FAIR WEATHER FRIENDS OR PILLARS OF SUPPORT: ASSESSING THE SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY OF EU GOVERNANCE AMONG THE PUBLIC ACROSS EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

Fair Weather Friends or Pillars of Support:

Assessing the Sources of Legitimacy of EU Governance Among the Public Across Europe.

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Out of the current sovereign debt crisis, the continuing debate over the proper role and responsibility of national institutions and priorities shaping the European Union’s response to the current fiscal and economic crisis flowing from the global “Great Recession”, is a growing concern for policy makers and scholars alike regarding the legitimacy of the EU. The fear many hold is that the trust in the EU governance system has been seriously compromised in the eyes of the public across Europe. To many, it seems evident that the more the EU and European-level institutions struggle to navigate turbulent waters of the European financial crisis, the more the legal authority of the EU itself comes into question as both a legitimate and effective tool for easing the public’s anxiety over the present and future course of well-being. Manifestations of this include civil disturbances, electoral shifts among voters, government collapses, and most
dramatically, demonstrations of anti-system actors and strident and often virulent populist
erpressions by nationalist political parties on the fringes of European nation-states. Often
overlooked in the contemporary analysis of these turbulent, somewhat confusing, and very
challenging times is a fundamental question: Is what appears on the surface to be a growing and
clearly apparent erosion of the legitimacy of the European Union as both an appropriate and
effective steward of public security and prosperity something genuine and real, or is the
legitimacy of the EU as a governance system actually secure and largely intact despite surface
disturbances growing out of the frustrations and disappointments of policy?

The question is far more than rhetorical. If the EU governance system is a normal regime,
understood in its basic sense, then it can and will absorb the expressions of discontent that color
all stable and legitimate democratic regimes in times of unusual economic and social stress. It
will confront such challenges as come with global financial shocks, banking system failures,
austerity cuts to public welfare, and the shifting tides of partisan support across the nation-state
polities within its domain of authority, and still enjoy a reasonably stable reservoir of legitimacy
in the public’s opinion.

This paper holds that the legitimacy of the EU rests fundamentally on a public belief in the trust
extended by the public to the institutions and broader EU governance system as a means of
managing European social conflict and economic prosperity. However, in developing an
empirical assessment of this proposition, we note important qualifications to the primary model
connecting public expressions of trust in the EU to perceived economic conditions at both the EU and nation-state level. We segment the EU public into (1) “elites” and “non-elites” based on vocational status, (2) control for the public’s emotional symbolic resonance with the EU, and (3) the “left-right” political ideology across the EU public. We expect that these filtering mechanisms – occupational status, emotional attachment, and political ideology -- have significant implications for conflict management and resolution which will challenge both national and EU-level political leadership. The study compares Eurobarometer data for two cross-sectional time points, 2006 and 2009, a particularly difficult and challenging period of time for the EU and its institutions and policy-making devices. Following the analysis, we discuss the implications which these findings offer for the future specifically of European-level, and more generally, democratic governance.

This paper will also provide necessary context to the challenges to European governance through the use of in-depth interviews of European experts and EU policy makers. This small, open-ended data base will supplement the Eurobarometer survey data to provide perspective on the contours of legitimacy across the landscape of European public opinion.
DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my family, who has taught me that the world is my playground. I just need to go, explore and have some fun but always remember that I am a life-long learner.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my mother, Dagmar El. Stark-Bastin, for teaching me what it means to be strong in a maze, that we call our world. For showing me what it means to be more giving than possible. Mami Mami would be proud.

I would like to thank my father, Dale L. Bastin, for teaching me how to be the best kind of leader, kind, patient, passionate. For showing me what it means to never give up.

I would like to thank my sister, Scarlett S. Bastin, for teaching me how to be a role model and to feel like I am on top of the world.

I would like to thank my brother, Stirling S. Bastin, for teaching me to never forget how to laugh or smile, and to realize there is always a positive side in any situation.

I would like to thank Dr. John Robertson for his constant support and patience so that I may be a better academic.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On March 19th, 2012 the world was taken aback by acts that had not been seen in France since the 1980s – the killing of school children and a Jewish Rabbi. It became clear: anti-Semitism remains alive, mainly from its own citizens: French stemming from former colonies who are predominantly Muslims. Episodes and examples of this “anti-system” protest are increasingly common in Europe. While on the one hand these are social challenges to the nation-state in Europe growing from historical animosities and jealousies in the nation-state itself, it is increasingly apparent to many that the growth in these protests and populist political parties is a function of the very success of the EU itself – or at least, partial success.

This example underscores what many argue is a rise in populist groups within the various EU member-states resulting from European financial crisis. Declining economic circumstances is usually one of the biggest suspects associated with rising tides of political anxiety as losers look for enemies, and winners in the process become targets of accusations. So the underlying question remains: in the face of this ongoing challenging governance crisis for the EU, can we know if the necessary support for the EU is firmly holding among the core public, or is there
evidence of unraveling not merely among more extremist or populist sectors of the publics across the EU but among the mainstream of the general public?

**Legitimacy of the EU in the context of globalism**

Legitimacy is a challenge to any governing system. It requires government not merely act effectively to balance the various narrow interests of its citizenry, but simultaneously do so in a manner that enhances the community of interests, as well. It further requires that the governance process itself comport with a set of norms and values deemed to be consistent with the culture of the community deferring to the decisions and choices of the governing. The European Union governing system presents a special case, for it is neither a constitutionally based system, yet it possesses much of the authority and resources of a legitimate governance system associated with a large, federal, nation-state. The legitimacy of its governing system cannot be found in a specific founding act reflecting the will of a people or public who have opted for the system after consideration, and a public referred on the choice. Rather, its legitimacy depends upon a clear and straightforward bargain: the nation-state surrender a good portion of its own sovereignty in order to gain more prosperity, more security, and more relevance in a global community than would be the case without the EU governance system.¹

¹ For a survey of the different interpretations of EU constitutionalism, see Wilkinson (2013). Wilkinson draws explicit attention to the existing challenge to EU governance as a result of the lack of a founding act from which legitimacy commonly is assumed to emerge. As Wilkinson notes, legitimating issues are crucial because assumptions of what the EU “ought” to be remains inseparable from “what” the EU is. For Wilkinson, “The right question is not therefore ‘what sort of polity is the European Union?’ but rather ‘what sort of polity it is becoming?” (Wilkinson, 2013, pg.192)
Some see this bargain as the very definition of a “post-national” culture within the new global environment nation-states and economic markets operate within the 21st century. Marchetti and Wihtol de Wenden, elaborate the various venues of global governance (2011). They reason that the European Union finds expression in the emerging norms implied by a supranational governance system intended to deliver services on behalf of the people, but not authorized directly by any public directly to do so on their behalf. In effect, Marchetti and Wihtol de Wenden argue that although the idea of transnational activism has been “long confined to a national dimension [it] has expanded through growing cross-border activism, the rise of permanent transnational networks and global ‘epistemic communities’” (Marchetti 2011, pg.18).

