin 1979). Eitle (2002) notes that school districts under court mandated desegregation plans were more likely to track Black students into lower tracks compared to Black students in similar schools not under the mandate. The political and legal context of a school’s racial composition is attributed to the rate at which minority students are tracked. Yet, even this relationship is debated with some scholars and many practitioners arguing that grouping and tracking is solely to help students and is not based on race.

**Defining Grouping and Tracking: The Arguments**

In her seminal work on tracking practices in US high schools, Oakes (1985) defines tracking as “the process whereby students are divided into categories so that they can be assigned in groups to various kinds of classes.” Students are most generally characterized
based on their academic ability, as mentioned above, in an effort to produce a better learning environment and generate greater peer effects. Tracking significantly influences students’ learning opportunities, and holds implications for their cognitive achievement, postsecondary path, and even career trajectories. Students that are tracked in lower academic tracks typically remain in them throughout their entire post-secondary career, and vice versa for students tracked in higher ability groups. The students are usually exposed to the same curricula, but at different paces, breadth, and depth. Students in higher ability tracks can expect to receive the most fruitful academic experience because they are exposed to a broader curriculum, more advanced and higher quality teachers, and often the best or additional resources not offered to other students. Furthermore, the benefits noted of peer effects on student achievement (i.e. highly motivated, middle class, cultured peers) are all centralized in higher ability classrooms under academic tracking systems. In essence these students learn more; they receive the best education the school has to offer. On the other hand, students of lower tracks typically cover less of the formal curricula, experience less rigorous standards, and have lower quality and less experienced teachers.

Despite this obvious breach in the commitment to equality in education that tracking poses, many view grouping and tracking as the premier method of educating students of different knowledge sets. They contend that it is the most efficient and student friendly strategy to disseminating curricula to students of varying ability (Van Houtte, Demanet, and Stevens 2012). These arguments are based on several assumptions about student learning: 1) students learn better in groups with students similar to themselves, 2) most similar student classrooms are easier to teach, and teachers worry less about “losing the slowest or boring the fastest learners”, 3) less academically advanced students develop
positive attitudes about themselves, schools, and education when they are not grouped with more advanced students, 4) grouping students allows education to be tailored to students’ different labor market trajectories and anticipated educational or vocational needs, and 5) the groups are accurate, fair, and only reflect students’ past achievements and raw academic ability (Kulik and Kulik 1982; Oakes 1985; Southworth and Mickelson 2007; Brunello and Checchi 2007; Trautwein et al. 2006).

Nevertheless, empirical research shows that many of these assumptions are false. First, homogenous learning environments do not consistently benefit any student (Oakes 1985; Kulik and Kulik 1982). Instead the literature on learning environments indicates that sometimes academically advanced students learn more when they are taught amongst equally competent peers; other times they do not fare any better than academically advanced students taught in heterogeneous academic environments (Oakes 1985; Kulik and Kulik 1982; Lleras and Rangel 2009). Sometimes homogeneous learning environments negatively affect academically average or weaker students, and other times the learning environment has no effect on their academic success (Oakes 1985; Carbonaro 2005). These inconsistent findings lead many to believe that creating homogenous learning environments through tracking does not benefit students. Academically advanced students do not suffer in mixed ability classrooms, and average or weaker students do not benefit from learning amongst similar students, nor are they more easily assisted (Oakes 1985). Taken together, such findings indicate that ability grouping produces a stratified learning environment for students, in which the best students get better, but the average and poor students get worse (Lleras and Rangel 2009).

Second, tracking fosters lower self-esteem and negative attitudes about one’s ability and educational success among less academically advanced and average students.
The stereotypes, stigmas, and perceptions about lower tracks cause the students to adopt the same negative perceptions about themselves. They often have lower aspirations and limited future plans (Oakes 1985; Van Houtte, Demanet, and Stevens 2012). These students develop an anti-school culture that sometimes manifest in disruptive behavior, bullying, and complete alienation from school (Van Van Houtte and Stevens 2010). Grouping and tracking practices also widens the self-esteem gap between tracks. Being in a higher track enhances students’ self esteem. They develop a greater sense of status, ability and superiority compared to their lower tracked peers and more further away from them in characterizations of self concept (Van Houtte and Stevens 2010; Van Houtte, Demanet, and Stevens 2012). Additionally, once a student is placed in a lower track, it is extremely difficult for the student to move out of it, creating a sense of hopelessness and inferiority.

Finally, teachers and school administrators work hard to ensure that tracking placements are accurate. After all, students are typically placed in lifetime tracks that expand beyond secondary school. It is imperative that schools get this correct. However, they often do not. As briefly mentioned earlier, ability tracks are highly correlated with race (Oakes 1985; Buttaro et al. 2010; Mickelson 2001, but see Haller 1985). The literature shows that a host of other factors influence one’s track placement, including the school’s racial composition, poverty level, desegregation status—voluntary versus court mandated, teacher representation or grade level (Southworth and Mickelson 2007; Buttaro et al. 2010; Meier, Stewart, England 1989; Eitle 2002). Interestingly, Southworth and Mickelson (2007) find that tracking can adversely affect both Black and white male and female students, demonstrating that within-segregation practices greatly and consistently affect the outcomes of all students and nearly always at disproportionate rates.
Conclusion

In outlining the history of achieving desegregation and the high and low points of the Brown legacy, this chapter helps to set the stage and context of the current research. Are minority students in desegregated schools any better off than the students in segregated schools? The evaluative literature on school desegregation is inconclusive in answering this question. While some scholars point to academic, social, and economic victories for minority students and the state of racial equality in the US, others emphasize the other predictors of students’ academic success that conflict with and weaken desegregation’s influence. Consequently, it is unclear from the broad overview of literature if students are better served in racially balanced schools or if the threat of rapid resegregation is cause for concern. These gaps, inconsistencies, and the limited discussion of the local level politics of desegregation policy leaves much room for theoretical exploration into the political, organizational, and bureaucratic factors likely to shape local desegregation policy decisions and outcomes, as well as the manner in which the racial composition influences the noted factors.

The historical literature draws a clearer picture on why the focus is currently at the local level, how the historical and more recent federal actions have shaped where school districts are today in pursuing this goal, and where this policy should be directed to resolve the standing issues. It is through this lens that the empirical questions of the upcoming chapters are derived; testable hypotheses are established; and empirical findings are interpreted and probed for deeper insights on the differences and/or similarities in segregated and desegregated education. In the next chapter, I outline the theoretical framework used to explore the research questions of the dissertation project. The framework applies theories of organizational theory to the political dimensions of school
districts in an effort to explain how, when, and why the level of racial balance in a district matters.
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL

The literature previously discussed suggests a broad approach to fully understanding the predictors of school desegregation and its consequences for students. A historic look at desegregation policy highlights how that body of literature can benefit from an updated study of policy implementation and the outcomes for students as the U.S. demographics rapidly evolve and education remains the pathway to future success. The education literature from which most of the previous chapter is drawn, fails to acknowledge the political context in which desegregation policy functions. The previous chapter’s limited focus on the political nature of desegregation policy demonstrates the lack of discussion in education circles about the role that local government actors, political institutions and even the political environment play in shaping implementation decisions and policy outcomes and outputs. As such, this chapter develops and discusses a three part theory of school desegregation that considers the politics of desegregation policy. The research introduces the broad body of public administration literature to a well established sector of the education literature, demonstrating the interconnectedness of the fields while empirically testing the effect of this interaction in application. It draws from mid-range theories and subliteratures of public administration and political science that focus on non-policymakers in policy development, implementation, and outcomes. The model explores how challenging social policies such as school desegregation are decided at the local level, across varying political environments, and the consequences that follow.

In building this model, the work allows for not only a study of school desegregation policy, but also a broader study of public policy, local governance, and public organizations. The model serves as a guide to understanding the relationships among institutions,
structures, and the political environment. The case of school desegregation provides a testing ground for learning how bureaucrats, as non-policy factors, shape outcomes. Bureaucrats are often thought of as non-policymaking, non-partisan, unbiased experts of policy implementation. Some bureaucratic scholars perceive the bureaucracy as an appendage to the legislative and executive branches of government that should be controlled from the top-down (Hammond and Knott 1996; Wood and Waterman 1994). Others, however, argue the contrary, finding bureaucrats to be policymakers that operate as a semi-independent “fourth branch of government” that may be capable of exercising the public’s will and values (Shipan 2004; Meier and O’Toole 2006). Scholars of both arguments agree that bureaucrats are relevant and important to the study of public policy, especially as implementers and shapers of policy outcomes. Secondly, the case of school desegregation and the model allow for a test of the relationship between the political environment and public policy.

This dissertation is one of the few studies to explore and test a multi-theory, integrative framework of public policy at the local or organizational level. I use theories of representative bureaucracy, institutional structure, and public management to construct the theoretical model because these particular bodies of literature all place a great deal of emphasis on local level actors and their relationship to policy development, implementation and outcomes. Yet, these literatures provide room for more exploration into how the political and policy environment shape such relationships. The remaining sections of the chapter provide a brief overview of the multiple strands of theory with supporting literature on its effect on policy outcomes and a more developed discussion of the three part theory of desegregation.
Understanding Institutional Structure

Institutional structure includes the rules, boundaries, and limits of any organization or public institution that defines how the organization operates and makes policy decisions. Every happening of the organization is restricted and limited to these structural boundaries. “Structure is a major determinant of policy,” (Moe and Wilson 1994). The research on political control provides one point of view in examining the way that structure relates to policy decisions and outcomes. Scholars of this field note that political principals often use *ex ante* and ongoing controls to manipulate agencies’ structure in a way that accommodates their interests and reduces political drift while capitalizing on the technical competence of the agency (Bawn 1995; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994). Moe and Wilson (1994) suggest that many of the struggles between the executive and legislative branches are over the structure of bureaucracy—its design, location, staffing, and the appropriate levels of control or power from both branches of government.

From a public administration or public management perspective, structure not only includes the statutes or rules that govern an organization and managerial strategy, but also indicates the level of stability in an organization’s relations (O’Toole and Meier 2011; Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Hill and Lynn 2005). Public managers and organizations may operate in central authority controlled, hierarchical systems or more decentralized, interdependent networked systems (Hill and Lynn 2005; Heinrich, Hill and Lynn 2004; O’Toole and Meier 2011). Such structural relationships define how an organization and its public manager flex their power via collaborations with other organizations, external stakeholders, or clients. O’Toole and Meier (2011) contend that managers use structures to regularize organizational actions (xii). Structure also includes organizational form,
whether an organization is public, private, for-profit, or non-profit, in this body of literature (Hill and Lynn 2005).

As such, many studies on institutional structure focus on bodies of authority, those with the discretion and power to propose policy, oversee policy implementation and organizational evaluation, enact regulations and budgets, and establish the norms and values of an institution or organization. Empirical studies suggest that the structure under which governing authorities operate or impose on organizations can influence their leadership, policy decisions and the overall direction of an organization (Bawn 1995; Balla 1998; Meier et al. 2005; Knott and Payne 2004). Structure has been linked to organizational performance, as well as variation in outcomes for particular groups (Knott and Payne 2004; Hicklin and Meier 2008; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Ellis, Hicklin, and Rocha 2009). Scholars also examine access to governing bodies through varying structures, finding some structures to be more equitable than others (Jones 1976; Welch 1990).

I focus on the electoral structure used in school districts to elected school board members to inform my understanding of institutional structure’s effect on education policy in general and the implications for school desegregation policy and minority student outcomes. Using electoral structure and school board elections to examine how institutional structure may affect desegregation policy and outcomes is important for several reasons. First, historical evidence indicates that manipulating electoral structures was a frequently used tactic to limit electoral representation and the benefits of representation for certain groups. Although Progressives argued that certain structures were used to promote democracy and ensure fair elections for all, many states and localities used them to circumvent the minority and poor vote and reduce their political power. School districts were no different; they too used structure to reduce minority
access. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 made all forms of voting manipulation and disenfranchisement illegal. Most significant to this research, it forced many states and districts to redraw their district lines and change their electoral strategies to provide equal access to minorities. For many this meant moving to a single member district (SMD)/ward electoral system. Lawmakers assumed that creating majority-minority districts would decrease voter dilution, increase the chances of minority candidates’ success, and lead to greater minority representation in Congress, on city-councils, and on school boards. Social scientists testing this logic have reached varying conclusions that are discussed in the coming sections.

Second, school boards are possibly the most important school district actors to district policy and therefore, play a significant role in student outcomes and school success. Howell (2005) notes that school boards do not enjoy the total jurisdictional power they held in the early days of public education due to federal, state, local political intervention, as well as private interests. Nevertheless, school boards remain the official school district governing body. They frame and set the district’s policy agenda and are generally responsible for superintendent employment, curricula, budgeting and reform (Wirt and Kirst 1989; Allen and Plank 2005; Howell 2005). School boards are also seen as the liaison between the community and professional educators. Community concerns about education are addressed through the school board (Allen and Plank 2005). On the other hand, the

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23 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 states that state and local officials shall not adopt or maintain voting laws or procedures that purposefully discriminate based on race, color, or membership of a language minority. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled in Mobile v. Bolden that required plaintiffs to file suit and prove that the electoral standard, practice, or procedure was enacted or maintained to restrict racial minority opportunity in the political process. Shortly after in 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to include this language. The 1982 amendment prohibits any voting practice or procedure that leads to a discriminatory result, regardless of the intention. Plaintiffs must prove discrimination and harmful effects on minorities beyond the expectation of a harmful outcome (US Department of Justice 2013).
professional educators view the school board not only as their “boss,” but also the buffer between them and political influences and public discontent (Howell 2005).

As such, understanding how people are elected to this highly salient governing body and the factors that influence this process is important for predicting school policies, functioning and outcomes—from administrative, faculty and staff outcomes to student performance. Any study of k-12 education policy is incomplete without a discussion of the school board, so I focus on board members’ system of election to explore desegregation policy and students’ outcomes under its varying contexts.

**About Electoral Structures**

Scholars acknowledge two main types of electoral structural systems—single-member district (SMD) systems, also called wards, and at-large systems. In a SMD/ward system, school districts or communities are divided into geographic units, and representatives are elected from each individual borough to make up a complete, representative elected body (Rocha 2009). Prior to the Progressive reform movement of the early twentieth century, SMD/ward elections were typically used for city council elections; however, reformists argued that this system was corrupt and less focused on the public good and more on private and individual goals (Lineberry and Fowler 1967). As a result, reformists supported the second type of electoral system—at-large. Members are

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24 A third system, appointed systems, is mentioned in the literature, though less frequently because a smaller percentage of US school districts use this system. In appointed systems, the school board is nominated or selected by a superior individual to serve in the elected body. Appointive systems traditionally underrepresented minorities (Stewart, England and Meier 1989). However, research on Latino school board representation suggests that appointive systems can generate significantly large levels of representation for minorities (Meier and Stewart 1991; Leal, Martinez-Ebers and Meier 2004). The effect on African American representation also varies. Some scholars find that appointive systems can also be beneficial to African American representation on school boards, yielding greater representation than elective systems, particularly in larger cities with sizable black populations (Welch and Karnig 1978; Robinson and England 1981, but see Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig 1976; Fraga, Meier and Stewart 1986; Welch 1990).
elected from the totality of the county, district, or community in at-large systems. The reformists saw the at-large system as a way to “maximize representation of the city as a whole,” and meet their main goal to “‘rationalize’ and ‘democratize’ city government by the substitution of ‘community oriented’ leadership,” (Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Ironically, at-large elections were also established to reduce the impact of socio economic cleavages and minority voting blocs in local politics. Electoral systems were institutions created to serve as barriers against particularistic interests (Lineberry and Fowler 1967).

Although the original principles and goals of the reformers were intended to be “inclusive,” at-large systems were only successful for those who could afford to participate and attract voters. The system had a dramatically negative effect on minorities who were subject to residential segregation and disenfranchisement laws; it limited their ability to gain descriptive representation. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 sought to alleviate the disparities in access to political representation and participation for African Americans. It was later expanded in 1975 to include Latinos, Native Americans, Native Alaskans, and Asian-Americans (Engstrom 1994). The act helped increase the number of minority elected officials through minority electorate expansion and a shift to SMD/ward elections. The shift in electoral system alleviated some of the institutional constraints of the at-large system such as voter dilution (Engstrom 1994).

A substantial amount of literature has explored the extent to which electoral structure has been helpful in alleviating institutional political constraints for minorities as expected. Scholars are divided on the issue with some concluding that the SMD/ward electoral system is more favorable toward minority representation compared to an at-large electoral system (Meier and Stewart 1991; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig 1976; Karnig and Welch 1982; Jones 1976), and others finding support for the at-large system being
equally beneficial to minorities (Fraga, Meier and Stewart 1986; Welch and Karnig 1978). A third sector of the literature finds that mixed systems, that is, electoral systems that use both at-large and SMD/ward elections, have a positive effect on minority representation (Welch 1990; Taebel 1978; MacManus 1978; Davidson and Korbel 1981), though Welch (1990) finds that minority representation through mixed systems is not as equitable as pure SMD/ward or at-large systems.

More recent studies attempt to adjudicate the conflicting results, suggesting that the position minorities hold in a county or district’s total population best predicts the most advantageous system for the group (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005). Marschall, Ruhil and Shah (2010) find that Blacks must make up at least 25 percent of the population to gain electoral representation under a SMD/ward system and 40 percent of the population under an at-large system. Alternatively, researchers find evidence of a double bias in electoral structures. Minorities gain less representation under an at-large system when they are the numerical minority in the district. However, when minorities are the majority in a school district, they use the at-large system to also gain representation; an at-large system is equally beneficial for minorities as a SMD/ward system, and in some cases more beneficial (Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005). An at-large system holds a majoritarian bias toward any group that constitutes the majority of the population, termed an “at-large bias.” This means, theoretically, any electoral system is beneficial to racial minorities who comprise the numerical majority of the population. The empirical research shows that this is often the case for both African American and Latino representation (Meier et al. 2005; Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005).
Electoral Structure in Education

Many scholars use the case of education to explore the relationship between electoral structure and minority representation, and the consequences of this representation for minority students. Polinard et al. (1994) and Stewart, England and Meier (1989) find that electing minorities to political positions is directly related to recruiting and hiring more minority bureaucrats. Meier et al. (2005) find similar results, with minorities elected through ward systems having a greater influence on the number of minority administrators in school districts compared to minorities elected through at-large systems. The effect has also been found to translate into more minority teachers, which has implications for other policies such as suspensions, dropout rates or assignment to specific courses (Meier et al. 2005; Meier and England 1984). Electoral structure also affects education finance. While Blacks fail to significantly improve expenditures for Black students under any structure, Latinos improve expenditures for Latino students under both systems (Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha 2009).

On the other hand, research also indicates that structure can directly influence educational outcomes. Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha (2009), find that the general structure of SMD/ward systems is related to benefits for minority student, separate from minority school board representation. They show that structure can change the nature of equity in schools. Ward systems promote racial and ethnic equity in public education expenditures, shifting the resource distribution toward minority students even when minority representation fails to produce greater expenditures for minority students.

Outside of electoral systems studies, scholars also show that having a consolidated electoral structure also shapes school board representation and holds implications for educational governance and outcomes. Allen and Plank (2005) examine the effect that
consolidating school board elections with municipal elections or using special elections has
on minority representation, contending that separate elections reduce democratic
participation in school governance and those that participate in the separate school board
elections are often not representative of the population at-large. They find that
consolidated electoral structures do increase minority participation, while reducing low-
income participation. Special elections were associated with less electoral participation,
and hence less democratic representation in school governance. Special elections allow
school districts greater control over elections, and those elected through these systems
were found to be less responsive to the public compared to those operating in a
consolidated system (Allen and Plank 2005).

The institutional structure literature provides a solid ground to root questions of
school and student performance across various educational settings. Studies on electoral
structure provide a pretty clear picture on “the why” and “the how” structure matters for
student outcomes. The picture on the factors that influence this relationship, particularly
the policy setting, is less clear. Consequently, the role of structure in the desegregation
story is unknown. How does structure act in an imbalanced educational environment?
How does it operate in a racially balanced environment? And how does structure in each
environment shape representation? What are the implications for students in these
systems; do the benefits of ward elections transcend to students in racially segregated
schools too? In sum, does institutional structure’s effect look different in a racially balanced
environment versus an imbalanced environment and what are the implications for
performance? The coming chapters tackle these questions.
Understanding Representative Bureaucracy

Political science scholars agree that representation matters when it comes to implementing public policies and distributing public goods and services to the citizenry (Miller and Stokes 1963; Pitkin 1967; Eulau and Karps 1977; Erikson 1978). Representation is a fundamental component of democracy. It ensures that the will of the people is reflected in government. Public administration scholars take this a step further, however, and argue that representation matters in the electorate-determined government as well as the bureaucracy that supports elected officials in executing policies. From this proposition emerges the theory of representative bureaucracy. Originally introduced to study the English Civil Service, the theory hinges on the idea that bureaucracies should be reflective of the dominant class in society and no group can be trusted if it is not reflective of such (Kingsley 1944; Krislov 1974). Scholars applying this theory to an American context held that bureaucracies should indeed be reflective of the citizenry, but demographically, not on class position alone (Levitan 1946; Long 1952; Van Riper 1958). Simply stated, scholars theorized that as the bureaucracy increases in demographic representativeness, it will also become more responsive to the public’s needs and demands because people with shared demographics tend to share values and interests through similar socialization processes and experiences. Bureaucrats are assumed to use these values in their discretionary decision making process (Selden 1997; Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003).

Mosher (1968) expanded the base theory to include classifications of representation, similar to Pitkin’s (1967) classic work on political representation. He introduced the concepts of passive and active representation. Active representation involves bureaucrats advocating or “acting for” constituents’ interests, while passive
representation focuses on origins and demographic characteristics of bureaucrats and the
degree to which they mirror the society—“standing for” a particular group (Mosher 1968).
These two concepts have become the main tenants of studies on representative
bureaucracy as many scholars agree there are substantive links between the two concepts.
Consequently, much scholarship has focused on understanding the two concepts, their
effects, their relationship to each other and the casual mechanisms responsible for their
relationship.

The Passive to Active Representation Link

Recall that the basic premise of the theory of representative bureaucracy is that
passive representation is necessary or preferred in public bureaucracies because it affects
the level of active representation—the distribution of goods and services to clients based
on shared demographic based values and interests. The relationship between these two
concepts is highly debated in the literature, as some scholars find supporting evidence of
this relationship (see Hindera 1993; Selden 1997; Bardbury and Kellough 2008; Wilkins
and Keiser 2006), others contend that the relationship is conditional (see Hindera and
Young 1998; Rosenthal and Bell 2003) and yet a third camp notes that the relationship
does not exist, but instead supporters are finding “correlates” of the possible relationship
and very little sound evidence of it (see Rehfuss 1986; Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009;
Lim 2006). Frank Thompson (1976) is perhaps one of the earliest critics of the contended
relationship between the two concepts, and many scholars have taken his work to either
defend the relationship or contest it also. His research highlights the potential barriers to
active representation, yet contends that under certain circumstances these barriers may be
broken in which passive representation can lead to active representation. Barriers to the
passive to active representation link are broken when groups and institutions recognize
and “press” for minority interests; when issues hold obvious ramifications for one’s group; and there is employee mobilization, support and discretion (Thompson 1976).

Meier (1993a; 1993b) builds on Thompson and others’ arguments and suggests that several related conditions should be met for passive representation to actually transcend to active representation in a way that produces substantive outcomes. First, the bureaucrats should be integrated into positions that allow them to influence policy outcomes (Meier 1993b). Racial minorities or women should not be regulated to positions in the organization (i.e. clerical, maintenance and support) that prevent them from shaping policy outcomes. Second, organizational socialization must be minimal or at least supportive of representative behavior. In order to shape policy, bureaucrats must be able to use their personal values and beliefs to make decisions, separate from the organizational values they are expected to adopt. If the organization’s values conflict with the demographic groups’ values, bureaucrats may act on the organizational values that they have adopted as their own instead of their natural demographic values when making policy decisions. Third, the agency must have jurisdiction over an area where policy outcomes can actually affect the represented group (i.e. social welfare, education). Finally, bureaucrats must have discretion in making decisions for the agency. Organizations in which bureaucrats have little to no discretion limit when and how bureaucrats may use their demographic values, and consequently, active representation is not likely to occur.

Based on these conditions, education agencies are an ideal arena to test the theory of representative bureaucracy because education policy generally meets all of the noted conditions. Racial minorities are found at every juncture of school districts—from top level administration and governing boards to street level bureaucracy. Organizational socialization is minimal; education actors receive large amounts of professional
socialization, but less formal district-level socialization, leaving much room for
demographic values and beliefs to permeate the organization. Education policy decisions at
each level of a district are aimed at affecting students, including minority groups. Finally,
every level of education agencies has a substantial amount of discretion in implementing
policies. As such, many scholars have used this theory to explain the relationship between
administration representation and teacher representation, and teacher representation and
student outcomes.

Representative Bureaucracy in Education

Public administration scholars frequently use the case of education to test the
theory of representative bureaucracy, particularly in the implementation of school policies.
Many have found that representation is a positive predictor of student success. Minority
students educated in schools with greater percentages of minority teachers experience
greater performance outcomes (Weiher 2000; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Meier
and Stewart 1991). When female math teachers teach female students, they help to
find that minority teacher representation also has a significant effect on grouping and
tracking decisions. Having minority teachers decreases the likelihood that a minority
student is tracked into special education, increases his/her chances of being recommended
for gifted courses, and reduces the likelihood he/she receives the most severe form of
discipline. They conclude that greater levels of minority representation affect this process
because minority teachers share the same experiences, interests and goals as minority
parents and students.

Although education scholars may not always base their studies in representative
bureaucracy theory explicitly, their theoretical arguments and research findings support
the theory and corroborate public administration scholars’ works. They show that pairing students with teachers of a shared gender or race has a positive effect on students’ academic achievement (Klopfenstein 2005; Evans 1992; Dee 2005, but see Farkas et al. 1990; Ehrenberg and Brewer 1995). They are more likely to take more challenging academic courses under a same race or opposite gender teacher (Klopfenstein 2005); more likely to have better work habits, and better attendance records (Farkas et al. 1990). Some attribute the findings to the “role model effect,” in which same race, ethnicity, or gender teachers provide an example of the benefits to education for students, prompting students to alter their prior beliefs, increase their enthusiasm, confidence, and effort to perform better academically (Klopfenstein 2005; Dee 2004; Dee 2005). Under this model, it is assumed that teachers expect more and take more of an interest in mentoring students with a shared demographic also helping to improve their overall performance (Dee 2004).

