# THE FAILURE OF STORYTELLING TO GROUND A CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE

A Thesis

by

CHARLES WILLIAM TANKSLEY

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2004

Major Subject: Philosophy

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# ABSTRACT

The Failure of Storytelling to Ground a Causal Theory of Reference. (May 2004)

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I argue that one cannot hold a Meinongian ontology of fictional characters and have a causal theory of reference for fictional names. The main argument presented refutes Edward Zalta's claim that storytelling should be considered an extended baptism for fictional characters. This amounts to the claim that storytelling fixes the reference of fictional names in the same way that baptism fixes the reference of ordinary names, and this is just a claim about the illocutionary force of these two types of utterance. To evaluate this argument, therefore, we need both a common understanding of the Meinongian ontology and a common taxonomy of speech acts. I briefly sketch the Meinongian ontology as it is laid out by Zalta in order to meet the former condition. Then I present an interpretation of the taxonomy of illocutionary acts given by John Searle in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, within which we can evaluate Zalta's claims. With an ontology of fictional characters and a taxonomy of speech acts in place, I go on to examine the ways in which the Meinongian might argue that storytelling is an extended baptism. None of these arguments are tenable—there is no way for the act of storytelling to serve as an extended baptism. Therefore, the act of storytelling does not constitute a baptism of fictional characters; that is, storytelling fails to ground a causal chain of reference to fictional characters.

To Joy Tanksley

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to Chris Menzel for his insight and direction, and to Max Cresswell, Edward Zalta, and Jimmie Killingsworth for their generosity with time and comments. I am also especially grateful for the love, companionship, and support of Joy, Gunther, Charlie, Debbie, Ben, David, Debra, and David and Susan Murphy.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

Fictional characters are all around us: the actions, experiences, and choices of characters in movies, sitcoms, and books are constant topics for conversation, and this is not just idle chatter. Though the example itself comes from fiction, the recent movie *The Hours* poignantly demonstrates the way a fictional character, Mrs. Dalloway, can permeate the lives of ordinary people. Talk of fiction and fictional characters abounds and is non-trivial; but all this talk about fictional characters raises two important questions:

(1) What ontology of fictional characters should we adopt?

(2) What is the nature of reference to fictional characters?

One's answer to the first question will direct the way he or she can answer the second. One might believe that fictional characters do not exist in any way. Then reference to fictional characters will be explained in terms of empty names, where the goal is to explain how a name that actually has no referent can still be used in meaningful sentences.[1] A variation on the empty name theme is to take fictions generally to be pretenses or acts of make-believe. This view, pretense theory, generally holds that fictional name will refer not to an object but to our acting *as if* the object exists.[2] Similarly, one can take fictional characters as intentional objects—objects within the mind.[3] Alternatively one can hold that fictional names are not empty but actually refer

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This thesis follows the style of *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

[1] See Everett and Hofweber 2000 section I.

[2] See Walton 1990 and Everett and Hofweber 2000 section II.

[3] Martinich 2001.

to objects—abstract objects to be more precise. In what follows we will assume the answer to question (1) above is a version of this view championed by Edward Zalta.[4]

In this ontology we distinguish between two kinds of objects, ordinary and abstract. *Ordinary objects* are those objects which might have existed in space and time. In the realm of ordinary objects we find Abraham Lincoln, Mars, and the (possible) first colony on Mars. In comparison with these entities, *abstract objects* are just those objects which could never be spatiotemporal, e.g., the number four, the round square, and Sherlock Holmes.[5] Since abstract objects are not the sorts of things we can go out looking for, we need a way to know just which abstract objects there are. According to the comprehension principle for abstract objects, "for every condition on properties, there is an abstract object which is determined by just the properties meeting the condition" (Zalta 1983, 12). This comprehension principle could, on the face of it, lead to trouble. After all, as Russell pointed out, this comprehension principle implies that the existent golden mountain exists, and this is not so. To avoid Meinong's original logical troubles, Zalta introduces a distinction involving the way objects have properties. Ordinary objects *exemplify* properties. Mars, for instance, exemplifies the property 'being the fourth planet.' It is contingent whether Mars exemplify this property. Abstract objects, on the other hand, can also *encode* properties. The comprehension principle states that there is an object "determined" by every condition on properties. Zalta draws on a distinction made by Ernst Mally, namely: an object can be *determined*

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[4] See Zalta 1983, 1989, 2000, and 2003. Another important interpretation of the Meinongian ontology and fictional characters can be found in Parsons 1980. For an explication of a non-Meinongian approach see Thomasson 1999.

[5] See Zalta 2000 for a concise summary of his ontology.

by properties without *satisfying* those properties. Zalta translates the notion of satisfying into our ordinary notion of exemplifying—an object must exemplify a property in order to be said to satisfy it—and the notion of determining into the new notion of encoding.

It is an axiom of Zalta's ontology that no ordinary object can encode any properties. Abstract objects, however, can both encode and exemplify properties. The existent golden mountain encodes the properties 'being golden,' 'being a mountain,' and 'existing,' but this does not mean that it exemplifies any of these properties. In fact, it exemplifies the property of 'not existing.' Similarly, the round square encodes the properties of 'being round' and 'being square,' but exemplifies the property of 'being impossible.' One motivation behind the axiom that no ordinary object encodes any property is to avoid the consequence that an ordinary object and an abstract object be identical. That is, since there is an abstract object determined by every condition on properties, there is an abstract object that encodes all the properties Abraham Lincoln exemplifies. Since two objects are identical iff (a) neither encodes any properties and they exemplify all the same properties, or (b) both encode the same properties. The properties an abstract object encodes determine the identity of that object. Since we only know a limited amount about the properties certain abstract objects encode, we must allow incomplete objects into our ontology. That is, all we know about the round square is that it encodes these two properties. Since we do not know whether it encodes the property 'being blue,' it cannot be a complete object. Similarly, since any condition on properties determines an abstract object, there must be impossible objects.

Fictional characters are, as we have seen, just one kind of abstract object. They are, however, dependent upon another abstract object: stories. A *story* is an abstract object that was written by an author and which encodes only vacuous properties. *Vacuous properties* are properties that are constructed out of other properties, e.g., 'being such that Reagan was President,' 'being such that 7+5=12,' and 'being such that the world is round.' A story encodes "exactly the properties *F* which are constructed out of propositions true according to the story" (Zalta 1983, 91). The author of a story is the person who decides which propositions are true according to the story and which are not. The author does not create a story in an absolute sense, rather her act of creation consists in determining which abstract object is to count as her story. She does this by deciding which propositions are true in her story. This is, of course, an act requiring great skill and creativity. Stories, as abstract objects, exemplify as well as encode properties. While the author determines which properties her story encodes, the rest of the world determines which properties her story exemplifies. Furthermore, while a story can only encode vacuous properties, it can exemplify any property. For example, *Casablanca* encodes the property 'being such that Rick owns a bar' and exemplifies the properties 'being such that Rick is played by Bogart,' and (perhaps) 'being the greatest movie of all time.' The former exemplified property is, of course, a vacuous property while the second is not. A story is any continuous narrative written by an author in which one or more characters are in common. Thus, the 'Holmes stories,' though made up of many individual stories, should count as one, unified work.[6]

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[6] There are numerous problems with this conception of *story*, but examining these will take us too far

With a notion of story in hand, we can further define *native story* as the story in which a given character first appears. So, Holmes is native to the Holmes stories, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to *Hamlet*, though the former appears in *The Seven Per Cent Solution* and the latter in *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead*. Distinguishing native from non-native stories allows Zalta to claim that the condition on properties which determines the identity of fictional character is the set of properties attributed to that character in its native story. This set of properties is, except in the shortest of stories, quite large. The identity of stories and characters is closely intertwined, so any change in the one effects a change in the other, but this means that any change in one character effects a change in the story and this change effects a change in all the other characters. Consider the case of Holmes. Holmes encodes the properties 'being a detective,' 'living at 221B Baker Street,' and 'being friends with a doctor named Watson.' However, if Doyle had decided to not make Watson a doctor, but a lawyer instead, Holmes would exemplify the property 'being friends with a lawyer named Watson' and a host of related properties. The slightest change in one character affects them all. It should be further noted that characters need not be animate objects: any object which appears in a fictional story is itself a fictional character, though many characters in every story are not native to that story. The distinction between native and non-native stories keeps us from having to say that Holmes encodes the property 'having

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astray. It should be noted, however, that Zalta's notion will have problems with cases like J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*, as Salinger published many versions of parts of this story in magazines before publishing the actual book, but, though these stories share a central character, the novel is taken as its own story. Zalta will also have difficulty in cases where two authors write the same story without knowing it, e.g., the situation recounted in Borges's "Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote," and cases in which two people co-author a book then split up and each writes a sequel in which the main character from the first book acts in drastically different ways.

said "Elementary, my dear Watson,"' since he did not say this in the stories of Doyle—his native stories. This result is helpful if we are to identify a character with a story and a story with an author.

With an answer to our first question under our belt we can now ask the second: What is the nature of reference to fictional characters? Daniel Hunter frames the problem as one of establishing reference:

> the positive thesis of the [causal theory of reference] cannot be correct when applied to fictional names. For nonexistents cannot interact causally with existents. We cannot trace our reference to Holmes back to an ostensive baptizing of Holmes because no one could have pointed at Holmes and said 'I dub thee Holmes.' (Hunter 1981, 27)

One strength of the causal theory of names over the description theory is that one's reference to an object does not depend on one's knowledge about that object. A description theory of reference applied to fictional characters would severely complicate discourse about those characters: if one person associates the set of properties *X* with 'Holmes' and another person associates a different set of properties *Y* with Holmes they are talking about two different abstract objects with their uses of 'Holmes,' since each set of properties picks out a unique object. The causal theory of reference, if applicable to abstract objects, would secure reference to Holmes by uses of 'Holmes' since the context of utterance (i.e., the external features that determine whether a given discourse is about the Conan Doyle stories or *The Seven Per Cent Solution*), rather than the speaker, would determine the reference. Hunter's objection is that there is no way for an author to baptize a fictional character, and the consequence of this claim for reference is

that the causal theory must be abandoned: there is no way for a causal chain to link a use of 'Holmes' with Holmes if the causal chain can never get started.