The paradox seems to be that while global activism based on norms is the very ideal lying at the heart of the EU, the reality that follows logically from the ideal of a zero-sum relationship to the legitimacy of the nation-state. They note that “while the issues that motivate the mobilization can be ultimately global (though very often mediated by national or local dimensions), the successful outcome of mobilizations is rooted in overlapping national and transnational domains of political action” (2011, pg.21). Therefore, nation-states need the supranational EU in order to secure the trans-national gains of a governance system and a continental market system while sustaining their national legitimacy. Nonetheless, they diminish claims to their sovereignty, (and logically legitimacy) the more they transfer authority to the very governance structure that secures their prosperity – the European Union.
The semantics of the entire process proves to be more than one reason why certain citizens of the European Union’s nation states judge that their identity and their voice will be lost. Although the European Union offers greater opportunities to wealth creation than a single nation-state can on its own, the paradox of legitimacy noted remains a singularly large challenge, one of a number “of major obstacles that activists face in building up cross-border relationships among organizations with different cultures and languages, and with limited resources” (Marchetti and Wihtol de Wenden 2011, pg.21).

Globalization adds additional stresses which can aggravate existing disagreements on various governance issues (i.e. should the European Union get involved with ‘border control’ and does it not cross the line between the necessity of humanitarian aid and national views of certain nation states)? Certain NGOs can be seen as an example of these ‘fine-line’ walkers in the sense that “from radical antagonism to radical nationalism (not to mention criminal groups), those who have taken an oppositional stand to institutional politics have often [been] criminalized and marginalized from the political system” (2011, pg.24). Thus, financial crises are not the only challenges to face the EU governance system and institutions.
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden notes, « Les pays européens qui seront les plus touchés par les nouvelles demandes sont ceux qui ont des liens linguistiques, coloniaux, transnationaux (migrations de travail et familles déjà existantes) avec les foyers de crises » (2011, pg.62).²

The question posed earlier of what the European Union is becoming assumes special significance when considering the case of France. The very ideal of the Republique of France is that a *rep*ublic requires a strong sense of identity built around a common core culture. Yet, France continues to face issues with anti-Semitism and racism and has a constant influx of immigrants from Northern Africa, who for various reasons (asylum seekers, better opportunities for jobs, etc.) realize that their closest and most feasible chances do in fact tie in with their old mother country. This causes issues as the European Union wishes to stand as a humanitarian figure but does not and cannot risk a) losing the support of the French nation state as it holds a great deal of power and weight in terms of financial assistance, etc. and b) does not want to give the impression of being overpowering. However, the normative premise underlying of the European Union was and still is to some extent to a) stabilize Europe (no more war, more economic and social coordination along lines of democracy and liberal values) b) minimize extremism c) create and keep efficient and rational markets and d) hold independence from US and other global hegemons. Therefore, some may argue that the European Union is walking a dangerously fine line at times and cannot push further toward supranational integration without bringing into

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² Translation: The European countries who will be the most affected by the new demands (i.e. asylum seekers) are the ones who have linguistic, colonial, transnational links (working migrations and already existing families) with the homes countries in crises.
question the idea of a legitimate Europe grounded in a legal tradition, equal to or superior to the member-states, and still be based on some notion of a European “people”.

**The problem defined**

The legitimacy of the European Union’s governance system rests on the argument that it is both more efficient and effective at delivery of the core needs of a nation-state (economic prosperity, economic and political stability, management of long-term goals and objectives associated with globalization, and improved quality of life conditions for its citizenry) than are nation-state governance systems alone. The basic core logic of the EU has always been that in terms of economics, it is offers scales of economy that cannot be matched by individual smaller nation-states. The rules associated with the system have been shaped and enforced jointly through a multi-layered system of governance including national and EU-level political institutions and authorities. The legitimacy attached to the EU system of governance has always been assumed to be based on two dimensions: (1) a performance, or instrumental dimension, and (2) a public sanctioned dimension (Scharpf, 2012). Absent of many of the normal avenues of public sanctions

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3 The literature on Euroscepticism and legitimacy issues facing the EU is extensive. Typically, this literature has tied legitimacy to citizen identification with Europe and the European Union, in contrast to national identity and national patriotism. This study will not explore the broader issue of identity, although we will introduce the concept of one’s image of the EU as a reflection of the person’s symbolic bonding to the EU. Recent contributions which have advanced the broader understanding of the factors influencing EU identity with important implications for the basis of EU legitimacy as a governing regime include van Klinger, Boomgaard and de Vreese (2013), Olsen (2013), Meier-Pesti andKirchler (2003), Skinner (2013), Rosalind (2012), Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia (2013), Roose (2013), and Duff (2013). This study will consider primarily what Klingren, following the example of Boomgarden and de Vreese (2013) the relationship between the “hard” factors influencing one’s assessment of the legitimacy of the EU and that person’s broader identity with the EU (namely, the economy), and the various “soft” factors of legitimacy and identity (namely, emotive attachments to the EU, such as trust and positive attachments and images of the EU).
typically anchoring nation-state authorities to their electorates (only members of the European Parliament of the major EU institutions are directly chosen and sanctioned by European electorates), the instrumental dimension of legitimacy has always been of crucial importance to the claim of those advocating more authority for the EU institutions relative to the nation-state. Lipset’s (1964, pg. 64) widely referenced modern conception of legitimacy, captures the logic underlying the basis of EU legitimacy when he states that “legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved”. No doubt, resolving the conflict between Germany and France (that tore Europe apart for centuries) is an instrumental accomplishment that EU advocates can claim and thereby use to sustain a sense of legitimacy to the European-wide governance system. However, in the face of a deepening and broadening financial and economic crisis that defies an easy solution for the EU, and the challenges to the nation-states and members of it citizenry, as they face the new reality of open borders and respect for the free movement of peoples (as well as capital, service and goods), the anti-system political movements and political parties which are merging within Europe reflect more dramatic manifestations of growing challenges to the legitimacy of the European Union. Following the logic of Lipset, this corresponds to a lack of belief that the EU is the appropriate set of institutions to manage the economy and society of the Europe today (since the European Union now captures the bulk of European space and populace). Thus, in the face of financial crisis and the lingering doubts about EU legitimacy, the broader sense that the EU governance system is just not up to the task (a concern that was vividly exposed during the constitutional debate in Europe in the several years preceding the financial
crisis of 2007), in which many argued that the EU must assume a more robust role in the
governance affairs of nation-states across the EU. Yet, this strategy promises only to inflame and
excite anti-system responses. Thus, the very use of authority by the EU itself to meet the
challenges of the sovereign debt crisis imperils the claim of the EU as a legitimate and relevant
supranational governing authority in the lives of the citizens across the nation-states of the EU.
It is perilously close to a simple Catch-22: more EU without effect only confirms its
“inappropriateness” underscoring a legitimacy deficit; less EU may well simply condemn the EU
experiment to failure with dramatic attendant consequences for member nation-states, also
mortally inflicting the legitimacy of the EU.