Others consider the cultural similarities that co-ethnic teachers and students share that allow teachers to reach students better (Ladson-Billings 1994; Goldsmith 2004). The teachers are either able to relate and sympathize with the students’ racial and/or class background or more effectively use cultural references and history to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to improve student performance (Ladson-Billings 1994; Goldsmith 2004). Here, the assumption is that students learn more and better when their home and school environments match. Same-race or same-gender teachers provide this “cultural congruence” (Ferguson 1998; Howard 2001). Beyond the representative bureaucracy frame, education scholars highlight the credibility that a shared demographic provides a teacher in shaping outcomes for co-ethnic or co-gender students.

The education benefits of representation are not restricted to a teacher-student relationship, however. Research indicates that street level bureaucrats have perhaps the
largest effect on student performance, but upper level bureaucrats can also influence outcomes and district policies and decisions. Having minority representation on school boards and having minority superintendents or principals is related to positive outcomes for minority students and an increase in minority focused policies and programs (Leal and Hess 2000; Theobald 2007; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011). School districts with larger proportions of Latino school board representatives are more responsive to limited-English proficient (LEP) students’ needs. These districts allocate more aid for English language learners (ELL) teachers and designate more of these teachers to bilingual education programs (Leal and Hess 2000; Theobald 2007, but see Robinson 2002). The same effect holds for Latino superintendents (Theobald 2007). Rocha and Wrinkle (2011) take these findings one step further and find that having Latina representation improves support for bilingual education and other Latino centered programs at a rate higher than simply having any Latino representative. Greater levels of African American and Latino school board representation are associated with the hiring of more African American and Latino school administrators and teachers (Rocha 2007; Fraga, Meier, and England 1986).

Like the institutional structure research, the representative bureaucracy literature also provides a solid ground to root questions of school and student performance across various educational settings. This research on representative bureaucracy theory in public education provides us with a plethora of examples of how, why, and when it works and matters for students. It proves that the theory is pretty solid in predicting bureaucrat-client relationships and outcomes. However, will these findings hold when the policy environment is considered? That is, how much of the past findings of representational effects are dependent on policy environment in which it occurs, and how might the policy
environment alter or shape policy outcomes? The theoretical framework developed in this chapter considers this.

**Understanding Public Management**

Public management is a diverse and fragmented theory of academic and practitioner wisdom and experience with a primary goal of informing public managers of effective actions toward making government work (Bozeman 1993). Most scholars agree that the discipline is defined by a few character features that unite much of the public management literature such as the focus on upper level management\(^{25}\), case study design\(^{26}\), and managerial behavior (Kettl 1993, 58). However, the central research question of public management studies—the relationship between political strategies, policy implementation, and program results—defines the study of public management. The question makes public management very useful in the study of public policy, particularly the implementation and outcome dimensions.

Similar to the research on representative bureaucracy theory, public administration and public management scholars examine the unique factors, strategies, and techniques of public managers and often public organizations to understand how and

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\(^{25}\) There is a more recent emphasis in the literature on the multiple levels of management that also make a difference in policy implementation and organizational performance. Scholars show that middle management decision making is just as important to organization's implementation and policy outcomes as upper level management (Johansen 2012; Morgan et al. 1996). A wave of research also holds the competing position that middle management is not very beneficial to organizations and is a source of conflict. Theories rooted in organizational theory and human resource management suggest that street level bureaucrats or localized employees are more productive and satisfied when they are more directly connected and responsible for the conditions of organizational success and production (Peters and Waterman 1982; Cohen and Brand 1993). Research in the government reform movement also hold the position that middle managers are costly, dysfunctional, and are less relevant as the government shifts its focus from producing goods to contracting out and managing goods' production (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

\(^{26}\) Many scholars have moved beyond the case study approach to quantitatively predict behavior and management using sophisticated models of management behavior, best practices, and effectiveness in moving the discipline beyond observational studies (O'Toole and Meier 1999; Heinrich 2000).
why polices are implemented and the results of this implementation process. This research is particularly useful in learning about policy success and failure. As such, much of their work centers on the manager. The collective works consistently indicate management as a fundamental factor of organizational functioning, policy implementation, and policy outcomes (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009). Scholars note that everything from a manager’s specific techniques or tools of management, to one’s personal traits and behaviors matter in managing an effective and productive organization. They contend that it is a manager’s ability to motivate and lead subordinates, network with stakeholders and external actors for resources and information or buffer the organization from external constraints that allows them to shape an organization’s performance and outcomes (Lieberson and O’Conner 1972; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2001).

**Public Management in Public Education**

Public management researchers suggest that managers affect policies and outcomes to a greater extent at the local level than at any other level of government (Kettl 1993, 63). As such, many of the large-n analyses of public management and organizational outcomes are based in local governing systems such as public education. School districts have proven to be an ideal setting for answering public management questions and observing the public management and public policy connection for several reasons. First, they are the largest US service providers, serving nearly 50 million students nationally based on Fall 2012 enrollment estimates (National Center for Education Statistics 2012). They are designed as independent “governments” intended to restrict external government and political influence (Tyack 1974; Meier and O’Toole 2001). However, a range of other actors and voices—from political to social service—influence much of what school districts do. Second, school districts are managed organizations that engage in the policy process.
The school board serves as the overarching governing board that oversees policy, but school superintendents serve as upper level managers in the district responsible for implementing the school board’s policies and making policy suggestions to the governing board based on their interactions with subordinates. Superintendents operate a central office, as well as the set of schools within the district. They are responsible for overseeing the function of this office and every school in the district. School principals act as middle managers—semi-autonomous managers of their individual schools with control and oversight over the teachers, or local street-level bureaucrats within their school. They assist superintendents in managing the individual schools. Both superintendents and school principals yield a substantial amount of discretion in implementing policy, making them optimal candidates for empirical studies on policy implementation and evaluation.

Finally, school districts are perhaps the most frequently evaluated public organizations. Current federal education policies require school districts to evaluate schools’ and the district’s overall performance annually across subpopulations. As such, the policies school boards enact, managers implement, and street level bureaucrats execute are constantly measured, assessed, and provide a plethora of data on outcome indicators for researchers of the policy process and policymakers.

Public management scholars have found that a range of managerial factors are positively related to student performance. For example, Meier and O’Toole (2001) show that a manager’s networking behavior, that is, the frequency in which they interact with school district and community actors, is positively related to improvements in student performance. Students perform about four percentage points higher on the Texas state achievement test under a manager who networks more frequently. Scholars also find that superintendents who adopt a proactive managerial style, that is, actively seeking to
preemptively control outcomes, versus a reactive style also help to improve student performance (Goerdel 2005). Superintendents of higher quality, as assessed by any additional compensation beyond a one’s base pay, also help to improve students’ performance (Meier and O’Toole 2002). In sum, public managers play an important role in student achievement and success.

Educational leadership and administration scholars hold a similar contention, finding that education managers—superintendents and school principals—not only execute policy directives from the school board, but they also work to directly affect student achievement and performance (Marks and Printy 2003; Eberts and Stone 1988; Brewer 1993). The educational leadership work shows that specific management or leadership behaviors and traits influence student performance (Eberts and Stone 1988; Friedkin and Slater 1994; Grissom and Loeb 2011, but see Hallinger, Bickman and Davis 1996); that specific leadership styles have a greater effect on student performance than others (Robinson, Lloyd, and Rowe 2008; Brewer 1993); and that particular leadership characteristics such as one’s gender influence the manner in which one leads and consequently alters student performance (Hallinger and Murphy 1985; Hallinger, Bickman and Davis 1996). Linkages between a principal’s level of experience as a principal, a teacher, or experience in a particular school and improvements in student performance have been established in the education literature as well (Eberts and Stone 1988; Brewer 1993). Brewer’s (1993) research also indicates an indirect relationship between school principals and student performance; they influence outcomes through teacher appointments and academic oriented goal setting. Schools with principals holding more leverage of teacher employment and campus goals experience an increase in student performance from 10th grade to 12th grade (Brewer 1993).
These collective bodies of literature emphasize the importance of understanding how and why public managers matter in general and specifically to public education. The research provides much evidence that public managers are vital to student performance and can greatly alter their level of success, but do these managers have the same effect when addressing challenging policies or in challenging policy environments? Are they able to also manage these situations to help student performance or provide resources to teachers and students? Does management have the same effect on students when it operates in a racially imbalanced environment as when it operates in a racially balanced environment?

**Conclusion**

The above literature highlights a few things that will help this exploration into why the levels of desegregation efforts and attempts to maintain racial balance in schools vary across individual campuses and districts, and the implications of variations in racial balance for education policies, teacher and administrative behavior, and student performance.

First, the literature on institutional structure with a specific emphasis on electoral structures indicates that the structural rules and policies that determine how an organization will be governed and who will govern it matter for organizational decisions and outcomes. Electoral structures have long been investigated as a deterrent to minority representation; however, the more recent work illustrates that the bias of structure is not against racial minorities per say, but against any group in a numerical minority (Jones 1976; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Meier and Gonzalez-Juenke 2005; Meier et al. 2005). Institutional structures play a significant role in determining who governs and consequently which policies are pursued, how the policies are designed and implemented,
and the outcomes that follow. The first puzzle to understanding local desegregation policies and its consequences is to consider the varying structures and their policy environments that can potentially lead to significant variation in the policy process across school districts.

Second, the representative bureaucracy literature provides a substantive amount of evidence that beyond the rules and structural norms, “people matter.” That is, one’s local administrators, leaders, and street level bureaucrats play an important role in district governance, policy decisions, and inevitably policy outcomes and outputs. However, these people do not simply matter due to their position in the organization or the function they may serve; they also matter on a personal, demographic dimension (Long 1952; Van Riper 1958; Selden 1997; Keiser et al. 2002). Representing a range of demographics in an organization translates into representing and serving a range of interests that may not have been recognized without a change in organizational representation. Therefore, another piece of the puzzle to understanding local desegregation policies—or even policies in general—and the consequences of such policies for students across demographic groups is to consider the demographic nature of a school district. The demographic makeup of one’s district and/or schools via local bureaucrats and administrators presents an opportunity for changes in policy decisions, implementation, and outcomes that reflect the diverse policy environment.

Finally, the public management literature offers another vantage of considering how and why “people matter” in this desegregation picture. Broadly, the literature notes that public managers are essential to the functioning of an organization as the chief implementers. The management literature, especially the more recent studies that seek to explain how and why “management matters” to public organizations, has spent a great deal
of time explaining the role and significance of public managers, exploring their decision making process and actions, and finally quantifying this decision making process, their behaviors, and the consequences for public organizations. An overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that indeed “management matters;” therefore, it seems highly relevant to see if and how management matters to this desegregation puzzle. Public managers may also use their policy implementation decisions and behaviors to influence the policy environment in a way that produces different outcomes across policy settings. In sum, the established literature on institutional structure, representative bureaucracy, and public management provide a solid basis for understanding how bureaucrats affect policy and policy outcomes. I use these literatures to develop a theory of desegregation policy through bureaucratic action and policy environments, and examine the implication of these actions for students under settings of varying levels of racial balance.

The Tri-Part Theory of School Desegregation

The Theoretical Model and Its Components

I construct a three part, integrative theory to predict a district’s decision to pursue racially balanced schools as an indication of maintaining or establishing a desegregation policy. Because this project focuses heavily on non-political actors’ role in shaping policy decisions and outcomes, I build upon studies of bureaucrats. Other scholars taking an integrative approach to answering challenging policy questions also note the role of bureaucrats and public managers in developing and implementing public policy (Hicklin and Godwin 2009; Howlett 2011; Kingdon 1984). This provides some supporting evidence to the validity of this approach in addressing policymaking via “non-policymakers” and addressing the questions of desegregation policy. Secondly, the various sectors of literature each indicate that bureaucrats and public managers are highly salient to public policy;
therefore, it is imperative to use them as a lens for investigating the research questions. Finally, school desegregation policy has always been a locally implemented policy, and in more recent years has become a locally decided policy in which the local education leaders decide not only the implementation process, but also the policy's overall fate.

**Phase 1: The Determinants of Desegregation Policy**

The theory aims to explain two parts or phases of the current desegregation policy. First, it explores why differences in the pursuit of the policy occur across school districts. In other words, *why are some schools desegregating while others are resegregating?* Here, I argue that bureaucratic actions drive this process. There are a set of institutional, structural, and management factors that best explain why some school districts seek to achieve racial balance through desegregation policies, while others do not. In this section, I outline the main tenants of the argument and present an overview of the findings for first phase of this dissertation project. All empirical results are included in Appendix A. Phase 1 provides groundwork research on which the more extensive and focal second phase of the dissertation project is based. It establishes the predictors of racially balanced educational settings, while the second phase pushes these findings to explore the consequences of racial balance and imbalanced educational settings for minority students. More specifically, the second phase of research, discussed in more detail in future sections of this chapter, poses the question, *"If institutional, structural, and management factors can predict the fate of desegregation polices, how does the policy environment affect the predictors and what are the consequences for students?"* Phase 2 essentially looks at the relationship between the policy environment and bureaucratic actions to predict education policies and student performance.
The three factors—institutional, structural, and management—used to predict the level of racial balance in school districts are considered for a few reasons. First, the literature suggests that the factors are solid predictors of individual stages of the policy process. Institutional factors like representation shape the implementation and outcome phases; structural factors establish the rules of the process; and management also shapes the implementation and outcomes stages of the policy process. Assuming past findings are correct, one may also expect the factors to successfully predict the outcome of desegregation policy—more racially balanced schools or imbalanced schools.

Second, as outlined and discussed above, the mid theory literatures from which this model is drawn provides substantive evidence of these factors mattering a great deal for policy outcomes, particularly at a local level. Minority representation has been shown to have the greatest effect at bureaucratic level (Meier 1993b; Roch et al. 2010). Institutional structure’s effect on outcomes and polices has also traditionally been studied at the local level with implications at other levels of government. Public management, typically tested at the organizational or “unit” level, has shown a positive effect at multiple levels of government, including the local level. If these collective literatures are correct, these findings may also hold consistently for the policy outcome of racially balanced schools, used in this context as an indication of a district’s efforts toward racially desegregated schools. The model, shown in Figure 3.1, suggests that the racial balance of a school district is a function of the local representation, a district’s institutional structure, and the management of that district.
However, one reason we might not expect these predictors to work as well in predicting the level of racial balance in a district is the stronger predictive power of other confounding factors such as the level of residential segregation in a community or school district. Residential segregation makes it very difficult for school districts to manipulate the racial composition of their schools, particularly when neighborhood schooling is the general policy. A second reason may be the unobserved influence of state government. Many state governments have also moved away from focusing on the racial balance of schools to other issues. Their power to pass laws and directives on education policy may reflect this shift in focus and effortlessly restrict the amount of time, funding, and effort local districts may place into racially balancing their schools. Finally, local school districts may have shifted their focus from racial balance to other means of equality such as bilingual education, accountability though test scores, and special programs.

Although the theoretical model is organized as an additive relationship among the non-policy making bodies and the level of racial balance of a school district, I examine each
factor’s effect individually. The subsequent sections further explain how each factor relates to desegregation\textsuperscript{27} and the differing effects they have on the racial balance of school districts.

\textit{Institutional Structure}

The electoral structure under which a representative is elected can have a direct effect on one’s understanding and view of representation. Representatives elected under an at-large system may represent differently from those elected under a ward/SMD system because their constituent base and perceived responsibilities differ. Representatives elected under a ward electoral system can represent more narrow interests, those that appeal to the ward’s majority electorate. On the other hand, those elected under an at-large system must represent the interests of the entire locality because their electorate is drawn from all possible voters. Consequently, the policies that each representative proposes, supports, and implements differ.

For minority representatives, this means that being elected through an at-large system may provide less room or opportunity to propose policies that are beneficial to minorities or represent their more narrow interests, especially when they fail to make up a plurality or the majority of the locality’s total population. An at-large elected minority may have to downplay minority salient issues to appeal to the median voter and majority constituents in an effort to remain in office (Meier, Walker and Walker 2008; but see Guinier 1991). However, being elected through a ward system may provide some advantages to minority interests outside of simply gaining descriptive representation. The

\textsuperscript{27} Ideal analysis of this question would include a direct measure of a district’s desegregation policy or plan; however, the current research uses the outcome of policy—the racial composition of schools in a district—as a proxy to a district’s desegregation policy or plan. This practice is consistent with the past and current research investigating the effect of school desegregation policies (or lack of) on student achievement and various outcome measures (see Rivkin 2000; Card and Rothstein 2007 for examples).
potential for substantive representation is higher under such a system because actively seeking to represent minority interests and interests of that specific region in the locality only helps the representative’s chances of being re-elected. Therefore, minority representatives elected through a SMD/ward system emphasize and put more effort into maintaining racial balance in their schools as a minority interest compared to at-large elected members responsible for representing majority interests that expand beyond the narrow focus of racial minority interests, especially when racial minorities are the numerical minority of a district.

Empirical research, however, shows that minorities actually benefit from representation through an at-large system over a ward/SMD system (see Appendix A). School districts in which the minority representatives are elected through an at-large electoral structure are more racially balanced. This seems to indicate that one way of changing the racial balance of school districts is through the election of minority representatives with enough power to make desegregation more than a “ward” or “minority” issue, but to present it as a district-wide issue that serves multiple interests. Minorities elected through an at-large system are able to do this.

Representation

Having substantial minority representation among education bureaucrats to convey the interest of racially balanced schools that they share with minority parents, community members, and students is another way to alter the level of racial balance in a district. Having passive representation in a bureaucracy often shapes an organization’s values in a way that includes the interests, preferences, and ideals of previously

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28 Electoral structure has no significant effect on the level of racial balance between White and Latino students.
underrepresented groups. As the values of the bureaucracy changes with the added representation, the policy agenda and development also change to reflect this shift. Additionally, having this representation at multiple levels of a bureaucracy—upper, middle, and street-level—provides the power and discretion necessary to substantively represent minority interests. Varying discretion and power levels is likely to alter the extent to which a bureaucrat is a representative and the effect this representation has on policy and outcomes.

The empirical findings indicate that representation does affect the racial balance of a district; however, it does not help to improve the level of racial balance. Instead, increases in African American teacher and administrator representation are related to decreases in the level of racial balance in a school district\(^\text{29}\). Additionally, the level at which representation occurs has a negative effect on the racial balance of a district, though the magnitude of the effect is magnified as expected. These findings provide little support for the contention of representation being a predictor of desegregation and are likely indicating where minority teachers and administrators represent larger proportions of the faculty. Nevertheless, the findings leave room for more theoretical exploration into why representation matters less at this stage and when it is more likely to matter in helping to affect the racial balance of schools or other policies for students.

*Public Management*

Finally, the management of an organization affects how policies are implemented and the resulting outcomes of the implementation process. Public managers play a significant role in shaping the success of public policies. Their leadership style,

\(^{29}\) Latino teacher and administrator representation fails to have a significant effect on the level of racial balance for Latino students.
management behaviors, and the role adopted all alter policy decisions; they dictate how
policies are viewed, decided and implemented, and therefore also shape the overall success
of policies in the organization. Similarly, public managers, or school administrators in this
context, can also influence the outcome of racial balancing efforts in one’s district. Through
their leadership, unique strategies, or particular behaviors such as networking and internal
management, managers are able to get difficult policies such as desegregation on the
district’s agenda, gain community and staff support for it, or protect the schools and
district from any external challenges to the policy. A manager that is able to increase the
salience of desegregation, able to gain support for pursuing and maintaining racial balance,
and buffer any external challenges to the policy, is likely to have a more racially balanced
school or district.

Results (see Appendix A) show that some of a principal’s management behaviors—
networking with the external actors and managing the internal workings of one’s school—are related to a more racially balanced school. This suggests that another way to improve
the racial balance of imbalanced schools is through the hiring or training of public
managers to manage better internally and externally, and to collaborate with others on the
issue directly. Adopting an advocate role to address minority issues has no affect on the
racial balance of one’s school. Being simply an advocate is not enough to enact real change.

**Phase 2: Evaluating Desegregation Policies through Bureaucratic Actions and Policy Environments**

The hallmark of this dissertation project is evaluating policy and performance outcomes under racially segregated and desegregated school districts. The first portion of this research (see Appendix A) establishes that institutional structure, representation, and
public management matter to a limited and varied extent in predicting the racial composition of schools. Although these factors may shape the process toward more desegregated schools, the reality remains that for many school districts, racial imbalance is and will remain the norm in its schools. Changing their level of bureaucratic representation, adopting alternative management strategies, or altering the electoral structure to improve representation is likely not enough to convince such school districts that pursuing racially balanced schools is worthwhile and important to improving their district’s success. For such districts, a deeper analysis of the consequences to racially imbalanced schools for the entire organization may be more convincing. Realizing this and the theoretical importance of investigating policy environments, I pose the second stage of research questions: what are the implications of differences in the level of racial balance for student performance and outcomes when the predictors are considered? In other words, are students better off in racially segregated or desegregated schools? Here the focus is less on predicting where desegregated education is likely to occur and why, and more on how desegregated education differs from segregated education and why they differ. The literature and findings of the first phase indicate that representation, structure, and management loosely matter for predicting desegregation and student performance outcomes. Based on those findings, I theorize and examine how the previously tested predictors matter across different policy environments and the consequences for policies and organizational outcomes. In sum, the practical questions of the chapters as they relate to the theoretical model are: does institutional structure perform the same, yielding the same outcomes suggested in the traditional literature and empirically shown above? Do bureaucrats represent the same way in segregated settings versus desegregated settings? And management, does it look different in these two settings? These questions are rooted
in the organizational theory and behavior literature. Organizational theorists who study the relationship between organizations and their environments argue that organizational functioning and outputs are largely a function or consequence of the environment and its contingencies and constraints (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Scott and Meyer 1983; Oliver 1997; Thompson 1967). In other words, they contend that the governance of organizations is mainly external. Organizations develop and implement policies in response to their policy environments, and their outcomes are reflective of the environmental influence. In essence, organizations are puppets of the external environment. I take a similar approach to public education organizations, realizing that they too are largely a function of internal workings at the hand of external influence. I argue the policy environment in which locally elected officials, bureaucrats, and public managers operate plays a significant role in the manner in which they establish and make policy decisions, implement policy, and the outputs and outcomes produced. Consequently, district policies, behaviors, and outcomes may be more so a reflection of the policy environment versus the independent effect of structure, representation, or public management. By comparing these previously tested factors of school desegregation in racially balanced and imbalanced districts, I am able to not only explore the role of external control in public policy, but also demonstrate the unique differences of the two settings. In each empirical chapter, I probe the relationship between the policy environment and a policy factor—institutional structure, bureaucratic representation, or public management—and the implications for this relationship for student outcomes.
Lacking from the organizational theory research is clear guidance on the direction in which policy environment influence may shape the tested factors and what this translates into for student outcomes. In other words, it is unclear from the research if externally controlled policy factors and policies are likely to have a positive or negative effect on policy outcomes. Similarly, it is unclear from this work if we should expect one type of policy environment, (i.e. a racially balanced school district) to have a more positive or negative effect on the tested factors and student outcomes. However, research on the racial composition of schools and its effect on student achievement provide some reason to expect a more racially balanced district to be more advantageous for student outcomes and a more positive policy environment for the examined factors. Scholars note that racially balanced school districts tend to have more experienced teachers, greater resources, more advanced courses, and higher achievement and attainment levels for minority students.
(Southworth and Michelson 2007; Goldsmith 2009; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005).

Nevertheless, this dissertation project focuses less on making a solid, a priori claim for or against one type of school district and more on demonstrating the policy environment differences, the implications of these differences for structure, bureaucratic representation, public management, and ultimately student outcomes. Such an investigation will provide a better understanding of the pros and cons of school desegregation and how students fare under both educational settings.

Substantively, the research questions of this phase fit into the larger discussion of school accountability and closing the achievement gap between minorities and Whites. Under the current public education accountability model, students are expected to learn and meet achievement goals irrespective of their environment. The research questions put this model to the test. No indication of observable differences in student performance and policies between racially balanced and imbalanced schools and districts will provide support for the model’s contention and will indicate to some degree that the setting in which one learns and the resources or barriers that accompany that setting matter less for closing the achievement gap than expected. If students learn and perform equally well in racially segregated districts as balanced districts, then perhaps moving into the vision of the current accountability model is correct. Opposite findings in which there are observable differences may indicate the flaws of the current accountability model and a need to refocus its emphasis to include the level of racial balance and students’ learning environments.

*The Effect of Policy Environment on Institutional Structure and Representation*

The first empirical chapter builds from previous findings that related the interactive effect between electoral structure and representation to the racial balance of
school districts. The previous results provide some evidence that structure manipulates the way in which school board members represent, but two things are not clear. First, does this effect influence other policy outcomes such as teacher representation or student performance? Past research suggests that ward systems promote equality (Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha 2009) and administrator and teacher representation is increased under minority school board members elected under a particular system (Stewart, England and Meier 1989), yet the research linking this representation directly to students is limited (but see Meier, Stewart and England 1989). Second, how do the previous findings hold in a varying policy environments? Other research fails to acknowledge the significant role of the environment in shaping the internal workings of an organization and its outcomes. In this chapter I look to see if the interactive effect between structure and representation changes with the policy environment.

Why might the previously observed relationships and outcomes differ when the policy environment is considered? Theorists of organizations and external control suggest that organizational structures are externally defined. Organizations adopt institutional structures that reflect the expectations, rules, regulations, and interests of their policy environment to gain legitimacy, support, prestige, and to maintain or earn resources. Each of these factors adds to the organization’s ultimate goal of increasing its probability of survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987; Oliver 1997). In this chapter, I adopt this knowledge to predict the structure most likely to be adopted in racially balanced and imbalanced districts, structure’s conditional effect on school board representation, and then how the policy environment shapes structure and representation’s effect on policy outcomes. I develop a series of hypotheses to test the differences and similarities in racially balanced and imbalanced districts, while also demonstrating its potential effect on
minority representation and outcomes. This chapter also allows me to probe how well students are being represented and likely to fare under each policy environment. Theoretically, the chapter adds to the established research on electoral structures in its attempt to offer an alternative explanation for past inconsistent findings.