Edward Zalta takes up Hunter's challenge and argues that the act of *storytelling* ought to be considered an extended baptism of fictional characters and the stories in which they appear.[7] Zalta argues that there are salient similarities between an act of storytelling and a standard baptismal locution. A standard baptism is "a speech act more like proposing a definition than asserting something about the object being baptized;" likewise "the act of storytelling [. . .] is a speech act more similar to definition than to assertion" (Zalta 2003, 7-8). The differences between standard baptisms and storytelling utterances are brushed aside:

> [U]nlike baptisms of existing objects, in which the name being introduced is used once, baptisms of [abstract] objects frequently involve many uses of the name throughout the course of the baptism. However, as in definitions in which a single word is being introduced into the language, all of the words in the definiens have their ordinary meanings. This reveals that baptisms of characters, like definitions, can be considered special uses of language. (Zalta 2003, 8)

Zalta's argument here relies on an explicit invocation of a theory of speech acts, though the exact workings of the speech act argument are left implicit. Zalta is arguing that since storytelling and standard baptisms are more like definitions than assertions—the former is an extended version of the later—but we are not told in what ways storytelling and baptism are related, what makes storytelling an extended baptism rather than an extended definition, etc. Even if we accept Zalta's argument, it is not clear that storytelling is an extended baptism. For all the argument purports to show is that

[7] Zalta 2003.

storytelling and baptism are speech acts similar to proposing a definition; that is, to use Austin's terminology, that the two are performative utterances. Now, the class of performatives is fairly large, so establishing that storytelling and baptism are both performatives is just the first step in making the argument Zalta needs. Regardless, taken as a complete argument or just as part of a larger argument, Zalta's conclusion does not follow. In Chapter II we will set out a taxonomy of speech acts. In Chapter III we will use this taxonomy to evaluate the claim that storytelling is the same speech act as baptism and will conclude that storytelling cannot serve as a baptism for fictional characters.

# CHAPTER II

## ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

J. L. Austin introduced an interesting type of utterance in his paper "Performative Utterances:" by uttering a 'performative' one does not report any facts (including the fact about what one is doing); rather, to utter a performative is—in itself—to do something, to make something the case beyond the utterance itself. The standard examples of performatives include 'I dub thee *N.N.*,' 'I now pronounce you husband and wife,' 'I promise to *A*,' etc. In each of these examples, the act of uttering is what counts as naming, marrying, or promising: there is not some other act behind the scenes on which these utterances report—the speaker does what she aims to do simply by uttering the appropriate thing. Utterance alone does not a performative make, however, most performatives are governed by conventions.[8] An utterance of 'I hereby name this ship *N*' does not perform the action of naming a ship outside of a convention of naming ships; one cannot walk up to the U.S.S. Alabama in Mobile Bay and name it 'Boy George' by simply uttering 'I hereby name this ship "Boy George;"' a ship can only be named according to certain conventions that determine who can name it and when and how it can be named. An utterance that fails to conform to the required conventions is, in Austin's terminology, infelicitous.

Historically, talk of performatives gave way to talk of illocutionary acts. This move accommodates the intuition that assessments, commands, promises, reports, and apologies are all 'performatives' too, that they are all speech acts. (Austin's

[8] For an interesting discussion of the role of conventions in performatives, see Strawson 1964.

illocutionary taxonomy calls these verdictives, exercitives, commissives, expositives, and behabitives, respectively.[9]) While Austin's early paper is important historically and includes a number of key insights, it is not the most precise formulation of a taxonomy of illocutionary acts. We therefore turn to the more recent work of John Searle.

The first point Searle makes is that illocutionary acts are in many cases conflated with the English verbs that convey them. (Austin himself makes this mistake.) A taxonomy of illocutionary verbs can be useful, but it seriously limits the applicability of the taxonomy. For one thing, a taxonomy of illocutionary verbs is only applicable to one language. Further, a taxonomy of verbs only classifies explicit performative utterances—e.g., 'I order you to *Y*' and 'I promise to do *X*'—thereby neglecting the wide range of implicit illocutionary speech acts. Searle focuses his taxonomy on illocutionary forces, rather than verbs. Instead of classifying 'order,' 'command,' 'ask,' 'request,' etc., he classifies speech acts into broader categories such as 'acts which commit the speaker to a future action' and 'acts which attempt to get the hearer to commit an action.' Searle's taxonomy is most clearly laid out in the books *Speech Acts* (1969), *Expression and Meaning* (1979), and *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic* (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). Though the specifics of the taxonomy—the criteria for classifying illocutionary acts—shift somewhat throughout this time period, the method behind the taxonomy remains both consistent and effective. In this chapter I present a truncated version of the taxonomy found in Searle's *Expression and Meaning* and then explain the developments and alterations to the taxonomy found in his *Foundations of Illocutionary*

[9] See Austin 2001.

*Logic*. I then offer a new interpretation of the taxonomy that culls the central features and insights from both versions of the taxonomy while jettisoning some problems found in *Expression* and *Foundations*.

In *Expression and Meaning*, Searle splits illocutionary acts up into five classes of illocutionary force: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives. In order to derive these five illocutionary forces and classify particular speech acts according to them, Searle introduces a taxonomy that relies on 12 criteria. These criteria serve to group and sort illocutionary acts. In this version of the taxonomy, Searle takes the following three criteria to be the most important:

(i) Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act.
(ii) Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world.
(iii) Differences in expressed psychological states (Searle, 1979, 2-8). [10]

These criteria are used to classify speech acts by illocutionary force; this is a rough-grained classification but is all our interpretation will need from *Expression*.

Criterion (i) is what Searle will call "illocutionary point" and is, generally, what the speaker is trying to do with an utterance; is she trying to name a person, report on the events of her day, or get a hearer to shut the door? Searle will later say, "In general we can say that the illocutionary point of a type of illocutionary act is that purpose which is essential to its being an act of that type" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 14). This is the most straightforward and least technical of the three criteria here: the illocutionary point is just the point of the utterance.

[10] The numbering in the original is in decimal notation and has been changed here; similarly, the original is all in italics and has been changed here as well.

Criterion (ii), the direction of fit of an illocutionary act, refers to the relation between the words of an utterance and the world. There are two directions of fit: a speaker can try to make the propositional content expressed by her utterance match up with the world or a speaker can try to get the world to match up with the propositional content expressed by her utterance. In the former case, the word-to-world direction of fit, the speaker tries to speak truthfully, to accurately represent the way things are with her utterance; in the latter case, the world-to-word direction of fit, the speaker tries to get the world to change in some way to match the propositional content of her utterance. This distinction is perhaps best explained in a story told by Searle:

> Suppose a man goes to the supermarket with a shopping list given him by his wife on which are written the words 'beans, butter, bacon, and bread'. Suppose as he goes around with his shopping cart selecting these items, he is followed by a detective who writes down everything he takes. As they emerge from the store both shopper and detective will have identical lists. But the function of the two lists will be quite different. In the case of the shopper's list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the world to match the words; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the list. In the case of the detective, the purpose of the list is to make the words match the world; the man is supposed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper. This can be further demonstrated by observing the role of 'mistake' in the two cases. If the detective gets home and suddenly realizes that the man bought pork chops instead of bacon, he can simply erase the word 'bacon' and write 'pork chops'. But if the shopper gets home and his wife points out that he has bought pork chops when he should have bought bacon he cannot correct the mistake by erasing 'bacon' from the list and writing 'pork chops'. (Searle 1979, 3-4)

So, to recap: an utterance with a world-to-word direction of fit is one in which the speaker tries to get the state of affairs expressed in the propositional content of an utterance to obtain via the actions of some agent—hearer or speaker—while a word-to-

world direction of fit is one in which the speaker seeks to accurately represent the world in the propositional content of her utterance.

In addition to the two primary directions of fit, Searle introduces the null direction of fit and the double direction of fit. In the null direction of fit, "the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed" (Searle 1979, 15). The null direction of fit is characterized by expressive utterances, e.g., 'I am sorry' and 'Thank you.' For an utterance of 'I am sorry' to be successful, the speaker must indeed be sorry. However, the speaker is not trying to get her words to match the world, since in a successful utterance of 'I am sorry' the speaker *must* be sorry. An assertion tries to get the words of the utterance to match the world—the speaker tries to speak truthfully—but in a successful utterance of 'I am sorry' the speaker cannot help but speak truthfully. The double direction of fit, on the other hand, is when the speaker does "attempt to get language to match the world [. . . b]ut they do not attempt to do it either by describing an existing state of affairs [. . .] nor by trying to get someone to bring about a future state of affairs" (Searle 1979, 19). A successful utterance of 'I dub thee *N.N.*' changes the world, it makes it such that the name *N.N.* refers to a new object. However, this utterance does not try to get the world to match her words; rather, she makes the world match her words by utterance alone. Other examples of the double direction of fit are 'You're out' and 'I now pronounce you husband and wife.' These are utterances in which the speaker affects a change by merely speaking.

Lastly, the sincerity conditions of an utterance (criterion (iii)) are the intentions a speaker must have toward the propositional content of his or her utterance. This is perhaps an even more straightforward criterion than illocutionary point, as Searle quickly points out that there are only three possible sincerity conditions for the five illocutionary forces. In the discussion of the five illocutionary forces that follows, Searle's understanding of sincerity conditions will come to light, so to avoid repetition I will not elaborate on them any more here.

As noted, Searle's taxonomy includes five categories of illocutionary forces: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives. Assertives have the illocutionary point of committing "the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition;" (Searle 1979, 12) their direction of fit is word-to-world—they are veridical; their sincerity condition is belief, i.e. the speaker is committed to believing, to some degree, the proposition he or she asserts. Example assertives are 'suggest,' 'insist,' 'state,' and 'conclude;' "the simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false," though this will give neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the class (Searle 1979, 13).