The focus of the study

Therefore, the central question this paper intends to examine is simply this: in the face of this
ongoing and challenging governance crisis for the EU, can we know if the necessary support for
the EU is firmly holding among the core public, or is there evidence of unraveling not merely
among more extremist or populist sectors of the publics across the EU, but within the
mainstream of the public more broadly defined? To approach this question, we will examine the
changing levels of trust across the EU public for the EU and its institutions of governance and
assess whether this trust can be reasonably understood to be sufficient enough to sustain the
public’s belief that the EU governance system is appropriate for solving various key social
conflicts. We will also examine the degree of satisfaction with EU and national economic
circumstances as a proxy for estimating whether such trust can be sustained and built upon,
across the EU. We will assume that the “core” European public is divided into key stake holders
associated with occupational status, political ideology, and emotional ties and personal associations with the EU. We will compare and contrast models tying these filtering perspectives to trust in the European Union across two cross-sectional time-points with survey data taken from the Eurobarometer data collected at these two different cross-sectional points in time: 2006 and 2009. This longitudinal comparison of cross-sectional survey data will allow us to gauge any shifts in the base of legitimacy for the EU associated with the time period dealing with both constitutional reform (i.e., the Lisbon Treaty of 2009) and the early stages of the global financial recession (which convention holds began in 2007).

To provide invaluable context to supplement more systematic analysis of survey data employed in this study to answer these questions we will draw upon a small sample of in-depth open-ended interviews conducted by the author in Europe during the summer of 2012. Once having tested our models we will consider the implications of our findings for the legitimacy of EU authority and what these implications mean for the future.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The intent of this thesis is to determine whether there is enough perceived appropriateness and trust in the European Union governance system within a small set but key group of stakeholders within European society. These three stakeholders are those whose (1) occupational and vocational interests and skills are most likely to depend upon and benefit from the success of a European-wide governance system and economic market of transaction and trade, (2) normative orientations to politics which project clear prescriptive and proscriptive preferences for governance and economic strategies of welfare and prosperity, and (3) whose emotional bonding to the EU have drawn them into a personal identification with the EU and whose sense of security and stability may indeed be dependent upon their belief that the EU is still something positive and worth preserving and indeed expanding. The latter group are the loyalists. One assumes that the “fair-weather” friends of the EU have no emotional stake in the EU’s progress and survival. A loss of legitimacy among this segment of the European public is both expected and discounted by markets. It is the loyalists whom pose a different issue. Depending upon how broad their numbers are, they are the last redoubt of resistance to a “cut and run” attitude which dooms the survival of the common monetary system, and single market, and European-wide normative rules protected and managed by a European governance system designed to refine and enlarge the vision of Europe beyond petty national differences.
Stakeholders of the EU

This study follows convention and divides the European public into two groups: elite and non-elite. For the purposes of this study, elites will be defined as those who hold what would be considered occupations requiring higher levels of educational training, professional licensing, accreditation, and which by necessity draw the person into the broader cross-border networks of European-wide market and professional services and interactions. These are the holders of high “EU property stakes”, broadly defined. Property stakes are what one has invested in the future of the system. Elites are those who are assumed to be more cosmopolitan and educated and may lean towards more dependency in the current system to achieve future ends, such as global benefits. In particular, economic elites have invested more than most as they are the ones who have transnational economic interests, these can vary from doctors, capitalists, lawyers, bankers, etc.

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4 For a review of the literature and empirical research employing elite-public classifications of European publics, see Haller (2008, pp. 1-30). For a theoretical differentiation of elites, see Haller, pp. 31 – 57. We draw on his distinction of “horizontal” elites, and in particular, “economic” elites as being the most relevant category of elite-citizen classification for the purposes and focus of this paper. The economic elites are those whose economic and capital stake are dependent upon the success of a single market, a common monetary union, and open borders allowing their entrepreneurial and professional skills to take full advantage of the expanded scale of the European economic network under one governance umbrella.

5 For an overview of the role of occupational status as a concept within the literature on Euroscepticism with implications explicitly for economic conditions within the EU and its broader linkages to rational choice interpretations underlying studies of citizenry perceptions of the EU, see van Klingen, Boomgarden and de Vreese (2013, pp. 3 – 5). Their findings suggest a lesser role of occupational status in defining one’s perception of the EU than our study expects to see in the data. Yet, their data (Eurobarometers for 1994 and 2005) cover a different period of history – though recent – and does not capture the accumulated impact of a constitutional debate and the onset of the economic and financial crisis affecting the trans-Atlantic community between 2006 – 2009. In addition, the present study connects what they would label as “hard” and “soft” factors to a different measure of one’s perception of EU legitimacy. As noted above, we are exploring the perception of EU public in the appropriateness of the EU as a governing regime (following Lipset’s conceptualization of legitimacy), not a more “instrumental” assessment of whether the country has “benefitted” or not from EU membership, as do van Klingen, Boomgarden and de Vreese.
This position is important because it goes to the core of understanding and analyzing the legitimacy of the European Union governance system. It is unlikely that anything the European Union does is legitimate in terms of policy making if the constituents favor their own national governing system to the EU. The elites and the public will not trust the EU Commission, for example, if they prefer a more nationalistic view on legitimacy. Through our recent field research we conclude that generally speaking the system of governance is not up to the task and that there is a need for political integration because the system lacks output delivery.

