

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: THE ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY

ARRANGEMENTS IN MULTIETHNIC STATES

A Dissertation

by

RENAT SHAYKHUTDINOV

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2007

Major Subject: Political Science

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ABSTRACT

Give Peace a Chance: The Origins of Territorial Autonomy

Arrangements in Multiethnic States. (August 2007)

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This research explains the formation of territorial autonomy regimes, arrangements enabling ethnic groups to express their distinct identity. The origins of territorial autonomy arrangements is an important topic due to the great potential of such institutions to prevent ethnic strife or reduce ongoing conflict. While the literature has explored the consequences of autonomy regimes, its contribution to our understanding of the origins of territorial autonomy is limited. In answering why territorial autonomy regimes are adopted, I develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of ethnic groups. Specifically, I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by ethnic groups influence national leaders' decision-making processes. In this dissertation, I also address the question of why ethnic groups employ peaceful, as opposed to violent, tactics. Hypotheses derived from this theorization are tested using 197 ethnic groups in 95 states. In the empirical analysis I use data from 1945 to 2000 and employ the duration model and the modified Heckman selection model as my primary statistical methods. To trace the *process* of territorial autonomy formation I use a case study conducted in the

Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The results suggest that while groups with access to easily extractable resources choose to employ violent strategies, ethnic collectivities who use peaceful protest tactics are in fact more successful in obtaining territorial autonomy arrangements from central governments.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY
ARRANGEMENTS IN MULTIETHNIC STATES*

In today's world, there are more than 2,000 ethnic groups but less than 200 states. This situation leaves the majority of ethnic groups without states of their own and renders most of the states today multiethnic in nature¹. As many ethnic groups strive to attain their own homelands, while most central governments oppose such moves, ethnic conflict and its management remains a very pertinent issue today. As a matter of fact, ethnic conflict was frequent during the Cold War and incrementally increased by the end of the period (Gurr 1994:350). In 1994 alone, eighteen out of the total of twenty-three wars were contested as a result of ethnic rivalries (Gurr 1994:350).

Scholars and policy makers have long been preoccupied with finding ways to govern ethnic diversity and manage ethnic conflict. In this pursuit some have suggested that states should disregard cultural differences altogether as has been the norm until 1990s (Gurr 2000). Those on the other extreme have proposed partitioning existing states along ethnic lines. Although such recommendations could arguably be considered as viable options for preventing and resolving ethnic strife, neither of them is normatively appealing. Both of these solutions would satisfy the aspirations of only one contending side and leave the other party less than pleased. There are, however, middle

This dissertation follows the style of *American Political Science Review*.

¹ As (Toft 2003) claims, two-thirds of all independent states have three or more concentrated minorities on their territories (27).

ground solutions for managing ethnic conflict, which aim to transform the calculus of the game between states and ethnic groups from zero-sum to a win-win situation. By preserving ethnic diversity within the society, designers of power-sharing institutions aspire to retain the territorial integrity of the state. In this chapter, I examine one of the most important power sharing institutions—territorial autonomy. My question, precisely, is why and how these institutions are established.

It is important to study the *formation* of territorial autonomy due to the propensity of such institutions to decrease ethnic conflict (Rothchild and Hartzell 2000). Knowing how these institutions have been formed in the past could help policy makers to design future institutions to mediate ethnic conflict. Furthermore, formation of autonomy regimes presents a theoretical puzzle. Some multiethnic states chose to adopt them, while others do not. For instance, while the Gagauz people of Moldova have received an autonomy deal from the central government in Chişinău, the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia and the Ruthenians in the Ukraine have not. It is not immediately clear why autonomy was established in the former case but not in the latter.

Although policy makers have resorted to autonomy for a long time, the interest in this institution as a possible conflict-managing mechanism has been on the rise only in recent years (Gurr 1994; Nordquist 1998; Lapidoth 1997). Such interest, furthermore, is largely balanced by the insufficient attention to autonomy in the work of social scientists. Most of those who study autonomies have focused on the conceptual and legal aspects related to this institution, leaving the issue of autonomy's causes and effects largely unexplored. Consequently, while we know that these regimes are adopted, there

is little scholarly understanding on how and why. While the consequences of autonomy is an important topic of study, to fully understand it we need to understand the origins of autonomy regimes first, as the way autonomy is established could explain its subsequent performance. In answering why and when territorial autonomy regimes are adopted, I develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of ethnic groups. Specifically, I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by ethnic groups influence national leaders' decision-making processes. The theoretical importance of this dissertation, therefore, is that it will fill this gap in the literature by suggesting and testing a theory of the origins of territorial autonomy regimes.

In the rest of this chapter, I will clarify relevant concepts—ethnicity and territorial autonomy. Next, I will present additional reasons for studying territorial autonomy and briefly examine the current state of literature on this topic. Finally, I provide a brief roadmap for the rest of the dissertation.

Understanding Ethnicity

Defining ethnicity has been difficult (Sollors 1996). According to a survey, four of five social scientists and anthropologists were in favor of leaving this term undefined (Isajiw 1974). Those researchers that leave the concept undefined do not provide any reasons for doing so. However, according to Isajiw (1974), a good reason for not doing so related to two dangers. One is that the definition may be too narrow and, therefore, inapplicable to ethnic groups under interest or too broad and, consequently, deprived of any substantive meaning. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to define this concept.

Drawing on a common definition, by ethnicity I mean subjective perceptions of common origins and kinship among a group of people. Such perceptions could be expressed via race, religion, language, or even culture. This definition is consistent with Horowitz's conceptualization of ethnicity, which is based on the ascribed differences among the groups, "whether the indicium is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof" (Horowitz 1985:17-8).

The element of subjective perception of belonging to a particular group is in line with Gellner's (1983) definition of a nation. To Gellner, recognition by the person and others that s/he belongs to the national group (along with the element of shared culture) is a major delineating characteristic of the group².

Although one of the advantages of this definition is its breadth, an objection might be raised against inclusion of such seemingly different characteristic as race into the notion of ethnicity along with language, religion, and culture. Arguably, color-based relations are different as they are more conducive to conflict due to their ability to arouse more intense sentiments and solidarity among the group members than other types of ethnic differences (Horowitz 1985:42). It is also argued that color differences provide a strong and trustworthy sign of identification in contrast to other features of groups, which is another reason why it should not be considered in the same category with language, and religion (Horowitz 1985:42).

² Overall, this definition is also consistent with the understanding of ethnicity by Lee, Lindström, Moore, and Turan (2002). They combine conceptualizations by both Gellner and Horowitz and define ethnicity on the basis of "ascriptive differences that the members of the group and others see as salient to their identity" (3).

Both concerns require an accurate empirical investigation to be fully addressed, yet Horowitz (1985) drawing on anecdotal evidence has shown that the first argument “mistakes the indicator for the substance of the relationship” (Horowitz 1985:42). In fact, the hierarchies of ethnicity are possible without color-based differences. The examples of Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi, Tausang and Luwaan of the Philippines, Osu and Ibo in Nigeria, and Burakumin and other Japanese show that differences other than color are more important in inter-group relations (Horowitz 1985:42-3). Furthermore, the stigma that color-based relations are deterministic for group solidarity and inter-group conflict does not seem to be supported historically, as the initial difference between the masters and slaves in North America was based mostly on religion. The North American English were described as “Christians”, while the slaves were called “heathens” (Horowitz 1985:43).

By 1680s, however, the black-white dichotomy replaced the former typology, as many blacks became Christian. Even though the advantage of color vis-à-vis religion was its visibility and permanency, it is likely to be more important only in the ranked systems, where the ruled group attempts to escape its identity (Horowitz 1985:44). I, therefore, consider race as just another category around which ethnic identities are built.

Other scholars might argue that the notion of ethnicity is just another conflation of the concepts of language and culture. It is true, as defined above, that the perception of common bonds, which defines ethnicity, could be expressed through the notions of language and culture. However, ethnicity is distinct from both culture and language. Culture is rather a loose term, which could be expressed at different levels of

aggregation, in which ethnicity is just one. As arguably one of the most influential studies that has recently reasserted the concept of culture in political science claims, “Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (Huntington 1996 (1993):2). In this typology, the highest and broadest cultural grouping of people is civilization. In other words, ethnicity can be defined by culture. However, it is just an instance, or one level, of culture, which is a broader and looser concept than ethnicity. Second, an ethnic group can have different cultures. Ironically, it is Huntington as well, who implies this.

According to him, there are “torn countries”, which while having a degree of cultural homogeneity suffer civilizational divides. Turkey, “the most profoundly torn country” (20) represent a prototypical example with its division over “modern, secular, Western nation state” (19) and “Middle Eastern Muslim society” (19). Mexico, “the most immediate torn country” (20) is another example with its “North American-oriented leaders” (19) and “those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country” (19-20). “Globally the most important torn country” (20), Russia is divided over the question of whether it “is part of West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization” (20). In all of these countries, cultural divides are observed within the dominant ethnic groups. This difference once again emphasizes distinction between ethnicity and culture.

Similarly, the fact that different ethnic groups can speak the same language, as, until very recently, did Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, and those belonging to the same ethnic group may speak different, at times very distinct, dialects, shows the concepts of language and ethnicity are not the same either.

Understanding Territorial Autonomy

A viable and meaningful territorial autonomy is characterized by two aspects. The first element is the existence of a legal document—constitution, agreement, or statute—that recognizes the establishment of territorial autonomy as such and is *accepted* by the governing bodies *both* of the central *state* and the *ethnic* territory. The second aspect of territorial autonomy is that the autonomous government enjoys taxing and spending authority. Both of these features encompass the notion of power sharing that lies at the heart of territorial autonomy arrangements. Thus, they provide a means for ethnic groups different from the preeminent group in the country to express their distinct identity, and, hence, are consistent with other definitions of autonomy³. Although the notion of territorial autonomies could be used in a non-ethnic context, the focus of this study is on the ethnically-based territorial autonomies.

Territorial autonomy is related to, but distinct from, federalism in important ways. Despite the wide debate on the nature of federalism (such as being democratic or not, e.g., Kahn 2002; Stepan 2004), most scholars of federalism would agree that, at the very least, federal arrangements involve constitutional guarantees for subnational autonomy at least in one policy area for the units composing the state (Elazar 1994;


³ The first part (legal codification) of this definition is based on an idea expressed by Lapidoth (1997). The second (fiscal powers) has been inspired by Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) suggestion that territorial autonomies could be conceptualized in terms of centralized and decentralized federations.

The definition adopted in this study is superior to others, in part due to its relatively clear and easy way of identifying territorial autonomies. In contrast, Rothchild and Hartzell's (2000) definition, for instance, does not provide a clear criterion for distinguishing an autonomy regime from federalism as they treat federalisms with autonomy arrangements as similar to federalisms without. Their criteria for regional autonomy—presumably non-federal type of autonomy—are also ambiguous.

Riker 1964). Territorial autonomy could, therefore, be partly construed as a narrower conceptualization of federalism, which is specifically designed to accommodate ethnic differences. However, territorial autonomy cannot be extended to all instances of federalism as some federations are of non-ethnic or semi-ethnic nature. In this sense, federalism is “larger” than territorial autonomy.

Yet, it is also important to note that territorial autonomy is not limited to the cases of federal arrangements as some unitary states can grant territorial autonomy (e.g. Italy, Finland, Georgia, and the Ukraine). Unlike in truly federal states, formal provisions for territorial autonomy in such states are limited only to certain territorial units, but not to all. In this sense, therefore, territorial autonomy is a broader concept than federalism. Following this discussion, I would depict the relationship between territorial autonomy and federalism in the following way (Fig. 1):

Fig. 1. Relationship between Territorial Autonomy and Federalism



Although my definition of autonomy is distinct from others, it is possible to find a common denominator between it and other conceptions of territorial autonomy. At heart of the concept of autonomy lies the notion of power sharing between the central government and a certain group or region. This feature of autonomy allows the group or region to enjoy a degree of self-government within the state⁴. Through the mechanism of self-government autonomy aims at granting groups different from the preeminent group in the country the means to express their separate identities (Lapidoth 1997:33).

This is true for the two major types of autonomy regimes used by political scientists—*cultural (personal)* autonomy and *territorial* autonomy regimes⁵. As evident from its name, personal autonomy applies to the members of a particular group regardless of the territory of the state in which they live (Lapidoth 1997; Lijphart 1977) allowing them to practice their distinct cultures and life-styles. The non-territorial nature of personal autonomy has been viewed as an advantage, because it could apply to all members of the target group residing in the state (Lapidoth 1997:40), while excluding non-members. Examples of cultural autonomies are widespread in the today's world. They include the Sami autonomies in the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway, and Sweden (Myntti 2002). The Law on Cultural Autonomy has also been adopted in Russia in 1996, and reestablished in Estonia in 1993, Latvia in 1991, and Lithuania in 1989 (*MINELRES: Minority Electronic Resources*). In territorial autonomies, on the other

⁴ A number of studies imply that. See, for example, Rothchild and Hartzell (2000:261), Heintze (1998); also cited in Stroschein (2003) and Cornell (2002).

⁵ Although distinction between territorial and other kinds of autonomy are never clear due to the omnipresent 'spatial' dimension in any autonomy (Safran 2000:12), scholars nevertheless do distinguish the concept of personal, or cultural, autonomy (Lapidoth 1997:37), contrasting it to territorial autonomy (Lijphart 1977:43).

hand, a certain *territory* inhabited by an ethnic group is vested with self-governance over the issues important to this group (Brunner and Küpper 2002:21).

There are might be concerns that cultural autonomy is easily conflated with democracy. While democracy almost certainly makes establishment of cultural autonomy easier, there are instances of cultural autonomies in non-democratic contexts, such as Ottoman Empire. Moreover, not every democracy is conducive to cultural autonomy for minority ethnic groups. French democracy, for example, provides only limited opportunities for its ethnic minorities to express their distinct identities, as did Turkish democracy to some of its minorities for a long time. Many also claim that the Baltic nations of Estonia and Latvia also “suppress” their Russian non-citizens. However, even in less than minority-friendly democracies, laws / agreements on cultural autonomy specify both concessions granted to minorities and criteria for an ethnic group to be eligible for such concessions. In Estonia, for instance, “National minority cultural autonomy may be established by persons belonging to German, Russian [citizens of Estonia], Swedish and Jewish minorities and persons belonging to national minorities with a membership of more than 3,000” (“The Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities (unofficial translation)” 1995, Article 2, point 2). In Turkey,

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall...have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein (“Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923” 1924, Article 40).

Why Territorial Autonomy?

Although personal and territorial autonomy could complement each other and are not necessarily mutually exclusive, in this dissertation I focus on territorial autonomy due to the fact that ethnic groups usually demand territorial, rather than personal, autonomy; furthermore, while personal autonomies are primarily concerned with culture, language, education and religion, territorial autonomies, in addition to those, also involve a broad array of economic and social affairs (Lapidoth 1997:39-40). In addition to, and in connection with, socioeconomic issues, territorial autonomy entails *politico-institutional* arrangements, which hardly apply to the instances of personal autonomy. This renders the consequences of territorial autonomy much more far-reaching than those of personal, or cultural, autonomies (Cornell 2002).

A more important reason for studying territorial autonomy is its potential to manage ethnic conflict and maintain peace. Although there is no conclusive evidence as yet regarding the impact of territorial autonomy on ethnic conflict, in my view the negative findings encountered in the empirical studies (Cornell 2002; Roeder 1999), however, are driven by their focus on the communist world where territorial autonomy in the majority of cases were implemented without consent of ethnic groups in question (Cornell 2002; Stepan 2004). In contrast, studies that find a positive effect of territorial autonomy on the likelihood of peace (Rothchild and Hartzell 2000; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) are more representative, as they are global in nature and focus on *negotiated* and

agreed upon territorial autonomies, which I consider to be true territorial autonomy and, therefore, study in this dissertation.

The State of the Literature

While many practitioners and scholars emphasize the merits of territorial autonomy regimes, we still do not know much about the determinants of autonomy. Although some scholars of power sharing and consociationalism explicitly identify autonomy as an element of a stable consociational democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1977), they, nevertheless, do not study autonomy on its own merit. The literature that explores territorial autonomy as an individual phenomenon has been dominated by scholars with background in law and jurisprudence⁶. Despite an important contribution of this work to describing and clarifying the concept of autonomy and its use in international and domestic law, these studies show little systematic empirical examination of the origins and consequences of autonomy. A more recent wave of scholarship includes only two studies completely devoted to examining the consequences of autonomy⁷ and one study that focuses exclusively on the origins of territorial autonomy regimes⁸. The findings and theoretical arguments of each of these studies that examine the consequences of autonomies are diametrically different leaving this area open for further study. The study that examines the origins of autonomy arrangements, on the other hand, limits itself to

⁶ See, for example, the volume edited by Suksi (1998). Many contributors to this book are legal professionals. Lapidoth (1997) constitutes another example.

⁷ These are Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) and Cornell (2002). Roeder (1999), in contrast, studies autonomy within a broader framework of power-sharing arrangements.

⁸ van Cott (2001). Nordquist (1998) is concerned with *durability* of territorial autonomies.

one region of the world making its global applicability problematic. In general, therefore, studies on ethnically divided societies with some exceptions largely ignore the question of territorial autonomy formation, as many of them “center... too much on examining the best outcomes, as opposed to looking at the ways these outcomes evolve through bargaining processes” (Sisk 1996:18).

Although some scholars exclude the idea of federalism from their definition of territorial autonomy altogether (Nordquist 1998), federalism remains an important part in my conceptualization of territorial autonomy as I consider all “ethnic” federations and ethnically-based units of “mixed” federalisms as territorial autonomy, provided that they satisfy the criteria for territorial autonomy specified above (Fig. 1).

William Riker is still widely recognized as the most renowned authority on the topic of the origins of federalism. The implicit assumption of his theory of the formation of federal arrangements relates to subunits’ *agreed* incorporation into would-be federations. In the Rikerian federal bargain, the side offering the bargain does so in order to increase territorial control, e.g. through aggression, or to prevent external military or diplomatic threat. By the same token, those who accept the offer, are interested in protecting themselves from the external threat—either military or diplomatic; they may also be eager to use the opportunity to engage in the potential aggression by the federation, according to Riker (1964:12). Acknowledging Riker’s contribution, Stepan (2004), however, takes an issue with the essence of his argument claiming that “as comparativists, we must recognize that some of the most important federations in the world emerged from a completely different historical and political logic” (33). He agrees

that the origins of the United States and Swiss federalisms, which he conceptualizes as “coming together”, comply neatly with Riker’s theory. Nevertheless, Stepan sees “coming together” as just one instance in the broader categorization of the ways federalism come into being. In addition to “coming together”, he introduces “holding together” and “putting together” categories of federations (33). Typically, “holding together” are formerly unitary regimes, such as India, Belgium, and Spain, which arrive to “the constitutional decision that the best way to “hold together” in a democracy would be to *devolve power* and to turn their threatened polities into federations” (33-34). The third category, “putting together”, comprises the instances of “nonvoluntary, nondemocratic federation formation” (35), which includes the Soviet Union.

In a very recent contribution to this literature, (Ziblatt 2004) seemingly transcends these categories suggesting his own theory of federalism’s origins. Specifically, his theory diverges from the existing account of the formation of federalism in that 1) federal (and unitary) states can be formed through a combination of coercion and compromise; and 2) the degree of *infrastructural capacity* of the subunits determines whether they will be preserved in the future federal state as constituent units or stripped of their powers completely and thrown into the wastebasket of history in a new unitary setup. This work implies that 1) the ideal categories of “putting together” and “coming together” federations are blurred as both ways could be used *together* in establishing one federal state; and 2) the degree of *a priori* institutional capacity helps preserve the units within the larger state, since they can act as *credible negotiation partners* and are capable of *delivering benefits sought by the state-builders* which makes it logical

for the leader of the expanding state to preserve the institutional distinction of the newly incorporated entities.

The innovative ideas suggested by Ziblatt have been qualitatively tested in the context of the nineteenth-century Italy and Germany. However, the projects of “coming together” federations discussed in the modern period have been relatively few (e.g., the Tito-Dimitrov discussions on the Balkan Federation) and whenever formed, were short-lived (e.g. the United Arab Republic). As currently inviolability of international borders by other states is a norm rather than an exception (Hurd 1999), development of undemocratic “putting together” instances of federations is unlikely. While providing an interesting account for the federal formations, this study, however, excludes the cases of “holding together” federations, which have a profound current relevance relatively to other forms of federations and autonomy arrangements.

In this dissertation, therefore, I develop a theory that explains primarily the formation of “holding together” arrangements. In developing this theory, I adopt the idea that autonomy arrangements should be construed as outcomes of bargaining processes (Riker 1964; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000; Sisk 1996; van Cott 2001; Ziblatt 2004). I, therefore, identify a major factor responsible for the formation of territorial autonomies – bargaining tactics of ethnic groups. In addition to contributing to the understanding of the origins of autonomy regimes, it is my hope that my focus of this research on peaceful bargaining as a means of conflict resolution will also enhance the dialogue between the subfields of comparative politics and international relations and aid in bridging the gap between them. Moreover, my examination goes beyond federations as it is applicable for

the formation of territorial autonomies in unitary states as well. In doing so, it bridges the well-recognized gap that the federal and ethnic politics literatures in comparative politics have largely developed separately (Stepan 2004).

The plan for the rest of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter II, I suggest a theory of peaceful tactics and autonomy formation. I subsequently derive hypotheses from this theory and test them using 196 ethnic groups in 95 states over the period of 1945 to 2000. I then discuss the results and relate them back to theory. The results obtained from the chapter raise the question why a minority of rational ethnic collectivities still opts for violent tactics in face of more effective peaceful strategies. I tackle this question, both theoretically and empirically, in Chapter III. Drawing on the previous literature, I suggest that formation and endurance of both peaceful and violent movements depends on availability of resources that could be used by ethnic entrepreneurs for distributing to the members of their organizations. The major feature of such resources is high value and easy extractability. Items, such as oil, drugs, and diamonds, are considered primary sources of these commodities. I use statistical method to test the theory, present results, and discuss the findings. In Chapter IV, I trace the process of territorial autonomy formation using a case study of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The results from the statistical and case study chapters suggest that peaceful protest tactics are in fact influential motivators for national leaders' decisions to grant autonomy to ethnic collectivities. I conclude in Chapter V outlining policy implications of this dissertation for state, group, and international actors and suggesting avenues for further research.

CHAPTER II

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND THE CREATION OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have clarified the concepts of ethnicity and territorial autonomy central to the dissertation, dwelled on the reasons for studying territorial autonomy formation, and briefly reviewed the literature on this subject. Specifically, I have pointed out that the institutions of territorial autonomy serve as an effective means of maintaining peace within ethnically-divided states. This result has been attributed to the capacity of territorial autonomy arrangements to address the security concerns of ethnic groups by providing them with a degree of local control over social, political and economic issues. Further augmenting the conflict management capacity of autonomy arrangements are the opportunities these institutions often provide for minority representation within the central government (Hartzell 1999; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000).⁹

While the existing literature on territorial autonomy has emphasized its potential value as a conflict management tool, the question of exactly *how* the institutions of territorial autonomy are first formed has been largely unexplored. In this chapter, I develop the argument that the particular strategies employed by aggrieved ethnic

⁹ For a more skeptical view of the conflict management capacity of territorial autonomy arrangements, see Lake and Rothchild (2005).

communities play an important role in determining whether or not these groups achieve autonomy. My core finding is that groups that employ peaceful protest strategies tend to enjoy more success in achieving their goals in comparison to those collectivities favoring the use of violent tactics.

The chapter is organized as follows. I begin by discussing the state of literature regarding formation of territorial autonomies noting the predominance of hard power factors in explaining success of territorial autonomy formation. Subsequently, I provide a theoretical discussion that challenges this view and posits that the expected relationship between nonviolent action and autonomy formation is stronger. I then conduct an empirical test of my hypotheses employing a data set comprised of observations for 196 ethnic groups from 95 countries. I conclude by considering the policy implications of this research.

Peaceful Demands and Territorial Autonomy: Existing Explanations

As noted in chapter I, I consider a territorial autonomy to have emerged if a new institutional arrangement meets two criteria. First, there must be the existence of a legal document—constitution, agreement, or statute—that recognizes the establishment of territorial autonomy and is *accepted* by the governing bodies of *both* the central state and the territory. Second, the newly established territorial unit's local government must have taxing and spending authority. These two elements encompass the notion of power sharing that lies at the heart of territorial autonomy arrangements. They each provide a means for ethnic groups, distinct from the dominant community, to express their identity

and are thus consistent with established definitions of autonomy. Although the notion of territorial autonomies could be used in a non-ethnic context, in this dissertation I elect to focus exclusively on the creation of ethnically-based territorial autonomies.