**Minority Representation under Varying Policy Environments**

In the second empirical chapter, I dissect representative bureaucracy's previous findings to consider how representation changes when the environmental context of policy decisions is considered. The first section suggested that representation may not work as expected to improve the racial balance of a district; however, past scholars have shown that representation is beneficial to student outcomes. The results coupled with the past literature seem to suggest that perhaps representation matters less for the overall makeup of the school, but its energy and emphasis does matter for the internal happenings of the school. I look at the effectiveness of minority bureaucrats, in this case teachers, in creating an equal, less discriminatory policy environment for racial minority students through the grouping and tracking policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school systems. Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) and Meier and Stewart (1991) demonstrate that African American and Latino teachers help reduce the rate in which Black and Latino students are grouped into lower academic tracks (i.e. special education) and receive harsher discipline. They also show that minority students are more likely to be recommended for more advanced academic courses in such settings. Additionally, minority student performance is significantly improved in districts and schools with greater amounts of minority teacher representation (Weiher 2000; Dee 2005). The goal of this chapter is to push the theory of representative bureaucracy and see if the previous findings hold across varying policy settings.
The chapter uses the open systems theory research of organizational theory to explain when and why minority representation in racially balanced and imbalanced districts are likely to be the same or at least similar, and when the two policy environments are likely to diverge. I contend that when the policy environment strongly dominates the organization, minority representatives will represent according to the dictates of their policy environment. As the education literature suggests, differences between racially balanced and imbalanced districts are likely to lead them to diverge in policy; representation will differ; and student outcomes based on the representation will also differ. However, when organizations are able to leverage even a small amount of autonomy, particularly at the street-level, minority bureaucrats may use this flexibility to advocate for minority policy interests and equity. Given the representative bureaucracy findings on minority bureaucratic behavior, we might expect this response in either policy environment—racially balanced or imbalanced districts. The chapter tests for both arguments to give a deeper understanding of representative bureaucracy research and also probe where students are faring better in terms of school equity.

Managing the Constraints

The final empirical chapter moves the focus to the management level and considers how public education managers—school principals in this case—handle different policy environments. The chapter builds on the previous chapter’s findings to investigate the final level of local governance that the environment may shape. Like the previous chapters, I use the organizational theory literature to understand how the environment influences managers and public organizations, but I also center this research in a set of studies on managers’ specific actions in influencing the functioning, operation, and success of public organizations to understand their potential responses to their policy environment and its
imposed constraints. This chapter deviates from the previous formats because it focuses less on demonstrating how and why policy environments influence public management, and more on managerial response to the environment; the environment’s effect is taken as a known, established fact of the literature in this chapter.

Public management literature has shown that public managers often deal with constraints in two fashions—they exploit them, that is, they use them to benefit the organization, or they buffer them to protect the impact on the organizations (Thompson 1967; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Honig 2009). This chapter looks to managerial style—a manager’s collective leadership practices, management practices, and strategies—to explain how managers respond to varying policy environments, particularly those that may not be buffered or exploited, and why public managers respond differently. I contend that style determines how a manager views constraints, the decisions related to them, the implementation process, and the resulting consequences for organizational performance. The analysis of this chapter centers on showing that managers handle “fixed” constraints differently and these differences lead to different outcomes for students.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlines the collective theories used in one of the first three–part, integrative theories of school desegregation policy. It dissects the literature on institutional (electoral) structure; introduces and summarizes representative bureaucracy theory; and highlights public management’s contributions to policy research, particularly in education policy. The three-part theory of school desegregation explains why we should expect these factors—representation, structure, and management—to have a significant, but possibly different effect on students according to their school environment. It proposes that these factors matter a great deal for school desegregation policy and are likely to matter for
public policy in general. The theory also explains how these factors matter and why they matter differently under a segregated and desegregated setting. In the coming chapters, I test the theoretical model's components through an examination of student performance measures and grouping and tracking indicators. Student performance and tracking variables allow me to test the robustness of this theory for student achievement and student and racial equity. It also allows me to test our knowledge and prior understanding of why desegregated education mattered for minority students and possibly to demonstrate its continual importance. The landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision was rooted in the assumption that minority students would receive more equitable opportunities and consequently better outcomes in racially balanced schools. In the next chapter, I explore if this assumption holds and how electoral structures and school board representation affects this process.
CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND REPRESENTATION

“[Institutional] structure is a major determinant of policy,” (Moe and Wilson 1994).

Empirical research provides solid evidence that structure can have a significant effect on leadership, policy decisions and the overall direction of an organization or elected body (Bawn 1995; Balla 1998; Meier et al. 2005; Knott and Payne 2004; Welch 1990; Jones 1976). It affects the decision making process of organizations, bureaucracies, and governmental bodies (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994). It influences who makes the decisions; the linkage between representative elected positions and electoral structures is well established in the literature and continuously demonstrates the role of electoral structure in the under or overrepresentation of minority elected officials on school boards and county councils (Karnig and Welch 1982; Fraga, Meier and Stewart 1986; Davidson and Korbel 1981). Institutional structure often shapes the substantive outputs that flow out of this representation (Polinard et al. 1994; Meier et al. 2005; Meier and England 1984), and has also been shown to influence policy outcomes directly (Ellis, Hicklin and Rocha 2009). Although scholars have not looked at this effect in relation to desegregation policies and efforts, results of the first phase of the dissertation project provided support for these traditional ways that structure influences outcomes. Results indicated that the structure of an electoral system influences the level of racial balance in a district, as a measure of policy outcomes; although not as expected. The unanticipated results suggested a need for a greater understanding of the factors potentially driving institutional structure and its observed effect on outcomes and governance as a whole. What influences institutional structure; what makes structure such
an important factor for understanding the governance and outputs and outcomes of governing bodies and organizations?

Few researchers have probed the factors that influence electoral structure, leaving us with a very limited understanding of why structure is such an important factor for representation and substantive policy outcomes. However, a recent wave of research has begun to shift the focus on predicting when structure’s effect is manipulated or reduced and its implications for minority representation, focusing on the influence of population size and partisanship (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier and Rutherford 2012).

On the other hand, early theorists of policy and institutions contend that policy decision making and related administrative actions are best understood within an organization’s context, that is, an organization’s environmental or political setting (Simon 1957; Barnard 1938). As such this chapter focuses on the relationship between the racial balance of school districts (as the policy environment) and the electoral structures used to elect school board members to understand the nature of minority representation and student outcomes. It takes a step back from the previous research on the linkages among electoral structures, minority representation, and policy outcomes to figure out how these linkages even occur. Without a consideration of the policy environment in which institutional structures operate and must navigate, past research provides an incomplete picture and explanation for why and how structures can be used to alter institutional access and equity within institutions.

I take an in-depth look at the policy environment and the means through which minority school board members are elected to understand the role of electoral structure in shaping the level of minority representation on a school board, the political agenda and policies pursued, and the policy outcomes that follow. Specifically, the chapter addresses
the following research question: *how does the policy environment influence institutional structure and its effect on representation and policy outcomes?* I examine the differences and similarities in minority representation and student outcomes based on the policy environment and the electoral structure to determine if students are represented better through a particular structure given the level of racial balance.

Literature drawn from the institutionalism framework of political science and institutional theory of organizations provide a basis for thinking about how this process could or should work and drive my expectations for student outcomes. In political science, institutions refer to the rules, norms, standards, and strategies that are used to govern, and structure is one of many elements that define institutions. They establish rational choices among actors and guide their efforts to navigate conflicting or competing interests (Hill 1997; Frederickson and Smith 2003, 68-73; Ostrom 2007, 22). Organizational theorists, however, include the external environment into their theories concerning institutions. They contend that institutional environments exert external normative pressures to influence an organization’s structure-related decisions (Zucker 1987). Here, organizational structure and the operations that flow out of structure are a consequence of organizational conformity to environmental pressure in an effort to increase resource accessibility and improve chances of long run survival (Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1977).

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30 This explanation of institutions is based on its more common treatment within institutional theory. The term “institution” may also refer to different types of organizations such as states, various governmental jurisdictions, universities, bureaucracies, political parties, etc. (Ostrom 2007, 22-23; Frederickson and Smith 2003, 68). References made to the political science view of institutions throughout this chapter are based on the institutional theory treatment of institutions discussed in the text.

31 Organizational structure and institutional structure will be used interchangeably to reference the system of governance use in school districts. Similarly, electoral structure will be used to describe the system of elections used to elect school board members.
Drawing from both bodies, though most heavily from the organizational theory perspective, I contend that the environment can pressure the operation of electoral structures in a way that influences school board representation and its outcomes for students. These governing institutions are not exempt from the weight of external policy environments and consequently, their structures are a reaction to the policy environment. Pressures from varying policy environments allow for potentially differing effects on minority representation and policy outcomes, despite the shared type of structure. In other words, structures are a function of their surrounding policy environment. An at-large electoral structure in a racially imbalanced school district may differ in its effect on representation and outcomes from an at-large structure in a racially balanced school district. Chapter results suggest interesting trends on the effect of electoral structure and representation across policy environments. In general, there are both benefits and disadvantages to both types of structures based on the level of racial balance.

**Policy Environments, Structure, and Desegregation Policy**

Political science research on the structure-policy environment relationship often treats the policy environment, that is, the setting in which policy outcomes are being influenced, as a part of the organization or institution. Some acknowledge that institutions and their structure, rules, and are influenced by their external social, economic, and political context, but many view the institution and its components as more powerful influences on the policy environment in general (Frederickson and Smith 2003, 68). This approach has provided much insight on the relationship between institutional structures and policy outcomes; however, treating the environment as a part of the organization or institution and an element of the broader framework is also a weakness of this approach to exploring structure because it restricts the relationship to only the institution and its
structure influencing the environment. It fails to consider the fact that institutions and its components such as structure, actually operate within the broader framework of policy environments that can also influence institutions. Organizational theorists, on the other hand, take this more inclusive approach to viewing institutions and organizations and offer explanations as to why and how organizations and structures are externally established and manipulated.

I view this approach as a more accurate depiction of the desegregation policy story and locally elected school officials’ policy decisions regarding desegregated education. Early research on school districts’ limited compliance and weak plans to racially balance schools suggests that school boards and administrators often looked to the external environment, in this case Whites’ public opinion of desegregation, to develop plans and gauge their efforts. White civic elites, local business leaders, local council leaders and on occasion civil rights organizations were influential in plan development (Crain 1968; Rodgers and Bullock 1976). The slow progress toward compliance amidst the strong white opposition to desegregated schools, particularly in the south, demonstrates the important role of the external policy environment in shaping organizational decisions and the policy consequences.

The politics surrounding more recent efforts of school desegregation also offer some insight on the way that the policy environment can shape school boards as political institutions and their decisions. For example, the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle that ruled against using race for school assignments has created a federally supported policy environment that discourages desegregation plans based on race. Consequently, interested districts and those still under court order desegregation must turn to more race neutral means to achieve racially
balanced schools. Additional mandates to improve teacher accountability and student performance through market based principles have also helped to create a policy environment that leads school board members to focus less on the racial balance of their districts and its implications, and more on meeting the newer federal mandates. A similar policy environment effect can be observed in the case of eroding desegregation policy in Wake County, North Carolina. Amongst much opposition to the school board's decision to eliminate their desegregation plan and adopt neighborhood school assignments, support from affluent white, suburban parents and conservative advocacy and interest groups fueled their policy decision (Sturgis 2012).

Some researchers also find more direct linkages between the racial composition of schools as a policy environment and district policies. For example, Condron and Roscigno (2003) demonstrate that inequalities in within district academic spending are related to racial and class inequality and concentration in school districts. They note that local school board discretion in funding allocation is often subject to and shaped by local “stratification arrangements,” leading board decisions to reflect the stratification patterns engrained in the surrounding environment. In other words, school boards are responsive to their external environment, likely the dominant voting constituency, and their resource allocation decisions follow this trend. Renzulli (2006) finds the level of racial balance in a district is positively related to charter school policies and Black charter school enrollments.

A handful of empirical studies less related to school desegregation and the racial composition of schools also show continual support for the role of the external environment in shaping school board decisions and the manner in which they govern school districts. Land (2002) contends that school boards design and develop policies and priorities in response to their local policy environment, including the economic, social,
political and sometimes even religious context. Newman and Brown (1992) point out that school boards typically adopt policies and make decisions based on community involvement or interests or the superintendent’s suggestions. As expected, factors such as school resources and size also contribute to school board’s policy making process (Land 2002).

These studies suggest the important role that a district’s policy environment, particularly the racial composition of the district, can play in influencing the policies adopted and policy outcomes. They show that the organization and its leaders are not lone players in the decision making process. Instead, we see the external environment actively influencing and manipulating the process. As such, it is important to explore the manner in which this policy environment influences the system of policy development.

**Controlling Structure: Policy Environments and Institutional Structure**

Theories of “institutional environments,” as external policy environments are referenced in this literature, suggest that the environment defines and determines organizational structures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend that because the modern context of organizations is heavily “institutionalized,” organizational structures that develop in this context are often a reflection of the rationalized norms and expectations of societal institutions. In other words, organizations develop structure type and norms based on the level and type of external pressure experienced (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). This perspective of external control relies less on resource-dependence, market motives, and competition to explain external influence and control, and more on entities of power such as the state, professional associations, powerful constituents as sources of external control (Oliver 1997; DiMaggio 1988). It centers on the relationship between external rules, regulations, and requirements and internal organizational rules, protocol of
production, and performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1997). The policy environment establishes the organizational structures, norms, and activities that are deemed appropriate, legitimate, or socially acceptable for an organization and its leaders (Oliver 1997; Meyer and Scott 1983). Theorists of this frame of external control cite a few reasons, or theoretical mechanisms, that explain why organizations yield to the external environment in developing structure and consequently, shaping organizational performance and outcomes.

First, institutional theorists suggest a host of incentives that the policy environment provides organizations to influence its structure. Organizations that come into isomorphism with their environment are more likely to gain support, legitimacy and prestige, and resources (Oliver 1997; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rowan 1982; Zucker 1987). Organizations, particularly public organizations, recognize the need for external support to achieve their goals and maintain functioning; therefore, adopting the rules, regulations, preferences, and norms of the external policy environment helps to build the desired support. Externally influenced structures show conformity to the collective norm and responsiveness to external interests and public expectations that foster greater support. Such support is fundamental to improving organizational productivity and performance.

Similarly, organizations seeking to legitimize their activities, goals and interest may adopt structures that reflect the norms and rules of the institutional environment (Zucker 1987; Oliver 1997). Doing this establishes a perception of responsiveness and social validity, and allows the organization, to not only gain support of the structure, activities and goals that mirror the environment, but also the personal, individual goals and interests of the organization that are likely different from the broader goals and interests of the environment. Organizations are able to establish some internal flexibility in other areas of
functioning when the structure meets the interests and demands of the environment (Zucker 1987; Oliver 1997). And perhaps, a large driver of much of this activity is access to resources. The environment is most welcoming to organizations that meet its “collective normative order,” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987), and therefore, having an institutional structure that fits this “collective normative order” provides access to valuable societal resources, both human and capital (Zucker 1987; Scott and Meyer 1983).

Collectively, these factors increase an organization’s probability of survival and stability, perhaps the strongest motive of any organization (Zucker 1987). Gaining support, prestige and legitimacy, and greater resources help to build an organization’s “stock,” and those of greater stock have a higher probability of survival and are also assumed to be the most successful organizations (Oliver 1997; Rowan 1982). Nevertheless, it is their adherence and adoption of external rules, regulations, expectations and norms via structure that ultimately determines survival and makes the institutional environment a highly significant player in the internal structure decisions of the organization.

Institutional theorists also cite goal displacement as a second reason that organizations adopt structures reflective of their environment (Zucker 1987). Organizations with unstable and less “popular” values and goals are more likely to lose their goals to the broader goals, interests, and norms of the policy environment. Similarly, organizations of less popular structures are also likely to “lose” their structures to the institutional environment. This practice is often observed, for example, in the transformation of low-performing public schools into charter schools or the closing of low performing charter schools. Such school districts often find themselves under the pressure and influence of the boarder policy environment to change their structure, and many
choose to change their structure to a market-based charter system over the less favorable policy alternative of school closings.

Finally, the organization’s level of power, independent of its environment, also has an effect on the extent to which the policy environment influences its structure. Organizations with less independent power and control over its boundaries are more likely to adopt internal structures that are reflective of the policy environment (Zucker 1987). Public organizations, such as school districts, often have less power and control over their boundaries relative to private firms and organizations. They are typically viewed as entities of the state, and as such, are subject to much more environmental intrusion and influence. Therefore, public school districts are likely to adopt structures that are more reflective of the policy environment.

In sum, organizational structure is a function of external policy environment influence because of environmental incentives toward isomorphism, goal displacement, and limited power (Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rowan 1982). If these arguments are correct, a school district’s policy environment should also be a valid predictor of its electoral structure. Here, the level of racial balance is viewed as the policy environment of interest.

_Hypothesis 1: The level of racial balance in a school district will be significantly related to electoral structure._

The literature provides limited guidance on predicting the electoral structure most likely to be associated with racially imbalanced or balanced school districts. However, scholars of electoral structures note trends in electoral districts more or less likely to operate under at-large or ward systems. For example, scholars find minority population to be a strong predictor of representation under certain structures (Meier et al. 2005).
Relatedly, areas of large minority populations are historically more likely to use ward systems of election based on restrictions and regulations of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Majority-minority districts and ward electoral systems were viewed as a solution to Black voter dilution. On the other hand, some have argued that the ward structure is restrictive and makes it difficult for minorities to gain electoral seats, particularly in more integrated areas (Bowler, Dovovan, and Brockington 2003, 17-18). Applied to the policy environment argument, we might expect:

_Hypothesis 1a: Racially balanced school districts are more likely to operate under an at-large electoral structure._

_Hypothesis 1b: Racially imbalanced school districts are more likely to operate under a ward electoral structure._

As highlighted in prior chapters, the bulk of research on electoral structure has focused on its relationship to representation for racial minorities and has come to varied conclusions concerning the extent to which certain electoral systems are harmful to racial minorities. This body of research places a heavy emphasis on structure and its ability to manipulate descriptive and substantive representation; however, the institutional environment research suggests that structure alone is not the dominant factor shaping representation. Instead it is equally, if not more important to recognize that organizational structures form out of their external environments (Zucker 1987). As the policy environment predicts the structure used, it also influences the _meaning_ of such structures. The policies, procedures, and systems that dominate an organization are enforced by the external policy environment—the constituents, laws, or public opinion, for example (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Therefore, the policy environment may determine how electoral structures function. Structures developed in a policy environment that is hostile to
minority representation, for example, may yield fewer minority representatives, while those developed in more friendly environments are likely to yield the opposite effect. Applying this logic to school districts and school board elections, we may find that an at-large system in a racially balanced policy environment may yield a different level of minority representation than one in a racially imbalanced environment (see Meier et al. 2005; Leal et al. 2004 for a similar argument). The same type of relationship could occur for a ward system. Whereas previous scholarship has generally found ward structures to be more beneficial for minority representation, considering the policy environment of the ward structure may alter these findings. Instead, ward structures may only be beneficial to minorities when they are in racially imbalanced districts or vice versa. Similarly, at-large systems may be only beneficial to minorities when they are seeking election in racially balanced districts.

**Hypothesis 2:** The level of racial balance in a school district and structure will be significantly related to the level of minority representation.

If the first set of hypotheses perform as expected, that is, if ward systems are more likely to be found in racially imbalanced districts and the general findings for minority representation under a ward structure are true, I expect the following relationship,

**Hypothesis 2a:** Racial minorities will gain greater representation under a ward system in racially imbalanced districts (than an at-large structure in an imbalanced district).

On the other hand, research on the differences and similarities of racially balanced and imbalanced districts give reason to expect an alternative effect. As anticipated, scholars find that the level of racial balance in a school district often affects students. Those in racially balanced districts tend to have greater access to resources, more educational opportunities, and higher education attainment levels when compared to students in
racially imbalanced districts (Southworth and Michelson 2007; Dawkins and Braddock 1994). However, it also affects teachers. Teachers in balanced districts tend to be more experienced, are less likely to lack certification, and are considered for higher quality. They tend to have more resources for teaching and more support from administrators also (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). These works seems to suggest that a more racially balanced environment provides the greatest benefits for minorities and should also be a more positive electoral policy environment for minority candidates. This contention, coupled with the research findings on structure and minority representation, suggests an alternative relationship:

_Hypothesis 2b: Racial minorities will gain greater representation under a ward system in racially balanced districts (than an at large system in balanced district)._  

A smaller body of scholarship has focused on the substantive benefits that follow the election of minority representatives under a particular electoral structure. This research takes the traditional electoral structure research one step further to probe why this representation matters for policy outcomes. Polinard et al.’s (1994) research shows that electing minorities to political positions is directly related to recruiting and hiring more minority bureaucrats. Meier et al. (2005) find similar results; minorities elected through ward systems tend to help increase minority administrator and teacher representation in a district (Meier and England 1984). In general, these works propose the following hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 3: The level of racial balance and electoral structure of minority representation will be significantly related to policy outcomes._

However, if the arguments of institutional environment research are true, then we should also expect these findings to differ based on the policy environment. Policy
outcomes are also likely to be a function of the policy environment’s effect on structure and representation. Building from the previous hypotheses, research on electoral structures, and institutional environments, I hypothesize the following:

**Hypothesis 3a:** Minority representatives elected under a ward structure in racially imbalanced districts will have a greater effect on policy outcomes than those elected in a racially balanced district.

Alternatively, the policy environment may also have a limited effect on the organizational outcomes of the district. Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that organizations yield the development of formal structure to the environment, conditionally. They propose that organizations of externally controlled structures maintain “gaps” between their externally influenced structures and their core, technical tasks and activities to maintain some level of autonomy and control over organizational performance. If this argument holds, we might expect the policy environment to maintain its influence over electoral structures, but play a smaller role in influencing the outcomes that follow. In other words, the policy environment effects of racially balanced and imbalanced districts may mirror each other when policy outcomes are considered.

**Hypothesis 3b:** Policy outcomes of minority representatives elected under a ward structure in racially balanced districts will mirror those of minority representatives elected under the same structure in racially imbalanced districts.

Here, I expect the structure and minority representation effect on policy outcomes to be the same, regardless of the policy environment. In other words, I do not anticipate any differences in outcomes given the two policy environments. The same results are also expected to hold for minorities elected under an at-large system. Figure 4.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses discussed above and the expected relationships.
Methods and Measures

Data for this chapter are collected over three school terms, 2000-2001; 2003-2004; and 2008-2009 from a series of sources. I use the National Education Survey of US Public Schools, an original survey of the 1800 largest school districts in the United States, to gather data on the racial composition of the school faculty (teachers and administrators); the National Center for Education Statistics' (NCES) School District Demographic System and Common Core Database for data on schools’ student racial compositions and community resource variables; and the 2000 Census to create a measure of residential segregation. The units of analyses are public school districts with a 1999-2000 school enrollment above 5000.

Dependent Variables

Dependent variables examined are grouped into three classes: structural, school board representation, and bureaucratic representation. The structural and board representation dependent variables also serve as explanatory variables in several models.
Electoral structure is measured as the proportion of board members elected under an at-large or ward system. This measure allows me retain all districts operating under a mixed/hybrid electoral system, in which some members are elected under a ward system and others are elected under an at-large system.

**Board Representation**

Minority board representation is measured as the percentage of African American and Latino board members in each school district.

**Bureaucratic Representation**

Bureaucratic representation variables include the level of teacher and administration representation, measured as the percentage of Black and Latino teachers and administrators in a district. The measures serve as indicators of the substantive policy outcomes that flow out of minority board representation, consistent with past research that demonstrate a positive relationship between the two sectors (Polinard et al. 1994). This relationship holds important implications for minority students because coethnic representation is associated with increased student performance, greater aid to minority-centered programs, and reduced racial inequality in schools (Theobald 2007; Weiher 2000; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). As such, I examine school board representation’s ability to provide this resource to minority students, given the policy environment and electoral structure.

**Explanatory Variables**

A key explanatory variable in this study is the level of school district racial balance, the measure of policy environment. Racial balanced is assessed as a Taeuber dissimilarity index for each district, indicating the overall evenness of schools within a district (Tauber 1964). The measure itself indicates the percentage of students that would
need to transfer to different schools to make all of the schools within the district equally mixed among the races and ethnicities. Traditionally, lower valued indices indicate greater levels of racial balance and fewer student transfers, while higher numbers indicate less racial balance and more student transfers. I convert the measure into a similarity score to simplify interpretation as follows:

\[
1 - \left( \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \frac{b}{B} - \frac{w}{W} \right| \right)
\]

where \( b \) equals the Black students in an individual school, \( B \) equals the number of Black students in the entire district, and \( w \) equals the Anglo students in an individual school and \( W \) equals the Anglo students in the entire district. \( L \) equals the Latino students in an individual school and \( L \) equals the Latino students in the entire district (Rodgers and Bullock 1976, 34-36).

An index score of zero (total racial isolation) shows that a district is completely segregated and nearly all of their students would need to change schools to equally distribute the races across the district, while a score of one (complete racial balance) indicates complete desegregation. A similarity index score of .30 or below indicates high levels of segregation; scores between .40 and .50 are considered moderate levels of segregation and values of .60 typically signal maximum desegregation or a close approximation. The .60 cutoff is used in analyses below to distinguish more racially balanced districts from less racially balanced districts. As previously mentioned, electoral
structure and minority school board representation serve as the remaining explanatory variables.

**Control Variables**

As mentioned above, population size is noted as a predictor of political representation on school boards, so I control for the 2000 Census population percentage estimates of Black and Latino population in the respective models (Dennis 1990).

A dummy variable was included to control for geographic region, in which a one designates a state as southern. Southern states have a historical legacy of instituting discriminatory policies and manipulating structure and laws to restrict minorities’ access to politics and limit their political power (Engstrom and McDonald 1982). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was established to eliminate such discriminatory policies and practices; however, as recent as 2012, some southern states have come under fire for their efforts to covertly restrict voting rights and political power in a way that adversely affects racial minorities (Demessie and Capers 2012; National Conference of State Legislatures 2012). Interestingly, Census statistics reveal that African Americans remain heavily concentrated in southern states and their school districts continue to be some of the most desegregated in the nation (Orfield 2005). These tidbits lead to two potential expectations for representation and student outcomes in southern states: there will be greater African American representation and positive outcomes for Black students in southern states, given their population size, or there will be less minority representation and fewer positive student outcomes in southern states, given their history and current efforts of restricting...

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32 The Census Bureau acknowledges the following states as the “South,” which are included as a controls in the current study: West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Washington, D.C. Missouri and Kansas were also included in control group of the South because of their history of lawful discrimination toward blacks (Census Bureau 2010; Meier, Stewart and England 1989).
minority political power and access. I expect similar or null effects for Latino representation and student outcomes in the south, given their smaller, but growing population and limited history of discrimination in southern states, with the exception of Texas.