Various studies have explored the roots of different perceptions of the EU among elite and non-elite citizens within Europe. Rosamond (2012) has argued that unlike the elites, the public tends to look for more short term solutions and investments which clearly then draws on definite tensions over what authority means and to whom it should rest on. Since the feeling of identity among both the public and the elites is dependent to whom they will defer the authority, it can be said that legitimacy, deference and identity are interconnected. In fact, legitimacy depends on identity and vice versa. Rosamond declares that “The first of these axioms is the idea that [economic patriotism] involves discourses and practices that are necessarily protectionist and contrary to the premises of economic liberalism. The second is the intuitive understanding of EP as an exclusive property of nation-states and of national economic space” (Rosamond 2012, pg. 324-25). In this context he explains that an economic patriotism is in and of itself nationalism.
Economic patriotism holds value in the betterment of the nation and is dependent upon the nation-state for policy and decision making. With this being said, nations that hold this type of self-determined interest in the betterment of their nation-state will identity under the ‘pro-nationalist’ category. As a result, they can be seen as harder to cooperate within matters of ‘European’ issues, if there is no seen gain or benefit in their involvement. From our perspective, Rosamond’s notion of economic patriotism is something akin to the general citizenry’s attachment to local, regional and nation-state economies and not consistent with elites’ view that such domains while important to public wealth and social security, are wholly insufficient to meet the challenges of a global society and therefore, insufficient for the economic skills, market resources, and professional credentials elites possess.

Vala, Pereira and Ramos (2006) add further dysfunction to the elite-citizenry distinction. They explore the relationship and correlation of nation-states within the European Union and their attitudes towards racial prejudice, threat perception and opposition to immigration. They asked “…what factors lead to the construction of immigration as a threat and not as a new resource, or even as a motive of pride for the populations of the receiving countries?” (2006, pg. 119)

Their results “suggest that attitudes towards immigration are associated with racial ideology and with ‘ethnism’ (2006, pg.136). It is inevitable to counter argue though, “that opposition to
immigration is anchored in the perception of not only at an economic and security level, but also in the identity sphere” (2006, 136). Lastly, their findings help explain the current rise in nationalism and the issues surrounding the well-known Franco-German relations when finding out that results suggest an extreme contrast between the two countries when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants. “As expected, ‘ethnism’ in the selection of immigrants is higher in Germany, but the feeling of cultural threat is lower in this country than in France” (2006, pg.137).

Although only mentioned briefly, the true perception of threat deals with the issue of identity in the realms of the public versus elite. This paper will examine whether or not the expectations and the outcomes of the EU governance system are congruent in the eyes of its citizenry. How far away or close is the majority of the category to the European Union and the concept of a unified Europe or to one’s own perceptions of what can be trusted as legitimate towards European political authority?

Vivien A. Schmidt (2010) draws our attention to the desire to find the solution to the gap between cooperation of the public and the elites and the role of a basic ‘customer satisfaction’ ideology. If the public is involved with the elites and their decision making, then there is a direct correlation of positive cooperation on the European Union level. Schmidt (2010, pg.1) notes that “…scholars have analyzed the EU’s democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of the trade-offs between the output effectiveness of EU’s policies outcomes for the people and the input
participation by the people”. Although there is a discrepancy in this as it asks for participation from the people and although this participation can be seen as a measurement of successful cooperation, it is not something easily willed. She also points out that “…big legitimacy problems remain, first, with the institutional rules, in particular the fact that once decisions are made, they are nearly impossible to overturn by the member-states in the Council…” (Schmidt 2010, pg.17).

If the public in a nation-state felt that their elected elites within the Council were being stripped away of their rights of opinions and a voice, they would feel in a sense, left out. A part of their identity that was shared with the elites, and indirectly the European Union itself, would be seen as removed. This feeling would then draw those who were cooperative away and we would be faced with a body of pro nation-state citizens, and worse the masses of a public have always outnumbered that of the elites.

Nonetheless, it is vital to remember that the seen ‘elites’ be also considered in the question of identity. More often than not, they can be seen as figures that would automatically side with the European Union, due to acts of ‘bandwagon’. After two world wars, the idea of peace is something everybody sought out. One expert interviewed from the summer interviews noted that “the politicians [could] feel a great distance since they seem to not see their influence on the greater aspect of the EU. They have more power with their voters back home”. As a result, the necessity to keep an open mind about the various ways the public and the elites can draw their
sentiments of identity from are numerous. Through these governance mechanisms there can be a lot of gaps and communication is not the easiest. The European Union’s basis of governance off of treaties is something long withheld so as to bring nation-states together but through the various drawing boards it may have split them up instead.

The next additional stakeholder is accounted for in this analysis, having particular relevance to issues cementing nominal assessments of the EU to evaluations of the instrumental performance of EU governance. The group consists of those who exhibit some personal bonding identity with the EU. Symbolic perceptions show how individuals have attached to European Union symbols through personal and emotional attachments. We posit that they are much more likely to hold more confidence and trust in the institution and identify more with Europeanism than the general citizenry among the European public.6

The last additional stake holder is those in the European society whose normative preferences and empirical assessments are shaped in accordance with a constrained logic aligned with a “left” and “right:” political perspective. Political ideology is at the very core of one’s calibration

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6 The literature on national symbols, emotional attachment via symbols, and feelings of identity and patriotism may be found in many different fields of study, including psychology, sociology, and political science. Recent empirical and theoretical research on the subject include Butz (2009), Schatz and Lavine (2007), Meir-Pesti and Kirchler (2003), Vignoles, et. al. (2006).
of how appropriate governing institutions perform, as well as how effective these institutions are in ensuring the EU becomes the ideal it “should” be.\footnote{The ideological “left” and the “right” within Europe’s political spectrum have long taken divergent views across nation-state regarding the EU and its instrumental benefits to citizens. These differences have also been associated by a number of students of EU politics resonating with core normative values of the relationship between the citizen, the state and the market. See Usherwood and Startin (2013) for an analysis of how these ideological differences have come into play during the recent economic and financial crises in Europe.}
CHAPTER III

MODELS, DATA, OPERATIONALIZATIONS

The working proposition guiding this paper holds that the legitimacy of the EU rests fundamentally on a public belief in the appropriateness of the EU governance system as a means of managing social conflict and economic prosperity (national security is excluded from this set as the EU has no direct authority over the nation’s security of nation-states and the public). We refine this argument to assert that the public trust granted to the EU governance system is qualified across the public by how various stake-holders filter their assessments of EU performance and from this formulate their conception of trust. These filters define the lines separating elements of the European public into those who have a high property stake in the success of the EU (e.g., those whose occupational status place them at the heart of the broader European single market and common monetary union), those to whom the EU fulfills both normative and empirical expectations regarding the political-economic and social organization of society (e.g., the left-right ideological disposition of a citizen), and those who may have moved beyond specific instrumental and normative assessments of the EU as a governance system to embrace more emotional, and basic symbolic representations of the EU, either as something positive and good, or negative and bad (e.g., those holding very strong emotional symbolic attachment to the EU).
The argument summarized