In Table 1, I present a list of groups in which territorial autonomies emerged during the time period under analysis. To identify these instances of autonomy I employed Elazar's (1994) *Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements* and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

Table 1. Ethnic Groups under Provisions for Territorial Autonomy between 1945–2000

Name of the Group	Country Name	Period of Territorial Autonomy
Jurassians	Switzerland	1979–
Basques	Spain	1978–
Catalans	Spain	1978–
South Tyrolians	Italy	1992–
Sardinians	Italy	1948–
Karachay	Russia	1993–
Ingush	Russia	1993–
Buryat	Russia	1993–
Tuvinians	Russia	1993–
Yakut	Russia	1993–
Tatars	Russia	1994–
Crimean Russians	Ukraine	1991–
Afars	Ethiopia	1991–
Oromo	Ethiopia	1991–
Somalis	Ethiopia	1991–
Tigreans	Ethiopia	1991–
Amhara	Ethiopia	1991–
Xhosa	South Africa	1976–
Southerners	Sudan	1979–1982, 1991–

Table 1 Continued

Name of the Group	Country Name	Period of Territorial Autonomy
Kashmiris	India	1949–1989
Mizos	India	1986–
Tripuras	India	1988–
Assamese	India	1985–
Nagas	India	1960–
Baluchis	Pakistan	1973–1974, 1985–
Pashtuns	Pakistan	1973–1974, 1985–
Sindhis	Pakistan	1973–1974, 1985–
Mohajirs	Pakistan	1973–1974, 1985–
Azerbaijanis	Iran	1946–1946
Tibetans	China	1951–1959
Turkmen	China	1946–1950
Gagauz	Moldova	1994–
Serbs	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995–
Bouganvilleans	Papua New Guinea	1976–1986, 2000
Scots	United Kingdom	1998–

Among cases in which aggrieved groups have gained territorial autonomy, there are notable instances in which acts of violence preceded the state's willingness to reach an accord with the relevant ethnic community. This proved to be the case in Kosovo as a violent resistance movement among ethnic Albanians influenced the Serbian government's decision to grant autonomy to the region; similarly, acts of terrorism provided the impetus for Spain's government to establish an autonomous region for the Basque ethnic community.

There is an obvious logic behind the expectation that violent movements would be associated with the granting of territorial autonomy. Given that terrorism, riots and acts of war are simultaneously high risk and costly behaviors, these tactics signal a high

level of resolve on the part of the ethnic group seeking autonomy. The willingness of activists to sacrifice their lives for their cause puts a country's leadership on notice that the desire for autonomy is genuine and that it is an issue requiring immediate attention.

This anticipated relationship between violent tactics and autonomy formation is consistent with an influential Rikerian theory on the origins of federalism. Riker implies that governments are unable to take a full control of their territories due to, in part, their *military incapacity*, leading to the failure to establish fully-centralized states (Riker 1964:12). Similarly, bargains on the formation of territorial autonomies in Latin America between central governments and ethnic groups were aimed at ending armed struggles that challenged governing regimes or took place when the regimes faced crises of legitimacy and governability (van Cott 2001).

The research presented in this study, however, suggests that while violent tactics may at times be effective in pressing for territorial autonomy, a far more common pattern is for violent tactics to foster a domestic and international environment increasingly hostile to accommodating the interests of the aggrieved ethnic communities. In this sense, groups prove more likely to achieve their goals if they favor the use of peaceful tactics such as boycotts and demonstrations.¹⁰ For example, Tatars in Russia, Eskimos in Canada and Scots in Britain attained a degree of autonomy from the central governments using nonviolence as their political action strategy.

¹⁰ Walter (2006) addresses the issue of territorial autonomy formation. However, her study does not consider the influence of protest tactics on the success or failure of autonomy movements.

While violent tactics might result in territorial autonomy, their success is limited by the reactions they engender among the relevant government's leadership, domestic public, and the international community. While violence may garner domestic and international attention for an autonomy movement, it also has the effect of preventing representatives of these movements from appearing as sympathetic figures worthy of assistance. With the resort to arms, the perceptions of groups employing violent tactics become transformed from ethnic activists to extremists and terrorists. I further develop this argument below.

Factors Associated with the Creation of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements

While my theoretical focus is on the strategies employed by ethnically-based autonomy movements, I recognize that this is not the only influence on the eventual success or failure of these efforts. In what follows, I describe tactics and other factors likely to play a role in the trajectory of these movements.

Movement Tactics

The strategies associated with autonomy movements form the central focus of this study. My argument is that the most effective autonomy movements will be those that emphasize nonviolent tactics. These tactics have the advantage of garnering attention for the concerns of ethnic groups without the liability of provoking the animosity or distrust created by violent conflict.

While not addressing the specific issue of territorial autonomy formation, an established literature does describe the potential for nonviolent tactics to serve as an effective means of making demands on government (e.g., McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Sharp 1973:110; Zunes 2000). These studies equate the nonviolent tactics used by group activists to political “*jiu-jitsu*” intended to throw their opponents off balance, weaken their power, and cause repressive policies to rebound (Sharp 1973:110).

One of the major “*jiu-jitsu*” assets at the disposal of nonviolent movements is their *moral advantage* vis-à-vis violence (Gurr 2000:156). From an ethical standpoint, many leaders should find it difficult to justify repressive policies against nonviolent groups, resulting not only in the failure to strengthen their position but also in the possibility to weaken it (Gurr 2000:111). The emphasis on nonviolent tactics thus has the potential to divide governments over the question of whether repression is an appropriate response to the movement (Sisk 1996:675; Zunes 2000:184). Further, political leaders should prove less concerned about the consequence of reaching a compromise with a nonviolent group as such groups are perceived less threatening to leaders’ personal security (Zunes 2000:184).

In the context of the evolving international norms of justice, nonviolent action also has the potential to shape world opinion about a conflict as is evident in the cases of South Africa (Klotz 1995; Zunes 2000:184) and the Philippines. In the Philippines, for instance, the choice of Washington decision makers to withhold their support from the Marcos regime and instead favor the peaceful movement challenging the regime proved critical (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). In this sense, nonviolent protesters can effectively

use the international media to reach out to distant publics and garner international sympathy for their cause (Gurr 2000:156).

Aware of the moral power of nonviolence, governments might try to discredit nonviolent groups. Governments, for instance, utilize *agents provocateurs* (Seidman 2000:166; Zunes 2000:184) to instigate violence. High-ranking officials can also condone paramilitary organizations and death squads designed to exterminate the leaders advocating nonviolent tactics often with the support of police and the military (Zunes 2000:185).

Nonviolent actions, therefore, are likely to be more successful when the universal norms of justice are not only internationally recognized but also abided by by the contending government (Seidman 2000). In this sense, British adherence to the value of fair play proved crucial for Gandhi's *satyagraha* campaign (Gurr 2000:158). Success of Gandhi's policy of nonviolence was spelled by the British Viceroy's acknowledgement that the colonizing power was reduced to helplessness by Gandhi's movement (Gurr 2000:157-158). The British could not do anything against Indians without being villains (158). In other words, the British were restrained by their norms defining the acceptable and unacceptable governance. In contrast, the failure to accept the universal norms by the apartheid government precipitated a much turbulent path of transition where peaceful tactics were at times mixed with violence (Seidman 2000).

Even when a government rejects universal values, nonviolent action may still empower activists in several important ways. According to an influential scholar of nonviolent movements, Gene Sharp, in order to effectively work, punishing sanctions

must cause fear and willingness to obey. Lack of fear and presence of overriding loyalties, however, imply persistence of action on the part of protesters in spite of repression (Sharp 1973:110-1). Since many who engage in nonviolent action realize the possibility of repression and are willing to fearlessly endure it, the long-run success of repression is questionable.

In addition to emphasizing the lack of fear, persistence of peaceful protest can also demonstrate the limits of opponent states' capacities to resist long-term demands by overcrowding prison cells (Sharp 1973:111). Even in the short run, protesters can learn to "disrupt the smooth functioning... [of the system] with boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations without exposing individual leaders to arrest, or provoking immediate police attacks" in the face of well-equipped modern armies of highly industrialized states (Seidman 2000:164).

While nonviolent activists might be exposed to repression, their chances of facing governmental wrath are less than that of violent groups (Sharp 1973:110). In comparison to violent tactics, more people support peaceful expression of demands and grievances. Since protesters compose a large proportion of the general population and are likely to express public opinion, the odds of singling out one person by the government for the purpose of repression is much lower in nonviolent movements than in a violent action (Sharp 1973).

This logic arguably applies to the "Yellow Revolution" in the Philippines where the Catholic Church, many members of the middle and upper class, even some institutions, such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, normally suspicious of

insurgents, came together to protest the Marcos regime and its practices (McAdam and Tarrow 2000:152-3). On the day when the Philippine dictator took presidential oath for another term, Corazón Aquino was sworn to the post in another part of the town. Most citizens pledged their support to Aquino, as they thought the elections were rigged. By the time Marcos left office, he controlled little outside of Malacanang Palace (Zunes 2000). While public opinion about elections was crucial in mobilizing people, it was rational for any single individual to take part in the peaceful protest, as the chances of being singled out for punishment within a large and growing movement were negligibly low.

By contrast, the use of violent tactics may indicate a high degree of resolve on the part of ethnic activists but also has the potential to present these groups as unreliable partners in the future governance of the state. Given that violent strategies call into question the government's "monopoly on the legitimate use of force," a country's leadership has justifiable reasons to doubt that the conflict will definitively end with the granting of autonomy. There remains the equally plausible scenario that the political success associated with earlier acts violence will instead encourage future armed conflict on the basis of new and more extreme demands. This is especially relevant in light of the arguments that possession of territorial autonomy by ethnic groups enables them to develop both the institutional capabilities and motivation to press further for a full-fledged secession from the "parent" state (Cornell 2002).

For governments confronting violent autonomy movements, I anticipate that the most common reaction among the leadership will take the form of repression intended to

bring an end to the rebellion. Opportunities for support from the international community should also be limited with the resort to arms as both states and international organizations prove reluctant to meddle in violent internal disputes with implications for a state's sovereignty. Such reluctance might stem from the concerns about legitimacy of foreign interference and the threat to an intervener's self-interest (Hurd 1999).

Moreover, many states have maintained that they not negotiate with terrorists. This would thus make negotiating difficult if the group becomes violent and might act as a check for group leaders to think carefully about if they want to escalate their protests into violence or not.

In summary, my theoretical expectation is that the least successful autonomy movements will tend to be those that employ violent tactics. While bloodshed may increase the level of attention accorded an autonomy movement, it should also limit the potential sympathy for ethnic activists that might otherwise be forthcoming from either the state or international actors. In contrast, nonviolent strategies are associated with higher odds of territorial autonomy formation.

In order to represent the different strategies that groups might adopt to demand autonomy or independence from the state I employ a total of four indicators drawn from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set. The first two indicators reflect the tactics of nonviolence associated with either autonomy or independence movements. The distinction between group claims for a territorial autonomy as opposed to the calls for an outright independence is introduced to capture the nature of group demands in a more nuanced way. Values for these variables range from one to five if collectivities use

peaceful tactics ranging from public statements, boycotts, to peaceful public demonstrations. The minimum value reflects instances in which the efforts of elites were confined to public statements pressing for autonomy or independence. A value of five indicates the holding of demonstrations involving at least 100,000 people.¹¹

A second set of variables reflects instances in which groups seek either autonomy or independence through violence. Among collectivities using tactics including terrorism or war to signal such demands, the score for this indicator ranges between one and seven with the scale representing increasing degrees of violence. The minimum value identifies those cases in which activities were limited to sporadic terrorism; the maximum value indicates the existence of a protracted civil war.¹²

In many instances, ethnic groups opt to employ both violent and nonviolent tactics simultaneously. The MAR dataset indicates that 59 (or 30.10 percent) of all collectivities I include in this analysis chose a mix of strategies to make their case for either autonomy or independence. For these cases, I include *only* the value associated with violent tactics and record a score of zero for peaceful activities. This coding decision is based on the expectation that both states and the international community will

¹¹ A value of zero is assigned to the group when no protest is in evidence; a two reflects acts of symbolic resistance, including sit-ins, sabotage, and blockage of traffic; a three signifies small demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with a total participation of less than 10,000; a four is assigned to the instances of medium demonstrations with the total number of participants of less than 100,000. Although the MAR scale of the rebellion variable reflects the action of groups, which, in certain instances, might follow the actions of states, the scale captures primarily groups' behavior. Complete information concerning this coding scale is available from the MAR website at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp>.

¹² A value of zero is recorded if the group has not engaged in protest activity; a group is scored with a two if conducts terrorist campaigns; a three reflects local rebellions; a four signifies small-scale guerilla activity; a five is assigned to intermediate guerilla activity; a six reflects large-scale guerrilla activity. Complete information concerning this coding scale is available from the MAR website at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp>.

tend to focus on violence as the most pressing threat and thus discount the significance of any peaceful efforts taking place at the same time.

The following are the two alternative hypotheses that I investigate:

H1a: The use of nonviolent tactics by an ethnically-based movement increases the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

H1b: The use of violent tactics by an ethnically-based movement increases the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge. However, the increase in the odds of autonomy formation by violent tactics are lower than those caused by nonviolent strategies.

To conduct the preliminary test of the difference between effects of peaceful, as opposed to violent, strategies employed by ethnic collectivities, I used a contingency table and the Chi Square Test of Independence. I selected only the groups that express demands for either independence or territorial autonomy. I employ the MAR dataset, discussed in further detail below, as my primary data source. I present the frequencies for ethnic group tactics and territorial autonomy formation in Table 2.

Table 2. Frequencies for Ethnic Group Tactics and Territorial Autonomy Formation

	Autonomy Formed	Autonomy Not Formed	Total
Peaceful Only	9	18	27
Violent Only	1	1	2
Both	11	54	65
Neither	5	98	103
Total	26	171	197

As the table indicates, of the total 27 groups demanding increasing degree of self-governance peacefully 9 (33.33%) autonomy receive territorial autonomy. In contrast, only 11 out of 67 groups that express their demands, at least in part, violently, or 17.91% receive territorial autonomy arrangements. The Chi Square statistic associated with these data (2.638) yields a probability of only 0.10 that territorial autonomies are formed independently from the tactics employed by ethnic groups. Based on these results, one, therefore, may conclude that autonomy formation depends on group strategies.

To subjugate the results presented above to a more stringent analysis, the model should be tested against the rival explanations. In an effort to simplify the discussion, I categorize these indicators as those that define: (1) the nature of the dispute, (2) the characteristics of the government, and (3) the groups demanding autonomy.

Nature of the Dispute

To represent the nature of the dispute I consider the degree to which the international community has chosen to involve itself in efforts to resolve the conflict.

International Mediation

Beyond the tactics of the groups themselves and their relative capabilities vis-à-vis the central government, the involvement of actors outside states also often plays a role in shaping the nature and trajectory of interethnic disputes.¹³ Most relevant to the

¹³ On this topic, see Lake and Rothchild's 1998 edited volume.

concerns of this study is the literature pointing to the capacity of mediators to identify means of peaceful compromise that either prevent or bring hostilities to an end (see, for example, Bercovitch and Houston 1996).

Depending on the source of their authority, mediators bring different advantages to the bargaining table. Mediators representing states have a greater potential to deploy resources (both financial and coercive) that might facilitate or sustain a deal; by contrast, mediators representing international organizations such as the United Nations have fewer assets at their disposal, but are typically trusted to behave as unbiased referees of the conflict resolution process (Rothchild 1997).

In order to represent the potential for international mediation to heighten the development of territorial autonomy arrangements, I recorded all cases of mediation of these disputes identified by either Bercovitch (2000) or *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.¹⁴ I then constructed two dichotomous indicators representing the different capacities of mediators. A first indicator identifies the presence or absence of mediation efforts by state representatives; a second measure notes whether or not mediators representing international organizations took part in efforts at conflict resolution.

The following hypothesis is investigated:

H5: The presence of both kinds of international mediators to resolve a dispute between ethnic communities and the state increases the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

¹⁴ Referencing *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* proved necessary for those cases of interethnic dispute that did not appear in Bercovitch's study.

Government Characteristics

With the items described below, I take into account core characteristics of the governing regime under which the autonomy movement takes place. I include these factors based on an expectation that a country's system of government and the resources at its disposal should prove critical in shaping the reactions of a country's leadership to ethnic-centered demands for either autonomy or independence.

Level of Democracy

Regime type defines the potential that exists for members of the public to influence government decision-making. Not surprisingly, opportunities for the public to play a role in the policymaking process tend to be greatest in those states that enjoy the highest levels of democracy. Democratic states are also credited with forging a culture of toleration that allows for diverse cultures to live together within the context of a single state.

Further, democratic institutions are thought to discourage contestation over the structure of political institutions and decrease the potential for violence (e.g., Dassel and Reinhardt 1999:67). In long-standing democracies, elite preferences for repression are reduced, since historically they have been able to address successfully group grievances and challenges (Gurr and Moore 1997:8). Historical patterns and institutional constraints make it costly for state leaders to use force against their citizens opting instead for conciliatory means to redress grievances.

My expectation is that the easy accessibility of the leadership should have the effect of making democratic regimes more responsive to demands for ethnic autonomy. I measure the level of democracy within a state drawing on data from the Polity IV project. Measures vary between -10 and 10 with lower values reflecting the least democratic states.

H6: The higher the level of democracy within a state, the higher the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

Government Economic Capabilities

If regime type determines whether decision makers are available to the public, state capabilities should shape the degree to which leaders feel compelled to accommodate these demands. Governments with ample access to key resources may consider themselves sufficiently powerful to simply ignore or suppress ethnic-based autonomy movements. The central aspect of state power I consider in this study is the country's overall level of economic wealth.

A state's level of wealth has important implications for the ability of ethnic groups to achieve territorial autonomy. As impoverished states have a limited capacity to resist the demands of ethnic groups, the claims for territorial autonomy are more likely to materialize in poorer states than in wealthier polities. To capture a state's level of economic growth, I employ a measure of the state's Gross Domestic Product per Capita derived from the *World Bank*.¹⁵

¹⁵ These data were obtained from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset.

H7: The higher the level of economic development within a state, the lower the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

Stability of Political Institutions

In addition to regime type and economic capabilities of central states, the stability of national political institutions is another factor with the potential to influence the odds of territorial autonomy formation. Specifically, in stable political systems, ethnic collectivities generally do not enjoy an opportunity to shape political institutions. In stable majoritarian democracies, groups are likely to be outvoted, while in lasting authoritarian regimes they can be similarly ignored, coercively silenced or prevented from voicing grievances altogether. However, in unstable political systems abundant with legitimacy crises, such groups have the potential to be more assertive. Feeling more empowered, groups in such systems can shape the content of new constitutions by pressing for territorial autonomy when such crises occur (van Cott 2001).

To measure the stability of political institutions I count the number of years from the time when a constitution was enacted until the year it was discontinued. On average, the overhaul of the entire constitution weighs much more than introduction of one single amendment in the supreme document of the land. Admittedly, the collection of amendments might equal the change of the entire constitution with respect to its impact on institutional stability. However, the critical mass of comparable amendments are not likely to accumulate over a short period of time.

For cases that do not show constitutional formation during the period (e.g., Bahrain), the number of years since independence were employed. The data were coded using Jackman (1993), and updated through the Constitution Finder of the University of Richmond and CIA World Factbook.

H8: The higher the level of stability of political institutions, the lower the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

Ethnic Group Characteristics

A final category of variables consider the characteristics of the groups seeking autonomy in an effort to account for particular community characteristics with the potential to either enhance or disadvantage their movements.

Power Factors

The conventional arguments explaining territorial autonomy formation and, more generally, concessions of central governments attend to military and demographic capabilities as the main conditions for such institutional arrangements to take place. The classical Rikerian theory of the origins of federalism assigns an important role to the balance of military capabilities of territorial subunits and central governments in the process of federalization and territorial autonomy formation. This argument implies that if the military strength of the central government by far exceeds the military capabilities of subnational entities, the central government is in a position to abandon the federal idea in favor of a unitary state (Riker 1964). By extension, as the military balance between the central government and territorial units approach parity, federal

arrangements and institutions of territorial autonomy beneficial to ethnic groups should be more likely to emerge.

Recognizing that military strength is only important to the extent that it reflects the balance of power between groups opposing one another, I measure the ratio that exists between the men under arms for the relevant ethnic group and the government. Employing data from the *Military Balance* and *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbooks*, I identify values ranging between zero (in the case of US Hawaiians) and .74 (in the case of Armenians in Azerbaijan). This means that for every 10 men under arms in the regular army of Azerbaijan, there are 7 armed ethnic Armenians willing to fight government forces. The minimum, maximum, mean values for this and other variables used in the analysis as well as their standard deviations are given in Appendix A.

H2: The stronger the military power of an ethnic group, the higher the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

Population and Settlement Pattern

State leaders should be more predisposed to consider groups with particular characteristics that appear to legitimate claims to a degree of self-governance. Chief among these attributes is population size relative to the country as a whole. Groups with large populations may justifiably claim that the shared interests of a large number of individuals should be accommodated through government policy; it is also the case that

autonomy movements for larger populations might engender efforts at accommodation by leaders concerned about the potential for widespread unrest (van Cott 2001:52).¹⁶

Yet not all ethnic groups with large populations are distributed within a state in such a way that autonomy is a viable option. In the case of Malaysia, for example, the substantial Chinese minority population has never sought autonomy given that they are widely dispersed throughout the state. The settlement pattern most likely to favor the creation of autonomy appears in those instances in which groups are concentrated within a single region in which they enjoy majority status (Toft 2003). By contrast, the least favorable pattern would be those instances in which a community is spread across the country in such a way that they cannot easily mobilize and it remains unclear exactly what territory would constitute their homeland.

My measure of the relative population size of each ethnic community is derived from the MAR data set and indicates the percentage of the country's total population that belongs to the relevant ethnic group. My measure of settlement pattern is similarly based on MAR. Values range between zero to one with the highest value representing the most concentrated settlement pattern for regional majority groups.

H3: The greater the size of an ethnic group's population relative to the country as a whole, the higher the odds that an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

H4: The larger and more concentrated an ethnic group's population in the region, the higher the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

¹⁶ A reverse relationship, however, is also possible. Groups smaller in size in comparison to the rest of the state may gain autonomy as they are generally understood to be less threatening by state elites (van Cott 2001).

Resources of Ethnic Territories

The final indicator I include is the presence of economic resources within the ethnic group's homeland. The local availability of valuable assets such as oil, diamonds or industries are significant as they can serve as an important source of leverage in the negotiations with state leaders over the formation of territorial autonomy. In the Russian experience, for instance, wealthier regions were much more assertive in their relationships with the federal government than relative poorer units (Kahn 2002).

For their part, state leaders have incentives to negotiate a stable relationship with wealthy regions at least for two reasons. First, an important task of central governments—successful redistribution of resources across the country—critically depends on the revenues effectively collected from economically powerful subnational units and territories. Although substantial devolution of fiscal and political powers to economically-developed units might strain central governments' budget, devolution of powers may also result in a more effective resource extraction. Second, central governments grant substantial autonomy to economically powerful regions to preserve the very unity of the state (Treisman 1999). If not given the desired powers, such units have the potential to tear the state apart.

I again draw on the MAR data set to identify those ethnic homelands with substantial economic resources and complement the missing data. Values for this variable range from zero to one. To note one example, Yakuts in Russia are designated

with a score of 1 based upon the substantial diamond mining industry present within their territory.

H9: The presence of significant economic assets in ethnic homelands increases the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge.

Empirical Analysis

I now turn to a discussion of the empirical tests intended to identify the effect of protest tactics on the formation of institutions associated with territorial autonomy.

Case Selection

In the statistical analysis I consider the potential of an autonomy arrangement emerging for each ethnic group listed in the MAR dataset for the years between 1945 and 2000. Since peaceful strategies are likely to be successful when the threat of violence is vivid (Gurr 2000), I select ethnic groups who are “at risk” of rebellion to properly test the propositions presented above. My sample includes minority groups that constitute at least one percent of their country’s population or have 100,000 members or more. Groups included in this study reside in the countries with a population of at least 500,000 and have either benefited or suffered from discriminatory practices or have mobilized in defense or support of its perceived interest. This constitutes a total of 197 ethnic communities within 95 states.¹⁷

¹⁷ Only relevant groups, i.e. those with a potential to demand only a *part* of the state’s territory, are included in this study. For this reason, only those groups classified by MAR as ethnonational, indigenous, ethno-class, religious sect, or national minority are included in the analysis.