I also control for the level of residential segregation in a district. Scholars such as Orfield and Eaton (1996) credit the changes in the racial composition of schools to regional residential trends. Lower levels of residential segregation increase the probability that students attend more racially balanced schools. I include an interaction index, an exposure measure, scaled from zero to one that measures the probability of Blacks or Latinos interacting with Whites in their school district, given the census block restrictions. Index values are calculated as follows:

\[ P_{kk} = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left( \frac{n_{ij}}{N_j} \right) \left( \frac{n_{ik}}{n_i} \right) \]

where \( n_{ij} \) is the population of group \( j \) in census block \( i \); \( N_j \) is the total population of group \( j \) in the district; \( n_{ik} \) is the total population of group \( k \) in census block \( i \), and \( n_i \) is the total population in census block \( i \). Greater index values indicate higher levels of exposure (less segregation) and values closer to zero represents a smaller probability of interacting with Whites (White and Kim 2005).

I account for a host of resource variables that are likely to influence both the electoral process and student outcomes. Greater resources increase minorities’ ability to actively participate and influence local politics and political systems (Robinson, England, and Meier 1985). They may also use the resources to pressure school districts to improve outcomes for minority students (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart
I control for the percentage of Blacks and Latinos with college degrees, the percentage that are homeowners, the median Black or Latino family income, and the percentage of Whites in poverty. The percent of Blacks with college degrees is measured as the percentage of the Black population over age 25 with a bachelor’s degree or beyond. Median income is measured as a ratio of Black or Latino median income to white median income. The percentage of Whites in poverty is measured as the percentage of white families living below the 1999 poverty level. The variable provides a measure of social class and minority educational opportunity based on the social distance argument of the power thesis. The power thesis suggests that discrimination based on race and class should increase as social distance increases; therefore, white middle class populations may favor Black middle class populations over lower-class Whites because the middle class Blacks are closer to them economically and socially (Triandis and Triandis 1961; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989). This bias should result in greater political and educational opportunities for middle class minorities, so I expect a negative relationship between minority representation and student outcomes and the level of white poverty. Year dummy variables are included to control for any time variation. The analysis uses a maximum likelihood estimation method, the logit model, to test the first hypothesis and ordinary least squares modeling for the remaining hypotheses. Clustered, robust standard errors were also used to address issues of heteroskedasticity.

**Findings**

**Policy Environments and Electoral Structures**

A test of the first hypothesis establishes the baseline influence of policy environments on institutional structures. Table 4.1 shows the predicted electoral structure type based on the level of racial balance in a school district. The models show that more
racedly balanced school districts are more likely to utilize an at-large electoral system for board elections, while more imbalanced districts are more likely to use the opposite—ward systems, as predicted.

**Table 4.1: Effect of the Policy Environment on Electoral Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Black Ward Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Black At Large Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Latino Ward Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Latino At Large Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Racial Balance</td>
<td>-0.620***</td>
<td>0.505***</td>
<td>-0.476***</td>
<td>0.358***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Population(%)</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Segregation</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-1.042***</td>
<td>0.779***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.208***</td>
<td>0.145*</td>
<td>-0.204***</td>
<td>0.142*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.122*</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>0.540***</td>
<td>0.876***</td>
<td>-0.270*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>5,093</td>
<td>5,089</td>
<td>5,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistical regression; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

An examination of the predicted probability results reveals that a racially balanced district has about a 35 percent probability of operating a ward structure and a 54 percent probability of operating under an at-large system. Figure 4.2 shows this outcome graphically.
The results support all three parts of the first hypothesis set; the policy environment is demonstrated to be a predictor of structure, suggesting that organizations develop structures based on their external policy environment. This finding is also consistent with the research on the relationship between minority population size and electoral structure as it shows that when minorities are segregated and constitute a large, centralized population in various "pockets" of the district, the district is more likely to use a ward system. When minorities are more dispersed throughout the district and therefore seem to make a "smaller" or more proportional size of the population, the district is more likely to use an at large system. Lastly, the findings guide expectations for the latter hypotheses for board representation and bureaucratic representation given the noted influence of the policy environment on electoral structure. If the policy environment is able to influence the electoral system, it is also likely to shape the level of minority representation under each structure.
Minority Board Representation across Structures and Policy Environments

Table 4.2 reveals the interactive effect of the policy environment and electoral structure on the level of minority representation. The models suggest that the policy environment effect on ward structures has no significant effect on Black school board representation, but has a negative effect on Latino school board representation. Marginal effects graphs suggest that the insignificant finding of the first model only applies to lowest and highest ends of the racial balance scale; in school districts that are “severely segregated” and those that are highly balanced, school board representation through a ward structure is unaffected by the level of balance between white and Black students in the school district (See Figure 4.3). Interestingly, nearly half of the cases fall into the significant category and show that in the average school district—one that is either moderately imbalanced or acceptably balanced, the level of racial balance does have a positive and significant effect on Black school board representation. More Black board members are likely to be elected under the ward structure, over the at–large structure (see Figure 4.4); however, they gain greater representation in more racially balanced districts. For Black school board representation, a racially balanced district appears to be a better policy environment than a racially imbalanced district. Ward structures continue to have a positive, though limited effect on Black board representation when the policy environment is considered.
Table 4.2: Effect of Electoral Structure on Board Representation across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Black Board Representation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Black Board Representation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Latino Board Representation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Latino Board Representation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure (%)</td>
<td>-0.0235 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.0225** (0.010)</td>
<td>-1.1061 (1.223)</td>
<td>-4.6885*** (1.819)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Latino Level of Racial Balance</td>
<td>-3.5330** (1.704)</td>
<td>-2.5945 (1.623)</td>
<td>-11.061 (1.223)</td>
<td>-4.6885*** (1.819)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward* Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.0191 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.0235* (0.013)</td>
<td>-2.5931*** (1.623)</td>
<td>-1.1061 (1.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Large Structure (%)</td>
<td>0.0011 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.0028 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.4778*** (1.223)</td>
<td>0.4813*** (1.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large*Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0028 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.4778*** (1.223)</td>
<td>0.4813*** (1.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>0.9795*** (0.023)</td>
<td>0.9774*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.4778*** (1.027)</td>
<td>0.4813*** (1.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-2.5973*** (0.772)</td>
<td>-2.6624*** (0.769)</td>
<td>-0.1857 (0.901)</td>
<td>0.0802 (0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.1857 (0.901)</td>
<td>-0.0802 (0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates</td>
<td>-0.0194** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.0181* (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.1857 (0.901)</td>
<td>-0.0802 (0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Homeownership</td>
<td>-0.0025 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.0045 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.1857 (0.901)</td>
<td>-0.0802 (0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-2.4029*** (0.360)</td>
<td>-2.5260*** (0.359)</td>
<td>-0.3968* (0.230)</td>
<td>-0.5038** (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.1822*** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.1750*** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.0757** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.0683** (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.2204 (0.336)</td>
<td>-0.1930 (0.335)</td>
<td>-0.8034*** (0.275)</td>
<td>-0.7902*** (0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.2547 (0.341)</td>
<td>-0.2327 (0.341)</td>
<td>-0.6833** (0.271)</td>
<td>-0.6837** (0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates</td>
<td>0.0502*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.0478*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.0502*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.0478*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Homeownership</td>
<td>0.0225*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.0222*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.0225*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.0222*** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.6689*** (1.376)</td>
<td>3.5913** (1.480)</td>
<td>-2.2253* (1.166)</td>
<td>1.0707 (1.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,504</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>4,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.5996</td>
<td>0.5992</td>
<td>0.3460</td>
<td>0.3481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Ward Electoral Structure on Black Representation as the Policy Environment Changes

Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of At-Large Electoral Structure on Black Representation as the Policy Environment Changes
For Latinos, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 suggest greater support for the expectation that racial minorities would receive greater representation under a ward system in racially imbalanced districts than representation in a racially balanced, ward system and a racially balanced, at-large system. However, two interesting trends emerge from the figures. Both electoral structures perform as expected. In general, the ward system has a positive effect on Latino school board representation, and the at-large system has a negative effect on Latino school board representation. However, the policy environment reduces the positive effect of ward structures and also reduces the negative effect of at-large structures on Latino representation. As a consequence of the policy environment's mitigating influence, Latinos can also gain significant representation in at-large structure of a racially balanced district. In sum, Latinos are likely to see significant levels of school board representation under both types of electoral structures as the policy environment dictates. This trend complements the research of an at-large basis toward numerical majority populations and other research suggesting negative ward effects in large majority, minority districts (see Leal et al 2004; Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington 2003).
Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of Ward Electoral Structure on Latino Representation as Policy Environment Changes

Figure 4.6: Marginal Effect of At-Large Electoral Structure on Latino Representation as Policy Environment Changes
Bureaucratic Representation across Structures and Policy Environments

The final set of analyses test the policy implications of school board representation under at-large and ward electoral systems in the two policy environments. Here, I examine the substantive effects of minority board representation, given the policy environment and electoral structure. Per the outlined theoretical expectations and previous results, if the policy environment predicts the electoral structure and the level of minority representation under each structure, then it is also likely to greatly influence the outcomes of the board representation.

Administration Representation

Table 4.3 suggests that greater board representation and ward-elected members reduces the level of Black administrator representation in balanced districts, while it has a null effect in racially imbalanced districts. An insignificant effect is also observed for the models testing at-large structures. The marginal effects graph of Black administrator representation in racially balanced districts under ward structures is consistent with Table 4.3; Black school board representation under a ward system in racially balanced districts has a positive, but diminishing effect on Black administrator representation. In other words, Blacks receive fewer substantive benefits in racially balanced districts when their level of school board representation increases through ward election increases. The policy environment seems to reduce the potential for substantive policy benefits through minority board representation in this case. The findings suggest a negative consequence to the typically positive factors linked to racial equality and representation (see Figure 4.7).
The insignificant finding for imbalanced districts is not consistent. Instead, I find that Black administrator representation increases only slightly with greater Black school board representation under a ward system (See Figure 4.8). Here, Blacks are subject to gain nearly the same amount of policy outcome benefits, regardless of the proportion of Black, ward-elected members. Racially imbalanced districts seem to restrict substantive minority representation through structure to a greater extent than racially balanced districts.

Marginal effects graphs on Black representation in at-large structures suggest that Blacks gain the greatest policy outcomes through pure at-large systems in racially balanced districts (see Appendix B). This finding conflicts with both the stated hypothesis and the previous research on electoral structures and policy outcomes, but is consistent with the desegregation literature on the benefits of racially balanced districts. In sum, the at-large system in racially balanced districts is an avenue for greater Black policy gains.
Table 4.3: Effect of Black Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Administration Representation across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Ward Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Ward Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Board Members (%)</td>
<td>0.2002*** (0.026)</td>
<td>0.1477*** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.2768*** (0.064)</td>
<td>0.3064*** (0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure (%)</td>
<td>0.4984 (0.393)</td>
<td>0.5808 (1.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Members*Ward</td>
<td>-0.0731** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.0204 (0.064)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large Structure (%)</td>
<td>-0.6554* (0.388)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0006 (1.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Members*At-Large</td>
<td>0.0500 (0.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0416 (0.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-4.3060*** (0.913)</td>
<td>-4.3292*** (0.916)</td>
<td>-8.2825*** (2.187)</td>
<td>-8.1444*** (2.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>0.7527*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.7472*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.6530*** (0.087)</td>
<td>0.6518*** (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates</td>
<td>0.0364** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.0367** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.0873** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.0877** (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0003* (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0002* (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.2908*** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.2937*** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.1696* (0.090)</td>
<td>-0.1698* (0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Homeownership</td>
<td>0.0033 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.0021 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.0811*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.0788*** (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1.6780*** (0.478)</td>
<td>1.6233*** (0.480)</td>
<td>3.7802*** (1.263)</td>
<td>3.8315*** (1.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.7342** (0.299)</td>
<td>-0.7144** (0.299)</td>
<td>-0.8350 (0.997)</td>
<td>-0.8546 (1.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>0.6744 (0.423)</td>
<td>0.6775 (1.089)</td>
<td>0.1368 (1.103)</td>
<td>0.1346 (1.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.6981*** (0.769)</td>
<td>4.3530*** (0.857)</td>
<td>5.3716** (2.168)</td>
<td>5.5825** (2.242)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 2,821  2,823  505  506
R²: 0.6185  0.6185  0.7150  0.7152
Figure 4.7: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts)

Figure 4.8: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts)
Overall, the results fail to support the third set of hypotheses, but continue to show the role of the policy environment in manipulating structure. The unexpected benefits of at-large structure representation in racially balanced districts reveal interesting differences between the two policy environments and their relationship to structure and substantive policy outcomes.

*Latino Administrator Representation*

Results of Table 4.4 and marginal effects graphs on Latino bureaucratic representation suggest that increases in Latino board representation and ward structure representation have a positive and additive effect on Latino administrator representation in racially imbalanced districts, but a positive and slightly diminishing effect in racially balanced districts (See Figure 4.9 and 4.10). The findings show some support for my expectation of greater administrator representation in ward structures of racially imbalanced districts over racially balanced districts, and are consistent with the results of Table 4.4. Here, Latinos gain the best outcomes in imbalanced districts. The findings are inconsistent with the desegregation literature, but the policy environment’s effect on structure and representation is consistent with the broader literature on external control. They suggest that there are benefits to racially imbalanced district also; Latinos do not appear to be politically restricted in an imbalanced district.
Table 4.4: Effect of Latino Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Administration Representation across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Ward Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Ward Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Board Members (%)</td>
<td>0.2503*** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.2076*** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.1711*** (0.036)</td>
<td>0.3617*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure</td>
<td>0.1160 (0.280)</td>
<td>-0.7614 (0.624)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Members*Ward</td>
<td>-0.0282 (0.059)</td>
<td>0.2026*** (0.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large Structure (%)</td>
<td>-0.0513 (0.280)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7723 (0.638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Members*At-Large</td>
<td>0.0505 (0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1905*** (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-0.2352 (1.065)</td>
<td>-0.1862 (1.062)</td>
<td>6.2475*** (1.827)</td>
<td>6.9220*** (1.905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>0.3809*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.3820*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.4996*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.5086*** (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates</td>
<td>0.0593*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.0599*** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.1650*** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.1672*** (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0002*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0002*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.0411 (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.0321 (0.048)</td>
<td>0.0677 (0.075)</td>
<td>0.0554 (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Homeownership</td>
<td>0.0287*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.0281*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.0343* (0.018)</td>
<td>0.0388** (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.6801* (0.358)</td>
<td>0.7094** (0.357)</td>
<td>1.2795* (0.676)</td>
<td>1.4723** (0.658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-1.0443*** (0.313)</td>
<td>-1.0617*** (0.313)</td>
<td>-1.9713*** (0.664)</td>
<td>-1.9697*** (0.672)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.9294** (0.379)</td>
<td>-0.9260** (0.380)</td>
<td>-1.5012** (0.755)</td>
<td>-1.4830* (0.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.7041 (1.246)</td>
<td>-1.7311 (1.262)</td>
<td>-7.7190*** (1.848)</td>
<td>-9.2371*** (1.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,766</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.6976</td>
<td>0.7003</td>
<td>0.8595</td>
<td>0.8577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Figure 4.9: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts)

![Graph showing the marginal effect of Latino board representation on Latino administrator representation as electoral structure changes in balanced districts.]

Figure 4.10: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts)

![Graph showing the marginal effect of Latino board representation on Latino administrator representation as electoral structure changes in imbalanced districts.]

Dependent Variable: Latino Administrator Representation

Marginal Effect of School Board Representation

95% Confidence Interval
The opposite trends are observed for Latino administrator representation in racially balanced and imbalanced districts under at-large systems (see Appendix B). The marginal effect graphs show that in general, increases in Latino board representation continues to have a positive effect on Latino administrator representation, but greater at-large representation suppresses it in racially imbalanced districts, and weakens it in balanced districts.

*Teacher Representation*

Although few teachers are hired directly through the school board, considering their effect on teacher representation is also important to understand the broad reaching implications of the way in which policy environments shape structure. Table 4.5 provides the regression results of Black board representation’s effect on teacher representation across policy environments and electoral structures. The first two models suggest a positive and significant relationship between the interactive effect of Black board representation and the proportion of ward electoral seats, regardless of policy environment. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 support the models of Table 4.5, as well as my expectation of mirroring policy outcomes under a shared electoral structure. Marginal effects graphs of Black teacher representation under an at-large structure follow the same pattern (see Appendix B). Increases in at-large board representation decreases the positive effect of Black board representation on teacher representation in both racially balanced and imbalanced districts. The findings on teacher representation deviate from previous substantive outcome findings and suggest that the policy environment plays a smaller role in influencing structure’s effect on it. This finding could be related to the indirect relationship between board representation and teacher representation. It may also be related to the shared formal practices and norms of teacher representation of the two.
policy environments. Nevertheless, in this case, Blacks receive more policy outcomes in ward structures of both environments.

Table 4.5: Effect of Black Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Teacher Representation across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Ward Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Balanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Ward Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>At-Large Imbalanced Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Board Members (%)</td>
<td>0.0603*** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.1604*** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.0196 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.1551** (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure (%)</td>
<td>-0.1300 (0.381)</td>
<td>-0.3280 (1.150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Members*Ward</td>
<td>0.0886** (0.035)</td>
<td>0.1832*** (0.062)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large Structure (%)</td>
<td>0.1456 (0.367)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0193 (1.192)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Members*At-Large</td>
<td>-0.1157*** (0.033)</td>
<td>-1.0193 (0.074)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-3.3636*** (0.770)</td>
<td>-3.5001*** (0.766)</td>
<td>-7.8653*** (2.089)</td>
<td>-8.0465*** (2.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>0.5510*** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.5402*** (0.030)</td>
<td>0.6425*** (0.072)</td>
<td>0.6289*** (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates</td>
<td>0.0710*** (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0701*** (0.016)</td>
<td>0.1453*** (0.039)</td>
<td>0.1684*** (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0001** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0001** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0004** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.0197 (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.0318 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.0969 (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.1650* (0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Homeownership</td>
<td>0.0172** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.0176** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.0121 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.0015 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.3562* (0.200)</td>
<td>0.3510* (0.196)</td>
<td>1.2527 (0.856)</td>
<td>-0.8715 (0.867)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>1.3600*** (0.403)</td>
<td>1.7206*** (0.388)</td>
<td>1.3808 (1.136)</td>
<td>0.1958 (0.989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.6274 (0.879)</td>
<td>0.3357 (0.969)</td>
<td>4.1144* (2.128)</td>
<td>6.7711*** (2.524)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3,015  3,018  611  612
R² = 0.5379  0.5415  0.7304  0.7238

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Figure 4.11: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts)

Figure 4.12: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts)
**Latino Teacher Representation**

Latino teacher representation across the two policy environments presents a different picture. Table 4.6 suggests that structure’s effect on Latino board representation and on teacher representation only matters in racially imbalanced districts; models suggest insignificant interactive effects for at-large and ward systems in balanced districts. However, marginal effects graphs reveal significant effects for all models. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 shows support for my expectation of greater policy outcomes in racially imbalanced districts under a ward structure. Latino teacher representation increases as the Latino board representation and members ward-elected increases, but it decreases slightly under this same standard in racially balanced districts. Results show a slight disadvantaged to a racially balanced policy environment. Interestingly, in a racially balanced district, Latino teacher representation also increases with increases in Latino board representation and at-large elected members. Although the finding conflicts with the hypothesis, it shows an interesting trend observed earlier in the test of Latino board representation in racially balanced districts under an at-large structure. Again, I find that Latinos are able to benefit from both structures in both environments. In an imbalanced district, I find a diminishing effect on Latino teacher representation under an at-large structure (see Appendix B).
Table 4.6: Effect of Latino Board Representation and Electoral Structure on Teacher Representation across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Ward Balanced</th>
<th>At-Large Balanced</th>
<th>Ward Imbalanced</th>
<th>At-Large Imbalanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Board Members (%)</td>
<td>0.2047***</td>
<td>0.1655***</td>
<td>0.0471</td>
<td>0.2272***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure</td>
<td>0.1099</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.527)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Members*Ward</td>
<td>-0.0248</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1967***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large Structure (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0313</td>
<td>0.0679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.551)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Members*At-Large</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0489</td>
<td>-0.1798***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>1.2131</td>
<td>1.2562</td>
<td>0.5873</td>
<td>1.0800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.043)</td>
<td>(1.061)</td>
<td>(1.260)</td>
<td>(1.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>0.3943***</td>
<td>0.3939***</td>
<td>0.5376***</td>
<td>0.5471***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates</td>
<td>0.0628***</td>
<td>0.0632***</td>
<td>0.1821***</td>
<td>0.1867***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Income ($1000s)</td>
<td>-0.0000**</td>
<td>-0.0000**</td>
<td>-0.0001**</td>
<td>-0.0001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.0725</td>
<td>0.0858</td>
<td>0.3053***</td>
<td>0.2961***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Homeownership</td>
<td>0.0242***</td>
<td>0.0231***</td>
<td>0.0370**</td>
<td>0.0422***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-1.0855***</td>
<td>-1.0997***</td>
<td>-1.2858***</td>
<td>-1.2364*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.626)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-1.1270***</td>
<td>-1.1193***</td>
<td>-1.3591***</td>
<td>-1.3124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.656)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.0576***</td>
<td>-3.0839***</td>
<td>-6.8910***</td>
<td>-7.7365***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.872)</td>
<td>(0.845)</td>
<td>(1.386)</td>
<td>(1.470)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 2,975 | 2,978 | 648 | 648
R² | 0.7450 | 0.7474 | 0.8402 | 0.8378

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Figure 4.13: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Balanced Districts)

Figure 4.14: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as Electoral Structure Changes (Imbalanced Districts)
Conclusion

This chapter establishes the extent to which racial balance influences electoral systems and affects descriptive and substantive representation for minority students. Amongst the myriad of findings, a few trends emerge that shed light on the theoretical and substantive questions of the chapter. On the substantive question, are minority students better served in racially balanced districts versus racially imbalanced districts, the conclusion depends on the set of minority students being discussed. On the dimensions of minority board and administrator representation, Black students tend to experience greater outcomes in racially balanced districts, and in terms of Black teacher representation, they experience increases with board representation in both policy environments. Latino students, on the other hand, attain their greatest representational benefits in racially imbalanced districts. Therefore, the general finding of desegregation literature that racially balanced districts are the best educational setting for minority students is not supported (see Figures 4.15 and 4.16).
### Table: Black Representation Results Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Number</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Interaction Tested</th>
<th>Hypothesis Support</th>
<th>Conclusion - Best Policy Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Structure</td>
<td>n/a; board type</td>
<td>supported</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Electoral Structure</td>
<td>At-Large</td>
<td>supported</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Electoral Structure</td>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>supported</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Board Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td>supported</td>
<td>Racially balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Board Representation</td>
<td>Racial balance* structure (%)</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Board Representation</td>
<td>Racial balance* structure (%)</td>
<td>supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Representation</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>Administrator Racially balanced</td>
<td>Teacher No difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Representation</td>
<td>Board Representation * structure (%)</td>
<td>Administrator Not supported</td>
<td>Teacher Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Representation</td>
<td>Board Representation * structure (%)</td>
<td>Administrator Not supported</td>
<td>Teacher supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The inconsistent findings spur more questions about minority education, especially the distinct experiences of African American and Latino students. Here, the arguments of the *Brown* decision and subsequent research continue to hold for Blacks; racially balanced and imbalanced districts have distinct effects on outcomes, but the structural benefits of ward systems are enhanced and the negative effects of at-large districts are reduced for Blacks in racially balanced districts. As the research predicts, this policy environment allows Black access to resources, in this case political resources, which are not as accessible in racially imbalanced districts. However, this is not the case for Latinos. Separate does not appear to mean unequal for them. In fact, they seem to flourish politically in separate, racially imbalanced districts. Scholars studying the resegregation of American schools...
often place particular attention on the high levels of segregation Latino students experience and are likely to continue to experience given their population growth. Assumptions that this segregation has a negative effect as seen for Blacks are generally made about the Latino education experience; however, here I show that may not be the case. While I do not directly test student measures yet, the findings on the political school setting factors that are examined set up some of the important parameters that often determine education outcomes. Focusing on the policy makers and the effect that the level of racial balance has on their access to policy making and their specific policy decisions provides the first round of indication that students in racially imbalanced districts may fare just as well as those in balanced districts. If policy makers are able to use structure and racial imbalance to their advantage, they make be equally successful in improving student outcomes in such an environment.

The theoretical implications also warrant some discussion. The chapter attempts to contribute to the budding literature on the factors that can manipulate electoral structure in the favor of minority constituents and candidates. While others have looked at specific mechanisms such as political parties and partisanship and population size, the current research applies the theories of institutional environment and external control to make an argument for why and how we should expect such factors to be theoretically and empirically important to predicting electoral structure’s effect on representation at the descriptive and substantive level. The findings indicate that structure is indeed not a sole actor of representation and policy influence, and is perhaps less influential when the policy environment is considered.

Overall, the findings of this chapter demonstrate the significance of racial balance at the electoral level. The next chapter extends the substantive representation findings and
examines how teacher representation translates into substantive benefits for minority students given the level of racial balance. I continue to explore the policy environment that best serves minority students, but I move to the second dimension of segregation—grouping and discipline policies. Many scholars have found teacher representation to have a mitigating effect on racial disparities in grouping and tracking policies. I apply the currently established knowledge on the two policy environments to this research to determine if minority teachers continue to reduce such disparities.
CHAPTER V

MINORITY REPRESENTATION UNDER VARYING POLICY ENVIRONMENTS

As thoroughly outlined in the earlier chapters, much empirical research has shown a positive relationship between bureaucrats’ ability to actively represent clients and alter client outcomes (Keiser et al. 2002; Bardbury and Kellough 2008; Wilkins and Keiser 2006). Specifically, minority students tend to perform better and receive more equitable treatment in schools with greater minority teacher representation (Dee 2005; Weiher 2000; Meier, Stewart, England 1989). Similarly, greater resources are allocated for minority-focused programs such as bilingual education for Latino students when there is greater Latino administration representation (Theobald 2007). However, an interesting omission from this literature is the policy environment in which teachers and students must operate. The previous chapter shows the policy environment as an important player in electoral politics and the outcomes of varying electoral structures. This chapter applies the findings of the previous chapter to the bureaucratic level and explores its effect on teacher representation.

The evaluative literature on desegregation policy provides some insight on how one’s school environment and the conditions of this environment may shape both teacher behavior and student performance, though scholars come to varied conclusions about student performance and their overall success in racially balanced and imbalanced environments. On one hand, researchers find that there are great benefits to students being educated in desegregated, racially balanced schools. When compared to their peers educated in segregated schools, students of racially balanced schools tend to have higher academic achievement records, greater aspirations, and economic and future success
(Southworth and Michelson 2007; Goldsmith 2011; Wells and Crain 1994). The legal elimination of segregation of public education, on the other hand, has also led to a rise in informal, within-school segregation (Oakes 1985). Additionally, teachers of more racially balanced, diverse schools tend to have more experience and have lower turnover rates (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; Southworth and Michelson 2007).