The basic working hypothesis of this study holds that levels of legitimacy in the form of trust in the EU held by citizens of Europe is a function of the citizen’s perception of the instrumental performance of the broader economic environment within the country, and across Europe, as well. We assume trust to be a reflection of the person’s view that the governance system is appropriate to the instrumental task before it – namely, national and trans-European economic prosperity, stability and security. We elaborate further by postulating that crucial filters in the public’s eye (e.g., occupational status, political ideology and one’s overall attachment to the very symbolic notion of the EU itself) modifies the core relationship between assessments of the EU instrumental performance and the legitimacy extended the EU (i.e., trust in the EU and perceptions of national and European economic conditions). We expect that elites will express more trust than non-elites, that the “right” will probably extend more trust to the EU than the political “left” (given the EU’s traditional classic liberal economic philosophy regarding prosperity), and that those with strong positive images of the EU will indeed tend to trust the EU much more than those without such positive dispositions toward the EU. These hypotheses are spelled out on Model 2 in Table 1. And finally, we hold that such modifying effects will hold up regardless of the respective perceptions of the current economic situation in Europe or the nation-state. Therefore, we assert that instrumentalities should not in general push the public off track given their primary structural disposition toward the EU. Good times or bad, the non-elite will trust less than the elite, political “left” will trust less than the political “right”, and those attached to the EU will trust more than those absent of such positive attachments.
If these hypotheses, as explicitly stated in Table 1 are verified, we may conclude EU legitimacy is a work in progress that cannot simply be won through instrumental successes. The governance regime must look to various stake holders as more or less willing to extend the EU the necessary trust upon which the legitimacy of the EU will stand, and which confirms the public’ assessment that the EU itself is an appropriate system to manage the instruments of policy and progress across Europe. If in general our hypotheses are not readily confirmed, one must conclude that either (1) instrumentalities themselves do not matter, (2) legitimacy is denied (no trust) or, (3) legitimacy is uniformly distributed across the various stakeholders in identical proportions given instrumentalities (trust prevails).

We add, of course, the time factor, and posit that in the context of unusually distressful and challenging times for the European public across the nation-states of the EU, one should expect to see a shift in expressions of trust as we move from 2006 into 2009. Nonetheless, if trends prevail across both time periods in rough approximation to each other, we may conclude that turbulence is of limited importance to the core foundations of establishing legitimacy. Either legitimacy prevails in both periods, or it does not. However, if we note a pattern in 2006 and a different pattern in 2009 we must also conclude that legitimacy is indeed dependent upon the nature of shifting fortunes. If, as we expect, legitimacy of the EU is sustained based on the individual level Eurobarometer data, we may say with greater confidence that the governance regime of the EU is in fact a work in progress (legitimate to some, not yet to others given the instrumentals coloring their perceptions), but that the foundations for further extending the perception in the public of the EU as an appropriate governance system are well in place as it can
withstand the traumas of constitutional debate and the onset of a great recession and not see legitimacy eroded entirely. Friends, who are not fair weather, represent the foundations of a normal governance system.

**The argument specified in Models**

Table 1 presents the models and their respective hypotheses guiding our analysis. Model 1 evaluates an individual’s trust in the EU to their evaluation of the current economic situation of their country (Hypothesis 1a), i.e. their satisfaction. It tests research hypothesis that trust is conditional by circumstance. Hypothesis 1b posits that trust in EU is also conditional by satisfaction with outputs from the EU.

Model 2 begins our analysis of the relationship between occupational status (Hypothesis 2a), political ideology (Hypothesis 2b) and images of the EU (Hypothesis 2c) on the one hand, with trust in the EU on the other.

Model 3 and Model 4 each introduces controls into the analysis. Specifically, controls for the person’s assessment of the current national economic situation (Model 3), and the current European economic situation (Model 4). Returning for a moment to Lipset’s conceptualization of legitimacy, we note that one’s trust in the EU (as a measure of legitimacy, per se) if based on instrumental assessments of the EU, will vary relative to the assessment one holds of the national
current economic situation within a country, as well as the current economic situation of Europe in general (and by association, the European market and monetary governance space). On the other hand, if we find that the variance pattern between trust in the EU and any of the filters (occupational status, political ideology, and images of the EU) is unaltered regardless of the economic condition, we may conclude that legitimacy perceptions across the three stakeholders, including elites and non-elites, are structural relationships independent of the instrumental performance of the EU.

As Table 2 notes, we will utilize Eurobarometer data from 2006 (Eurobarometer 66.1), and 2009 (Eurobarometer 71.3). The study will utilize basic cross tabulation of data in testing the bivariate and simple control models outlined in Table 1. All models will be tested using European samples.

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8 Antonis Papacostas, *Eurobarometer 66.1, European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September – October 2006* (ICPSR 21281); and, Antonis Papacostas, *Eurobarometer 71.3, Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June – July 2009* (ICPSR 28184). While the basic time frame was selected to capture the particular stresses and challenges associated with the debates over EU constitutionalism and the beginnings of the financial crisis (pre-Greece financial collapse of 2010), the specific Eurobarometers were selected based on exact matches of survey items asked of respondents in the two surveys. Later Eurobarometers that may have been more ideal for capturing the full effects of the financial crisis are not yet unembargoed by the Commission of the EU, cleaned and released for public analysis by the ICPSR.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

The following section will report the results of the analysis of each of the hypotheses noted in Table 1. Following this section, we will consider the implications of the findings.

Findings From Analysis of Model 1: Trust and Economic Situations

Our analysis of Hypothesis 1a reveals that one’s trust in the EU is conditioned by one’s assessment of the current national economic situation. Thus, legitimacy, to the extent it is represented by one’s trust in the European Union, is directly tied to the citizen’s assessment of the instrumental performance of the national economy. For both 2006 and 2009, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, the majority of the public in our European sample tend to express more trust in the EU institutions (58% and 56% as seen in Tables 1a and 1b) than non-trust. Moreover, we see one’s trust is directly tied to one’s assessment of the current economic conditions in the national economic situation. Poor assessments lead to sharp declines in trust; more positive assessments correlate with large degrees of trust across the European public in general. This trend is slightly more robust in 2009 than in 2006 reflecting the impact of the great recession in combination with failed institutional reforms associated with the European Constitution.
Tables 5 and 6 confirm for 2009 the same trend shown in Tables 3 and 4 hold up in 2009. Indeed, assessments of the European economic condition weigh heavily on an individual’s trust in EU institutions, much more than is the case for national economic conditions as show in Tables 3 and 4. Whereas, the differential in relative trust levels among individuals who assess the national economic situation differently (good v. bad) is only in the range of 10-15 percentage points as is shown in Tables 3 and 4. The respective levels of trust extended to the EU across those assessing the European economic condition as good or bad is in the range of 20-30 percentage points. In Table 5, we note that for 2006 there is clearly a 30 percentage point gap between people assessing the European economic condition as good or bad and the degree of trust and non-trust extended to the EU. This pattern is virtually the same in Table 6 for our 2009 European sample.

