HUNGRY FOR RESPECT: THE MODERATING ROLES OF STATUS AND JUSTICE ORIENTATION ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE AND EMOTIONS

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Affective reactions to unfair treatment date back to the earliest work on organizational justice. Seminal research on inequity identifies anger and guilt as primary responses to judgments of low justice. More recently, interpersonal justice has been linked to emotions such as anger and hostility. In fact, interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally charged of all the justice types. Yet, despite the strong theoretical support and empirical evidence linking interpersonal justice to negative emotions, we are unsure whether dignity and respect from a supervisor may also influence positive emotions.

Justice scholars have also begun to investigate the moderating influence of status on to the effects of interpersonal justice. It has been suggested, and empirically demonstrated, that people of lower objective status (hierarchical position, race) react more strongly to fairness relative to those higher in status. However, we do not yet know how the effects of interpersonal justice may be moderated by employees’ perceptions of personal status, workgroup status, or supervisor status. Furthermore, scholars have yet to examine the moderating influence of status on emotional reactions to interpersonal justice.

In this dissertation, I answer recent calls for further investigation into the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions and between interpersonal justice and status. Specifically, I draw from affective events theory and self-enhancement theory to develop a model of interpersonal justice, status, and emotions. In this model, I
hypothesize a mediating effect of emotions on the relationships between interpersonal justice and a number of distal attitudes and behaviors. I further predict a moderating influence of justice orientation and three types of status—personal (self) status, workgroup status, and supervisor status—on the interpersonal justice to emotions relationships. A sample of 427 university-based military cadets provided partial support for my model. As expected, interpersonal justice predicted a number of important distal outcomes indirectly through both positive and negative emotions. Personal status, supervisor status, and justice orientation moderated several of the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions. Implications for practice and theory are discussed.
DEDICATION

To my parents, David and Linda Stoverink, whose love, support, and guidance have influenced my successes to a greater extent than they will ever realize.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I humbly acknowledge and extend my sincere gratitude for the many blessings God has bestowed upon me over the years. His watchful eye and unconditional love have ensured that my path, which has not always been the straightest of lines, was always headed in the right direction. For this, I am eternally grateful.

There are also a number of people who have played critical roles in my development as a budding scholar at Texas A&M University. My deepest appreciation goes to my dissertation committee chair, Professor Brad Kirkman. There are many reasons to be thankful for Brad’s role in my life. I am, of course, grateful for the many hours he spent engaging in dissertation discussions, combing through my writing, and providing high-quality feedback (both positive and negative). Yet, as much as I appreciate Brad’s efforts as an advisor to my research, I am most thankful for the exceptional friendship that Brad has given, and continues to give me today. He has taught me that achieving success as a scholar and achieving success as a person are not mutually exclusive, a lesson more valuable than any other I have learned in my five years as a doctoral student.

Brad certainly did not act alone in helping me shape my dissertation into the ‘masterpiece’ it is today. He also had the help of a highly capable committee—Professors Elizabeth Umphress, Murray Barrick, and Dudley Poston. Elizabeth can be credited for teaching me that research can be fun (a task that should not be undervalued). Given the amount of time she spent walking me through my formative years as a first- and second-year PhD student, it is amazing that she was able to find time for her own research and
attainment of tenure. Furthermore, it was Elizabeth’s passion for the study of workplace fairness that inspired the selection of my dissertation topic. Murray, in addition to serving as my most heated fantasy football rival, has also invested considerable time and effort into my growth as a researcher. I could always count on Murray to ask the difficult questions, ensuring that my dissertation was conducted with the highest levels of methodological and theoretical rigor. Furthermore, as a coauthor on my first top-tier journal article, Murray can also be credited for teaching me how to navigate the publication process. Dudley, who joined my committee as a member of the Sociology faculty here at Texas A&M, was also instrumental in my success. While enrolled in his Quantitative Methods course, I was immediately impressed by his passion and energy toward educating his students. This passion and energy carried over to his role as a member of my dissertation committee, and I am grateful that it did.

I would also like to express my gratitude for two very special individuals whom I met during my undergraduate days at the University of Missouri—Professors Mary Beth Marrs and Dan Turban. I am in no way exaggerating when I say that I would not be where I am now if not for the influences of Mary Beth and Dan. Their support and encouragement began well before my PhD journey and continues to this day. For example, Mary Beth played a critical role in my decision to apply to PhD programs, and it was Dan who recommended that I add Texas A&M to my list of target schools. Both of them together have provided invaluable mentorship on both a personal and a professional level. I cannot say enough about what these two remarkable people mean to
me. So I will simply say to them, “thank you for your friendship”. I hope that one day I can improve someone’s life to the extent that you have improved mine.

I would be remiss if I did not mention my fellow PhD students who have walked down the doctoral path with me. Although there is a rather long list of individuals that deserve mention, I will limit this list to only the usual suspects, which include Brad Harris, Ning Li, Cheryl Trahms, Rhett Brymer, Brian Swider, Joanna Campbell, Richard Gardner, Andy Hinrichs, Li Dai, Emilija Djurdjevic, Serge Da Motta Veiga, Anthony Klotz, and of course Curtis Wesley II, who is quick to remind us all that the light at the end of the tunnel is often a train. These colleagues have shared in both the ups and the downs of ‘the program’, and when necessary, provided a much appreciated release from the academic rigors. If it was not for our occasional sessions of philosophic beverage consumption, I am unsure of whether or not my sanity would still be intact. Then again, if it weren’t intact, would I even know?

There are also a number of people outside the academic world who have been there for me over the years. This list should begin and end with my mother and father. I could not have dreamed of better parents, and I don’t tell them this enough. Although each of them claims that I take after other one, I am confident that the person I have become is a direct result of how they both raised me. I hope with all my heart that they know how much I love them and that I have made them proud. I would also like to acknowledge my brother, Matt, his wife Joanna, and my beautiful niece, Isabella. Thank you all for being such wonderful people, whom I am proud to call my family.
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And finally, I would like to end with a big shout-out to the Texas A&M football team, 2012 Heisman Trophy winner, Johnny “Football” Manziel, and all the members of the Tailgaters Association of America—Texas A&M Chapter. When I arrived on campus in the fall of 2008, the football team accumulated four wins and eight losses, and the tailgate scene could only be described as subpar. I knew right away that God had sent me to Aggieland for a reason, and I immediately went to work. Five years later, the Aggies have just completed an eleven-win season, highlighted by a Heisman Trophy, a Cotton Bowl blowout victory over Big 12 champion Oklahoma, and a top five national ranking in the final standings. Oh, and the tailgating at Texas A&M is now the best in the land. With that said, my work here is done.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Problem

Organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987) has played an important role in organizational research for several decades. People make judgments regarding the fairness they receive in the workplace and subsequently react to these judgments in a number of meaningful ways. What started with an interest in the equity of important outcomes (distributive justice; Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976) soon expanded to include the fairness of the procedures through which these outcomes are determined (procedural justice; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Justice scholars have also highlighted the importance of interactional justice, or the fairness of the social exchange between supervisors and subordinates when procedures are executed (Bies & Moag, 1986). Interactional justice has two distinct factors—informational justice and interpersonal justice. Informational justice describes the extent to which a supervisor’s explanations for important decisions are adequate and timely, and interpersonal justice is defined as the dignity, respect, and propriety afforded subordinates by their supervisors (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993a; Colquitt, 2001). I focus on the fairness of this social exchange in the present research by examining interpersonal justice, a construct that has seen a recent increase in scholarly attention due to its ability to attenuate the consequences of low distributive and/or procedural justice as well as its relatively high practical utility—managers tend to have
more discretion over their use of respectful behavior than they do over other sources of justice such as organizational rewards and procedures (Greenberg, 2011; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009).

A thorough review of the interpersonal justice literature demonstrates that employees place considerable value on being treated with dignity and respect. Interpersonal justice influences a number of important outcomes in the workplace (for a review, see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). For example, respect, dignity, and propriety from a supervisor have been positively associated with several favorable employee outcomes such as job performance (Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002), job satisfaction (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), supervisor satisfaction (Liao & Rupp, 2005), trust in management (Kernan & Hanges, 2002), and discretionary citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005). Interpersonal justice has also been negatively associated with a number of unfavorable employee consequences such as stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2004), absenteeism (Gellatly, 1995), and counter-productive behaviors (Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006).

Yet, despite the established relationships between interpersonal justice and both attitudes and behaviors, Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, and Grandey (2000: 51), stated that “what has not been so clearly demonstrated...is the relationship that organizational justice has with the discrete emotions that are experienced in relation to work.” They go on to suggest that “a theory of justice that is devoid of emotion is a theory missing what is perhaps the most fundamental part of the experience” (p. 62).
The study of emotions is a relatively new trend in organizational research and, more specifically, in the organizational justice literature (for reviews, see Elfenbein, 2007; Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). Despite the newness of empirical research linking emotions to fairness, theoretical discussions of these relationships date back to the earliest work on organizational justice. Homans (1961: 75), in his classic description of social behavior, suggested that a person receiving the short end of an unfair reward distribution would “display the emotional behavior we call anger.” On the other hand, he also suggested that a person benefiting from an inequity may experience feelings of guilt. Following this logic, Adams (1965: 283), in his introduction of equity theory, suggested that inequity of rewards would result in “an unpleasant emotional state, be it anger or guilt”.

Following this call for action, a handful of justice scholars set out to empirically demonstrate the effects of different types of justice perceptions on a variety of discrete emotions such as anger and disappointment (De Cremer, 2006), hope and joy (Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005), fury and sadness (van den Bos & van Prooijen, 2001), contentment and hostility (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), happiness and pride (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000), and envy (Cohen-Charash, Mueller, & Goldman, 2004). Particularly relevant to the present work, scholars have demonstrated relationships between interpersonal justice and anger (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002), hostility (Judge et al., 2006), and composite indices of negative emotions (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Stecher & Rosse, 2005).
Interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally charged of all the justice types (Harlos & Pinder, 2000). Indeed, Bradfield and Aquino (1999: 609) state that “violations of interpersonal justice tend to evoke the strongest emotional responses, ranging from anger to moral outrage”. For example, the experience of interpersonal mistreatment by a supervisor has been linked to psychological distress (Tepper, 2000) and likened to a hot, emotionally laden sensation (Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 2002). This burning sensation may involve a number of negative emotions such as anger, hostility, shame, and guilt (Barclay et al., 2005; Harlos & Pinder, 2000). The important theoretical connection between interpersonal justice and emotions inspired Cohen-Charash and Byrne (2008: 384), in their recent review of the justice-emotions literature, to note that “we need further study on interactional justice and its components: informational and interpersonal justice.”

In the present work, I set out to help answer this call by examining emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I examine the negative emotions anger, hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety, and embarrassment. Each of these emotions has been theoretically linked to fairness in previous work (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris et al., in press; Judge et al., 2006). Interestingly, research has yet to empirically demonstrate the influence of interpersonal justice on positive emotions (for an exception using customer fairness judgments, see Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). This is not overly surprising, as scholars have argued that we stand to gain more from the study of (and reactions to) low interpersonal justice than from the study of high interpersonal justice (Bies, 2001). Indeed, supervisors are expected to treat subordinates with dignity and
respect (Folger & Bies, 1989). Thus, meeting this expectation will likely evoke a weaker response than violating it (Cahn, 1949). However, research has demonstrated that other types of justice influence positive emotions (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). Furthermore, interpersonal justice plays a critical role in defining one’s self-concept (Bies, 2001; Tyler & Lind, 1992), and self-enhancing events have been linked to positive affective responses (Kwang & Swann, 2010). It is therefore likely that interpersonal justice will also influence positive emotions. Accordingly, I examine this possibility with six positive affective reactions (i.e., joy, happiness, pleasure, delight, pride, and contentment), each selected based on its low intensity relative to the negative emotions listed above (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O’Connor, 1987). Again, meeting the expectation of interpersonal justice should evoke more moderate reactions than the violation of this expectation.

Another potentially important construct in the experience of interpersonal justice is status. Organizational research has recently seen an increase of scholarly interest in the influence of status on a number of attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors in the workplace (for a review, see Pearce, 2011c). By status, I mean the respect, admiration, esteem and prestige given an individual or group by other organizational members (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 1968). Status represents the social component of one’s self-concept. That is, status is concerned with people’s perception of how they are viewed by others. Thus the more people are respected and admired by others, the higher their self-concept.
The recent popularity of status in organizational research, of course, is not surprising. Status is a highly salient and prevalent construct in organizational settings. With structured hierarchies, organizational charts, titles indicative of rank, and an unequal distribution of rewards, employees are often well aware of their status in an organization. This awareness plays an important role in the sense-making and motivational processes of organizational life. That is, status maintains order and coordination throughout the ranks and provides incentives for people to expend additional effort in order to achieve higher status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

Organizational justice scholars have found status to be a particularly useful mechanism for explaining a variety of fairness-related phenomena (for a review, see Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). Although Greenberg and Ganegoda (2011: 270) noted that “connections between justice and status noted in the literature are not fully developed”, fairness researchers have made some important strides in linking the two fields of study. Specifically, they have identified status as a predictor of fairness (Erdogan, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), an outcome of fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988), and a moderator of fairness effects (Diekmann, Sondak, & Bearsness, 2007). Scholars have specifically found that status moderates the effects of interpersonal justice. A study by Aquino, Galperin, and Bennett (2004) suggests that objective status (hierarchical position and race) moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and deviant behavior. However, we do not yet know the potential roles that perceived personal status, workgroup status, and supervisor status play in moderating the effects of interpersonal justice.
Interpersonal justice and status share considerable conceptual similarities. Indeed, whereas status “connotes respect and dignity” (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011: 272), interpersonal justice perceptions capture the extent to which respect and dignity is actually given. This seemingly obvious conceptual link led Greenberg and Ganegoda (2011: 288) to recently state that “it is curious that research linking status to interactional justice has been extremely limited.” As a consequence, in this dissertation, I aim to add to the understanding of this relationship by testing the potential moderating influence of status on the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions.

My decision to integrate emotions and status into the interpersonal justice literature was motivated by three theoretical perspectives. First, both status and emotions are both likely to play a central role in the experience of interpersonal justice. Specifically, self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973) suggests that status is likely to drive the need for interpersonal justice from a supervisor, as those who are low in status (i.e., deprived of respect and prestige) should covet respectful supervisor treatment more than those of high status. Further, affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that emotions should serve as immediate responses to interpersonal justice events.

Second, the conceptual similarities between interpersonal justice and emotions, and between interpersonal justice and status are striking. The emotionally-charged nature of interpersonal justice, coupled with its meaningful overlap with the tenets of status, make the addition of both constructs to the literature potentially fruitful.
Finally, in addition to the apparent connections that these two constructs have with interpersonal justice, emotions and status are also theoretically meaningful to each other. The intensity of emotional reactions is a function of the importance placed on the emotion-triggering event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Because low-status employees are more deprived of respect than high-status employees, they are likely to place higher value on interpersonal treatment from their supervisors. Thus, the strength of an emotional reaction to interpersonal justice is likely to depend on status.

In my examination of status as a moderating influence on the interpersonal justice-emotion relationship, I examine three unique types of perceived status—personal status (i.e., status of the self), workgroup status, and supervisor status. It is expected that people low in personal status, or who receive low levels of respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige from their fellow group members (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 1968), will have a stronger desire for fair interpersonal treatment from their supervisors in order to enhance their self-concept (i.e., status). The extent to which this desire is met should trigger a number of emotions. Thus, because they are likely to place greater value on interpersonal justice, low-status employees should experience stronger emotional reactions to this treatment than high-status employees. The same argument can be made for members of low-status workgroups. By workgroup status, I mean the perceived respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige that one’s workgroup is given by other workgroups in the organization (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 1968) part of a workgroup that, by definition, commands relatively low levels of respect and admiration throughout the organization, group members are likely to experience particularly strong
On the other hand, an opposite effect is expected for the perceived status of the supervisor. Supervisor status is defined as the perceived respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige that one’s supervisor is given by his/her subordinates. High-status supervisors are likely to be considered more credible than low-status supervisors. When supervisors communicate information about employees’ self-worth via interpersonal treatment (Tyler, 1989), this information is more likely to be accepted as a true representation of the self when the supervisor is high in status and therefore more credible compared to a low-status supervisor.

The foundations for these arguments can be found by conjoining the frameworks of affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that salient workplace events trigger a number of emotional reactions, and these emotions serve as mediating mechanisms that explain the relationships between the events and a variety of important distal attitudes and behaviors. At the center of this phenomenon lies a wide variety of goals, objectives, and values (Lazarus, 1991). Employees pursue a number of goals throughout the day. Some goals may be performance-related, such as completing specific tasks or performing tasks at a targeted level. Others may include the formation and maintenance of positive social ties with coworkers and supervisors. Events frequently occur within the workplace that may facilitate or obstruct the attainment of these goals. These intervening events have the potential to trigger emotions. For example, an event that hinders one’s ability to
attain a goal may result in a feeling of anger. Conversely, an event that facilitates this same goal may lead to an increase in happiness.

One common goal for all employees is to receive dignity and respect from their supervisors (Bies, 2001; Folger & Bies, 1989). Thus, each exchange with one’s supervisor has the potential to evoke a number of positive and negative emotions. Interpersonally fair treatment from the supervisor, for example, would facilitate the goal, likely triggering positive emotions. Conversely, low interpersonal fairness would serve as an obstruction to the goal, likely triggering negative emotional reactions. Thus, interpersonal justice should be positively related to positive emotions and negatively related to negative emotions.

According to affective events theory, it is also likely that the emotions resulting from interpersonal fairness will serve as mediators to important distal outcomes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). The theory, in addition to explaining the role of salient workplace events in the emergence of emotions, also states that these emotions will mediate the relationship between the events and a number of attitudes and behaviors. When employees form job-related attitudes, they recall their many affective experiences. Thus, when determining job satisfaction, employees actively recall the events that triggered a variety of emotions, and these recollections are subsequently combined to make an evaluation of the job as a whole. For example, positive affect has been positively linked to job satisfaction (Fisher, 2000). Furthermore, in much the same way that events obstruct or facilitate individual goals to form emotions, these emotions can also obstruct or facilitate job-related behaviors. Indeed, positive affect is also positively related to job
performance (Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994). Thus, interpersonal justice events are likely to influence attitudes and behaviors through the experience of emotions. Indeed, Judge and colleagues (2006) found that hostility mediates the relationship between interpersonal justice and deviant behavior. That is, the relationship between interpersonal justice and deviance can be explained by an employee’s level of hostility. By examining the potential mediating influences of a variety of emotions, the present work potentially adds to our understanding why interpersonal justice influences a number of important attitudes and behaviors beyond deviance.

According to affective events theory, the intensity of these emotional reactions is a function of the importance of the goals impacted by the event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Thus, the intensity of emotional reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal fairness is positively correlated with the value that the employee places on receiving such interpersonal fairness. We know from previous literature that receiving dignity and respect is a natural right for all (Folger & Bies, 1989). However, in the present work, I argue that some people value respectful treatment more than others. Specifically, I predict that those low in status will experience a greater need for interpersonal justice than their high-status counterparts.

I base this prediction on the tenets of self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975). The theory states that people have a natural desire to view themselves favorably and are therefore motivated to enhance their self-images. This need for self-enhancement drives reactions to events that inform their self-concepts. Specifically, people react positively to self-enhancing information and negatively to information that
threatens their self-worth. Because interpersonal treatment from a supervisor positively influences employees’ self-views (Ferris, Spence, Brown, & Heller, in press; Tyler, 1989), self-enhancement theory suggests that employees will react more favorably to high interpersonal justice and negatively to low interpersonal justice. Furthermore, the theory also suggests that these reactions may not be uniform across all employees. People who perceive themselves to be of relatively low worth, and who have relatively few status-affirming resources, are likely to be more motivated to enhance their self-concept and therefore hungrier for fair interpersonal treatment than people of high self-worth. Thus, according to self-enhancement theory, low-status employees, compared to high-status employees, will react more positively to fair interpersonal treatment and more negatively to unfair interpersonal treatment.

Self-enhancement theory has been particularly useful in predicting affective responses to self-descriptive information (Shrauger, 1975; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987), thus adding further relevance to the present research. Specifically, people experience positive affect in response to self-enhancing information and experience negative affect in response to self-threatening information (for a meta-analytic review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010). Given the findings that 1) people respond affectively to self-descriptive information, 2) interpersonal justice informs peoples’ self-views, and 3) people of low self-worth react more strongly to this self-defining information than do people of high self-worth, I hypothesize that status will moderate the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions. Specifically, I predict that these relationships will be stronger for people of low status compared to people of high status.
Interestingly, an opposite moderating effect is expected for perceptions of supervisor status. Self-enhancement theory tells us that people desire to view themselves in a positive light and therefore react positively to self-enhancing information (Jones, 1973). However, it is possible that the impact of self-relevant information varies depending on the source of that information. Specifically, self-enhancement theory suggests that information from a credible source is more likely to influence the self-concept than information from a non-credible source (Shrauger, 1975). Research suggests that source credibility is positively related to the extent to which people accept and react to self-relevant information (Bannister, 1986; Suzuki, 1975). Further, status connotes credibility (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 1976; Sigall & Helmreich, 1969). Thus, I expect that interpersonal justice will matter more when it comes from a high-status supervisor, compared to a low-status supervisor.

Finally, I also expect that emotional reactions to interpersonal justice will depend on the employees’ level of justice orientation, or the extent to which they view justice as a moral virtue and are cognizant of justice events around them (Rupp, Byrne, & Wadlington, 2003). Those who are higher on justice orientation, and therefore more sensitive to fairness, should experience stronger emotional responses to interpersonal justice than people low on justice orientation.

1.2 Summary

To summarize, the present work provides a number of important contributions. First and foremost, I add to our understanding of interpersonal justice by examining its relationships with two important and theoretically relevant constructs—emotions and
status. Given the theoretical and conceptual relevance of emotions and status to interpersonal treatment in the workplace, integrating these two constructs into the interpersonal justice literature provides a new direction for justice scholars that is ripe with potential. The emotionally laden nature of receiving (or not receiving) respect, dignity, and propriety from supervisors has the potential to trigger a myriad of affective reactions. Specifically, the present work contributes to the justice and affect literatures by examining the potential role that interpersonal justice plays in predicting positive affect. Further, like interpersonal justice, emotions also play a critical role in the workplace, influencing a robust collection of important outcomes (Ashkanasy, Hartel, & Zerbe, 2000; Elfenbein, 2007). Examining emotions as potential mediators to the effects of interpersonal justice on distal outcomes not only advances our understanding of the experience of justice, but it also contributes to our understanding of why interpersonal justice has such a meaningful impact on important job attitudes and behaviors.

The present work also identifies certain conditions in which emotional reactions to interpersonal justice may be stronger (or weaker). Specifically, I examine potential characteristics of the employee (i.e., personal status, workgroup status, justice orientation) that may inform researchers and practitioners of which people are more or less sensitive to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. Research has demonstrated that people of varying levels of self-worth react differently to information that speaks to their self-concept. Specifically, people with relatively low self-worth react more strongly to self-descriptive information. This suggests that interpersonal fairness, while universally important to all employees’ self-concepts, may be more important to some people than it
is to others. Specifically, it is expected that low-status employees and members of low-status workgroups will value interpersonal fairness more than their high-status counterparts. Furthermore, I also examine a characteristic of the supervisor (i.e., supervisor status) that may potentially help identify the managers who are likely to elicit stronger or weaker reactions to interpersonal justice. High-status supervisors are likely to be more credible than low-status supervisors, and therefore more likely to influence the self-concept. Thus interpersonal justice effects should be stronger when the supervisor enacting the justice is high in status. By examining the moderating influence of status, the present work, therefore, also contributes to a contingency model of interpersonal justice.

Whereas emotions and status have both received recent increases in scholarly attention within the organizational justice domain, our understanding of their respective roles in the experience of interpersonal justice is still quite limited. By focusing on these constructs in the present research, I answer specific calls for further investigation into the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008) and between interpersonal justice and status (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011).