Students of racially imbalanced schools tend to have lower levels of academic attainment and achievement, are more likely to hold government or blue collar positions; and generally earn less than peers of desegregated schools (Frankenberg 2009; Rumberger and Willms 1992; Wells and Crain 1994; Crain and Strauss 1985). However, they also tend to have more positive and optimistic attitudes about school and higher educational aspirations and occupational expectations (Goldsmith 2004). Research indicating academic benefits of segregated education is limited, however.

Collectively, these literatures suggest that both representative bureaucrats and the policy environment have a separate, but similar effect on student outcomes. The empirical research on representative bureaucracy has generally focused on individual bureaucrats’ actions without much attention placed on the environment in which bureaucrats operate and the consequences for outcomes in varying policy environments. Similarly, the research on desegregated and segregated education rarely discusses how the two settings affect bureaucratic behavior in a way that shapes student outcomes (but see Sanders 1984). The miscommunication between these two bodies of research leaves a window for important questions on how they relate and the manner in which they may collectively affect student outcomes. Such questions include: should we expect the benefits of representation to transcend varied policy environments? Do the previous chapter’s findings that the policy environment can help to increase teacher and administrator representation translate into
better substantive outcomes for students given the policy environment differences? Do teachers or administrators in segregated schools benefit students in the same manner as those in racially balanced schools and vice versa? Are students any better off in the racially balanced environment as the traditional desegregation literature suggests?

This chapter builds from the open systems theory of organizations to look at this relationship between policy environments and representative bureaucracy, using the case of racially imbalanced and racially balanced school districts as two policy environments that may influence bureaucratic action in a manner that leads to distinct or similar policy outcomes for students, particularly minority students. Broadly, open systems theory suggests that the (policy) environment can greatly influence organizational behavior and outcomes, primarily through resources and support. I draw from this work to contend that the bureaucrats act within the confinements of their policy environment. It determines the extent to which minority bureaucrats are more or less representative to minority students. As this external control changes, it relaxes or contracts, minority representation may also change. I examine the ability of minority bureaucrats, in this case teachers, to create a more equal or less discriminatory school experience for racial minority students through grouping and discipline policies to demonstrate these differences and the implications for student outcomes. Results indicate interesting differences but also similarities in representation under racially balanced and imbalanced systems.

**Revisiting Representative Bureaucracy and Education Policy Research**

There is a plethora of research on the relationship between teacher race and student performance. As noted above and in the previous chapter, public administration scholars contend that a bureaucrat’s ability to actively represent students leads to changes in student performance and the equality of school policies, particularly for minority
students of a more racially representative environment (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Meier and Stewart 1991; Weiher 2000). Similarly, education scholars theorize that minority students perform better under minority teachers due to the teacher’s ability to create a role model effect and use of shared culture in “reaching” minority students (Dee 2004; Ladson-Billings 1994). This “reaching” effect can extend beyond academics. Atkins and Wilkins (2013) find that minority teacher representation helps to reduce the Black teen pregnancy rate. The findings of both bodies of research are consistent and robust, and they extend beyond the teacher-student relationship. The scholarship also notes a positive relationship between minority student outcomes and minority administrators (Leal and Hess 2000; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011).

This research is particularly salient to the broader scholarship on the unintended consequences of federal desegregation policy because it suggests one way to mitigate the within school segregation and inequalities that have expanded post-Brown. Meier and his colleagues show on multiple occasions that teacher representation, as a form of political power and access, helps to reduce grouping and tracking inequalities for African American and Latino students (Meier, Stewart, England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). The inequalities of grouping and tracking procedures within schools highlight an aspect of school desegregation policy that the courts and law makers did not foresee, but also did not directly ban or correct. Plus, the negative effect that ability grouping has on student achievement, especially among lower ability students who are often students of color or from a lower income background, threatens the overall academic success and quality of life for these students (Carbonaro 2005; Schofield 2006). It undercuts the vision of the Brown decision.
Yet in the abundance of this literature, there is a dearth of theoretical exploration into exactly how the environment affects the relationships and to what extent these past findings hinge on the setting in which they operate. Does this effect happen in all types of schools—racially diverse or homogenous? After all, among the many arguments supporting the Brown v. Board of Education decision was the contention that the conditions under which students are taught play a large role in student and teacher resources and experiences, and inevitably outcomes. The research of external organizational control and constraint offers one lens for examining the relationship between the policy environment in which teachers and students operate and educational outcomes for students.

The Environment as an External Control

To understand why minority bureaucrats may be more or less effective in producing substantive benefits for their co-ethnic clients, it is necessary to have an understanding of the internal and external factors that contribute to the organizational outcome process. Internal processes—the factors that are within the bureaucrat’s or organization’s control—are often times easy to manipulate or navigate around to ensure productivity and organizational success. For example, organizations have much more control over employee morale than political support, and can therefore adjust internal happenings to make this a positive factor for organizational success. However, external processes, factors outside of the organization or bureaucrat’s realm of control are more difficult to manipulate and address. These factors may consist of clientele preferences or opinions, political elites’ control, or institutional and structural constraints to the organization. Consequently, the actions of organizational bureaucrats, implementers of policy and handlers of clientele concerns and interests, may also be restricted to this
external control. Such restrictions could lead bureaucrats of varying environments under different forms or types of external control to represent differently.

I use the open systems theory research of organizational theory and behavior to guide my argument and expectations for why and how minority bureaucrats in racially balanced districts may represent differently from their colleagues in less racially balanced districts. Arguments of organizations under the open systems theory note that organizations have interdependences and interactions with their environment that guide their actions, outcomes, and outputs (Katz and Kahn 1966). Changes and cues from the broader environment or “system” also influence changes in organizations (Shafritz, Ott, and Jang 2005, 476). Two main perspectives on how organizations handle environmental influence have emerged from this literature: Thompson’s (1967) synthesis of open and closed systems (a contingency perspective) and Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency theory. Under Thompson’s perspective, organizations face uncertainty and uncontrollable circumstances through the environment, but they also have rational, closed system aspects that permit them to maintain some control and certainty over the organization and its outputs. This perspective suggests that the technical, bureaucratic level generally remains closed and rational, meaning the actors still have some control over outcomes. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view organizations similarly, but they argue that organizational functioning and outputs are largely a function or consequence of the environment and its contingencies and constraints because they are dependent on it for resources and support. The governance of organizations is mainly external, so organizations and the bureaucrats within them are akin to puppets of the external environment. Unless organizations are able to dominate their resource environment, they have limited room to establish themselves separate from the environment.
In the case of school desegregation policy and the racial composition of schools, the arguments provide a lens for explaining and understanding how more racially balanced school districts, as a policy environment, could differ from less racially balanced districts, outside of the typical discussions of their level of resources and effects on students. It is without question that distinctions in resources and student effects matter; however, recognizing the nature of organizations and their ability to handle constraints and challenges may better explain how the district types could differ and why the two experience different student outcome effects based on resources, student peers, and teachers, and different educational outcomes overall.

Additionally, integrating these arguments into the representative bureaucracy literature produces an alternative and perhaps more accurate understanding of how bureaucrats come to represent clients, when and where they are more or less likely to represent their racial group's interests, and why a minority bureaucrat in a racially balanced district could represent very differently or similarly to one in a racially imbalanced district, and inevitably alter policy outcomes. Bureaucrats who must represent within these frames behave according to the environmental manipulations, demands, and expectations differently. Consequently, teachers of a district that aligns more with Pfeffer and Salancik's argument may find themselves more restricted in their ability to represent co-ethnic students, particularly if this practice is frowned upon in the organization. On the other hand, we might expect those in an organization of Thompson's perspective to experience environmental constraints or restrictions, but they may also have the liberty to address environmental uncertainty, demands, and control by creating coping mechanisms that allow them to sidestep environmental influence and represent co-ethnic students despite the environmental challenges.
Minority Representation under Varying Policy Environments: Applying the Thompson and Pfeffer & Salancik Perspectives

Recall that the basic argument of representative bureaucracy and its supporting research is that passive representation is a fundamental component of public bureaucracies because it affects the distribution of goods and services to clients based on shared demographic-based values, experiences, socialization, and interests, a process known as active representation (Selden 1997; Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003). However, as noted previously, organizational theorists provide alternative views on why this argument for bureaucrats as entities of bureaucratic organizations may not work and may vary across organizations’ policy environments. I apply two of those arguments, Thompson’s and Pfeffer and Salancik’s here to explain when and why bureaucrats of racially balanced districts may look the same as their colleagues in racially imbalanced districts, and when and why they may represent differently.

Thompson’s (1967) general argument about organizations as they relate to their environment is that the environment is indeed a master manipulator of organizations; however, organizations also maintain some of their autonomy from the environment at the lower, technical level. Applied to school districts, this lower level equates to the teachers and other faculty and staff that perform technical functions in the organizations and work most closely with the clients, the students. Because this level is considered a "closed system" to the environment, teachers hold discretion from the environment to operate as they please. Representation may occur freely, and minority teachers are likely to use this discretion and their ability to represent to help minority students of their shared racial or ethnic group. Thompson (1967) also contends that all formal organizations contain a technical "suborganization" that is insulated from external control to focus on effective
technical performance. As such, external influence and environmental differences should matter less in predicting representation’s effect and organizational outcomes. Minority representatives that are prone to represent minority students will represent the students’ interests and help to reduce the level of inequalities regardless of the level of racial balance because they operate in a “closed” system from environmental challenges or constraints.

Hypothesis 1: Minority representatives in racially imbalanced and racially balanced districts will have the same effect on student outcomes.

The racial balance, as a proxy of a bureaucrat’s external policy environment, will be irrelevant to their representative behavior as they operate semi-independent or “protected” from the challenges and demands of the environment. I expect no difference in minority representation between racially balanced and imbalanced districts, and findings most consistent with previous research on the relationship between minority representation and student outcomes.

On the other hand, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) argument leaves room to reach a different expectation for minority representation in racially balanced and imbalanced districts. Their argument generally holds that organizations’ context shapes their activities. The internal operation and happenings of the organization and its bureaucrats reflect the external environment on which it is dependent. This would also mean that if organizations and those within the organizations depend on different environments, then the organizations should also function differently, as the environment dictates. As environments vary, the functioning, processes, and likely outcomes of organizations also vary. Under this argument, minority teachers of different school district environments should also represent their minority students differently. In other words, minority representatives of racially balanced districts will represent in one way, while those of
racially imbalanced district will represent in another. Because this research deals with inequalities that are likely sensitive to minorities, we may not expect the minority representatives of racially balanced and imbalanced districts to always represent in opposite ways, but Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) approach gives reason to expect some divergent behavior that Thompson’s argument does not necessarily support.

**Hypothesis 2: Minority representatives in racially imbalanced districts will have a different effect on minority students’ outcomes when compared to representatives in racially balanced districts.**

From the Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) perspective, it is unclear the direction or level of divergence for representation between racially balanced and imbalanced school districts. However, the sizable body of research on the effects of a school’s racial composition and teacher behavior, and research on racially balanced and imbalanced school district differences may guide expectations for representational differences across the two policy environments. Scholars find that teachers in more racially imbalanced, highly minority populated schools are more likely to be novice teachers, have higher turnover rates, have lower salaries, poorer work facilities, and are more likely to be of color (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2005; Frankenberg 2009; Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and Luczak 2005). In fact, Frankenberg (2009) notes that African American and Latino teachers are overrepresented in urban, highly minority populated schools and underrepresented in suburban schools and areas where most of the students are white. On the other hand, teachers in more racially balanced schools are generally more experienced, considered of higher quality, and less likely to lack certification (Southworth and Michelson 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). Such differences have been linked to student achievement. Sanders (1984) finds that Black students of racially isolated teachers "gained
5.27 months less achievement” than their peers of non-isolated teachers. The finding suggests that differences in the policy environment affect teachers with implications for students.

Additionally, the desegregation research also highlights general distinctions in education under racially imbalanced districts and racially imbalanced districts that support the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective of external environmental effects on organizations. Racially balanced school districts tend to have a more rigorous academic climate and greater financial and human capital (Southworth and Michelson 2007). Scholars also find that students of the more balanced, or desegregated environment, are generally more successful academically and economically in the long term. They tend to have greater academic attainment levels—they are less likely to dropout of school and more likely to attend and complete college, often hold occupational positions of higher prestige, and are more likely to have white collar and professional jobs (Goldsmith 2009; Wells and Crain 1994; Crain and Strauss 1985; Guryan 2004).

There is also research outside of this desegregation frame that points to differences in racially balanced and imbalanced learning environments that help to support the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective. Benner and Crosnoe (2010) show that in general, students perform better in more diverse settings with more co-ethnic peers (but see Caldas and Bankston 1999). Interestingly, white students benefit the most from such an environment. The research suggests that the ideal learning environment for students consists of a diverse, well balanced body of students.

These works, coupled with the previously highlighted research on within school segregation, suggests a few important differences between racially balanced districts and racially imbalanced districts that help to develop expectations for representation under the
two types of policy environments. First, when the organization (school district) is dependent on a more balanced environment, they seem to have more resources and opportunities for students, all positive indicators of student outcomes. However, greater resources and opportunities also equate to greater latitude for the inequitable distribution of goods; some students are likely to be favored or fare better than others in such an environment. Although there is evidence that minority representation helps to promote equity in schools, minority representatives are less likely to be found in more racially balanced environments (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). Therefore, there are fewer opportunities for minority representation benefits in racially balanced environments compared to racially imbalanced environments. Finally, more balanced environments tend to support equality externally, as exhibited through the level of racial evenness in the district, but internally there is less equality. Students are more likely to be grouped and tracked in a discriminatory fashion (Southworth and Mickelson 2007). Given these differences,

*Hypothesis 2a: Racially balanced school districts will have higher levels of inequitable policy outcomes compared to racially imbalanced districts.*

While there is also a greater probability of less minority representation in racially balanced districts, this policy environment also calls for stronger and more minority representation because the demand is greater. Assuming that the environment is not completely hostile to active representation, minority teachers may respond to the inequitable “functioning” of the organization on behalf of minority students. Greater or stronger representation amongst minority teachers may occur within racially balanced districts as a response to the policy environment, particularly the inequitable internal happenings. In other words, minority teachers that are able to enter the more racially
balanced environment are more likely to address the inequitable policies and have a
greater level of influence on policy outcomes when compared to their colleagues in less
racially balanced environments.

   Hypothesis 2b: Representation in racially balanced districts will have a greater effect
on inequitable policy outcomes when compared to representation in racially imbalanced
districts.

The probability of greater minority representation is higher in racially imbalanced
school districts; however, this policy environment may actually demand less minority
representation, particularly in addressing within school segregation techniques. Here, the
environmental constraints and demands may call for minority representation to operate on
a different dimension of “functioning” to represent minority students such as role model
effects or college readiness. Therefore, we may expect an opposite or less significant effect
in the racially imbalanced districts.

   Methods and Measures

This chapter uses the previously discussed data sources and data over two school
terms, 2000-2001 and 2003-2004. The units of analysis are public school districts with a

Dependent Variables

Dependent variables are grouped as two areas of education policy: academic
grouping and discipline. Three measures are used in each category to identify within
school segregation procedures and to examine any differences in how minority teacher
representation affects the processes across the two policy environments considered.
**Academic Grouping**

Academic grouping is the placement of students in classes outside of the standard education setting based on their “estimated achievement or ability levels,” (Office for Civil Rights 2010). I only account for students placed in special education and gifted education courses; however, academic grouping also includes students pulled out of regular mathematics or language arts classes for alternative or additional assistance (Office for Civil Rights 2010).

Academic grouping measures are developed to indicate the disproportionate assignment of African American and Latino students to gifted education courses and categories of mental retardation for special education assignments. A proportional index measure (odds ratio) is constructed to capture the extent to which African American or Latino students are disproportionately assigned to special education or gifted education classes. It assumes that students of each racial group represented in a school or district are assigned to such courses at a rate equal to their population size. It can be best illustrated as

\[ P = \frac{\frac{h_g}{H_t}}{\frac{G_t}{N}} \]

where \( h_g \) equals the number of Latino students grouped in gifted or special education courses, \( H_t \) is the total Latino student population, \( G_t \) represents the total number of students grouped in gifted or special education, and \( N \) is the total student population.

Traditional of any ratio calculation, an index value of 1.0 indicates that students are

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33 Office for Civil Rights ability grouping data does not include grouping based on required prerequisites for certain courses (i.e. Algebra I as a prerequisite for Algebra II) or programs and services for students with disabilities served under IDEA (Office for Civil Rights 2010).
proportionally represented in special education or gifted courses relative to their share of the total student population; values above 1.0 indicate overrepresentation in the courses and values below 1.0 indicate underrepresentation.

This measure allows me to observe the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of students in academic groups to determine how schools are using these systems to create segregated settings within the schools. However, the measure fails to capture some important aspects of resegregation that are fundamental to desegregation research. First, the discriminatory process of academic grouping often follows discriminatory tracking policies—the disproportionate assignment of minority students in college bound or vocational tracks. The OCR data does not allow me to capture this aspect of resegregation and the effect that representation and the policy environment may have on this process, though previous scholarship suggests that there is reason to believe that students in a racially balanced environment are more likely to be disproportionately funneled into the lower, vocational track and less likely to be fostered into the college-bound track (Oakes 1985).

Second, I am not able to disentangle the extent to which students are discouraged to pursue certain academic tracks or more positive opportunities. It is unclear how much of the grouping is related to “self-selection,” and the amount attributed to teacher or administrator behavior. Though the theory contends that teachers and administrators of certain backgrounds affect the process through their recommendations, a full picture of physical recommendation (submitting formal paperwork to group a student), and verbal recommendation to individual students would be ideal to capture academic grouping and tracking assignments. Nevertheless, the measure is the best measure for capturing within school segregation and limitations in students’ educational experiences.
Discipline

Three common disciplinary actions are used as the second set of dependent variables: corporal punishment, out of school suspensions, and expulsions. Corporal punishment consists of paddling, spanking, or other forms of physical punishment imposed on a student (Office for Civil Rights 2010). Although controversial, corporal punishment remains legal in some US public schools. Only 31 states and the District of Columbia have outlawed the practice in their public schools. States that permit corporal punishment generally leave policy making on its use and severity to local school boards (Center for Effective Discipline 2011). Out of school suspensions include the removal of a student from his/her regular school for one day or longer, while expulsions consist of a student’s removal for the remainder of the year or longer (Office for Civil Rights 2010).

Again, a proportional index measure (odds ratio) is constructed to capture the extent to which African American or Latino students are disproportionately punished under the same assumptions of proportional representation discussed above. A separate measure is generated for each form of discipline. The current discipline measures fail to capture other, and perhaps more frequent, methods of discipline such as verbal reprimanding and classroom discipline, visits to a school administrator, and in-school suspensions, but it is the most accurate measure of within school discipline practices known to date.

Explanatory Variables

Bureaucratic representation, the main independent variable, is measured at the street level as the percentage of African American and Latino teachers per district. The key explanatory variable, level of racial balance, is measured using the previously explained
similarity score (see Chapter 4). Consistent with the previous chapter, the .60 cutoff is used in the analyses below to separate more racially balanced districts from less racially balanced districts.

Control Variables

Consistent with the previous chapter, I controlled for geographic region, level of residential segregation, and a set of resource variables—percentage of Blacks and Latinos with college degrees, the percentage that are homeowners, the median Black and Latino family income, and the percentage of Whites in poverty (see Chapter 4). Resource variables are expected to improve the equity of grouping and discipline policies for minority students because greater resources—financial or political—increase minorities’ ability to pressure school districts to create a more equitable academic setting for students (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). Biases against poor Whites are expected to work in the favor of middle class Blacks and Latinos so I expect a negative relationship between the odds ratios of each policy and white poverty.

I also account for the size of the district, using a measure of district enrollment to control for district size. Larger districts are generally more professionalized, more aware of civil rights laws and regulations, and are typically under more public scrutiny when it comes to questions of equity. Therefore, they are also more likely to be sensitive to even covert discriminatory practices like inequitable grouping and tracking policies, leading me to expect more equitable polices in larger districts (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989, 36; Meier and Stewart 1991, 147).

Ordinary least squares modeling is used to test the hypotheses. Diagnostic tests revealed heteroskedasticity issues; therefore, robust standard errors were used to address the concern.
Findings

Grouping Policies

Observing the linear relationship between minority representation and grouping and tracking policies is insufficient without first establishing baseline levels of disproportionate grouping policies by race/ethnicity. Table 5.1 shows the odds of Black, Latino and white students being grouped in gifted education and the two special education categories. Black and Latino students are underrepresented in gifted courses, while White students are about 30 percent overrepresented in gifted education courses. Black students also face greater odds of being grouped as mildly or moderately retarded into special education courses and are significantly overrepresented in this category; Latino students, on average, are represented fairly equitably to their total enrollment in both special education categories, and White students are slightly underrepresented.

Table 5.1 Grouping Policy Ratios by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping Policy</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifted Education</td>
<td>.4837</td>
<td>.4241</td>
<td>.5008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mild Retardation</td>
<td>1.966</td>
<td>2.2096</td>
<td>.9249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Retardation</td>
<td>1.869</td>
<td>5.879</td>
<td>.9808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A deeper look at this data by policy environment in Table 5.2 shows that Black and Latino students are still underrepresented in gifted classes in both racially imbalanced and balanced districts, but to a greater extent in racially balanced districts, supporting my hypothesis, though there is no statistical difference observed for Latino students. White
students remain overrepresented in gifted classes, regardless of the academic setting, though their odds of being placed in gifted education are significantly higher in more racially imbalanced school districts.

### Table 5.2 Grouping Policy Ratios by Race and Level of Racial Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping Policy</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>Racially Imbalanced</td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gifted Education</strong></td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.4657*** (.3995)</td>
<td>.5645 (.5131)</td>
<td>.4960 (.3959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mild Retardation</strong></td>
<td>2.017* (2.322)</td>
<td>1.776 (1.716)</td>
<td>.9697*** (1.498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderate Retardation</strong></td>
<td>1.910 (6.387)</td>
<td>1.725 (3.535)</td>
<td>.9546 (1.8199)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; Ratios between racial group in racially balanced and imbalanced districts statistically different at specified level.

Results on negative groupings also reveal interesting grouping policy differences and similarities across policy environments. While there is a statistical difference in mild retardation classification between the two policy environments for all three racial groups, only Black students are overrepresented in special education. Latino and White students are underrepresented in assessments of mild and moderate retardation and move closer to parity in racially balanced districts for both special education categories. Results again suggest that all students, especially Latino students, are faring better on average in racially imbalanced districts.

34 Districts with a similarity index score of .60 or above are considered racially balanced; districts with a score below .60 are considered imbalanced districts.
Discipline Policies

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 highlight the inequalities of discipline policies. Black students are overrepresented in all three forms of discipline, while white students are underrepresented across all three forms. Latino students, on the other hand, fare as anticipated. Table 5.3 shows that Latino students have the greatest odds of being disciplined at the most equitable rate compared to Black and white students. Latino students are underrepresented, on average, in corporal punishment discipline procedures and are suspended and expelled from schools at a rate nearly equitable to their total population. It is unclear from the data exactly why Latino students tend to be more equitably represented in discipline policies.

Table 5.3 Discipline Policy Ratios by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline Policy</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal Punishment</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>.9817</td>
<td>.6008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspensions</td>
<td>1.846</td>
<td>.8686</td>
<td>.9815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsions</td>
<td>1.597</td>
<td>1.967</td>
<td>.9467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the distribution of discipline actions in racially balanced districts are compared to those in imbalanced districts, results indicate statistical differences between the two for each racial group, but also similarities consistent with the grouping policies of Table 5.2. Black students are consistently overrepresented in disciplinary actions and to a greater extent in racially balanced schools, as hypothesized. Latino students, on the other
hand, are underrepresented to the greatest extent in corporal punishment relative to the other racial groups. All three racial groups seem to experience less disciplinary action in racially imbalanced districts, which suggests a more equitable environment in such districts. These findings provide a stronger indication of minority students experiencing a more equitable and less harsh discipline policies in racially imbalanced districts. Again, students in racially balanced districts do not seem to be faring better than their peers in racially segregated schools. Instead, these students, particularly African Americans, are experience stronger and harsher disciplinary policies.

Table 5.4: Discipline Policy Ratios by Race and Level of Racial Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>Racially Imbalanced</td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>Racially Imbalanced</td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>Racially Imbalanced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporal Punishment</strong></td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Std. Deviation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.469 (1.017)</td>
<td>1.417 (.9029)</td>
<td>.5124 (.5278)</td>
<td>.4527 (.5482)</td>
<td>.8503 (.4964)</td>
<td>.8339 (.6340)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspensions</strong></td>
<td>1.912*** (.8845)</td>
<td>1.549 (.7228)</td>
<td>1.017*** (.5364)</td>
<td>.8240 (.4969)</td>
<td>.8482*** (.2052)</td>
<td>.7322 (.2676)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expulsions</strong></td>
<td>1.660*** (2.084)</td>
<td>1.325 (1.324)</td>
<td>.9607 (1.8199)</td>
<td>.8896 (1.300)</td>
<td>.7738*** (.4277)</td>
<td>.6207 (.4213)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Ratios between racial group in racially balanced and imbalanced districts statistically different at specified level.

The research findings overall are consistent with previous literature, suggesting that not much has changed in regard to second generation discrimination in public schools (Oakes 1985; Meier, Steward and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991). However, two interesting trends emerge from Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 when comparing grouping and discipline policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts that provide new
insights on second generation discrimination. First, I find support for the expectation of less equitable policies in racially balanced districts compared to imbalanced districts. Overall, students tend to fare better in racially imbalanced districts. This finding challenges the long held argument that more racially balanced, diverse educational settings provide the greatest benefits for students. Although students may receive greater long term academic benefits and access to resources in racially balanced schools, the results show that the “benefits” come at a cost and are limited to minority students, especially Black students.