Thus, from Tables 3-6 we can conclude that the trust in the European Union shown by citizens of the EU is very much attached in the public’s mind to their perceptions of the condition of the European economy. It seems clear from these tables that the hypotheses in Model 1 are supported: the public clearly holds the EU accountable for economic performance at the European level, arguably a reasonable and sound position given what the founders and subsequent generations of EU leaders have advocated.
Findings from analysis of Model 2: stake holders and trust

Table 3-6 confirm the baseline relationship between public trust of the EU, as a measure of EU legitimacy, is tempered by the public’s perception of the prevailing economic situation at both the national and especially the EU level. However, we ask whether trust levels vary across different groups of stake holders. We begin first with occupational status and consider whether a person’s trust in the EU depends upon whether they are elite or non-elite with regard to property stakes in the EU. Tables 7 and 8 confirm Hypothesis 2a. Elites in both 2006 and 2009 are much more likely to extend trust to EU institutions, although the differences between elites and non-elites are not dramatic. Nonetheless, both tables demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between occupational status and trust in EU institutions. Tables 7 and 8 also confirm that for those citizens in occupations which we argue are more likely to be central to the ideals associated with the European wide open-markets, trust in the EU is more common than among those occupations tending to remain attached to the proximate environment of a local or national economy.

Next, we explore whether trust varies with political ideology. We expect that those on the political “right” will have a closer affinity to the ideals of a liberal, open-market EU than those on the political “left”. Tables 9 and 10 confirm a clear distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ political ideologies and the citizen’s trust in EU. Hypothesis 2b is therefore confirmed. Those on the ‘right’ of the political spectrum, in both 2006 and 2009, are slightly more trusting of the EU than are those on the left scale of the political spectrum. Tables 9 and 10 therefore underscore the impression held by many that the political “right” identifies and trusts the liberal economic
orientation of the EU as reflected in the European ideal of the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, while those on the ‘left’ see the open economy of the EU single market and monetary union as a threat to their livelihood and cultural-economic values.

Finally, Tables 11 and 12 vividly demonstrate a strong and robust relationship between one’s image conjured of the EU and their trust extended to the EU. As one might expect, the symbolic attachment of the individual to the EU almost certainly invests something of the person’s identity and ergo to the image of the EU, whatever image that might be. If it is a positive image trust is readily forthcoming; if it is a negative image trust is dramatically withheld. Since all else is equal there can be no mistake that favorable images of the EU reinforced by symbols and general representations of the EU pay profound dividends of trust to the EU.

**Findings from analysis of Model 3: stake holders and trust, by national economy**

Tables 13 and 14 align with the effects of the great recession and frustrations over the debate surrounding the European Constitution that colored the political narratives between 2006 and 2009. In Table 13 (top section) we note that when the one’s assessment of the national economic situation in 2006 is “good” there is no difference between those who are ‘elites’ and those are ‘non-elites’ with respect to trust in the EU. However, in 2006 when the assessment of the current national economic situation is bad (bottom section of Table 13) ‘elites’ express a fairly robust trust of the EU, to a notably greater degree than ‘non-elites’ (61% to 51%, respectively). The chi-squares for the two groups of assessments in Table 13 (p = .289, p = .002, respectively)
underscore this sharp deviation in trust attached to one’s perceptions of the national economic situation in 2006.

Moving to Table 14 we can see the trend of divergence of ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ continuing across both “good” and “bad” assessments of national current economic situation for 2009. However, what is notable in Table 14 is the overall decline in the assessment of the national current economic situation by both ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’. In 2006, as shown in Table 13, almost 50 percent of the public in general (not controlling for elite/non-elite) assessed the current national economic situation as “good” or “bad” (N = 12,659, with 49.7% assessing national economic situation as “good”, and 50.3% assessing the national economic situation as “bad”). By 2009, more than three times as many European citizens assessed the current national economic situation as “bad” (78%, N = 10,694) as “good” (22%, N = 3,035). Nonetheless, whether the citizens’ assessment of current national economic situation is “good” or “bad”, ‘elites’ were clearly more willing to trust the EU by a slight degree, but a statistically significant degree, than were the ‘non-elites’. We note from Tables 13 and 14 that in “bad” times ‘elites’ are the source of the EU’s legitimacy within the public and that since the onset of both the great recession in 2007 and the failed constitutional reform of 2004-2009, ‘non-elites’ have clearly withheld their trust in the EU to a greater extent than the ‘elites’. Therefore, we conclude that hypothesis 3a is on the whole confirmed by the data.
Turning to political ideology, we note that in Tables 15 and 16, regardless of one’s assessment of the current national economic situation in 2006 or 2009, European citizens on the ‘right’ side of the political ideological scale considerably extend trust to the EU more than do those of the ‘left’ side of the politically ideological scale. It is difficult to conclude from these findings that the political ‘left’ or ‘right’ modifies their trust in the EU depending upon economic circumstances. Hypothesis 3b is therefore confirmed.

Like political ideology, conjured images of the EU are not impacted by one’s assessment of the current national economic situation in either 2006 or 2009. As confirmed in Tables 17 and 18, regardless of one’s assessment of the current national economic situation, positive images of the EU correlate strongly with trust in the EU. The turbulences between 2006 and 2009 seemingly did nothing to dent the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of those who have positive images of the European Union. Tables 17 and 18 confirm Hypothesis 3c.

**Findings from analysis of Model 4: stake holders and trust, by European economy**

Tables 19 and 20 demonstrate the sharp differences between ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ in extending their trust in the EU when they assess the European economic situation to be “bad”. This reflects again the pattern shown in Tables 13 and 14 which confirm that when non-elites’ assessment of the national economic situation is “bad”, their trust in the EU declines sharply, unlike the ‘elites’ who despite their assessment of the current national economic situation as "bad" retain their distinctive trust in the EU. From Tables 19 and 20 it is clear that ‘elites’ continue to sustain their
trust in the EU even when assessing the current European situation as “bad”, whereas ‘non-elites’ withhold their trust when they assess the current European situation as “bad”. As is shown in Table 20, by 2009 ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ alike disproportionately extend their trust to the EU during what they assess as “good” conditions within the current European economic situation. Virtually equal proportions of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ expressed trust in 2009 and assessed the current European economic situation to be "good" (77% and 73%, respectively). However, when assessments among the public of the current European economic situation were “bad”, elites were far more likely to extend their trust to the EU than were the elites (53% v. 47%, respectively). Tables 19 and 20 underscore the general conclusion that one’s occupational status is a significant factor in providing the support for European Union legitimacy. Property stakes through occupational status consistently show throughout our analysis to be powerful and important underpinnings of trust extended the EU. Therefore we may conclude that Hypothesis 4a is confirmed.