The second contribution of the present work is the advancement of knowledge pertaining to emotions in the workplace. In particular, by examining the influence of interpersonal justice on emotional reactions, I highlight an important antecedent to negative (Barclay et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2006) and a potential antecedent to positive emotions. Furthermore, the inclusion of status as a boundary condition contributes to our
understanding of when these emotional responses are likely to be strengthened and weakened.

Third, I contribute to the literature on status in the workplace. As previously noted, status is quite salient in organizational settings. Furthermore, status connotes a certain level of dignity and respect, thus influencing how people think and behave around others. However, despite its obvious importance in the workplace, “status has occupied a rather minor place in the management and organization literature” (Pearce, 2011a: 1). The present work examines status in the organizational justice domain by investigating the potential moderating influence of status on reactions to interpersonal treatment from supervisors. In this examination, I focus on three distinct operationalizations of status—personal (self) status, workgroup status, and supervisor status. Furthermore, I examine a variety of potential affective experiences resulting from the interaction of status and interpersonal justice. This work contributes to the literature by answering recent calls by organizational scholars such as Pearce (2011b: 343), who suggested that the “the future payoff from making status more central to [management and organizations] research holds great promise”.

Fourth, I integrate two theories—self-enhancement theory and affective events theory—that, to this point, have yet to be linked in the organizational justice domain, and to my knowledge, have only been linked once recently in scholarly research (Ilies, De Pater, & Judge, 2007). The tenets of these two theories are closely related, which provides a great deal of potential for each theory to inform the other. Self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975) is primarily concerned with the enhancement of
one’s self-concept. Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) explains the emotional reactions to events that facilitate or obstruct important goals. Because “there is a fundamental human tendency for people to seek positive or self-enhancing feedback” (Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989: 782; italics in original), events that facilitate or obstruct this pursuit are likely to trigger emotional responses. Indeed, a number of studies have demonstrated the ability of self-enhancing motives to predict affective responses (for a review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010). I believe that the interplay of these two theories will not only contribute to our understanding of the experience of interpersonal justice, but will also provide a new outlet for organizational scholars that is rich with potential to explain a multitude of phenomena in the workplace.

In the subsequent chapter, I review relevant research on interpersonal justice, status, and emotions. I then discuss in detail the tenets of my two theoretical frameworks—affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. In doing so, I develop a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status. I hypothesize that interpersonal justice will trigger a emotional reactions, and that these emotions will serve as mediators, influencing a number of distal attitudes and behaviors. I further argue that emotional reactions to interpersonal fairness will be weakened by personal status and workgroup status, and strengthened by supervisor status. Finally, I predict that justice orientation will strengthen the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL

2.1 Chapter Overview

In the subsequent sections, I will review the literatures on my constructs of interest and propose a theoretical model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status. I will begin with an overview of previous work on interpersonal justice, explaining its meaning and value to employees, as well as its origins and relationships with important workplace outcomes. Research on interpersonal justice has consistently demonstrated the respect, dignity, and propriety afforded subordinates by their supervisors predict a large number attitudes and behaviors that are critical to individual and organizational effectiveness (for a review, see Colquitt et al., 2001).

Additionally, and particularly relevant to the present research, this literature suggests that interpersonal justice may influence a variety of affective responses. I therefore illustrate the central role that emotions play in the experience of justice, paying special attention to the theoretical link between emotions and interpersonal justice. Research has shown that the level of fairness provided employees by their supervisors has a significant influence on both positive and negative affective reactions (for a review, see Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). In line with this previous research, I focus on both categories by hypothesizing relationships between interpersonal justice and positive (i.e., joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment) and negative (i.e., anger, hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety, and embarrassment) emotions.
I will then explain the salience and importance of status in the workplace, highlighting its relationship with organizational justice, again with a special emphasis on its theoretical relevance to interpersonal justice. I propose that the experience of interpersonal justice is not uniform across all employees, but rather interpersonal justice effects depend on perceived status. I hypothesize that personal status, workgroup status, and supervisor status will all influence reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I argue that personal and workgroup status will weaken these reactions, and supervisor status will strengthen them. Finally, I explain the potential role that justice orientation plays in the emotional response to interpersonal justice.

To develop my proposed model, I draw from two theoretical frameworks— affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that critical events occurring in the workplace trigger a wide variety of emotions responses. Given the emotionally-charged nature of interpersonal justice (Bies, 2001), and its impact on an employee’s self-concept (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992), I expect that interpersonal justice from a supervisor will result in affective responses. Further, the theory also suggests that emotions will serve as mediators explaining the relationships between workplace events and important attitudes and behaviors. Following this line of reasoning, I hypothesize that emotions will mediate the relationships between interpersonal justice and a number of important workplace attitudes and behaviors.

Drawing on the tenets of self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975) I argue that status may influence the strength of emotional reactions to interpersonal
justice. Self-enhancement theory “has arguably become one of social psychology’s most widely accepted theories” (Kwang & Swann, 2010: 264). The theory posits that people have a desire to view themselves in a positive light and therefore seek information that enhances their self-worth. This is particularly true among people who have relatively low self-concepts, as these individuals have the greatest need for self-enhancement.

Interpersonal justice communicates information about people’s social self, or view that they are valued and respected by their coworkers and supervisors, and this view plays a critical role in defining one’s self-concept (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The more dignity and respect people receive from their supervisors, the higher their perceived value. Thus, based on self-enhancement theory, I argue that employees with low personal status, or views that they garner low levels of respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige from others, have a greater need for information that enhances their social self than people of high status. Thus, I expect these individuals to be more sensitive to interpersonal justice. Research suggests that interpersonal justice also communicates information about the status of workgroups. Fair treatment of a group signals that the group is valued within the organization, and this perceived group value contributes to the self-concepts of all group members (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoe, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). I therefore make a parallel argument for workgroup status, such that members of lower-status workgroups will feel a greater need to enhance their self-views via respectful supervisor treatment.

The status of the supervisor who enacts the interpersonal justice is also expected to moderate reactions to the treatment. In their pursuit of self-enhancing information,
people actively judge the various sources from which this information is derived. Specifically, people are concerned with the credibility of the source (Shrauger, 1975). The higher the source credibility, the more likely that people will accept the information and react to it (Bannister, 1986; Suzuki, 1978). Because high-status supervisors are likely to be perceived as more credible than low-status supervisors (Halperin et al., 1976), employees should be more accepting of the information communicated by their interpersonal treatment. Thus, I expect that employees will be more sensitive to interpersonal justice from a high-status supervisor than from a low-status supervisor.

Although self-enhancement motives have been used effectively to explain a myriad of phenomena related to increasing or maintaining a positive self-concept (for a review, see Leary, 2007), these motives are especially effective in predicting affective responses to self-defining information (Kwang & Swann, 2010; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Thus, by integrating affective events theory and self-enhancement theory, I make the argument that workplace events such as interpersonal justice will trigger emotions, and the strength of these effects will depend on the extent to which a person is in need of self-enhancing information and the extent to which this information comes from a credible source. Specifically, people of low personal status, those belonging to low-status workgroups, and those reporting to high-status supervisors are expected to experience stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice than those with opposite levels of these attributes.

As a final prediction, I expect that people’s emotional reactions to interpersonal justice will vary depending on their justice orientation, or the extent to which they
perceive justice to be a moral virtue and are cognizant of justice events around them (Rupp et al., 2003). Research has demonstrated the moderating influence of justice orientation on the relationships between interpersonal justice and a variety of important outcomes (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp et al., 2003). I extend these findings to hypothesize the moderating influence of justice orientation on the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions.

In summary, in this chapter I will propose a theoretical model in which employees experience a variety of emotions as a result of their supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. These emotions are hypothesized to mediate the relationships between interpersonal justice and several attitudes and behaviors (job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviors). Finally, status (personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice orientation are expected to moderate the emotional reactions to interpersonal justice.

2.2 Interpersonal Justice

Organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987) research is concerned with employee judgments of workplace fairness and the behavioral and attitudinal reactions associated with such judgments. In their simplest form, organizational justice judgments are based on the extent to which organizations, and supervisors as their acting agents, treat employees in a manner consistent with the way they believe they ought to be treated. Although the origin of organizational justice is often attributed to the work of Adams (1965), its roots can be traced back to the philosophical teachings of Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates (Aristotle, 1759; Frost, 1972; Ryan, 1993), each of whom showed an interest in the topic of fairness.
The modern day study of fairness in organizations began with a focus on distributive justice, or the perceived fairness of reward allocation decisions (Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976). Largely based on Adams (1965) equity theory, distributive justice is determined by input-output ratio comparisons. Employees develop perceptions of the extent to which their inputs (e.g., knowledge, skills, abilities, effort) align with their rewards (e.g., pay, promotions). They then compare these input-output ratios with the ratios of their coworkers to determine the fairness of their own rewards. A high level of distributive justice exists when these ratios are relatively equivalent.

Organizational justice scholars soon realized that, in addition to the fairness of reward allocation decisions, employees were also concerned with the procedures used to arrive at those decisions. Thibaut and Walker (1975) introduced procedural justice in their discussion of the fairness of procedures used to resolve legal disputes. Their work focused primarily on the extent to which such procedures provided disputants with process control, or influence in determining the outcome of the dispute. Leventhal (1980) extended Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) work by identifying a number of additional criteria that contribute to the perceived fairness of decision procedures. Specifically, Leventhal (1980) suggested that, in addition to process control, judgments are also made regarding the extent to which procedures are enacted consistently, accurately, ethically, and without bias; represent the interests of those affected; and can be corrected in the event that errors occur.

Not long after organizational scholars began studying the fairness of procedures, Bies and Moag (1986) suggested that there may be an additional social component to
workplace fairness judgments. With their introduction of interactional justice, these authors highlighted the importance of a fair social exchange between organizational authorities and subordinates when outcome decisions are communicated. Specifically, interactional justice is concerned with the extent to which an authority’s interpersonal communication consists of respect, propriety, truthfulness, and justification (Bies & Moag, 1986).

One final change to the dimensional structure of organizational justice came when Greenberg (1993a) suggested that interactional justice is actually composed of two distinct constructs—informational and interpersonal justice. According to Greenberg (1993a), informational justice describes the extent to which communications from organizational authorities are perceived to be reasonable, timely, and adequate. Interpersonal justice is concerned with employee perceptions that authorities treat them with dignity, respect, and propriety.

Thus, a review of the organizational justice literature suggests that employees consciously gauge four distinct factors of workplace fairness—distributive justice, procedural justice, informational justice, and interpersonal justice. Following Colquitt’s (2001) confirmatory factor analysis, which provided construct validation for his new four-factor scale of justice, the popularity of measuring four unique factors of fairness quickly accelerated, resulting in a wide acceptance of Colquitt’s scale (Greenberg, 2011).

In the present work, I focus on interpersonal justice. It is important to note that scholars examining organizational fairness often refer to injustice and low justice
interchangeably, despite recent work suggesting that low levels of justice and high levels of injustice are distinct constructs (Colquitt, Long, Rodell, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 2010). Because an overwhelming majority of justice research has examined justice, and because the justice literature has yet to introduce a validated measure of injustice (Colquitt et al., 2010), I refer to interpersonal justice in the present work.

Interpersonal justice was chosen over other justice types for a number of reasons. Colquitt and Shaw (2005) noted the importance of carefully selecting dimensions of justice that are theoretically appropriate for answering specific research questions. Given my interest in the roles that emotions and status play in the experience of fairness, interpersonal justice has a great deal of theoretical relevance. First, interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally-charged of all four fairness judgments (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Harlos & Pinder, 1999; 2000). Dignity and respect from a supervisor enhances employees’ self-concepts by informing them that they are valued members of the organization (Ferris et al., in press; Tyler & Blader, 2003), and this self-enhancing information triggers positive affective reactions (Swann et al., 1987; Kwang & Swann, 2010). On the other hand, disrespectful treatment can evoke a variety of negative affective reactions. Unfair interpersonal treatment has been likened to “white-hot emotions,” with recipients of low justice reporting that they felt “mad, angry, and bitter” (Bies & Tripp, 1996: 254).

Second, status is also highly relevant to the experience of interpersonal justice. There is a clear conceptual overlap between the extent to which people receive dignity and respect (i.e., interpersonal justice) and the extent to which people command dignity
and respect from others (i.e., status) (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). Organizational justice research has linked interpersonal justice to status in such a way that receiving dignity and respect from a supervisor informs employees of their relative status in an organization (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the present work, I am interested in the moderating influence of status on interpersonal justice effects. Aquino et al. (2004) lend empirical support to this notion by finding that objective status influences reactions to interpersonal justice in such a way that low-status employees react more strongly to interpersonal justice than high-status employees.

In light of the theoretical relevance of both emotions and status to the experience of interpersonal justice, organizational scholars have recently called for further examination of these constructs in the interpersonal justice literature (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008; Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). The present work attempts to answer these calls by developing a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status (see Figure 2.1). In addition to the potential theoretical implications of examining the interplay of these three constructs, this investigation also potentially has a great deal of practical utility. Because supervisors tend to have considerable discretion over their interpersonal exchanges with subordinates (Scott et al., 2009; Greenberg, 2011), a better understanding of these exchanges is likely to be quite beneficial to organizations as they hire, train, and evaluate their supervisors. Thus, the potential for theoretical and practical contributions, combined with the fact that “the majority of contemporary studies of organizational justice focus on interactional justice” (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011:
makes the study of interpersonal justice a timely and fruitful avenue for examining the roles of emotions and status in the experience of fairness.

Employees place a great deal of value on interpersonal justice (Bies & Moag, 1986). Courtesy from others is considered a natural right to all employees and, therefore, a critical responsibility of their supervisors (Folger & Bies, 1989). Rawls (1971: 337) noted that all people have “the duty of mutual respect...the duty to show a person the respect due to him as a moral being.” According to Bies (2001), violations of this right can stem from a wide range of supervisor actions including deception, derogatory judgments, invasion of privacy, and disrespectful treatment (e.g., inconsiderate behavior, verbal abuse, coercion). Given the considerable value placed on interpersonal treatment, it is no surprise that employees are quite sensitive to the dignity and respect they receive from their supervisors.

Respectful interpersonal treatment (and the lack thereof) by a supervisor has been linked to a myriad of important organizational outcomes (for a review, see Colquitt et al., 2001). For example, judgments of interpersonal justice influence the experience of stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2004), satisfaction with both the job (Masterson et al., 2000) and the supervisor (Liao & Rupp, 2005), trust in management (Kernan & Huanges, 2002), and a number of critical workplace behaviors such as performance (Cropanzano et al., 2002), discretionary citizenship (Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005), counter-productive acts (Judge et al., 2006), and absenteeism (Gellatly, 1995).
FIGURE 2.1
Hypothesized Model of Interpersonal Justice, Emotions, Status, and Justice Orientation
In addition to the myriad of workplace attitudes and behaviors linked to interpersonal justice perceptions, scholars have also demonstrated the emergence of proximal affective responses that serve to mediate these relationships. In the next section, I discuss the influence of justice judgments on emotions in the workplace, with special attention paid to emotional reactions resulting from the experience of interpersonal justice.

2.3 Interpersonal Justice and Emotions

“Emotion has become one of the most popular—and popularized—areas within organizational scholarship” (Elfenbein, 2007: 315). This is certainly not surprising, as the workplace serves as an ideal environment for the arousal of a wide array of feeling states. Employees are constantly exposed to organizational stimuli that have the potential to trigger emotional reactions. From the feelings of joy and anger resulting from interpersonal exchanges with supervisors, coworkers and customers, to the distress, guilt, and frustration associated with the constant pressure to perform, emotions play an integral role in the experience of organizational life (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995).

Emotions fall under the umbrella term “affect,” which encompasses both emotions and moods. Emotions are defined as affective states that are relatively high in intensity, short in duration, and resulting from a specific stimulus (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). It is important to distinguish between the affective experience of emotion and the affective experience of mood, which serves as the relative comparison used in the previous definition. That is, moods are relatively low in intensity, long in duration, and emerge under much more ambiguous circumstances than emotions, often occurring without the
person’s knowledge (Barsade et al., 2003). In the present research, I propose a model in which interpersonal justice in the workplace influences emotional reactions. I focus on emotions, rather than moods, because of their targeted nature. That is, emotions, more so than moods, are directed at a specific object or event. Given my interest in interpersonal justice events, emotions serve as the logical choice for measuring the affective experience following these events.

Affective events theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) explains the emergence of emotions in the workplace. An infinite number of unique events can occur at work. Whether it is an exchange with a supervisor, a personal success or failure on the job, or an allocation of rewards, events happen throughout the day, and according to AET, these events affect the employees involved. Specifically, they trigger a variety of emotional responses.

AET is an appraisal theory. People cognitively appraise events and, based on these appraisals, emotions emerge. During the appraisal process, people evaluate the extent to which the event is personally relevant, how it is relevant (i.e., beneficial vs. harmful), and who or what caused the event to occur. The relevance of the event dictates the direction (positive vs. negative) and intensity (i.e., strong vs. weak) of the emotions, and the cause of the event determines the specific types of emotions (e.g., inward vs. outward focused) that emerge.

The appraisal of event relevance is made in reference to the personal goals of the individual. Some events benefit the individual by facilitating progress toward goals, and others harm the individual by impeding this progress (Lazarus, 1991). Events that are
consistent with (i.e., facilitate) personal goals will likely trigger positive emotions, and those that are inconsistent with (i.e., impede) goals should result in negative emotions. Employees possess many goals in their work domain. They could set goals for something to happen, for something to not happen, or for maintaining something that is currently happening (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Some goals, for example, may pertain to achieving a certain level of performance, others to enhancing their self-worth. Simply put, if it is important enough to be positioned as a goal, it is important enough to serve as fodder for an emotional appraisal. However, not all goals are created equal. Rather, goals are positioned hierarchically, with some topping the priority scale and others serving more subordinate roles. AET suggests that the more important the goal, the more intense the emotional response to events that facilitate or impede progress toward this goal.

In addition to determining the direction and intensity of the emotion, the event appraisal process also serves to determine which emotions will emerge. The assignment of blame to an event has the potential to evoke a number of different emotions. For example, if people cognitively determine that an event will result in a negative consequence and that this event was someone else’s fault, these appraisals are likely to arouse outward negative emotions such as anger or hostility directed at the transgressor. If, however, people determine that a negative event was self-induced, this appraisal may elicit self-directed emotions such as shame or embarrassment. Similarly, events that are likely to lead to positive outcomes should trigger positive emotions toward the persons responsible for these events, whether it is the self, another, or perhaps even both.
According to Weiss and Cropanzano (1996: 31), an event is defined as “a change in circumstances, a change in what one is currently experiencing. Some, but by no means all, events have affective significance in that they generate an emotional reaction or mood change in people.” Consistent with AET, judgments of justice serve as cognitive appraisals of an event (Weiss et al., 1999). Theoretical linkages between justice and emotions date back to the seminal work on organizational fairness. In Homans (1961) classic description of social behavior, he suggested that, following an injustice, people experience feelings of anger or guilt. Adams (1965), in his introduction to equity theory, drew from Homans’ work to suggest that these emotional reactions to inequity translated to the workplace. Specifically, people are likely to experience the emotional state of anger when they are slighted on important organizational rewards or guilt when they receive more rewards than they deserve. Several years later, Adams and Freedman (1976: 44) once again highlighted the emotional experience of low justice, describing these feelings of anger and guilt as “inequity distress.” Despite the theoretical linkages created by Homans (1961) and Adams (1965), Adams and Freeman (1976: 45) pointed to the lack of empirical measurement of emotional distress following low justice by stating, “Determining empirically the existence and quality of distress is potentially fruitful in testing equity theory. Failing to do so would be equivalent to not having searched for Pluto after Kepler had hypothesized its existence to account for the orbital paths of visible planets.” Cropanzano and Folger (1989) helped answer this call by empirically examining the role of emotions in the experience of justice. These authors also extended the claims of early justice theorists by suggesting the emotional reactions
to inequitable rewards would be maximized in the event that the procedures used to
arrive at these allocations were also unfair. Specifically, Cropanzano and Folger (1989)
argued that people would experience heightened levels of resentment when both
distributive and procedural justice perceptions were low. Their work helped spark a
steady stream of research examining the relationships between justice and emotions
(e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Cropanzano & Baron, 1991; Cropanzano & Randall, 1995).
Yet, this work is still in its infancy, and a more thorough investigation of justice and
emotions is needed. “Indeed, the experience and emotions of injustice are
underemphasized and under-appreciated in organizational justice theory” (Bies & Tripp,

Justice scholars have taken heed to these calls by investigating the effects of each
justice type on a variety of emotions (Bies & Tripp, 2001; De Cremer, 2004; 2006a;
2006b; Harlos & Pinder, 2000; Judge et al., 2006; for a review, see Cohen-Charash &
Byrne, 2008). Research has linked overall judgments of justice to affective responses
such as anger (Mikula, 1986, 1987), disgust, sadness, fear, shame, and guilt (Mikula,
Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998), and envy (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Scholars
have also examined emotional responses to distributive justice, with the most consistent
results suggesting that over-rewarded employees experience heightened levels of guilt
(Brockner, Greenberg, Brockner, Bortz, Davy, & Carter, 1986; Brockner, Davy, &
Regarding under-rewarded employees, the emotions present following an inequitable
reward allocation may include anger, distress, anxiety, and resentment (Austin &

Research on the affective effects of procedural justice (Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999)
and related constructs such as voice (van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002;
vanden Bos & van Prooijen, 2001) and procedural accuracy (Vermunt, Wit, van den
Bos, & Lind, 1996), detected the emergence of emotions such as anger, irritation, insult,
fury, hostility, disappointment, and depression. Other scholars found that procedural
justice judgments interacted with distributive justice judgments to predict affective
reactions, in such a way that procedural justice strengthened the positive relationships
between distributive justice and positive emotions (e.g., happiness, pride), and weakened
the negative relationships between distributive justice and negative emotions (e.g.,
anger, guilt, disappointment) (Cropanzano et al., 2000; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000;
Weiss et al., 1999).

Finally, justice scholars have linked perceptions of interpersonal fairness to
emotional responses such as hostility (Judge et al., 2006), negative affect (Stecher &
Rosse, 2005), and anger (Turillo, et al., 2002). Yet, we are unsure if interpersonal justice
may also play a role in predicting positive affect. A study by Chebat and Slusarczyk
(2005) provide preliminary evidence for this relationship. The authors found that
customer perceptions of interactional justice (i.e., perceptions that employees are honest
and polite) are positively related to customer feelings of joy. It is plausible that this
relationship also translates to exchanges between supervisors and subordinates.
The experience of unfair interpersonal treatment has been likened to “a feeling of being engulfed in white-hot emotions” and of being “inflamed and enraged” (Bies & Tripp, 1996: 254). In fact, interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally charged of all justice types (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Harlos & Pinder, 1999, 2000). As Bies and Tripp (2002: 208), stated, “Violations of noncomparable principles like truth, as in the case of lies and defamatory statements, or like human dignity, as in the case of public beratement or harassment, are often associated with the most negative, intense, and enduring emotions.” Bies and Tripp (2002) also suggest that the relative emotional strength of low interpersonal justice, compared to low distributive or procedural justice, may be due to the inability to compensate for interpersonal violations. That is, compared to rewards and procedures that can be corrected after the fact, interpersonal mistreatment may not be revocable. Given the relative lack of attention to emotions in the interpersonal justice literature, the emotionally charged nature of interpersonal treatment from a supervisor, and the calls for further investigation linking interpersonal fairness to emotions, the examination of emotional reactions to interpersonal justice promises to be an interesting and fruitful extension to the justice literature.