Note that, while all groups within the analysis are considered to have the potential to participate in protest activity, this does not mean that they have actually engaged in such movements. In fact, among the general population, aggrieved people who do not protest or rebel are “[b]y far the larger category” (Lichbach 1995:12).

In this respect, my dataset corresponds to the general population distribution. In my sample, the number of years spent by groups in peace constitutes 90% (6,522) out of the total 7,253 years. Although 67 (34%) ethnic communities were engaged in violence at least at some point between 1945 and 2000, many (27 or 14%) employed strategies of peaceful protest or were not involved in any significant political action at all (103 groups or 52%). For example, Russians in Belarus and Azerbaijan, Slovaks in the Czech Republic, and Germans in Kazakhstan are representative of ethnic groups within the MAR sample that were “at risk” but have not mobilized based on demands for autonomy or independence.

A unit of analysis in this dataset is group-year. Such statistical setup allows to treat each of the 197 groups at every year between 1945 and 2000 as a separate, though related, case.

Method

I use a duration model to test my expectation that groups employing peaceful protest tactics have the greatest potential to gain territorial autonomy. Duration models assess the influence of the independent variables on the amount of time (in this case, as measured in years) before a particular event occurs. From within the family of event

history models, I chose to employ a Weibull distribution for my statistical analysis. In this instance, the reason behind employing the Weibull distribution is the expectation that autonomy arrangements are more likely to form *soon after* an autonomy movement emerges rather than proving unrelated to the passage of time.¹⁸ Observation for a group starts from year 1945. The dependent variable – formation of territorial autonomy – is measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if territorial autonomy is formed and 0 if it does not exist.

Due to the concerns that individual country effects may bias statistical results, in addition to the control variables specified above, I also control for country effects through clustering in the empirical analysis presented below. The results from the analysis that accounts for country effects are not significantly different from the model that does not include such influences.

Results

I present the results of my statistical analysis in Table 3. All variables related to autonomy and independence movements have a positive and statistically significant influence on the formation of autonomy arrangements. This suggests that the tactics

¹⁸ In an effort to address concerns that the assumptions tied to the Weibull distribution may not be appropriate to the formation of autonomy arrangements, I also tested the same variables employing a Cox events history model. The Cox model makes no assumption about the effects of the passage of time on the odds of the relevant event occurring. The findings when employing the alternative specification are consistent with those produced by the Weibull model.

employed by groups seeking greater levels of self-rule play a critically important role in determining the central government's response to these demands.

Which of these nonviolent and violent tactics proves most effective in encouraging autonomy formation? Column four in Table 3 addresses this question by indicating how variations across the values of each tactic affect the probability of territorial autonomy formation.¹⁹ The most notable aspect of these results is that peaceful demands for the increased autonomy prove to be the single most effective strategy for groups seeking such an accommodation²⁰. As the model indicates, increasing this variable one unit from its mean value of .09 heightens the probability of territorial autonomy formation by 118 percent. Nonviolent demands for independence are also successful in securing territorial autonomy. Heightening peaceful secession demands one unit from its average value of 0.04 enhances the odds of territorial autonomy formation by 107 percent (Table 3).

¹⁹ The substantive influence of the variables of interest on the likelihood of autonomy formation is assessed by dividing the "revised" hazard rate by the "base" hazard rate. The "revised" hazard rate is calculated after the increase or decrease on the variable of interest from its mean (for continuous variables) or mode (for dichotomous variables) level. A "base" hazard rate is calculated when all the variables in the model are kept at their empirical average or mode (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:27).

²⁰ Different models were run for groups that achieved independence (such as Slovaks in Czechoslovakia or Croats in Yugoslavia). These groups were coded both as if they have achieved autonomy and as if they have not. No significant differences in the results have been observed in these models.

Table 3. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation, 1945-2000

Variable	Coefficient	Hazard Ratio	Revised Hazard Rate/ Base Hazard Rate
Peaceful Autonomy Demand	.78** (.19)	2.18** (.41)	2.18
Peaceful Independence Demand	.73** (.22)	2.07** (.46)	2.07
Violent Autonomy Demand	.44** (.12)	1.55** (.19)	1.55
Violent Independence Demand	.27* (.10)	1.30* (.13)	1.30
<i>Nature of the Dispute</i>			
Mediation by a State	1.05 (.75)	2.84 (2.13)	2.84
Mediation by an International Organization	-.84 (1.03)	.43 (.44)	.43
<i>Government Characteristics</i>			
Democracy Level	.03 (.04)	1.03 (.04)	1.03
Economic Development of the State	.10 (.08)	1.10 (.09)	1.10
Stability of Political Institutions	-.01 (.01)	.99 (.01)	.99
<i>Ethnic Group Characteristics</i>			
Groups' Capability Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	-.50 (4.28)	.61 (2.59)	.61
Groups' Population Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	-.69 (2.44)	.50 (1.22)	.50
Concentrated Majority in the Region	.62 (.58)	1.86 (1.08)	1.86
Resources in the Region	.17 (.54)	1.18 (.63)	1.18
Constant	-362.38** (100.39)		
Subjects	203		
Autonomies Formed	24		
Number of observations	7253		
Log pseudolikelihood	41.077347		
Wald chi2(13)	105.62		
Prob>chi2	0.0000		

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.

**p<.001, *p<.05

The capacity of nonviolent movements to secure territorial autonomy arrangements becomes most apparent when compared to the effects of violent independence and autonomy movements. While one-unit shifts (e.g., from inaction to verbal demands) in the value for peaceful independence movements increased the odds of autonomy formation by 107 percent, comparable violent movements (e.g., from inaction to political banditry and sporadic terrorism) increase the odds of autonomy formation by a much more limited 30 percent.


A similar result is apparent when comparing peaceful and violent movements demanding territorial autonomy. A one unit change in the intensity of peaceful movements increases the odds of autonomy formation by 118 percent, while comparable measures for violent movements prove much lower, at 55 percent. It is also notable that the threshold of statistical significance for violent independence demand variable is lower than that of both indicators of nonviolent strategies (Table 3).

Superior effects of peaceful tactics on territorial autonomy formation are also highlighted by statistical tests of difference between the coefficients. In the model (Table 3), the estimate of peaceful autonomy demands is different from both the violent independence and violent autonomy demands at .004 and .064 levels, respectively. Peaceful independence demands are statistically different from violent independence demands at less than .061 level, although the coefficient of peaceful independence protest fails to achieve statistically significant difference from the estimate of violent autonomy demands at .190 level. However, three out of four pairs of variables exhibit

statistically significant levels of difference between the peaceful and violent strategies, supporting the central theoretical argument.

To further illustrate the contrasting success rates between peaceful and violent movements, I present a visual representation of these results in Fig. 2. The horizontal axis on the graph indicates duration of time from year 1945 to year 2000. The vertical axis denotes the hazard rates. Hazard is the slope of the survival curve, or *instantaneous failure* rate, which represents how quickly territorial autonomies are formed. In other words, hazard rates depicted in the graph show the probability that an ethnic group that has not enjoyed territorial autonomy up to time t will attain it during the interval $t+\Delta$. The function represented by the solid line is constructed for a group that demands both autonomy and independence peacefully. The function shown by the dotted line illustrates the rate of autonomy formation for the group which demands autonomy and independence violently. All other variables in the model are held at their mean or mode values.

Fig. 2. Hazard Rates of Territorial Autonomy Formation in the Context of Peaceful and Violent Group Tactics



The graph indicates that the rate of groups expressing peaceful demands to gain autonomy reaches approximately .3 almost immediately following the articulation of the demand. In contrast, groups that employ violent strategies have rates of gaining autonomy less than .1 at the start of the movement. In fact, the solid line representing peaceful tactics has higher rates of autonomy formation than the broken line at any given point in time. Strikingly, the lowest rate of autonomy formation attainable through nonviolent means (approximately .3 in year 1945) is *higher* than the highest rate of autonomy formation achievable by violent strategies (close to .2 in year 2000). While

both lines in the graph rise throughout the period, the solid line (representing peaceful groups) does so faster than the dotted line (representing violent groups). In other words, while the rate of obtaining autonomy is steadily increasing for groups employing violence, those using peaceful tactics consistently enjoy higher rates of success.

None of the other variables appear to be statistically significant. Specifically, mediation by states and international organizations may not be effective due to the self-selection of international mediators into the “difficult” cases. In other words, international mediators tend to intervene in the serious conflicts that involve significant violence. However, such intervention might not relieve the strife, since the dispute between central government and ethnic group has progressed to an irremediable degree.

Economic development of the state may have two different effects canceling each other out. On the one hand, a poorer state, in contrast to a wealthier central government, has a limited capacity to oppose the demands of ethnic groups for territorial autonomy. On the other hand, even if impoverished polities allow the formation of territorial autonomies, they have insufficient material base to help build the institutions of territorial autonomy or provide the necessary fiscal powers to the local authorities in order to do so.

Instability of political institutions within the central government, as hypothesis 7 states, provides an opportunity for ethnic groups to establish territorial autonomy within the state. The insignificant results of my findings can be explained by a countervailing tendency of the general instability on the national level to prevent the establishment of viable subnational institutions.

Similar to the control variables elaborated above, the factors representing ethnic groups' power propensity and settlement patterns are not significant either. The opposite influences of these factors may provide insight to the insignificant findings for these variables as well. Ethnic groups that boast large and territorially concentrated populations may advance legitimate demands for the autonomy forcing governments to accommodate their claims. However, it may also be the case that autonomy movements for larger populations (or those residing compactly on a given territory) might increase the concerns of national leaders. National policy makers may fear that provision of territorial autonomy would not appease ethnic groups, but provide them with higher capabilities for further demands and continuing unrest (van Cott 2001:52).

Although hypothesis 9 postulates that the presence of significant economic assets in ethnic homelands increases the odds an autonomy arrangement will emerge, the results indicate that the impact of this variable is not statistically significant. Devolution of fiscal and political powers to resourceful regions may lead to a successful extraction of resources from the ethnic territory and the subsequent enrichment of central governments' coffers. Second, devolution of power, e.g. formation of territorial autonomy, could be used as a tool by central governments to appease economically-powerful regions. While these considerations provide incentives for central governments to grant territorial autonomy, the desire of national leaders to control every policy area on the subnational level (Riker 1964), especially lavish resources, may preclude establishment of territorial autonomies.

Democracy variable does not yield expected results in my statistical analysis either. The explanation to this finding lies in the different dynamics of interaction between ethnic groups and central governments as observed in democracies and authoritarian regimes. Unfortunately, these dynamics cannot be captured by the “main effect” of the democracy variable. Consequently, I split my sample into democracies (POLITY score > 5) and autocracies (POLITY score < - 5) to obtain the effect of ethnic groups’ tactics contingent on the level of democratization of central governments.

As Table 4 indicates, democracies tend to give a positive response to nonviolent expressions of autonomy demands. A one unit change in the intensity of peaceful movements increases the odds of autonomy formation by 82 percent. In contrast, democracies respond negatively to the demands for a full-fledged independence. A one unit increase in peaceful secession demands decreases the likelihood of territorial autonomy formation by more than 99 percent. None of the violent demands variables is statistically significant. This implies that democracies are responsive only to peaceful demands. Yet, to achieve territorial autonomy within democracies peaceful demands are not sufficient. Groups striving to attain ethnic homeland have to express only reasonable demands that do not threaten territorial integrity of a democratic polity.

Among other factors, mediation by international organization in democracies surprisingly has a negative effect on territorial autonomy formation decreasing its odds by almost 100 percent. Due to their relatively limited capacities, international organizations are likely to mediate most serious cases, which, in turn, may be too grave to be promptly resolved by a third party. Group capability and population ratios have a negative effect on the formation of territorial autonomy in democracies. One unit increase in both factors is associated with more than 99 percent reduction in the odds of territorial autonomy formation. This outcome is in line with the discussion above, which points out that democracies do not respond well to violent demands for an increased self-governance. In other words, larger group capabilities are not likely to push democracies to grant autonomy concessions to ethnic groups.

In contrast, concentrated groups which constitute majority on a given territory are 494 percent more likely to attain territorial autonomy (Table 4). Such groups have certainly the ability to mobilize larger capabilities than dispersed collectivities in their drive for autonomy. However, this outcome is better explained by the legitimacy that such groups enjoy in the eyes of decision makers in democratic states (Toft 2003)²¹.

²¹ Testing the theory using only post-Cold War cases produces the results that similarly support the proposed theory. Hazard ratios for peaceful self-governance demands are in the expected direction (2.21 for secession demands and 3.11 for autonomy demands) and statistically significant at less than .001 level. The violent independence demand variable is not statistically significant ($p=.531$) with a hazard ratio of 1.17. The violent demand for autonomy is statistically significant ($p=.043$). However, its hazard ratio – 1.42 – is much lower than that for both peaceful independence and peaceful autonomy demands.

Table 4. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation in Democracies, 1945-2000

Variable	Coefficient	Hazard Ratio	Revised Hazard Rate/ Base Hazard Rate
Peaceful Autonomy Demand	.60** (.24)	1.82** (.44)	1.82
Peaceful Independence Demand	-25.40** (1.20)	.00** (.00)	.00
Violent Autonomy Demand	.09 (.26)	1.10 (.28)	1.10
Violent Independence Demand	.10 (.17)	1.10 (.18)	1.10
<i>Nature of the Dispute</i>			
Mediation by a State	3.11 (2.75)	22.41 (61.61)	22.41
Mediation by an International Organization	-28.66** (2.24)	.00** (.00)	.00
<i>Government Characteristics</i>			
Economic Development of the State	.06 1.12	1.06 (.13)	1.06
Stability of Political Institutions	-.00 (.01)	1.00 (.01)	1.00
<i>Ethnic Group Characteristics</i>			
Groups' Capability Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	-139142.70** (18272.02)	.00** (.00)	.00
Groups' Population Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	-6.77** (3.21)	.00** (.00)	.00
Concentrated Majority in the Region	1.78* (1.03)	5.94 (6.11)*	5.94
Resources in the Region	.11 (1.06)	1.12 (1.19)	1.12
Constant	-517.05** (144.36)		
Subjects	150		
Autonomies Formed	12		
Number of observations	2568		
Log pseudolikelihood	22.51983		
Wald chi2(13)	3720.53		
Prob>chi2	0.0000		

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.

**p<.05, *p<.1

Table 5 represents the results for territorial autonomy formation in authoritarian regimes. In contrast to democracies, authoritarian regimes respond very negatively to peaceful expression of demands for higher self-governance. For both peaceful autonomy and independence demands, one unit increase in the intensity of demands results in almost a 100 percent decrease in the odds of territorial autonomy formation. Similarly, when groups express limited demands for self-governance, i.e. autonomy, autocratic regimes tend to revoke, rather than grant, the freedoms for such collectivities. A one unit increase in the violent demands for territorial autonomy is associated with a 99 percent decrease in the odds of territorial autonomy formation. It is only when groups express their desires violently and bluntly demand an outright independence authoritarian regimes grant territorial autonomies. A one unit increase in violent independence demands results in a 105 percent increase in the likelihood of territorial autonomy formation.

It is not surprising that autocratic regimes enjoying higher state capacity are more confident in denying territorial autonomies to ethnic groups. As the results indicate, a \$1,000 increase in the per capita income within an authoritarian state decreases the likelihood of territorial autonomy formation by 89 percent (Table 5). The fact that groups' population ratio is associated with a positive influence on the formation of territorial autonomy arrangements indicates that autocracies respect power rather than peaceful demands. The status of a concentrated majority within a territory tends to decrease the likelihood of territorial autonomy formation for ethnic groups in a non-democratic setting. I link it to the idea that legitimacy ethnic collectivities enjoy by

virtue of being concentrated majorities in a region tends to intimidate authoritarian regimes forcing them to refuse the formation of an institutionalized ethnic homeland on the given land.

Table 5. Determinants of Territorial Autonomy Formation in Autocracies, 1945-2000

Variable	Coefficient	Hazard Ratio	Revised Hazard Rate/ Base Hazard Rate
Peaceful Autonomy Demand	-14.37** (1.52)	.00** (.00)	.00
Peaceful Independence Demand	-7.85** (.72)	.00** (.00)	.00
Violent Autonomy Demand	-5.28** (1.44)	.01** (.01)	.01
Violent Independence Demand	.72** (.15)	2.05** (.31)	2.05
<i>Nature of the Dispute</i>			
Mediation by a State	.39 (.55)	1.48 (.81)	1.48
Mediation by an International Organization	1.21 (.82)	3.35 (2.75)	3.35
<i>Government Characteristics</i>			
Economic Development of the State	-2.19* (1.22)	.11* (.14)	.11
Stability of Political Institutions	-.00 (.00)	1.00 (.00)	1.00
<i>Ethnic Group Characteristics</i>			
Groups' Capability Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	-3.49 (3.04)	.03 (.09)	.03
Groups' Population Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	2.46** (.74)	11.66** (8.68)	11.66
Concentrated Majority in the Region	-16.45** (.70)	.00** (.00)	.00
Resources in the Region	3.26** (1.21)	26.05** (31.45)	26.05
Constant	-457.91* (245.52)		

Table 5 Continued

Variable	Coefficient	Hazard Ratio	Revised Hazard Rate/ Base Hazard Rate
Subjects	120		
Autonomies Formed	3		
Number of observations	2921		
Log pseudolikelihood	8.3805756		
Wald chi2(12)	24027.34		
Prob>chi2	.0000		

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. All significance tests are two-tailed.
 **p<.05, *p<.1

Conclusion

In this chapter I have dealt with the major question of this dissertation, namely, why territorial autonomies are formed. I have found previous literature on this topic sparse and unsatisfactory as it primarily dwells on the factors associated with violence in order to explain formation of territorial autonomy arrangements. Drawing on the body literature that deals with nonviolent resistance, I, in contrast, have proposed that states are more responsive to the needs of ethnic groups that employ nonviolent tactics.

This proposition then has been empirically tested using duration analysis model. The statistical analysis suggests that nonviolent movements are indeed more effective at achieving territorial autonomy than ethnic groups that employ violence. The results further suggest that success of peaceful tactics varies across regimes types. Specifically, in democratic polities group demanding territorial autonomy through peaceful means are likely to achieve it, whereas in authoritarian context this proves not to be the case.

While this chapter increases our knowledge and understanding of the origins of territorial autonomy formation by proposing and testing an innovative idea, it, however, raises an important question. As has been shown above, 27 ethnic groups express their demands for an increased self-governance peacefully, while 67 have employed violence at some point in time. If the theory and results suggested in this chapter are correct, then why so many rational ethnic collectivities choose to employ violence? I address this question in the subsequent chapter claiming that their choice of tactics is contingent upon groups' initial strength.

CHAPTER III
BETWEEN PEACE AND VIOLENCE: RESOLVING THE STRATEGY
DILEMMA OF ETHNIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

The question that arises from the previous chapter is why do some ethnic collectivities employ violence, when it appears that peaceful strategies are more effective? In other words, what determines the choice of peaceful, as opposed to violent, tactics by ethnic groups? I deal with this question in this chapter. To answer this question, I employ the general rational choice / collective action framework, which represents the state of the art in the extant literature on ethnic strife. In doing so I adhere to the idea presented and tested in the previous chapter that peaceful strategies are the most effective tools for achieving territorial autonomy. In this chapter, I further develop this idea by examining the constraints on the choice of peaceful tactics forcing ethnic groups to employ violence. While some of these limits, such as the level of democratization of the polity, have been discussed in the previous chapter²², below I study in greater detail the factor of initial strength largely responsible for the choice of violent, as opposed to peaceful, tactics.

In this chapter I assume that any ethnic group is engaged in a two-level decision-making process. First, members of ethnic collectivities have to decide whether to engage in a collective action or not. Subsequently, those groups that elect to voice their discontent are faced with the choice of tactics – whether to express their grievances

²² The results from the previous chapter suggest that governments' level of democracy influences success of peaceful tactics. It would be reasonable to suggest, therefore, that ethnic group leaders may rationally calculate the chances of their success based on the level of democratization while choosing their tactics.

peacefully or violently. The current literature largely overlooks the second level of group decision-making. Instead, most scholars are concerned with explaining either general collective action or, more exclusively, violent group behavior.

Although the question of strategy choice has received only limited attention in the current literature on mass violence, the insight from this body of work is helpful in elucidating the distinction between peaceful and violent action adopted by ethnic groups. Accordingly, below I draw on the relevant literature to discuss the factors affecting both levels of decision making. I specifically emphasize valuable and easily extractable resources, which contribute to private material benefits, as one of the most pertinent determinants in the choice of political tactics.

Relative Deprivation Argument

An important literature on civil and ethnic conflict developed since 1970s sees psychological factors, especially, *relative deprivation* as a major force beneath violent behavior (see, e.g., Gurr 1971). The seminal work by Ted Robert Gurr *Why Men Rebel* (Gurr 1971), in particular, proposes a connection between perceived deprivation and frustration in its frustration-anger-aggression theory. Gurr further elaborates on the frustration-aggression proposition positing that “the grater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration” (9). These postulates provide basis for his initial proposition regarding political violence, that the magnitude of political violence directly depends on the intensity of deprivation (9).

The theory further details four psychocultural variables that determine humans' levels of discontent – perceived discrepancy between expectations and capabilities, importance of the affected values, the number of other satisfactions to fall back, and the quantity of the alternative ways to satisfy one's discontent. Specifying the importance of time, it is also claimed that anger denied expression in the short run intensifies before it quiets (Gurr 1971). This theory has been empirically tested and received some support in quantitative studies (Gurr and Moore 1997).

Rational Choice/Collective Action Framework

Building on the argument developed in the *relative deprivation* literature, the collective action framework sees injustice and deprivation as constant incentives and necessary conditions underlying collective violence (e.g., Collier 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lichbach 1995). Despite importance attributed to *relative deprivation*, scholars adhering to this framework place much of the explanatory power on the *opportunities* to rebel.

In general, current rational choice models suggest that it is inherently irrational for any single member of a group to engage in a collective rebellion even in the presence of objective grievances. Group members realize if they act collectively, they may attain public good that benefits everybody within the group. However, the indivisible nature of public goods and high cost of rebellion pose a significant obstacle to the very formation of a collective violent action. In particular, an individual group member is able to receive benefits even if she does not engage in a collective action because she cannot be

excluded from receiving collective goods. Moreover, uncertainty regarding the involvement of other group members in the rebellion suggests an inherently high cost associated with the upheaval (Tong 1991:87; Lichbach 1995). If an individual ethnic group member engages in a rebellion, she may find herself alone bearing the costs of police or military brutality as other group members abstain from rebelling. Hence, the safest and most rational outcome is not engaging in rebellion at all.

Despite their seeming irrationality, rebellions, nevertheless, do occur. The major challenge that scholars have faced in this respect is the question *how collective action is overcome* by group members (e.g., Lichbach 1995). The extant literature on the subject has made substantive progress offering various explanations that enrich our knowledge of how collective action is circumvented. Below I examine in greater detail an important factor related to the opportunities of ethnic groups for collective action – their private material benefits. In doing so, I draw on the “greed vs. grievance” literature and the notion of the “weapon of the weak” suggested by Scott (Scott 1985).

Private Rewards/Selective Incentives and Collective Action

Organizations formed to carry out collective action—protest or rebellion—are the primary entities providing selective incentives through their institutional structure. Lichbach distinguishes between self-governing rebel institutions and externally organized groups, both of which offer private rewards to their members. There are five techniques provided by self-governing rebel institutions that maximize selective incentives and six offered by externally organized groups. The methods practiced by

self-governing organizations are “conspiracy of silence”, absence of formal organization, *covert* struggle, small scale resistance, and clandestine, surreptitious, and concealed opposition (Lichbach 1995:228). These organizations emerge spontaneously and are especially prominent in peasant dissent (228), as well as in “the structure of mafias, peasant armies, social bandits, and base areas” (229).

More relevant for the contemporary long-standing ethnic rebels and protesters are externally organized groups. Political entrepreneurs within those groups realize that they need to design a peculiar organization to be able to carry out three important duties—1) acquire resources; 2) secure the inflow of new members; and 3) keep current membership (Lichbach 1995). Fulfillment of the last two tasks critically depends on the entrepreneurs’ ability to offer private rewards, i.e. on their first task. Normally, resources are obtained and distributed through 1) plundering, 2) expropriating from those outside the organization and giving to those inside, 3) privatizing a certain issue, good, or grievance of interest to group members, 4) challenging the central government’s monopoly on state institutions by establishing local (proto)governments serving on behalf of the group’s supporters, 5) seeking patrons who could provide such private rewards, and 6) selectively awarding expensive resources to the professional and high-value elites while providing cheaper private rewards to others (Lichbach 1995).