Among the illocutionary force of directives we find orders, commands, invitations, questions, and advice. The illocutionary point of a directive is to get the hearer to do something; the direction of fit is world-to-word, since they are attempts to make the world (the actions of the hearer) match the propositional content of the utterance; and their sincerity condition is desire, a desire on the part of the speaker, to some degree, that the hearer commit a future action. For example: 'Clean your room' is

an attempt on the part of a speaker to get a hearer to clean her room, 'I beg you not to tell *N*' is an attempt to get a hearer to not divulge some information, and 'I'll let you go to the movies tonight' is an attempt to get the hearer to go to the movies by way of granting permission so to do.

Commissives parallel directives: their illocutionary point is to commit the speaker to a future action; their direction of fit is therefore also world-to-word; and their sincerity condition is intention: a speaker cannot (successfully) utter a commissive without intending to make the propositional content expressed therein obtain. 'Swear,' 'promise,' 'vow,' and 'pledge' all carry the commissive illocutionary force: 'I swear to tell the truth' is an utterance that commits the speaker to doing something; namely: telling the truth.

Expressives, such as 'congratulate' and 'thank,' differ greatly from their predecessors. "The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content" (Searle 1979, 15). Expressives have no direction of fit, since the truth of the proposition expressed must be presupposed, and their sincerity condition is a variable ranging over "the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of the illocutionary acts in this class" (Searle 1979, 16). So when one utters 'Thank you,' one is expressing the fact that they feel gratitude toward the hearer.

The final, and most pertinent to our discussion, is the declarative illocutionary force. Among declarations we find utterances such as 'You're fired,' 'I quit,' and 'I dub thee *N.N.*' The illocutionary point of declarations is to make something the case; Searle

claims that "it is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world" (Searle, 1979 16-17). While directives and commissives seek to make the world match the proposition expressed via an agent (either hearer or speaker), declarations have no direction of fit precisely because they require no such agent—the successful utterance of 'I quit' makes it such that the speaker has quit: the world matches the words of the utterance in virtue of their (successful) utterance alone. In *Expression and Meaning*, Searle claims that declarations have no sincerity conditions; he later changes his mind however and claims that declarations can only be successfully uttered if the speaker both believes that she has the power she is invoking (e.g. the power to baptize an object), and the desire to "bring about the state of affairs represented" by her utterance (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57). The latter, two-fold sincerity condition is more plausible, as this conforms with the fact (acknowledged by both Austin and Searle) that declarations are, with few exceptions, governed by conventions. An utterance of 'You're out' in a major league baseball game is not a declaration when the speaker is the shortstop—since this speaker cannot believe that he can bring this state of affairs about in virtue of his utterance. When the speaker is the umpire, however, 'You're out' *makes* the base-runner out. The umpire's utterance carries this power and weight in virtue of the umpire's (true) belief that he can call runners out and his desire to utter a declarative or make something the case.[11] When the shortstop utters 'You're out'

[11] The notion of *desire* used here is a weak one and it is not intended to capture all our intuitions. There

the utterance has an assertive illocutionary force: it expresses the shortstop's belief that the base-runner is out; when the umpire utters 'You're out' the player *is* out, whether the instant replay proves the umpire right or not; it is the umpire's successful uttering of 'You're out' that makes the base-runner out, not an objective fact about relations between the base-runner, base-player, and ball.[12]

In *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*, Searle significantly alters the characteristics of illocutionary acts, though his taxonomy follows the same mechanism just outlined. Two significant things happen to the taxonomy in the period between 1979 and 1985: first, direction of fit ostensibly falls out of the characteristics of an illocutionary act; second, the twelve criteria condense to seven. This latter change is a good one for the reader, as the seven are much more precise than the twelve—though they still are not as pellucid as some might like. The former change is not desirable and its motivation is not apparent: though the new "seven components of illocutionary force" do not include direction of fit when they are given to the reader on pages 12-20, direction of fit shows up as central to the classification and derivation of the five illocutionary points on pages 52-62. Direction of fit does not make it into the components of illocutionary force, though we are told that "the five different

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are certainly many cases where a speaker must utter a declarative, though she does not want to (e.g., say the umpire is a die-hard Red Sox fan and the player he is calling out is a Red Sox player). Our notion of *desire* needs to accommodate these sorts of cases and Searle's claim that "the psychological states expressed in all declarations are belief and desire. A speaker who declares that *P* expresses simultaneously his desire to bring about the state of affairs represented by *P* and his belief that his utterance is bringing it about" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57-58). The umpire's desire to call the runner out is small, but she must have one. If *P* is the state of affairs in which the runner is out, the umpire desires to bring about *P* in virtue of another desire to be an honest umpire. This desire commits her to desiring to bring about any state of affairs which she, as an expert, thinks should obtain.

[12] Of course an umpire can be overruled by a fellow umpire or made to change his or her mind by an irate player or coach, but in ordinary circumstances the umpire's calling a player out makes the player out.

illocutionary points exhaust the different possible directions of fit between the propositional content and the world," (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 53) so it is clearly still central to illocutionary force.

Searle might want to minimize direction of fit because, as he admits in *Expression*, while there are only four directions of fit there are five illocutionary forces. The taxonomy would be strengthened if there were a one-to-one correspondence between illocutionary forces and direction of fit. Though reducing the two forces with a world-to-word direction of fit would be optimal, Searle's inability to do this does not provide a sufficient reason to push direction of fit out of the components of illocutionary force. We are here interested in determining whether one type of utterance (storytelling) can be said to be an extension of another type of utterance (baptism). In order to determine this we will need to be able to classify the two speech acts very precisely; this is the reason for favoring the taxonomy of *Foundations* over that of *Expression*—but a taxonomy that incorporates both will suit our purposes better than either in isolation.

The taxonomy ought to be understood as dividing up utterances in two ways. First, given an utterance, we use (i)-(iii) to make a rough-grained classification, to put the utterance under an illocutionary force. This is to distinguish 'It rained today' from 'Loan me a dollar'—it is to sort the assertives from the directives, etc. Once we have determined that an utterance is, e.g., an assertive, we are in a position to decide if the utterance needs to be further classified. If so, we can make the fine-grained classifications within the assertive force: we tell guesses from assertions and assertions from testimony using the five components of illocutionary force. These two types of

classification are distinct and have as an analogy the distinction between classifying animals by genus (illocutionary force) and classifying them by species (illocutionary acts). To be certain, a full scientific or philosophical analysis of a speech act will require both classifications, and the genus/force classification must precede the species/act classification; however, the rough-grained classification will often suffice as a stopping point for classification: just as knowing that an animal is a monkey (without knowing that it is a vervet monkey) is often sufficient, so too does knowing that an utterance is an assertive rather than a directive often do the job.

The classification of an illocutionary act is a pragmatic thing, often done on the fly. Illocutionary force is tied directly to meaning, and classifying an illocutionary act is closely related to determining its meaning. When a husband says to his wife 'We just don't understand each other anymore,' she needs to know whether this is an observation on his part or a suggestion that they need to change their ways; when a mother tells a daughter to clean her room, it is important that the daughter know whether it is a suggestion, request, or order. The case of the couple is one in which a hearer needs to determine the illocutionary *force* of the utterance: is he asserting *P* or suggesting that we do *Q*? The case of the mother and daughter is one in which the hearer needs to make a distinction between two illocutionary *acts*: is she suggesting this or ordering it? These are two different uses of the taxonomy which, as such, have not been recognized by Searle. His taxonomy does allow for the ambiguity in both situations to be resolved, but it requires the same process in both when an abbreviated version would be more appropriate for the first (the couple). For this reason, we ought to take Searle's insight in

*Expression* that illocutionary point, direction of fit, and sincerity conditions are central to illocutionary force as seriously as we take the insight in *Foundations* that there are five other components that identify individual acts within a force. The taxonomic mechanism then ought to consist of a rough-grained sorting of illocutionary force that first groups illocutions according to the five categories (based on point, direction of fit, and sincerity conditions) then, when necessary, a fine-grained sorting of illocutionary verbs and utterances into illocutionary acts (based on (1)-(5) presented below) can be used to distinguish any two different illocutionary acts that share a force from one another. In what follows I will spell out the fine-grained sorting mechanism; we will then employ this two-tiered mechanism for the rest of our discussion of 'baptism' and 'storytelling.'

In *Foundations*, Searle claims that there are seven components of illocutionary force: illocutionary point, degree of strength of illocutionary point, mode of achievement of illocutionary point, propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and degree of sincerity conditions. In our interpretation of this taxonomy, illocutionary point and sincerity conditions have will have been taken into account by the time the components of illocutionary force are used, so we will leave those out at this step and instead focus on the other 5 components.[13]

(1) Degree of strength of illocutionary point: The amount of force accompanying an utterance; e.g. begging is a much stronger way for a speaker to try to get something than requesting.

[13] Our numbering will then differ from Searle's.

(2) Mode of achievement of illocutionary point: Any special conditions which must be met for a successful utterance of that illocution; the speaker who utters 'Drop and give me twenty' must be in a special position of authority over a hearer for the utterance to be successful, assuming that the hearer is an ordinary individual and is not renowned for her willingness to demonstrate her athletic prowess.

(3) Propositional content conditions: Limitations on what can be said within a given illocutionary force; one cannot say "'I order you to have eaten beans last week'" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 16) because of constraints on the propositional content of directives; likewise, one cannot promise to punch the hearer in the face (under ordinary circumstances), since this is doubtless not in the interest of the hearer, though one can well threaten to do just this.

(4) Preparatory conditions: Conditions that must obtain if the utterance is to be successful; for example: the ability for the hearer of a directive to make the propositional content obtain or that there be evidence a hearer can reference when a speaker asserts that they have proven something.

(5) Degree of strength of sincerity conditions: The degree to which one e.g. believes the propositional content of an assertion; a key difference between 'testifying that *P*,' 'asserting that *P*,' 'suggesting that *P*,' and 'guessing that *P*' is that one can believe *P* less as one progresses from 'testifying' to 'guessing.'