Racially imbalanced districts prove to be particularly more equitable policy environments for Latino and White students. They are consistently underrepresented on the negative indicators (i.e. discipline and special education classifications). This is somewhat expected for white students but is not expected for Latino students. Both tables show that grouping and discipline policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts are consistently harmful to African American students, while other students tend to experience some relief in racially imbalanced districts. Black students experience lower odds of being placed in gifted education and greater odds of being placed in special education and experiencing harsh discipline policies. Even in the more segregated environments where Black students are more likely to make up the majority of the student population, decreasing the “need” to internally separate students, they remain significantly overrepresented in special education and disciplinary actions. Consistent with the argument of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, separate schools are far from being equal from Black students, although they are more equal than racially balanced schools. Interestingly, they seem to be more equitable to students that the original legislation did not cover. The results suggest that neither environment is particularly beneficial for
African American students, leading one to question the state of Black education. If Black students experience such inequalities, regardless of the environment, where should practitioners and scholars center their focus and efforts in improving their educational experience? Additionally, will the similarities of racially balanced and imbalanced districts trump any intervention introduced to address the inequalities? Findings of the next section consider these questions in showing the effect of minority teacher representation on the disparities in grouping and discipline policies in segregated and desegregated school districts.

**Representation and Racial Balancing in Public Schools**

*Grouping Policies*

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 include a comparison of the results for the test of minority teacher representation's effect on grouping policies in racially balanced and imbalanced school districts for Black and Latino students. The results of Table 5.5 suggest that Black teachers positively influence Black students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education and reduce their odds of being classified as mildly retarded and recommended to special education, but fail to show any effect on more severe special education classifications. Although the level of racial balance fails to have a significant effect on any ability groupings, its interactive effect is shown to matter for Black gifted education assignments. Figure 5.1 allows for a more complete view of how the policy environment shapes bureaucratic action. The model and figures provide some support for the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective. Here, the policy environment reduces teacher representation effects and to the greatest extent in racially balanced districts, leading Black representation in the imbalanced environment to differ from representation in the most balanced districts. Among the entire range of racially imbalanced districts, districts with a racial balance score
below the .60 threshold, Black teachers have a positive, but diminishing effect on Black students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education. In the most racially balanced districts, those in which over 80 percent of the schools are racially balanced, the effect is lost; Black teachers fail to have a significant effect on gifted education groupings for Black students. The model suggests that Black students in racially imbalanced districts may be faring relatively better than their peers in racially balanced districts, given their representational support. The results are consistent with the preliminary findings.

The remaining grouping policy areas yield different results. Consistent with Table 5.5, marginal effect figures (see Appendix C) indicate that Black teachers help to reduce Black students’ odds of being classified as mildly retarded across both policy environments, nearly at the same rate as Thompson predicts; however, they fail to have a significant effect on reducing their odds of being classified as moderately retarded. Though insignificant, the model is still consistent with Thompson’s perspective on policy environment effects. Overall results provide greater support for Thompson’s perspective. The policy environment is undoubtedly influential in representation’s ability to reduce inequitable grouping practices for Black students, but Black teacher representation tends to have the same effect on student outcomes, regardless of the level of racial balance. I do not find much support for my hypothesis of greater representation effects in racially balanced districts.
Table 5.5: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Academic Grouping Outcomes for Black Students across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Gifted Education Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Mild Retardation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Moderate Retardation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Representation</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>-0.029*</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Racial Balance Index</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation*Racial Balance</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White College Graduate Ratio</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income Ratio</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-1.232***</td>
<td>-2.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>1.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Size (1000s)</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.060***</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Gifted (%)</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Mild Retardation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Moderate Retarditation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.176**</td>
<td>3.696***</td>
<td>3.531***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
I find a similar relationship for Latino students; Latino teachers help to improve Latino students’ odds of being assigned to gifted education, but fail to have any effect on their odds of special education assignments (see Table 5.6). Because, the interaction coefficients reveal very little about the true relationship between the policy environment and Latino representation, I turn to Figure 5.2 for more insight. The figure for Latino representation's effect on Latino students' odds of being assigned to gifted education across the varying policy environments is nearly the same as Figure 5.1 of Black students. I find some support the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective, though it is somewhat limited. Latino teachers in less racially balanced districts also have a positive, but diminishing effect.
on Latino students’ assignment to gifted education, and this finding holds until the higher end of racial balance. In the most racially balanced districts, which are also the districts in which minority students experience greater levels of inequality, Latino representation has no effect on their odds of being assigned to gifted education. This finding only affects about 60 districts in the sample, but it certainly raises the question of why the benefits of representation fade in such districts. Interestingly, representation is shown to be more effective in racially imbalanced districts, the environment in which Latino students are grouped more equitably. The results of both figures—Figure 5.1 and 5.2—fail to support my expectation of a greater effect in racially balanced districts.

On the negative grouping dimensions, I find that Latino teacher representation has its greatest effect in racially balanced districts, as hypothesized (see Appendix C), in terms of mild retardation classifications. Latino teachers in more racially balanced districts help to reduce the level of inequitable groupings, while Latino teachers in less racially balanced districts fail to influence the policy outcome. Results on the mild retardation classification for special education provide more support for the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective, while results for the more severe, “moderate retardation” classification are insignificant and more consistent with the Thompson perspective of policy environment influence.
Table 5.6: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Academic Grouping Policy Outcomes for Latino Students across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Gifted Education Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Mild Retardation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Moderate Retardation Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representation</td>
<td>0.011*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino-White Racial Balance Index</td>
<td>0.412*** (0.098)</td>
<td>0.746* (0.386)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation*Racial Balance</td>
<td>-0.009*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.023* (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White College Graduate Ratio</td>
<td>0.031 (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.069)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income Ratio</td>
<td>-0.024 (0.050)</td>
<td>0.100 (0.134)</td>
<td>-0.091 (0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>0.002** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.005* (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.048*** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-0.293*** (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.689*** (0.275)</td>
<td>-0.193 (0.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Size (1000s)</td>
<td>0.000** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.150** (0.069)</td>
<td>0.049 (0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Gifted (%)</td>
<td>0.006*** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.011*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.010*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Mild Retardation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Moderate Retardation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.146* (0.077)</td>
<td>1.761*** (0.335)</td>
<td>1.424*** (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>1,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Gifted Education Assignment as Policy Environments Change

Previous scholarship examining the relationship between representation and policy outcomes for African American and Latino students separately shows representation overall to be a benefit for minority students in improving the access to education and reducing the levels of internal segregation that federal policies and legislation do not address. Yet, when this representation is examined under the microscope of varied policy environments and the realistic context of where teachers are actually “representing,” the results suggest that assuming that all minority teachers actively represent students or are able to represent the students in a way that significantly improves their academic experience is premature. In some instances, the settings can lead

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to different representational effects. Figure 5.3 summarizes the academic grouping findings for Black and Latino students as they align with the two perspectives of external control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thompson Perspective, No differences</th>
<th>Gifted Education</th>
<th>Mild Retardation</th>
<th>Moderate Retardation</th>
<th>Gifted Education</th>
<th>Mild Retardation</th>
<th>Moderate Retardation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X—NS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X—NS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfeffer &amp; Salancik; differences</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discipline Policies

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 include the effect of teacher representation on discipline policies for Black and Latino students in varying policy environments. The coefficients of Table 5.7 suggest that although Black teacher representation helps to reduce Black students’ odds of being suspended and receiving corporal punishment at a disproportionate rate, this effect is lost when the environment in which the representation occurs is considered. Figure 5.4, a graph of the shared effect of policy environment and Black teacher representation on Black students’ suspension odds, indicates that representation has the same limited effect on school suspensions for Black students in both policy environments. Black teachers have a negative, but constant effect on Black students’ odds of suspension. The finding conforms to Thompson’s perspective of environmental effects; Black teachers in racially balanced districts represent students in the same manner as their colleagues in racially imbalanced districts.
Table 5.7: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Discipline Policy Outcomes for Black Students across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Corporal Punishment Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Suspensions Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Expulsions Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Representation</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Racial Balance Index</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>1.352***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation*Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White College Graduate Ratio</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>-0.132***</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income Ratio</td>
<td>-0.326</td>
<td>0.205***</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.048***</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-1.166***</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>-0.742**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Size (1000s)</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Corporal Punishment (%)</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Suspensions (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Expulsions (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.037***</td>
<td>2.261***</td>
<td>1.965***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>1,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
The remaining discipline policies provide support for both perspectives (see Appendix C). Black teacher representation has a negative effect on Black students’ odds of receiving corporal punishment; however, in the most racially balanced districts, representation loses its effect. Results provide support for the Pfeffer and Salancik perspective, but fail to support my expectation of greater representation effects in racially balanced districts. Representation fails to reduce inequalities in districts where it is perhaps needed the most. Black teachers in imbalanced districts provide greater representational benefits, possibly because they are more likely to recommend this least severe form of punishment to avoid more severe forms. Finally, Black teachers are unable to reduce the odds of the most extreme discipline measure, expulsion, similar to the
findings of Table 5.7. The insignificant interaction graph supports Thompson’s perspective of policy environment influence, as the nearly flat line indicates. Representation’s null effect appears to occur separate from any significant policy environment influence. Past research has shown a relationship between teacher representation and expulsion rates, but the current finding could be related to the more recent “zero tolerance” clauses added to many school discipline policies.

Table 5.8 suggests that Thompson’s perspective is most appropriate in examining the relationship between Latino representation and discipline policies. In general, Latino teacher representation fails to reduce Latino students’ odds of experiencing harsh disciplinary measures. While other figures, discussed below and shown in the Appendix C, support the findings of Table 5.8, Figure 5.5 shows more support for the Pfeffer and Salancik view of policy environments. The figure shows that Latino teachers in racially imbalanced districts fail to reduce the odds of suspension for Latino students, while their colleagues in more racially balanced districts help to reduce the practice. Latino teachers in the most racially balanced districts, those reaching near perfect racial balance, do not show this effect. Findings also support my expectation of greater representation effects in more racially balanced districts.
### Table 5.8: Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on Discipline Policy Outcomes for Latino Students across Policy Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Corporal Punishment Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Suspensions Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Expulsions Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representation</td>
<td>0.010 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino-White Racial Balance Index</td>
<td>0.319 (0.204)</td>
<td>0.194* (0.111)</td>
<td>0.322 (0.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation*Racial Balance</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White College Graduate Ratio</td>
<td>-0.064* (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.042 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.245*** (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income Ratio</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.088)</td>
<td>-0.126** (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.336*** (0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.003*** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.017** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.023*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-0.821*** (0.143)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.300 (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Size (1000s)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.205* (0.120)</td>
<td>-0.124*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.057 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Corporal Punishment (%)</td>
<td>-0.005*** (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Suspensions (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Expulsions (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.936*** (0.238)</td>
<td>1.455*** (0.085)</td>
<td>1.666*** (0.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
As Table 5.8 suggests, Latino teacher representation does not have an effect on corporal punishment for Latino students, regardless of policy environment. The result supports Thompson’s perspective, although I fail to show any significant relationship among the predictors. However, the relationship between Latino representation and Latino students’ odds of expulsion is more supportive of the Thompson perspective. Latino teachers in the least segregated districts and moderately balanced districts reduce Latino students’ odds of being expelled; however, the environment’s substantive effect is limited as Thompson predicts, given the nearly flat slope. Figure 5.6 summarizes the above findings as they relate to the two theories of external control.
Figure 5.6: Discipline Policy Findings Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Black Students</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Latino Students</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporal Punishment</td>
<td>Suspension</td>
<td>Expulsion</td>
<td>Corporal Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X—NS</td>
<td>X—NS</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective, No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfeffer &amp; Salancik; differences</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

What conclusions can be drawn from the findings of this chapter? Are minority students better off in racially balanced districts as much education literature suggests and proponents and Supreme Court justices believed in their groundbreaking *Brown v. Board of Education* decision? Summary figures, Figure 5.7 and 5.8, suggest that in some ways they are, but in other ways they are not. Consistent with the findings of the previous chapter, minority students do not *always* fare better in racially balanced districts. This chapter’s results show that minority students continue to experience higher levels of within school segregation in racially balanced schools. African Americans, in particular, face the greatest barriers to equality in racially balanced schools, and this effect oddly holds in racially imbalanced districts also. These findings highlight an unintended consequence of desegregated education and challenge the arguments that racially balanced districts are “better” for minority students. In fact, it is shown that African American students are subject to overrepresentation in special education and harsh discipline policies, regardless of level of racial balance in a district.
In terms of minority representation “benefits”, minority students in racially balanced districts experience a few different effects, but the benefits of representation are few. Latino teacher representation in racially balanced districts helps to reduce the odds of Latino students being suspended and grouped in special education as moderately retarded, while their peers in racially imbalanced districts fail to experience any redress via representation. Black students in racially balanced districts do not experience any distinct

35 N/A designates that the Thompson perspective was supported; students in racially balanced and imbalanced districts experienced the same representational effects and consequently, the policy environment in which students fared better cannot be determined.

36 X designates that the Pfeffer & Salancik perspective was supported and students of the marked category fared better than those in the unmarked category.
“benefits” through Black teacher representation. Instead, when the environments differ, Black students experience more relief in the segregated districts. Nevertheless, there are far more instances of representation having the same effect on policies, regardless of policy environment. There is no clear advantage in racially balanced or imbalanced districts for minority students when it comes to addressing the inequalities of academic grouping and discipline policy.

These findings raise substantive concerns about public education. The lack of differential support to demonstrate that racially balanced districts are significantly “better” for minority students than racially imbalanced districts calls into question the educational opportunity both environments provide to students. Although much research supports the argument that racially balanced schools provide greater advantages for minority students that can be link to better outcomes, excluding them from the courses and opportunities that ensure equal academic opportunities undercuts the relevance of the resources and advantages. This is not to say that some minority students do not benefit from racially balanced districts; however, the results highlight the fact that the full potential and benefit of racially balanced school districts is restricted through internal segregation processes. Furthermore, as Black students find themselves being grouped and disciplined inequitably with limited minority teacher mitigating effects, even in racially imbalanced districts that tend to have greater minority teacher representation, it becomes clear that internal practices and the effect of these practices are virtually the same for minority students, regardless of the level of racial balance of their school. The results call for a more meaningful discussion and consideration of what “separate and unequal” really means. The alarming resegregation of US schools has drawn some attention to the growing isolation and inequitably academic experiences of minority students across school districts;
however, this work shows that it is equally important to draw attention and concern to the separate and unequal experiences students are receiving within the segregated and desegregated schools.

Findings of the past two chapters lead one to question if the observed relationships are simply a matter of representation. Do such outcomes for students only occur on a shared ethnic background basis? Should we only expect minority school board members, administrators, or teachers to have an effective concern for the outcome and equality of minority students? The next chapter moves away from representation effects and focuses on the final component of the framework model, public management, to predict policy outcomes in varying policy environments. I examine how public managers operate in the two distinct environments and their strategies for influencing student outcomes, given the policy environment.
CHAPTER VI
MANAGING CONSTRAINTS: PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, POLICY ENVIRONMENTS, AND STUDENT OUTCOMES

The previous chapters provide mixed results in determining the policy environment, racially imbalanced or balanced, that best serves minorities students, particularly when the level of minority representation is considered. In general, representation is an asset for minorities; it is related to greater substantive benefits such as the hiring of more minority bureaucrats and less discriminatory grouping policies. However, when representational “benefits” are examined under the two policy settings, differing outcomes emerge. In some instances, racially balanced districts are helpful in maintaining the benefits of representation, and in others it fails. Imbalanced districts also prove to be beneficial to minority students in some instances. The chapters show that policy environment effects on the school board and teachers really determines how much representation matters and the extent to which teachers or board members act as “representatives” at all. But is this the case when teacher or administrator demographics are not assessed? Is it really all about racial demographics and environmental context alone or can other factors alter policy or student outcomes.

Public management literature shows a strong indication that representation is not the only factor that matters in shaping outcomes for minorities. Scholars of this field find that public managers play a significant role in affecting organizational functioning, outcomes and performance (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009). Most importantly, managers often work to alter the external policy environment’s effect on their organization, a somewhat different approach than discussed for elected officials and street level bureaucrats. As the education literature suggests and the previous chapters show, the
racial balance of a school as a policy environment plays an important role in shaping
district and student outcomes. If public managers also “manage” the environment, can
management help to alter racial balance’s effect on student outcomes? That is, do the policy
outcomes of imbalanced schools mirror those of racially balanced schools when
management is considered? Secondly, why does management matter in this context?

This chapter shifts to the school level to examine the management factors that may
mitigate the environment’s effect on student performance. It emphasizes the role of school
principals as local public managers and the consequences of their management decisions
for organizational outcomes across the two policy environments. Here, I focus less on
exploring how the level of racial balance affects policy outcomes and more on how to make
the policy outcomes of both settings meet. I highlight the management factors that public
managers bring to the organization, outside of racial representation, to alter performance
outcomes. Because managers have very little control over altering the racial composition of
their schools, I explore managers’ use of their own unique abilities to “manage” the
challenge. Specifically, I make an argument for managerial style’s effect on decision making
and student performance. Results provide limited support for the theory, but hold
important implications for understanding how principals affect student performance in
racially balanced and imbalanced schools.

**Managers’ Effect on Organizational Outcomes and the Environment**

As mentioned above, management is found to be the single most consistent factor
to affect organizational functioning, outcomes and performance, regardless of a managers’
demographic background (Boyne 2003; Lynn et al. 2001; Rainey 2009). Public
management scholars note that specific managerial behaviors, traits, and techniques are
responsible for management having such a significant effect on organizational performance
and outcomes. They contend that it is a manager's ability to motivate and lead subordinates, to network with stakeholders and external actors for resources and information or to buffer the organization from external constraints that allows him to shape an organization's performance and outcomes (Lieberson and O'Connor 1972; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Meier and O'Toole 2001). Educational leadership and administration scholars hold a similar contention, finding that principals not only execute policy directives from the school board or superintendent, but they also network with teachers and the external environment to improve student performance, build social capital, and reduce costs (Friedkin and Slater 1994; Kahne et al. 2001; Smith and Wohlstetter 2001). A manager's leadership ability, as measured through teacher satisfaction, is also related to greater student performance (Friedkin and Slater 1994).

A few scholars have also explored how management matters for specific groups, finding that the effect and particular management techniques are not equally beneficial to clients. O'Toole and Meier (2004) show that managers' networking behavior improves white students' performance, but it does not have a significant effect on Latino, African American, and low-income students. They conclude that network managers are most responsive to politically powerful and dominating groups and contribute to inequalities in society. Others find more positive effects; greater networking is shown to mitigate the negative effects of organizational diversity on Latino and low income students (Owens and Kukla-Acevedo 2012; Meier et al. 2006). Managerial quality also proves to matter for improving minority students' performance outcomes. Black and Latino students earn up to 3.7 more points on standardized assessments under really good public managers (Meier et al. 2006). These studies all demonstrate that management matters for minority students, and this finding is particularly important to the current research as it seeks to address a
highly racialized issue through a public management lens. The collective bodies of literature also leave one to question to what extent management “matters”—more or less, in the desegregation and second generation discrimination story.

**Public Management and the Environment**

As demonstrated above, there is a strong consensus in the management literature that public managers can significantly influence the outcomes of organizations. However, less of this literature actually shows how managers influence outcomes of varying policy environments, particularly those that are constrained or not easily manipulated. Researchers studying organizational response and outcomes in the face of shocks provide some insights on how and why managers matter in a constrained fixed environment such as racially balanced and imbalanced schools.

Organizational theorists note that buffering the organization from shocks and external strains is a core aspect of management (Thompson 1967). In fact, buffering, blocking or minimizing the harmful effects of external actions—is an expected managerial action for turbulent environments. Similarly, the strategic management literature contends that defending an organization is a valid strategy in dealing with the external environment (Miles and Snow 1978). Protecting the organization from the environment and shocks is shown to help implement internal policy goals and improve performance outcomes (Meier et al. 2007; Meier and O’Toole 2008; Honig 2009).

Yet managers may not always seek to block their organization from shocks. Other works on organizational response to shocks show that some managers manage the environment in their favor. Rainey and Steinbauer’s (1999) research on effective government organizations notes that effective public organizations are often led by strong leaders or managers who are able to manipulate constraints into opportunities. Meier and
O'Toole (1999) propose a similar theory about management's response to constraints. Their formal model of public management includes a component of system shocks, a form of constraint from the environment, that management may attempt to block or buffer, or alternatively, exploit and use to positively influence the organization (O'Toole and Meier 1999). For example, Meier and O'Toole (2009) show that when faced with a budget decrease, managers may protect priority expenditures and funding, by reducing expenditures and funding in other operational areas and goals. Instead of attempting to avoid and block the shock completely, they manage the shock internally to mitigate its potential negative effect. Similarly, managers who maintain structural stability are able to mitigate and manage the harmful effects of a turbulent external environment (Boyne and Meier 2009).

In general, this research concludes that the most successful organizations have managers who protect their organization from shocks through buffering or internal management. What many of these studies fail to address or consider is the possibility that the environmental constraint is a structural component of the organization that may not be buffered and may only be weakly exploited37. Both responses to handling shocks or the environment are contingent on the possibility that the environment may be “handled.” Periodically, organizations face constraints that are not easily manipulated, and leave very little room for managers or policymakers to alter its effect on outcomes. Andrews et al. (2005) contend that in such circumstances few real managerial choices are made in shaping the organization and its performance. In other words, managers and management

37 Meier and O'Toole (2009) pose a similar question about environmental shocks that cannot be avoided and are forced upon the organization. Though similar, this work differs from their study in its conceptualization of the environment, not as a shock, but as a structural constraint embedded into the system.
matters less because the constraint overwhelms the potential effect. Although their research does not focus specifically on structural or fixed environmental constraints, it provides one indication of the relationship we might expect between management and the racial composition of schools.

The education literature is very clear in the fact that the racial composition of schools can be a constraint to the overall success of the school as those with higher minority populations tend to have fewer financial resources; greater levels of teacher turnover, and higher levels of low-income students (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; Goldsmith 2003). It affects student outcomes (Guryan 2004; Michelson 2001; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2009), and as earlier chapters show, it also effects school board members and teachers. Therefore, it is not farfetched to expect public managers to experience this same constraining effect, making “few managerial choices” as Andrews et al. (2005) suggest. Nevertheless, the majority of the management literature suggests that this constraint’s significance to student performance may also be managed in a way that reduces its impact. The next section considers how managers might address the fixed environmental constraints, despite Andrews et al.’s (2005) contention, through a discussion of their contributions to public organizations.

Managerial Style

I contend that managerial style—a manager’s leadership practices, management practices, and strategies—best explains why managers matter and how they handling an organization’s environment. Style is important to consider for several reasons. First, managerial style sets the tone of the organization. Subordinates, stakeholders and even clients often take cues from the manager about the importance of goals, the organization’s mission, and vision. Though this information may be stated, the manner in which a
manager prioritizes and implements them conveys the actual value attached to the goals and mission of the organization. The salience of organizational goals and objectives are generally based on the managers’ treatment of goals. He also models and sets the expectations, another aspect of setting the tone of the organization. The organization moves based on stakeholders and clients’ expectations, which are often convey to it through the manager. A manager’s style determines how all of this information is conveyed or presented to the organization. It determines ones’ view of goals and objectives, and consequently the responding treatment to them.

Second, a manager’s style influences his/her decision making process, one’s actual decisions, and the steps in which decisions are implemented in the organization. Public managers differ in their decision making calculus because style sets their view of the world. It dictates how they perceive and handle problems, as well as successes. It dictates their ability to make decisions and implement them. Similar to distinctions between “type A” and “type B” personality traits38, a manager that has an innovative or progressive style, for example, makes decisions very differently than a manager with a more rigid and structuralist style.

Consequently, style also determines how the manager handles the environment. Again, a manager will hold different perceptions and beliefs about the environment based on his/her style. Some styles may lead a manager to see the environment’s challenge as a burden and extra strain to the organization, while others may lead him/her to view it as an opportunity. Just as style operates to shape the tone of the organization and the decision-making process, it also influences how the manager perceives and interacts with the environment.

38 Personality theory defines a “Type A” personality as one exhibiting traits of ambition, hostility, impatience, and competitiveness, originally linked to health issues such as coronary disease (Friedman and Rosenman 1959; Chesney et al. 1981). “Type B” personality is defined as the relative absence of “Type A” personality and instead more a relaxed and easy going nature.
making and implementation process of an organization via its manager, it also determines how the organization will perceive and respond to the environment. Different responses to the fixed environmental constraint of schools’ racial composition can be traced to differences in managerial style.

As managerial style moves to influence each aspect of an organization, it becomes a potentially important predictor of the organization’s success. Though the environment may place an extra burden on the organization and manager, his/her style is important in managing the environment’s effect. In other words, managerial style may be thought of as a buffer or means of internal management to environmental strain, challenges, or conflict. Organizations with managers exhibiting the strongest style are likely to perform better than those with weaker style. In sum, managerial style determines the success of an organization in a constrained or challenging environment. As managers’ styles vary, the outcomes and the environment’s effect also vary.

Hypothesis 1: Managerial style will have a positive effect on organizational outcomes.

Although the public management literature does not distinctly discuss managerial style, the business and private management literatures support the contention. Many researchers note that managerial style is positively related to higher business unit performance and general performance outcomes (Slater 1989; Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Slater (1989) finds that managerial style—measured on the dimensions of background characteristics, behaviors, and personality—is positively related to organizational performance. Similarly, entrepreneurial style is associated with higher growth types (Sadler-Smith et al. 2003).
Understanding Managerial Style: The Components

Managerial style is composed of three components: leadership ability, managerial behavior, and management strategy. Both the public management and business management literature point to each of the factors mattering significantly to the functioning and outcomes of the organization. Managers, however, do not use these factors individually; instead they are often used simultaneously and distinctively across managers. Each manager uses the factors differently and in different combinations, making style an interesting point of study. Though the development of combinations of the elements is unknown, the extent of use is expected to matter greatly for how public managers make their decisions, implement decisions, and consequently affect organizational outcomes. One should expect these components’ collective effect as style to be positively related to organizational outcomes.

Leadership

Organizational theorists contend that leadership is one’s capacity to “direct and energize people to achieve goals,” (Rainey 2009). Research in this area often attempts to pinpoint the characteristics, traits, or factors that make an effective or “good” leader. Early leadership researchers considered physical, intellectual, and personality characteristics as indicators of effective leadership, while more recent works focus not only on personality and character, but also a manager’s treatment of and concern for subordinates and strategies for setting standards and productivity (Yukl 2006). The leadership literature generally lacks a dominant theory for understanding how and why it matters for organizations, and scholars have found mixed empirical results on the relationship (Fernandez 2005). However several theories have emerged, including trait and skill
theories, situational and contingency theories, and dyadic theories to explain leadership’s effectiveness in organizations.