Therefore, rebellions might arise due to the aspirations of rebels to grasp material wealth through illegal means (Collier 2000). Grievances in this process play only a secondary role, if any, according to collective action theorists. Although grievances might exist, revealing them in an empirical analysis is argued to be problematic and at

times misleading. Successful rebel groups, for instance, may not admit that they are concerned about material benefits, concealing their behavior and true intentions by expressing the grievances of deprivation. Moreover, it has been pointed out that some entrepreneurs within rebel groups may even be convinced by their own propaganda of grievances (Collier 2000). Further, as pointed out above, formation and survival of rebel groups heavily depend on recruitment. Hence, to boost the numbers of participants, leaders of such groups could play up grievances as a motivating factor. Similarly, as the size of the group grows, the marginal returns from membership in the rebel group diminish. Consequently, the rhetoric of grievances could be used in order to compensate for the reduction in divisible material resources (Collier 2000).

In the end of the day, it is valuable and easily extractable resources that make the largest contribution for breaking down the collective action problem and precipitating rebellion. These resources include drugs, oil, diamonds as well as metals, such as gold. Significant resources can be obtained directly from the areas where ethnic groups live, but might also be made available by “patron” ethnic kins and diasporas from abroad.

It is also reported that rivalry for the control for such commodities encourages violence between groups. As Tilly points out, Jamaica’s position as the place with the highest murder rate in the Caribbean is in part due to the clashes between armed gangs. The frequency of such shootings is, in turn, explained by the important position of Jamaica in the trafficking of cocaine to the United Kingdom and the United States (Tilly 2003:71). In America’s inner cities, according to Courtwright, crack has similarly

“produced violent disputes over rip-offs and territories, and financed the acquisition of automatic weapons” (Courtwright 1996).

This explanation is important for our understanding of violent rebellion as a general collective action phenomenon, but can also be employed to explain the distinction between peaceful protest and violent tactics. In other words, groups with a more limited access to easily extractable resources would have to resort to tactics other than violence. The metaphorical notion of the “weapons of the weak” borrowed from James C. Scott (Scott 1985) is especially pertinent in this regard. In his study of Malaysian villagers, Scott examines symbolic resistance by weak groups. Such resistance is short of an open and public defiance, such as invasion of the landlord’s land. Instead, weak groups employ only minimal standards of politeness, gossiping, generating a bad reputation for the rich among the villagers. What is implied here is the *impression* of compliance for the sake of minimizing the *substance* of the prescribed behavior (Scott 1985:26).

Similar behavior is seen in other social contexts. A study of Soviet labor in the 1980s connected the reluctant compliance of the Soviet labor force with the falling productivity of labor in the country (Oxenstierna 1990). More, in the literature on American slavery, in the conditions of a costly violent behavior, stubborn resistance was largely confined to “foot dragging, false compliance, flight, feigned ignorance, sabotage, theft, and, not the least, cultural resistance” (Scott 1985:35). Such actions fall under the category of peaceful strategies.

H1: The choice of strategies by group entrepreneurs depends on the level of resources for private rewards available to rebel/protest group members. Limited resources available for redistribution lead peaceful protest as the primary resistance tactic. Abundant resources available for redistribution prompt group entrepreneurs to select violent protest as the resistance strategy.

As noted above, valuable and easily extractable resources include oil, drugs, diamonds, metals, such as gold, and can be obtained directly from the areas of ethnic homeland and/or through ethnic kins and diasporas living abroad.

Oil data are obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003). This variable is dichotomous and ranges between 0 and 1. A group is assigned a value of 1 if oil constitutes more than a third of the exports of the country, in which the group lives; 0 is given to all other instances. Mizos in India is an example of ethnic collectivities with low access to oil (0). In contrast, Shi'is in Saudi Arabia are among the groups with the highest availability of oil resources (1).

Good comparable data on illegal cultivation and transportation of drugs are not available²³. Therefore, raw agricultural products' share in exports of the countries where groups reside is used as a proxy for groups' ability to cultivate drugs. Koreans in Japan is an example of groups with the lowest access to such resources (0 percent); Chinese in Vietnam are assigned the highest score of 86 percent. These data are obtained from World Development Indicators. Data on production and the reserves of diamonds are not

²³ Personal email correspondence with officers at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) of the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), Austria.

reported by the producing states due to commercial considerations. This factor, therefore, is not analyzed in this chapter empirically. Export share of metals and ores are used as a proxy for groups' access to other valuable mineral resources, such as gold and silver. Biharis in Bangladesh is one of the groups that have the lowest score of 0 on this indicator, whereas Bolivian groups (such as Lowland Indians) are assigned the highest value of 92. These data are obtained from World Development Indicators as well.

I have also used the general variable on the availability of natural and manmade resources in the specific territories, in which groups live. For this variable I have used a dichotomous indicator from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data complemented by Monica Toft.

Data on kins living abroad comes from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset as well. Variable GC10 (Transnational dispersion—kindred groups) is used to capture this factor. Value 1 is assigned if the group does not have a kin adjoining an international border; a 2 is given to groups that have close kins across the border in countries that do not adjoin groups' regional bases – groups with no regional bases are coded as such; groups that have no close kins in states that adjoin groups' regional bases are assigned a score of 3; if the group has a close kindred across the border that adjoins its regional base, the group receives a score of 4; 5 is assigned to groups that have more than 1 close kindred across the international border in countries that adjoin groups regional base. Kumyks in Russia are one of the groups that is given the lowest score of 1, whereas Baluchis and Arabs in Iran are examples of ethnic groups that have the highest score of 5.

Alternative Opportunity Explanations: Income, Settlement Patterns, Mountainous and Forested Terrain, and Cold War

Current academic work has identified a number of other opportunity variables responsible for collective action by ethnic groups. For instance, it has been claimed that per capita income is associated with the lower likelihood of civil wars. First, it serves as a proxy of the general state capacity, including the military, financial and administrative capabilities of the central government. Second, more developed states are able to penetrate deeper into the countryside and the remote areas by building a stronger web of communication, such as roads. Further, recruitment of young males as guerilla warriors become easier in the conditions of lower per capita income in the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

H2: GDP per capita tends to increase the likelihood of ethnic mobilization and violence.

The measure of economic development, GDP per capita, was obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003) (<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/>). These data are adjusted to 1985 constant US dollars.

An important study by Monica Toft examines the influence of geography on ethnic leaders' choice of violence (as opposed to peaceful tactics) and posits that group concentration and its share within the population of the state is an important predictor of strategy choice (Toft 2003). As her study contends, geographical settlement patterns foster legitimacy and capability for ethnic groups' claims and actions.

H3: Large ethnic group population is associated with the increase in the likelihood of violence. Low ethnic group population corresponds to peaceful protest.

Data for the size of ethnic groups are extrapolated using the MAR time points. The lowest population ratio of a group relative to the state is among the Karachay in Russia—0.05; the largest is among the Black Moors in Mauritania. In the case of demographic variables, for a number of years, the data for ethnic groups are extrapolated using the initial MAR time points.

H4: Concentration of ethnic groups and their status as regional majorities facilitates violent action. Dispersion of ethnic groups and their minority status is likely to be associated with nonviolent protest tactics.

To capture this variable I am using the MAR data complemented by Toft (2003). Arabs in Iran are an example of a regionally concentrated majority group, whereas the Karachay in Russia are not a concentrated regional majority. Values range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the most concentrated settlement pattern for regional groups.

Similarly, scholars have suggested that mountainous or forested terrain, as well as separation of ethnic territories by water or land from the seat of the central government, may precipitate violent rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

H5: Mountainous and forested terrain increases the likelihood of violence. Unforested areas and plains are conducive to peaceful action.

Fearon and Laitin's MTNEST variable (estimated % of mountainous terrain) (Fearon and Laitin 2003) is used to capture the mountainous terrain variable. The minimum score for this variable in the dataset is 0.00. Groups, such as Poles and

Russians in Lithuania are assigned this score. Lhotshampa in Bhutan have the highest score of 94 percent. Since data on world forests are not available for the time frame under consideration, this factor is not included in the final equation.

Presence of the Cold War is another variable that provides an opportunity for ethnic groups to engage in collective action and rebellion. During the Cold War one superpower had incentives to help insurgents in the third countries, the governments of which, in turn, had been supported by the rival superpower. For instance, while the US government supported rightist regimes in Latin America, the Soviet Union and Cuba helped armed insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003:82). Moreover, the fact that the Soviet Union supported governments in Eastern Europe under the “Brezhnev doctrine” (Fearon and Laitin 2003:82) as the U.S. sponsored radio stations encouraged East European publics to rebel against their communist governments, makes the arguments for such support elsewhere in the world quite plausible. If anything, therefore, the aftermath of the end Cold War era would negatively affect eruption of ethnic conflicts²⁴ (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Under the circumstances of the severed funding and the lack of resources to wage wars, rebellious ethnic groups and states alike have more incentives to stop fighting.

H6: Incentives for ethnic groups to employ peaceful tactics are higher in the aftermath of the Cold War. The resort to violent action is more common during the Cold War.

²⁴ As Fearon and Laitin argue, increase of civil wars in the early 1990s was not due to the effects of the Cold War, but rather due to disintegration of the USSR. Immediately after that, however, a sharp decline in the number of ethnic wars is observable.

Years between 1945 and 1988 have been coded as the Cold War era. Post-1989 period has been designated as the post-Cold War years.

Discrimination and Grievances

In accordance with the relative deprivation argument, higher levels of economic, cultural, and political grievances may be associated with the greater odds of political mobilization and ethnic strife. Consequently, I control for the discrimination and grievance factors as well.

H7: Ethnic group grievances are associated with the greater likelihood of political mobilization and violence.

Ethnic groups' dissatisfaction with their economic, political, and cultural status is approximated by the salience of the idea for greater territorial autonomy and even independence among ethnic group members. To capture the salience of territorial autonomy I have used MAR variables AUTGR4/AUTGR5. Value 0 is assigned if the group does not have an autonomy grievance, score 2 is given if the issue of lesser importance/salience, 3 is assigned if the issue is significant/relative importance unclear, 4 – if the issue is highly salient/important to most within the group. The variable representing independence grievances takes score 1 if independence grievances are present and 0 if none have been detected. MAR variable AUTGR3 was used to code this variable for the 1980s-90s. For both variables, missing data for the decades preceding 1980 were complemented using Keesing's Contemporary Archives. If no contradictory information was found, the data from the archives was extrapolated to the rest of the

decade, as public sentiment within the group regarding autonomy or independence grievances were likely to persist. If no information was found in a decade regarding territorial autonomy, no autonomy or independence demands were recorded.

Democracy

Democratic polities grant people a number of important civil liberties, including the rights to vote, freedom of association and immunity from persecution. Tolerance of minority cultures and languages are arguably more widespread in democratic polities than in autocracies. Therefore, states' respect for civil liberties is likely to result in a lower level of repression and less grievances.

H8: Collective action and violence are more likely in autocracies than democracies.

The democracy variable is constructed by combining autocracy and democracy scores employing variables from Polity IV project. Data are obtained using Fearon and Laitin (2003) (<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/>).

Ethnic Fractionalization

It has been argued that multiethnic societies are in general prone to conflict. Monica Toft (Toft 2003), for instance, has shown that in ethnically diverse polities conflict is more likely due to the negative precedence, such as secession, set by some ethnic groups. Central governments in multiethnic societies are keener to prevent such precedents, increasing the odds that groups' demands turn violent. Similarly, Barbara

Walter (Walter 2006) connects violence in multiethnic states to the desire of central governments to keep tough reputation. The analysis of literature by Fearon and Laitin (2003) similarly concludes that ethnically fractioned societies are violence-prone.

H9: Ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher levels of political mobilization and violence.

The number of politically-relevant ethnic collectivities present in the country is used to operationalize the ethnic fractionalization score. Minorities at Risk dataset complemented by Monica Toft has been employed as the data source for this variable.

Case Selection and Method

In the statistical analysis I consider the potential of violence for each ethnic group listed in the MAR dataset for the years between 1945 and 2000 that may express discontent. This includes minority groups that constitute at least one percent of their country's population or have 100,000 members or more. Groups included in this study reside in the countries with a population of at least 500,000 and who either benefit or suffer from discriminatory practices or have mobilized in defense or support of its perceived interest. This constitutes a total of 197 ethnic communities within 95 states.²⁵

The question that the statistical analysis helps elucidate is why some groups choose to employ violent strategies, while others use peaceful tactics. To test the theory one might be tempted to select only those groups who are engaged in collective action,

²⁵ Only those groups classified by MAR as ethnonational, indigenous, ethno-class, religious sect, or national minority are included in the analysis.

both peaceful and violent. Consequently, the sample employed for testing the hypotheses discussed above would not be randomly selected. This is problematic, as there might be some included and omitted variables that influence both selection of cases into the sample as well as the ensuing outcome. In other words, there might be an unmeasured (and immeasurable) variable, such as an innate propensity of group members for dissatisfaction, which, along with the measured variables, influences selection of cases into the model (the “selection”, or “collective action”, model), but also explains the choice of violent strategies (the “outcome”, or “strategy choice” model) as also do measured factors. In this case, standard statistical methods, such as logit and OLS would yield inaccurate estimates (Sartori 2003).

This problem of the “two-step models” is not unique to this study. As Sartori mentions, many interesting phenomena in politics follow this pattern. These include the choice of going to war and the subsequent decisions to vote or select a new form of government after the war. An increasing number of studies, therefore, are using statistical methods to circumvent the selection bias problem. Chief among them are the Heckman Selection Model and its derivatives (e.g., Heckman 1974). The Heckman Selection model, however, requires an extra explanatory variable for the selection stage, but not for the outcome model. Theoretically, and as shown above, it is difficult to come up with an extra factor that influences groups’ decision to engage in a collective action, but does not explain groups’ aggressive behavior from nonviolent tactics.

Sartori (2003) offers a more appropriate method to circumvent this issue. She develops a maximum likelihood estimator for the identical factors that influence both the

equation of interest as well as the selection model with binomial dependent variables.

This statistical technique is used to test the hypotheses stated above. Due to the concern

that regional effects may bias final results, I also control for five geographical zones –

Western Europe/North America, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Northern

Africa/Middle East²⁶.

Table 6. Determinants of Collective Action (“Selection”) and Strategy Choice (“Outcome”) Models

	<i>Selection</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
<u><i>Private Material Rewards</i></u>		
Access to Oil	.52*** (.11)	0.71** (.24)
Access to Raw Agricultural Products	.00 (.00)	.04*** (.01)
Access to Metals and Ore	.01*** (.00)	.00 (.01)
Resources in the Ethnic Homeland	-.35** (.10)	-1.54*** (.26)
Presence of Kins across Border	.05** (.02)	.24*** (.06)
<u><i>Opportunity Variables</i></u>		
GDP per Capita	.02** (.02)	-.04 (.04)
Population Ratio	.61** (.22)	-1.75** (.64)
Regional Concentration	.05 (.12)	3.51 (8.14)
Regional Majority	.18** (.09)	-1.05*** (.27)
Mountainous Terrain (%)	-.01*** (.00)	-.03*** (.01)
Cold War	-.78*** (.10)	.14 (.21)

²⁶ Eastern Europe has been excluded as a reference category.

Table 6 Continued

<i>Relative Deprivation</i>	<i>Selection</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
Autonomy Grievances	.49*** (.05)	.88*** (.09)
Independence Grievances	-.23 (.15)	-.86** (.26)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-.04* (.02)	.01 (.03)
Democracy Score	.01* (.01)	-.02 (.02)
Constant	-.01 (.26)	-10.4 (11.5)
Number of observations		1878
Wald chi2(20)		407.73
Prob > chi2		0.00
Log likelihood		-187.6397

Results

As the results indicate (Table 6), there is a pattern of similarity between the selection model and the outcome model of interest in terms of the effects of the causal factors. Two variables representing private material benefits – access to oil and presence of ethnic kins across border are significant and in the expected direction. Among other *opportunity* variables, population ratio and regional majority status are statistically significant as well. However, access to raw agricultural products is significant only in the “outcome” model, while access to metals and ore are statistically different from zero solely in the “selection” model.

Moreover, the “outcome” model that predicts the eruption of violence, as opposed to peaceful action, exhibits a more limited number of statistically significant factors than the “selection” model. These factors are access to oil, the relationship to the kins abroad, presence of manmade and natural resources in the ethnic homeland, population ratio, mountainous terrain, regional majority status, and autonomy grievances.

There is also a difference in the magnitudes of the effects of the variables in both models. Among the private rewards/selective incentive variables, access to oil enhances the likelihood of being “selected” into a collective action by 19.85 percent. A one-standard deviation shift in the exports of ore and metals from the mean score of 10.61 results in a 5.83 percent positive change in the odds of ethnic groups selecting to engage in a collective action. Increasing the value of cross-border kins by one standard deviation from its mean of 3.16, which approximately corresponds to having no close kins in states that adjoin groups’ regional bases (3), to 4.67 (approximates to groups that have more than 1 close kindred across the international border in countries that adjoin groups’ regional base) is associated with a 2.82 percent rise in the likelihood of collective action. Other opportunity variables—resources in the homeland, population ratio, mountainous terrain, and regional majority, exhibit influence on probabilities of collective action in the following magnitudes. Access to general manmade or natural resources in the region decreases the likelihood of group involvement in collective action by 18.66 percent. One standard deviation increase in the group – state population ratio from the mean of 12:100 to 29:100 is associated with a 3.81 percent increase in collective action. Regional

majority status of ethnic groups results in a 6.64 percent enhancement in the probability of collective action. Cold War, as hypothesized is associated with a 30.02 percent increase in the likelihood of collective action.

In contrast, in the “outcome” model, varying statistically significant factors individually by one standard deviation (or one unit for dichotomous variables) while holding other factors constant at the mean or mode, does not show a substantive increase in the likelihood of groups employing violent, as opposed to peaceful, tactics. In fact, the likelihood of violence remains at a level close to 0 percent despite a shift in any statistically significant factor. However, when all factors in the model are increased by one standard deviation (one unit for dichotomous variables) a substantial increase in the odds of ethnic groups selecting violent tactics is observed.

Variables associated with grievances – level of democratization and autonomy grievances – have different effects on the formation of collective action. While a one-standard deviation change in the democracy score (from its mean of .16 to 7.28) leads to a 4.13 percent decrease in the likelihood of collective action, a one-standard deviation shift in autonomy grievances (from the mean of 1.37 to 2.23) is associated with 16.06 percent increase in the odds of collective action. Increasing ethnic fractionalization by one standard deviation from its mean (of 4.77 to 6.80) leads to a 41.15 percent rise in the odds of collective action.

Discussion and Conclusions

These empirical findings reveal the importance of material rewards and selective incentives in explaining both the group decisions to mobilize and engage in violence. The effect of these variables is especially vivid in explaining the first stage of ethnic group decision making, in which groups elect to take part in a collective action or abstain from it. The statistical significance of two important private material rewards variables – access to oil and support of kindred groups across the border – is also evident in the second stage of decision-making, which involves the choice between peaceful and violent strategies. However, the magnitude of those effects depends on the underlying conditions informed by other variables. When all other explanatory variables are kept at their mean or mode levels, the substantive influence of private rewards and material benefits on the likelihood of groups choosing violent strategies is close to 0 percent. However, if a hypothetical authoritarian state ($\text{Polity} = -10$) located in Western Europe is assumed to be a home to two ethnic groups, the group that has access to oil is 5.26 percent more likely to choose violent tactics than a nonviolent strategy. Under such circumstances ($\text{Polity} = -10$ and $\text{Western Europe} = 1$), proximity of kin groups across the border (one standard deviation shift from the mean) enhances the odds of resorting to violence, as opposed to peaceful tactics, by almost two percent. After adding the condition of an extreme salience of autonomy grievances ($\text{Autonomy Grievances} = 4$), access to oil increases the likelihood of groups choosing violence tactics by 25.19 percent. Under the increased grievance condition a one standard deviation shift in the

cross-border support of ethnic kins enhances the odds of electing violent strategies by 13.77 percent.

These results thus suggest that ethnic groups choose violence when they have both incentives and opportunities for doing so. Specifically, access to easily extractable resources under the condition of grievances is among the key factors explaining the distinction between violent and peaceful protest strategies.

It is curious to see that in both equations, amount of mountainous terrain exhibits statistically negative results – in the direction different than expected. This finding points to the idea that mountains prove to be an obstacle for the occurrence of collective action, and violence, in particular. Central governments usually have better intelligence than ethnic groups, and are almost certainly in possession of higher military capabilities. Natural borders, such as mountains and rivers, while providing an opportunity for ethnic groups to engage in violence, make it also difficult for them to concentrate the necessary forces for a prolonged action. The statistical analysis shows that this effect is superior to the one hypothesized in the extant literature.

It is also curious that the access to the general manmade and natural resources shows a significant result in the direction opposite than expected. These results are likely to suggest that ethnic territories with an extensive industrial potential are generally wealthier and have more to lose by engaging in collective action and violence, specifically, than groups with no such opportunities.

According to Hypothesis 2, GDP per capita tends to increase the likelihood of ethnic mobilization and violence. Contrary to the expectations, the findings show that

income levels do not play any significant role in explaining mobilization and strategy choice by ethnic groups. It is likely that income has a mixed effect on strategy choice canceling out any significant impact on the eruption of violence and collective action, more broadly. While for some group members income provides an opportunity to rebel, others view their standard of living as a costly commodity to lose, if they chose to engage in violence.

While showing a similarity between the two levels of ethnic groups' decision-making, this statistical analysis also points to a difference between them. Specifically, ethnic collectivities seem to take a more holistic approach in their choice of tactics (second, or "outcome" level) than in the decision to engage in collective action (first, or "selection" level). However, private material resources, such as access to easily extractable resources, are among the key factors explaining both levels of decision-making. A major policy implication of this dissertation, therefore, relates to the relationship between ethnic entrepreneurs and incentives they are able to provide to their group members. To the extent that halting access to easily extractable resources, such as oil and drugs, is possible, the production and supply routes for these items should be severed to reduce the likelihood of violence. Similarly, remittances and aid from the kins abroad should be checked to ensure that they are not used for acquisition of lethal weaponry. This, however, does not mean that opportunity of engaging in a legitimate political action should be limited. If peaceful protest is seen as a credible alternative to violent expression of political demands, then groups should be ensured an opportunity to do so.

In addition to the opportunity/private rewards factors, the findings also show that democracy is associated with a decrease in collective action, due to its potential to resolve controversial issues within the established processes and institutions. Strengthening democratic institutions of central governments, therefore, might be a policy that nation-level decision makers could entertain, if they would like to reduce the chances of ethnic groups' mass mobilization.

CHAPTER IV

**PEACEFUL TACTICS AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY FORMATION: THE
CASE OF TATARS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

The Rationale for the Chapter

In the previous chapters I developed and statistically tested a theory, which suggests that nonviolent tactics employed by ethnic groups are more likely to result in the formation of territorial autonomy than violence strategies. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the *process* of a group's action and the government's reaction. In other words, I am interested in *how* territorial autonomy is formed when ethnic group uses peaceful tactics. In order to unpack "the black box" of territorial autonomy formation, I use the case of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. Specifically, I employ systematic data on (1) the grass-roots protests organized by the Tatar intellectual elites and (2) the official public statements expressed by the Tatar political elites directly to the Russian government. I then observe the changes in the position of the Russian government toward granting territorial autonomy to Tatarstan. Examination of these data establishes a causal mechanism between peaceful protest, on the one hand, and central government concessions, on the other. In particular, the sequence of these events enables me to draw positive conclusions regarding the temporal condition for causality when peaceful demands come *before* the central government's concessions. Second, observation of protest events allows me to establish correlation between (a) peaceful demands and (b) Muscovites' concessions—another condition for causality. For any scientific research

three conditions for causality should be met: 1) the cause should take place before the effect, 2) the variables – cause and effect – must be correlated, and 3) the observed relationship between variables should not be attributed to a third factor (Babbie 1986; Bunge 1963). The three conditions are consistent with King, Keohane and Verba's definition of causality: "the causal effect is the systematic difference between the systematic observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variables takes on another value" (King et al. 1994:81-82). In this chapter, I have an explicit variation on the theoretical variable of interest – peaceful protest – and the explained phenomenon – concessions from the central government, which culminated in the formation of territorial autonomy. Both of these variables vary over time. My focus on *one* spatial location over a relatively short period of time ensures that other potentially relevant control variables are held constant.