We know that 'I dub thee *N.N.*' and 'I quit' are utterances with the illocutionary force of declaratives in virtue of their illocutionary point, direction of fit, and sincerity conditions; we know that the utterances do not mean the same thing (that one attaches a

name to an object and the other terminates the speaker's employment) because, minimally, we know that the preparatory conditions for the two are different. Classifying these utterances as declaratives uses the rough-grained classifying mechanism of (i)-(iii). Classifying 'I dub thee *N.N.*' and 'I quit' as two distinct illocutionary acts requires the fine-grained mechanism of (1)-(5). It must typically be the case that the speaker has the authority of an institution to baptize another person, but there is no such requirement for a successful utterance of 'I quit.' If one person 'insists that *A*' and another 'requests that *A*,' the two differ in degree of strength of illocutionary point, preparatory conditions, and (possibly) propositional content conditions; insisting and requesting are therefore not the same illocutionary act, though they are both directives. We can likewise determine two illocutionary acts to be identical just in case we can ascertain that they have the same illocutionary force and are identical in all five components of illocutionary force.

Though Searle does not address the issue of speech act *extension* directly, he does recognize that something like extension can happen to illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts are propositions (or propositional content) expressed with a particular illocutionary force. Searle introduces a notation to symbolize this relationship, $F(P)$, wherein $F$ is the illocutionary force behind the utterance and $P$ the propositional content of the utterance. The purpose of this notation is to eliminate confusion when talking about illocutionary commitment and indirect speech acts. One utterance, e.g., 'Can you reach the salt?' might mean both the ordinary directive and another directive such as 'Pass the salt.' In this case, $F_1(P_1)$ is an utterance with the propositional content ($P_1$) of

'Can you reach the salt?' and the force ($F_1$) of a directive, i.e., a question about the hearer's ability to reach the salt. However, this utterance might, and often does, mean that the speaker wants the hearer to pass the salt, so the utterance also has the propositional content ($P_2$) of 'Pass the salt' and the force ($F_2$) of a directive, i.e., a request. Searle tells us:

> *an illocutionary act of the form* $F_1(P_1)$ *commits the speaker to an illocutionary act* $F_2(P_2)$ iff in the successful performance of $F_1(P_1)$:
> (A) The speaker achieves (strong) or is committed (weak) to the illocutionary point of $F_2$ on $P_2$ with the required mode of achievement and degree of strength of $F_2$.
> (B) He is committed to all the preparatory conditions of $F_2(P_2)$ and to the propositional presuppositions.
> (C) He commits himself to having the psychological state specified by the sincerity conditions of $F_2(P_2)$ with the required degree of strength.
> (D) $P_2$ satisfies the propositional content of $F_2$ with respect to the context of utterance. (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 24)[14]

Searle suggests that one can only be committed to an illocutionary act strongly or weakly: strong illocutionary commitments are the illocutionary acts that a speaker performed in virtue of performing another speech act while weak illocutionary commitments are those that are inferred from an utterance. In this chapter I present an exposition of Searle's discussion of weak and strong illocutionary commitment; this discussion will serve as a framework for our evaluation of Zalta's argument.

Strong illocutionary commitments are rather straightforward: when a speaker utters 'I know John ran a four-minute mile' she has asserted that she has knowledge about an event and she has asserted that this event occurred—that John has indeed run a four-minute mile. Likewise, when a judge says 'I order you to appear before the court

[14] (A)-(D) are (1)-(4) in Searle; they have been changed here to avoid confusion with the five components of illocutionary force.

on Tuesday,' her utterance has the illocutionary point of ordering the defendant to appear before court and carries the strong illocutionary commitment of giving the defendant permission to appear before the court. Strong illocutionary commitments are easiest to see in cases where one illocutionary verb is just a stronger version of another: 'begging' is strongly committed to 'asking' because you cannot beg for something without asking for it as well; likewise 'swearing' implies 'promising,' and 'insisting' 'asserting.' But there are also cases of strong illocutionary commitment where $F_1(P_1)$ is of a different illocutionary force than $F_2(P_2)$: 'Shut the door' is a directive that commits the speaker to an assertive equivalent to 'The door is open,' else there would be no need to order the hearer to shut the door.

It is clear that strong illocutionary commitment meets Searle's (A)-(D) above. Since strong illocutionary commitment is characterized as a speaker's having committed an act $F_2(P_2)$ in virtue of her utterance of act $F_1(P_1)$, it makes sense to talk about a speaker being strongly committed to $F_2(P_2)$ in virtue of the degree of strength of illocutionary commitment of $F_1(P_1)$ or in virtue of the degree of strength of sincerity conditions of $F_1(P_1)$. In fact, with the exception of (3) propositional content conditions, it is appropriate to talk about strong illocutionary commitment (i.e. extension) *in virtue of* each of the five components of illocutionary force taken individually. In chapter four we will do just this, though this is always shorthand for saying that $F_1(P_1)$ strongly commits the speaker to $F_2(P_2)$ and the most salient feature of this commitment is e.g. the degree of strength of illocutionary commitment, though *any* case of illocutionary commitment must meet all four clauses of the definition proposed by Searle.

Consider a case where a student utters 'I'm begging you to give me an A' in the context of a discussion with a teacher about a grade. The student is explicitly begging (a directive) and is at the same time committed to a host of other illocutionary acts, including a request (another directive) that the teacher give her an A and an assertion that she does not already have an A. This case of strong illocutionary commitment meets the four clauses in the following ways. (A) If $F_1$ is the illocutionary force of begging and $P_1$ is the proposition expressed by 'Give me an A,' then the speaker has achieved $F_2$ (requesting) with the required mode of achievement and degree of strength because doing so is part of achieving $F_1$; an analogy here is counting: in the process of successfully counting to a number $n \geq 2$ one must successfully count to $n$-1. (B) The preparatory conditions and propositional presuppositions required for $F_1(P_1)$ include all those for the successful utterance of $F_2(P_2)$, so this condition is satisfied. (C) The same reasoning shows that this condition is satisfied as well, since a stronger desire is needed to successfully beg than is needed to successfully request. Finally, (D) in this case $P_2$ does satisfy the propositional content of $F_2$, as one can certainly utter a weak directive, such as requesting, on a propositional content if one can successfully utter a stronger directive, begging, on the same propositional content.

The notion of weak illocutionary commitment encompasses both indirect speech acts and conversational implicature.[15] To explain weak illocutionary commitment, Searle gives the following example:

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[15] What is said here of indirect speech acts holds of conversational implicature. See Recanati 1987, 121-126 for arguments that "indirect speech acts are nothing but a special case of conversational implicature, where the speaker's intention to perform the indirect speech act is conversationally implicated by his performance of the direct speech act" (Recanati 2001, 266). For a discussion of conversational

Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight.
Student Y: I have to study for an exam. (Searle 1979, 33)

Student Y has explicitly uttered an assertive, but if Y's response stopped there it would be wholly inadequate, it would not be an appropriate response to X's directive. In order for Student Y's response to make sense in the context she must be committed to a directive to the effect of 'I cannot go to the movies tonight' (this is a directive because it is the rejection of an offer, which is a directive). The assertive in this case, while explicit and therefore "literal", is secondary, and the directive is "indirect" but primary (Searle 1979, 34). The class of weak illocutionary commitments is larger and more variegated than their strong counterparts. While there are standard, exemplar cases of weak illocutionary commitment (the question 'Can you pass the salt?' has as its primary meaning, almost without exception, an indirect request), their reliance on context and conventions makes the workings of weak illocutionary commitments less obvious than those of strong illocutionary commitments.

In the case of Student Y's utterance we are concerned with showing that Y's primary illocutionary act is the rejection of X's offer; $F_1$ is the illocutionary force of assertion and $P_1$ is the proposition expressed by 'I have to study for an exam' while $F_2$ is the illocutionary force of a directive and $P_2$ is the propositional content of 'I cannot go to the movies tonight:' (A) Y is committed to $F_2$ on $P_2$ if $F_1(P_1)$ is to count as a adequate reply to X and Y has the required mode of achievement and degree of strength for $F_2$—since Y is able to determine what she will or will not do this evening and, presumably,

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implicature more generally, see Grice 2001. Martinich 2001 suggests that indirect speech acts can be understood within the framework of conversational implicature when he uses Grice's maxims to argue that storytelling is not an illocutionary act that weakly commits an author to a directive such as 'I order you to imagine *P*'.

intends her reply to be an appropriate response to X, we can conclude that Y's utterance meets this criterion; (B) she is likewise committed to the preparatory conditions and propositional presuppositions of $F_2(P_2)$, namely she is committed to the truth of the assertions regarding her having an exam and her inability to simultaneously study and watch a movie; (C) Y has a desire to reject X's offer; and (D) $P_2$ satisfies the propositional content of $F_2$, that is to say $P_2$ is a state of affairs that X can bring about (namely the state of affairs wherein X does not ask Y to do anything else this evening).

# CHAPTER III

## STORYTELLING AND STANDARD BAPTISM

Zalta is concerned with showing that storytelling is an extension of baptism, that the notion of 'baptism' ought to encompass a group of acts rather than the one single act (characterized by the utterance 'I dub thee *N.N.*') traditionally associated with the term and this group of acts ought to include storytelling utterances as well.[16] On the face of it, this proposal is trivial: it would be short sighted indeed to believe that *every* name in the world was bestowed upon its bearer via an utterance of 'I dub thee *N.N.*' Though there are many reasons think the class of baptismal utterances broader than the exemplar case, the most obvious are that this is clearly the stilted language of philosophical discourse and not the sort of sentence the average person would ever utter and that this view would assume that everyone is baptized in English. The idea of *a* or *the* standard baptismal locution is not to be taken seriously; rather, this locution is to be taken as a model for the type of act required to baptize an individual. While this exact utterance is not necessary to establish reference, it follows a formula that characterizes the (still rather narrow) class of baptismal locutions. The standard philosophical notion of 'baptism' requires simply that a name be connected with an individual by way of a causal interaction between the speaker and the named. Within this notion there is a natural bias toward

[16] One might wonder if Zalta needs to make this argument at all: perhaps Searle's account of storytelling can be adapted to suit Zalta's ontology. However, Searle's theory is a variation on pretense theory (see Searle 1969). Searle argues that storytelling utterances are staged utterances of other speech acts, not a speech act of their own, and it is hard to see how this could be adapted to ground the reference of fictional names *to abstract objects*. In Zalta 2000, Zalta argues that his own ontology (which he there calls object theory) and pretense theory can be reconciled, but (a) this requires a deviation from the Meinongian ontology, (b) the viability of this move is doubtful, and (c) evaluating this option fully would take us beyond the scope of this paper.

ordinary objects, however: the act of naming is typically taken to involve an ostensive reference to the named, usually taken to be some sort of gesture made in the presence of the named, and nonexistent objects cannot be so referred to. An utterance can deviate greatly from 'I dub thee *N.N.*' but still count as 'baptismal' if it follows this general pattern. Zalta tries to show that 'storytelling' follows this pattern, ostensibly picking out fictional characters in the process. An utterance of '*N.N.*' by a parent in response to a nurse's utterance of 'What will the little one's name be?' is taken as a baptismal utterance, even if the child is not in the room at the time of utterance. We actually let a broad range of utterances count as baptismal, so Zalta's suggestion that we take 'baptism' as a class of utterances that is broader than the standard, exemplar utterance is in fact already heeded. However, it is not clear that 'storytelling' is similar enough to any utterance typically accepted as baptismal to warrant Zalta's proposed extension.