Some scholars show that leadership can have a significantly positive effect on organizations (Peterson et al. 2003; Waldman and Yammarino 1999; Weiner and Mahoney 1981; Thomas 1988; Hennessey 1998). Peterson et al. (2003) find that one’s personality and traits contribute to organizational performance. Waldman and Yammarino (1999), Trottier, Van Wart, and Wang (2008) and Conger and Kanungo (1987) find that specific leadership styles contribute greatly to organizational outcomes; charismatic leadership is related to more committed, motivated, and satisfied subordinates and higher performing organizations. The same is also shown for the closely related transformational leadership style (Waldman and Yammarino 1999; Trottier, Van Wart, and Wang 2008).

Contingency theory research on the relationship between leadership traits, situational variables, and organizational performance also indicates that managers’ leadership is beneficial to organizational performance (Fielder 1967; Chemers and Skrzypek 1972). Fielder (1967) contends that situational demands can mediate leadership style and its effectiveness in group performance outcomes. Hunt’s (1967) analysis supports Fielder’s theory, but he also finds leadership to be a very strong predictor of outcomes, separate from task structure, the situational variable. His results suggest that a manager’s leadership ability is almost as equally powerful or potentially superior to environmental factors. These collective results lead me to also expect leadership ability to be beneficial in altering outcomes.

_Hypothesis 1a: Public managers with greater leadership ability will be positively related to higher performing organizations._
Managerial Behavior

Much of the public management literature focuses on what managers actually do to matter in public organizations. Two central tasks of management is managing internally—tending to the daily tasks within the organization—and managing externally, interacting with the public outside of the organization.

Internal Management

Perhaps the largest and most significant managerial role is one’s ability to manage the internal workings of one’s organization—internal or generic management. Simon (1976) contends that internal management is about maintaining structure—framing goals, setting incentives and negotiating contributions from members and system actors. Therefore, the daily tasks of internal management consists of motivating employees, setting and communicating organizational expectations, standards, priorities, and goals, and decision making. Some set organizational culture, and many are also charged with the responsibility of evaluating group and subordinates’ performance, recruiting employees, and establishing incentives to boost or attract staff and to produce efficient and effective outcomes (Meier and O'Toole 2004; Kaufman 1979; Allison 1983; Fernandez 2005). Public managers perform a wide range of tasks related to internally managing their organization that often vary across organizations’ size, clientele, and overarching purpose.

External Management and Networking

Public managers also spend a considerable amount of time managing outside of their organization because they are often tied to other organizations through required mandates, interagency or inter-governmental linkages, or contracted public-private relationships (Hall and O'Toole 2000; Yukl 2006; Meier and O’Toole 2003). External management is also done to gain information and political support, resources, reach a
collective goal or improve the individual organization (Provan and Milward 1995; O’Toole 1997; McGuire 2002; Fernandez 2005). They also use it to buffer the organization from conflict—political or community. The extent that public managers choose more frequent external management behavior over internal management and with whom they engage externally is characteristic of one’s style. Research indicates that such networking and external management are key tasks in which managers engage to improve organizational performance outcomes. As such, many managers find external management through networking to be a beneficial tool in addressing challenging, complicated demands and tasks, gaining resources and expertise, and reducing organizational strain and transaction costs (Provan and Milward 1995; O’Toole 1997). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that public managers who network more frequently also have better organizational outcomes (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Heinrich and Lynn 2000; Ewalt 200439).

Unfortunately, these works do not specify which function networking serves in improving organizational outcomes. The results do not allow scholars to conclude that the networking was done specifically to buffer the environment, only to get more information and resources, or simply to gain political support. We know very little about what public managers do in these networking relationships. Because of that restriction, one must assume that managers use it to serve all or some combination of those purposes to

39 Though external management is shown to be beneficial to organizational performance and outcomes, public managers are often plagued with the tradeoff between internal and external management (Meier and O’Toole 2001). Greater amounts of external management also mean that a manager spends less time managing internally, which may be harmful to one’s organization. As such, a direct measure of internal management is excluded from the study and low levels of external management are understood as high levels of internal management.
influence organizational outcomes, especially in terms of environment imposed challenges and constraints.

*Hypothesis 1b: External management will be positively related to organizational outcomes.*

**Strategy**

The final component of style is managerial strategy. Here strategy is rooted primarily in Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology of organizational response to the environment. They contend that the organizational environment influences managerial behavior and consequently determines the nature of an organization. Managers often manipulate and shape their strategies to fit the environment in which the organization operates—either yielding to the environment and its demands, blocking external environment forces, or some variation of these two responses (Miles and Snow 1978; Rainey 2009; Andrews et al. 2009). Organizations and managers are placed in one of the four orientations of behavior or strategy: prospector, defender, analyzer, or reactor. However, the extent to which a public manager yields to one of these orientations over the other to handle the environment is a matter of one’s style; strategy is not environmental response alone\(^{40}\).

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\(^{40}\) Alternative theories of strategy formation and development include rational planning and logical incrementalism. Rational planning applies a bounded rationality framework to strategy development, arguing that organizations examine their internal and external environment and use analytical, formal and logical processes to develop policy options (Elbanna 2006). Logical incrementalism contends that strategy development and formation is a political process open to conflict over organizational goals that are “resolved” through the strategy formation process (Andrews et al. 2009). Both theories limit the manager’s influence in setting organizational strategy and consequently miss the depth of his/her contribution to strategy and outcomes. In considering managerial style, I do not dismiss these two theories, but instead view strategy formation through the lens of the public manager to highlight his/her contribution to strategy and performance outcomes.
Prospectors frequently respond to the environment or stakeholders’ demands; their organization’s structure is flexible and regularly seeks to adopt innovations or trends. Defenders could be viewed as the antithesis of prospectors. Rigid control in strategy, structure, and production are characteristic of defenders. They focus on improving the organization’s efficiency independent of environmental controls and demands. Miles and Snow (1978) contend that prospectors and defenders will perform better than other classifications. Those that exhibit both defender and prospector characteristics are viewed as analyzers; they work to balance efficiency in the organization with the flexibility to adopt innovation and changes that will enhance organizational efficiency and performance. Lastly, reactors are viewed as dysfunctional because they perceive change and environmental demands but are unable to respond; they lack consistency and clear strategies or approaches for the organization.

This typology has been used in many studies, with scholars generally finding that the strategy is important for organizational performance, but seems to vary based on the organization type and the climate of the environment (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006). In fact, Andrews et al. (2006; 2009) argue that strategy (content) is the most important determinant of organizational performance. They find that organizations perform best under a prospector strategy compared to the defender or reactor strategies (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006). A more recent study of Welsh public service providers reveals that both the prospector and defender strategies are related to greater performance outcomes as Miles and Snow originally proposed (Andrews et al. 2009). Yet other research shows that the defender strategy alone is best for improving performance outcomes in the context of public education (Meier et al. 2004; Meier et al. 2007). On the other hand, Snow and Hrebinjak (1980) finds that in highly regulated industries that face many demands and
binding constraints from stakeholders, a reactor strategy is positively related to organizational performance.

Despite the varied findings in both the public and private organization literature, scholars agree that strategy matters for handling the environment. Andrews et al. (2009) also note although strategy is often rigidly implanted into organizations, it should not always be treated as such because organizations are most likely to shift strategies as the circumstances and challenges also change; Zajec and Shortell (1989) corroborate their contention. This contention helps to explain the varied conclusions on the strategy content related to greater organizational performance outcomes. It also continuously highlights strategy's close connection to the environment. Expectations for how managers may use strategy to deal with challenging, racially constrained environment are unclear however, so I test both Miles and Snow's (1978) and others' findings to explore how managers use their style to manage the effect of racially balanced and imbalanced environments on outcomes.

**Hypothesis 1c:** A prospector strategy will be positively related to organizational outcomes.

**Hypothesis 1d:** A defender strategy will be positively related to organizational outcomes.

**Managerial Style and Student Outcomes**

Why exactly should we expect managerial style to be related to student outcomes? First, school principals are held accountable for what happens at the school level, and since the 1980s, have been held accountable for student performance especially (Glasman 1984). The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has only heightened this focus on school principals and teachers in relation to student performance. Under this act, school principals are not
only expected to improve the overall performance of their schools, but also the performance of subpopulations (i.e. low income students, minority students, special needs students). Failure to do so holds various consequences, including loss of one’s job. Therefore, school principals are likely to use every possible avenue to improve student performance or maintain high test scores. Style shapes how avenues are selected, used and the frequency of use. For school principals in racially imbalanced schools that are also generally lower performing, this could also mean utilizing a host of tactics and techniques according to one’s style to overcome or “manage” the environmentally imposed challenge.

The education literature provides substantial indication that school managers, school principals, at various levels play an important role in student achievement outcomes (Marks and Printy 2003; Eberts and Stone 1988; Brewer 1993). A great deal of this literature focuses on school principals’ leadership. Scholars find that a principal’s behavior and traits can influence student performance (Eberts and Stone 1988). It also notes that specific leadership styles have a greater effect on student performance than others; instructional leadership seems to have a larger effect on student outcomes than transformational leadership (Robinson, Lloyd, and Rowe 2008). Marks and Printy (2003) conclude, however, that integrating both transformational and instructional leadership into one’s leadership repertoire yields the best effect on student achievement. Principals that network with teachers and the external environment also have greater student performance outcomes (Friedkin and Slater 1994). However, what much of this research fails to address is exactly how principals affect student performance when the racial environment is considered, leaving very little guidance on expectations for racially balanced and imbalanced schools. This research fills that gap.
### Figure 6.1: Summary of Managerial Style Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Dimension Tested</th>
<th>Relationship Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Managerial style will have a positive effect on organizational outcomes for all students in all environments.</td>
<td>Managerial Style</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Public managers with greater leadership ability will be positively related to higher performing organization for all students in all environments.</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>External management will be positively related to organizational outcomes for all students in all environments.</td>
<td>External Management</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>A prospector strategy will be positively related to organizational outcomes.</td>
<td>Prospector Strategic Management Strategy</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d</td>
<td>A defender strategy will be positively related to organizational outcomes.</td>
<td>Defender Strategic Management Strategy</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Methods and Measures

Data for this chapter are taken from the 2011 Texas Middle Management Survey, an original survey of about 1500 Texas school principals at various levels; the Texas Education Agency database; and the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) School District Demographic System. The survey of school principals was administered across five waves and gained a response rate of about 29 percent from Texas public schools. The weighted variables are representative of all Texas schools. Among a host of education related topics, the survey also provided information on managers’ actions, practices and perspectives (Thomas, Walker and Meier 2011). The main independent variables are from the middle management survey, while student performance data and data for control
variables are taken from the Texas Education Agency database on all Texas schools and districts\(^\text{41}\) or the NCES’s Demographic System.

**Dependent Variable**

The percentage of African American and Latino students that pass the state-required standardized test, Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) during the 2010-2011 school term is used as the main dependent variable to represent organizational performance outcomes. Although controversial and limiting, standardized test scores are used as the main dependent variable because they indicate students’ ability to master basic academic skills at the tested grade level, are highly salient to the organization and public, and are a sensible measure of management activity toward organizational performance.

Every TAKS test is aligned to the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills, the Texas academic curricula guidelines. The test is required for students in grades three through eleven (Texas Education Agency 2010). The test for students in grade eleven is a high stakes test required to receive a regular diploma in Texas. The total pass rate measure used in the current study includes the percentage of students in each school that passes the assessment’s reading, writing, and math sectors.

**Explanatory Variables**

*Management Factors*

Several variables taken from an original survey of school principals (in Texas) are used to measure the dimensions of managerial style. Managers’ leadership ability is assessed through three questions aimed at tapping the leadership traits of flexibility,

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\(^{41}\) Using Texas schools is a reasonable ground to test the current ideas. Texas is a diverse state that contains nearly eight percent of all US school districts, suggesting that it also includes a larger portion of the US schools. Districts and schools serve the same function, but differ in their geography—urban or rural, their finances—rich or poor, and racial compositions—racially homogenous or heterogeneous. Using Texas allows me to capture all of these types of schools from a single, assessable and representative source.
innovation and change, and stronger personal relationship with subordinates (Yukl 2006). The questions include, “I have the ability to implement policies and procedures in my school that are not consistent with district policy if they benefit my students,” “A principal should be involved in curriculum planning and selections,” and “I give my teachers a great deal of discretion in making decisions.” Each question is rated on a four point scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). Responses were combined in an index variable ranging from 3 to 12\textsuperscript{42}.

External management\textsuperscript{43} is measured as the frequency of interaction with networking nodes that are not direct-line subordinates or superiors. Respondents were asked to rank the frequency of interaction with all the networking actors on a six-point scale ranging from no interaction to daily interaction. Their responses were factor analyzed to create an external management measure. The factor analysis method is helpful because it allows the researcher to combine responses measuring the same concept, in this case, external management, while giving each included variable a different weight. The unequal weight distribution of the factor may provide a clearer understanding of the most salient actors with the greatest effect on organizational outcomes. The factor is superior to indexing in this research because it allows the variables to vary, while indexing treats all the included variables equal. The external management factor loaded positively on the first factor and produced an eigenvalue of 1.55.

Because external management requires the manager to operate outside of the organization and manage less internally, this measure also serves as measure of internal

\textsuperscript{42} Variables correlate at less than the .10 level.

\textsuperscript{43} External network actors include local business leaders, police and fire departments, health organizations, non-profit organizations, state legislators, and local government officials.
management. It assumes that greater levels of external management as measured through the frequency of interaction with non-direct line subordinates or superiors, is equivalent to lower levels of internal management.

Table 6.1: Measurement of External Management Using Factor Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optional Network Indicators</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal Associations</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Related Organizations</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Associations</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Business Leaders</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police/Fire Department</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit organizations</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four questions are used to capture the dimension of managerial strategy based on the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. To capture a prospector strategy, respondents are asked to rate how much they agree with the statement, “Our school is always among the first to adopt new ideas and practices,” and “our school continually adjusts our internal activities and structures in response to stakeholder initiatives and activities,” on a four point scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). Responses to the two questions are summed in an index variable to create a “prospector strategy” scale, ranging from two to eight. To create “poles” of a prospector strategy (that is combined on a three point “defender” scale discussed below), the two through eight scale is recoded from -1 to 0, in which -1 represents all the respondents falling above the scale’s mean value and all others are coded as 0. Negative one is selected to represent those above the mean because it designates that
the individual is also the least likely to be categorized as a defender. Those that are coded as 0 are more likely to be categorized as a defender or utilize a mixture of both strategies.

Two questions, “Our school concentrates on making use of what we already know how to do,” and “I strive to control those factors outside the school that could have an effect on my organization,” are used to capture a defender style, again measured on a four point likert scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). The questions are combined to create a “defender strategy” scale of two to eight. All respondents scoring below the scale’s mean are recoded as 0 and those score above the mean are coded as 1. The “prospector style” and “defender style” scales are combined to create a continuous, three point scale ranging from -1 to 1, in which -1 indicates a prospector strategy, 0 represents an analyzer strategy, and 1 indicates a defender strategy.

The final variable, managerial style, is summed to create a continuous value of the combined managerial style components—leadership, external management, and strategy. Higher values indicate a stronger managerial style, while lower values indicate a weaker style.

Racial Balance

A key explanatory variable in this study is the level of racial balance in the districts and schools. I account for racial balance through Taeuber dissimilarity indices similar to those discussed in the previous chapters with a few modifications to fit the context of this study. I only calculate indices for school districts in which a least one principal in the district responded to the middle management survey. School districts that included one school at each level—elementary, middle, and high—were excluded from this sample of

\[44\] None of the style components are correlated higher than the .10 level.

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schools because they lack the flexibility to alter racial balance through school transfers. These restrictions reduced the total sample to 865 cases.

Controls

A set of controls potentially related to student performance are also included based on the education literature. Controls are grouped as resources for performance or constraints to student performance. As assumed by grouping names, resources are expected to have a positive effect on performance, while constraints are expected to be negatively related to performance outcomes. The literature suggests that having more resources can have a positive effect on student performance (Hedges and Greenwald 1996). Included resource measures are the average teacher salary, average years of teacher experience, average class size, and the percentage of teachers with less than five years experience. I expect teacher salaries and teacher experience to have a positive relationship with performance. Conversely, I predict negative relationships between performance and class size, and percentage of teachers with less than five years of experience and performance.

On the other hand, the literature also notes race and poverty as highly correlated with education problems. Minority and poor students are reported as more difficult to educate and hence, less likely to have positive (high) performance outcomes as a function of managerial style. Additionally, the challenges that accompany educating these students are likely to affect a school’s overall performance outcome (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003). Therefore, this study also includes measures for the percentage of Latino, Black, and poor (students receiving free or reduced lunch) students as constraint control variables (Jencks and Phillips 1998; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003). A negative relationship is expected for all constraint variables.
Finally, standard resource variables included in the previous chapters—the percentage of Blacks and Latinos with college degrees, the median Black or Latino family income, and the percentage of Anglos in poverty—were also included in the analysis as controls, expect to aid in minority student outcomes. Ordinary least squares modeling is used to test the hypotheses.

**Findings**

**Preliminary Findings: Looking at the Data**

Before assessing the effect managerial style on student performance, the raw data is analyzed to highlight similarities and differences between racially balanced and imbalanced schools. Table 6.2 shows the results. On average, Black and Latino students seem to perform better in racially balanced schools, though the difference in pass rates is only statistically different for Black students. These findings are consistent with the past literature and expected differences.

Interestingly, the lowest performing school for African American students, Mesquite Academy, is among the more racially balanced schools, and one of the highest performing schools, Ditto Elementary, is among the more racially imbalanced schools. A similar relationship is observed for Latino students; Star High School is among the lowest performing schools for Latino students, but it is also one of the most racially balanced schools for them too. Though these cases are interesting outliers, they demonstrate the difficulty of making predictions about which type of school best serves minority students. They also indicate the necessity of studying other factors that may shape students’ performance. The literature predicts that minority students will perform best in racially balanced schools, yet these two schools conflict with that contention. Empirical results test
the possible managerial factors that may explain interesting outlier cases like Mesquite Academy and Ditto Elementary School.

I also assess the strength of each managerial component and one’s managerial style in racially balanced and racially imbalanced schools to observe differences in managers based on their environmental settings. Only external management is statistically different across environments for both Black and Latino students. Managers in Black-white racially balanced schools tend to engage in external management more frequently than those in imbalanced schools, while the opposite is shown for managers in Latino-white balanced schools. Managers of imbalanced Latino-White schools manage externally more frequently when compared to managers of balanced schools. This should be expected given their more challenging environment. For Black students, managers in racially balanced districts tend be identified as prospectors more compared to their colleagues in racially imbalanced schools. There are no statistical differences in leadership and use of the defender strategy between managers of racially balanced and imbalanced schools.

Finally, managers with strong managerial styles are found in both racially balanced and imbalanced schools, but I only observe a statistical difference in style for managers of Latino-white segregated schools. Managers of imbalanced Latino schools are found to have a stronger style than those of racially balanced schools. The difference in managerial style across schools and racial groups provides mixed support for the proposed theory and hypotheses; however, the multivariate analyses will allow me to examine the effect of this style on student performance given the environmental context. A test of each managerial style component is done to better understand how the factors individually relate to performance in each setting first.
Table 6.2: Comparison of Means: Racially Balanced Versus Racially Imbalanced Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>(Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Racially Imbalanced</td>
<td>(Std. Deviation)</td>
<td>Racially Balanced</td>
<td>(Std. Deviation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pass Rate</td>
<td>68.95***</td>
<td>(15.01)</td>
<td>60.92</td>
<td>(17.75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Pass Rate</td>
<td>_______</td>
<td>_______</td>
<td>75.04</td>
<td>(12.10)</td>
<td>74.99</td>
<td>(13.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>9.301</td>
<td>(1.141)</td>
<td>9.389</td>
<td>(1.208)</td>
<td>9.275</td>
<td>(1.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Management</td>
<td>.0745*</td>
<td>(.8504)</td>
<td>-.0235</td>
<td>(.8319)</td>
<td>.0426*</td>
<td>(.8363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector Strategy</td>
<td>5.832**</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td>5.694</td>
<td>(1.009)</td>
<td>5.901</td>
<td>(1.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender Strategy</td>
<td>6.096</td>
<td>(.9796)</td>
<td>6.048</td>
<td>(.9295)</td>
<td>6.117</td>
<td>(.9519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial Style</td>
<td>14.86</td>
<td>(2.247)</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>(2.303)</td>
<td>14.81**</td>
<td>(1.1232)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theoretical Findings

Effect of Managerial Style Components on Student Performance

Table 6.3 shows the effect of each managerial style component on African American students' performance in imbalanced and racially balanced schools. One's leadership ability in relation to his/her subordinates is assessed as a predictor of student performance also. Table 6.3's first model suggests that though leadership is significantly related to Black students' performance, it has a negative effect in racially balanced schools. Leaders who give their teachers more discretion, participate in developing the school's curriculum, and implement policies unique to their individual school seem to harm Black students' performance in racially balanced schools. This finding may be an indication that such leaders fail to consider subpopulations within their schools. Their policies and curriculum may work against Black students. On the other hand, students in racially imbalanced
schools, especially those in the most imbalanced schools, benefit from a manager having more leadership qualities. The fourth model of Table 6.3 shows a positive and significant relationship (p<.10) between the Black pass rate and leadership, as hypothesized.

For Latino students in racially balanced schools, the opposite effect is shown. Greater leadership ability is positively related to Latino students’ pass rate in both racially balanced and imbalanced schools. Results support my hypothesis. Additionally, leadership’s effect on Latino students’ performance is greater in racially imbalanced schools compared to racially balanced schools. The magnitude of leadership is more felt in racially imbalanced schools.

Results on external management’s effect on minority students’ performance show that a manager’s actions matter differently across policy environments. The second model of Table 6.3 and the second model of Table 6.4 show that managing the external environment is positively related to both Black and Latino students’ pass rate in racially balanced schools but not in racially imbalanced schools. My expectation of both schools benefiting from external management is only partially supported, but is somewhat consistent with the findings of Table 6.2. Racially balanced schools benefit more from this style component. The difference between racially imbalanced and racially balanced schools may be related to the differences in potential network actors in one’s environment.
Principals of racially balanced schools may engage in better networks with more information, resources, and support, while those of racially imbalanced schools may find their networks more limiting with fewer resources, information and support. On the other hand, principals of racially balanced schools may have a greater ability to protect or buffer threats that may harm student performance. Alternatively, managers of racially balanced schools may not only manage externally more frequently, they may also be better at it. Managers of racially balanced schools may possess greater leadership abilities in their external management roles.

In terms of managerial strategy, managers closer to the defender managerial style have a negative but insignificant effect on the pass rate of their Black students, regardless of environment. African American students in both racially balanced and imbalanced schools perform poorly under a defender strategy. Latino students, on the other hand, perform well under the defender strategy in racially balanced schools, but it fails to help improve performance. There is a negative and insignificant effect on Latino students’ performance in those schools. The results fail to support my hypotheses about strategy, but reveal that managers of imbalanced and racially balanced schools may not be very different in their strategies for managing organizations and responding to the environment.
Table 6.3: The Effect of Managerial Style Components on Black Students’ Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Black Pass Rate</th>
<th>Racially Balanced Schools</th>
<th>Racially Imbalanced Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership (Coefficient (Std. Error))</td>
<td>External Mangmt (Coefficient (Std. Error))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>-1.196* (.6650)</td>
<td>3.096* (1.838)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Teachers with Less than 5yrs Experience</td>
<td>.0037 (.1240)</td>
<td>.1190 (2.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Experience</td>
<td>-2.799 (.5314)</td>
<td>.5826 (9.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>-2.114 (.3692)</td>
<td>2.307*** (6.999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Salary ($)</td>
<td>.0002 (.0003)</td>
<td>-.0005 (.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Students</td>
<td>-.3485*** (.1046)</td>
<td>-.2822 (2.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Latino Students</td>
<td>-.1553* (.0860)</td>
<td>.0373 (1.569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Low Income Students</td>
<td>-.0482 (.0688)</td>
<td>-.0692 (1.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Black Income ($)</td>
<td>.0002*** (.0001)</td>
<td>.0002 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Latino Income ($)</td>
<td>.0011 (.0001)</td>
<td>.0004 (0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.4814*** (.1638)</td>
<td>.4136 (3.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.1590 (.1211)</td>
<td>-.0480 (3.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Poverty Rate (%)</td>
<td>.0280 (.0176)</td>
<td>.0008 (1.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>77.01*** (16.59)</td>
<td>43.50 (37.45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 280  R² = .33  F = 9.36***

* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01
Table 6.4: The Effect of Managerial Style Components on Latino Students’ Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Latino Pass Rate</th>
<th>Racially Balanced Schools</th>
<th>Racially Imbalanced Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>External Mgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Teachers with Less than 5yrs Experience</td>
<td>.0586 (.0822)</td>
<td>.1809 (.1346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Experience</td>
<td>.4937 (.3550)</td>
<td>.8186 (.5963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>1.293*** (.2734)</td>
<td>1.104** (.5082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Salary ($)</td>
<td>.0002 (.0002)</td>
<td>.0004 (.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Students</td>
<td>-.3223*** (.0718)</td>
<td>-.3236*** (.1300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Latino Students</td>
<td>-.1908*** (.0564)</td>
<td>-.1049 (.0928)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Low Income Students</td>
<td>-.0064 (.0449)</td>
<td>-.1484*** (.0756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Black Income ($)</td>
<td>.0002*** (.00005)</td>
<td>.0001 (.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Latino Income ($)</td>
<td>.0002*** (.0001)</td>
<td>.00004 (.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.0663 (.0867)</td>
<td>.4502** (.2232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-.0197 (.0533)</td>
<td>.0848 (.1142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Poverty Rate (%)</td>
<td>-.1484*** (.0506)</td>
<td>-.0861 (.0825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>39.93*** (12.75)</td>
<td>41.05* (21.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>11.82***</td>
<td>4.59***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01

Managerial Style and Student Performance

In Table 6.5 the collective effect of managerial style is shown. The first model shows that Black students in racially balanced schools do not benefit from a stronger managerial
style. Managerial style, as indicated by higher scores on the “style scale,” has a negative effect on their performance. In other words, managers that use a more defender-like strategy, manage externally more frequently, and have greater leadership abilities are more likely to depress the Black student performance rate in racially balanced schools. In racially imbalanced schools, such managers do not fare any better. A negative, but insignificant relationship is observed between managerial style and Black students’ performance. Neither model performs as expected. Public managers are not able to improve Black students’ performance regardless of the environmental context. A comparison of these two models also shows that public managers in racially balanced schools are also more harmful to Black students’ performance than in imbalanced schools. The magnitude of their negative effect is slightly larger than in racially imbalanced schools. This is somewhat consistent with the previous chapter’s findings on teacher representation effects on discipline policies for Black students.