In this chapter, therefore, I illustrate the theoretical and statistical part of the dissertation more intuitively and interpret the behavior of both parties through causal criteria. In the rest of the chapter, I first briefly present the case of Tatars and Tatarstan – specifically, its suitability for this study and historical background information. I then specify the major political actors, provide conceptual and operational definitions and data sources for the major variables examined, and study their relationship as a sequence of peaceful demands for autonomy and central government's reaction. I conclude with the policy implications of this chapter's results.

Case Selection

The policies of *perestroika* initiated by Gorbachev gave ethnic groups within the Soviet Union an opportunity to express their grievances. In addition to the former Soviet Union and post-communist Europe, the issue of ethnicity became increasingly salient in much of the rest of the world. While most of the well-known ethnic demands are violent in nature, a far more common practice for ethnic groups, however, is to express their concerns peacefully. As Gurr (2000:155) shows, out of 275 politically significant ethnic groups, in 1998, 40% used techniques of nonviolent struggles, in contrast to more than a third did not engage in any recognizable political action, and only 21 out of 57 rebellious communities that were involved in medium or large-degree wars. The case of Tatars in the Russian Federation who employed nonviolent strategies and are examined in this chapter is, therefore, more generalizable with respect to ethnic group action globally than that of the Chechens or East Timorese who employ violent tactics.

Many nonviolent movements resulted in the significant concessions granted by central governments in the transitional polities. In post-communist Russia, for instance, the federal government allowed the formation of a number of negotiated territorial autonomies in response to peaceful demands expressed by the representatives of ethnic territories. The leading role in starting this process is almost unanimously attributed to the Tatar initiatives. Therefore, to understand the interaction between peaceful demands and the concessions granted by the central government in the Russian context, it is inexorably necessary to trace the process of political relationships between the Tatars and the central government in Moscow.

The case of Tatarstan is generalizable beyond the post-communist world. Many governments granted concessions to ethnic groups as a direct consequence of peaceful action employed by ethnic collectivities. As Gurr (2000) points out, nonviolent political activism of Native Americans resulted in the repeal of the long-standing opposition of the Canadian government against the formation of a Native American territorial autonomy. Consequently, in April 1999, the autonomy was eventually established in the northern territory of Nunavut. Similarly, in late 1999, the German government made it easier for millions of legal Turkish residents to acquire German citizenship due to the efforts of German and Turkish activists (Gurr 2000:155). The establishment of the home rule in Scotland and Wales in 1998 is largely attributable to the relentlessly peaceful actions by the representative of both ethnic groups. Although these cases do not exhibit a one-to-one correspondence to Tatarstan in Russia, to understand how concessions were formed and granted in these instances, it is helpful to examine the case of Tatarstan. Autonomy was granted earlier to Tatarstan than to all of these cases, which might have been benefited from the Tatar example, as the *Model of Tatarstan* had attracted a worldwide attention as soon as it was negotiated.

Background Information on Tatars and Tatarstan

Tatarstan is located in the eastern part of the East European Plain at the confluence of the Volga (İdel) and Kama (Çulman) rivers. Tatars who speak a version of the Kypchak Turkic language as Bashkirs and Chuvash (Tanrısever 2001:46) boast a rich political tradition. One of the first Tatar states, Volga Bulgaria, was seen as

powerful in Eastern Europe. It adopted Islam as the state religion by 923 AD and became the northernmost corner of Islam in the world. Following the Mongol conquests of the 13th century, much of Bulgaria was destroyed and under Batu Khan eventually became a part of the Tatar state Golden Horde. During the 13th and 14th centuries Tatars controlled the Russian lands extending their rule as far west as Kiev (McAuley 1997:42-43). Largely due to the internal quarrels, the Golden Horde collapsed and was replaced by a number of Tatar Khanates (Tannrisever 2001:46). The most influential and powerful among them was the Kazan Khanate. Much of the history of the Kazan Khanate was marked by its rivalry with the Russian territories united under the Muscovy. In this struggle, the balance of power eventually shifted to the Russian Moscovite side. Despite the efforts organized by the last ruler of the Khanate – Queen Soyembika – Kazan fell to the forces of Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Following the conquest, the repressive policies of the czarist regime led to the destruction of mosques, seizure of property, building of churches and monasteries (Davis et al. 2000:205). The policy of the imperial Russia was to co-opt the Tatar aristocracy via religious conversion (Tannrisever 2001:46). However, only a small portion of Tatars adopted Orthodox Christianity (Tannrisever 2001:46). Consequently, the locals who did not convert were forced to relocate 30 kilometers away from Kazan and the riverbanks (Faller 2002:82). As the Russian peasantry was transferred to the area [and exempt from serfdom, which was in place in the rest of the Muscovy], Tatars found themselves expelled from their rural areas to arid lands (Faller 2002:82). Division of the Tatar territories and suppression of the Islamic religion continued until the time of the rule of Catherine II (McAuley 1997:42).

Although Kazan became a center for missionary activity, Slavic colonization, and Moscow's assimilation efforts accompanied by sporadic Tatar revolts against Russification, an understanding between the two groups developed with respect to mutual benefit and cohabitation (Toft 2003:46). Tatars were increasingly becoming mediators between the Christian imperial core and the Turkic peoples conquered more recently contributing to their coexistence (Toft 2003:46).

Their central geographical location within Russia and social role allowed Tatars to enjoy a relative prosperity that led to the establishment of a large Tatar middle class (Toft 2003:46-47). Tatars exhibited high literacy rates, developed national consciousness and grew concerned about "de-Tatarization" and the challenges to the Tatar way of life (Toft 2003:46). By the end of the 19th century, they agreed that a Tatar homeland should exist in the middle Volga region (Toft 2003:46). By the end of the czarist rule, Muslim Tatars were able to acquire political representation in the Russian Duma and assert their aspirations for self-government. The Idel-Ural state (1917-1918) uniting Tatars, Bashkirs and the Finno-Ugric people of the area was formed during the World War I, but proved to be short-lived as Bolsheviks took over. Political repression of the 1920s-30s suppressed the Tatar national movement (Iskhakov et al. 2005:11). The entire Tatar intelligentsia was purged in 1930s due to the accusation of bourgeois nationalism (Faller 2002:82).

By the end of the Soviet period Tatarstan had become one of the most industrially developed areas of the country (Gorenburg 2003:20). It produced 50% of all Soviet trucks in one of the largest factories in the USSR. By 1970s the republic was the

largest producer of oil in the Soviet Union (Gorenburg 2003:20) with an industrial potential superceding that of the three Baltic republics. In spite of the industrial developments, the borders of Tatarstan formed by Soviet ethnic engineered were explicitly designed to divide Tatars and weaken the Tatar identity laying ground for the expression of the ethnically driven demands by the end of the Soviet rule (Toft 2003:48).

Key Players

The Tatar forces are represented by two key players within the republic – Tatar nationalizing intellectual elites who organized peaceful protests and the Tatar political elites. The Russian side relevant to this study consists of the Russian federal government as well as Russian pro-unitary groups within Tatarstan. The two sets of Tatar elites and Russian pro-unity groups largely defined the political landscape in Tatarstan and Tatarstan’s relationship with Moscow during the period of transition (Giuliano 2000; Kondrashov 2000; also implied in Toft 2003) Constituents, or target populations, for each of these forces included almost the entire population of Tatarstan and, in the case of the Tatar elites, also the Tatars living outside the republic.

Both intellectual and political elites have *always* pressed for the greater autonomy for Tatarstan. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I define both of them as the core players expressing Tatar group demands. The interests of both sets of elites converged during the early period of the autonomy movement. Over time, political elites grew more politically relevant while the significance of the intellectuals and their groups vanished. Yet, the strategies employed by both sets of actors have been overwhelmingly

nonviolent. Below I briefly describe the nature, evolution, and the emergence of political tactics of both groups. I also examine in brief the pro-unity factions.

Tatar Intellectual Elites

Both intellectual and political elites in Tatarstan were, to a higher or lower degree, the products of what Giuliano (2000) calls “an overt, publicized strategy of nativization (*korenizatsiia*) and a covert strategy of Russification” of the ex-USSR (304). Nativization led to the increased social mobility of the minority titular populations in the republics, but it also meant that titular nationality groups had to play by the rules of the game, which implied education in Russian and communication in Russian at work. As noted,

By the 1980s, for many of the Tatar intelligentsia, using Russian in public had come to seem entirely normal, because most of the urbanized cultural elite were what is known locally as second, third, or fourth generation, Tatars whose parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents had moved from countryside to city. Many of them spoke Russian as their first (and often only) language (Giuliano 2000:304).

The urban Tatar intelligentsia became quite isolated from the Tatar culture and was advocating the need for language revival. Hence, the founders of the first non-state nationalist organization Tatar Public Center (TOTs) (*Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr – TOTs*, or *Tatar İçtimağıy Üzäge – TIÜ*) were Russified Tatars (Giuliano 2000:304-305). The issue of language revival did not attract much support from Tatar-speaking Tatars, most of whom resided in the countryside. For Tatars living in the countryside the fear of being deprived of the native language did not exist as they spoke a fluent Tatar. It has been also explained that a cleavage in social status took place between the urban and

rural Tatars, “as a psychological divide, a rural inferiority complex a different way of thinking”, which resulted in a very limited support of the nationalist aspirations shared by the urban Tatars (Giuliano 2000:306). Hence, the national organizations did not make much attempt to reach out to them.

Tatar Political Elites

Despite their inferior status in the eyes of the urban intellectual elites, it was mostly the Tatar-speaking Tatars from the countryside who came to play an important role in the political elite of Tatarstan. These elites were formed under the leadership of the Tatar communist party *obkom* (republic or oblast’ level Communist Party committee, or branch) first secretary Tabeev who ruled Tatarstan in the 1960s and 1970s. During his term in office he brought to Kazan people from the local and city administrations through the practice of “gathering your own people [*zemlyaki*] around you” (Giuliano 2000:307). “They spoke Tatar as their first native tongue, usually received their early education in the countryside, then moved to a career in the local administration” (307).

There exists some discrepancy in the numbers of active members within these organizations. According to the pro-Russia movements, the number of TOTs included around 3,000 “permanent activists”, whereas the self-estimated number as of October 1989 was no less than a million in the USSR (Kondrashov 2000:127). Toft (2003:52) mentions that the number of TOTs activists was 2,000 at its peak, for splinter extreme groups *İttifaq* and *Azathıq* about 300 and 500, respectively, and pro-Russian *Soglasie* just 50.

Russian Pro-Unity Groups

It was recommended that a statement as to what was at the heart of the Russian movement in Tatarstan is included. The paragraph was edited as follows: “The Russian pro-unity movement was represented by the groups of *Soglasie*, Democratic Party of Russia, and the parliamentary group called *Narodovlastie* (Giuliano 2000:308). They were opposed to both Communist era political elites and Tatar nationalists and presented the idea of unity with Russia (Giuliano 2000:308). These Russian groups have been widely regarded to be of pro-democratic nature (e.g., Kondrashov 2000:183-4). However, the existence of the “extreme groups on the other [Russian] side” pointed out by Toft (Toft 2003:51), implies that the only commonality that lies in the heart of such movements is their opposition to Tatar nationalism and unity with Russia.

Although the three forces – Tatar political and intellectual elites as well as pro-Russian unity movements – might be treated as distinct, they have aligned with each other at various points in time. This is especially true for the Tatar political and intellectual elites, as the Tatar political elite seemed to tolerate and condone the demonstrations of the intellectuals-formed organizations. Although TOTs joined forces with the pro-Russian movements against the ruling presidential elite in 1992 when the interests of the two Tatar groups diverged (Fomenko 1992), “...during 1989 and early 1990, differences between the ruling elite and the reformers, either the party clubs or Tatar organizations, or between the reformers themselves did not dominate the relationships. All, at this time, shared a common aim: the acquisition of Union republic status” (McAuley 1997:55-56).

Cooperation between the Players

The mutual collaboration of the Tatar intellectual elites with both the Tatar political establishment and the pro-Russian forces owes a large part to the moderate nature of the largest Tatar nationalist organization – TOTs. Despite the fact that some see TOTs adopting an “extremely nationalist stance in a rambling thirty-six article declaration” (Kahn 2002:111), other observers claim that

Although TOTs champions Tatar interests, it continues to advocate the equality of different ethnic and religious groups, including the many ethnic minorities residing in the Tatar ASSR. For example, a TOTs resolution of this [1989] summer called for the publication of Chuvash-language newspapers in the Tatar ASSR... (Russians and Jews have their own branches of TOTs) (Schamiloglu 1989:11).

Toft also argues that

The largest nationalist organization, Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr, TPC) was, in fact, a *moderate*, group whose agenda sought the enhancement of Tatarstan’s regional and economic status, and not the advancement of a distinct Tatar identity. Though its platform called for Tatar as the republic’s language and for the cultural and spiritual consolidation of all Tatars within the Soviet Union, its main agenda was to achieve greater economic sovereignty (Toft 2003:51, emphasis as in original).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also calls the organization “moderate nationalist Tatar Public Center” (RFE/RL 2005).

This does not mean that more extreme national organizations did not exist. Smaller groups that split from TOTs - *İttifaq* and *Azatlıq* – seem to be such, yet as Toft shows they “never drew large following” (51) and their demands for “Tatarstan for Tatars”, calls for a ban on Tatar-Russian marriages and extension of citizenship rights for any Tatars living outside of Tatarstan were “counterbalanced by equally extreme

groups on the other side” (51). The Tatarstan branch of Zhirinovskii’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is a good example.

Despite the existence of splinter groups, I consider (1a) Tatar intellectual elites, (1b) Tatar political/presidential elites and (2) pro-Russian unity movements as the main forces on the political scene of Tatarstan. The Tatar group interests are represented, as noted above, by the first two groups. Throughout the period, there was a shifting balance of forces among them. In general terms, however, between 1988 and 1992, the nationalist movement “set the agenda” (McAuley 1997:54), but from 1992 “[n]egotiation with Moscow over the republic’s resources came to be determined by [ruling] elite interests” (McAuley 1997:54).

Conceptual and Operational Definitions and Data Sources

Independent Variable: Ethnic Group Strategies

The major independent variable in this study is *strategies* that ethnic groups employ to express their demands for greater autonomy. This variable takes on three major values – 1) peaceful protest, 2) violent protest, and 3) nonevent. Peaceful protest refers to the expression of discontent through such means as public statements, boycotts, or nonviolent public demonstrations. In contrast, violent demands involve the use of weapons intended to kill people. They range from the acts of sporadic violence to engagement in civil wars with the central government. Both peaceful protest and violent

demands are distinguished from nonevents if the occurrences that satisfy these criteria are observed in the data sources.

The values on the independent variable are conditioned by two sets of actors – Tatar intellectual elites that organized grass-root rallies and demonstrations and Tatar political establishment represented by the Shaimiev government. The importance of the first group was especially salient in 1988-1992, whereas in the subsequent years the latter group dominated political processes in the republic. To trace protest activities organized by the first group, Beissinger (2002) and Gorenburg (2003) data are used. Figures by both Beissinger and Gorenburg allow inferences on the number of protests. Both examine events that involve a minimum of 100 persons. Both data sources exclude strikes and petitions since few strikes were driven by national sentiment (Gorenburg 2003:121). Moreover, neither strikes nor petitions regularly appear in the republic press used in the analysis²⁷. From Beissinger’s data I exclude demonstrations organized only by the Russian side or those having explicitly non-national demands. To draw on the largest possible amount of data, I use both data sources.

Protests data – including events and nonevents – are valid for the entire period of 1988 to 1994, although the presence of *events* only derived from the available data

²⁷ Beissinger defines a protest event using the following criteria: “(1) it was a voluntary gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against public policies; (2) it involved a minimum of one hundred persons; (3) it was bounded by space and time (that is, occurred in a specific location during a limited time period); (4) the number of participants was not restricted by the organizers of the event (that is, it was not a conference, convention, or other restricted organized meeting); and (5) it did not have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that is, was not a mass violent event)” (2002:462).

To Gorenburg (2003), a demonstration is “a voluntary, nonviolent gathering of persons for the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against a public policy” (120).

sources that satisfy the coding criteria are confined to the period of 1987 / 1988²⁸ to 1992. Beissinger and associates reviewed 150 different sources to code protests of the Tatar and other nationalities in the ex-USSR for the period of 1987 – 1995 (Beissinger 2002). Gorenburg used three primary data sources: Komorova’s chronology of “ethnic events” (1989-1991), Beissinger’s (2002) database of protest events discussed above, and newspapers from the region (1988-1993).²⁹ Gorenburg acknowledges the existence of protest events after 1992. However, by the end of 1992 already, participation in protests declined with an average of 200 people. “In 1993, participation declined even further, as the media ceased to pay attention to the nationalist movement, while the movement itself became increasingly preoccupied with internal conflicts” (Gorenburg 2003:126). Those events, therefore, were both of much less importance as well as out of reach for coders. The absence of protest events after 1992 in the codings of both Beissinger and Gorenburg conform the general idea expressed by Kondrashov (2000) that the period of 1988-1992 captures the life-span of the Tatar nationalist movement. In his view, this time interval “represents a clearly defined page in the history of the Tatar national movement...[as it] was marked by the revival of Tatar nationalism and its desperate attempt to implement the vision of a Tatar nation state, which ended in apparent failure and crisis of the movement” (Kondrashov 2000:x).

²⁸ 1987 for Beissinger, 1988 for Gorenburg.

²⁹ *Sovetskaia Tataria* (renamed *Respublika Tatarstan*), *Vecherniaia Kazan'*, *Kazanskie Vedomosti*, and *Komsomolets Tatarii/Molodezh' Tatarstana*.

To capture the official public statements expressed by the second set of actors – the political elites embodied in the Shaimiev government – directly to the Yeltsin government I use the *White Book of Tatarstan*. The book contains the official documents concerning the developments of Tatarstan’s state sovereignty including statements concluded in the aftermath of individual negotiations between the delegations of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. According to its editor, Rafael Khakimov, *The White Book* encompasses the *most relevant* and *important* documents *signed* by one or both parties to negotiations³⁰. *The White Book* of Tatarstan is also used as the primary data source for tracing the concessions of the Yeltsin government to Tatarstan – the dependent variable.

Dependent Variable: Response of the Central Government

The qualitative nature of the chapter allows a more nuanced coding of the dependent variable than does statistical analysis. For the purposes of this chapter, the dependent variable is defined as the response of the central government to the group’s demands. There are three theoretically possible response outcomes – 1) positive response by the central government, i.e., concessions; 2) preservation of the status quo; and 3) negative response by the central government expressed in the repeal of previously granted concessions or repression. Central governments’ concessions range from a mere recognition of the group and its representatives as legitimate actors to the full or partial satisfaction of groups’ other demands. The highest value on the scale of concessions is

³⁰ Personal communication with Rafael Khakimov. July 10, 2006.

the full-fledged settlement of territorial demands through the formation of a territorial autonomy or an independent state with powers acceptable to both sides. On the other hand, the lowest values on governments' negative response are swift policies of cultural assimilation and physical extermination of the group members.


Group demands and governmental responses are examined in five phases. I follow Hafeez Malik's (1994) four chronological periods of negotiations and also examine the period immediately prior to negotiations when the onset of peaceful protests was observed.

Phase I: Period Prior to Negotiations

At the dawn of Gorbachev reforms, the Soviet Tataria was a peaceful province of the Russian heartland. Tatars were deemed a group successfully assimilated into the larger culture (Kondrashov 2000). In this part of the Soviet Union, grievance and conflict were hardly expected to ever take place. However, the seeming national stability of the Soviet regime started to shatter with the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the highest post within Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Lapidus, et al. (Lapidus et al. 1992) argue, the "revolution from above" resulted in unintended consequence for the emergence of potent national movements in the different corners of the USSR. Already by July 1987, as Beissinger (2002) shows (relying on Dawson (1996)), environmental demonstrations were held in Kazan alongside with Estonia, Leningrad and Irkutsk. This was the start of ecological mobilizations that would overlap with nationalist claims (65). Although the Gorengurg data (Figure 3) does not classify this demonstration as national

in character, I tend to side with Beissinger (Figure 3) on this issue, since much of the national discourse was intertwined with the environmental rhetoric in the early period of the national movement.

Fig. 3. National Protest Frequency in Tatarstan, 1987-1992



The first formal meeting of core national activists took place on June 27, 1988, to organize Tatar Public Center (*Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr* (TOTs), or *Tatar İçtimağy Üzäge* (TIÜ)) (Schamiloglu 1989:11). The activist core of 11 people was elected from among 200 members (Iskhakov 1992:6). On October 15, 1988, some 800-900 demonstrators gathered at the Kazan Kremlin to observe the date (Beissinger 2002:263). Although their relationships have been bumpy at first, key players within the

political elites allowed TOTs to hold its founding convention in February 1989 (Beissinger 2002:263) and officially register as a public organization in July 1989 (Kondrashov 2000:124). The aims of nationalists were to acquire Union republic status within the Soviet Union, revive the use of the Tatar language and spiritually revitalize the Tatar people (McAuley 1997:55-6).

From summer 1989 on, one can see the nationalist discourse being developed in the republican media by TOTs. From 1989, the Public Center has also organized street campaigns. The issues that dominated street campaigns – rallies and demonstrations – in 1989, as in 1987, were environmental in nature. Specifically, the rallies were held against the construction of large industries in the republic, especially, the central government's plans to build a nuclear plant in the heart of Tatarstan. TOTs was able to utilize these meetings to underline the idea that Tatarstan was completely subsumed to Moscow bureaucrats who cared neither about its environment nor about the republic as a whole. (Kondrashov 2000:124-5). Consequently, the Tatar nationals supported by the members of other nationalities pressed for greater political freedoms, upgrading of the republic's status to that of the Union republic and even independence as a solution to republic's problems (McAuley 1997:54). At its second congress, in February 1991 TOTs for the first time pressed for a full-fledged independence (Beissinger 2002:266). It is not surprising then that between 1988 and 1992, the nationalist movement “set the agenda” (McAuley 1997:54) in the republic.

The Tatar nationalist demands were not limited to grassroots protests. Tatar political elite took a number of steps that complemented those protests. For instance, at

its meeting on June 14, TOTs adopted a petition addressed to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin requesting that Tatarstan be given the status of a Union republic within USSR outside of Russia. This petition was read by a Tatar deputy at the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow. The Congress adopted the Russian republic's Declaration of Sovereignty from the USSR. Yet, the Tatar prime minister at the time – Sabirov – voted against it citing the fact that the problems of national territories were not adequately addressed (Sabirov 1990:1). Sabirov raised these issues with Boris Yeltsin and thought that Yeltsin started to have a deeper understanding of these problems. Specifically, the Council of Nationalities was formed for the first time within the framework of the Russian republic representing the interests of the national entities in deliberations of the important documents (Sabirov 1990:1).

A month later, in August, the proposed text of a Union treaty between Tatarstan and the USSR was published in the republic press³¹. By December 1990, the Tatar Parliament adopted a petition on the Union Treaty (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). In the petition, Tatarstan declared its readiness to be a co-founder of the Union making no reference to its subordination to the Russian republic. By the end of the month, the Tatar Declaration of Sovereignty was adopted. This, however, did not mean that the authorities of the USSR or those of the Russian republic would accept the Declaration of Sovereignty by Tatarstan.

³¹ ("Poekt: Dogovor Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki s Soюзom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o razgranichenii polnomochii mezhd u Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respublikoi i Soюзom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik". (The Draft of the Treaty between the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Delimitation of the Jurisdictions between the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)" 1990).

Yeltsin was quick to respond to the mounting, yet, peaceful pressures coming from Tatarstan. He traveled to the republic in late summer and held a number of visits with the representatives of economic enterprises, intelligentsia, and parliamentary deputies. Yeltsin responded positively to the republic's demands, although in rather symbolic terms. During a briefing at Kazan University (August 6-8, 1990)³² he was asked a question regarding the right of nations for self-determination. Yeltsin's response was concise but clear – “I would like to remind you the Declaration of the rights of peoples of Russia signed by Ul'yanov [Lenin] on November 2, 1917. In its article 2 it states that the peoples of Russia have a right to a free self-determination, up to secession and the formation of an independent state”³³. On several occasions, Yeltsin implied that he would not oppose the decisions adopted by Tatarsan's parliament that might lead to an overarching self-determination. “Whatever the Supreme Soviet of Tataria decides is its own issue. If it defines that land, natural and mineral resources of Tataria are her own property, then we should recognize this decision by the Supreme Soviet” (2). “The [current] law of RSFSR [Russian republic] should be executed. [But] when you adopt a decision on the sovereignty and the supremacy of the laws of the Tatar republic or state over the Russian, then go ahead” (2). It was also during this visit when Yeltsin made a legendary and even idiomatic announcement inviting Tatarstan and, indeed, other republic to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow” (Malik 1994; Røysi 2004:44).