In formulating a definition of the notion of *extension* we can take cues from Zalta's argument for the extension of baptism. Zalta argues from the following observations to the conclusion that storytelling is an extended baptism:

1. 'I dub thee *N.N.*' is "a speech act more like proposing a definition than asserting something about the object being baptized;"
2. within the theory of abstract objects, storytelling "is a speech act more similar to definition than assertion;" and
3. while in a standard baptism a name need only be used once, in storytelling the name is used repeatedly. (Zalta 2003, 7-8)

The notion of extension used here focuses on both type of speech act and length of utterance. Zalta does not spell out this notion, but from the argument just given, it appears that Zalta might like to try the following definition:

($Df_1$) Speech act *a** *extends* another speech act *a* just in case (i) *a** and *a* share an illocutionary force and (ii) *a** is longer than *a*.[17]

This definition cannot be accepted because it is not suitably precise to determine that storytelling is an extended baptism without also allowing that storytelling is an extended resignation, blessing, and excommunication (as these share an illocutionary force and all are, characteristically, shorter than stories). There are problems with both clauses of this definition. One obvious problem is that (i) uses the entirely too broad notion of illocutionary force, and illocutionary force does not group illocutionary acts closely enough for this purpose. In what follows we will use the five components of illocutionary force to try to find a replacement clause (or clauses) for (i). This alone will not fix the definition; an evaluation of (ii) will show that length of utterance, word repetition, etc. have nothing to do with an utterances classification as a particular speech act, so (ii) must be amended or rejected as well.

Any notion of extension derived from the components of illocutionary force will rely heavily on the idea of one illocutionary act accomplishing another by being stronger or larger or broader than the other. So 'asserting' is extended by 'testifying' in relation to the five components of illocutionary force because, to put it roughly, 'testifying' is a

[17] 'Longer than' might need to defined as well: though it is intended in a non-technical sense we could take it that utterance *x* is 'longer than' utterance *y* iff *x* has more syllables than *y*.

stronger illocutionary act than 'asserting:' 'testifying *P*' is a way to 'assert *P*' and more. We might then amend (i) in our definition of extension as follows:

> ($Df_2$) Speech act *a** *extends* another act *a* just in case (i) a speaker who successfully performs *a** will also perform *a* and (ii) *a** is longer than *a*.

Clause (i) fits the description of strong illocutionary commitment; this suggests that (i) is a good clause for our definition. Before we embark on a discussion of Searle's notion of illocutionary commitment and its applicability to baptism and storytelling we need to deal with clause (ii) of the notion of extension. It seems that we might be able to squeeze something like (ii) in under (3)'s propositional content conditions. Length is clearly a key factor in distinguishing storytelling from a standard baptism; though removal of this difference might not make storytelling identical to standard baptism, it would certainly help in making Zalta's case. The Meinongian might suggest that storytelling extends baptism via propositional content conditions because storytelling allows for greater propositional content than standard baptism: storytelling does more than standard baptizing because it baptizes on a grander scale—consider Zalta's assertion that "an author simultaneously baptizes both a story and its characters through a storytelling," (Zalta 2003, 9) and the fact that "the characters of a story are the objects which exemplify properties according to it[: . . .] any story objects, not just real or imaginary persons or animals" (Zalta 1983, 92). But it cannot be the case that storytelling is an extended baptism simply by virtue of its having more propositional content than baptism.

To see why the sheer length of storytelling alone fails to make it an extended baptism consider the illocutionary act of a 'christening' or Christian baptism. There are a wide range of illocutions that count as christening locutions; these differ not in content but in length of utterance. 'You are hereby baptized' will suffice to baptize an individual under the right circumstances. If length of propositional content were enough to justify a claim that one illocutionary act extends another, it seems reasonable to think that if any two illocutionary acts differ significantly in length we ought to consider them two distinct acts of which one is the extension of the other. But then 'You are hereby baptized' would be a different illocutionary act than a long baptism wherein the speaker utters '. . . I baptize you my brother/sister in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; buried with Christ in baptism, raised to walk in the newness of life . . ..' If these two do not differ greatly enough to warrant the introduction of distinct illocutionary acts, then surely the 12 page long Episcopal baptismal service ought to differ enough from 'You are hereby baptized' to be an extension of said utterance if anything does. But it does not. This point is further illustrated by considering another example. Many high school students find themselves writing a report in the course of their studies. Their skills are not very well developed, so the teacher usually requires a report of, say, 1500 words. The paper the students turn in should be considered a reporting speech act. Now, consider all 336 pages of *The Starr Report: The Official Report of the Independent Counsel's Investigation of the President*. We have no problem recognizing that both utterances are reports, though the one is clearly longer than the other. Again, if the length of utterance alone does determine a difference between speech acts, it must do so

in this example. But again, these two are reports. So, length of utterance alone neither belongs in (3) nor serves to differentiate illocutionary acts; though the disparity in length between 'You are hereby baptized' and the Episcopal baptismal service does serve to differentiate *utterance* acts, it bears no significance on *illocutionary* acts. Clause (ii) in our definition is then a red herring; amending our notion of extension to reflect this gives us:

($Df_3$) Speech act *a** *extends* another act *a* just in case a speaker who successfully performs *a** will also perform *a*.

The five illocutionary forces are too broad for us to say that if any two acts *a* and *a** share a force, *a** is an extension of *a*: we would not say, for example, that 'refusing' is an extension of 'accepting' or 'begging' of 'warning,' though the former are both commissives and the latter both directives. Since illocutionary forces are so clearly delineated by Searle's five components (and are given their identity conditions by said components) it seems that the logical way for one act to extend another would be found here.

(1) Degree of strength of illocutionary point: 'Asking' and 'commanding' differ in regards to degree of strength of illocutionary point. 'Asking *P*' and 'commanding *P*' are both attempts to get a hearer to bring *P* about and are both therefore directives; but 'commanding' is a stronger way to achieve this point than 'asking.' 'Commanding' might then be understood as an 'extended asking.' To 'beg for *x*' is a very strong way to 'ask for *x*,' similarly, to 'guess *y*' is weak way to 'assert *y*.' By contrast, to 'tell a story about *N.N.*' is *not* a strong way to 'baptize *N.N.*,' nor is to 'baptize *N.N.*' a weak way to

'tell a story about *N.N.*,' if we continue to take a story to be a fictional thing. The degree of strength relationship is not symmetrical—'beg' is a stronger way to 'ask,' but 'ask' is not a stronger way to 'beg.' But every degree of strength relationship implies a converse degree of strength relationship—since 'beg' is a stronger way to 'ask,' 'ask' is a weaker way to 'beg.' Since 'storytelling' is a supposed extension of 'baptism,' we will assume that 'storytelling' is a stronger way to 'baptize' an object. But we cannot then say that 'baptizing' is a weaker way to accomplish 'storytelling,' so these two illocutionary acts cannot lie on an spectrum of degree of strength of illocutionary force in the way that 'ask' and 'beg' do: 'storytelling' cannot extend 'baptism' via degree of strength of illocutionary force. As further support for this claim consider Searle's assertion that for declarations the "degree of strength of illocutionary point [. . . is] null" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 61): the degree of strength of illocutionary point for a declaration, such as 'baptize' is either 'yes' or 'no,' either it works or it does not, and 'storytelling,' if it turns out to be a declaration at all, would have the same null degree of strength of illocutionary point, so one clearly cannot be greater than the other. Therefore, 'storytelling' cannot extend 'baptism' in this way via degree of strength of illocutionary point.

(2) Mode of achievement of illocutionary point: In his discussion of the mode of achievement of illocutionary point, Searle claims that "some, but not all, illocutionary acts require a special way or special set of conditions under which their illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of a speech act," (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 15) and he offers as an example the fact that an order must be given under certain

conditions if it is to be distinguished from a request (the speaker must be in a position of authority over the hearer for a directive to count as an order). Taking this lead from Searle and mirroring the discussion of degree of strength of illocutionary point above, we might well suppose that a speech act *a** extends speech act *a* via mode of achievement of illocutionary point just in case the mode of achievement of *a** includes the mode of achievement of *a*. The mode of achievement of illocutionary point most often depends on the relations between speaker and hearer and the facts about the context of their discourse. In the discussion of We can say that 'order' strongly commits one to 'suggest' because when a speaker is in the position to 'order' a hearer, that person is also in a position to 'suggest' the person to do the same thing. If a father says to his daughter, 'You must clean your room this Saturday,' he has committed himself to suggesting that she clean her room (a weaker act) in virtue of a stronger utterance that he has the power to make because he is her parent, though he could well have simply suggested it to her. Similarly, when a judge says, 'I order you to appear before the court,' she has 'ordered' the accused to come to court, but she has also 'permitted' the accused to do the same; though she could have just 'permitted' the accused to appear before the court, she uses the stronger illocution, and this illocution is only at her disposal because of her status in relation to the hearer. (The judge could not order the defense lawyer to cut her lawn because she has no authority so to do—though she could ask this of him or her, the judge's utterance cannot be an ordering illocutionary act.)