For Latino students, the opposite effect is observed. Table 6.6 shows that managerial style is positive, but insignificantly related to performance in racially balanced schools, and positive and significantly (p<.10) related to it in racially imbalanced schools. Stronger styled managers help Latino students’ performance, particularly in racially imbalanced schools. The pass rate for Latino students in racially imbalanced schools is improved by nearly two points under managers that defend, externally manage more frequently, and have stronger leadership. This finding is also consistent with previous chapter’s findings that suggest Latinos fare better in racially imbalanced districts in terms of political board representation.
Table 6.5: The Effect of Managerial Style on Black Students’ Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Racially Balanced Schools</th>
<th>Racially Imbalanced Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managerial style</strong></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Teachers with Less than 5yrs Experience</td>
<td>-.0839</td>
<td>.1217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Experience</td>
<td>.3370</td>
<td>.5304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>3.641</td>
<td>.4312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Salary ($)</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Students</td>
<td>-.1457</td>
<td>.1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Latino Students</td>
<td>-.0553</td>
<td>.0868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Low Income Students</td>
<td>-.1146*</td>
<td>.0698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Black Income ($)</td>
<td>.0002***</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Latino Income ($)</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.1253</td>
<td>.1094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.0261</td>
<td>.1131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Poverty Rate (%)</td>
<td>-.0486</td>
<td>.0727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>55.28***</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 287   256
R²  .30   .28
F  8.47*** 6.71***

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 6.6: The Effect of Managerial Style on Latino Students’ Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Racially Balanced Schools</th>
<th>Racially Imbalanced Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managerial style</strong></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Teachers with Less than 5yrs Experience</td>
<td>-.0005</td>
<td>.0780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Experience</td>
<td>.0192</td>
<td>.3529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>1.117***</td>
<td>.2768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teacher Salary ($)</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Students</td>
<td>-.2338***</td>
<td>.0693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Latino Students</td>
<td>-.2448***</td>
<td>.0561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Low Income Students</td>
<td>.0250</td>
<td>.0438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Black Income ($)</td>
<td>.0001***</td>
<td>.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Latino Income ($)</td>
<td>.0002***</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-.0204</td>
<td>.0912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>.0679</td>
<td>.0497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Poverty Rate (%)</td>
<td>-.1970***</td>
<td>.0557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>50.91***</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 287   256
R²  .30   .28
F  8.47*** 6.71***

203
Conclusion

This chapter explores the extent to which school principals are able to “manage” the effects of their school’s racial composition on student outcomes and considers if minority students are better served in racially balanced or imbalanced schools through management efforts. Although managerial style performs as predicted for Latino students in racially imbalanced schools, overall Latino students, as well as Black students, tend to fare better in racially balanced schools. Style and the management components tested are insignificant in nearly all instances in racially imbalanced schools. On the other hand, the management effects on student performance are varied, but influential in racially balanced schools. Such findings conform to the standard desegregation literature and show support of the advantages of racially balanced schools over racially imbalanced schools. Here, management matters much more for minority students than in racially imbalanced schools.

Figure 6.2: Findings Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Racially Balanced Schools</th>
<th>Racially Imbalanced Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black Students</td>
<td>Latino Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1: Managerial style, positive effect</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1a: leadership, positive effect</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1b: External management, positive effect</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1c: Prospector strategy, positive effect</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1d: Defender strategy, positive effect</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The finding, however, also leads one to question why management fails to have a significant effect in racially imbalanced schools? Perhaps the challenges and constraints characteristic of racially imbalanced schools (i.e. fewer resources, more inexperienced
teachers, high turnover rates, more inadequately prepared students in poverty) overwhelm the management effects. Alternatively, public managers of racially balanced schools may simply be better managers than those of imbalanced schools, also consistent with the desegregation literature. This could also mean that management contributes to the widening disparity between imbalanced and racially balanced schools. An original argument for balanced educational settings is the fact that racially balanced schools tend to have greater resources—both financial and human—that contribute to higher performance outcomes and better life chances for their students (Kluger 2004; Clotfelter 2004). Showing that managers in racially balanced schools are able to make their external management or strategy techniques “count,” while managers of imbalanced schools do not, leaves one to believe that balanced schools receive the better connected, more prepared, and higher quality managers, and consequently their students perform better. The results lend itself to the argument for why balanced education is a better approach to addressing the racial inequalities in public education. Nevertheless, the findings that specific managerial qualities have a different effect on students in racially balanced versus racially imbalanced schools suggests that there are some aspects of management that should be emphasized more, such as leadership, in imbalanced schools to aid student performance.

Similar to the two previous chapters, I continue to see more distinctions in education experiences for Black and Latino students in racially balanced and imbalanced schools. While African American students were rarely better off with “strong style” managers, Latino students found some benefit in having these managers, particularly in the racially imbalanced environment. African American students, on the other hand, found it detrimental to their performance in racially balanced schools and irrelevant in racially imbalanced schools. A comparison of the models suggests that using the same strategy to
fix the racial balance or performance issues for Latinos and African Americans is not likely to work. Though limited, the results show that bringing in the “right” principal or leaders could help Latino students in a racially imbalanced school. However, relying on this same strategy alone to improve African American students’ performance is not likely to work as well. African American students in racially imbalanced schools will need more than a strong or “good” manager to help improve their performance outcomes. While the differences across all three empirical chapters highlight the uniqueness of Black and Latino experiences in racially balanced and imbalanced environments, they also demonstrate the necessity of further research to understand why these differences occur and what they mean for the state of minority education broadly.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Nearly 60 years after the Supreme Court declared that “separate but equal” was inherently unequal and had no place in public education, large portions of the American education system remain separate and often unequal. Many students find themselves racially isolated and limited in the benefits and opportunities that an education provides. Although we tend to value racial diversity and balance in schools and acknowledge its contribution to the American “political and cultural heritage,” our understanding of how to achieve this goal within the boundaries of Supreme Court restrictions and its relative influence on school boards, teachers, and administrators in relation to student outcomes is more limited (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007). As such, this dissertation seeks to answer the broad research questions: why are some school districts pursuing and/or maintaining racially balanced schools, while others are not and what are the policy outcome related implications of racially balanced and imbalanced schools?

The first phase of research (see Appendix A) addresses the first research question; however, the empirical body of the dissertation, discussed below, addresses the second research question. The dissertation’s goal allows for both substantive and theoretical contributions that should be important to policy makers, policy implementers, and scholars of education, public policy, and public administration. Substantively, the research centers on identifying the differences and similarities of student outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts to inform policy makers and education leaders of the implications of each policy environment. Theoretically, it examines the way that the external policy environment shapes policy decisions, the implementation of policy, and policy outcomes
via elected officials, bureaucrats, and managers. The subsequent sections provide a more
detailed discussion of the research findings and their implications for policy making and
theory.

**Findings Overview**

The major finding of this research is that racially balanced schools are not *always*
better for minority students. In many instances, students of racially imbalanced districts
are no different from their peers of racially balanced districts. They are generally able to
gain the same levels of teacher and administrator representation through structure and
minority board representation; they often experience the same level of academic grouping
and discipline relief through minority representation, and can gain the same performance
outcome benefits of good management traits and practices. However, when the two
settings diverge, that is, when differences in school board, teacher, or administrator factors
in racially balanced and imbalanced districts are observed, minority students tend to fare
better in racially balanced settings. I find that Black and Latino students are more likely to
experience better policy outcomes in racially balanced districts more often than in racially
imbalanced districts. However, the finding is not consistent; I also find some observed
benefits of a racially imbalanced education. Each chapter showcases at least one instance in
which minority students are better served in racially imbalanced districts. In Chapter IV I
conclude that Latino students gain better outcomes in racially imbalanced districts; I reach
the same conclusion for African American students in Chapter V. The inconsistency
suggests that positive student outcomes can happen anywhere and despite inequitably
environments.
Implications for Policy Makers

Accountability = Equity?

As noted in Chapter III, findings of similar outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts could be interpreted as some level of support for the current accountability model’s argument that the setting in which one learns and the resources or barriers that accompany the setting play only a small role in student outcomes and success. Do policy makers and advocates of the current accountability model have it right? Yes and no. While there is support for their argument that students can learn and succeed in any environment, there are also differences in outcomes that can be attributed to the unique policy environments. The differences suggest that advocates looking to this reform method as a “solution” to equity concerns and issues in public education must be more mindful of the factors that contribute to the mirrored outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts. For example, Chapter V illustrates that students experience similar grouping and discipline policy outcomes in racially balanced and imbalanced districts; however, it is the level of teacher representation that reduces the significantly higher level of disparity in racially balanced districts that leads to the similar outcomes observed across policy environments. Similarly, school board representation and management strategies both contribute to the reflective policy outcomes in the two policy environments shown in Chapters IV and VI respectively.

Additionally, policy makers should be mindful of the instances in which the policy environment does matter for student outcomes. As noted above, when there were significant differences in the policy environment effect, racially balanced districts were generally more beneficial for minority students, consistent with the historical desegregation literature. This finding not only detracts from the belief among school
reformers that the racial composition of schools does not matter for student performance, but it also shows policy makers and policy implementers that their decisions are not divorced from their environment, particularly their racial environment. This racial environment is political and influential in every level of school district policy making—from the elected officials to the teacher at the street-level. Such actors should be more sensitive to their policy environment and make policy decisions, programs, and implementation strategies that mirror or adapt to the policy environment. It is clear that the level of racial balance cannot be subtracted from accountability discussions, especially when they focus on minority students and their achievement.

Because the policy environment—the level of district racial balance—is shown to be an important factor in predicting student outcomes, an ideal solution to addressing achievement gaps and inequitable outcomes is to address the issues of racial balance. Policy makers should take this avenue of “reform” more serious or incorporate it into the current accountability models of education reform. While policy implementers and even local policy makers are faced with various barriers to incorporating racial balance into their agenda, the results highlight that a less direct, but perhaps equally beneficial and significantly relevant way to address the outcomes of the racial balance issue is to alter the internal institutional, structural, and management factors that also make a difference in the outcomes of the district. Now that we know more about how they function in both settings and the consequences of balanced and imbalanced environments for students, policymakers can use the tested factors as levers to alter the outcomes of each policy environment. The collective results suggest that improvements to broader internal policies given the level of racial balance effect may be one way to actually achieve equal schools with similar outcomes, despite the environmental barriers.
Finally, policymakers should also be mindful of the dual nature of racially imbalanced schools. WEB DuBois asked the novel question—“does the negro need separate schools?”—in 1935, nearly 20 years before separate schools were outlawed and it was understood that the negro did not need separate schools. Indirectly, this work also ponders DuBois’s question, as it attempts to figure out the implications of separate education for minority students, but comes to the conclusion that the negro, or any minority, does not need separate schools, but separate schools may not be a death sentence to minority students as the deciding justices believed in the 1954. The input benefits given the level of balance are not one sided. There is also much to be learned from the benefits of teacher representation, board representation, and management factors in racially imbalanced districts to improve outcomes in racially balanced districts. Therefore, policy makers should be sensitive to the unique intricacies of both settings—balanced and imbalanced—to maximize their contributions to minority student outcomes and success.

**Latino and African American Education Differences**

A notable trend across the empirical chapters is the variation in findings for African American and Latino students. While both groups experience their share of inequity and disadvantage in racially balanced and imbalanced school settings, Black students tend to fare relatively worse. This is particularly alarming on two fronts. First, although the *Brown* decision was decided with Black students in mind as the primary beneficiaries, they generally experience fewer of the benefits of racially balanced schools. As Chapter V illustrates, Black students experience the highest level of inequitable grouping and discipline in racially balanced districts when compared to Latino and white students. Chapter VI shows that they also have lower performance outcomes compared to their
Latino peers in racially balanced schools, and they experience fewer of the management-related benefits of an education in a racially balanced environment.

The differences highlight a weakness, but also a strength in the goal of the *Brown* decision that policy makers and implementers should note. Racial balance is not improving educational opportunities and access for African American students as it was originally hoped, but it is improving opportunity and access for another disadvantaged group. As the Latino population grows, racial balance may become increasingly important to their educational success. Therefore, policies aimed at improving Latino outcomes should also take into account the importance of racial balance to Latino students’ academic success.

On the other hand, the stratified benefits of a racially balanced education leave room for greater levels of inequality and disparity between Latinos and African Americans in education. Examining this possibility is beyond the scope of the current research, but future scholarship will consider the differential effect that group benefits have on other equally disadvantaged groups.

Second, the consistent variation in Latino and African American student outcome findings across policy environments is also alarming. Black students saw fewer educational benefits and positive outcomes in both racially balanced and imbalanced districts compared to their Latino peers. In other words, Black students fail to experience superior outcomes even in districts in which they make up a large proportion of the student population; Latinos do not share this disadvantaged experience. The findings show the complexity of Black education and the unique barriers that Black students experience in general.

Collectively, the unique findings for Latino and African American students demonstrate that simple, “one-size fits all” minority solutions are not sufficient in
addressing the questions of equity and performance outcomes for African American and Latino students. As race scholars note, their experiences are unique, and this uniqueness means that we should also expect unique policy outcomes and the need for more careful policy decisions in regards to addressing their issues and needs. Policy makers and implementers, particularly those serving large minority populations such as racially imbalanced districts, should also be more mindful of these differences in policy development and implementation.

**Implications for Theory**

This project also focuses on the theoretical relationship between external environmental control or influence and school district policies and outcomes. Chapter III introduces the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical chapters, as well as the literatures central to developing the arguments of each chapter. Each empirical chapter tests a subset of the modeled relationships, bridging the public administration and political sciences sub-literatures to organizational theory in an effort to understand the broader policy process.

**External Environmental Control**

Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution of this research is its insight into the discussion of control. In political science, scholars often debate the extent to which political institutions, also thought of as external power in some cases, control bureaucratic actions and political decisions. While some contend that political institutions and “principals” yield significant power and influence over the bureaucracy, others demonstrate that the bureaucracy often acts semi-independent of its principals to exercise the public’s preferences and values via policy decisions. Collectively, these works suggest that the bureaucratic decisions are developed through the interests and preferences of
political institutions and bureaucratic preferences and values. However, this work often neglects to acknowledge the separate, external policy environment’s role in manipulating this entire process.

Overall, the empirical chapters show that the external policy environment wields a considerable amount of influence on the policy process and at multiple levels of an organization. While scholars debate the significance of political principals and the bureaucracy in establishing policy decisions, the current work shows that much of this debate neglects a significant predictor of the entire process. Decision makers, such as political elites and bureaucrats, often work within the confines of their external policy environment, and consequently, the policy environment changes policy decisions, implementation, and outcomes. The chapters show this effect for each level of decision making—the elected official or “principal” level, management level, and the bureaucratic or “agent” level. At each juncture, I find that the policy environment significantly influences decision making and leads to an observable difference in policy outcomes. As such, differing policy outcomes and decision processes can be attributed to varying external policy environments.

While external policy environment influence may be a good thing in general for meeting citizen demands and reflecting the interests and values of the public, in some instances this may also be a deterrent to the policy process. As Chapter V demonstrates, sometimes the external policy environment can block or hinder the policy process. Here, public managers are less effective in improving organizational outcomes when the external policy environment is considered. Minority students experienced very few benefits to management across both policy environments examined; although management has been shown to contribute greatly to student outcomes (see O’Toole and Meier 1999).
other hand, I find considerable support for the policy environment’s positive effect on the policy outcomes in the first two empirical chapters. The findings increase our understanding of direction in which policy environment influence generally shapes policy, particularly policy outcomes.

In understanding the significant role that the policy environment has in predicting behavior and policy outcomes, we are also able to make better assumptions and develop more accurate theories about bureaucratic representation and structure. Adding the policy environment dimension to some of the well established theories of representative bureaucracy and electoral structure alters the relationships and outcomes typically observed in the literature. Chapters IV and V show that the policy environment in which minority school board members are elected and environment in which minority teachers represent changes their level of representation. Students often experience more or less representation based on the policy environment; this finding indicates that not considering the external policy environment in our discussions of representative bureaucracy and electoral structure may lead to incomplete findings and conclusions.

**Non-Policy Makers in the Policy Process**

The results also offer some information on how bureaucrats as non-policy makers shape outcomes. The results provide more evidence of them engaging in the policy process, not as simple “agents” of the organization or institution, but as a semi-independent wing of the organization responsible for policy decisions and outcomes. However, they also indicate that non-policymakers do not shape policy independent of their constituents and their policy environment, suggesting that the true principal of the entire process is the policy environment. While some scholarship on bureaucrats and the policy process tends to suggest that bureaucrats make decisions based on their expertise or level of discretion
to use personal values and interests, the general findings here point to their relationship with the policy environment as the predictor of decisions and outcomes. Non-policy makers’ role in the policy process seems to be truly an interactive one between them and their constituents of the policy environment. In moving the theories of non-policy makers forward, scholars should consider exploring this relationship to understand non-policy makers and the extent to which political principals, expertise, or bureaucratic values actually serve as the primary modes of influence. Such inquires will help us to better understand when bureaucrats are more or less likely to push for outcomes that reflect their political principal’s interests, their policy environment or constituent’s interests, or their personal values and interests.

Overall, the dissertation project reveals that the local governance of school districts is a complex process that involves not only the elected and internal district leaders, but also the external environment and its unique traits. Policy decisions, including the decision to actively pursue desegregation plans, and the related policy outcomes are a function of political actors and the policy setting. Additionally, the level of racial balance is shown to be an important factor in understanding both student outcomes and the behavior of the most influential local education actors. As the nation continues to become more diverse and schools continue to resegregate, the need to address the importance of district racial balancing and its implications is likely to grow also. Similarly, the complexities of the desegregation issue may continue to grow; however, scholars and practitioners alike should always consider the noted but varied benefits of both environments in making decisions about desegregation policy.
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APPENDIX A

Table A-1: The Effect of Electoral Structure and School Board Representation on Racial Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Board Representation (%)</td>
<td>-0.00014 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00062** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00011 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00011 (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino Board Representation (%)</td>
<td>-0.00090*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.0096*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00022 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00019 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Structure (%)</td>
<td>-0.00007** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00002 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Representation* Ward</td>
<td>-0.0067*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representation * Ward</td>
<td>0.01274*** (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00247 (0.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>At-Large Structure (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00050 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00002 (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>0.00153*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00120*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00177*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00177*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.00777** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.01115** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.00706 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.00698 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White or Latino/White</td>
<td>0.03569*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.02885*** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.00028 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.00032 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White or Latino/White</td>
<td>-0.01919*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.01794*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.02351*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.02351*** (0.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>College Graduates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Latino</td>
<td>-0.00016** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00022** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00045*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00045*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00360*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00380*** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00004 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00004 (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>0.10565*** (0.016)</td>
<td>0.11998*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.31502*** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.31480*** (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Level Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.59575*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.58942*** (0.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>0.00169*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00160*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00222*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00222*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.00335 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00557* (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00506** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.00514** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.00458** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.00514*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.00364* (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.00371* (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Level Racial Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.54932*** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.54933*** (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.25585*** (0.015)</td>
<td>0.24893*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.08945*** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.08729*** (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>4,314</td>
<td>4,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.5348</td>
<td>0.4670</td>
<td>0.4949</td>
<td>0.4951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A-1: Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Black-White Racial Balance as Electoral Structure Changes (Ward)

Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Desegregation as Electoral Structure Changes

Dependent Variable: Level of Black-White Racial Balance

Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Desegregation as Electoral Structure Changes

Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Electoral System-SMD/Ward

Marginal Effect of Black Representation

95% Confidence Interval

Figure A-2: Marginal Effect of Latino Representation on Latino-White Racial Balance as Electoral Structure Changes (Ward)

Marginal Effect of Latino Representation on Desegregation as Electoral Structure Changes

Dependent Variable: Level of Latino-White Racial Balance

Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Electoral System-SMD/Ward

Marginal Effect of Latino Representation

95% Confidence Interval
Figure A-3: Marginal Effect of Black Representation on Black-White Racial Balance as Electoral Structure Changes (At-Large)

Dependent Variable: Level of Black-White Racial Balance

Figure A-4: Marginal Effect of Latino Representation on Latino-White Racial Balance as Electoral Structure Changes (At-Large)

Dependent Variable: Level of Racial Balance Desegregation
Table A-2: The Effect of Bureaucratic Representation on District Racial Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Teacher Representation (%)</td>
<td>-0.00311*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Administrator Representation (%)</td>
<td>-0.00106*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Teacher Representation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00052 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00067 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Administrator Representation (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>0.00144*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00044 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.00049*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00054*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00001 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00001 (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.00887** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.01227*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.00173 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.00324 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income</td>
<td>0.04098*** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.04833*** (0.011)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White College Graduates</td>
<td>-0.02029*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.02365*** (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00534*** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00547*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00048 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00019 (0.001)</td>
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<td>Level of Residential Segregation</td>
<td>-0.00730 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.00672 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.22799*** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.22855*** (0.021)</td>
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<td>Latino Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.58464*** (0.016)</td>
<td>0.58355*** (0.017)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-0.00456 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00295 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00368 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00591* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-0.00132 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.00039 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00461 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.00529 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>-0.00024*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00030*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00048*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00050*** (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>0.00144*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00154*** (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income</td>
<td>0.01171 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.01056 (0.010)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White College Graduates</td>
<td>-0.01755*** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.01738*** (0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.55563*** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.54956*** (0.022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37199*** (0.016)</td>
<td>0.37685*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.14288*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.15006*** (0.023)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>2,949</td>
<td>2,781</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.5494</td>
<td>0.5411</td>
<td>0.4906</td>
<td>0.4868</td>
</tr>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
### Table A-3: The Effect of Managerial Style on District Racial Balance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Black-White Racial Balance Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Latino-White Racial Balance Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defender Managerial Style</td>
<td>-0.00728 (-0.005)</td>
<td>-0.00582 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income</td>
<td>-0.02911** (-0.014)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>0.00003 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00079** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00327*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00174** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00232*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00174*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00354*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.78465*** (0.031)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.01573** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.01208** (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income</td>
<td>0.01786 (0.029)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-0.00094*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.81395*** (0.020)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.29971*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.11578*** (0.027)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                                      | 774                                                | 721                                                 |
| R²                                     | 0.6806                                             | 0.8085                                             |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
## Table A-4: The Effect of Managerial Strategy on District Racial Balance

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<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
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<td>External Management</td>
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<td>-0.00404 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.01675** (0.007)</td>
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<td>Internal Management</td>
<td>0.01133*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.02707*** (0.010)</td>
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<td>Black/White Income</td>
<td>-0.02164** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.00139* (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-0.00270*** (0.001)</td>
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<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00159*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00141*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00341*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00344*** (0.001)</td>
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<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00090 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00117* (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00249*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00168** (0.001)</td>
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<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00205*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00184*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00372*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00392*** (0.001)</td>
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<td>Latino Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.87634*** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.86546*** (0.020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.01361** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.01574*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.01588*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.02255*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00462 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.00499 (0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00100*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00159*** (0.000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Racial Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80906*** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.70031*** (0.041)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.26366*** (0.023)</td>
<td>0.26099*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.13396*** (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.03467 (0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.7996</td>
<td>0.7937</td>
<td>0.8040</td>
<td>0.6723</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
### Table A-5: The Effect of Managerial Internal Management of Diversity Issues on District Racial Balance

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Teacher Interactions (on diversity)</td>
<td>0.00020 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.00817 (0.005)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Interactions</td>
<td>-0.0028 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.00332 (0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income</td>
<td>-0.03431*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.03469*** (0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>0.00028 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00028 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00069* (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00069* (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00328*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00323*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00171** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00171** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00227*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00220*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00179*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00180*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00339*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00336*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.78071*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.78148*** (0.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.00053 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00052 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00020 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00016 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income</td>
<td>0.01265 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.01748 (0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-0.00079** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.00073** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.81137*** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.81141*** (0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.27349*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.27470*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.11361*** (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.12147*** (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.6636</td>
<td>0.6636</td>
<td>0.8090</td>
<td>0.8078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
### Table A-6: The Effect of Managerial Role Adoption on District Racial Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Black-White Racial Balance</th>
<th>Latino-White Racial Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Std. Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Advocate Role Adopted</td>
<td>-0.00439 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.00160 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/White Income</td>
<td>-0.03043** (0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>0.00064 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites Below Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.00070* (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00340*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00220*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00227*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population (%)</td>
<td>-0.00172*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00361*** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Racial Balance</td>
<td>0.76664*** (0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.00069 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00027 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/White Income</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01620 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino College Graduates (%)</td>
<td>-0.00095*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Racial Balance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.79585*** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.29465*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.11623*** (0.027)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                                      | 701                        | 669                         |
| R²                                     | 0.6724                     | 0.8059                      |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
APPENDIX B

Figure B-1: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts)

Figure B-2: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Administrator Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)
Figure B-3: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts)

Marginal Effect of Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes

Dependent Variable: Latino Administrator Representation

Marginal Effect of School Board Representation
95% Confidence Interval

Figure B-4: Marginal Effect on Latino Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)

Marginal Effect of Board Representation on Latino Administrator Representation as Electoral Structure Changes

Dependent Variable: Latino Administrator Representation

Marginal Effect of School Board Representation
95% Confidence Interval
Figure B-5: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts)

Figure B-6: Marginal Effect of Black Board Representation on Black Teacher Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)
Figure B-7: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Balanced districts)

Figure B-8: Marginal Effect of Latino Board Representation on Latino Teacher Representation as At-Large Structure Changes (Imbalanced districts)
APPENDIX C

Figure C-1: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Special Education (Mild Retardation) as Policy Environments Change

Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Blacks Odds of Special Education as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Mild Retardation, Special Education for Black Students

Figure C-2: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Special Education (Mild Retardation) as Policy Environments Change

Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latinos Odds of Special Education as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Special Education for Latino Students
Figure C-3: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Special Education (Moderate Retardation) as Policy Environments Change

Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Blacks Odds of Special Education as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Moderate Retardation, Special Education for Black Students

Level of Racial Balance

-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Level of Policy Environment

95% Confidence Interval

Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latinos Odds of Moderate Retardation, Special Education as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Special Education for Latino Students

Level of Racial Balance

-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Level of Policy Environment

95% Confidence Interval
Figure C-5: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Corporal Punishment as Policy Environments Change

Figure C-6: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Corporal Punishment as Policy Environments Change
Figure C-7: Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Black Students’ Odds of Expulsion as Policy Environments Change

Marginal Effect of Black Teacher Representation on Blacks Odds of Expulsion as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Expulsion for Black Students

Figure C-8: Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Students’ Odds of Expulsion as Policy Environments Change

Marginal Effect of Latino Teacher Representation on Latino Odds of Expulsion as the Policy Environment Changes

Dependent Variable: Odds Ratio of Expulsion for Latino Students