³² ("Natsional'niy Muzei Respubliki Tatarstan: Muzei Tatarstana: Lenta Vremeni" 1990)

³³ ("B.N El'tsin: "Ja videl sdes' tol'ko dobrye glaza" (B.N. Yeltsin: "I Saw Here Only Kind Eyes")" 1990, author's translation)

Yeltsin could afford making such symbolic gestures as he did not yet possess a sole and legitimate control over the resources within the Russian republic. During the visit in Tatarstan, he, in effect, gave away the powers, which were still under the jurisdiction of the Gorbachev-led Soviet Union. In addition, by making promises to Tatarstan, Yeltsin could gain political leverage for himself as a leader of the Russian republic over Gorbachev in the struggle with the Soviet leadership over power distribution within the Russian Soviet Federated Republic (RSFSR).

Despite Yeltsin's efforts, Shaimiev and the republican political elite cooperated with Gorbachev's Union forces with the purpose of gaining a Union republic status for Tatarstan (Beissinger 2002:266). Hence, when Yeltsin tried to introduce in Gorbachev's referendum the question on the formation of the Russian presidency, the republican elite excluded this question from the referendum.

Yet, the Tatar political elite decided not to ban the subsequent Russian presidential elections. Although the general public, seemed initially apathetic to political activism – with two-thirds of the electorate not supporting any political party (Toft 2003:52) – by the election date of both Tatarstani and Russian presidents (June 1991) support of the public increased and led to “largest demonstration of the independence movement” (52). The decision by the Tatr political elites “evoked the first sustained wave of separatist mobilization within the republic in May 1991” (Beissinger 2002:266). Nationalist organizations resisted the elections of the Russian president on the soil of Tatarstan and by the end of April 1991 approximately 10,000-strong rally stipulated the recall of the Tatar deputies from the Russian parliament (Beissinger 2002:266; Toft

2003:52). Scholars also note a demonstration of some 15,000 participants on May 21, which included the members of *İttifaq*, who went as far as to start a hunger strike; newspaper *Novosti* wrote of daily rallies and protest meetings (Toft 2003:52). The moderates in these protests wanted to see a fast adoption of the Constitution of Tatarstan, which would annul Russian laws on the republic's territory; radicals expected an establishment of a Tatar state and a subsequent demographic change in Tatarstan's population (52). Although the general public, seemed initially apathetic to political activism – with two-thirds of the electorate not supporting any political party (Toft 2003:52) – by the election date of both Tatarstani and Russian presidents (June 1991) support of the public increased and led to “largest demonstration of the independence movement” (52).

These events were critical as they led to the onset of negotiations between the Tatar and Russian political elites. The Russian forces both within Tatarstan as well as in the federal government acknowledge that protest were an important bargaining chip at the disposal of the Tatar side. The leader of the pro-Russian movement within the Tatar republic, *Soglasie*, Vladimir Beliaev noted that political elites condoned the establishment of an ethno-territorial movement so that they could use the reference to the will of people in the negotiations with Moscow. In the view of the leader of a pro-Russian movement within Tatarstan, political elites exaggerated it, so that they “could literally refer to the ‘will of people’” (Kahn 2002:112).

Similarly, Tishkov, a Russian negotiator and Ethnology and Anthropology professor in Moscow suggests that the Tatar team ‘had tried to find a creative approach

to the text [of the Sovereignty Declaration] that would allow them to satisfy all major public forces and at the same time exploit ethnonationalism as the major argument to provide bargaining power with the Center' (113). In an interview, a non-Tatar official in the Parliament of Tatarstan, has noted that the popular pressure was masterminded by the political elites of Tatarstan³⁴. Such statements of the Russian side suggest that petitions and protest, which were predominantly peaceful in nature, were an important bargaining tool at the disposal of the Tatar political elites. They led to the opening of the first round of negotiations between the Tatar and Russian governments on August 12, 1991.

It is, however, important to keep in mind that all of the parties who expressed these views have a particular political agenda. Beliaev was the leader of a pro-Russian movement within Tatarstan; Tishkov—a Russian negotiator from the federal side; Isaev—a non-Tatar official within the Tatar Parliament. Even Jeffrey Kahn, who cites Beliaev, is in apparent contradiction with his source in effort to underline his argument: “*TOTs* was not a spontaneous movement, but an organization *engineered from the top echelons of Tatar power*”, meaning political leadership of Tatarstan (Kahn 2002:112, emphasis added). At the same time, Vladimir Beliaev claims: “I *do not think Shaimiev created an ethno-territorial movement*. He just played it up” (Kahn 2002:112, emphasis added). It is conspicuous that this contradiction between two statements appears on the same page just three lines apart from each other!

³⁴ Interview by author with Georgii Isaev, aide on political affairs to the speaker of the Tatar Parliament. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.

Other scholars see the movement more as a grassroots organization independent of the Tatar political elites. As Gorenburg claims, the

initial meeting of the first Tatar nationalist organization illustrates most of the key factors that shaped the emerging Tatar movement: its origin in academic institutions, its use of existing social networks for the recruitment of new activists, and the importance of a sense of common identity among those who joined (Gorenburg 2003:54).

Such scholars do not deny that the national movement engaged in cooperation and bargaining with other groups—Tatar political elites and pro-Russian forces.

However, it is implied that they do so as an independent force:

The Tatar nationalist movement came into existence in institutional spaces created by the Communist government. It quickly used to social ties, collective identities, and organizational resources provided by these institutions to establish itself as viable political movement in the republic. But it also made sure to separate itself from the ruling elite by working together with pro-democracy activists and Tatars living outside the republic (Gorenburg 2003:57-58).

Similarly, Toft implies the independence of Tatar nationalist movement from the Tatar political leadership, while describing the power game between the two:

The first significant effect of the nationalist demonstrations was nearly immediate. On May 28 the Tatarstan Parliament, probably surprised that such a degree of mobilization could be achieved in the thus-far quiet republic, capitulated to the demands of the protesters and ruled that the only elections to be held in Tatarstan would be only for the president of Tatarstan, and not for that of Russia... When the nationalists became *too* threatening, as they did in October 1991... Shaimiev clamped down, closing the capital and declaring an end to all militia movements (Toft 2003:53).

Phase II: First Round of Negotiations

The Russian negotiating team was headed by Gennadii Burbulis, Yeltsin's State Secretary; among the principle Tatar negotiators were Rafael Khakimov – President

Shaimiev's advisor on political affairs and Indus Tahirov – an expert of Tatar studies and Dean of the Faculty of History at Kazan University. The Tatar side “invoked the resolution of the third Russian Congress of the Soviets, which was held in January 1918, saying: (1) that the Russian Federation was based upon the principle of freedom and equality of Soviet republics; (2) the republics were to join the Federation voluntarily; and (3) it was up to the republics to decide for themselves whether to join or get out of the Federation” (Malik 1994:14). These points were accepted by Yeltsin during his visit to Kazan. Burbulis agreed, but dismissed them as simply ideological.

Nevertheless, the first signed document as a result of these talks appeared on August 16 three days before the failed coup in the Soviet Union³⁵. The signed protocol recognized the parties as two sovereign states seeking to continue their joint consultations in both Kazan and Moscow. Another 3-point protocol was signed in the aftermath of consultations in Moscow on October 4, 1991. In this document, both sides (1) recognized that the relationships between RSFSR and Tatarstan should be built on the basis of an agreement; (2) acknowledged the importance of joint decision-making on a number of economic issues; and (3) reaffirmed their willingness to continue consultations in October in Moscow (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Although this protocol might be perceived as purely symbolic, it nevertheless signifies a positive response by the Russian government to Tatar demands.

³⁵ Interview by author with Marat Galeev, a Tatar negotiator and Chair of the Economy, Investments, and Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.

The second protocol was signed when popular protests were on the rise. The peak of the support for the nationalist demands came in the wake of the failed coup in the USSR in August 1991. The perceived support of the August *putsch* (takeover, coup) by the republican political elite prompted protests demanding President Shaimiev's resignation, which drew up to 50,000 supporters (Figure 3) (Beissinger 2002:267). A crisis situation occurred at the anniversary of the Kazan conquest by Ivan the Terrible in mid-October when nationalist demonstrators, inspired by events in Chechnya demanding Shaimiev's resignation and complete independence of the republic, attempted to seize the parliament (Figure 3) (Beissinger 2002:267). As a consequence, seven demonstrators and sixteen police were injured (Beissinger 2002:267). Nobody, however, was killed. Although by that time 86 percent of Tatars and 24 percent of Russians favored Tatarstan's independence, following this crisis event, support for the national groups had drastically dropped (Beissinger 2002:267).

This event also resulted in the precautionary measures taken by the political elites against potential violence, sending an important sign to the domestic publics and the federal authorities. On October 17, 1991 President Shaimiev issued an *ukaz* [decree] outlawing the formation and activities of public militarized units and armed entities on Tatarstan's territory (Shaimiev 1991). In the wake of the drop of nationalists' popularity, Shaimiev skillfully outmaneuvered the nationalist rivals by taking over some of their issue concerns (Beissinger 2002:267). The republican political elite was eventually able to consolidate its power, while nationalist intellectuals undergoing numerous divisions and declines were taken over by the structures of state or para-statal institutions

(Beissinger 2002:267). Giuliano explains this process arguing that Tatarstan presents an interesting case, whereby strong sense of belonging and ethnic identity present in the region did “not necessarily translate into support for nationalist politics” (Giuliano 2000:296). In this context, the Tatar political elite was able to alternate the key issue—the sovereignty vote—from an ethnonational question to the issue of the regional economic rights for Tatarstan and all of its citizens (Giuliano 2000). Now, “[n]egotiation with Moscow over the republic’s resources came to be determined by [ruling] elite interests” (McAuley 1997:54).

In the meanwhile, on December 24, the Tatarstan parliament openly expressed its frustration regarding the fact that Tatarstan was deprived of quotas in the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Soviet Union and signatory membership in the Agreement on the economic commonwealth of independent states. As a result, the parliament adopted the Act of State Independence of the republic (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Two days later (December 26), the republic’s parliament declared that Tatarstan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a co-founding member – a symbolic move reaffirming its special status (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

In light of these developments, as a result of the first round of negotiations with the Russian side, the Tatar government signed the first *substantive* agreement [*soglashenie*] on economic collaboration with Russia in Moscow on January 22, 1992. The fourteen-article document postulated that land, water, and natural resources located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan belong to her people. The sides also acknowledged that federal (Russian), republic (Tatar), and joint property, might exist on

the republic's territory. The ownership of the property was to be defined in accordance with mutual interest and free agreement (article 1) (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Article 6 of the agreement is especially prominent as the parties recognize that Tatarstan independently controls production and marketing of the natural resources, primarily, oil and oil products on its territory. Delivery of the Tatar oil to Russia was to be regulated through annual agreements. The parties also agreed to conduct independently external trade on all items with the exception of the products that have quotas and licenses (article 8). Moreover, the parties agreed to jointly regulate social security and employment in the territory of Tatarstan (article 9), collaborate in science, education, health policy, and culture (article 10), conduct independently, yet through coordination, environmental policies, and establish permanent representative offices of their governments (article 11) (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

During the negotiations process, the Russian side, especially Burbulis, claimed that the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan was no more than a mere statement of Tatar elites' intent unsupported by public will and called for a plebiscite. The calculations of the Russian side were evidently based on the ethnic factor, as at the time only some 48.5% of population were Tatar³⁶. Moreover, a Tatar negotiator and Chair of the Economics, Investment, and Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament, Marat Galeev points out that Tatarstan's dependence on Russian demand for its huge military industrial complex was another important factor in explaining the Russian

³⁶ Interview by the author with Marat Galeev, a Tatar negotiator and Chair of the Economy, Investments, and Business Committee of the Tatar Parliament. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.

delegation's move. Those employed in the defense industry were expected to vote against Tatarstan's sovereignty. Due to the conciliatory nature of the Tatar government, the demand was accepted. On February 21, 1992, the parliament announced that the referendum on the State Sovereignty would take place on March 21. People would have to respond to the following question: "Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, the subject to international law, which builds its relationships with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of agreements between the equal parties?" "Yes" or "No". (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Surprisingly, 61% of all voters were in favor of Tatarstan's sovereignty. The turnout rate was 79% out of 2.5 million eligible to vote (Malik 1994) (see Table 7).

Surprisingly, before the referendum Yeltsin and the Russian side took a negative position. In a TV address, Yeltsin noted that the referendum aimed to divide Russia and lead to ethnic violence (Malik 1994). The vice-premier for nationalities and regional policies of the time, Sergei Shakhrai, characterized the referendum as a *coup d'état*, the Russian Parliament appealed to the Court and a week before the referendum the Russian Constitution Courts ruled that the referendum along with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of 1990 and the changes to the Tatar Constitution were not in line with the federal Constitution. Consequently, an economic blockade was imposed against the republic (Kahn 2002:153-54). Both Galeev and Khakimov – the members of the Tatar negotiating team – note that the pressure from the Russian side was high. Military exercises were conducted around Tatarstan just some 60 kilometers (37 miles) away

from its border. Marines previously deployed in Latvia were transferred to Ul'yanovsk³⁷. On all federal highways, Russian troops were present. At the eve before the referendum, the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov traveled to Volzhsk. This move bore an important symbolic meaning as Ivan the Terrible was also located there before the takeover of the Kazan. According to Galeev, Khasbulatov emphasized that President Shaimiev would be brought in an iron cage to Moscow just as was the Tatar-supported Russian rebel Pugachev in the Middle Ages³⁸. The last ruler of the Kazan Khanate Queen Söyembikä was allegedly also forcibly brought to Moscow.

I suspect that the key reason why Moscow troop did not intervene and the referendum go is due to the moderate rewording of the referendum question. Giuliano shows that newly-elected President Shaimiev and his supporters did not have a secure place in Tatarstan's Parliament. They were caught between a growing popular support for the Tatar nationalists and a large population of Russians in Tatarstan. In the meanwhile, different factions in the Tatar Parliament argued for various wordings of the referendum question. For instance, Russian unitarists, *Narodovlastie* and *Soglasie*, advocated a direct question "Are you in favor of Tatarstan seceding from the Russian Federation?" hoping that it would attract a negative vote. Ultimately, the Parliament adopted the (Shaimiev's) version with indirect wording: "Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of treaties between

³⁷ Interview by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin.

³⁸ Interview by author with Marat Galeev. May 20, 2005. Kazan. Tatarstan Parliament.

equal parties?” Shaimiev, in effect, “stole the middle ground” from the nationalists who were at the peak of popularity, while attracting moderate Russians (Giuliano 2000:311).

President Shaimiev and the Tatar team employed a conciliatory and moderate approach toward the Russian side and on a number of occasions tried to alleviate the situation while still determined to conduct the referendum (Malik 1994). In one of its announcements, for instance, one could see an attempt to downplay their demands from independence to autonomy.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet [parliament of Tatarstan] draws special attention that the acts of state sovereignty and referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan *in no way question the state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation*. They do not discriminate or divide the citizens of the republic on national or religious basis. Rather, they assume that the citizens are equal regardless of their national or religious affiliation, establish Tatar and Russian as state languages, and unconditionally recognize the citizenship of the Russian Federation for all citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan while respecting citizen’s right to freely change their citizenship (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

In another petition to the people of the Republic of Tatarstan, issued in response to petition of the Russian parliament, the Presidium of the Tatar parliament declared on March 6 that they “...categorically reject the accusations against the Republic of separatism in its willingness to “sever centuries-long links of the Tatar people with the other peoples and get out of the Russian Federation”, expressed in the Petition of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

They reaffirmed that “Tatarstan has been and will be resolving all existing problems only through civilized means”. “Once again, we declare our readiness to continue the broad negotiations with the Russian Federation on political, economic, and

humanitarian issues and express our confidence that they would conclude in the signed Agreement contributing not only to the renovation of the Russian Federation, but also to the establishment of the Union between Tatarstan and Russia” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

Similarly, article 2 of the five-point petition issued on March 16 by the Tatar parliament to clarify the nature of the referendum’s question stated that separation of the Republic of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation, alteration of its borders and territorial integrity are not the subject of this referendum (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). My understanding is that they wanted to gain a greater domestic legitimacy for further negotiations through the referendum. In an interview with Shaimiev’s advisor on political matters, Rafael Khakimov³⁹, it was made clear that *they* opted for the peaceful strategy and ruled out the Chechen variant right away. A cofounder of TOTs, who to the dismay of some, is now close to the ruling elite of the republic, Khakimov spelled out the tactics of both the ruling Tatar elite and the *mainstream* nationalists. The rhetoric of Tatarstan’s political elites regarding the referendum on State Sovereignty appealed to the median Tatarstani and ensured the support of more than 61% of Tatarstan’s inhabitants (Giuliano 2000) (Table 7).

³⁹ Interview by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin.

Table 7. Results of the Referendum on State Sovereignty of Tatarstan, March 21, 1992

1.	Total number of eligible citizens	2,600,297
2.	Number of citizens who received ballots	2,134,271
3.	Number of participants	2,132,357 (82.00% of #1)
4.	Number of citizens who answered yes	1,309,056 (61.39% of #3)
5.	Number of citizens who answered no	794,444 (37.26% of #3)
6.	Number of invalid ballots	28,851 (1.35 of #1)

In the meanwhile, the Russian side decided to shelf the Rumiantsev plan for the Russian constitution of 1990. Rumiantsev suggested replacing ethno-territorial system with a nonethnic federal system of territories enjoying equal rights and modeled after the *Länder* of the Federal Republic of Germany (Teague 1996). Due to the protests from ethnic republics the center was concerned that this model of federal structure would facilitate Russia's split. Even though Rumiantsev's draft was rejected, the new constitution could not be adopted due to the struggle between the President and the Parliament in Russia. A new mechanism—the Federation Treaty—was adopted instead in order to keep the integrity of the Russian state. The Federation Treaty was signed by 18 republic ten days after the Tatarstani referendum. Yet, Tatarstan alongside with Chechen-Ingushetia refused to sign it (Teague 1996:19).

During the negotiations the team from Tatarstan realized that Russia was not prepared to accept the independence of Tatarstan. In Burbulis' conception, the relationship between Russia and Tatarstan should be asymmetrical (Malik 1994). The Tatar team pressed Burbulis to recognize the sovereignty of Tatarstan in the bilateral Treaty. In response, Burbulis uttered forcefully: "Then the sovereign rights of Russia must also be included in the Treaty" (Malik 1994). Burbulis suggested that parts of the Federation Treaty signed by other republics should be included in the Treaty with Tatarstan to establish the sovereign powers of Russia. The Federation Treaty had 18 policy issues under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federal government, 12 under the joint control of the Federal government and the republics and a much shorter list of powers belonging exclusively to the republics (Federation Treaty, Appendix to the Russian Constitution). The highly inclusive nature of items reserved for exclusively Russian jurisdiction made it impossible for any autonomous republic to evade total supremacy of Moscow (Malik 1994). In Malik's view, Article I of the Federation Treaty gave Moscow sweeping control of the republics. Article II enumerating joint jurisdiction further diminished the republics' power. Article III diminished them to the level of local municipal corporations. Teague seconds this analysis suggesting that the document clearly specified the rights of the center. In contrast, the shared responsibilities were a source of confusion and the residual rights of the provinces were the vaguest (Teague 1996).

Only 18 republics accepted this arrangement proposed by Moscow. After signing the treaty the provinces complained that the center did not execute its provisions (Teague

1996). Bashkortostan signed the Federation Treaty at the last minute only after an appendix on economic concessions was agreed with the republic and attached to the Treaty. Tatarstan and Chechen-Ingushetia refused to sign it.

Phase III: Second Round of Negotiations

In contrast to Chechnya, Tatarstan wanted to continue the negotiations process. The Russian delegation had a similar will. The second round of negotiations started in March 1992 and was over by January 1993. Joint consultations held in Moscow between March 30 and April 2 resulted in a three-article protocol, which (1) recognized the need to establish a *special* relationship for the Republic of Tatarstan with the Russian Federation, urged to (2) quickly implement the intergovernmental agreement on economic matters signed in January 22, and (3) guarantee human rights and freedoms irrespective of national, confessional or other differences, regulate citizenship and recognize the equal use of the Tatar and Russian languages. During this meeting, the draft of the bilateral treaty prepared by Tatarstan was discussed and the Russian proposal to Tatarstan to join the Federation Treaty considered. An agreement was reached to continue negotiations in April-May 1992 (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

The next ordinary meeting that resulted in a written document took place on July 2. During the meeting the working groups once again considered the draft of the Treaty prepared by Tatarstan. The Russian party was apparently not content with the contents of the Treaty and both sides decided that Expert Groups should be formed to prepare a detailed draft of the Treaty. They have also agreed that (1) the process of Treaty

preparation should be expedited and completed by July-August; (3) recommendations should be given to the experts to account for the sovereign status of the Republic of Tatarstan while drafting the Treaty; (4) a legal personality should be established for Tatarstan in international law; (5) the principle of border inviolability; and (6) human rights should be unconditionally respected as well (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

By August 15, 1992, the draft of the Treaty elaborated by both the Tatar and Russian experts was complete (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Article I of the draft spells significant concessions given to the Tatar side, as it recognizes that the Republic of Tatarstan is a *sovereign state* that independently executes all powers of state authority, including, among others, adoption and inaction of its Constitution and lawmaking on budget and budgetary process, taxes, banks, court structure, and procuracy (office of the Attorney General). Tatarstan would also be able to establish foreign relations, and have its own treasury and citizenship. This was an important step forward as the heads of both Russian and Tatar Expert Committees—Boltenkova and Khamidullin—signed the draft leading to the expectation that political leaders of both sides would accept Tatarstan's sovereignty (Malik 1994).

Less than two weeks later, on August 27, Prime Minister of Tatarstan Sabirov promulgated the official news regarding the conclusion of an economic agreement between Tatarstan and Russia at the end of the talks. Sabirov noted that the leaders of Russia are becoming more and more understanding of Tatarstan's needs. He also mentioned that the Russian government removed the economic blockade of Tatarstan levied by the Russian parliament (Sabirov 1992).

It is crucial that Sabirov restated the adherence to peaceful strategies. In his view, “Tatarstan did not need its own army – all defense matters are delegated to the federal Russian government and participation in maintaining CIS defenses will be effected physically and materially through agreements with Russia” (Sabirov 1992:28).

In light of the progress made in the relationships between the two sides popular protests grew less relevant. One of the last came three days later, on the second anniversary of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Tatarstan. The All Tatar Public Center organized a rally demanding an equal treaty with Russia and the Russian recognition of Tatarstan’s independence (FBIS 1992).

In the meanwhile, within the Russian camp, Sergei Stankevich – a member of the negotiating team – waged a vicious internal campaign against Burbulis in the Russian Parliament. Stankevich took an inflexible stance against Tatarstani aspirations for greater sovereignty and independence (Malik 1994). Right-wing nationalist forces were also accusing Burbulis of being too “soft” on ethnic republics. Eventually, Yeltsin cancelled his visit to Japan [in September] organized by Burbulis and removed him from the leading position in the negotiations with the Tatar side. Sergei Shakhrai, a would-be Vice-Premier of Russia, assumed a primary role in the Russian team during the talks (Malik 1994).

Consequently, the talks did not resume until the second half of the winter of 1993 (Malik 1994). In the meanwhile, the Parliament of Tatarstan adopted the Constitution of the Republic on November 6, 1992, ahead of the Russian Constitution. The preamble of the Tatar Constitution refers to the results of the referendum on the state status of

Tatarstan, in accordance with which the Constitution was adopted. The first article of the first chapter of the Constitution proclaims Tatarstan a sovereign democratic state, which expresses the will and interests of the entire multiethnic people of the republic. A special provision regarding the Agreement with Russia was made in article 61 of chapter 5 stating that, “Tatarstan is a sovereign state, subject to international law, associated with the Russian Federation – Russia on the basis of the Treaty On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers” (“Konstitutsiia Tatarstana” 1993:14).

Adherence to the peaceful means yet again was expressed. It appeared on the second substantive page of the new Constitution. Specifically, it was proclaimed that

The Republic of Tatarstan rejects violence and war as a means for conflict resolution between peoples and states.
 The territory of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
 In the Republic of Tatarstan, propaganda of war is prohibited
 (“Konstitutsiia Tatarstana” 1993:4, chapter 1, article 8).