To argue that storytelling extends baptizing in virtue of the mode of achievement of illocutionary point, Zalta might try to use an analogy with the previously described

relationship between order and suggest. That is, he might argue that just as one must have greater credentials, so to speak, to order than one does to suggest, a speaker needs greater credentials to tell a story than to baptize. Searle tells us that "all declarative illocutionary forces have the mode of achievement that the speaker invokes his power or authority to perform the declaration," (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57) so perhaps the power of an author is similar to the power of a parent or judge. An important feature in the relationship between order and suggest is that, in our example, the father was able to choose between suggesting that his daughter clean her room and ordering her so to do. This feature is not unique to our example. Other utterance pairs that have this relationship include argue/assert, swear/commit, and beg/request.[18]

In the case of 'storytelling,' however, Doyle could not choose to simply 'baptize' Holmes rather than tell a story about him—since it is a consequence of Zalta's notion of 'storytelling' that the only way to baptize a character is through telling a story about it. That a speaker in a certain position can choose to utter illocutionary act *a* or the stronger illocutionary act *a** is a central to *a**s extending *a*. Or: *a** strongly commits a speaker to *a* in virtue of mode of achievement of preparatory conditions iff the speaker could, all other things being equal, choose to use *a* rather than *a**. We know that if a speaker could 'order' something she could also 'ask' for it and, ignoring the other components of illocutionary force, she would have achieved the same end.

(3) Propositional content conditions: Clause (D) of Searle's definition of illocutionary commitment claims that when a speaker utters $F_1(P_1)$ she is committed to

[18] See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, "Appendix I: Semantic Tableaux for Illocutionary Commitment" for further discussion.

an utterance of $F_2(P_2)$ if clauses (A)-(C) hold of the utterance and "$P_2$ satisfies the propositional content of $F_2$ with respect to the context of utterance" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 24).[19] The propositional content conditions on *P* for a given force *F* are, roughly, the conditions that determine whether *P* is the type of thing which you can *F*. For example, "if a speaker makes a promise, the content of the promise must be that the speaker will perform some future course of action. One cannot promise that someone else will do something (though one can promise to *see to it* that he does it) and one cannot promise to have done something in the past" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 16). Likewise, one cannot apologize for something over which he or she had no control (Searle gives us the example of modus ponens). It is difficult to see exactly how two illocutionary acts *a* and *a** must relate to one another if the utterance of *a** strongly commits a speaker to *a*. The requirements of clause (D) do not mention $F_1(P_1)$ but are limited to $F_2(P_2)$. However, it is safe to say that, even in a case of strong illocutionary commitment, the propositional content conditions on $P_2$ need not have any relation to those on $P_1$. As an example take 'I promise to tell the truth' as $F_1(P_1)$ and 'I know something you would like to hear' as $F_2(P_2)$. $F_1(P_1)$ has as its most important propositional content condition that $P_1$ is in the hearer's interest,[20] but the primary propositional content condition for $F_2(P_2)$ is that $P_2$ is within the realm of things of which the speaker can have knowledge. The one strongly commits the speaker to the other—else the speaker would not need to utter the commissive—but the propositional content conditions have little, if anything, to do with one another. Therefore, regarding

[19] Following our earlier convention, Searle's '(4)' is here called '(D)'.
[20] See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 16 and 192.

both the general discussion of extension via propositional content conditions—that is, extension in virtue of the requirements the illocutionary force places on the propositional content of the utterance—and a more specific discussion of the possibility of extending 'baptism' via propositional content conditions, we can conclude that no illocutionary act *a** can strongly commit a speaker to illocutionary act *a* in virtue of propositional content conditions.

(4) Preparatory conditions: Preparatory conditions are those conditions that must obtain if a speech act is to be performed successfully and nondefectivly; "for example, a promise differs from a threat in that the act promised must be for the hearer's benefit. [. . . And] a speaker must satisfy the preparatory condition of being in a position of authority before he can nondefectively issue an utterance with the mode of achievement of a command" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 18). Preparatory conditions are often, but not always, shared by an entire illocutionary force: "all acts whose point is to get the hearer to do something—orders, requests, commands, etc.—have as a preparatory condition that the hearer is able to do the act directed" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 17-18). Obviously, any preparatory conditions that are shared by the whole illocutionary force must be shared by two illocutionary acts if one is to count as the extension of the other. We could further generalize the idea of extending via preparatory conditions if, mirroring (1) and (2), when we have it that an act *a* whose preparatory conditions are achieved in committing another act *a**, we take *a* to be extended by *a** (i.e. *a** is an extended *a*). For example, 'testifying' extends 'asserting' via preparatory conditions because

(a) both 'testifying' and 'asserting' require that a speaker believe he or she has knowledge about a subject, and

(b) 'testifying' has the further requirement (preparatory condition) that the speaker must "have witnessed the events (or is personally acquainted with the facts) represented by his testimony" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 188-89).

An utterance of 'Clean your room' both 'orders' and 'suggests' that the hearer clean his or her room, but it also asserts a whole host of propositions—the propositions that the preparatory conditions for the hearer cleaning his or her room have obtained. The speaker is strongly committed to the assertions that 'You have a room,' 'You are my subordinate,' 'Your room is dirty,' etc. when he or she utters 'Clean your room.' The illocutionary acts ($a_1$, . . ., $a_n$) that express the preparatory conditions for another illocutionary act $b$ are such that the summation or conjunction of $a_1$, . . .,$a_n$ will describe a state of affairs such that $b$ is easily deduced. This works in a way similar to beating around the bush: when a speaker does not want to tell a hearer something (this is $b$), she utters a series of illocutionary acts ($a_1$, . . ., $a_n$) that hint at $b$ or from which $b$ falls out. For example,

$a_1$ = 'My textbooks are really expensive this semester.'
$a_2$ = 'I can't believe how much my rent has gone up.'
$a_3$ = 'Have you seen Bill's new truck?'
$a_4$ = 'My old car has been breaking down a lot lately.'
. . .
$a_n$ = 'I've been eating Ramen every meal for months.'

$\overline{b}$ = 'Can I have some money?'

Similarly, if a speaker went to great lengths to utter all the illocutionary acts that describe the preparatory conditions of a speech act *b*, *b* will fall out of this long utterance. We could say that 'order' extends 'ask' because if one listed the assertions of all the preparatory conditions for 'order *x*' and 'ask *x*,' one would get to 'ask' before 'order' (since ordering requires all the preparatory conditions of 'ask' and then some, 'ask' would fall out of the list before 'order'). 'Storytelling' does not strongly commit a speaker to 'baptizing' in this way; the preparatory conditions for and mode of achievement of illocutionary point of 'storytelling' are not over and above those of 'baptizing,' they are just different—if one utters the conjunction of the illocutionary acts that express the preparatory conditions for 'storytelling,' 'baptizing' will never fall out.

(5) Degree of strength of sincerity conditions: When considering degree of strength of sincerity conditions, we can again take 'assert' and 'guess' as a paradigm for extension or strong illocutionary commitment. Since 'assert' and 'guess' are both assertives the speaker must believe the proposition expressed by her illocutionary act.[21] However, 'asserting *X*' implies a greater degree of belief than 'guessing *X*.' If a speaker 'asserts *X*,' we can take it that she believes *X*, but if she 'guesses *X*' we cannot take it that she believes *X*, only that she thinks *X* might be true. The degree of strength of sincerity conditions tells us how strongly or weakly one must hold a certain sincerity

[21] It should be noted here that our use of the notion of belief is a technical one that might not match up with all our intuitions. There are obviously varying degrees of belief, but Searle might break from our intuitions when he suggests that we allow not only the strong convictions that lead to insisting that *X* but the very weak convictions that accompany a guess (where this belief might be rooted in a hunch that *X* is true, a vague recollection of some knowledge of *X*, a feeling that *X* is better than its competitors for some reason, etc.). This notion of belief follows from Searle's claim that to utter an assertive a speaker must have "reasons (or grounds or evidence) that count in favor of or support the truth of the propositional content" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 54).

condition in order to successfully utter an illocutionary act. If we consider the degree of belief in *X* required to 'guess *X*,' 'assert *X*,' and 'swear that *X*' we see that within an illocutionary force there is a range of degree of strength of sincerity conditions and if one holds a belief of degree *n* in the proposition expressed by *X*, an utterance that expresses this belief also expresses all the illocutionary acts weaker than this one. So, if one 'testifies *X*,' one has 'asserted *X*' as well, since to testify requires stronger belief than to assert.

To utter a baptismal illocution one must both believe that one is in a position to baptize and desire that the baptized have the name one is about to bestow upon it.[22] There is neither a weak nor a strong form of baptism, since the "degree of strength of sincerity conditions [is] null" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 61). A speaker either has the requisite belief and desire or not. If not, then no baptism takes place; the baptismal utterance is defective, infelicitious, unsuccessful.

'Storytelling' cannot commit a speaker to 'baptism' via degree of strength of sincerity conditions for two reasons. First, 'storytelling' cannot have a greater degree of strength of sincerity conditions than 'baptism' because, as Searle tells us, there is no room for variation in degree of strength of sincerity conditions for declarations. Second, even if we ignore Searle's claim about declaratives we must recognize that while the belief of 'assert' is belief in the propositional content of the utterance and the desire of 'order' is that the propositional content of the utterance obtain, "a speaker who declares

[22] Earlier, I suggested that the notion of *desire* used here is a weak one. The account given there can be adapted to cases where a speaker must baptize an object though does so begrudgingly by the idea of one desire (say, the desire to have a child or to not be put in jail for abandoning a child) committing a speaker to another (weak) desire.

*P* expresses simultaneously his desire to bring about the state of affairs represented by *P* and his belief that his utterance is bringing it about" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57-58). Whereas 'ordering *P*' requires more desire that *P* be brought about by the hearer than 'asking *P*,' telling a story S does not require a stronger desire to baptize the characters in *S* than simply 'baptizing' them would. Of course, one cannot simply 'baptize' fictional characters, and this is the problem: 'storytelling' does not require either a desire to name characters or a belief that one is naming characters; though 'storytelling' may well require a desire to create characters and a belief that one can so do, this is not the same as naming, nor can it be taken as an extension of naming.