AET suggests that, following an interpersonal exchange with a supervisor, an appraisal ensues. During this appraisal, employees evaluate how they were treated. They determine the relevance of the exchange to their personal goals, and given adequate relevance, develop emotional responses. The intensity of these responses depends on the extent to which the exchange facilitates or obstructs progress toward goals. Considering that all people have a goal of enhancing their self-worth (Jones, 1973), and the powerful
influence of a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment on an employee’s sense of self (Bies & Tripp, 1996, 2002), it stands to reason that interpersonal justice events are relevant enough to trigger an emotional reaction. Indeed, in a study inspired by AET, Judge and colleagues (2006) hypothesized and empirically supported the influence of interpersonal justice events on state hostility. The specific emotions that emerge are determined by evaluations of causal attribution (toward the supervisor vs. toward the self). Because the treatment being appraised is the action of the supervisor, emotional responses should largely be directed at him/her (Watson, 2000). However, it is also conceivable that interpersonal treatment from a supervisor can influence a number of inward focused emotions such as pride or embarrassment.

I chose six negative emotions (i.e., anger, hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety and embarrassment) that are all theoretically relevant to the experience of interpersonal treatment from a supervisor (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris et al., in press; Judge et al., 2006; Kim & Shapiro, 2008; Tepper, 2000). Justice scholars have suggested that we stand to gain more from the study of low justice than from the study of high justice (Bies, 2001; Judge & Colquitt, 2004). Whereas high justice serves as the standard for what people expect to receive, low justice violates this standard and is therefore more likely to elicit a response (Cahn, 1949). For example, Bies (2001: 90) stated, “When people talk about justice, their narratives are in terms of the injustices they experience and, in particular, in terms of mistreatment they receive from another person.”

I chose anger because of its prevalence in, and relevance to, the justice literature. Cohen-Charash and Byrne (2008: 366) stated that “Anger is a universal reaction to
injustice and the one most often reported”. The theoretical link between anger and fairness can be traced back to the original roots of organizational justice (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961). Further, research has demonstrated that anger is influenced by acts of interpersonal justice (Turillo et al., 2002). In fact, the most frequent cause of anger in the workplace is interpersonal mistreatment, particularly when the transgressor is the individual’s supervisor (Fitness, 2000).

In their development of an emotional hierarchy, Shaver and colleagues (1987) identify anger as one of the most basic (primary) emotions (see also, Fehr & Russell, 1984), and one that is among the first emotions learned by young children (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981). As people age and develop a greater level of emotional knowledge, they learn the meaning and usefulness of a more nuanced lexicon of feelings, and thus add a number of subordinate emotions to their collection (Shaver et al., 1987). Consistent with this reasoning, it is expected that, in addition to the primary emotion of anger, a number of subordinate emotions will also be aroused following an act of interpersonal justice. I therefore selected three emotions from the Shaver et al., (1987) hierarchical cluster analysis of emotions. Specifically, I selected hostility, rage, and irritability. Each of these emotions falls into the anger cluster, and each emotion has been theoretically linked to interpersonal justice (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris et al., in press; Judge et al., 2006). Although three of the six negative emotions (i.e., anger, hostility, irritable) have also been empirically linked to interpersonal justice (Judge et al., 2006), to my knowledge, no studies have empirically linked the other three (i.e., rage, anxiety, and embarrassment) to
interpersonal justice. However, acts of low interpersonal justice have been described as 
fairness norm violations that elicit feelings of moral outrage (Bies, 1987). Furthermore, 
Ferris and colleagues (in press) suggested that interpersonal mistreatment can threaten an 
employee’s self-worth and subsequently trigger a feeling of outrage. Consistent with 
these previous claims, I also include rage as a potential affective reaction to 
interpersonal justice. Furthermore, both anxiety and embarrassment have been shown to 
emerge following an interpersonal exchange with a supervisor (Kim & Shapiro, 2008; 
Tepper, 2000).

Because of the predominant focus on low levels of interpersonal justice, justice 
scholars examining emotional reactions tend to focus on negative emotions (for an 
exception using customer fairness judgments, see Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). 
However, considering that fair interpersonal treatment facilitates subordinates’ goals of 
enhancing their self-worth (Tyler & Blader, 2003), and that self-enhancing events trigger 
positive affective reactions (Kwang & Swann, 2010), it seems plausible that the 
experience of high interpersonal justice may also influence a variety of positive 
emotions. To test this possibility, I include six positive emotions in my model (i.e., joy, 
happiness, pleasure, delight, pride, and contentment).

Like anger, joy is considered a basic (primary) emotion (Fehr & Russell, 1984; 
Shaver et al., 1987) that is learned at a very young age (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; 
Bretherton et al., 1981). Also similar to anger, joy has a number of nuanced emotions at 
a subordinate level. However, relative to anger, joy falls lower on the intensity scale. 
Because fair interpersonal treatment is a normative expectation (Cahn, 1949), meeting
this expectation is unlikely to trigger any high-intensity emotions such as love, desire, or passion. Rather, I expect that respectful treatment from a supervisor will influence relatively low-intensity positive emotions. Each of the selected positive emotions falls under the joy category in the Shaver et al. (1987) cluster analysis of emotions, and unlike feelings such as pride and triumph that are directed at the self, each of the selected emotions is outward-focused, allowing me to examine its emergence in response to supervisor treatment.

Consistent with affective events theory, the appraisal of an interpersonal justice event should trigger emotional reactions. Interpersonal exchanges with a supervisor can influence subordinates’ goal of enhancing their self-worth. Fair interpersonal treatment facilitates, and unfair interpersonal treatment obstructs, this goal. Following the logic put forth by AET, I expect interpersonal justice to be positively related to positive emotions and negatively related to negative emotions. I therefore propose the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1A**: Interpersonal justice is negatively related to the negative emotions.

**Hypothesis 1B**: Interpersonal justice is positively related to the positive emotions.

### 2.4 Emotions as Mediators

According to AET, emotions serve not only as reactions to important organizational events but also as mediators between these events and more distal attitudes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Work-related attitudes directed at the supervisor,
at the organization, and at the job are, at least partially, determined by the recall of affective experiences relevant to each target. Following the appraisal process described above, emotional responses emerge, and these feelings are then stored in memory. Employees draw on their database of affective experiences when deriving relevant attitudes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). For example, one’s level of job satisfaction is influenced by the emotions (both positive and negative) one has experienced while on the job in such a way that satisfaction is enhanced by the recollection of positive emotions and reduced by the recollection of negative emotions. Indeed, Scott and Judge (2006) demonstrated that job satisfaction is negatively influenced by emotions such as hostility and fatigue and positively influenced by emotions such as joviality and attentiveness. Furthermore, a composite of negative emotions including anger, frustration, and unhappiness was linked to lower levels of satisfaction with one’s supervisor (Fisher, 2000).

In support of AET, the findings reviewed above demonstrate that emotions influence attitudes in the workplace. Indeed, meta-analytic results suggest that state positive and negative affect are both related to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intentions (Thoresen, Kaplan, Barsky, Warren, & de Chernmont, 2003). Thus, workplace events trigger affect, which in turn influence distal attitudes.

Several studies have demonstrated a mediating influence of emotions on justice effects (for a review, see Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). For example, Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005) found that both positive (i.e., joy, hope) and negative (i.e., anxiety,
disgust) emotions mediated the effect of distributive justice on customer loyalty. Further, Tepper, Duffy, Henle, and Lambert (2006) demonstrated that procedural justice influences perceptions of abusive supervision, and that this relationship is partially mediated by depression.

Research has also examined emotional mediators of the effects of interpersonal justice. For example, Rupp and Spencer (2006) found that anger mediates the effect of customer-initiated interactional justice (combination of interpersonal and informational justice). Specifically, employees are angrier when they are treated unfairly by customers, and this anger in turn resulted in greater emotional labor. In another study, Judge and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that the relationship between interpersonal justice and deviant behavior is mediated by hostility.

Consistent with these studies and the tenets of affective events theory, I also expect emotions to mediate the effects of interpersonal justice on important attitudes. Specifically, AET suggests that interpersonal justice events will influence a number of important attitudes, through a number of emotional experiences. That is, interpersonal justice is expected to influence distal outcomes because of the emotions that are triggered in the employees receiving the justice.

When selecting outcomes for this study, I first identified attitudes that have been theoretically and empirically linked to interpersonal justice in previous research. Colquitt and colleagues (2001), in their meta-analytic work investigating the effects of organizational justice suggest that effects of interpersonal justice, which is enacted by the supervisor, are likely to be strongest when they are targeting that supervisor. Thus, I
first identified a number of supervisor-directed attitudes (i.e., supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, and supervisor relationship viability) that are likely to be influenced by interpersonal fairness. Furthermore, because the supervisor enacting the fairness is serving as an agent to the organization (i.e., the overarching policy making entity), outcomes directed at the organization are also affected by interpersonal justice (Colquitt et al., 2001). I therefore include organizational commitment and withdrawal intentions in my model. Finally, because interpersonal justice influences subordinates’ experience while on the job (Masterson et al., 2000), I also expect that interpersonal justice to influence job satisfaction. I expect these findings to emerge in the present work.

In addition to the established relationships each of these outcomes has with interpersonal justice, these attitudes are particularly appropriate for the present work because they have also been linked to affective experiences in the workplace (Spector & Fox, 2002; Fisher, 2000; Thoresen et al., 2003; Staw & Barsade, 1993), therefore contributing additional relevance to AET. With this in mind, I present the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 2A: The relationships between interpersonal justice and (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction are mediated by negative emotions.**

**Hypothesis 2B: The relationships between interpersonal justice and (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability,**
(iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction are mediated by the positive emotions.

2.5 Moderators of Interpersonal Justice-Emotions Relationships

In the previous sections, I discussed the importance of emotions in the experience of interpersonal justice. Consistent with the tenets of AET, I hypothesized that interpersonal justice events trigger emotional responses, and these emotions mediate the impact of interpersonal justice on a number of important attitudes in the workplace. Research has provided some empirical support for these claims, demonstrating that emotions do, in fact, serve as a mediator of interpersonal justice effects (Judge et al., 2006). However, my discussion to this point has made the assumption that all employees react to interpersonal justice in a universally similar manner. I have not addressed the possibility that some people may experience stronger (or weaker) emotional responses to interpersonal treatment from their supervisors.

Organizational justice scholars have identified a variety of moderators which impose meaningful boundary conditions on justice effects (Gilliland & Steiner, 2001; Greenberg, 1993b; Kwong & Leung, 2002; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). In their review of the justice literature, Nowakowski and Conlon (2005) identify both contextual and individual difference factors that influence the strength of justice relationships. For example, Colquitt, Scott, Judge, and Shaw (2006) found that individual differences such as trust propensity, risk aversion, and trait morality all moderate behavioral reactions (e.g., performance and counter-productivity) to interpersonal justice. Furthermore, in an
examination of emotions and fairness, Judge et al., (2006) found that trait hostility moderated the influence of interpersonal justice on state hostility. Specifically, people high in trait hostility experienced stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice compared to people low in trait hostility. Taken together, these studies suggest that interpersonal fairness matters more to some people than it does to others, and that these differential effects may account for variance in the experience of emotion.

In the next section I propose that a person’s self-concept may also play a role in determining the strength of emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I argue that the social component of the self-concept—core self-evaluation and personal status—moderates the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status perceptions are low, compared to high.

2.5.1 Personal Status

Status plays a critical role in organizational life, separating those of high relative standing from those positioned lower on the social hierarchy. Employees are structured and rewarded in such a way that status remains a perpetually salient concept in the workplace. Although the term status can be used to describe the relative standing of people on any number of dimensions (e.g., wealth, education, physical attractiveness, age, sex, race, expertise, authority; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980), in the present work, I adopt the more colloquial meaning of personal status—the respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige accorded an employee by peer coworkers (Fiske, 2010; Kemper,
2006; Zelditch, 1968). That is, personal status is a self-reflection of how one is viewed by others.

Status was chosen because of its theoretical relevance to interpersonal justice. Other constructs such as power are also likely to contribute the experience of interpersonal justice. Yet power and status differ in their theoretical association with justice judgments. Interpersonal justice and status are related in such a way that interpersonal treatment is positively related to one’s status (i.e., self-concept; Tyler & Blader, 2003). This relationship is described in further detail below. Self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973) suggests that people with low self-concepts have a greater need for self-enhancing information, such as that provided by interpersonal justice, than people with high self-concepts. Power, on the other hand, is the control one has over critical resources (Blader & Chen, in press). Interpersonal justice does not directly inform individuals of their power. An individual’s control over resources does not change with the level of treatment he/she receives from a supervisor. Thus, status, rather than power, will be examined in the present research.

Status matters to people in work and in life. It has long been an important topic in social psychological research (Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1914), and has also demonstrated considerable influence on important outcomes in the field of management (for a review, see Pearce, 2011a). Some of the earliest management scholars highlighted the importance of status in the workplace (Barnard, 1938). For example, in his classic hierarchy of needs, Maslow (1943) posited that one of the most basic human needs is that of respect and esteem from others. This early work suggests that status serves as an
influential motive; so influential, in fact, that the need for status has even been credited for explaining why people are motivated to work (Vroom, 1964). More recently, scholars have demonstrated the influence of status on a number of workplace phenomena such as role expectations (Sande, Ellard, & Ross, 1986), performance evaluations (Humphrey, 1985), and actual performance and attitudes (Eden & Shani, 1982). Specifically, high-status employees are expected to perform at higher levels, are motivated to perform consistently with these expectations (i.e., behavioral confirmation) and are subsequently evaluated more positively by those who hold the expectations (i.e., expectation confirmation) (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Relative to low-status employees, those of high status also reap the benefits of more unsolicited help from others (Van der Vegt, Bunderson, & Oosterhof, 2006), disproportionate credit for workgroup successes (Merton, 1968), and greater influence over workgroup decision-making processes (Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). Finally, status also influences perceptual judgments in such a way that high-status people report that they receive greater recognition for their performance than those of low status, even when the recognition is constant across groups (Pettit & Sivanathan, in press). In sum, a review of the management literature suggests that status matters in the workplace.

Organizational justice scholars have also begun to examine status as an important factor influencing the experience of fairness in the workplace (Begley, Lee, Hui, 2006; Erdogan et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1988; Greenberg & Ornstein, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilde, 2002a; for a recent review, see Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). For example, Fiddick and
Cummins (2001) found that status influences fairness perceptions in such a way that high-status individuals perceive that they are treated more fairly than their low-status counterparts. Regarding the distribution of important organizational resources, high-status people also tend to receive more rewards in organizational settings (Greenberg, 1988), believe that they are more entitled to these rewards (Pelham & Hetts, 2001), and when given the opportunity, allocate more rewards to themselves, even when their contributions equal those of low-status individuals (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1989).

It has been argued that this inequality of resource allocation serves to establish and maintain social order within organizations, providing justification for both high- and low-status employees to accept their relative positions (Edelman, 1978).

Status also plays a role in the perceived fairness of procedures in such a way that more status leads to higher perceptions of justice. In a study by Erdogan and colleagues (2001), status was measured objectively, via hierarchical position within the organization. Results of the study suggest that employees at a higher organizational level (a quality that connotes high status) tend to report more procedural fairness than lower-level employees.

Finally, scholars have also linked status to judgments of interpersonal fairness. Specifically, Aquino and colleagues (2004) examined the moderating role of status in the relationship between interpersonal justice and workplace deviance. In addition to hierarchical position, these authors also examined the potential role of race in explaining differential effects of interpersonal justice. As expected, the authors found that African Americans and those in lower formal organizational positions reacted more strongly to
interpersonal justice to interpersonal low justice by engaging in more deviant acts than their high-status counterparts.

The literature reviewed above suggests that status plays an important role in the experience of organizational life, and in particular, organizational justice. In the present work, I examine the potential moderating role of status in relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions. Self-verification theory and self-enhancement theory are two frameworks that potentially contribute to our understanding of why this moderating influence may occur. Both theories are concerned with how people react to information that shapes their self-concept, and both predict that people with a high self-concept will react differently to this information than people with a low self-concept. Phenomena related to the self-concept are highly relevant to the experience of interpersonal justice, as interpersonal treatment from organizational authorities plays a central role in determining the self-concept (Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Ferris et al., in press; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Indeed, the causal linkage between interpersonal treatment and the self-concept dates back to the early 1900s (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934).

The self-concept is defined as “a person’s cognitive understanding of whom and what he or she is” (Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011: 115). This includes all aspects of the self that contribute to one’s view of total self-worth. People derive their self-concept, at least partially, from their status in valued groups; that is, their personal worth is informed by the extent to which they are valued by the group and its authority members, with fair treatment signaling high worth and unfair treatment signaling low
worth (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, status and the self-concept are socially constructed. Blader and Chen (in press: 2) define status as “an index of the social worth that others ascribe to an individual or a group”. In the present work, I examine the influence of personal status on the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions. The higher people believe they are regarded by others, the higher their self-concept. Because interpersonal justice serves as information that contributes to people’s perceived status among peers, and therefore influences their self-concept (Tyler, 1989), both self-verification and self-enhancement theories suggest that people will react differently to this treatment depending on whether they are higher or lower in status. Both self-verification and self-enhancement theories suggest that people will react differently to self-descriptive information, depending on their self-concept. However, the two theories differ on a fundamental level—they disagree on which group (high vs. low self-concept) will react more strongly. Self-verification theory suggests that fair treatment is more important to those with high self-concepts, and self-enhancement theory argues that those with a low self-concept will be more sensitive to such treatment. To help reconcile these seemingly competing hypotheses, I will now summarize both theories as they pertain to organizational justice and highlight the primary reasons why one of these theories—self-enhancement—is more relevant to the present work than the other.

Self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) suggests that people desire to maintain a consistent self-concept. They seek information that confirms, or verifies, the view that they hold of themselves. The theory is a rebirth of self-consistency theory, which was
introduced by Lecky (1945) and later modified by dissonance scholars (Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957). Lecky’s original contention held that people are motivated to act in such a way that their behaviors and experiences are consistent with their self-concepts. For example, self-consistency theory might argue that, compared to people who perceive themselves to be relatively unintelligent and unmotivated, those who view themselves as highly intelligent and achievement-oriented may be more likely to pursue higher education and strive for a respectable job upon graduation. Indeed, successfully earning a college degree and acquiring a good job communicates information to intelligent, highly driven people that is commensurate with the way they view themselves. Self-consistency theory appears to have fallen off the scholarly grid upon the introduction of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Dissonance theory reversed the prediction of the self-consistency motive by suggesting that, rather than behaving in such a way that is consistent with their self-concepts, people cognitively re-evaluate themselves, modifying their self-concepts in order to maintain consistency with their behaviors.

The modern theory of self-verification (Swann, 1983) reverts back to Lecky’s (1945) original view that people hold relatively stable self-concepts and therefore seek information that is consistent with these conceptions. Self-verifying information allows people to maintain their stable self-concepts and provides them with a feeling of coherence; a feeling that everything is the way it should be. The theory suggests that those who think highly of themselves strive for positive events and information that support these views. Perhaps even more interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive, the
theory also suggests that those with relatively low self-concepts actually prefer negative self-relevant information. For example, a study found that those suffering from depression were more likely to seek negative feedback than those not suffering from depression (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Thus, in regards to the present study, self-verification theory suggests that people with high self-concepts (i.e., status) prefer fair interpersonal justice more than people with low self-concepts, as this treatment provides information consistent with their view that they are people who are highly respected and admired.

Empirical support for self-verification theory in the justice literature can be found in research conducted by Brockner, Heuer, Siegel, Wiesenfeld, Martin, Grover, Reed, and Bjorgvinsson (1998). In five studies, these authors found that procedural justice (i.e., voice) matters more to people with a high self-concept (i.e., self-esteem) than to people with a low self-concept. Specifically, voice had stronger effects for high-esteem people than for low-esteem people on a variety of outcomes such as organizational identification, organizational support, and satisfaction with resource-allocation decisions. Another study by Wiesenfield, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007) also lends support to self-verification motives. In five studies, these authors found a positive influence of procedural justice on organizational commitment among employees with high self-esteem, but not among employees with low self-esteem. Those with high self-esteem responded favorably to the fair, self-verifying treatment by increasing their commitment to the organization (see also Heuer, et al., 1999). Interestingly, and in direct support of self-verification theory, Wiesenfeld and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that
the effect of self-esteem on reactions to fairness was only present when the potential to self-verify was likely to be salient.

Further support for self-verification theory was provided by Diekmann, Sondak, and Barsness (2007), who found procedural justice was more influential in predicting job satisfaction among high-status employees than low-status employees. These authors further hypothesized and found that the level of perceived deservingness for procedural justice mediated the interactive effect of fairness and status on job satisfaction. That is, high-status employees believe they deserve more procedural justice than low-status employees, and this perceived deservingness explains why justice varies in importance between the two groups.

Results of the studies reviewed above suggest that people do indeed experience self-verification motives. Those with high self-concepts perceive that they deserve fair treatment consistent with their high worth and therefore react more strongly to this treatment than those with low self-concepts, who perceive that relatively less fair treatment is more consistent with their worth. In sum, according to self-verification theory, people strive for information that matches their self-concept. Fair treatment is therefore more important to people who think highly of themselves.

In contrast to self-verification theory, self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975), suggests that all people strive to view themselves in a positive light and therefore seek favorable information that enhances their self-concepts. Self-enhancement theory has received an abundance of scholarly attention (for a review, see Leary, 2007); so much that “the notion that people are fundamentally motivated to acquire positive
evaluations has developed into one of social psychology’s most influential theoretical assumptions” (Kwang & Swann, 2010: 263). Indeed, “by far, the greatest amount of research on self-motives has involved self-enhancement” (Leary, 2007: 319). Origins of the theory can be traced back to Allport (1937), who noted that one of the most vital and basic human needs is the need to feel good about oneself—the need to enhance one’s self-worth. Self-enhancement theory and self-verification theory are alike in one meaningful way. Both theories suggest that people with high self-concepts strive for positive, self-validating information. However, regarding those with low self-concepts, they make very different predictions. As previously noted, self-verification theory argues that people with low self-concepts prefer negative information that confirms their self-views. Self-enhancement theory, on the other hand, predicts the opposite—those who have a low self-concept have the strongest desire for positive, self-enhancing information (Shrauger & Lund, 1975). This notion was put forth by Hull (1943), who suggested that humans who are the most deprived of a basic need, experience the greatest drive to satisfy it. Using the need for sustenance as an example, he argued that the people who are the most deprived of food are the hungriest for it. In order to satisfy this hunger and sustain themselves, they experience a powerful drive to attain something to eat.

“Self-enhancement, like eating, is a fundamental part of human nature” (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008: 102). The need for positive self-validating information, while possibly not as critical as the need for food, behaves in much the same way. Those who possess a low self-concept are more deprived of the basic need of self-worth than those
with a high self-concept and are therefore hungrier for self-validating information. Thus, according to self-enhancement theory, low self-concept employees should be more sensitive than high self-concept employees to fairness that communicates information about their self-worth. People with a low self-concept are therefore expected to react more strongly to justice compared to those with a high self-concept.

De Cremer (2003) provided empirical support for self-enhancement theory using an organizational justice lens. He found that low procedural justice (i.e., leader inconsistency) led participants to feel bad about themselves, but this relationship only occurred among employees with low social self-esteem. Further evidence was provided by Vermunt et al. (2001). In this study, the relationship between procedural justice and outcome fairness judgments was stronger for those low in self-esteem than those high in self-esteem. Research has also examined the moderating influence of one’s self-concept on reactions to interpersonal justice. De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Dijke, and Bos (2004) found that interpersonal justice was more influential in predicting affective organizational commitment in low self-esteem employees than in high self-esteem employees. Furthermore, as previously noted, Aquino and colleagues (2004) found that status moderates the effects of interpersonal justice in such a way that low-status employees respond more strongly than high-status employees.

The literature reviewed above suggests that aspects of peoples’ self-concepts (e.g., self-esteem, status) play a moderating role in their reactions to fairness. People react to justice events differently depending on whether they hold high or low views of themselves. What is less clear is the specific motive that is driving these differential
reactions. Theoretical and empirical support exists for both self-verification and self-enhancement strivings. Adding further complexity to this issue is the finding that these different motives appear to predict opposite effects. This issue is quite perplexing. Why in some studies do participants with high self-concepts react stronger to fairness, and in other studies stronger reactions are observed among those with low self-concepts? Are people concerned with verifying their self-concepts or enhancing them?