The two delegations eventually met in January 1993. Yet, this time they were headed by two Presidents – Shaimiev and Yeltsin. The high-profile negotiations were also attended by the Chairman of the Tatarstan’s Supreme Soviet (parliament) F.M. Mukhametshin, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet N.T. Ryabov, the Head of the Russian Cabinet V.S. Chernomyrdin, Tatar Prime-Minister M.G. Sabirov., Vice-President of Tatarstan V.N. Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Cabinet S.M. Shakhrai, Vice-Chairman of the Russian government Yu.F. Iarov, deputy from Tatarstan G.V. Kobelev, and the Advisor to the President of Tatarstan R.S. Khakimov. The sides

held the discussion about the project of the Treaty and reaffirmed that their relationships should be built on treaty-constitutional basis. It was noted, as the Treaty was drafted, priority should be given to the realm of economics, environmental protection, foreign economic interactions, and crime. Both Yeltsin and Shaimiev were content with the work of the expert committees and agreed on all issues that were considered. However, no overarching treaty was signed at the end of this negotiations period. The next meeting was scheduled for February (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). No record was found as to whether it has ever taken place.

Phase IV: Third Round of Negotiations

By this time, relationships between the sides were less warm. Less than a month after the Constitution of Tatarstan was adopted, Shaimiev signed a law, requesting the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation insert a special provision in the draft of the Russian Constitution that would establish treaty-constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). The Tatar President publicly expressed his frustration regarding the progress on the Treaty three weeks prior to the Russian referendum on the approval of Yeltsin and his economic policies. Shaimiev stated that all branches of the federal authority, its President, his circle, as well as parliamentarians do not value enough the significance of the regions (Shaimiev 1993b). Shaimiev forecasted that “the people of the republic would treat the referendum with restraint” (Shaimiev 1993b:2). He further said that the relationships between Russia and Tatarstan (i.e., the Treaty) should be defined before the

Russian draft constitution is promulgated. Nevertheless, the conditions to conduct the referendum were put in place. However, its execution and financing was carried out by Russia (Shaimiev 1993a). Shaimiev was right in his prediction as in the referendum only 22.8% of eligible voters came to the polling booths to cast their votes (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

On May 10, Shaimiev together with the Chairman of the Parliament Mukhametshin coauthored a letter to Yeltsin. In the letter, they drew attention to the sharp contrast between the results of the referendum on State Sovereignty (that was endorsed with a 61.4% approval rate) and the failed referendum on the approval of the Russian presidency. Pointing out that the treaty negotiating process was conducted thanks to the joint initiative of the Tatar and Russian Presidents with the involvement of both parties' parliaments and governments, Shaimiev and Mukhametshin boldly stated that the talks and implementation of the agreed provisions were stalled *not* because of the Tatar side. Consequently, they expressed concerns that the people of the republic as well as international observers may doubt the Russian leadership's commitment to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the democratic reformation of the Federation. They have also warned that this situation might lead to real difficulties in the formation of political institutions of the Russian Federation and disappearance of the Tatar representation from the federal structures. The letter concluded that "Tatarstan deem[ed] that the time has arrived to officially recognize its new state status and include a special provision in the draft of the new Constitution of

the Russian Federation accounting for the treaty-constitutional relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan...” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

In response, Yeltsin decided to give a green light to the new negotiations. On May 27, he signed a presidential order confirming the names of the Russian negotiators. The talks started the same day. The five person Russian team consisted of Yeltsin himself, Vice-speaker of the Russian parliament Riabov, and three Vice-Premiers – Lobov, Federov, and Shakhrai. The Tatar side consisted of Shaimiev, Speaker of the Parliament Mukhametshin, Prime-Minister Sabirov, Vice-President Likhachev, and the Chair of the budget committee of the Tatar Parliament Kobelev (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). The sides noted that separate *soglasheniia* [agreements] on environmental protection, higher education, oil and oil products transportation, as well as the property agreement are ready and would be signed as soon as possible. Work on customs regulation, banking, taxing policy, budgeting, and others will continue (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

Although some progress seemed to have taken place during the May talks, the Tatarstan leaders desired to enshrine the special status of the republic in the Federal Constitution. On June 4, 1993, the Tatar Parliament addressed its legislative initiative to the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Russian Federation – Boris Yeltsin. The initiative urged Yeltsin to amend the existing constitution through introducing a special clause for Tatarstan. The amendment envisioned exclusion of Tatarstan from article 56 and introduction of a new article 56.1, which stated that “The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject to international law, associated with the Russian

Federation - Russia on the basis of the Treaty on mutual delegation of authorities and subjects under jurisdiction” (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

As the appeal fell on deaf ears, both Tatar President and the Speaker of the Parliament expressed their frustration in a joint petition on June 24 (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Consequently, Tatarstan withdrew from the Russian Constitutional conference and the discussions on the new Russian Constitution (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

Russian authorities interpreted Tatarstan’s moves as an attempt to secede. Fearing that other ethnic areas may follow the suit, Shakhrai eventually traveled to Kazan in June and convinced the Tatar President to take part in the Russian Constitutional conference (Malik 1994). He threatened that if Tatarstan did not participate, Moscow will discontinue negotiations on the status of the republic (Malik 1994). The Tatar side gave in.

At the Constitutional conference in July 1993, all issues and suggestions were to be adopted via majority vote. The member of the Tatar delegation, Rafael Khakimov, noted that he faced an unknown Tatar Mulla who was allegedly a leader of a Tatar political party in Moscow. Apparently, artificial political parties have been created to outmaneuver the nationalist leaders in the republics and forge a positive outcome on the version of the federal constitution favorable to Moscow’s desires and needs (Malik 1994).

The bilateral negotiations continued and were presided over by the highest figures on both sides. During the talks, Shaimiev restated the familiar position that

Tatarstan was a sovereign state, subject to the international law, *associated* with Russia. Yeltsin suggested that the discussion of Tatarstan's political status should be delayed and the easily negotiable issues settled first (Malik 1994). The Tatar side was in favor of this arrangement, reserving the negotiation on less tractable issues for a latter period⁴⁰. The sides instituted the agreements over "joint" and "exclusive" powers (Malik 1994).

A package of 3 *soglasheniia* [agreements] was agreed and signed on June 5, 1993. It included the agreement on higher education; oil transit and transportation of oil products; and environmental protection. All three were concluded for five years and could be renewed. The agreement on higher education stipulated independence of the institutions of higher learning on the territory of Tatarstan. The language of education was agreed to be both Tatar and Russian. The government of Tatarstan would grant property to the institutions of higher learning land and basic funds at no charge, establish or contribute to, if the tax is out of its jurisdiction, the tax breaks for such institutions. An agreement on transportation of oil and oil products allowed both the Tatar and Russian industries to have equal access to the pipelines located both on the territory of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Oil transfers were to be conducted under equal tariffs for all industries irrespective of their party and form of ownership. It was also agreed that the transportation of the Tatar oil outside the Russian Federation would be regulated by the separated agreements between the Republic of Tatarstan and foreign nations. The industries of Tatarstan would also conduct customs proceedings for their oil

⁴⁰ Interview by author with Rafael Khakimov. May 17, 2005. Kazan Kremlin.

in accordance with the customs law of Russia and the customs agreement between Tatarstan and the Russian government (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

The latter agreement contained six articles ensuring the adoption of both sides' environmental laws through mutual consultations. To implement the concurrent powers, the parties established the Coordination Council composed of environmental experts. For a small landlocked republic with a multitude of the institutions of higher education, large industries, and environmental concerns these agreements signaled vital concessions. Relatively, for Russia these concessions were not as large as the gains for Tatarstan, which they represented. Although many complained that Tatarstan was "more equal than other regions", the concessions given by the Russian side was apparently a reasonable price for preserving stability in the region.

During this round of negotiations, the Russian side expressed willingness to control policies in outer space, standardization, defense, and military production. The Tatar delegation refused to accept this, and eventually Russia put defense and military industrial complex under the "mutual" authority, [in addition to customs authority, banking, payments to the Russian Federation, scientific research, definition of mutual property and division of state property] (Malik 1994). Tatarstan agreed that defense-related industries and installations should be under Russian jurisdiction, but was not confident that it was practical to manage them jointly (Malik 1994). Russian reaction to this argument was negative. Hence, to show the degree of the Tatar industries' dependence on Moscow, they cut the financing of the military industrial complex in Tatarstan. State orders were reduced by 40% and in some products by 90%; under such

conditions no meaningful conversion of military production for civilian purposes could be conducted. These threats changed the Tatar position on this issue (Malik 1994). Yet, quite in line with the Tatar style, the government of Tatarstan received the control of the *peaceful* industries of the military industrial complex. Russia has certainly duplicates of such industries elsewhere. Nevertheless, it was an important concession for Tatarstan.

Specifically, in the *soglashenie* on defense industry signed on June 22, it was stipulated that in the territory of Tatarstan, the Russian government regulates the development, application, and production of weapons and military technology; prepares and applies the *konversii* programs [aimed at converting military technology for civilian goods production]; conducts programs involving products of dual military and civilian purpose (article 2). The Tatarstani government was to regulate and coordinate defense industries on its territory, which involved *development and production of the civilian products and consumer goods [exclusively]*. Appointment and dismissal of the leaders of these industries as well as their bylaws were to be coordinated jointly by both governments (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

In the same package of agreements, the *soglasheniia* on property and customs were also signed. The customs agreement specified that the head of the Tatar regional customs should be appointed by the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation through consultation with the Tatarstani government. The Russian customs was agreed to completely satisfy the idiosyncratic needs of the Republic of Tatarstan with regards to customs affairs. My understanding that this is true only for the items delivered from outside the Russian Federation. Those produced inside Russia would not be covered by

this agreement. The distribution of customs fees, taxes, excises, and collections between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was to be determined by the interbudgetary regulations agreement (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

In terms of property, Tatarstan would possess much of the state property located on its territory except for items regulated by the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian Security Ministry, and the Russian Interior army and financed from the Russian budget. Moreover, with certain exceptions, property possessed by the Russian Transportation Ministry, the Russian Committee on Standardization, Meteorology, and Certification, as well as the Russian Sanitation-Endemic Committee, are excluded from the Tatar control as well (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

It is important to note at this point that the agreements signed on June 5 and June 22, 1993, relate, in large part, to the previous steps taken by the Tatar government. As shown above, during the third round of negotiations, by December, 1992, Shaimiev formally asked the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the Russian Soviet Federated Republic to include a special provision for Tatarstan in the draft of the Russian Constitution. On May 10, 1993, both Shaimiev and Speaker Mukhametshin coauthored a letter to Yeltsin accusing the Russian side of stalling the talks and obstructing implementation of the already agreed provisions. On June 4, the Tatar Parliament forwarded Yeltsin the legislative initiative to enshrine a special status for Tatarstan in the Russian Constitution. These low level expressions of political demands sent a signal to the Russian authorities that certain concessions had to be made. These requests by the Tatar side could not have been easily ignored by the Russian government in Moscow as

high-level nonviolent protests had been taking place just several months ago and were still fresh in their memory. They did not want the repetition of those events, which could potentially escalate into violence.

Despite these successes of the Tatar strategies, a full-fledged Treaty between the two sides was not yet signed. Tatarstan still wanted to gain a seat in the United Nations, similar to that of Ukraine during the Soviet Union (Malik 1994). This did not necessarily imply demand for full independence, as Ukraine was still a part of the USSR, even though it held a UN seat along with USSR (and Belorussia). In the framework of Russian constitutional negotiations, Tatarstan formed a team of ten ethnic areas which agreed they should enjoy a sovereign status and, therefore, ought to press for the development of the Russian Constitution on the basis of the Federation Treaty. In addition to these demands, Tatarstan had an idiosyncratic desire to be excluded from the ordinary list of the republics within Russia and recognized as an area with a special relationship to the Russian government (Malik 1994).

Shakhrai refused to talk about these issues, sending the question to the Presidential Group of Negotiators to settle. The group exhibited a negative attitude against conditions proposed by Tatarstan. In the ideal world, however, the Tatar side wanted the clause to be inserted first in the constitution and then continue to negotiate delimitation of policy issues with the Russian government. In contrast, the Yeltsin's side wanted Tatarstan to join the Russian Federation first, and then determine the relations of both sides on these issues (Malik 1994). As a result, Tatarstan left the Constitutional

conference once again. The nine collaborating republics, however, stayed helping Yeltsin to isolate Tatarstan (Malik 1994).

In Tatarstan, the government declared that Tatarstani laws were supreme to those of the Russian Federation and welcomed the will of the Russian *oblast's* [provinces] to increase their status to that of republics (Malik 1994). Although the final settlement was not yet reached and some of the Tatar desires, such as a seat in the United Nations and a special provision in the Russian Constitution, refused, the agreement signed in June enabled Tatarstan to establish [exclusively] economic [and rather lucrative] partnership with Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Crimea and supply them 600,000 barrels of oil daily (Malik 1994).

Phase V: Fourth Round of Negotiations

The long standoff between the Russian President and the Supreme Soviet concluded in a bloody conflict and bombing of the Russian Parliament by the Presidential forces in October 1993. This development resulted in a psychological change for both Yeltsin and the leaders of republics within Russia. After the bloody conflict with the parliament Yeltsin found out that many leaders within ethnic entities did not support him (Teague 1996). Yet, he was emboldened by his victory over the parliament and consolidation of the federal-level power. Hence, in the new constitution Yeltsin withdrew most of the privileges the Federal Treaty gave to the ethnic republics. The resultant constitution, however, was still as ambiguous as the Federal Treaty itself with regard to the power shared between the center and the provinces (Teague 1996:22).

Because of that, the pressure for autonomy did not subside (23), especially in Tatarstan. The referendum on Yeltsin's constitution was conducted in the Tatar republic. However, its results had the effect of cold shower on those who expected good turnout. Out of 2.6 million registered and eligible voters only 13.88% came to the voting booths to cast valid votes (and, of them, 25.16% expressed their disapproval of the draft) spelling the failure of the referendum in Tatarstan. The results of the referendum in Tatarstan stood in sharp contrast to those in Russia, as the turnout rate in Russia overall was 54.81% (Table 8)⁴¹.

Table 8. Results of the General Referendum on the Russian Draft Constitution in the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, December 12, 1993

	Tatarstan	Russia
1. Total amount of citizens eligible for voting and registered	2,638,886	106,170,835
2. Number of citizens who took part in voting	367,088 (13.91% of #1)	58,187,755 (54.81% of #1)
3. Number of ballots found in ballot boxes	366,220 (13.88 of #1)	
4. Number of invalid ballots	13,434 (3.67% of #3)	
5. Number of valid ballots	352,786 (96.33% of #3)	56,371,093 (53.10 of #1)
6. Number of votes that approves the Constitution of the Russian Federation	264,028 (74.84 of #5)	32,937,630 (58.43 of #5)
7. Number of votes that disapproves the Constitution of the Russian Federation	88,758 (25.16% of #5)	23,433,463 (41.57% of #5)

⁴¹ The figures for the referendum results in Tatarstan have been taken from the Protocol of the Electoral Commission of the Tatarstan electoral district #16, which appeared in the White Book (Khakimov 1996). Data for the referendum results in the Russian Federation have been obtained from the Federal Center of Informatization, Federal Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation ("Rezultaty referendumu 12 dekabria 1993 goda po proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii" 1998-2001), website last accessed November 15, 2006. Figures in cells 5 and 7 have been calculated by author based on the available information. Number of invalid ballots for Russia is not available.

In this situation Tatarstan wanted to negotiate its own Treaty as soon as possible. On February 15, 1994, two months after the failed referendum, negotiations resumed and the parties signed a series of five agreements on (1) foreign trade; (2) monetary, credit, and foreign currency policy; (3) budgetary interactions between the governments of Russia and Tatarstan; (4) law enforcement; and (5) the military sphere.

The first agreement in the package stated that Tatarstan had an exclusive authority to conclude trade and economic agreements with foreign states and their territorial units; borrow foreign public and commercial loans and control their use; form and regulate the foreign currency fund of the republic; form and conduct policies on foreign direct investments to Tatarstan; take part in international economic and financial organizations; receiving and using foreign aid; give credits and loans to foreign partners; and form free economic zones in Tatarstan (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

The agreement on monetary, credit, and foreign currency policy prescribed that the Central Bank of Russia would conduct the emission of cash money after consulting the Tatarstani cabinet; and the National Bank of Tatarstan could differentiate credit rates between certain commercial banks provided that on average it would agree with the accounting rate of the Russian Central Bank (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

With respect to the budgetary interactions, Tatarstan would pay a 13 percent profit tax to the republican budget of Russia, 1 percent income tax from individuals, and Value Added Tax determined by yearly agreements between the Ministries of Finance of Tatarstan and Russia (article 1). To financially backup the environmental programs of

the Republic of Tatarstan and protection of natural resources, the following was to remain in the budget of the Republic of Tatarstan: excises on spirits, vodka, [other] alcohol products, oil and gas excises, land fees, privatization profits, special tax on the financial support for crucial industries. It was concluded for a five-years term (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

Agreement on law enforcement stated that another special agreement on the relationship of Tatarstan with Interpol would be concluded and law enforcement and courts would be funded mutually (Khakimov 1996, the White Book). Agreement in the military sphere envisioned that recruitment would be conducted jointly as well; Tatarstan could influence the defense doctrine of Russia through her representatives in the Russian government. Land could be given to the military forces of Russia with the agreement of the Tatarstani government. The land under the auspices of the Military Forces of Russia would be used only as prescribed. The harm inflicted on the environment, industries, and population of the Republic of Tatarstan by the Russian Military Forces would be compensated by the Russian Federation and quotas for the Tatarstani citizens in the Russian Army would be determined in consultation with the Government of Tatarstan (Khakimov 1996, the White Book).

The negotiations process culminated in signing of the Treaty *On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan* on the same day. In the Treaty, the Republic of Tatarstan was defined as a state “united with the Russian Federation” (Appendix C). The Treaty granted broad powers to the republic’s

government, which received an exclusive jurisdiction over 16 important policy issues (Appendix C, article II), and mutual jurisdiction with the government of the Russian Federation over 23 areas (Appendix C, article III).

The agreement was not unproblematic. It was not ratified by the parliaments of both entities to avoid the implication of an international agreement. Yet, through parliamentary approval it would have received more legitimacy and a better guarantee for preservation. Further, it contained potentially contradictory and ambiguous provisions recognizing mutually inconsistent documents—the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Constitution of the Russian Federation, with arguments over their interpretation almost certain to erupt (Teague 1996:26). Moreover, its conclusion and negotiation in less than a fully democratic way has also been pointed out in the literature (Kahn 2002; Teague 1996).

Despite the faults that the Treaty contained, its ambiguity contributed to its eventual conclusion preserved peace in the republic. Although extreme forces on both sides opposed it, the Treaty was generally received with excitement and enthusiasm. Shaimiev's political ranking as a leading politician in Russia skyrocketed from number 27 in January 1994 to top 10 in February, after the Treaty was signed. Moreover, in the wake of its conclusion, Shaimiev was able to focus on solidifying Tatarstan's national identity through an emphasis on its civic *Tatarstani* part than a more exclusive ethnic Tatar definition (Tanrıseven 2001). The treaty has also contributed to the improvement of the economic situation in Tatarstan.

It is important to emphasize that the conclusion of this Treaty was preceded by Five Phases of peaceful demands. The first and second phases were characterized by high-level peaceful protests and demonstrations in the streets. The protest dynamics changed in the third through fifth phases. This period was dominated by low-level political rhetoric and appeals by the Tatar political elites directly to the Russian authorities.

It is important to note that low-level peaceful approach was, arguably, also responsible for the development after 2000, during the reign of President Putin. In post-2000 period, the importance of the 1994 Treaty was drastically diminished. Yet, the talks on a new, albeit a much more restricted, Treaty have been recently concluded. Unlike the 1994 Treaty, the new abridged version was passed by the Tatarstani legislature and has been submitted for legislature by Putin to the Russian State Duma. The legislative seal of approval might grant the Treaty a flavor of democratic legitimacy giving the hope that it will continue to contribute to the stability and ethnic concord in the Eastern-most corner of Europe.

Conclusions

Most conflicts today take place within the borders of nation-states with many centering on identity politics. Hence, there is a pressing necessity to design institutional arrangements that can alleviate an ongoing ethnic strife and prevent militarized disputes. In this chapter I considered the process of development of one of such institutional arrangements – territorial autonomy. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, I have

shown that territorial autonomy may be achieved through peaceful strategies employed by ethnic groups. Using the case of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation I illustrated how ethnic groups can achieve territorial autonomy through a battery of peaceful tactics, including protests, petitions, and rallies. My analysis implies that ambiguity regarding the ultimate group demands as well as high levels of initial protests facilitate the formation of territorial autonomy in the long run. These findings affirm the theoretical idea developed in this dissertation that there exists a nonviolent means for settling interethnic disputes and preventing their escalation.


The case of Tatarstan has been important for ethnic groups within the Russian Federation as an example for developing strategies of peaceful action. It stands in a sharp contrast with the Chechen experience, where demands for larger self-governance escalated into violence. It also shows that expressing demands peacefully is more fruitful than preserving the status quo with no articulation of claims.

Tatarstan was one of the better known cases of peaceful autonomy formation beyond the former communist bloc due to its *Tatarstan Model*. However, observation of the autonomy development through peaceful means has been rather unsystematic in this case. While systematizing the evidence on the peaceful formation of territorial autonomy in Tatarstan in 1994, we still do not know much about the recent and rather clandestine negotiations that have to the conclusion of the 2006 Treaty. It is my hope that this question will be studied in the future.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATION

In this dissertation project I asked a simple, yet important question – why do territorial autonomies form? This question is significant as territorial autonomy has a potential for restraining mass political unrest. Over past decades, ethnic clashes have become a primary form of collective political violence (Wimmer 2004). The majority of civil war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as those observed since the end of the Second World War have been fought for the sake of larger ethnonational autonomy or independence (Wimmer 2004). As figure 4 indicates, the trend in ethnopolitical wars as well as peaceful protests and violent rebellions of ethnic groups has been on the rise since 1945. Of all wars fought only between 1983 and 1993, 60 (63.8 percent of the total) were ethnic in nature (Scherrer 1994:74).

Fig. 4. Global Trends in Ethnopolitical Conflict, 1945–2002

Source: Wimmer (2004), using protest and rebellion data from Bennett & Davenport (2003), civil war data are from Eriksson, Wallenstein, & Sollenberg (2003) (at www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/).

Territorial autonomy is a political institution that allows preservation of sovereign states' territorial integrity, while simultaneously permitting ethnic groups to express their distinct identities. Territorial autonomies thus tend to change the view of both ethnic leaders and central state elites regarding each others' actions from a zero-sum calculus to one of mutual benefit. Formation of territorial autonomies by national elites sent a signal to ethnic groups that the central government perceives ethnic diversity as a value than a threat and treats the expressions of their identities with respect. The every event of territorial autonomy formation may break the peril of the security dilemma whereby the security of one collectivity is perceived as a threat by another. In

fact, establishment of territorial autonomy may send a strong enough signal that reverses the security dilemma spiraling cooperation between a majority-dominated central government and an ethnic minority group. Territorial autonomy is a substantial concession by the central government that could hardly be overlooked by the ethnic minority group thus delivering a soothing effect on minority concerns and grievances. In fact, a global empirical study by Rothchild and Hartzell (2000) suggests that territorial autonomies do in fact reduce ethnic strife.

In this dissertation, I have put forth and tested a theory of territorial autonomy formation, which sees peaceful protest as an effective strategy for ethnic groups in their quest for territorial autonomies. I argued that nonviolent means used by ethnic collectivities knocks their repressive opponents off balance and allows these groups to attain their desired goals. I further have shown that groups which resort to peaceful strategies are somewhat weaker than those who employ violence. Yet, peaceful groups have lower grievances as well. These finding, however, should not mean that peaceful strategies are deterministically employed in response to the underlying conditions. They can be and are as a conscious tactic by ethnic collectivities. In the rest of this chapter, I will summarize the argument and its place within the extant literature, discuss policy implications of the research in this dissertation, and provide the venues for future research.