We cannot say that 'storytelling' commits a speaker to 'baptizing' in virtue of any of the five components of illocutionary force; moreover, since any strong illocutionary commitment that fits the definition offered by Searle in (A)-(D) would require *a** to commit a speaker to *a* in virtue of one or more of the five components of illocutionary force, we can conclude that a 'storytelling' illocutionary act does not strongly commit a speaker to a 'baptizing' illocutionary act.

With the possibility of storytelling being an extended baptism in virtue of a storytelling utterance's strong illocutionary commitment to a baptismal utterance shut off to the Meinongian, the remaining option is for storytelling to weakly commit a speaker to a baptismal utterance. As we have seen, Searle's presentation of weak illocutionary commitment could lead a reader to believe that the only sort of weak illocutionary commitment is an indirect speech act, but as, e.g., Recanati (2001) argues, conversational implicature ought to count as a weak illocutionary commitment as well,

so there appear to be other types of weak illocutionary commitment. Once we note the similarities between Searle's presentation of indirect speech acts and the maxims of conversational implicature this claim ought to be readily accepted. The key is to bear in mind the hallmark of weak illocutionary commitment is the speaker's commitment to $F_2(Q)$ *in virtue of* an utterance of $F_1(P)$.

In what follows we will take Zalta's goal to be to show that a storytelling utterance is an indirect declarative; though showing storytelling to be an indirect baptism is the ultimate goal, this lesser goal is often easier to work with and if it cannot be realized the stronger goal must be unreachable as well. I will argue that there are certain salient characteristics of storytelling utterances—some dependent on Zalta's conception of storytelling—that rule out the possibility of storytelling committing a speaker to a declarative. That is to say, when we look at some consequences of Zalta's notion of storytelling (and our intuitive conception of said notion) we will see that a storytelling utterance cannot carry a weak illocutionary commitment to a declarative.

Searle tells us that declaratives generally have

> the mode of achievement that the speaker *invokes* his power or authority to perform the declaration and the general preparatory condition that the speaker *has* the power or authority to change the world by performance of the appropriate utterance act. (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57, emphasis added)

By clause (A) in Searle's discussion of illocutionary commitment,[23] we know that if storytelling ($F_1(P_1)$) is to weakly commit an author to a baptismal utterance ($F_2(P_2)$), then the speaker must be "[weakly committed] to the illocutionary point of $F_2$ on $P_2$ with

[23] See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 24.

the required mode of achievement" for $F_2$, and by clause (B) we know that the author must be "committed to all the preparatory conditions of $F_2(P_2)$." So, if an author is to commit herself to a baptismal utterance (or, more generally, a declarative utterance) in virtue of a storytelling utterance, she must both *possess* the authority to change the world by uttering the baptismal utterance and *invoke* this power. We have already shown that the author does not possess the power to baptize fictional characters directly (or by strong illocutionary commitment); in what follows we will show that the author cannot possess the power required to utter $F_2(P_2)$, and subsequently that the author cannot invoke said power. The author, then, fails to meet the preparatory conditions and the mode of achievement of illocutionary force for a declarative, so storytelling cannot be a declarative.

The author must, if her storytelling utterances are to carry a commitment to declarative utterance(s), possess the power to change the world by virtue of her utterance of the appropriate locution. An appropriate, successful utterance of 'I quit' is what serves to forfeit the speaker's job—remember Austin's original insight that performatives (our declaratives) are not themselves reports of, e.g., mental states, but are what make a state of affairs obtain in virtue of their successful utterance. The author must, in virtue of her utterance act alone, change the world if storytelling is to weakly commit the speaker to a declarative. Determining exactly what ought to count as the utterance act is a difficult matter since the stories with which philosophers generally concern themselves are the heavily revised, edited, and polished classics of literature. The issue of what counts as a storytelling utterance, exactly which utterances are our

alleged declarative utterances, would take a different shape if we concerned ourselves with non-commercial stories; ghost stories told around the campfire, the stories told by children when playing 'make-believe,' and collective fictions such as the Santa myth would, if taken as our paradigm cases of storytelling, lead our discussion down different paths. In this discussion of storytelling we are following Hunter and Zalta's lead and talking about the Holmes stories and we can follow Zalta's general theory of fiction to answer our question.

The notion of 'storytelling' or 'authoring' is, for the most part, left to the reader in Zalta's early formulations of his ontology: "we trust that our readers have at least an intuitive grasp on what it is to author something" (Zalta 1983, 91). In Zalta's later work he takes stories to be *props*, that is, objects which mandate which propositions a reader is to imagine as true. Stories, taken in this way, are like recipes that tell us exactly what to imagine and when, if we are to properly understand the story. With the notion of a story as a prop in hand, Zalta can further define the notion of authorship:

*x authors s* iff $\exists y$[*x* produces *y* & *y* is a prop for *s*]. (Zalta 2000, 125)[24]

This just means that Doyle authors the Holmes stories iff he writes the documents which say just which propositions are true in the Holmes stories. This formulation of authorship is well and good, but if producing a prop for a particular story is what it means to tell that story, the claim that storytelling is an extended baptism cannot be made. The identity conditions for a fictional character are just those properties encoded

[24] As I noted earlier, Zalta 2000 seeks to reconcile object theory with pretense theory. But central to pretense theory is the claim that storytelling utterances are staged and Zalta's adopting a pretense theoretic understanding of storytelling would preemptively undermine his attempts to argue that storytelling is an indirect declarative.

by the abstract object that is that character encodes, viz., all and only those properties which are attributed to the character in the story in which the character is native. So Holmes, an abstract object, encodes the property 'smoking a pipe' and not the property 'having said "Elementary, my dear Watson,"' since the former is attributed to him in the Holmes stories and the latter only in subsequent writing by authors other than Doyle. Zalta makes it clear that the canonical Holmes stories are what determine the identity of Holmes. We ought then to conclude that, within the framework established by Zalta, the utterances with whose weak illocutionary commitment we should be concerned are those published utterances that constitute 'the stories' or 'the book' or what have you. To be more precise, the canonical Holmes stories are what determine which abstract object is our Holmes, which object is picked out by 'Holmes.' Now, Zalta does not purport to give the exact identity conditions for fictional characters. Rather, he claims to provide "identifying properties" for fictional characters, where "the identifying properties of native characters are exactly the properties exemplified by that character in the story" (Zalta 1983, 93). On the face of it, this is a claim that the properties attributed to a character in its native story are just the way we *pick out* characters, though the characters may encode other properties we do not use to identify them. This just means that Holmes may encode properties other than those attributed him in the Holmes stories. These extra properties could either be properties Doyle failed to mention in the telling of Holmes's exploits or properties which other authors have attributed to Holmes. But this cannot be so. The identifying properties for fictional characters given in their native story must be the stronger identity conditions for that character.

Take any fictional character *A* and its native story *S*. The set of properties attributed to *A* in *S* will be called $A_1$. *A* must be unique, that is, '*A*' must pick out only one abstract object, since if '*A*' picked out $A_1$ and $A_2$ we would no longer be able to evaluate the truth of claims about what happened to *A* in the story. The reason for this is that the property *X* might be attributed *A* in $A_1$ but not in $A_2$, that is, we would not be able to say whether *X* is true or false of *A*, since '*A*' might pick out characters that encode both *X* and ~*X*. Holmes never said 'Elementary, my dear Watson,' but if we let the properties attributed Holmes by Doyle in the Holmes stories be merely *some* of the properties Holmes encodes we would not be able to assert this fact. This would sacrifice the clarity the causal theory was to get us in the first place. 'Holmes,' in ordinary parlance, refers to the Holmes of Doyle's stories, just as 'Lincoln,' in philosophy examples, refers to Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President; in other contexts, 'Lincoln' might refer to another Lincoln, likewise, in certain contexts, 'Holmes' might refer to the Holmes of *The Seven-Per-Cent Solution*, but part of the appeal of the causal theory of reference for fictional characters is that we can be sure that when someone says 'Holmes always said "Elementary, my dear Watson,"' they are speaking falsely, and if the properties attributed to Holmes in the Holmes stories do not exhaust the identity of Holmes we are no longer guaranteed that an utterance of 'Holmes always said "Elementary, my dear Watson,"' is false.

So Zalta's claim that storytelling is more like proposing a definition than asserting—which we are taking to mean that storytelling utterances are a version of the standard declarative baptismal utterance—is a claim about the printed words of a story.

This is a plausible delineation of the class of storytelling utterances; we would certainly run into problems if we let every utterance by an author in the storytelling process count as a storytelling utterance. Under this approach—where every relevant utterance by an author sticks, so to speak, to the story and its characters—an author could not utter a proposition ascribing properties to a character and then decide that those properties should not identify that character: once they have been uttered, propositions irrevocably identify characters. The utterance acts that compose storytelling on this interpretation include utterances made during all parts of the storytelling process, and since this surely includes the pre-writing phases, if an author entertains the possibility of attributing a property to a character she must actually attribute that property to that character.

Zalta is right, then, not to take an approach in which every utterance by the author sticks, where every utterance is irrevocable, eternal, and reference or identity fixing. Zalta's approach above focuses on the prop produced by an author and this is, intuitively, the right move to make; however, the implications of this for storytelling do not help Zalta's cause. In this admission the preparatory conditions for declaratives are jeopardized; the author has a chance to rethink or evaluate his or her utterance after it has been uttered but before it changes the world, and this is not an opportunity common to the speakers of declaratives. While a bride can mull over her impending utterance of 'I do' and is free to change her mind, she can only do so before the original utterance act. If the act of marrying mirrored storytelling here, the bride would have the ability to utter 'I do' then decide if she really meant it or if she would like to recant, and this

option is certainly not open to the bride.[25] Supposing for the time being that storytelling utterances are declaratives, the author then has the power to utter whatever she likes and then, retrospectively, determine which of her utterances carried the force of a declarative—which of her utterances changed the world in virtue of their being successful utterances. Another analogy: if the poker player had the power we are granting authors here she could utter 'Call,' see the hands of all the other players, then determine which, if any, of her bets still count and/or if her utterance of 'Call' stuck. Now, analogies should not be taken as proof that storytelling is not a declarative, but these analogies do serve to point out that storytelling is a rather odd declarative if it is one at all: the power afforded the author, under a plausible conception of storytelling, is starkly different than the powers afforded speakers of other declaratives.