The answer to these questions can likely be found in the old cliché, “it depends.” I take the stance that both motives influence people’s reactions to fairness, but their influence depends on a number of other important factors. Each of the studies reviewed above differ on several fundamental levels, and these differences may help explain why they appear to have produced contradictory results. In reconciling the two theories, I point to three critical decisions made by the study authors that may have contributed to these differential findings. Specifically, I discuss how differences in the selection of moderators and independent variables may help explain these results.

I begin with the type of self-evaluation used to moderate the relationship. The studies reviewed above all used either procedural or interpersonal fairness as independent variables. According to the relational model of justice, this type of treatment plays a critical role in the development of one’s self-concept (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Specifically, the extent to which people are treated fairly (procedurally and interpersonal) by an authority figure communicates information about their social self, or their value within the group. Thus, according to the relational model, the self is socially constructed. Due to the influence of fairness on the social construction of the
self, it seems logical that when examining the interplay between justice and the self-concept, researchers should employ measures that capture the social self rather than more global measures (see De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer et al., 2004).

Research suggests that in regards to the social self-concept, those who perceive that they are socially excluded and unaccepted experience a greater desire for social approval than those who view themselves as valued members of the group (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, it is likely that people with low social self-concepts will strive for more self-enhancing information than those with high social self-concepts. Indeed, justice studies employing measures of social self-esteem (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer et al., 2004; Vermunt et al., 2001) appear to lend support to self-enhancement theory, whereas studies focusing on general measures of self-esteem (Brockner et al., 1998; Wiesenfeld et al., 2007) seem to support the predictions of self-verification theory. It therefore appears that, when focusing on the social self, self-enhancement motives are more appropriate than self-verification motives.

A second factor likely to play an important role in determining which motives influence reactions to fairness is the type of fairness being studied. Again, the research reviewed above employed either procedural or interpersonal justice as events which informed participants’ self-concepts. Procedural justice considers factors such as voice, consistency, and bias, with the voicing of one’s concerns serving as the most popular and frequently used measure in justice research (Brockner et al., 1998). Interpersonal justice, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the relational aspects of an exchange such as respect and dignity. Although both types of fairness influence the self-
concept, scholars have argued that relational treatment is more appropriate for informing the social self than control-based procedures such as voice (De Cremer et al., 2004). Indeed, voice might be considered more important to those high in self-efficacy, as those with little efficacy would likely have low expectations for the potency of their suggestions. Thus, justice studies examining control-based procedures such as voice (Brockner et al., 1998) may appear to demonstrate support for self-verification, because the fair procedures matter more to people who believe that they have a capable voice (i.e., high self-esteem). On the other hand, justice studies focusing on procedures considered to be more relational (e.g., procedural consistency; De Cremer, 2003; Vermunt et al., 2001) appear to support self-enhancement theory, as consistency matters more to those low in self-esteem than those high in self-esteem. Consistent with this reasoning, studies that measured the relational concerns of interpersonal justice (Aquino et al., 2004; De Cremer et al., 2004) also found that those with low self-concepts reacted more strongly to fairness than those with high self-concepts. This research therefore suggests that the type of fairness used to inform the self-concept may play a role in determining which motive drives reactions to this information. Specifically, it appears that the more relational the fairness is, the more relevant it is to self-enhancement strivings.

In sum, the motives which drive reactions to fairness likely depend on the moderators and predictors of interest. Self-enhancement motives are likely more relevant evaluations of the social self and relational self-informing events. Self-verification motives, on the other hand, appear to be more appropriate for studies examining general
self-evaluations, and less relational events. In the present research, I examine the moderating influence of status on emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Given the social construction of status (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000), the relational concerns of interpersonal justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), and by definition, the affective nature of emotions, I base my moderating hypotheses on the tenets of self-enhancement theory.

As previously noted, affective-events theory posits that the strength of emotional reactions is a function of the importance of the emotion-triggering event. Self-enhancement theory suggests that interpersonal treatment is more important to low-status employees, who are more deprived of respect and esteem from others and are therefore hungrier for these status-affirming resources than are high-status employees. Thus, following the combined logic of affective-events theory and self-enhancement theory, I expect that low-status employees will experience stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice than their high-status counterparts. I therefore predict:

_Hypothesis 3A: Personal status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is low rather than high._

_Hypothesis 3B: Personal status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is low rather than high._
2.5.2 Workgroup Status

In the previous section, I hypothesized that people’s personal status will influence their emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. According to self-enhancement theory, compared to people high in status, those who are low in status are hungrier for information that enhances their self-worth. Interpersonal justice serves as self-enhancing information (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, employees low in personal status are expected to react more strongly than high-status employees to interpersonal justice.

It is possible that the status of one’s workgroup also has a similar influence on his or her reactions to interpersonal fairness. To the extent that people also derive their self-concept from the status of their workgroup, and interpersonal treatment from a supervisor also shapes a group’s status, employees in a low-status workgroup should be more sensitive than employees in a high-status workgroup to interpersonal fairness.

According to the social identity literature, membership in a high-status group enhances people’s self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The knowledge that one is part of something important contributes to his or her personal feelings of worth. Indeed, the group-value model (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoe, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992) identifies two unique, yet related, dimensions of status—personal status and group status—that serve to influence one’s self-concept. Personal status represents one’s perception of how they are regarded within their group, and corresponds to the discussion of status in the previous section. Group status, on the other hand, describes one’s perceptions of the extent to which the group is respected and admired by other
groups within the organization. Members of high-status workgroups feel more pride than those in low-status workgroups. Thus, according to the group-value model, people derive their self-worth from their personal status and their workgroup’s status. This model also suggests that both types of status are influenced by interpersonal treatment from a supervisor. Regarding workgroup status, interpersonal fairness from a supervisor toward a group is an indicator that the group is valued and respected. Thus, interpersonal treatment toward the group communicates information to group members about their self-concept.

Consistent with self-enhancement theory, reactions to interpersonal fairness should therefore depend on the status of an employee’s workgroup. Because people with lower self-concepts have a greater need for self-enhancing information, and people in low-status workgroups have lower self-concepts than those in high-status workgroups, it is expected that members of low-status workgroups will be more sensitive to interpersonal treatment from a supervisor. In line with affective-events theory, because members of low-status workgroups likely place higher value on interpersonal justice, they are likely to experience stronger emotions than high-status employees as a result of this treatment. Thus, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 4A: Workgroup status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is low rather than high.
Hypothesis 4B: Workgroup status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is low rather than high.

2.5.3 Supervisor Status

To this point, I have discussed the role that a person’s personal and workgroup status play in influencing reactions to interpersonal justice. I have argued that one’s status determines his or her need for self-enhancing information, with a low status driving a greater need for enhancement than a high status. Thus, interpersonal justice, as a source of self-defining information, should matter more to low-status employees and members of low-status workgroups. In this section, I present the likelihood that the status of the supervisor who enacts the interpersonal treatment may also play a moderating role in interpersonal justice effects.

Self-enhancement theory states that people care about the way they view themselves and therefore react to information that influences their self-concept, responding positively to self-enhancing information and negatively to self-threatening information. However, it is likely that information varies in its effect on the self. Information can come from a number of different sources, and these sources may vary in credibility. That is, depending on the source, some information may be more or less believable. According to self-enhancement theory, the credibility of the information source serves as a critical determinant of the extent to which the information affects people (Shrauger, 1975). The more credible the source, the more likely that the
information will be accepted as an accurate representation of the self. Thus, reactions to
information should depend on the extent to which the source of the information is
deemed credible. A thorough review of the feedback literature suggests that the
credibility of the information source may, in fact, be the single greatest predictor of the
extent to which self-relevant information is accepted (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979).
Indeed, the credibility of the feedback source increases the feedback’s favorability
(Albright & Levy, 1995), acceptance (Suzuki, 1978), and intention to use (Bannister,
1986).

It seems likely that a supervisor who is high in status—that is, highly respected
and admired by the employee—would be considered more credible than a low-status
supervisor. Indeed, Sigall and Helmreich (1969: 72) note that “Differences in prestige,
status, expertise, etc. each make for differences in credibility” (see also McGuire, 1969).
Empirical support for this notion is provided by Halperin and colleagues (1976), who
provided feedback about participants via three information sources, each varying in
status. The authors found that acceptance of the feedback increased significantly with the
status of the information source.

Although I am unaware of any research that has explicitly examined the potential
influence of supervisor status on justice effects, a number of studies provide some
suggestive evidence in support of this notion by demonstrating that supervisors vary in
their influence on subordinates’ self-concepts (Cornelis, van Hiel, De Cremer, 2006;
Pierro, Cicero, Bonaiuto, van Knippenberg, & Kruglanski, 2005). For example, Smith,
Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, and Lind (1998) in a test of the group-value model found that an
authority’s treatment quality had a stronger influence on employee respect and self-esteem when the authority was affiliated with the ingroup than when the authority was affiliated with an outgroup. In another study, Lipponen, Koivisto, and Olkkonen (2005) found similar results using leader prototypicality, or the extent to which a leader embodies the characteristics that define a group (Hogg, 2001). These authors demonstrated that the influence of procedural justice on feelings of pride and respect was stronger when the leader was considered prototypical.

Although ingroup affiliation and leader prototypicality differ from supervisor status, their influences on reactions to fairness are likely similar. Smith and colleagues (1998) argued that treatment from an outgroup authority provided less self-relevant information than an ingroup authority, as the ingroup authority’s behavior was considered to be more legitimate. Similarly, prototypical leaders, more so than non-prototypical leaders, are believed to carry the general opinions of the group and therefore provide information that is more indicative of an employee’s relative standing in the group (Seppala, Lipponen, & Pirttila-Backman, 2012). Based on these arguments, it seems logical to conclude that ingroup authority and prototypical leaders provide more credible information for defining the self-concept.

Taken together, the findings reviewed above suggest that when people receive self-relevant information, such as that stemming from justice events, they actively judge the source of the information and use this judgment to determine whether or not to accept and respond to it. Consistent with self-enhancement theory, information is more likely to be accepted and to trigger a response if it originates from a credible source, as
credible information is considered more representative of one’s true self (Shrauger, 1975). Because status is indicative of credibility (Halperin et al., 1976; Sigall & Helmreich, 1969), information is more likely to be influential if it comes from a person with high status. In the context of the present research, this suggests that interpersonal justice will be more important when the supervisor enacting the justice is high-status rather than low-status. Thus, following the logic of affective events theory, interpersonal justice should result in stronger emotional reactions when the supervisor is high in status, compared to when the supervisor is low in status. I therefore predict:

_Hypothesis 5A: Supervisor status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is high rather than low.

_Hypothesis 5B: Supervisor status moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is high rather than low._

2.5.4 Justice Orientation

According to deonance theory (Folger, 2001), people have a moral duty to treat people fairly. The theory states that fair treatment is a virtue (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998), and employee reactions to justice events are determined by the extent to which a supervisor’s behavior is consistent with (or in violation of) moral obligations. However, people differ not only in the extent to which they are cognizant of
justice events, but also in the extent to which they hold justice as virtuous. That is, they vary in their justice orientation (Rupp et al., 2003).

Justice orientation moderates the effects of fairness in such a way that people with a high justice orientation are more sensitive to fairness than those with a low justice orientation (Rupp et al., 2003). Interpersonal justice is of particular moral relevance (Bies, 1987), suggesting that justice orientation should play an important role in determining one’s reactions to this type of fairness. Indeed, research has shown that justice orientation influences the effects of interpersonal justice on a number of important outcomes such as satisfaction and commitment (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp et al., 2003). Given the emotional nature of interpersonal justice, and the moral outrage that ensues following violations of interpersonal treatment (Bies, 1987), the extent to which individuals hold fairness as a moral virtue is likely to also influence the affective reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. Thus, I predict:

**Hypothesis 6A:** Justice orientation moderates the relationships between interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more negatively to these emotions when justice orientation is high rather than low.

**Hypothesis 6B:** Justice orientation moderates the relationships between interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal justice relates more positively to these emotions when justice orientation is high rather than low.
2.5.5 Moderated Mediation

In the previous sections, I presented a number of mediating (i.e., the influence of interpersonal justice on attitudes through emotions) and moderating (i.e., the influence of personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation on the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions) hypotheses. Following the lead of previous scholars, I also propose a moderated mediation of these relationships (James & Brett, 1984). Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007: 193) note that “moderated mediation occurs when the strength of an indirect effect depends on the level of some variable, or in other words, when mediation relations are contingent on the level of moderator”. In the context of the present work, I expect a first stage (independent variable to mediator) moderation. That is, the strength of the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on attitudes (through emotions) will depend on the level of status (personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice orientation. Specifically, I expect the indirect effects to be stronger at lower (versus higher) levels of personal and workgroup status and higher (versus lower) levels of supervisor status and justice orientation.

Consistent with my previous moderation hypotheses, I propose a stage 1 (interpersonal justice-to-emotions) moderation. I therefore present the following formal hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 7A:** The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through negative emotions are moderated by personal status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher.
Hypothesis 7B: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through positive emotions are moderated by personal status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher.

Hypothesis 7C: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through negative emotions are moderated by workgroup status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher.

Hypothesis 7D: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through positive emotions joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment are moderated by workgroup status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher.

Hypothesis 7E: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through the negative are moderated by supervisor status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is higher, rather than lower.
Hypothesis 7F: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through positive are moderated by supervisor status in such a way that the relationships are stronger when status is higher, rather than lower.

Hypothesis 7G: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through negative emotions are moderated by justice orientation in such a way that the relationships are stronger when justice orientation is higher, rather than lower.

Hypothesis 7H: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through positive emotions are moderated by justice orientation in such a way that the relationships are stronger when justice orientation is higher, rather than lower.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Chapter Summary

In Chapter II, I proposed a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and justice orientation. Specifically, I proposed that interpersonal justice influences emotions (both positive and negative), and that these emotions serve as mediators connecting interpersonal justice to a number of important outcomes. I further argued that the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions are moderated by status in such a way that they are weakened by personal status and workgroup status and strengthened by supervisor status. Finally, I also proposed that justice orientation would have a positive moderating effect on these relationships. In the present chapter, I describe the methodology used to test the hypotheses put forth in my model. I begin with a description of my sample and data collection procedures. I then explain which measures (i.e., independent variables, mediators, moderators, outcomes, and control variables) I used to capture my constructs of interest. Finally, I identify and describe the procedures used to analyze my data and ultimately test my model.

3.2 Sample and Procedures

3.2.1 Sample

Participants in this study were 390 cadets of a university-based military organization (i.e., the Corps) affiliated with a large university in the southern United States. Participants were recruited via an email which described the study and asked
them to click a link to join. Given that everyone in the organization was sent an email rather than contacting only randomly selected members, this sample should be labeled as an opportunity sample. Because my sampling procedure was not random, it is difficult to generalize my findings and make inferences about the population. However, population statistics suggest that my sample is similar to that of the entire organization. For example, 11.2 percent of my participants were female, which is not significantly different from the 11.5 percent in the entire Corps ($z = .14, ns$). Likewise, the 23 percent Sophomores ($z = .63, ns$), 29.5 percent Juniors ($z = .55, ns$), and 22 percent Seniors ($z = 1.59, ns$) who participated also did not differ significantly from the population. Similarly, the 1.4 percent Black/African American ($z = 1.80, ns$) and the 2.8 percent Asian/Asian American ($z = 1.21, ns$) were not significantly different than their respective percentages in the population. With that said, there were several demographic distinctions between my sample and the population. For example, the 23 percent Freshmen differed from the population ($z = 2.55, p < .05$), as did the 61 percent White/Caucasian ($z = 4.05, p < .001$) and the 10.5 percent Latino/Hispanic American ($z = 4.02, p < .001$). The mean age was 20 ($S.D. = 1.26$; ages ranged from 18 to 25). Population data for average age was not available. See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the experimental sample demographics, population demographics, and demographics for the supplemental analyses (discussed in detail below).

The organization contains 2,203 cadets. Of the 2,203 emails sent, 950 were opened. From the 950 that opened the email invitation, 427 cadets completed the study,
providing a response rate of 45 percent. However, 37 were unable to recall a specific interpersonal justice event that matched the requested criteria. As this recollection was

<table>
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<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Experimental (N = 390)</th>
<th>Nonexperimental (N = 427)</th>
<th>Population (N = 2,203)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values are rounded to the nearest percent.

critical to the study’s manipulation (explained in detail below), these participants were removed from the dataset. Thus 91 percent of the responses were deemed useable for this study.

The Corps was selected for a number of theoretically and methodologically relevant reasons, largely related to its emphasis on status. First, like most military organizations, the Corps classifies its members hierarchically based on rank, making status quite salient as members in higher positions enjoy more respect and privilege than those in subordinate positions. Specifically, throughout their tenure in the Corps, cadets climb four broad levels of seniority, each corresponding to their respective classification of freshmen, sophomores, juniors, or seniors. Senior cadets serve as the Corps’ executive leaders, establishing policies and rules, planning organizational activities, and
overseeing the underclassmen. Junior cadets are responsible for the sophomores, who in turn lead the freshman cadets. Freshmen are positioned at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy and have no leadership authority. Furthermore, each cadet also possesses a formal rank (e.g., Cadet Colonel, Cadet Lieutenant Colonel, Cadet Major, Cadet Captain, Sergeant Major, Master Sergeant, Corporal, Private First Class). There are seventeen hierarchically structured formal ranks in the Corps. These hierarchical classifications contributed to the variance in individual status perceptions, thus allowing me to examine the influence of personal status in my model.

Second, the Corps is also ideal for testing the effects of workgroup status. The organization is partitioned into thirty-seven units (i.e., outfits), each with its own unique reputation. These reputations stem, in part, from the unique skillsets possessed by the members. For example, some outfits are known for their superior athletic abilities, representing the Corps in intramural sports and inter-collegiate athletic competitions. Other outfits have established themselves as academic leaders, with exemplary aggregate grade point averages. Still other outfits are composed entirely of university band members. One outfit is exclusive to veterans of military combat. Reputations are also influenced by annual recognition for exemplary performance. Each year, a number of awards are allocated to the outfits that excel in a variety of criteria identified by organizational leadership. The skill diversity existing among the outfits, and the annual identification and recognition of top performing units are both likely factors that contributed to the variance in group status perceptions, thus allowing me to test my hypotheses regarding workgroup status.
The third way in which the Corps is relevant to the present study pertains to the established structure of individual leaders. In addition to the status granted members based on their respective level of seniority, a select few from each class (except the freshman class) are selected to serve in formal leadership roles (i.e., leaders are selected through an interview process). For example, the Corps Commander serves as the leader of the entire Corps. Under the Corps Commander is the Corps Staff, a formal chain of command consisting of several high-level leadership positions that oversee the operation of the Corps (e.g., Deputy Corps Commander, Corps Sergeant Major, Corps Chief of Staff, Plans Sergeant, Inspector General, Scholastics Officer). Several Major Unit Staffs also exist. Each Major Unit Staff reports directly to the Corps Staff and is responsible for approximately four outfits. The Major Unit Staff is also composed of high-level officers (e.g., Major Unit Commander, Major Unit Executive Officer, Major Unit Sergeant Major, Inspection Sergeant, Scholastics Sergeant, Operations Sergeant). Finally, each outfit also has a number of leaders that oversee the daily operations of the members (e.g., Unit Commander, Executive Officer, First Sergeant, Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Squad Leader). The hierarchical structure of the Corps leadership likely contributed to variance in subordinates’ perceptions of their leaders’ status, thus allowing me to test my supervisor status hypotheses.

Furthermore, my model contains a number of complexities (e.g., numerous moderators and mediators) that will serve to substantially reduce the degrees of freedom when testing my hypotheses. It is therefore necessary to make my sample large enough
to provide sufficient power (Cohen, 1988) to detect statistical significance and therefore avoid type II errors. The Corps has provided a sufficiently sized sample.

Finally, previous justice scholars have found military samples to be an effective context for studying organizational justice effects (Brennan & Skarlicki, 2004; Cole, Bernerth, Walter, & Holt, 2010; Tepper & Taylor, 2003).

3.2.2 Procedures

Data were collected via two online questionnaires (see Appendix A and Appendix B for detailed instructions and all items used in both questionnaires), which were completed one week apart. Prior to beginning each questionnaire, participants were assured that all responses would be kept strictly confidential, and that results would be reported only in aggregate form with no individual identifying information. The first questionnaire captured personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. I also measured dispositional control variables (i.e., trait affect, self-esteem) and demographics in this questionnaire.

In the second questionnaire, I measured the influence of interpersonal justice on emotions using the critical incident technique introduced by Flanagan (1954). Research investigating both organizational justice (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007; Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Brockner, Heuer, Magner, Folger, Umphress, van den Bos, Vermunt, Magner, & Siegel, 2003; Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg 2009) and emotions (Crossley, 2009; Dasborough, 2006; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979) have recently found success using this method to recall critical events and their subsequent emotional reactions. Particularly relevant to the present research, Barclay et
al. (2005) found that participants were able to recall emotions resulting from a previous interpersonal justice event.

Following the lead of Mayer and colleagues (2009), I randomly assigned each participant to one of two conditions (i.e., high or low interpersonal justice), thereby creating a quasi-experimental study design. In the high interpersonal justice condition, participants were asked to recall an event in which their supervisors treated them with “particularly high levels of dignity, respect, and politeness”. In the low interpersonal justice condition, participants were asked to recall a situation in which their supervisors treated them with “particularly low levels of dignity, respect, and politeness”. After recalling the event, participants were then asked to briefly write (in a few sentences) a description of the event. This procedure was used by Aquino and colleagues (2006), and is expected to enhance the accuracy of the recollection. Immediately following the event description, participants reported the extent to which the event caused them to feel a variety of emotions, including those central to the study as well as several filler emotions added to mask my specific hypotheses.

Participants subsequently answered a series of questions which measure the outcomes of interest (i.e., supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction). Because the strength of emotions has been shown to dissipate over time (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990), participants also reported the length of time that had passed since the recalled interpersonal justice event occurred. Finally, to ensure that my manipulation
was successful, respondents also rated the supervisor’s level of interpersonal justice during the event.

In exchange for their participation, respondents were entered into a lottery drawing to win one of fifteen Apple iPad 4’s.

3.3 Measures

3.3.1 Manipulation Check

To assess the effectiveness of my manipulation, I asked participants to rate their supervisors’ interpersonal justice during the recalled event. Respondents completed the interpersonal justice scale developed and validated by Colquitt (2001). This 4-item measure is widely accepted among organizational justice scholars (see Greenberg, 2011 for a review). Participants were instructed to refer to their recalled event when responding to these items. Specifically, the items asked to what extent, “Did your supervisor treat you in a polite manner” “Did your supervisor treat you with dignity” “Did your supervisor treat you with respect” “Did your supervisor refrain from improper remarks or comments”. Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale. Responses ranged from 1 (to a small extent) to 4 (somewhat) to 7 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s reliability coefficient for the interpersonal justice manipulation check was .96.

3.3.2 Emotions

I used composite indices of discrete emotions to measure my positive emotion and negative emotion constructs. Previous literature examining relations between justice and emotions have similarly aggregated a number of discrete emotions to create latent emotion constructs (Barclay & Kiefer, 2012; Barclay et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2006;
Stecher & Rosse, 2005). In creating my emotion constructs, I selected twelve discrete emotions from the emotional hierarchy developed by Shaver et al. (1987). Each construct consisted of six discrete emotions.

Shaver et al.’s (1987) cluster analysis revealed five primary emotional clusters—love, joy, anger, sadness, and fear. Because of the unlikelihood of interpersonal justice triggering positive emotions as extreme as love, this cluster was not used in my study. Thus, all six positive emotions were pulled from the joy cluster. Specifically, I chose the emotions of joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment. The reliability coefficient for positive emotions was .97. Because discussions of negative emotional reactions to interpersonal justice tend to describe feelings related to anger (Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Judge et al., 2006), a majority of my negative emotions were selected from the anger cluster. Specifically, I chose anger, hostility, irritability, and rage. I also chose one emotion—embarrassment—from the sadness cluster and one emotion—anxiety—from the fear cluster. The reliability coefficient for negative emotions was .92.