The Origins of Territorial Autonomies: The Argument

The literature that examined the central question of this dissertation – *why territorial autonomies are formed* – is relatively old, dating back to Riker’s seminal work that came into existence in 1960s (Riker 1964). Yet, much of the work that dealt with the question focused on hard power politics that gave precedence to explanations involving violence and military power as a primary mechanism for territorial autonomy formation. I took a diametrically opposite view and claimed that peaceful protest strategy is a more effective way to achieve territorial autonomy for ethnic collectivities than violent tactics. Bringing in the literature on nonviolent protest I have shown that peaceful autonomy movements have a *moral advantage* over those that exercise violent action. Specifically, groups that use nonviolent tactics are able to divide central governments as some within the governments might oppose the use violence while others back such policies. Further, certain factions within the central governments might feel unthreatened and physically secure to start negotiations with ethnic group leaders. Moreover, the tactics of peaceful resistance imply a long-time commitment on the part of the protesting collectivities. Hence, they also imposed substantial economic, political, and military costs on their repressive opponents in the long run. All of these arguments can be gathered under the umbrella concept of political *jiu-jitsu*.

One of the most immediate questions raised by this reasoning is why do the supposedly rational ethnic collectivities choose to employ violent tactics in the face of more effective nonviolent strategies? This question is important not only for the theoretical objectives of my dissertation, but also due to the larger policy implications

regarding violent strife. To address this question I resorted to the rational choice model which views the problem as a collective action issue. Much of theoretical and empirical literature developed so far views *opportunities* as important explanations for violent rebellion disregarding *incentives* for doing so. I, therefore, started with bringing into the equation the *material private rewards* factors developed in the “greed” vs. “grievance” literature on violence, as a primary element. This literature, however, fails to consider peaceful protest as a separate category. At best, one may infer that the “greed” vs. “grievance” scholars would suggest the same explanation for nonviolent action as they do for violence. Consequently, one may conclude that this literature leaves no theoretically meaningful explanation for the distinction between violent and nonviolent tactics as, at the end of the day, it equates violent action with all types of mass behavior.

To circumvent this impasse, I utilized a metaphorical notion of the “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985) to understand the decision of groups to use nonviolent tactics. The idea of valuable and easily extractable resources as promoters of violence was employed to explain collectivities which resort to brutality. Such theoretical setup is consistent with an earlier (case) study (Schwarz 1970) suggesting that factors offered by the theories of violence are also associated with peaceful movements, but at quite lower levels. Thus, though factors explaining peaceful protest are not distinct from those employed for violent action, their degree is.

I, however, also draw on the previous literature on *relative deprivation*, which also finds support in my analysis.

Statistical Analyses

To substantiate these claims with empirical evidence, I use data on 197 ethnic groups in 95 states. Event history analysis was utilized as the primary statistical methodology to explain formation of territorial autonomies. I find consistent support for the idea that peaceful autonomy is best achieved through peaceful means. To empirically test the hypotheses pertaining to the strategies employed by ethnic groups I have used a novel modified Heckman Selection model suggested by Sartori (2003). This method allows me to estimate simultaneously the model of the general collective action along with the equation that distinguishes between violent and peaceful movements without the faults of selection bias or exclusion restriction. The results support the idea that ethnic groups engaged in violence are likely to do so due to the existence of easily available resources, which ethnic leader can distribute in return for a rebellion-prone loyalty. The findings, however, show that the *grievance*, or *relative deprivation*, factors are important as well.

Case Study

While statistical methodology allows me to test the external validity of my theoretical propositions, it has only a limited, if any, capacity to show the process of territorial autonomy formation. To answer the question *how* regarding the origins of territorial autonomy and strategy choice, I conduct a case study of Tatars in the Russian Federation. Tracing the actual mechanism of decisions with respect to strategy choice and its subsequent influence on the concessions from the central government, this

chapter provided an intuitive illustration of the process and confirmed the claims advanced in the dissertation.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The three chapters elaborate on the formation of territorial autonomy arrangements and the relevant issue of strategy choice by ethnic collectivities. This dissertation does not rule out the effectiveness of violent strategies in demanding territorial autonomies. It, however, underlines that violence is useful to the extent lower than that of peaceful tactics. The findings from this dissertation may lead readers to think that peaceful strategies are mechanically chosen by *weak* collectivities, while violence is the domain of groups that possess diamonds, oil, drugs, and gold. This interpretation should not discount the conscious *moral* choice of nonviolent tactics by ethnic groups. Weaker groups are more likely to select nonviolent tactics. Yet, groups with access to easily extractable resources do so only under particular circumstances. Under the conditions when other variables are held at their mean or mode levels, the effect of the private material rewards on the eruption of violence, as pointed out in chapter III, is minimal. In other words, under the average normal conditions ethnic groups are likely to employ peaceful strategies. I link this choice to the *morally* superior nature of such strategies, which cannot be easily quantified.

What do we learn from this study? On the theoretical level, there are at least two major contributions. One is related to the application of the peaceful strategy idea to the formation of territorial autonomies. This bears importance for the origins of territorial

autonomy literature as it is rather sparse. Moreover, it draws largely on hard-line violence-prone political factors as the source of explanation for the emergence of territorial autonomies.

The literature on nonviolent protest has also gained from my dissertation. Two of the three major criticisms faced by the proponents of nonviolent movements are limited applicability of the framework of nonviolence to international relations and absence of a solid empirical grounding (Koch 1984). The study of ethnic politics, and ethnic conflict, specifically, lies at the crossroad of domestic politics (usually examined by comparativists) and international politics (which is typically the turf of the subfield of international relations). This dissertation and its author root themselves in the study of ethnic politics, which lies at the nexus of comparative politics and international relations. It, therefore, signifies one of the attempts at dialogue between comparative politics and *international relations* using the arguments from the literature on *nonviolent protest*.

My dissertation addresses the latter criticism as well, as it is an *empirical* study of the effects of nonviolence on the formation of an important political institution. As shown in the previous pages, my study lends support to the theoretical claims developed in the peaceful movement literature.

Second, this dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the resolution of the peace vs. violence dilemma faced by ethnic collectivities while they choose a proper mode of collective action. The only study (Schwarz 1970), to the best of my knowledge, that addressed this issue explicitly was a case study, which did not provide a generalizable test of its claims. Secondly, as it was published in 1970, it did

not benefit from almost forty years worth of theoretical advances, which currently revolve around the collective action problem. Both of these concerns are addressed in my dissertation. It is an empirical and generalizable study that uses collective action paradigm in developing theoretical arguments.

Policy Implications

It is important to address the relevance of this project to the policy making realm of state leaders, ethnic collectivities, and international actors. This project is relevant for ethnic communities seeking certain freedoms linked to territorial autonomy. Theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this work would advise the leaders of ethnic autonomy movements to consider nonviolent strategies as a potent tool for attaining their political aims. Nonviolent tactics are found to be effective due the morally superior articulation of interests free of antagonistic wrath and suspicion associated with violence. Although the groups who do not have access to valuable and easily extractable resources are more likely to adopt nonviolent tactics, even those collectivities that have private material rewards are *under the normal* real life conditions are likely to use peaceful tactics. The audience both within and outside the state value the moral advantage of peaceful protest and see collectivities engaged in peaceful expression of demands as having the potential to be reliable political partners rather than despicable enemies.

Another major policy implication relates to central government elites. This dissertation shows that the amount and type of the resources that group entrepreneurs

deliver to group members are positively associated with violent outbreaks when the democracy factor kept at its minimum. One possible recommendation may suggest that the ways allowing easy access to valuable resources, such as oil and monetary remittances from the kins living abroad, should be controlled and guarded by neutral and impartial forces. Yet, an equally, if not more so, important advise to central governments is to strengthen institutions and culture of democracy for a more desirable peaceful protest to take place.

International mediators have only limited influence in formation of territorial autonomy, as my findings indicate. This, however, does not mean that third parties should refrain from providing logistic and material support for both ethnic collectivities and central governments in establishing territorial autonomy arrangements, if these institutions are viewed as viable options for the regions in question. Second, foreign governments and international organizations can serve both ethnic groups and national leaders by helping halt the flow of foreign support intended for violence. This task is much less complicated in the aftermath of the Cold War, as, at least initially, the superpowers had lower incentives and/or capabilities to fund rebel groups overseas. Most importantly, help in building up long-term democratic institutions and culture within the disputed territories is another useful way for the international community to contribute to peace. Specifically, helping build up territorial autonomy may contribute to both democratization of the state and peaceful coexistence.

Venues for Future Research

What are the implications for future research that this dissertation brings? A logical extension of this dissertation is to examine whether the argument regarding the effectiveness of peaceful protest in carving out the concessions from the central government would still hold if the institutions at stake are different from territorial autonomy. Would the response from the central government be any different, if ethnic collectivities demanded quotas in the national parliament or the cabinet or asked to allow the establishment of ethnic parties and affirmative action policies? It is especially interesting to see whether the influence of peaceful strategies on the likelihood of central government concessions is moderated by the issue at stake. A critic of the nonviolent movements argument might expect that national leaders are much more indisposed to cede a share in the central government than a part of the territory.

In the debates regarding the formation and maintenance of territorial autonomies and other political institutions of power-sharing, both ethnic leaders and central government elites have to appeal to at least two major constituencies – the dominant ethnic group within the country and the minority ethnic group within the ethnic homeland. Assuming that both types of leaders are rational actors, they would like to garner support from both constituencies. In other words, both types of elites have the incentives to frame the language and issues at stake differently for different constituencies. The room for rhetorical maneuverability is especially wide-open, when the dominant group and the minority ethnic collectivity speak different languages. Two sets of elites under such conditions would have a temptation to say different things in

different languages not only in form but also in substance. This effect will admittedly decrease if both dominant and minority collectivities speak each other's languages well or have similar policy preferences. This, however, is rather an exception than a rule. This idea, therefore, could be further developed and tested empirically in the future.

It is also interesting to see the effect of territorial autonomies and power-sharing institutions, in general, on political behavior of ethnic group members and the dominant groups within the state. Does implementation of territorial autonomies increase people's satisfaction with the current political regime in the country? Does it have any effect on their life satisfaction, more broadly? This may constitute as another broad topic for prospective studies.

Further, if power sharing arrangements are debated and voted in the parliament of the central government, one might be curious about the determinants for their support or rejection among individual parliamentarians. In this dissertation I looked mostly at the group and country-level explanations for the formation of territorial autonomy arrangements. However, to answer the questions in this and preceding paragraphs, one should consider the individual-level unit of analysis and seek explanations there as well. Therefore, in order to answer these questions, a thorough review of the political behavior literature from comparative and American politics literature should be conducted. To test the hypotheses derived from this literature, an advantage could be taken of the existing data sources. However, it should be expected that original surveys and archival work would have to be carried out in order to address these questions.

Most conflicts today take place within the borders of nation-states centering on issues of identity. In the today's world policy makers and theoreticians face a task of finding proper institutional arrangements to alleviate ethnic rivalry. In this study I examine the origins of an important form of accommodation between ethnic groups – territorial autonomy arrangements – suggesting that peaceful demand strategies are superior to violent tactics. I further examine the conditions, under which peaceful, as opposed to violent, conflict takes place. It is my hope that this dissertation project as well as any future studies inspired by it will have a positive influence on our theoretical understanding and practical leverage of the pressing issues in ethnic and identity politics and conflict, more broadly.

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APPENDIX A

MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, MEAN VALUES, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN CHAPTER II

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Nature of the Dispute</i>				
Peaceful Autonomy Demand	0.088	0.508	0	4
Peaceful Independence Demand	0.035	0.332	0	5
Violent Autonomy Demand	0.178	0.904	0	7
Violent Independence Demand	0.251	1.154	0	7
Mediation by a State	0.031	0.172	0	1
Mediation by an International Organization	0.017	0.128	0	1
<i>Government Characteristics</i>				
Democracy Level	0.106	7.311	-10	10
Economic Development of the State	3.320	3.633	0.064	27.007
Stability of Political Institutions	50.192	60.891	0	248
<i>Ethnic Group Characteristics</i>				
Groups' Capability Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	0.003	0.026	0	0.7375
Groups' Population Ratio (vis-à-vis the state)	0.120	0.226	0.00	2.44
Concentrated Majority in the Region	0.233	0.423	0	1
Resources in the Region	0.433	0.496	0	1

APPENDIX B

CODING RULES AND DATA SOURCES FOR CHAPTER II

Rebellion and Protest: In those cases in which MAR indicates that demands for regional autonomy or political independence were highly salient or significant for the relevant collectivity, I consider them to have had an active movement. The level of nonviolent protest is reflected in MAR's PROT variable while the dataset's REBEL indicator reflects the level of violent activity.

For the PROT variable, value 0 is assigned to the group when no protest is recorded; 1 indicates verbal expression of discontent and includes public letters, petitions, and publications; 2 reflects acts of symbolic resistance, including sit-ins, sabotage, and blockage of traffic; 3 signifies small demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with a total participation of less than 10,000; 4 is assigned to the instances of medium demonstrations with the total number of participants of less than 100,000; 5 shows the instances of large demonstrations with more than 100,000 participants.

For the REBEL variable, similarly, 0 is assigned if no protest has been recorded for the group; the instances of political banditry and sporadic terrorism are given the value of 1; a group is scored with a 2 if conducts terrorist campaigns; 3 reflects local rebellion; 4 signifies small-scale guerilla activity, which includes (1) less than 1,000 armed fighters who (2) engage in sporadic armed attacks—less than six per year—(3) conducted in a small number of locales; 5 is assigned to intermediate guerilla activity, which has one or two characteristics of a small-scale guerilla activity and one or two traits of the large-scale guerrilla activity; 6 reflects large-scale guerrilla activity, which is defined by (1) the involvement of more than 1,000 armed fighters (2) frequently engaged in armed attacks—over six in a year—(3) which took place over an extended area of land of group's residence; if the group is engaged in a protracted civil war they are scored as 7.

To capture ethnic groups' demands for territorial autonomy, MAR variables AUTGR4 (Interest in greater regional autonomy in 1980s through 90s) and AUTGR5 (Interest in limited autonomy in 1990s) were employed. The supplemented data were acquired from Monica Toft (2003).

Demand for autonomy is coded as 1, if value on AUGR4/AUTGR5 equaled 1 (Issue is highly salient or important for most) or 2 (Issue significant/relative importance unclear). As an indicator for independence demands, MAR variable AUTGR3 (Political independence in 1980s-90s) was used.

For both variables, missing data for the decades preceding 1980 were complemented using Keesing's Contemporary Archives. If no contradictory information was found, the data from the archives was extrapolated to the rest of the decade, as public sentiment within the group regarding autonomy or independence grievances were likely to persist. If no information was found in a decade regarding territorial autonomy, no autonomy or independence demands were recorded.

International Mediation: Data on international mediation were collected from Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Jacob Bercovitch's dataset. Two dichotomous variables are coded for the mediation by 1) states, and 2) international organizations including both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. An instance of state mediation was recorded for the case Cyprus in 2000; organizational mediators were involved in the East Timorese issue in Indonesia in 1996. In contrast, such groups as Tuvinians and Lezgins in Russia have experienced neither organizational nor state-sponsored mediation in their dealings with the central government.

Democracy: The democracy variable is constructed by combining autocracy and democracy scores employing variables from Polity IV project. Data for the period from 1945 to 1994 are obtained using Fearon and Laitin (2003) (<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfeardon/>) and from 1995 to 2000 using Polity IV project directly. An example of a minimally democratic state scored as “-10” on Polity score is Iran between 1955 and 1978. The United States is coded among the most democratic states throughout the period with a score of “10”.

Economic Development: The measure of economic development, GDP per capita, was obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003) (<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfeardon/>) for 1945-1995 period; the 1996-2000 data are acquired from World Development Indicators and adjusted to 1985 constant US dollars. The minimal value for economic development is recorded for the Democratic Republic of Congo in year 2000—US \$ 64 per capita, while the highest is for Japan in year 2000—\$27,007 US dollars adjusted to year 1985.

Resources of Ethnic Homelands: These data are obtained from the MAR dataset. A number of missing data points have been complemented by the author. Yakuts in Russia are among the groups whose territory is endowed with economic resources, while Basques in France do not have much of the vital resources. Values range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing ethnic territory endowed with economic resources. Economic resources include oil, natural gas, and diamonds because of the high legal commercial value of these products.

Military Capabilities: To capture military strength of both states and ethnic groups, I use the measure of men under arms. The data for this variable were collected from two sources: (1) the *Military Balance*, and (2) *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)* yearbooks. An example of a group with minimal military capabilities are Hawaiians in the US—0. Among the groups in the sample, the highest ratio of men under arms vis-à-vis the state have the Armenians in Azerbaijan in year 2000—.74, meaning for every one government (Azerbaijani) soldier there are .74 Armenians under arms.

Relative Population: Data for ethnic groups are extrapolated using the MAR time points. The lowest population ratio of a group relative to the state is among the Karachay in Russia—0.05; the largest is among the Black Moors in Mauritania. In the case of

demographic variables, for a number of years, the data for ethnic groups are extrapolated using the initial MAR time points. Since the end of the World War II, the world has not experienced many forced displacements or genocides of entire ethnic groups. (The Soviet cases in the wake of the World War II of Chechen, Ingush, Crimean Tatar and Turkish Meskhet deportations seem to be exceptions rather than the rule. Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia of early 1990s that changed demographics of the region is reflected in the dataset). Hence, it is likely that the demographic factors that characterize ethnic groups would generally stay stable. In the case of the relative military capabilities of ethnic groups 0 is assigned for the missing points. This is consistent with the idea that in the majority of cases ethnic groups are badly outnumbered by state armies.

Ethnic Groups' Settlement Patterns: To capture this variable I am using the MAR data complemented by Toft (2003). Arabs in Iran are an example of a regionally concentrated majority group, whereas the Karachay in Russia are not a concentrated regional majority. Values range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the most concentrated settlement pattern for regional majority groups.

APPENDIX C

TREATY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN “ON DELIMITATION OF JURISDICTIONAL SUBJECTS AND MUTUAL DELEGATION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE STATE BODIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE STATE BODIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN”, CHAPTER IV

Authorised representatives of the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan:

governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan;

proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples for self-determination, principles of equality, voluntariness and freedom of the will;

guaranteeing the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of economic space;

promoting the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, languages;

seeking for ensuring civil peace, inter-ethnic accord and security of peoples;

implementing the priority of the basic human rights and freedoms and citizen irrespective of national origin, religion, residence and other differences;

taking into consideration the fact that the Republic of Tatarstan as a state is united with the Russian Federation in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty on Demarcation of the Objects of Management and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between State Bodies of the Russian Federation and Bodies of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan, participates in international and foreign economic relations,

hereby have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

Demarcation of the objects of management and mutual delegation of powers between the state bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation.

The state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power, and shall:

- 1) ensure protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
 - 2) form the budget of the Republic, define and impose the Republic's taxes;
 - 3) decide the issues of the jurisprudence and notary public;
 - 4) implement legal regulation of administrative, family, housing relations, as well as relations existing in the field of environmental protection and use of natural resources;
 - 5) grant amnesty to individuals convicted by courts of the Republic of Tatarstan;
 - 6) decide issues relating to possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber and other natural resources, as well as state enterprises, organisations and other movable and immovable property, located in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan which is an exclusive property of the people of Tatarstan except for objects of Federal property.
- Demarcation of state property shall be regulated by the separate Agreement;
- 7) establish the system of state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as their organisational structure and functioning;
 - 8) decide the issues of the Republic's citizenship;
 - 9) establish the procedures for alternative civil service in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan for citizens having the right - in accordance with the Federal law - for substitution of military service;
 - 10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with republics, regions, districts, autonomous regions and autonomous districts, cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg of the Russian Federation which shall not contradict the Constitutions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, the present Treaty and the other agreements between the state bodies of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan;
 - 11) participate in international affairs, establish relations with foreign states and conclude relevant agreements not contradicting the Constitution and international obligations of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty, participate in the activity of corresponding international organisations;
 - 12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate agreement;

13) conduct independently foreign economic activity.

Demarcation of powers in the field of foreign economic activity shall be settled by a special agreement;

14) decide, according to the procedure fixed by separate agreement, the problems of conversion for enterprises which are in possession of the Republic of Tatarstan;

15) establish the state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan.

ARTICLE III

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan jointly are authorised to:

1) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms, the rights of national minorities;

2) protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity;

3) organise mobilisation of the national economy, direction of the development and production of the weapons and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; matters concerning the sale armaments, ammunition, military equipment and other military property, as well as the conversion of defence industry.

The form and the share of Parties' participation shall be governed by a separate Agreements;

4) settle common and contradictory questions of citizenship;

5) co-ordinate international and foreign economic relationship;

6) co-ordinate pricing policy;

7) create funds for regional development;

8) pursue monetary policy;

9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or of the Republic of Tatarstan, that can be transferred to the joint management, according to their interest based on voluntary and mutual consent. The forms and the procedures for the joint management of the specific objects shall be governed by a separate Agreement;

10) co-ordinate activity on questions of geodesy, meteorology , calendar system;

11) create joint funds for the aim of financing joint programmes, elimination of the consequences of natural calamities and disasters on the mutual agreement basis;

12) co-ordinate joint management of power system, road, railway, pipeline, air and water transport, communications and information systems;

13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement of vehicles, cargoes and products by air, sea, river, railway and motor roads, as well as by pipeline transport;

14) estimate the state of environment conditions in accordance with international standards and take measures for its stabilisation and rehabilitation; ensure environmental safety, co-ordinate actions concerning the use of land, water and other natural resources; prevent ecological disasters; matters of specially guarded natural areas;

15) implement common policy in social sphere: population employment patterns, migration processes, social protection, including social security;

16) co-ordinate the activities on the issues of health care, protection of family, maternity, paternity, childhood, education, science, culture, physical culture and sport; train national specialists for schools, educational, cultural institutions, mass media organisations and other institutions and organisations; provide pre-school and school organisations with native language literature; co-ordinate scientific research in the fields of history, culture of nations and their languages;

17) deal with matters of personnel for judicial and law enforcement bodies;

18) settle litigation, arbitration and notary public matters;

19) co-ordinate the activity of law enforcement bodies, interaction of security services, creation and use of the targeted programmes of crime control;

20) establish common principles for organisation of the state bodies and local administration system;

21) establish administrative, administrative procedural, labour, family, housing, land, water, forest, mineral wealth, environment protection legislations;

22) address the matters of joint use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources;

23) exercise other powers, established by mutual agreement;

ARTICLE IV

The following are within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies:

1) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, control over execution of laws; the implementation of federal structure and territory of the Russian Federation;

2) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; matters of citizenship in the Russian Federation; regulation and protection of national minorities' rights;

3) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial bodies and the

procedures for their organisation and activities; formation of federal bodies of state power;

4) federal state property and its management;

5) establishment of the basis for federal policy and federal programmes in the fields of governmental, economic, environmental, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation.

6) establishment of the legal ground for common market; financial, foreign currency, credit and customs regulations, money supply, principals of general pricing policy; federal economic agencies including federal banks;

7) federal budget, federal taxes and duties; federal funds for regional development;

8) federal power systems, nuclear energy, fissile materials, federal transport, traffic, communication pathways, information and communication systems; space activities;

9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international agreements of the Russian Federation; matters of war and peace;

10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;

11) defence and security; defence industry, the procedures for sale and purchase of armaments, ammunition, military equipment and other military material; production of toxic substances, narcotic drugs and the procedures for their use;

12) status and defence of state borders, territorial waters; air space, the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf of the Russian Federation;

13) the judicial system, the Prosecutor's Office; penal legislation, penal procedural and penal executive legislations; amnesty and clemency; civil, civil procedural and arbitration procedural legislations;

14) federal collision law;

15) meteorological service, standards, gauges, metric system and time calculation; geodesy and cartography; names of geographical points; official statistics and book-keeping;

16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

17) Federal State Service.

ARTICLE V

Legal documents issued by state bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian Federation and the state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be valid within the terms of reference for these bodies, institutions and officials.

ARTICLE VI

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation, as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, shall have no right to issue legal acts on the matters, which do not relate to their terms of reference.

The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Federal State Bodies as well shall have the right to protest against the laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan when they violate the present Treaty.

Disputes on exercising the powers within the common terms of reference of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled according to the procedures agreed upon between the Parties.

ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of implementation of the present Treaty the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude additional agreements, establish joint structures and commissions on a parity basis.

ARTICLE VIII

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have plenipotentiary representative offices in the cities of Moscow and Kazan, respectively.

ARTICLE IX

No unilateral cancellation of, alteration of or amendment to the present Treaty or its provisions shall become valid.

The Treaty shall come into force 7 days after its signing and shall be the subject to publication.

Made in Moscow on February 15, 1994 in two copies, each in the Tatar and the Russian languages, both texts having equal validity.

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION B. YELTSIN	PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN M. SHAIMIYEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION V. CHERNOMYRDIN	PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN M. SABIROV

VITA

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