But we are concerned with showing more than that storytelling is an odd declarative; our charge is to show that it is no declarative at all. To this end we will now consider a number of ways in which the author, qua speaker, forsakes (or: is forced to forsake; or: never achieves) the requisite preparatory condition—we will look at reasons why the author does not have the power to change the world by successfully uttering storytelling propositions. An author, if her storytelling utterances are to be declaratives, must have the "power or authority to change the world by performance of the appropriate utterance act;" two groups of people, editors and scholars, ought to be seen as severely restricting the power of storytelling utterances, restricting them to the point that the author does not have the power to change the world by mere utterance.

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[25] Of course marriages can be annulled, but this ought to be viewed as a separate declarative that has bearing on a previous declarative rather than a continuation of the initial marrying declarative.

For Zalta the printed word takes a place of authority: Holmes encodes property *p* iff *p* is attributed Holmes in the Holmes stories, where the Holmes stories consist of all and only the stories and books written by Conan Doyle in which Holmes appears. The identity of a fictional character is thus a strict thing, and this is as it should be; we do not want nebulous, vague characters floating around.[26] Holmes's identity does not consist of only those propositions in the Holmes stories that reference him, be it directly or indirectly; rather, it must include every proposition in the Holmes stories. Since Holmes is defined as that character that encodes all the properties attributed Holmes in the Holmes stories, and the Holmes stories are defined as (that is: are) the abstract objects that encode all and only the propositional properties uttered by Doyle in the telling of the Holmes stories (that is, since the identity of the Holmes stories is just as strict as the identity of Holmes), any slight change in the propositions encoded by the Holmes stories results in a change in Holmes. Since every property Holmes encodes is critical to 'Holmes' picking out $A_1$ rather than $A_2$, Holmes rather than Sholmes, a change in even the most minor proposition expressed in the Holmes stories completely alters the identity of Holmes. Editors are in a position to make (or force authors to make) changes to the text, thus altering the identity of the written story by altering its content. That is, the work of editors suggests that authors do not have the power to change the world by utterance alone: utterances that ought to be storytelling utterances, that ought to be

[26] The sense in which some characters, e.g., Moriarty are vague is not the sense to which we object here. Moriarty is an incomplete object—there are lots of things we do not know about him. However, his identity, as an object, is still very clear because the comprehension principle for our Meinongian ontology tells us that there is one and only one object which encodes all the properties which are true of Moriarty.

declaratives, that ought to have changed the world, are censored by editors. On this count, storytelling is quite different than the other declarative utterances.

In order to ensure that authors have the power to change the world by utterance alone, Zalta might try to alter the notion of storytelling somewhat. The problem might be avoided by introducing a distinction between kinds of storytelling and say that an utterance is a *strong storytelling utterance* if it is the original creative utterance of an author (traditionally conceived), while an utterance is a *weak storytelling utterance* if it is an utterance that determines the final content of a story. The comments and changes of editors, reviewers, and authors would perhaps all be examples of weak storytelling utterances. We might then say that only strong storytelling utterances are baptismal utterances. This distinction, or something like it, seeks to secure the intuition that the author is the one doing all the work, that her utterances are the ones that should really count. The author is the one who baptizes characters. However, this distinction will not do the job for Zalta. Holmes is correctly identified by a close reading of the Holmes stories which determines just which propositions are true about Holmes. These propositions are what serves to determine the reference of 'Holmes.'[27] The final, published stories must be the utterances that count as baptismal, if any are to do so, and this is not the set of strong illocutionary utterances. On the other hand, if we decide that it is the weak storytelling utterances that should count as baptismal, we are left with the result that authors, editors, reviewers, etc. are all party to the baptism of a fictional character, and this does not gel up with our intuitions about authors and storytelling.

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[27] Cf. the account of determining the identity of fictional characters in Parsons 1975.

Another option Zalta might pursue is to argue that *every* utterance which alters the content of a story should count as a storytelling utterance, an utterance which serves to establish the identity of the fictional characters within that story. The idea behind this move is that we should take the changes as editors as declarative utterances which override certain declarative utterances of the author, just as the declarative utterances of an annulment override the declaratives of a wedding. This option leaves Zalta open to say that authors do indeed utter declaratives, but editors do too. However, this option too fails to accord with our intuitions that it is the author that does the important work of storytelling and character creation. Editors play no role in Zalta's account of authorship above, and this is, it seems, as it should be.

As evidence of the problems posed by editors, consider the case of Thomas Wolfe.[28] Wolfe is perhaps most famous for his book *You Can't Go Home Again*, but this work was published posthumously and in a form that greatly differed from Wolfe's original manuscript. In the December prior to Wolfe's untimely death, he met with an editor at Harper named Edward C. Aswell, turned over a large manuscript, and signed a contract to publish the book with Harper. Wolfe's friends recall that "Wolfe himself arranged and rearranged portions of his unpublished manuscripts and typescripts in his large, ubiquitous packing crates, establishing that up to the time of his death his writing plans were fluid." This leads a scholar on Wolfe to concluded that though "the posthumous writings had received a 'final' order by Wolfe, [this order was] one which [Wolfe] felt he still had to work on for at least a year" (Field 1987, 7). The manuscript

[28] This account comes from Field 1987.

handed over at that meeting was approximately one and a half million words and was published after Wolfe's death as two novels, *The Web and the Rock* and *You Can't Go Home Again*, and one collection of stories, *The Hills Beyond*.[29] Though there is much debate in the world of Wolfe scholarship as to whether the changes Aswell made to the text should minimize or override Wolfe's contribution to the work, the common Wolfe reader is not wholly off-base in her belief that Wolfe wrote these works. Leslie Field's book on Wolfe's relation to his editors claims to "dispel the myth that Thomas Wolfe's posthumous publications were written by his last editor, Edward C. Aswell." Field argues that "internal evidence and newly discovered letters prove that Wolfe was the writer, Aswell the editor: the posthumous publications are authentic Wolfe works" (xii). The case of Thomas Wolfe gives us a solid example of an author whose storytelling utterances were drastically overruled by an editor, thereby supporting the claim that storytelling utterances cannot be declaratives.

Supposing that we ignore the argument that editors negate the storyteller's power and we conclude that the printed word comes from the author complete with the requisite power to change the world, we must still acknowledge the power of scholars to alter the content of an author's storytelling utterances; editors alone to not keep the author from possessing the power needed to utter declaratives. Take the case of critical editions as an example of the work of scholars. Often in a critical edition the scholar functions as an editor; he or she looks at the published and unpublished versions of the manuscript and, in an attempt to honor the original intentions of the author, changes the

[29] Field 1987, 17.

published text to make it more accurate. Critical editions seem, at first glance, to try to restore power to the author. Of course, not every story is recreated in a critical edition, so critical editions cannot fully restore the power of the author generally. Call the utterances that the author wanted to make but was unable to for whatever reason (editorial considerations, deadlines, death, etc.) the intended storytelling utterances. In the case of critical editions it is not always the case that the author's intended storytelling utterances are restored. The scholar might impose an agenda on the author or misread the author's intentions; either way the content of the story is altered, thus the identity of the story and fictional characters are themselves altered. Even when these critical editions do not make it into the public consciousness they have a status of authority; critical editions are canonical, they determine the truth or falsity of utterances about what went on in a particular story. Likewise, scholarly interpretations of stories can find their way into public consciousness, thus altering the identity of characters or stories. Simply put: scholars can change the content of stories, thereby altering the identity of the characters native to those stories and this means that the author does not have the final say in the identity of his or her characters.

At the very least, the evidence suggests that the storytelling utterances of authors are vastly different than the paradigmatic declarative utterances of umpires, priests, and new parents. The storytelling utterance is not final, while the standard declarative is. This accords with our intuitions that authors ought to be able to change their minds about the details of a particular story without, in the process, creating a monstrous character that no one, reader or author alike, recognizes or wants to create; however, this implies

that storytelling utterances do not meet the preparatory conditions for declaratives: storytelling utterances cannot carry a weak illocutionary commitment to baptismal (or, more generally, declarative) utterances.[30]

[30] It has been suggested that some of the criticisms of Zalta's theory just raised might be problems for any account of fiction. Our purpose here has been to show that Zalta's theory, as it stands now, cannot account for reference to fictional characters. The bearing of these arguments on other theories of fiction is of no concern to us in this paper, however interesting these results may be in their own right.

# CHAPTER IV

# CONCLUSION

Hunter's original charge was that the Meinongian could not reconcile a causal theory of reference with his or her ontological take on fictional characters. Zalta took up this challenge by showing that we can take storytelling as an extended baptism, that storytelling is like baptism in certain salient respects. The salient features of a baptism are its ostensive quality and that it is a declarative speech act. Granting Zalta an argument that storytelling can fill the ostensive shoes of gesturing in the case of fictional characters, the task at hand was to show that storytelling is a declarative utterance. One way to do this was to show that in the process of storytelling one also commits an act of baptism; to show this one would show that storytelling utterances carry a strong illocutionary commitment to baptismal utterances. We have shown that this is not the case using Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. The other option for Zalta is to show that storytelling carries a weak illocutionary commitment to baptismal utterances—that a baptism is implied in an act of storytelling in the same way that 'Pass the salt' is implied in 'Can you reach the salt?'; but as we have just shown, the notion of storytelling does not permit an author to achieve the preparatory conditions or mode of achievement of illocutionary point for a declarative, so storytelling cannot carry a weak commitment to baptizing. The Meinongian cannot establish a baptism for fictional characters and thus cannot reconcile the causal theory of reference with his or her ontology of fictional characters.

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