Following previous research examining emotional reactions to justice (Barclay & Kiefer, 2012; Barclay et al., 2005), I asked participants to indicate the extent to which they experienced each emotion in reaction to the interpersonal justice event. Specifically, they were given the following instructions: “Please rate the extent to which you experienced each of the following emotions in reaction to the interpersonal treatment you received from your superior in the situation you just recalled”. In order to reduce the demand characteristics for the specific emotions of interest (Weiss et al., 1999), I also
included a number of filler emotions borrowed from Shaver et al. (1987). The responses for the 7-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 4 (somewhat) to 7 (very much).

3.3.3 Personal Status

To measure participants’ perceptions of personal status, I used a version of the perceived status scale developed by Diekmann et al. (2007), modified to reflect the participants’ status within their workgroups (i.e., outfits). Although there are other potential groupings that can be examined (i.e., major unit, platoon, squadron), the outfit level was selected as a referent because cadets in the same outfit live together, train together, and participate in Corps-related activities together. This increased interaction is likely to enhance their awareness of personal status, as cadets are regularly afforded opportunities to observe how others behave toward them. The Diekmann et al. (2007) scale consists of three items including: “I am very highly regarded in my outfit,” “I have a lot of status in my outfit,” and “I have a lot of prestige in my outfit”. Consistent with other operationalizations of status (Lount & Pettit, 2011), I also added a fourth item to represent the extent to which participants were respected by their group members: “I have a lot of respect in my outfit”. Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for personal status was .93.

3.3.4 Workgroup Status

I also measured workgroup status at the outfit level. The outfit level was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it is at this level that organizational awards are given, thus separating some outfits from others in terms of prestige. Second, people tend to join
outfits based on common interests and strengths (e.g., athletics, academics, band), which enhances outfit homogeneity and likely leads to more status variance between outfits than within outfits. Finally, it is the outfit level to which cadets refer when describing different groups in the Corps, thus making status-based reputations the most salient at this level. The items used to measure workgroup status were the same four items used to capture personal status (Diekmann et al., 2007). However, each item will be modified to reflect the change in referent from the self to the workgroup. Items included, “My outfit is very highly regarded in the Corps,” “My outfit has a lot of status in the Corps,” “My outfit has a lot of prestige in the Corps,” and “My outfit has a lot of respect in the Corps.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for workgroup status was .95.

3.3.5 Supervisor Status

To measure supervisor status, participants were asked to rate the status of the supervisor who enacted the interpersonal justice in the recalled event. Supervisor status was measured with the same four items used to measure personal and workgroup status (Diekmann et al., 2007), modified to reflect the supervisor as the referent. Sample items included: “My superior is very highly regarded by the members of my outfit,” “My superior has a lot of status among the members of my outfit,” “My superior has a lot of prestige among the members of my outfit,” and “My superior has a lot of respect among the members of my outfit.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for supervisor status was .96.

3.3.6 Justice Orientation

Justice orientation was measured with the 16-item scale developed by Rupp and colleagues (2003) and later employed by Liao and Rupp (2005). Sample items included, “I hurt for people who are treated unfairly, whether I know them or not,” “I am prone to notice people being treated unfairly in public,” “No one is free as long as one person is oppressed,” and “All of us need to take responsibility when others are treated unfairly.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for justice orientation was .88.

3.3.7 Supervisor Satisfaction

Supervisor satisfaction was measured with a 5-item version of Brayfield and Rothe’s (1951) Overall Job Satisfaction Scale (i.e., OJS). This 5-item scale has been used by other organizational researchers to assess satisfaction (Ilies & Judge, 2002). The items were modified to reflect the supervisor as the referent. This scale was selected because of its superior ability to capture affective-based satisfaction, relative to other scales (Schleicher, Watt, & Greguras, 2004). Items referenced the supervisor who enacted the recalled interpersonal justice event. Sample items included: “At this very moment, I am enthusiastic about working with my superior,” “Right now, I am fairly satisfied with my superior,” “At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my superior”, and “Right now, I consider my superior rather unpleasant” (reverse-scored).
Each item was rated on a 7-point Likert scale with a response range of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*neither agree nor disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The reliability coefficient for supervisor satisfaction was .94.

### 3.3.8 Supervisor Trust

I measured supervisor trust with the nine items developed by Cook and Wall (1980) to capture interpersonal trust toward management. Sample items included, “My superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view,” “My superior can be trusted to make sensible decisions for my future,” “My superior seems to do an efficient job,” and “I have a poor future unless I have a better superior” (reverse scored). Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale. The responses ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*neither agree nor disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The reliability coefficient for supervisor trust was .96.

### 3.3.9 Supervisor Relationship Viability

The perceived viability of the supervisor relationship was measured with a shortened 5-item version of Evans and Jarvis’s (1986) Group Attitude Scale. Items were tailored in such a way that they reference the supervisor. Sample items included: “I want to remain with my superior,” “I don’t care what happens to my superior” (reverse scored), “I wish it were possible to stop reporting to my superior now,” and “If it were possible to move to another superior at this time, I would” (reverse scored). Participants responded to each item on a 7-point Likert scale with a response range of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*neither agree nor disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The reliability coefficient for supervisor relationship viability was .97.
3.3.10 Organizational Commitment

Given my interest in attitudes likely to be influenced by emotional responses, I measured organizational commitment using the affective commitment scale developed by Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) and later revised by Vandenberghe, Bentein, and Stinglhamber (2004). Affective organizational commitment captures participants’ emotional attachment to the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1984). The scale contains six items, and sample items included: “I enjoy discussing the Corps with people outside it,” “I really feel as if the Corps’ problems are my own,” “I would be very happy to spend the rest of my college career with the Corps,” and “I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to the Corps” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale. The responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for organizational commitment was .94.

3.3.11 Withdrawal

I measured withdrawal with the 4-item turnover intent scale developed by Kelloway, Gottlieb, and Barham (1999) to capture the likelihood that participants will leave the organization in the future. Colquitt and colleagues (2001) identified turnover intent as a common type of withdrawal used in the organizational justice literature. Items included: “I am thinking about leaving the Corps,” “I am planning to look for something to do with my time other than the Corps,” “I intend to ask people about new opportunities outside the Corps,” and “I don’t plan to complete my four years in the Corps.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale. The potential
responses ranged from 1 *(strongly disagree)* to 4 *(neither agree nor disagree)* to 7 *(strongly agree)*. The reliability coefficient for withdrawal was .76.

### 3.3.12 Job Satisfaction

I measured job satisfaction with the Overall Job Satisfaction Scale (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951). The OJS consists of 18 items that assess participants’ feelings toward their jobs. The OJS was selected because it is more affectively based than other job satisfaction scales (Schleicher et al., 2004), thus making it relevant for examining attitudes reflective of emotions. As each cadet is assigned a specific position in the Corps (e.g., Finance Corporal, Scholastics Sergeant, Public Relations Corporal, Recruiting Officer, Discipline Sergeant), participants were informed that each item pertained to that particular position. Sample items included: “I feel fairly well satisfied in my present position,” “My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored,” “I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets,” and “I like my position better than the average cadet does.” I used a 7-point Likert scale for each item. The potential responses ranged from 1 *(strongly disagree)* to 4 *(neither agree nor disagree)* to 7 *(strongly agree)*. The reliability coefficient for job satisfaction was .94.

### 3.3.13 Control Variables

I included a number of control variables in order to rule out alternative explanations for my findings. Specifically, in my regression and mediator analyses, I controlled for trait positive and negative affect, and the length of time since the recalled interpersonal justice event. It is possible that participants’ emotional reactions to
interpersonal justice may be influenced by their dispositional tendencies to experience affect. For example, some people may tend to experience more anger or more joy than others. Likewise, meta-analytic research suggests that trait positive affect (PA) and trait negative affect (NA) influence perceptions of justice (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007). To eliminate this possible confounding influence, I controlled for the extent to which participants experience, in general, PA and NA. To do so I used the 20-item Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (i.e., PANAS) developed by Watson, Clark, & Tellegen (1988). The scale is divided into two distinct factors: PA and NA. The PA scale consists of the following ten items: interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, and active. The reliability coefficient for PA was .90. The NA scale consists of the following ten items: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid. The reliability coefficient for NA was .86. Second, the emotions literature has demonstrated the potential for emotional strength to dissipate over time (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990). Further, the accuracy of emotional recollections may be reduced as a function of time (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Thus, to rule out any potential recency bias, I controlled for the time since the event occurred. Specifically, I asked participants, “Approximately how long ago did this event occur?” Finally, in addition to trait PA, trait NA, and event proximity, I also controlled for social self-esteem in my moderated regression analyses. Research has shown that self-esteem moderates the relationships between justice and a variety of outcomes (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer et al., 2004; Vermunt et al., 2001) in such a way that people of low self-esteem react more strongly to judgments of fairness. This is particularly true for the
social aspect of self-esteem, which captures people’s perceived social competence. Thus, I control for social self-esteem with the 7-items that make up the social dimension of Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) self-esteem scale. Sample items included: “I feel self-conscious,” “I feel displeased with myself,” “I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure,” “I am worried about looking foolish” (all reverse-scored). The reliability coefficient for social self-esteem was .85.
4.1 Chapter Summary

This chapter describes in detail the statistical procedures employed to test my hypotheses. I also report the results of each analysis, including supplemental procedures.

Table 4.1 presents the means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and intercorrelations among all study variables. The manipulation of interpersonal justice was significantly related to both negative emotions ($r = -.72, p < .01$) and positive emotions ($r = .78, p < .01$) in the hypothesized directions. Interpersonal justice was also positively and significantly related to the distal supervisor-directed outcomes of supervisor satisfaction ($r = .48, p < .01$), supervisor trust ($r = .42, p < .01$), and supervisor relationship viability ($r = .36, p < .01$). However, interpersonal justice was not related to the distal outcomes of organizational commitment ($r = .05, ns$), withdrawal ($r = .00, ns$), and job satisfaction ($r = .02, ns$). Negative emotions correlated with each distal outcome as follows: supervisor satisfaction ($r = -.69, p < .01$), supervisor trust ($r = -.67, p < .01$), supervisor relationship viability ($r = -.61, p < .01$), organizational commitment ($r = -.17, p < .05$), withdrawal ($r = .14, p < .01$). Finally, positive emotions demonstrated significant relationships with each supervisor-directed outcome: supervisor satisfaction ($r = .57, p < .01$), supervisor trust ($r = .53, p < .01$), and supervisor relationship viability ($r = .45, p < .01$). However, positive emotions were not related to
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Note. n = 390. Reliability coefficients are reported along the diagonal. Event proximity was reported in number of weeks. Interpersonal justice manipulation was coded such that 1 = high justice and 0 = low justice. *p < .05, **p < .01.
organizational commitment ($r = .05, ns$), withdrawal ($r = .00, ns$), or job satisfaction ($r = .06, ns$).

4.2 Analyses

To assess the factor structure of my study variables, I employed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). I then employed an analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test my first set of hypotheses, which predicted that interpersonal justice would influence both negative (H1a) and positive (H1b) emotions. Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted that negative and positive emotions both mediate the relationships between interpersonal justice and each of the following distal outcomes including: supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction. To test the hypothesized indirect effects, I employed the Mplus procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for models containing multiple mediators. This method utilizes the bootstrapping technique, which repeatedly resamples the data and tests for significance of the indirect effects in each sample (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). It has been argued that bootstrapping is superior to the traditional multivariate product-of-coefficient approach to detecting indirect effects in models with multiple mediators (Briggs, 2006; Williams, 2004; Williams & MacKinnon, 2008). Traditional methods assume a normal sampling distribution, thereby producing confidence intervals (CIs) with forced symmetry. Scholars have noted that assuming a normal distribution may result in inaccurate estimations, increased Type I errors, and power issues during hypothesis testing (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Bootstrapping makes no such assumption. Rather, the CIs produced by the bootstrapping
technique are based on empirical estimations of the indirect effects and are free to take asymmetric form when the data are skewed. The presence of significant indirect effects will lend support to my mediation hypotheses. Hypotheses 3a-6b predicted that the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions are moderated by status (personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice orientation. I used OLS moderated regression in SPSS to test these hypotheses. Finally, hypotheses 7a-7h predicted that the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on each of the distal outcomes through emotions is conditioned (i.e., moderated) by each of the status variables and justice orientation. To test these moderated mediation hypotheses, I used an SPSS macro developed by Preacher and colleagues (2007), which was designed to detect conditional indirect effects. I specifically employed the Model 2 procedures, which test for stage 1 moderation. This method allowed me to use the recommended bootstrapping technique to examine the significance of the indirect effects at three different levels of my moderator (i.e., mean, one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean). The Preacher et al. technique has been used in recent organizational research (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011) to uncover conditional indirect effects in the workplace.

4.3 Results

To assess the effectiveness of my manipulation, I compared the mean interpersonal justice ratings (Colquitt, 2001) of participants in the low interpersonal justice (unfair) condition to the ratings of those in the high interpersonal justice (fair) condition. ANOVA results suggest that participants in the high justice condition reported
that their supervisor exhibited higher levels of interpersonal justice ($M = 6.54$) than participants in the low justice condition ($M = 3.03$), and that this difference was significant ($F = 706.48, p < .001$). These results suggest that my manipulation was a success.

Table 4.2 presents the results of my CFAs, including the following fit statistics: chi-square, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), and comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). Although the chi-square statistic ($\chi^2$) does not demonstrate the actual fit of a model, it is considered an effective metric for fit comparison among multiple nested models. RMSEA values below .05 are generally considered indicative of good fit, values below .08 are believed to represent reasonable fit, and any models with RMSEA values above .10 are generally perceived to fit the data poorly (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). CFI values above .90 represent models with good fit (Mathieu, Gilson, & Ruddy, 2006; Medsker, Williams, & Holahan, 1994). My measurement model consisted of twelve factors: my moderators—personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation; my mediators—negative emotions and positive emotions; and my outcome variables—supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction. This twelve-factor model fit the data relatively well ($\chi^2[3,588] = 7,022, p < .001; \text{CFI} = .90, \text{RMSEA} = .05$). I further tested the fit of alternative models, which were developed by combining variables with high correlations or theoretical overlap. For example, in one model, I collapsed each of my supervisor-directed attitudes. In another, I combined each of my status variables. My hypothesized
model demonstrated superior fit to each alternative model, thus lending support for the discriminant validity of my constructs.

### TABLE 4.2

Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses – Experimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>( \Delta \chi^2 )</th>
<th>( \Delta df )</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twelve factors: Hypothesized model</td>
<td>7022</td>
<td>3588</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Supervisor satisfaction and supervisor trust combined</td>
<td>7604</td>
<td>3599</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Personal status and job satisfaction combined</td>
<td>36550</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>29528</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Personal and workgroup status combined</td>
<td>8659</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Organizational commitment and withdrawal combined</td>
<td>36550</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>29528</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten factors: Supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, and supervisor relationship viability combined</td>
<td>8457</td>
<td>3609</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten factors: Personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status combined</td>
<td>10070</td>
<td>3609</td>
<td>3048</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight factors: All status variables combined and all supervisor-related variables combined</td>
<td>11498</td>
<td>3626</td>
<td>4476</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* CFI = Confirmatory Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. *p* < .001.

With regard to hypotheses 1a and 1b, MANOVA results suggest that interpersonal justice has a direct effect on both negative and positive emotions. First, after finding significance in my multivariate test \( F = 347.20, p < .001 \), I proceeded to
examine the univariate effects. Participants in the high interpersonal justice (fair) condition experienced lower levels of negative emotions ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 1.02$) than did participants in the low interpersonal justice (unfair) condition ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.54$), and this difference was significant ($F = 405.57$, $p < .001$). Likewise, participants in the high interpersonal justice condition experienced higher levels of positive emotions ($M = 5.15$, $SD = 1.46$) than did participants in the low interpersonal justice condition ($M = 1.85$, $SD = 1.21$), and this difference was also significant ($F = 583.12$, $p < .001$). Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are both supported.

Before testing the mediating effects of emotions, I first assessed the fit of my structural model. My model (seen in Figure 4.1) displayed adequate fit with the data ($\chi^2 [1,835] = 4,443$, $p < .001$; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .06). I then examined the significance of the paths between my mediators and my distal outcomes, a requisite of mediating relationships. SEM results suggest that both positive and negative emotions exhibited significant relationships with distal outcomes. Negative emotions were negatively related to supervisor satisfaction ($b = -.49$, $p < .001$), supervisor trust ($b = -.51$, $p < .001$), supervisor relationship viability ($b = -.56$, $p < .001$), and organizational commitment ($b = -.23$, $p < .01$). Further, negative emotions also displayed a significant positive relationship with withdrawal ($b = .17$, $p < .05$). Negative emotions did not influence job satisfaction ($b = .04$, $ns$). Positive emotions also displayed a significant relationship with supervisor satisfaction ($b = .23$, $p < .001$) and organizational commitment ($b = -.18$, $p < .05$), although the path to organizational commitment was in the opposite direction of what was expected. Further, the paths between positive emotions and supervisor trust ($b$
and withdrawal \( (b = .15, p < .10) \) were both approaching significance, with the effect on withdrawal in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Positive emotions were unrelated to supervisor relationship viability \( (b = -.01, ns) \) and job satisfaction \( (b = .09, ns) \).

At the request of a committee member, I also analyzed the effects of emotions on my dependent variables separately for participants in the high interpersonal justice and low interpersonal justice conditions. In the high interpersonal justice (fair) condition, negative emotions predicted supervisor satisfaction \( (b = -.67, p < .001) \), supervisor trust \( (b = -.63, p < .001) \), supervisor relationship viability \( (b = -.62, p < .001) \), withdrawal \( (b = .20, p < .05) \), and job satisfaction \( (b = -.20, p < .05) \). Negative emotions did not predict organizational commitment \( (b = -.14, ns) \) in the fair condition. Positive emotions in the fair condition predicted supervisor satisfaction \( (b = .34, p < .001) \), supervisor trust \( (b = .33, p < .001) \), and supervisor relationship viability \( (b = .30, p < .001) \). Positive emotions did not predict organizational commitment \( (b = .01, ns) \), withdrawal \( (b = -.02, ns) \), or job satisfaction \( (b = .09, ns) \).

In the low interpersonal justice (unfair) condition, negative emotions predicted supervisor satisfaction \( (b = -.74, p < .001) \), supervisor trust \( (b = -.69, p < .001) \), supervisor relationship viability \( (b = -.77, p < .001) \), organizational commitment \( (b = -.26, p < .001) \), withdrawal \( (b = .21, p < .01) \), and demonstrated a marginally significant relationship with job satisfaction \( (b = .11, p = .08) \). Positive emotions in the unfair condition predicted supervisor satisfaction \( (b = .61, p < .001) \), supervisor trust \( (b = .48, p < .001) \), and supervisor relationship viability \( (b = .49, p < .001) \). Positive emotions were
FIGURE 4.1
Structural Equation Modeling Results for Experimental Data

Note: Standardized coefficients provided. Nonsignificant results are dashed.
n = 390. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
not related to organizational commitment ($b = .06, ns$), withdrawal ($b = .03, ns$), job satisfaction ($b = .03, ns$).

Once I established significant paths from my independent variable (i.e., interpersonal justice) to both mediators (i.e., negative emotions and positive emotions), and significant paths from these mediators to several distal outcomes, I then examined the significance of the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on my outcomes through negative and positive emotions. In order to do so, I conducted a test of indirect effects in Mplus. Following the recommendation of Preacher and Hayes (2008), I employed a bootstrapping procedure that resampled my data 5,000 times and tested the indirect effects in each sample.

My mediation model fit the data relatively well ($\chi^2(1,847) = 4,656, p < .001; CFI = .89, RMSEA = .06$). Although the CFI fell slightly below the cutoff of .90, previous research suggests that CFI is better suited for smaller samples and for studies with exploratory pursuits, whereas RMSEA is the more appropriate fit index for larger samples and those used for confirmatory analyses (Rigdon, 1996). My RMSEA suggests that my model demonstrates reasonable fit. Results of the mediation analyses can be found in Table 4.3. Interpersonal justice displayed significant indirect effects, through negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction ($b = 1.92, p < .001, 95\% CI = [1.49, 2.50]$), supervisor trust ($b = 1.77, p < .001, 95\% CI = [1.31, 2.26]$), supervisor relationship viability ($b = 2.04, p < .001, 95\% CI = [1.51, 2.67]$), organizational commitment ($b = .73, p < .001, 95\% CI = [.37, 1.02]$), and withdrawal ($b = -.67, p < .01, 95\% CI = [-1.13, -.29]$). Interpersonal justice also demonstrated significant indirect effects, through
positive emotions, on supervisor satisfaction ($b = 1.05$, $p < .001$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [.53, 1.42]$) and supervisor trust ($b = .68$, $p < .01$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [.32, .99]$). The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction through negative emotions ($b = .14$, $ns$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [.00, .35]$) and positive emotions ($b = .15$, $ns$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [-.07, .32]$) both failed to reach significance. Furthermore, the indirect effects of interpersonal justice, through positive emotions, on supervisor relationship viability ($b = .37$, $ns$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [-.17, .71]$),

### TABLE 4.3

**Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice, through Negative and Positive Emotions, on Distal Outcomes – Experimental Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>95% C. I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>[1.49, 2.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Trust</td>
<td>1.77***</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>[1.31, 2.26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
<td>2.04***</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>[1.51, 2.67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>[0.37, 1.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>[-1.13, -0.29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>[-0.09, 0.14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>[0.67, 1.52]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Trust</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>[0.37, 1.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.80]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>[-0.56, 0.05]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>[-0.11, 0.66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>[-0.06, 0.37]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 390. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.  

96
organizational commitment ($b = -.24$, $ns$, 95% CI = $[-.53, .03]$), and withdrawal ($b = .26$, $ns$, 95% CI = $[-.13, .62]$) also failed to reach significance. Taken together, these results suggest that emotions do tend to mediate the effects of interpersonal justice on distal outcomes. Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b were both partially supported.

Prior to examining my hypothesized moderating effects, I conducted an omnibus test for multiple interactions, as recommended by Aguinis (2004). I first assessed the incremental variance in negative emotions explained by the addition of all higher order constructs. Results suggest that the higher-order constructs explained a significant amount of variance beyond that explained by the first-order constructs (controls and interpersonal justice manipulation) alone ($\Delta R^2 = .06$, $p < .001$). Similarly, adding the higher-order constructs to the model predicting positive emotions also resulted in incremental variance explained ($\Delta R^2 = .03$, $p = .05$). According to Aguinis (2004), significant omnibus tests, such as these, warrant the examination of each two-way interaction separately. I therefore proceeded to test each moderation hypothesis.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that the relationships between interpersonal justice and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, would be conditioned on the subordinate’s personal status, such that the relationships are stronger when status is low (vs. high). To test these hypotheses, I used moderated regression analyses to compare the relationship at one standard deviation below the mean status level to the same relationship at one standard deviation above the mean status level. I included trait negative affect, trait positive affect, proximity of the interpersonal justice event, and social self-esteem as control variables in the analyses. Prior to analyzing the data, I
centered my moderator around the mean to improve interpretability and eliminate nonessential multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The same procedures were used when examining the potential moderating roles of personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. Results of the moderation regression analyses\(^1\) (See Table 4.4) suggest that the effect of interpersonal justice on negative emotions was not significantly different between low status individuals and high status individuals \((b = .04, ns)\). Likewise, as shown in Table 4.5, the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions also demonstrated no significant difference based on personal status \((b = -.02, ns)\). Hypotheses 3a and 3b, therefore, were not supported.

In hypotheses 4a and 4b, I predicted that the relationship between interpersonal justice and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, would be moderated by the status of one’s workgroup, such that the relationship is stronger when status is low (vs. high). Results of the moderated regression analysis (See Table 4.6) suggest that the influence of interpersonal justice on negative emotions did not differ significantly between high-status and low-status workgroups \((b = -.10, ns)\). As demonstrated in Table 4.7, workgroup status also failed to demonstrate a significant moderating role in the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions \((b = .00, ns)\). Thus, hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported.