Tables 21 and 22 once again verify that in general the relationship between political ideology and trust in the EU as shown previously in Models 1, 2 and 3, are modified by perceptions of economic assessments. However, there is one telling exception. We note that in Table 21 (2006) there is a statistically insignificant difference in the tendency to express trust in the EU for the ‘right’ or the ‘left’ when citizen assessments of the current European economic condition are “bad”. This finding however, is not repeated in the 2009 sample (Table 22). By 2009, in the face of the challenging conditions of failed constitutional reforms and the great recession, the ‘right’
once again tended to express a greater willing to trust the EU than the ‘left’ in degrees that are statistically significant. So therefore, we may conclude that overall, Hypothesis 4b is confirmed.

Turning to Tables 23 and 24 we note that consistent with Models 2 and 3, positive images of the European Union steadfastly support and sustain trust in the EU regardless of one’s assessment of the current European economic situation. This despite the fact that for this sample of citizens by 2009 (as shown in Table 24 with a margin of 2:1), citizens viewed the current European economic condition to be “bad”. The data therefore confirms Hypothesis 4c.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

Lying behind the theory, models and analysis of this paper lies a simple question: is the EU plagued by fair-weather friends, or does it enjoy trust among important stake holders from whom trust and the foundations of legitimacy can sustain the governance regime of the EU as it moves forward in the future with the challenges associated with the post-recession reforms and innovations required by the new global economic and financial conditions? From our analysis presented above, the answer is an unqualified “yes”. Elites, the political “right” and those who have bonded through positive images of the EU, ostensibly constructed through symbolic images that generate the personal rewards of identification crucial to any governing system vis-à-vis its citizenry, are all reservoirs of trust and sources of validation of the EU as an appropriate governing regime. These groups extend their support and trust regardless of the instrumental circumstances of the period.

The conclusions are based upon Eurobarometer data from both 2006 and 2009. These data represent the most recent available data allowing a sample of respondents at two time points affording us an estimate of the effect of the greatest economic crisis in the Western world since the 1930s upon the public within the European Union. Although we have categorized our data in factors of symbolic attachment, ideology and occupation, the end result can be seen most clearly and bluntly by examining data from Model 1c and 1d. Although 2009 can be seen as falling
within the beginning phase of the economic crisis effecting the European Union, it is astounding how even though the public may view the current economic crisis in the European as “bad”, a) trust in EU institutions and b) more trust in 2009 than in 2006 (35% in 2006 versus 49.3%) is confirmed by the data.

Lying beneath these facts are the core conclusions: (1) trust depends upon certain stake holders, whose trust (2) is continual despite economic circumstances, at least during the period 2006 – 2009, and (3) withheld trust comes from the ‘non-elite’ occupational group, those on the political ‘left’ who have traditionally sought social security through public redistribution, and those who stand apart from the EU by virtue of lacking an emotional and personal attachment to the European experiment in supranational governance. These are the groups whose circumstances may be most threatened by the failure of European laws to be ensconced within a constitutional document, and whose livelihoods are most vulnerable to the economic uncertainties of the “Great recession”. In this context, our findings raise two fundamental questions: (1) why should it be any surprise to anyone that “austerity” is a preferred policy of the European Commission (among others) in its struggle to combat the financial crisis, given the political “right” support of the EU, and the trust afforded the EU from those probably least vulnerable to the effects of classical liberal economic systems; and (2) why should one assume the commitment to austerity as a policy course to the future as a means of dealing with the financial crisis of 2007 – 2012, rapidly expending EU legitimacy when such a steadfast reservoir of trust continues to emanate from those to who a symbolic attachment to the EU has survived constitutional crisis and economic shock on the scale of the current market collapse of the Atlantic community? Our findings
suggest caution to those prognosticating an end to the common monetary union and an overall rejection of the experiment in European integration. These arguments were echoed also in the interviews of the summer of 2012 during the credit crisis following Italy’s financial troubles where the common assumptions of the experts interviewed were that the EU was in dire trouble. Our findings, however, remind us that reservoirs remain in specific stakeholders. The core of importance remains in important stakeholders and has been sustained, at least since the initial phases of Europe’s most serious post-Cold War. A building cannot stand without its foundation, and these important stakeholders are the foundation of the European Union.
## CHAPTER VI

### TABLES & MODELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Model and Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the EU as a Function of Assessments of the Current Economic Situation in Europe and the Nation-State</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1a</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is Conditioned by One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1b</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is Conditioned by One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<td><strong>Model 2:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2a</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of Occupational Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2b</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of Political Ideological Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2c</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union</td>
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<td><strong>Model 3:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective Conditioned by the Current National Economic Situation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3a</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Occupational Status, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3b</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Political Ideological Perspective, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</td>
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<td>Hypothesis 3c</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</td>
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<td><strong>Model 4:</strong></td>
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<td>Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective Conditioned by the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4a</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Occupational Status, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4b</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Political Ideological Perspective, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<td>Hypothesis 4c</td>
<td>One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union, Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concepts</td>
<td>Variables</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td>EU Legitimacy</td>
<td>Trust the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distal Economic Context</td>
<td>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Political Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affinity Towards the EU</td>
<td>Conjured Images of the EU</td>
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### Table 3: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 1a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=12,721</td>
<td>N=12,010</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 299.86; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \text{Tau}_b = .110 (p=.000) \)

### Table 4: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 1a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=6,303</td>
<td>N=20,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 476.933; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \text{Tau}_b = .134 (p=.000) \)
Table 5: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 1b)  
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>Bad %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=17,633  N=5,048  N=22,681  
\[ \chi^2 = 1,676.257; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \tau_b = .272 \ (p=.000) \]

Table 6: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 1b)  
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good %</td>
<td>Bad %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=7,850  N=17,139  N=24,989  
\[ \chi^2 = 1,192.852; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \tau_b = .218 \ (p=.000) \]
Table 7: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation (Hypothesis 2a)  
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Non Elite</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>7,501</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>5,453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 12.713; df= 1; p=.000; Tau_b = -.031 (p=.000)

Table 8: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation (Hypothesis 2a)  
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Non Elite</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>54.5</td>
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<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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χ² = 11.001; df= 1; p=.001; Tau_b = -.038 (p=.001)
Table 9: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology (Hypothesis 2b)
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>42.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 26.245; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \text{Tau}_b = -0.036 (p=.000)$