Hypotheses 5a and 5b posited that the status of the supervisor moderated the

\(^1\) Based on the recommendation of a committee member, I also controlled for objective status, (i.e., classification—freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior). The addition of objective status as a control variable resulted in no substantive changes for the interactive effects of interpersonal justice and personal status on either emotions variable. It was therefore removed from the analysis.
TABLE 4.4
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Negative Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2.30*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2.90**</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-2.38*</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Proximity</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-18.12***</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-18.08***</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Status</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ x Personal Status</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F                         3.40     | 168.18   | 168.35   |
F change                   3.40*    | 164.77***| 0.18     |
R^2                       0.04     | 0.55     | 0.55     |
R^2 change                 0.04     | 0.50     | 0.00     |

Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
**TABLE 4.5**

Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Positive Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.93</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>21.36***</td>
<td>3.38</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>21.30***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Status</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.
***p < .001 (two-tailed test).*
TABLE 4.6
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on Negative Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>3.08**</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>3.62***</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.69†</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<td>-19.41***</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>-1.15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

F 4.44  197.96  199.29
F change  4.44**  193.52***  1.33
R² 0.05  0.55  0.55
R² change  0.05  0.50  0.00

Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup.
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
### TABLE 4.7
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on Positive Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
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<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
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<td>-0.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event Proximity</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG Status</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPJ x WG Status</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>F change</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
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<td>0.61</td>
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</table>

Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup.

†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
relationships between interpersonal justice and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, such that the relationships are stronger when supervisor status is high than when it is low. In military settings, not unlike many traditional workplaces, personnel concurrently report to multiple supervisors. When asked to recall a specific interpersonal justice event in this study, a large number of participants described events that were enacted by supervisors that were different from those for whom they provided status ratings on the previous survey. Specifically, of the 390 participants, 146 participants recalled an interpersonal justice event enacted by a supervisor for whom no status rating was given. The sample for examining the potential moderating influence of supervisor status ($n = 244$) represents only those participants who rated the same supervisor in both the first and second surveys.

Results of the analysis (See Table 4.8) suggest that there was no significant difference in the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions ($b = .15, ns$) for people reporting to high-status supervisors versus people reporting to low-status supervisors. Likewise, the results displayed in Table 4.9 suggest that there was no significant interaction between interpersonal justice and supervisor status in predicting positive emotions ($b = -.00, ns$). Hypotheses 5a and 5b, therefore, were not supported.

In hypotheses 6a and 6b, I predicted that justice orientation would interact with interpersonal justice to influence negative and positive emotions, such that justice orientation would strengthen these relationships. Regression results (See Table 4.10) suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is conditioned on the individual’s level of justice orientation ($b = -.33, p < .05$). To further
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
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<td>( b )</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
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F 3.15 148.57 150.76
F change 3.15* 145.41*** 2.19
\( R^2 \) 0.05 0.57 0.58
\( R^2 \) change 0.05 0.52 0.00

Note. \( N = 244 \). IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor.
*\( p < .05 \), **\( p < .01 \), ***\( p < .001 \) (two-tailed test).
### TABLE 4.9
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Supervisor Status on Positive Emotions – Experimental Data

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$b$</td>
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<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$t$</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.99</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<td>$F$ change</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
<td>179.81***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
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<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</table>

*Note. N = 244. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor.*

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).*
TABLE 4.10
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on Negative Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
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<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
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<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
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<td>Event Proximity</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
probe the nature of the interaction, I conducted simple slope analyses for both high and low levels of justice orientation. As expected, results of these analyses suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is stronger for people with high justice orientation \( (b = -2.85, p < .001) \) than for those with low justice orientation \( (b = -2.27, p < .001) \). A visual representation of this interaction can be found in Figure 4.2. Justice orientation did not interact with interpersonal justice to influence positive emotions \( (b = -.04, ns) \). Results of the moderated regression analysis can be found in Table 4.11. Thus, hypothesis 6a was supported, whereas hypothesis 6b was not.

**FIGURE 4.2**
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on Negative Emotions

Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.
TABLE 4.11
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on Positive Emotions – Experimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event Proximity</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
<td>3.37</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JO</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ x JO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F                           | 1.13 |    | 268.27 |       | 0.06 |    | 268.33 |
F change                    | 1.13 |    | 267.14*** |     | 0.06 |    | 268.33 |
R²                          | 0.01 |    | 0.62   |       | 0.62 |    | 0.62   |
R² change                   | 0.01 |    | 0.60   |       | 0.60 |    | 0.60   |

*p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
Hypotheses 7a through 7h each posited moderated mediation. Specifically, I hypothesized that the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on each outcome, through both negative and positive emotions, would be conditioned on each of my proposed moderators—personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. A significant interaction between interpersonal justice and a proposed moderator is a necessary condition for moderated mediation. Because personal status, workgroup status, and supervisor status did not interact with interpersonal justice to predict emotions, their corresponding hypotheses—7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 7f, and 7h—were not supported. However, because justice orientation interacted with interpersonal justice to predict negative emotions, I proceeded to examine the potential that this interaction moderates the indirect effect of interpersonal justice, through negative emotions, on my hypothesized distal outcomes. My moderated mediation analyses followed the procedures outlined by Preacher and colleagues (2007) for stage 1 moderation. These procedures employ bootstrapping to examine the hypothesized indirect relationship at three levels of the proposed moderator (i.e., the centered mean [.01], one standard deviation below the mean [-.88], and one standard deviation above the mean [.90]). As shown in Table 4.12, results suggest that the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through negative emotions, strengthened with increasing levels of justice orientation. The relationship was weakest at low levels of justice orientation ($b = 1.55, p < .001$), was stronger at the mean ($b = 1.76, p < .001$), and was strongest at one standard deviation above the mean ($b = 1.97, p < .001$). These results lend support to the hypothesized moderated mediation relationship. A similar pattern emerged when
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Boot indirect effect</th>
<th>Boot SE</th>
<th>Boot Z</th>
<th>Boot p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Conditional indirect effect at**  
JO = M, M ± 1 SD                  |                      |         |        |         |
| **Supervisor Satisfaction**     |                      |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | 1.55                 | 0.19    | 8.08   | 0.0000  |
| Mean                           | 1.76                 | 0.18    | 9.75   | 0.0000  |
| +1 SD                          | 1.98                 | 0.22    | 9.11   | 0.0000  |
| **Supervisor Trust**           |                      |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | 1.44                 | 0.17    | 8.36   | 0.0000  |
| Mean                           | 1.65                 | 0.16    | 10.33  | 0.0000  |
| +1 SD                          | 1.86                 | 0.19    | 9.60   | 0.0000  |
| **Supervisor Relationship Viability** |                  |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | 1.54                 | 0.20    | 7.87   | 0.0000  |
| Mean                           | 1.76                 | 0.19    | 9.34   | 0.0000  |
| +1 SD                          | 2.00                 | 0.23    | 8.83   | 0.0000  |
| **Organizational Commitment**  |                      |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | 0.18                 | 0.12    | 1.46   | 0.1440  |
| Mean                           | 0.20                 | 0.14    | 1.47   | 0.1410  |
| +1 SD                          | 0.23                 | 0.15    | 1.47   | 0.1420  |
| **Withdrawal**                 |                      |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | -0.26                | 0.13    | -2.06  | 0.0394  |
| Mean                           | -0.29                | 0.14    | -2.09  | 0.0370  |
| +1 SD                          | -0.32                | 0.16    | -2.08  | 0.0378  |
| **Job Satisfaction**           |                      |         |        |         |
| -1 SD                          | 0.06                 | 0.11    | 0.52   | 0.6027  |
| Mean                           | 0.06                 | 0.12    | 0.52   | 0.6015  |
| +1 SD                          | 0.07                 | 0.14    | 0.52   | 0.6019  |

Note: N = 390. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. JO = Justice Orientation.
predicting supervisor trust. The relationship was weakest at one standard deviation below the mean ($b = 1.44$, $p < .001$), stronger at the mean ($b = 1.65$, $p < .001$), and strongest at one standard deviation above the mean ($b = 1.86$, $p < .001$). The indirect relationship between interpersonal justice and supervisor relationship viability, through negative emotions, also strengthened with higher levels of justice orientation. The effect was weakest at low levels of justice orientation ($b = 1.54$, $p < .001$), stronger at the mean ($b = 1.77$, $p < .001$), and strongest at high levels ($b = 2.00$, $p < .001$). The indirect effects on withdrawal were also conditioned on justice orientation, with the weakest effects found at low levels of justice orientation ($b = -.26$, $p < .05$), stronger effects at the mean ($b = -.29$, $p < .05$), and the strongest effects at high levels of justice orientation ($b = -.32$, $p < .001$). The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on organizational commitment were not significant at any of the three levels of justice orientation: one standard deviation below ($b = .18$, $ns$), mean ($b = .20$, $ns$), and one standard deviation above the mean ($b = .23$, $ns$). Likewise, the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction, through negative emotions, also failed to reach significance: one standard deviation below the mean ($b = .06$, $ns$), mean ($b = .06$, $ns$), and one standard deviation above the mean ($b = .07$, $ns$). Thus, hypothesis 7g was partially supported.

4.4 Supplemental Analyses

In designing my study, I noted the possibility that asking participants to recall events in which their supervisors engaged in particularly high or low levels of interpersonal justice would likely result in the recollection of extreme justice events. For example, participants in the low interpersonal justice condition likely recalled the most
disrespectful exchanges they had with their supervisors, as these events should be the most salient in their minds. Similarly, participants in the high interpersonal justice condition likely recalled the one situation in which their supervisors treated them with the highest level of dignity and respect. It is plausible that these events were extreme enough to trigger strong emotional reactions in all participants, regardless of their personal status, or the status of their workgroups or supervisors. This universally strong reaction to my independent variable (i.e., little variance across groups) would enhance the difficulty of detecting significant interactions.

This possibility led me to design an alternative method for testing my hypotheses. In the alternate design, I did not manipulate interpersonal justice, but rather captured interpersonal justice via a non-experimental measure (Colquitt, 2001). The items from this scale were the same items used in my manipulation check. However, the instructions for this scale differed from those used in the manipulation check. Specifically, rather than asking about the interpersonal justice of a single recalled event, participants were instructed to complete this scale by thinking about all of the interactions they have had with their supervisor from the beginning of their supervisor-subordinate relationship until the time of the survey. This measure, more so than the manipulation, captured a range of interpersonal exchanges, each likely varying in their levels of fairness. It was my hope that this would provide more potential for variance across the conditions created by my status moderators. The alpha coefficient of reliability for this scale was .95.
In addition to broadening the interpersonal justice measure, I also altered the instructions for reporting emotions. Rather than asking participants to report the emotions resulting from one particular incident, I instead requested that they report the extent to which they experienced each emotion in reaction to the interpersonal treatment they have received from their supervisor since the beginning of the supervisor-subordinate relationship. This method was based on the work of Barclay and Kiefer (2012), who broadly asked participants to rate the extent to which they experienced “emotions with respect to [their] job/work over the last six months”. I modified these instructions slightly to focus the participants’ attention toward the interpersonal exchanges they have had with their supervisors. Finally, in the supplemental analyses, whereas interpersonal justice and emotions were both measured at Time 2, the outcome variables were measured at Time 3 (approximately one week later), thereby reducing the likelihood of common method bias. I used the same moderator variables (collected at Time 1) that were used in my previous analyses. See Appendix C for the Time 3 survey.

After adding the 37 individuals from the experimental design who were unable to recall an interpersonal justice event, the new sample consisted of 427 participants. Means, standard deviations, reliabilities and correlations of the study variables can be found in Table 4.13. Interpersonal justice was significantly related to both negative emotions ($r = -.70, p < .01$) and positive emotions ($r = .66, p < .01$) in the hypothesized directions. Interpersonal justice was also positively and significantly related to the distal outcomes of supervisor satisfaction ($r = .71, p < .01$), supervisor relationship viability ($r = .67, p < .01$), organizational commitment ($r = .23, p < .01$), withdrawal ($r = -.15, p <
TABLE 4.13
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study Variables – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trait Negative Affect</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Trait Positive Affect</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-24**</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>-51**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Interpersonal Justice</td>
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<td>.19**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-16**</td>
<td>-70**</td>
<td>(.89)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>1.52</td>
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<td>.19**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-66**</td>
<td>-55**</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>-15**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>-63**</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Supervisor Relationship</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>-13**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td>-59**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.87**</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-16**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-19**</td>
<td>-19**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Withdrawal</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-26**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-15**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>-17**</td>
<td>-22**</td>
<td>-52**</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-37**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-34**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>-35**</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Personal Status</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>-36**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-23**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>(.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Workgroup Status</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Supervisor Status</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Justice Orientation</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>-25**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. n = 390. Reliability coefficients are reported along the diagonal. Event proximity was reported in number of weeks.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
.01), and job satisfaction ($r = .29, p < .01$). Negative emotions correlated with each distal outcome as follows: supervisor satisfaction ($r = -.63, p < .01$), supervisor relationship viability ($r = -.59, p < .01$), organizational commitment ($r = -.19, p < .01$), withdrawal ($r = .14, p < .01$), and job satisfaction ($r = -.34, p < .01$). Finally, positive emotions also demonstrated significant relationships with each outcome as follows: supervisor satisfaction ($r = .64, p < .01$), supervisor relationship viability ($r = .60, p < .01$), organizational commitment ($r = .19, p < .01$), withdrawal ($r = -.13, p < .01$), and job satisfaction ($r = .36, p < .01$).

Before testing my hypotheses, I first examined the factor structure of my model. Results of my CFA suggested that one of my outcome variables—supervisor trust—was too highly correlated with the other two supervisor-directed attitudes—supervisor satisfaction and supervisor relationship viability. I therefore removed supervisor trust from my model, which resulted in twelve latent factors (interpersonal justice, negative emotions, positive emotions, personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, justice orientation, supervisor satisfaction, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, job satisfaction). The Chi-squared statistic for the model was 8,861 ($df = 3,173$). The CFI (.81) for my model was lower than what is generally considered good fit (<.90; Mathieu et al., 2006; Medsker et al., 1994). Yet, the RMSEA (.065), a more appropriate gauge of fit for large-sample, confirmatory models (Rigdon, 1996), suggests that my factor structure demonstrated reasonable fit with the data. Furthermore, the fit of my factor structure was superior to that of several alternative models (See Table 4.14).
### TABLE 4.14
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\Delta\chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta$df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twelve factors: Hypothesized model (excluding supervisor trust)</td>
<td>8861</td>
<td>3173</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Supervisor satisfaction and supervisor relationship viability combined</td>
<td>9720</td>
<td>3184</td>
<td>859*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Personal status and job satisfaction combined</td>
<td>32933</td>
<td>3321</td>
<td>24072*</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Organizational commitment and withdrawal combined</td>
<td>11582</td>
<td>3203</td>
<td>2721</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven factors: Personal and workgroup status combined</td>
<td>10698</td>
<td>3184</td>
<td>1837*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten factors: Interpersonal justice, negative emotions, positive emotions combined</td>
<td>11519</td>
<td>3194</td>
<td>2658*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten factors: Personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status combined</td>
<td>12381</td>
<td>3194</td>
<td>3520*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine factors: All status variables combined and both supervisor-related variables combined</td>
<td>13237</td>
<td>3203</td>
<td>4376*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: CFI = Confirmatory Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. * p < .001.
FIGURE 4.3
Structural Equation Modeling Results for Nonexperimental Data

Note: Standardized coefficients provided. Nonsignificant results are dashed.
\( n = 427. \) ** \( p < .01, \) *** \( p < .001. \)
My structural model also fit the data reasonably well ($\chi^2[1,975] = 5,031.03, p < .001$, CFI = .89; RMSEA = .06). SEM results (See Figure 4.3) suggest that interpersonal justice had a significant negative relationship with negative emotions ($b = -.72, p < .001$), and a significant positive relationship with positive emotions ($b = .68, p < .001$). Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.

Negative emotions subsequently related negatively to supervisor satisfaction ($b = -.21, p < .001$), supervisor relationship viability ($b = -.28, p < .001$), and job satisfaction ($b = -.23, p < .01$). Negative emotions were not related to organizational commitment ($b = -.01, ns$) or withdrawal ($b = -.02, ns$). Likewise, positive emotions were positively linked to supervisor satisfaction ($b = .32, p < .001$), supervisor relationship viability ($b = .21, p < .001$), and job satisfaction ($b = .28, p < .001$). Positive emotions also did not relate significantly to organizational commitment ($b = .05, ns$) or withdrawal ($b = -.02, ns$).

I next set out to examine the significance of the indirect effects of interpersonal justice, through emotions, on supervisor satisfaction, supervisor relationship viability, and job satisfaction. To do so, I once again employed the procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008), with 5,000 iterations of bootstrapping. Results of these analyses can be found in Table 4.15. My mediation model fit the data reasonably well ($\chi^2[1,451] = 3,867.09, p < .001$; CFI = .89; RMSEA = .06). Results of the mediation analysis suggest that interpersonal justice has a significant indirect effect, through negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction ($b = .14, p < .01, CI = [.08, .25]$), supervisor relationship viability ($b = .19, p < .001, CI = [.09, .26]$), and job satisfaction.
(\(b = .10, p < .01, \text{CI} = [.03, .16]\)). Interpersonal justice also displayed significant indirect effects through positive emotions on supervisor satisfaction (\(b = .20, p < .001, \text{CI} = [.12, .27]\)), supervisor relationship viability (\(b = .14, p < .01, \text{CI} = [.08, .23]\)), and job satisfaction (\(b = .11, p < .001, \text{CI} = [.05, .15]\)). Because neither negative emotions nor positive emotions were significantly related to organizational commitment and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>95% C. I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[0.08, 0.25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[0.09, 0.26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[-0.08, 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[-0.07, 0.10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[0.03, 0.16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Emotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[0.12, 0.27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[0.08, 0.23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.11]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[-0.08, 0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>[0.03, 0.16]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 427. * \(p < .05\), ** \(p < .01\), *** \(p < .001\)*
withdrawal, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on these outcomes did not meet the necessary prerequisites for significant mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b were partially supported.

Again, in accordance with the recommendations of Aguinis (2004), I conducted an omnibus test of my two-way interactions. Moving from first-order effects to higher-order effects in my model resulted in a significant level of incremental variance explained for both negative emotions ($\Delta R^2 = .02, p < .05$) and for positive emotions ($\Delta R^2 = .10, p < .001$). Thus, I proceeded to independently test the significance of each two-way interaction.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that the relationships between interpersonal justice and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, are conditioned on the subordinate’s personal status. I again tested these hypotheses using moderated regression analyses, controlling for trait positive affect, trait negative affect, and social self-esteem. Results, shown in Table 4.16, suggest that a significant interaction does indeed exist between interpersonal justice and personal status when predicting negative emotions ($b = -.04, p < .05$). Contrary to expectations, results of the simple slope analyses suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions was stronger when personal status was high ($b = -.68, p < .001$) than when personal status was low ($b = -.54, p < .001$). Figure 4.4 illustrates the interaction. As demonstrated in Table 4.17, interpersonal justice also interacted with personal status to predict positive emotions ($b = .05, p < .05$). A visual representation of this interaction can be found in Figure 4.5.
### TABLE 4.16
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Negative Emotions – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Step 2</th>
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<th>Step 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>5.09***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.38***</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-16.78***</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-16.99***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| **F**                   | 15.06  | 163.78  | 168.39  |
| **F change**            | 15.06*** | 148.72*** | 4.62*   |
| **R^2**                 | 0.12   | 0.53    | 0.54    |
| **R^2 change**          | 0.12   | 0.41    | 0.01    |

*Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.*

*p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).*
TABLE 4.17
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
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<td>β</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>IPJ x Personal Status</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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F 5.44 125.37 131.50
F change 5.44** 119.93*** 6.13*
R² 0.05 0.44 0.45
R² change 0.05 0.45 0.01

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
FIGURE 4.4
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Negative Emotions

Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.

FIGURE 4.5
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on Positive Emotions

Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice.
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<td>5.11***</td>
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<td>-18.89***</td>
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<td>18.68***</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|            |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| F          | 16.06     |           |           |           | 194.60    |           |           |           | 194.64    |           |           |           |           |           |
| F change   | 16.06     |           |           |           | 178.54    |           |           |           | 0.05      |           |           |           |           |           |
| $R^2$      | 0.11      |           |           |           | 0.53      |           |           |           | 0.53      |           |           |           |           |           |
| $R^2$ change | 0.11 |           |           |           | 0.42      |           |           |           | 0.00      |           |           |           |           |           |

**Note.** $N = 427$. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup.

*p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
TABLE 4.19
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data

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<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
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<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG Status</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPJ x WG Status</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$\dagger p < .10$, $^* p < .05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Note. $N = 427$. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup.
Again, the relationship was stronger when personal status was high \( (b = .70, p < .001) \) than when personal status was low \( (b = .52, p < .001) \).

Hypotheses 4a and 4b posited that the relationship between interpersonal justice and emotions would be stronger for individuals in low-status workgroups than those in high-status workgroups. Moderated regression results suggest that workgroup status does not interact with interpersonal justice in predicting either negative emotions \( (b = .00, ns; \text{Table 4.18}) \) or positive emotions \( (b = .04, ns, \text{Table 4.19}) \). Thus, no support was found for hypotheses 4a and 4b.

Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that supervisor status would interact with interpersonal justice to predict emotions. Results of the moderated regression analysis (See Table 4.20) suggest that no significant interaction exists between interpersonal justice and supervisor status when predicting negative emotions \( (b = .02, ns) \). However, an interactive effect between interpersonal justice and supervisor status did emerge when predicting positive emotions \( (b = .05, p < .05; \text{Table 4.21}) \). I plotted the interaction in Figure 4.6. Simple slope analyses suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions is significant for both levels of supervisor status.

Consistent with expectations, the relationship is stronger for those reporting to high-status supervisors \( (b = .57, p < .001) \) than those reporting to low-status supervisors \( (b = .42, p < .001) \). Hypothesis 5a was therefore not supported, whereas Hypothesis 5b was.

Hypotheses 6a and 6b posited that justice orientation would also moderate the interpersonal justice-emotions relationships. Moderated regression results (See Tables 4.22 and 4.23) suggest that justice orientation did not interact with interpersonal justice
TABLE 4.20
Moderated regression analysis examining the interactive effect of interpersonal justice and supervisor status on negative emotions – Nonexperimental Data

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<th>Step 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.07***</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>5.08***</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.54</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-12.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-2.81**</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-2.46*</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-2.46*</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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</table>

F 17.49 176.68 177.91
F change 17.49*** 159.19*** 1.23
R² 0.14 0.57 0.57
R² change 0.14 0.43 0.00

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
Table 4.21
Moderated regression analysis examining the interactive effect of interpersonal justice and supervisor status on positive emotions – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
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<th>Step 3</th>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sup Status</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPJ x Sup Status</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| F                       | 5.28    | 148.87  | 153.93  |
| F change                | 5.28**  | 143.59***| 5.06*   |
| R²                      | 0.05    | 0.50    | 0.50    |
| R² change               | 0.05    | 0.45    | 0.01    |

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
to predict either negative emotions ($b = -0.03, ns$) or positive emotions ($b = 0.02, ns$). Thus, Hypotheses 6a and 6b were not supported.

I once again employed the procedures of Preacher and colleagues (2007) to test my moderated mediation hypotheses. As demonstrated in Table 4.24, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through negative emotions, was weakest at low levels of personal status ($b = 0.19, p < .001$), stronger at the mean level of personal status ($b = 0.22, p < .001$), and strongest at high levels of personal status ($b = 0.25, p < .001$). The indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor relationship viability was also weakest for low-status individuals ($b = 0.18, p < .001$), stronger for moderate levels of status ($b = 0.21, p < .001$), and strongest for high-status individuals ($b
TABLE 4.22
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on Negative Emotions – Nonexperimental Data

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***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
**TABLE 4.23**  
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data

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<td><strong>β</strong></td>
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<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
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<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
<td><strong>t</strong></td>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.33</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Self Esteem</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JO</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.30</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| F                        | 5.15   | 142.77***| 142.99   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| F change                 | 5.15** | 137.63   |          | 0.22     |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| R²                       | 0.04   | 0.44     | 0.44     |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| R² change                | 0.04   | 0.40     | 0.40     | 0.00     |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |

*Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. JO = Justice Orientation. **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).*
### TABLE 4.24
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on Outcome Variables, through Negative Emotions, at Different Levels of Personal Status – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Boot indirect effect</th>
<th>Boot SE</th>
<th>Boot Z</th>
<th>Boot p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditional indirect effect at Pers. Status = M, M ± 1 SD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.5460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.5454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.5460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.9579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.9579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.9579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.0206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.0196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: \(N = 427\). Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. Pers. = Personal.
TABLE 4.25  
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on  
Outcome Variables, through Positive Emotions, at Different Levels of Personal  
Status – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Boot indirect effect</th>
<th>Boot SE</th>
<th>Boot Z</th>
<th>Boot p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditional indirect effect at Pers. Status = M, M ± 1 SD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Relationship Viability</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.4864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.4848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.4860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.9523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.9522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.9522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


= .23, p < .001). A similar pattern was displayed for the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction, although these relationships were only marginally significant. The weakest effects were found in individuals with low-status (b = .022, p < .10),
stronger effects were found in individuals with status at the mean level \((b = .025, p < .10)\), and the strongest effects were found at high-status individuals \((b = .028, p < .10)\). The indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through positive emotions, also followed a similar pattern (See Table 4.25), with the weakest effects found in low-status individuals \((b = .17, p < .001)\), stronger effects at the mean-level of status \((b = .21, p < .001)\), and the strongest effects found in high-status individuals \((b = .24, p < .001)\). The indirect effect on supervisor relationship viability was also weakest for low-status individuals \((b = .16, p < .001)\), stronger for moderate-status individuals \((b = .19, p < .001)\), and strongest for high-status individuals \((b = .22, p < .001)\). Likewise, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction, through positive emotions, was weakest at low status levels \((b = .026, p < .01)\), stronger at the mean level of status \((b = .032, p < .01)\), and strongest at high levels of status \((b = .038, p < .01)\).

Supervisor status also played a moderating role on the indirect effects of interpersonal justice through positive emotions. Results of the moderated mediation analyses can be found in Table 4.26. As expected, the relationships were stronger when the supervisors had high status than when their status was low. The indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through positive emotions, was weakest for individuals reporting to supervisors with average status \((b = .13, p < .001)\), and strongest for individuals reporting to high-status supervisors \((b = .15, p < .001)\). Similarly, the indirect effect on supervisor relationship viability was weakest when the supervisor had low status \((b = .07, p < .01)\), stronger when the supervisor had moderate status \((b = .09, p < .01)\), and strongest when the supervisor had high status \((b = .11, p <\)
Likewise, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction was weakest at low status levels ($b = .028$, $p < .01$), stronger at the mean status level ($b = .033$, $p < .01$), and strongest at high status levels ($b = .039$, $p < .01$).

Because no significant interactions emerged between interpersonal justice and supervisor satisfaction when predicting negative emotions, the necessary prerequisites for moderated mediation were not met. Likewise this prerequisite was also not met for the moderating roles of either workgroup status or justice orientation on either of the interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships.
TABLE 4.26
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on Outcome Variables, through Positive Emotions, at Different Levels of Supervisor Status – Nonexperimental Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Boot indirect effect</th>
<th>Boot SE</th>
<th>Boot Z</th>
<th>Boot p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervisor Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervisor Relationship Viability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Commitment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.2944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.2910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.2933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Withdrawal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.5294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.5276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.5289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job Satisfaction</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 SD</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 SD</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 427. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. Sup. = Supervisor.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Chapter Summary

In the preceding chapters, I proposed and empirically examined a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and justice orientation. In the present chapter, I highlight the key contributions of this research. I begin with a general discussion of my findings, noting the emergence of both significant and non-significant relationships. Second, I offer several implications with regard to both theory and practice, along with potential directions for future scholars to extend the present work. I then point to a number of limitations in the methods used to test my theoretical model, and I conclude with general comments.

5.2 General Discussion

People place a great deal of value on the dignity and respect they receive from their supervisors. Fair interpersonal treatment is considered one of the most fundamental human rights (Folger & Bies, 1989; Miller, 2001; Rawls, 1971). It is not surprising, then, that interpersonal justice influences a number of critical workplace outcomes such as supervisor evaluations (Kernan & Hanges, 2002; Liao & Rupp, 2005), job satisfaction (Masterson et al., 2000), performance (Cropanzano et al., 2002) and absenteeism (Gellatly, 1995). Interpersonal justice has also been shown to have affective power, influencing a number of negative emotions in employees (Judge et al., 2006; Stecher & Rosse, 2005). In fact, scholars have claimed that interpersonal justice may be the most
emotion evoking of all the dimensions of justice (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Harlos & Pinder, 1999, 2000).

Previous research investigating the influence of interpersonal justice on emotions has been informative. Yet, this research has, to this point, focused exclusively on negative emotional reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. It has yet to uncover the potential positive affective reactions that may be triggered. Furthermore, this research has generally assumed a common relationship between interpersonal justice and emotions across all employees (for one exception using trait hostility as a moderator, see Judge et al., 2006). Scholars have yet to theorize potential differences in the strength of these relationships across groups of employees varying in status and justice orientation. The present work attempts to fill these voids, thereby enhancing our understanding of the nuances of interpersonal justice.

This study aims to develop theory for (1) why interpersonal justice may influence both negative and positive emotions, (2) why both negative and positive emotions serve as explanatory mediating mechanisms linking interpersonal justice to important distal outcomes, and (3) why the strength of the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions may vary across groups of employees. To do so, I hypothesized that emotions (both positive and negative) explained the effects of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction. I also identified four potential stage 1 moderators. Specifically, I proposed that personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation would all condition the effects of interpersonal justice on
emotions. I then tested my model using a university-based military sample in which both interpersonal treatment and status are highly salient.

The combination of original (i.e., using experimental data) and supplemental (i.e., using non-experimental data) analyses resulted in several interesting findings. First, both sets of analyses demonstrated strong effects of interpersonal justice on both negative and positive emotions. Participants experienced strong emotional reactions both to a single critical incident of interpersonal justice and to a broader judgment of their supervisors’ interpersonal justice across time. Second, in both sets of analyses, positive and negative emotions mediated effects of interpersonal justice on a number of distal outcomes. Specifically, evidence emerged for the significant indirect effects of interpersonal justice, through negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction. Significant indirect effects also occurred from interpersonal justice, through positive emotions, to supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, and job satisfaction. It therefore appears that interpersonal justice influences distal attitudes toward the supervisor, the organization, and the job by first triggering both negative and positive proximal emotions, which subsequently impact such outcomes.

Finally, results also lend support for the notion that, when predicting emotions, interpersonal justice significantly interacts with three of the four hypothesized moderators. Specifically, results from the original analyses suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is conditioned by justice orientation...
in such a way that justice orientation strengthens the negative effect. Although none of the status variables demonstrated significant interactive effects in the original analyses, both personal and supervisor status moderated the effects on both positive and negative emotions in the supplemental analyses. Personal status moderated the effects on both positive and negative emotions, and supervisor status moderated the effect on positive emotions. The nature of the interactions suggests that both status moderators strengthened the effects of interpersonal justice. Participants therefore experienced stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal treatment with increases in personal status, supervisor status, and justice orientation.

As previously noted, it is believed that the overall lack of significant moderation in the original analyses was due to the extreme nature of the recalled critical incidents. When asked to think about one single interpersonal event, those in the unfair condition likely recalled the one situation in which their supervisors treated them with the lowest levels of dignity and respect, as these events should be the most salient. Conversely, those in the fair condition likely recalled the one incident in which their supervisors treated them with the highest levels of dignity and respect. This view is supported by the large difference in manipulation check ratings between the unfair ($M = 3.03$) and fair ($M = 6.54$) conditions. If my logic is correct, then the extremity of the recalled events was sufficient to influence strong emotional reactions for all participants, regardless of status, thereby making it difficult to detect moderating effects.

Workgroup status did not moderate the effects of interpersonal justice on either negative or positive emotions. Despite research in both the group identification (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986) and group value model (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, et al., 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992) literatures noting that people identify with their groups to the extent that these groups become a part of their self-concepts, perhaps participants did not internalize their outfit’s status to a great enough extent to sufficiently influence emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Or, at the very least, perhaps this internalization was not as strong as that of their perceived personal status, making it comparatively more difficult to detect moderation. It is also possible that the outfits were too large (n ~ 60) to truly identify with all the other members and the group as a whole. For example, group size has been shown to have a significant influence on group cohesion, with smaller groups reporting more cohesiveness than large groups (Carron & Spink, 1995; Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1990). If this is the case, it is quite possible that a lower-level grouping (e.g., platoon, team) may be more appropriate to test the moderating effects of group status on the interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships.

Taken together, my results suggest that interpersonal justice triggers emotional responses (both negative and positive), that these emotions subsequently influence important attitudes directed at the supervisor, the organization, and the job, and that the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions are conditioned by personal status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. I now highlight a number of theoretical implications of these findings and offer potential avenues for scholars to extend these findings in future research.
5.3 Theoretical Implications

In this dissertation, I contribute theoretically to the management literature in three primary ways. First, the primary contribution of the present work is the extension of organizational justice theory. Cohen-Charash and Byrne (2008) recently noted the need for further investigation into the role emotions play in the experience of interpersonal justice. Although research has linked interpersonal justice to a small number of negative emotions (Judge et al., 2006; Turillo et al., 2002), a relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions has yet to emerge in the literature. This paucity of research on positive emotions in the organizational justice literature, and interpersonal justice literature in particular, reflects the broader study of emotions across all fields, which has largely been dominated by the examination of negative emotions (Fredrickson, 2004). Of course, this is not overly surprising, as psychologists have traditionally been more fascinated by the study of psychological problems and their associated dangers to society than with the study of positive attributes (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The study of interpersonal justice has been no different. Scholars have argued that we have more to gain by examining unfair treatment than fair treatment (Bies, 2001). Indeed, low justice marks a violation of a generally accepted standard and therefore is more likely to trigger a response than high justice, which merely marks the presence of a met expectation (Cahn, 1949). Support for this notion can be found in a study by Miner, Glomb, and Hulin (2005). Although, they measured mood rather than emotions, these authors found that the impact of negative events on employee affect was five times stronger than the impact of positive events.
Yet, despite the reasoning that negative effects of fairness judgments may be more compelling, the examination of positive emotions may also prove beneficial to justice researchers. Indeed, positive affect has been linked to a wide variety of desirable outcomes including: creativity (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), job performance (Staw et al., 1994), job satisfaction (Fisher, 2000), and both psychological and physical well-being (Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004) to name a few. Thus, the benefits of identifying additional antecedents to positive affect are far-reaching. Furthermore, recent justice scholars have called for the simultaneous examination of both negative and positive reactions to fairness judgments, as doing so may help detect differential effects of such emotions on distal outcomes (Barclay & Kiefer, 2012). Results of the present study suggest that, in addition to influencing negative emotions, interpersonal justice also triggers positive emotions in a strong way. Further, both positive and negative emotions served mediating roles in relationships between interpersonal justice and a number of important distal outcomes. Thus, in addition to identifying interpersonal justice as an antecedent to positive affect in the workplace, the present work also uses emotions to help explain why interpersonal justice has such a profound impact on distal attitudes toward the supervisor, job, and organization.

The literature on interpersonal justice suggests that it may be more interesting to study the dark side of interpersonal justice (Bies, 2001) than it is to study the bright side. Support for this contention can be found in the present study, as negative emotions explained more interpersonal justice effects than did positive emotions. Furthermore, results of a post-hoc analysis, in which I separately viewed the correlations between
emotions and my dependent variables in both high and low interpersonal justice conditions, suggest that emotions have a stronger relationship with distal outcomes in the following a negative event than following a positive event. For example, negative emotions were related to supervisor evaluations (average effect size of supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, and supervisor relationship viability) to a greater extent in the unfair condition ($\bar{r} = .59$), following a negative event, than in the fair condition ($\bar{r} = .50$), following a positive event. With regard to positive emotions, the relationship with supervisor evaluations was only slightly weaker in the unfair condition ($\bar{r} = .34$) than in the fair condition ($\bar{r} = .36$). These findings support previous research suggesting that people are better able to recall negative events, and these negative events further have a stronger impact on them than events that are deemed positive (Dasborough, 2006). It therefore seems likely that the negative emotions stemming from negative events may be more readily available than positive emotions when deriving attitudes such as supervisor evaluations (cf. Miner et al., 2005).

Yet, despite the findings that negative events have stronger effects than positive events, results of the present study demonstrate that fair interpersonal treatment may also be meaningful to one’s workplace experience. Indeed, interpersonal justice was positively related to positive emotions, which subsequently influenced important distal outcomes. Thus, although negative events may trigger stronger emotional reactions, and have a greater distal effect on workplace outcomes than positive events, the study of high interpersonal justice also appears to have substantial merit, as fair interpersonal
treatment has implications for positive emotional experiences and important workplace attitudes.

Furthermore, the study of positive emotions also informs the literature on motivation. The traditional views of motivation (e.g., Herzberg, 1966) would suggest that supervisory practices act as hygiene factors that are extrinsic to the subordinate rather than serving as intrinsic motivators. Yet, the present work suggests that a supervisor’s behavior, namely his or her interpersonal treatment toward a subordinate, has a positive intrinsic influence on the subordinate through the activation of positive emotions. This finding aligns well with views of supervisors as transformational leaders (Bass, 1985; 1996) that trigger internal feelings of trust, admiration, and respect toward the supervisors. These feelings subsequently motivate subordinates to do more than they otherwise would without the influence of the supervisor. Future scholars should explicitly examine the influence of interpersonal justice on a subordinate’s level of intrinsic emotions.

Emotions are critical components to the experience of justice, and scholars have made important steps toward understanding exactly what roles they play (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). Yet, there is a great deal of opportunity for further extension, particularly with regard to interpersonal justice. The present work examined the effects of interpersonal justice on a small handful of emotions. Future scholars may find it beneficial to investigate the potential effects of interpersonal justice on a much wider collection of emotions. Similarly, a more diverse set of distal outcomes may also generate interesting results. With the exception of withdrawal, which captured
behavioral intent, all other outcome variables used in this dissertation were attitudes. Scholars should also examine emotions as potential mediators of interpersonal justice effects on actual behaviors. To this point, this avenue has been relatively untapped in the literature (for one exception using hostility to link interpersonal justice to deviant behavior, see Judge et al., 2006). It would also be interesting to isolate the effects on each discrete emotion, rather than aggregating them together, as has typically been done in the justice literature. Weiss and colleagues (1999: 787) propose that “ignoring discrete emotions in favor of general positive or negative affective states can reduce the ability to predict specific behaviors”.

The present study also draws from the status literature to extend our understanding of interpersonal justice. In doing so, I answer recent calls for further examination of the roles of status both within the broad field of management (Pearce, 2011a) and, more specifically, within the realm of organizational justice (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2010). Results suggest that status interacts with interpersonal justice to predict both positive and negative emotions. Moreover, two distinct types of status—personal status and supervisor status—moderated these relationships.

Of particular interest in the present study is the use of perceptual status variables. Research has found that objective status (i.e., hierarchical position and race) moderates the effects of interpersonal justice on deviant behavior (Aquino et al., 2004). Yet, to this point, no interpersonal justice studies have tapped into the cognitive components of status. Without this knowledge, we can only speculate as to why people in particular positions of status react to stimuli in different ways. This dissertation attempts to shine
some light on the issue by asking participants to rate the extent to which they are given status, regard, prestige, and respect from their colleagues. Results of the present research suggest that interpersonal justice influences emotions to a stronger degree in participants who perceive that they are given high status by others than in participants who perceive that they are given low status. Results also demonstrate that the perceived status of the supervisor, as the deliverer of the interpersonal justice, also impacts the effect of that treatment on emotions. Specifically, the relationship is stronger when the subordinate perceives that the supervisor is afforded high levels of status, regard, prestige, and respect by the group than when the supervisor is perceived to have low levels. This finding corresponds to a well-established notion in sociology known as ‘the Thomas theorem’, which states that “if men define situations as real, they are real in consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 572). In other words, perception is reality. Thus, according to the theorem, if people perceive that they (or their supervisors) have high status, they are likely to think and behave in a manner that reflects this perception. In support of the Thomas theorem, research has demonstrated that people are generally quite accurate in perceiving their status, as their perceptions correlate highly with the perceptions others have of them (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). These findings lend further support to the utilization of perceived status.

Status presents a wealth of opportunities for future extensions within the interpersonal justice literature. First, although I examined status as a moderator of interpersonal justice effects in this study, status may also play a causal role in the generation of interpersonal justice judgments. According to Van Prooijen and colleagues
“people have mental representations of the concepts of status and fairness and that there is a cognitive link, or mental association between these representations, such that representations of status affect representations of fairness”. Although there have, to this point, been no studies examining the influence of status on interpersonal justice judgments, Fiddick and Cummins (2001) provide preliminary evidence that such effects may exist. In an experimental study that manipulated status, these authors found that high-status individuals perceive that they were treated more fairly by other participants than did their low-status counterparts. It, therefore, seems plausible that high-status employees may rate their supervisors significantly higher on interpersonal justice than would their low-status counterparts. Second, status may also serve as an outcome to interpersonal justice. As suggested by the relational model of justice, interpersonal treatment by a supervisor influences employees’ perceptions of how they are viewed by others in the group (Ferris et al., in press; Tyler, 1989). Thus, it is likely that status plays a much more complicated role in the experience of interpersonal justice than what has been uncovered in this dissertation. It may be that (1) interpersonal justice influences one’s perceived standing in a group, (2) this standing reciprocally influences one’s perceptions of interpersonal justice, and (3) the strength of one’s reactions to interpersonal justice will further be influenced by this standing. Future scholars are invited to test these possibilities simultaneously in a more complex model of interpersonal justice and status.

This dissertation also contributes to the literatures on status and emotions by integrating the two. The power-status theory of emotions (Kemper, 2006) suggests that
many emotions emerge as a result of people’s status relative to that of their social exchange partners. People can view their relative status as adequate, excessive, or insufficient. When status is adequate, people are likely to experience positive emotions such as contentment or happiness. Perceptions that status is excessive may trigger feelings of guilt or embarrassment. When status is insufficient, people may feel angry or sad. According to the theory, perceived status can fluctuate following social exchanges. If, for example, an individual is mistreated by his/her exchange partner, the individual’s perceived status may decrease, potentially triggering a number of negative emotions. Conversely, if the same individual receives a compliment from his/her exchange partner, the individual’s perceived status may increase. This increase is likely to result in emotions such as happiness, if the increase in status was warranted, or potentially even embarrassment if the individual feels unworthy of the compliment. The power-status theory of emotions therefore predicts that interpersonal justice has the potential to increase or decrease a subordinate’s perceived status and subsequently trigger emotions based on whether the new level of status is adequate, excessive, or insufficient. Future scholars may find it fruitful to test a longitudinal model of interpersonal justice, status, and emotions to determine if interpersonal justice does indeed influence status over time, and whether the emotional responses are a result of one’s perception of the adequacy of the changed status.

Perhaps the most compelling finding of this dissertation was the moderating influences of personal status on interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships. Although a significant interaction between interpersonal justice and personal status did emerge, the
nature of the moderation was in the opposite direction to what I hypothesized. Despite my theoretical framework, which was grounded in self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973), this finding directly supports self-verification theory (Swann, 1983). As previously discussed, the tenets of self-verification theory make predictions that directly conflict with those of self-enhancement theory. According to self-enhancement theory, low-status employees should react more strongly to interpersonal justice, because they are in greater need of self-enhancing information than high-status employees. Conversely, self-verification theory proposes that high-status employees will react more strongly, because they feel they deserve more respectful treatment to verify their already high self-worth, relative to low-status employees. Even more perplexing is the strong empirical support for both theories. Within the field of organizational justice, scholars have found that both high-status employees (Weisenfeld et al., 2007) and low-status employees (Aquino et al., 2004, De Cremer, 2003) have reacted significantly more strongly to fairness judgments in different studies. In the present study, high-status participants reacted more strongly than low-status participants, supporting self-verification theory. Further, participants reporting to high-status supervisors experienced significantly stronger emotional responses to interpersonal justice than those reporting to low-status supervisors. This may lend support to self-enhancement theory, as a more credible supervisor is likely to provide more self-enhancing information from the interpersonal treatment than a less credible supervisor. Yet, this finding may also support self-verification theory, as participants reporting to high-status supervisors may feel a greater sense of deservingness than those reporting to low-status supervisors. Although
there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding which motives are driving reactions to interpersonal justice, what is clear is that the self-concept plays a central role in these responses. Future scholars can help clarify these issues by measuring the psychological processes involved. Explicitly examining the competing motives of self-enhancement and self-verification motives would likely be very informative for the justice literature.

Finally, the present study also extends the literature on justice orientation. Results suggest that justice orientation demonstrated a significant interaction with interpersonal justice. Whereas research has demonstrated the interactive effects of these two variables on outcomes such as organizational satisfaction and commitment (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp et al., 2003), this is the first study that has examined its ability to predict emotions. Participants who rated themselves as high on justice orientation experienced significantly stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice than those who rated themselves as low on justice orientation. Although no significant interaction emerged when predicting positive emotions, the interactive effect on negative emotions suggests that justice orientation may be useful in investigating outcomes that are more proximal than the distal attitudes examined in previous studies.

5.4 Practical Implications

Practically, results of the present research suggest that organizations concerned with improving attitudes directed at the supervisor, organization, and job may benefit from increasing the level of positive emotions, and decreasing the level of negative emotions, in their employees. According to AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), this may be accomplished by focusing on the events which trigger such emotions. In particular,
the results suggest that increasing the positive (and decreasing the negative) emotions experienced by a company’s workforce may be as simple as treating employees with heightened levels of dignity and respect. Given the critical role played by supervisors in such treatment, corporations may be wise to enhance sensitivity training for employees with direct reports. It may also be beneficial to place an increased emphasis on employees’ previous record of interpersonal exchanges with others before selecting them for promotion to a supervisory level.

Results also suggest that interpersonal justice, while important to all employees, may be even more critical to those who possess high levels of perceived status. Thus, whereas supervisors should certainly treat all employees with dignity and respect, they may be wise to take extra care when communicating with their high-status subordinates. The greatest challenge, of course, is identifying those employees who possess high levels of perceived status. As noted by Simmel (1908), “the first condition of having to deal with somebody at all is to know with whom one has to deal” (quoted from Wolff, 1950: 307). One option supervisors have for identifying differences in status is noting characteristics that are indicative of status. According to status characteristics theory (Anderson, Berger, Cohen, Zelditch, 1966), status is influenced by any number of characteristics, including, but not limited to, gender, race, and attractiveness. In the workplace, additional characteristics such as organizational tenure, educational attainment, title, salary, quality/location of office/cubicle/desk may influence how an employee is viewed by others. Furthermore, those employees who consistently perform at high levels may also enjoy high status in the organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Thus, by simply observing the characteristics (both demographic and professional) that symbolize status, supervisors may be able to detect those employees who require heightened levels of interpersonal justice.

The same can be said about identifying high-status supervisors. Results suggest that interpersonal treatment may be more meaningful if it is delivered by high-status supervisors, relative to treatment delivered by low-status supervisors. Again, whereas all supervisors should be trained to deliver high levels of dignity and respect to their subordinates, organizations may benefit from providing additional sensitivity training to those supervisors who enjoy high status in the organization. Companies may find success in noting the aforementioned status characteristics when selecting supervisors for this additional training.