Table 10: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology (Hypothesis 2b)
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=12,253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 79.453; \text{df}=1; p=.000; \text{Tau}_b = -0.061(p=.000)$
### Table 11: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European Union (Hypothesis 2c)
**Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006**
**European Union Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>EU Negative</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trusted in EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>14,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>10,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column Total</strong></td>
<td>N=12,816</td>
<td>N=7,723</td>
<td>N=4,312</td>
<td>N=24,851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 6,620.918; \text{df}=2; \text{p}=.000; \text{Tau}_b = .485 \ (p=.000) \]

### Table 12: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European Union (Hypothesis 2c)
**Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009**
**European Union Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>EU Negative</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trusted in EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>15,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>11,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column Total</strong></td>
<td>N=12,642</td>
<td>N=9,337</td>
<td>N=4,738</td>
<td>N=26,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 9,147.888; \text{df}=2; \text{p}=.000; \text{Tau}_b = .556 \ (p=.000) \]
Table 13: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation, Controlling for Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3a)
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of Current National Economic Situation: Good</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>4,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>6,294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = .335; \text{df}= 1; p=.289; \tau_{ab} = -.007 (p=.560) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of Current National Economic Situation: Bad</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU I</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>3,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU I</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>3,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>6,365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 9.723 \text{ df}= 1; p=.002; \tau_{ab} = -.039 (p=.002) \]
Table 14: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation, Controlling for Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3a)
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non Elite</td>
<td>Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=2,794</td>
<td>N=241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$$\chi^2 = 4.323; \text{df}= 1; p=.021; \text{Tau}_b = -.038 \ (p=.029)$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=10,086</td>
<td>N=608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$$\chi^2 = 3.804; \text{df}= 1; p=.028; \text{Tau}_b = -.019 \ (p=.051)$$
Table 15: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, Controlling for the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3b)  
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left (%)</td>
<td>Right (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=5,900</td>
<td>N=4,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N=10,877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 8.412; df= 1; p=.002; Tau_b = -.028 (p=.004)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left (%)</td>
<td>Right (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=5,388</td>
<td>N=3,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N=9,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 11.966 df= 1; p=.000; Tau_b = -.036 (p=.001)$
Table 16: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, Controlling for the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3b)
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=2,769</td>
<td>N=2,545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 10.417; df= 1; p=.001; Tauｂ = -.044 (p=.001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=9,218</td>
<td>N=6,334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 56.528 df= 1; p=.000; Tauｂ = -.060 (p=.000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Positive %</td>
<td>Neutral %</td>
<td>EU Negative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=7,408</td>
<td>N=3,594</td>
<td>N=1,615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 2,969.234; \text{ df}=2; p=.000; \tau_{b} = .452 (p=.000) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=5,200</td>
<td>N=3,983</td>
<td>N=2,630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 3,346.695 \text{ df}=2; p=.000; \tau_{b} = .502 (p=.000) \)
Table 18: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European Union, Controlling for Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3c) Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>EU Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>EU Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=3,657</td>
<td>N=1,946</td>
<td>N=635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 1,636.351; \ df= 2; p=.000; \ Tau_b = .482 \ (p=.000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>EU Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>EU Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=8,653</td>
<td>N=7,190</td>
<td>N=3,970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 7,090.981; \ df= 2; p=.000; \ Tau_b = .568 \ (p=.000)$
Table 19: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4a)
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Elite %</td>
<td>Elite %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=8,156</td>
<td>N=613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2 = 3.743; \text{df}= 1; \ p=.029; \ Tau_b = -.021 \ (p=.047)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Elite %</td>
<td>Elite %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=2,469</td>
<td>N=136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2 = 4.283 \text{ df}= 1; \ p=.025; \ Tau_b = -.041 \ (p=.050)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 20: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4a)  
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009  
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Status of Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=3,666</td>
<td>N=270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=3,936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χ² = 2.145; df = 1; p = .080; Tau_b = -.023 (p = .126)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bad                                                     |            |                     |
| Tend to Trust EU                                       | 47.1%      | 52.5%               |
| Tend not to Trust EU                                   | 52.9%      | 47.5%               |
| Column Total                                           | N=8,331    | N=551               |
|                                                        | N=8,882    |                     |
| χ² = 5.824 df = 1; p = .009; Tau_b = -.026 (p = .016)  |            |                     |
Table 21: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, Controlling the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4b)
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006
European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left %</td>
<td>Right %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=8,028</td>
<td>N=6,545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 13.458; df= 1; p=.000; Tau_b = -.030 (p=.000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left %</td>
<td>Right %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=2,436</td>
<td>N=1,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 1.699 df= 1; p=.102; Tau_b = -.021 (p=.193)
### Table 22: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4b)  
*Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009  
European Union Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left %</td>
<td>Right %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tend to Trust EU</strong></td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tend not to Trust EU</strong></td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column Total</strong></td>
<td>N=3,382</td>
<td>N=2,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 17.736; \text{df}= 1; p=.000; \ Tau_b = -.053 (p=.000) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tend to Trust EU</strong></td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tend not to Trust EU</strong></td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column Total</strong></td>
<td>N=8,093</td>
<td>N=5,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 42.595 \text{df}= 1; p=.000; \ Tau_b = -.056 (p=.000) \]
Table 23: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European Union, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 (Hypothesis 4c) European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Positive</td>
<td>Neutral Neutral</td>
<td>EU Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=10,510</td>
<td>N=5,050</td>
<td>N=1,938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 3,760.611; \text{df} = 2; \text{p}=.000; \tau_{bu} = .429 \ (p=.000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe:</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=1,478</td>
<td>N=1,741</td>
<td>N=1,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 1,181.751; \text{df} = 2; \text{p}=.000; \tau_{bu} = .458 \ (p=.000)$
Table 24: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European Union, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe

Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 (Hypothesis 4c)

European Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>5,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=4,770</td>
<td>N=2,356</td>
<td>N=664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 1,978.572; df= 2; p=.000; Tauₜ = .472 (p=.000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe</th>
<th>Trust in EU</th>
<th>Conjured Images of the EU</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Trust EU</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>8,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to Trust EU</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>8,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>N=7,008</td>
<td>N=6,276</td>
<td>N=3,661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 6,006.186; df= 2; p=.000; Tauₜ = .564 (p=.000)
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Butz, David. "National Symbols as Agents of Psychological and Social Change."


Sonia Lucarelli (Editor), Furio Cerutti (Editor), Vivien A. Schmidt (Editor). 2010. Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union (Routledge/GARNET series)

Usherwood, Simon, and Nick Startin. "Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon."