In addition to basing status ratings on demographic and professional characteristics, organizations may also choose to simply ask employees about their social standing in the company. Because the present study found that interpersonal justice effects differed based on perceived status, organizations may benefit from surveying their employees with regard to how they are viewed by others. Furthermore, while inquiring about the perceived status of their employees, companies should also include a measure of justice orientation in the survey, as the present results suggest that the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions is strengthened by the awareness of justice events and the belief that justice is a moral virtue.
5.5 Limitations

As is the case for all scientific research, the present study is not without limitations. Perhaps most notable is my inability to conclude that self-reflective motives serve as the driving mechanism for my moderation results. Although my findings do align well with both self-verification and self-enhancement theories, I did not explicitly measure either self-reflective motive. It is therefore possible that these findings were driven by other factors. For example, ratings of perceived personal status were highly correlated with participants’ academic classifications (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior; $r = .55, p < .01$). Thus, participants who hold the highest perceived personal status tend to be the most senior cadets in the Corps. It is possible that longer tenure in the Corps caused participants to gradually become ‘fed up’ with their superiors’ interpersonal treatment over time, thereby strengthening their reactions to such treatment. Future scholars should not only empirically capture the self-reflective motives that make up the foundation of the present study’s theoretical framework, but they should also rule out a number of other potential competing factors that may be driving the results.

Next, the sample from which my data were collected was a university-based military organization. The generalizability of my findings can only be supported with future research examining my model in more traditional work settings. Indeed, military institutions possess clear distinctions from what might be considered a typical workplace. For example, the Corps places a great deal of time and effort into physical training and the study of military tactics, two aspects that are not of focal importance in
most non-military jobs. Further, the demographic composition of the Corps also differs from the general population. For instance, the 49% minorities and 11% females are substantially different from the national averages of 36% and 50.8%, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Given that prior justice research has used both race and gender as proxies for status (Aquino et al., 2004), it would be quite interesting to see a replication of this study in a more demographically diverse sample. Despite these distinctions, military organizations also possess important similarities to business organizations. For example, a highly structured hierarchy of authority is a military staple. Supervisor-subordinate relationships are quite salient and meaningful, and cadets are well aware of their social standing, thereby enhancing the saliency of status. Also, it is important to note that military settings have been effective contexts for studying justice effects in previous research (Brennan & Skarlicki, 2004; Cole et al., 2010; Tepper & Taylor, 2003).

Another potential limitation is the possibility of nonessential multicollinearity among some of my study variables. Multicollinearity generally refers to the high correlation among independent variables (Cohen et al., 2003). However, in mediation models, multicollinearity can also occur when the correlation between an independent variable and a mediator is excessively high (Baron & Kenny, 1986). When multicollinearity exists, regression coefficients possess very little unique information (i.e., enlarged standard errors), resulting in unreliable estimates. Based on the high intercorrelations between interpersonal justice and both emotion mediators, multicollinearity may be a potential concern in my data. For instance, in my
experimental data (Table 4.1), interpersonal justice had a correlation of -.72 with negative emotions and .78 with positive emotions. In my nonexperimental data (Table 4.13), these correlations dropped to -.70 and .66 respectively. It is clear that multicollinearity exists. In fact, according to Kenny (2013), “multicollinearity is to be expected in a mediational analysis and it cannot be avoided.” The question, then, is whether or not this multicollinearity is excessive. As the path from the independent variable and mediator (path \(a\)) strengthens, the power to detect significance in the path between the mediator and dependent variable (path \(b\)) is reduced (Kenny, 2013). At the extreme, if perfect collinearity existed between the independent variable and mediator (i.e., \(r = 1.0\)), there would be no unique variance for the mediator to predict the dependent variable, making it impossible for a significant indirect effect to exist. My results suggest that significant indirect relationships do exist between interpersonal justice and several outcome variables, through both positive and negative emotions. The estimate for path \(a\) was therefore not sufficiently large to eliminate the significance of path \(b\), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major concern in my data. To lend further support for this claim, I conducted a CFA for my nonexperimental data, in which I combined all three latent variables (i.e., interpersonal justice, negative emotions, and positive emotions) into one factor. Collapsing these three variables resulted in a reduction of fit (\(\chi^2[3,194] = 11,519 \ p < .001; \ CFI = .72, \ RMSEA = .08\)), suggesting that these three variables are distinct constructs.

Additionally, all data were collected via self-report measures, thus presenting the potential for common-method bias. Despite this possibility, my CFA results suggest that
discriminant validity exists among study variables. I also provided temporal separation between variables, as recommended by Podsakoff and colleagues (2003). For example, at Time 1, I collected only my moderators and control variables. In my experimental design, I collected my mediators and dependent variables cross-sectionally immediately following my Time 2 manipulation. Yet, many of these experimental results were replicated in my nonexperimental design, in which I provided temporal separation by capturing all outcome variables at Time 3.

5.6 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I theoretically developed and empirically tested a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and justice orientation. Although not every hypothesis in my model received support, many interesting findings emerged. For example, I found that, in addition to its ability to predict negative emotions, interpersonal justice can also trigger positive feelings in subordinates. Perhaps, then, high levels of interpersonal justice does more than simply meet expectations, as such behavior is unlikely to result in the strong positive emotional responses demonstrated in this study. Furthermore, I found that the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions are conditioned by a number of moderators, including personal status, supervisor status, and justice orientation.

The hypotheses in my model were guided by two well-established theoretical frameworks: affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) and self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973). My results demonstrated strong support for the tenets of AET. Interpersonal justice triggered emotions, which subsequently influenced a number of
important attitudinal outcomes. However, the self-enhancement hypotheses received mixed results. Most notably was the interaction of personal status and interpersonal justice, which resulted in effects that were in the opposite direction of what I hypothesized. Interestingly, this finding appears to align well with a theory that directly conflicts with self-enhancement—self-verification theory (Swann, 1983).

Overall, the present work extends organizational justice theory by integrating literature on emotions, status, justice orientation, and the self-concept. It is my hope that this research will spark future studies linking these variables (and others) with a variety of phenomena pertinent to fairness in the workplace.
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APPENDIX A

SURVEY #1

(Scale titles and citations were not visible to participants)

Consent Document

[organization name] Attitudes & Perceptions Study

You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by [organization name] and a team of researchers from the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. The information in this form is provided to help you decide whether or not to take part. If you decide you do not want to participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits you normally would have.

Why Is This Study Being Done?
The purpose of this study is to understand the perceptions and attitudes of individuals in [organization name].

Why Am I Being Asked To Be In This Study?
You are being asked to be in this study because you are a member of [organization name].

How Many People Will Be Asked To Be In This Study?
Approximately 2,300 cadets will be invited to participate in this study locally.

What Are the Alternatives to being in this study?
No, the alternative to being in the study is not to participate.

What Will I Be Asked To Do In This Study?
You will be asked to complete three 30-minute online surveys over the course of the next few weeks.

Are There Any Risks To Me?
The things that you will be doing are no more risks than you would come across in everyday life. Although the researchers have tried to avoid risks, you may feel that some questions that are asked of you will be stressful or upsetting. You do not have to answer anything you do not want to.

Will There Be Any Costs To Me?
Aside from your time, there are no costs for taking part in the study.
Will I Be Paid To Be In This Study?
Upon completion of all three surveys, your name will be entered into a lottery to win one of fifteen new iPad 4’s (each valued at $499).

Will Information From This Study Be Kept Private?
The records of this study will be kept private. No identifiers linking you to this study will be included in any sort of report that might be published. Research records will be stored securely and only the Mays Business School research team will have access to them.

Information about you will be stored in computer files protected with a password.

Information about you will be kept confidential to the extent permitted or required by law. People who have access to your information include the Principal Investigator and research study personnel. Representatives of regulatory agencies such as the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) and entities such as the Texas A&M University Human Subjects Protection Program may access your records to make sure the study is being run correctly and that information is collected properly.

Who may I Contact for More Information?
You may contact the Principal Investigator, Adam Stoverink, to tell him about any concern or complaint about this research at 979-845-4851 or mgmtresearch@mays.tamu.edu.

For questions about your rights as a research participant; or if you have questions, complaints, or concerns about the research, you may call the Texas A&M University Human Subjects Protection Program office at (979) 458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu.

What if I Change My Mind About Participating?
This research is voluntary and you have the choice whether or not to be in this research study. You may decide to not begin or to stop participating at any time. If you choose not to be in this study or stop being in the study, there will be no effect on your student status or your relationships with either Texas A&M University or the [organization name].

By completing the surveys, you are giving permission for the investigator to use your information for research purposes.

Thank you
Introduction Page

Welcome to the [organization name] Attitudes & Perceptions Study!

This research is highly important to Texas A&M University, [organization name], and Mays Business School. We appreciate your careful attention to each question and your thoroughness in responding.

All parts of this questionnaire are important. Please read every question carefully and provide your response. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.

To make sure you read everything carefully, the system records time spent on questions, sections, and the overall completion time. It also has a number of features to detect random or careless responding. If the system determines that questions were not read carefully, your responses will be discarded and you will not be eligible for the iPad 4 drawing.

Also, please make sure you complete the entire questionnaire. You will need to reach the last screen with the following message "We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. Your response has been recorded."

As a final point, you will notice that several questions that are very similar are asked numerous times. While we recognize that this can be frustrating, please understand that it is necessary to achieve the objectives of the study.

Thank you for your participation! Again, your help is greatly appreciated!
**Perceived status (Diekmann et al., 2007)**

On the next few pages we will ask you questions about yourself. In particular, we are interested in how you are viewed by the other cadets in your outfit.

\( (1 = \text{strongly disagree}, \ 7 = \text{strongly agree}) \)

1. I am very highly regarded in my platoon.
2. I have a lot of status in my platoon.
3. I have a lot of prestige in my platoon.
4. I have a lot of respect in my platoon.

**Perceived workgroup status (Diekmann et al., 2007)**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding how your outfit is viewed by other outfits in the Corps.

\( (1 = \text{strongly disagree}, \ 7 = \text{strongly agree}) \)

1. My outfit is very highly regarded in the Corps.
2. My outfit has a lot of status in the Corps.
3. My outfit has a lot of prestige in the Corps.
4. My outfit has a lot of respect in the Corps.

**Perceived supervisor status (Diekmann et al., 2007)**

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding how your immediate superior is viewed by the cadets in your outfit.

\( (1 = \text{strongly disagree}, \ 7 = \text{strongly agree}) \)

1. My platoon leader is very highly regarded by my platoon.
2. My platoon leader has a lot of status in my platoon.
3. My platoon leader has a lot of prestige in my platoon.
4. My platoon leader has a lot of respect in my platoon.
Justice Orientation (Rupp et al., 2003)

Please read the statements below and rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement about yourself.

(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I wish I could make amends for every single injustice I have ever committed.
2. I rarely notice people being treated unfairly.
3. I hurt for people who are treated unfairly, whether I know them or not.
4. I have been in public situations where I have noticed strangers being treated unfairly.
5. When I observe or hear about people being treated unfairly, I tend to think about it for a long time.
6. Our nation needs to care less about success and more about justice.
7. People should care less about getting ahead and more about being fair.
8. I am prone to notice people being treated unfairly in public.
9. I think in terms of justice and fairness.
10. I see people treating each other unfairly all of the time.
11. No one is free as long as one person is oppressed.
12. I am conscious of issues of justice around me.
13. People are happier when they are fair to others.
14. I tend to notice even the smallest injustice.
15. It makes me sick to think about all of the injustice in the world.
16. All of us need to take responsibility when others are treated unfairly.

PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then indicate to what extent you typically feel this way in general, that is, on average.

(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

1. Interested
2. Distressed
3. Excited
4. Upset
5. Strong
6. Guilty
7. Scared
8. Hostile
9. Enthusiastic
10. Proud
11. Irritable
12. Alert
13. Ashamed
14. Inspired
15. Nervous
16. Determined
17. Attentive
18. Jittery
19. Active
20. Afraid

Social self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991)

We are interested in how you typically feel about yourself. Please respond to the following items about how you feel in general, that is on average, as a member of the Corps of Cadets.

(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.
2. I feel self-conscious.
3. I feel displeased with myself.
4. I am worried about what other people think of me.
5. I feel inferior to others at this moment.
6. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.
7. I am worried about looking foolish.
APPENDIX B

SURVEY #2

Introduction Page

In this survey, we are interested in better understanding the interpersonal exchanges between cadets and their leaders. We will therefore ask you about the interpersonal treatment you receive from your various leaders. Specifically, we will ask you about your immediate superior you identified in Survey #1.

As always, your responses will be completely anonymous. All responses will be summarized, and your personal information will be wiped from the database before any summary reports are created. Furthermore, your superiors' names will also be removed prior to creating the summary reports. We only ask for the superiors' names to allow us to link your ratings in this survey to your ratings in the previous survey. It's important that we ensure the same superiors are being rated across surveys.

As always, we ask that you please rate your superiors with complete honesty.
We would first like you to rate the interpersonal treatment you receive from your immediate superior (the person to whom you report directly). This should be the same person you listed as your immediate superior in Survey #1.

What is the name of your immediate superior? Please enter his/her First and Last names. (This name will only be used to link these ratings with your previous ratings. After linking the ratings, your superior's name will be removed from the database along with yours.)

**Immediate Superior Interpersonal Justice (Colquitt, 2001)**

The following items refer to your immediate superior (the person to whom you directly report).

Think about all of your interactions with your immediate superior since you arrived on campus in August.

In that time, to what extent...

(1 = to a small extent, 7 = to a large extent)

1. ...has your immediate superior treated you in a polite manner?
2. ...has your immediate superior treated you with dignity?
3. ...has your immediate superior treated you with respect?
4. ...has your immediate superior refrained from improper remarks or comments?
Now we are interested in understanding how the interpersonal treatment you have received from your immediate superior has made you feel emotionally. On the next five pages, we list a series of emotions. Please indicate the extent to which you have felt each emotion in reaction to the interpersonal treatment you have received from your immediate superior since you arrived on campus in August.

**Emotions**

Please indicate the extent to which you have experienced each of the following emotions in reaction to the interpersonal treatment you have received from your immediate superior since arriving on campus in August.

(Please read carefully, as some emotions are positive and some are negative.)

Angry
Irritated
Anxiety
Rage
Joy
Pleased
Happiness
Delight
Pride
Content
Aggravated
Agitated
Hostility
Agreeable
Bitter
Embarrassed
Deserving
Despair
Disappointed
Depressed
Disgusted

Fearful
Hope
Envious
Anger
Frustrated
Furious
Grateful
Happy
Contentment
Helpless
Hopeless
Pleasure
Infuriation
Insulted
Jealous
Joyful
Outraged

Delighted
Enraged
Pissed
Resentful
Sad
Satisfied
Mad
Shamed
Stressed
Displeased
Surprised
Sympathetic
At ease
Annoyed
Bored
Calm
Elated
Gloomy
Anxious
Cheerful

Confused
Discouraged
Energetic
Ecstatic
Frightened
Fatigued
Intimidated
Miserable
Relaxed
Interested
Distressed
Excited
Upset
Strong
Guilty
Scared
Hostile
Enthusiastic
Proud
Irritable
Alert
Ashamed
Inspired
Nervous
Determined
Attentive
Jittery
Active
Afraid

**Interpersonal Justice Manipulation**

In order to better understand the interpersonal interactions between cadets and their superiors, we would now like you to recall one particular incident in which your superior treated you with particularly **HIGH/LOW** levels of dignity, respect, and politeness.

Specifically, we are referring to the superior to whom you believe you can best rate on leadership skills & behaviors. For some of you, this is your immediate superior. For others, it is your 'alternate' superior. If you have trouble recalling a situation that meets this criteria perfectly, please just think of an incident that BEST meets this criteria.

Again, please be completely honest. Your name, and the name of your superior, will be wiped from the database prior to creating any summary reports.

Please enter the First and Last name of the superior to which you are referring.

Please take a minute to really think about the specific situation in which your superior treated you with particularly **HIGH/LOW** levels of dignity, respect, and politeness.

Once you have a specific situation in mind that meets these criteria, please use the space below to briefly describe the situation in a few sentences (e.g., What happened? How did you feel? etc.).
**Proximity to Interpersonal Justice Event**
Approximately how long ago did this situation occur? Please be as specific as possible (e.g., 2 weeks and 4 days ago).

**Manipulation Check (Interpersonal Justice; Colquitt, 2001)**

Please rate the treatment you received from your superior in the situation you just recalled:

In the situation you just recalled, to what extent...

*(1 = to a small extent, 7 = to a large extent)*

1. ...did your superior treat you in a polite manner?
2. ...did your superior treat you with dignity?
3. ...did your superior treat you with respect?
4. ...did your superior refrain from improper remarks or comments?

**Emotions (PANAS and Hypothesized emotions)**

Once again we would like you to rate your emotional experiences. This time, we are interested in the extent to which you experienced each emotion in reaction to the treatment you received from your superior during the situation you just recalled.

Angry
Irritated
Anxiety
Rage
Joy
Pleased
Happiness
Delight
Pride
Content
Aggravated
Agitated
Hostility
Agreeable
Bitter
Embarrassed
Deserving
Despair
Disappointed
Depressed
Disgusted

Fearful
Hope
Envious
Anger
Frustrated
Furious
Grateful
Happy
Contentment
Helpless
Hopeless
Pleasure
Infuriation
Insulted
Jealous
Joyful
Outraged

Delighted
Enraged
Pissed
Resentful
Sad
Satisfied
Mad
Shamed
Stressed
Displeased
Surprised
Sympathetic
At ease
Annoyed
Bored
Calm
Elated
Gloomy
Anxious
Cheerful

Confused
Discouraged
Energetic
Ecstatic
Frightened
Fatigued
Intimidated
Miserable
Relaxed

Interested
Distressed
Excited
Upset
Strong
Guilty
Scared
Hostile
Enthusiastic
Proud
Irritable
Alert
Ashamed
Inspired
Nervous
Determined
Attentive
Jittery
Active
Afraid
Superior Satisfaction (scenario; Brayfield & Rothe, 1951)

The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

At this very moment, I am enthusiastic about my superior.
Right now, I feel fairly satisfied with my superior.
At present, each minute with my superior seems like it will never end.
At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my superior.
Right now, I consider my superior rather unpleasant.

Superior Trust (scenario; Cook & Wall, 1980)

The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. My superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view.
2. I have a poor future unless I have a better superior.
3. If I got into difficulties in the Corps, I know my superior would try and help me out.
4. My superior can be trusted to make sensible decisions for my future.
5. I can trust my superior to lend me a hand if I needed it.
6. My superior seems to do an efficient job.
7. I feel quite confident that my superior will always treat me fairly.
8. My superior can be relied upon to do as he/she says he/she will do.
9. My superior would be quite prepared to gain advantage by deceiving me.

Superior Relationship Viability (Evans & Jarvis, 1986)

The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

1. I want to remain with my superior.
2. I don't care what happens to my superior.
3. If I could stop working with my superior now, I would.
4. I wish it were possible to stop working with my superior now.
5. If it were possible to move to another superior at this time, I would.
Job Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951)

What is your position in the Corps? If you have multiple positions, please choose the one with which you identify most (i.e., the position that is most important to you.) If you are a fish, please enter "fish".

The following statements are in reference to the position you entered above.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. My position seems like a hobby to me.
2. My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored.
3. It seems that other cadets would be more interested in their positions.
4. I consider my position rather unpleasant.
5. I enjoy my position more than my leisure time.
6. I am often bored with my position.
7. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present position.
8. Most of the time, I have to force myself to do the tasks related to my position.
9. I am satisfied with my position for the time being.
10. I feel that my position is no more interesting than other cadets could get.
11. I definitely dislike my position.
12. I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets.
13. Most days I am enthusiastic about my position.
14. Each day in my position seems like it will never end.
15. I like my position better than the average cadet does.
16. My position is pretty uninteresting.
17. I find real enjoyment in my position.
18. I am disappointed that I have this position.
Organizational Commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Vandenberghe et al., 2004)

The following items are in reference to the Corps. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the Corps.

(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I really feel a sense of belonging to the Corps.
2. I feel proud to be a cadet in the Corps.
3. The Corps means a lot to me.
4. I do NOT feel emotionally attached to the Corps.
5. I do NOT feel like “part of the family” in the Corps.
6. I do NOT feel a strong sense of belonging to the Corps.

Withdrawal (Kelloway et al., 1999)

The following items are in reference to the Corps. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (If you are on the Corps Staff or a Major Unit Staff, you can skip the outfit-related items at the bottom)

(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I am thinking about leaving the Corps.
2. I am planning to look for something to do with my time other than the Corps.
3. I intend to ask people about new opportunities outside the Corps.
4. I don’t plan to complete my four years in the Corps.
APPENDIX C
SURVEY #3

On the next few pages, we will ask you to rate your immediate superior (the person to whom you report directly). Your superior's name will only be used to link these ratings with ratings from your previous surveys. Names will be wiped from the database prior to creating our summary reports.

What is the first and last name of your immediate superior?

Immediate Superior Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951)

The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom you directly report). Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

1. At this very moment, I am enthusiastic about my immediate superior.
2. Right now, I feel fairly satisfied with my immediate superior.
3. At present, each minute with my immediate superior seems like it will never end.
4. At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my immediate superior.
5. Right now, I consider my immediate superior rather unpleasant.

Immediate Superior Trust (Cook & Wall, 1980)

The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom you directly report).

(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

1. My immediate superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view.
2. I have a poor future unless I have a better immediate superior.
3. If I got into difficulties in the Corps, I know my immediate superior would try and help me out.
4. My immediate superior can be trusted to make sensible decisions for my future.
5. I can trust my immediate superior to lend me a hand if I needed it.
6. My immediate superior seems to do an efficient job.
7. I feel quite confident that my immediate superior will always treat me fairly.
8. My immediate superior can be relied upon to do as he/she says he/she will do.
9. My immediate superior would be quite prepared to gain advantage by deceiving me.
Immediate Superior Relationship Viability (Evans & Jarvis, 1986)

The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom you directly report).

\( (1=\text{strongly disagree}, 7=\text{strongly agree}) \)

1. I want to remain with my immediate superior.
2. I don't care what happens to my immediate superior.
3. If I could stop working with my immediate superior now, I would.
4. I wish it were possible to stop working with my immediate superior now.
5. If it were possible to move to another superior at this time, I would.

Job Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951)

What is your position in the Corps? If you have multiple positions, please choose the one with which you identify most (i.e., the position that is most important to you.) If you are a fish, please enter "fish".

The following statements are in reference to the position you entered above.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

\( (1=\text{strongly disagree}, 7=\text{strongly agree}) \)

1. My position seems like a hobby to me.
2. My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored.
3. It seems that other cadets would be more interested in their positions.
4. I consider my position rather unpleasant.
5. I enjoy my position more than my leisure time.
6. I am often bored with my position.
7. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present position.
8. Most of the time, I have to force myself to do the tasks related to my position.
9. I am satisfied with my position for the time being.
10. I feel that my position is no more interesting than other cadets could get.
11. I definitely dislike my position.
12. I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets.
13. Most days I am enthusiastic about my position.
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15. I like my position better than the average cadet does.
16. My position is pretty uninteresting.
17. I find real enjoyment in my position.
18. I am disappointed that I have this position.

**Organizational Commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Vandenberghe et al., 2004)**

The following items are in reference to the Corps.

*(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)*

1. I really feel a sense of belonging to the Corps.
2. I feel proud to be a cadet in the Corps.
3. The Corps means a lot to me.
4. I do NOT feel emotionally attached to the Corps.
5. I do NOT feel like “part of the family” in the Corps.
6. I do NOT feel a strong sense of belonging to the Corps.

**Withdrawal (Kelloway et al., 1999)**

The following items are in reference to the Corps. (If you are on the Corps Staff or a Major Unit Staff, you can skip the outfit-related items at the bottom)

*(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)*

1. I am thinking about leaving the Corps.
2. I am planning to look for something to do with my time other than the Corps.
3. I intend to ask people about new opportunities outside the Corps.
4. I don’t plan to complete my four years in the Corps.